[Senate Hearing 117-465]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-465
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES TO THE UNITED
STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, INCLUDING THE
COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, AND THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 29, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILBLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-894 WASHINGTON : 2024
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia, Chairman
RON WYDEN, Oregon JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE LEE, Utah
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico STEVE DAINES, Montana
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
MARK KELLY, Arizona BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana
JOHN W. HICKENLOOPER, Colorado CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
ROGER MARSHALL, Kansas
Renae Black, Staff Director
Sam E. Fowler, Chief Counsel
Melanie Thornton, Professional Staff Member
Richard M. Russell, Republican Staff Director
Matthew H. Leggett, Republican Chief Counsel
Brian Clifford, Republican Principal Deputy Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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OPENING STATEMENTS
Page
Manchin III, Hon. Joe, Chairman and a U.S. Senator from West
Virginia....................................................... 1
Barrasso, Hon. John, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from
Wyoming........................................................ 3
WITNESSES
Lambert, Mark, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.................. 4
Mohandas, Dr. Siddharth, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for East Asia, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 14
Nakoa, Keone, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Insular and
International Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior......... 20
ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED
Barrasso, Hon. John:
Opening Statement............................................ 3
New York Times article entitled ``China Close to Signing
Secret Security Accord With Solomon Islands''.............. 38
Lambert, Mark:
Opening Statement............................................ 4
Written Testimony............................................ 7
Questions for the Record..................................... 53
Manchin III, Hon. Joe:
Opening Statement............................................ 1
Mohandas, Dr. Siddharth:
Opening Statement............................................ 14
Written Testimony............................................ 17
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 58
Nakoa, Keone:
Opening Statement............................................ 20
Written Testimony............................................ 22
Responses to Questions for the Record........................ 64
Zackios, Gerald M.:
Letter for the Record........................................ 75
THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES TO THE UNITED
STATES AND OUR ALLIES IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION, INCLUDING THE
COMPACTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION WITH THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA,
THE REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS, AND THE REPUBLIC OF PALAU
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TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-366, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joe Manchin
III, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE MANCHIN III,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.
Let me thank both of you for being here. We appreciate it,
and I think we have one person who is going to be with us
virtually. Our Committee meets today to discuss the importance
of our strategic alliance with the Freely Associated States of
the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau and negotiating the
expiring provisions of the Compacts of Free Association. There
is broad consensus between Republicans and Democrats and the
Administration of the growing importance of the Indo-Pacific
region to American security and the need to prioritize our
relationship with the Freely Associated States. While our
attention remains focused on Putin's atrocious actions in
Ukraine, we must not turn a blind eye to the potentially severe
consequences of China's continued aggression toward Taiwan and
the Indo-Pacific region at large. Central to the Compacts
include economic assistance provisions and access to certain
federal programs and services, like the U.S. Postal Service,
that are set to expire in 2023 for the Marshall Islands and
Micronesia, and in 2024 for Palau. It remains in America's best
interest to expedite these negotiations to demonstrate our
loyalty to these special allies and our longstanding commitment
to maintaining peace and security in this region.
Senator Barrasso and I have sent Secretary Haaland and
Secretary Blinken two letters urging the Administration to
expedite the Compact negotiation process in light of our
national security interests. The Administration shared some
good news last week. Ambassador Yun was appointed as Special
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, and I am
optimistic that his appointment marks a new chapter in our
efforts to renew the Compacts of Free Association. In
considering the Compacts' renewal, we must not forget the
longstanding relationship formed between the United States and
the people of the Freely Associated States in the aftermath of
World War II. The Compacts of Free Association emerged as an
extension of the United States-United Nations trusteeship
agreement, which recognizes the strategic importance of the
Pacific Islands. It allowed the United States to establish an
unrestricted military presence on the islands and in the
surrounding waters which cover an area larger than the
continental United States to prevent future aggressions in the
region. In return, the trusteeship obligated the United States
to foster the economic development and self-sufficiency of the
islands and to promote the well-being of their people.
The U.N. trusteeship eventually dissolved, replaced by the
Compacts of Free Association, which allow the United States to
maintain defense and security rights in exchange for economic
assistance to the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau.
Today, the Freely Associated States' economies face immense
challenges, including limited natural and human resources,
remote locations, poor infrastructure, pandemic recovery, and
assorted environmental issues. All three nations rely on the
key services and financial assistance that we have provided
under the Compacts for over 35 years. The Compacts are
scheduled to have provided $2.5 billion to the Marshall Islands
by 2023, $3.7 billion to Micronesia by 2023, and $803 million
to Palau by 2024. Compact funding has primarily supported
healthcare and education in the Freely Associated States, but
it has also helped fund infrastructure projects, disaster
response and recovery, and more.
To put it plainly, we cannot afford to abandon the Freely
Associated States nor our strategic military presence in the
Indo-Pacific, given the threat of our current adversaries.
China has long been leveraging its economic power to undermine
the autonomy of countries throughout the Pacific region by
offering easy money, then applying coercive economic policies.
The Marshall Islands are one of China's top priority
recipients, and China is a significant source of foreign aid to
Micronesia. In 2017, Beijing essentially banned Chinese
tourists from visiting Palau, whose economy is heavily reliant
on tourism. The United States must be proactive in coming to
the negotiation table to maintain our alliance in the Indo-
Pacific and to ensure these countries remain economically free
from coercive strategies. We must not send the signal to China
that the Freely Associated States are an opportunity to expand
their authoritarian interests and influence. Given our interest
in maintaining strong and close relationships with the Freely
Associated States, our defense interests, and our interest in
deterring China's expansion in the Pacific, this Committee has
a responsibility to look ahead to the problems that may arise
if the financial assistance afforded by the Compacts comes to
an end.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses from the
Department of the Interior, the Department of State, and the
Department of Defense, regarding their plans to coordinate an
expedited negotiation process that shows the Freely Associated
States and China that they are a top U.S. priority. I want to
thank the Administration officials for being here with us today
to help us learn more about this issue. And with that, I am
going to turn it over to Senator Barrasso for his opening
remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WYOMING
Senator Barrasso. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks for holding this important hearing and thanks to the
witnesses who are joining us today.
