[Senate Hearing 117-288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 117-288

        NOMINATIONS OF THE 117th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS




                             FIRST SESSION

                               ----------                              

                                 Part I

                  January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021

                               ----------                              



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
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                   Available via the World Wide Web: 
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
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                  NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS, 
                         FIRST SESSION--PART I
                         
                         





                                                        S. Hrg. 117-288
 
        NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I

=======================================================================

                                HEARINGS



                               BEFORE THE



                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE



                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS




                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                                 Part I

                  January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021

                               __________



       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
       
       
   [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]    
       


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
        
        
        
        
           U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
47-861 PDF           WASHINGTON : 2022 
    
        
        
        


                COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS          

            ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman          
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland             JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire            MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware           RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut          MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                      ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts          RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                     TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey               JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                     TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland               MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                         BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                Jessica Lewis, Staff Director          
       Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director          
                   John Dutton, Chief Clerk          






                             (ii)          

  


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

Responses to additional questions from the committee and any 
  other material submitted for the record are located at the end 
  of each hearing transcript.

                                 PART I

January 19, 2021--Blinken, Hon. Antony J., of New York, nominated 
  to be U.S, Secretary of State--hearing transcript printed as a 
  separate document in two parts:

    Part I: https://bit.ly/3yKm75m

    Part II: https://bit.ly/3OIPCd6



January 27, 2021--Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, of Louisiana, 
  nominated to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations--
  hearing transcript printed as a separate document: https://
  bit.ly/3AsQRsH



March 3, 2021....................................................     1

    Sherman, Hon. Wendy R., of Maryland, nominated to be Deputy 
      Secretary of State.........................................     9

    McKeon, Hon. Brian, of the District of Columbia, nominated to 
      be Deputy Secretary of State (Management and Resources)....    13

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................    60



March 23, 2021...................................................   171

    Power, Hon. Samantha, of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 
      Development................................................   176

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   207



April 15, 2021...................................................   263

    Nuland, Hon. Victoria, of Virginia, nominated to be Under 
      Secretary of State (Political Affairs).....................   269

    Zeya, Uzra, of Virginia, nominated to be Under Secretary of 
      State (Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights).....   272

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   292



April 28, 2021...................................................   353

    Jenkins, Hon. Bonnie D., of New York, nominated to be Under 
      Secretary of State (Arms Control and International 
      Security)..................................................   357

    Fernandez, Hon. Jose W., of New York, nominated to be Under 
      Secretary of State (Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
      Environment); Alternate Governor of the International Bank 
      for Reconstruction and Development; Alternate Governor of 
      the Inter-American Development Bank; and Alternate Governor 
      of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development....   360

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   379






                                 (iii)

May 19, 2021.....................................................   425

    Nichols, Hon. Brian A., of Rhode Island, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (Western Hemisphere Affairs)..   431

    Sison, Hon. Michele Jeanne, of Maryland, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (International Organization 
      Affairs)...................................................   434

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   462



June 9, 2021.....................................................   493

    Andre, Hon. Larry Edward Jr., of Texas, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia..............   498

    Brewer, Hon. Maria E., of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho.......................   500

    Mushingi, Hon. Tulinabo S., of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Angola, and to serve 
      concurrently and without additional compensation as 
      Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and 
      Principe...................................................   503

    Aubin, Hon. Elizabeth Moore, of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria..   505

    Young, Eugene S., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      the Republic of Congo......................................   508

    Lamora, Christopher John, of Rhode Island, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon.....................   510

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   520



June 15, 2021....................................................   549

    Robinson, Hon. Todd D., of New Jersey, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (International Narcotics and 
      Law Enforcement Affairs)...................................   552

    Holmgren, Brett M., of Minnesota, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (Intelligence and Research).............   555

    Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (East Asian and Pacific 
      Affairs)...................................................   558

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   583




July 13, 2021....................................................   617

    Smith, Gentry O., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (Diplomatic Security)...................   622

    Bitter, Hon. Rena, of the District of Colombia, nominated to 
      be Assistant Secretary of State (Consular Affairs).........   625

    Medina, Monica P., of Maryland, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (Oceans and International Environmental 
      and Scientific Affairs)....................................   628

    Knapper, Marc Evans, of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam............   631

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   647



July 20, 2021....................................................   669

    Adams-Allen, Paloma, of the District of Columbia, nominated 
      to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
      International Development (Management and Resources).......   672

    Donfried, Dr. Karen, of the District of Columbia, nominated 
      to be Assistant Secretary of State (European Affairs and 
      Eurasian Affairs)..........................................   675
    Phee, Hon. Mary Catherine, of Illinois, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) and a member 
      of the Board of Directors of the African Development 
      Foundation.................................................   677

    Witkowsky, Anne A., nominated to be Assistant Secretary of 
      State (Conflict and Stabilization Operations), and to be 
      Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development.............   680

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   695



                              ----------                              

                                PART II

July 27, 2021....................................................   739

    Gifford, Hon. Rufus, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief 
      of Protocol and to have the rank of Ambassador during his 
      tenure of service..........................................   745

    Satterfield, Lee, of South Carolina, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (Educational and Cultural 
      Affairs)...................................................   748

    Coleman, Hon. Isobel, of New York, nominated to be Deputy 
      Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 
      Development (Policy and Programming).......................   751

    Lu, Hon. Christopher, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the U.N. for U.N. Management and Reform, 
      and to be the Alternative Representative to the Sessions of 
      the General Assembly of the U.N............................   753

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   768



July 28, 2021....................................................   789

    Salazar, Hon. Kenneth Lee, of Colorado, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the United Mexican States....................   795

    Lewis, Jessica, of Ohio, nominated to be Assistant Secretary 
      of State (Political-Military Affairs)......................   798

    Lu, Hon. Donald, of California, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (South Asian Affairs)...................   801

    Escobari, Hon. Marcela, of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
      International Development (Latin America and the Caribbean)   803

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   823



August 5, 2021...................................................   859

    Raynor, Hon. Michael, of Maryland, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and 
      without additional compensation as Ambassador to the 
      Republic of Guinea-Bissau..................................   863

    Ostfield, Marc, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Republic of Paraguay................................   866

    Fitrill, Troy Damian, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Republic of Guinea..................................   868

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   879



September 15, 2021 (a.m.)........................................   889

    Noyes, Hon. Julieta Valls, of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (Population, Refugees, and 
      Migration).................................................   896

    Bauer, Hon. Denise Campbell, of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the French Republic, and to serve 
      concurrently and without additional compensation as 
      Ambassador to the Principality of Monaco...................   899

    Smith, Julianne, of Michigan, nominated to be U.S. Permanent 
      Representative to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty 
      Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador.......   902

    Leaf, Hon. Barbara A., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (Near Eastern Affairs)..................   905

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................   929
September 15, 2021 (p.m.)........................................   997

    Kang, Dr. C.S. Eliot, of New Jersey, nominated to be 
      Assistant Secretary of State (International Security and 
      Nonproliferation)..........................................  1000

    Scheinman, Hon. Adam, of Virginia, nominated to be Special 
      Representative of the President for Nuclear 
      Nonproliferation, with the rank of Ambassador..............  1002

    Bernicat, Hon. Marcia Stephens Bloom, of New Jersey, 
      nominated to be Director General of the Foreign Service....  1005

    Crocker, Hon. Bathsheba Nell, of the District of Columbia, 
      nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Office of the 
      U.N. and other International Organizations in Geneva, with 
      the rank of Ambassador.....................................  1007

    Carpenter, Dr. Michael, of the District of Columbia, 
      nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Organization for 
      Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the rank of 
      Ambassador.................................................  1010

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1028



September 22, 2021...............................................  1067

    Nides, Hon. Thomas R., of Minnesota, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the State of Israel..........................  1079

    Cohen, David L., of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to Canada..................................................  1082

    Telles, Dr. Cynthia Ann, of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Costa Rica...................  1084

    Udall, Hon. Tom, of New Mexico, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      New Zealand and without additional compensation to be 
      Ambassador to the State of Samoa...........................  1115

    Margon, Sarah, of New York, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor..  1118

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1130



September 28, 2021...............................................  1249

    Markell, Hon. Jack A., of Delaware, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
      and Development, with the rank of Ambassador...............  1256

    Gitenstein, Hon. Mark, of Washington, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the European Union, with the rank of 
      Ambassador.................................................  1259

    Flake, Hon. Jeffrey Lane, of Arizona, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey.......................  1262

    McCain, Cindy Hensley, of Arizona, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the U.N. Agencies for Food and 
      Agriculture with the rank of Ambassador during her tenure 
      of service.................................................  1265

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1285



September 29, 2021...............................................  1311

    Sullenberger, Capt. C.B. III, of Texas, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative on the Council of the International Civil 
      Aviation Organization with the rank of Ambassador during 
      his tenure of service......................................  1318

    Gawande, Dr. Atul A., of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for 
      International Development..................................  1321

    Cronin, Hon. Claire D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to Ireland......................................  1323

    Logsdon, Kent Doyle, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova......................  1336

    Cromer, Sharon L., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      the Republic of The Gambia.................................  1339

    Palmer, Hon. Virginia E., of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Ghana........................  1341

    Van Vranken, Howard A., of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana.....................  1344

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1352
September 30, 2021...............................................  1411

    Holgate, Hon. Laura S.H., of Virginia, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
      with the rank of Ambassador, and to be U.S. Representative 
      to the Vienna Office of the U.N. with the rank of 
      Ambassador.................................................  1415

    McClelland, Caryn R., of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam............................  1418

    Young, David John, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      the Republic of Malawi.....................................  1420

    Pierangelo, Claire A., of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and to serve 
      concurrently and without additional compensation as 
      Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros.....................  1423

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1431



                              ----------                              

                                PART III

October 5, 2021 (a.m.)...........................................  1455

    Stewart, Mallory A., of the District of Columbia, nominated 
      to be Assistant Secretary of State (Verification and 
      Compliance)................................................  1458

    Bondy, Steven C., of New Jersey, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Kingdom of Bahrain..................................  1461

    Carty, Lisa A., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council, 
      with the rank of Ambassador, and to be Alternate 
      Representative to the Sessions of the U.N. General Assembly 
      during her tenure of service...............................  1463

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1485



October 5, 2021 (p.m.)...........................................  1525

    Hovenier, Jeffrey M., of Washington, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo.......................  1529

    Murphy, Michael J., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to Bosnia and Herzegovina..................................  1532

    Pantaleon, Hon. Julissa Reynoso, of New York, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Kingdom of Spain, and to serve 
      concurrently and without additional compensation as 
      Ambassador the Principality of Andorra.....................  1535

    Kennedy, Victoria Reggie, of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Austria......................  1538

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1558



October 20, 2021 (a.m.)..........................................  1583

    Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the People's Republic of China...............  1587

    Emanuel, Hon. Rahm, of Illinois, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to Japan...................................................  1626

    Kaplan, Jonathan Eric, of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore....................  1630

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1651



October 20, 2021 (p.m.)..........................................  1735

    Mahoney, Hon. Patricia, of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Central African Republic.................  1739

    Vrooman, Hon. Peter Hendrick, of New York, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique...................  1741

    Haas Peter D., of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to the 
      People's Republic of Bangladesh............................  1744
    Chung, Julie, of California, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.............  1747

    Shukan, Brian Wesley, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Republic of Benin...................................  1756

    Fitzsimmons, Elizabeth Anne Noseworthy, of Delaware, 
      nominated to be Ambassador to the Togolese Republic........  1759

    Gilmour, Hon. David R., of the District of Columbia, 
      nominated to be Ambassador to the Republic of Equatorial 
      Guinea.....................................................  1762

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1771



October 26, 2021.................................................  1837

    Stanley, Marc R., of Texas, nominated to be Ambassador to the 
      Argentine Republic.........................................  1840

    Rashad, Hussain, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador-at-
      Large for International Religious Freedom..................  1846

    Wong, Chantale Yokmin, of the District of Columbia, nominated 
      to be U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank, with the 
      Rank of Ambassador.........................................  1849

    Kugler, Dr. Adriana Debora, of Maryland, nominated to be U.S. 
      Executive Director of the International Bank for 
      Reconstruction and Development for a term of two years.....  1852

    Toloui, Hon. Ramin, of Iowa, nominated to be Assistant 
      Secretary of State (Economic and Business Affairs).........  1857

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1873



November 2, 2021.................................................  1941

    Barrett, Hon. Thomas, of Wisconsin, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg................  1947

    Harpootlian, Jamie L., of South Carolina, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Slovenia.....................  1950

    Miller, Scott, of Colorado, nominated to be Ambassador to the 
      Swiss Confederation, and to serve concurrently and without 
      additional compensation as Ambassador to the Principality 
      of Liechtenstein...........................................  1952

    Ramanathan, Erik D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden........................  1955

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  1968



December 1, 2021.................................................  1985

    Nathan, Scott, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief 
      Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development 
      Finance Corporation........................................  1990

    Bass, Hon. John R., of New York, nominated to be Under 
      Secretary of State (Management)............................  1993

    Brzezinski, Hon. Mark, of Virginia, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Poland.......................  1995

    Adler, Michael M., of Florida, nominated to be Ambassador to 
      the Kingdom of Belgium.....................................  1998

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  2024



December 14, 2021 (a.m.).........................................  2067

    Blome, Hon. Donald Armin, of Illinois, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.............  2074

    Garcetti, Hon. Eric M., of California, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of India........................  2077

    Gutmann, Dr. Amy, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Federal Republic of Germany.........................  2080

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  2094
December 14, 2021 (p.m.).........................................  2151

    Hill, Hon. Christopher R., of Rhode Island, nominated to be 
      Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia.......................  2156

    Taylor, Michele, of Georgia, nominated to be U.S. 
      Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Council with the 
      rank of Ambassador during her tenure of service............  2159

    Albright, Alice, of the District of Columbia, nominated to be 
      Chief Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge 
      Corporation................................................  2162

    Donnelly, Hon. Joseph, of Indiana, nominated to be Ambassador 
      to the Holy See............................................  2164

    Whyche-Shaw, Oren E., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S. 
      Director of the African Development Bank for a term of five 
      years......................................................  2180

    Ebong, Enoh T., of the District of Columbia, nominated to be 
      Director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency..........  2182

    Nucete, Leopoldo Martinez, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S. 
      Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank 
      for a term of three years..................................  2185

    Jorge, Maria Fabiana, of the District of Columbia, nominated 
      to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-
      American Development Bank..................................  2188

    Additional Material Submitted for the Record.................  2196


                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in 
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present. Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Rubio, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and 
Hagerty.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    We are here today to consider nominees for two critical 
positions, Wendy Sherman, to be Deputy Secretary of State and 
Brian McKeon to be Deputy Secretary of State for Management and 
Resources.
    They are both foreign policy veterans with deep experience 
in Congress and the executive branch. Ms. Sherman has held a 
series of positions at the State Department and is well versed 
in international affairs.
    And I would be remiss if I did not mention Mr. McKeon's 
long service as chief counsel and deputy staff director of this 
committee under then-Chairman Biden. And we appreciate your 
willingness to return to government service.
    We thank your families as well because, inevitably they are 
part of the sacrifice. And I understand before I begin my 
opening comments that Senator Cardin would like to introduce 
Ambassador Sherman.
    So I will recognize him for that purpose.
    Senator Cardin?

             STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, 
and Ranking Member Risch, thank you for the opportunity for me 
to introduce a fellow Marylander, a person I deeply admire, a 
seasoned diplomat, and, I think a person eminently qualified to 
take on the responsibilities as Deputy Secretary of State, and 
that is Wendy Sherman.
    On a personal note, I have known Wendy Sherman and her 
family for my entire adult life. Her family represents the 
values of giving back to the community, and Wendy has chosen a 
career in public service for all the right reasons. to make our 
nation and world safer and to enhance opportunities for all.
    So first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Wendy Sherman and 
her family for their willingness to continue in public life. We 
recognize the sacrifices and we thank you for being willing to 
serve our country.
    Ambassador Sherman is extraordinarily qualified to be the 
Deputy Secretary of State. She started as a social worker and 
rose to become the chief of staff for Senator Barbara Mikulski.
    She knows how to work with senators.
    She was the Secretary for Children and Youth in Maryland, 
and also in Maryland the director of the Maryland Office of 
Child Welfare. She has executive experience. She knows how to 
manage and she knows how to lead.
    She has incredible experience in the State Department as 
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, a counselor 
for State under Secretary Albright with the rank of ambassador, 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the first woman 
to hold that position.
    And if confirmed, she would be the first woman to hold the 
Deputy Secretary of State position. She knows the strength of 
diplomacy and how to use it to advance U.S. interests. I cannot 
think of a person better suited for this position at this 
moment.
    We are at a critical junction. We have the opportunity to 
rebuild America's diplomacy, to strengthen relations with 
allies around the world, and to promote our reputation as a 
global leader for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
    In order to seize this opportunity, we need competent 
compassionate leaders with deep expertise and integrity at the 
helm of the U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Sherman is just 
such a leader. She is, first and foremost, a dedicated public 
servant.
    Ambassador Sherman has spent her career advocating for 
people and the public good. Ambassador Sherman is a tested 
diplomat with particular experience in many of the most urgent 
challenges that face our global community today. She has gone 
toe to toe with our adversaries from North Koreans to Iranians, 
and represented the United States with dignity, strength, and 
poise.
    Her achievements in community organizing and her experience 
in both the public and private sector give her the knowledge 
that she needs to carry out these responsibilities.
    I want to just mention one example of why I think 
Ambassador Sherman is the right person for this position, and 
that is the Iran nuclear agreement. I was ranking member in 
2015 when we took up the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and 
let me just set the stage because I think many of us knew at 
that time that there was the threatened veto by the Obama 
administration.
    There was a deep partisan division in the Senate as to how 
we should review the act. And we worked together, Democrats and 
Republicans, with the Obama administration. Ambassador Sherman 
was extremely helpful in making this a reality.
    And at the end of the day, that Review Act passed the 
United States Senate by a 98 to 1 vote and Ambassador Sherman 
was key in involving Congress as we reviewed that Act. She gave 
each of us, Democrats and Republicans, a meaningful role in how 
we could improve the Iran nuclear agreement. She was totally 
engaged with complete transparency and trust.
    Ambassador Sherman and I came out with different sides on 
the final agreement. But I could not stress enough how 
impressed I was of her commitment to include all of us in the 
process. She gave us the opportunity to fully participate in 
the best traditions of the executive and legislative branches 
working together to strengthen U.S. foreign policy.
    Ambassador Sherman is the type of leader we need at the 
State Department, who knows how to work with Congress and will 
always put the national security of America first.
    I strongly endorse her nomination to be the next Deputy 
Secretary of State. And, Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would ask 
unanimous consent that a letter signed by a hundred former 
ambassadors endorsing Ambassador Sherman's nomination to be 
Deputy Secretary of State be made part of our record.
    The Chairman. Without objection.


    [The information referred to is located at the end of this 
transcript.]


    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
    As an esteemed and respected senior member of the 
committee, you are well served, Ambassador, by that glowing 
introduction. So thank you, Senator Cardin.
    Let me start off with a few remarks to set the scene and 
then I will turn to the distinguished ranking member.
    Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon, before diving into some 
of the many regional and global issues we face, I want to 
address the serious challenges facing the department and its 
workforce. Our career Foreign and Civil Service are an 
invaluable resource for this nation. Their dedication, 
professionalism, and sacrifice deserve our gratitude and our 
support.
    But the last few years have been trying for the department. 
There has been a stunning loss of expertise, steep declines in 
morale, little accountability for those at the top, and the 
department still has not achieved a workforce that reflects the 
diversity of this great country.
    It is clear that Secretary Blinken is setting a tone and, 
critically, an example that will help restore trust and empower 
career experts. In particular, I appreciate his commitment to 
ensuring the department's leadership and workforce reflect the 
diversity of our nation, including the recent announcement of a 
chief diversity officer.
    It will, of course, take more than just a good example and 
hard work from the Secretary to rebuild the department and its 
workforce. So I look forward to hearing from both of you how 
you will contribute to that cause.
    You also both know the importance of a strong relationship 
between the department and Congress, and the value of engaging 
and securing congressional support on major foreign policy 
decisions.
    In recent years, that relationship has suffered. I 
appreciate the Secretary's acknowledgement of the problem and 
commitment to productive engagement with this committee.
    I expect to work with him and you to solidify this 
relationship so it does not vacillate from one administration 
to another.
    While restoring and rebuilding the department, it is 
essential we face a series of pressing challenges around the 
world, and I will just highlight a few.
    Iran. As I am sure you remember, I was not a proponent of 
the JCPOA. But I also believe that the Trump administration's 
decision to withdraw without a serious strategy involving our 
allies would, ultimately, leave us less safe and Iran 
emboldened.
    Unfortunately, my belief has been realized by Iran's 
continuing aggression across the Middle East, and the recent 
IAEA report that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is now more 
than 14 times over the JCPOA limit.
    Public reports suggest that they are three months away from 
crossing the nuclear threshold. I support this administration's 
plan to return to diplomacy. But returning to the JCPOA without 
concrete actions to address Iran's other dangerous and 
destabilizing activities will be insufficient.
    I believe there is bipartisan support to find a 
comprehensive diplomatic approach with Iran that includes 
working closely with our European and regional partners, and I 
urge you to do everything possible to find this sweet spot 
because without bipartisan support, no deal will be durable.
    Russia continues to challenge the U.S. and our allies 
around the world. I welcome the President's commitment to lead 
again on areas requiring cooperation like strategic stability 
and arms control.
    But the U.S. is also obligated to counter the Kremlin as it 
uses its military to attack neighbors, its media to lie to the 
world, its oligarchs to corrupt our economies, and its security 
forces to repress peaceful democratic opposition.
    Many on this committee are focused on the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline. I have supported the legislation to stop the 
pipeline. It is the congressional will as is evidenced by its 
passage, and I urge the administration to act with urgency to 
block this effort.
    In our own hemisphere, democratic governance is under deep 
strain. Cuba remains under the rule of an entrenched 
dictatorship, Venezuela has been kidnapped by a brutal criminal 
regime, and fraudulent deeply flawed presidential elections 
have led to political crises in multiple countries.
    Across the region, irregular migration has skyrocketed as 
citizens face diminished prospects, crime, and lose hope in 
their home countries. More than 5 million people have fled 
Venezuela, and hundreds of thousands are abandoning El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Addressing these crises 
require effective leadership.
    I am very concerned about the viability of the peace 
process in Afghanistan. The Taliban is, clearly, not abiding by 
all of its commitments under the February 29th agreement, 
calling into question the future of Afghan security and 
governance. We need senior level focused attention from the 
department.
    On Africa, this was another casualty, in my view, of the 
previous administration. We are losing the Sahel. The 2020 
Global Terrorism Index found that seven of the 10 countries 
with the largest increase in terrorism were in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.
    Fragile democratic transitions are in jeopardy in Ethiopia 
and Sudan, while there is significant democratic backsliding in 
Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, and the Ivory Coast. Here, too, we need 
senior level attention and an effective strategy.
    I will save China for questions, but it is, clearly, the 
single most significant foreign policy challenge to the United 
States. We must not only confront China, but we must compete 
with it, and I look forward to hearing some of your views in 
that regard.
    Finally, I would be remiss not to note that there are 
American citizens being held hostage or otherwise unlawfully or 
wrongfully detained in many countries around the world. Iran is 
among the worst offenders, including the wrongful detention of 
Siamak Nimazi, and more recently, Emad Sharghi.
    As the lead sponsor of the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery 
and Hostage Taking Accountability Act, which was signed into 
law last year, I want and expect to work with you to make sure 
the administration is doing everything possible to bring these 
Americans home now and to implement the Levinson Act quickly 
and effectively. There is nothing more critical to our foreign 
policy than the safety of Americans abroad.
    With that, I look forward to hearing your remarks and I 
turn to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Risch, for 
his comments.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sincerely 
appreciate that. And thank you to our two nominees. I want to 
thank you both personally for spending the time you did meeting 
with me.
    Mr. McKeon, I really--on a personal note, I really 
appreciate your personal history of my office, since your 
attachment to that office goes back a long ways, and the way we 
open the closets and find things in there, your history has 
helped explain a lot of things as we occupy that office.
    So thank you for that. I understand you worked there with 
then Senator, now President Biden in that office and it was--
the history was interesting. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Ranking Member, can you expound upon what 
you meant?
    Senator Risch. I will not.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Risch. But that is a question for you--Senator Lott 
also had that office, and I have had many interesting 
conversations with Senator Lott about the office and 
attributing certain things to certain people is important to 
me. So that is why I have appreciated Mr. McKeon's 
enlightenment in that regard and it explains a lot of things.
    Well, the two nominations that we have before us today are 
really of considerable importance to our foreign policy and to 
the effectiveness, certainly, of the State Department. The 
Deputy Secretary of State will serve as chief advisor to 
Secretary Blinken and serve as Secretary in his absence.
    The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources 
will serve as the lead officer for the management of personnel 
and resources at the department. We all know on this committee 
how important that is.
    Neither job is a small task, but both serve critical 
functions. While the deputy secretaries will face a broad array 
of foreign policy issues during their tenure at the department, 
there is a few pressing matters I would like to talk about and 
I would like to focus on specifically today.
    Obviously, I am not going to touch on them all. I think 
Senator Menendez did an outstanding job of underscoring the 
hotspots around the world and places that are of real concern 
to us.
    I also want to say that I fully agree with Senator Menendez 
that China and the Indo-Pacific are critically important 
regions in the world for United States interests and are going 
to be the challenge of the 21st century.
    The region is home to some of our strongest alliances and 
partnerships, and it also is the primary arena of competition 
with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist 
Party routinely engages in actions that deliberately undermine 
U.S. interests and values, as well as the world order based on 
free markets and the rule of law.
    This includes anti-competitive economic statecraft, 
aggressive military posture and coercion, and undermining the 
tenets of free and open societies.
    These are huge challenges for you and for all Americans.
    The State Department's highest priority must be to 
prioritize resource and respond to the challenges posed by the 
Chinese Government.
    The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is currently 
negotiating a legislative package on China. There are a number 
of bills kicking around already on the issue. Both sides of the 
aisle are robustly engaged, and the American people deserve a 
bill that is truly bipartisan and includes concrete and 
effective proposals.
    I look forward to continue working with Senator Menendez, 
my other colleagues on the committee and off of the committee 
as they are--the jurisdiction cuts across several committees on 
the bill that would strengthen the U.S. position in this 
competition, and I hope we can put forward a strong final 
product.
    China is not and cannot be a partisan issue. It is a common 
issue for all Americans. A central theme for this 
administration is rebuilding U.S. alliances in the Indo-
Pacific. The Biden team has, in fact, already inheriting strong 
relationships, including with Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan, 
and other nations.
    In addition to the lofty discussions by the current 
administration on that, I would really like to hear specific 
steps that the administration is pursuing to support and 
strengthen U.S. alliances.
    One area that is particularly important to our alliances is 
extended deterrence, which is fundamental and foundational to 
the health and strength of U.S. alliances. The Biden 
administration should commit to our declaratory policy and 
nuclear posture will continue to reflect that reality. A 
failure to modernize or an embrace of policies that dilute or 
reduce our extended deterrence commitments will make the Indo-
Pacific more dangerous for us and for our allies.
    Finally, on the Indo-Pacific, North Korea's nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs continue to threaten both regional 
stability and U.S. forces and allies in the region.
    Ms. Sherman, I would appreciate your assessment of the 
North Korea issue and your views on sanctions, the role of 
high-level diplomacy, and other matters relevant to the Biden 
administration's North Korea strategy, at least as much as we 
can in an open setting like this. We did not get a chance to 
talk about that much when we met. So I will be interested in 
hearing that from you.
    Another issue of acute concern for all of us is Iran. It is 
really unfortunate that the Iran issue has divided us 
frequently more than it has brought us together, and it is 
absolutely critical to our relations in the region.
    And my views on Iran are well known. I was robustly 
engaged, as Mr. Chairman knows, when we talked about this years 
ago, and several of my colleagues joined me in a letter to 
President Biden last week outlining the Republican consensus on 
an appropriate policy, moving forward.
    I do not know if you have seen that or not, Ms. Sherman, 
but it does detail mine and other members of this committee's 
views on that. Those of us that signed it were Republican, but 
that does not mean that those views are strictly Republican. 
There are a number of us that have worked across the aisle on 
this issue.
    The Iranians are testing this administration. They tested 
it again this morning, as most of you know, with an attack on 
American facilities in the region, and the response at the 
outset is going to be very important.
    I have no doubt that all of you are at the present time 
discussing that and, I would hope, creating a very worthwhile 
appropriate response to the testing that is done. This testing, 
I think, that the Iranians are doing is emblematic of the 
mindset of these people. We are at a juncture here when people 
are talking more and more about sitting down and trying to 
resolve the issues and what do they do but ratchet up actual 
kinetic attacks against Americans.
    These people, as you told me, Ms. Sherman, are not to be 
trusted and I agree with you on that, in that regard, and I 
doubt there is many people sitting around the table here that 
would think otherwise.
    Rejoining the old nuclear accord is a nonstarter, as far as 
I am concerned, and it does not meet U.S. national security 
interest. The scope is too narrow and the sunsets have passed 
or remain dangerously close.
    Any new deal with Iran must address its regional terrorism, 
ballistic missiles, and detention of U.S. persons, issues that 
should be addressed now while the United States has leverage.
    Additionally, there must be no sanctions relief or 
unfreezing of assets as a precondition for negotiation. 
Negotiations--I am troubled by what I hear are discussions 
between the administration and South Korea, as far as 
unfreezing some of those assets. That will not be helpful, I do 
not believe.
    To think you can enter into so-called follow-up agreements 
on the issues that I just discussed--terrorism, ballistic 
missiles, and detention of U.S. persons--anyone who would think 
that you could enter into follow-up agreements with Iran after 
a nuclear agreement I really believe is delusional.
    We were--it has been proven in the past that that did not 
work. It did not work then. It is not going to work now, and it 
is all because of the Iranian mindset on these issues.
    If you enter into a nuclear deal without dealing with these 
other malign activities, that is a delusional activity, and I 
believe, once again, we will walk away bamboozled by the 
Iranians.
    I assure you, Chinese, Russian, and diplomats--excuse me.
    Finally, I want to--I want to address and I hope that the 
Biden administration has demonstrated it has learned from the 
mistakes of the past. I know we are going to struggle again 
with if we get to an agreement point how that agreement is 
ratified by America.
    I know everyone here has seen what has happened in the 
past. If, indeed, this is a partisan agreement, three years 
from now we will see a cadre of Republicans trying to get the 
nominee for the--to run as the party standard bearer, and once 
again, you will go along the line and they are going to say, 
what will you do with it, and they will say, well, I am going 
to set it on fire. The next guy will say, well, I am going to 
shred it. The next guy will say, well, I am going to put it on 
the floor and stomp on it.
    That is what happened last time and, of course, we wound up 
where we wound up with that. This needs to be something that is 
embraced by all of us, not one of the parties, and we will wind 
up again where we are.
    When I was--I cannot tell you how many times--I think all 
of us had this experience--where our European partners and 
others would come in and say, well, you know, America, you 
breached your agreement that you entered into.
    And I kept telling them, you did not have an agreement with 
America. You had an agreement with Barack Obama and with John 
Kerry. An agreement with America is a treaty that goes through 
the United States Senate and is ratified by a vote by the 
United States Senate.
    Now, I understand that they have already--the 
administration has already said that is a nonstarter. I am 
unhappy to hear that. But, hopefully, at least we will have 
very close to unanimous agreement on--agreement that--as we go 
forward.
    Well, finally, I want to briefly address the administrative 
role of Deputy Secretary positions. If we did not appreciate 
the importance of U.S. global health security before, we 
certainly must now.
    As the deputy is charged with coordinating policy and 
resources, it will be incumbent upon you to ensure that the 
department is organized and resourced to lead global health 
diplomacy and coordinate the implementation of a coherent 
global health security strategy overseas.
    I cannot underscore enough how important this is on global 
health.
    It will also be imperative that you seek reforms to the 
department where necessary. My staff and I have heard from 
numerous current and former diplomats over the last few years 
about how difficult it is to get outside of our embassies and 
consulates abroad to meet with the locals.
    The department's approach has been so cautious that it 
often stops our diplomats from doing their jobs. I assure you, 
the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats are not having 
these issues, and in order to stay ahead of our adversaries and 
advance our interests, the State Department needs to rebalance 
its risk tolerance as far as ambassadors and other people being 
able to get out from the embassies to do their jobs.
    I also look forward to working with you as the department 
establishes an Office of Sanctions Coordination pursuant to the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. That should strengthen 
the role of the department in development and implementation of 
sanctions policy.
    This has been a matter of tension between the first and 
second branch for some time. Hopefully, the Act will smooth 
that out.
    I welcome your views on all these important issues. Again, 
I thank you both for being here today and I look forward to 
hearing your thoughts on these important matters.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    We will now proceed to the testimony of both of our 
nominees for the committee's information. At some point, 
Senator Cardin and I will rotate here because we have a vote in 
the Senate Finance Committee for the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.
    So if we get up at one point, it is not because of what you 
said but because we need to go cast a vote.
    So we will turn to our nominees.
    Ambassador Sherman, as to both of you, your full statement 
will be entered for the record. We ask you to summarize it more 
or less in about five minutes. And then we will get to a pre-
agreed with the ranking member round of seven-minute questions 
for each member.
    Ambassador Sherman?

STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY R. SHERMAN OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE 
 THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today, and thank you, Senator Cardin for your very kind and 
generous introduction.
    I am grateful to my husband, Bruce, who sits behind me, for 
his love and support, and my daughter, Sarah, who inspires me 
with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my grandsons, Ezra and Oscar, 
seven and five, watching in Boston, and my sister, Andrea, her 
husband, Kevin, their son, Eric, along with numerous friends 
and colleagues have sustained me in their love and counsel.
    I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice 
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in 
nominating me to be Deputy Secretary of State.
    If confirmed, I pledge to work every day to sustain that 
trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate. President 
Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts diplomacy 
center stage where we lead not just by the example of our power 
but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy 
benefits and serves the American people.
    This vision is one that is deeply personal to me. In 1945, 
my parents were present at the founding of the United Nations. 
My father, then an active duty Marine still recovering from 
injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, thought it was important 
that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to prevent 
war and spare future generations from suffering their 
generation endured.
    This same sentiment led him to help found what later became 
the American Veterans Committee. My parents instilled in me a 
profound commitment to making a safer better world for the 
American people. That commitment led me to social work and 
community advocacy, and later to politics and public service as 
a means of providing improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
    As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool 
of first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected 
and competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis 
to nuclear proliferation, the challenges that threaten the 
prosperity and security of the American people will only be 
solved by working together in common purpose with our allies 
and partners.
    To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships, 
strengthen our democratic institutions, increase economic 
opportunity, and enhance respect for democratic principles, 
including freedom of the press, religious liberty, human 
rights, and the rule of law.
    Engaging in the broadest way possible not only with 
government officials but with the private sector and all of 
civil society--youth, women and girls, journalists, and opinion 
leaders--is critical to our success in this effort.
    When I served as the Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, I traveled to 54 countries to advance Americans' 
interests and values. I went to Burma in support of further 
democratic and economic reforms, and met with both Aung San Suu 
Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing.
    I traveled to Bangladesh after the horrific garment factory 
accidents to press on worker safety and labor rights. In 
Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment and welcomed 
rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African 
Leaders Initiative.
    I traveled to almost every conflict zone and engaged 
extensively with our transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and 
international partners who work with us to resolve those 
conflicts.
    If confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and 
relationships to bear on the challenges that face our country 
today. Among all of these challenges posed by the ambitions of 
China to rival the United States, the determination of Russia 
to damage and disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other 
threats posed by Iran and North Korea, to compete and win the 
strategic competition with China we have to invest in America 
and confront and challenge Beijing where we must, including on 
human rights and democratic values.
    We will act firmly in defense of our national interests in 
response to actions by Russia that harm us or our allies.
    If I may, Mr. Chairman, ask for one more moment. Thank you.
    With respect to Iran, as the lead of the U.S. negotiating 
team for the JCPOA, I remain clear eyed about the threat that 
Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies.
    I am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA. But I 
would note that 2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor 
2016 when it was implemented. The facts on the ground have 
changed, the geopolitics of the region have changed, and the 
way forward must similarly change.
    Moving forward on the challenges that our country faces 
will not be easy. But I firmly believe in the capacity of the 
United States to meet those challenges through renewed global 
leadership and the exceptionally talented staff of the State 
Department.
    During my prior service, I experienced the unparalleled 
professionalism of the State Department civil servants, Foreign 
Service officers, locally engaged staff, and contractors. I 
also saw the personal sacrifices and contributions of their 
families. I hope I will have the opportunity again to work with 
these extraordinary women and men.
    Of course, our diplomacy to be successful in any issue we 
must engage with you, with Congress. I am honored to now be 
participating in my fourth nomination hearing before this 
committee. The first time was as the nominee to be the State 
Department's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs in 
1993.
    I have learned firsthand the need for close and 
constructive coordination with Congress with consultation, not 
just with notification. As a former congressional chief of 
staff, I have a deep appreciation for the role of the Congress 
and the executive branch.
    Secretary Blinken has spoken to this committee of his and 
the President's commitment to restoring Congress' traditional 
role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if 
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
    With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look 
forward to our discussion today. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Wendy R. Sherman

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    And thank you Senator Cardin for your kind introduction.
    I am grateful to my husband Bruce for his love and support and my 
daughter Sarah, who inspires me with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my 
grandsons Ezra and Oscar, and my sister Andrea, her husband Kevin, 
their son Erik, along with numerous friends and colleagues, have 
sustained me in their love and counsel.
    I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President 
Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in me in nominating me to 
be Deputy Secretary of State. If confirmed, I pledge to work every day 
to sustain that trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate.
    President Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts 
diplomacy center stage, where we lead not just by the example of our 
power but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy 
benefits and serves the American people. This vision is one that is 
deeply personal to me. In 1945, my parents were present at the founding 
of the United Nations. My father, then an active-duty Marine still 
recovering from injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, felt it was 
important that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to 
prevent war and spare future generations from the suffering their 
generation endured. This same sentiment led him to help found what 
later became the American Veterans Committee.
    My parents instilled in me a profound commitment to making a safer, 
better world for the American people. That commitment led me to social 
work and community advocacy, and later, to politics and public service 
as a means of improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
    As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool of 
first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected and 
competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear 
proliferation, the challenges that threaten the prosperity and security 
of the American people will only be solved by working together and in 
common purpose with our allies and partners.
    To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships; strengthen 
our democratic institutions; increase economic opportunity; and enhance 
respect for democratic principles, including freedom of the press, 
religious liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. Engaging in the 
broadest way possible, not only with government officials, but with the 
private sector and all of civil society--youth, women and girls, 
journalists and opinion leaders--is critical to our success in these 
efforts.
    When I served as Under Secretary of State, I travelled to 54 
countries to advance American interests and values. I went to Burma in 
support of further democratic and economic reforms and met with both 
Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing. I traveled to Bangladesh after 
the horrific garment factory accidents to press on worker safety and 
labor rights. In Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment, and 
welcomed rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African 
Leaders Initiative. I traveled to almost every major conflict zone, and 
engaged extensively with our Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and 
international partners who work with us to resolve those conflicts. If 
confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and relationships to 
bear on the challenges that face our country today.
    Among those challenges are those posed by the ambitions of China to 
rival the United States, the determination of Russia to damage and 
disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other threats posed by Iran 
and North Korea. To compete and win the strategic competition with 
China, we have to invest in America and confront and challenge Beijing 
where we must, including on human rights and democratic values. We will 
act firmly in defense of our national interests in response to actions 
by Russia that harm us or our allies. With respect to Iran, as the lead 
of the U.S. negotiating team for the JCPOA, I remain clear-eyed about 
the threat that Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies. I 
am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA, but would note that 
2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor 2016 when it was 
implemented. The facts on the ground have changed, the geopolitics of 
the region have changed, and the way forward must similarly change.
    Moving forward on the challenges our country faces will not be 
easy, but I firmly believe in the capacity of the United States to meet 
these challenges through renewed global leadership and the 
exceptionally talented staff of the State Department. During my prior 
service, I experienced the unparalleled professionalism of the State 
Department's civil servants, foreign service officers, locally engaged 
staff, and contractors. I also saw the personal sacrifices and 
contributions their families make for our nation. I am grateful that, 
if confirmed, I will again have the opportunity to benefit from the 
expertise and dedication of all of the women and men who advance 
American interests every day in all of the 180 countries with which we 
have diplomatic relations.
    Of course, for our diplomacy to be successful on any issue, we must 
engage with Congress. I am honored to now be participating in my fourth 
nomination hearing before this committee. The first time was as the 
nominee to be the State Department's Assistant Secretary for 
Legislative Affairs in 1993.
    Since then, in three decades of work in foreign policy and national 
security, I have learned first-hand the need for close and constructive 
coordination with Congress. As a former Congressional Chief of Staff, I 
gained a deep appreciation of the Senate's responsibility to provide 
oversight of the Executive Branch. Secretary Blinken has spoken to this 
committee of his and the President's commitment to restoring Congress's 
traditional role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if 
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
    With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look forward to 
our discussion today.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Sherman.
    Mr. McKeon?

  STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN MCKEON OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
   NOMINATED TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES 
        DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES

    Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of 
the committee, it is an honor to appear before you as the 
President's nominee to be the Deputy Secretary of State for 
Management and Resources.
    I want to start by thanking President Biden, Secretary of 
State Blinken, for selecting me for this position. It is 
particularly gratifying to appear before this committee, which 
was my professional home for 12 years when I worked for the 
Democratic staff supporting then Senator Biden when he was 
chairman or ranking member from 1997 to 2009.
    I spent a lot of hours sitting in confirmation hearings up 
in 419 and I never imagined I would be on the side of the dais 
as the President's nominee.
    I would not be here without the strong support of my 
family, particularly my parents and my wife. My parents were 
both children of the Depression. They are no longer with us, 
but they taught us the value of hard work and perseverance.
    My father, who was a lawyer by training but spent most of 
his time in politics, sparked my interest in public service and 
taught me that politics is a noble profession.
    My wife, Liz, who worked in this chamber for 25 years for 
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better 
person, giving me unstinting love and support and advice and 
helping me in tolerating all the long hours that go with 
government service.
    My over 20 years of service in this chamber and eight years 
in the executive branch have given me a strong appreciation for 
the many challenges confronting our country, long experience in 
national security, and a deep knowledge of how the two 
political branches operate.
    I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage large 
organizations to get things done and to work across party 
lines, including on this committee with the staffs of Senator 
Helms and Senator Lugar.
    I also have a great respect for the role of Congress and 
foreign affairs. The debates in this chamber on the Gulf War, 
the Iraq War, the Balkans conflicts, the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance 
were, for me, among the most memorable and important of my time 
here, because in a democratic society matters of war and peace 
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of 
the American people through their representatives here in 
Congress.
    I know from this experience that not all wisdom resides in 
the executive branch. I firmly believe that we share the same 
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well 
being of our country, although I know we will always--not 
always agree.
    As Secretary Blinken has made clear in his recent message 
to the workforce, the department must consider Congress to be a 
full partner in its work.
    My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the department 
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security 
challenges of this century.
    This starts with investing in our greatest asset, the over 
75,000 public servants who work in Washington at over 270 posts 
around the world and in dozens of facilities in the United 
States.
    Our diplomats are on the frontlines of America's security 
and interests, and they deserve our support and efforts to 
strengthen their ranks. We must ensure that we recruit, 
develop, and retain a diverse and professional workforce that 
is prepared and empowered to advance not only our traditional 
diplomatic interests but also to address the pressing 
challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health 
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased 
economic competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and 
not least the long-term strategic competition with China.
    Let me say a few words about diversity, which will be a top 
priority for all of our senior leadership. Stated simply, the 
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless the 
workforce is fully representative of America.
    We must make real gains in advancing diversity, equity, and 
inclusion through concrete actions to dismantle structural 
barriers at the department. Meaningful change requires 
sustained focus on three key areas. talent management, 
transparency, and accountability.
    Secretary Blinken has made clear he will have such a focus 
and so will I, if confirmed. If confirmed, I also intend to 
devote considerable attention to ensuring that we are aligning 
our resources with our policy priorities, both investments in 
State operations and in State and USAID foreign assistance 
programs, and that we are good stewards of the taxpayer 
dollars.
    For the last several years, Congress has, on a bipartisan 
basis, protected the international affairs budget from 
requested cuts, which has, thankfully, provided a solid 
foundation on which to build.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure 
the department has the resources and authorities it needs to 
meet the challenges we face.
    I am committed to ensuring the effective management of 
these resources. But we will need your help to make necessary 
investments in our workforce and information technology, and 
building and maintaining safe and secure embassies and in our 
foreign assistance programs.
    With that, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today 
and look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]


               Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian P. McKeon

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is 
an honor to appear before you as the President's nominee to be Deputy 
Secretary of State for Management and Resources.
    I would like to start by thanking President Biden and Secretary of 
State Blinken for selecting me for this position. It is particularly 
gratifying to appear before this committee, which was my professional 
home for 12 years, when I worked on the Democratic staff supporting 
then-Senator Biden during his tenure as Chairman or Ranking Member from 
1997 to 2009. I spent many hours sitting in confirmation hearings; I am 
not sure that I ever imagined sitting on this side of the dais as the 
President's nominee.
    I would not be here without the strong support of my family, 
particularly my parents and my wife. My parents, both children of the 
Depression, taught me the value of hard work and perseverance. My 
father, a lawyer by training whose main avocation was politics, sparked 
my interest in public service, and taught me that politics is a noble 
profession. My wife, who spent 25 years working in this chamber for 
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better person. She 
provided unstinting love, support, and advice, and patiently endured 
the long hours that I spent away from home over the years, for which I 
am deeply grateful.
    My over 20 years of service working in the Senate, and eight years 
in the Executive branch, have given me a strong appreciation for the 
many challenges that confront our country, long experience in 
international affairs and national security policy, and a deep 
knowledge of how the two political branches operate. I believe I have 
demonstrated an ability to manage large organizations, to get things 
done, and to work across party lines, including through close 
collaboration with the staffs of Senators Helms and Lugar on this 
committee.
    I also greatly respect the role of Congress in foreign affairs. The 
debates in this chamber on the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the Balkan 
conflicts, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the expansion of the 
North Atlantic Alliance were among the most memorable and important of 
my time here--because in a democratic society, matters of war and peace 
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of the 
American people, through their representatives in the Congress.
    I know intuitively from this experience that not all wisdom resides 
in the Executive Branch. I firmly believe that we share the same 
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well-being of 
our country, and that we must work together. As Secretary Blinken made 
clear in a recent message to the workforce, the Department of State 
must consider the Congress a full partner in its work.
    My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the Department of State 
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security challenges of the 
21st century. That starts with investing in its greatest asset--the 
over 75,000 public servants who work in Washington, at over 270 posts 
around the world, and in dozens of facilities around the United States. 
Our diplomats are on the front lines of America's security and 
interests. They deserve our support and efforts to strengthen their 
ranks. We must ensure that we recruit, develop and retain a diverse and 
professional workforce that is prepared and empowered to advance not 
only our traditional diplomatic interests, but also to address the 
pressing challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health 
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased economic 
competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and, not least, 
long-term strategic competition with China.
    Let me say a few words in particular about diversity, which will be 
a top priority for all of the senior leadership. Stated simply, the 
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless its workforce 
is fully representative of America. We must make real gains in 
advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion through concrete actions to 
dismantle structural barriers at the Department. Meaningful change will 
require sustained focus on three key areas: talent management, 
transparency, and accountability. Secretary Blinken has made clear he 
will have such a focus, and so will I, if confirmed. As an initial 
action, the Secretary has followed through on his commitment to this 
committee by creating a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Office, reporting 
directly to him.
    If confirmed, I also intend to devote considerable attention to 
ensuring that we are aligning our resources with our policy 
priorities--both investments in our operations and in State and USAID 
foreign assistance programs--and that we are good stewards of taxpayer 
dollars.
    For the last several years, the Congress has, on a bipartisan 
basis, protected the international affairs budget from requested cuts, 
which has thankfully provided a solid foundation on which to build as 
we undertake the collective work to revitalize the Department of State. 
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure the 
Department has the resources and authorities it needs to meet the many 
challenges we face. I am committed to ensuring the effective management 
of the resources made available to us, but we will need your help to 
make the necessary investments in our workforce, in information 
technology, in building and maintaining safe and secure embassies, and 
in our foreign assistance programs that seek to advance our national 
interests.
    I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. I look forward 
to your questions.


