[Senate Hearing 117-465]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-465

THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES TO THE UNITED 
    STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, INCLUDING THE 
 COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, 
    THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, AND THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                      ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 29, 2022

                               __________


                       Printed for the use of the
               Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
               
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILBLE IN TIFF FORMAT]               

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
                              __________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-894                    WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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               COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

                JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia, Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington           JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont             MIKE LEE, Utah
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          STEVE DAINES, Montana
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii              LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine            JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada       JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
MARK KELLY, Arizona                  BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, Colorado       CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
                                     ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas

                      Renae Black, Staff Director
                      Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
              Melanie Thornton, Professional Staff Member
             Richard M. Russell, Republican Staff Director
              Matthew H. Leggett, Republican Chief Counsel
       Brian Clifford, Republican Principal Deputy Staff Director
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page
Manchin III, Hon. Joe, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from West 
  Virginia.......................................................     1
Barrasso, Hon. John, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from 
  Wyoming........................................................     3

                               WITNESSES

Lambert, Mark, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian 
  and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State..................     4
Mohandas, Dr. Siddharth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
  for East Asia, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. 
  Department of Defense..........................................    14
Nakoa, Keone, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Insular and 
  International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior.........    20

          ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED

Barrasso, Hon. John:
    Opening Statement............................................     3
    New York Times article entitled ``China Close to Signing 
      Secret Security Accord With Solomon Islands''..............    38
Lambert, Mark:
    Opening Statement............................................     4
    Written Testimony............................................     7
    Questions for the Record.....................................    53
Manchin III, Hon. Joe:
    Opening Statement............................................     1
Mohandas, Dr. Siddharth:
    Opening Statement............................................    14
    Written Testimony............................................    17
    Responses to Questions for the Record........................    58
Nakoa, Keone:
    Opening Statement............................................    20
    Written Testimony............................................    22
    Responses to Questions for the Record........................    64
Zackios, Gerald M.:
    Letter for the Record........................................    75

 
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES TO THE UNITED 
    STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, INCLUDING THE 
 COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA, 
    THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, AND THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                 Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in 
Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joe Manchin 
III, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA

    The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
    Let me thank both of you for being here. We appreciate it, 
and I think we have one person who is going to be with us 
virtually. Our Committee meets today to discuss the importance 
of our strategic alliance with the Freely Associated States of 
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau and negotiating the 
expiring provisions of the Compacts of Free Association. There 
is broad consensus between Republicans and Democrats and the 
Administration of the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific 
region to American security and the need to prioritize our 
relationship with the Freely Associated States. While our 
attention remains focused on Putin's atrocious actions in 
Ukraine, we must not turn a blind eye to the potentially severe 
consequences of China's continued aggression toward Taiwan and 
the Indo-Pacific region at large. Central to the Compacts 
include economic assistance provisions and access to certain 
federal programs and services, like the U.S. Postal Service, 
that are set to expire in 2023 for the Marshall Islands and 
Micronesia, and in 2024 for Palau. It remains in America's best 
interest to expedite these negotiations to demonstrate our 
loyalty to these special allies and our longstanding commitment 
to maintaining peace and security in this region.
    Senator Barrasso and I have sent Secretary Haaland and 
Secretary Blinken two letters urging the Administration to 
expedite the Compact negotiation process in light of our 
national security interests. The Administration shared some 
good news last week. Ambassador Yun was appointed as Special 
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, and I am 
optimistic that his appointment marks a new chapter in our 
efforts to renew the Compacts of Free Association. In 
considering the Compacts' renewal, we must not forget the 
longstanding relationship formed between the United States and 
the people of the Freely Associated States in the aftermath of 
World War II. The Compacts of Free Association emerged as an 
extension of the United States-United Nations trusteeship 
agreement, which recognizes the strategic importance of the 
Pacific Islands. It allowed the United States to establish an 
unrestricted military presence on the islands and in the 
surrounding waters which cover an area larger than the 
continental United States to prevent future aggressions in the 
region. In return, the trusteeship obligated the United States 
to foster the economic development and self-sufficiency of the 
islands and to promote the well-being of their people.
    The U.N. trusteeship eventually dissolved, replaced by the 
Compacts of Free Association, which allow the United States to 
maintain defense and security rights in exchange for economic 
assistance to the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. 
Today, the Freely Associated States' economies face immense 
challenges, including limited natural and human resources, 
remote locations, poor infrastructure, pandemic recovery, and 
assorted environmental issues. All three nations rely on the 
key services and financial assistance that we have provided 
under the Compacts for over 35 years. The Compacts are 
scheduled to have provided $2.5 billion to the Marshall Islands 
by 2023, $3.7 billion to Micronesia by 2023, and $803 million 
to Palau by 2024. Compact funding has primarily supported 
healthcare and education in the Freely Associated States, but 
it has also helped fund infrastructure projects, disaster 
response and recovery, and more.
    To put it plainly, we cannot afford to abandon the Freely 
Associated States nor our strategic military presence in the 
Indo-Pacific, given the threat of our current adversaries. 
China has long been leveraging its economic power to undermine 
the autonomy of countries throughout the Pacific region by 
offering easy money, then applying coercive economic policies. 
The Marshall Islands are one of China's top priority 
recipients, and China is a significant source of foreign aid to 
Micronesia. In 2017, Beijing essentially banned Chinese 
tourists from visiting Palau, whose economy is heavily reliant 
on tourism. The United States must be proactive in coming to 
the negotiation table to maintain our alliance in the Indo-
Pacific and to ensure these countries remain economically free 
from coercive strategies. We must not send the signal to China 
that the Freely Associated States are an opportunity to expand 
their authoritarian interests and influence. Given our interest 
in maintaining strong and close relationships with the Freely 
Associated States, our defense interests, and our interest in 
deterring China's expansion in the Pacific, this Committee has 
a responsibility to look ahead to the problems that may arise 
if the financial assistance afforded by the Compacts comes to 
an end.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses from the 
Department of the Interior, the Department of State, and the 
Department of Defense, regarding their plans to coordinate an 
expedited negotiation process that shows the Freely Associated 
States and China that they are a top U.S. priority. I want to 
thank the Administration officials for being here with us today 
to help us learn more about this issue. And with that, I am 
going to turn it over to Senator Barrasso for his opening 
remarks.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING

    Senator Barrasso. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman. 
Thanks for holding this important hearing and thanks to the 
witnesses who are joining us today.
    Today is really a great opportunity to discuss the 
strategic importance of our Freely Associated States in the 
Indo-Pacific region. They play a vital role in our deterrence 
of an even and ever more aggressive China. The war in Ukraine 
has raised the alarm to the world. We are seeing a shifting of 
the global world order as we know it. A belligerent and hostile 
Russia has reminded Europe that the world is not a peaceful 
place. Security, peace, and stability can no longer be taken 
for granted there. At the same time, aggressive countries, like 
China, with larger global ambitions are watching. They are 
watching to upset the security and power dynamic in the region 
and to threaten Taiwan. We cannot take their actions lightly. 
We should do all that we can to deter them from taking the same 
course as Russia.
    The Compacts of Free Association that we have with the 
Freely Associated States of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, 
and Palau, are a key part in that deterrence. These island 
nations and our U.S. territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, they form an 
important line of support and defense for the U.S. and our 
allies in the Pacific. The military assets and personnel that 
we currently have stationed on these islands, they do and help 
provide stability. So will our future plans for additional 
facilities and assets. The Compacts of Free Association 
facilitate these strong bonds. They are critical to continuing 
our historically strong relationships with these nations. The 
Administration has stated they understand the priority of the 
Compacts in their recently released Indo-Pacific strategy of 
the United States. In its Indo-Pacific strategy, the 
Administration stated, ``We will also prioritize negotiations 
on our Compacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated 
States as the bedrock,'' they say, ``of the U.S. role in the 
Pacific.''
    However, as Chairman Manchin and I have noted in our recent 
letter to the Administration, to date, despite these statements 
by the Administration, there has been no formal Compact 
negotiation meeting between any of the FAS and the 
Administration since the year 2020, meaning none with the Biden 
Administration. Actions speak louder than words, as the 
Chairman has said. China is on the move. Time is running out 
for renewing the expiring provisions of these Compacts. The 
agencies before us today, the Departments of Interior and 
State, as well as the Department of Defense, need to work 
together to get these negotiations back on track. Now is not 
the time to send a signal to our adversaries that the U.S. does 
not consider the Freely Associated States a strategic priority. 
We cannot allow China to forge stronger ties with these nations 
at our expense and at the expense of our allies. The people of 
the Freely Associated States have stood by us as steadfast 
allies. They expect, in return, that their priorities are 
heard.
    With the three agencies before us today, it is my hope, Mr. 
Chairman, that we can get a better sense of what is being done 
to deter China and what the barriers are to moving forward with 
these Compact negotiations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look 
forward to the testimony.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
    I would like to turn to our witnesses now, and we are going 
to begin with Mr. Lambert, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs with the 
Department of State.
    He will then be followed by Dr. Mohandas, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Department of 
Defense.
    Finally, we are going to hear from Mr. Nakoa, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs with 
the Department of the Interior.
    I want to thank you all for joining us today. And Mr. 
Lambert, we will start with you.

OPENING STATEMENT OF MARK LAMBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 
 BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                             STATE