Today is really a great opportunity to discuss the
strategic importance of our Freely Associated States in the
Indo-Pacific region. They play a vital role in our deterrence
of an even and ever more aggressive China. The war in Ukraine
has raised the alarm to the world. We are seeing a shifting of
the global world order as we know it. A belligerent and hostile
Russia has reminded Europe that the world is not a peaceful
place. Security, peace, and stability can no longer be taken
for granted there. At the same time, aggressive countries, like
China, with larger global ambitions are watching. They are
watching to upset the security and power dynamic in the region
and to threaten Taiwan. We cannot take their actions lightly.
We should do all that we can to deter them from taking the same
course as Russia.
The Compacts of Free Association that we have with the
Freely Associated States of the Marshall Islands, Micronesia,
and Palau, are a key part in that deterrence. These island
nations and our U.S. territories of Guam, the Commonwealth of
the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa, they form an
important line of support and defense for the U.S. and our
allies in the Pacific. The military assets and personnel that
we currently have stationed on these islands, they do and help
provide stability. So will our future plans for additional
facilities and assets. The Compacts of Free Association
facilitate these strong bonds. They are critical to continuing
our historically strong relationships with these nations. The
Administration has stated they understand the priority of the
Compacts in their recently released Indo-Pacific strategy of
the United States. In its Indo-Pacific strategy, the
Administration stated, ``We will also prioritize negotiations
on our Compacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated
States as the bedrock,'' they say, ``of the U.S. role in the
Pacific.''
However, as Chairman Manchin and I have noted in our recent
letter to the Administration, to date, despite these statements
by the Administration, there has been no formal Compact
negotiation meeting between any of the FAS and the
Administration since the year 2020, meaning none with the Biden
Administration. Actions speak louder than words, as the
Chairman has said. China is on the move. Time is running out
for renewing the expiring provisions of these Compacts. The
agencies before us today, the Departments of Interior and
State, as well as the Department of Defense, need to work
together to get these negotiations back on track. Now is not
the time to send a signal to our adversaries that the U.S. does
not consider the Freely Associated States a strategic priority.
We cannot allow China to forge stronger ties with these nations
at our expense and at the expense of our allies. The people of
the Freely Associated States have stood by us as steadfast
allies. They expect, in return, that their priorities are
heard.
With the three agencies before us today, it is my hope, Mr.
Chairman, that we can get a better sense of what is being done
to deter China and what the barriers are to moving forward with
these Compact negotiations. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look
forward to the testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
I would like to turn to our witnesses now, and we are going
to begin with Mr. Lambert, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs with the
Department of State.
He will then be followed by Dr. Mohandas, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Department of
Defense.
Finally, we are going to hear from Mr. Nakoa, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Insular and International Affairs with
the Department of the Interior.
I want to thank you all for joining us today. And Mr.
Lambert, we will start with you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF MARK LAMBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Lambert. Thank you very much, Senator.
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished
members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to testify on the importance of the
Freely Associated States, both to the United States, as well as
to our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific Region. I am
very pleased to be here today with Deputy Assistant Secretary
Keone Nakoa of the Department of the Interior and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, Dr. Siddharth
Mohandas.
As the most dynamic and fastest growing demographic area on
earth, the Indo-Pacific is a vital region. The Indo-Pacific
strategy, the first regional strategy released by the
Administration, reflects renewed U.S. commitment to deepen our
engagement in the region and build innovative links with local
allies, partners, and institutions so we can collectively
address the urgent challenges that face the Pacific Islands. As
was pointed out, our relationships with the Republic of the
Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Republic of Palau, collectively referred to as the Freely
Associated States, have, since World War II, contributed to a
secure, stable, and prosperous Western Pacific and a strategic
location for the United States in the larger Indo-Pacific
region. Reflecting the unique and longstanding relationship
between the United States and the Freely Associated States, the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services provided the FAS
with enough vaccines for their entire populations as well as
personal protective equipment and technical and financial
assistance to combat COVID-19. The Republic of the Marshall
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau are also
historically among the United States' strongest supporters at
the United Nations. Most recently, all three countries stood
alongside the United States and made strong statements at the
United Nations in support of Ukraine. It is significant that
Micronesia even severed diplomatic relations with Russia.
Moreover, Palau and the Marshall Islands are two of the 14
countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. These
relationships are under enormous pressure from the PRC, as
Taiwan has lost eight diplomatic partners since 2016.
In recent years, the PRC has expanded its engagement with
the Pacific Islands. Between 2006 to 2018, the PRC provided
$1.8 billion in assistance to the Pacific Islands, which would
put them third in the region after Australia, which provided
$7.7 billion and the United States, which provided $1.9
billion. That being said, the United States welcomes
opportunity to collaborate with partners, including even the
PRC, if our interests and development goals overlap in the
Pacific Islands. The Biden-Harris Administration is
prioritizing Compact negotiations with the Federated States of
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and Palau as
a U.S. foreign policy objective. We are coordinating closely
across our interagency to evaluate a range of options to
promote continuing assistance to all three countries. As
Senator Manchin pointed out, in light of the critical nature of
these complex negotiations, President Biden appointed retired
Ambassador Joseph Yun as the Special Presidential Envoy for
Compact Negotiations on March 22nd. Ambassador Yun has more
than 33 years of diplomatic experience, including as our
country's Special Representative for North Korea Policy and as
the United States Ambassador to Malaysia.
The U.S. Compact team is focused on continuing with
productive talks in order to complete these negotiations in a
timely fashion. To date, the negotiation team has consulted on
subsidiary agreements under the Compact with each of the Freely
Associated states covering certain federal programs and
services and direct economic assistance, contingent on the
availability of funding. The U.S. Compact team has held
numerous negotiations and discussions with representatives from
the Federated States of Micronesia, and U.S. officials remain
eager and ready to engage with the Marshall Islands, and
particularly with respect to provisions that expire after
Fiscal Year 2023, and have sought associated discussions.
Likewise, with Palau, we remain ready to engage in the required
Compact review that already is broad in scope and flexible. And
we are also ready to resume negotiations on possible assistance
after Fiscal Year 2024--that is in the case of the Federated
States of Micronesia--and the Republic of the Marshall Islands
has been a core element of the overall Compact relationship.