    The Chairman. Well, thank you both.
    We will start our round of seven minutes for members. I am 
just going to ask you some generic questions on behalf of the 
full committee, and I will reserve the balance of my time to 
intercede as I believe is appropriate.
    When I met with both of you, we discussed the department 
will need to rebuild and repair its relationship with the 
committee after the last few years.
    Based on our discussion and the points that you have made 
in your opening statement, I am confident you understand the 
importance of a constructive relationship between the 
department and Congress. So I have a few quick questions along 
these lines and I would just appreciate a yes or no answer to 
them.
    Do you agree that the State Department is accountable to 
Congress and the American people?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Mr. McKeon. I do.
    The Chairman. Do you commit that the department will keep 
this committee fully and currently informed on the department's 
activities?
    Ms. Sherman. I do.
    Mr. McKeon. Yes.
    The Chairman. Do you understand and agree that a 
constructive relationship between the department and this 
committee requires meaningful engagement and consultation with 
the committee while policies are being developed, not after the 
fact, and do you commit to ensuring that type of meaningful 
engagement?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Mr. McKeon. Yes, I do.
    The Chairman. And do you commit to working with this 
committee to provide answers on outstanding requests that your 
predecessors withheld from Congress through years of 
stonewalling?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, to the extent that I know what they are, 
Senator.
    Mr. McKeon. Same answer, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    With that, I will turn to Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Ms. Sherman, let us get right to the heart of the thing to 
begin with. Your comments about this not being 2015 are greatly 
appreciated.
    I think we all understand that. You say you are clear eyed 
about the challenge in front of you and I--in your defense, I 
will say that you are carrying water for different people this 
time than you were last time. I and a lot of my colleagues here 
were deeply, deeply disappointed, as you know, in your 
performance in negotiating in getting to the JCPOA, and I got 
to tell you, one of the most surreal experiences I have had in 
the United States Senate is the hearing we had where I was 
asking you about the annexes or whatever you call them, the 
supplements to the JCPOA, and you would not tell me what was in 
them.
    And as you know, I serve on the Intelligence Committee so I 
got the same national security clearance that you do and did at 
the time. And yet, you wanted me to support the agreement but 
would not tell me what was in part of the agreement.
    And I could not do that and I will not do that, and I will 
not do that in the future.
    So what--you say you are clear eyed on this. We are all 
clear eyed, we hope. But tell me, what are your thoughts about 
putting in front of us another agreement that has got annexes 
or agreements that we cannot see, and yet you want us to 
support them? Are we headed down that road again?
    Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, thank you very much for your 
candor and for recalling a situation that was uncomfortable all 
the way around.
    Senator Risch. I bet it was.[Laughter.]
    Ms. Sherman. What I want to say to you and to all the 
members of the committee today is that President Biden has been 
very clear about what he wants to achieve as has Secretary 
Blinken with regards to Iran, and it is along the lines of both 
the letter that you and Republicans sent as well as the 
sentiments that have been expressed by the Democrats.
    And that is that we have to ensure that Iran does not 
obtain a nuclear weapon, that there be compliance-for-
compliance, as the President has said, and Iran is a long way 
from compliance, as we all know.
    The President and the Secretary have also said that we must 
work with you and with our partners and allies to address all 
the other issues of concern regarding Iran, and there are many. 
their ballistic missile production, their state sponsorship of 
terrorism, their really concerning behavior in the region, 
their arms sales, their human rights abuses of their own 
people, putting American citizens in Evin Prison. I can go on 
and on about all of the range of concerns.
    So, in my view, Senator, and I do not have access to 
intelligence right now, which is considerably important in this 
situation. I do not have access to all of the thinking of the 
administration because I am not in it.
    But if confirmed, I would want to learn all of that. So in 
the Deputies Committee, I can bring my experience. But the 
decisions that need to be taken will be along the lines of 
those laid out by the President of the United States and the 
Secretary of State, and indeed have to be decided on the merits 
of where we are today, not nostalgia for what might have been.
    I think this is a very tough problem set. I think it will 
require serious discussions, as the chairman said, with the 
United States Senate on both sides of the aisle to get your 
views, to understand.
    I do think we have the same objectives and I think the 
issue is how to achieve them, how to sequence various steps to 
get there, how to work with our allies and partners to make it 
real.
    So I think we have a tough road ahead. You will be very 
important to that policymaking, as the chairman laid out and as 
you and I discussed in your office, and I look forward to those 
conversations and to working in this administration, if 
confirmed, to deal with what is a very difficult challenge.
    Senator Risch. Well, I agree it is a difficult challenge. 
As you and I discussed when you were in my office, I consider 
the malign activity of Iran just as important as the nuclear 
aspects of it.
    And as I told you, the nuclear aspects of it, for me, 
become less important when I know that there is a country on 
this planet which has a tolerance that is substantially lower 
than ours for Iran developing a nuclear weapon.
    Indeed, they consider it existential and they have said to 
me over and over and over again they will never allow that to 
happen. You guys can sign any agreements you want. You can do 
whatever you want. But Iran is not going to have a nuclear 
agreement, and these people mean it when they say it.
    So, to me, it is all well and good to talk about enrichment 
and all that sort of thing. But the other thing is the 
terrorism, the ballistic missiles, the human rights, and on and 
on and on, as you have said to me are equally important to the 
nuclear aspects of this.
    The enrichment thing really bothers me. We argued about 
this last time, and I could not believe that the JCPOA allowed 
enrichment. There is only one reason that Iran wants to do 
enrichment and that is if it eventually wants to pursue a 
nuclear weapon.
    I do not believe them when they say, oh, well, this is for 
peaceful nuclear energy. I know you do not believe them in that 
regard. I do not think anybody believes them in that regard. 
But they say those kinds of things frequently.
    Is it still the position of the--of the administration that 
they are going to go it alone and you are not going to submit 
an agreement as a treaty under the Constitution of the United 
States to the Congress?
    Ms. Sherman. I do not know what the ultimate decision will 
be, Senator, because I do not know where we will be. I think 
that the Biden administration is absolutely committed to 
following the law and doing what is appropriate and necessary 
to whatever gets decided.
    But since I do not know, none of us today know what the 
ultimate outcome will be here, it is hard to make a commitment 
in advance. And I am not in a position--I am not an 
administration official. Hope to be, if confirmed by this 
committee and by the United States Senate, to give you a 
definitive answer.
    Senator Risch. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Senator Cardin?
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. McKeon, thank you for your willingness to serve, 
continue to serve, returning to the political life. We 
appreciate it very much. I appreciate the opportunity that we 
had to talk about the management at the State Department.
    I want to give you an opportunity to talk about the 
commitment, if confirmed, to deal with the diversity at the 
State Department. This committee has for many years been 
concerned about the opportunities within the State Department 
for all people, diversity, so our State Department looks like 
our nation and can represent a global community more 
effectively.
    I was pleased to hear that Secretary Blinken announced a 
new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer. I do not believe 
that person has been named yet.
    Could you just share with the committee your commitment and 
strategies to improve diversity at the State Department if you 
are confirmed?
    Mr. McKeon. Yes. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
    The President has made his commitment and he has made it 
clear that he wants to have a government that looks like 
America and that, of course, includes the Department of State.
    The department does okay in recruiting underrepresented 
communities. It is not doing well in retention and promotion, 
and the data of officials at senior levels bear that out.
    The GAO just did a report, I believe, for this committee in 
the House committee that emphasizes that once again. As you 
said, the Secretary has appointed or he has announced he will 
have a Chief Diversity Office. There is, I believe, a person 
who has tentatively been chosen and is probably embedding. So I 
hope that announcement will be made soon.
    We really need to make it a priority across the board in 
everything that we are doing and emphasize to all of our 
leaderships that this has to be a priority in the bureaus and 
in overseas missions.
    What we really need to focus on, among other things, on the 
retention and promotion side is transparency, giving people 
opportunities to advance in a fair and objective way and making 
opportunities available for people to show that they have 
leadership skills and the capabilities.
    And we need to understand why are people leaving, why are 
they not finding the Foreign Service to be a good professional 
home.
    So the department has done some work on that. There is a 
lot more that needs to be done, and you can be sure that I am 
going to spend a lot of time with the Chief Diversity Officer 
drilling down on this and working to make material progress.
    Senator Cardin. I can assure you that there is great 
interest in this committee in this, your efforts, and I would 
ask that, if confirmed, you share with us your strategies and 
work with us, so we can have accountability at the end of the 
day.
    Mr. McKeon. Definitely will do that, Senator. As the 
Secretary said in his confirmation hearing, we will be measured 
in significant part on this issue if we have succeeded or 
failed to make significant progress in the next few years.
    Senator Cardin. Ambassador Sherman, I want to talk about 
one of the issues that we have talked about before and that is 
President Biden's commitment to embrace our values in our 
foreign policy. We just saw with the report released in regards 
to the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi some transparency, 
which I think was very much appreciated.
    But there is also frustration that because of the position 
of the Crown Prince, there may not be full sanctions imposed 
against him under--using Magnitsky sanctions or the like.
    So I want to give you an opportunity to express how we will 
advance U.S. values. There is legislation that Senator Wicker 
and I have put in to make the Global Magnitsky statute a 
permanent statute. It is, certainly, gaining global 
credibility.
    We have also, with Senator Young, introduced legislation 
that would provide a clearer direction on dealing with anti-
corruption around the globe.
    Can you just share with me your commitment to advance U.S. 
values as we embrace countries that we have to have strategic 
relations with? We recognize that. But it needs to be under the 
umbrella of advancing U.S. values.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, and thank 
you for your leadership and working with Senator Young as well 
on both the Global Magnitsky Act and trying to figure out how 
to better deal with the challenge of corruption around the 
world, which is, certainly, a very difficult and very critical 
challenge in so many ways.
    Where the horrifying murder of Jamal Khashoggi is 
concerned, the administration, the Biden/Harris administration, 
has made it very clear from the start, as has Secretary 
Blinken, that the administration is recalibrating its 
relationship with Saudi Arabia.
    It has done that by making public the report that had been 
kept nonpublic for so long about the murder and the 
accountability for that murder. The President took a very 
important step by saying that we would no longer sell offensive 
weapons to Saudi Arabia because we want to see an end to the 
Yemen war, which is, in fact, a very bipartisan view up here in 
the Senate, that that conflict should end, that it is a 
humanitarian disaster.
    I think that we will, in other ways, and I think that when 
the President spoke to the King of Saudi Arabia he was quite 
clear that we will not be silent on human rights. We will speak 
up and we have, in fact, sanctioned many people in Saudi Arabia 
and we have said that many are barred from visas, though that 
visa list is not made public, Senator, given the rules of 
privacy around visas.
    Senator Cardin. And I understand that, and the Magnitsky 
statute is a statute that involves the Congress and the 
executive branch together, and we will be making 
recommendations to the administration. In many cases, this will 
be nonpublic correspondence in order to investigate before 
sanctions are considered or imposed.
    Will you commit to consider the names that we present to 
you for sanctions in a deliberative manner and work with us to 
make sure that the intent of the Global Magnitsky statute is in 
fact carried out?
    Ms. Sherman. I certainly believe, Senator, that on all 
issues we should make a commitment to be open to your ideas, 
your thoughts, your counsel, your advice, and so yes.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Rubio?
    Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here, 
for your willingness to serve.
    Ms. Sherman, let me just ask you quickly as we start out, 
what is your understanding of former Secretary Kerry's role? Is 
he going to be involved in Israeli-Palestinian issues? Is he 
going to be involved in negotiating the Iran issue? Or is he 
solely going to be focused on the climate issues?
    Ms. Sherman. My understanding, Senator, is that former 
Secretary Kerry is the President's Special Envoy on climate and 
that is his sole responsibility and it is quite a large one. 
Should take up most of his time.
    Senator Rubio. Since January 2017, have you met with any 
Iranian Government officials?
    Ms. Sherman. I have met with Iranian officials. I cannot 
remember the last time that it happened, Senator.
    Senator Rubio. Who did you meet with?
    Ms. Sherman. I have met with Foreign Minister Zarif. I have 
met with my former counterparts, Abbas Araghchi and Majid 
Ravanchi, who is now the ambassador to the United Nations.
    And when I had such meetings, they were on the margins of 
the Munich Security Conference, where, as you know, everyone 
attends from all over the world.
    Before and after these meetings, Senator, I was, I think, 
most of the time if not every time in touch with then Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Hale to let him know that I was 
having such a meeting and to let him know that I would 
certainly stay in touch.
    I would represent America's policies, whether I agreed with 
them or not, and in those meetings my sole purpose was to urge 
the Iranians not to take actions that were against the deal 
that would escalate the security situation.
    And most importantly, Senator, I am appealed to by almost 
every family who has someone detained in Evin Prison, and so my 
major purpose, quite frankly, in those meetings was to urge the 
Iranians that I know to get Americans out of Evin Prison 
because it is the most heartbreaking set of meetings anyone can 
have is to sit with families and hear how horrifying the 
situation is.
    Senator Rubio. And I would agree with that, and I 
appreciate your work on that and I appreciate your answer on 
having been in touch with members of the previous 
administration.
    And let me--you did write an article in July of 2020 where 
you wrote, among other things, an area I care about is, as a 
result of Trump's failure people, you know, inside--the people 
of Cuba and Venezuela face a bitter future.
    So I wanted to explore, in particular, just a number of the 
changes that were made under the Trump administration to see if 
you think that those were bad ideas. One of them was a measure 
that prohibited doing business with entities controlled, owned, 
and operated by the Cuban military, and in particular, one of 
them was the one that controls all the remittances. They take 
10 percent right off the top.
    So you can send remittances to Cuba. You just have to do it 
through a bank. It just cannot be through the hands of this--
that takes--skims off 10 percent and you can do business with 
individual private Cubans. You just cannot do business with 
entities controlled by the Cuban military and the regime.
    Was that a bad idea?
    Ms. Sherman. I do not know the details well enough, 
Senator, but I do agree that we should take measures that say 
to the Cuban Government that we do not support their way 
forward and that we support the freedom of the Cuban people.
    Senator Rubio. Well, I only--the details are as follows. 
The goal of this strategy was to say, if you want to do 
business with an individual, a private Cuban, in fact, the 
Trump administration made it easier to send remittances to 
Cubans who are using that money to open up a private business, 
to the extent that they are allowed to do it. You are allowed 
to send remittances.
    If they can do it through a bank you can, obviously, take 
the cash in yourself as an individual. The one thing they said 
is you cannot send it through this entity, which skims 10 
percent off the top. And that is just the beginning of how they 
take the money that you also have to spend it at their stores. 
And you cannot do business, not even with the Ministry of 
Tourism, per se, in some cases, but with the entities 
controlled by the Cuban military.
    The gist of it is if individual Cubans are allowed to 
engage in commercial activity, the United States can do a lot 
of things with them. But if it is going to be run through the 
clearing house of an entity controlled by the military in Cuba, 
they cannot. That is the prohibited entity.
    So I am curious. I mean, that was the heart and soul of the 
Trump policy. Yet, you say somehow it leads to a bleak future 
for the Cuban people. And so I am curious of those things you 
thought were bad ideas as I have described it to you.
    Ms. Sherman. So, Senator, I believe that it is very 
important that we support the Cuban people and that we take 
actions that increase their chances for freedom, their chances 
for private commercial activity, their ability to get 
remittances, which increases their own economic power.
    The ability that--the primary objectives, is my 
understanding of the Biden/Harris administration, is to move 
forward on the freedom and the need for democracy in Cuba, and 
the greatest emissaries for that are the American people led by 
Cuban Americans.
    And, quite frankly, Senator, you and I have not had a 
chance to talk. I know how much you know about Cuba. I know how 
much you know about what we need to do to help support the 
Cuban people, and I look forward to further discussions with 
you about that.
    So yes, if there are ways to support the Cuban people, I am 
all for it.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. And you also mentioned Venezuela in 
that piece. The cornerstone of the Trump approach was the 
recognition of Juan Guaido, the legitimately elected president 
or the President of the legitimately elected National Assembly, 
and imposing sanctions that he and almost the entire opposition 
supported, which sanctioned how the regime stole money.
    Was that a bad idea?
    Ms. Sherman. I think it was a very good idea to support 
Guaido as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. What I would have 
hoped for, Senator, difficult to do, is that we would have done 
more work to bring together our allies and partners in the 
region and around the world, quite frankly, not just in Latin 
America but around the world, to increase the pressure and to 
support and recognize Guaido to try to end the horrible saga 
for the Venezuelan people and --
    Senator Rubio. Well, the overwhelming majority of countries 
in the region did recognize Guaido and did come together via 
the Lima Group.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, indeed, and beyond the Lima Group and 
around the world. I just think there were more steps that we 
could have taken. It is a very difficult situation and, again, 
you and I have not had a chance to talk about this and I look 
forward to your counsel. I know we share the same objective, 
and that is for the people of Venezuela to have a life, and 
right now they do not.
    Senator Rubio. Well, I will just close by saying this. 
Beyond the Lima Group, the only countries really left at that 
point at that time were Nicaragua, Cuba, and Argentina under--
and Bolivia under Morales. Good luck with that.
    Ms. Sherman. Beyond Latin America, Senator.
    Senator Rubio. Well, that is--the EU just sanctioned 
Venezuela as well, and many of those countries did. So thank 
you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you both for being here 
this morning, for your willingness to be considered for these 
very important posts and for your ongoing willingness to serve 
this country.
    I think you are both the perfect choices for this difficult 
time, based on your understanding of both the executive branch 
and Congress, of the State Department, and your commitment to 
restoring America's role in the world.
    So I want to begin and, really, appreciate both of you 
taking the opportunity to talk with me before we got to this 
hearing, and one of the issues that I discussed with both of 
you was how we are going to continue to treat those public 
servants from the State Department and other parts of our 
Government who have been affected by what is known as the 
Havana Syndrome, the attacks against our diplomats in Cuba, 
China, and other parts of the world.
    And there are--as I see it, there are two parts to this 
problem. One is to ensure that those people who have been 
attacked are treated properly, are believed, and that they get 
the medical attention and benefits that they deserve, and 
Congress has worked on that. We passed legislation in the last 
Defense Authorization Act to try and better level the playing 
field for those people who were affected.
    But the other piece of that is ensuring that we get to the 
bottom of who is responsible, and I hope the State Department 
will work with DOD, who, as I understand, has been designated 
the lead agency to try and come to understand what is 
happening.
    So I would ask that, if confirmed, will you both commit to 
addressing the recommendations of the National Academy of 
Sciences report, and more generally, to providing more 
transparency with Congress and the public on this issue?
    Mr. McKeon. Senator Shaheen, as we discussed yesterday, 
protecting the people we send overseas is our top priority. We 
have to take care of them. We send them out on behalf of the 
United States.
    And so we are very grateful for the work that you have done 
and the committee has done and the Congress has done to make 
sure that benefits are being provided to those who have 
suffered.
    But we do, obviously, need to do work to find out what is 
the cause of this. I do not really understand why, between the 
FBI and the CIA and DOD and State Department, we have not been 
able to figure it out. That is not a slight against anybody who 
is doing the work. It is just--it is kind of confounding.
    So, as you know, the Accountability Review Board on this 
matter pointed out there was not leadership at the top of the 
department paying attention to this issue.
    So I intend to take on this issue in coordination with 
Ambassador Sherman. But this will be a high priority to get 
after this and we will be happy to continue to talk to you 
about this.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador Sherman?
    Ms. Sherman. I completely agree with what Mr. McKeon has 
said, and I must say, Senator, it is very disturbing that we 
have personnel who have gone through this and continue to 
suffer from it.
    It is critical that they get the medical attention that 
they deserve and that we find out what happened so that it does 
not happen again.
    So thank you for your leadership on this, along with others 
across the aisle. And I know that Secretary Blinken is 
committed to getting to the bottom of this as well.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for that.
    One of the challenges we continue to face is the ongoing 
war in Afghanistan. One of the reports that did not get as much 
attention as the Khashoggi report in recent weeks was the 
Afghanistan Study Group that made a number of recommendations 
that I think are particularly relevant as we see the recent 
assassination campaign against civil society leaders in 
Afghanistan and, particularly, against women.
    But what that report recommended is that the administration 
should slow the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, abandon 
the May 1st exit deadline, reduce American forces further only 
as security conditions improve.
    And I wonder if you could respond to that, Ambassador 
Sherman.
    Ms. Sherman. Certainly. I have been briefed on the Iraq/
Iran study--sorry, the Afghanistan Study Group. It is hard to 
keep all the study groups straight. And I think they just did 
extraordinary work that I am sure the administration will take 
into account as it is undertaking its own review.
    There is no question that Secretary Blinken believes that 
diplomacy has to be at the core of a just and sustainable 
settlement in Afghanistan, that the role of our troops is 
really to ensure that we do not have the recreation of al-Qaeda 
in the future or even a new ISIS foothold as a safe haven.
    And so there is very careful deliberation going on with our 
Defense Department colleagues, it is my understanding, and 
ultimately, a decision by the President as we approach May 1st 
about how to proceed.
    To your point about women, and I told you this story --I 
will share it with the other senators--one of the most searing 
meetings I have ever been in as a diplomat was with Secretary 
Albright in a Peshawar refugee camp after the Taliban had 
driven people out of Afghanistan.
    And Secretary Albright and I were able to meet with the 
women in that camp because we were women, and my daughter was a 
teenager at the time and a teenager about her age told the 
story of watching her sister being raped and thrown out the 
window.
    These were women who were doctors and teachers and 
professionals and homemakers and moms who are just trying to 
keep their family together, and I was horrified. And I know 
there is a deep commitment to ensure that whatever ultimately 
happens for the people of Afghanistan that women never find 
themselves in such a position again.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you for that. I think there is 
some anxiety around the administration's announcement of Zalmay 
Khalilzad continuing as the Special Representative for the U.S. 
in Afghanistan. He has been distinctly unresponsive to the need 
to include women in any of the negotiations.
    Now, that may have been a function of the previous 
administration. But I can tell you, in my discussions with him 
he did not hear me at all when I said this needs to be a 
priority for the United States.
    So I hope you will take that back to the State Department 
and to the Biden administration and make it clear that in any 
work that he is doing on our behalf that he is including women 
at the table.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, if confirmed, there will be no doubt 
that in everything I do at the State Department on behalf of 
the people of this country, I will make sure women are 
included.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Senator Cardin. [Presiding.] Senator Romney is recognized.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Sherman, as the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs under President Obama, you, obviously, were 
very much involved in the development of the JCPOA and 
negotiating the JCPOA.
    You know that people like myself and many in my party were 
very, very concerned that that was not an agreement that was 
effective in preventing Iran from, ultimately, having a nuclear 
weapon.
    As a matter of fact, my read of that agreement is that it 
would delay Iran from being able to develop a nuclear weapon 
but that, ultimately, they would be permitted to develop a 
nuclear weapon and have the missiles necessary to deliver that 
to targets of their interest.
    Am I correct in that understanding that the agreement would 
delay but not prohibit Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, people read the agreement 
differently. The objective of the agreement, and the--I believe 
the outcome of that agreement was that Iran would never obtain 
a nuclear weapon.
    I do completely understand why many senators and many 
people in Congress and many people in the world believe that if 
Iran can continue to create fissile material, the stuff that 
goes inside a nuclear weapon, that they would be concerned that 
having that ability gives them the option should they choose to 
go there.
    So I see the problem quite clearly and what I have said 
this morning, I think, is very important, which is that we are 
now where we are, which is outside of the agreement.
    The Iranians have increased their enrichment capacity. They 
have increased their development of ballistic missiles. They 
have increased their bad behavior. The Maximum Pressure 
campaign may have put chips on the table, but it has not 
stopped. In fact, they have gone further than they had at the 
end of the Obama administration.
    So we will all have to work together on what is the best 
strategy, going forward. The President and the Secretary have 
said that they want to reenter the deal if there is compliance-
for-compliance. The Iranians are far away from compliance so 
there is a long way to go here.
    Senator Romney. With time, I am anxious to get your 
perspective as to how it is this agreement prohibits Iran from 
ever having a nuclear weapon. My understanding is the agreement 
allows them to enrich and to create fissile material down the 
road, and that they, obviously, had the capacity at some point 
to use that fissile material to develop a nuclear weapon under 
that agreement.
    It does strike me that the purpose of our strategy with 
regards to Iran's nuclear program is twofold. Number one is to 
try and to dissuade them from ever having a nuclear weapon and 
that that is the ultimate objective, and number two, to exact a 
very high price on Iran such that they, as well as other 
nations thinking of going nuclear, would understand the 
consequence of taking that step, that the price is going to be 
very, very heavy, indeed.
    I do not understand how reentering the JCPOA in any way 
either, number one, dissuades Iran from ever having a nuclear 
weapon, or makes the price sufficiently high to keep them from 
pursuing that course.
    So I guess I am anxious to get your perspective as to what 
the purpose would be of reentering an agreement which does not 
prohibit them from having a nuclear weapon.
    Ms. Sherman. The Biden administration, is my understanding, 
Senator, has said that they want to create a deal that is 
longer and stronger, but is part of a comprehensive strategy 
that deals with all of the elements of concern with Iran, 
including delivery systems for a nuclear weapon, and to ensure 
that any agreement ensures that Iran will not obtain a nuclear 
weapon.
    I would be glad to but I think it probably will get us into 
the weeds to talk about why the JCPOA did create the assurance 
that you are looking for. But it is really beside the point now 
because we are at a very different place. The geopolitics are 
very different in the region.
    There were many things that I disagreed with the previous 
administration on. But the normalization of relations of 
countries with Israel, known as the Abraham Accords in the 
previous administration, was a very good thing. It has changed 
the geopolitics of the region, and that means that one has to 
think about this in a different way because there are different 
elements on the table.
    So I think we have to start where we are now and figure out 
the best way forward, and I would hope that if I am confirmed 
that I have an opportunity to get your views on this.
    And as was laid out at the beginning of this when the 
chairman asked for commitments from Mr. McKeon and me, that 
Congress and the Senate and this committee will be there at the 
takeoff, not just at the landing.
    Senator Romney. Do you have any optimism about the prospect 
of Iran bowing, if you will, to our demands to pull back from 
their enrichment program and otherwise return to the JCPOA as, 
perhaps, adjusted in some ways, making it tougher?
    With the attack last night by Iranian-backed militias in 
Iraq, it would suggest that they are flexing their muscle, not 
showing their weakness. Are we reading that wrong? Is there any 
prospect for them agreeing to a course which is more consistent 
with our objectives?
    Ms. Sherman. I hope so, Senator, but I do not know. I am 
not privy to intelligence. I am not privy to all of the 
deliberations in the administration.
    But, if confirmed, one has to dig into the details and into 
the intelligence and into consultations with you, with our 
allies, with our partners, with Israel, with the Gulf Arab 
states, with countries around the world that might have 
information that is useful to making those assessments.
    So I cannot give you a definitive answer today. I certainly 
hope so because the other routes the President, the Vice 
President, and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of 
Defense, all of us, all of you, are committed to ensuring that 
Iran does not present an existential threat to anyone not able 
to deter our and our allies and partners' actions, and if they 
had a nuclear weapon that would change that calculus in very 
significant and very bad ways.
    Senator Romney. Like you, Ambassador, I do not have access 
to that intelligence. I am not a member of the Intelligence 
Committee, as is Ranking Member Risch.
    But I would hope you study very carefully the conditions 
there in Iran, the health and well being of their leadership, 
the state of their economy, the public attitudes there.
    I think there is some prospect that the Maximum Pressure 
campaign is actually delivering the kind of impetus that we 
might be looking for, and that before we bend and provide to 
Iran the hoped for reduction of our sanctions that we might 
consider the option of continuing with the Maximum Pressure 
campaign. I offer that only as a request on my part.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
    Senator Coons?
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and thank you, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon. Thank 
you for your willingness to serve our nation again, and my 
thanks to your families as well.
    I am particularly pleased to have the two of you with such 
experience, such skills, such background in the executive 
branch and State and DOD and the White House, and here in the 
Senate so that we can help work together to make sure that the 
foreign policy priorities and agenda of the executive branch 
are supported or at least well understood, in close 
consultation with this committee, going forward.
    And I look forward to being partners in demonstrating to 
the American people how foreign policy and the foreign policy 
of this administration actually improves their lives, advances 
their security and prosperity, whether it is from keeping 
COVID-19 variants from spreading through doing robust 
vaccination around the world to mitigating threats from our 
adversaries to addressing the existential threat of climate 
change.
    And I hope you will be partners in working through some of 
our nation's most urgent national security challenges, from 
building an enduring and bipartisan strategy for confronting 
China, cooperating where necessary and possible but being 
prepared for a robust and sustained competition with China, 
addressing Iran's nuclear program and its other threats to the 
region and to the world, recalibrating the U.S.-Saudi 
relationship in light of the release of the ODNI report on the 
Crown Prince's role in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and 
reviewing authorizations of the use of military force to 
strengthen and ensure congressional oversight on critical 
issues of war and peace.
    I look forward also in my new role as the chairman of the 
State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee to 
aligning resources with policy and commitments, and 
prioritizing the protection of human rights, the defense of 
democracy, the revitalization of the State Department and 
promoting the diversity of the workforce.
    It is my hope the President's budget request will increase 
funding to what has been a stagnant foreign affairs budget to 
restore our leadership by fulfilling climate pledges, 
strengthening global health and security, and addressing our 
arrears at the United Nations.
    So, Ambassador Sherman, just a brief question. You will be 
called on to travel the world to continue your service overseas 
on behalf of the American people. I hope you will also spend 
time traveling within our nation, speaking to the American 
people.
    Do you agree diplomats in Washington, leaders in the 
administration, have to do a better job of explaining foreign 
policy not just abroad but here at home?
    Ms. Sherman. I quite agree with you, Senator.
    When Secretary Blinken asked me and the President agreed 
for me to be nominated as Deputy Secretary of State, one of the 
things I said to the Secretary--he was not yet Secretary at 
that point--but said to the Secretary that I thought it was 
critical that not only he but myself, if confirmed, Mr. McKeon, 
if he was confirmed, anyone who was a leader in the State 
Department ought to be spending as much time in America talking 
to the American people as we did abroad.
    Jake Sullivan, who is the National Security Advisor, said 
very early on that every day in consideration of national 
security and foreign policy we need to ask, what does this mean 
for the American people? What does this mean for working 
people? What does this mean for the middle class in America?
    People do not understand why we do what we do and how it 
has anything to do with their day-to-day lives. So I thank you 
for laying out this very critical issue. I think this is 
something that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, which is 
that the American people deserve to hear from us why we are 
doing what we are doing and why it matters to them.
    Senator Coons. Well, thank you. And I think as we work to 
combat the pandemic, we have right in front of us an example of 
how the health of the world impacts the health of the American 
people.
    As we work to confront climate change, we have an 
opportunity to look at how our competition with China, our 
realignments around trade, may well end up also advancing our 
goal of combating the existential threat of climate change.
    I know you have both heard of the Global Fragility Act. We 
discussed it in our constructive conversations before today. I 
just want to urge that this bipartisan tool that is available 
to address the real security challenges in the Sahel mentioned 
by the chairman in his comments is taken full advantage.
    It is something that a group of us worked hard to get 
introduced and marked up and passed and signed into law, and it 
gives an opportunity for the State Department, along with AID 
and DOD, to really lead a strategy.
    But it will only work if done in consultation with this 
committee and with robust funding from Congress. So it is my 
hope that you will let us know what you need to implement it 
effectively and that you will utilize, in particular, the 
multi-donor fund that it has authorized to leverage resources 
from public and private sector partners elsewhere.
    If confirmed, you will have critical influence over whether 
we stand up for democracy and human rights at a time when 
China's authoritarian model is posing an increasing challenge 
to our principles.
    How do we balance the need to impose consequences on 
Beijing for its horrific actions in Xinjiang and its oppression 
in Hong Kong while also, perhaps, cooperating in some areas 
like nonproliferation or climate change?
    And in my view, our response to China has to bring in 
domestic policy, robust investments in manufacturing, IP 
protection, and labor, but include engagement with our allies.
    I would be interested, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon, 
if you might, in the minute and a half I have left, just some 
brief comment on how the Foreign Relations Committee can best 
help in shaping a sustained bipartisan policy with regards to 
China.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
    I agree. I think this is an area where Democrats and 
Republicans agree. China is a major challenge for the United 
States, and I think there are three elements to it. We have to 
compete with China, and President Biden, Vice President Harris, 
the Secretary have said that begins with investment here at 
home in infrastructure and 5G and quantum computing and 
artificial intelligence and jobs for Americans that will take 
them into the next decades ahead.
    We have to compete and win. That includes ensuring that 
China cannot hack our networks, cannot steal our trade secrets, 
and cannot steal our corporate secrets.
    We need to challenge and confront China where we must in 
the South China Sea. Certainly, what they do on human rights. 
Secretary Blinken said, in his view, that the treatment of the 
Uighurs was genocide. I would agree with him on that and we 
should not shy away from saying things as they truly are.
    And third, there will be some small areas in which we will 
have to cooperate, and as strange as it may sound, global 
health may be one of them, starting with getting the real facts 
about what happened in the pandemic.
    And I will turn the last 15 seconds over to my colleague.
    Mr. McKeon. As you know, Senator Coons, the President said 
in the campaign and since that he wants to put democracy and 
human rights back at the center of our foreign policy. So that 
means it is integral and it will inform all the decisions we 
make.
    At a minimum, we are going to speak out about China's 
outrageous behavior and treatment of its citizens in 
international fora or as well as directly, and we need to look 
at new tools to amplify what is happening there.
    One of them is Radio Free Asia that is funded by the U.S. 
Agency for Global Media. You may not know that Senator Biden 
was the author of the legislation to create it and it is one of 
the things I am proud of having worked on.
    So we definitely would want to collaborate with you on the 
best ways to come to grips with the China challenge because it 
is going to be a generational one.
    Senator Coons. Well, thank you both.
    And, Mr. Chairman, if I might just, in conclusion, across 
questioning and exchanges with a wide range of members of this 
committee, it is clear that close consultation, briefings both 
classified and open, and debate with this committee around the 
path forward on Iran, around the path forward on authorizations 
of the use of military force, are critical to our success and 
our ability to craft something that will win bipartisan support 
here.
    And I look forward to working with you on Africa as well, 
something the chairman mentioned, and I know we have great 
promise for making progress in this administration.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you.
    Senator Paul?
    Senator Paul. One of the things I agreed with candidate 
Barack Obama on was that he said in an interview with a Boston 
paper we should not go to war without congressional 
authorization unless under imminent attack.
    I had the chance to ask him about this after the 
administration chose to launch attacks on Libya and he said, 
well, I said unless under imminent attack and Benghazi was 
under imminent attack. And I said, really? You were talking 
about imminent attack of a foreign city, not the United States? 
I think nobody interprets the idea of a president going to war 
unless under imminent attack to be anything other than a U.S. 
city or a U.S. interest, at the very least.
    So I was shocked by that. What was your position in the 
Obama administration about the Obama administration's decision 
to go to war in Libya, Ms. Sherman?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
    These decisions, as you know, are incredibly difficult to 
make, and when Libya began I was the Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs. And I think that most people thought that we 
were providing support to Europe for a humanitarian 
intervention.
    It turned out to be quite something different. I am glad 
that today, some years later, we are now potentially facing 
elections in Libya, that Libya is getting back, perhaps, 
hopefully--fingers crossed--to a better place for Libyan 
people.
    I will be the first to say, and I think President Obama has 
said so in his own memoir, that we did not have a full 
understanding--we have learned from this--that Gaddafi had not 
built any institutions. He had not created any government.
    So when Gaddafi disappeared in Libya, there was nothing. 
There was absolutely nothing except the potential for a civil 
war and for an ongoing conflict. So I think we have to be very 
careful.
    Senator Paul. I appreciate the understanding. In 
retrospect, it may not have been the best activity. But one of 
the lessons we might learn, and we might learn from Iraq also, 
is that regime change does not work, that Thomas Jefferson is 
not waiting in the wings and American-style democracy is not 
going to blossom, and when we get rid of a tyrant maybe you get 
another tyrant.
    But I guess the reason I question whether there was a 
lesson learned is that immediately many people in the Obama 
administration, the Hillary Clinton camp, et cetera, Samantha 
Power, Susan Rice, and I am not sure you, were then advocates 
of going into Syria in a big way.
    In fact, your boss basically said, well, the problem was we 
just did not go in big enough into Syria. What was your opinion 
on Syria during the Obama administration on sending arms in and 
getting involved in their civil war?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. I want to correct the 
record a minute, as I was thinking about this. I was not 
actually in the Government at the time of the Libya decision. 
The reason it is so much in my mind is I was on the Defense 
Policy Board at the time and we had a big discussion about 
Libya. And the Policy Board believed we should not create a no-
fly zone in Libya. We should not help out. We had breakfast 
with Secretary Gates on a Wednesday morning. He said, we are 
absolutely not going to do this. And on Thursday, we did it. So 
that is why it is very fresh in my mind. But I was not in 
government at the time.
    On Syria, I was very torn. I thought there was a disaster 
happening in Syria and happening for the Syrian people. 
President Obama was very cautious because he understood that 
this was a slippery slope, that the American people were tired 
of war in the Middle East. And so he moved very, very 
carefully.
    It is a struggle in those situations when you see terrible 
suffering of people, so not an easy decision. I think he tried 
to be very cautious.
    Senator Paul. But, you know, I think we have to learn some 
lessons sometime. I mean, many in the Democrat side of things 
learned the lesson very quickly. Maybe just for partisan 
reasons they did not like the Iraq war, and it was a disaster. 
But, really, it was a disaster. I mean, it is still an ongoing 
disaster. The whole tipping of the balance between Iran and the 
rest of the Middle East was tipped by, you know, getting rid of 
the regime in Iraq.
    And so it is this idea that we are going to make the world 
this great place for democracy, this Wilsonian idea of us, 
naivete that, you know, we are going to get rid of a regime and 
it is going to get better, even in Syria.
    So we did not go all the way in, you know, with the full 
might of the U.S. We went partway in. But you could argue that 
had we not gotten involved and had we discouraged the other 
Arab nations from getting involved that it would have still 
been a disaster but maybe 10,000 people die instead of 500,000 
people.
    So I think the misguided notion that we helped anybody in 
Syria, it would be easy to argue. The evidence shows that a 
half a million people died and millions of people are 
dislocated because we did the half-ass approach to it. We went 
halfway in there.
    And so then Blinken's response, in conclusion, is we should 
have gone all the way in there. And from my perspective, is we 
need to stay the hell out of these wars and toppling, you know, 
one strong man, one tribal leader, we get another one or we get 
worse.
    And all along the Syrian civil war, the fiercest fighters, 
we would pretend that there were lawyers and doctors fighting, 
that there were these moderates over there fighting. Al Nusra 
were the fighters. Al-Qaeda were the fighters. The fiercest 
fighters were the jihadists.
    And so I have never thought that the jihadists would be 
better than Assad, and I am not a fan of Assad either. But we 
have to learn some lessons, and I do not think we adequately 
learn the lessons. We go from Iraq and the power vacuum of 
Iraq. People say, oh, ISIS came about because we left too soon. 
Well, maybe ISIS came about because we got rid of Hussein. I 
mean, what is the original domino that leads to that? It is 
destabilizing in having no government.
    You may be optimistic about Libya. But I see it as one of 
the biggest terrorist havens in the world. You got competing 
governments. The last administration was never really clear who 
they were supporting, whether it was this General Haftar or the 
U.N. government.
    And the thing is, is it is muddled, and we have all these 
people we give arms to who are then giving arms to both--you 
know, to opposite sides in this Libyan civil war.
    Maybe we would have been better off not getting involved, 
not bombing Gaddafi into oblivion, not thinking that he was 
some great saint but knowing that there was at least some 
stability there. And I wonder if chaos is worse, you know, a 
worse scenario.
    And all I would ask is that we have got to learn these 
lessons. And I am not so positive--I do not think Blinken has. 
He is already sending us back into Syria. What do you think of 
sending more convoys into the conflict in Syria?
    Ms. Sherman. Well, my understanding, Senator, is that is 
not what Secretary Blinken is about. What he is about is 
looking at what our interests are regarding ISIS and a de-ISIS 
campaign, and to make sure that we have a very small footprint 
and an appropriate one that is only in our interests.
    But I do appreciate, Senator, the issues you raise. These 
are very hard decisions. You are correct that we should learn 
lessons of history and try not to repeat them, that regime 
change is rarely, if ever, successful.
    So on some of your points, I would agree with you. I think, 
nonetheless, we do have American interests that compel us 
sometimes to use very precious blood and treasure.
    But no President, no Secretary of State, no Secretary of 
Defense, makes these decisions without enormous consideration, 
and I hope as this administration goes forward with more and 
more consultation with Congress, as I think the chairman knows, 
finally, long overdue, there are now Title 10 notifications--
pre-notifications to this committee, and I think that is a step 
in the right direction.
    Senator Paul. I hope you will be a constructive voice. All 
I will say is that we are bombing now again in Syria without 
congressional approval and we are sending more convoys in there 
without congressional approval to a messy war.
    It has been going on forever. There is nothing good that is 
going to come out of our involvement. People say, well, U.S. 
lives are at risk. Yeah, because we put them there. You know, 
we put them in the middle of a civil war that is, largely, 
over, but can continue if we keep putting troops there--to put 
our troops as a tripwire to get involved in a further 
escalation of this war.
    So I hope there will be sane voices and I hope you will be 
one of those. But I do not have a great deal of confidence that 
we have actually gone away from John Bolton. I think we have 
gone to a liberal form of John Bolton with your new boss and 
that is something I am very concerned with.
    The Chairman. Senator Murphy?
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to you both for your continued willingness to 
serve your country. Senator Paul and I do not always agree on 
the answers to these weighty questions but I do think he brings 
a healthy caution regarding American hubris, particularly in 
the Middle East and I appreciate his line of questioning.
    I am hoping to squeeze in three questions here, two, for 
you, Ambassador Sherman, one for you, Mr. McKeon.
    I wanted to come back to the topic of Venezuela. I remember 
shortly after Elliott Abrams was appointed to be President 
Trump's envoy, he came into my office and he talked about the 
big chance that the administration was taking, essentially, 
sort of playing all of our cards right at the outset, including 
the recognition of Juan Guaido, and he predicted that if Maduro 
had not fallen, had not left power by May of 2019, then our 
chance that we had taken would have been perceived as a 
mistake.
    Last week, the Europeans, essentially, de-recognized Juan 
Guaido as the leader of Venezuela, essentially confirming that 
two years later our policy has not worked.
    Maduro is still in power. Russia, China, and Cuba are more 
deeply involved in Venezuela and the United States, having 
played all those cards early on, we look feckless, not just in 
Venezuela but throughout the region.
    And so does it make sense to continue a policy that by all 
objective measures has not worked and, if not, what should a 
new policy look like?
    Ms. Sherman. If I knew the answer this morning to that 
question, Senator, you should confirm me quickly without 
hesitation.[Laughter.]
    Ms. Sherman. I think this is a very thorny and very 
difficult situation. I think that the United States and the 
world community was right to recognize Juan Guaido. I do not 
think that the previous administration took advantage of all of 
the things that it might have to try to push that agenda 
forward.
    I do not think we have supported Colombia in the way that 
we perhaps needed to for taking in all of the refugees out of 
Venezuela. I think that we have given Maduro a platform to, in 
fact, say that everybody is feckless and he gets to do whatever 
he wants to do.
    There are ways, perhaps, that we can communicate with the 
Venezuelan people that we have not. But I do not--I will be the 
first to say I do not this morning--I am filled with humility 
in saying that I do not know that there is an easy answer to 
this problem.
    What I can say to you, Senator, is I think it is a very 
critical one. It is absolutely wrapped up in China's investment 
in Latin America, Russia's investment in Latin America, about 
sort of the triad with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and we 
have to think through what a strategy going forward might be.
    And, if confirmed, I look forward to speaking with you and 
with everyone on this committee with your ideas and thoughts 
about the best way we might crack this very difficult 
challenge.
    Senator Murphy. I hope it is also a prism through which the 
administration can take a review of American sanctions policy. 
I think there is an argument to be made that in this case the 
sanctions may have, ultimately, accrued to the benefit of 
Maduro to the detriment of Venezuelan citizens, and not gotten 
us the political return that we had hoped and still hoped for.
    On Iran--I know we keep on coming back to this, but I just 
wanted to clarify an answer that you gave to Senator Romney in 
your exchange with him. You listed out a number of malevolent 
behaviors by the Iranians, the things that we hope that they 
eventually come to the table on.
    But I just wanted to confirm that it is still your 
understanding that the administration's position is that we 
should get back into the nuclear deal, get back on the same 
page with the P5+1 and use that as a platform through which to 
put pressure on the Iranians with respect to its ballistic 
missile programs, its support for terrorist groups.
    I think the Maximum Pressure campaign was built on a 
fantasy, this idea that we could have a comprehensive 
negotiation where the Iranians would come to the table on 
everything all at once. In fact, during the last four years, 
despite these intense sanctions the Iranians came to the table 
on none of Secretary Pompeo's list of 12 demands.
    So it is still our belief that we should get back into the 
nuclear agreement and as quickly as possible, understanding 
that that will take negotiation, and use that as a platform 
with which to bring together the world community around other 
behaviors that we object to by Tehran.
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is my understanding that the Biden/
Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, want to get back into 
the deal but to make it longer and stronger, and to use it as a 
platform to have negotiations on the other issues of concern 
that we have with Iran.
    Senator Murphy. And it makes me a little nervous when we 
sort of hear terms like longer and stronger. Again, I think 
many of us supported that deal on its terms. We understand that 
we always had to have a follow-on negotiation to make sure it 
was lengthened.
    But by expanding out the number of things that we want to 
talk about at this negotiating table, I worry that, you know, 
we may be setting ourselves up for failure. But I look forward 
to continuing that discussion with you.
    Thank you again for your service. I am really looking 
forward to supporting your nomination and working with you.
    Mr. McKeon, I wanted to expand the conversation that you 
and I had privately and that is the question about the 
effectiveness of our diplomacy abroad when we have such 
difficulty getting outside the wire.
    Diplomacy does not just happen in embassies. It needs to 
happen in communities. And in the wake of Benghazi, we have 
become much shyer, much more reluctant, much more cautious 
about putting our diplomats out, especially in dangerous 
places, and the work that Senator Coons has done on fragile 
states, I think, is part of the answer here.
    But, you know, we also have a review process for incidences 
abroad that tends to, you know, make people very, very hesitant 
to do anything that might put any diplomat at risk.
    The risk tolerance in State is fundamentally different than 
the risk tolerance we have in the Department of Defense, and I 
think that is a mistake.
    I think we should pursue some congressional reforms to the 
Accountability Review Board process to make people less fearful 
of punitive action and more willing to learn from mistakes.
    What is your thoughts on how we can try to push diplomacy 
back outside our embassy compound walls?
    Mr. McKeon. Senator Murphy, thank you. It is a hard 
challenge, and I appreciate you being willing to dive into it.
    You know, there is no such thing as perfect security. The 
diplomats that work for our country are in a dangerous 
business, and evidence of that is on the walls of the C Street 
lobby in the State Department, the names of those who have been 
killed while serving the government overseas.
    As you said, we have the statute that mandates 
accountability review. Our board process was enacted in the mid 
'80s. It does not apply in the same way to DOD or the 
intelligence community. So I appreciate if you and other 
members of committee are willing to take a look at that. We 
should have a conversation about it.
    The department began a review under the last Secretary, 
being led by very senior diplomat, to look at this question 
which they put it under the framework of risk mitigation. 
Though I do not know the timing of his work, but that will also 
inform our conversation.
    Senator Murphy. Great. I look forward to working with you 
on that.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. Put your microphone on, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. There we go. I was saying thank you very 
much for scheduling this important hearing for two very 
important positions in the State Department.
    Also, Ambassador Sherman, I appreciate your acknowledgement 
of the success of the Abraham Accords. A tremendous amount of 
work went into that. I know you had been critical of the 
previous administration about this earlier.
    But I appreciate your acknowledgement of the success 
because, indeed, it has changed the dynamic in the region. And 
I encourage the Biden administration to strongly consult with 
our allies in the Middle East as you consider reentry into the 
JCPOA.
    I would like to turn now, Ambassador Sherman, to a 
discussion on the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, if I 
might. You mentioned earlier that the Biden administration will 
follow the law. I would just like to follow up on Ranking 
Member Risch's comments here, if I might, because I think it is 
very important that we talk about the oversight dynamic here.
    The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires the 
executive branch to submit to Congress any and all agreements 
that are related to the nuclear program of Iran. Those need to 
be submitted for congressional review.
    Ambassador Sherman, can you imagine any scenario in which 
the Biden administration would decide to participate again in 
the JCPOA concerning Iran's nuclear program or modifies any 
aspect of the current sanctions regime on Iran and you would 
not submit this to Congress for review?
    Ms. Sherman. It is always hard, Senator. I am not a lawyer. 
But any lawyer would tell you and has told me never to make a 
completely universal comment about such a question.
    But what I will say to you is that this administration, the 
Biden/Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, are committed 
to following the law. And if, indeed, whatever is decided falls 
within the terms of INARA, then we must, indeed, come to 
Congress.
    Senator Hagerty. I think this is the concern that Ranking 
Member Risch and I have right now and that is looking at a very 
specific legal interpretation of the document and not looking 
at the purpose of the Act.
    The purpose of the Act is to ensure congressional review, 
not to find weasel words or ways to get out of complying with 
it. So I encourage this administration and you, if you are 
confirmed, to find a way to comply with the purpose of this 
Act.
    Ms. Sherman. I think that is a fair point that the intent 
is to make sure that Congress has a say, and I think what is 
and, as Senator Cardin pointed out earlier, I was very engaged 
with both Senator Cardin and Senator Corker to ensure that 
INARA, in fact, happened, and that there was a congressional 
review process. I thought it was terribly important, and very 
grateful to then Chairman Corker and Senator Cardin, who was 
ranking at the time, for moving forward on a congressional 
review process.
    What I would hope this time is that we have happen what is 
happening here, which is that you all are there at the takeoff 
that you are reviewing the considerations of this 
administration throughout the process, and that the review does 
not just come at the end but the review happens throughout any 
process that goes forward.
    And if I am confirmed, you have my commitment, not just 
regarding any agreement with Iran but with what we are doing in 
foreign policy and national security, writ large.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Can we turn to the Central Bank of Iran now? That is 
another source of concern. U.S. policy has sought to deny the 
Iranian regime, including the Central Bank of Iran, the money, 
especially the hard currency that it uses to fund terrorism and 
many other malign activities that threaten the national 
security of the United States, of Israel, and our partners in 
the Gulf.
    The Treasury Department has concluded that, since at least 
2016, Iran's IRGC Quds Force, the terror outfit that exists 
there, has received the vast majority of its foreign currency 
from the Central Bank of Iran.
    Ambassador Sherman, do you commit to maintaining sanctions 
on the Central Bank of Iran and hold it accountable for its 
activities to support terrorism, including any secondary 
sanctions that are now in place?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, I do not know all the ins and outs of 
the current sanctions that are in place because I have been out 
of government now for some time.
    But I, certainly, do not want to do anything that supports 
the IRGC to continue its activities in the region that are 
vastly destabilizing and put our allies and our partners and 
ourselves at tremendous risk.
    Senator Hagerty. I think these sanctions have taken a great 
deal of time and effort. I was personally involved in some of 
the aspects of this. And I would encourage you and I would 
encourage the Biden administration not to grant sanctions 
relief to the Central Bank of Iran without a thorough review 
and make certain that these sanctions are--continue to stay in 
place until they have stopped in all aspects supporting 
terrorism.
    A further question, Ambassador Sherman. The Iranian regime, 
clearly, wants the United States to lift sanctions against the 
Central Bank of Iran. Please, and I would love for your 
commitment on this to not provide any form of sanctions relief, 
including through the use of waivers or licenses to the Central 
Bank of Iran unless we can verifiably ensure that they cease 
all of their malign activities.
    Ms. Sherman. I appreciate your view and I will, certainly, 
want to talk with you further, if confirmed, and as I learn 
more about the sanctions that are currently in place and how 
they affect different activities by Iran. Thank you for that.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much.
    Turn to North Korea for just a minute, you and I have 
spoken about this before. As you know, when I was ambassador to 
Japan, I was there when Kim Jong-un launched two 
intercontinental ballistic missiles over Japan and, at a 
different time, tested a hydrogen bomb.
    I have no doubt that North Korea is going to remain one of 
the most critical national security challenges that the United 
States will have to face this decade. And as we learned during 
the Trump administration, subordinates come and go in the 
negotiations, sometimes permanently, perhaps.
    Kim Jong-un takes the decisions on the nuclear program. It 
is critical to strengthen the Maximum Pressure campaign to 
sharpen the choices for the Kim regime.
    Ambassador Sherman, do you support additional sanctions 
against the Chinese companies that are doing business with 
North Korea?
    Ms. Sherman. Again, because I have been out of government, 
I do not know all that is in place now. But, certainly, we do 
want to ensure that North Korea understands that unless it 
comes to the table to really make progress in denuclearization 
that we will use every tool that we have to prevent them from 
doing so and, certainly, want China not to be playing an 
adverse role in that process.
    Senator Hagerty. Yeah, they have been playing a tremendous 
role, as you and I both know, and I hope we can continue to 
work toward that goal.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you. I look forward to it, Senator, if 
confirmed.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses. I want to follow up on Senator Hagerty's line of 
questions with respect to congressional approval of forward 
steps on Iran.
    I have a very different opinion about the JCPOA than the 
Republican members of this body, and Senator Risch and I have 
done this often. But I have exactly the same opinion as all the 
members of the body about congressional review, and I was the 
original--sort of one of the original drafters of INARA. 
Because the Obama administration--the plan was to do a deal 
with Iran and do it pursuant to waiver authority under the 
congressional sanctions and not bring it to Congress for eight 
years.
    Eventually, at year eight, they would have to come to 
Congress to have a statutory lifting of the sanctions. That was 
the original plan. And even though I thought the negotiation 
was coming up with a deal that I thought was much better than 
the status quo ante, and Senator Corker did not think so, we 
both thought because congressional sanctions were being used as 
leverage to get the deal that Congress had to be involved. And 
whatever the forward steps on the deal might be, Congress needs 
to be involved because you are using a congressional statute 
that imposes sanctions as leverage in this topic. So I just 
want to associate myself with the comments that he made.
    Now I will go to associating myself with topics raised by 
Senator Paul. You talked about your parents being there at the 
founding of the U.N. because your dad was a Marine veteran who 
had suffered war injuries at Guadalcanal, and he wanted to be 
there at the founding of an organization that was designed to 
prevent war.
    Sadly, we, as humans, cannot prevent war. No organization 
can. But we should try to prevent unnecessary war.
    And it is interesting the way the Framers of the 
Constitution and then even the architects of Senate procedures 
have tried to help us figure out a way to prevent unnecessary 
war.
    So the United States, unlike virtually anywhere else in the 
world, has a founding document, the Constitution, that says it 
is not for the executive to decide to go to war. It is for the 
legislative branch.
    Nobody does that. I mean, war is for the king, the monarch, 
the emperor, the dictator. But not here. The initiation of war 
is supposed to be by Congress with the President then managing 
the war because the last thing you need is 535 commanders in 
chief.
    And then within the rules of this body decisions about 
going to war come out of the Foreign Relations Committee, not 
out of the Armed Services. I am on the Armed Services 
Committee.
    Most people guess that that is where war resolutions start. 
They do not, because as you said, prefer diplomacy first, and 
if diplomacy fails, war can be a sad necessity. But prefer 
diplomacy first. So it has to start in the Foreign Relations 
Committee.
    Let me ask you this, Ms. Sherman, and I have very high 
regard for both of you and I will support both your 
nominations. Iraq right now, are they an enemy or are they a 
partner?
    Ms. Sherman. I hope they are a partner, Senator.
    Senator Kaine. Yeah, they are a partner. They are not an 
enemy anymore. There are some challenges with our partner, with 
Iraq, especially the activities of these Iranian-backed militia 
groups, which the successive prime ministers have tried to 
figure out how to control without completely satisfying us.
    But they are not an enemy. We still have two war 
authorizations against the nation of Iraq that have not been 
repealed. Gulf War 1991, Iraq War Resolution 2002. Boy, how is 
that to treat a partner and have a war authorization against 
them?
    Today, Senators Lee, Paul, Young, Grassley, Kaine, Durbin, 
Coons, Duckworth, we are introducing a bill to repeal the two 
Iraq AUMFs.
    And I am not going to ask you for a commitment on that. You 
are not part of the administration yet. But I would think 
Congress should not just allow war authorizations to exist in 
perpetuity.
    But we often do. We pass them and then they are just out 
there and they can be used in mischievous ways.
    The President undertook on his own initiation without 
congressional approval missile strikes against militia 
positions in Syria that are connected to Iran last Thursday.
    At the same time that this happened, the U.S. had an offer 
on the table with Europeans for Iran to come back to a table 
for a no-preconditions discussion about what do we do about the 
JCPOA. Iran was considering that offer.
    The administration, from my conversations, was actually 
pretty optimistic that Iran was going to accept that offer. 
Then missile strikes happened on Thursday, and then Iran turned 
down the offer on Sunday.
    The President asserted, as a rationale for the missile 
strikes, that he had unilateral power under Article 2 to do 
them. He did not refer to the AUMFs, which was good because 
those would be fig leaves. He just said, I have Article 2 
power.
    But the challenge is if you allow presidents unilaterally 
to do things, even things that are prudent, okay, president 
takes a step with a missile strike. Iran then turns down an 
opportunity to explore diplomacy.
    I cannot imagine anybody at the Pentagon or at the State 
Department was surprised with the militia airstrikes back at 
the Air Force--at the Air Force Base where U.S.-led coalition 
forces were yesterday.
    When one side decides, I can do this unilaterally, then the 
other side decides, I can do this unilaterally because you 
started it. No, you started it. No, you started it. And then we 
are in the midst, potentially, of a significant military 
engagement of war without a discussion in Congress.
    I do not care how prudent unilateral executive action is. 
It can lead to counteraction and counteraction and reaction, 
and then suddenly, we are in the middle of something that has 
not been discussed in front of Congress, has not been discussed 
in front of the American people.
    And I just think, again, even the events of the last couple 
of days since, Ms. Sherman, you and I talked on our Zoom call 
have demonstrated that the Framers were not really wrong when 
they said decisions about war and the initiation of war should 
be sort of aired before the people's legislative body and have 
an imprimatur. If we are going to do it, it should have an 
imprimatur on it of more than just one person.
    I have shared this view about the missile strikes last 
Thursday and about the at least temporary collapse of this 
diplomatic opportunity Sunday, and then the Iraqi strikes 
against the base with the U.S.-led coalition.
    This is the kind of thing that happens and there is no 
guarantee it will not happen if you have more dialogue with 
Congress and the public. But you reduce the risk. I think you 
reduce the risk of unnecessary and uncontemplated escalation if 
you have the kind of consultation that, I think, both Democrats 
and Republicans on this committee would expect of you.
    I know you believe that and I am confident you will push 
for that to all your might, and that is one of the reasons that 
I have the confidence that I will support you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young?
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. McKeon, I enjoyed visiting this week. When we spoke, 
you outlined how examining the resourcing of America's 
development enterprise and our foreign assistance would be one 
of your top priorities, if confirmed.
    This is an area of particular interest to me. It dates back 
several years. In fact, I co-chaired a CSIS task force in 2017 
with Senator Shaheen on reforming our foreign assistance 
programming.
    And one of the recommendations that we made in that 
convening of former career Foreign Service officers and USAID 
professionals and other experts was to take a hard look at the 
overlapping responsibilities and, thus, the duplicative efforts 
and budgets of the State Department, USAID, and various 
development finance organizations and to empower USAID to have 
a bigger voice in the conversation and more of a leading role 
in American foreign policy.
    So that starts with strategic direction from the top. From 
the outside, what do you find, sir, most concerning about how 
our foreign assistance is organized?
    Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator. I will have to dig out the 
task force report from 2017 because I am not familiar with it.
    As you know, the USAID administrator reports to and is 
under the direct authority of the Secretary of State. But I 
think, from experience in the last 20 years, that relationship 
has probably had more--marked more by tension than 
collaboration.
    So I think one of the first priorities would be to try to 
reset that working with Ambassador Power, if she is confirmed. 
She is going to be a great spokesperson for the mission and is 
not shy.
    So I am sure that she will assert her views about the 
relationship and the direction of our program. So I think first 
priority is to get the relationship between State and AID in 
the right place and make sure that the programs are aligned and 
not duplicative.
    Then, as you mentioned, the other agencies. The Secretary 
of State chairs the board of the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation.
    And so we, at the State Department, if I am confirmed and 
the Secretary, we need to make sure we are using that role to 
ensure that everyone is rowing in the same direction on our 
programs and are aligned with the President's priorities and 
strategies.
    You have given us great tools with the--with these 
agencies, the DFC being the newest one, but we need to put them 
to greatest effect, and I would like to talk to you more about 
it as I dig into it, if I get into the job.
    Senator Young. While I move to our diverse array of various 
agencies that are tasked with foreign assistance, it is one of 
the things I discovered when I became a member of this 
committee is just the constellation of different agencies.
    And one avenue to explore is how we can task some of these 
agencies with operating in countries with lower incomes or 
worse health outcomes while directing others to specifically 
address more developed economies and societies, rather than 
throwing our resources from the various agencies at the same 
countries.
    For instance, how can the United States better utilize our 
more independent development organizations like the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation or the Development Finance Corporation 
and make them more strategic in their investments?
    I would like you to sort of speak to that generally, and 
then answer this specifically. Can the Development Finance 
Corporation be more focused on middle income countries that 
face more pressure from Russian and Chinese influence?
    Mr. McKeon. Senator I need to dig into the DFC statute. My 
understanding from a briefing paper is they are supposed to 
prioritize their investments in lower income countries. I think 
there is some exception for middle or higher income countries 
in some respects. But the primary focus is supposed to be on 
the lower income countries. If I have that wrong, please tell 
me.
    Senator Young. Respectfully, I think that is just been the 
construction of the statute. The statute actually does call for 
development assistance to lower income countries, and then 
there is--in the same charge, it indicates that the resources 
may also be deployed strategically.
    So it is like so many of our statutes. It is a vaguely 
written statute, which I lament, but my own views, which you 
might have sort of inferred by the question, is that we have an 
opportunity here to perhaps use DFC in a more strategic fashion 
vis-`-vis some of our strategic competitors, like Russia and 
China.
    So I would look forward to working with you or others 
within the administration to--on that effort.
    Ambassador Sherman, I do not want to neglect you, and I am 
grateful for your long-standing service and for your appearance 
here today.
    President Biden has signaled that working with our partners 
and allies is going to be a foundation of his foreign policy 
and that he will seek to renew relations with our European 
partners.
    In fact, in his recent address before the Munich Security 
Conference, he called the transatlantic relationship the 
cornerstone of all we hope to accomplish in the 21st century.
    I agree that we must be engaging with our democratic allies 
in order to reach agreements on security and trade and 
technology development and health resiliency and all manner of 
other things.
    But we also have to be willing to embrace our own ability 
to shape these areas and not the other way around, right. So 
there is a balance to be struck.
    So if the leaders of Europe are unwilling to confront the 
threats emanating from around the globe, most especially the 
threats emanating from China and Russia, how would you 
recommend the United States adjust its strategy to engage with 
them?
    In 10 seconds or less, please.
    Ms. Sherman. I think it is absolutely critical that we 
engage with the transatlantic relationship around China and 
Russia. We are so much stronger together than we are apart, and 
I think that it will take vigorous diplomacy, which Secretary 
Blinken is going to lead, and, if confirmed, I hope to help him 
do exactly what you are suggesting, that we help to drive that 
agenda.
    Europe is not always excited about us being back at the 
table because they are wary, given some years of us being away. 
But they also respect and understand the power of the United 
States of America, and I think that it is time that we lead by 
our example by what we are doing to compete and build our own 
infrastructure to do that competition.
    But doing it together will make us much more powerful in 
challenging China, competing with China, and dealing with all 
of the threats that are put forward by Russia.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    I understand we have Senator Markey virtually.
    Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, 
and thank both of you for your long-term service to our country 
and we hope that you will be given the opportunity to continue 
because I think you would be enormous assets to ensuring that 
we have a safer better world that we are living in for everyone 
in our society.
    If I may, Mr. Chairman, just want to go through a few bits 
of facts from the past so that we can just establish it as part 
of this hearing record.
    Before you helped to get the world's major powers and Iran 
to the negotiating table, Iran was about two months away from 
producing enough highly-enriched uranium for its first nuclear 
bomb.
    Is that correct?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, that was the assessment.
    Senator Markey. And after all sides began implementing the 
Iran nuclear deal, that breakout time extended to more than a 
year. Is that correct?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Senator Markey. And Senator Risch asked you about 
enrichment, so I would like to go back to that. As part of the 
Iran nuclear deal, Iran reduced, reduced, its stock of low-
enriched uranium by 98 percent to 300 kilograms.
    But as a result of the Trump administration's unilateral 
exit from the Iran nuclear deal, that number increased to 12 
times over that 300-kilogram limit.
    Is that correct?
    Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
    Senator Markey. Okay. So, again, while many of my 
colleagues have spent time criticizing the Iran deal, the 
effect of that arrangement did dramatically reduce the ability 
of Iran to have a quick breakout time towards producing a 
nuclear weapon.
    And I just want to make sure that all of that is out on the 
table, and again, you played an instrumental role in ensuring 
that that would be part of that agreement.
    So compliance-for-compliance is what President Biden is now 
saying his goal is. So can you just, again, expand a little bit 
more on what the Biden administration's policy will be in terms 
of compliance-for-compliance in ensuring that we do go back to 
a position where Iran's breakout time is lessened dramatically?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
    It is my understanding what the Biden/Harris administration 
hopes to do is to get Iran to come back into full compliance 
with the deal.
    Then we would be in compliance with the deal and that we 
would build from that to get a longer and stronger agreement, 
given that the deal is now some years old and, as you have 
pointed out, Iran has now increased its stockpile, increased 
the depth of its enrichment, increased many of its capabilities 
more--using more sophisticated centrifuges as a result of our 
leaving the deal, and that we would not only get back to where 
we were but we would build a better, stronger, longer platform. 
And then we would address the other issues of concern.
    And as you pointed out, Senator, that one-year breakout 
time is critical because it allows us if for some reason Iran 
is able to cheat, though there were the most extraordinary 
verification and monitoring mechanisms, we would have time to 
slap back on sanctions or even to take military action.
    So we would maintain all of our options to ensure that Iran 
not obtain a nuclear weapon.
    Senator Markey. Yeah, and I agree with you. A one-year 
breakout time gives us time to put additional pressure on, but 
if it goes down to only two months or one month as a breakout 
time, our capacity to respond is, obviously, diminished 
dramatically.
    So I think the approach which the Biden administration is 
taking is the correct one.
    If I could just move over to Burma, that recent coup 
carried out by the Burmese military against the democratically-
elected civilian government has been condemned by the Biden 
administration, and I welcome the steps which the 
administration has already taken, including imposing targeted 
sanctions against the military.
    What role do you think China should play in partnering with 
the United States and do we have a capacity to get China to 
partner with us in order to put pressure on the military in 
Burma to allow for the civilian democratically-elected 
government to return to power?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you for that really important question, 
Senator.
    It is my understanding that Linda Thomas-Greenfield, our 
ambassador now to the United Nations, is going to use our 
platform since we are in the presidency in the month of March 
to have a more serious discussion in the U.N. Security Council 
about Burma and encouraging China to urge a return to a 
democratically-elected government and to end the military coup, 
which in its wake is just having a horrifying impact on the 
rights and the freedoms of the Burmese people.
    We have lots of issues with Burma even before this coup, 
given the treatment of the Rohingya. But now it is of great 
concern for all of the people of Burma and their freedom and 
their way forward.
    I applaud Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield for taking 
this subject up as one of the first things that she does, and 
Secretary Blinken has made it very clear this is a very high 
priority for him and to not only look at those sanctions but 
see that we get everyone engaged in ensuring that we return the 
government.
    Senator Markey. Okay, thank you. And I do believe we have 
to put much more pressure on those military leaders and I hope 
that that is part of the Biden plan. And no one has done more 
thinking about the North Korean nuclear program than you have, 
historically. You have just a rich history of the three 
generations of the Kim family and their attitudes about this 
issue.
    Could you give us your sense of what the steps should be 
that are taken by the Biden administration in conjunction with 
the regional allies, especially in order to reduce this ever-
increasing nuclear threat from North Korea?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. It is my understanding 
that a review is going on in the administration to decide on 
how best to proceed with North Korea. Very tough challenge.
    Quite agree with you it needs to be done with partners and 
allies in the region, particularly Japan and South Korea. But 
with everyone who has a stake in ensuring that Kim Jong-un does 
not develop even more nuclear weapons, greater delivery 
systems, and pose even a greater threat to the region and to 
the world.
    So I understand that review is ongoing and, if confirmed, I 
would be glad to be talking with everyone here more about it to 
get your views and ideas as well.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Markey. Do you--okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz?
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Welcome to the both of you. Congratulations on your 
nominations.
    In the last six weeks, the Biden administration has 
embraced China, has bombed Syria, has empowered Russia and 
Putin, has refused to stand with Israel on the Golan Heights, 
and has lifted sanctions on Iranian-backed terrorists.
    That is not an encouraging opening for the foreign policy 
of this country for the next four years. I want to focus on a 
couple of those areas.
    Let us start with an area that should be a potential for 
bipartisan cooperation. It is a topic that I discussed with 
both of you at length in the past week, and that is Nord Stream 
2.
    Nord Stream 2, in the last year, was an incredible 
bipartisan victory for the United States. The pipeline was over 
90 percent completed from Russia to Germany. Congress acted not 
once but twice, passing strong bipartisan sanctions.
    Sanctions supported by Republicans and Democrats on this 
committee passed it into law, and despite mountains of Russian 
disinformation, the pipeline ceased minutes before those 
sanctions were signed into law.
    Unfortunately, the Biden administration has been sending 
mixed signals and those signals have been heard by Putin. And 
so Putin, after ceasing building the pipeline for a year, has 
gone back to building the pipeline because Putin and Russia 
believe the Biden administration will not hold them 
accountable, will allow them to complete this pipeline, which 
would put billions of dollars in Putin's pockets to be used 
against America, against Europe.
    The European Parliament, by the way, in December 2018 voted 
433 to 105 to oppose Nord Stream 2, and in January 2021, after 
Putin attempted to murder Navalny, they voted again to condemn 
it, this time 581 to 50.
    Let me start with both of you. Do both of you agree that 
allowing Nord Stream 2 to be completed would be terrible policy 
for the United States?
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, the President of the United States, 
the Secretary of State, have both said they oppose Nord Stream 
2 and do not believe it should be completed.
    Mr. McKeon. Senator that is my understanding as well. The 
President has said it is a bad deal.
    Senator Cruz. Well, if they oppose it, they are not very 
effective at opposing it because when their administration came 
into office, suddenly it commenced, and to be particular, last 
month the State Department transmitted a mandatory and overdue 
report to Congress about who is helping Putin build the 
pipeline. The report included one ship and its owner, which the 
Trump administration had already sanctioned.
    So it simply reiterated what the Trump administration had 
done. It did not include any entities that are plainly in 
violation, not even the company that is actually constructing 
the pipeline Congress has instructed the President to sanction.
    Then, yesterday, the Biden administration imposed sanctions 
for the poisoning of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, but 
those sanctions went out of their way not to touch the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline.
    That was not an accident. Now that construction is resumed, 
we have precious little time. I told both of you that if the 
Biden administration does not change course, we are going to 
wake up in six months or a year and this pipeline is going to 
built because the Biden administration failed to act.
    And so I want to ask you, Ms. Sherman, if confirmed, will 
you move immediately to ensure that the Biden administration 
meets its mandatory obligation imposed by Congress to name and 
sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe laying, 
pipe laying activities, certification, or insurance related to 
Nord Stream 2?
    Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, even if confirmed, I will not 
have the authority to make those decisions unilaterally. But I 
can say to you that I will do everything I possibly can to 
ensure that Nord Stream 2 does not go forward, and I know that 
the administration will welcome advice and counsel from you and 
from the Senate and we will move forward on everything that 
they can do legally to stop the pipeline.
    Senator Cruz. Well, I want to be very clear so that no one 
in the administration is surprised. This was an incredible 
victory for U.S. foreign policy and an incredible loss for 
Putin and Russia.
    The sanctions legislation was supported by virtually the 
entirety the committee when we voted on it. The vote was 20 to 
2, an overwhelming bipartisan majority.
    The administration has all of the tools to stop the 
pipeline, as evidenced by the fact that we stopped it for a 
year that it worked, that we know it worked.
    And it has only been in the last few weeks with the new 
administration that Putin has felt he has the green light to go 
ahead. I understand that the Germans want the pipeline built, 
that the German Government does.
    But going soft on Russia is a serious mistake, and once it 
is built, it likely is impossible to unwind. So the window and 
the urgency is now.
    Ms. Sherman. Senator, we share the sense of urgency, and I 
just want to say although I am not yet a part of the 
administration and will not be unless confirmed by the Senate, 
that I do not believe that the Biden/Harris administration has 
been soft on Russia in any way, shape, or form.
    I know we disagree when it comes to Nord Stream 2. But they 
are very clear. As we heard, Ambassador Burns, who is, I hope, 
about to be confirmed to be the director of the CIA, said and 
who is our ambassador to Russia, that we all should be very 
clear eyed about Russia being an adversary. Secretary Blinken 
has spoken at length about ways in which Russia threaten our 
country and I think there is a commitment to move in a tough 
way.
    Senator Cruz. Ambassador Sherman, with all due respect--
with all due respect, words are cheap. And so if the Biden 
administration wishes to not be soft on Russia, rather than 
saying we do not want to be soft on Russia they could actually 
follow the mandatory law and stop the pipeline.
    The test is going to be real simple. If Putin has billions 
of dollars and Europe is energy dependent on Russia because the 
Biden administration refused to comply with mandatory 
bipartisan sanctions, that will be the test and not any 
political rhetoric about we are tough on Putin.
    If you are tough on Putin, do not give him billions of 
dollars. The State Department needs to file a supplemental 
interim report on Nord Stream 2 that sanctions every entity and 
they are refusing to do so.
    And if this pipeline gets completed, it will be the fault 
of this administration. I do not want this to happen. I want 
that to be a bipartisan victory and a victory for the United 
States. You both have the opportunity to make sure that happens 
and so I implore you to do that.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Just since the chairman reserved 
his time I am going to take a moment of that time.
    President Trump could have used sanctions for the course of 
his four years in office on Nord Stream. He did not need 
congressionally-approved sanctions to affect the pipeline. 
Would that be from your experience a fair statement?
    Ms. Sherman. That is a fair statement, Senator.
    The Chairman. And yet he did not do that. So I join my 
colleague in my concern for Nord Stream. I mentioned it in my 
opening remarks, and I urge the administration to do everything 
they can to stop Nord Stream.
    But it would be intellectually unfair to suggest that the 
Biden administration is going to be the reason why Nord Stream 
gets built when four years were lost with no sanctions 
whatsoever.
    I understand that Senator Schatz is up next virtually.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
both of you for being willing to serve again.
    My first question is for Ambassador Sherman. You know, as 
people think of Asia, the mind races across the Pacific to 
China and not the nations in between us and them, and so I want 
to talk a little bit about Oceania.
    It has got 12 million people, 14 island states, 17 
territories, and 6 percent of the votes that we may need at the 
United Nations. And so how do we step up engagement in Oceania?
    Ms. Sherman. It is a great question, Senator, and you 
probably understand this part of the world better than most of 
us do, representing Hawaii, where it is very much a part of 
your neighborhood in many ways.
    I think that it is critical to engage with Oceania and with 
the island states. They are often, as you point out, critical 
votes at the United Nations and, certainly, in the General 
Assembly.
    And I know that in the Obama administration we, in fact, 
created a special forum to have those conversations and to 
ensure that we had diplomats who traveled to those island 
nations. That often does not happen because they are far away. 
Sometimes the travel is difficult. But it is quite critical.
    So I thank you very much for raising it and, if confirmed, 
I certainly will commit to you to pay attention to what is 
often a swing vote.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you. And I think one area for 
potential cooperation, you know, we think of climate action as 
an objective of American foreign policy.
    But climate action is a shared response to the climate 
crisis, especially in the disaster preparation, disaster 
response space, and as we look at more long-term impacts of sea 
level rise, especially in island nations and coastal nations, 
there are opportunities to step up what USAID is doing and 
other sort of, as you like to use the term, avenues of smart 
power.
    And so I am particularly excited about the opportunities 
for us to deploy those resources throughout island nations for 
selfish reasons but also for good humanitarian reasons.
    Can you talk a little bit about what is going to be the 
climate action strategy? I know we have got, you know, a lot of 
horsepower behind this, including the President of the United 
States, the former Secretary of State.
    But how does that get operationalized in the international 
context? And I am particularly interested not just in Paris but 
how we use shared climate response as a tool of diplomacy.
    Ms. Sherman. So let me make a couple of comments and then 
Mr. McKeon may want to add to it as well in terms of how we are 
organizing to tackle this very critical challenge.
    The President of the United States, the Secretary, the vice 
president have made clear that climate and our response to the 
changing climate is a whole-of-government approach and it is 
also a whole of State Department approach.
    So as much as we have a special presidential envoy for 
climate in former Secretary Kerry, every part of the 
department, every bureau of the department, will have a focus 
on climate as well because, as you well know, some of these 
island nations are at risk of even disappearing, let alone the 
changes in the ecosystem of the oceans, which affects fishermen 
and the ability to have maritime and fishery economies. So it 
is a critical issue that we will all have to pay attention to.
    And your point, Senator, about disaster preparedness is 
often a place where countries even with whom we do not agree on 
everything can work together because it is such a necessity, 
and the United States brings, really, unparalleled capabilities 
in disaster preparedness and response.
    Mr. McKeon, I do not know if you want to add to that.
    Senator Schatz. Mr. McKeon, before you answer, I would like 
you to perhaps provide some emphasis on those areas where we 
can make some permanent structural change within the department 
so that our climate strategy becomes so embedded into American 
foreign policy objectives that it does not swing in one 
direction or the other depending on the partisan affiliation of 
the President herself or himself.
    Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator.
    As Ambassador Sherman said, we really have to integrate the 
emphasis on climate action throughout the department. It is not 
just going to be Secretary Kerry's team, but, of course, they 
will be leading the diplomacy.
    But it has to be front of mind for the work of everyone in 
the department in all of the regional and functional bureaus to 
think about how in pursuit of their programs and their planning 
they are integrating a climate action dimension to it, not just 
in our diplomacy but also in our assistance programs, as you 
suggested.
    So I think we owe you more thinking on this and I am not 
sure what planning has gone on already because we are not in 
the department.
    But we will come back to you once we are--once we are in 
the seat, if confirmed, to give you more detail about how we 
are moving forward on this.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    My final question for Ambassador Sherman, global press 
freedom is on the decline. Reporters Without Borders found that 
the protection of rights for journalists has decreased 12 
percent since it started reporting on such things in 2013.
    What can we do to reverse this trend?
    Ms. Sherman. Really important, Senator, and we have already 
had some discussion here this morning about our response on the 
horrifying death of Jamal Khashoggi. I think it is critical 
that we engage with journalists around the world, that we talk 
about press freedom wherever we go.
    Yes, journalists are separate and apart, and they are part 
of holding us accountable and administration accountable. But 
they are also citizens. They are also standing for freedom.
    And, in fact, one of the great parts of the United States 
is when we find ourselves challenged, as we have in many ways 
over the last years, it is often the press who hold all of us 
accountable for what we are doing.
    And so we have heard Secretary Blinken speak of the 
importance of press freedom and making it essential to our 
human rights agenda around the world and our agenda on 
democracy.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you to you both for testifying, for 
being willing to serve again. And I just want to thank the 
chair and the ranking member and all the staff for welcoming me 
on to the committee.
    The Chairman. It is very good to have you with us, Senator 
Schatz.
    Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, and I want to thank both of you for your prior public 
service and your willingness to serve again.
    Mr. McKeon, I want to associate myself with the remarks 
from my fellow Maryland senator, Senator Cardin, about the 
importance of your commitment to greater diversity in the 
Foreign Service and the State Department.
    Senator Sullivan and I are the co-chairs of the Foreign 
Service Caucus and will soon be reintroducing legislation we 
introduced last year, the Foreign Service Families Act.
    It is to provide Foreign Service spouses and families 
serving overseas with the same opportunities that we rightly 
provide now to military spouses and families serving overseas.
    I am just looking for your commitment that you will review 
this legislation and provide us with your feedback as soon as 
possible.
    Mr. McKeon. Senator, you definitely--you have that 
commitment. I have already looked at the bill and it looks, on 
its face, very straightforward. I am sure colleagues in the 
department will tell me we might need a tweak here or there to 
make it more workable for--from the perspective of the 
department. But we can work with you on that.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. One of the benefits 
of going last here is you also get to associate yourself with 
some of the prior comments, and I do want to associate myself 
with the comments of Senator Young and Senator Coons, and I 
know the chairman shares this, about better coordinating all 
the tools available in our both diplomatic arsenal and our 
development arsenal. USAID, the International Development 
Finance Corporation. You and I spoke about that and I look 
forward to working with you on that as well.
    Ambassador Sherman, I teamed up with Senator Toomey to pass 
two pieces of legislation. One is the BRINK Act, to apply 
secondary sanctions against entities doing business with the 
North Korean regime, and the Hong Kong Accountability Act to 
apply sanctions to those Chinese officials who are tasked with 
implementing the crackdown on democracy and human rights in 
Hong Kong.
    I would like your commitment to work with us to both fully 
and effectively apply the sanctions under both those pieces of 
legislation.
    Ms. Sherman. It is an easy commitment to make, to make sure 
that whatever sanctions we have we use them effectively and 
efficiently.
    Senator Van Hollen. So let me turn now to a little bit of 
the Middle East, and JCPOA has been well covered here. 
President Biden has made clear that he supports what had been 
for a long time a bipartisan objective of U.S. foreign policy, 
which is a secure State of Israel and a viable Palestinian 
state--a two-state solution.
    The Biden administration has also indicated that it would 
oppose unilateral steps by either party that undermines the 
prospects of a two-state solution, and we need to hold 
everybody accountable there.
    You would agree with, would you not, that expanding 
settlements in East Jerusalem of the West Bank are unilateral 
measures that do not serve the interests of protecting the 
prospects of a two-state solution, would you not?
    Ms. Sherman. It has been a long-standing position that 
settlements, is my understanding, do not help to achieve a two-
state solution when they go beyond the current outlines of the 
two states--the potential for two state.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate it. Well, one of them 
under consideration is an area called E-1, which the Bush 
administration made clear, Secretary Condoleezza Rice made 
clear would be a very clear violation of our efforts to 
preserve the opportunity for a two-state solution. So I hope 
you will look into that right away.
    While ISIS no longer controls any substantial territory, 
you would agree that it remains a very potent threat to the 
United States and our allies, would you not?
    Ms. Sherman. I do agree it remains a threat.
    Senator Van Hollen. And you would also agree, I believe, 
that our Syrian Kurdish allies have been absolutely essential 
partners in our fight against ISIS and have been a major part 
of why we have been able to diminish ISIS' influence in the 
region, would you not?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. So can you commit to working with us to 
work with Turkey to stop trying to, essentially, kill and 
destroy our Syrian Kurdish allies who have been such key 
partners in that fight against ISIS?
    Ms. Sherman. You know, Senator, I certainly understand 
why--Turkey's concerns. But, nonetheless, I agree with you that 
the Kurds have been immensely helpful partners to us and that 
we need to work with Turkey to find a way forward for them to 
understand that that partnership does not threaten them if we 
all manage it in a sane kind of way.
    Our relationship with Turkey is very complicated and one in 
which I think, if confirmed, I would certainly pay some 
considerable attention to.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, and the chairman and 
the ranking member and I have been very involved in the 
legislation to impose the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey for their 
purchase and deployment of the S-400. Turkey is talking about 
another round of purchasing S-400 from Russia. So I hope you 
will work with us and with Turkey to discourage them from 
moving forward there.
    On the JCPOA, I just want to underscore the fundamental 
principle behind it, which is it is our policy to prevent Iran 
from getting a nuclear weapon, right?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. And it is also our view, your view, my 
view, that resolving that through diplomatic means is better 
than going to war with Iran, right?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. And the United States has lots of 
troops in Iraq right now, do we not?
    Ms. Sherman. We do indeed.
    Senator Van Hollen. And I actually agree with Senator 
Paul's analysis of the consequence of the--our actions with 
respect to Iraq, which is the biggest geopolitical winner was 
Iran, which, of course, neighbors Iraq.
    If we were to go to war with Iran, our troops in Iraq would 
be put in grave danger, would they not?
    Ms. Sherman. It is my belief that they would be, yes, 
Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. I think it is pretty clear that they 
would be right in the line of fire. So I encourage you to 
continue your efforts with respect to JCPOA compliance-for-
compliance and I hope that we can get to that position as soon 
as possible.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Booker?
    Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
    I would like to jump in. Ms. Sherman, I am grateful to see 
you here and very excited to support your nomination on the 
floor of the Senate.
    You and I talked a lot about the Horn of Africa and some of 
the challenges we see going on within Ethiopia that are really 
painful and discouraging. Amnesty International said over the 
weekend and CNN has reported that there have been massacres by 
Eritrean forces, which have killed hundreds of civilians in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia.
    It is really a point that I think we are at the level of a 
major humanitarian crisis affecting millions of people, and 
that there is the possibility of a famine, and I know you are 
aware of it.
    I really did appreciate Secretary Blinken's receptiveness 
to appointing a special envoy to the Horn of Africa in a 
statement last week, and I really do hope that we move forward 
in that direction.
    But the Government of Ethiopia continues to deny that there 
is even ongoing fighting there, and this puts us in a difficult 
situation. They are even putting out a lot of misinformation 
that makes it hard to understand what is happening.
    And so understanding that the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship is 
important, as we know, could you just maybe give some more, 
publicly in this hearing, some more thoughts on how you would 
engage Prime Minister Abiy to cease hostilities and ensure that 
humanitarian access is in the region and how we create better 
governmental accountability?
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you 
for your concern about the Horn of Africa and about what is 
happening in Ethiopia, which is quite horrifying.
    Secretary Blinken, is my understanding, spoke to the prime 
minister yesterday and made it very clear that we expect him to 
ensure humanitarian access.
    He had said that he would, but the Secretary wanted to make 
sure that he understood that there would be consequences if he 
did not, that he has responsibility for ensuring peace in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia, that Eritrean troops should leave 
and others who are not helpful actors should not be in the 
region.
    I think we will have to follow this up, working with our 
diplomatic presence in Ethiopia, to ensure that that 
humanitarian access continues, that this conflict ends, and the 
Ethiopian prime minister understands that the United States is 
not only watching but we will take action.
    And I am very grateful as a citizen, as a person who cares 
about the rights of people around the world, that Secretary 
Blinken was so forthright yesterday with the prime minister.
    Senator Booker. I am really grateful. Can we shift to Libya 
and Somalia as well, another really difficult area of conflict?