    Mr. Lambert. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished 
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to testify on the importance of the 
Freely Associated States, both to the United States, as well as 
to our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific Region. I am 
very pleased to be here today with Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Keone Nakoa of the Department of the Interior and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Dr. Siddharth 
Mohandas.
    As the most dynamic and fastest growing demographic area on 
earth, the Indo-Pacific is a vital region. The Indo-Pacific 
strategy, the first regional strategy released by the 
Administration, reflects renewed U.S. commitment to deepen our 
engagement in the region and build innovative links with local 
allies, partners, and institutions so we can collectively 
address the urgent challenges that face the Pacific Islands. As 
was pointed out, our relationships with the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the 
Republic of Palau, collectively referred to as the Freely 
Associated States, have, since World War II, contributed to a 
secure, stable, and prosperous Western Pacific and a strategic 
location for the United States in the larger Indo-Pacific 
region. Reflecting the unique and longstanding relationship 
between the United States and the Freely Associated States, the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provided the FAS 
with enough vaccines for their entire populations as well as 
personal protective equipment and technical and financial 
assistance to combat COVID-19. The Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau are also 
historically among the United States' strongest supporters at 
the United Nations. Most recently, all three countries stood 
alongside the United States and made strong statements at the 
United Nations in support of Ukraine. It is significant that 
Micronesia even severed diplomatic relations with Russia. 
Moreover, Palau and the Marshall Islands are two of the 14 
countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. These 
relationships are under enormous pressure from the PRC, as 
Taiwan has lost eight diplomatic partners since 2016.
    In recent years, the PRC has expanded its engagement with 
the Pacific Islands. Between 2006 to 2018, the PRC provided 
$1.8 billion in assistance to the Pacific Islands, which would 
put them third in the region after Australia, which provided 
$7.7 billion and the United States, which provided $1.9 
billion. That being said, the United States welcomes 
opportunity to collaborate with partners, including even the 
PRC, if our interests and development goals overlap in the 
Pacific Islands. The Biden-Harris Administration is 
prioritizing Compact negotiations with the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau as 
a U.S. foreign policy objective. We are coordinating closely 
across our interagency to evaluate a range of options to 
promote continuing assistance to all three countries. As 
Senator Manchin pointed out, in light of the critical nature of 
these complex negotiations, President Biden appointed retired 
Ambassador Joseph Yun as the Special Presidential Envoy for 
Compact Negotiations on March 22nd. Ambassador Yun has more 
than 33 years of diplomatic experience, including as our 
country's Special Representative for North Korea Policy and as 
the United States Ambassador to Malaysia.
    The U.S. Compact team is focused on continuing with 
productive talks in order to complete these negotiations in a 
timely fashion. To date, the negotiation team has consulted on 
subsidiary agreements under the Compact with each of the Freely 
Associated states covering certain federal programs and 
services and direct economic assistance, contingent on the 
availability of funding. The U.S. Compact team has held 
numerous negotiations and discussions with representatives from 
the Federated States of Micronesia, and U.S. officials remain 
eager and ready to engage with the Marshall Islands, and 
particularly with respect to provisions that expire after 
Fiscal Year 2023, and have sought associated discussions. 
Likewise, with Palau, we remain ready to engage in the required 
Compact review that already is broad in scope and flexible. And 
we are also ready to resume negotiations on possible assistance 
after Fiscal Year 2024--that is in the case of the Federated 
States of Micronesia--and the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
has been a core element of the overall Compact relationship.
    As part of our most recent engagement efforts, we have 
proposed in-person meetings with each country to further 
negotiations and address issues that remain. As I noted, 
negotiators seek to complete negotiations in a timely fashion, 
understanding that Congress needs sufficient time to enact 
legislation, as needed, before any agreements amending the 
Compacts are brought into force and to provide Congress the 
opportunity to appropriate funds to avoid any lapses in 
assistance. To that end, we look forward to engaging with 
Congress as negotiations progress. We understand that 
successful negotiations are crucial to deepening our strategic 
partnership with Pacific Island countries in support of a free, 
open, and secure Indo-Pacific.
    Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished 
members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to 
appear before you today, and we look forward to working closely 
with Congress to ensure that our country can effectively secure 
U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Lambert follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lambert.
    Now we are going to hear from Dr. Mohandas. Doctor, thank 
you so much for being here.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. SIDDHARTH MOHANDAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF 
              DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member 
Barrasso, and distinguished members of the Committee. My name 
is Dr. Siddharth Mohandas, and I serve as the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and I am pleased to have 
the opportunity to testify before you today alongside DAS 
Lambert from State and DAS Nakoa of Interior.
    The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation with deep 
linkages with our partners in the Pacific Islands region. We 
share a unique and special relationship with this critical 
crossroads of the Indo-Pacific. Forged on the World War II 
Pacific Campaign battlefields of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and 
Peleliu, we share a history defined by sacrifice. Today, our 
peoples value democracy, freedom, and human rights. We share 
the same profound concerns over the existential threat from 
climate change and seek opportunities to build prosperous and 
healthy societies.
    Last August, when the President of the Republic of Palau, 
President Surangel Whipps, visited Secretary Austin at the 
Pentagon, he remarked that the United States and Palau are 
``like family.'' Our Pacific Island family matters greatly to 
the United States, and nowhere is as critical as the Freely 
Associated States of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall 
Islands. When Secretary Austin met with President Whipps, he 
said that the Department of Defense was committed to upholding 
the U.S. responsibility and authority for defense and security 
matters in and related to Palau and the other Freely Associated 
states. The Department will work with each of the Freely 
Associated States on addressing the most pressing defense and 
security needs. As we engage with and partner with Palau, 
Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, the Compacts of Free 
Association communicate our long-term commitment to our Pacific 
Island partners. Another unique aspect of the Freely Associated 
States is their commitment to and service in the U.S. military. 
They have served alongside us in every major conflict, and we 
at the Department of Defense are profoundly grateful for that.
    The Compacts of Free Association with each of the Freely 
Associated States facilitate an unprecedented strategic 
partnership with our Palauan, Micronesian, and Marshallese 
partners. The United States has responsibility and authority 
for defense and security matters, and greatly values the unique 
access, basing, and overflight afforded us in each of these 
countries. The Compacts also allow the United States the right 
to strategically foreclose such access, basing, and overflight 
to third country militaries. In an era of intensifying 
geopolitical competition, this is vital to U.S. national 
security interests. The Department of Defense is supporting our 
interagency partners as the U.S. Government seeks to negotiate 
amendments to allow for the continued provision of certain 
economic assistance, including federal programs and services 
that would otherwise expire to the Freely Associated States. 
The Department of Defense has a vested interest in seeing the 
successful and mutually beneficial completion of the 
negotiations so that we can continue to bolster our strategic 
partnership with each of the Freely Associated States.
    Now, the United States is not the only nation that 
recognizes the significance of the strategic geography of 
Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. The People's 
Republic of China is seeking to expand its influence in the 
Freely Associated States, and the PRC is increasing its 
concerning activities throughout the Pacific Islands region. 
From illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing to outright 
bullying of sovereign nations that have diplomatic ties with 
Taiwan, the PRC's provocative behavior appears to be focused on 
seeking to erode the U.S. strategic partnership with the Freely 
Associated States. The Compacts of Free Association are an 
important signal to both our partners, as well as our 
competitors, that the U.S. commitment to the Freely Associated 
States is ironclad. U.S. security cooperation activities and 
investments in the Freely Associated States are mutually 
beneficial and advance strategic partnerships with each of our 
countries. These include security assistance aimed at building 
partner capacity as well as our Civic Action Team in Palau, 
which, for the past 50 years, has provided rotational 
detachments of engineers and medical teams that have promoted 
people-to-people ties through community relations and programs. 
We also conduct a number of exercises jointly and through 
services in Palau and the other Freely Associated States.
    The Pacific Islands also present opportunities for 
increased cooperation with our closest allies and partners. 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, France, and others all share our 
interest in the region's strategic importance, and we will find 
ways to leverage our comparative advantages to further 
strengthen our capacity building activities in the region. For 
example, in 2020, the United States, Australia, and Japan 
partnered to finance an undersea cable project for Palau. We 
have also cooperated with Australia on enhancing maritime 
domain awareness, and seeking ways to ensure that we do that in 
a complementary fashion. I must also note that the Compacts of 
Free Association enabled key defense posture initiatives in the 
Indo-Pacific region. The Republic of the Marshall Islands hosts 
the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site at U.S. 
Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll. This site conducts regular space 
operations to provide space situational awareness and the 
protection of key space assets supporting three geographic 
combatant commands. It is ideally located for the observation 
of foreign missile launches and facilitates advanced technology 
testing for DOD. Future cooperation with the Federated States 
of Micronesia will facilitate agile combat employment for the 
U.S. Air Force and the highly anticipated Tactical Multi-
Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar, or TACMOR, in Palau will 
provide the Department of Defense an unprecedented level of 
situational awareness of the maritime domain in the Indo-
Pacific region.
    Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished 
Senators and colleagues, thank you again for the opportunity to 
testify today about the strategic importance of the Freely 
Associated States to U.S. national security. I look forward to 
your questions and will be happy to answer them.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Mohandas follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Mohandas.
    Now we are going to hear from Mr. Nakoa. I hope you are 
feeling better, sir, and I understand you were not able to 
travel today, but I really appreciate you making the effort to 
be with us.