As part of our most recent engagement efforts, we have
proposed in-person meetings with each country to further
negotiations and address issues that remain. As I noted,
negotiators seek to complete negotiations in a timely fashion,
understanding that Congress needs sufficient time to enact
legislation, as needed, before any agreements amending the
Compacts are brought into force and to provide Congress the
opportunity to appropriate funds to avoid any lapses in
assistance. To that end, we look forward to engaging with
Congress as negotiations progress. We understand that
successful negotiations are crucial to deepening our strategic
partnership with Pacific Island countries in support of a free,
open, and secure Indo-Pacific.
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished
members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you today, and we look forward to working closely
with Congress to ensure that our country can effectively secure
U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lambert follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Lambert.
Now we are going to hear from Dr. Mohandas. Doctor, thank
you so much for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. SIDDHARTH MOHANDAS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member
Barrasso, and distinguished members of the Committee. My name
is Dr. Siddharth Mohandas, and I serve as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and I am pleased to have
the opportunity to testify before you today alongside DAS
Lambert from State and DAS Nakoa of Interior.
The United States is an Indo-Pacific nation with deep
linkages with our partners in the Pacific Islands region. We
share a unique and special relationship with this critical
crossroads of the Indo-Pacific. Forged on the World War II
Pacific Campaign battlefields of Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and
Peleliu, we share a history defined by sacrifice. Today, our
peoples value democracy, freedom, and human rights. We share
the same profound concerns over the existential threat from
climate change and seek opportunities to build prosperous and
healthy societies.
Last August, when the President of the Republic of Palau,
President Surangel Whipps, visited Secretary Austin at the
Pentagon, he remarked that the United States and Palau are
``like family.'' Our Pacific Island family matters greatly to
the United States, and nowhere is as critical as the Freely
Associated States of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall
Islands. When Secretary Austin met with President Whipps, he
said that the Department of Defense was committed to upholding
the U.S. responsibility and authority for defense and security
matters in and related to Palau and the other Freely Associated
states. The Department will work with each of the Freely
Associated States on addressing the most pressing defense and
security needs. As we engage with and partner with Palau,
Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands, the Compacts of Free
Association communicate our long-term commitment to our Pacific
Island partners. Another unique aspect of the Freely Associated
States is their commitment to and service in the U.S. military.
They have served alongside us in every major conflict, and we
at the Department of Defense are profoundly grateful for that.
The Compacts of Free Association with each of the Freely
Associated States facilitate an unprecedented strategic
partnership with our Palauan, Micronesian, and Marshallese
partners. The United States has responsibility and authority
for defense and security matters, and greatly values the unique
access, basing, and overflight afforded us in each of these
countries. The Compacts also allow the United States the right
to strategically foreclose such access, basing, and overflight
to third country militaries. In an era of intensifying
geopolitical competition, this is vital to U.S. national
security interests. The Department of Defense is supporting our
interagency partners as the U.S. Government seeks to negotiate
amendments to allow for the continued provision of certain
economic assistance, including federal programs and services
that would otherwise expire to the Freely Associated States.
The Department of Defense has a vested interest in seeing the
successful and mutually beneficial completion of the
negotiations so that we can continue to bolster our strategic
partnership with each of the Freely Associated States.
Now, the United States is not the only nation that
recognizes the significance of the strategic geography of
Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands. The People's
Republic of China is seeking to expand its influence in the
Freely Associated States, and the PRC is increasing its
concerning activities throughout the Pacific Islands region.
From illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing to outright
bullying of sovereign nations that have diplomatic ties with
Taiwan, the PRC's provocative behavior appears to be focused on
seeking to erode the U.S. strategic partnership with the Freely
Associated States. The Compacts of Free Association are an
important signal to both our partners, as well as our
competitors, that the U.S. commitment to the Freely Associated
States is ironclad. U.S. security cooperation activities and
investments in the Freely Associated States are mutually
beneficial and advance strategic partnerships with each of our
countries. These include security assistance aimed at building
partner capacity as well as our Civic Action Team in Palau,
which, for the past 50 years, has provided rotational
detachments of engineers and medical teams that have promoted
people-to-people ties through community relations and programs.
We also conduct a number of exercises jointly and through
services in Palau and the other Freely Associated States.
The Pacific Islands also present opportunities for
increased cooperation with our closest allies and partners.
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, France, and others all share our
interest in the region's strategic importance, and we will find
ways to leverage our comparative advantages to further
strengthen our capacity building activities in the region. For
example, in 2020, the United States, Australia, and Japan
partnered to finance an undersea cable project for Palau. We
have also cooperated with Australia on enhancing maritime
domain awareness, and seeking ways to ensure that we do that in
a complementary fashion. I must also note that the Compacts of
Free Association enabled key defense posture initiatives in the
Indo-Pacific region. The Republic of the Marshall Islands hosts
the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site at U.S.
Army Garrison-Kwajalein Atoll. This site conducts regular space
operations to provide space situational awareness and the
protection of key space assets supporting three geographic
combatant commands. It is ideally located for the observation
of foreign missile launches and facilitates advanced technology
testing for DOD. Future cooperation with the Federated States
of Micronesia will facilitate agile combat employment for the
U.S. Air Force and the highly anticipated Tactical Multi-
Mission Over-the-Horizon Radar, or TACMOR, in Palau will
provide the Department of Defense an unprecedented level of
situational awareness of the maritime domain in the Indo-
Pacific region.
Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso, distinguished
Senators and colleagues, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today about the strategic importance of the Freely
Associated States to U.S. national security. I look forward to
your questions and will be happy to answer them.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Mohandas follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Mohandas.
Now we are going to hear from Mr. Nakoa. I hope you are
feeling better, sir, and I understand you were not able to
travel today, but I really appreciate you making the effort to
be with us.
STATEMENT OF KEONE NAKOA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, INSULAR
AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Mr. Nakoa. Of course, thank you so much.
Good morning, Chairman Manchin, Ranking Member Barrasso,
and honored members of the Committee. My apologies for not
being able to attend in person as I had planned, but thank you
to the Committee and to your wonderful staff for the last-
minute accommodations.
I am Keone Nakoa, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the
Interior for Insular and International Affairs. I am deeply
honored to be here representing Secretary of the Interior Deb
Haaland in today's hearing alongside DAS Lambert from State and
DAS Mohandas from the DOD. I respectfully request that my full
written testimony be made a part of the hearing record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Nakoa. Thank you.