    [Senator Booker requested and was granted permission to 
submit the material referenced above for inclusion in the 
hearing record. That information is located at the end of this 
transcript beginning on page 144.]


    And we can see that this was an internationalized conflict 
with more countries being involved. Libya, UAE, Russia, Turkey, 
have all fueled this conflict that I believe is another strike 
point on the continent.
    In Somalia, you see these other groups that are pursuing, 
really, their own interests that are really to the detriment of 
Somalia's Government and federalized system.
    And so could you maybe give some insights on what you will 
do to address the issues of foreign interference in a situation 
that is really fragile and could destabilize even more, and how 
you will help the regional bureaus of the State Department 
cross between their silos?
    That is the challenge you have in the Near East and Africa 
bureaus that I am a little concerned about, that structurally 
we are not really organizationally prepared for the conflict 
that we are seeing there.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. On Libya, I actually have 
a small sliver of hope, given the pending elections and the 
peace process that has begun in Libya. It is very fragile, as 
you say, led by the Europeans.
    And yes, I agree with you there. Lots of it became a proxy 
place for conflict, and that those who represent those proxies 
should be out of Libya and let the Libyan people decide their 
own future.
    I was in Libya right at the point where Hadi was about to 
run as the only presidential candidate. It was fragile then. It 
remains fragile now, and--I am sorry, Hadi is Yemen. Long in 
the process here. I apologize.
    But I was in Libya at the point of the conflict and before 
we had to shut down our embassy in Libya. So I hope that there 
is a more--a chance for peace in Libya, led by Europe with our 
support.
    In terms of Somalia, which I also visited when I was Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs, and I thought we were on the 
road to a better future for the Somali people. It has, clearly, 
gone backwards in just terrible ways.
    And so I think we have to engage across bureaus, as you 
suggest, to make sure that we bring all of our resources to 
bear. I know that our ambassador to the U.N. will also play a 
role both in the Libyan and the Somalia circumstances.
    And I do not know whether my colleague has something he 
wants to add on sort of how we are organized to become a better 
matrix organization and less siloed.
    Senator Booker. I appreciate you opening the door to Mr. 
McKeon and maybe I will turn to him. I had this incredible 
couple paragraphs written here, knowing you are a Notre Dame 
graduate, to remind you of my exploits as a football player 
against your school and defeating them soundly. But I am going 
to----
    Mr. McKeon. After we talked the other day, I watched the 
video of you making that catch and avoiding tackle from the 
all-star NFL star.
    Senator Booker. I appreciate you saying that because my 
chairman, I am not sure if he even knows that I played.
    Mr. McKeon. I texted some friends, and they were just 
wondering how you got away from Lou Holtz.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. McKeon. So they would like to hear the story.
    The Chairman. The chairman recognizes that the junior 
senator from New Jersey excels in everything.[Laughter.]
    Senator Booker. Thank you very much. I am actually going to 
just ask you--I just want to maybe say it on the record. You 
were so gracious. But I have a lot of concerns about diversity, 
paid internships.
    I am going to introduce a bill today about paid internships 
in the State Department because that is just an issue to me 
that has always troubled me, as I have traveled around the 
world, seeing our State Department, these amazing heroic 
frontline folks, but they do not really reflect the diversity 
of our country.
    And I just would love to just maybe get in the five, 10 
seconds I have left maybe some thoughts from you on that 
effort.
    Mr. McKeon. Yes, thank you.
    As I said to you the other day, the department has scraped 
together a few million dollars to start paying interns. It is 
not for the entire program. And it appears that I need to dig 
into it some more.
    We might need some legislative authority to facilitate this 
in addition to the resources. So we will come back to you and 
look forward to working with you on this legislation.
    Senator Booker. I look forward to supporting you as well on 
the Senate floor, and thank you both for your extraordinary 
service to our nation.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Booker.
    So the Chair will reclaim his time, and we appreciate that 
you have been through two and a half hours without relief. So 
we will try not to make this too prolonged.
    But, Ambassador, is it fair to say that the Trump 
administration's maximum effort campaigns did cause economic 
consequences to Iran?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, I would say that it did.
    The Chairman. Yeah. But it is also fair to say that Iran is 
now closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than it was before 
and during the Maximum Pressure campaign?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is.
    The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that we could not get 
one vote for many of our major allies at the United Nations to 
extend the arms embargo that ceased?
    Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding, Senator. Yes.
    The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that the Maximum 
Pressure campaign has done nothing, ultimately, to get Iran to 
stop its nefarious activities throughout the region?
    Ms. Sherman. That is my assessment as well.
    The Chairman. Or, for that fact, to diminish its support 
for terrorism in the world?
    Ms. Sherman. It appears so, yes, Senator.
    The Chairman. So I say these only because I recognize that 
the Maximum Pressure campaign cost Iran financially, but it did 
not meet the goals that I think we, collectively, want. So let 
me ask you this.
    There is no question--well, let me ask you, do you believe 
that a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat to the State 
of Israel?
    Ms. Sherman. I do.
    The Chairman. And I share that view, and I also believe 
that it is a threat to the United States of America, not just 
about Israel or our allies in the region. So, therefore, I 
believe that it is President Biden's view that Iran cannot be 
allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.
    Ms. Sherman. That is correct.
    The Chairman. Now, in that regard, how we achieve that goal 
is really the question, and so I appreciate the phrase 
``stronger and longer.'' Longer, I get what it means. Stronger, 
I am hoping for definition.
    Because the reality is if all--from my perspective, and I 
have heard my colleagues on both sides here--from my 
perspective, if all we do is return to the JCPOA, that 
certainly is not stronger.
    And if we extend it, it might be longer, but it is not 
stronger because there are still sunset issues that are now 
more prevalent today than they were in 2016 when the agreement 
went into effect.
    And so it also will not have dealt with the ballistic 
missiles. It will not have dealt with the destabilization of 
the region. It will not have dealt with its support for 
terrorism or the violation of its own people's human rights.
    And so, you know, the question in my mind is not so much 
JCPOA. The question is, what is the JCPOA Plus or what do we 
do, but how do we, in fact, ensure that we have more than 
illusory promise in terms of what comes, the follow-on, and the 
connection between any return to some form of the JCPOA with 
some clearly determined process to deal with these other 
issues.
    Otherwise, my own view will be that we will have failed. 
And so this--I drive this because while I also, in fairness, 
for the record, you are not going to be the lead on the Iran 
portfolio. That has already been designated to others.
    But upon confirmation as a deputy you are going to be in 
all the deputy meetings, and you also have expertise and 
experience in this regard and you will be called upon to 
express both the Secretary and the administration's view but 
also on your expertise.
    So could you give me a sense of what that would be in broad 
strokes, understanding--and I appreciate your comments in 
response to other questions about looking at the intelligence 
when you have access to it again because I think a deep dive 
into the intelligence will be very important to understand what 
Iran has and has not complied with in its actions and its 
intentions.
    Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
    I do not know all of the answers at this point because not 
only have I not made a deep dive into the intelligence because 
I am not in the administration, I do not know what 
deliberations have gone on so far in the administration as they 
try to think through the strategy that is best here.
    You know, I have seen what others see from press reports 
about our offer to open diplomacy, which I think should be the 
first resort always. I have seen the strike in Syria in 
retaliation for the threat against Americans.
    I have seen the response, perhaps, or just a separate 
action against Al Asad Airbase. I, you know, read in some of 
the Iranian press what is going on politically in their 
country. But I do not know all the pieces of the puzzle 
anymore. You have to be really inside to get the fingertips for 
what is going on.
    But I do agree with you, Senator, that there has to be very 
careful deliberations which will include, and I hope already 
have begun to include, you and the members of this committee 
and other senators who have interest in this arena to get your 
advice and counsel, as I have said in this hearing, at the 
takeoff, not just at the landing, to have true consultation, 
not just notification, how we sequence sanctions, how we 
sequence any lifting of sanctions, what we expect from the 
Iranians, what those who are in the negotiation and in the 
JCPOA yet believe we need to do going forward.
    So there are a myriad of puzzle pieces here and, if 
confirmed, I would look forward to extensive discussion with 
you and with others who have interest in this to sort through 
how the administration goes forward.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you this. If we were still in the 
agreement and Iran had done what it has done today, would that 
not be subject to snap back?
    Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. And I would consider that it would be a set 
of actions that would require snap back, from my own 
perspective.
    Let me ask you this. Sanctions relief for whatever deal may 
come forward, clearly, we have to be very careful. There are 
sanctions which I helped fashion that are not about the nuclear 
portfolio and issue, but about terrorism and other things.
    Iran likes to try to claim that all sanctions that we levy 
are just about their nuclear portfolio. We cannot tolerate that 
or else we will have nothing in our arsenal of peaceful 
diplomacy to deal with Iran's other nefarious activities.
    Is that a fair statement?
    Ms. Sherman. It is a fair statement that we have to keep 
sanctions on that deal with human rights abuses, state 
sponsorship of terrorism, arms sales, et cetera, what we have 
done in terms of Hezbollah and Hamas.
    So, yes, I think there are many things that need to stay in 
place.
    The Chairman. Let me turn to another subject for a moment. 
First of all, my dear friend and colleague, Senator Rubio, on 
Venezuela, you know, I agree with him and our cause in 
Venezuela.
    I think what you meant in response to his question, and 
correct me if I am wrong, that one of the things you thought 
should have been done is to take the international recognition 
of Guaido and, ultimately, maximize that recognition beyond 
simple recognition, but an effort to multilateralize sanctions 
against the Maduro regime. Or am I wrong?
    Ms. Sherman. No, very well said. Wish I had said it as 
well.
    The Chairman. Okay. So, but--and let me refer to Senator 
Murphy, who said that the European Union no longer recognizes 
Guaido.
    The European Union never recognized Guaido. Individual 
member states of the European Union recognized Guaido and some 
of them have a concern because the basis of that recognition 
was under the Venezuelan Constitution.
    The President of the National Assembly, in the absence of 
the President or a legitimate president, ultimately is 
recognized as the interim president of Venezuela.
    He is, according to the view of some, no longer the 
President of the National Assembly because we had an 
internationally-condemned false elections in Venezuela that 
elected a new National Assembly.
    But it is not because he lost his title. It is because they 
had an election that has been internationally condemned. Is 
that a fair statement?
    Ms. Sherman. I believe so, yes, sir.
    The Chairman. And so how we internationalize this is 
incredibly important.
    Let me turn to Cuba for a moment, which is, along with 
Iran, one of my passions. You know, do you know that a Cuban 
worker in Cuba cannot be employed directly by a foreign entity?
    Ms. Sherman. I did not.
    The Chairman. Hotels in Cuba, or a U.S. company that gets 
created in Cuba, cannot directly hire a Cuban worker. They go 
to the state employment agency controlled by the regime. The 
regime sends the worker, for example, to the hotel. The regime 
gets paid in dollars by the foreign company and then gives the 
worker a fraction of their wages in return.
    Do you know that Cuban doctors that are sent abroad, 
ultimately, have their passports taken from them so that they 
cannot leave the country they are sent to, and that payment for 
their service by that country is sent to the regime and not 
paid to a Cuban doctor?
    Ms. Sherman. I had been aware about the passport issue and 
I better understand now from you how the payment system works.
    The Chairman. Do you understand that when we talk about we 
want to help the Cuban people, of which I am all in favor, but 
when we send a remittance to Cuba as a U.S. citizen for one of 
our family members that the regime takes 10 percent of it right 
off the bat, and you do realize that?
    Ms. Sherman. I had heard of that.
    The Chairman. And then after that, they turn the balance of 
the remittance not in dollars, which have a far more vibrant 
buying ability within the island, but they turn it into 
worthless pesos.
    So when we send money, we allow money to be sent under 
these circumstances, what we are doing is empowering the 
regime.
    Do you realize that a U.S. company that wants to open up in 
Cuba has to go through one of Castro's two relatives in order 
to be able to open up and the state becomes a co-owner with 
them?
    Ms. Sherman. I had not realized that, sir.
    The Chairman. That is exactly what happens, in tourism and 
whatnot. You have Castro's son and son-in-law. Both heads of 
the Cuban military are parts of the Cuban military and they 
direct the two corporate entities that do all these.
    So I share these with you because I find it interesting, 
you know, lying on the beach in Veradaro and sipping a Cuba 
Libre, which is an oxymoron, is not going to liberate the Cuban 
people.
    Have you heard of the San Isidro movement?
    Ms. Sherman. Yes.
    The Chairman. Okay. The San Isidro movement is a bunch of 
artists and writers who just want freedom of their expression. 
The Government cracked down on all of those, and so they 
started a movement in what is a black majority part of Havana 
to, ultimately, denounce their artistic and freedom of 
expression movement.
    The Government has viciously attacked them and arrested 
them. These are the realities of Castro's Cuba, not the 
romanticism that some people seem to have, and I personally 
have a problem--I like to be consistent. In this town, 
consistency is not a great virtue. But I like--I try to be 
consistent.
    My advocacy for human rights and democracy globally is not 
subject to where it lies. So whether it be in Burma, whether it 
be in Venezuela, whether it be on the Uyghurs and human rights 
in China, whether it be about the Rohingya, my view is pretty 
universal.
    And the problem I have with some is that when it comes to 
certain places in the world they are enormous advocates of 
democracy and human rights; but when it comes to other places 
in the world, they are willing to look totally the other way 
and act in a different way than we would seek to act in other 
places. And I think that is problematic.
    I understand the world. There is not a single way we can--
do not get to treat everybody in a cookie cutter fashion.
    By the same token, when we send different messages--that 
here is where we will promote human rights and democracy, here 
is where we will not, here is where we will sanction the 
consequences of violations of human rights and here is where we 
will not--then it becomes a really problematic area to stand up 
for what I believe President Biden is about, which is about 
standing up for democracy and human rights--based upon the time 
I served with him on this committee.
    So I hope we are thinking about that, whether it is about 
Cuba or any other place. I want to help the Cuban people, 
ultimately, live a better life. I would like them to be free. I 
would like them to choose who governs them. I would like them 
to be able to worship at the altar that they choose.
    But that is not, for the most part, the reality of life in 
Cuba. So we need to understand the realities, not the 
romanticism, and when we seek to help; what we cannot do is, 
ultimately, help a regime that oppresses them.
    Finally, I hope you will pay some attention to, upon your 
confirmation, to the eastern Mediterranean region. I passed 
into law with Senator Rubio the Eastern Mediterranean Security 
and Energy Partnership Act of 2019. It is incredibly important 
that we look at Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and others in an 
eastern Mediterranean strategy that is both about energy, but 
at the--and that can diversify and, therefore, not have the 
pipeline issue as important as issue as it is, but at the same 
time deals with security.
    Several of these countries host us in very significant 
ways, are our security partners. With Turkey being under 
Erdogan, the--not the reliable NATO ally that we have aspired 
it to be, not to be the bridge between East and West, not to 
be--you know, there are more lawyers and journalists jailed in 
Turkey than in any other place in the world. That is an 
extraordinary statement about a NATO ally.
    And so what we do as it relates to Turkey but also in our 
own interest. Even if Turkey was a perfect partner, which it is 
not, the East Med is an incredibly important area and I want to 
commend that to your attention as you look forward to take 
duty.
    And then, very finally, I hope the President will keep his 
commitment to recognize the Armenian genocide. The United 
States Senate by unanimous consent passed it last year. I was 
proud to sponsor that. The House of Representatives has passed 
it.
    It is time for the President of the United States to do 
what the rest of the Congress of the United States has 
represented to the American people, which is to recognize the 
genocide. Let us call history for what it is.
    And in that regard, I also hope that we will look to help 
the people of Armenia and help to facilitate the release of 
POWs that the Azerbaijanis have. It is in violation of 
international law what they are doing.
    We need to speak out, which the previous administration did 
not, and we need to work to try to get that region to look 
forward to what the Minsk process was. There is some suggestion 
that this is all over. No, it is not, and we need to get--
released the POWs and we have to help Armenia as it gets all of 
these people, refugees, back into their country.
    With that, before I close, I am introducing into the record 
a letter written by 19 of Brian McKeon's former Republican 
colleagues during his time on this committee expressing 
enthusiastic support for his nomination and complete confidence 
in his character and abilities.
    I am quoting from the letter. They note their deep respect 
for Brian as a leader who exhibits unfailing integrity, 
fairness, professionalism, devotion to our national interest.


    [The information referred to is located at the end of this 
transcript.]


    The Chairman. Due to COVID precautions, my staff will email 
the letter directly to the clerk.
    With that, and thanks to the committee for your attendance, 
the record will remain open until the close of business 
tomorrow, March the 4th.
    I urge both of you, if there are questions for the record, 
to respond to them in--as quickly as possible so that your 
nominations can be considered at a business meeting of the 
committee.
    And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

                              ----------                              


   Letter in Support of Hon. Wendy R. Sheman's Nomination, Signed by 
           Former Ambassadors and National Security Officials








   Letter in Support of Hon. Brian McKeon's Nomination, Signed by 19 
                  Republican Former SFRC Staff Members








                   Responses to Additional Questions 
                        Submitted for the Record


     Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
            Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. The FY 21 NDAA includes a requirement for the Secretary 
of State to develop and implement a strategy for countering white 
identity terrorism globally. The attack on Congress earlier this month 
underscores the importance of this issue. Do I have your commitment 
that you will submit this strategy on time if confirmed?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to developing a Department of State 
strategy for countering white identity terrorism globally, in line with 
the NDAA requirement. Countering white identity terrorism and other 
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE) is a top 
priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. The State Department has 
an important role to play on these issues, as we are seeing increasing 
transnational links between white identity terrorists and other REMVE 
actors. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with the 
interagency and our partners around the world to address the threat of 
white identity terrorism and other REMVE, as well as all forms of 
terrorism and violent extremism--offline and online.

    Question. How specifically will you ensure that the State 
Department prioritizes this issue?

    Answer. ``white identity'' terrorism, including terrorism 
designations as appropriate, and foreign partner engagement. The United 
States developed effective tools to counter the spread of ISIS and al-
Qa'ida that can be adapted to address this threat. Among these tools, 
public diplomacy programs that promote people-to-people engagement help 
increase awareness and build international consensus to counter white 
identity terrorism.

    Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship, 
which will be critical in addressing 21st century challenges ranging 
from climate change to China. In light of this, I introduced the 
Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate Cooperation with India Act to 
boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy. If confirmed, what 
aspects of the Trump Administration's work on energy in India will you 
continue and what will you change?

    Answer. In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of 
installing 450 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I 
would support the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance 
the flexibility and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage 
India's clean energy transition over the next decade. In contrast to 
the previous administration's approach, in order to support India 
raising its climate ambition, if confirmed, I would prioritize lower 
cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as coal-fired power, 
including by promoting renewable energy, battery storage, and load 
shifting.

    Question. I also believe that the U.S.-India partnership is 
strongest when based on shared democratic values, and I am concerned by 
the recent trend away from those values in India. From the recent 
crackdowns on farmers peacefully protesting the new farming laws and 
corresponding intimidation of journalists and government critics, to 
the rising anti-Muslim sentiment and related government actions like 
the Citizenship Amendment Act, to the continued repression in Kashmir 
nearly a year and a half after the abrogation of Article 370, there are 
a significant number of human rights and democracy issues facing India. 
Do I have your commitment that you will actively raise human rights and 
democracy issues with the Indian Government, at your level and all 
levels of the Department?

    Answer. I share your belief that the U.S.-India relationship is 
underpinned by a common commitment to democracy and democratic 
institutions. The Biden-Harris administration will ensure human rights 
and religious freedom remain core pillars of U.S. foreign policy, and 
if confirmed, my engagement with the Indian Government will reflect our 
values and commitment to human rights.

    Question. What is your plan for ensuring that discussion of these 
important issues does not get lost amidst other priorities in the 
bilateral relationship?

    Answer. The U.S.-India strategic partnership is one of our most 
critical relationships in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will work 
with counterparts in the U.S. and Indian Government to deepen our 
comprehensive partnership based on mutual interests including regional 
security and economic growth, promoting shared values of democracy and 
human rights, and cooperation on shared challenges including climate 
change, COVID-19 response efforts, and trafficking in persons. By 
prioritizing our shared interests and values, we can advance broader 
U.S. national security interests for regional peace and stability in 
the Indo-Pacific.

    Question. A democratic, stable and resilient Ukraine is in the 
national security interest of the United States, and efforts towards 
that end receive broad bipartisan support in the Senate. If confirmed, 
how will your policy approach to Ukraine differ from the approach taken 
during the Obama and Trump Administrations?

    Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship 
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will continue to oppose Russia's 
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic 
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia 
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and 
aggression in eastern Ukraine. Further, if confirmed I will work with 
Congress to continue providing the security assistance, including 
lethal defensive weapons, Ukraine requires to defend itself against 
Russia's aggression. I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic 
path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and economic 
reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter 
future for all Ukrainians.

    Question. Do you support the provision of lethal security 
assistance for Ukraine, beyond providing Javelin missiles?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress 
to continue providing the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself 
against Russia's aggression, including lethal weapons, based on a U.S. 
and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense requirements. This 
includes the provision of defensive lethal assistance that has already 
expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as armed Mark VI patrol boats 
this year, for instance.

    Question. How will you work to urge Ukrainian officials and its 
private sector to deny Chinese efforts to take over significant 
military production capabilities in the country?

    Answer. The United States is prepared to work with our Ukrainian 
partners to advance our shared interests and protect Ukraine's 
sensitive industries. I was pleased to see Ukraine's decisive action to 
sanction Chinese firm Skyrizon, which has attempted to take control of 
Motor Sich, on January 29. This action protects U.S. and Ukrainian 
national security. The administration has urged and will continue to 
urge Ukraine to remain vigilant about People's Republic of China (PRC) 
influence in its strategic industries and to pass legislation creating 
a mechanism for reviewing investment. If confirmed, I would work 
closely with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to 
support U.S. investors as alternatives to predatory PRC investors.

    Question. Do you believe that our Indo-Pacific strategy ought to be 
a function of our China policy, as was the case with the Trump 
administration, or that our China policy ought to be a function of our 
Indo-Pacific strategy? Put another way, can we get China ``right'' if 
we don't get the region right, first?

    Answer. Our global policy to compete with China and the U.S. 
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific are complementary 
strategies. Our relationship with China will be competitive when it 
should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must 
be. The common denominator is the need to engage China from a position 
of strength. To do that, the United States needs to support a free and 
open Indo-Pacific, where our engagement builds broad cooperation with 
allies and partners in pursuit of common interests, including advancing 
COVID-19 recovery and returning to sustained economic prosperity, 
dealing with the climate crisis, upholding international law and 
multilateral institutions, and reinforcing democracy, human rights, and 
good governance. As the President has said, how the United States and 
Asia work together to secure the peace, defend our shared values, and 
advance our prosperity across the Indo-Pacific, including how we 
address the China challenge, will be among the most consequential 
efforts we undertake.

    Question. With regards to China and the broader Indo-Pacific 
region, aside from words of condemnation and economic sanctions: What 
other tools does the Biden Administration have to counterbalance 
China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious 
regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will promote Department efforts to re-
engage with allies, partners, and international organizations to create 
a level playing field for U.S. businesses across the globe, support 
those who fight for democracy and human rights in China and across the 
Indo-Pacific, maintain our technological edge, protect U.S. 
intellectual property from theft, promote freedom of navigation and 
overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and continue to work with 
Congress to spotlight and combat malign PRC actions and human rights 
violations, including in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.

    Question. There is little question that the Trump administration's 
failed North Korea policy has left us worse off than we were before. 
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are unconstrained, our 
alliance with the Republic of Korea has been put under great stress, 
and the sanctions regime is in tatters. President Trump's diplomatic 
failure with North Korea is the latest in a long-line of failed efforts 
to achieve a denuclearized North Korea. How will the Biden 
administration approach North Korea?

    Answer. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program and 
proliferation activities constitute a serious threat to international 
peace and security and undermine global nonproliferation efforts. If 
confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing 
policy review, in consultation with our allies, of the state of play on 
North Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the 
complete denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the 
near term on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.

    Question. What is the pathway to denuclearization and a stable, 
peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula?

    Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea must remain a top national 
security priority for the United States. I support the Administration's 
plan to evaluate and adopt, in consultation with our allies, a strategy 
to keep the American people and our allies safe and that takes into 
account pressure options and the potential for future diplomacy with 
North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress 
on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's WMD and 
ballistic missile programs.

    Question. What does success with North Korea look like?

    Answer. Foremost, success entails achieving the complete 
denuclearization of North Korea and a durable peace on the Korean 
Peninsula, which would promote stability for our allies, the region, 
and the world. Further, success would entail an end to malign North 
Korea-linked actions globally, including cyber-enabled malicious 
activities and arms trafficking, and involve greater respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in North Korea. If confirmed, I plan to 
join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing policy review, in 
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North 
Korea.

    Question. The war in Yemen is about to enter its 6th year and, in 
spite of the efforts of UN special envoy Martin Griffiths, little 
progress has been made toward ending a conflict that has killed more 
than 17,000 civilians and created the world's worst humanitarian 
crisis. Iran continues to ship weapons, including ballistic missiles, 
which have allowed the Houthis to menace Saudi Arabia and continue 
their war against the internationally recognized Yemeni Government. 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to hit civilian targets in Yemen with 
U.S.-made warplanes and munitions. I am pleased to see that the 
Administration shares my concerns about the civilian casualties 
resulting from Saudi Arabia's use of U.S. munitions, and is reviewing 
arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while ending U.S. support 
for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. What evidence will the Administration 
need to see regarding the improved use of offensive U.S. weapons 
systems by those countries before it is comfortable with further sales?

    Answer. As President Biden said, the Administration is committed to 
reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, alongside the UN and others, to 
achieve a ceasefire and end the war in Yemen. The Administration is 
recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia to reflect U.S. 
values. The President announced the ending of U.S. support for 
offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant arms sales, and 
appointed Special Envoy Tim Lenderking to spearhead our diplomatic 
efforts and support to the UN. The Administration paused two arms sales 
with Saudi Arabia, and, if confirmed, I will support efforts to 
evaluate other potential sales to help ensure they are consistent with 
our values and that Congress will be consulted. The Administration will 
work with our partners to help them reduce the risk of civilian harm.

    Question. I am under no illusions about the Houthi's malevolent 
role in the conflict, but Secretary Blinken's reversal of his 
predecessor's poorly thought-out FTO designation of the Houthis has 
prevented Yemen's humanitarian crises from exponentially worsening. At 
the same time, I am also deeply concerned by the previous 
administration's freeze on assistance to Northern Yemen. Will the Biden 
Administration lift this freeze? What steps will the Administration 
take, alongside the UN and other international donors, to ensure that 
the Houthis are not able to divert or place unacceptable conditions on 
international assistance?

    Answer. USAID was forced to partially suspend some assistance to 
NGOs in northern Yemen in March 2020 due to Houthi interference in 
partners' operations. This decision is currently under review. As with 
all humanitarian programs, the United States aims to ensure our 
partners can deliver assistance in a timely manner without undue 
interference. Without proper oversight of taxpayer money, we adjust or 
terminate funding to specific programs as necessary. Over the last 
year, the U.S. has worked closely with our partners, including the UN 
and other donors, to advocate with the Houthis to cease interference in 
aid operations, and there have been some positive changes. The 
Administration continues to press all parties to allow for the 
unhindered provision of aid.

    Question. I am also concerned by the recent Houthi advance into 
Marib province, which threatens to displace hundreds of thousands of 
Yemenis, many for the second or third time. How will the Biden 
Administration build leverage to push all warring parties to agree to a 
nationwide ceasefire in Yemen and begin talks aimed at a sustainable 
political solution to the conflict?

    Answer. The President committed to ending all support for the 
Saudi-led Coalition's offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant 
arms sales. There is no military solution to the conflict and the 
Department redoubled its diplomatic efforts to find a political end to 
the war and address the dire humanitarian crisis. The Secretary named a 
U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen in order to redouble U.S. efforts to find 
a peaceful resolution as soon as possible. If confirmed, I will support 
efforts towards a nationwide ceasefire that quickly moves to 
negotiations and increases international pressure against the Houthis 
to convince them to halt their assault on Marib.

    Question. The Taliban's commitments on counterterrorism are an 
indispensable part of the February 29th agreement. Its compliance with 
those commitments, or lack thereof, must inform the decisions the U.S. 
makes regarding our future in Afghanistan and will certainly be the 
basis of future congressional support for assistance to Afghanistan. Do 
you commit to make the Taliban's compliance with the February 29th 
Agreement, especially with the counterterrorism provisions, the basis 
of any decisions the U.S. makes regarding our future in Afghanistan?

    Answer. I agree it is important to ensure Afghanistan never again 
serves as a safe haven for terrorist groups that threaten the security 
of the United States and our Allies. To this end, I support the 
Administration's ongoing review of compliance by all parties with their 
commitments in the February 29 U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the February 
29 U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration. This review includes assessing 
whether the Taliban are fulfilling their commitments relating to 
counterterrorism, reducing violence, and engaging in meaningful 
negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

    Question.  Our relationship with Mexico is one of the most 
important in the world. However, I have serious concerns over the 
growing challenges to the rule of law in Mexico by armed criminal 
organizations-especially when certain groups increasingly appear to be 
equipped with military-grade arms and vehicles. While the Mexican 
Government rightfully raises concerns about international arms 
trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico, that only tells half the story. 
The arrest and botched release of former Mexican Defense Minister 
Cienfuegos last year, as well as other high profile cases, suggest that 
criminal organizations have coopted certain officials and institutions 
at various levels of the Mexican Government. And, despite these 
challenges, the Lopez Obrador Government has taken steps to complicate 
bilateral law enforcement cooperation. What is your assessment of 
challenges to the rule of law in Mexico and how will you work with 
Mexican authorities on these issues?

    Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national 
security priority. It is critical that U.S. efforts to dismantle 
transnational criminal organizations, reduce impunity and corruption, 
and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico receive the full cooperation 
of the Mexican Government. If confirmed, I look forward to 
comprehensive conversations with the Mexican Government so that this 
cooperation deepens and works for the benefit of both nations. In the 
context of those conversations, I will not hesitate to raise any issues 
with the Mexican Government that I believe to be obstacles to our 
bilateral security cooperation.

    Question. The U.S. has a long-running strategic interest in the 
stability of the East Africa region, given its proximity to the Red 
Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean. The last 
administration never developed a holistic plan to consolidate 
democratic gains, prevent democratic backsliding and pursue our 
geostrategic interests. I am working on legislation to develop such an 
approach, and I hope you will work closely with me on that effort. 
Ethiopia is one country that will be impacted by my efforts. The 
transition to democracy there is jeopardized by an ongoing conflict in 
Tigray, communal violence in other parts of the country and closing 
political space. Prominent political opposition figures are in jail, 
along with thousands of opposition supporters, journalists, and others. 
Under the current circumstances, do you believe Ethiopia can hold 
credible elections in June? What action should the USG consider in 
addressing the deep humanitarian, political, and security crisis that 
is now impacting Ethiopia?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the State 
Department develops and implements a comprehensive strategy for the Red 
Sea region. One critical element of this is a strategy to address the 
ongoing issues in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the ongoing border 
dispute with Sudan. A peaceful, stable, democratic Ethiopia at peace 
with its neighbors is essential for the Horn of Africa and the wider 
region. The Ethiopian Government has promised national elections in 
June. Inclusive dialogue among all political actors is a prerequisite 
to identifying and adopting necessary reforms. All detainees need to be 
afforded due process. The violence in Tigray must end; humanitarian and 
human rights workers must receive unhindered access; and independent 
investigations into reported human rights abuses and violations must 
proceed.

    Question. Sudan, another country along the Red Sea Corridor, is 
undergoing a fragile transition as well. What specific steps will you 
take to ensure a successful transition?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support Sudan's democratic transition 
and Civilian-led Transitional Government, as well as efforts to promote 
economic reform and development. Further, if confirmed, I intend to 
ensure consistent engagement with Sudan's civilian leaders to encourage 
progress in taking the difficult, but necessary, next steps, including 
governance and security sector reforms, expanded protection of 
civilians in Darfur, resolution of ongoing conflicts, and 
accountability for past atrocities.

    Question. As I told Undersecretary Hale over a year ago, we are 
losing the Sahel. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index found that seven of 
the ten countries with the largest increase in terrorism were in sub-
Saharan Africa; Burkina Faso topped the list. But this is not just a 
security crisis; we need a comprehensive strategy that addresses 
Diplomatic, Development, and Defense issues (3Ds). Will you make the 
crisis in the Sahel a top priority for the State Department, and ensure 
that the interagency pursues a ``3Ds'' strategy in the region?

    Answer. I agree with your concern about rising violent extremism, 
governance challenges, and humanitarian concerns in the Sahel. The path 
to lasting stability lies in accountable governance, providing services 
and economic opportunities, protecting the rule of law, and engaging 
communities in decisions. The Biden-Harris Administration has committed 
to undertake an interagency review of our diplomatic, security, and 
other assistance programs. As part of the review, the Administration 
will work to understand threats in the region and evaluate our overall 
approach to address the drivers of insecurity. If confirmed, I will 
work with the Department of Defense, USAID, and other agencies to 
ensure that the U.S. Government has and implements a unified strategy 
to support sustained security and stability in the Sahel.

    Question. As Deputy Secretary, how will you ensure close 
coordination between regional bureaus to develop strategies and 
integrated approaches to geographic regions such as the Sahel and the 
Red Sea?

    Answer. The President's interim national security guidance 
underscores that we must be prepared to manage crises and challenges 
that do not respect borders. If confirmed, I will work closely with the 
Department's regional and functional bureaus to make sure they 
understand the President and Secretary's policy imperatives in both the 
Sahel and the Red Sea region and that they work collaboratively through 
working groups, joint briefings, and persistent coordination to develop 
strategies around which we can organize our diplomatic engagement and 
foreign assistance. If confirmed, I will guide the Department to work 
across bureaucratic and geographic seams to address regional challenges 
by understanding, engaging, and cooperating with allies and partners; 
building strong partnerships; and strengthening long-standing 
connections.

    Question. Multilateralism has long been a pillar of U.S. foreign 
policy, and an avenue for advancing international human rights. 
However, over the last four years, the U.S. Government went from being 
a strong champion of human rights and of the rights of women, girls and 
LGBTQ individuals, to being an obstacle to those goals at the United 
Nations and other multilateral forums. It is vital that this 
Administration send an early signal that it is fully committed to 
reversing that, and to advancing human rights and gender equality 
globally. How will you demonstrate, through early action at the State 
Department, a renewed U.S. commitment and leadership to promote global 
gender equality, women's and girls' rights, and the rights of LGBTQ 
persons?

    Answer. As President Biden has said, the promotion of democracy and 
human rights is central to this Administration's foreign policy and if 
confirmed, I will examine all options to address threats to gender 
equality and the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons. I 
fully support the objectives outlined in President Biden's memorandum 
on advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world. The 
work to promote gender equality and respect for the human rights of all 
women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons is amplified when the United States 
works multilaterally and coordinates with international partners. If 
confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts to increase U.S. 
engagement on these issues bilaterally and across relevant UN fora and 
regional organizations, as appropriate.

    Question. How will you use your role to immediately halt and 
reverse dangerous rollbacks on women's rights and LGBTQ rights in 
intergovernmental processes and multilateral forums?

    Answer. Advancing the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ 
persons is essential to ensure just and equitable societies where all 
individuals can fully contribute. If confirmed, I pledge to work 
closely with partner nations, civil society, and multilateral 
institutions, as appropriate, to advance women's health and human 
rights, including women's and girls' sexual and reproductive health and 
reproductive rights. I will also fully support the objectives outlined 
in President Biden's Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human 
Rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world and will work with other 
governments and multilateral institutions to ensure that U.S. diplomacy 
and foreign assistance promote and protect these rights.

    Question. On June 18, 2020, following a year-long investigation by 
my staff, I published a comprehensive report on the Global Forced 
Migration Crisis, which examined the urgent plight of millions of 
people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution. It 
provided a blueprint for addressing this growing crisis. What actions 
will you take, including with our partners, to address the global 
forced migration crisis? How, specifically, will you work to address 
the root causes of displacement, such as new and unresolved conflicts, 
support populations on the move and those enduring lengthy 
displacement, and seek to assist the low-income countries who host the 
majority of refugees and displaced people?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure State and USAID are 
strengthening protection and durable solutions for the millions of 
forcibly displaced people across the globe by pursuing new strategies 
for addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change; 
rebuilding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; enhancing U.S. 
engagement in international institutions; and standing up for 
democratic values and human rights. The State Department will continue 
to work with our partners and the Department of the Treasury to engage 
multilateral development banks on support in protracted situations of 
displacement. In addition, the Department aims its diplomacy at 
continuing to strengthen the global humanitarian architecture, 
including through donor engagement, and at promoting respect for 
international humanitarian principles.

    Question. Principled humanitarian action is under attack around the 
world. Violent conflict has reached record highs, and nearly 235 
million people worldwide need emergency humanitarian assistance-a 40 
percent increase from last year. There has also been a steep escalation 
in the deliberate, willful obstruction of humanitarian access to those 
in need, the targeting of innocent civilians and humanitarian aid 
workers, and an overall noncompliance with international law. What will 
you do to minimize the abuse of humanitarian assistance, including the 
blocking or diverting of humanitarian aid, and to minimize the 
targeting of civilians and humanitarian aid workers?

    Answer. I support the United States taking a strong leadership role 
in support of principled humanitarian action. If confirmed, I intend to 
engage publicly and privately where necessary to promote the protection 
of civilians and humanitarian workers, and humanitarian access, working 
closely with our global and multilateral partners. Further, I will 
support the efforts of the State Department to prevent and immediately 
address any diversion or abuse of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The 
Administration's commitment to these principles has already been clear 
in the Secretary's engagement on the protection of civilians and 
unhindered humanitarian access.

    Question. How can the United States best hold accountable the 
perpetrators of such abuses, and promote accountability and compliance 
with the law of armed conflict and human rights law?

    Answer. I support using all tools available to promote 
accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians, including 
humanitarian aid workers, consistent with international law. If 
confirmed, I would encourage all parties to armed conflict to comply 
with international humanitarian law and ensure the protection of those 
providing humanitarian aid. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that 
the United States supports a variety of tools at our disposal, 
including investigations and prosecutions at appropriate international 
and national tribunals, targeted sanctions, and other mechanisms, to 
promote accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians, 
including humanitarian aid providers.

    Question. We are in a 15-year democratic recession, and this past 
year has been among the worst we've seen for global democracy. For the 
first time since 2001, more people live under autocracies than 
democracies. The COVID-19 crisis has created new opportunities for 
authoritarians and those leaders who strive to consolidate power to 
cement their hold on government structures and erode the fundamental 
human rights of their countrymen. How will you address democratic 
backsliding and emerging global electoral challenges? These include 
foreign interference; the manipulation of new media platforms; 
advancements in artificial intelligence and sophisticated cyber 
threats; and corruption in electoral processes that undermines 
governance?

    Answer. I share concerns over the need to defend democracy and 
counter growing authoritarianism globally, including authoritarian 
responses to the global pandemic that suspend or severely curtail 
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. President Biden 
committed to host a global summit to bring together democracies around 
a common agenda to defend and strengthen democratic institutions, 
including commitments on combating corruption, pushing back on 
authoritarianism, and advancing human rights, including online. If 
confirmed, I will support the Administration's goals of promoting good 
governance at home and abroad with all available diplomatic, 
programmatic, and other foreign policy tools to counter democratic 
backsliding and strengthen democratic resilience to malign influence.

    Question. How will you invest in democracy programs, particularly 
in the context of the secondary impacts of COVID-19 on elections and 
democracies worldwide?

    Answer. The United States has long been a leader in promoting 
democracy and human rights, including advancing civil and political 
rights abroad. Adhering to democratic principles is essential for an 
effective global response to COVID-19, and it is imperative that 
countries not use the pandemic as a means to suspend or severely 
curtail democratic governance, rule of law, and respect for human 
rights. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that democracy programs 
support civil society groups and governments in strengthening 
protections for human rights by fostering accountable, responsive and 
inclusive democratic institutions and processes that directly address 
the secondary impacts of COVID-19.

    Question. The Department of Defense annually seeks to duplicate 
various security assistance authorities heretofore reserved to the 
Department of State, to the detriment of the Secretary of States 
fundamental mission to oversee and direct U.S. foreign policy. If 
confirmed, will you personally and aggressively defend the Department 
of State's prerogatives in this area?

    Answer. I am aware of the Defense Department efforts in this area 
and recall selectively supporting some security assistance authorities 
for Defense, where for example they provided clearly for the Secretary 
of State to ``concur'' in Defense's use of such authorities; were time-
limited; did not duplicate State's authorities; and provided for joint 
formulation. If confirmed, I will certainly study this matter 
thoroughly, as I share your concerns. Among my key goals will be 
personally to uphold and defend prerogatives of the Secretary and the 
Department and to protect the fundamental and primary responsibility of 
the Secretary to carry out for the President the fundamental mission of 
overseeing and directing US foreign policy.

    Question. Will you commit that you and your staff will work closely 
with this committee to protect the Secretary of State and the 
Department of State's primacy in this regard?

    Answer. I look forward to working closely with you and the 
committee to protect the primacy of the Secretary of State and the 
Department in this regard. I also consider that protecting such primacy 
means also protecting and enhancing the tools to engage 
internationally, such as reserving to, or enhancing the broadest range 
of agile foreign assistance authorities of the Secretary of State. If 
confirmed, I also look forward to working with you to ensure that such 
authorities are robust and flexible, particularly given the view by 
some countries that Defense authorities may be less restrictive than 
those of the State Department.

    Question. Section 10 U.S.C 127(e) allows the Secretary of Defense 
to provide undefined support to any foreign person that is in any 
undefined way supporting U.S. Special Forces operations in a country, 
so long as the Chief of Mission of such country concurs. There is no 
requirement in the law that the Secretary of State, nor the Department 
of State, be aware of such activities. Such ``support'' has included, 
at least, the provision of lethal defense articles to unknown foreign 
persons, who could be involved in criminal or even terrorism-supporting 
activities. It is vital that the Secretary of State be aware of this 
support. Secretary Blinken, when asked this question, confirmed that he 
would look into the current practices and procedures in the Department 
with respect to reporting and concurring with such transfers and, if 
necessary, make amendments. Will you, if confirmed, ensure that this 
issue is put to the Secretary for decision, or if delegated to you, 
that you will direct all Chiefs of Mission not to agree to any such 
request without first consulting with you or the Secretary of State?

    Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are working closely to 
address the changing global threat environment. If confirmed, I will 
coordinate closely with the Secretary of State and critical Department 
stakeholders to review the current Department practices and procedures 
related to Section 10 USC 127e. In the event this issue is delegated to 
me, I will take appropriate action to communicate Department procedures 
to chiefs of mission and will initiate a discussion with Department of 
Defense counterparts to clarify reporting and concurrence procedures 
and make amendments as necessary.

    Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to 
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and 
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in 
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much 
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered 
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will 
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the 
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is 
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their 
ability?

    Answer. The people who work for the U.S. Department of State are 
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect Americans 
and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of career 
talent over the last four years coincides with declines in overall 
employee job satisfaction in annual workforce. That said, the nearly 
77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient. If 
confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining State Department 
to advance our security and prosperity, including by developing a 
diplomatic corps that fully represents America in all its talent and 
diversity. That means recruiting, retaining, and providing career 
development opportunities to officers with the skills to contend with 
21st Century challenges and who represent the diversity of the country 
we represent. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to ensure their 
safety and well-being and demand accountability for fostering a more 
diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.

    Question. Last year, I published a report Diplomacy in Crisis, 
which laid out the challenges facing the Department workforce. It cited 
employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for example, 
steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared reprisal or 
retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does that 
concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?

    Answer. I agree that retaliation for participating in the EEO 
process or anti-harassment program, for requesting a reasonable 
accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is unlawful, 
grounds for discipline, and counter to good management; employees do 
best when they have the ability to speak up and help us improve. If 
confirmed, I plan to amplify the Chief Diversity and Inclusion 
Officer's, Bureau of Global Talent Management's, and the Office of 
Civil Rights' efforts to promote a culture of speaking up, free from 
fear of retaliation.

    Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State 
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning 
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the 
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as 
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the 
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as 
having substantial impact on their career. Do you commit to reviewing 
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how 
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and 
help more women serve in senior roles?

    Answer. I am committed to ensuring that women have equal 
opportunities for career advancement and professional development. 
Throughout my career, I have benefitted from strong mentors and leaders 
who have helped me shape my career, and I have worked to mentor others. 
If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to serve as models for 
the Department on mentorship and promulgating the tenets of fairness 
and transparency in building their teams. I will hold my senior 
leadership responsible for creating environments where everyone's 
contribution is valued. I will also prioritize reviewing 
recommendations on initiatives to help address the gender gap in the 
Department from our employee affinity groups and associations.

    Question. As you know, Ahlam Tamimi is responsible for 
masterminding a terrorist attack that killed 15 people, including two 
Americans at a restaurant in Israel in 2001. She has been living in 
Jordan since 2011 and the United States has continued to try to bring 
her to justice. Do you commit to pursuing justice for Americans 
murdered in this brazen attack?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the 
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise 
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage 
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is 
in force.

    Question. Will the administration continue to pressure Jordan to 
publicly condemn Tamimi and her actions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the 
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise 
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage 
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is 
in force.

    Question. Will the administration press Jordan to seek 
parliamentary ratification of the 1995 extradition treaty?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the 
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise 
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage 
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is 
in force.



                               __________


     Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
            Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. In your view, are the Maduro regime's involvement in 
transnational organized crime and its poor economic and political 
policies in Venezuela to blame for region's most significant security 
and humanitarian crisis? Can humanitarian conditions improve on the 
regime's watch?

    Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime's corruption and repression 
are responsible for the economic collapse and the resulting 
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Maduro and his enablers tolerate and 
often cooperate and collude with criminal and terrorist networks, non-
state armed groups, and many malign actors that perpetrate human rights 
abuses and human trafficking. Instead of applying Venezuela's resources 
to respond to its humanitarian crisis, Maduro and those allied with him 
pillage state coffers.
    I understand the impact the current crisis in Venezuela is having 
on the region, and the pain it is inflicting on Venezuelans and their 
families. If confirmed, I am committed to addressing the humanitarian 
situation affecting millions of Venezuelans both inside the country and 
the millions who have fled to neighboring countries, pressing for a 
peaceful, stable, democratic outcome in Venezuela through free and fair 
elections and helping the Venezuelan people rebuild their lives and 
their country.

    Question. Please describe your views on what would constitute 
adequate conditions under which free and fair presidential, 
legislative, and local elections could be conducted in Venezuela.

    Answer. There are several conditions that should be met before we 
can consider any Venezuelan elections free and fair. The illegitimate 
Maduro regime should free all political prisoners, return political 
party organizations to their duly chosen leaders, and remove all undue 
restrictions on individuals and political parties to allow their free 
participation. All candidates, political parties, and the electorate 
should have unrestricted access to independent news sources and other 
sources of information. An independent National Electoral Council 
should be appointed and allowed to organize the elections free from 
undue influence. Finally, consistent with the bipartisan Venezuela 
Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act (VERDAD) of 
2019, elections should be observed and certified as free and fair by an 
independent electoral observation mission comprised of domestic and 
international experts.

    Question. Please describe the conditions under which you would 
recommend the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

    Answer. The United States continues to maintain diplomatic 
relations with Cuba, which provides an opportunity to communicate 
directly with the Cuban Government regarding matters of human rights. 
The Biden-Harris administration's Cuba policy will be governed by two 
principles. First, support for democracy and human rights will be at 
the core of our efforts through empowering the Cuban people to 
determine their own future. Second, Americans--especially Cuban-
Americans--are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba. 
We have serious differences with Cuba on a range of issues, including 
Venezuela and human rights, but the administration will engage directly 
on those differences and on other issues that are in the interest of 
the United States.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to conduct meaningful 
consultations with me, my office, and the rest of the committee before 
and during any negotiations with Cuba?

    Answer. Through three decades of work in foreign policy and 
national security, I have learned firsthand the need for close and 
constructive coordination with Congress. I recognize there are many 
different views in Congress on what our approach to Cuba should be. If 
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on a range of 
policy topics, including Cuba.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that U.S. 
public and private engagement in Cuba does not disproportionately 
benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or 
personnel at the expense of the Cuban people?

    Answer. The administration committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-
Cuba policy, including our posture regarding economic sanctions on 
Cuba, to ensure they advance the goals the administration is trying to 
achieve in empowering the Cuban people to determine their future. If 
confirmed, I will support the Department's review of the policy with an 
eye toward assessing its impact on the political and economic well-
being of the Cuban people and look forward to consulting with Congress 
on this issue.

    Question. In December 2020, Mexico approved reforms to its national 
security law, limiting the power of foreign law enforcement agents in 
the country and restricting their ability to operate. If confirmed, 
what steps will you take to ensure effective law enforcement 
cooperation with Mexico?

    Answer. It is critical that the United States and Mexico work 
together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and their 
operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the rule of 
law in Mexico. If confirmed, I look forward to comprehensive 
conversations with the Mexican Government, and I will not hesitate to 
raise any concerns I believe to be obstacles to our bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the recommendations 
of the Bureau of International Organizations as compared to the 
regional bureaus?

    Answer. I have long appreciated and valued the expertise available 
from the Bureau of International Organizations. If confirmed, I will 
ensure the bureau's perspective is solicited, whenever appropriate, and 
in all circumstances welcome its recommendations. The bureau's voice 
and role in U.S. foreign policy is crucial as the administration re-
engages with international organizations, restores its partnerships, 
and returns to its traditional alliances.

    Question. Will you support the creation of an Office of Integrity 
in the United Nations System within the Bureau of International 
Organizations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to 
ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively to 
push back against the rising influence of China and others in the UN 
system and other international organizations and to select qualified 
and independent candidates to lead and staff these bodies, including 
highly specialized agencies.

    Question. Nations have increasingly used hostage diplomacy in an 
attempt to gain leverage through coercion. Multiple Americans are 
victims of this trend, and Americans are currently wrongfully detained 
in Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela, among other countries. What role 
do you believe the Deputy Secretary has in returning Americans and 
preventing hostage diplomacy?

    Answer. Bringing home U.S. hostages and wrongful detainees is a top 
priority for the administration and the Department of State. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and Special 
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs to make every effort to quickly 
recover all U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad. 
Additionally, it will be of the utmost importance to closely coordinate 
with, and lend support to, family members of hostages and wrongful 
detainees.

    Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, in what 
concrete ways will you work to bring home Americans wrongfully detained 
abroad and support the work of the Special Presidential Envoy for 
Hostage Affairs?

    Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens is one of the 
highest priorities of the Department of State. If confirmed, I will 
ensure the Department continues to use all the diplomatic means at our 
disposal to work for the release of those U.S. citizens wrongfully 
detained or held hostage and provide support to their families. 
Specifically, I will support the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage 
Affairs and the interagency in implementing the Robert Levinson Hostage 
Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act. The Levinson Act is 
critical for harnessing all of the U.S. Government's capabilities to 
resolve these cases quickly and provide support to families.

    Question. The Iranian regime received billions in sanctions relief 
as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The 
Obama administration argued that ``our best analysts expect the bulk of 
this revenue to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits 
the lives of the Iranian people.'' However, a vast body of follow-on 
reporting indicates that a majority of sanctions relief was, instead, 
funneled to the regime's defense budget and to its proxies in Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

   Do you believe that sanctions relief provided to Iran as a part of 
        the JCPOA improved the economy and the lives of the Iranian 
        people?

    Answer. While the DIA testified in 2017 that the majority of 
sanctions relief was used for domestic purposes, the Biden-Harris 
administration is under no illusions about Iran's destabilizing 
activities in the region and about its government's willingness to 
divert funding that should be used to better the lives of its citizens 
to those purposes. It is also clear that the reimposition of sanctions 
has not had the effect of drying up Iran's proliferation of missiles, 
support for terrorism, and regional activities.
    We need to address all of these activities using a variety of 
tools--deterrence, sanctions on Iranian entities providing support to 
violent groups and militias in the region, and, in the event we rejoin 
the JCPOA, in any follow-on talks with Iran--in close consultation and 
coordination with our allies and partners. If confirmed, I am committed 
to consulting closely with Congress on the path forward.

    Question. What tools and safeguards exist that would prevent Iran 
from directing future sanctions relief to malign activities?

    Answer. The U.S. Government maintains a range of tools to combat 
terrorist financing, and we will continue to use these to counter 
Iran's destabilizing activities and support for terrorism.
    We will continue to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian 
entities and individuals providing support to terrorist groups in the 
region. The Biden-Harris administration will take action, in 
coordination with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter 
Iran's destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these 
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely 
with Congress on the path forward.

    Question. Do you commit not to pursue sanctions relief or 
unfreezing of Iranian assets as a precondition for nuclear negotiations 
with the Iranian regime?

    Answer. We are ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a 
mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
as a starting point for follow-on negotiations. Our first order of 
business is consulting with Congress and our allies on the path 
forward.

    Question. You have previously expressed skepticism over the 
prospects of U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, indicating that if such a 
development were to take place, the United States would need to be 
willing to put ``more on the table.'' Please describe in detail the 
prospects for U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, to include views of UNSCR 
2231-mandated Transition Day in 2023 and Termination Day in 2025.

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to ensuring 
that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many 
other issues of concern related to Iran. The administration remains 
ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to 
compliance with JCPOA commitments as a first step, but the work will 
not end there. The administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use 
it as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's 
nuclear program and to address other critical issues.

    Question. Exactly what form should ``more on the table'' take in 
your view? What do you see as being acceptable to both the United 
States and Iran?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains ready to engage in 
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with 
JCPOA commitments. While it is too early to speculate on the specific 
details, if confirmed, I commit to robust consultation with Congress 
and our P5+1 partners on the best way forward.

    Question. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17) 
(``INARA'') requires the President to provide to Congress the text and 
related materials of any agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear 
program of Iran within five days of reaching the agreement. 
Additionally, INARA stipulates that the administration certify that 
such an agreement is not ``inimical to or constitute an unreasonable 
risk to the common defense and security.''

   Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any future 
        nuclear deal with Iran?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are 
satisfied, including its transmission and certification requirements.

    Question. Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any 
process of rejoining or reaffirming U.S. participation in the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under INARA. The JCPOA was submitted under INARA in 2015 and 
underwent close Congressional and public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am 
committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. Would any agreement between the United States and Iran 
regarding how the United States and Iran might return to compliance 
with the JCPOA constitute an ``agreement with Iran relating to the 
nuclear program of Iran''?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the 
requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. What are the reporting requirements of INARA that you 
believe that the administration is currently subject to?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the administration to 
identify and confirm those requirements. I am committed to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting 
requirements.

    Question. In 2014, in your capacity as Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, you hosted a roundtable in which you suggested that 
the JCPOA contained ``in one way or another, all the concerns that must 
be addressed.'' While the 2015 agreement did secure time-limited curbs 
on Tehran's nuclear program, it failed to address Iran's destabilizing 
support for proxy militias and its ballistic missile development. 
Further, it failed to secure the release of American hostages, like 
Washington Post reporter Jason Rezain, who remained illegally detained 
by the Iranian regime until January 2016.

   Is it still your position that the 2015 nuclear agreement contained 
        a sufficient basis for the United States to address all of its 
        most pressing national security concerns?

    Answer. The objective of the JCPOA was to ensure that Iran would 
never obtain a nuclear weapon, which is just one of the myriad issues 
of national security concern the United States and our allies and 
partners face regarding Iran. The situation we face in 2021, however, 
is different from the situation in 2015. The facts on the ground have 
changed, and our path forward must take this into account. The Biden-
Harris administration is committed to addressing not only the concerns 
about Iran's nuclear program, but also broader concerns, including 
Iran's unjust detentions of U.S. citizens, its ballistic missile 
program, and destabilizing regional activities.

    Question. Would you recommend the United States pursue re-entry 
into the 2015 nuclear agreement absent the release of American 
hostages, including Morad Tahbaz, Baquer Namazi, and Siamak Namazi?

    Answer. The safety of U.S. citizens overseas is a top priority for 
the U.S. Government. The continued unjust detention of U.S. citizens in 
Iran is atrocious. I have spoken with family members of U.S. citizens 
detained in Evin Prison and their stories are horrific. As President 
Biden has said, the administration will aggressively work for the 
release and return of all our unjustly detained U.S. citizens.

    Question. The Biden administration has indicated that it will 
attempt to address Iran's regional terrorism and ballistic missile 
activity in follow-on agreements after rejoining the JCPOA. Assuming 
the United States grants nuclear-related sanctions relief as a part of 
U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, what leverage would the Biden 
administration retain to ensure Iran engages in meaningful discussions 
on its support of regional terrorism and ballistic missile program? 
Please be specific.

    Answer. As President Biden has said, we are ready to engage in 
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and then use that as a 
platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear 
program and address other issues of concern. The framework of U.S. 
sanctions on Iran remains robust, and there are many layers of that 
sanctions architecture that would remain in place, even in the event of 
a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This certainly includes the primary U.S. 
embargo on Iran, and many other U.S. sanctions on Iran. Working with 
allies and partners, we also have other avenues to place pressure on 
Iran.

    Question. The Abraham Accords have the potentially to fundamentally 
change the Middle East for the better. The previous administration had 
an empowered agent in the White House, Jared Kushner, to pursue 
normalization agreements. We understand that the Biden administration 
will push this role back down to the State Department--currently at the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Given the importance of the Abraham 
Accords, how do you plan to expand and strengthen the Accords without a 
similar empowered staff?

    Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important 
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris 
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the 
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, we will 
also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date, 
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to 
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with 
Israel.

    Question. Will you assign responsibility for additional 
normalization agreements to more senior staff?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the normalization 
agreements with the relevant subject matter experts and determining the 
best way forward, including with respect to staffing responsibilities.

    Question. In your hearing testimony, you referenced a number of 
meetings that you had with Iranian officials after you had concluded 
your service at the Department of State in 2015. What meetings did you 
have with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department in 
2015? Were these meetings scheduled ahead of time? If so, by whom?

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister 
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018 
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New 
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in 
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis 
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with 
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by 
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on 
the margins.
    In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the 
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its 
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently 
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised 
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.

    Question. Who were the participants in those meetings? When and 
where did those meetings occur? In what capacity did you engage in 
those meetings?

    Answer. As noted in the previous answer, the meetings were 
principally with Foreign Minister Zarif. At the Munich Security 
Conference, I believe he was accompanied by DFM Abbas Araghchi. When I 
saw FM Zarif in New York he was also accompanied by the DFM and by 
Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations. When I saw DFM Araghchi in 
Moscow, he was alone.

    Question. Please describe in detail the purpose of the meetings, 
the scope of the discussions that occurred in the meetings, the 
positions you took in those discussions, and how those discussions 
inform your views on Iran policy issues.

    Answer. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, I kept Under 
Secretary Hale apprised of the meetings and committed to sharing any 
useful information with him. I attended meetings to urge Iran to not 
escalate the situation, to stay compliant with the JCPOA, to cease its 
regional violence, and to release U.S. citizens who had been unjustly 
detained. As I noted, families have continued to call me and urge me to 
do whatever I can to help gain release of their loved ones. My views on 
Iran policy were offered in the confirmation hearing and were not 
changed by the meetings.

    Question. Did you inform any sitting U.S. official that you had 
planned or were likely to have each of these meetings? If so, please 
provide details for each meeting.

    Answer. As noted, I kept Under Secretary David Hale apprised of the 
meetings.

    Question. After each of these meetings occurred, did you inform any 
sitting U.S. official that the meetings had taken place and/or share 
what was discussed? If so, please provide details for each meeting.

    Answer. As noted, I offered to apprise Under Secretary Hale of any 
useful information and did so as appropriate.

    Question. Outside of these meetings, have you had any other 
contacts with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department 
in 2015? Please provide details.

    Answer. None that I recall.

    Question. What are the tools and strategies the Department can best 
employ to address cross-regional security, political, and economic 
challenges in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Sahel, and Maghreb regions 
of Africa?

    Answer. It is essential that we bring an end to deadly conflicts 
and prevent the onset of new ones; help African nations address climate 
change; violent extremism; promote development, health security, 
environmental sustainability, democratic progress, responsive and 
responsible governance, and rule of law; assist countries facing 
economic distress, including health and food insecurity; and support 
economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign 
influence. If confirmed, I will ensure we work across bureaucratic and 
geographic seams to address these regional challenges by cooperating 
with allies and partners, building strong partnerships, investing in 
civil society, and strengthening long-standing political, economic, and 
cultural connections.

    Question. Do you believe Special Envoys are the most effective tool 
in confronting such complex regional issues?

    Answer. Special Envoys have been an important tool for responding 
to complex security and political challenges, in certain cases where 
sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement is needed. When well-
coordinated with regional and functional bureaus and embassies, envoys 
can help to integrate and lead cross-regional policy efforts, such as 
building international coalitions to counter transnational threats. 
Envoys can play an important role in responding to conflicts of a 
cross-border and cross-regional nature that require complex, negotiated 
solutions with buy-in from multiple states and actors. If confirmed, I 
intend to play an active role in the policy discussions surrounding the 
potential deployment of future envoys.

    Question. What other tools should the United States consider?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes that many of the 
biggest threats we face are transnational in nature and must be 
addressed collectively, including through international organizations. 
Nowhere is this more true than in Africa--the African Union (AU) and 
sub-regional institutions play an important role on governance, 
economic, and security issues across the continent. If confirmed, I 
will ensure increased U.S. engagement with the AU and other 
subregional bodies. Additionally, I will work to pursue 
mutually beneficial partnerships across Africa. Coordination and 
collaboration are essential, and we must work to align our approaches 
to holistically address security and governance challenges.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to building greater 
interagency coordination and strategy regarding U.S. security policy 
and programs in Africa, namely between the Department of State and the 
Department of Defense, and specifically with the United States Africa 
Command (AFRICOM)?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department 
of Defense and AFRICOM to make sure we are united in our efforts to 
implement the President and the Secretary's policy imperatives in sub-
Saharan Africa and that we work collaboratively to develop unified U.S. 
Government policies around which we can organize our diplomatic, 
security, and development engagement.

    Question. The U.S.-Germany relationship has been increasingly 
strained in recent years. Among our points of disagreement are the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, military spending, attitudes towards China, and 
questions of the use of nuclear weapons. What steps will you hope to 
take to improve the United States' relationship with Germany?

    Answer. Reinvigorating and modernizing relations with U.S. Allies, 
including Germany, is one of this administration's highest priorities. 
The administration has already begun this process by conducting 
extensive consultations with the German Government on a range of issues 
of mutual concern. The administration also halted the withdrawal of 
U.S. troops from Germany and lifted the cap on the number of U.S. 
troops that can be stationed in Germany. If confirmed, I look forward 
to further strengthening the U.S.-German relationship, consulting 
closely on our common security priorities, especially at NATO, and 
partnering based on our shared values on challenges, including climate 
change, recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic, and addressing threats 
posed by China, Russia, and Iran. We will not always agree, but we will 
look to manage those differences constructively as Allies.

    Question. Under German leadership, the European Union just 
concluded an investment deal with China. How do you view the German 
Government's attitudes towards China, doing business with China, and 
their recently published Indo-Pacific Strategy?

    Answer. The EU's investment deal with China is a demonstration of 
the amount of work we have before us to reinvigorate our Transatlantic 
alliance and develop a more unified response to the challenge posed by 
China. If confirmed, I will engage actively with the EU, Germany, and 
other European partners on shared concerns about China. My engagements 
will include discussions on how to advance our shared economic 
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, prevent 
goods made with forced labor from entering global markets, create a 
level playing field and promote private enterprise, and highlight 
China's failure to uphold its international commitments.
    The Biden-Harris administration will work jointly with Germany, 
NATO, the EU, and other partners to address China's predatory economic 
practices, the challenges China poses to our collective security, and 
its human rights violations. Ultimately, the onus will be on China to 
show that its new pledges on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and 
subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not just cheap talk. The 
United States welcomes Germany's support for a rules-based 
international order, including in the Indo-Pacific, where Berlin 
recently announced it will send a naval vessel to demonstrate Germany's 
active engagement in the region.

    Question. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder recently wrote 
in Handelsblatt that ``a moralizing foreign policy'' towards China, 
implying that, when it comes to China, human rights should be placed 
after economic interests. Do you agree?

    Answer. China has engaged in gross human rights violations that 
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The 
President has been clear that the administration will put our 
democratic values back at the center of our foreign policy and stand up 
for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. The United States will 
work with Germany and other allies and partners to condemn human rights 
violations by China in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Promoting 
respect for human rights will be a pillar of U.S. engagement with 
Germany and other allies with respect to China both in bilateral and 
multilateral settings.

    Question. How do you and the Biden administration intend to work 
with those European voices and actors that fall on either side of the 
human rights-economics divide?

    Answer. The President has made it clear that revitalizing our ties 
with allies and partners, including in Europe, is an administration 
priority. The administration is working to demonstrate that democracies 
that protect human rights deliver for their people and that human 
rights, democracy, and the rule of law are essential to meet the 
challenges of our time. Vibrant democracies that protect human rights 
are more stable, more open, better partners to us, and more dependable 
markets for our goods and services. If confirmed, I will strengthen our 
relations with our allies, work with likeminded partners, and pool our 
collective strength to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of 
law.

    Question. Do you believe that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline should be 
completed?

    Answer. The President has made clear his belief that the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline is a bad deal and that the administration will oppose 
it, and I strongly agree with this position. Nord Stream 2 expands 
Russian malign influence, threatens Europe's energy security, makes 
Allies and partners more vulnerable, and divides Europe. This project 
has the potential to destabilize Europe and embolden Russian aggression 
toward the West. I understand that the Department and our embassies in 
the region are carefully monitoring any activities taken to construct 
the pipeline and will respond in accordance with our obligations under 
PEESA and CAATSA. The administration continues to engage with Germany 
to express the United States' continued opposition to the pipeline and 
to highlight our concerns. If confirmed, I will continue to use all 
available tools to counter Russian malign influence, to work with 
Allies and partners in the region, and to support Transatlantic energy 
security goals.

    Question. Do you commit to following the law and fully implementing 
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act and the Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Clarification Act?

    Answer. Yes. The State Department submits a report to Congress 
every 90 days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying 
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those 
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting 
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report 
due to Congress in mid-May. I understand the Department submitted the 
first report required by PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed, 
I will continue to use all available tools to counter Russian malign 
influence and to work with Allies and partners in the region to support 
Transatlantic energy security goals. The administration will continue 
to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and 
will designate additional entities as appropriate.

    Question. Do you believe the United States should entertain 
potential proposals from the German Government that might allow the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline be completed?

    Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other 
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. The 
administration views Nord Stream 2 as a geo-political project that is a 
threat not only to Europe's energy security, but to strategic stability 
on the continent. The United States will continue to work with allies 
and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and the 
Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy 
supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security.

    Question. Do you believe that it would be worthwhile to allow the 
completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in hopes of improving the 
U.S.-German relationship?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has clearly stated that the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline should not be completed and has consistently 
conveyed this to German officials. Germany is an important economic and 
security ally and, if confirmed, reinvigorating and modernizing 
relations with U.S. allies will be among my highest priorities. Close 
friends and allies should be able to talk frankly to one another about 
disagreements, as we do with German officials on Nord Stream 2. The 
administration remains hopeful that through diplomatic engagement, 
bolstered by the tools provided by Congress, Germany will address our 
concerns raised by the pipeline related to energy security, Ukraine, 
and malign Russian influence.

    Question. Are such proposals currently being entertained?