 STATEMENT OF KEONE NAKOA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INSULAR 
   AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

    Mr. Nakoa. Of course, thank you so much.
    Good morning, Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, 
and honored members of the Committee. My apologies for not 
being able to attend in person as I had planned, but thank you 
to the Committee and to your wonderful staff for the last-
minute accommodations.
    I am Keone Nakoa, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Interior for Insular and International Affairs. I am deeply 
honored to be here representing Secretary of the Interior Deb 
Haaland in today's hearing alongside DAS Lambert from State and 
DAS Mohandas from the DOD. I respectfully request that my full 
written testimony be made a part of the hearing record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.
    Mr. Nakoa. Thank you.
    In addition to overseeing the Secretary's duties to the 
United States, the U.S. territories of American Samoa, CNMI, 
Guam, and the USVI, I also lead DOI's administration of the 
Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau, 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)--collectively, 
the Freely Associated States, or the FAS. DOI partners with 
other departments and agencies operating in the FAS under the 
Compacts, including State, Defense, FAA, FEMA, USPS, the 
Departments of Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, 
Homeland Security, the FDIC, the Department of Veterans 
Affairs, and others. While the last Administration began the 
third round of COFA negotiations in 2020 by emphasizing the 
strategic importance of the FAS, as the Chair and Ranking 
Member have highlighted this morning, it was hampered by the 
determination of some of the FAS to address unresolved issues 
relating to the current implementation for both the Compacts, 
as amended, and relevant U.S. law, as well as issues settled in 
the 1986 Compact that the RMI wishes to revive from the second 
round of the COFA negotiations in 2003.
    At the end of 2020, the U.S. negotiators presented the 
three FAS with ``Non-Paper'' economic proposals that did not 
address demands from the FAS and lacked provisions from key 
federal agencies. Those proposals were limited to extending and 
amending only certain expiring economic assistance provisions 
with a perceived downgrading of assurance levels for all 
economic assistance. Moreover, instead of the full faith and 
credit assurances in the original 1986 Compact, or mandatory 
funding--the grant model--all economic assistance was proposed 
to be funded through discretionary appropriations. The RMI had 
responded in 2021 to the informal U.S. proposal with a 
conceptual counterproposal containing a proposed negotiating 
agenda. The President of Palau, as was noted previously, came 
to Washington and explained to the U.S. Cabinet level officials 
in 2021 that the 2020 offers were inadequate and unacceptable. 
All of FSM remains engaged, including informal talks with this 
team in Honolulu last year, last November, and a discussion 
with USGS about their current operations in the FSM earlier 
this month. Many of the most complex issues remain, including 
infrastructure assistance and trust fund management processes.
    When I assumed my duties as DAS in the Fall of 2021 and was 
assigned to serve as the Interior Department's COFA co-
negotiator, the RMI and Palau had already refused to continue 
COFA negotiations without certain conditions being met. Given 
the history of the 2020 and 2021 negotiations, particularly 
with Palau and RMI, in 2021, the Biden-Harris COFA team began 
an intensive review of the polices put in place during the last 
Administration, taking feedback from Congress and the FAS into 
consideration. As a result of that review, we identified 
several areas where the U.S. negotiation strategy and 
expectations of the FAS were misaligned. Specifically, we noted 
the barriers related to the lack of consideration of mandatory 
funding proposals to the FAS, the need to appoint a 
Presidential representative, and the need for broader 
discussion of COFA-related issues respectful of all parties. 
Today, I am optimistic, and pleased to report to this Committee 
recent actions from the Biden-Harris Administration, chiefly 
the naming of Ambassador Joseph Yun as the Special Presidential 
Envoy for Compact Negotiations on March 22, with interagency 
reach to address a broader range of issues than that of any 
single department, and the Administration's support to request 
the necessary and mandatory funding for implementing the 
agreements that are reached in the negotiation process, as 
previewed in the President's budget and released yesterday. The 
Administration has taken steps to put the negotiations back on 
a viable track for timely completion and approval of agreements 
by the United States and FAS, which is still achievable as long 
as we have the commitment and cooperation of all three FAS as 
well as federal stakeholders to move forward.
    Although we have not yet worked out every detail of the 
many complex issues in these negotiations, with the new Special 
Presidential Envoy, I am hopeful that we can quickly take the 
initial and necessary step of hearing each other out in a way 
that allows our countries to raise matters of importance and to 
find those areas of negotiation on which you do share a mutual 
understanding very soon. From there, we will need the FAS to be 
prepared to provide their own proposals to resume discussions 
leading to a new beginning to earnest negotiations. We look 
forward to the continued engagement from this Committee and 
both chambers of Congress. My written statement also included a 
historical narrative about the success of the Compact. For that 
success to continue, the FAS need to come forward with their 
proposals and solutions so we can finish our mission and bring 
an agreement to Congress in time for you in Congress to be able 
to do your jobs as well. I believe we can accomplish this 
mission and pledge support and work with the Administration's 
Special Presidential Envoy and all seekers to ensure we do. 
Thank you so much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nakoa follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    The Chairman. Thank you. And now, we have our questions. We 
will start with our questions and I will begin with mine, and 
mine is going to be an overreaching statement that I want all 
three of you to kind of comment on.
    But basically, knowing what is going on in the region that 
we are discussing right now on the islands, and how strategic 
that has been for us for so many years, is there a sense by the 
people that live there that the United States has not fulfilled 
its commitment? That they do not have a comfort level with us 
and are talking to China? Do they understand the gravity of 
working with China and what that could mean as far as their 
freedoms of basically making decisions and working in a 
democratic process and not a committed one because of 
obligation? I am just trying to get a feel for what is going on 
here because we see a lot of movement of China, not just there, 
but all over the world, but especially there being in their 
back yard.
    So if you can just tell me what we are dealing with and 
what more we can do to give the confidence to the people that 
we relish and we cherish this relationship and I hope they do 
not think we have taken it for granted. So, we will start with 
Mr. Lambert and we will just go right down the line, okay?
    Your honest opinion on what you are seeing.
    Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Okay.
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, the Chinese are looking at the 
Pacific Islands as a vital part of a bigger strategy. It is 
obvious they are investing in infrastructure development. They 
are putting people into areas where they traditionally have 
not--for instance, in the Solomon Islands, going beyond the 
three countries we were talking about in the FAS. They are also 
really amping up their diplomatic presence in that region. Part 
of this is trying to push Taiwan----
    The Chairman. Is their reach greater than what ours has 
been, or have we basically dropped down to where we are not 
giving the attention that we said we would or we had in the 