In addition to overseeing the Secretary's duties to the
United States, the U.S. territories of American Samoa, CNMI,
Guam, and the USVI, I also lead DOI's administration of the
Compacts of Free Association between the United States and the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of Palau,
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)--collectively,
the Freely Associated States, or the FAS. DOI partners with
other departments and agencies operating in the FAS under the
Compacts, including State, Defense, FAA, FEMA, USPS, the
Departments of Education, Energy, Health and Human Services,
Homeland Security, the FDIC, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, and others. While the last Administration began the
third round of COFA negotiations in 2020 by emphasizing the
strategic importance of the FAS, as the Chair and Ranking
Member have highlighted this morning, it was hampered by the
determination of some of the FAS to address unresolved issues
relating to the current implementation for both the Compacts,
as amended, and relevant U.S. law, as well as issues settled in
the 1986 Compact that the RMI wishes to revive from the second
round of the COFA negotiations in 2003.
At the end of 2020, the U.S. negotiators presented the
three FAS with ``Non-Paper'' economic proposals that did not
address demands from the FAS and lacked provisions from key
federal agencies. Those proposals were limited to extending and
amending only certain expiring economic assistance provisions
with a perceived downgrading of assurance levels for all
economic assistance. Moreover, instead of the full faith and
credit assurances in the original 1986 Compact, or mandatory
funding--the grant model--all economic assistance was proposed
to be funded through discretionary appropriations. The RMI had
responded in 2021 to the informal U.S. proposal with a
conceptual counterproposal containing a proposed negotiating
agenda. The President of Palau, as was noted previously, came
to Washington and explained to the U.S. Cabinet level officials
in 2021 that the 2020 offers were inadequate and unacceptable.
All of FSM remains engaged, including informal talks with this
team in Honolulu last year, last November, and a discussion
with USGS about their current operations in the FSM earlier
this month. Many of the most complex issues remain, including
infrastructure assistance and trust fund management processes.
When I assumed my duties as DAS in the Fall of 2021 and was
assigned to serve as the Interior Department's COFA co-
negotiator, the RMI and Palau had already refused to continue
COFA negotiations without certain conditions being met. Given
the history of the 2020 and 2021 negotiations, particularly
with Palau and RMI, in 2021, the Biden-Harris COFA team began
an intensive review of the polices put in place during the last
Administration, taking feedback from Congress and the FAS into
consideration. As a result of that review, we identified
several areas where the U.S. negotiation strategy and
expectations of the FAS were misaligned. Specifically, we noted
the barriers related to the lack of consideration of mandatory
funding proposals to the FAS, the need to appoint a
Presidential representative, and the need for broader
discussion of COFA-related issues respectful of all parties.
Today, I am optimistic, and pleased to report to this Committee
recent actions from the Biden-Harris Administration, chiefly
the naming of Ambassador Joseph Yun as the Special Presidential
Envoy for Compact Negotiations on March 22, with interagency
reach to address a broader range of issues than that of any
single department, and the Administration's support to request
the necessary and mandatory funding for implementing the
agreements that are reached in the negotiation process, as
previewed in the President's budget and released yesterday. The
Administration has taken steps to put the negotiations back on
a viable track for timely completion and approval of agreements
by the United States and FAS, which is still achievable as long
as we have the commitment and cooperation of all three FAS as
well as federal stakeholders to move forward.
Although we have not yet worked out every detail of the
many complex issues in these negotiations, with the new Special
Presidential Envoy, I am hopeful that we can quickly take the
initial and necessary step of hearing each other out in a way
that allows our countries to raise matters of importance and to
find those areas of negotiation on which you do share a mutual
understanding very soon. From there, we will need the FAS to be
prepared to provide their own proposals to resume discussions
leading to a new beginning to earnest negotiations. We look
forward to the continued engagement from this Committee and
both chambers of Congress. My written statement also included a
historical narrative about the success of the Compact. For that
success to continue, the FAS need to come forward with their
proposals and solutions so we can finish our mission and bring
an agreement to Congress in time for you in Congress to be able
to do your jobs as well. I believe we can accomplish this
mission and pledge support and work with the Administration's
Special Presidential Envoy and all seekers to ensure we do.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nakoa follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Chairman. Thank you. And now, we have our questions. We
will start with our questions and I will begin with mine, and
mine is going to be an overreaching statement that I want all
three of you to kind of comment on.
But basically, knowing what is going on in the region that
we are discussing right now on the islands, and how strategic
that has been for us for so many years, is there a sense by the
people that live there that the United States has not fulfilled
its commitment? That they do not have a comfort level with us
and are talking to China? Do they understand the gravity of
working with China and what that could mean as far as their
freedoms of basically making decisions and working in a
democratic process and not a committed one because of
obligation? I am just trying to get a feel for what is going on
here because we see a lot of movement of China, not just there,
but all over the world, but especially there being in their
back yard.
So if you can just tell me what we are dealing with and
what more we can do to give the confidence to the people that
we relish and we cherish this relationship and I hope they do
not think we have taken it for granted. So, we will start with
Mr. Lambert and we will just go right down the line, okay?
Your honest opinion on what you are seeing.
Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
Mr. Lambert. Senator, the Chinese are looking at the
Pacific Islands as a vital part of a bigger strategy. It is
obvious they are investing in infrastructure development. They
are putting people into areas where they traditionally have
not--for instance, in the Solomon Islands, going beyond the
three countries we were talking about in the FAS. They are also
really amping up their diplomatic presence in that region. Part
of this is trying to push Taiwan----
The Chairman. Is their reach greater than what ours has
been, or have we basically dropped down to where we are not
giving the attention that we said we would or we had in the
past?
Mr. Lambert. I would not characterize it that way, sir. I
would say that they have upped their game. We need to up our
game.
The Chairman. Got you.
Mr. Lambert. We are working together. I hope it is evident
here by our three agencies being latched up in a way we need to
be. We are looking at ways to amp up our diplomatic presence.
You probably saw that when Secretary Blinken was in Fiji last
month, he announced our intention to reopen an embassy in the
Solomon Islands. We have other plans in the works to expand our
diplomatic presence. We are also talking about expanding the
offering of federal services to the Freely Associated States
that they have asked for. And I think the message we are
sending now is being well received. I am confident that with
the announcement of Joe Yun being the Presidential Envoy that
we will be engaged in formal negotiations readily.