    Answer. The administration continues to engage Germany to make 
clear our view that Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal and should not be 
completed. The administration has not received any formal proposals 
from the German Government related to Nord Stream 2.

    Question. The Biden administration has stated its intent to achieve 
``a carbon pollution-free power sector by 2035'' that puts the United 
States ``on an irreversible path to a net-zero economy by 2050.'' To 
this end, President Biden has ordered that federal agencies move to a 
fully electric vehicle fleet for automotive transportation needs and 
begin to use the federal procurement system for smaller equipment to 
drive demand for low energy-use appliances. What specific steps will 
you take to achieve these goals at the Department?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to 
comply with relevant authorities of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (PL 109-
58), in full consideration of the administration's net-zero goal and 
Federal Acquisition Regulations.

    Question. Will these environmental goals impede other Department 
missions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department's operations, 
logistics and procurement experts to implement relevant policies, 
strategies and plans in a manner consistent with federal laws and 
regulations and as outlined in the President's Executive Order on 
Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

    Question. Will the Department be expected to offset carbon 
emissions from activities such as air travel?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department supports 
the administration's goals, which may include future carbon offsets.

    Question. Do you agree that extended nuclear deterrence is 
foundational to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and to the strength 
of U.S. alliances?

    Answer. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in advancing 
U.S. national security objectives, including ensuring a free and open 
Indo-Pacific. It does so by providing assurance to allies and partners, 
which are our greatest strategic asset, and promoting nonproliferation. 
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress, allies, and 
partners on this important issue.

    Question. Do you believe that adoption of a sole purpose doctrine, 
a no first use policy, or a posture that fails to modernize U.S. 
nuclear forces would serve U.S. and allied interests in the Indo-
Pacific?

    Answer. The United States will ensure our strategic deterrent 
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence 
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. As directed by 
the President, this administration will conduct reviews of various 
nuclear policies. In that process, we will consult with our allies and 
partners, including those in the Indo-Pacific, as well as with 
Congress.

    Question. The Trump administration advanced a ``free and open'' 
Indo-Pacific strategy, which yielded a lot of concrete cooperation, 
especially with Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia. If confirmed, 
what are the key principles, initiatives, and other elements of the 
previous administration's Indo-Pacific strategy that will you continue?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working 
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific 
region. As President Biden has said, working with allies and partners 
to secure peace, defend our shared values, and advance our prosperity 
across the Indo-Pacific will be among the most consequential efforts we 
undertake. If confirmed, I will join the administration's review of our 
Indo-Pacific policy, and I commit to working closely with Congress to 
make sure we have the right components in place.

    Question. What major policy changes would the administration make 
in U.S. strategy towards the region?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working 
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific 
region. The administration is conducting a review of our 
IndoPacific policy and, if confirmed, I commit to working 
closely with Congress to make sure we have the right components in 
place.

    Question. The Obama administration failed to secure congressional 
support for the Iran nuclear deal. If confirmed, and if the Biden 
administration pursues an agreement with North Korea regarding its 
weapons programs, do you commit to regular briefings at both the member 
and staff levels in advance of and following negotiations with North 
Korea?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress on efforts to 
limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missile programs.

    Question. If confirmed, and if the Biden administration pursues an 
agreement with North Korea regarding its weapons programs, do you 
personally commit to appear before this committee prior to the 
completion of any such agreement for public hearings on the matter?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Congress on 
efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile programs.

    Question. Do you believe that an agreement with North Korea 
regarding its weapons programs should be submitted to the Senate as a 
treaty for the Senate's consent to ratification? If no, please explain 
in detail.

    Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national 
security priority for the United States. I understand the 
administration, in consultation with our allies, will evaluate and 
adopt a strategy to keep the American people and our allies safe and 
that takes into account pressure options and the potential for future 
diplomacy with North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting 
with Congress on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's 
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, including 
through any agreements that may be negotiated.

    Question. The Indo-Pacific is the most important region for U.S. 
security and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global 
population and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the 
world, but is also home to security challenges that threaten to 
undermine U.S. national security interests, regional peace, and global 
stability. The Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a 
``free and open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with 
regional countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region 
to support this goal. Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision 
for the ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last 
several years?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. If so, what should the State Department's role be in this 
strategy? If not, why not?

    Answer. While our Indo-Pacific policy is still under review, the 
State Department will have a major role in supporting a free and open 
Indo-Pacific, including by reinvigorating our alliances and 
partnerships, helping the region recover from the global pandemic, 
promoting democratic resilience, and confronting climate change. As the 
President has said, we will work with partners in the Indo-Pacific and 
across the world to protect the free exchange of ideas in open, 
democratic societies and to ensure the benefits of growth are shared 
broadly and equitably.

    Question. Chinese influence in Europe continues to grow. It has 
invested billions across Europe and has sought to acquire strategic 
infrastructure and companies in Europe. European countries are starting 
to take a much more robust approach to China across the board, 
including on investment and human rights. What is your assessment of 
China's objectives in Europe and with regard to the transatlantic 
alliance?

    Answer. The objective of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) is 
to make Europe more reliant and compliant, by dividing and weakening 
alliances forged through the European Union and NATO. They attempt this 
through abusive, unfair, and illegal economic and trade practices, 
including market-distorting subsidies, intellectual property theft, 
forced technology transfers, and predatory investments. With economic 
leverage comes political influence, security vulnerabilities, and the 
ability to coerce countries. This weakens countries' willingness to 
oppose the PRC's efforts to reshape the international order, creating a 
threat to the transatlantic alliance itself.

    Question. How should the United States respond to growing Chinese 
influence in Europe?

    Answer. Our engagement with Europe to counter the growing influence 
of the People's Republic of China should begin with a common 
understanding of the threats facing our mutual prosperity and national 
security and must include collaboration with NATO. Working with our 
Allies and partners, we will address vulnerabilities to Transatlantic 
security, promote technology innovation, information sharing, and 
energy security within the Alliance. We will support transparent 
economic growth and fair labor practices. We are developing foreign 
assistance programs to reach 24 countries that focus on transaction 
advisory, cybersecurity, and strategic infrastructure protection.

    Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States 
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China, 
including a chapter on contending with China's anti-competitive 
economic practices. I argued that the United States and Europe should 
revitalize trade negotiations, continue important initiatives at the 
World Trade Organizations such U.S.-EU-Japan efforts on subsidies, fix 
current sticking points like ongoing disputes between Boeing and 
Airbus, coordinate on export controls, and strengthen supply chain 
resilience. How would you advance these goals?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding 
and revitalizing relations with our European allies and working with 
them as using the full array of tools to counter China's abusive 
economic practices, both in bilateral and multilateral fora, including 
the WTO. The administration will work with our allies and partners to 
ensure the resilience of the United States, as well as global supply 
chains, particularly under the February 24, 2021, Executive Order on 
America's Supply Chains. As of March 5, the administration announced a 
four-month suspension of tariffs on the UK and EU with the goal of a 
permanent settlement, under the Section 301 Boeing-Airbus case. If 
confirmed, I will continue these efforts to take on the challenge of 
China's abusive and illegal economic practices.

    Question. What additional areas would you prioritize?

    Answer. In addition to those issues discussed in the previous 
question, presenting positive alternatives to China, which showcase the 
value of the U.S. model against the techno-authoritarian model 
proliferated by Beijing, is critical. If confirmed, I will work with 
our European allies and partners on a coordinated approach to China's 
abusive economic practices, human rights violations, and other 
challenges. The EU has made it clear it is willing to cooperate with 
the Biden-Harris administration on China. The administration will work 
in bilateral and multilateral fora, including the UN and others, to 
ensure U.S. national security is protected with respect to investments 
in critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies, and to push back 
against PRC attempts to weaken standards, rules, and institutions that 
support our economic prosperity.

    Question. The incoming administration has stated that global health 
cooperation with China will be a major priority. The United States 
invested a lot of resources and personnel over many years to pursue 
health cooperation with China. That included a close relationship 
between the U.S. CDC and China's CDC, including co-location 
arrangements where they worked side-by-side for many years. While co-
location arrangements ceased because of concerns about the physical 
security of U.S. diplomats, cooperation still continued. However, in 
the world's hour of need at the beginning of a serious pandemic 
originating in China, the Chinese Government's response proved that 
global health cooperation would always take a back seat to the standing 
and reputation of the CCP. While some level of cooperation may be 
necessary, how can we have confidence in these initiatives without 
reciprocal good faith efforts by Chinese Government interlocutors?

    Answer. It is important that we get to the bottom of the early days 
of the pandemic in China so that we can take steps to prevent future 
pandemics. The Biden-Harris administration will rebuild and expand the 
systems to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats globally, 
including in China. The administration will work to get our experts 
back into China so that our scientists have the access and 
relationships needed to prepare for and respond to the emergence and 
spread of potential future outbreaks around the globe. If confirmed, I 
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on 
certain issues, including on global health, but will be guided by a 
clear-eyed assessment of China's intentions.

    Question. How will you overcome this fundamental challenge, and why 
should the American people trust that use of taxpayer dollars and other 
resources will bear fruit?

    Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation 
state to the United States and our interests. There are competitive, 
cooperative, and adversarial aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. We 
must advance our economic interests, counter China's aggressive and 
coercive actions, sustain our key military advantages, defend 
democratic values, and restore our vital security partnerships as we 
also conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges 
such as global health. The Biden-Harris administration will test 
whether China is willing to play a constructive role on certain issues, 
including on global health, but will be clear-eyed about China's 
intentions.

    Question. What areas of health cooperation will the incoming 
administration prioritize with China?

    Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as 
ours. The Biden-Harris administration is willing to test whether China 
is willing to play a constructive role in certain areas where we may 
share interests but will be clear-eyed about China's intentions. We 
will not trade off our core interests or values in discussions with 
China or any other country.

    Question. What will be the role of the State Department in this 
regard?

    Answer. The State Department can play a leading role in elevating 
global health diplomacy to identify potential global health risks, to 
work with the international community to detect and prevent epidemics 
and pandemics before they occur, and to ensure effective international 
responses when they do. This includes addressing the root causes of 
these events and strengthening the prevention and response capabilities 
of local health systems. If confirmed, I will strengthen the Department 
of State's diplomatic engagement in support of the COVID-19 health and 
humanitarian response, as well as global health security more broadly, 
in close alignment with USAID, HHS, CDC, and other agencies involved in 
this space.

    Question. Would you advise the President to send high-level 
visitors to Taiwan, boost defense ties, explore negotiations for a Free 
Trade Agreement, strengthen the economic partnership set up by the 
Trump administration, and advocate for Taiwan in international 
organizations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I support sending senior-level visitors to 
Taiwan to deepen and broaden our relationship. I support boosting 
defense ties and strengthening the economic partnership with Taiwan, as 
well as advocating for Taiwan's participation in international 
organizations. I understand that USTR is the lead agency on trade, and 
pending confirmation of the new USTR, I will work with the office of 
the USTR on a review of trade policy toward Taiwan.

    Question. The previous administration authorized many critical 
capabilities via arms sales to Taiwan over the last several years, 
including fighters to replace and augment those being worn out from 
Chinese Air Force incursions, ground-launched anti-ship missiles, 
mobile artillery rocket systems, and surveillance drones. Do you commit 
to fulfilling these arms sales with speed and urgency so that the 
capabilities get to Taiwan in a timely manner?

    Answer. My support for Taiwan is rock solid. Taiwan is a leading 
democracy, a major economy, and a critical security partner. I support 
a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with the 
wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support efforts to make available defense articles and 
services necessary to enable Taiwan to defend itself, consistent with 
the law, U.S. export regulations, and nonproliferation policy.
    Taiwan remains a priority for this administration. In my position 
at the Department of State, working together with the Department of 
Defense, I will implement that priority wherever feasible to assist 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

    Question. Do you commit to ensuring that the Department of State 
adheres to a regularized process with regard to Taiwan arms sales, 
including avoiding the practice of bundling?

    Answer. Yes, that would be my intent, if confirmed. Consistent with 
the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China Policy, the United States 
continues to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 
capability. This longstanding policy contributes to the maintenance of 
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
    If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. policy to assist 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so 
increases stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the 
region.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
         to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. Throughout my life, my most important contribution has been 
to help open doors for women and to advocate for their human rights, 
and I have sought to stand for any group of marginalized people in the 
United States and around the world. In politics, I ran Barbara 
Mikulski's successful campaign for the Senate, helping her to become 
the first Democratic woman elected to the Senate in her own right. I 
was also Executive Director of EMILY's List, helping Democratic women 
get elected to the U.S. House and Senate. As Undersecretary of State, 
on virtually every overseas trip, I made it a point to meet with women 
leaders, women business owners, and women crafts persons to give women 
visibility and press coverage and regularly spoke out about ensuring 
that half of the world should be included.
    As I traveled as a diplomat, I met with LGBTQI+ youth in Nepal, the 
first country to allow citizens to check `other' on their passport, and 
I met with LGBTQI+ advocates in other countries as they sought their 
rights. I met with the Rohingya in Bangladesh and had a frank 
conversation in Burma with Aung San Suu Kyi. I have also worked to help 
free those unlawfully detained and imprisoned, particularly in Iran, 
and helped achieve some releases over the years.

    Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when 
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of 
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote, 
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups?

    Answer. Studies show how diverse teams outperform other teams based 
on their ability to innovate and address new challenges creatively. 
Diversity is America's competitive advantage on the global stage. 
Addressing today's challenges across the globe will require the 
Department to harness the wealth of diversity and experiences in our 
workforce to address increasingly complex challenges impacting our 
foreign policy as well as the lives of the American people. If 
confirmed, I commit to fostering an inclusive workplace throughout the 
Department so that every employee's contribution is valued. If 
confirmed, I will hold our senior leadership accountable for the 
conduct of their teams and for perpetuating an environment where each 
individual is heard and seen.

    Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the 
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that 
is diverse and inclusive?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that my team upholds the values 
of diversity, inclusion, and mutual respect by setting that example 
myself and cultivating an environment where every contribution is 
valued and considered, regardless of differences in race, gender, 
ethnicity, or other attributes. I will ensure my team takes the proper 
training to cultivate an office environment that creates opportunity 
for dialogue and for innovation across diverse backgrounds. If 
confirmed, I will hold my leadership accountable and will work with the 
Department's new Chief Diversity and Inclusion officer to ensure our 
administrative and foreign policies support the values of diversity and 
inclusion.

    Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and 
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S. 
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's 
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests 
of any senior White House staff?

    Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

    Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any 
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the 
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior 
White House staff?

    Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

    Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have 
any financial interests in any foreign country?

    Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual 
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international 
presence, but these mutual funds are exempt from conflict of interest 
laws. I am committed to following all applicable ethics laws and 
regulations and remaining vigilant with regard to my ethics 
obligations. I will divest any investments the State Department Ethics 
Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of interest.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter 
and supporter of terrorism?

    Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its 
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces, 
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The 
administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our 
personnel and our vital interests and will respond to any such threat 
using all appropriate means.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States should trust the 
world's leading exporter of terrorism to honor any international 
agreements?

    Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful 
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA does not rely on trust; 
it provides the most intrusive nuclear verification and monitoring 
procedures ever negotiated. Diplomacy is a tool; it is not a reward or 
concession. It is a means to advance U.S. interests. I remain clear-
eyed about the threat Iran poses to us and our allies.

    Question. What policies will you be pressing for to address Iran's 
non-nuclear threats?

    Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful 
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and then use that as a platform to 
build a longer and stronger deal and also address other areas of 
concern. The administration also intends to pursue full implementation 
of relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions involving Iran.

    Question. Regarding ``compliance for compliance'' with the 
Iranians, can you commit today that you will not be counseling the 
administration to take the first step or dilute its existing leverage 
vis-a-vis the Iranians amid this process? Could you please explain to 
us how you define compliance by the Iranians with the JCPOA?

    Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful 
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a starting point for follow-on 
negotiations. There are many steps in the process to getting there that 
we will need to evaluate. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting 
with Congress and our allies on the path forward.

    Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be 
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?

    Answer. The administration agrees that a bipartisan approach to 
Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for the long 
term, and if confirmed I will work to engage with Congress on this and 
other issues. As the Biden-Harris administration develops its Iran 
policy, it is committed to consulting closely and regularly with 
Congress, as well as U.S. allies and regional partners, to listen to 
their ideas and concerns.

    Question. Do you believe that the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?

    Answer. The Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is 
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with 
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and it is a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. I 
believe Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism and that, as the IRGC 
branch focused on extraterritorial activities, the IRGC-Quds Force has 
been directly involved in planning, directing, and supporting terrorist 
acts outside of Iran. Iran's support for terrorism threatens U.S. 
forces, diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. 
The administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our 
forces, personnel, and our vital interests, and will respond to any 
such threat using all appropriate means.

    Question. Are you committed to strict enforcement of sanctions 
against the IRGC and its subsidiaries and affiliates?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to countering 
Iran's destabilizing activities, including its ballistic missile 
program and support for terrorist groups and violent proxies in the 
region. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to maintain and 
impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals supporting 
terrorist activity or responsible for serious human rights abuses, and 
will work with our allies promote accountability for those involved.

    Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 3, 2021, you acknowledged that you met 
with officials of the Iranian regime--a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism--during your time out of 
government since 2017. You also stated that you coordinated directly 
with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale 
concerning your interactions with Iranian regime officials.

   Did you also coordinate directly with any of the following senior 
        U.S. State Department officials who handled Iran in their 
        portfolio: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
        Affairs David Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian 
        Hook, Special Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy 
        Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State 
        Michael Pompeo?

   If yes, please identify dates of consultation? If not, why not?

    Answer. I did not engage with any of the named individuals beyond 
Undersecretary for Political Affairs David Hale.

    Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in 
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text 
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and 
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the 
exchanges.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have 
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings 
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person 
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.

    Question. Do you agree that a credible option to use military force 
is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from obtaining 
nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?

    Answer. Should Iran threaten U.S. personnel, the United States will 
respond in a way that is calculated, on our timetable, consistent with 
all applicable domestic and international law, and using a mix of tools 
seen and unseen.

    Question. Do you believe there were gaps in the JCPOA that must be 
addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon?

    Answer. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed that under no circumstances would it 
ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons and committed to a 
series of limits on its nuclear activities that would verifiably block 
any path to producing nuclear material for weapons for their duration. 
The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it is committed to 
ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

    Question. You have previously stated that the JCPOA provided the 
most comprehensive inspection regime ever negotiated. But in 2018, 
Israel revealed Iran's nuclear archive--which was unknown to the IAEA. 
Do you agree Iran lied to the IAEA about the possible military 
dimension (PMD) of its nuclear program?

    Answer. The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information 
provided by Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has 
previously reported that it found evidence of possible military 
dimensions of Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of 
activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device 
were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated 
effort, and some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration 
will not take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear 
program, and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification 
authorities to investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear 
material or activities in Iran.

    Question. Can you describe your understanding of the regime's 
financial system with respect to terrorism finance, money laundering, 
corruption, and other illicit activity? Did the JCPOA change this 
behavior?

    Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its 
support for terrorism threatens our forces and partners in the region. 
President Biden is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing 
activities, including its ballistic missile program and support for 
terrorist groups and violent proxies in the region. The United States 
and our partners negotiated a deal that verifiably prevented Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon and subjected it to the most intrusive 
inspection regime ever negotiated. It was working. The President has 
made clear that the United States will be prepared to resume 
participation in the deal if Iran resumes strict compliance, as a 
starting point for follow-on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen 
these nuclear constraints, and address other issues of concern, 
including Iran's ballistic missile program and its destabilizing 
regional activity.

    Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden 
administration?

    Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding 
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to 
implementing the requirements of INARA.

    Question. Do you agree that because INARA requires any agreement 
with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran to be submitted to 
Congress for review ``regardless of the form it takes'', ``whether a 
political commitment or otherwise'', and ``regardless of whether it is 
legally binding or not'', that any informal agreement, including even 
an unwritten oral understanding, reached about how the United States 
and Iran will return to compliance with the JCPOA, or move in the 
direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA, must be submitted 
to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the 
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the 
transmission requirement.

    Question. Do you agree that prior to and during the period for 
transmission of an agreement to Congress for review pursuant to INARA, 
and during the period for congressional review provided in INARA, ``the 
President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or 
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to 
Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such 
sanctions pursuant to an agreement'' required to be transmitted to 
Congress for review pursuant to INARA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the 
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the 
transmission requirement.

    Question. Do you agree that the sanctions that may not be waived, 
suspended or otherwise obviated under the circumstances described in 
the preceding question include sanctions that may have been waived, 
suspended or otherwise obviated pursuant to the JCPOA following 
congressional review of that agreement pursuant to INARA, but which 
were subsequently re-imposed by the United States Government?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). I understand that the Biden-Harris administration 
is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA and if 
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including with respect to limitations during any 
congressional review period.

    Question. Are you personally committed to upholding the spirit of 
INARA's restrictions on sanctions relief for Iran referred to in the 
preceding two questions by not seeking to extend sanctions relief to 
Iran in circumvention of those restrictions?

    Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during the 
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris 
administration is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA. 
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied.

    Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress 
will be able to review pursuant to INARA any agreement that is 
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, 
irrespective of the level of formality or politically or legally 
binding nature of such agreement, to include any agreement providing 
for return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that 
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its 
transmission requirement.

    Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to ``keep 
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and 
currently informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating 
to Iran's nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement''?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under INARA.

    Question. Are you personally committed to keeping the appropriate 
congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of 
any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's nuclear 
program, including any new or amended agreement?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on 
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under 
INARA.

    Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to submit 
a report to Congress not less frequently than every 180 calendar days 
``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the [JCPOA] 
during the period covered by the report''?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting 
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as 
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.

    Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to make a 
determination and certification to the appropriate congressional 
committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar days 
regarding Iran's compliance with the JCPOA?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting 
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as 
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make 
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).

    Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements 
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA 
will require the President to submit a report to Congress not less 
frequently than every 180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and 
the compliance of Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period 
covered by the report''?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting 
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as 
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including its semi-annual reporting requirements.

    Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements 
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA 
will require the President to make a determination and certification to 
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership not less than 
every 90 calendar days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new 
agreement?

    Answer. I am aware of reporting and certification requirements of 
the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am 
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating 
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring 
the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including the requirement to 
determine whether to make the certification called for in Section 
135(d)(6).

    Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration will be 
required under INARA to resume submitting reports and certifications to 
Congress that are mandated under INARA should the administration 
announce that the United States has returned to the JCPOA, or is 
returning to the JCPOA?

    Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements 
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am 
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating 
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting 
requirements.

    Question. If you agree that the Biden administration will be 
required under INARA to resume submitting such reports and 
certifications to Congress should it announce that the United States 
has returned to the JCPOA, or is returning to the JCPOA, on what date 
will the first such report be due, and on what date will the first such 
certification be due? If you are not able at this time to specify the 
dates on which such reports and certifications will be due, please 
specify the method or formula you will use to calculate the respective 
due dates.

    Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements 
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The United States has 
not announced it has returned to the JCPOA, and I am not able to 
specify dates for potential future reporting requirements. If 
confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with Congress on any 
agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under 
INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, 
including meeting its reporting requirements in a timely manner.

    Question. Can you assure the committee that there are no 
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by 
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your 
responses to the foregoing questions?

    Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is 
committed to implementing the requirements of the Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best 
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?

    Answer. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest 
supporters over the last fifty years. The U.S.-Israel relationship is 
deeply personal to him and he has met and worked closely with every 
Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. The President believes the 
ties between our two countries, rooted in strategic interests and 
shared values, should transcend domestic politics. In this vein, his 
administration will not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel 
relationship, but also ensure that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's goals to work closely 
with Israel, to include building on normalization agreements to 
strengthen cooperation between Israel and its neighbors.

    Question. Do you believe Israel is and should always remain a 
Jewish State?

    Answer. President Biden supports Israel's future as a Jewish and 
democratic state. He continues to believe the two-state solution is the 
best way to ensure that Israel remains both Jewish and democratic. If 
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to 
restore credible U.S. engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
and look for opportunities for the type of diplomatic progress that can 
protect Israel's long-term security.

    Question. Do you agree with United States policy (and law) that 
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel?

    Answer. This administration recognizes that Jerusalem is central to 
the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. Jerusalem is 
the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final status issue, 
which will need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct 
negotiations. The administration will handle all issues related to 
Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity that they deserve.

    Question. Do you agree the United States Embassy in Israel should 
remain in Jerusalem?

    Answer. The U.S. position is that our embassy will remain in 
Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The ultimate status 
of Jerusalem is a final status issue, which will need to be resolved by 
the parties in the context of direct negotiations.

    Question. Do you support full funding for United States security 
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year Memorandum of 
Understanding?

    Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is 
ironclad. As you know, the President played an important role in 
helping to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 
security assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the 
terms of the MOU without reservation.

    Question. The MOU is a comprehensive agreement that outlined the 
terms and conditions of this assistance to Israel. If confirmed, will 
you oppose efforts to impose additional conditions or restrictions on 
this aid?

    Answer. The administration will continue to uphold President 
Biden's strong commitment to Israel and its security. If confirmed, I 
will advance the administration's position that we oppose efforts to 
place additional conditions on U.S. military assistance to Israel.

    Question. Do you support the United States' commitment to Israel's 
Qualitative Military Edge?

    Answer. The United States is required by law to help preserve 
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge in the Middle East. If confirmed, I 
will champion President Biden's priorities related to Israel's 
security, including our commitment to maintain Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge.

    Question. If confirmed, will you make ensuring Israel's Qualitative 
Military Edge is maintained a priority?

    Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is 
inviolable. If confirmed, I will support the administration's objective 
to continue U.S. military assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's 
Qualitative Military Edge, which is critical to ensuring Israel has the 
means to defend itself.

    Question. Do you agree that the only way to reach a lasting 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through direct, 
bilateral negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians rather than 
one imposed by outside actors?

    Answer. The United States is working toward a more peaceful, 
secure, and prosperous future for the people of the Middle East. As 
part of this, the United States seeks to advance the possibility of 
achieving a negotiated two-state solution, in which Israel lives in 
peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state. If confirmed, 
I will support direct negotiations between the two parties to advance 
this goal. I will also support the administration's goals of working 
closely with Israel, engaging the Palestinians, and consulting with 
partners in the region who have a common interest in supporting efforts 
to advance lasting peace.

    Question. Israel constantly faces terrorist attacks and threats--
including rocket attacks by Hamas in Gaza and attacks from Iranian-
backed groups in Lebanon and Syria. Do you fully support Israel's right 
to defend itself from terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive 
action to disrupt weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?

    Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is a key 
foreign policy tenet. The administration will continue U.S. military 
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, 
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself. 
The administration will take action, in coordination with our allies 
and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's destabilizing 
activities. There should be no doubt that the President has Israel's 
back. If confirmed, I will support the administration's goals regarding 
Israel's security.

    Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to counter the 
global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign against Israel? 
Will you work to expand Israel's inclusion in the international 
community and ensure our ally is treated as a normal nation?

    Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This 
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the 
American people's First Amendment rights, it will not hesitate to voice 
our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to delegitimize 
Israel on the world stage. The administration will work tirelessly to 
support Israel's further integration into the international community.

    Question. The International Criminal Court over the last several 
years has taken actions potentially leading to the prosecution of 
American and Israeli nationals despite neither country being a member 
to the court. If confirmed, will you oppose and work to prevent ICC 
prosecutions of Americans or Israelis?

    Answer. The United States shares the goals of the ICC in promoting 
accountability, respect for human rights, and justice for victims of 
atrocities. However, the United States has always objected to any 
attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United States 
is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will work to 
protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I share the 
administration's serious concerns about the ICC's attempts to exercise 
jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel is not a State Party, and 
Palestine is not a State.

    Question. Hezbollah's arsenal, particularly its precision guided 
munitions (PGM), represents a clear threat to U.S. and allied forces 
across the Middle East. If confirmed, what specific actions will you 
recommend the U.S. take to address the PGM threat from Hezbollah?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States uses 
all the tools at its disposal to push back on Hezbollah's terrorist and 
illicit activities. Hezbollah's actions threaten regional stability, as 
well as Lebanon's security, stability, and sovereignty. Hezbollah's 
actions demonstrate it is more interested in advancing its own 
interests than those of the Lebanese people. If confirmed, I will also 
consult closely with Israel on how to address threats to regional 
security and stability.

    Question. What actions will you take to press all our European 
allies and the United Nations to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as 
a terrorist entity?

    Answer. Hezbollah has been designated by the State Department as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997 and a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist since 2001. The Department remains concerned about 
Hezbollah's terrorist and illicit activities around the world and its 
destabilizing actions in Lebanon. If confirmed, I will continue to 
advance our long-standing diplomatic efforts to press countries and the 
European Union to fully designate, ban, or restrict Hezbollah from 
operating in their territory. Thirteen governments around the world, 
including in Europe, took significant domestic action along these lines 
against Hezbollah in recent years. The administration will encourage 
others to follow suit.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the U.S. 
continues support for the Kurds of Syria during the Biden 
administration?

    Answer. I am committed to supporting our local partners, the Syrian 
Democratic Forces. They cannot continue to root out ISIS terrorists or 
guard the tens of thousands of ISIS detainees and families who are 
still in their custody without U.S. support. If confirmed, I will also 
support renewed U.S. efforts to stabilize areas of northeast Syria 
liberated from ISIS, to include an ongoing Syrian Intra-Kurdish 
Dialogue, which aims to de-escalate tensions with the Syrian opposition 
and advance more inclusive governance in northeast Syria.

    Question. In a July 2020 piece in Foreign Policy titled ``The Total 
Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump'', you criticized the 
Trump administration for having ``made no effort to find areas of 
cooperation with China, such as climate change.'' Should cooperation or 
competition be the dominant U.S. policy approach to Beijing?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, ``our relationship with 
China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can 
be, and adversarial when it must be. The common denominator is the need 
to engage China from a position of strength.'' China has been growing 
more authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. Beijing is now 
challenging our security, prosperity, and values in significant ways 
that require a new U.S. approach. If confirmed, I will be committed to 
meeting this challenge.

    Question. If you seek to cooperate with the PRC, do you believe 
that the Chinese Communist Party will cooperate in good-faith?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration approaches China through 
the lens of strategic competition and recognizes there are adversarial 
and cooperative aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. The 
administration is willing to test whether China is willing to play a 
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about 
China's intentions. China's failure to act consistently with its 
international obligations and commitments will significantly factor 
into how the U.S. approaches China on issues where our interests may 
align. If confirmed, I will keep these past shortcomings in mind in 
future dealings with Beijing and will consult with Congress on any 
potential areas of cooperation.

    Question. Can you name bilateral agreements between the United 
States and the PRC that Beijing has honored in full and without later 
reneging? How do you plan to ensure that Beijing fulfills its part of 
any agreement on climate change given its long record of broken 
promises?

    Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation-
state to the interests of the American people. The Biden-Harris 
administration is committed to working closely with our allies and 
partners to press China to act more constructively. If confirmed, I 
will be unflinching in our diplomacy with China on climate change. 
Given Beijing's track record of failing to honor its international 
obligations, the United States will keep eyes wide open and not limit 
its options in addressing the China challenge just because Beijing 
makes offers of cooperation. The administration will judge Beijing by 
its actions, not its words.

    Question. Does China have more or fewer coal-fired power plants 
today than in 2016?

    Answer. China has more coal-fired power plants now than it did in 
2016. China currently has approximately 1,005 gigawatts (GW) of 
installed coal power generation capacity, which is roughly half of the 
world's total. According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean 
Air, China also accounts for 41 percent of planned coal-power 
construction, approximately 200 GW over the next five to ten years. 
Although China has made efforts to decommission old coal plants and 
curtail future builds, it has continued to expand its coal-fired power 
fleet and added a net 36.8 GW and 29.8 GW of coal-fired generation 
capacity in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Media report that, in 2020, 
alone China built more than three times the amount built elsewhere 
around the world.

    Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department, under your 
leadership, push for international transparency and accountability to 
ensure we learn what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent 
the next pandemic?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes COVID-19 is a 
global challenge that requires a global response and will engage 
globally to respond to and recover from COVID-19, as well as to prepare 
for the next threat. The administration will work with allies and 
partners to strengthen and reform the WHO, push for a transparent 
investigation into the emergence and spread of COVID-19 to better 
prepare for future outbreaks, and support multilateral efforts to end 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The commitment to combat COVID-19, promote 
public health, and advance global health security, as embodied in 
National Security Memorandum-1, will save lives, foster economic 
recovery, and build better resilience against future biological 
threats.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department 
will follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure of new 
information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology? Will you 
commit to sharing with Congress--and with the public as appropriate--
further details on the disclosures including the names of the Wuhan 
Institute of Virology researchers who were sick in the fall of 2019?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it supports 
a robust and transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 
pandemic. An impartial public health investigation into the origins and 
early spread of any novel outbreak is vital to protecting against 
future health security threats. The administration will review all 
information available to us about the origins of SARS-COV-2. It is 
imperative to have transparency on the early events of the pandemic and 
determine how COVID-19 spread, so future emergence events with pandemic 
potential can be averted. If confirmed, I commit to follow up--with 
Congress and with the public--on disclosures of new information and 
relevant diplomatic reporting.

    Question. If confirmed, will you support the suspension of U.S. 
funding to research institutions in China engaged in virological 
studies, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology and all branches of 
the PRC Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and discontinue all 
joint research projects involving Chinese scientists and U.S. 
scientists that receive funding from the U.S. taxpayers so long as none 
of this impacts U.S. national security, until PRC authorities allow a 
credible and unfettered international investigation into the origin of 
SARS-COV-2?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the current 
policy and funding priorities for any programs the Department may have 
for joint research projects with China.

    Question. On April 3, 2020, you signed a statement entitled 
``Saving Lives in America, China, and Around the World,'' which read in 
part: ``No effort against the coronavirus--whether to save American 
lives at home or combat the disease abroad--will be successful without 
some degree of cooperation between the United States and China. China's 
factories can make the protective gear and medicines needed to fight 
the virus; its medical personnel can share their valuable clinical 
experience in treating it; and its scientists can work with ours to 
develop the vaccine urgently needed to vanquish it.'' Do you still 
believe today that the same regime that infected the world with this 
deadly virus, and then lied to cover it up, can really be part of the 
solution?

    Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as 
ours. It is not a favor to be bargained for, but a challenge best 
addressed with China's cooperation. The Biden-Harris administration 
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on 
certain issues where we may share interests, such as global health, but 
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions. The administration will 
not trade off U.S. core interests or values in discussions with China 
or any other country.

    Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese 
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are 
compatible with our own?

    Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian, 
and increasingly aggressive. Under the Biden-Harris administration, the 
United States will advance an alternative world view that promotes 
democratic governance and transparency.

    Question. What are the ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party? 
Are they purely domestic in scope? Regional? Global? If global, how do 
they challenge U.S. interests?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to expand its 
domestic, regional, and global influence and drive wedges between the 
United States and our partners and allies. The PRC's coercive economic 
activity and aggressive acquisition of critical technologies through 
licit and illicit means--coupled with a corresponding expansion of its 
military footprint and collection capabilities--seek to expand Chinese 
influence around the globe. These actions pose a threat to U.S. 
interests and undermine our own military, diplomatic, and economic 
influence. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Defense, 
other national security agencies, and Congress to address this 
challenge.

    Question. In what areas do you think the United States should try 
to frustrate the CCP's ambitions and undermine the party's ability to 
achieve their international ambitions?

    Answer. The United States is committed to working with our allies 
and partners to counter China's malign actions around the world. The 
U.S. should engage in international institutions and make the necessary 
investments in our military to ensure we can deter any aggression. 
Economically, we can and must out-compete China, including by 
preventing U.S. intellectual property and technology from being used in 
ways that could undermine our competitiveness and security. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to confront 
the challenges posed by China from a position of strength.

    Question. Do you believe that the Chinese Communist Party's united 
front and intelligence activities inside the borders of the United 
States, as well as inside the borders of our allies and partners, 
challenge the integrity of our policymaking? Why?

    Answer. It is important that we bring greater transparency to bear 
on malign People's Republic of China influence activities in the United 
States. China's use of information operations and other coercive and 
corrupting efforts to undermine and interfere in democracies poses a 
threat to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, 
I will push back on Beijing's attempts to write the rules of the 
information age by working with allies and likeminded partners to 
support an affirmative, democratic vision for the global information 
space, while building resilience against these threats and exposing 
China's malign activity. Further, if confirmed, I will also work to 
educate important U.S. constituencies, including state and local 
governments, on these threats.

    Question. Do you agree that the goal of the Chinese Communist Party 
is not merely to make China stronger and more developed, but rather for 
China to ultimately supplant the United States as the world's dominant 
economic, political, and military power?

    Answer. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends for the People's 
Republic of China, which is growing increasingly illiberal, 
authoritarian, and aggressive, to become a dominant world power. Its 
values are often at odds with our own. The administration is committed 
to working with our partners and allies to address the challenges the 
CCP poses to democratic values from a position of strength. The 
Department will communicate this clearly and directly in our public 
diplomacy efforts. The Department will confront the CCP's growing 
authoritarianism and escalating efforts to divide and manipulate others 
and write the rules of the information age. It will work with allies 
and partners to define an affirmative, democratic vision for the world.

    Question. Is Xi Jinping's ``Community of Common Destiny for 
Humanity'' compatible with your views of the international order and 
the ways in which countries conduct diplomacy? If not, why not?

    Answer. China seeks to make America and its allies more dependent 
on China and erode the international system that has provided peace and 
stability since the end of World War II. Xi's ``Community of Common 
Destiny for Humanity'' policy framework is no exception. If confirmed, 
I will prioritize renewed engagement with our allies and partners. I 
will rally their support to push back against China, including its 
attempts to reshape the international order and assert a set of values 
inconsistent with our own.

    Question. How would you assess the United States' policy of 
engagement with Beijing from 1979 to 2017? In retrospect, did that 
policy effectively protect and advance of our most vital national 
interests? Do you support a return to that policy?

    Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in 
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad 
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political 
liberalization, that has not happened. China has grown more 
authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. The CCP is illiberal, 
authoritarian, and intends for China to become a dominant world power. 
Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete with and challenge 
the United States. This necessitates a new U.S. approach. If confirmed, 
I will commit to addressing China from a position of strength in 
coordination with allies and partners.

    Question. Please explain how you believe the United States should 
act to defend our national interests when challenged by the Chinese 
authorities, even if our allies and partners are reluctant to join us.

    Answer. The most effective way to defend our national interests 
when challenged by Chinese authorities is to build positions of 
strength with U.S. allies and partners. On its own, the United States 
represents about a quarter of global GDP. When we join with fellow 
democracies that share more than doubles. China cannot afford to ignore 
more than half the global economy.
    When it is in the United States' interest to act on our own, we 
will do so. It is essential to confront directly China's economic 
abuses, defend our values, and protect the long-term prosperity and 
security of the United States.

    Question. While multilateral efforts are preferable, do you support 
unilateral action to counter China's malign activities if diplomatic 
efforts to secure multilateral action should fail?

    Answer. The challenges that China poses to our security, 
prosperity, and values, and how we conduct this competition in 
coordination with our allies and partners, will be crucial for defining 
the 21st century. PRC actions hurt American workers, blunt our 
technological edge, threaten our alliances, and undermine international 
organizations. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to 
counter Beijing's aggressive and coercive actions, sustain our military 
and economic advantages, and defend our democratic values from a 
position of strength. However, when it is in the United States' 
interest to act on our own, we should do so.

    Question. If confirmed, in future dialogue with Beijing, will you 
press for meaningful progress as a precondition for further rounds of 
dialogue? Do you commit to supporting the administration and Secretary 
in raising issues that Beijing deems ``sensitive''--such as human 
rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the Uyghurs--regardless of 
whether doing so may affect the CCP's willingness to engage in further 
dialogue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will stand up for our values when human 
rights are being abused in Xinjiang and Tibet--or elsewhere in China--
or when autonomy is being assaulted in Hong Kong. The administration is 
willing to test whether the Chinese Government is willing to play a 
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about U.S. 
interests. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) failure to uphold its 
international commitments will significantly factor into how we develop 
our approach to the PRC. If confirmed, I will keep these past 
shortcomings in mind in future dealings with Beijing. The Biden-Harris 
administration will put our democratic values at the center of our 
foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights, and human 
dignity.

    Question. Do you support the Trump administration's designation of 
the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification as a foreign 
mission of the PRC? What steps will you take to ensure other such front 
organizations are properly designated, and to inform relevant 
stakeholders within the U.S.--including state and local governments, 
universities, and business associations--of the nature and mission of 
such front organizations?

    Answer. China's use of coercive and corrupting tools of influence 
to undermine and interfere in democracies is a concern for the United 
States and our allies and partners around the world. The Biden-Harris 
administration will take action to counter this malign Chinese 
influence, including by increasing transparency and accountability. The 
administration will work with our allies and likeminded partners to 
build resilience against these threats, to expose China's malign 
activity and, when appropriate, to impose costs. The administration 
will also work with important U.S. constituencies, including state and 
local governments and academic institutions, to address these threats.

    Question. Do you support the Trump administration's reciprocity 
requirements that PRC diplomats report certain categories of meetings 
to the U.S. Government, including meetings with educational 
institutions and Chinese community groups?

    Answer. The United States seeks for our diplomats in China the same 
open access PRC officials enjoy in the United States. For years, 
Beijing has systematically obstructed access by U.S. officials. The 
administration will use all the tools at our disposal to achieve 
reciprocal access for our diplomats in China.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights 
concerns are integrated in every senior bilateral engagement, and that 
specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, both publicly 
and privately, with the PRC?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will put our democratic values at the 
center of our foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights, 
and human dignity. Effective diplomacy on human rights issues requires 
not only general statements but also targeted engagement on specific 
cases. If confirmed, I will integrate advocacy on specific cases into 
our human rights diplomacy.

    Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious 
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a 
responsible global actor?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China seeks international 
acceptance of its authoritarian alternative to the rules-based 
international system that has been the mainstay of global security and 
prosperity over the course of decades. At the same time, Beijing denies 
or obfuscates that it has an alarming record of violations and abuses 
of international human rights. If confirmed, I will work with the 
Department to challenge authoritarian governance and stand up for the 
human rights of all individuals, including by calling on PRC 
authorities to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms consistent 
with China's international obligations and commitments.

    Question. In December 2018, Chinese authorities detained Pastor 
Wang Yi of the Autumn Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, and one year 
later, sentenced him to nine years in prison for refusing to accept the 
CCP controls of his congregation described above. If confirmed, will 
you agree to raise Pastor Wang's case with leaders in Beijing and 
advocate for his immediate and unconditional release until they do so?

    Answer. I share your concerns regarding the deterioration of 
freedom of religion and belief in the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
Religious leaders are at particular risk of PRC repression and are 
pressured to join state-run religious organizations, as we have seen in 
the cases of Buddhist lamas, Muslim imams, Protestant pastors, and 
Catholic bishops and priests. Pastor Wang Yi is no exception and, if 
confirmed, I will continue the Department's advocacy for his release. 
Effective diplomatic engagement on human rights issues requires not 
only general statements but also engagement on specific cases. If 
confirmed, I will advocate on specific human rights cases.

    Question. Former Secretary of State Pompeo rightly determined that 
the People's Republic of China is committing genocide and crimes 
against humanity in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslim 
minorities. Secretary Blinken agreed with this determination. Do you 
concur with former Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Blinken?

    Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has committed 
crimes against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang. Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups have suffered unspeakable oppression at the hands of 
China's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged in atrocities that 
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. If 
confirmed, I will speak out consistently with allies and partners to 
condemn these atrocities, and I will consider all appropriate tools to 
promote accountability for those responsible and to deter future 
abuses.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work toward getting like-minded 
countries to join the United States in a genocide determination?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken said in his judgment that the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) has committed genocide against Uyghurs, and I 
agree. The PRC also has committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang 
against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other 
ethnic and religious minority groups, including imprisonment, torture, 
enforced sterilization, and persecution. The associated abuses in 
Xinjiang are particularly devastating to ethnic minority women and 
girls. These atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with 
serious consequences. If confirmed, I will speak out consistently and 
jointly with allies and partners to condemn these atrocities and will 
consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those 
responsible and deter future abuses.

    Question. Will you endorse the Rubio-McGovern Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act to prevent Beijing from profiting from its abuse of 
Uyghur and other persecuted groups' labor?

    Answer. While I cannot comment on pending legislation, I can 
confirm that the Biden-Harris administration stands against forced 
labor and abuses targeting Uyghurs and other minority groups carried 
out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). If confirmed, I will work 
with international partners to promote accountability for the PRC's 
atrocities in Xinjiang, press for the immediate and unconditional 
release of all those arbitrarily detained, the abolition of the 
internment camps and an end to forced labor, as well as the cessation 
of all other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. In 
addition, if confirmed, I will support efforts across the government to 
limit the profits China gains from forced labor.

    Question. Do you believe that the National Liberation Army (ELN) is 
a terrorist organization?

    Answer. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is designated as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.

    Question. Do you believe that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) is a terrorist organization?

    Answer. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is designated as 
a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.

    Question. Cuba harbors terrorists groups like the ELN. Do you 
support keeping Cuba on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to carefully 
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the 
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The 
administration will also carefully review policy related to Cuba and 
will provide further information at the appropriate time. The 
administration does not discuss deliberations or potential 
deliberations regarding designations.

    Question. The Cuban regime denies the Cuban people essential 
liberties such as free association, expression, belief, and access to 
information. How would you characterize the Cuban regime's human rights 
record?

    Answer. Cuba has a poor human rights record. The Cuban Government 
has increased its practice of arbitrary arrest and harassment of human 
rights defenders, journalists, and anyone who criticizes the 
Government. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-Harris 
administration's promise to ensure that democracy and human rights 
remain at the core of our policy efforts toward Cuba. The 
administration will engage directly with a large swath of Cuban civil 
society, with the goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine 
their own future. The administration will also engage directly the 
Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for reform.

    Question. The Cuban military plays a large role in controlling the 
flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this control to support 
the Cuban Communist Party and ensure regime survival. Do you support 
restricting financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to 
promote freedom in Cuba?

    Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the 
pandemic, economic upheaval caused by the country's recent monetary 
measures, and decades of living under an oppressive government that has 
failed to responsibly manage Cuba's economy. The administration has 
committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including our 
posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they advance 
the administration's goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine 
their future. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of 
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and 
economic well-being of the Cuban people, and I look forward to 
consulting with Congress on this issue.

    Question. Do you agree that Americans should be compensated for 
property that was confiscated by the Castro regime?

    Answer. Many Americans waited decades for compensation due to the 
Cuban Government's confiscation of their or their family's property. 
The Department will explore the best ways to support claimants and 
resolve outstanding claims. The administration committed to carefully 
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the best way to advance U.S. 
nationals' claims against the Cuban Government. The administration 
recognizes the varied views in Congress, and if confirmed, I look 
forward to consulting with Congress in developing a path forward.

    Question. Do you agree with Secretary Pompeo's decision to no 
longer exercise the suspension authority in the LIBERTAD Act, which 
allows Americans to sue in U.S. courts, companies trafficking in their 
stolen properties?

    Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing 
U.S.-Cuba policy, including U.S. posture regarding the suspension 
authority in Title III of the LIBERTAD Act. I understand that the 
administration is exploring ways to best support U.S. nationals' 
claims. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on 
this issue.

    Question. Do you agree we should maintain strong sanctions against 
Cuba and Venezuela as the Cuban regime provides intelligence and other 
vital support to the Maduro regime in Caracas in exchange for 
subsidized or free oil?

    Answer. The United States should maintain strong sanctions 
targeting the illegitimate Maduro regime and its enablers, including 
those complicit in human rights abuses and corruptly siphoning wealth 
and resources from the Venezuelan people. The administration is also 
committed to taking all appropriate steps to prevent our sanctions from 
impacting humanitarian access and delivery.

    Question. Do you support Interim President Juan Guaido in the 
pursuit of the restoration of democracy in Venezuela?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration continues to recognize Juan 
Guaido as the interim President of Venezuela. If confirmed, I will 
press for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela through holding of 
free and fair elections.

    Question. Do you support democracy assistance to the Cuban people 
to promote democracy, civil society and human rights in Cuba pursuant 
to U.S. law?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-
Harris administration's promise to ensure that the advancement of 
democracy and human rights remains at the core of our policy efforts 
toward Cuba. The Biden-Harris administration will engage directly with 
a large swath of Cuban civil society, with the goal of empowering the 
Cuban people to determine their own future. The administration will 
also engage with the Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for 
reform. I am committed to consulting closely with Congress about Cuba 
policy, if confirmed.

    Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds 
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of 
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice 
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict 
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign 
assistance?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will take the Helms Amendment and other 
legislative restrictions, including other restrictions related to 
abortion, very seriously and will work with partners to ensure 
compliance.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. March 15 will mark the 10th anniversary of the brutal 
crackdown by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad against peaceful 
protestors, resulting in a violent and protracted civil war. I am 
concerned that U.S. actions in Syria in the last four years have not 
reflected a robust decision-making process focused on supporting our 
allies and countering malign actors. Having visited our Kurdish 
partners in 2018, I have seen first-hand the value of an engaged U.S. 
policy on Syria. What actions are available for the United States to 
take now to improve the outcome in Syria?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration's policy goals in Syria 
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution under the 
parameters of UNSCR 2254, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and 
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in 
need. The administration will use a variety of tools, across a 
coordinated whole-of-government approach, to push for a sustainable end 
to the Syrian people's suffering. Any political settlement must address 
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria. Additionally, 
the humanitarian situation is dire. If confirmed, I will work within 
the administration to do more to aid vulnerable Syrians displaced 
within Syria, as well as refugees who fled abroad.

    Question. How should the U.S. balance Turkey, the Kurds and Russia 
in responding to the situation in Northeastern Syria?

    Answer. Preventing an ISIS resurgence in Iraq and Syria demands 
revitalized U.S. engagement. The administration is committed to 
supporting our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The 
United States has shared interests with Turkey in countering terrorism 
and ending the conflict in Syria and understands Turkey's concerns 
about U.S. cooperation with the People's Protection Units (YPG) as part 
of the SDF in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, which we will continue to 
address. The administration will continue to consult with Turkey on 
Syria as it seeks areas for cooperation. The United States has always 
been open to dialogue with Russia on Syria, as long as the dialogue 
contributes to protecting civilians and to credibly moving forward on a 
political resolution to the conflict.

    Question. I was pleased to see the Biden administration 
implementing a sanctions regime against those responsible for the 
poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny and the 
continued construction on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. On Nord Stream 2, 
what next steps should the administration take to stop the Nord Stream 
2 pipeline?

    Answer. The administration believes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a 
bad deal and a threat to European energy security, including Ukraine 
and other vulnerable partners. The administration welcomes Congress's 
interest and appreciates Congressional efforts to provide the tools 
needed to combat Russian aggressive actions. In a February 19 report to 
Congress, the Department identified Russia-based KVT-RUS as an entity 
knowingly selling, leasing, or providing the vessel FORTUNA for the 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, as required by 
PEESA, as amended. I understand that the Department will continue to 
inform companies about the risks of doing business with Nord Stream 2 
and use all available tools to examine entities potentially involved in 
sanctionable activity, as outlined by CAATSA and PEESA, as amended. It 
will also continue its diplomatic engagement with key European partners 
and allies to outline our serious concerns regarding the project's 
geopolitical implications for Europe's energy security.

    Question. How do you view the timeline for the administration to 
act to stop the pipeline? Is there a point after which our options to 
stop the pipeline are limited?

    Answer. The administration's efforts to date aimed at stopping the 
pipeline, aided by the authorities granted by Congress, have 
significantly slowed the pipeline's pace of construction. It is of the 
utmost importance to maintain this high level of engagement and 
diplomatic pressure to prevent the pipeline's completion. If confirmed, 
I will ensure the Department of State maintains this high level of 
engagement and diplomatic pressure.

    Question. What should next steps for broad, coherent U.S. policy 
response to Russian aggression look like? How are the Navalny sanctions 
part of a wider strategy to respond to and deter Russia?

    Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will 
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions 
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration 
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the 
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United 
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions 
and will comply with the legal obligations to impose a second round of 
sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
Elimination Act of 1991. As the administration works to advance U.S. 
interests, it will continue to hold Russia accountable for its 
destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, including its 
repeated use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and human rights violations.

    Question. What additional legal tools does the administration need 
to stop this pipeline?

    Answer. I appreciate Congressional support to stop this pipeline. 
The administration has a number of sanctions tools at its disposal to 
stop Nord Stream 2, including the Protecting Europe's Energy Security 
Act (PEESA), as amended, Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA). As you know, PEESA and CAATSA Section 232 provide more 
specific tools targeting Russian energy export pipelines, which can be 
supplemented by IEEPA if needed. If confirmed, I will continue to work 
with the ample tools Congress has already provided. I will also work to 
maintain the high level of engagement with companies and diplomatic 
pressure to bring an end to the pipeline's construction.

    Question. How can the administration better amplify the concerns of 
our central and eastern European allies to persuade Danish and German 
authorities to stop the pipeline?

    Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other 
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. It 
views this project as a threat not only to Europe's energy security but 
also to strategic stability on the continent. The German and Danish 
authorities are aware of the U.S. position from frequent and high-level 
interaction and statements, and the administration will continue all 
such efforts. The United States will also continue to work with our 
allies and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and 
the Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy 
supply that does not undermine collective security.

    Question. From the administration's point of view, what aspects of 
the pipeline's construction are the most vulnerable to targeted 
sanctions that could stop the project?

    Answer. To date, targeted outreach to Western insurers and 
certification, engineering, and construction firms, including companies 
providing pipe-laying vessels, have significantly affected the rate of 
the pipeline's construction with many entities winding down their 
operations and untold more refusing to engage with Nord Stream 2 AG 
given the risk of sanctions. The administration will continue to be 
clear that companies risk sanctions if they involve themselves in Nord 
Stream 2 construction and will continue to monitor companies involved 
in potentially sanctionable activities.

    Question. Georgia has been on a dangerous backslide away from 
democracy for several years now. Recent developments, including the 
arrest and detention of Russian opposition leader Nika Melia, threats 
to further destabilize Georgia and the region. What policy responses 
are available to the United States? How should the U.S. work with 
European allies to develop an international consensus on Georgia?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Georgian 
people's choice to pursue closer ties with the EU and NATO and, as 
Congress has done, voice strong U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty 
and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized 
borders. In its messaging of support for Georgia's future in the 
context of recent developments, the Department has emphasized the 
importance of Georgian leaders and politicians modeling the values and 
norms of the Euro-Atlantic community they aspire to join. If confirmed, 
I look forward to working with Congress and European allies to help 
identify opportunities to support Georgia's democratic development, 
including reforms to foster judicial independence and a level electoral 
playing field, as well as anticorruption and pro-business reforms. U.S. 
assistance directly supports these goals. I am committed to ensuring 
U.S. assistance to Georgia advances U.S. policy objectives.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. Last week I sent a letter cosigned by the other GOP 
ranking members of national security committees to provide our vision 
for a successful renegotiation with Iran over its nuclear program and 
its regional aggression. As you are probably aware, I was a vocal 
critic of the previous JCPOA and I believe that the Biden 
administration has a rare opportunity to fix the fatal flaws of the 
previous agreement.
    Specifically, my colleagues and I would like to see that the 
nuclear issue and Tehran's regional aggression be addressed together. 
Iran remains the number one state sponsor of terror, and it would be a 
critical mistake to separate the two issues. Additionally, there should 
be no financial relief for Iran to meet their pre-conditions for 
diplomatic talks. This is a mistake that is often repeated time and 
again, not just in our negotiations with Iran, but with rogue regimes 
worldwide.

   If confirmed, do you commit to addressing Iran's nuclear program 
        and regional aggression together in any future diplomatic 
        negotiations, while opposing any such deal that includes one 
        without the other? Do you agree to not grant concessions as a 
        precondition to diplomatic talks?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration agrees that we need to 
supplement the JCPOA if we want a deal that is sustainable. There are 
several issues the deal did not address, including Iran's ballistic 
missile development, proliferation, and destabilizing regional 
activities. Iran also remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism, 
threatening international security and U.S. forces, diplomatic 
personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The administration 
is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return 
to compliance with the JCPOA, and then use it as a platform to 
negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal, and other critical issues.

    Question. Do you agree to not grant concessions as a precondition 
to diplomatic talks?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will not make decisions 
based on artificial Iranian deadlines. The President made clear he is 
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, and the 
administration believes diplomacy, in coordination with our allies and 
regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal. The 
administration is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a 
mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA and then use it as a 
platform to negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal and other areas 
of concern. Iran continues to exceed JCPOA limits on many fronts, so we 
are a long way from that point.

    Question. Senator Cardin and I worked together to push back against 
the politically motivated global boycott, divestment, and sanctions 
movement unfairly targeting Israel. These efforts have achieved 
widespread bipartisan support in the Senate, and we look forward to 
working with your State Department to ensure that Israel is not 
unfairly targeted through these efforts.

   What is your view on the strategic US/Israel relationship and can 
        we count on your support to oppose global BDS movements against 
        Israel?

    Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the 
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This 
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the 
American people's First Amendment rights, the administration will not 
hesitate to voice our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight 
efforts to delegitimize Israel on the world stage.

Anti-Normalization laws in the Middle East
    The Trump administration achieved major breakthroughs in Israel's 
relations with the Middle East. Senator Booker and I plan to re-
introduce a bill called ``Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken 
Against the Normalization of Relations with Israel Act'' to capitalize 
on this moment. This bill requires the Department of State to report 
instances of Arab Government efforts to undermine people-to-people 
engagement with Israeli citizens and residents. I believe it is 
imperative that the normalization of formal relations between Arab 
Governments and Israel is extended down to these countries' citizens.

   How crucial is it that instances of anti-normalization laws are 
        documented publicly, and what further actions can the 
        administration take to ensure that people are not punished for 
        engaging with Israeli citizens?

    Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important 
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris 
administration will seek to build on these efforts to expand the circle 
of peace between Israel and its neighbors, urging states and 
multilateral organizations with anti-normalization legislation or 
decrees to revoke them immediately so that negotiations can commence. 
The administration will also closely monitor the status of the existing 
agreements to encourage both sides to uphold their commitments to 
establish full diplomatic relations.

    Question. Here in the Senate we have worked hard to provide the 
right framework for Ukrainian Security assistance-I am proud to have 
been a principle author of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, 
a program that has provided the Ukrainians billions in military aid and 
training. Under the previous administration, we have provided increased 
amounts of lethal assistance, and I was glad to see in the NDAA that 
$125 million is set aside for lethal assistance-all of this aid is 
appropriately tied to continued Ukrainian sector reforms, which I am 
glad to see President Zelensky is committed to.

   Can I get your commitment to continue the support of robust funding 
        for USAI while supporting corruption and continued reforms in 
        Ukraine?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to provide robust 
security assistance to Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and 
to support continued reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee 
the execution of $115 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $3 
million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $6 
million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related 
Programs (NADR) funds that Congress appropriated for Ukraine for FY 
2021. Additionally, if confirmed, I will closely coordinate with the 
Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that Congress 
appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) in 
FY 2021, including the process to certify that the Government of 
Ukraine has taken substantial actions to make defense institutional 
reforms before the final tranche of $150 million in USAI funding is 
released.

    Question. For two decades, the Chinese Government has 
systematically recruited U.S. researchers and sent Chinese military 
researchers to steal U.S. taxpayer-funded research and intellectual 
property at U.S. universities and institutes. This has led to the U.S. 
taxpayer unwittingly funding the rise of China's military and economy. 
This has to stop.
    Last Congress, the Homeland Security and Government Affairs 
Committee passed Senator Carpers and I's Securing American Innovation 
Act. This bipartisan legislation will increase visibility on who is 
conducting our federally funded research, their potential conflicts of 
interest, and potentially problematic ties with our adversaries. More 
importantly, it will provide the State Department the authority to deny 
visas to foreign researchers whose problematic affiliations and access 
to export-controlled technologies through fundamental research raise 
national security concerns. We took a balanced approach with this bill. 
We need foreign researchers to work with our researchers here, but we 
need to take common-sense steps to prevent bad actors from coming to 
the United States.

   Do you agree that these new visa authorities are necessary, and how 
        will they better protect taxpayer-funded research and 
        intellectual property from foreign adversaries?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department guards against 
the transfer of sensitive technology to foreign adversaries. The 
Department will implement existing visa ineligibility grounds targeting 
this activity. Presidential Proclamation 10043, issued in May 2020, 
suspends the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) nationals to 
study or conduct research if the applicant is affiliated with an 
identified PRC entity that implements or supports China's military-
civil fusion strategy. The United States continues to welcome 
legitimate students and scholars from China and around the world and 
promote the United States for international science and technology 
talent critical to our research enterprise. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with Congress on reviewing legislation to further 
State's work and role in these efforts.

International Criminal Court Mandate
    Question. As you are aware, last year the appeals chamber of the 
ICC allowed a politically motivated investigation into alleged actions 
of US and allied personnel in Afghanistan to move forward. This court 
has no jurisdiction over the US as we are not a signatory to the Rome 
Statute. I was glad to see that the Trump administration responded with 
financial sanctions and the restriction of travel visas for foreign 
individuals assisting the ICC in this manner.
    However, just last month, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber granted 
authorization for an investigation into alleged crimes in the West 
Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to move forward. Like the United States, 
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. This is not the first 
time that the ICC has conducted a politically motivated investigation. 
My good friend Senator Cardin and I led a bi-partisan letter on this 
issue along with 67 other Senators asking the State Department to push 
back on the ICC's decision to prosecute Israel for alleged war crimes 
in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. And this month, we plan to send 
to the Biden administration a follow up to that letter asking for a 
firmer stance on these politically motivated investigations. Like us, 
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and in our view this is 
harmful to the peace process and again, outside of the ICC's 
jurisdiction.

   Do you agree that the ICC's expansion of their mandate is 
        detrimental to prospects of a negotiated settlement between 
        Israel and the Palestinian authority and what additional 
        actions can be taken to push back against the expansion of the 
        ICC's legal mandate?

    Answer. I share the administration's serious concerns about the 
ICC's attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel 
is not a State Party, and Palestine is not a State. A peaceful, secure 
and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on 
building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange, 
not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut 
efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.

    Question. What steps would you take to protect U.S. service and 
allied coalition members from the ICC's jurisdiction?

    Answer. I share the concerns and the objection by the United States 
to any attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United 
States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will 
work to protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I 
also share the administration's serious concerns about the ICC's 
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. We will 
continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security, 
including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. For several months, tens of thousands of farmers have 
been camping out on the outskirts of New Delhi, demanding the repeal of 
three agricultural laws they say will drive down crop prices and 
negatively affect their earnings. Multiple rounds of talks between farm 
union leaders and the central government have taken place, but have not 
yet resulted in a resolution. As part of its response, Prime Minister 
Modi's Government has shut down internet service in several districts, 
impeding access to information and compromising protesters' fundamental 
right to freedom of expression. It has also arrested activists on 
suspicion of sedition for allegedly advocating for support of the 
farmer protests. Internet freedom in India continues to decline as the 
central government utilizes internet shutdowns to clamp down on 
dissent, including for these protests and in the Jammu and Kashmir 
region. As Deputy Secretary of State, what steps will you take to 
ensure digital access is not obstructed in India?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by the growing use of government-
imposed Internet shutdowns around the world, including in India, which 
restrict the rights of individuals online. If confirmed, I will speak 
out against this worrying global trend and use bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy, including through U.N. bodies and the Freedom 
Online Coalition, to raise our concerns with governments that engage in 
this practice, including India. I will emphasize the need to protect 
freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information, both online and offline.

    Question. Many of those protesting come from the northern Indian 
states of Punjab and Haryana, regions with a significant Sikh 
population. The Indian Government has labeled some of the farmers and 
their supporters as ``anti-national'' and questioned their allegiance 
to India. What will you do to encourage the Indian Government to 
respect the right to protest for all its citizens?

    Answer. The freedoms of expression, association, religion or 
belief, and peaceful assembly are universal human rights. If confirmed, 
I will use the full array of diplomatic tools to encourage the Indian 
Government to respect these human rights.

    Question. In 2019, then-Secretary Pompeo announced that the United 
States would ``no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se 
inconsistent with international law'' and rescinded a 1978 legal 
opinion that then-Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell provided to Congress 
reaching a contrary conclusion that said, ``civilian settlements in 
those territories is inconsistent with international law.'' This legal 
justification was never publicly released or provided to Congress. How 
do you view this issue?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the two-state 
solution is the best way to ensure Israel's future as a Jewish and 
democratic state and to give the Palestinians the state to which they 
are entitled. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus 
on urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps, 
such as annexation of territory, settlement activity, demolitions, 
incitement to violence, and providing compensation for individuals 
imprisoned for acts of terrorism, that exacerbate tensions and make it 
more difficult to preserve the viability of a two-state solution.

    Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, would you work to 
reverse that decision?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts 
to urge both Israel and the Palestinians to refrain from unilateral 
steps that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a 
negotiated two-state solution, such as annexation of territory, 
settlement activity, demolitions, incitement to violence, and providing 
compensation for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.

    Question. If confirmed, would you provide Congress with the Trump 
administration's Hansell opinion to include its legal justification for 
the decision, and any new decision the Department may reach under 
Secretary Blinken?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus on 
urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps that 
exacerbate tensions and make it more difficult to preserve the 
viability of a two-state solution. This will include engaging Congress 
on significant policy matters related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Do you believe the EU's recent commercial agreement with 
China is already putting the United States on its back foot when 
seeking to bring a unified front?

    Answer. It is a demonstration of the amount of work we have before 
us to reinvigorate our transatlantic alliance and develop a more 
unified response to the challenge posed by China. If confirmed, I will 
engage actively with our EU and other European partners on shared 
concerns about China. My engagements will include discussions on how to 
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive 
and coercive actions, prevent goods made with forced labor from 
entering global markets, create a level playing field and promote 
private enterprise, and highlight China's failure to uphold its 
international commitments.
    Ultimately, the onus will be on China to show that its new pledges 
on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and subsidies in the new 
agreement are not just cheap talk.

    Question. Some U.S. partners with whom we will have to cooperate to 
best tackle the foreign policy challenges of the coming decades are not 
democracies or are illiberal ones. They occupy key positions in the 
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, and we may find ourselves 
relying on them more. How do you believe the United States should be 
cooperating with the Governments of Vietnam, the Philippines, India, or 
our Gulf partners, even as we have concerns about human rights, 
democratic values, and good governance?

    Answer. As you rightly point out, the United States cannot always 
choose the partners it must work with in addressing the most pressing 
foreign policy challenges we face. Further, there is not a one-size-
fits-all approach to foreign policy, and no country has a perfect human 
rights record. I believe the United States should approach cooperation 
on a case-by-case basis, working to advance U.S. interests while also 
placing democracy and human rights at the center of U.S. foreign 
policy. As President Biden said, ``Diplomacy is back at the center of 
our foreign policy.'' The United States must repair our alliances and 
engage with the world once again to meet accelerating global 
challenges--from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear 
proliferation--which will only be solved by nations working together. 
We cannot do it alone. If confirmed, I will seek to work in partnership 
with countries where we have a national security interest, while at the 
same time addressing human rights concerns, promoting good governance, 
and upholding our democratic values.

    Question. The Biden administration has spoken of the need to work 
closely with allies and partners to develop a coordinated response to 
the China challenge. What specific differences in approach do you 
expect to be most difficult to resolve?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the 
center of U.S. foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that 
underpin peace and security and compete with China from a position of 
strength. The United States will consult with allies and partners on a 
coordinated approach to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) coercive 
economic practices, human rights abuses, malign influence operations, 
and other key challenges. The administration will work with the EU, our 
Indo-Pacific and NATO allies, the Quad, and others to restore our vital 
security partnerships, secure the technologies of the future, re-engage 
in the U.N. system, and address attempts by the PRC to undermine the 
international rules-based system.