past?
    Mr. Lambert. I would not characterize it that way, sir. I 
would say that they have upped their game. We need to up our 
game.
    The Chairman. Got you.
    Mr. Lambert. We are working together. I hope it is evident 
here by our three agencies being latched up in a way we need to 
be. We are looking at ways to amp up our diplomatic presence. 
You probably saw that when Secretary Blinken was in Fiji last 
month, he announced our intention to reopen an embassy in the 
Solomon Islands. We have other plans in the works to expand our 
diplomatic presence. We are also talking about expanding the 
offering of federal services to the Freely Associated States 
that they have asked for. And I think the message we are 
sending now is being well received. I am confident that with 
the announcement of Joe Yun being the Presidential Envoy that 
we will be engaged in formal negotiations readily.
    But you are exactly right, sir, we are in a competition and 
we need to put our best people forward on it.
    The Chairman. Dr. Mohandas, your observation?
    Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Chairman Manchin.
    Let me first just make a comment from a defense perspective 
and note that one of the several unique aspects of the Compacts 
of Free Association is that we have, as I noted in my 
testimony, unrestricted access basing and overflight rights in 
the Freely Associated States as well as the right to deny any 
third countries from developing a military presence in the 
Freely Associated States and that those rights exist in 
perpetuity. And in return----
    The Chairman. Are we enforcing that right now? We are not 
allowing any one of those islands to basically negotiate with 
China on any type of activity militarily?
    Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, but I should also clarify that 
they have not attempted to do so either.
    And in return, we also provide for their defense, you know, 
as you note, in a dangerous world. And so, I think from that 
perspective, the U.S. commitment to the Freely Associated 
States is ironclad and is something that----
    The Chairman. You think they feel that way? They feel that 
our commitment is ironclad?
    Dr. Mohandas. I do believe that, sir.
    The Chairman. And that we have not neglected them?
    Dr. Mohandas. I believe that is the case, and that is when 
President Whipps came and met with Secretary Austin. He 
specifically highlighted the importance of our defense 
relationship and our longstanding defense relationship. But you 
are absolutely right, Senator, that China is seeking to expand 
its influence throughout the entire Pacific Islands region, and 
specifically the Freely Associated States, and is offering a 
number of economic steps to do that.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Mohandas. Thank you.
    The Chairman. How about Mr. Nakoa, real quick. I know I am 
running over my time here. I am so sorry to cut you off, sir, 
but we have time limits.
    Mr. Nakoa. No problem. I just wanted to say quickly that I 
concur with what DAS Lambert just said. We are in a competition 
with the FAS. With that said, we remain the partner of choice 
for all three FAS.
    The Chairman. Do you feel that we still have that type of 
presence there?
    Mr. Nakoa. We do, and I think that there is a feeling from 
my meetings with President Whipps last week and discussions 
with the FSM earlier that they would like for the United States 
to remain the partner of choice, but like DAS Lambert said, we 
need to up our game, and I think that the last recent actions 
from the Administration with Envoy Yun and mandatory spending 
do exactly that.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you all so much.
    Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Mohandas, you talked about the defense 
relationship. The Air Force operates 450 Minuteman 
intercontinental nuclear missiles located in my home State of 
Wyoming, as well as Montana and North Dakota. Both of those 
states are also represented with members on this Committee. 
According to the Air Force, a few times a year, a missile 
without its nuclear warhead is actually pulled from its silo. 
These missiles are then launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
in California to a test range in the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, also known as the Ronald Reagan test site. The 
Minuteman III nuclear missile test launches are conducted on a 
rotational basis. Wyoming crews from F.E. Warren Air Force Base 
as well as crews from North Dakota and Montana Air Force bases. 
So how important is this Ronald Reagan test site in the 
Marshall Islands in terms of our--you know, you talked about 
our defense relationships in terms of our military readiness--
and how important are these tests as part of our nuclear 
deterrence on countries such as China?
    Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Senator.
    The Ronald Reagan test site is vitally important and it is 
vitally important for our ballistic missile testing. We test 
hypersonics there. That testing is critical to ensuring the 
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent, as you note, 
sir. And then, the Ronald Reagan test site and Kwajalein Atoll, 
the garrison there, also are critical for our space situational 
awareness.
    Senator Barrasso. In terms of one of the follow-ups to what 
Senator Manchin had to say, Dr. Mohandas, your written 
testimony caught me. I was very interested. It said, the 
People's Republic of China, the PRC, is seeking to expand, you 
said, its influence in the Freely Associated States, and the 
PRC is increasing its--your words--intimidating activities 
throughout the Pacific Islands region. Can you briefly give 
some examples as to how China is trying to expand its influence 
in the Freely Associated States?
    Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, Senator.
    So, first to be clear, the PRC is seeking to expand its 
influence throughout the Pacific Islands region because they, 
too, perceive it to be a strategic region. With respect to the 
Freely Associated States in particular, I would note that Palau 
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands maintain diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, and obviously, that is a source of 
intense focus for the PRC as part of their longstanding effort 
to reduce Taiwan's international space. And so, we have seen, 
frankly, coercive behavior, including, as Senator Manchin 
noted, efforts to manipulate tourism numbers, reduce tourism 
numbers to Palau, and also, just generally, I would suggest, 
increase economic dependency on the PRC and throughout the 
Freely Associated States.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, to Mr. Lambert, along this line--
there is a story in the New York Times. You probably saw it, 
page A6 on Saturday, ``China Close to Signing Secret Security 
Accord With Solomon Islands.''
    [The article referred to follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Senator Barrasso. And you know, the article states that if 
signed, it would give the Prime Minister of the Solomon 
Islands, ``the ability to call on China for protection of its 
own government while granting China a base of operations 
between the United States and Australia that could be used to 
block shipping traffic across the South Pacific.'' So it is 
clear China has a long-term strategy for gaining influence in 
the Indo-Pacific region, including the Freely Associated States 
and their neighbors. Could you briefly give some specific 
examples of what actions China has already taken to gain 
influence in the region and how you view the potential security 
agreement that is reported here in the New York Times between 
China and the Solomon Islands?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator Barrasso, I think the Chinese have a 
pretty well-established kit bag of leverage that they use, not 
just in the Pacific Islands, but also in East Asia. You know 
how they use investment. We have seen in recent years where 
they punished South Korea after the Republic of Korea deployed 
the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system by cutting off 
investment. We saw in Vietnam how after there was a 
confrontation involving a Chinese oil rig in the waters off of 
Vietnam, the Chinese used cutting off tourism and cutting off 