But you are exactly right, sir, we are in a competition and
we need to put our best people forward on it.
The Chairman. Dr. Mohandas, your observation?
Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Chairman Manchin.
Let me first just make a comment from a defense perspective
and note that one of the several unique aspects of the Compacts
of Free Association is that we have, as I noted in my
testimony, unrestricted access basing and overflight rights in
the Freely Associated States as well as the right to deny any
third countries from developing a military presence in the
Freely Associated States and that those rights exist in
perpetuity. And in return----
The Chairman. Are we enforcing that right now? We are not
allowing any one of those islands to basically negotiate with
China on any type of activity militarily?
Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, but I should also clarify that
they have not attempted to do so either.
And in return, we also provide for their defense, you know,
as you note, in a dangerous world. And so, I think from that
perspective, the U.S. commitment to the Freely Associated
States is ironclad and is something that----
The Chairman. You think they feel that way? They feel that
our commitment is ironclad?
Dr. Mohandas. I do believe that, sir.
The Chairman. And that we have not neglected them?
Dr. Mohandas. I believe that is the case, and that is when
President Whipps came and met with Secretary Austin. He
specifically highlighted the importance of our defense
relationship and our longstanding defense relationship. But you
are absolutely right, Senator, that China is seeking to expand
its influence throughout the entire Pacific Islands region, and
specifically the Freely Associated States, and is offering a
number of economic steps to do that.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Mohandas. Thank you.
The Chairman. How about Mr. Nakoa, real quick. I know I am
running over my time here. I am so sorry to cut you off, sir,
but we have time limits.
Mr. Nakoa. No problem. I just wanted to say quickly that I
concur with what DAS Lambert just said. We are in a competition
with the FAS. With that said, we remain the partner of choice
for all three FAS.
The Chairman. Do you feel that we still have that type of
presence there?
Mr. Nakoa. We do, and I think that there is a feeling from
my meetings with President Whipps last week and discussions
with the FSM earlier that they would like for the United States
to remain the partner of choice, but like DAS Lambert said, we
need to up our game, and I think that the last recent actions
from the Administration with Envoy Yun and mandatory spending
do exactly that.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you all so much.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Well, thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Mohandas, you talked about the defense
relationship. The Air Force operates 450 Minuteman
intercontinental nuclear missiles located in my home State of
Wyoming, as well as Montana and North Dakota. Both of those
states are also represented with members on this Committee.
According to the Air Force, a few times a year, a missile
without its nuclear warhead is actually pulled from its silo.
These missiles are then launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base
in California to a test range in the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, also known as the Ronald Reagan test site. The
Minuteman III nuclear missile test launches are conducted on a
rotational basis. Wyoming crews from F.E. Warren Air Force Base
as well as crews from North Dakota and Montana Air Force bases.
So how important is this Ronald Reagan test site in the
Marshall Islands in terms of our--you know, you talked about
our defense relationships in terms of our military readiness--
and how important are these tests as part of our nuclear
deterrence on countries such as China?
Dr. Mohandas. Thank you, Senator.
The Ronald Reagan test site is vitally important and it is
vitally important for our ballistic missile testing. We test
hypersonics there. That testing is critical to ensuring the
safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent, as you note,
sir. And then, the Ronald Reagan test site and Kwajalein Atoll,
the garrison there, also are critical for our space situational
awareness.
Senator Barrasso. In terms of one of the follow-ups to what
Senator Manchin had to say, Dr. Mohandas, your written
testimony caught me. I was very interested. It said, the
People's Republic of China, the PRC, is seeking to expand, you
said, its influence in the Freely Associated States, and the
PRC is increasing its--your words--intimidating activities
throughout the Pacific Islands region. Can you briefly give
some examples as to how China is trying to expand its influence
in the Freely Associated States?
Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, Senator.
So, first to be clear, the PRC is seeking to expand its
influence throughout the Pacific Islands region because they,
too, perceive it to be a strategic region. With respect to the
Freely Associated States in particular, I would note that Palau
and the Republic of the Marshall Islands maintain diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, and obviously, that is a source of
intense focus for the PRC as part of their longstanding effort
to reduce Taiwan's international space. And so, we have seen,
frankly, coercive behavior, including, as Senator Manchin
noted, efforts to manipulate tourism numbers, reduce tourism
numbers to Palau, and also, just generally, I would suggest,
increase economic dependency on the PRC and throughout the
Freely Associated States.
Senator Barrasso. Well, to Mr. Lambert, along this line--
there is a story in the New York Times. You probably saw it,
page A6 on Saturday, ``China Close to Signing Secret Security
Accord With Solomon Islands.''
[The article referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Barrasso. And you know, the article states that if
signed, it would give the Prime Minister of the Solomon
Islands, ``the ability to call on China for protection of its
own government while granting China a base of operations
between the United States and Australia that could be used to
block shipping traffic across the South Pacific.'' So it is
clear China has a long-term strategy for gaining influence in
the Indo-Pacific region, including the Freely Associated States
and their neighbors. Could you briefly give some specific
examples of what actions China has already taken to gain
influence in the region and how you view the potential security
agreement that is reported here in the New York Times between
China and the Solomon Islands?
Mr. Lambert. Senator Barrasso, I think the Chinese have a
pretty well-established kit bag of leverage that they use, not
just in the Pacific Islands, but also in East Asia. You know
how they use investment. We have seen in recent years where
they punished South Korea after the Republic of Korea deployed
the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system by cutting off
investment. We saw in Vietnam how after there was a
confrontation involving a Chinese oil rig in the waters off of
Vietnam, the Chinese used cutting off tourism and cutting off
the purchases of agricultural goods from that country to
enforce leverage. The same thing potentially could happen in
the Pacific.
Dr. Mohandas talked about how reliant these countries are
on tourism. Palau, in particular, gets most of its revenues
from tourism. Just because of its geography, many of those
tourists are Chinese, and they can be turned on and off with a
switch, once COVID is behind us. In a similar fashion, as China
buys more and more goods from these countries, these countries
are going to be more and more dependent. We are seeing very
heavily leveraged loans, in the case of a country like Tonga.