    Question. The Biden administration has stated that it hopes to 
cooperate with China on such pressing global issues as climate change, 
proliferation, and global health. How would you respond to concerns 
that the administration might downplay areas of friction with China in 
order to make progress on these global priorities?

    Answer. Combatting climate change; opposing the proliferation of 
sensitive goods and technology related to WMD, missile systems, and 
advanced conventional weapons; and promoting global health are in 
China's interest as well as ours. They are not favors to be bargained 
for. If confirmed, I will test whether China is willing to play a 
constructive role on certain issues where we may share interests but 
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions, while advancing the 
interests of the American people. Our core interests and values will 
not be traded off in discussions with China or any other country. 
Further, the Department of State will seek Congressional input on 
potential areas of cooperation.

    Question. India is making great strides in developing renewable 
energy sources, but continues to rely heavily on coal-fired power 
generation. Will you seek to work with India on balancing its growing 
power consumption with a mutual interest in addressing climate change 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions?

    Answer. I fully support the administration's ongoing efforts, led 
by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, to work with 
India on more ambitious climate commitments. As Secretary Blinken noted 
in his confirmation hearing, the Biden-Harris administration is 
committed to ensuring developing countries can meet their energy needs 
while also reducing their emissions and building resilience against the 
destabilizing impacts of climate change--both of which have clear 
benefits not only for the recipient countries, but also for the United 
States and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I look forward to 
working with Congress to promote affordable energy in the developing 
world consistent with our nation's energy and climate goals.
    In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of installing 450 
GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I would support 
the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance the flexibility 
and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage India's clean 
energy transition over the next decade. If confirmed, I would 
prioritize lower-cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as 
coal-fired power, including by promoting renewable energy, battery 
storage, and load shifting.

    Question. How do you intend to engage Pakistan as a player in U.S. 
strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will push for an open and honest bilateral 
relationship with Pakistan that stands on its own merits based on our 
mutual interests. Despite a challenging relationship, I believe that 
continued cooperation with Pakistan is possible on shared priorities 
like securing a responsible end to the conflict in Afghanistan, 
advancing regional security and fighting terrorism, expanding bilateral 
commerce, and addressing climate change. By fostering productive ties 
with all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, we hope to advance our 
shared prosperity, security, and values.

    Question. Do you view increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan as 
an obstacle to U.S. interests?

    Answer. I have concerns about many of China's activities globally 
and will raise and take action on those concerns whenever appropriate. 
While in principle the United States welcomes investments in 
infrastructure and economic development that are sustainable and meet 
international standards, I am concerned PRC-sponsored projects often 
lack transparency and impose unsustainable debts. If confirmed, I will 
work to encourage Pakistan to pursue a sustainable development path 
involving good governance, long-term capacity building, and market 
principles. U.S. diplomacy and cooperation with Pakistan reflects a 
vision for a region of independent and prosperous nations at peace with 
each other and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I will continue to 
support that objective.

    Question. To what extent will you prioritize cooperating with 
Islamabad in combatting Islamist militancy and stabilizing Afghanistan?

    Answer. Cooperation with Islamabad in combatting terrorist groups 
in the region is a key part of U.S. efforts to seek a stable, peaceful 
Afghanistan through a just and durable political settlement, and 
success in this effort would be crucial to improved U.S-Pakistan 
bilateral relations. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the 
Pakistani Government to play a constructive role in advancing the 
Afghan peace process as a means to achieve a more stable and secure 
South Asia. Further, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with 
Afghanistan's neighbors to press for a significant reduction in 
violence to facilitate progress in peace negotiations.

    Question. Do you support the Abraham Accords and the landmark 
normalization agreements that occurred during the Trump administration?

    Answer. Yes, I support the Abraham Accords and the Trump 
administration's role in negotiating them. The normalization agreements 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors are a positive step that reflect 
recognition among Israel and the states that have signed the agreements 
that they hold many interests in common and can most effectively 
address them through cooperation. The agreements are the product of 
years of quiet diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors supported by 
U.S. administrations from both parties.

    Question. Do you intend to help Israel consolidate existing 
normalization arrangements and normalize its relations with other Arab 
states, and if so, how?

    Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important 
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris 
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the 
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. The administration 
will also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to 
date, encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with 
Israel to uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic 
relations with Israel.

    Question. How will the administration approach arms sales and 
issues such as the Western Sahara impasse with Morocco in light of the 
normalization agreements to date?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration welcomes normalization 
agreements as an important contribution to regional peace and continues 
to review policy in numerous areas, including Western Sahara. The 
administration wants to see the appointment of a Personal Envoy of the 
U.N. Secretary-General and a renewed U.N.-led political process. 
Morocco is a major non-NATO ally, and our military-to-military 
partnership is a regional model. The administration looks forward to 
continued cooperation, including the upcoming Moroccan-hosted African 
Lion exercise, the largest joint military training and interoperability 
exercise in Africa. The State Department continues to ensure all arms 
sales meet U.S. national security objectives and reflect our values.

    Question. Congress has passed two rounds of mandatory sanctions 
against Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline as part of the Protecting 
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's Energy 
Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). These laws necessitate the 
imposition of sanctions against entities that engage in or support 
deep-sea pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under the laws, on 
February 19, 2021, the State Department submitted a report to Congress 
only identifying Russia's Fortuna vessel and its owner as engaging in 
sanctionable activities. However, media and other forms of public 
reporting, including visual data from reputable ship-tracking portals, 
indicate that numerous other vessels and companies are supporting the 
Fortuna's pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under PEESA and 
PEESCA, the State Department must immediately identify these entities 
to Congress and subject them to mandatory U.S. sanctions. When will the 
State Department submit an updated report to Congress that formally 
identifies these entities?

    Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90 
days on the provision of vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying 
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those 
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting 
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report 
due to Congress in mid-May. If confirmed, I will continue to use all 
available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to work with 
Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic energy 
security goals. I understand that the State Department is actively 
examining entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and 
will designate additional persons and entities as appropriate.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. U.S. sanctions have taken a heavy toll on civilians in 
countries worldwide, particularly amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As a 
humanitarian matter and as a matter of global public health, would you 
consider strengthening humanitarian exemptions through a worldwide 
temporary general license to ensure that sanctioned countries are able 
to obtain critical humanitarian resources, including the COVID-19 
vaccine?

    Answer. Many U.S. sanctions programs include provisions aimed at 
facilitating delivery of medical and other humanitarian supplies. If 
confirmed, I will continue the State Department's conversations with 
our allies and multinational and non-governmental organizations on 
these issues. I will also continue State's cooperation with the 
Department of the Treasury to use available tools, including issuance 
of clarifying guidance and expediting of license requests, to 
facilitate global delivery of humanitarian assistance particularly 
during the COVID-19 pandemic. I would support initiatives by Treasury 
to explore additional options, which could include issuance of 
additional licenses to facilitate medical- or vaccine-related 
transactions.

    Question. What specific recommended additional actions will the 
Biden administration pursue to hold Mohammed bin Salman, and senior 
Saudi officials, responsible for the murder of Mr. Khasshogi?

    Answer. The administration has taken a number of concrete steps to 
recalibrate the relationship with Saudi Arabia. It followed the law and 
submitted an unclassified report to Congress on the horrific murder of 
Jamal Khashoggi. Under the Global Magnitsky Act, it sanctioned a former 
senior Saudi official and the group whose members were involved in the 
killing. The Department has taken action pursuant to a new visa 
restriction policy against 76 Saudi individuals believed to have been 
engaged in threatening dissidents overseas, including but not limited 
to the Khashoggi killing. The Department will report on any such 
extraterritorial activities by any government in the annual Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices.

    Question. We will not stop climate catastrophe here at home if we 
are supporting industries abroad engaging in ecocide. How will the 
Administration prioritize policies that dramatically reduce U.S. 
financial and diplomatic exposure in polluting industries abroad?

    Answer. Dealing with climate change means investing in resilience 
and green energy here at home and leading a global effort to reduce 
carbon pollution. In his recent foreign policy speech, Secretary 
Blinken described these challenges as being simultaneously domestic and 
foreign. The administration is taking a whole-of-government approach to 
put climate change at the center of its domestic, national security and 
foreign policy, and to working with other nations to advance 
conservation promote green recovery; revitalize communities and cities; 
and secure environmental justice.

    Question. Does U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan 
Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, have specific instructions to make 
the return of Paul Overby--my constituent who went missing in 
Afghanistan/Pakistan in 2014--part of ongoing U.S. peace negotiations 
with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan?

    Answer. I have been advised the Secretary specifically directed 
Ambassador Khalilzad to continue his efforts to press for the return of 
Paul Overby and of Mark Frerichs during engagements with the Taliban 
and with key regional partners.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
           to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. On July 7, 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Martin Dempsey testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee about Iran. He clearly stated, ``Under no circumstances 
should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile 
capabilities and arms trafficking.''
    Only seven days later, you and the Obama-Biden Administration 
disregarded the views of the American commanders on the battlefield. As 
the lead negotiator of the Iran nuclear deal, you agreed to lift the 
arms embargo and restrictions on ballistic missile technologies.

   In any future negotiations, would you continue to disregard the 
        advice our military commanders?

    Answer. The President and his national security team will always 
take the advice of military commanders seriously. Iran's development 
and proliferation of ballistic missiles, as well as its delivery of 
weapons to violent proxies across the region, pose a threat to 
international security and remain significant challenges. These 
challenges existed despite the U.N. Security Council resolutions that 
aimed to address them.
    The Biden-Harris administration will use a variety of 
nonproliferation tools to work to prevent the further advancement of 
Iran's missile program and its ability to proliferate technology to 
others, and will continue to enforce the U.S. arms embargo on Iran. The 
administration will also work with our partners to stop shipments of 
equipment and technology, seek to disrupt Iran's delivery of weapons to 
violent proxies, and use our engagement in multilateral fora to urge 
countries to take steps to address these activities.

    Question. On October 18, 2020, the international arms embargo on 
Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, was officially 
lifted.

   Considering the fact that you helped draft the agreement 
        eliminating it in the first place, what specific steps, if any, 
        will you take to reinstate the Iran arms embargo?

    Answer. The administration will continue to push for full 
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions barring the 
unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and to the Houthis in 
Yemen, and also continue to use domestic authorities to dissuade 
countries from providing arms to Iran.

    Question. What is your strategy to stop the dramatic increase of 
weapons flowing to terrorists and proxy groups in the region?

    Answer. The administration will continue to use domestic 
authorities to dissuade countries from providing arms to Iran and 
continue to push for full implementation of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions barring the unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and 
to the Houthis in Yemen. The administration will also continue to use 
domestic authorities, including sanctions, to counter Iran's support 
for terrorism in the Middle East.

    Question. The U.S. constitution provides the Senate the power to 
approve or reject treaties. Under your leadership, the Obama--Biden 
administration refused to submit the Iran nuclear deal to the Senate 
for its advice and consent. As one of the lead negotiators of the Iran 
nuclear deal, you played a major role in drafting the agreement in a 
way to avoid the ratification process.

   If confirmed, will you continue to disregard the will of the 
        American people by negotiating international agreements and 
        then refusing to submit them to the Senate?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
committee on matters related to treaties and other international 
agreements. The Supreme Court has long held that not all international 
agreements require approval as treaties pursuant to the procedures set 
out in Article II of the Constitution, and the Congress has recognized 
this through the enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes 
procedures regarding legally binding international agreements other 
than treaties. Regardless of the form which particular agreements may 
take, however, I am committed to engaging with the Senate as a partner 
in the State Department's efforts to advance our national interests 
through international agreements.

    Question. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is 
altered at all to include new provisions, would you advocate for the 
administration to submit the accord for congressional review under the 
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act or other laws?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. Authoritarian regimes continue to restrict religious 
freedoms and the rights of individuals. The violence, oppression and 
attacks on human dignity cannot be tolerated. It is critically 
important for the United States to stand up for those who are being 
persecuted whether it is Christians in Nigeria or Uyghurs in China.

   What additional efforts will you pursue at the State Department to 
        promote international religious freedom?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use the full range of diplomatic 
tools--both positive and punitive--to encourage governments to live up 
to their international obligations and commitments to respect religious 
freedom. This includes reforming outdated laws, ending abusive or 
discriminatory practices, releasing individuals imprisoned for their 
beliefs, and achieving justice for victims and accountability for 
perpetrators of religious freedom abuses. The State Department will 
also continue to fulfill its statutory requirements to produce its 
annual report and annually review and designate countries and entities 
for engaging in or tolerating severe or particularly severe religious 
freedom violations.

    Question. Defending human rights and the dignity of every person is 
a fundamental value for Americans. Yet, the United Nations Human Rights 
Council has refused to make serious reform to its organization. Efforts 
by previous administrations failed to achieve the reforms needed. 
Secretary Blinken recently admitted the council ``is flawed and needs 
reform.''

   What are the flaws of the United Nations Human Rights Council?

    Answer. The two principal flaws of the Human Rights Council are its 
disproportionate focus on Israel and the continued election of 
countries with problematic human rights records. The continued 
existence of a separate agenda item on Israel, Agenda Item 7, unduly 
focuses attention on Israel to the exclusion of the human rights 
records of every other country. The Administration believes that the 
Council should treat Israel the same as it does every other U.N. member 
state. Similarly, the membership on the Council must reflect high 
standards for upholding human rights. Those with the worst human rights 
records should not be members of the Council.

    Question. What specific reforms does the administration believe 
need to be taken at the U.N. Human Rights Council and how do you plan 
to get the organization to make those reforms?

    Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the 
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's 
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. The 
United States has seen that when we play an active and constructive 
role, we can advocate more effectively on Israel's behalf and engage 
with our allies and friends to keep some of the countries with the 
worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage countries 
with better records to run for seats. When we were previously on the 
Council, the United States was also able to help reduce the number of 
resolutions focused on Israel. If confirmed, I will ensure the United 
States prioritizes these specific reforms.

    Question. Does the administration plan to demand any commitments 
from the United Nations Human Rights Council on making those reforms 
prior to rejoining?

    Answer. The United States is pursuing reforms while re-engaging and 
seeking a seat on the Human Rights Council, as announced by Secretary 
Blinken during his speech to the Human Rights Council on February 24, 
2021. The United States is most effective at the Human Rights Council 
(HRC) and in other U.N. bodies when we are at the table, in the room, 
in good financial standing, and use the full weight of our diplomatic 
might to lead and to pursue appropriate and needed reforms. If 
confirmed, I will ensure the United States prioritizes needed reforms 
as part of our re-engagement with the HRC.

    Question. For years, the United Nations Human Rights Council has 
included human rights abusers and refusing to stand up for human rights 
taking place across the world. A recent example is the election of 
China and Russia to the United Nations Human Rights Council in October 
2020. The Chinese Communist Party engages in torture, detention, and 
forced labor of religious and ethnic minorities. Russia tramples on 
free speech and the free press every day. Shockingly, Russia was 
elected to the council the same week that the EU sanctioned Russian 
officials for attempts to assassinate a Russian opposition figure. The 
United Nations should be condemning the actions of Russia and China not 
electing those responsible to this body.

   Would you advise the United States to vote in favor of Russia, 
        China, or other human rights violators for membership on the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council?

    Answer. The continued election of countries with problematic human 
rights records to the Human Rights Council remains one of the principal 
flaws of the Council. If confirmed I will advise the United States to 
vote for nations with strong human rights records for the Council.

    Question. During the Trump Administration, there were several 
historic developments between Israel and its regional Arab neighbors. 
The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan joined Egypt and 
Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. These 
agreements have created the path to peace through recognition and 
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel.
    In January, Secretary Blinken stated, ``We very much support the 
Abraham Accords, we think that Israel normalizing relations with its 
neighbors and other countries in the region is a very positive 
development, and so we applauded them. We hope that there may be an 
opportunity to build on them in the coming months and years ahead.''

   Do you believe the Abraham Accords are a positive step forward for 
        the region?

    Answer. Yes, I firmly believe the normalization agreements are a 
positive step forward for Israel and the region and are in the United 
States' best interest.

    Question. What specific steps will you take to build upon these 
historic successes and create additional peace agreements between 
Israel and Arab nations?

    Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important 
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris 
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the 
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, I will 
closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date, 
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to 
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with 
Israel.

    Question. Congress continues to be deeply concerned with the 
Turkish Government's purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile 
defense systems from Russia. This decision threatens a range of U.S. 
interests, including the strength of the NATO Alliance.

   Do you believe a weak U.S. response to Turkey's actions would 
        embolden other countries to consider buying advanced Russian 
        military systems?

    Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior 
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. A top 
priority will be urging Turkey not to retain the S-400 and to refrain 
from additional Russian arms purchases. The CAATSA sanctions announced 
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400 
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of 
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence. 
Turkey's suspension from the F-35 partnership represents an additional 
significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress 
to review the impact of the sanctions imposed in response to the S-400 
acquisition and to determine whether additional measures are required 
or warranted.

    Question. Are you committed to fully implementing the Countering 
America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) with respect to 
Turkey's S-400 acquisition and any related purchases by other foreign 
nations?

    Answer. Yes. The imposition of CAATSA Section 231 sanctions on 
Turkish individuals and entities in December demonstrated the State 
Department's continuing commitment to CAATSA. If confirmed, I will not 
only continue that commitment as it relates to Turkey's S-400 
acquisition but also with respect to any other country that may be 
considering similar transactions. I would strongly urge anyone 
considering potentially significant transactions with Russia's defense 
or intelligence sectors, or persons operating for, or on behalf of 
either sector, to avoid such transactions, which may expose them to 
CAATSA sanctions.

    Question. Are current U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian 
aggression in Europe adequate?

    Answer. NATO has undertaken significant adaptation over the past 
decade in response to Russian aggression in the Euro-Atlantic area, 
including the illegal invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. The Alliance 
relies on both conventional and nuclear capabilities for deterrence and 
is also addressing growing gray area challenges. Allies will need to 
continue work toward meeting equitable burden sharing to maintain 
effective deterrence. Only with greater investment in defense across 
the Alliance can we ensure NATO is able to adapt quickly to a changing 
security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military 
readiness.

    Question. What is your position on the administration maintaining 
or expanding sanctions intended to get Russia to change its policies 
with regard to Ukraine, cyberattacks, and other malign activities?

    Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will 
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions 
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration 
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the 
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United 
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions 
and will comply with our legal obligations under the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. As the 
administration works together with allies to advance our interests, it 
will continue to hold Russia accountable, including by sanctions, for 
its destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, human 
rights violations, interference in our elections, unlawful cyber 
activity, and aggression in Ukraine and Georgia.

    Question. How will you approach relations with Saudi Arabia?

    Answer. President Biden has committed to recalibrating the U.S.-
Saudi relationship to ensure it reflects U.S. interests and values. The 
Administration has elevated support for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, which has already led to positive initial results, such as 
the conditional release of detained U.S. citizens and activists. Like 
Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I will press Saudi Arabia for the 
removal of conditions on their release, including travel restrictions, 
and the implementation of reforms to avoid future such cases. 
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia remains an important U.S. partner on regional 
security and counterterrorism, and the U.S. will continue to support 
Saudi Arabian efforts to defend its people and territory, which is home 
to thousands of U.S. citizens.

    Question. How important of a role does Saudi Arabia play in our 
efforts regarding Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestinian issues?

    Answer. Saudi Arabia is a critical partner for containing Iranian 
aggressive actions. The Biden-Harris administration strongly supports 
Saudi Arabia's outreach to the Government of Iraq, to include recently 
reopening its main border crossing with Iraq for the first time since 
1990 and ongoing discussions to provide electricity to Iraq, both of 
which will help to reduce Iraq's dependence on Iran. In Yemen, the 
Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis has contributed to Yemen's 
dire humanitarian crisis; Special Envoy Tim Lenderking is working with 
Saudi Arabia, regional partners, and the U.N. to resolve the conflict. 
With respect to Israel, Saudi Arabia supports a two-state solution and 
has allowed overflights of Israeli-registered aircraft through Saudi 
airspace to the UAE and Bahrain.

    Question. What role, if any, do you see for Saudi Arabia and other 
regional U.S. partners in talks with Iran?

    Answer. The administration is committed to consulting closely with 
our regional partners regarding U.S. policy on Iran, and in broad 
terms, it supports dialogue among the countries in the region on issues 
of regional security and stability.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently 
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the 
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or 
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by 
either such committee relating to any such activity or 
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of 
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and 
transparently? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee 
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform 
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.


    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that 
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified 
information in notifications provided by the State Department to 
Congress? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.


    Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory 
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable 
activities because of their participation in the construction of the 
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition 
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included 
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump 
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities 
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA. 
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional 
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities - 
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and 
operation of NS2 - were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can 
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its 
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant 
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance 
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?

    Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90 
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and 
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy 
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress 
in mid-May. I understand the Department of State submitted its first 
report on PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed, I will continue 
to use all available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to 
work with Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic 
energy security goals. I understand that the Department of State 
continues to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable 
activity and will designate additional persons as appropriate, and will 
comply with statutory reporting requirements.


    Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial 
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented 
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in 
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed - which 
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning - officials from the 
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress 
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by 
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future 
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and 
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional 
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress? 
If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on 
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under 
INARA.


    Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear 
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which 
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not 
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a 
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris 
administration is committed to complying with the requirements of 
INARA, and if confirmed, I am committed to doing so.


    Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea 
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets 
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to US sanctions. Reports 
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden 
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any 
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case, 
and confirm doing so.

    Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the 
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if 
confirmed, to work with the committee to try to accommodate any 
official committee request for such Department information.


    Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three 
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden 
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those 
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the 
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of 
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's 
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not 
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in 
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed 
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on 
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told 
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these 
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said 
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the 
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not 
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders, 
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you 
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly 
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief 
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed 
terrorists? If not, why not?

    Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question 
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions 
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that 
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they 
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any 
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of 
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group 
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the 
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which 
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If 
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts, 
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions, 
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities. 
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy 
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior 
and ultimately end the war.


    Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT 
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.

    Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these 
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were 
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the 
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a 
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an 
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's 
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to 
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, and 
therefore remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any 
attendant travel restrictions.


    Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order 
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations. 
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to 
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly 
modify - this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a 
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to 
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts 
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the 
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners 
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism, 
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and 
we will continue to use all tools available to counter Iran's support 
for terrorism. The President has made clear that the United States will 
be prepared to resume participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) if Iran restores strict compliance, as a starting point 
for follow on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen constraints and 
address other issues of concern, including Iran's regional activity.


    Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is 
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not 
lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to agree within the 
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify - these 
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the , in the absence of a 
determination that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material 
support to terrorist organizations.

    Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and 
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to 
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for 
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile 
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The 
President is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing activities 
using the array of tools at our disposal, including sanctions to deal 
with Iran's support for terrorism.


    Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as 
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this 
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear 
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and 
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also 
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli 
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that 
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you 
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you 
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?

    Answer. The IAEA has a decades-long successful track record of 
monitoring the non-diversion of declared nuclear material globally. 
While the IAEA thoroughly investigates all available information, 
including based on its own verification and monitoring activities, it 
is not an intelligence organization. It can only act on information 
that is either acquired by it in the performance of its verification 
mandates or presented to it. President Biden has made clear he is 
committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The 
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any 
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could 
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.


    Question. Please describe what new measures would you insist are 
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the 
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?

    Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its 
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its 
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional 
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides 
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program, 
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has 
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive 
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any 
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The 
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such 
indication.


    Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met 
with officials of the Government of Iran during your time out of 
government. You also stated that you coordinated directly with Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale concerning your 
interactions with Iranian regime officials. Please list any additional 
senior State Department officials responsible for Iran policy with whom 
you consulted or coordinated your engagement with Iranian officials, 
such as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David 
Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, Special 
Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy Secretary of State 
Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.

    Answer. I coordinated with Undersecretary Hale and did not engage 
with others listed in this question.


    Question. Please identify the dates on which you coordinated or 
consulted with these officials.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister 
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018 
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New 
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in 
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis 
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with 
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by 
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on 
the margins.
    In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the 
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its 
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently 
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised 
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.


    Question. Please describe any additional contact you had with 
officials from the Government of Iran Besides in-person meetings, have 
you otherwise been in contact with any Iranian regime officials, 
including via e-mail, text exchange, or secure messaging platforms, 
between January 20, 2017, and today? If yes, please identify dates of 
contact and the text of the exchanges.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have 
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings 
referenced in the previous question, other than to arrange logistical 
details for those in-person meetings. I do not have records of those 
exchanges.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. What is the status of the Clean Network Initiative at the 
U.S. Department of State? As of November 2020, over 50 countries, 180 
telecommunications companies, and dozens of other leading tech 
companies had joined the State Department's Clean Networks Initiative 
and pledged to advance common principles with regard to securing 5G and 
other digital technologies against untrusted foreign vendors and 
suppliers. The Biden administration, however, appears to have removed 
any references to the Clean Network Initiative from the State 
Department's website.

    Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration views 5G security as a high 
priority and is working with allies and partners to ensure their 5G 
networks are free of untrustworthy vendor equipment and to support a 
vibrant and diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications 
equipment and services. The United States will pursue a comprehensive 
strategy that addresses the full range of these issues. As is routine 
practice, the Department archives webpages during the transition of 
administrations. Webpages from 2017 to 2021 remain available to the 
public at https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html.

    Question. What is the status of the Blue Dot Network at the U.S. 
Department of State? In November 2019, the United States joined 
Australia and Japan in launching the Blue Dot Network concept that 
seeks to bring together governments, the private sector, and civil 
society under shared standards for international infrastructure 
development. If the Blue Dot Network is fully realized to promote 
quality infrastructure investment that is open, transparent, and 
compliant with international standards--including by eventually 
mobilizing the deep capital markets of the United States and other 
marked-based democracies--it can help to counter to China's predatory 
One Belt One Road (OBOR) infrastructure initiatives.

    Answer. I understand that the Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the 
development of quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by 
certifying projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I 
understand that the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation continue to work with our Australian 
and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of the 
initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying quality 
infrastructure projects in the developing world.

    Question. In any negotiations that may occur with the authoritarian 
regime in North Korea, do you commit to pursuing an end-state that 
achieves complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization? What 
do you perceive as the risks of further nuclear proliferation in East 
Asia if we fail to achieve that end-state?

    Answer. North Korea's proliferation-related activities constitute a 
serious threat to international peace and security and undermine global 
nonproliferation efforts. If confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris 
administration's ongoing policy review, in consultation with our 
allies, of the current state of play on North Korea. I support the U.S. 
commitment over the long term to the complete denuclearization of North 
Korea, while also focusing in the near term on limiting the threat to 
the United States and our allies.

    Question. Do you concur that any U.S. international agreement to 
achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea must 
also eliminate the threat of North Korean regime's ballistic missile 
program?

    Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national 
security priority for the United States. North Korea's weapons of mass 
destruction and ballistic missile programs constitute a serious threat 
to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I plan 
to join the administration in conducting a thorough policy review, in 
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North 
Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the complete 
denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the near term 
on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department 
will consult closely and proactively with Members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and their personal staff before providing 
humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that any such U.S. 
assistance benefits directly the suffering North Korean people and is 
not vulnerable to diversion by the Kim Jong Un regime?

    Answer. As part of its North Korea policy review, the Biden-Harris 
administration will carefully consider the country's egregious human 
rights record and work closely with partners and allies to promote 
respect for human rights in the closed country. The administration 
remains deeply concerned by the humanitarian situation in North Korea 
and is committed to ensuring any humanitarian assistance benefits the 
most vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, children, and 
the elderly in detention, in North Korea, and not the Kim Jong Un 
regime. The administration will continue to press for monitoring and 
access necessary to ensure the assistance reaches its intended 
recipients. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on 
this crucial issue.

    Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new 
Special Representative for North Korea? If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I plan to join the administration's ongoing 
review, in consultation with our allies, of the current state of play 
on North Korea. I am not aware of any new personnel announcements at 
this time.

    Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden 
administration?

    Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding 
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to 
implementing all of the requirements of INARA.

    Question. Do you agree that any agreement-including any annexes or 
any informal agreement, even an unwritten oral understanding-involving 
the United States and Iran regarding how the two countries will return 
to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or 
will move in the direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA 
must be submitted to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the 
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the 
transmission requirement.

    Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress 
will be able to review, pursuant to INARA, any agreement that is 
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran-
irrespective of the level of formality or of the politically or legally 
binding nature of such agreement-including any agreement providing for 
return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that 
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its 
transmission requirement.

    Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements 
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including 
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the 
President to submit a report to Congress not less frequently than every 
180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of 
Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period covered by the 
report''?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting 
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as 
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.

    Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements 
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including 
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the 
President to make a determination and certification to the appropriate 
congressional committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar 
days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new agreement?

    Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement 
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting 
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as 
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA 
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make 
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).

    Question. Can you provide an assurance that there are no 
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by 
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your 
responses to the foregoing questions?

    Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is 
committed to implementing all of the requirements of Iran Nuclear 
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring 
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. When you were negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA) during the Obama administration, were you aware at the 
time that the Iranian regime was concealing a nuclear weapons archive? 
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. The Government of 
Israel revealed the existence of this undeclared, covert nuclear 
weapons archive in April 2018.

    Answer. No. However, the United States and others were well aware 
of Iran's long history of concealment regarding elements of its nuclear 
program, especially as related to its past military dimensions. That is 
why we worked with our allies and partners to ensure that the JCPOA 
provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated, 
including to investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear material 
or activities in Iran, as well as any information that came to light 
after implementation of the JCPOA. President Biden has made clear he is 
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
    The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by 
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously 
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of 
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities 
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were 
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and 
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not 
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program, 
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to 
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities 
in Iran.

    Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama 
administration, were you aware that the Iranian regime was storing 
undeclared nuclear material at a warehouse reportedly called 
Turquzabad? I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. In May 
2020, the State Department noted that in late 2018 ``public allegations 
surfaced that Iran had been hiding material and equipment at a site in 
Tehran called Turquzabad, only three miles from where the infamous 
`nuclear archive' had been stored.''

    Answer. No. The Turquzabad site was first publicly disclosed by 
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in late 2018. To date, the IAEA has 
detected particles of chemically processed uranium at the undeclared 
location but has not yet made any conclusion regarding the potential 
storage of nuclear material there. The IAEA continues to investigate 
the source of the detected particles. The JCPOA provides the most 
intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated, including to 
investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear materials or 
activities in Iran, and the administration has made clear its strong 
support for the IAEA's investigation of safeguards-relevant information 
that has come to light after implementation of the JCPOA.

    Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama 
administration, were you aware of any other undeclared sites under the 
control or influence of the Iranian regime where nuclear material may 
be present?

    Answer. Iran has a long history of denial and concealment regarding 
its past nuclear weapons program. The JCPOA addressed potential 
undeclared locations by providing for the most intrusive verification 
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of 
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has 
made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a 
nuclear weapon.
    The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by 
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously 
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of 
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities 
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were 
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and 
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not 
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program, 
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to 
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities 
in Iran.

    Question. Did your Iranian regime counterparts disclose to you the 
existence of its nuclear weapons archive, the Turquzabad site, or any 
other undeclared Iranian regime nuclear-related site during the 
negotiations for the JCPOA?

    Answer. Iran has never acknowledged its past nuclear weapons 
program. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure Iran never again pursues 
nuclear weapons and provides the most intrusive verification procedures 
ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared 
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has made clear 
he is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.

    Question. President Biden says he will rejoin the JCPOA if the Iran 
regime first returns to ``full compliance'' with the JCPOA. Can the 
Iranian regime be in full compliance with the JCPOA if it is concealing 
undeclared nuclear material, sites, and/or activities?

    Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards 
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear 
activities in Iran. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to strict limits on 
its nuclear program as well as enhanced verification and monitoring 
measures that go beyond its obligations under its safeguards agreement. 
The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever 
negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared 
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. It is critical that Iran 
comply with both its safeguards obligations and its JCPOA commitments. 
President Biden has made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran 
never acquires a nuclear weapon.

    Question. Is it your view that Iran must fully and verifiably 
account for all of its undeclared activities, sites, and materials 
before the United States would rejoin the JCPOA and lift any sanctions? 
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no.

    Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards 
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear 
activities in Iran. The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification 
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of 
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The Biden-Harris 
administration strongly supports the IAEA's ongoing investigation in 
Iran into indications of possible undeclared nuclear material and, 
along with the rest of the international community, awaits the IAEA's 
conclusions in its ongoing safeguards investigations while expecting 
full Iranian cooperation with inspectors. President Biden has made 
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear 
weapon.

    Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met 
with senior officials of the Iranian regime-a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism-during your time out of 
government. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in 
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via phone, e-mail, 
text exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, 
and today? I request that you begin your response with a yes or no. If 
yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the exchanges.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have 
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings 
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person 
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.

    Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in 
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text 
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and 
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the 
exchanges.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have 
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings 
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person 
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.

    Question. In ``The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under 
Trump'' (Foreign Policy, July 31, 2020), you wrote: ``As a result of 
Trump's failures, the Middle East is further from peace..'' But soon 
thereafter, in September 2020, Israel signed the Abraham Accords that 
normalized bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates and 
Bahrain, respectively. In December 2020, Morocco signed the Abraham 
Accords with Israel. And in January 2021, Sudan also signed the Abraham 
Accords with Israel. What is your current assessment about the Trump 
administration's efforts to promote peace and normalization agreements 
between Israel and Arab nations? And what steps will you support to 
further the Abraham Accords peace process in the Middle East?

    Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important 
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris 
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the 
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, the 
administration will also closely monitor the status of the 
normalization efforts to date, encouraging the states that have signed 
such agreements with Israel to uphold their commitments to establish 
full diplomatic relations with Israel.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that if the United 
States decides to participate again in the JCPOA, you will seek to 
prevent the Iranian regime or any other Iranian entity from being 
allowed to export oil to Syria either in defiance of U.S. sanctions 
under Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, Executive Order 13894, 
Executive 13582, and other relevant authorities, or by receiving a 
waiver or license to do so?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is under no illusions about 
Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, nor has it forgotten 
about the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime. The Biden-Harris 
administration is committed to countering the threat posed by Iran, 
using the various tools at its disposal, including sanctions, and 
working in close coordination with our allies and partners. If 
confirmed, I commit that I will seek to enforce fully U.S. sanctions 
with respect to Syria.

    Question. Will the Biden administration maintain existing sanctions 
designations against the Assad regime and continue imposing new 
sanctions designations against the Assad regime? The Caesar Syria 
Civilian Protection Act has imposed significant economic pressure 
against the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad. Before January 2021, 
the U.S. Government imposed more than 100 sanctions designations 
against the Assad regime and its supporters since June 2020. Under the 
Biden administration, the U.S. Government has not yet imposed any new 
sanctions designations against the Assad regime and its allies.

    Answer. The Caesar Act is an important tool, which seeks to limit 
the ability of Assad and others in the Syrian Government to profit from 
the ongoing conflict and any post-conflict reconstruction. Sanctions 
are also one way to press for accountability from the Assad regime for 
its atrocities, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure U.S. 
sanctions do not unnecessarily impede humanitarian access in Syria and 
that they remain targeted in a way that contributes to progress toward 
our political objectives.

    Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new 
Special Envoy for Syria? If not, why not? Since closing the U.S. 
Embassy in Damascus in February 2012, the U.S. Government has 
maintained a Special Envoy for Syria to oversee diplomatic activities 
concerning Syria. The Biden administration has not appointed a new 
Special Envoy for Syria since the previous envoy left office in January 
2021, leaving the position vacant.

    Answer. I understand that the State Department does not have any 
appointments or nominations to announce at this time, but I am assured 
there is a very experienced team in place working on these issues. If 
confirmed, I will continue to advance our policy goals in Syria, which 
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution that addresses 
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria, under the 
parameters of UNSCR 2254 and in close consultation with our allies, 
partners, and the UN; ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS; and 
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in 
need.

    Question. Energy revenues account for approximately 80 percent of 
Russia's exports, and the conclusion of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) 
pipeline would provide a financial boon for Russia's Putin regime. At 
the same time, Nord Stream 2 pipeline-if finished-would drastically 
increase Russia's malign influence and coercive leverage over Europe 
especially by exposing Central and Eastern European allies to potential 
supply cutoffs and price manipulation by Russia. Does the State 
Department continue to publicly maintain that Nord Stream 2 is a 
Russian malign influence project? This has been the position of the 
U.S. Government, including the Secretary of State and the State 
Department, for the last few years.

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear that Nord 
Stream 2 is a geo-political project that threatens Europe's energy 
security. If confirmed, I support publicly addressing the ongoing 
threats to energy, geopolitical security, and European solidarity posed 
by Nord Stream2. Nord Stream 2 is a clear example of a tool that Russia 
uses for coercive actions in the region and provides the means to use 
gas, a critical natural resource, to advance its political goals and 
spread its malign influence within Europe.

    Question. Why has the State Department not yet imposed sanctions 
against NS2 AG itself pursuant to mandatory sanctions against 
Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA)? NS2 AG expressly describes 
itself on its website as the ``project company established for 
planning, construction and subsequent operation of the Nord Stream 2 
Pipeline. The company is based in Zug, Switzerland and owned by Public 
Joint Stock Company (PJSC) Gazprom.''

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use all available tools to 
counter Russian malign influence, to work with Allies and partners in 
the region, and to support Transatlantic energy security goals. I 
understand the Department of State is continuing to examine entities 
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate 
additional persons as appropriate. The administration has made clear to 
Germany and other European partners that it does not view Nord Stream 2 
as just a commercial deal, but as a threat to Europe's energy security 
to strategic stability on the continent.

    Question. During the Trump administration, the United States worked 
closely with the Government of Japan to facilitate an expedited process 
for Foreign Military Sales. Based on that experience, has the State 
Department created a best practices template or manual to facilitate 
and expedite further Foreign Military Sales to allies and partners? 
Please begin your answer with yes or no.

    Answer. While the Department has not developed a specific manual or 
template for expediting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to allies and 
partners, the State Department adjudicates almost all FMS cases within 
48 hours. The Department also continually works with interagency 
colleagues and our foreign partners to facilitate and streamline the 
FMS process. If confirmed, I will ensure the FMS process works as 
smoothly as possible to advance the interests of the United States and 
for the benefit of our allies and partners around the world.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. U.S. consulates are a key tool for engaging with local 
populations, and I am concerned that the closures of the Vladivostok 
and Yekaterinburg consulates will negatively impact our ability to 
engage with the Russian people in those areas. What impact will the 
closures of those two consulates have on our ability to engage with 
Russians in those regions? If confirmed, how will you ensure that the 
U.S. continues to engage directly with the Russian people in these 
regions?

    Answer. At this time, there has been no permanent change to the 
consulates' posture. Engaging with Russians, especially those outside 
Moscow, is critical to diplomacy. U.S. consulates provide a valuable 
platform to convey the deep concerns President Biden has expressed 
about the Russian Government's continued efforts to suppress freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly, and to share our values and insights 
from the U.S. experience in democracy. During the pandemic, Mission 
Russia has adopted a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid 
engagements to maintain a connection with these audiences. If 
confirmed, I am committed to continuing, and finding ways to expand, 
the Department's virtual engagement.

    Question. If confirmed, what will you do to advocate for the 
release of locally employed consulate staff who remain unjustly 
detained in the aftermath of the Turkish coup attempt?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to press the Government 
of Turkey on behalf of Mission Turkey's three wrongfully accused 
locally employed (LE) staff, including by supporting their legal cases 
and by calling for their releases and exonerations. Senior Department 
and Mission Turkey officials have publicly and privately condemned the 
unjust prosecution and conviction of these employees in discussions 
with senior Turkish officials, and the Department continues to call for 
the swift release of the employee who remains in detention. Department 
personnel regularly consult with the LE staff and their families, who 
remain appreciative of USG support, and respect their concerns that 
public USG statements are more likely to damage than assist their 
cases.

    Question. More than four years after U.S. personnel overseas began 
suffering from a set of mysterious but in many cases debilitating 
symptoms, we have more questions than answers about who was behind 
these attacks, what the ongoing threat may be to personnel, and, going 
forward, what we need to do to protect diplomats and others serving 
overseas. Do I have your commitment to engage fully on this issue, to 
be transparent with this committee, and to work with relevant 
interagency partners to provide Congress all relevant information about 
these attacks?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. The Department of State faced deep budget cut proposals 
every year under the Trump administration. And, as they say, ``if you 
show me your budget, I'll tell you your priorities.'' Congress pushed 
back repeatedly against these proposed cuts. But they were proposals 
that never should have been made to begin with. Do I have your 
commitment that you will seek and fight for a full and robustly-funded 
Function 150 International Affairs budget?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure 
a function 150 budget that will allow us to ``make diplomacy the tool 
of first resort for U.S. statecraft to achieve the administration's top 
foreign policy priorities,'' as the Secretary said on March 3. If 
confirmed, I will advocate for the necessary investments in our people 
and programs to support and cooperate with our allies and partners 
around the world to advance our interests and build back better, 
including by furthering the democratic values of prosperity, freedom, 
and peace.

    Question. The Department of State has remained perilously behind 
the curve when it comes to tech innovation and cyber security. The 
recent SolarWinds hack is a stark reminder of the high risk of 
vulnerabilities in government systems. What do you see as the immediate 
priorities for State's cyber infrastructure? What steps will the 
Department take in the future to prevent such intrusions and to 
mitigate the damage where these intrusions do occur?

    Answer. The SolarWinds supply chain compromise is a serious 
cybersecurity issue for the federal government and private sector 
companies. Cybersecurity remains of paramount importance and if 
confirmed I intend to support the Department's efforts to protect and 
maintain its cyber infrastructure. These efforts are focused on 
dedicated investments in infrastructure, talent, and planning to ensure 
the security and resilience of the Department's networks and digital 
assets, thereby protecting its global workforce and the citizens we 
serve. We must also ensure that the Department's internal governance 
structure for cybersecurity is properly aligned to protect the 
Department's networks.

    Question. How is the Department cooperating and coordinating with 
other relevant USG agencies and offices to address the intrusion and to 
repair any damage?

    Answer. While a full assessment of the incident is ongoing, I will, 
if confirmed, support the Department's continued cooperation and 
coordination with the joint Cyber Unified Coordination Group in 
addressing the SolarWinds vulnerability. It is critical that the 
federal government also work with private sector partners to address 
the ever-expanding landscape of threats.

    Question. In September 2020, State's Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) identified $200 million spent on Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership programs as potentially wasteful spending 
due to mismanagement and inadequate oversight from staff in the Africa 
Bureau. The OIG found that, among other contributing factors, the 
Africa Bureau continuously experiences staffing shortages, and that the 
State Department has not appropriately prioritized the Africa Bureau's 
needs. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, what will you 
do to ensure that the Africa Bureau has adequate resources and staff, 
including a properly skilled, trained, and incentivized workforce 
equipped to meet the bureau's needs and objectives?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of African 
Affairs to ensure it has the resources, including personnel, necessary 
to meet the bureau's objectives. I recognize that the Bureau of African 
Affairs is chronically understaffed both in terms of positions and 
vacancies. If confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the 
world to ensure that our embassies and bureaus are adequately staffed 
to meet our duties and advance our interests. Staffing must be aligned 
with our most pressing interests, including oversight of critical 
programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If 
confirmed, I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship 
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to 
ensure that our vacancies are filled, which would address elements of 
the OIG report related to field-based oversight.

    Question. I understand that our embassy in Niger lacked both a 
political officer and an economic officer for months on end, at a time 
when that country was preparing for historic elections, chairing the 
Economic Community of West African States regional bloc, and engaging 
in counterterrorism operations in the increasingly insecure Sahel. 
Similarly, despite an armed uprising and a recent contentious election, 
our embassy in the Central African Republic reportedly lacks a 
political officer. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, 
what will you do to ensure that hard to fill posts, especially in 
Africa, are appropriately staffed by qualified Foreign Service 
Officers?

    Answer. The Department offers a number of incentives for employees 
to serve voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship 
differential payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when 
appropriate. Service need differential provides an additional 15 
percent of salary for employees who agree to serve an extra year at 
posts that are particularly difficult to staff. There are also 
procedural incentives, such as the ability to take ``stretch'' 
assignments into higher-ranking positions that may offer more 
challenging work and greater opportunities for promotion. If confirmed, 
I will continue to review these incentives and calibrate them to 
America's national interests overseas.

    Question. There are long-standing concerns among career civil 
service employees that the Department is ``designed'' for the career 
foreign service, with few career advancement pathways for the career 
civil service. The lack of such pathways can mean that the Department 
loses talent to outside industries or to another office or bureau with 
higher-graded positions available. How will you address these long-
standing concerns among career civil service employees, and create 
intentional and transparent pathways to career advancement?

    Answer. I am committed to listening to the workforce and ensuring 
we retain high performers by investing in their professional 
development and strengthening programs that mentor individuals for 
success, provide actionable feedback on performance, chart career 
progression, provide more interagency and other detail opportunities, 
and create viable pathways for those in the Civil Service who aspire to 
advance their careers. I support efforts to expand existing career 
development and detail opportunities for Civil Service employees.

    Question. Some of the most successful businesses in the world have 
developed extensive employee training and career-long mentoring 
programs. The Department has a renowned facility in the Foreign Service 
Institute that plays a critical role in training both foreign and civil 
service employees. Unfortunately, there are very few classes focused on 
developing the management skills necessary to maximize the morale and 
effectiveness of Department employees. Do you believe the Department 
should develop a more robust management training initiative to ensure 
that sound management skills are viewed as a necessary skill not just 
for ``management-coned'' foreign service officers?

    Answer. Yes, I believe that management skills should be widely 
taught to all of our foreign affairs professionals, and that all 
training should reinforce the leadership skills needed to build up 
employees' morale and effectiveness. If confirmed, I will continue to 
promote FSI's commitment to providing world class training to employees 
across the Department. I will work to ensure FSI remains committed to 
seeking additional ways to expand its reach in these crucial areas.

    Question. Do you commit to reviewing existing management trainings 
and reporting back to the committee with recommendations for 
improvement?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to a full review of current 
management skills training at FSI and will report back to the committee 
with recommendations for improvement as necessary.

    Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State 
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning 
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the 
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as 
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the 
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as 
having substantial impact on their careers. Do you commit to reviewing 
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how 
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and 
help more women serve in senior roles?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will review this report, and will work to 
build upon the Department's ongoing initiatives and framework to 
increase flexibilities and support for our workforce. The Department 
instituted a number of policy changes designed to advance equal 
opportunity for women in the workforce and address barrier concerns 
raised by affinity groups and associations. In line with the 
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are 
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' if confirmed, I 
commit to the Department's undertaking of further analysis to explore 
barriers to equal advancement for women and what remedies can be taken 
to mitigate those barriers to support the retention and career 
advancement of women at the State Department.

    Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to 
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and 
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in 
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much 
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered 
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will 
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the 
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is 
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their 
abilities?

    Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are 
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S. 
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of 
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in 
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys. The 
report issued by your committee last July, ``Diplomacy in Crisis,'' 
also chronicles the decline in morale at the Department, among other 
things. That said, the nearly 77,000 State Department employees 
worldwide remain resilient. If confirmed, I am committed to improving 
the State Department to advance our security and prosperity, including 
by investing in a diplomatic corps that fully represents the United 
States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting, 
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to officers 
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who 
represent the diversity of the country we represent. I will spare no 
effort, if confirmed, to ensure their safety and well-being and demand 
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan 
workplace.

    Question. Last year, I published a report, Diplomacy in Crisis, 
which laid out the challenges facing the Department's workforce. It 
cited employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for 
example, steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared 
reprisal or retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does 
that concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?

    Answer. I reviewed the committee's report prior to the confirmation 
hearing. These findings do concern me. I agree that retaliation for 
participating in the EEO process or anti-harassment program, requesting 
a reasonable accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is 
unlawful, grounds for discipline, and counter to good management; 
employees do best when they have the ability to speak up and help the 
Department improve. The release of the forthcoming Diversity and 
Inclusion Strategic Plan will help guide a collective action approach 
to, among other things, fostering a culture that encourages people to 
speak up. If confirmed, as a senior leader in the Department, this work 
will be a priority.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in 
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular 
presence and where diplomatic engagement proved critical to securing 
access for global health experts on the one hand and the evacuation of 
American citizens on the other. Who is responsible for the execution of 
U.S. foreign policy at overseas posts, including diplomatic engagement 
to advance U.S. global health security interests in countries of all 
income categories: the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), or the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC)?

    Answer. At every overseas mission, the chief of mission is 
responsible for the execution of U.S. foreign policy. Multiple agencies 
have personnel on the ground under chief of mission authority, and the 
State Department works closely with all relevant agencies to deliver on 
our robust U.S. Government foreign policy objectives.

    Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to organize and resource 
the Department to advance the global health security and diplomacy 
objectives of the United States overseas?

    Answer. The Department of State is firmly committed to using 
diplomacy to advance global health security objectives. The Department 
has already begun to mobilize an international response to COVID-19 
with an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi, which will support 
COVAX, along with a pledge to provide an additional $2 billion through 
2022. The State Department's efforts to address the full range of 
global health security threats are facilitated by the close 
coordination of bureaus across the Department and the interagency. I 
understand the State Department is reviewing options to structure its 
response to meet critical policy objectives and, if confirmed I look 
forward to being part of these efforts and working with Congress as 
planning progresses.

    Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently 
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had 
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on 
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic 
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized is vital to the effective 
planning and execution of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) programs. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State 
Department-led COP process is restored and that the implementing 
agencies--USAID and CDC--adhere to such plans without unwarranted 
delays or deviations?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is fully committed to and 
supportive of PEPFAR. On March 5, 2021, the Department announced plans 
for the COP/ROP 2021 planning process to resume on April 1, 2021, and 
conclude no later than May 21, 2021. If confirmed, I will be firmly 
committed to ensuring that collaborative, transparent, and data-driven 
COP/ROP 2021 plans are completed in every PEPFAR-supported country and 
region and that there is no disruption in HIV services at the start of 
FY 2022. Following COP/ROP 2021 approvals, I understand that PEPFAR 
will move expeditiously through the required processes of Congressional 
notifications, approvals, and transfer of funds to implementing 
agencies in advance of the beginning of FY 2022.

    Question. During his confirmation process, this committee asked 
Secretary Blinken: ``Under your leadership as Secretary of State, what 
actions will you pursue to ensure that hard-to-fill posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently staffed?'' On January 
19, he replied in writing: ``If confirmed, I will work with the White 
House and relevant State Department bureaus and offices to ensure that 
all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently 
staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' Secretary Blinken's response 
was insufficient because it merely re-phrased the question into an 
answer and was non-specific on any action reflecting a change in 
priority from previous administrations. What do you view as the most 
pressing management and staffing challenges facing the Department's 
Bureau of African Affairs?

    Answer. Advancing the State Department's diplomatic agenda and 
implementing innovative, effective foreign assistance programs depends 
on its personnel. The Bureau of African Affairs has been chronically 
understaffed both domestically and overseas, impeding the Department's 
ability to achieve the administration's goals, as well as to seize 
opportunities when they appear. Staffing must be aligned with our most 
pressing interests, including oversight of critical programs like the 
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If confirmed I will explore 
enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including those in 
Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our vacancies are 
filled.
    The Department offers a number of incentives for employees to serve 
voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship differential 
payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when appropriate. 
Service need differential provides an additional 15 percent of salary 
for employees who agree to serve an extra year at posts that are 
particularly difficult to staff. There are also procedural incentives, 
such as the ability to take ``stretch'' assignments into higher-ranking 
positions that may offer more challenging work and greater 
opportunities for promotion. If confirmed, I will continue to review 
these incentives and calibrate them to America's national interests 
overseas.

    Question. What specific actions will you prioritize in your role to 
ensure that the Africa Bureau's staffing efforts focus on building 
regional expertise, diversity, and preparedness so the Department can 
sufficiently and consistently staff hard-to-fill posts in Africa?

    Answer. I recognize that the Bureau of African Affairs is 
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If 
confirmed, I will review the State Department's staffing levels around 
the world to ensure that staffing is aligned with its most pressing 
interests. I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship 
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to 
ensure that our vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive 
workplace and, if confirmed, will support the Bureau of African 
Affairs' efforts as they work to implement management reforms for 
recruitment, hiring, and retention.

    Question. Recently, legal restrictions--commonly referred to as 
``section 889''--have gone into effect that severely limit the types of 
telecommunications networks that U.S. Government departments and 
agencies can use overseas. These restrictions were an attempt to combat 
the Chinese Government's sale and use of Chinese companies' 
technological networks and equipment in other countries to engage in 
espionage. However, many countries' networks are so saturated by 
prohibited telecommunications equipment that complying with section 
889, absent a waiver, may limit the ability of our posts to operate 
abroad. How do you assess the burden placed on the Department by these 
restrictions?

    Answer. Compliance with FY 2019 NDAA Section 889 places an extreme 
burden on the Department's ability to conduct diplomacy in those 
nations where access to trusted networks is limited or non-existent. 
The current ODNI national security interest waivers mitigate the impact 
of Section 889, enabling the State Department to continue to supply its 
posts with critical services. There are parts of the world where it is 
unlikely that any trusted vendor will be available. Current ODNI 
waivers expire in 2022. Without waiver extensions, changes to the 
compliance regimen, or unforeseen technical solutions, the Department 
will be severely impacted in its ability to conduct diplomacy overseas.

    Question. Do you believe that the Department should be able to 
implement these restrictions fully without diminishing its ability to 
operate abroad?

    Answer. While I strongly support the intent of Section 889 of the 
2019 NDAA, I understand that the current global market upon which the 
Department relies cannot meet the provision's requirements without 
waivers while continuing to accomplish the Department's mission. Absent 
a waiver, critical mission area activities will cease or be seriously 
hindered.

    Question. Are there costs associated with these restrictions?

    Answer. As a result of the ODNI approved waivers, I understand that 
the initial cost of compliance has been manageable and mainly focused 
on administrative workloads. As alternatives and compliant sources are 
identified overseas, it is anticipated the cost of compliance will 
increase when transitioning overseas acquisitions to compliant 
services.

    Question. Would the Department be able to operate without the 
waivers currently granted by the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) to the Department?

    Answer. I understand that the Department of State would not be able 
to operate without the waivers currently granted by the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). ODNI granted nine waivers under section 
889(d)(2) until September 30, 2022, to allow the Department to continue 
contracting activities that would otherwise be prohibited under section 
889(a)(l)(B). I understand that these waivers cover not only 
contracting for telecommunications services, but also contracting for 
security services and equipment and many other programs and services 
vital to the Department and potentially impacted by the breadth of 
section 889(a)(1)(B).
    The Department will make use of these waivers until an offeror 
attests itself eligible under section 889(a) or until alternative 
sources eligible under section 889 can be identified and contractual 
arrangements and necessary transitions implemented.

    Question. Do you plan to request an extension of waivers?

    Answer. Without change to the current compliance requirements, I 
understand that the Department must pursue extensions of all waivers 
granted by ODNI. I am committed to protecting U.S. telecommunications 
and, if confirmed, will work across government agencies and in the 
international community to adopt networks based on trusted supply 
chains

    Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to find a long-term 
solution that ensures secure, reliable communications while encouraging 
foreign governments to move away from prohibited technological 
networks?

    Answer. Yes. I strongly support the intent of the FY 2019 NDAA 
Section 889 and concur that steps must be taken to contract with safe, 
reliable, and secure services. If confirmed, I will continue to engage 
with the Department's interagency partners to develop a unified long-
term solution.

    Question. One troubling trend my staff and I have identified during 
our travels over the previous Congress is that many of our diplomats 
are not getting out from behind embassy walls and meeting with the 
local population or even other diplomats. Frequently, we are told that 
the security requirements are too great to support regular traverses to 
and from embassy compounds. This intolerance of reasonable, voluntary 
risk sacrifices advancement of U.S. interests for airtight security and 
keeps our diplomats from being able to do their jobs. Does the 
inability of State Department diplomats to leave the embassies at which 
they are currently stationed put the Department at a strategic 
disadvantage?

    Answer. Consistent in-person outreach remains essential to 
advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. Doing this work requires a 
diplomatic presence in some of the most difficult and dangerous 
environments in the world. The Department of State continues to 
prioritize people-to-people engagement and relationships while taking 
into account a wide range of threats, including the unique local 
circumstances at each post. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing 
the Department's current overseas operating posture and consulting with 
Congress and internal Department stakeholders such as the Bureau of 
Diplomatic Security to determine if current laws and our policies to 
mitigate operational risk should be modified.

    Question. Do Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats face similar 
restrictions to those placed on U.S. diplomats?

    Answer. I am not currently in a position to answer the question of 
exactly what restrictions are now being placed on Chinese, Russian, and 
Iranian diplomats.

    Question. Do you support getting our diplomats back outside posts? 
If yes, how so?

    Answer. The Department of State strives to provide the most secure 
environment possible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy while 
acknowledging that there is never a guarantee of complete safety. The 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) makes every effort to ensure that 
the Department's personnel and contractors are aware of potential risks 
and trained accordingly. State Department employees understand the 
risks but face them every day to advance U.S. national security and 
foreign policy interests on behalf of the American people. If 
confirmed, I will work with the DS to maximize the ability of our 
diplomats to work outside posts whenever possible through effective 
risk mitigation and management decisions.

    Question. Do you intend to emphasize to the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security, regional security officers, and chiefs of mission your desire 
to do so? If yes, what specific steps will you take?

    Answer. Engaging diplomatically outside posts whenever possible is 
paramount to the success of the Department. If confirmed, I intend to 
work closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure our 
foreign affairs community can effectively achieve U.S. foreign policy 
goals with an acceptable level of risk.

    Question. Should security concerns always take precedence over the 
ability of our diplomats to operate abroad?

    Answer. Security conditions faced by our foreign affairs community 
overseas evolve, but the need to operate globally and carry out the 
State Department's diplomatic mission remains constant. If confirmed, I 
commit to ensuring the Department routinely assesses the threat 
environment in which its people live and work, mitigating risk with all 
the tools at our disposal, and making informed risk management 
decisions. My objective will always be to ensure personnel working in 
the Department's diplomatic missions overseas are able to carry out 
their duties in as safe and secure an environment as possible.

    Question. How should diplomatic objectives be weighed in relation 
to security concerns, particularly with regard to embassy security?

    Answer. I understand that the Department uses a variety of 
policies, training, and techniques to weigh diplomatic objectives in 
relation to security concerns. The Department sets a high baseline of 
security practices for all personnel and diplomatic facilities wherever 
they are located. If confirmed, I intend to continuously review and 
improve the Department's global security standards without sacrificing 
our ability to effectively fulfill our diplomatic mission.

    Question. Between late 2016 and May 2018, the State Department 
found that certain U.S. Embassy community members suffered a series of 
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. If 
confirmed, will you commit to continuing the investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the sonic attacks?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to engaging in the 
ongoing investigation into circumstances surrounding the unexplained 
health incidents. The Department continues to work on determining what 
happened to our staff and their families and to ensure their well-being 
and health going forward. There is no higher priority than the safety 
and security of our U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S. citizens.

    Question. Will you seek to ensure the safety and security of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel in Havana and other posts where personnel have 
been injured?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure the 
safety and security of U.S. personnel and their families under Chief of 
Mission security responsibility. The Department is working to determine 
what happened to its staff and their families and to ensure the well-
being and health of our officials going forward. That investigation is 
ongoing and is a high priority.

    Question. Dozens of these cases were reported by personnel 
stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba. To date, Cuba has 
refused to cooperate with investigations into these reports. Is it in 
the national interest of the United States to assign an ambassador to 
Cuba before the Cuban Government fully and credibly cooperates with 
these investigations and explains the targeted attacks on U.S. 
diplomats in Havana?

    Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than the 
safety and security of U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S. 
citizens. The Department continues to review its staffing posture to 
ensure that Embassy Havana can continue its core mission effectively 
and safely. The Department continually reminds the Cuban Government of 
its obligation under the Vienna Convention to take all appropriate 
steps to protect our diplomats.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support all State 
Department employees and their families who were injured by these sonic 
attacks, including those employees who have since left the Department?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting all State 
Department employees and their families who were injured by these 
unexplained health incidents, regardless of employment status. To 
ensure that affected personnel receive the appropriate care, the 
Department established the Senior Care Coordinator position to serve as 
an advocate for the affected personnel and provide administrative 
support including assistance in applying for workers' compensation. 
This position is an advocate for all affected personnel.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work constructively with 
other government agencies to find the cause of the attacks and 
determine the best ways to support those U.S. Government employees who 
have been injured?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to strengthening 
interagency cooperation on this issue. The Department has partnered 
with multiple agencies to help identify the source and cause of these 
injuries. Recently, the Department designated a senior-level official 
as the Senior Advisor to the Health Incidents Response Task Force who 
will advise senior Department leadership and coordinate the 
Department's response to the health incidents with the interagency.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly share new 
information on this issue with Congress, including updates on any live 
investigations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to regularly share new 
information on this issue as appropriate.

    Question. Do you support Congress passing a State Department 
authorization bill?

    Answer. As you might imagine, given my years working with the 
President, including in his capacity as chairman of this committee, I 
have been very involved in and supportive of Congressional efforts to 
pass a State Department Authorization Act. If confirmed, I am committed 
to working with the committee on our shared interest in strengthening 
the capabilities of the Department, including through legislation as 
necessary.

    Question. Do you believe it is important that the Department be 
explicitly authorized outside of the appropriations process?

    Answer. I do think it is important. Given my past work on the staff 
of the committee, I appreciate the role of the Senate Foreign Relations 
committee, in considering and developing authorization legislation 
pertaining to Department operations. I recall, too, the challenges 
encountered at times in efforts to secure such authorization. If 
confirmed, I am committed to working with the committee on legislative 
proposals, particularly those providing needed authorizations.

    Question. Do you believe that the role the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee is important in providing congressional oversight?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Do you commit to making Department personnel under your 
purview available for timely briefings upon request?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department 
makes available personnel who are well-positioned to be responsive to 
your requests in a timely manner.

    Question. In light of the massive cyber hack of the U.S. federal 
Government that was reported in December 2020, how important is 
cybersecurity to the State Department and U.S. diplomacy?

    Answer. Cybersecurity is of paramount importance to the Department 
of State. The Department needs to ensure cybersecurity is an integral 
part of its efforts, including as it adopts new technologies to meet 
new global diplomacy demands. The continually evolving threat to the 
cyber landscape requires a dedicated investment in infrastructure, 
talent, and planning to ensure the security and resilience of our 
networks and digital assets while protecting its global workforce and 
the citizens we serve.

    Question. What cybersecurity challenges does the Department 
currently face?

    Answer. As with any global organization, the Department of State is 
an attractive target for malicious cyber activity. Therefore, the 
Department is always engaged in identifying cybersecurity threats and 
taking steps to counter any threats. Cyber threat actors will likely 
prioritize exploitation of the Department's maximum telework and global 
posture and attempt to target remote access solutions and devices to 
collect internal Department information. Threat actors will attempt to 
identify and exploit any new vulnerabilities in operations. 
Additionally, cyber threat actors may be more likely to target supply 
chain operations against the Department's software providers, inspired 
by the recent SolarWinds event. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the 
Department's cybersecurity efforts are geared toward addressing these 
challenges.

    Question. How do you intend to improve cybersecurity at the 
Department?

    Answer. The Department's approach to cybersecurity is rooted in a 
deep understanding of the operational nexus between malicious cyber 
activity and counterintelligence threats and the need to develop 
proactive solutions for managing the Department's global cyber exposure 
and ensuring a safe and reliable digital environment for performing the 
diplomatic mission. To proactively defend against current, emerging, 
and future cybersecurity threats, the Department should continue steps 
to consolidate network monitoring and infrastructure IT operations and 
maintenance as well as maximize network visibility, auditing, and 
configuration management. The Department must ensure rigorous 
vulnerability management and swift patch deployment, while leveraging a 
matrix of cybersecurity, security technology, and investigative 
capabilities to detect, analyze, and defend against all cyber threats.

    Question. As with any workforce, high morale among the State 
Department's employees is vital to attracting and retaining talent. Is 
morale at the Department a problem?

    Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are 
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S. 
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of 
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in 
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys, as well 
a reduction in test takers for the Foreign Service exam. That said, the 
nearly 77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient and 
work every day to advance the interests of the American people.

    Question. If yes, how do you intend to improve and maintain morale 
at the Department?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining a 
State Department workforce that advances our security and prosperity, 
including by developing a diplomatic corps that fully represents the 
United States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting, 
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to personnel 
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who reflect 
our country's diversity. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to 
ensure their safety and well-being and demand accountability for 
fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.

    Question. Are there specific areas of morale (or bureaus) that you 
believe need immediate attention?

    Answer. I am not currently in a position to speak to this question, 
but if confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to investigate the 
areas and bureaus that may need urgent attention. I commit to ensuring 
the safety and well-being of the entire workforce and demand 
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive, and non-
partisan workplace.

    Question. In 2017, Congress passed a lateral entry pilot program 
for the Foreign Service which the Department has yet to implement. Do 
you commit to begin implementation of the program in 2021 and to design 
it as Congress intended?

    Answer. I understand the Department developed and planned to roll 
out a new Lateral Entry Pilot Program for Foreign Service generalists 
in FY 2021. Implementation was delayed for Congressional consultation 
and notification requirements in the Department's annual appropriations 
act and by the Department's focus on responding to the global COVID-19 
pandemic. If confirmed, I commit to resume implementation of the 
program when appropriate.

    Question. Currently, Foreign Service oral assessments are only held 
in Washington, D.C., throughout the year and once a year in San 
Francisco, California. On February 24, 2021, Secretary Blinken issued a 
press statement saying that, in order to effectively represent the 
American people to the world, ``we must recruit and retain a workforce 
that truly reflects America.'' Is geographic diversity important is 
building a Department that ``truly reflects America''?

    Answer. The Department administers the Foreign Service Oral 
Assessment outside of Washington, D.C. twice each year, in San 
Francisco in February and in Chicago in May. In addition, the 
Department maintains a national recruitment platform that includes 
geographic diversity in its strategic recruiting objectives. In 2020, 
the recruitment team conducted 1,500 events nationwide. Secretary 
Blinken is committed to increasing diversity, including geographic 
diversity, at all levels through recruitment and retention as a major 
priority. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to build a 
diverse workforce that is fully representative of our Nation.

    Question. Do you think making it easier and more cost effective for 
Americans outside of Washington, D.C., and northern California to take 
the Foreign Service oral assessments would encourage a more 
geographically diverse Foreign Service?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken and I are committed to building a diverse 
workforce representative of the American people--including 
geographically--and the Department will continue to expand the 
accessibility of the Foreign Service assessment process. If confirmed, 
I will dedicate resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition 
and support additional innovations to attract exceptional talent. The 
Department typically offers the Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside 
of Washington, D.C., twice each year in San Francisco (February) and 
Chicago (May). In response to COVID-19 disruptions, the Department 
successfully piloted a virtual oral assessment for Specialist 
candidates in June 2020. If confirmed, I will direct my team to resume 
in-person oral assessments outside Washington, D.C., as soon as 
conditions allow.

    Question. Do you commit to expanding the number of locations where 
the Foreign Service oral assessments can be administered?

    Answer. COVID-19 caused disruptions to the assessment process. To 
overcome this, in June 2020 the Department successfully piloted a 
virtual oral assessment for Foreign Service Specialist candidates. 
Although the Generalist Foreign Service Oral Assessment could not be 
adapted to a virtual format, the Department's prioritization of public 
health measures at the assessment facility will permit in-person oral 
assessments to resume in Washington, D.C., in late March. When health 
and safety conditions permit, the Department will again offer the 
Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside of Washington, D.C., twice each 
year, in San Francisco and in Chicago. If confirmed, I will dedicate 
resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition and support 
additional innovations to attract exceptional talent.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to briefing this committee on 
the administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to 
the constitutional and legal authority to appoint such officials?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to briefing this committee on the 
administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to the 
relevant appointment authorities.

    Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes 
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If 
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to 
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?

    Answer. Yes, I am aware that this office has been re-established in 
statute, and that the law requires the administration to appoint a head 
of such office to have the rank of ambassador and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate. I understand that the Department is actively 
reviewing these new requirements. If confirmed, I believe there will be 
the opportunity for me to engage in this process, as we will want to 
ensure that any such official would have the expertise and stature, 
including political support, to operate effectively within the U.S. 
Government and internationally.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. While a Senate staffer working for then-Senator Biden--
first in his Senate office as a foreign policy legislative assistant, 
and later as chief counsel on the staff of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations--I developed and executed on legislative and oversight 
efforts to protect and enhance the work of U.S. international 
broadcasting, which provides objective news and information to 
audiences around the world. In particular:


   Early in the Clinton administration, Senator Biden blocked an 
        effort, proposed in the first budget submitted by President 
        Clinton, to close Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). 
        Senator Biden believed, as I did, that it was premature to 
        close the radio services, given that democratic governments and 
        traditions in Europe and Eurasia after the collapse of the 
        Soviet bloc were not firmly established. In that period, we 
        also learned from testimony by leaders such as Poland's Lech 
        Walesa of the power of these services during the Cold War in 
        sustaining dissident movements. With the regression of 
        democracy in the region since then, it is clear that the 
        decision to preserve RFE/RL was well-founded.

   Based on the success of RFE/RL, Senator Biden authored the 
        legislation that led to the creation of a similar `surrogate' 
        radio service to broadcast to China and other countries in East 
        Asia. ``Radio Free Asia (RFA)'' was established by legislation 
        enacted in 1994 and initiated broadcasts in 1996. Today, the 
        service has a well-established reputation for its coverage of 
        news in the countries to which it broadcasts and has earned 
        numerous journalism awards. For example, in 2019, a journalist 
        from RFA's Uyghur service received the Magnitsky Human Rights 
        Award for her reporting on the humanitarian and human rights 
        situation in China's Xinjiang region.

    When legislation was proposed to consolidate U.S. foreign affairs 
agencies in the 1990s, Senator Biden insisted that the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors (BBG)--then a part of the U.S. Information Agency--
be maintained as an independent agency, and not merged into the 
Department of State, based on our concern that doing so would 
jeopardize the journalistic integrity of the broadcasting services 
supported by the BBG.
    As chief counsel to the Committee on Foreign Relations, in 
coordination with a human rights organization, I initiated a standard 
set of questions for the record that were posed to every ambassadorial 
nominee about human rights issues in the country to which they had been 
nominated. We also later undertook to request follow-up reports from 
the ambassadors after they had been at post for a number of months. I 
believe this process helped to sensitize nominees to the importance of 
these issues and ensure that they were giving priority attention to 
human rights issues as part of their work.

    Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when 
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of 
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote, 
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups?

    Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's 
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance 
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to 
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and 
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to 
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders 
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new 
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to 
championing diversity and inclusion.

    Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the 
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that 
is diverse and inclusive?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to provide 
updates on their initiatives and contributions to advance diversity and 
inclusion at the State Department. I will encourage leaders to 
prioritize innovation and creativity across teams, ensuring that all 
voices are heard and that their contributions matter. If confirmed, I 
will support, empower, and work with the new Chief Diversity and 
Inclusion Officer and bureau representatives to implement Department-
wide diversity and inclusion policies, ensure transparency of these 
initiatives, and hold senior leadership accountable for progress.

    Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and 
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S. 
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's 
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests 
of any senior White House staff?

    Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules, and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

    Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any 
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the 
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior 
White House staff?

    Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

    Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have 
any financial interests in any foreign country?

    Answer. My spouse does not have any financial interests in a 
foreign country. My investment portfolio, as set forth in my SF-278 
submitted to the committee, includes mutual funds and exchange traded 
funds, including a foreign stock fund, which may hold interests in 
companies with an international presence, but these funds are exempt 
from the conflict of interest laws. I am committed to following all 
applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining vigilant with 
regard to my ethics obligations. I will divest any investments the 
State Department Ethics Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of 
interest.



                               __________


           Responses to Additional Questions for the Record 
         Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. There is the proliferation of special envoys, who are 
often political appointees, and who tend to duplicate work that should 
belong to the regional bureaus and other permanent offices of the 
Department. This is not to say that special envoys cannot play a role 
in certain circumstances, but many career diplomats seem to think there 
have been too many in recent years. If confirmed, what will you do to 
streamline the Department, reduce wasteful spending, and do away with 
redundant positions?

    Answer. I understand that the Secretary shares your concern about 
the proliferation of redundant positions. I also am aware that some 
special envoy positions are required by law. If confirmed, I will work 
toward accomplishing the Secretary's goals of efficient and effective 
management, including by examining the Department's use of special 
envoys.

    Question. It is critically important that we have a Foreign Service 
that is designed to meet the needs of this century. The talent we have 
recruited to the Foreign Service is impressive, but I think there are 
ways to further strengthen how we identify new talent and train the 
workforce that we have. To meet the challenges of this century, our 
Foreign Service must be structured to counter the malign influence of 
the Chinese Communist Party. The new regional China officer positions 
created during the last administration were a good step in this 
direction. If confirmed, what would you do to shift the focus of the 
Foreign Service toward developing regional expertise and advanced 
language skills, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region? If the 
generalist model is to be retained, are you prepared to carve out a 
separate track for political and economic officers who specialize in 
one region and/or critical language?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to examining the best ways to 
develop and advance the skills of Department employees so they are 
prepared to meet global challenges, including the challenges posed by 
China. In addition to operational and leadership effectiveness, 
officers wishing to get into the Senior Foreign Service must 
demonstrate language proficiency. The new Professional Development 
Program also gives officers the flexibility to focus on and build 
expertise in a specific region.
    I understand in 2020 the State Department stood up a Mandarin 
Language Task Force to answer the continuing critical need for regional 
expertise and advanced Chinese language skills. The task force has 
already delivered an Advanced Mandarin Training Program, with students 
starting in-country, in-depth language training in Summer 2021.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to an evaluation of the 
personnel numbers in each region and adjust accordingly?

    Answer. People are the most important State Department asset and 
properly aligning them to regions and posts is essential to achieving 
our mission objectives. If confirmed, I will work to make sure that the 
State Department has the appropriate people in the right place at the 
right time to achieve its objectives.

    Question. Another perennial problem is that too many Foreign 
Service officers have traditionally regarded human rights and democracy 
promotion as the responsibility of civil servants in the Department of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), or USAID, but not the Foreign 
Service. If confirmed, what will you do to raise the importance of 
human rights and democracy issues in the Foreign Service?

    Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have made clear that 
America's cherished democratic values are at the center of this 
administration's foreign policy. If confirmed, I will ensure that this 
is reflected in human resources decisions as well as policy actions. I 
pledge to encourage Foreign Service Officers, most of whom passionately 
and skillfully carry the mantle of human rights and democracy promotion 
in the execution of their duties, to serve in DRL and to elevate their 
attention to these issues, wherever they serve. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working to better enable Foreign Service Officers to build a 
career around these important issues and to elevate the roles that 
human rights and labor officers play at our embassies.

    Question. I hear from married couples in the Foreign Service that 
getting assignments in the same country is often difficult. It is 
important that we find creative ways to keep married couples together, 
both for morale reasons and to make the best use of the talent we have. 
If confirmed, what will you do to support Foreign Service families and 
tandem couples?

    Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find 
appropriate positions at the same post, while also ensuring that we 
meet service need, promote career development, and follow the law such 
that no advantage or disadvantage accrues to any employee on marital 
status grounds. If confirmed, I will look for ways to expand workplace 
flexibilities for tenured employees to increase opportunities for 
tandems to serve together, including identifying aligning tours of 
duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees teleworking 
overseas, and identifying more opportunities for in-country language 
training.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
               to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. Sluggish State Department hiring procedures--including a 
pre-pandemic average of six months to complete a security clearance--
contribute to recruitment challenges and poor morale, and create 
significant staffing gaps. This is particularly true overseas, where 
embassies rely on spouses, known as eligible family members (EFMs), to 
fulfill critical professional and support roles. These positions can be 
vacant as often as one-third to one-half of the time due to the lengthy 
hiring and security process. If confirmed, what will you do to address 
sluggish State Department hiring procedures, particularly for eligible 
family members?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support ongoing efforts of 
the Department's senior leadership to re-engineer the security 
clearance process for all employees, including EFMs. The government-
wide Federal Investigative Standards, implemented in 2017, has 
increased the work that goes into completing background investigations, 
which impacts EFM onboarding. To streamline family member employment to 
fill available positions overseas, I am committed to expanding 
membership in the Foreign Service Family Reserve Corps (FSFRC), where 
eligible EFMs are appointed to a position that allow them to maintain 
their current security clearance during gaps in employment at posts. 
The FSFRC is a helpful tool in reducing the time needed to hire and 
onboard EFMs overseas.

    Question. The pandemic has necessitated a swift move to remote 
work, highlighting possibilities for expanding the use of telework even 
after the current health emergency is under control. Would you support 
increasing the number of foreign and civil service domestic positions 
approved for telework overseas (i.e. DETO, domestically employed 
teleworking overseas) and opening them to EFMs and tandem spouses?

    Answer. During the pandemic, Foreign Service personnel and employed 
family members teleworked from the United States to provide remote 
assistance to our missions around the world. The Department implemented 
new workplace flexibilities allowing domestic employees to telework 
remotely from other U.S. locations to maintain an agile workforce. In 
the past five years, the Department doubled the number of both Foreign 
and Civil Service DETOs, which allowed qualifying employees to perform 
their domestic work overseas for a defined period of time. Family 
members who encumber Civil Service and Foreign Service positions may 
enter DETO arrangements to perform work from the location of their 
spouse's overseas assignment. If confirmed, I will strongly support the 
Department's focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities, 
including telework and remote work.

    Question. Would you instruct offices to re-examine policies that 
permit remote telework only after several months of in-office work, 
thereby eliminating eligible overseas applicants from applying?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's 
focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities, including telework 
and remote work. The pandemic has reinforced the need for such 
flexibilities and demonstrated that virtual work can be successful.
    I understand in August 2020, the Department established a remote 
work policy, which permits employees in domestic positions to work 
full-time from an alternate worksite in the United States with 
supervisor and bureau approvals.

    Question. Would you support expanding telework to allow for 
appropriate overseas positions to be filled by EFMs and tandem spouses 
who are stationed in the U.S. or at other posts?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would support expanding employment 
opportunities overseas for spouses to work in the country to which 
their employee spouse is assigned and accredited. While the Department 
does not have authority to employ family members domestically using its 
overseas hiring authorities, family members with prior U.S. Government 
service who are currently residing in the United States may be eligible 
to apply non-competitively to Civil Service positions.

    Question. Being assigned to the same post is a perpetual struggle 
for tandem couples. While the State Department is prohibited from 
discriminating based on marital status, 3 FAH-1 H-2425.8-7(A) states 
that State ``will make a reasonable effort to assign both members of a 
tandem to the same post in positions appropriate to their class levels 
and qualifications.'' What actions will you take to ensure that this is 
implemented given current challenges that tandems face in being 
assigned to the same post?

    Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find 
positions at the same post that are appropriate to their skill codes, 
grade levels, and qualifications, while also ensuring that no advantage 
or disadvantage accrues to any employee on the grounds of marital 
status. I will look for ways to expand existing and new workplace 
flexibilities for tenured FS employees to increase opportunities for 
tandem spouses to serve together, including identifying aligning tours 
of duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees 
teleworking overseas (DETO), and identifying more opportunities for in-
country language training.

    Question. Will you work to align bidding timelines across different 
components of the State Department (e.g. Diplomatic Security and 
generalist/specialist cycles) and different foreign affairs agencies?

    Answer. The Department has worked to bring bidding cycles in line 
over the past two years for all employees. The main cycle takes place 
in the fall, for positions that will be open the following summer. 
There are also bidding cycles for winter vacancies, for ``priority 
staffing posts'' in 11 countries, and for chiefs of mission, deputy 
chiefs of mission, and principal officers. I will continue to review 
the bidding cycles and process to ensure they meet our staffing and 
mission requirements. Other foreign affairs agencies manage their own 
bidding cycles and process to meet their mission needs.

    Question. Will you direct the Entry Level Division of the Career 
Development and Assignments Office to make every reasonable effort to 
direct assignments for incoming officers and specialists to posts where 
their tandem spouse is already serving?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the Career Development and 
Assignments Office (CDA) to follow the law when directing assignments 
for entry-level employees, so that no advantage or disadvantage accrues 
to any employee on the grounds of marital status. Further, if 
confirmed, I will direct CDA to make reasonable efforts to assign both 
members of a tandem to the same post or region within the bounds of the 
law. Entry-level employees have less flexibility due to tenure 
requirements and therefore are always the ``lead bidder'' when bidding 
with a mid- or senior-level spouse; more flexibilities exist for mid- 
and senior-level employees to align tours with an entry-level spouse. 
If both tandem spouses are entry-level, CDA will direct the entry-level 
employees according to service needs and career development.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Rob Portman

GEC/Global Disinformation
    Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over the last 4 
years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through our 
efforts and have made important strides in countering global 
disinformation. I think this is one of the gravest threats we face 
internationally. Disinformation operations are cheap, deniable, and 
when combined with economic and political subversion can be a 
devastating to democracies. Thanks to the work of the GEC we now have 
an effective organization that can help our allies fight back.
    However, there is more work to be done to ensure that the effort is 
sustained and strengthened through the work of the GEC. In particular, 
I would like to see:


   A sustained funding level of at least $138 million annually. At its 
        current amount of $60 million, the Center continues to be under 
        resourced, and is unable to expand into areas such as Africa 
        where countries desperately need our assistance.

   Extension of hiring authority. It is critical that the Center be 
        able to retain its talent within the Department as well as 
        recruit outside expertise.

   A commitment to continue the work of the GEC. Foreign 
        disinformation is a threat to our democracy and a tool our 
        adversaries wield against us. It is critical that we have the 
        resources, means, and capability to combat this threat, and the 
        GEC located within the Department of State is the right 
        organization to do it.

    Question. Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and 
me to continue strengthening the capabilities and funding of the GEC so 
that we can continue the fight against state sponsored disinformation 
campaigns worldwide?

    Answer. You have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you and 
your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the GEC and our full 
range of public diplomacy programs so that we are better able to 
counter disinformation campaigns of authoritarian regimes.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. Will you commit that the Department will make a robust 
State Department and USAID budget request in Fiscal Year 2022 to 
address the global pandemic and its secondary impacts?

    Answer. If confirmed, and to the extent that decisions have not yet 
been made on the FY 2022 budget request by the time I am appointed, I 
am committed to making sure that the Department requests the necessary 
resources in FY 2022 to address the global pandemic and secondary 
impacts on Department operations and foreign assistance. I know 
Congress has already generously provided the Department with funding 
and expanded authorities in FY 2020 and 2021, which protected the 
health and safety of the American people and others worldwide, allowed 
for the timely and efficient repatriation of Americans stationed 
overseas in the early stages of the pandemic, supported global health 
security and pandemic preparedness, and sustained consular operations 
worldwide into FY 2021. I also understand there are significant 
resources for international pandemic response efforts in the American 
Rescue Plan, which the Congress is currently considering.

    Question. Will you commit to the goal of working in cooperation 
with our international allies to ensure that every person, regardless 
of wealth, will gain access to a life-saving vaccine?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's 
commitment to multilateralism to surge broad and equitable global 
vaccine distribution. On December 22, 2020, Congress appropriated funds 
to contribute to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance to support the procurement 
and distribution of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, including 
through the COVAX Advance Market Commitment to facilitate vaccine 
distribution in 92 low- and middle-income countries. Last month, the 
Administration announced an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi, 
and that the additional $2 billion provided by Congress will be 
released as the United States works with other donors to elevate their 
pledge commitments. I will encourage countries to consider vulnerable, 
marginalized, and at-risk populations in their national vaccination 
plans.

    Question. What role can ``vaccine diplomacy'' play towards 
restoring the U.S. global image?

    Answer. Most countries in the world are anxious to procure COVID-19 
vaccines. In addition to meeting our primary responsibility and 
commitment to ensuring that all U.S. citizens have access to vaccines, 
therapeutics, and other resources, the United States will also lead in 
ensuring sufficient vaccines are available around the world, with a 
focus on protecting communities most at risk. The United States is 
supporting COVAX, a multilateral initiative to ensure equitable 
distribution of vaccines. The U.S. will work to expand global 
vaccination, including through encouraging others to donate to COVAX, 
and will work to support efforts to mitigate secondary impacts. If 
confirmed, I will work to leverage our technical, financial, 
diplomatic, and other assistance to support global vaccination efforts.

    Question. What steps will you take to revitalize efforts to ensure 
that USG diplomatic and administrative personnel who identify as LGBTQI 
are able to receive visas for themselves and their families when 
assigned to U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities and bases abroad?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that all of 
the Department's employees and their families are treated fairly and 
equitably. For employees assigned overseas, that commitment includes 
seeking accreditation, with all appropriate privileges and immunities, 
for our LGBTI employees and their families. The State Department has 
formed a dedicated senior working group to seek ways to gain full 
recognition for our LGBTI families in those countries that do not now 
extend such recognition.

    Question. Will you commit to regular and personal oversight of 
these efforts?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to regular and 
personal oversight of these efforts.

    Question. I was pleased to see the recent Presidential Memorandum 
on Advancing the Human Rights of LGTBQI Persons Around the World. The 
memorandum outlines a leadership role for the State Department to 
ensure the federal government's swift and meaningful response to 
incidents which threaten the human rights of LGBTQI persons abroad. 
Please articulate how you will mobilize our diplomatic corps to support 
LGBTQI equality worldwide.

    Answer. In accordance with President Biden's Presidential 
Memorandum on Advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the 
world, I am committed to working closely with our diplomatic corps in 
using the broad range of diplomatic and programmatic tools and 
resources to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. 
If confirmed, I pledge to support the Department's efforts to empower 
civil society and local LGBTQI+ movements; combat criminalization of 
individuals on the basis of LGBTQI+ status or conduct; protect 
vulnerable LGBTQI+ refugees and asylum seekers; and allow swift U.S. 
responses to human rights violations of LGBTQI+ persons.

    Question. How can the Department better use the insights and 
talents of its affinity groups to increase outreach to minority 
communities with a view to increasing diverse employment and better 
connecting U.S. foreign policy programs and goals to the needs of the 
American people?

    Answer. The State Department encourages all employees to help 
recruit diverse talent by using their professional affiliations and 
networks to amplify Department career opportunities. The Department's 
17 Employee Affinity Groups (EAGs) members can explain to future 
colleagues their unique roles and cooperation to create a culture of 
inclusion across the Department. The Department's Volunteer Recruiter 
Corps, launched in January 2021, will leverage employees' diverse 
insights and experiences to recruit for a more inclusive workforce; 
half of the 500 participants are EAG members. Outreach from members of 
underrepresented groups in the diplomatic workforce will be key to 
prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a 
national security imperative.

    Question. Specifically, will you consider encouraging domestic 
travel of U.S. diplomats, increasing the number of Pickering and Rangel 
Fellows, and increasing the number of Diplomats in Residence at U.S. 
colleges and universities in underserved areas?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to carefully reviewing 
this proposal. I will also continue the Department's efforts to build a 
more diverse workforce. Currently, 16 regional Diplomats in Residence 
are based around the country, including seven at Historically Black 
Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving Institutions. In 2020, 
the Department's virtual recruitment and career fairs opened new 
channels to reaching candidates. A new ``sourcing unit'' will identify 
highly skilled potential candidates from all backgrounds.
    The Department increased the Pickering and Rangel Fellowship 
Programs by 50 percent in 2020 and will welcome a newly expanded cohort 
of 90 fellows in March. Additionally, in 2020, the Department recruited 
a record number of fellowship candidates. The Department is considering 
new fellowships to meet specialist career track hiring needs and 
diversity and inclusion initiatives, as we have done for Information 
Specialists with the Foreign Affairs IT Fellowship. If confirmed, I 
also look forward to continuing conversations with Congress to explore 
an expanded paid internship program.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
           Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities 
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently 
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the 
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or 
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by 
either such committee relating to any such activity or 
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of 
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and 
transparently? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee 
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform 
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.

    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that 
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified 
information in notifications provided by the State Department to 
Congress? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.

    Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory 
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable 
activities because of their participation in the construction of the 
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition 
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included 
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump 
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities 
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA. 
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional 
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities--
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and 
operation of NS2--were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can 
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its 
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant 
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance 
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?

    Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90 
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and 
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy 
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress 
in mid-May. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to counter 
Russian malign influence and to work with Allies and partners in the 
region to support Transatlantic energy security goals. The Department 
of State will continue to examine entities involved in potentially 
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as 
appropriate.

    Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial 
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) 
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented 
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in 
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed--which 
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran 
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning--officials from the 
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress 
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by 
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future 
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and 
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional 
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress? 
If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on 
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under 
INARA.

    Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear 
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which 
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not 
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act 
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a 
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden administration 
is committed to complying with the requirements of INARA, and if 
confirmed, I am committed to doing so.

    Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea 
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets 
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to U.S. sanctions. Reports 
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden 
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any 
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case, 
and confirm doing so.

    Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the 
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if 
confirmed, to work with the committee to appropriately comply with an 
official committee request for such Department information.

    Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three 
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden 
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those 
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the 
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of 
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's 
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not 
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in 
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed 
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on 
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told 
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these 
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said 
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the 
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not 
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders, 
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you 
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly 
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief 
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed 
terrorists? If not, why not?

    Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question 
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions 
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that 
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they 
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any 
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of 
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group 
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the 
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which 
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If 
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts, 
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions, 
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities. 
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy 
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior 
and ultimately end the war.

    Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT 
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.

    Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated 
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these 
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were 
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the 
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a 
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an 
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's 
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to 
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen and, 
therefore, remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and 
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any 
attendant travel restrictions.

    Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order 
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations. 
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to 
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly 
modify--this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a 
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to 
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts 
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the 
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners 
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism, 
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and 
the administration will continue to use all tools available to counter 
Iran's support for terrorism.

    Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is 
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not 
lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to agree within the 
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify--these 
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the absence of a determination 
that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material support to 
terrorist organizations.

    Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and 
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to 
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for 
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile 
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The 
administration is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing 
activities using the array of tools at our disposal, including 
sanctions to deal with Iran's support for terrorism.

    Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as 
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this 
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear 
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and 
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also 
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli 
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that 
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you 
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you 
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?

    Answer. I did not work on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
while serving in the Obama-Biden administration, but I did support the 
policy decision by President Obama to conclude it. The IAEA has a 
decades-long successful track record of monitoring the non-diversion of 
declared nuclear material globally. While the IAEA thoroughly 
investigates all available information, including based on its own 
verification and monitoring activities, it is not an intelligence 
organization. It can only act on information that is either acquired by 
it in the performance of its verification mandates or presented to it. 
The administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any 
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could 
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.

    Question. Please describe what new measures you would insist are 
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the 
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?

    Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its 
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its 
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional 
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides 
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program, 
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has 
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive 
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any 
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The 
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such 
indication.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Jeff Merkley

    Question. In partnership with the State Department's New Chief 
Diversity Officer, what tangible steps will your office take to improve 
diversity across the State Department, including at the most senior 
levels of the Foreign Service?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will partner with the Chief Diversity and 
Inclusion Officer to track the progress of the Department on 
performance metrics on diversity and inclusion as outlined in the soon-
to-be released Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. I will hold 
officers who report to me accountable to promote a culture of 
inclusion--where every individual voice is heard, respected, and 
valued. The Department is taking a critical look at the current 
selection processes employed by the deputy chief of mission and 
principal officer selection panels. If confirmed, I will encourage 
hiring managers to identify opportunities that will allow the 
Department to reach a wider candidate pool to include more candidates 
from underrepresented backgrounds. Additionally, the Department is 
finalizing an Enterprise Data Strategy which will include an initial 
emphasis on supporting Department diversity and inclusion efforts.

    Question. Why have women and minorities historically left the 
Foreign Service at significantly higher rates than white males, and 
what can you do to address that troubling trend?

    Answer. Understanding why women and minorities leave the Department 
is a crucial step in increasing retention. If confirmed, I intend to 
ask Department experts to examine whether there is a significantly 
higher rate of attrition for certain populations. Consistent with the 
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are 
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' I commit to the 
Department's undertaking of further analysis, including as part of its 
forthcoming Enterprise Data Strategy, to explore what interventions the 
Department can introduce to mitigate attrition, including of 
underrepresented minorities and women, ensuring the Department remains 
an employer of choice. If confirmed, I will focus on bringing 
accountability and transparency to this issue.

    Question. Significant delays in the hiring process have impacted 
the State Department's ability to bring on board talented Foreign and 
Civil Service Officers, as well as local staff and family members at 
many embassies abroad. Do these delays affect the State Department's 
ability to deliver on its goals, and how will you approach implementing 
a more efficient hiring process?

    Answer. I understand in FY 2020, the Department achieved a 20-
percent reduction in Foreign Service assessment timelines, despite 
disruptions caused by COVID-19. A new virtual oral assessment and a 
remote-proctored Foreign Service Officer test allowed at-home testing. 
The Department's Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) created an 
entirely virtual Foreign Service onboarding process that met FY 2020-
authorized Foreign Service hiring targets, including 414 Foreign 
Service staff hired virtually. The Department exceeded the Foreign 
Service Specialists target by 14 percent. The Department has 
experienced high Civil Service (CS) vacancy rates due to the extended 
hiring freeze; however, I understand the CS hiring backlog has been 
significantly reduced. If confirmed, I will dedicate resources to 
continue modernizing hiring strategies and support additional 
innovations to attract exceptional talent.

    Question. With last year's closure of the U.S. Consulate in 
Chengdu, the United States appears to be at a disadvantage in our 
diplomatic reach and representation in China. How will you approach re-
positioning our diplomatic footprint in China to ensure that we have 
the broadest reach, including access to parts of the country in which 
we do not currently have representation?

    Answer. I understand that the suspensions of operations at U.S. 
Consulate General Chengdu and U.S. Consulate General Wuhan 
significantly increased the workload for Embassy Beijing without adding 
additional staff, and that the Department is currently reviewing 
Mission China's request for additional personnel. It is important that 
the Department is adequately resourced and positioned to know what is 
happening inside China. If confirmed, I will review the Department's 
diplomatic presence there, including whether it should resume 
operations at U.S. Consulate General Wuhan.

    Question. For many years, the State Department has relied on 
consular fees to fund most of its basic functions, a model that proved 
untenable over this last year. How will you approach working with 
Congress to find a more sustainable model for funding the Department?

    Answer. The consular funding structure relies on visa fees and the 
growth in visa demand to fund the Department's highest priority: the 
protection of U.S. citizens and their interests. The Department retains 
only 83 percent of all consular fees it collects. Retained fees are 
exclusively from passport and visa applications. The Department remits 
the remaining consular fees, primarily for overseas citizen services, 
to the Treasury. For FY 2021, Congress expanded expenditure authorities 
of certain retained fees which otherwise could not be used to support 
U.S. citizen services. I understand that the Bureau of Consular Affairs 
may continue to need appropriations without further changes to its 
fiscal structure. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to find a 
solution.



                               __________

            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. In your prepared statement, you highlighted the 
importance of increasing diversity in the Department of State to ensure 
that it is ``fully representative of America.'' If you are confirmed, 
what metrics will you develop to measure that all aspects of diversity, 
to include race, gender, ideology, regional, and socioeconomic 
differences are represented in the Department of State's efforts to 
increase diversity?

    Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's 
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance 
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to 
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and 
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to 
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders 
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new 
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to 
championing diversity and inclusion.
    In addition, I will work to ensure that our recruiting efforts 
target all regions of the country. The Department is also developing a 
program to begin to pay some interns, which will help our recruitment 
efforts with those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged.

    Question. In the era of global connectivity and greater ease of 
movement, what is the purpose of an Embassy in the 21st century?

    Answer. Maintaining a U.S. embassy presence allows the Department 
to cultivate personal relationships around the world to advance U.S. 
foreign policy, economic, and national security interests and to 
support U.S. citizens abroad, such as assisting and evacuating more 
than 100,000 U.S. citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. While creative 
and effective pivots to virtual traditional and public diplomacy have 
allowed the Department's missions to promote U.S. priorities during 
COVID-19, consistent in-person outreach remains the most effective way 
to achieve an understanding of host countries that strengthen our 
ability to assert U.S. influence. If confirmed, I am committed to 
working with Congress to ensure Department resources and personnel are 
aligned to respond to 21st century challenges.

    Question. Do you support reorganizing or abolishing aspects of the 
Department of State to prevent redundancy and overlapping areas of 
responsibility?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Department's 
organization and aligning available resources and staffing with 
strategic priorities, as well as ensuring clear lines of accountability 
and responsibility. I am committed to ensuring the effective and 
efficient use of U.S. taxpayer dollars.

    Question. In your view, how can we reform the allocation and 
selection of career Ambassadors to ensure American interests are 
adequately represented?

    Answer. The Department of State endeavors to ensure that U.S. 
interests are strongly represented by career ambassadors who embrace 
the diversity of the United States. There is a rigorous selection 
process in place which focuses on the candidate's suitability, talents, 
skills, abilities, and experience, and the candidate is vetted by 
senior Department officials before being submitted for consideration by 
the White House. These positions are highly competitive, and the 
Department thoroughly reviews all qualified candidates. If confirmed, I 
will review the Department's ambassadorial selection process to ensure 
we are choosing the best candidates for these positions.
    Question. In your view, should any Ambassador be seated who has not 
met and counseled with the President of the United States?

    Answer. The ambassador is the direct representative of the 
President of the United States. As such, it is beneficial for the 
United States for the ambassador to meet and counsel with the 
President. However, that is not always possible, given the number of 
ambassadors and the President's schedule. As you know from your 
experience as Ambassador to Japan, ambassadors do receive a personal 
letter of instruction from the President that provides them guidance 
directly from the President in preparation for their assignment.

    Question. In order to expand the pool of qualified candidates for 
senior positions in Embassy Tokyo, specifically the position of Deputy 
Chief of Mission, the Department of State previously removed as a 
requirement Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4. Is there 
a requirement for Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4 to 
be eligible to apply for the position of Deputy Chief of Mission in 
Embassy Tokyo? Please begin your answer with yes or no.

    Answer. No. A 4/4 level in Japanese is exceedingly rare and would 
exceed the working-level requirement of 3/3 for most language-
designated positions. Although having Japanese language skills is 
certainly desirable, there is no specific language requirement for the 
selection of the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo.



                               __________

                     Additional Material Submitted 
                       by Senator Cory A. Booker

 Report by Amnesty International on the November 19, 2020 Massacre at 
                            Axum (Ethiopia)









                       Massacre in the Mountains

             A CNN Report on the November 2020 Massacre in 
                     the Tigray Region of Ethiopia



    [Editor's Note: The CNN report contains video material that 
cannot be adapted to the formats used by the Government 
Publishing Office to publish committee hearings. The report can 
be accessed with the following URL:]



https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-
massacre-intl/index.html



                              ----------                              




                               NOMINATION

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in 
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, 
Rounds, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will 
come to order. Today we are considering the nomination of 
Ambassador Samantha Power to be administrator of the United 
States Agency for International Development, known to all of us 
as USAID.
    Ambassador Power, congratulations on your nomination. Thank 
you for your willingness to return to public service. It is a 
pleasure to welcome you back before the committee.
    When I chaired your 2013 hearing to be U.N. Ambassador, I 
said you were, quote, ``impeccably qualified for the 
position.'' Your experience, drive, and dedication to the 
advancement of humanitarian principles also, I believe, make 
you impeccably qualified to be the next USAID administrator.
    Before I go any further, I understand that our 
distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, a member of the 
committee, wants to introduce you this morning. So we will turn 
to him first.
    Senator Markey?

              STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, Ranking 
Member Risch. It is my absolute honor and pleasure to introduce 
our nominee today, Ambassador Samantha Power, nominated to be 
the administrator of the United States Agency for International 
Development, USAID, and more importantly, a cherished 
Massachusetts resident.
    I would also like to welcome Ambassador Power's husband, 
Cass, and their two young children, Declan and Rian, who are 
right behind us here today.
    Samantha is a friend, a constituent, and, of course, a 
fellow Irishman--Irishwoman in her case. As noted in a New 
Yorker profile of her, Ambassador Power's last name, Power, 
comes from the Irish ``de paor,'' meaning ``of the poor.'' 
Fittingly, she has dedicated her entire life in the service of 
others, using her razor-sharp intelligence and fierce advocacy 
as a journalist, activist, and diplomat to stand with the 
world's voiceless masses, all while simultaneously advancing 
United States interests by building bonds in every corner of 
our world.
    Ambassador Power has been known to be ferocious in the 
pursuit of justice, human rights, and democracy, always taking 
the time to hear other points of view with great humility.
    While she disagrees with Henry Kissinger on everything from 
politics to the no-brainer debate of Red Sox versus Yankees, he 
has said that Samantha, quote, ``has----
    The Chairman. Do not ruin the nominee's opportunity here, 
Mr. Markey.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Markey. Ambassador Henry Kissinger has said that 
Samantha ``has an excellent analytical mind, and even on 
matters where I might have come to different conclusions, I 
respected her analysis,'' perhaps the highest praise ever given 
by a Yankees fan to a member of Red Sox Nation.
    As an immigrant from Ireland, Ambassador Power's personal 
background gives her a unique and deep respect for this country 
and all it stands for. Spending time between Pittsburgh, 
Atlanta, Dublin, and Boston, she received her bachelor's degree 
at Yale University and went on to obtain her law degree at 
Harvard University.
    She served in several key positions during the Obama 
administration, including as the Special Assistant to the 
President, the National Security Council, Senior Director for 
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights and, notably, as the 
youngest ever United States ambassador to the United Nations.
    Prior to entering government service, she began her career 
as a war correspondent, reporting from the seas of Sarajevo. 
She became a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and served as the 
founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights 
Policy at Harvard University.
    As she takes on the important work of the challenges 
Ambassador Power will face are daunting: recovering from the 
global pandemic, revamping the state of global democracy, 
tackling the climate crisis, and extending life-saving 
assistance to the nearly 1 billion people around the world who 
go to bed hungry every night.
    I know of no person more qualified to take on this task. 
She embodies that bold red, white, and blue USAID logo which 
states ``From the American People.''
    In 2015, Ambassador Power invited me to be her guest to 
attend His Holiness Pope Francis' address before the United 
Nations General Assembly. For two Irish Catholics from 
Massachusetts, it was the experience of a lifetime.
    On that day, Pope Francis spoke of the need for compassion, 
inclusivity, and action in tackling the world's shared 
challenges.
    Ambassador Power's career personifies each of these 
qualities, and I know she will take her compassion, her 
inclusivity, and her unwavering desire for action to achieve 
great things for the people of the United States and the world 
at USAID.
    So welcome, Ambassador Power. We are pleased to have you 
here. We cannot wait to see you get to work over at USAID and I 
thank you for your service to our nation.
    It is my privilege, Mr. Chairman, to introduce Ambassador 
Power to the committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Markey. We know 
that you both sit here and in other committees. So if you have 
other work to do, we certainly invite you to join us if you 
can. If not, we will see you back a little later.
    That was a rousing introduction and with--but with one 
flaw. I thought it was extraordinary. So as a Yankee fan, I 
just--I just cannot be quiet.
    So, anyhow, let me start off. Ambassador, in his inaugural 
address, President Biden said that, quote, ``We will lead not 
merely by the example of our power, but by the power of our 
example.''
    The work that dedicated professionals of USAID do 
exemplifies that example, supporting people around the world to 
advance democratic and citizen-responsive governance, to help 
ensure fair treatment and access to opportunity for vulnerable 
minorities, and provide life-saving relief on behalf of the 
American people.
    We know that these core values are the strength of our own 
country and that promoting them abroad contributes to more 
stability and stability worldwide.
    As I emphasized to Secretary Blinken at his nomination 
hearing, the U.S. must reassert itself as a global leader 
capable of confronting complex challenges.
    As we work to address COVID-19 inequality, migration, 
climate change at home, if the U.S. is not contributing 
leadership and resources to address these issues globally, then 
our security at home is tenuous at best.
    There are few people as familiar with many of today's 
complex long-running conflicts as you are. As you well know, if 
confirmed, you will be responsible for responding to new and 
renewed conflicts from Venezuela to Ethiopia to Burma, human- 
and resource-driven conflicts which have victimized hundreds of 
thousands of civilians, forcing millions to flee their homes.
    Political crises in Latin America have caused unprecedented 
humanitarian disasters. I am encouraged by the Biden 
administration's plans to renew our commitment to achieving a 
diplomatic solution to the Venezuela crisis where USAID has 
provided significant humanitarian and development assistance.
    In the Northern Triangle countries, addressing rampant 
crime, weak governance, corruption, and displacement must also 
be a top U.S. priority, as stability there directly impacts the 
security and prosperity of the United States.
    Across Africa we have seen democratic backsliding in 
various countries, along with persistent terrorist threats and 
conflicts that have cost thousands of lives and displaced 
hundreds of thousands more.
    In particular, the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Province 
has contributed to destabilizing the whole Horn of Africa while 
increased terrorism has thrown the Sahel into chaos.
    Meanwhile, climate change is increasing food insecurity and 
natural resource scarcity, and threatening the very existence 
of many small island nations, while COVID-19 pandemic continues 
to ravage the world.
    At the same time that you will be confronting these global 
challenges, you will also need to rebuild and restore USAID as 
an institution. Successful U.S. foreign policy rests on the 
appropriate utilization of the three D's: defense, diplomacy, 
and development.
    Unfortunately, the previous administration had anywhere 
from skepticism to disdain for the last of those two. While I 
believe Ambassador Green who--for whom I have great respect, 
believed and invested in the mission of the agency, the years 
after his departure have taken a serious toll on the agency 
morale, strained USAID's relationships with its implementing 
partners, and weakened trust in America.
    The agency needs internal attention, and I recommend that 
if confirmed you listen to USAID's civil servants, Foreign 
Service officers, and Foreign Service nationals to explain what 
USAID needs.
    As you may know, USAID underwent a major reorganization 
spearheaded by Ambassador Green, and while I believe he 
approached this effort with the best of intentions, the 
ultimate execution was lacking.
    I do believe the agency must be nimble enough to respond to 
changing and pressing challenges, and I trust that you will 
make the ongoing reorganization work better and consult with 
this committee on how that might be achieved.
    So, in conclusion, if confirmed, you will have your work 
cut out for you. However, I have great confidence in your 
experience and abilities, not to mention your passion for 
making this world a better place.
    But we would expect you to engage with this committee as a 
partner and asset in accomplishing USAID's mission. This 
committee has a long bipartisan history of support for USAID, 
and I expect you to engage in frequent and open dialogue to 
help sustain that support.
    I look forward to hearing from you today. We welcome your 
family, who is always part of the sacrifices that those of us 
who are in public service make.
    And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking 
member, Senator Risch.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Menendez. I appreciate 
that, and Ambassador Power, thank you for agreeing to take this 
on and thank you to your family. As the chairman noted, there 
is always sacrifices that are shared, sometimes not equally by 
the family.
    The role of the USAID administrator is an important one. We 
all know that. In order to accomplish the goals of our--as a 
nation, we need a development agency that reflects the 
challenges of the 21st century and is staffed and resourced to 
be strategic, efficient, effective, and accountable.
    USAID must be led by someone who understands that aid is 
most effective when it is targeted toward clearly-defined U.S. 
national interests and those who are committed to advancing 
good governance, economic growth, and self-reliance.
    The challenges before us are immense. An estimated 80 
million people globally have been displaced from their homes, 
26 million of whom are now refugees. The conflict in Syria has 
entered its tenth year and has left more than 12 million people 
food insecure.
    Ebola has reemerged in West Africa and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, and the COVID-19 pandemic has shuttered 
schools, destroyed livelihoods, and pushed millions of people 
into poverty around the world.
    USAID has a successful record of responding to emergencies, 
and we will count on the next administrator to put dollars 
provided for humanitarian assistance to good use.
    The agency has also done tremendous work in combating food 
insecurity, expanding access to water, and empowering women to 
participate in their economies.
    USAID needs to work on coordination with the CDC. This is 
why the largest U.S. global health program, PEPFAR, is 
coordinated by the Department of State.
    As we continue to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, I look 
forward to working with the department, USAID, the CDC, and my 
colleagues here in Congress on a more comprehensive approach to 
global health, security, and diplomacy.
    Senator Menendez and I have been discussing that issue in 
particular, and we have talked about a path forward to where we 
can get a bipartisan piece of legislation that will be one of 
the most important things we do as far as global health is 
concerned and as far as the people of the world are concerned.
    We must put in the work now so we can get ahead of the next 
pandemic and keep Americans safe from infectious disease 
threats before they cross our borders again. We should also 
maximize the impact of U.S. contributions to COVAX and GAVI, 
the Vaccine Alliance, and through the Global Fund's COVID-19 
response mechanism.
    Beyond pandemics, I am interested to learn more about how 
you, if confirmed, will position USAID to counter China's 
malign development model. That model is something that many of 
us consider to be one of the greatest threats to U.S. national 
security.
    I would also like to better understand your view on 
promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, the 
foundations of healthy and stable societies. The United States 
cannot, should not, and should not even consider singlehandedly 
trying to solve the world's problems. Difficult choices must be 
made.
    But while the administrator is not empowered to make those 
choices independently, USAID does remain under the foreign 
policy direction of the Secretary of State.
    I am pleased to see that the next administrator will have a 
seat at the principal's table on critical matters of 
development and humanitarian response.
    If confirmed, I am eager to work with you to ensure that 
USAID remains strategic focused and accountable.
    Thank you, Senator Menendez.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    With that, Madam Ambassador, the floor is yours. Your full 
statement will be included in the record. We ask you to 
summarize it, and then we will have a conversation with you.

 STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, OF MASSACHUSETTS, NOMINATED 
      TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR 
                   INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

    Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member Risch, members of the committee. It is a tremendous 
honor to appear before you today. I am humbled by President 
Biden's trust in me and by the opportunity to join such an 
indispensable agency at such a critical time.
    I would like to begin by thanking my mother, Veera Delaney, 
a doctor whom I have watched care for her patients during the 
darkest hours of this pandemic, my father, Eddie Bourke, whose 
curiosity about the world helped spark my own, my husband and 
best friend, Cass Sunstein, an American original, and my 11-
year-old son, Declan, and eight-year-old daughter, Rian, whose 
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our 
responsibility to our planet.
    Public service does ask a lot of families and I am 
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine. 
I would also like to thank the members of this committee.
    While bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan 
support for the U.S. Agency for International Development has 
saved and improved millions of lives while enhancing U.S. 
security and U.S. prosperity.
    I was fortunate to work with many of you when I last 
served. If confirmed, I will be eager to build on these 
relationships and forge new ones.
    I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I 
started my career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and 
partners deliver food to the vulnerable while supporting 
mothers as they tried to locate their missing sons and 
husbands.
    Since then, wherever I traveled, whether in East Timor just 
after became the world's newest nation, Darfur in the middle of 
this century's first genocide, or West Africa at the height of 
the Ebola epidemic, USAID was there. America was there, 
identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to meet them.
    In my work, I have seen how the investments the United 
States makes in other countries are investments in our own 
security. I have seen the inextricable linkages between 
political freedom and broad-based economic growth.
    I have seen that the most effective development is driven 
by those on the ground with local knowledge and expertise, and 
I have seen the overwhelming power of individual dignity as a 
driver of world events.
    Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to 
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they 
be able to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and 
exercise their fundamental rights.
    If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of 
USAID and invest in the capabilities of the agency's dedicated 
10,000 Foreign Service officers, civil servants, locally 
employed staff, contractors, and other personnel.
    This means seeking out and amplifying their insights, 
learning about specific local needs, and adapting our programs. 
It means addressing the issues related to diversity, equity, 
inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce, and it 
means emphasizing what President Biden himself and both of you, 
I think, already have stressed.
    Development is critical to America's ability to tackle the 
toughest problems of our time, economic, humanitarian, and 
geopolitical. In consultation with you and others in Congress, 
I will aim to ensure that USAID enhances its long-standing 
leadership in food security, education, women's empowerment, 
and global health, while also addressing four interconnected 
and gargantuan challenges confronting the world at this moment.
    First, the COVID pandemic and the development progress that 
has been imperiled in everything from food security to gender 
equality to access to education to economic growth.
    Climate change, and the surge in droughts, storms, food 
shortages, and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies.
    Third, with more conflicts occurring today than at any 
point since the end of the Cold War, conflict and state 
collapse.
    And fourth, finally, with freedom declining around the 
world for the fifteenth straight year in a row, democratic 
backsliding.
    In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure 
the committee that I will work every day to expand burden 
sharing in the international system. At the U.N., working with 
my administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major 
commitments from other countries to care for refugees, respond 
to the Ebola epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the 
sustainable development goals.
    U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to mobilize 
governments, international organizations, foundations, and 
businesses to help countries achieve their own development 
goals.
    If I am confirmed to lead this great agency, I will work 
tirelessly with members on both sides of the aisle to ensure 
that taxpayer dollars are well spent. Guided by evidence, I 
will work with you to adapt or replace programs that are not 
delivering. I will be transparent and accessible as together we 
chart a course that meets the needs of the current moment.
    In 1979, as Senator Markey alluded to, my mother brought my 
younger brother and me to America from Ireland, blessing me 
with a life full of opportunity. As one who has been given so 
much by the United States, I would take it as an incomparable 
privilege to lead the world's premier development agency in 
order to expand the opportunities available to others.
    I thank you, and I look forward to answering your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Power follows:]


               Prepared Statement of Hon. Samantha Power

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, 
it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today. Thank you, Senator 
Markey, for your kind introduction.
    I am humbled by President Biden's trust in me, and by the 
opportunity to join such an indispensable Agency at this critical time.
    I would like to begin by thanking my mother Vera Delaney, a doctor 
whom I have watched care for her patients during the darkest hours of 
this pandemic; my father Eddie Bourke, whose curiosity about the world 
helped spark my own; my husband Cass Sunstein, an American original; 
and my 11-year-old son Declan and 8-year-old daughter Rian, whose 
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our responsibility 
to our planet. Public service asks a lot of families, and I'm 
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine.
    I would also like to thank the members of this committee. While 
bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan support for the U.S. 
Agency for International Development has saved and improved millions of 
lives while enhancing U.S. security and prosperity. I was fortunate to 
work with many of you when I last served. If confirmed, I will be eager 
to build on these relationships and forge new ones.
    I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I started my 
career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and partners deliver 
food to the vulnerable, while supporting mothers as they tried to 
locate their missing sons and husbands. Since then, wherever I 
travelled--whether to East Timor just after it became the world's 
newest nation; Darfur, in the midst of this century's first genocide; 
or west Africa, at the height of the Ebola epidemic--USAID was there--
America was there--identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to 
meet them.
    In my work--as a writer, professor, human rights advocate, national 
security staffer, and diplomat--I've seen how the investments the 
United States makes in other countries are investments in our own 
security. I've seen the inextricable linkages between political freedom 
and broad-based economic growth. I've seen that the most effective 
development is driven by those on the ground with local knowledge and 
expertise. And I've seen the power of individual dignity as a driver of 
world events. Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to 
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they be able 
to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and exercise their 
fundamental rights.
    If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of USAID 
and invest in the capabilities of the Agency's dedicated 10,000 foreign 
service officers, civil servants, locally-employed staff, contractors, 
and other personnel. This means seeking out and amplifying their 
insights, learning about specific local needs, and adapting our 
programs. It means urgently addressing the issues relating to 
diversity, equity, inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce. 
And it means emphasizing what President Biden himself has stressed: 
Development is critical to
    America's ability to tackle the toughest problems of our time--
economic, humanitarian and geopolitical.
    In consultation with you and others in Congress, I will aim to 
ensure that USAID enhances its longstanding leadership in food 
security, education, women's empowerment, and global health, while also 
addressing four interconnected and gargantuan challenges confronting 
the world at this moment:


   The COVID-19 pandemic. With decades of development gains shattered 
        by COVID, imperiling progress on everything from food security 
        to gender equality and access to education, USAID's support to 
        partners will be vital for recovery, including by building more 
        robust and durable health infrastructure for the future.

   Climate Change. With the surge in droughts, storms, food shortages, 
        and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies, USAID can help 
        countries become more resilient, while supporting their efforts 
        to reduce carbon emissions.

   Conflict and state collapse. With more conflicts occurring today 
        than at any point since the end of the Cold War, USAID 
        assistance will continue to mitigate suffering, while working 
        with U.S. diplomats and our international partners to address 
        the root causes of such crises.

   Democratic backsliding. With freedom declining around the world for 
        the fifteenth year in a row, USAID's democracy, rights, anti-
        corruption, and governance programming must nimbly support 
        democratic and civil society actors as they push back against 
        creeping authoritarianism and seek to build lasting democratic 
        institutions.