the purchases of agricultural goods from that country to 
enforce leverage. The same thing potentially could happen in 
the Pacific.
    Dr. Mohandas talked about how reliant these countries are 
on tourism. Palau, in particular, gets most of its revenues 
from tourism. Just because of its geography, many of those 
tourists are Chinese, and they can be turned on and off with a 
switch, once COVID is behind us. In a similar fashion, as China 
buys more and more goods from these countries, these countries 
are going to be more and more dependent. We are seeing very 
heavily leveraged loans, in the case of a country like Tonga. 
Tonga owes a huge amount of its foreign debt to the PRC. That 
is leverage. These are the types of things that we need to work 
on, not just with the Freely Associated States, but with all 
the countries in the Pacific, through the Pacific Island Forum 
and with our closest allies and partners, like Australia, New 
Zealand, the UK, France, and Japan, to push back.
    Senator Barrasso. Even though we may be the partner of 
choice, due to this leverage and forced applications, we may 
end up in the long-term not being the partner that they choose?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, that is what is at risk. I think that 
is very well said, yes, sir.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    And now we will have Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. I think the way that you summed that up, 
Senator Barrasso, in terms of partner of choice versus the 
partner that they choose really gets at what our challenge is 
in the South Pacific. You know, people brought up the question 
of has there been neglect? Have we kept our promises over the 
years? And I would urge all of our colleagues to spend some 
time there to see the capabilities in Kwajalein that you 
reference, Senator Barrasso, to see also the impacts to places 
like Bikini and Enewetak.
    According to the government of the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal has been unable to pay $23 
million in personal injury awards and $2.2 billion in property 
damage awards due to a lack of funds. The Marshall Islands 
government regards these unfunded awards as part of ``the core 
of all discussions on nuclear justice.'' My father was a 
witness to two of the detonations in the Marshall Islands and 
paid a pretty steep health cost for his proximity to those, and 
I can only imagine the scale of what the Marshallese sacrificed 
as a result of all that testing. So, Mr. Lambert and Mr. Nakoa, 
is additional compensation related to past U.S. nuclear weapons 
testing being discussed in the negotiations of the Marshall 
Islands? And if not, why not?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, we negotiated a full and final 
settlement of the nuclear issue with the Marshall Islands 
several years ago and the Congress approved that. Nonetheless, 
we are open to hearing any concerns any of the Freely 
Associated States have. Ambassador Yun will be empowered to 
hear any concerns that the citizens of these countries have. We 
will then, of course, need to work closely with colleagues in 
the Administration and in Congress to see what our country 
could do.
    Senator Heinrich. I recognize what we negotiated. I have 
also seen with my own eyes what the reality on what ground is 
left is there. This is a place where the culture and the 
community is really struggling with not only the impacts of 
that testing, but also the direct impacts of climate change and 
sea-level rise, and those things compound on each other.
    I do want to ask, Dr. Mohandas, can you elaborate a little 
more on the very acute threat that--what I would call pirate 
fishing, what is often referred to as illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing by the PRC--poses to all of our South 
Pacific allies?
    Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, Senator. As you know, illegal, 
unregulated, non-reported fishing is a major, major challenge 
throughout the region and not just in the Pacific Islands, I 
mean, what you see up and down the Indo-Pacific is PRC fishing 
fleets, associated maritime militia moving en masse to rich 
fishing grounds, engaging in sort of industrial scale catches--
--
    Senator Heinrich. Primarily trawling and long lines.
    Dr. Mohandas. Precisely.
    And this has a huge impact. It certainly depletes fishery 
stocks in fragile ecosystems. It has an outsize economic 
impact, obviously, crowding out indigenous fishermen and 
fishing industries.
    Senator Heinrich. Yes, the irony of what I saw in the area 
around Kwajalein was the inability due largely to lack of fuel, 
in particular, for local communities to be able to access a 
very rich fishing resource. Yet, you had pirate fishing coming 
in that was absolutely devastating and of a scale that was 
nothing like the traditional local use. Are there 
opportunities, as we have this broader conversation around 
remote sensing, and in particular, cooperation with the U.S. 
Coast Guard, to get a better handle on pirate fishing across 
the South Pacific?
    Dr. Mohandas. It is absolutely a focus area for the 
Department of Defense and a focus of our security assistance in 
the area. We have allocated $20 million to help build partner 
capacity and enhance maritime domain awareness. So it will 
absolutely remain a priority.
    Senator Heinrich. It seems like there is a real opportunity 
there with what we can see, even from just commercial satellite 
imagery these days, to not just patrol, but to have our 
capabilities, our resources, when we can do partnership with 
these various governments to have them in the right place to 
actually intercept that pirate fishing. Thank you.
    Dr. Mohandas. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    And now we are going to have, let's see--Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I am really glad that, Mr. Chairman, you are having this 
hearing on the importance of our relationship with our friends, 
the Freely Associated States. Well, the United States accepted 
the responsibility to compensate the people of the Marshall 
Islands, and not fully, by the way, as I do share the concerns 
that Senator Heinrich expressed. On March 1st, in honor of 
Nuclear Victims Remembrance Day in the Marshall Islands, 
Senator Markey and I introduced a resolution formally 
apologizing to the people of the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands for the U.S. nuclear testing program and affirming the 
importance of the Compact of Free Association.
    This is for all of our witnesses. Does the Administration 
support formally apologizing to the people and government of 
the Republic of the Marshall Islands for the damages caused by 
our country's nuclear testing program?
    We will start with you, Mr. Lambert, and then we will just 
go down the line.
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, we do acknowledge that our nuclear 
testing caused tremendous devastation in the Marshall Islands. 
As to your specific question, do we support a formal apology? I 
honestly do not know the answer to that, but I will try to get 
you the answer to that.
    Dr. Mohandas. Senator, likewise, you know, I would say the 
United States has recognized the affects of our nuclear testing 
program and has accepted and acted on our responsibility to the 
people of the RMI. And on the question of the apology, I think 
we are happy to take that back.
    Senator Hirono. Mr. Nakoa.
    Mr. Nakoa. Aloha Senator Hirono.
    You know, with regard to the bigger picture, as DAS Lambert 
and DAS Mohandas have said, the United States has recognized 
its responsibility and its role in significant--nuclear testing 
legacy, and I think, you know, apologies and you know, what 
possibilities should be on the table, and as DAS Lambert kind 
of mentioned, we want to ensure that we are able to hear from 
the RMI on what kinds of provisions and what things that they 
would like to propose in terms of things being left out. And 
with that in mind, you know--apology--I just want to make sure 
that we're not just doing an apology alone. But with regard to 
the specific legislation, I can have our office take a more 
close assessment of it and get back to you.
    Senator Hirono. Frankly, I do not consider your responses 
particularly encouraging because, and especially from Mr. 