Tonga owes a huge amount of its foreign debt to the PRC. That
is leverage. These are the types of things that we need to work
on, not just with the Freely Associated States, but with all
the countries in the Pacific, through the Pacific Island Forum
and with our closest allies and partners, like Australia, New
Zealand, the UK, France, and Japan, to push back.
Senator Barrasso. Even though we may be the partner of
choice, due to this leverage and forced applications, we may
end up in the long-term not being the partner that they choose?
Mr. Lambert. Senator, that is what is at risk. I think that
is very well said, yes, sir.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And now we will have Senator Heinrich.
Senator Heinrich. I think the way that you summed that up,
Senator Barrasso, in terms of partner of choice versus the
partner that they choose really gets at what our challenge is
in the South Pacific. You know, people brought up the question
of has there been neglect? Have we kept our promises over the
years? And I would urge all of our colleagues to spend some
time there to see the capabilities in Kwajalein that you
reference, Senator Barrasso, to see also the impacts to places
like Bikini and Enewetak.
According to the government of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands, the Nuclear Claims Tribunal has been unable to pay $23
million in personal injury awards and $2.2 billion in property
damage awards due to a lack of funds. The Marshall Islands
government regards these unfunded awards as part of ``the core
of all discussions on nuclear justice.'' My father was a
witness to two of the detonations in the Marshall Islands and
paid a pretty steep health cost for his proximity to those, and
I can only imagine the scale of what the Marshallese sacrificed
as a result of all that testing. So, Mr. Lambert and Mr. Nakoa,
is additional compensation related to past U.S. nuclear weapons
testing being discussed in the negotiations of the Marshall
Islands? And if not, why not?
Mr. Lambert. Senator, we negotiated a full and final
settlement of the nuclear issue with the Marshall Islands
several years ago and the Congress approved that. Nonetheless,
we are open to hearing any concerns any of the Freely
Associated States have. Ambassador Yun will be empowered to
hear any concerns that the citizens of these countries have. We
will then, of course, need to work closely with colleagues in
the Administration and in Congress to see what our country
could do.
Senator Heinrich. I recognize what we negotiated. I have
also seen with my own eyes what the reality on what ground is
left is there. This is a place where the culture and the
community is really struggling with not only the impacts of
that testing, but also the direct impacts of climate change and
sea-level rise, and those things compound on each other.
I do want to ask, Dr. Mohandas, can you elaborate a little
more on the very acute threat that--what I would call pirate
fishing, what is often referred to as illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing by the PRC--poses to all of our South
Pacific allies?
Dr. Mohandas. Absolutely, Senator. As you know, illegal,
unregulated, non-reported fishing is a major, major challenge
throughout the region and not just in the Pacific Islands, I
mean, what you see up and down the Indo-Pacific is PRC fishing
fleets, associated maritime militia moving en masse to rich
fishing grounds, engaging in sort of industrial scale catches--
--
Senator Heinrich. Primarily trawling and long lines.
Dr. Mohandas. Precisely.
And this has a huge impact. It certainly depletes fishery
stocks in fragile ecosystems. It has an outsize economic
impact, obviously, crowding out indigenous fishermen and
fishing industries.
Senator Heinrich. Yes, the irony of what I saw in the area
around Kwajalein was the inability due largely to lack of fuel,
in particular, for local communities to be able to access a
very rich fishing resource. Yet, you had pirate fishing coming
in that was absolutely devastating and of a scale that was
nothing like the traditional local use. Are there
opportunities, as we have this broader conversation around
remote sensing, and in particular, cooperation with the U.S.
Coast Guard, to get a better handle on pirate fishing across
the South Pacific?
Dr. Mohandas. It is absolutely a focus area for the
Department of Defense and a focus of our security assistance in
the area. We have allocated $20 million to help build partner
capacity and enhance maritime domain awareness. So it will
absolutely remain a priority.
Senator Heinrich. It seems like there is a real opportunity
there with what we can see, even from just commercial satellite
imagery these days, to not just patrol, but to have our
capabilities, our resources, when we can do partnership with
these various governments to have them in the right place to
actually intercept that pirate fishing. Thank you.
Dr. Mohandas. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
And now we are going to have, let's see--Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am really glad that, Mr. Chairman, you are having this
hearing on the importance of our relationship with our friends,
the Freely Associated States. Well, the United States accepted
the responsibility to compensate the people of the Marshall
Islands, and not fully, by the way, as I do share the concerns
that Senator Heinrich expressed. On March 1st, in honor of
Nuclear Victims Remembrance Day in the Marshall Islands,
Senator Markey and I introduced a resolution formally
apologizing to the people of the Republic of the Marshall
Islands for the U.S. nuclear testing program and affirming the
importance of the Compact of Free Association.
This is for all of our witnesses. Does the Administration
support formally apologizing to the people and government of
the Republic of the Marshall Islands for the damages caused by
our country's nuclear testing program?
We will start with you, Mr. Lambert, and then we will just
go down the line.
Mr. Lambert. Senator, we do acknowledge that our nuclear
testing caused tremendous devastation in the Marshall Islands.
As to your specific question, do we support a formal apology? I
honestly do not know the answer to that, but I will try to get
you the answer to that.
Dr. Mohandas. Senator, likewise, you know, I would say the
United States has recognized the affects of our nuclear testing
program and has accepted and acted on our responsibility to the
people of the RMI. And on the question of the apology, I think
we are happy to take that back.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Nakoa.
Mr. Nakoa. Aloha Senator Hirono.
You know, with regard to the bigger picture, as DAS Lambert
and DAS Mohandas have said, the United States has recognized
its responsibility and its role in significant--nuclear testing
legacy, and I think, you know, apologies and you know, what
possibilities should be on the table, and as DAS Lambert kind
of mentioned, we want to ensure that we are able to hear from
the RMI on what kinds of provisions and what things that they
would like to propose in terms of things being left out. And
with that in mind, you know--apology--I just want to make sure
that we're not just doing an apology alone. But with regard to
the specific legislation, I can have our office take a more
close assessment of it and get back to you.
Senator Hirono. Frankly, I do not consider your responses
particularly encouraging because, and especially from Mr.