    In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure the 
committee that I will work every day to expand burden-sharing in the 
international system. At the United Nations, working with my 
administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major commitments 
from other countries to care for refugees, respond to the Ebola 
epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the Sustainable 
Development Goals. U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to 
mobilize governments, international organizations, foundations, and 
businesses to help countries achieve their own development goals.
    If I am confirmed to lead this great Agency, I will work tirelessly 
with Members on both sides of the aisle to ensure that taxpayer dollars 
are well spent. Guided by evidence, I will work with you to adapt or 
replace programs that are not delivering. I will be transparent and 
accessible--as together we chart a course that meets the needs of the 
current moment.
    In 1979 my mother brought my younger brother and me to America from 
Ireland, blessing me with a life full of opportunity. As one who has 
been given so much by the United States, I would take it as an 
incomparable privilege to lead the world's premier development Agency 
in order to expand the opportunities available to others.
    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Power.
    We will start five-minute rounds of--in order of those who 
have appeared either in person or virtually, and I will start 
with the chair.
    USAID plays a central role in the U.S. government's 
humanitarian response to conflict and forced migration. Last 
year, I released a comprehensive report on forced displacement, 
which found that the vast majority of the 80 million displaced 
people worldwide are not displaced for months but for years or 
decades at a time.
    How will you lead efforts at USAID to ensure coherence 
between the U.S. humanitarian and development programs and to 
ensure that a maximum impact is achieved in assisting 
protracted displacement?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    Well, first, let me say that those displacement numbers, as 
you know, are the highest since World War II. Every year, we 
see that number go up. When I was U.N. Ambassador, it was the 
highest since World War II, and it gets worse and worse.
    Climate-related events, of course, are a factor, and I 
think you are likely to see a surge and displacement stemming 
from the economic fallout from the COVID pandemic.
    It is important to look behind the numbers at the causes of 
displacement, which vary. I alluded in my testimony to the fact 
that more conflicts are occurring now than at any point since 
the end of the Cold War. As you noted just now, conflicts are 
lasting longer.
    So it used to be that one conflict would start but another 
might have been brought to an end and that, therefore, again, 
those numbers were not just continuing to grow.
    But as a new conflict starts, other conflicts are just 
lasting longer and longer, and so the protracted refugee 
population is higher than it has been since World War II.
    The investment that President Biden has committed to making 
in diplomacy is a critical part of this. We have seen, for 
example, in Libya, diplomacy produce, for the first time in 
many years, a U.N.-brokered transition government.
    We need diplomacy to pay dividends in Yemen, which is 
facing the worst humanitarian crisis of any place on earth. And 
when it comes to a place like the Northern Triangle, where you 
have been so active, it is critical to look at the different 
drivers of migration, which range from physical personal 
insecurity and gang violence and corruption to the lack of 
economic opportunity.
    And USAID, again, I think has a really important role to 
play in mitigating humanitarian suffering, but also looking 
upstream at why people are leaving their homes in the first 
place.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Let me ask you this. Under the 
last restructuring of USAID, the Democracy Rights and 
Governance Center was moved under the new development, 
Democracy and Innovation Bureau.
    My question is, I think this is a very significant part of 
the mission of USAID. I noticed you mentioned it among your 
four pillars.
    How will you elevate and integrate democracy and human 
rights in USAID's response both to the COVID pandemic, which 
has provided cover for autocrats to attack civil society and 
diminish human rights, but even more broadly?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Well, there is a 
contest in this world occurring now between two models, the 
democratic model and an authoritarian model. The trends were 
not pretty before COVID struck and, as you note, they are 
getting worse in terms of human rights recessions, even in 
established democracies around the world.
    I think that there would be no question to any of the 
wonderful USAID staff as to the level of priority that I give 
democracy and human rights. My whole career has been in that 
field.
    I was moved to go into foreign policy by the massacre in 
Tiananmen Square that occurred in June of 1989 when I was still 
a college kid.
    And so on the specifics of whether the Democracy Rights and 
Governance Center and that programming belongs within the DDI 
Bureau where it is now, I would love to revert.
    But on the substance, I would just like to note that, 
again, this is incredibly important programming, partnering 
with the Department of State and their Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor Bureau, looking at anti-corruption work specifically, 
which is a real Achilles for authoritarian and illiberal 
countries, I think one we have not taken full advantage of.
    This will be a huge priority for me, Senator.
    The Chairman. All right. And finally, you mentioned in your 
comments, and I think it is one of the central issues that we 
need to face as we deal with the challenges of migration and 
the challenges that we have at the border, having AID address 
violence, corruption, and other drivers of migration in the 
Northern Triangle countries are incredibly important as part 
of--Vice President Biden was--when he was vice president he had 
a plan then.
    Unfortunately, it was not continued. There is another 
provision in--that he has put forth. How do you see the key 
components of a joint USAID-State Department strategy as part 
of that the Northern Triangle effort?
    Ambassador Power. Well, just to note that I have been very 
heartened in the briefings that I have been able to have from 
outside by the reliance on data and evidence in tailoring those 
programs.
    USAID actually gets data from the International 
Organization of Migration and CBP, the Customs Border 
Protection, to find out why individuals are leaving their 
homes, to dig into the specifics, to dig into the localities 
from which they are fleeing.
    And USAID--prior to the funding suspension under the Trump 
administration, USAID actually has tailored programs around 
those places where people are most likely to flee and tailor 
programming around, again, the causes of migration.
    So I think that is the right approach. It will take us some 
time to ramp back up, unfortunately, because some of those 
programs were suspended. But the infrastructure is in place and 
I look forward to working with you again to dig into specifics.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you.
    Ambassador Power, first of all, thank you for taking the 
time yesterday and previously for you and I to talk about this 
position and your confirmation, and one of the things we talked 
about yesterday was National Security Memorandum No. 1 that 
President Biden has executed in which the Secretary of State 
will lead and, in coordination with the USAID administrator, 
the development of the U.S. Government wide plan to combat 
COVID-19 pandemic.
    Can I get your thoughts on the record for that, please, 
briefly?
    Ambassador Power. Specifically on COVID-19 or on the 
structural----
    Senator Risch. Well, generally on the structure and then as 
it relates to COVID-19.
    Ambassador Power. Yeah. I mean, I think that as actually 
COVID-19 illustrates probably better than any contemporary 
threat, our fates, and the fates of the American people, are 
connected to health infrastructure, economic prosperity, the 
curbing of extremism and radicalization internationally.
    And so programming that USAID does in that regard, in 
cooperation with the State Department and other agencies, is 
incredibly important for our security and what President Biden 
has done in elevating USAID and giving it a seat on the 
National Security Council and in the Principles Committee, I 
think, has just effectively enshrined that reality, which is 
that our development efforts and our diplomatic efforts have to 
be resourced and prioritized alongside, of course, our 
essential defense efforts.
    So I think that is the logic. You know, from having spoken 
with him about this decision, that is the logic of elevating 
USAID. The expertise is there, the know-how is there, and I 
think what is really important about doing this is it means 
that that expertise and know-how will be reflected in the 
interagency, not only at high levels but at every level.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. Thanks for that answer.
    Moving offshore, the memorandum also refers to a diplomatic 
outreach plan for enhancing the United States response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic by engaging partner nations.
    Could you give me your thoughts on that, please?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    When I was U.N. Ambassador, I had the privilege of being 
part of President Obama's effort to mobilize a large anti-Ebola 
coalition to prevent, in that instance, an epidemic, a horrific 
epidemic from becoming a global pandemic of the kind that we 
are now living through.
    I think the United States is at its most powerful, 
effective, and efficient when it leverages the support that it 
offers international institutions or the resources that it 
dedicates to combating global challenges, when it leverages 
that to get others to do more.
    And that is what President Biden, I think, has already done 
in the context of announcing the $2 billion that you allocated 
late last year for GAVI, for the vaccine effort, that that $2 
billion is going to be contributed.
    But it is also going to be leveraged to get other countries 
to do more before the next $2 billion is obligated, and I think 
that is just one example. There has not--there has not been, I 
should say, optimal coordination, I think, in the international 
global vaccine area and that is something that I am very eager 
to dig into, if I am confirmed.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate those thoughts.
    The Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act, which I 
introduced, creates a coordinator position at the State 
Department that is consistent with the type of framework I 
believe that President Biden intends in his memorandum.
    Are you familiar with that, by any chance, and go ahead. 
Your thoughts?
    Ambassador Power. The prior version of the bill I was 
familiar with. I have not seen--I think the bill that you 
either are on the verge of introducing or have just introduced.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. And as I indicated, 
Senator Menendez and I have been talking about the global 
health issue and an effort by this committee in that regard, 
and I intend to work with Senator Menendez on the creation of 
the framework because, obviously, the success is going to 
depend on that framework and I hope to engage you and your 
agency as we move forward on that.
    And with that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Senator Cardin, who is with us virtually?
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Ambassador 
Power, thank you very much for your willingness to continue to 
serve our nation.
    I want to follow up on comments that you made earlier this 
year, which was something I was pleased to see where you 
indicated that anti-corruption would be a centerpiece of 
President Biden's foreign policy agenda.
    And you have already answered some of that with Senator 
Menendez in regards to how you are using the DRG Center. You 
specifically mentioned in those comments the use of the tools 
that are at your disposal, including Magnitsky sanctions.
    Can I take it that you will work with us as we look at 
permanently authorizing the Global Magnitsky statute today? It 
is by executive order and by statute that expires. We take 
pretty much what was in the executive order, Senator Wicker and 
I, and codified that as permanent authorization.
    Do we have your support on that legislation?
    Ambassador Power. Unequivocally, and let me just thank you 
for the Magnitsky Act where your leadership was so pivotal. As 
you know, it has now been replicated to a large extent in 
Europe and in Canada.
    I think one of our tasks is to ensure that other countries 
adopt similar measures so that we can multilateralize these 
corruption and human rights sanctions.
    Senator Cardin. And Senator Young and I have introduced 
legislation to try to build on it to give capacity for our 
missions to evaluate how well the countries in which they 
operate are are dealing with corruption.
    So it is a way of using a standard similar to what we do in 
trafficking in persons to monitor progress made in fighting 
corruption. You mentioned in your article anti-bribery statutes 
and dealing with those--the laundering, anti-laundering 
statutes, et cetera.
    Will you work with us as we look to enact this law to give 
you additional tools to help fight corruption?
    Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator. Always looking for 
additional tools. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    So let me talk a little bit about Central America. You 
already talked a little bit about that with Senator Menendez, 
and I know that President Biden is looking at providing help to 
the Central American countries in order to do what is right in 
our hemisphere from the humanitarian point of view as well as 
the practical aspects of migration.
    But there is systemic corruption in these countries that if 
we do not deal with it we are going to be giving money that 
will not get to its intended purpose.
    So how do you intend to make sure that our assistance to 
the Central American countries are used for the people to deal 
with the problems of Central America and not just fuel 
corruption?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    You put your finger on a real inhibitor of progress--above 
all progress for the people of that region. Let me say that, 
from what I understand of USAID programming up to this point, 
there is, of course, a recognition of the barrier that 
corruption has constituted to economic progress, to progress in 
combating threats to physical security, and thus, much of the 
programming is routed, for example, through local officials who 
have been identified as reformers or--and/or civil society 
partners.
    And, indeed, many of those partners, as you know, are doing 
work to hold the central authorities accountable for 
transgressions and for different forms of corruption.
    It has been disappointing to see some of the strides that 
were made, for example, in Guatemala and Honduras through CSIG. 
CSIG was actually the most popular and I know you were critical 
in pushing for its mandates to be renewed successively in 
Guatemala. It was the most popular institution in Guatemala 
before it was shut down, and so that is disappointing because 
it had a really important role to play. Then Vice President 
Biden was also critical in ensuring that it was preserved 
there.
    But I think, thinking through at the central level, how--
what more we can do for civil society actors that are holding 
government accountable to try to change the equation so that 
those governments that are trending in worrying directions 
reverse that tide.
    Senator Cardin. I know that we can help you in this regard. 
I strongly support our involvement in Central America. But when 
we put conditionality on aid, it gives the administration, I 
think, the additional strength in dealing with the governments 
to indicate there has got to be progress made in dealing with 
the governance issues.
    So I hope you take that as friendly help when we look at 
conditionality to make sure that we do achieve progress in 
dealing with systemic problems in these countries.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Portman, who is with us virtually, I understand?
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Ambassador Power, and also thank you to your husband, Cass 
Sunstein, for his willingness to come back into public service. 
We appreciate your willingness to step up again.
    I enjoyed our conversation, and let me follow up a little 
bit on what Senator Cardin just talked to you about.
    As you know, I suppose, we have spent $3.6 billion of 
taxpayer money in the Northern Triangle countries--El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala--in the past five years. The results are 
not impressive, understanding that recently some of the natural 
disasters in that area, particularly the hurricanes, added to 
this.
    But I will tell you, I just got the numbers this morning 
from last week. Five hundred and fifty kids per day came into 
the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle countries, 
which is five or six times more than in January when there was 
less than a hundred.
    In terms of families--and by the way, there were 300 in 
February so we are going up and up and up--in terms of 
families, 1,500 per day last week, as compared to a thousand in 
February, on average, less than a hundred in January, again, a 
15 times increase.
    So the push factors are not being addressed effectively. 
People are coming. The pull factors are that the changes were 
made in policies to allow people to come and they are 
responding and the traffickers are responding.
    So I guess what I would ask you is how you would do it 
differently. Senator Cardin rightly asked you about corruption, 
and I believe insisting on transparency and rule of law and 
tying our aid is important.
    By the way, of that $3.6 billion, as you know, much was 
sent through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, which 
has precisely those criteria and others to ensure the money is 
well spent.
    But I guess I would ask you also about tying it to 
immigration and specifically requiring those countries to work 
with us to have people apply for asylum from their country of 
origin or if they feel it is unsafe to do it in a safe third 
country, which is one of the programs that was discontinued by 
the current administration.
    In other words, someone could apply in Guatemala for asylum 
if they are from Honduras, which would be the first country 
that they would come into, a safe third country.
    Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us 
spending what President Biden has now suggested, which is 
another $4 billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been set 
in the last five years?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    Well, first, just to embrace the premise of your question 
that we have a responsibility to be effective vigilant stewards 
of taxpayer resources, this is an immensely challenging set of 
problems, and as you called them push factors out of the region 
to deal with there are no silver bullets. Needless to say, if 
there were someone would have found one along the way.
    But I guess I would just offer a few thoughts. I mean, 
first of all, there is actually compelling data, and I look 
forward to digging into the numbers further if I am--if I am 
confirmed, but that shows that, for example, in the districts 
where USAID had programming aimed at curbing violence--for 
example, in El Salvador between 2015 and 2017, there was a 61 
percent drop in homicide rates.
    There are comparable numbers in terms of the statistics in 
districts that USAID programming was set up in Honduras, with a 
slightly smaller drop but, nonetheless, a very substantial drop 
in homicide rates.
    I think that is encouraging. I think, you know, suspending 
the programs, unfortunately, gave us less influence in using 
our programming to work with those reformist officials who were 
willing, again, to crackdown on violence within their 
neighborhoods.
    Senator Portman. Ambassador, let me interrupt you just for 
a second----
    Ambassador Power. Of course.
    Senator Portman [continuing]. Because I want to cover 
another topic as well. But just on this topic, having just been 
at the border the last few days, I did talk to a lot of 
unaccompanied kids and also to families and single men coming 
over from Central America and, as you know, the constant 
refrain is, ``I can make 10 or sometimes 20 times as much in 
America. I want to take care of my family.''
    So I agree that dealing with the violence is important and 
I applaud those changes. And, in fact, not only has violence 
been dealt with in those countries so that the numbers are a 
little better, generally, but also the economic situation is a 
little better, although the hurricanes and the COVID-19 numbers 
are probably not going to be as good.
    But it is--it is an economic issue, primarily. In other 
words, people will still be looking to come to the United 
States. And my question to you was, should we condition 
billions of dollars in taxpayer money not just on the important 
things that Senator Cardin talked about but also on working 
with us on this issue of immigration and, specifically, on 
asylum claims? Do you agree with that?
    Ambassador Power. Well, I think that one of your premises, 
if I understood it, of putting individuals in a position where 
they could apply for refugee status or asylum in the region 
rather than entrusting, for example, their children to 
coyotes----
    Senator Portman. Right. And taking a dangerous course, 
which is----
    Ambassador Power. I do not think any parents, you know, 
relishes the entrusting of one's child, again, to a smuggler. 
So one of the things that we looked at in the Obama 
administration, as you know, was setting up these UNHCR offices 
in the region. I think that is something that President Biden 
is looking at again, and that is very important.
    But you put your finger, again, on one of the major causes 
of migration, which is the lack of economic opportunity, and 
that is something that USAID has a lot of experience investing 
in.
    You are right, we have not produced the same kinds of 
results, as I have pointed to, when it comes to physical 
security and crime. But I think, you know, now with tailored 
programming, not being everywhere but being specifically in 
those communities where we know that there is the highest 
concentration of migrants, we can, working with you and being 
held accountable, hopefully, begin to make a dent.
    Senator Portman. Well, Ambassador, I hope you--I hope you 
work with--my time is getting toward the end here. But my 
question is specifically dealing with the economy----
    The Chairman. The senator's time has past expired so----
    Senator Portman [continuing]. And the violence issues, but 
also if you could work with us on this issue of immigration and 
asylum so people can apply from their home country or a safe 
third country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons, who just returned from the Tigray region in 
Ethiopia on a mission and we appreciate his work, and you are 
recognized.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch, and Ambassador Power.
    Welcome, and thank you for your willingness to serve our 
nation again, and to Cass and to Declan and to Rian, thank you 
for supporting your wife and mother in her tremendous service 
to our nation.
    You are taking on this role, hopefully, once confirmed at a 
critically important time. We all saw how, in the last year of 
the previous administration, the absence of a Senate-confirmed 
administrator.
    The absence of clear and forceful leadership led to real 
drift and some challenges operationally and organizationally.
    There are humanitarian crises all over the world, as many 
of us will comment today, from Venezuela to Yemen to Burma to 
Ethiopia to many other nations, and clear and capable 
leadership at USAID is critical.
    I have profound respect and appreciation for the work of 
the USAID, the folks who are deployed around the world. I just 
had the opportunity to meet with a number of the humanitarian 
partners and leaders that USAID is relying on in Ethiopia, as I 
have elsewhere.
    I also think it is critical we continue to explain to the 
average American how the work of USAID overseas helps keep us 
safer, healthier, and more prosperous.
    And, tragically, COVID-19 is an opportunity for us to 
remind folks exactly how vaccinating the rest of the world is 
critical to preventing new variants from breaking out and from 
harming all of us.
    So I look forward to working with you in my role as the 
chairman of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations 
Subcommittee and to having a meaningful dialogue.
    Let me dive in first, if I could, to what I just saw. If 
confirmed, can we count on USAID to work with this committee 
and with all of us in Congress to ensure that we are addressing 
the humanitarian crisis throughout Ethiopia and, in particular, 
in the Tigray region?
    Ambassador Power. Absolutely. Thank you for taking the trip 
that you took. USAID, as you know, just made an announcement of 
an additional $52 million dollars in humanitarian support. I 
think that makes the contribution so far $150 million plus 
since the crisis began.
    But the humanitarian--mitigating the humanitarian 
suffering, of course, is not all we need to be doing. We need 
to get at the root causes of that suffering and secure access 
so that that food can be delivered.
    So thank you for what you have done to try to make that 
happen.
    Senator Coons. And I am optimistic we will make progress 
now on humanitarian access.
    I also met with the head of the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, Daniel Bekele, and discussed with him and with 
other international leaders about carrying out a thorough and 
independent investigation of human rights abuses.
    The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle 
Bachelet, has also talked recently about doing a joint 
investigation.
    From your career working in human rights issues, what kind 
of investigation do you think would be most effective and have 
the greatest impact in getting to the root of human rights 
violations that have occurred?
    Ambassador Power. Well, the biggest challenge, 
traditionally, for international human rights investigations, 
especially independent ones, is securing access, and so the key 
is not only getting the approval from the Center and from the 
prime minister for something like that, but making sure that 
that agreement trickles down and that there is a willingness on 
the part of the authorities who have granted access to ensure 
that, you know, the checkpoints do not go up then as soon as 
the investigators deploy.
    There are many, many countries where atrocity allegations 
have occurred, have developed. Unfortunately, creative 
traditions of erecting roadblocks, you know, where it matters--
in other words, harassing, intimidating witnesses and so forth, 
denying visas to particular communities, blaming so-called 
uncontrolled militia, you know, without, at the Center, really 
taking steps to make sure that those militia allow 
investigators to do their work.
    Senator Coons. Well, I look forward to partnering with you 
and relying on your advice in exactly how to make sure that 
this commitment that has recently been announced by the prime 
minister to investigate and this partnership that I think is 
quite possible is successful.
    And there is a number of things I look forward to working 
with you on: the implementation of the Global Fragility Act, a 
bill that I helped lead that has been signed into law that is a 
new tool to ensure that development and diplomacy take the lead 
in support of defense work in securing countries from the Sahel 
to the Northern Triangle, the Nita Lowey Middle East 
Partnership for Peace Act and ensuring that we are investing in 
both people-to-people programs and joint economic ventures to 
facilitate the conditions for a possible two-state solution, 
and then ways in which we can keep the Development Finance 
Corporation a development finance corporation and to best use 
the MCC.
    My last question will be for you about the critical role 
that delivering safe and effective vaccines to the developing 
world can play in continuing our role as one of the world's 
leading supporters of effective public health programs.
    There has been a significant increase in the appropriated 
funds available through COVAX. We have rejoined WHO.
    What do you think we most need to do to ensure the prompt 
and equitable distribution of effective vaccines globally?
    Ambassador Power. Well, let me just cite, Senator, the 
International Chamber of Commerce report--I think we discussed 
it on the phone a month or two ago--but that shows that until 
and unless there is economic recovery by virtue of vaccinations 
and curbing of the pandemic in the developing world, it is 
going to cost the global economy $9 trillion, including 
developed countries $4.5 trillion. Between that and the issue 
of variants, where as long as the pandemic is raging somewhere 
there is a chance of some mutation and variants moving 
aggressively, it is so in our interest to make that happen.
    COVAX, if fully funded, will vaccinate 20 percent of 
people, they hope, by the end of this year--20 percent of the 
people in developing countries.
    That is not sufficient, and so looking to see how COVAX is 
being supplemented by bilateral donations, surplus donations, 
and other contributions, I think, is really important.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Paul?
    Senator Paul. Good morning. Welcome.
    Ambassador Power. Good morning.
    Senator Paul. Many on the left are horrified at being 
associated with the neocon foreign policy. But it is no small 
irony that the end results of responsibility to protect are, in 
reality, little different than the interventionist policies of 
John Bolton and Bill Kristol.
    Like the neocons, the liberal advocates of responsibility 
to protect have advocated for military intervention in Libya, 
Syria, and Yemen.
    Sure, the reasoning might be more humanitarian than 
geopolitical, but the advocacy for military intervention ends 
up looking pretty much the same.
    I remember liking what candidate Obama said about military 
intervention, that without congressional approval it was only 
justified when there was an imminent threat.
    After President Obama began bombing Libya, I asked him at 
lunch one day, what about your pledge to ask and seek 
congressional permission unless it was an imminent threat.
    He responded that there was an imminent threat to Benghazi. 
I looked at him incredulously and responded, ``Really? An 
imminent threat to a foreign city is your justification for an 
unauthorized war?''
    The responsibility to protect ideology did not learn much 
from the Libyan debacle and immediately pushed the Obama 
administration to jump into Syria. Many on the left, like 
Secretary Blinken, do not admit that there was too much 
intervention. They actually believe in Syria that they failed 
because there was too little military intervention.
    Several hundred thousand people have died in Syria and more 
than a million refugees have been displaced. If you are talking 
about humanitarianism, famine, the wars, really, other than 
natural causes war is the number-one cause of famine around the 
world.
    An argument can be made, though, that Assad would probably 
massacred far fewer people had the West and the Gulf States 
stayed out of the civil war.
    Are you willing to admit that the Libyan and Syrian 
military interventions that you advocated for were a mistake, 
and that going forward, you will be more conscious of the 
unintended humanitarian disasters that seem to occur again and 
again with our military interventions in Africa and throughout 
the Middle East?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    Well, first, if I may, just talk about USAID and its role, 
which I think can be very important in Libya today.
    I think before you arrived I mentioned that there is--a 
power-sharing government has finally been set up in Libya. 
USAID right now, because of the security conditions, operates 
its programs, largely, from the----
    Senator Paul. You would acknowledge Libya is worse now than 
it was before we started bombing them?
    Ambassador Power [continuing]. I think it is really 
important with Libya having the opportunity to have elections 
at the end of this year for us to do what we can to support 
those elections. I think it is in the face of mass atrocities 
there are a whole set of nonmilitary tools that are--I would 
hope that you would support deploying.
    We had some successes with them, for example, in helping 
bring about the South Sudanese Referendum, which was a risk of 
grave atrocities occurring back in the first term of the Obama 
administration, an attempt to steal an election in Cote 
d'Ivoire where diplomatic pressure averted mass atrocities, and 
even sending technical advisors, military advisors, to Central 
Africa to combat the Lord's Resistance Army, which kidnapped 
children and----
    Senator Paul. Do you think we were successful in Libya, 
that Libya is a better place because of our military 
intervention, or Syria?
    Ambassador Power. The decision that President Obama made 
when confronted with the risk to the people of Benghazi and 
other civilian centers was an incredibly difficult one, and 
again, in sitting in the Situation Room, I think it is hard now 
to remember--you know, with the United Nations, NATO, the Arab 
League, this body, the Senate, unanimously calling for a no-fly 
zone, President Obama made the judgment that the risks of 
allowing Benghazi to fall and the slaughter that would ensue 
were not----
    Senator Paul [continuing]. I know it is a tough decision, 
but in retrospect, was Libya a good idea to militarily 
intervene in Libya? A good idea to militarily intervene in 
Syria, in retrospect?
    Ambassador Power. I think the challenge is that we do not 
have the counterfactual and, certainly, the fallout in the--in 
the wake of the intervention, the centrifugal forces have been 
incredibly difficult to manage and, above all, hard on the 
Libyan people.
    Senator Paul. But we have to learn lessons sometime. I 
mean, we went into Libya. We went into Iraq. We destabilized 
Iraq. We are still dealing with that. We went into Libya, 
destabilized Libya. We are still dealing with that. Syria, the 
same thing, and Yemen as well.
    So, I mean, there should be an accumulation of knowledge 
and a learning curve here that our interventions make things 
worse, not better.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
    I, certainly, agree that nonmilitary tools in the toolbox 
are--carry with them far fewer risks. I opposed the war in 
Iraq. I agree with you on Yemen.
    All I am trying to describe is that when these situations 
arise, it is a question almost of lesser evils, that the 
choices are very challenging.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations, 
Ambassador Power, for your nomination.
    You have been a human rights activist. You have played a 
number of roles with the Obama administration, including U.N. 
ambassador, and now you are poised to take the helm of a 
critical engine of humanitarian assistance around the globe.
    So I am going to ask you questions that kind of combine all 
the roles, both about what you might do at USAID but also how 
you see some of the challenges that affect the committee.
    You began your prepared remarks with four gargantuan 
challenges, and one was democracy backsliding, and I want to 
talk to you about that. We are seeing it everywhere.
    We are seeing it in every continent. We are seeing, as you 
indicate, declines in freedom and democracy indices, whether 
you are looking at, you know, Freedom House annual reports or 
the Economist Democracy Index annual reports.
    President Biden has indicated that sometime either later 
this year or earlier next year he wants to convene a summit of 
democracies, which I think is a great idea.
    How would you foresee USAID being part of what the U.S. 
might do in convening such a summit? Just share your thoughts 
on that.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    If I might, just because the democracy and human rights 
numbers are so unfortunate and depressing, just to offer 
something on the other side of the ledger.
    Prior to the pandemic, there were more political protests 
that occurred in more places than at any point in modern 
recorded history.
    So on the one hand, you have states increasingly repressing 
their people and growing more sophisticated in shutting down 
the internet and in stifling space for civil society.
    On the other hand, many, many people are not getting that 
memo and are insisting on taking their protests and their 
concerns to the streets and holding governments accountable.
    So I think there is a lot to work with out there of 
concerns about violations of dignity and rights and a desire 
for the United States to play a leadership role in promoting 
human rights, of course, with humility.
    With regard to the summit, I am not privy to the 
deliberations and sort of what the planning and thinking is 
either on timing or on the details of substance.
    But I think there are a lot of opportunities to collaborate 
and for USAID to play an important role, for example, in 
combating misinformation and sharing best practices for doing 
so in protecting election infrastructure, not only from 
misinformation but from hacking and other forms of intrusion, 
the anti-corruption programs that have been effective in 
holding governments accountable and bringing civil society into 
conversations that are too often top down.
    I think there are a lot of lessons that can be imparted in 
that regard. And often, Senator, I think it is--it is countries 
that themselves are at different stages of democratic 
progression that have the most valuable lessons to impart to 
those countries that are just becoming democratic.
    For example, the country of Sudan, which is experiencing a 
political transition, is a long way from being a full and--a 
full Jeffersonian democracy, that----
    Senator Kaine. Sudan is a good example of something. I 
agree with you.
    You would agree with me that in something like a summit of 
democracies it would be very important not to just focus on, 
like, a NATO like U.S. and Europe or an OECD, just kind of the 
big developed nations, but we should include large and small 
democracies, mature and nascent from every continent on the 
planet.
    I mean, should not that be the goal of such a summit?
    Ambassador Power. Again, I do not know how the current 
administration is thinking about the summit. I can tell you, 
Senator, from having helped design invitation lists as a U.N. 
ambassador that questions of who is in and who is out are 
actually quite challenging.
    Senator Kaine. And but I am not asking about particular 
nations. I am just saying it would have less utility if it is 
just seen as kind of a U.S. and Europe thing or a big nation 
thing, right?
    If we are going to have a summit of democracies, there are 
democracies on every continent. They are big and small and 
nascent and mature. And if we are going to try to uphold the 
model and share best practices, we should not have kind of a 
U.S. or U.S. and Europe-centric view. We should try to include 
democracies from everywhere.
    Ambassador Power. I think the more demographically and 
culturally and regionally representative we can be in general 
in talking about democracy and human rights the better.
    The progress I was able to make as U.N. ambassador on LGBTQ 
rights would not have happened without the leadership of Latin 
American countries, who were at the forefront there.
    So I agree with the premise of your question. I am just not 
familiar with what the plans are for the summit.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. I do not have any other 
questions, Mr. Chair. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young?
    Senator Young. Welcome, Ambassador, and congratulations on 
your nomination.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    Senator Young. As you know, the People's Republic of China 
is using development dollars to advance its foreign policy 
goals through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative.
    Some have proposed expanding DFC's work to enable it to 
more effectively combat China's investments by targeting 
middle-income countries or perhaps utilizing DSC to support the 
export of U.S.-made emerging technologies.
    Whether through USAID or DFC, it is absolutely essential 
that our development dollars, I think, be used to advance our 
geostrategic priorities.
    So, Ambassador, how would you like to see our development 
agencies improved so that we are able to more effectively 
compete with China?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    The way in which, and I alluded to this in my opening 
statement, but that China is using its economic leverage and 
heft not only to, in often a predatory way, but not only to 
change governing practices within countries but in my old place 
of work the United Nations to actually leverage those financial 
commitments to change the rules of the road altogether and to 
water down international human rights commitments and so forth, 
for fear that those laws and norms will be used against China. 
It warrants urgent, immediate, and well-resourced attention.
    I think you asked about improvement and I am, again, 
incredibly impressed with what USAID staff have done and was 
very impressed with the leadership of Mark Green in this area.
    I think you and Senator Coons and others have worked on 
making the DFC a much more powerful tool in the American 
toolbox. I think increasing coordination between the Millennium 
Challenge Corporation, the DFC, USAID, and the range of other 
development actors is one answer.
    I think recognizing our comparative advantages--you know, 
we actually believe in local self-reliance. That is what we are 
working toward. We want countries not to be dependent on 
international assistance.
    So the investments we make are in their ability to have 
agency and to dictate their own affairs. This is very----
    Senator Young. Sure.
    Ambassador Power [continuing]. Different, I think, than the 
China model. Go ahead, sir.
    Senator Young. No. So you mentioned local self-reliance. I 
am going to get into that momentarily since you brought that 
up.
    Might you support expanding DFC's mission to target areas 
in the developed world where China is attempting to make 
inroads?
    Ambassador Power. I would want to look into that and hear 
from you and others, just, again, having not worked yet within 
the administration or dug into DFC-related questions, if I 
could.
    But I think, certainly, the question for American foreign 
policy, broadly, is not only, you know, how do we deal with 
China in sub-Saharan Africa and the inroads they are making 
there, but across the developed world as well.
    Senator Young. You mentioned self-reliance, that emphasis 
on making countries self-reliant, I think, is itself an 
advantage, right, because all people--so I think not just most 
people but all people want to be more self-reliant, less 
reliant upon foreign nations and others. It is sort of wired 
into our DNA.
    How would you say America's national security interests are 
helped by making countries more self-reliant? Is that 
consistent with your thinking?
    Ambassador Power. Absolutely consistent with my thinking, 
and I think you put your finger on it. It is you cannot travel 
the world and talk to individuals, whether they are those who 
are receiving U.N. food assistance or those receiving technical 
assistance in a government ministry, without being struck by 
how eager they are to not be dependent on international 
assistance, and I think that is something USAID staff have 
taken to heart. So----
    Senator Young. Is there--is there a way that we might, or 
how should we measure self-reliance?
    Ambassador Power. Well, I think domestic resource 
mobilization is something that USAID has invested a lot in, so 
making sure that countries are able to collect their own tax, 
infrastructure, strengthening the rule of law, so that there is 
an ability, you know, not only for NGOs to hold governmental 
actors accountable for potential corruption or malfeasance but 
also the courts, and making sure there is an independent 
judiciary. So work in those domains, I think, is one----
    Senator Young. Then, lastly, in summary fashion, I will 
just ask you, how would you use your seat on the Development 
Finance Corporation's executive board to ensure that DFC and 
USAID's complementary missions are furthering achieving self-
reliance in our targeted countries?
    Ambassador Power. I really look forward to that individual 
being named, nominated, confirmed, and sitting down with them. 
I think a critical answer to your question about China but also 
our larger question about just enhancing development for the 
sake of U.S. security and prosperity lies in that partnership.
    And the resources that DFC bring to bear but also, 
specifically, they bring to bear what countries most want, 
which is private sector investment and, really, to move away 
from assistance to a more equal relationship of that nature.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador. I will be submitting 
some questions for the record about Burma.
    Ambassador Power. Okay. Thank you.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I understand that Senator Schatz 
is with us virtually.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Ambassador, for being willing to serve. Again, thank you to 
your family.
    USAID is already leading in climate in our foreign 
assistance. We see that in the work of the bureaus, the various 
offices, and the regional missions.
    But I do think there is more that we can do to make sure 
that there is leadership at the top to help to steer the 
agencies' climate work so there is an advocate for consistent 
and reliable funding, and someone to establish a clear set of 
priorities for USAID's mission.
    Can you talk about where we might make some permanent 
structural changes at USAID so that our emphasis on climate is 
embedded into our budget, our priorities, and our objectives, 
going forward, and so that it does not swing back and forth 
depending on who is the president of the United States?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for 
your leadership on climate.
    I am struck by how much work is already being done, and you 
are alluding to this at USAID as it relates to disaster risk 
reduction, helping those countries that want to transition to 
clean energy or to lower their carbon emissions, above all, 
dealing with something that I know you have worked on in the 
Pacific Island context, which is mitigation and adaptation 
for--especially with Pacific Island countries, those countries 
that are only a few feet above sea level and really suffering 
devastating effects of climate events and just the rising sea 
levels.
    But you asked a question more about the sort of 
bureaucratic instantiation of these efforts. I think, for 
starters, I will want to get smarter at a granular level about 
what USAID is already doing and was doing under the prior 
administration.
    I think, as well, thinking through what it means to 
acknowledge that climate touches just about every aspect of 
USAID programming, from food security to displacement and 
humanitarian emergency to we had an exchange earlier about 
conflict and the causes of conflict and how we can address root 
causes.
    So given that, what is the appropriate bureaucratic sort of 
structure for that disaster risk reduction, adaptation, 
mitigation, emissions reduction expertise? You know, what is 
the best way to channel all the expertise that exists within 
the building so that it is reflective of the fact that this 
expertise needs to permeate so many domains?
    And so I do not have an answer for you today, Senator. If 
you have ideas, I would love to hear them. But I think it is 
incredibly important to make sure that the structure is fit for 
purpose at this moment.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    I want to stay in Oceania and talk a little bit about not 
disaster response but disaster preparation. You know, the 
United States government is very effective in disaster 
response.
    I think of the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake and tsunami. I 
think of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that impacted coastal 
Thailand, among other places, and, of course, we were there for 
the rescue.
    But for such a small amount of money, we were able to 
prevent some of these disasters. Obviously, the natural 
disasters are unpreventable, but for the simple price of about 
$500,000, we were able to deploy some sea level gauges so that 
people would get early warning about tsunamis and save life.
    And I just wonder how you are looking at not just disaster 
response and mitigation in terms of hard infrastructure, but 
especially early warning systems and those relatively easy to 
deploy and inexpensive to purchase the kinds of assistance that 
really help island nations, and whether USAID would be amenable 
to really taking a look throughout Oceania about that.
    Ambassador Power. I cannot wait to dig into that set of 
questions, if I am confirmed. I do--I did read a little bit 
about it, just as I was been preparing these last weeks for 
this hearing.
    And, as you said, just with such modest financial 
investments, I read about these beetles that were working with 
NOAA to provide countries that, in low connectivity areas, 
allow people to communicate warnings of extreme weather events 
to come.
    I think that is just a great example of the kinds of uses 
of technology, the uses of satellites, the uses of surveillance 
that we can bring to bear to mitigate harms.
    So eager, all ears, and look forward to hearing more about 
what USAID staff, which have been so creative in this domain, 
have already done.
    Senator Schatz. Sea level gauges, DART buoys, drones for 
reconnaissance and disaster response--all of these are really 
inexpensive, even in the context of USAID but, certainly, in 
the context of our overall foreign aid and defense budget.
    So I look forward to working with you on all these things. 
Thank you, Ambassador.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador, I would like to commend your two children for 
attending today. I know that it takes a lot for a family to be 
as supportive as they have been of their parents, and I hope 
they obtain a great civics lesson today and I commend them for 
joining you and for being so supportive of your service.
    To the extent that the United States spends development 
funds overseas, I know we all want to make certain that those 
funds are spent in a manner that is efficient and as effective 
as possible at serving our interest.
    So I would like to turn our attention to women's 
empowerment. As you know, to the extent that women flourish in 
a nation their economies flourish, their democracies flourish, 
and we tend to see more stability.
    The previous administration put together a tremendous 
program, the Women's Global Development and Prosperity 
Initiative, and Congress has allocated some $200 million this 
fiscal year.
    It enjoys great bipartisan support from this committee. And 
I think it has tremendous potential.
    Ambassador, I would like to ask you, first, if you are 
aware of this program, and then further, how would you go about 
the implementation and making sure that we see this program 
through as it is intended?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, just to 
wholeheartedly agree with your various premises about the link 
between women's empowerment and education and increased GDPs. 
Peace processes last longer if women are included in at the 
table.
    As to the program that you are referencing, I have, 
certainly, read about it. I would like, if I could, to dig into 
it, again, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, and look 
at also how it fits alongside other USAID investments, for 
example, in girls' education, in other efforts to catalyze 
entrepreneurship for women and girls.
    But, again, I share your premises and happy to consult with 
you on that, going forward.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate that, and I would 
underscore that this is a terrific program and I think it has 
tremendous potential. So I hope that it will take a premier 
role as you evaluate what you may do, if confirmed, in the 
implementation of programs that will help advance our interest 
overseas.
    Along those same lines, I would like to shift gears and 
talk a bit about nations that are vulnerable to Chinese 
influence and, specifically, the implementation of Chinese 
technology into their networks and their infrastructure.
    Are there things that you might be able to accomplish, that 
USAID could accomplish, that would help make these nations less 
vulnerable to Chinese penetration, to help them stand up 
against the--this sort of incentivization that the Chinese 
often will give to get other types of benefits? Can you address 
that concern, please?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    Well, I think some of the answer is diplomatic. You know, 
the last administration, I think, exerted a lot of diplomatic 
pressure on countries and some of it was proved, I think, 
ultimately effective. For example, the United Kingdom reversing 
its prior decision on Huawei and 5G.
    So I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken in that 
regard. But also, I had a couple exchanges earlier, sir, about 
the comparative advantages of USAID assistance and U.S. 
development assistance, more broadly, and I do think the fact 
that we stand for digital and secure--secure and open digital 
infrastructure is a comparative advantage.
    It is something that aligns with the aspirations of 
hundreds of millions of people around the world, and so part of 
the investments that USAID makes in civil society and in 
nongovernmental actors, part of our work with the DFC, knowing 
how much countries value private sector investment from the 
United States.
    I think linking these conversations and recognizing that 
for American companies, for example, the investment climate is 
more hospitable in the event of an open and secure digital 
infrastructure. I think that can be part of our leverage 
alongside questions of how USAID spends--expends its resources.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate your time and effort 
looking at how we might better leverage our position to ensure 
that the networks around the globe remain free and clear.
    Thank you very much for your time.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I understand Senator Van Hollen is with us virtually.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member, for this hearing. And, Madam Ambassador, it is 
great to see you. Thank you for your past service to our 
country and for your willingness to serve again in this 
capacity, if confirmed, and it is great to see your family.
    Senator Murphy and I have proposed a new foreign policy 
budget to really meet the needs of this century in the year 
2021, recognizing that many of the threats that we face are 
transnational, global, from climate change to pandemics to 
cybersecurity, and we look forward to working with you to 
explore that budget.
    It includes a significant increase in the budget for AID, 
among other things, and part of the idea is also to combat what 
Senator Hagerty was just discussing, which is China's very 
active and aggressive effort to export its model of 
authoritarianism to the developing world through a number of 
instruments, including debt trap diplomacy, the Belt and Road 
Initiative.
    Their focus has been on sort of major infrastructure 
projects and, you know, decades ago, AID was also very focused 
on building larger infrastructure projects.
    If you could just comment on how you see the role of AID in 
the developing world in the context of China's ongoing efforts, 
but with the toolbox that you have. I mean, should we consider 
changing the mix in our toolbox as we go forward and how do you 
see that challenge?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    Understandably, this has come up a good bit today, just as 
it comes up every day in the world, and I should say thank you 
to you and Senator Murphy for looking into this question of how 
development diplomacy, our foreign affairs budget, should be 
tailored for this moment.
    So I look forward to seeing what comes of that exercise. I 
have seen the preliminary numbers, but look forward to more.
    You know, I think that the phrase I keep coming back to is 
comparative advantage, and you alluded to debt trap diplomacy.
    I think, you know, on the one hand, this has been a year of 
tremendous Chinese expansionism and aggressiveness when it 
comes to developing countries and when it comes to its near 
abroad as well. We have seen that in Hong Kong. We have seen it 
in the South China Sea. We have seen it on the Indian border.
    But it has not gone that well for China. Their--you 
actually see, you know, very poor polling when it comes to 
China's standing in the world. Even with the donations of 
protective gear in light of the COVID pandemic, you do not see 
increases in soft power.
    Quite the contrary, in light of COVID and the status of the 
global economy and how much different countries have suffered 
from that, and I think it is in part because people recognize 
that this coercive and predatory approach, which is so 
transactional and, seemingly, not really rooted in encouraging 
countries to achieve their own destinies, their own development 
objectives.
    I think it is not going over that well, and that creates an 
opening for the United States. I think our comparative 
advantages are our support for accountable governance, which 
aligns with what citizens want worldwide, our ability to not 
only bring in the DFC but, in parallel, private sector 
investments, which countries hunger for, the fact that we are 
carrying out programming that is supportive of various 
countries' environmental objectives, so many of these countries 
cherish the natural resources that they have been given.
    And so I think our approach, which is helping them sustain 
those resources rather than pillaging them, is something that 
also gives us a comparative advantage.
    So I can go on and, again, I think it is country specific 
in terms of how the programming should be tailored. But, 
fundamentally, it is about supporting those countries achieve 
their objectives and their goals of becoming self-reliant and 
not being dependent on assistance.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I also want to 
follow up briefly on the line of questioning from Senator Coons 
regarding our role in working with others in the world to 
defeat the coronavirus.
    As you indicated, the COVAX facility, we hope, will 
vaccinate about 20 percent of the developing world. But it is 
in their interest and in our interest, obviously, to stop the 
spread of variants as quickly as possible, variants that could, 
potentially, you know, become more immune to vaccines. And then 
there is the economic fallout, both in those countries and the 
global economy.
    What do you see as AID's role specifically in trying to 
expand the vaccination effort and the use of excess U.S. 
vaccine supplies?
    Ambassador Power. Well, because it will be some time before 
everyone is vaccinated in the world and in the developing 
world, it is really important not to lose sight of the 
diagnostic and the treatment support that we can offer, the 
support as well as we go in rebuilding health infrastructure 
that has been completely overwhelmed by the human costs of this 
pandemic.
    I also think, you know, there is no question that the 
humanitarian toll when it comes to severe malnutrition is going 
to be substantial, and USAID, of course, brings great assets 
when it comes to meeting humanitarian emergencies and 
supporting organizations like the World Food Programme and 
others in meeting food needs and humanitarian needs.
    So I think there is--to look at the pandemic both as the 
vaccination challenge, which we have talked about earlier, as a 
treatment challenge, but then not to lose sight of the fact 
that measles and TB and polio treatments and vaccines, all of 
those have lagged behind, and nor to lose sight of the need to 
ensure that this is the last pandemic that does this kind of 
damage and to be building again in the infrastructure that 
these countries need to be able to fend for themselves in the 
future.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy?
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to 
see you, Ambassador. Thank you for your willingness to serve 
again.
    Let me just quickly associate myself with a few comments 
and lines of questioning from other members on the committee.
    First, let me join with Senator Young in recommending that 
you play a forceful role at the DFC with respect to increasing 
their capability to be able to finance projects abroad. We 
have, obviously, targeted DFC's financing towards the 
developing world for good reason.
    But China plays a different game. We carved out a billion 
dollars through legislation written by myself and Senator 
Johnson about a year ago to allow for energy projects to be 
financed in nondeveloping countries.
    I think we are going to have to continue to expand the 
aperture when it comes to the type of countries and type of 
economies the DFC is able to do business in in order to compete 
with China.
    Let me just associate myself with Senator van Hollen's 
comments. You and I have talked ad nauseam about the need to 
dramatically increase our nonmilitary toolkit, and now you will 
be in a perfect position to advocate for those resources.
    My hope is that the administration, when it submits its 
budget, you know, will make a substantial down payment on those 
smart power tools. Just no way to compete with China or prevent 
the next pandemic or fight climate change if you are still 
funding, you know, more employees at military grocery stores 
than diplomats representing America abroad.
    My lines of questioning are on the ability of USAID to be 
able to be nimble enough to meet the changing nature of very 
complex challenges.
    The first is on the topic of how we get our USAID team 
outside the wire. We have significantly downsized--as an 
example, we have significantly downsized our embassy in 
Baghdad. I think right now we have four USAID officers 
overseeing a billion dollars of funding there.
    But it is not unfamiliar what is happening there. All over 
the world we are having a harder time getting our diplomats and 
our economic development officers outside of embassies.
    Second, we also have a lack of flexibility in the way that 
USAID can deploy funds. Congress tends to compartmentalize and 
earmark dollars so that when a challenge pops up it is 
difficult for the USAID administrator to put the dollars into 
the place that really needs it.
    So I wondered if you would talk for a second about the need 
to be able to move USAID personnel around to places that need 
to see American presence but also the need for Congress to work 
with you to try to give some more flexibility to the accounts 
that you are going to oversee.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Both such important 
questions.
    So when it comes to the circumstance for USAID personnel 
and U.S. diplomatic personnel, as you know, it is very 
challenging, with more conflicts happening than any point since 
the end of the Cold War.
    With extremists, you know, who do harbor depending on, 
again, where we are talking about can harbor ill intent towards 
U.S. personnel, you know, we need to take security precautions 
and keep our personnel safe.
    At the same time, you will never meet people more eager to 
be out in the communities where the beneficiaries of U.S. 
programming are than USAID's personnel. I mean, that is what 
drew these extraordinary men and women to this agency in the 
first place.
    You know, many of them are former Peace Corps volunteers or 
people who have taught English when they were, you know, 
practically in high school, you know, living in these 
communities.
    So I think--I look forward to working with Secretary 
Blinken and our security professionals to being sure that we 
have the balance right there.
    And then when it comes to flexibility in deploying funds, I 
do think this relates to the conversation that we have been 
having about China. You know, we--and actually, the Ranking 
Member Risch and I spoke about this a little bit in his office 
yesterday--we want our assistance to be fit for purpose.
    We want our rules and regulations to be fit for purpose. We 
need to be accountable to the American people, given the 
generosity and the spirit behind the investments that are being 
made through USAID.
    I, certainly, if confirmed, want to be responsive to the 
objectives that people have up here, and that is why you see a 
lot of those earmarks is that people have strong commitments 
and want to see particular programming.
    And from what I can tell, you know, that is the kind of 
programming that I would wish to see as well. But we really do 
need to make sure that we are able to move quickly.
    I know Administrator Green made some inroads on this issue. 
But I do think there is more to be done to make sure that we 
are--we are able to be a 21st century agency meeting the 
challenges of the moment.
    Senator Murphy. Agree. Circumstances change, and these days 
they change very quickly, and so I think there is probably a 
way for us to maintain accountability for funds, maintain 
programmatic earmarking but, perhaps, allow for a little bit 
more flexibility with regard to country and geography.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz?
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador, welcome.
    Ambassador Power. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. So, Ambassador, you and I have had a good 
working relationship. We had a very good conversation in my 
office. We have worked together, in particular, concerning 
humanitarian crises and dissidents.
    I appreciated your willingness when serving as U.N. 
ambassador to speak out for Meriam Ibrahim, who was wrongfully 
imprisoned in Sudan and sentenced to torture and death for the 
crime of being a Christian, and you showed courage speaking out 
for her.
    As you know, I was very frustrated President Obama would 
not speak out for her, but I was grateful that you did. But I 
also had very significant disagreements with you during your 
time as U.N. ambassador and nowhere were those disagreements 
stronger then concerning Israel and concerning Iran.
    Concerning Israel, I think, perhaps, the most shameful 
moment of the Obama administration was after the election in 
November of 2016 and was the Security Council's passage of 
Resolution 2334, which I do not think it is coincidental that 
the Security Council passed it after the presidential election 
and not before.
    And that resolution was passed with, at best, the 
acquiescence of the United States and of you as U.N. Ambassador 
and, at worst, the active encouragement of the Obama 
administration and you, as U.N. Ambassador.
    I believe Resolution 2334 is a pile of lies, that it is a 
resolution that is motivated by anti-Semitism, by hatred for 
Israel. Resolution 2334 declares much of modern-day Israel is 
illegitimate and illegally occupied territory.
    It declares the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem as illegitimate 
and illegally-occupied territory. It declares the Wailing Wall 
as illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory.
    The much-circulated picture of President Obama in a 
yarmulke paying respects at the Wailing Wall, to see the Obama 
administration put through a resolution designed to attack 
Israel, was quite dismaying.
    So I guess my first question is, do you agree with 
Resolution 2334?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
    I had--there were two sort of guiding principles that I 
relied upon as U.N. ambassador as it relates to Israel. The 
first was to combat bias and anti-Semitism and the unfair way 
that Israel has been treated at the U.N. and is treated at the 
U.N., and the second, following President Obama's direction, of 
course, was to preserve space for a two-state solution.
    I want to make sure I have the chance to just describe a 
little bit what I did, and I am disappointed we did not get to 
talk about this in your office, what I did in the first 
category because I think your question does not reflect the 
reality of my four years at U.N.----
    Senator Cruz. With respect, Ambassador Power, the time is 
limited----
    Ambassador Power. Right.
    Senator Cruz [continuing]. And so if you could just answer 
the question I asked. Do you agree with Resolution 2334?
    I recognize you may well have done other things that were 
positive concerning Israel. I am focused on this action at the 
United Nations.
    Ambassador Power. I just would like to get on the record 
that under my leadership we secured Yom Kippur as a U.N. 
holiday. We convened the first ever General Assembly condemning 
anti-Semitism in the same chamber as the Zionism is racism 
resolution was passed decades before.
    And we integrated Israel in a way that had never been done 
before: chairing committees, being able to actually be part of 
groups from which they had been traditionally excluded.
    I do not think there is a record that looks as substantial 
when it comes to integrating Israel.
    On the resolution itself, it is a resolution in keeping 
with President Obama's desire to encourage the parties to avoid 
unilateral steps, including terrorism, incitement to violence, 
and the building of settlements.
    Those dimensions of the resolution--I think, if you read my 
explanation of vote at the time, the problem with the 
resolution and the reason President Obama decided to abstain 
was, by and large, the venue because the U.N. has been so 
biased, because they are 18 General Assembly----
    Senator Cruz. So let us get to a little bit more 
granularity.
    Ambassador Power. Yeah.
    Senator Cruz. Do you believe the Jewish Quarter in 
Jerusalem is illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory?
    Ambassador Power. I do not.
    Senator Cruz. So do you disagree with the substance of 
Resolution 2334? Because that is what it says?
    Ambassador Power. Senator, President Obama's desire was to 
encourage the parties to avoid unilateral steps. That is the 
essence of that resolution and I think the reason that he made 
the judgment to instruct me to abstain.
    Senator Cruz. So encouraging the party to--parties to avoid 
unilateral steps. Resolution 2334 was a unilateral step. Israel 
had no say in it. It was a step taken by the enemies of Israel 
to condemn Israel.
    Ambassador Power. Again, the desire that animated me in my 
time at the U.N. was to fight bias and to preserve space for a 
two-state solution.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question. Can you please 
describe the role played by Iran and by the Houthis, in 
particular, in deepening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and 
assess whether the Biden administration's moves to relieve 
terrorism sanctions on the Houthis has played a role in that 
humanitarian crisis?
    Ambassador Power. The Houthis, when I was at the United 
Nations, the Houthi overran a sovereign government, used 
military force for territorial acquisition, have used food as a 
weapon of war.
    I mean, again, I am on record condemning Houthi actions and 
specifically, again, the use of humanitarian aid. I think the 
challenge is the vast majority of Yemenis live under Houthi 
control at the moment unless and until there is a political 
settlement.
    And so it is really important, given that that is the 
world's largest humanitarian catastrophe right now, that we 
find a way to get food to those vulnerable people.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Cruz. But the Biden administration's lifting the 
terrorism sanction----
    The Chairman. The senator's time has expired, and----
    Senator Cruz. I was just asking her to answer the question.
    The Chairman. I know. I have let more time than other 
colleagues.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. I would still like her to ask the 
question.
    The Chairman. I am sure you can submit it for the record 
and you will get a response.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. So you do not----
    The Chairman. No, I want to observe the time I have for 
everybody else.
    Senator Cruz. She could still----
    The Chairman. Senator Booker?
    Senator Booker. I am really grateful. We are all juggling 
hearings today and I appreciate the yielding of my friend from 
Texas and the considerations of our chairperson on a tight day.
    I am very happy to see Ambassador Power. I have known her 
for years. She is a woman of extraordinary integrity, 
commitment, and has lived a life of service to our nation on 
many fronts that no matter what your political bias is it is 
laudatory the kind of dedication she has had to the best 
interest of America and issues of human rights and human 
decency.
    I want to ask Ambassador Power, really quickly, about the--
around the issue of preventing future pandemics. Last week, it 
was reported that wildlife farms that were encouraged by the 
communist Chinese government to breed exotic animals were most 
likely the source of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    The senior senator from Texas and I--Senator Cornyn--
introduced a bill called the Preventing Future Pandemics Act, 
which authorizes funding to USAID to work on reducing demand 
for consumption of wildlife from wildlife markets.
    Will you work with us to reduce the global demand for 
wildlife that could lead to another zoonotic disease outbreak 
and will you work with us to invest in food systems and 
alternative sources of food protein to move food-insecure 
communities away from the consumption of wildlife?
    Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the 
integrated approach that that you bring to this issue, the idea 
that environmental, agricultural, health--that these sectors 
can be separated, I think, is--has been proven anachronistic 
and, if confirmed, part of my challenge at USAID is to bring 
about that integration and make sure that our experts are 
working together across what have been silos in the not so 
recent past.
    Senator Booker. Thank you.
    Ambassador, I know, from a friendship with you spanning 
from years, that you are--you have an incredible and courageous 
empathy for humanitarian crises around this planet and I know 
how seriously you take that.
    We are in the midst right now in 2021 with a record 235 
million people who are in need of humanitarian assistance and 
protection. That is an increase of 40 percent since 2020.
    I am really honored to be working with Senator Young. He 
and I co-chair a task force at CSIS to look at the humanitarian 
access, which has been increasingly constrained as violent 
conflict has escalated.
    The NGO partners we worked with identified both 
international--in other words, the willful obstruction by 
governments, as we are seeing, frankly, in Ethiopia, and 
bureaucratic obstruction of humanitarian access.
    And the humanitarian groups really argued to Senator Young 
and I that in the complicated environments like Yemen and 
Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, northeast Nigeria, and elsewhere, 
compliance with some USAID policies related to potential 
materiel support to terrorist groups has made it nearly 
impossible to operate.
    And so in my final question to you and respectful of the 
time of other senators, I just want to know, can you outline 
the steps that you are going to take to work internally at 
USAID and with colleagues at the State Department to try to 
streamline and improve the regulatory process itself so that 
humanitarian NGOs are really on a sound legal footing when 
carrying out humanitarian assistance that is funded by the 
United States?
    And will you work with us to find ways to ease some of the 
regulatory burdens on frontline humanitarian NGOs to make sure 
they are on legal--sound legal footing in carrying out 
humanitarian assistance funded by the U.S.?
    Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you so much. My 
gratitude to our partners working in those difficult 
environments and my gratitude to USAID staff who do the same at 
great risk.
    I think part of the reason that you are seeing humanitarian 
access denied is a sense of impunity on the part of various 
actors, and it does create immense challenges for our partners 
on the ground.
    With regard to vetting and the challenges of complying with 
regulations and certification, I think, Senator, that is 
something absolutely I would love to sit down with you and talk 
through.
    I think we have to make sure that our--we are doing 
everything in our power to ensure that our assistance reaches 
our intended beneficiaries, given the kinds of actors that 
inhabit these conflict areas.
    At the same time, if there are efficiencies to be achieved, 
of course, we would strive to achieve them. So absolutely happy 
to sit down with you and talk that through, consistent, again, 
with following the law and the requirements that this body has 
put forward.
    Senator Booker. I look forward to that partnership. I 
yield. But I would like to just say I am so grateful to the 
state of New Jersey for giving me the privilege of being a 
United States senator.
    I will count it as one of the great honors of my experience 
as a senator to vote for your confirmation on the Senate floor.
    You are an extraordinary human being that will do not just 
the United States proud but the world proud with what I believe 
will be extraordinary efforts to make this planet more just for 
humanity.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso?
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Congratulations. Good to see you. The kids have grown up 
since you were last here. Cass is behind you, and as you say, 
he is----
    Ambassador Power. He has not grown up.
    Senator Barrasso. No. No.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Barrasso. I would like to--if I could--before I 
start on some other questions, just if you could please answer 
Senator Cruz's question about if, when the Biden administration 
lifted the terrorism sanctions on the Houthis if that made the 
humanitarian crisis worse.
    Ambassador Power. In lifting the designation--that is an 
empirical question. I do not have an answer to the question and 
I had not heard the full question before. So I do not know the 
answer to that question.
    Senator Barrasso. I want to move to energy development in 
Africa. You know, worldwide 840 million people are living 
without electricity. Five hundred and seventy-three million 
live in--of these live in sub-Saharan Africa.
    Power Africa was launched to increase the number of people 
with access to power. Energy development can lift people out of 
poverty, improve their education, health, well-being. On my 
multiple trips to Africa, what I see is humanitarian problems 
when they do not have electricity, when they do not have power, 
whether it is to charge a phone or to deliver a baby and use 
the suction apparatus at the time of the birth of the baby 
with--it can make the difference between life and death.
    So developing countries desperately need access to a steady 
supply of affordable reliable electricity to support their 
economic growth as well. So, you know, people back home in 
Wyoming know firsthand the benefits of developing abundant 
energy resources.
    The solution to ending energy poverty does not lie in 
limiting options but, I believe, using all available options. I 
mean, you read about the most threatening environmental hazard 
to people it is--it is cook smoke. It is indoor smoke because 
they are using dung and wood to cook indoors.
    I think we have to be diligent in promoting all-of-the-
above energy strategy that helps alleviate energy poverty.
    So will you commit to helping developing countries use all 
energy resources, including coal and oil and natural gas, so 
they can get electricity?
    Ambassador Power. Senator, I know that many of our 
partners, you know, are seeking to transition, in part because 
of pollution. I think Power Africa, and grateful from afar for 
the last four years for your leadership on Power Africa.
    I think it has been a tremendous boon to many communities, 
both in poverty alleviation and in providing energy.
    I gather that more than 18 million new power connections 
for homes and businesses have been established through Power 
Africa and that means first-time energy access for more than 88 
million people in sub-Saharan Africa.
    You know, on the specifics of what the energy sources are, 
if I could--if I could get back to you I would be grateful. 
Again, I know that there has been a shift over time, including 
in the last administration, toward renewable sources. But I 
also know that the all-of-the-above approach has been one that 
has been the standard since the inception.
    Senator Barrasso. Well, there have been issues about what 
loans would be made to which countries, and China is rushing in 
with--if the United States does not want to be active in 
providing opportunities for affordable energy, China is happy 
to become a partner with many countries that, I think, are ones 
that we would rather those be working with us, and sometimes 
the purity of the climate alarmists, as I call them, is harmful 
to the economic needs and the health needs of people in these 
areas, parts of the world.
    Moving ahead, due to coronavirus, countries all around the 
globe are struggling to support the health and safety of their 
citizens. We see that--you have seen it firsthand.
    There are limited resources to address incredible and 
growing needs that we just heard about from Senator Booker. 
Given the increasing needs for humanitarian assistance, global 
health, and food insecurity, I am concerned that precious 
resources are going to be redirected away from that in terms of 
focusing on international climate change. Will climate change 
be your top priority as the administrator of USAID?
    Ambassador Power. Well, as you know, climate-related events 
and the changing climate and the warmer climate is affecting 
USAID returns on investments. You know, more droughts have made 
an impact on our agricultural and food security programming.
    So I think what we would be looking to do is within current 
programming, for example, on food security, to think about 
climate resilience.
    You know, when it comes to humanitarian emergency funding, 
you know, since there are more natural disasters happening 
statistically, as a general rule, each year, thinking about how 
to do disaster risk reduction, so there is less damage.
    And so we, thus, you know, need to provide less 
humanitarian emergency funding because buildings were built 
more securely in the first instance. So I think it is less a 
zero sum trade off and more about integration.
    Senator Barrasso. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank 
you.
    The Chairman. Ambassador, I am going to just draw your 
attention to a few things. I am going to submit those questions 
for the record. I would like a substantive response to them 
instead of going through it here. But I want to draw your 
attention to just a couple things.
    We have challenges in the hemisphere, like Venezuela and 
Colombia, and I would like to hear your assessment on how AID 
can provide development assistance to countries like Colombia 
that are hosting refugees and doing a good neighbor and a 
hemispheric good neighbor.
    But I think we need to help countries like that that are in 
the midst of doing that.
    Second, I would like to draw your attention to the 
challenges that the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh 
continues to face in the light of last fall's attack by 
Azerbaijan.
    In the short term, USAID can help address food, water, 
health care, and COVID assistance need, particularly for 
displaced Armenians. But I am concerned the U.S. has not done 
enough to date.
    So I would like to look forward to hearing from you on 
that. I would like to hear from you how the administration 
seeks to address the interconnected security governance and 
climate-related crises that are feeding the humanitarian 
emergency in the Sahel.
    And then lastly, I would like to draw your attention to the 
U.S.-India relationship. We introduced the prioritizing clean 
energy and climate cooperation with India to boost U.S.-India 
cooperation. I would like to hear the role you envision USAID 
playing in boosting U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy.
    And last, last year's appropriation omnibus authorized the 
USAID administrator to establish the United States-India 
Gandhi-King Development Foundation, which would attract public 
and private capital to fund grants to address development 
priorities in India. I would like to hear your views on that 
foundation.
    So we will submit those for the record. If you give us a 
substantive response, I would appreciate it.
    I want to salute Declan and Rian, who have done such an 
extraordinary job of listening to all these in-depth questions 
and had patience through this whole period of time.
    As the hearing comes to a close today, I want to thank 
Ambassador Power for her time and her thoughtful testimony. It 
is my intention, working with the ranking member, to hold the 
markup for Ambassador Power as soon as possible after the 
recess.
    The record will remain open until Thursday, March 25th. I 
would urge you to answer any questions that are submitted for 
the record so that you can be in a position to be considered at 
a business markup.
    With thanks to the committee, this hearing is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Robert Menendez

Refugees from Venezuela
    Question. I support a strong U.S. response to the Venezuela 
humanitarian crisis given the regional implications, particularly for 
neighboring Colombia, which has received the vast majority of 
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

   While the State Department leads on the refugee and migrant 
        response (with the exception of food aid), what is your 
        assessment of how USAID can provide development assistance in 
        countries hosting large numbers of refugees?

    Answer. Thank you for your support. USAID works closely with the 
State Department to coordinate response efforts across Latin America 
and the Caribbean, as these countries have received an unprecedented 
number of migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Since 2018, USAID has 
provided more than $298 million in humanitarian assistance supporting 
Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and host communities in Colombia with 
food assistance, direct cash assistance, and health support. USAID is 
also supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia 
resulting from the Venezuelan migration crisis. In Colombia, I gather 
that USAID has dedicated more than $77 million in development funding 
to provide long-term assistance for Venezuelan migrant receptor 
communities with the aim of expanding health, education, and justice 
services. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to all 
Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it possible 
for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important step for 
Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many Venezuelans it 
hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you on how 
USAID can support this effort.

Central America Regional Security Initiative
    Question. The Trump administration sought to include funding for 
reintegration services for migrants returning to Central America as 
part of all of its programming for the region. As a result, existing 
programmatic initiatives such as the Central America Regional Security 
Initiative (CARSI) were significantly distorted to address 
reintegration initiatives for deportees from the United States-
something never previously conceived to be a part of the CARSI 
framework.

   As USAID Administrator, will you work to ensure that well-
        established initiatives are used for their intended goals, and 
        that security initiatives such as CARSI are never utilized for 
        deportee reintegration services?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will work to 
ensure that well-established initiatives, including CARSI, are used for 
their intended goals.

Internal Displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
    Question. Humanitarian organizations report that internal 
displacement in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased over the 
past year as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the region has seen 
an uptick in gang and criminal violence, especially in El Salvador and 
Honduras. Women, children, and LGBTQI+ individuals are at heightened 
risk of violence, intimidation, and forced displacement.

   Given recent commitments by governments in the region to address 
        forced displacement, including the early 2020 passage of an 
        IDP-focused law in El Salvador, what more can USAID do on the 
        humanitarian and development fronts to respond to internal 
        displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?

    Answer. I agree this is a crucial issue. With growing needs from 
COVID-19, food insecurity, and the continued impact of recent 
hurricanes, USAID is looking to further expand humanitarian assistance 
in the region, for example increasing support for child protection. 
Following the hurricanes, USAID has been instrumental in providing 
emergency assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) ensuring 
they have safe shelter, food, clean water, health and protection 
services, in addition to helping them recover their livelihoods. The 
Agency utilizes several sets of data to understand internal 
displacement flows and dynamics and inform assistance, such as its 
InfoSegura regional project on security information management, 
implemented with the United Nations Development Program, and the 
International Organization for Migration's displacement and shelter 
mapping. This data collection and analysis informs evidence-based 
policies on human mobility in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. To 
increase protection for IDPs, USAID's Regional Human Rights Project 
supports strengthening early warning systems that track IDP dynamics, 
preventing and alerting their potential human rights violations, 
including referral programs for possible victims. Such efforts with the 
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, are now being expanded at the 
regional level through joint work with the human rights ombudsman from 
Honduras and El Salvador. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID 
remains focused on internal displacement data to inform programming in 
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

Gender-Based Violence
    Question. Will you ensure that USAID targets gender-based violence 
(GBV) survivors, women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for 
humanitarian programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will ensure 
that USAID continues to support gender-based violence (GBV) survivors, 
women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for humanitarian 
programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. I understand that 
in the Northern Triangle, USAID supports civil society and independent 
watchdog institutions to deter human rights abuses, respond to human 
rights violations, and support vulnerable populations. This includes 
forcibly displaced persons, women, children, and youth affected by 
violence and insecurity, indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, 
and LGBTQI+ individuals.

Nagorno-Karabakh
    Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to 
face serious challenges in light of last fall's attack by Azerbaijan. 
In the short term, USAID can help address food, water, healthcare, and 
COVID assistance needs, particularly for displaced Armenians.

   If confirmed, what will be your plan of action for providing needed 
        assistance to ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, including 
        those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and long term?

    Answer. This has been a horrific chapter in the lives of the 
civilians impacted by the recent conflict. President Biden has made 
clear his intention to look at enhancing humanitarian assistance in the 
region due to the displacement caused by the conflict. I believe USAID 
has an important role to play in supporting peacebuilding and 
humanitarian efforts, and supporting citizen-responsive governance and 
durable economic growth. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue all 
appropriate avenues for helping the people who are suffering in the 
aftermath of this war. Since September 2020, USAID has provided more 
than $4.5 million in total assistance to effectively respond to the 
complex humanitarian crisis resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and associated COVID-19 resurgence. USAID provided food, 
shelter, emergency health assistance, and social services to 
communities displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia.

    Question. What do you view as the biggest challenge to providing 
assistance at this time, and how will you address that challenge?

    Answer. Both the Armenian government and humanitarian actors 
estimate that 35,000-45,000 spontaneous arrivals will permanently 
remain in Armenia, which is a major challenge moving forward. While the 
displacement situation is dynamic and continues to evolve, USAID 
continues to work closely with the Department of State to assess urgent 
post-conflict humanitarian needs and possible future U.S. Government 
engagement on an ongoing basis.

The Sahel
    Question. The Sahel region of West Africa is facing a significant 
humanitarian crisis due to armed conflict, poor governance, and the 
impacts of climate change. Last year, the efforts of U.N. and 
humanitarian agencies in the region were severely underfunded.

   How will you, if confirmed, plan to address the interconnected 
        security, governance, and climate-related crises that are 
        feeding the humanitarian emergency in the Sahel?

    Answer. I am concerned about rising violent extremism, growing 
humanitarian needs, and increasing governance challenges in the Sahel. 
If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to align with regional, 
national, and local efforts to expand economic growth, improve human 
capital, counter violent extremism, strengthen governance.., and build 
resilience to climate risks. Gains in these areas will help communities 
be less vulnerable to shocks and violent extremism. Complementing these 
efforts, USAID carries out and coordinates resilience programs with a 
longer term aim to reduce chronic vulnerability that underlie the 
crisis and the need for recurrent humanitarian assistance. These 
investments aim to lift people out of poverty and improve on successful 
interventions to facilitate increased resilience to climate change and 
self-reliance in the Sahel. In addition, the administration will take 
advantage of the authorities provided in the Global Fragility Act to 
move this work forward. If confirmed, I hope to build on USAID programs 
already in place to counter violent extremism in the Sahel. I will also 
continue to work with my counterparts to find effective programming to 
address and combat violent extremism throughout the African continent.

Support for Cuban Civil Society
    Question. For more than two decades, USAID has co-led U.S. 
government initiatives to promote democracy in civil society, and to 
provide support for courageous human rights defenders, as well as civil 
society leaders and journalists who work independently of the Cuban 
regime.

   As USAID Administrator, what steps will you take to continue this 
        important work and ensure U.S. support for human rights 
        defenders, independent civil society leaders, and independent 
        journalists in Cuba?

    Answer. Cuba is one of the most repressive countries in the world. 
The country is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human 
rights, controls information among its populace, inhibits meaningful 
civil society activity-including free press-and criminalizes political 
dissent. The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential 
to Cuban democracy. I gather USAID has a portfolio in place to continue 
supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will 
push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency 
will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political 
prisoners and persecuted activists. USAID-supported NGOs continue to 
defend the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for 
their political beliefs. If confirmed, I will ensure these critical 
programs continue. Also, as one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to 
the UN, I raised the case of Oswaldo Pay  directly with the Cuban 
Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent investigation of 
the circumstances in which Pay  had been killed, and I continued to 
advocate publicly in support of Pay 's family. During my time at the 
UN, I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of Cubans 
like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer, and Antonio 
Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against Cuba's 
persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.

Haiti
    Question. Haiti's humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating, 
with the U.N. reporting extremely high levels of food insecurity, a 377 
percent increase in gender-based violence over the past year, and lack 
of access to education.

   What more can USAID do to support protection-related needs, such as 
        child protection and prevention, and respond to gender-based 
        violence?

    Answer. COVID-19 has had devastating direct and indirect impacts on 
women and children in Haiti. Supporting key initiatives that protect 
and empower vulnerable people is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that we continue to build on USAID investments in Haiti 
that support protection-related needs. For example, USAID has provided 
approximately $2.3 million in fiscal year 2020 funding to the United 
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and four non-
governmental organizations to provide protection services such as 
psychosocial support to Haitian children, families, and frontline 
health care workers affected by COVID-19. In addition to prioritizing 
protection activities, USAID also requires partners to adhere to COVID-
specific gender and protection mainstreaming requirements to ensure all 
programming is safe and accessible to the most vulnerable. USAID has 
also provided $500,000 to support activities in child-friendly spaces 
for vulnerable children and adolescents. USAID partners have also 
organized awareness campaigns that bring attention to gender-based 
violence services; trained journalists on how to ethically report on 
gender-based violence; and developed referral networks to connect 
survivors to safe spaces, legal aid, and other lifesaving services.

U.S.-India Cooperation
    Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship, 
and I was proud to introduce the Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate 
Cooperation with India Act to boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean 
energy.

   What role do you envision USAID playing in boosting U.S.-India 
        cooperation on clean energy?

    Answer. The U.S.-India development relationship spans more than 70 
years. India is a partner in advancing our shared objectives to support 
inclusive economic growth, reduced carbon emissions, open and inclusive 
digital ecosystems, and the global health security agenda across South 
and Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India is a priority country for 
our climate diplomacy strategy, both because of its current emissions 
trajectory, which is concerning, but also because we see India as an 
important partner on future clean energy research, development, and 
deployment. If confirmed, I envision that USAID will work with its 
clean energy transition as part of our shared objective of meeting the 
climate challenge.

U.S-India Cooperation and Congress
    Question. How can Congress and USAID work together to strengthen 
that cooperation?

    Answer. While India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases globally, the Government of India has demonstrated in recent 
years a commitment to reducing emissions and combating climate change, 
including by setting ambitious targets for power sector-led emissions 
reductions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress in 
support of India's climate priorities through programs and partnerships 
that prioritize climate change mitigation, clean energy development, 
sustainable landscapes, and disaster risk reduction.

United States-India Gandhi-King Development Foundation
    Question. Last year's appropriations omnibus authorized the USAID 
Administrator to establish the United States-India Gandhi-King 
Development Foundation, which would attract public and private capital 
to fund grants to address development priorities in India. What are 
your views on this Foundation? If confirmed, what will be your first 
actions regarding the Foundation?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Gandhi-King 
Scholarly Exchange Initiative Act, which calls for professional 
exchanges and the establishment of the U.S.-India Gandhi-King 
Development Foundation in coordination with the Government of India. 
The Foundation presents a unique partnership opportunity for the United 
States to work with the Government of India in leveraging India's 
domestic public and private resources to combat its most pressing 
development challenges. I look forward to advancing this partnership 
and honoring the legacies of both Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr and 
Mahatma Gandhi. If confirmed, I will support the establishment of the 
Foundation which will include coordinating with the relevant Government 
of India ministries and stakeholders and creating a roadmap for next 
steps in establishing the Foundation.

Labor Rights in Bangladesh
    Question. In March 2020, I released a SFRC report highlighting the 
growing threats to labor rights and trade unions in Bangladesh. The 
U.S. must respond to this threat by increasing our support for unions, 
not abandoning them. Under the previous Administration, USAID moved 
away from using its Bangladesh labor rights appropriation to support 
the development of unions, even though unions have been clear that they 
want, and can use, such support.

   If confirmed, will you commit to directly and robustly supporting 
        the development of trade unions in Bangladesh, including with 
        the funding from the annual appropriation for labor rights in 
        Bangladesh?

    Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue. 
Labor rights are actively threatened and diminished in Bangladesh, as 
was made clear in your 2020 Report commemorating the seventh 
anniversary of the Tazreen Fashions and Rana Plaza tragedies. I 
understand that USAID has a robust labor program in Bangladesh, and if 
confirmed, I commit to continuing this important work. If confirmed, I 
look forward to working with you to help ensure the findings of your 
report are central not just to USAID's labor programming in Bangladesh, 
but also the Agency's entire global labor program.

Tigray
    Question. The ongoing conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region has 
triggered a large-scale displacement crisis, regional instability, and 
a humanitarian emergency with constrained outside access.

   Under what conditions should the U.S. restore full foreign 
        assistance funding to Ethiopia? Should the U.S. increase 
        assistance for critical development programs that address the 
        drivers of the conflict and strengthen political reforms?

    Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the 
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The 
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access 
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what 
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties 
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides. 
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and 
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. I understand that the 
Administration is reviewing our diplomatic, security, and other 
assistance to the region. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging in 
this conversation and commit to keeping you informed.

    Question. Do you believe that, under current circumstances, 
Ethiopia can hold credible elections in June? What steps will you take, 
if confirmed, to address closing political and media space, and 
intercommunal violence in Ethiopia?

    Answer. For the June elections to constitute a step forward in 
Ethiopia's political development, they will need to be seen as credible 
by a majority of Ethiopians, result in more inclusive political 
representation, and lay the foundation for broader political dialogue 
across Ethiopia. If confirmed, I look forward to working with 
interagency partners to determine how USAID can best strengthen 
democratic processes in Ethiopia, especially at a time of such grave 
crisis.

COVID-19
    Question. Diseases do not recognize borders, so challenges like the 
COVID-19 pandemic necessitate a global response that the U.S. must help 
lead.

   How will USAID ensure its COVID-19 aid response is conflict 
        sensitive and takes a peacebuilding and trauma-informed 
        approach to reduce the risks of further violence and advance 
        effective recovery?

    Answer. Around two-thirds of the countries where USAID works are 
beset by or at risk of violent conflict, and COVID-19 is putting 
further stress on fragile systems in these nations. Dozens of countries 
have curtailed free expression, assembly, and media; more than 70 
countries postponed elections; and a number have experienced civil 
unrest. Disinformation is rampant. Loss of jobs and lack of adequate 
education and basic services create contexts ripe for conflict. I 
understand that USAID applies principles of conflict-sensitivity 
throughout all programs, including its COVID-19 response. If confirmed, 
I will ensure that USAID continues to support conflict-sensitive 
approaches across all USAID programming.

    Question. What steps will you take to address secondary impacts on 
health, education, poverty, and human rights in countries where USAID 
has programs and activities?

    Answer. No matter where in the world we live, we all share the goal 
of ending this terrible pandemic, restoring normalcy in our daily 
lives, and beginning to rebuild from the devastation caused by COVID-
19. We will not be safe here at home from COVID-19 and its variants 
unless the rest of the world makes significant progress on getting the 
pandemic under control. If confirmed, I will prioritize preventing 
COVID-19 transmission through public health and vaccine interventions; 
alleviating worsening humanitarian crises and food insecurity; and 
addressing the long term second order impacts on the global economy, 
democracy and human rights, education, and livelihoods. USAID will work 
with partner country governments, civil society organizations, and 
other partners to address the second order impacts through a conflict-
sensitive, rights-based approach to health, education, poverty 
reduction, and governance.

    Question. Will you revise the USAID-State COVID-19 strategy to 
ensure a peacebuilding and conflict prevention perspective is 
integrated?

    Answer. As directed by President Biden's first National Security 
Memorandum, USAID is working with interagency counterparts to develop a 
whole-of-government response plan for combating the global pandemic. 
That document will provide a framework for State and USAID's 
forthcoming work on COVID-19 and will prioritize addressing second-
order effects of the pandemic. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's 
programs incorporate and address the evolving context of the COVID-19 
pandemic, including issues related to peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention.

    Question. In what ways can USAID respond to governments using 
COVID-19 to justify closing civic space, curbing fundamental freedoms, 
committing human rights abuses and expanding authoritarianism?

    Answer. COVID-19 is not just a public health crisis but also a 
crisis for democratic governance, fundamental freedoms, and civic 
space. According to Freedom House, the condition of democracy and human 
rights worsened in 80 countries during the pandemic, with a range of 
countries using the crisis to tighten their grip on power, crackdown on 
political targets, and restrict the rights of vulnerable populations. 
The Administration will restore democracy and human rights to the 
center of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening the protection of human 
rights worldwide and re-establishing government-wide attention to 
atrocity prevention and the protection of civilians in war. USAID will 
ensure that programming to address COVID-19 is implemented in a 
conflict-sensitive, rights-based approach. If confirmed, my seat at the 
NSC will allow me to ensure that these issues are engaged at the 
highest levels of decision-making within the USG.

Environmental and Social Safeguards
    Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure adequate 
environmental and social safeguards are in place for all of USAID's 
programming?

   How will you support USAID's development of this mechanism to 
        ensure that it effectively addresses impacts that could 
        undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives?

    Answer. USAID has guiding regulations for examining the 
environmental impact of all projects, as well as a commitment to 
protect and advance vulnerable populations; to seek to do no harm; and 
to promote human rights. I understand USAID is designing an Agency-wide 
accountability mechanism that will further enable beneficiaries and the 
project affected community to express environmental, social and 
economic concerns and grievances. If confirmed, I commit that the 
project design and implementation for all USAID programs, projects, and 
activities will include strong safeguarding for beneficiaries, 
especially the project affected community, including Indignenous 
Peoples and vulnerable populations.

USAID Resources
    Question. Many USAID officials have argued they need greater 
flexibility in managing appropriated funds in order to adjust to 
rapidly changing global circumstances and achieve the greatest impact, 
while respecting Congressional priorities and maintaining high levels 
of accountability.


   How would you approach the question of increasing flexibility for 
        USAID?

   Are there resource management tools you need immediately as you 
        address the challenges presented by the pandemic, and 
        adjustments needed in the near term as we move to post-Covid-19 
        requirements?


    Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss 
ways to improve USAID's ability to align its resources with its 
strategic objectives and priorities, including increasing our ability 
to adapt and pivot to emergent needs and opportunities as they arise, 
while of course making sure to provide Congress with complete and 
useful information on the use of appropriated resources in a timely 
manner.

Accountability
    Question. Accountability of resources and programs through 
transparency, monitoring, evaluation, and learning is an important aid 
reform pillar that strengthens the ultimate impact of programs, and 
ensures sustainability of investments.

   Is it your intention to prioritize accountability across the 
        agency, especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and 
        learning to improve programs and strengthen their impact?

    Answer. Yes, it is my intention to prioritize accountability across 
the Agency, and especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and 
learning. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the 
American people. Measuring and analyzing results-and learning and 
adapting when programs fall short-are essential aspects of day-to-day 
management of USAID's operations. USAID is recognized as a leader among 
federal agencies in using evidence from monitoring and evaluation for 
accountability and for learning. Of course, there is always room for 
improvement and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing 
USAID even further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather 
information to adapt programs and achieve results.

    Question. What is your vision for ensuring important aid 
effectiveness tools will receive priority under your leadership?

    Answer. The key principles of development cooperation effectiveness 
include transparency, accountability, a focus on results, and inclusive 
partnerships. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to ensure 
that USAID deepens its commitments to these principles in all aspects 
of its programs. I will also ensure that USAID remains a leader in the 
international aid community in championing these principles and 
promoting learning and exchange among donor and partner countries. For 
example, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID will continue to 
support international accountability through USAID's leadership on 
remote monitoring and real-time evaluations, among other newer 
mechanisms. These innovative approaches have allowed USAID to maintain 
oversight of programs following the onset of the pandemic despite 
constraints placed on travel.

American Recovery Plan Funding
    Question. The American Recovery Plan provides $41 million for 
COVID-related operational expenses at USAID; $905 million for global 
health response activities; and an estimated $900 million for 
international economic stabilization efforts. The United States has 
both a national security and economic interest in mitigating the COVID-
19 pandemic's potentially crippling and destabilizing effects on 
regional and local foreign economies.

   With regards to the economic stabilization allocation: where do you 
        see the economic risks created by the pandemic as being most 
        acute?

    Answer. The pandemic has had devastating impacts on households in 
the U.S. and around the world, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities 
and inequalities, especially in humanitarian settings. The 
reverberating socioeconomic impacts of this global crisis are, and will 
continue to be, widespread-and have already led to major backsliding in 
development and governance. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID remains 
committed to addressing urgent humanitarian needs, providing immediate 
economic relief by forging sustainable pathways out of poverty, and 
working with partner-country governments, civil society, and other 
actors to stabilize economies.

    Question. Will you commit to fulsome engagement with this committee 
on the Agency's use of these funds?

    Answer. Yes, I commit to fulsome engagement with this committee on 
the Agency's use of the American Rescue Plan funds.

    Question. The GAO recently published a report finding that the 
previous administration gave USAID plenty of marching orders, but 
consistently neglected to involve USAID in strategy development and 
decision-making around USAID's CARES Act allocation.

   Will you commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in COVID 
        decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's 
        American Recovery Plan funds?

    Answer. Yes, I commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in 
COVID decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's American 
Recovery Plan funds.

USAID Vaccine Allotment
    Question. It was widely reported that the previous administration 
failed to acquire an allotment of the COVID vaccine for USAID employees 
from Health and Human Services.

   Will you commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID 
        personnel, and use the Recovery Plan's operational resources to 
        ensure a healthy and safe work environment at USAID?