Nakoa, I think you do recognize the importance of apologies, 
just as the United States apologized to the Native Hawaiian 
community for the unjustified overthrow of the Hawaiian 
monarchy. So these kinds of--and I cannot just say it is a 
symbolic gesture, but it is very meaningful to not only accept 
responsibility, although, again, not fully compensating. But it 
is very important to the peoples of these nations that we 
formally apologize. And so I would very much like you to--all 
of you--to get back to me as to why we cannot support a formal 
apology.
    And Mr. Lambert, I agree with you that we cannot take the 
goodwill generated from our historic bonds of friendship with 
the FAS people for granted. So I would say that it is long past 
time.
    One more thing. As you probably know that in the so-called 
Welfare Reform Act in 1993--the COFA citizens who can come to 
our country without the need for a VISA because of our special 
relationship with them through our Compacts--they were excluded 
from their ability to qualify for Medicaid, for example, as 
well as so many other kinds of resources. And so, there is a 
bill that would enable the COFA citizens to access other 
benefits. And I would like to know what the Administration's 
posture is with regard to enabling the COFA citizens in our 
country to access these other programs. I think you know what I 
am referring to, what kind of programs. So, again, why don't we 
go down the line?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, again, I apologize, I do not know the 
answer to that question--what the Administration's position is 
on providing citizens of these three countries Medicare and 
other sorts of benefits. We can certainly get you the answer to 
that.
    Senator Hirono. Well, it took me only about ten years to 
restore Medicaid eligibility for them.
    Doctor.
    Dr. Mohandas. Senator, this is not specifically an issue 
that the Department of Defense would opine on, so I would defer 
to my State and Interior----
    Senator Hirono. Okay.
    Mr. Nakoa.
    Mr. Nakoa. You know, Senator Hirono, I think your 
leadership on this issue with the passage of the Medicaid 
expansion was critical. I met with DHS Director Cathy Betts 
when I was in Honolulu last year, and she said that the impact 
of that legislation and expansion of benefits for the COFA 
population community in Hawaii has been incredible. I think it 
increased the amount of enrollees by 100 percent.
    Unfortunately, again, I will have to take a closer look at 
the specific legislation so I do not get ahead of myself or my 
colleagues, but you know, we will absolutely have my office 
take a closer look at your legislation and get your response on 
our posture.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, just one note on the eligibility of COFA 
citizens for various programs, you know, that exclusion was 
done without any basis that I could find in the legislative 
history. So I think it is really important that we restore 
their eligibility for other programs. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Cortez Masto.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. And I also want to thank 
Senator Hirono for all of her work, such important work here.
    As you can tell, gentlemen, the concern here is there. This 
notion that the United States has neglected the Freely 
Associated States to the point that now we have the PRC taking 
advantage of that neglect, and there is a time now for us to do 
something about it. I understand the White House has appointed 
the Ambassador. You have mentioned this earlier--Ambassador 
Yun. Can either of you or any of you--all three of you--expand 
on the current negotiations between the Administration and the 
Freely Associated States and how this recent appointment will 
contribute to your Departments' efforts?
    Mr. Lambert, let me start with you.
    Mr. Lambert. Well, let me take all three countries 
separately because the response is a bit different for each of 
them.
    We have been in regular talks with Micronesia, for 
instance. They have never been severed. Our lead negotiator met 
with the Micronesians as recently as March 16. Our roadblock, 
frankly, has been with the other two countries. With the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, we have made clear through 
our Ambassador there that we are ready for formal negotiations. 
We have not received a response back. A similar situation 
exists in Palau. But both of those countries seem to be very 
happy that we have appointed a Presidential Envoy. Frankly, we 
are pretty optimistic that we will be able to resume formal 
negotiations in the very near term.
    Ambassador Yun began work yesterday. He is already doing 
the rounds here in Washington. He is meeting with the 
representatives at those three countries' embassies here in 
Washington. Two of those countries are still closed because of 
COVID, but our hope is that Ambassador Yun is on a plane very, 
very soon and actually going to see people in all three 
countries face-to-face to push forward the negotiations.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
    Doctor.
    Dr. Mohandas. Senator, as you know, the defense provisions 
of the COFA are not up for renegotiation, only the economic 
assistance provisions. And so, for that reason, the Department 
of Defense is not directly involved in the negotiation process, 
but we are absolutely committed to supporting Ambassador Yun in 
any way that he requires for the negotiations, including, in 
particular, by making the case for the strategic importance of 
the COFA states both internally and externally, including in 
forums like this one.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Mr. Nakoa.
    Mr. Nakoa. Thank you, Senator.
    As DAS Lambert just said, you know, I think it is a little 
bit of a different situation among the three FAS. With FSM, as 
he mentioned, we have been continuing to have technical 
discussions around federal programs and services. We have just 
recently--as recently as, I think, a couple weeks ago--we met 
with the FSM and the USGS to discuss USGS's ongoing operations 
in the FSM, and that was a very productive and enlightening 
meeting, I believe, for the FSM side. USGS has been an issue 
that all three of the FAS have highlighted, as you know--very 
important. And so we are very happy to be moving forward on 
that.
    With the RMI, as DAS Lambert said, There has been a little 
bit of a different posture. But from the readouts that we have 
received from Ambassador Cabral delivering the messages that we 
have Ambassador Yun on board, it was very positive, and we were 
hoping to have some meetings with the lead negotiator this 
week, but unfortunately that was not possible. So we will look 
to continue to have some meetings with him shortly. Ambassador 
Yun will lead some meetings with him, hopefully soon.
    And then, with Palau, I was just out there last week and I 
was able to be in the room when Ambassador Hennessey-Niland and 
I gave him the news of Ambassador Yun's appointment, and he 
received that very well. It also, you know, seemed like the 
information about the mandatory spending that, you know, was 
tied into the President's budget yesterday was very well 
received as well. So with all of the recent steps through the 
Administration that, again, is does look like we will be able 
to get back to the table very soon and Ambassador Yun has, you 
know, is just getting his legs under him in terms of this new 
job, but he has a wealth of experience, you know, in the 
region. And so I look forward to working closely with him and 
supporting him as the lead representative from the Interior.
    Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And I have one further question and then if any of our 
other Senators would like to have another question, we will 
stay here.
    So with that, I am going to say, Senator Barrasso and I 
have sent two letters to both Secretary Haaland and Secretary 
Blinken urging the Administration to expedite the negotiation 
process for renewing the expiring provisions in the Compacts of 
Free Association. So we welcome the appointment of the Special 
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, which we hope will 
prioritize timely completion of the negotiations with the 
Freely Associated States. The most successful negotiators that 