Nakoa, I think you do recognize the importance of apologies,
just as the United States apologized to the Native Hawaiian
community for the unjustified overthrow of the Hawaiian
monarchy. So these kinds of--and I cannot just say it is a
symbolic gesture, but it is very meaningful to not only accept
responsibility, although, again, not fully compensating. But it
is very important to the peoples of these nations that we
formally apologize. And so I would very much like you to--all
of you--to get back to me as to why we cannot support a formal
apology.
And Mr. Lambert, I agree with you that we cannot take the
goodwill generated from our historic bonds of friendship with
the FAS people for granted. So I would say that it is long past
time.
One more thing. As you probably know that in the so-called
Welfare Reform Act in 1993--the COFA citizens who can come to
our country without the need for a VISA because of our special
relationship with them through our Compacts--they were excluded
from their ability to qualify for Medicaid, for example, as
well as so many other kinds of resources. And so, there is a
bill that would enable the COFA citizens to access other
benefits. And I would like to know what the Administration's
posture is with regard to enabling the COFA citizens in our
country to access these other programs. I think you know what I
am referring to, what kind of programs. So, again, why don't we
go down the line?
Mr. Lambert. Senator, again, I apologize, I do not know the
answer to that question--what the Administration's position is
on providing citizens of these three countries Medicare and
other sorts of benefits. We can certainly get you the answer to
that.
Senator Hirono. Well, it took me only about ten years to
restore Medicaid eligibility for them.
Doctor.
Dr. Mohandas. Senator, this is not specifically an issue
that the Department of Defense would opine on, so I would defer
to my State and Interior----
Senator Hirono. Okay.
Mr. Nakoa.
Mr. Nakoa. You know, Senator Hirono, I think your
leadership on this issue with the passage of the Medicaid
expansion was critical. I met with DHS Director Cathy Betts
when I was in Honolulu last year, and she said that the impact
of that legislation and expansion of benefits for the COFA
population community in Hawaii has been incredible. I think it
increased the amount of enrollees by 100 percent.
Unfortunately, again, I will have to take a closer look at
the specific legislation so I do not get ahead of myself or my
colleagues, but you know, we will absolutely have my office
take a closer look at your legislation and get your response on
our posture.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, just one note on the eligibility of COFA
citizens for various programs, you know, that exclusion was
done without any basis that I could find in the legislative
history. So I think it is really important that we restore
their eligibility for other programs. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cortez Masto.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. And I also want to thank
Senator Hirono for all of her work, such important work here.
As you can tell, gentlemen, the concern here is there. This
notion that the United States has neglected the Freely
Associated States to the point that now we have the PRC taking
advantage of that neglect, and there is a time now for us to do
something about it. I understand the White House has appointed
the Ambassador. You have mentioned this earlier--Ambassador
Yun. Can either of you or any of you--all three of you--expand
on the current negotiations between the Administration and the
Freely Associated States and how this recent appointment will
contribute to your Departments' efforts?
Mr. Lambert, let me start with you.
Mr. Lambert. Well, let me take all three countries
separately because the response is a bit different for each of
them.
We have been in regular talks with Micronesia, for
instance. They have never been severed. Our lead negotiator met
with the Micronesians as recently as March 16. Our roadblock,
frankly, has been with the other two countries. With the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, we have made clear through
our Ambassador there that we are ready for formal negotiations.
We have not received a response back. A similar situation
exists in Palau. But both of those countries seem to be very
happy that we have appointed a Presidential Envoy. Frankly, we
are pretty optimistic that we will be able to resume formal
negotiations in the very near term.
Ambassador Yun began work yesterday. He is already doing
the rounds here in Washington. He is meeting with the
representatives at those three countries' embassies here in
Washington. Two of those countries are still closed because of
COVID, but our hope is that Ambassador Yun is on a plane very,
very soon and actually going to see people in all three
countries face-to-face to push forward the negotiations.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you.
Doctor.
Dr. Mohandas. Senator, as you know, the defense provisions
of the COFA are not up for renegotiation, only the economic
assistance provisions. And so, for that reason, the Department
of Defense is not directly involved in the negotiation process,
but we are absolutely committed to supporting Ambassador Yun in
any way that he requires for the negotiations, including, in
particular, by making the case for the strategic importance of
the COFA states both internally and externally, including in
forums like this one.
Senator Cortez Masto. Mr. Nakoa.
Mr. Nakoa. Thank you, Senator.
As DAS Lambert just said, you know, I think it is a little
bit of a different situation among the three FAS. With FSM, as
he mentioned, we have been continuing to have technical
discussions around federal programs and services. We have just
recently--as recently as, I think, a couple weeks ago--we met
with the FSM and the USGS to discuss USGS's ongoing operations
in the FSM, and that was a very productive and enlightening
meeting, I believe, for the FSM side. USGS has been an issue
that all three of the FAS have highlighted, as you know--very
important. And so we are very happy to be moving forward on
that.
With the RMI, as DAS Lambert said, There has been a little
bit of a different posture. But from the readouts that we have
received from Ambassador Cabral delivering the messages that we
have Ambassador Yun on board, it was very positive, and we were
hoping to have some meetings with the lead negotiator this
week, but unfortunately that was not possible. So we will look
to continue to have some meetings with him shortly. Ambassador
Yun will lead some meetings with him, hopefully soon.
And then, with Palau, I was just out there last week and I
was able to be in the room when Ambassador Hennessey-Niland and
I gave him the news of Ambassador Yun's appointment, and he
received that very well. It also, you know, seemed like the
information about the mandatory spending that, you know, was
tied into the President's budget yesterday was very well
received as well. So with all of the recent steps through the
Administration that, again, is does look like we will be able
to get back to the table very soon and Ambassador Yun has, you
know, is just getting his legs under him in terms of this new
job, but he has a wealth of experience, you know, in the
region. And so I look forward to working closely with him and
supporting him as the lead representative from the Interior.
Senator Cortez Masto. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I have one further question and then if any of our
other Senators would like to have another question, we will
stay here.
So with that, I am going to say, Senator Barrasso and I
have sent two letters to both Secretary Haaland and Secretary
Blinken urging the Administration to expedite the negotiation
process for renewing the expiring provisions in the Compacts of
Free Association. So we welcome the appointment of the Special
Presidential Envoy for Compact Negotiations, which we hope will
prioritize timely completion of the negotiations with the
Freely Associated States. The most successful negotiators that
produce the Compacts of Free Association were based in the
Executive Office of the President, and they had State, Defense,
and Interior Department staff and were given written
negotiating authorities by the President through the National
Security Council that conferred all of government authority. We
know the Administration has responsibility for conducting
negotiations and we respect that. But we in Congress would like
to be as supportive as we can.
So Mr. Lambert, will the Envoy have the authority to fully
negotiate all of the issues, including continued federal
programs and services such as the U.S. Postal Service and the
National Weather Service?
Mr. Lambert. Senator Manchin, Ambassador Yun will be
empowered to discuss anything that the three states wish to
discuss.
The Chairman. Can you tell us if the new Special
Presidential Envoy will have received interdepartmental support
and interagency staffing?
Mr. Lambert. Yes, sir, he has.
The Chairman. Mr. Nakoa, how will you and the Department of
the Interior work with the Envoy on Compact negotiations? Will
Interior contribute personnel to the Envoy's team?
Mr. Nakoa. Yes, we intend to carry out, you know, be as
helpful as we can as Ambassador Yun sets up his shop, and I
intend to remain closely involved as the lead representative
from Interior and I, in close conversations with State, NFC,
and some of the other interagency--you know, it is my
understanding and expectation that Interior will remain closely
involved as we have a long relationship with all three of the
FAS and that personally, I will continue to lead the Interior
team. I have two staff that are completely devoted, and will be
chiefly devoted for the negotiations. And so, I am, you know,
ready and able to dedicate all personnel that are needed to
support Ambassador Yun's mission.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And Dr. Mohandas, how will you and the Department of
Defense work with the Envoy on Compact negotiations? Will the
Department be formally engaged in negotiation? Will it
contribute personnel to the Envoy's team?
Dr. Mohandas. Senator, as DAS Lambert noted, Ambassador Yun
just began work yesterday, so I think he is still in a process
of figuring out what his requirements are. What I will say is
the Department of Defense has fulfilled every request made by
the current negotiating team and we absolutely commit to
supporting Ambassador Yun going forward, and in particular,
continuing to make the case for the strategic importance of the
COFA states.
The Chairman. As a Committee, we would like to get a formal
reply back from your agencies on what you all intend to support
and how you are going to support and to what level, as quickly
as possible.
[All witnesses respond, ``yes, sir.'']
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Just one question, and Mr. Nakoa, I ran
out of time on my first round. I wanted to ask you what happens
if Compact negotiations are not completed in 2022, or in time
for Congress to pass a budget that includes economic assistance
for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and for the Federal
States of Micronesia in the Fiscal Year 2024 coming up?
Mr. Nakoa. Thank you, Senator.
You know, I do not want to jinx or get ahead of Ambassador
Yun's work but, you know, at the same time, understand that it
is important to understand, you know, what all contingencies
look like. For----
Senator Barrasso. You know, I just asked about options that
are out there, yes.
Mr. Nakoa. Sure. And in the event that, you know, we are
not able to conclude the negotiations by the end of 2023 or
2024 with Palau, I mean, the current Compacts have certain
mechanisms built in for the FSM and RMI that would mean that
they would revert to the disbursements from the Compact Trust
Funds. There is still work to be done from the Compact Trust
Fund Committees in terms of what those disbursements would or
could look like as well as what the longevity of the Compact
Trust Funds and the strategy around that will be, but you know,
that is work that would have to be done in the event that we
are not able to create a better outcome through the
negotiations. I would also add that, you know, Congress also
has plenty of authority too.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. I have a follow-up question.
This is for Mr. Nakoa and Mr. Lambert. It is my understanding
that the Administration still has not confirmed that certain
U.S. programs will continue to operate in the FAS after Fiscal
Year 2023 and 2024. This includes critical services like the
postal service, supplemental education grants, and FEMA
disaster assistance. Does the Administration support the
continued operation of these programs and services in the
Freely Associated States in the upcoming Compact negotiations?
Mr. Lambert. Senator, not to split hairs but the Compact
negotiations themselves are one thing. These other services are
something else. But I would like to emphasize that Ambassador
Yun will be empowered to hear out all concerns that all three
parties have and we will then, of course, need to work with the
interagency and with Congress to fulfill those requests.
Senator Hirono. So if the programs that I talked about will
not be the subject of the Compact negotiations, then does the
Administration support continuing these programs regardless?
Mr. Lambert. I know I personally do.
Senator Hirono. Okay. Put your best efforts forward.
Mr. Lambert. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. Mr. Nakoa, do you share that sentiment?
Mr. Nakoa. Yes, and I would just say that we have been
working with the interagency to find solutions, and we hope to
honestly work with the FAS to find more creative solutions to
meet all needs or requests as they come up in terms of the
negotiation. As DAS Lambert has very much stressed today,
Ambassador Yun will be empowered to hear any proposal from the
FAS. And so, yes, unfortunately, I have not been able to have
those conversations thus far with the FAS, but you know, I look
forward to Ambassador Yun's leadership and us being able to be
in a position with the negotiations to start creating solutions
and working to find how to best figure out ways to enable
federal services that benefit both the United States and FAS.
Senator Hirono. I think it is really important to continue
the programmatic support, but at the same time, I hope that we
can use these negotiations in some other context. For example,
to expand access to broadband or telemedicine for our FAS
partners because these are nations that could use a lot more
support in a lot more areas from us, and especially as we were
talking about China extending its so-called hand of friendship,
but mainly it is to, you know, expand their sphere of influence
in these countries. So I hope we can also bring to the
discussion ways to help the FAS countries modernize their
systems and platforms.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I want to thank you all for your testifying today and
helping us better understand what challenges we have ahead of
us. So I recognize it is in our best interest to prioritize the
Compact negotiations, as this sends a strong signal to our
allies about the importance of maintaining a strong and close
relationship with the Freely Associated States and to ensure
that we are doing our best to deter Chinese expansion in the
Pacific. I have previously said that this Committee has a
responsibility to look ahead to the problems that may arise if
the financial assistance afforded by the Compacts comes to an
end.
We will continue to monitor the status of the Compact
negotiations, and at some point in the future, we would like to
invite Ambassador Yun, the newly appointed Special Presidential
Envoy for Compact Negotiations, to come testify before our
Committee.
Members are going to have until the close of business
tomorrow to submit additional questions for the record.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED
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