produce the Compacts of Free Association were based in the 
Executive Office of the President, and they had State, Defense, 
and Interior Department staff and were given written 
negotiating authorities by the President through the National 
Security Council that conferred all of government authority. We 
know the Administration has responsibility for conducting 
negotiations and we respect that. But we in Congress would like 
to be as supportive as we can.
    So Mr. Lambert, will the Envoy have the authority to fully 
negotiate all of the issues, including continued federal 
programs and services such as the U.S. Postal Service and the 
National Weather Service?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator Manchin, Ambassador Yun will be 
empowered to discuss anything that the three states wish to 
discuss.
    The Chairman. Can you tell us if the new Special 
Presidential Envoy will have received interdepartmental support 
and interagency staffing?
    Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir, he has.
    The Chairman. Mr. Nakoa, how will you and the Department of 
the Interior work with the Envoy on Compact negotiations? Will 
Interior contribute personnel to the Envoy's team?
    Mr. Nakoa. Yes, we intend to carry out, you know, be as 
helpful as we can as Ambassador Yun sets up his shop, and I 
intend to remain closely involved as the lead representative 
from Interior and I, in close conversations with State, NFC, 
and some of the other interagency--you know, it is my 
understanding and expectation that Interior will remain closely 
involved as we have a long relationship with all three of the 
FAS and that personally, I will continue to lead the Interior 
team. I have two staff that are completely devoted, and will be 
chiefly devoted for the negotiations. And so, I am, you know, 
ready and able to dedicate all personnel that are needed to 
support Ambassador Yun's mission.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    And Dr. Mohandas, how will you and the Department of 
Defense work with the Envoy on Compact negotiations? Will the 
Department be formally engaged in negotiation? Will it 
contribute personnel to the Envoy's team?
    Dr. Mohandas. Senator, as DAS Lambert noted, Ambassador Yun 
just began work yesterday, so I think he is still in a process 
of figuring out what his requirements are. What I will say is 
the Department of Defense has fulfilled every request made by 
the current negotiating team and we absolutely commit to 
supporting Ambassador Yun going forward, and in particular, 
continuing to make the case for the strategic importance of the 
COFA states.
    The Chairman. As a Committee, we would like to get a formal 
reply back from your agencies on what you all intend to support 
and how you are going to support and to what level, as quickly 
as possible.
    [All witnesses respond, ``yes, sir.'']
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Just one question, and Mr. Nakoa, I ran 
out of time on my first round. I wanted to ask you what happens 
if Compact negotiations are not completed in 2022, or in time 
for Congress to pass a budget that includes economic assistance 
for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and for the Federal 
States of Micronesia in the Fiscal Year 2024 coming up?
    Mr. Nakoa. Thank you, Senator.
    You know, I do not want to jinx or get ahead of Ambassador 
Yun's work but, you know, at the same time, understand that it 
is important to understand, you know, what all contingencies 
look like. For----
    Senator Barrasso. You know, I just asked about options that 
are out there, yes.
    Mr. Nakoa. Sure. And in the event that, you know, we are 
not able to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2023 or 
2024 with Palau, I mean, the current Compacts have certain 
mechanisms built in for the FSM and RMI that would mean that 
they would revert to the disbursements from the Compact Trust 
Funds. There is still work to be done from the Compact Trust 
Fund Committees in terms of what those disbursements would or 
could look like as well as what the longevity of the Compact 
Trust Funds and the strategy around that will be, but you know, 
that is work that would have to be done in the event that we 
are not able to create a better outcome through the 
negotiations. I would also add that, you know, Congress also 
has plenty of authority too.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hirono.
    Senator Hirono. Thank you. I have a follow-up question. 
This is for Mr. Nakoa and Mr. Lambert. It is my understanding 
that the Administration still has not confirmed that certain 
U.S. programs will continue to operate in the FAS after Fiscal 
Year 2023 and 2024. This includes critical services like the 
postal service, supplemental education grants, and FEMA 
disaster assistance. Does the Administration support the 
continued operation of these programs and services in the 
Freely Associated States in the upcoming Compact negotiations?
    Mr. Lambert. Senator, not to split hairs but the Compact 
negotiations themselves are one thing. These other services are 
something else. But I would like to emphasize that Ambassador 
Yun will be empowered to hear out all concerns that all three 
parties have and we will then, of course, need to work with the 
interagency and with Congress to fulfill those requests.
    Senator Hirono. So if the programs that I talked about will 
not be the subject of the Compact negotiations, then does the 
Administration support continuing these programs regardless?
    Mr. Lambert. I know I personally do.
    Senator Hirono. Okay. Put your best efforts forward.
    Mr. Lambert. Yes, ma'am.
    Senator Hirono. Mr. Nakoa, do you share that sentiment?
    Mr. Nakoa. Yes, and I would just say that we have been 
working with the interagency to find solutions, and we hope to 
honestly work with the FAS to find more creative solutions to 
meet all needs or requests as they come up in terms of the 
negotiation. As DAS Lambert has very much stressed today, 
Ambassador Yun will be empowered to hear any proposal from the 
FAS. And so, yes, unfortunately, I have not been able to have 
those conversations thus far with the FAS, but you know, I look 
forward to Ambassador Yun's leadership and us being able to be 
in a position with the negotiations to start creating solutions 
and working to find how to best figure out ways to enable 
federal services that benefit both the United States and FAS.
    Senator Hirono. I think it is really important to continue 
the programmatic support, but at the same time, I hope that we 
can use these negotiations in some other context. For example, 
to expand access to broadband or telemedicine for our FAS 
partners because these are nations that could use a lot more 
support in a lot more areas from us, and especially as we were 
talking about China extending its so-called hand of friendship, 
but mainly it is to, you know, expand their sphere of influence 
in these countries. So I hope we can also bring to the 
discussion ways to help the FAS countries modernize their 
systems and platforms.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I want to thank you all for your testifying today and 
helping us better understand what challenges we have ahead of 
us. So I recognize it is in our best interest to prioritize the 
Compact negotiations, as this sends a strong signal to our 
allies about the importance of maintaining a strong and close 
relationship with the Freely Associated States and to ensure 
that we are doing our best to deter Chinese expansion in the 
Pacific. I have previously said that this Committee has a 
responsibility to look ahead to the problems that may arise if 
the financial assistance afforded by the Compacts comes to an 
end.
    We will continue to monitor the status of the Compact 
negotiations, and at some point in the future, we would like to 
invite Ambassador Yun, the newly appointed Special Presidential 
Envoy for Compact Negotiations, to come testify before our 
Committee.
    Members are going to have until the close of business 
tomorrow to submit additional questions for the record.
    The Committee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                      APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED

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