    Answer. The safety of USAID's workforce is my highest priority. I 
commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID personnel and to 
using the American Rescue Plan's (ARP) operational resources to secure 
a healthy and safe work environment at USAID. The Agency has recently 
partnered with the Department of State to vaccinate its overseas and 
domestic personnel with critical in-person continuity of mission 
functions. The Department of State is covering USAID personnel overseas 
while, domestically, USAID received a direct vaccine allocation from 
HHS. The Agency will continue to make every effort to keep USAID staff 
safe in its domestic facilities. The Agency will use ARP funds to 
augment its staff to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and to improve 
the Agency's operational readiness.

USAID's Global Labor Program
    Question. I need your commitment to restore and expand USAID's 
Global Labor Program. It is the agency's only multi-country program to 
empower marginalized workers to advocate for their rights and 
livelihood. Workers around the world are struggling amidst the COVID-19 
pandemic, with women workers suffering disproportionately.

   Do you believe USAID currently has the staff capacity and expertise 
        to develop the worker rights programs and approaches that 
        marginalized workers so desperately need right now?

    Answer. Empowering workers is relevant both globally and in the 
United States, and I appreciate your longstanding leadership on this 
critical issue. Work is central to people's daily lives, and labor 
issues and the ways in which workers express their rights affect many 
of USAID's development objectives. We already know, for example, that 
women are over-represented in a number of the industries (like retail 
and hospitality) most impacted by the pandemic around the world. 
USAID's Global Labor Program (GLP) was created to increase the capacity 
of worker organizations, and I look forward to working with our 
partners to ensure our strategy adequately promotes labor rights and 
access to justice in a fair and equitable manner. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that the high capacity and expertise of USAID staff to address 
these issues remains an Agency priority.

Climate
    Question. President Biden is hosting a Climate Leaders' Summit on 
April 22, 2021. How will USAID participate in this summit? Do you 
anticipate building global support and financing for climate adaptation 
at the Summit?

    Answer. I understand that USAID is actively participating in 
preparations for the Summit, and that the Agency welcomes the 
opportunity provided by the event to highlight their work with 
developing countries on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 
finance. A key theme of the Summit will be mobilizing public and 
private sector finance to drive the net-zero transition and to help 
vulnerable countries cope with climate impacts. USAID has extensive 
experience improving policies, strengthening institutions, and 
mobilizing finance for climate adaptation and mitigation that also 
advances countries' development priorities. If confirmed, I will 
continue to elevate these issues within the interagency and with our 
developing country partners, and look forward to engaging in the 
Summit.

    Question. Climate adaptation is currently vastly underfunded, and 
USAID's work in this area needs improvement in terms of execution, 
transparency and reporting.

   What are your initial ideas for how USAID can improve its support 
        for the needs of those communities hardest hit by climate 
        change to adapt in place?

    Answer. I agree with your concern that adaptation programs are 
vastly underfunded. USAID works with vulnerable countries to implement 
their adaptation priorities and is committed to further mainstreaming 
climate considerations into its work to intensify efforts to increase 
climate security and resilience. USAID helps partners access and use 
climate and weather data and tools, and develop strategies to build 
resilience to climate risks, whether from sudden events such as floods 
and storms or from slower-moving events such as droughts and sea-level 
rise. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that our efforts on 
climate are informed by on-the-ground knowledge and in consultation 
with stakeholders.

    Question. Many developing countries have made greenhouse gas 
emission reduction commitments to the Paris Agreement that are 
contingent upon support and assistance from multilateral finance 
institutions and/or bilateral assistance from developing countries.

   Is it important for U.S. support and assistance to developing 
        countries to be consistent with host country climate change 
        mitigation commitments?

    Answer. Yes, and with the U.S. having rejoined the Paris Agreement, 
USAID will play an important role in working with developing countries 
to set and achieve more ambitious targets under their Nationally 
Determined Contributions to the Agreement. Developing countries produce 
about two-thirds of annual global greenhouse gas emissions and are 
integral partners in limiting climate change. USAID will provide 
assistance to partner countries to achieve their climate mitigation 
commitments and low-emissions economic development goals through 
concrete actions like transitioning to renewable energy and improving 
conservation and management of carbon-rich forests and landscapes.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under 
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral 
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting 
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several 
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders deployed authoritarian 
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and constitutional 
frameworks, including in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
Meanwhile, across multiple administrations, including the Obama 
administration in which you previously served, U.S. democracy and 
governance programs are chronically underfunded and notoriously slow to 
respond to emerging opportunities.

   If confirmed, how will you prioritize reinforcing democratic 
        institutions and norms in Africa through USAID programs while 
        balancing competing priorities in the areas of economic growth, 
        stabilization, global health, humanitarian assistance, and 
        human rights?

    Answer. In sub-Saharan Africa, Freedom House reports that 21 
nations experienced democratic declines and only seven showed positive 
trends in 2020--the largest gap in 15 years. If confirmed, I will seek 
to increase, in scale and effectiveness, USAID's investments in 
democracy and governance throughout the region, including through 
support for anti-corruption efforts and justice reforms. In many 
backsliding countries, concerns about corruption and accountability are 
central to citizens' concerns about government performance. If 
confirmed, I will also work to make sure that USAID is doing much more 
to integrate efforts to address corruption and improve democratic 
accountability into economic growth, stabilization, global health, 
humanitarian assistance, and human rights programming. By embedding 
strong participation, inclusion, transparency, accountability, and 
oversight measures in health, education, and economic programming, 
USAID can better safeguard its investments in sustained and resilient 
recovery efforts from the pandemic, and lay a foundation for shoring up 
democratic institutions in the long term. This is an immensely 
challenging area, especially given China's growing support for various 
governments' undemocratic tactics and its provision of rights-
infringing technologies in many of these countries. Given the critical 
importance of reversing democratic backsliding and supporting 
democratic reformers, I look forward to consulting closely on the path 
ahead.

    Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked 
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was, 
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly 
mobilizing the necessary resources (enabling policies, funding, and 
staff) has been a challenge. If confirmed, how would you prepare USAID 
to respond to rapid democratic changes and seize unexpected 
opportunities?

    Answer. USAID's democracy, human rights, and governance efforts are 
intended to promote democracy and civil society participation as well 
as prevent and respond to closing democratic spaces. These efforts 
include both rapid response mechanisms through our Office of Transition 
Initiatives programs as well as long-term investments designed to 
demonstrate solidarity with pro-democratic forces, protect nascent 
advances, and prevent backsliding. USAID can play an important role 
during unexpected opportunities by helping civil society adapt to 
changing circumstances and providing assistance to strengthen existing 
checks and balances. To further support transitions and rapidly 
mobilize in the context of unexpected opportunities or crises, USAID 
seeks to promote flexibility within activity design, award language, 
and implementation. This can ensure that programming, implementers, and 
local actors are able to best respond to windows of opportunity and/or 
democratic backsliding. As the current crisis in Ethiopia demonstrates, 
democratic progress and overall stability are fragile, and if confirmed 
I will be focused on ensuring that USAID programming is appropriate 
for, and reflective of, actual circumstances on the ground. As a long-
time Sudan watcher, I am grateful to Congress for stepping up in 
support of Sudan's nascent democratic transition and eager to assess 
current programming and what more might be done to help deepen the 
reform process.

    Question. There are long-standing concerns about the fungibility of 
U.S. foreign assistance for African countries ruled by authoritarian 
regimes (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, etc.), particularly 
for health and food security programs, which account for the 
overwhelming majority of U.S. assistance on the continent. While this 
aid advances U.S. humanitarian interests, it can also offset essential 
budget lines, displace national investment, and enable authoritarian 
regimes to prioritize military spending, pilfer state resources, and 
support corrupt patronage networks.

   Do you think it is time for the United States to undertake a 
        comprehensive re-evaluation of the policies, forms, and methods 
        of delivering U.S. foreign assistance in Africa?

    Answer. The tendencies that you describe are certainly ones I have 
observed in Africa and other regions. USAID works in very complex 
environments and I gather that the Agency's investments in Africa, 
particularly in health and food security, are structured to be 
sensitive to local contexts, in order to save lives and improve 
livelihoods for those most in need. When providing assistance in the 
region, USAID works with both U.N. organizations and international and 
local non-governmental organizations to ensure that support and 
services go to those most in need. USAID also utilizes a variety of 
tools to monitor the delivery of assistance to ensure compliance with 
all applicable laws and regulations. If confirmed, I look forward to 
delving into these issues more deeply and consulting with you further 
to ensure that USAID's assistance does not inadvertently benefit 
authoritarian governments.

    Question. How will USAID effectively deliver aid such that it 
reaches the intended beneficiaries without enabling the preservation of 
repressive regimes?

    Answer. This is a very important issue. USAID adheres to strict 
guidelines for monitoring assistance provided in restrictive 
environments and, depending on the extent of the restrictions, has 
developed remote methods for program monitoring, including contracting 
with third party monitors who are able to access regions where USAID 
staff are not able to travel. One of the cornerstones of U.S. soft 
power is our willingness to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance 
wherever it is most needed. In response to famine or natural disasters 
in authoritarian countries, USAID works with non-governmental partners 
to ensure that aid reaches those most in need without providing 
material support to unfriendly or authoritarian regimes. When it comes 
to longer-term development programs in those countries, USAID works 
with civil society and other non-governmental organizations to support 
development and democracy and governance programs. If confirmed, I look 
forward to consulting with you further to ensure that USAID's 
assistance does not enable the preservation of repressive regimes.

    Question. Africa is experiencing a massive demographic shift. Over 
the next two decades, demographers project that Africa will account for 
nearly half of global population growth and, by mid-century, will be 
home to a quarter of the world's population. Sixty percent of Africa's 
population is currently under 25, with an overall median age of 20, and 
expected to continue to get younger. USAID will remain at the forefront 
of United States efforts to work with young Africans.

   Programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the 
        initiative's Mandela Washington Fellowship are important, but 
        what can USAID do to expand its reach, more effectively engage 
        Africa's massive youth population, and build long-term 
        partnerships with the next generation of decision-makers, 
        business partners, and allies?

    Answer. This emphasis on youth is key. Continent-wide initiatives 
such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Prosper Africa, 
Power Africa, as well as mission-based programs, contribute to USAID's 
global reputation as a leader in youth programming. For example, 
through YALI, USAID has equipped more than 20,000 young leaders from 49 
sub-Saharan African countries with the skills to catalyze economic, 
political and social change in their home countries based on American 
values of transparency, civic engagement, and accountability. I gather 
that USAID missions also integrate youth across all key sectors and 
support strategic partnerships with other donors and private sector 
partners, a practice I will ensure continues if confirmed. If 
confirmed, I look forward to further consultations with you on ways to 
expand USAID's engagement with young people on the continent, helping 
support the next generation of political leaders, engaged citizens, and 
business owners.

    Question. Launched by the Trump administration, Prosper Africa is a 
U.S. Government initiative supported by 17 agencies and departments, 
including USAID, to increase two-way trade and investment between the 
United States and Africa. In 2019, Africa accounted for just 1.4 
percent of U.S. global trade and received 0.7 percent of U.S. foreign 
direct investment. Such shares have declined relative to their 
historical highs a decade or so ago. One area of Prosper Africa that 
requires greater emphasis, and where USAID can play a critical role, is 
in improving the enabling environment for economic growth. 
Strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and promoting 
inclusive economic growth and human rights under a rules-based system 
would create better conditions for U.S. investment while also 
counterbalancing efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to undermine 
free-market competition in African markets to their advantage.

   How can the U.S. Government, and USAID in particular, most 
        effectively incentivize reforms that will improve the enabling 
        environment for investment and trade in Africa? Does the 
        existing Prosper Africa provide an effective framework, or does 
        it need to be modified? If so, how?

    Answer. Improving the enabling environment for private sector 
investment is essential, and I agree with you that USAID staff and 
programs can play an important role in engaging local actors to take 
steps to improve the regulatory and investment climate. USAID has 
developed innovative new programs in support of Prosper Africa, 
including a new continent-wide program to be launched this year to 
boost trade, increase investment, and support business-friendly policy 
reforms. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Departments 
and Agencies to advance this important goal, including through any 
necessary adjustments to Prosper Africa. I will support efforts that 
build the capacity of African businesses and catalyze U.S. private 
sector investment in Africa's growth, and engaging young entrepreneurs, 
especially women, as partners. Programs that strengthen the rule of 
law, protect individual rights, and tackle corruption are vital for 
creating the conditions for economic growth and for attracting U.S. 
investment and trade in Africa.

    Question. How should U.S.-African trade and investment initiatives 
factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter China, particularly in 
Africa?

    Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of 
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African 
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security, 
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening 
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone 
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African 
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in 
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States is 
providing a meaningful alternative to China's state-led approach by 
advancing a model of sustainable economic growth based on transparency, 
responsible lending practices, strong environmental standards, and 
investment in relationships with local communities. Through Prosper 
Africa, the United States aims to mobilize billions of dollars of U.S. 
private sector capital and to ensure that American companies can 
compete on an even playing field by sharing timely information on new 
opportunities, providing comprehensive packages of financing and other 
assistance, and supporting trade and investment policies that promote 
transparency and competition. We must also strengthen American soft 
power by effectively communicating this support, engaging with youth, 
and promoting entrepreneurship and American business practices. If 
confirmed, I look forward to consulting further with you and to working 
with other Departments and Agencies as well as the business community 
to help ensure that the U.S. is pursuing trade and investment 
initiatives strategically and from a position of strength.

Belarus
    Question. Since the August 9, 2020, presidential election, 
Belarusians have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to 
contest the official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander 
Lukashenka another term. The Government has responded to these peaceful 
protests with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances, 
arrests, torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists.

   Since the protests began, the United States, though USAID and the 
        State Department, has increased its support for civil society 
        in Belarus. Do you believe that the U.S. response to events in 
        Belarus has been adequate? What more could, or should, the 
        United States and its European allies do to assist those 
        Belarusians working for democracy, free media, and a free 
        society?

    Answer. I have used my platform as a private citizen to be an 
outspoken supporter of the courageous Belarusians who have been 
peacefully protesting for over seven months. If confirmed, I will build 
on the U.S. Government's support for their democratic aspirations. 
President Biden strongly condemned the Lukashenka regime for its 
violent repression of the protesters and called for a peaceful transfer 
of power, the release of all political prisoners, and new elections. As 
the administration consults with allies and partners to determine 
appropriate next steps to support the Belarusian people and their right 
to choose their own leaders via free and fair elections, if confirmed, 
I look forward to working with my interagency counterparts--guided by 
the Belarus Democracy Act of 2020--in developing a whole of U.S. 
Government approach to end this egregious assault on Belarusian 
citizens and initiate a constructive dialogue with those calling for 
change. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I made it a priority to call 
attention to the work of activists, dissidents, and reformers around 
the world, and to mobilize multilateral pressure on their behalf. In 
addition to demonstrating solidarity and raising international 
awareness, support from government officials can sometimes provide 
those on the front-lines in places like Belarus with a greater degree 
of protection from potential retribution. As such, if confirmed, I will 
continue to find ways to lift up the voices of those Belarusians 
working for democracy while encouraging my counterparts around the 
world to do the same.

Georgia
    Question. Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good 
progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic 
reforms, and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the 
EU and NATO. USAID has been a major funder of reform and development 
programs in Georgia. However, over the past few years, the country has 
suffered democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the 
judiciary, media, and the ruling political party.

   Do you believe that the political and governance situation in 
        Georgia has reached the point at which we should reevaluate our 
        relationship with the country, including by conditioning 
        certain aid to Georgia? What levers can the United States, 
        through USAID, use to push Georgians, including and especially 
        the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary 
        and complete its electoral reforms?

    Answer. I agree that for Georgia to unlock further progress in its 
economic and democratic development, the people of Georgia must have 
confidence that their elected leaders are committed to a citizen-
centered democracy based on the rule of law. USAID's work with 
Georgia's political parties, local nonpartisan monitoring groups, and 
the Central Electoral Commission support this goal. USAID's current 
programs are also actively working to strengthen Georgia's justice 
system and electoral process. If confirmed, I look forward to working 
with Congress to assess the shape and scope of these programs in light 
of the democratic downturn, so as to ensure that they are targeted 
appropriately, considering as well whether resources should be 
channeled in different ways.

Ukraine
    Question. Ukraine continues to fight two wars: first with the 
Kremlin and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and 
independence; and second with its own demons, particularly the 
entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic 
transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

   Should the United States continue to condition certain types of 
        assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms? 
        Should existing conditions for aid be expanded? What further 
        incentives does the United States, along with our European 
        partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its land 
        reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-
        enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive 
        judiciary?

    Answer. When I travelled to Ukraine in 2015 as U.S. Ambassador to 
the U.N., I spoke out against the very issue you identify: deep, 
systemic corruption that permeated virtually every facet of Ukrainian 
life. I continue to share your concerns about the daunting obstacle 
that corruption poses for the Ukrainian people. Troubling recent 
rulings by Ukraine's own Constitutional Court that weaken important 
anti-corruption institutions, such as the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau and the High Anti Corruption Court, demonstrate clearly how much 
work remains to be done. At the same time, some inroads have been made. 
When the protests against President Yanukovych began in November 2013, 
Ukraine ranked 144th out of 175 countries on Transparency 
International's corruption index. Today, it ranks 117. While there is 
obviously significant additional work yet to be done, these small but 
important advances show how critical USAID and USG assistance is to 
anti-corruption efforts, from work aimed at strengthening oversight and 
accountability mechanisms to partnerships with civil society 
organizations. The Biden administration has been clear about its intent 
to support Ukraine's self-chosen European path, including by pushing 
for more progress on fighting corruption and implementing reforms that 
will strengthen Ukraine's institutions. USAID implements numerous anti-
corruption programs in Ukraine that directly address land reform, 
judicial reform, decentralization, and privatization. Combating 
corruption is a central tenet and cross-cutting pillar of USAID's 
development strategy in Ukraine, and if confirmed, I will seek to 
ensure that measurable progress continues to be achieved on this 
pressing concern.

Central Asia
    Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have often 
been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy. However, the region sits 
between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S. 
involvement and activity in those countries. USAID has recently 
expanded its presence in the region in response.

   Over the past few years, the coordination between the United States 
        and EU on development programs in Central Asia has markedly 
        strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia 
        engagement strategies. Will you commit to continuing to 
        coordinate USAID's Central Asia engagement with the EU and to 
        ensuring that Central Asia remains a priority for engagement by 
        USAID?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that Central Asia remains 
a priority for USAID. The Biden administration fully supports the C5+1 
initiative and seeks to help this region be more independent and 
resilient. We will continue our close coordination with the EU on 
development programs. A crucial strategic interest for the United 
States is the stability of the region, which borders China, Russia and 
Afghanistan and is increasingly marked by conflict and 
authoritarianism. USAID has cultivated relationships in Central Asia, 
establishing two new Missions in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in June 
2020. If confirmed, I will build upon this momentum in collaboration 
with Congress and the European Commission's Directorate-General for 
International Partnerships, which has established technical expert 
working groups focused on coordinating trade, energy, water and 
environmental efforts in Central Asia.

    Question. The Indo-Pacific is a critical region for U.S. security 
and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global population 
and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, but is 
also home to security challenges that threaten to undermine U.S. 
national security interests, regional peace, and global stability. The 
Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a ``free and 
open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with regional 
countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region to support 
this goal. USAID played a significant role in this strategy.

   Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision for the ``free and 
        open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last several 
        years? If so, what should USAID's role be in this strategy? If 
        not, why not?

    Answer. Yes, I agree. The Biden administration has made it clear 
that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific will be a foreign policy and national 
security priority, consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 
of 2018. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to fulfill its 
important role supporting democracy, human rights, inclusive economic 
growth, open and inclusive digital ecosystems, and the global health 
security agenda in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, I believe that USAID 
should continue its vital leadership in efforts to support countries' 
COVID-19 responses and their natural resource management.

    Question. If confirmed, what are the key principles, initiatives, 
and other elements of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy 
do you believe should be retained and continued? How would you build on 
these initiatives? What other policies, initiatives, and priorities 
would you pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region? 
What specific policy and funding priorities would USAID require to 
advance a successful Indo-Pacific strategy?

    Answer. The Biden administration will continue to advance the 
principles of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will 
continue to prioritize strengthening democratic systems, fostering 
economic growth, and improving the management of natural resources as 
part of USAID's approach to the Indo-Pacific region. I look forward to 
building upon USAID's successful investments in democratic governance, 
transparency and anti-corruption measures, the digital economy, 
infrastructure, and energy across the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, 
USAID will need to review and adapt these initiatives to address the 
significant impacts of COVID-19 on the region, take advantage of new 
opportunities to increase climate security and resilience, and build 
upon renewed multilateral partnerships. I appreciate the continued 
support and advice of Congress on how to best advance U.S. interests in 
the Indo-Pacific region, and if confirmed, I look forward to working 
with you to identify policy and funding priorities.

    Question. Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands are both 
critically important regions to the United States.

   If confirmed, what will be your top priorities with respect to 
        USAID's work in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue deepening USAID's 
collaboration with like-minded partners in this critical region. I also 
support USAID's increased activities and staff presence in the Pacific 
Islands region to support our allies and counter Chinese influence.
    We are committed to working with our Pacific Islands partners to 
help them address the effects of climate change, which poses an 
existential threat, and to mitigate the impacts of frequent natural 
disasters.
    If confirmed, I am committed to advancing shared objectives toward 
strengthening democratic systems, fostering economic growth, and 
improving the management of natural resources throughout the region.

    Question. In the area of human capital development, the Trump 
administration emphasized preserving and expanding assistance programs 
that provide concrete technical assistance and capacity-building for 
emerging and established leaders in partner governments, the private 
sector, and civil society. How would you work to bolster human capital 
development programs in the Indo-Pacific through USAID, if confirmed?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support USAID's 
investments in technical assistance and capacity-building to bolster 
emerging leaders from partner governments, the private sector and civil 
society in the Indo-Pacific region. USAID will continue to prioritize 
investments to increase workforce participation opportunities (with a 
focus on women and girls), develop skills for a digital economy among 
youth, and improve education outcomes by modernizing curricula in 
partnership with host country governments, educational institutions, 
and the private sector. I will also direct USAID to work toward 
rebuilding human capacity in critical government institutions and 
health systems badly strained by their efforts to combat the COVID-19 
pandemic.

China
    Question. My view is that China's ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative 
(OBOR) is a means by which to increase the economic influence of state-
owned Chinese firms in global markets, engender undue PRC political 
leverage with governments around the world, create a China-centric 
technology regime, secure dependence on supply chains centered on 
Chinese companies, export corrupt business practices, and provide 
greater access to strategic nodes for the People's Liberation Army.

   Do you agree that these are the goals of OBOR? If confirmed, what 
        actions would you take and what partnerships would you seek to 
        execute concrete USAID projects to compete with or reduce the 
        influence of OBOR?

    Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's 
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under 
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt; 
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being 
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency 
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion 
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain 
projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-reaching 
strategy that addresses the challenges of OBOR, and I believe that 
frustrations around the world with China's development practices 
provide an opportunity for the U.S.
    The administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision 
to Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance, 
transparency, and local ownership in our global development work. If 
confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative 
advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by 
engaging directly with our partner countries and ensuring that good 
governance, sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are 
built into projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to 
ensure that development investments are both beneficial and 
sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners, 
including at the DFC and in the private sector, to better leverage our 
collective resources and influence, and I will be an advocate for the 
highest human rights, governance, environmental, social, and labor 
standards in order to promote investments that are sustainable for the 
long term.

    Question. In a speech you gave on China last year at Harvard, you 
highlighted that the Chinese Government and Chinese companies are 
supplying other countries with digital technologies, such as facial 
recognition and artificial intelligence, and those countries are in 
many cases using those technologies for repressive purposes. China is 
also supplying next generation telecommunications equipment and other 
technologies through its Digital Silk Road.

   In your view, what is the role of USAID in helping developing 
        countries harness emerging technologies to advance economic 
        prosperity and freedom?

    Answer. Emerging technologies can play a significant role in 
advancing economic prosperity and freedom, and USAID has an important 
role to play in this area. I understand that USAID launched its Digital 
Strategy in 2020 to ensure the Agency effectively integrates digital 
technologies across all its work and strengthens the openness, 
inclusiveness, and security of country-level digital ecosystems in 
partner countries. The Agency is supporting the digital security of 
civil society and media organizations, including cyber risk assessments 
and providing AI tools to track disinformation flows. If confirmed, I 
look forward to working with Congress to further strengthen USAID's 
work in this area.

    Question. What tools does USAID possess in this regard, and how 
would you prioritize putting them to good use, if confirmed?

    Answer. I understand that the Agency is supporting e-commerce and 
the opportunities that digital platforms offer traditional businesses 
in developing countries to access new markets and to better integrate 
into the global trading system. Additionally, it is working with CBP to 
apply emerging technologies such as non-invasive inspection systems to 
assure the safety, security and traceability of goods moving across 
borders. If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to promote the 
adoption of policies and technologies in our partner countries to 
advance U.S. national security objectives while creating innovation and 
investment opportunities for American businesses.

    Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States 
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China, which 
included chapters encouraging U.S.-Europe cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific and Africa.

   What areas relevant to USAID's mission are ripe for greater U.S.-
        Europe cooperation in these two regions? What are some factors 
        that could enable such cooperation, and what are the limiting 
        factors? What is your perspective on the analysis and 
        recommendations in the report I published?

    Answer. I agree that U.S.-EU cooperation is critical to combatting 
China's influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa and appreciated your 
report's analysis and recommendations to focus on areas such as 
democracy promotion, private sector growth, and the environment. USAID 
engages frequently with EU officials to seek to align policy and to 
increase burden sharing on key issues such as the COVID-19 global 
response, democracy and governance, economic growth, energy, food 
security and resilience, global health, and humanitarian assistance. 
The EU's new seven-year budget articulates commitments to climate 
change, human development, gender and digital development. These areas, 
along with immediate and second-order impacts of the pandemic, are 
opportunities for greater cooperation. In Brussels, Secretary Blinken 
and EU leaders recently discussed challenges that China presents to the 
rules-based order and agreed to resume U.S.-EU dialogue to coordinate 
approaches.

Burma
    Question. Please describe your planned approach to USAID engagement 
in Burma, in light of the military coup and the Biden administration's 
executive order that will retain support for humanitarian assistance 
and civil society.

   What areas of engagement and assistance will you prioritize, if 
        confirmed?

    Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military 
coup in Burma and the junta's violent actions against peaceful 
demonstrators. I support USAID's immediate action following the coup to 
redirect $42.4 million away from work that would have benefited the 
Government of Burma and toward strengthening civil society and other 
non-governmental actors.
    If confirmed, I will work with the administration and Congress to 
continue to put pressure on the military regime, call out human rights 
abuses and ensure that USAID programs do not benefit the military 
regime and are focused on improving health outcomes and combating 
COVID-19, strengthening the ability of civil society to guard 
democratic space, fostering food security, supporting independent 
media, and promoting peace and reconciliation in Burma's conflict--
affected regions. I would also prioritize continuing to provide 
critical humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya and other vulnerable 
populations including in Chin, Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states.

Supporting Middle East and North Africa Policy
    Question. When looking broadly across the Middle East and North 
Africa, one is struck with the enormity of the humanitarian need.

   However, given the relative size of budgets, how do you recommend 
        the United States best align USAID programs with larger 
        diplomatic objectives that further U.S. national interests?

    Answer. I agree with your assessment regarding the importance of 
aligning USAID's humanitarian and development work with diplomatic 
objectives, and ensuring that all advance U.S. national interests. 
USAID and State align department, regional, and country-specific 
strategies and in MENA, in particular, there is close collaboration to 
ensure mutually-reinforcing efforts. USAID's primary role in 
particularly volatile countries in the region is to meet the basic 
needs of suffering populations and support stabilization efforts that 
are necessary preconditions for enduring diplomatic solutions. If 
confirmed, I commit to working further with the Congress and closely 
with Secretary Blinken to ensure that USAID programs are as closely 
aligned as possible with our national interests across the region.

    Question. Looking across the region, what do you see as the most 
significant drivers of instability that run counter to U.S. interests 
and are most deserving of USAID's limited resources?

    Answer. Destabilizing factors--including Iranian aggression, malign 
Russian influence, terrorist networks, and authoritarian resurgence and 
repressive governments that don't provide outlets for dissent and 
pervasive corruption--run counter to U.S. interests in the region. 
Nations in the Middle East and North Africa are also struggling to 
address the impacts of the COVID pandemic. Fragile economies, medical 
facilities, schools and essential services that were already struggling 
to meet the needs of their local populations as well as people 
displaced by active conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, have 
been further strained by the pandemic. If confirmed, I will work to 
ensure that USAID's resources are addressing life-saving and 
stabilization needs and addressing the root causes of conflicts, such 
as polarization, state fragility, corruption, social and economic 
exclusion, gender inequality, and anemic economic growth.

Iran
    Question. In 2008, you advocated for a new Iran policy based on 
``broadening cultural contacts with the Iranian people, bypassing the 
regime through Voice of America and the Internet.''

   What role should USAID play in efforts to foster greater U.S. 
        engagement with the Iranian people? What form do you envision 
        this would take?

    Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights, 
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and 
freedom of expression. Iranian authorities have responded to a series 
of popular and widespread demonstrations with brutal repression, the 
arrests of thousands of protesters, and the use of lethal force. 
According to Amnesty International, over 300 people were killed during 
the most recent spate of major protests in late 2019.
    If confirmed, I will work within the administration to draw 
attention to the Iranian regime's human rights abuses and express 
support for the people of Iran. I look forward to engaging with 
Congress to further consider this issue.

    Question. Can you commit to limiting any USAID program to Iran to 
the development and humanitarian assistance space?

    Answer. Yes.

Iraq
    Question. In the past, you've suggested the United States should 
seek to mitigate, rather than eliminate, Iranian influence in Iraq. In 
2008, you wrote ``no aspect of the Iraq quagmire can be resolved 
without Iranian involvement.''

   Do you still believe this to be the case? If so, how do you plan to 
        balance concerns about Iranian's malign influence, including 
        its support for militia groups, with U.S. efforts to support a 
        stable, sovereign Iraq? What is your vision for the role U.S. 
        assistance can play in supporting an independent Iraqi 
        governance model?

    Answer. Iran's support for terrorism and human rights abuses 
threatens U.S. forces and civilians as well as U.S. partners in Iraq 
and the region, and can hinder our ability to implement foreign 
assistance progamming. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's 
programs in Iraq further the goal of a stable and sovereign Iraq, while 
also considering the safety and security of our staff balanced with 
proper oversight of USAID programs. I also will review USAID's approach 
to ensure that development and humanitarian assistance needs of all 
Iraqis continue to be met in a principled and equitable manner as USAID 
continues to support the recovery and rehabilitation needs of victims 
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), including Yezidis.

Lebanon
    Question. Despite the August 4, 2020, explosions in Beirut and 
unrest that followed, Lebanon's political elites have continued to 
cling to power. Past policy has been to withhold broader financial 
assistance absent reforms targeting corruption and transparency.

   How does USAID plan to advance crucial economic reforms in Lebanon, 
        and what conditions would Lebanon need to meet in order to 
        qualify for U.S. financial support?

    Answer. I share your concerns--the Lebanese people deserve 
accountability and a government that prioritizes their safety and 
prosperity. However, the crisis in Lebanon goes beyond the explosion at 
the port and other immediate concerns like COVID-19. Lebanon's crisis 
is the result of decades of bad governance, economic mismanagement, and 
corruption. Unfortunately, the Lebanese people have paid the highest 
price for their leaders' negligence. USAID's development programs are 
intended to provide support directly to the Lebanese people with 
essential services and humanitarian assistance and to counter potential 
Hezbollah influence in local communities. USAID can support the 
Lebanese people through programs that help businesses retain staff and 
assets to build a foundation for economic recovery; empower municipal 
governments and civil society to deliver vital services; and keep 
students in school. These programs lessen the likelihood that Lebanese 
citizens will suffer the worst effects of the economic crisis.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and the committee 
to ensure USAID's assistance is appropriately targeted to support the 
people in Lebanon in the face of these challenges.

    Question. Can you commit to working to ensure the $11 billion in 
CEDRE, IMF, and World Bank funding earmarked for Lebanon remains 
contingent on key reforms, including reforms to the electricity/natural 
gas sector, increased transparency, and an audit of the central bank?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will expect my team to continue to engage 
with the Department of State, the World Bank, other IFIs, and our 
allies in support of meaningful economic and political reforms 
necessary to halt further deterioration and put the country back on a 
path toward prosperity. Lebanon's elected officials must respond to the 
demands of their people and move forward on reform.

Yemen
    Question. The previous administration suspended U.S. humanitarian 
aid to Houthi controlled areas of Yemen in response to restrictions 
imposed on the delivery of aid.

   What is your position on the suspension? Can you commit to 
        maintaining broad restrictions on aid flows into Houthi 
        controlled areas until all 12 conditions are meaningfully and 
        comprehensively addressed?

    Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that 
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could 
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special 
award conditions. I further understand that USAID is carefully 
monitoring this issue, which includes participation in the Yemen 
Technical Monitoring Group (TMG), consisting of USAID, U.N. agencies, 
NGOs, and like-minded donors, which meets monthly to review Houthi 
progress towards the Benchmarks for Monitoring and Decision-Making on 
Donor Criteria/Conditions for Funding. If confirmed, I will support 
these efforts and monitor conditions on the ground closely.

    Question. How do you plan on working with U.S. funded NGOs to 
ensure the appropriate carve-outs are in place to ensure certain, life-
saving operations can continue despite the broader suspension in U.S. 
assistance?

    Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that 
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could 
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special 
award conditions. During the suspension of humanitarian operations, 
USAID continued to support NGOs implementing some critical life-saving 
assistance, such as treatment for severe malnutrition. USAID partners 
remained operational in southern Yemen.

Syria
    Question. More than 11 million people are in need of humanitarian 
aid in Syria. Traditionally, the U.S. and its partners have relied 
heavily on four humanitarian access points along the Syrian border to 
transport this life-saving assistance. Of these four cross-border 
access points, only the Bab al-Hawa crossing remains open, thanks to 
Russian and Chinese vetoes at the U.N. Security Council.

   How do you plan on continuing to maintain U.S. aid flows regardless 
        of any future action taken at the U.N. Security council related 
        to Bab al-Hawa?

    Answer. In 2014, I helped lead the U.N. Security Council in 
authorizing the delivery of vital assistance across the four 
humanitarian access points that you reference. I share your anger at 
Russia and China's vetoes at the U.N. Security Council to reduce the 
number of available access points, which even in 2014 were not even 
close to sufficient in terms of meeting the actual needs of Syrian 
civilians. Overall, since the beginning of the conflict, Russia and 
China have together vetoed 16 Security Council resolutions related to 
Syria. In the face of these unconscionable decisions, the U.S. must 
continue to aid vulnerable Syrians within Syria and across the region. 
The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in Syria, 
providing over $12.2 billion in humanitarian assistance since the 
conflict began. Despite enormous challenges, humanitarian organizations 
are reaching vulnerable Syrians in both government- and opposition-
controlled areas, utilizing both cross-border and cross-line access. 
That said, there are no viable alternatives that would yield the same 
range and magnitude of capability, or efficiency, as the U.N.'s cross-
border assistance to northern Syria. I understand that the Biden 
administration strongly supports renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border 
crossing and reinstatement of other crossings into northern Syria in 
the U.N. Security Council, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly in 
support of these efforts.

    Question. What are your thoughts on cross-border humanitarian 
assistance in the absence of a U.N. resolution?

    Answer. There is no solution at the scale needed if U.N. cross-
border access is not reauthorized. Humanitarian assistance must be able 
to be as flexible as possible, including both cross-line and cross-
border. The humanitarian needs inside Syria will only increase in the 
face of closing borders and shrinking operating spaces. As referenced 
earlier, I understand that the Biden administration strongly supports 
renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and reinstatement of other 
crossings into northern Syria in the U.N. Security Council, and if 
confirmed, I commit to tirelessly supporting these efforts. I also 
believe that we must partner with a range of countries, NGOs, and 
influential figures to raise awareness about the catastrophic impact on 
Syrian civilians that will result from losing the final crossing, 
highlighting the reputational costs for Russia if it uses its veto to 
completely cut off civilians in northern Syria from this life-saving 
assistance. Additionally, if confirmed, I will support the Department 
of State's efforts to advance a negotiated political settlement so that 
Syria can move beyond its continual cycle of violence and suffering 
towards reconciliation and rebuilding.

Central America
    Question. In September 2019, then-(Acting) Assistant Secretary of 
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Michael Kozak described to this 
committee how, despite years of programmatic successes, the U.S.-
Central America Strategy had failed to muster the political will 
necessary for aid-recipient countries to effectively combat the endemic 
corruption, economic protectionism, and rampant criminality that have 
generated wave after wave of illegal migration from the region.

   If confirmed, what actions would you take to build and maintain 
        political will among the political leadership in the countries 
        of Northern Central America to tackle the push factors of 
        illegal migration?

    Answer. The President has articulated a comprehensive $4 billion, 
four-year plan that will provide financial and other forms of 
assistance and incentives to confront corruption, enhance security, and 
foster prosperity across the region. As Vice President, he also exerted 
consistent diplomatic pressure in support of anti-corruption efforts in 
the region. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on 
the most effective ways to implement President Biden's plan, and 
increasing the diplomatic pressure on elected officials not doing 
enough to confront corruption and lawlessness. I understand that USAID 
is working in partnership with other U. S. Government Agencies to 
address the root causes of irregular migration from the Northern 
Triangle and foster an environment where families can envision their 
futures in their home countries and communities. USAID focuses on 
combating crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth, addressing 
corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational 
criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater 
economic opportunity, social services, and protection. With the 
appropriate time, sustained commitment, and appropriate partners, I 
believe USAID programs can help address the push factors that lead 
Central Americans to reluctantly leave their homes. To give just one 
example: in neighborhoods where USAID worked in El Salvador to 
implement security programs, homicides declined by an average of 45 
percent from 2015 to 2017. If we want to duplicate, improve upon, and 
eventually scale initiatives of this kind, strengthening our 
partnerships with civil society leaders--including advocates for 
transparent and accountable government and human rights--will be 
important. Similarly, USAID will work with those private sector leaders 
committed to transparency and the rule of law.

    Question. The 2014 Strategy for Engagement in Central America aimed 
to deter illegal migration from the region by promoting economic 
prosperity, security, and good governance in recipient countries. 
Pursuant to that strategy, Congress has placed multiple conditions on 
aid to these countries.

   To what extent have legislative conditions contributed to policy 
        changes in the recipient nations? How do you plan to 
        incentivize needed reforms if the recipient countries fail to 
        meet conditions set by Congress, and those failures prompt 
        restrictions on assistance?

    Answer. Congress is a key partner in setting America's foreign 
policy agenda and with regard to the implementation of foreign 
assistance. I cannot state definitively how the aforementioned 
conditions specifically impacted decision-making in recipient 
countries, but based on my own experiences as a diplomat, I agree that 
it is important that the administration work with Congress to utilize 
all available congressional tools with flexibility to implement our 
policies and respond to changing contexts.

    Question. President Biden has proposed a four-year $4 billion 
strategy for Central America.

   Can you describe the types of investments and specific reforms you 
        would seek from individual governments under this strategy to 
        reduce illegal migration from the region, including the 
        concrete and verifiable benchmarks by which you will measure 
        success? How will this strategy help the governments of Central 
        America become more self-sufficient so that U.S. foreign 
        assistance is no longer needed to achieve these objectives?

    Answer. I believe that the ultimate solution for sustainably 
reducing irregular migration from Central America is to work not only 
with governments to encourage critical reforms, but also broadly with 
civil society, the private sector, and international partners to 
catalyze structural changes that address corruption, security, and 
prosperity in the region. Creating economic opportunity, rebuilding the 
social fabric in communities that have been torn apart by violence, 
establishing inclusive, fair, and just rule of law, and ensuring there 
is the capacity to deliver citizen-responsive governance and services 
will position Central America's Northern Triangle countries to address 
the drivers of irregular migration for the long term.

Nicaragua
    Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in 
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted 
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of 
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua 
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by 
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in 
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections.

   If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing actions and programs 
        designed to improve the capacity of the democratic forces in 
        Nicaragua to be a credible challenge to Ortega ahead of the 
        November 2021 general elections?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring USAID supports viable, 
democratic processes and institutions in Nicaragua. USAID is focused on 
the November 2021 national elections in Nicaragua and on restoring 
democratic processes and respect for human rights through expanding 
opportunities for coalition building and supporting electoral integrity 
and an active civil society.

Cuba
    Question. According to the State Department, in 2019, the 
Government of Cuba maintained an estimated 50,000 medical personnel in 
more than 60 countries under conditions that represent forced labor. 
The United States, the United Nations, independent media outlets, and 
non-governmental organizations have all documented and called out the 
Cuban regime's exploitative and coercive practices toward its doctors 
participating in its overseas medical programs.

   Do you consider the Cuban regime's overseas medical missions to be 
        exploitative human trafficking efforts? How can USAID Missions 
        in countries that accept Cuban medical missions help 
        communicate the realities of the forced labor practices 
        employed by the Cuban regime?

    Answer. Support for democracy and human rights is at the core of 
this administration's Cuba policy. We must be vocal in our support for 
the journalists, human rights defenders, and democracy activists 
seeking to challenge the repressiveness of Cuban authorities, who 
maintain an extraordinarily tight grip on all aspects of life on the 
island and are ruthless in seeking to stifle dissent. I understand that 
USAID has programs in place currently to support the human rights of 
Cuban workers, including medical personnel. If confirmed, I will work 
with my colleagues at the Department of State to review the Cuban 
Government's practices with regard to its overseas medical programs and 
look forward to consulting with you on this issue.

    Question. The State Department's 2019 Human Rights Report for Cuba 
painted a dismal picture of human rights abuses by the Cuban regime, to 
include accounts of disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhumane, 
or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh prison and detention center 
conditions; arbitrary arrests and detentions; denial of fair public 
trial; and political prisoners and detainees. The regime also has 
cracked down on freedom of expression, limited internet freedom, and 
restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.

   Will you commit to calling out human rights violations by the Cuban 
        Government?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that support for human 
rights remains at the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of 
the most repressive countries in the world, and is ruled by a 
dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its 
populace from accessing even basic independent information, inhibits 
meaningful civil society activity--including free press--and 
criminalizes political dissent. As one of my first acts as U.S. 
Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case of Oswaldo Paya directly with 
the Cuban Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent 
investigation of the circumstances in which Paya had been killed, and I 
continued to advocate publicly in support of Paya's family. During my 
time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent 
treatment of Cubans like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio 
Ferrer, and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out 
against Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.

    Question. How will you work to support democratic activists and 
human rights defenders in Cuba?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's work to support 
democratic activists and human rights defenders in Cuba. The role of a 
vibrant civil society continues to be essential to Cuban democracy. I 
gather that USAID has a portfolio in place to continue supporting a 
diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will push for 
democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency will also 
continue providing basic needs assistance to political prisoners and 
persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue defending the human 
rights of those who are abused and even jailed for their political 
beliefs.

    Question. Do you commit to maintain a robust USAID democracy 
program focused on advancing respect for basic human rights in Cuba?

    Answer. Yes, I am committed to supporting robust USAID democracy 
programming in Cuba.

Haiti
    Question. Haiti is facing a complex and worsening constitutional 
crisis.

   What role can USAID play in promoting effective dialogue among the 
        different political forces? If confirmed, what efforts would 
        you make to support strengthening Haiti's technical capacity to 
        hold elections?

    Answer. The Haitian people deserve democracy and prosperity. Haiti 
has been without a functioning government for too long, and in the 
meantime, conditions continue to deteriorate. The political parties 
need to come together to end the misery, corruption and insecurity 
wreaking havoc for the Haitian people. While Haiti is facing a complex 
emergency that USAID assistance alone cannot resolve, USAID does have 
an important role to play in helping to promote democracy, human 
rights, and governance. With respect to the upcoming legislative 
elections, I understand that USAID's current activities aim to promote 
credible elections, increase political party competition, and expand 
civic participation in electoral processes to help end the ongoing 
political crisis of rule by decree. If confirmed, I will advocate for a 
strong whole-of-government and multi-donor approach for targeted 
democracy, human rights, and governance work to promote democratic 
political reform, peace and stability.

South America
    Question. Over the last three decades, Colombia has emerged as a 
source of economic prosperity and stability in the region and a key 
strategic ally and partner of the United States. Yet, policy decisions 
made during the negotiations of the 2016 deal with the FARC terrorist 
organization created new challenges for Colombia and in our relations. 
Coca production in Colombia has steadily increased since 2013, reaching 
212,000 hectares in 2019. In March 2020, the United States and Colombia 
announced a joint action plan to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine 
production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. The plan would make full 
use of all available tools, including rural development, interdiction, 
as well as manual and aerial eradication.

   Would you agree that achieving this goal by 2023 would deliver 
        significant health and security benefits for Americans here at 
        home? If confirmed, what tools and policies would you implement 
        to ensure that our two nations meet this goal?

    Answer. I share your concern about the flow of drugs from Latin 
America and the Caribbean to the United States. USAID plays an 
important role on this issue through its alternative development 
programs in Colombia, which are intended to offer licit alternatives--
such as coffee, cacao, dairy, and others--to replace coca production. 
Alternative development is a necessary but insufficient tool to 
significantly reduce coca cultivation, which also requires robust 
involvement by the private sector, civil society, and international 
organizations, along with a commitment by Colombian leaders to 
equitable economic development in communities that have long been 
underserved by government programs. Colombia's historic 2016 peace 
accord with the FARC was an important first step in ending one of the 
longest-running armed conflicts in the world, which had led to the 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions of 
Colombians. Implementing the various components of the accords is a 
complex undertaking, and a challenge that continues to this day. I 
gather that USAID's assistance focuses squarely on these efforts at 
implementation, which must move forward in order to enhance security, 
governance and development in former FARC-controlled and ungoverned 
territories where some 95 percent of coca is cultivated and cocaine is 
produced.

Venezuela
    Question. Approximately 7.2 million people will require 
humanitarian assistance due to the Venezuela regional crisis in 2021, a 
10 percent increase from the year before.

   How will you organize the resources of USAID to respond to the 
        increased need of millions of Venezuelans?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize humanitarian funding for 
the Venezuela regional crisis. The situation within Venezuela is grave 
and deteriorating: a recent U.N. fact-finding mission has uncovered 
``widespread and systematic'' abuses by the Maduro Government against 
the Venezuelan people, including extrajudicial executions, enforced 
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Concurrently, more 
than five million Venezuelans are now refugees, putting immense 
pressure on neighboring countries. USAID has provided more than $1 
billion in humanitarian assistance since 2017 for Venezuelan migrants 
and refugees, and host communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru, as well as more than $104 million since 2018 to reach people 
inside Venezuela with life-saving humanitarian assistance, making the 
U.S. the largest donor to the crisis regionally. USAID also supports 
long-term development and integration activities in Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Still, there is 
more that can be done, particularly in terms of stronger coordination 
and cooperation with like-minded countries.
    If confirmed, I will ensure USAID's critical humanitarian and 
development assistance continues. Furthermore, despite the Maduro 
regime's efforts to stifle any activities that threaten its hold on 
power or accountability for its numerous crimes, if I am confirmed, 
USAID will continue to provide support for civil society organizations 
and democratically-minded actors working under incredibly dangerous 
conditions to bring about a democratic transition.

Self-Reliance
    Question. Former USAID Administrator Mark Green spearheaded the 
agency's ``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative in an effort to 
provide strategic focus to U.S. foreign assistance, including by taking 
a data-based approach toward building partner country capacity to 
achieve and sustain development results. In contrast with China's 
development model, which creates dependence, Administrator Green argued 
that America should seek to foster self-reliance and responsibility 
among its friends.

   While distinct from diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, do you 
        agree that the purpose of development assistance is to end the 
        need for its existence? If so, how will you ensure that USAID 
        and the implementing partners it supports effectively work 
        themselves out of a job?

    Answer. Yes, I agree with the principle of self-reliance and that 
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. I 
also believe it is what the vast majority of beneficiaries of USAID 
programs want most for themselves and their communities. My vision for 
USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It also 
applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance within 
core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing democracy, 
human rights, increasing climate security and resilience, and global 
health in a collaborative manner with civil society partners and 
governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound, evidence-based 
development and humanitarian programming that continues to improve aid 
effectiveness, self-reliance and sustainability.

    Question. Do you intend to work with USAID to continue the 
``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative, whether in name or in spirit? 
If not, why not?

    Answer. I deeply respect and appreciate former Administrator Mark 
Green's leadership on this issue and intend to build on this 
initiative. I understand that the Journey to Self-Reliance emphasizes 
developing critical local capacities and supporting meaningful country 
commitments, fit to the diverse contexts in which USAID works. I agree 
the concept is sound and builds on the work of the Agency to support 
sustainable development that has spanned multiple administrations.

Global Health Security
    Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in 
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular 
presence and where intense, high-level diplomatic engagement proved 
critical to securing global health data, navigating supply chain 
disruptions, and facilitating the safe evacuation of American citizens.

   Do you agree with the framework outlined by President Biden in NSM-
        1, in which the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 
        USAID Administrator, leads (1) the development of the U.S. 
        Government-wide plan to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) a 
        diplomatic outreach plan for enhancing the United States' 
        response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on engaging 
        partner nations?

   Do you agree that this framework outlined by President Biden could 
        be used in other contexts to support global health efforts of 
        the U.S. Government, to include efforts to advance the Global 
        Health Security Agenda and enhance pandemic preparedness and 
        response overseas?

    Answer. Yes, I support the framework outlined by the President in 
NSM-1. I gather that there has been effective collaboration in the 
interagency on the Global Health Security Agenda and if confirmed, I 
look forward to reviewing it further and seeking ways to enhance our 
impact.

    Question. My bill, the Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act, 
creates a coordinator position at the State Department that is 
consistent with this type of framework outlined by President Biden. If 
confirmed, do you commit to work with me on this effort?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and the 
committee on all efforts to advance global health security so as to 
ensure that, after such devastation, the world is far better prepared 
to confront global health threats.

COVID-19
    Question. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2), 
included $10 billion in international affairs funding for the COVID-19 
pandemic response, to include: (1) $3.75 billion to prevent backsliding 
in HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis programs, of which $3.5 billion 
was directed toward the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria's COVID-19 Response Mechanism; and (2) nearly 
$5 billion in bilateral funds, of which an unspecified portion would be 
directed toward the United Nations and other multilateral entities. 
This is on top of the $4 billion that already had been appropriated to 
support U.S. contributions to COVAX/Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.

   What are the comparative advantages of bilateral funding versus 
        multilateral funding in the U.S. response to COVID-19 overseas? 
        Are there benefits to bilateral funding that you, if confirmed, 
        will advocate for and prioritize?

    Answer. I believe that the U.S. Government (USG) is most effective 
when both bilateral and multilateral funding is available and flows to 
responsible and accountable partners. Multilateral funding allows the 
USG to leverage the financial commitments, technical expertise, and 
diplomatic engagement of many partners, often achieving economies of 
scale and burden-sharing with other donors. Bilateral funding enables 
USAID to align that work and those commitments to action on the ground 
through the expertise and coordination of USAID field teams and ongoing 
local assistance efforts, and address priorities that may not be 
effectively or efficiently covered through multilateral channels.
    If confirmed, will you continue the policy of providing funding for 
multilateral entities, to include COVAX/Gavi and the Global Fund, in 
tranches, such that U.S. contributions are made available based upon 
need, performance, and other donor support?
    I understand that USAID funding to Gavi/COVAX will be provided in 
tranches. This will allow USAID to ensure Gavi/COVAX has the funding it 
needs to scale global vaccine access, while closely monitoring COVAX's 
performance and also incentivizing other donors to provide additional 
resources. I understand that to date, USAID has obligated $2 billion 
out of a total $4 billion to Gavi/COVAX. If confirmed, I will ensure 
that USAID, in consultation with Gavi, is carefully considering the 
timing of contributions to ensure COVAX is sufficiently resourced to 
meet critical public health needs, given evolving supply dynamics and 
resource constraints.

PEPFAR
    Question. Lack of strategic direction, embittered competition, and 
poor communication between the two principal implementers of U.S. 
global health assistance--USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)--have long plagued U.S. global health programs. This 
is why, when authorizing the greatest commitment by any country to 
combat a single disease in history, Congress placed the responsibility 
for coordinating the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR) within the Department of State. The PEPFAR program is now 
recognized as the most successful U.S. foreign assistance program since 
the Marshall Plan and has saved millions of lives, strengthened health 
systems and supply chains, and advanced key U.S. diplomatic, economic, 
and security goals.
    Recognizing the success of the PEPFAR model--but also understanding 
that PEPFAR would eventually need to be transitioned--the Obama 
administration in 2009 sought to launch a 6-year, $63 billion Global 
Health Initiative (GHI). Managed by the Coordinator of U.S. Government 
Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and Special Representative for Global 
Health Diplomacy at the Department of State, the GHI proposed to take 
an evidence-based approach toward strengthening health systems and 
enhancing global health security. Though the GHI never found its 
footing, the compelling need to close gaps in global health security 
while also mitigating the need for disease-specific initiatives 
justifies taking another look.

   Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the coordinating 
        role played by the Department of State and the implementing 
        roles played by USAID and CDC, has been successful? As more and 
        more countries approach epidemic control, do you believe this 
        model could be adapted to advance broader global health 
        security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama administration 
        envisioned under the GHI?

    Answer. I agree that PEPFAR has been enormously successful, and 
should be considered one of the most significant and impactful public 
health initiatives ever undertaken. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., 
many of my African colleagues spoke to me in strikingly personal terms 
about what PEPFAR meant to their countries, offering sincere and 
profound thanks to the American people for continuing to support this 
initiative. I am also aware that there are other highly successful U.S. 
Government public health initiatives, including the President's Malaria 
Initiative, the West Africa and Eastern Congo Ebola responses, and 
USAID's Neglected Tropical Disease program that should be reviewed for 
lessons learned. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the 
administration and Congress to review all of these successful programs, 
draw lessons learned and determine how to best posture the U.S. 
Government and USAID to advance global health security, global health 
diplomacy, and pandemic response objectives.

    Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently 
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had 
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on 
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic 
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process, and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized, is vital to the effective 
planning and execution of PEPFAR programs. If confirmed, will you 
ensure USAID fully and faithfully engages in the COP process and 
adheres to such plans without unwarranted delays or deviations?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully and 
faithfully engages in the COP process and adheres to such plans without 
unwarranted delays or deviations.

    Question. The World Health Organization (WHO): You had a front row 
seat to the ineptitude of the WHO during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa. It was so bad, in fact, that you helped lead the effort 
on the U.N. Security Council to declare the outbreak ``a threat to 
international peace and security'' and to establish the U.N.'s first-
ever ``health-keeping'' mission.
    Much like the Ebola outbreak that preceded it, the WHO was either 
unwilling or unable to mount an effective emergency response to the 
COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China. Not only did it fail to press the 
Chinese Government for access and information in the critical first 
days of the outbreak, but the WHO provided political cover for China's 
reckless response, publicly validated disinformation, and condemned 
travel controls designed to mitigate the global spread.

   Do you agree that the WHO is badly in need of reform? If so, what 
        specific reforms are necessary to restore its credibility among 
        the American people and the world?

    Answer. Yes, the WHO needs reform and strengthening. While the WHO 
continues to play an important role in the global response to COVID-19, 
the pandemic exposed weaknesses in the readiness posture of both the 
WHO and member states to respond to a crisis on this scale. President 
Biden is firmly committed to reforming and strengthening the WHO, and 
some of his first executive actions have focused on strengthening 
global preparedness against future pandemic threats. The administration 
believes that the best way to do this is by remaining an actively 
engaged member of the organization and working with all member states 
to support, strengthen, and build accountability at the WHO. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with the Departments of State and Health 
and Human Services to ensure USAID informs and supports efforts that 
strengthen the World Health Organization.

    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that by joining COVAX, the 
vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) 
Accelerator, the United States will not subsidize the distribution of 
non-transparently developed, reportedly substandard Chinese and Russian 
COVID-19 vaccines?

    Answer. USAID funding to COVAX will only support procurement and 
delivery of vaccines that meet rigorous quality standards, are safe and 
efficacious, and have been approved or authorized by a stringent 
regulatory authority, such as the U.S. FDA or the World Health 
Organization. To date, vaccines developed by China and Russia have not 
met these standards.

Food Aid and Food Security
    Question. The United States is the single most generous provider of 
humanitarian assistance in the world, both financial and in-kind, thus 
saving hundreds of millions of lives and promoting the growth of 
healthier, more stable societies. Yet today, an estimated 690 million 
people are food insecure, of which 270 million are facing starvation. 
As needs outpace the ability of donors to respond, it is imperative 
that the Department and USAID be enabled to stretch U.S. humanitarian 
resources farther, including by modernizing U.S. international food 
aid.
    Historically, the flagship U.S. food aid program--Food for Peace--
required that 100 percent of the food provided under the Act be 
purchased in the United States, of which 50 percent must be shipped on 
U.S. flagged vessels. According to the GAO, the shipping requirement, 
in particular, has added significant time and cost to emergency food 
aid, even while failing to fulfil its statutory purpose. Three 
consecutive administrations have thus proposed changes--ranging from 
setting aside 20 percent of the budget for local and regional 
procurement to eliminating Food for Peace entirely. The Global Food 
Security Act (as re-authorized through FY2023) and the 2018 Farm Bill 
did include modest reforms, but more needs to be done.

   Do you agree that the Department of Defense is capable of managing 
        its own sealift capacity and that U.S. agricultural cargo 
        preference requirements have outlived their statutory purpose, 
        add unnecessary time and expense to life-saving U.S. food aid, 
        and should no longer be applied to international food aid?

   If confirmed, will you carry forward the food aid reform efforts of 
        your predecessors, including under the Obama administration?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to 
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity and build the 
resilience of vulnerable communities as effectively and efficiently as 
possible. Each of the food assistance modalities--U.S. in-kind food, 
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming--
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and 
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need, 
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of 
our programs is of utmost importance.

Humanitarian Assistance
    Question. How will USAID, in coordination with the new Office of 
Sanctions Coordination, work with the Treasury Department to ensure our 
sanctions programs are designed to shape behavior without exacerbating 
humanitarian crises around the world?

    Answer. I understand that USAID coordinates regularly with the 
interagency to review sanctions programs, including how sanctions are 
impacting the COVID-19 response and humanitarian programs. If 
confirmed, I will support USAID's work with the Department of Treasury, 
the Department of State and the rest of the interagency to develop 
effective sanctions regimes with requisite flexibilities to ensure that 
life-saving humanitarian assistance can reach those in need.

    Question. Should U.S. humanitarian assistance be branded? If not, 
why not? If confirmed, will you uphold President Trump's Executive 
Order on branding U.S. foreign assistance and the USAID Branding 
Modernization Act (P.L. 116-334), including by branding all U.S. 
foreign assistance administered by USAID?

    Answer. I am committed to branding and agree that branding sends a 
strong public diplomacy message, conveying that our assistance is due 
to the generosity of the American people. It is also a critical element 
of a counter China strategy.
    Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to USAID 
awards and partners must continue to follow the branding requirements 
outlined in their assistance agreements.

Women, Peace, and Security
    Question. Under President Trump's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 
initiative signed into law in 2019, the United States is working to 
advance three objectives by 2023, such that: 1) women are more prepared 
and increasingly able to participate in efforts that promote stable and 
lasting peace; 2) women and girls are safer, better protected, and have 
equal access to government and private-assistance programs, including 
from the United States, international partners, and host nations; and 
3) the United States and partner governments have improved 
institutionalization and capacity to ensure WPS efforts are sustainable 
and long-lasting.

   What actions will you, if confirmed, take to ensure these goals are 
        met? Will you enhance lines of effort and agency actions?

    Answer. I agree that women's meaningful engagement leads to better, 
more durable outcomes for peace and security. Studies show that when 
women participate in peace processes the resulting agreement is 35 
percent more likely to last at least 15 years. More broadly speaking, 
one of the best predictors of a state's peacefulness is the way women 
are treated within that state. USAID assistance supports the objectives 
in the WPS Act to bolster women's ability to participate in peace and 
political processes, protect against gender-based violence, and hold 
accountable those that commit acts of gender-based violence. USAID's 
activities also help break down barriers to women's participation in 
conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. If confirmed, I will work with 
my colleagues to further implement our commitments under the WPS Act 
and ensure that these efforts continue to be a priority for the Agency.

Human Trafficking
    Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated cases of human 
trafficking and online sexual exploitation and abuse worldwide.

   What will you prioritize, if confirmed, to counter this growing 
        problem during COVID-19 and to prevent a resurgence of these 
        behaviors after the pandemic is over?

    Answer. I share your concerns and believe that human trafficking is 
a grave human rights abuse. Sadly, the COVID-19 crisis has amplified a 
number of factors that increase the risk of human trafficking and 
online sexual exploitation and abuse. In particular, as out-of-school 
or quarantined children spend more time online, the potential for 
online harm of children also increases. If confirmed, I am committed to 
USAID's work to counter human trafficking, which includes activities to 
raise awareness about the risk of online sexual exploitation and abuse, 
and provide children, families, and communities with the knowledge and 
tools they need to reduce exposure to harmful online content.

    Question. How will you, if confirmed, enhance USAID's role in the 
President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking 
(PITF) and the Senior Policy Operating Group to Combat Trafficking in 
Persons (SPOG)?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will bring USAID's expertise to bear in the 
PITF and SPOG, specifically by strengthening the interagency approach 
to promote evidence-based prevention practices; identify, protect, and 
respond to victims' needs; increase prosecutions and convictions; and 
build partnerships, including with the corporate sector. I will 
advocate for survivors and those who experienced trauma from human 
trafficking. A survivor-centered approach is essential to preserve the 
dignity, safety, and well-being of at-risk and vulnerable populations. 
I am committed to working within the interagency to increase 
collaboration with international organizations, civil society groups, 
and the corporate sector.

United Nations Funding
    Question. USAID provides significant amounts of funding to the 
United Nations system, including through voluntary contributions to the 
World Food Program, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and others.

   If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure that funding that goes 
        through the U.N. system has proper oversight and is not lost to 
        waste, fraud, abuse, or diversion to repressive governments, 
        armed groups, terrorist organizations, or criminal enterprise?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to hold 
United Nations (UN) organizations accountable to their mission and U.N. 
member states. This means doing everything possible to ensure that U.N. 
organizations are using resources efficiently and effectively--
eliminating waste, demanding zero tolerance for corruption and sexual 
exploitation, and strengthening whistleblower protections and 
transparency and accountability. Since most USAID funding to U.N. 
partners is project-based, the Agency also ensures that USAID's U.N. 
partners understand and comply with USAID requirements on monitoring 
and reporting. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Department of 
State and Mission to the U.N., to continue to advance these priorities.

DDI
    Question. With the re-organization of USAID, there is a new Bureau 
of Development, Democracy and Innovation.

   Can you speak in detail about USAID's democracy promotion efforts?

    Answer. China and Russia are using their resources, influence, and 
technology to support autocrats and undermine and interfere with 
democratic institutions. To meet this moment, the Biden-Harris 
administration will restore democracy and human rights to the center of 
U.S. foreign policy. USAID will pursue an affirmative strategy that 
counters new and emerging threats to democracy and advances human 
rights. This has been a top priority of mine throughout my career, and 
if confirmed, I will elevate democracy programming and seek to deepen 
current investments in anti-corruption programming, democracy, human 
rights, and governance, including by supporting civil society and 
promoting independent media and protection for journalists.

    Question. How do these efforts complement the work being done by 
the Department of State's Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau?

    Answer. USAID works closely with the Department of State and the 
National Endowment for Democracy in democracy promotion efforts. Each 
entity has distinct comparative advantages--in the case of USAID, that 
includes USAID's ability to leverage relationships and know-how through 
its missions to tailor its work to local conditions--which gives the 
United States a multi-faceted and more effective approach in 
increasingly complex environments. I understand the USAID's Bureau for 
Democracy, Development, and Innovation and the State Department's 
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) engage in regular 
information-sharing and coordination efforts to avoid duplication and 
make the most strategic use of assistance funds. This coordination 
takes place both in Washington and at our missions overseas. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts to ensure that 
coordination continues to take place and every effort is made to 
maximize the impact of our assistance.

Atrocity Prevention
    Question. What role does USAID play in U.S. atrocity prevention 
efforts?

    Answer. Since the 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass 
Atrocities, USAID has played a leadership role in helping improve U.S. 
Government capabilities related to atrocity prevention. USAID addresses 
mass atrocities in four main ways: identifying and communicating risk 
factors and warning signs that could lead to mass atrocities; 
mitigating risks and bolstering resilience to shocks that could lead to 
mass atrocities; responding to escalating atrocity situations with 
humanitarian assistance and prevention programs; and supporting 
recovery from mass violence and gross violations of human rights 
through programs focused on promoting justice and accountability, 
rebuilding social cohesion, supporting political transition, and 
supporting the protection of human rights.
    This work is incredibly important because preventing mass 
atrocities is a core national security interest of the United States. 
While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to 
the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human 
Rights, I worked with President Obama to create the aforementioned 
Directive and the Atrocities Prevention Board, the first White House-
led structure tasked with reacting to early warnings of atrocities.

Climate
    Question. If confirmed, how will you and USAID interact with the 
office of Special Presidential Envoy Kerry, including with respect to 
implementation of U.S. foreign assistance connected to any climate 
arrangements or agreements negotiated by the office of Special 
Presidential Envoy Kerry?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with 
Special Presidential Climate Envoy Kerry, as USAID plays an essential 
role in working with our partner countries to translate bold climate 
ambition into action. Indeed, Secretary Kerry and I have a strong 
working relationship, forged during my time as U.S. Ambassador to the 
U.N. while he was serving as Secretary of State. I understand that the 
administration's top priorities are to: immediately raise and implement 
partner countries' climate commitments, meet the U.S. climate finance 
pledge, accelerate efforts to increase the resilience of climate 
vulnerable countries. USAID will work with countries and regions with 
globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes to reduce 
deforestation and improve conservation, as unsustainable land use 
accounts for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, as well as 
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems 
that serve as global carbon sinks. USAID will also work with countries 
and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes 
to reduce deforestation and improve conservation.

Infrastructure
    Question. USAID plays an important role in the Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund, 
set up under the Trump administration.

   Please describe your specific views on these two programs. Will 
        USAID under the Biden administration retain this initiative?

    Answer. China's significant infrastructure investments around the 
world are often fiscally unsustainable, include corrupt practices and 
processes, do not comply with international environmental and labor 
standards, lack public oversight and transparency, and have limited 
community involvement. I believe that USAID, through initiatives like 
ITAN, should continue advising countries on how to ensure a fair and 
level playing field. Once a country commits to undertaking a 
competitive procurement process, USAID should continue using mechanisms 
such as the Transaction Advisory Fund to advise it on how to ensure 
projects are legally, financially, and technically viable and 
incorporate appropriate environmental and social safeguards.

Reproductive Health
    Question. President Biden has rescinded the Mexico City policy 
(which conditioned U.S. assistance to foreign NGOs upon a commitment 
that they will not perform or promote abortion with funding from any 
source) and has said the United States will rejoin the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA), notwithstanding concerns about its support for 
China's population control program. Abortion pro-choice advocates are 
also seeking to overturn the Helms amendment (prohibiting the use of 
U.S. foreign aid for the performance or promotion of abortion as a 
method of family planning) and the Siljander amendment (prohibiting use 
of U.S. foreign aid to lobby for or against the legalization of 
abortion).

   In your opinion, does the term ``reproductive health'' include 
        abortion?

    Answer. Abortion is not included in USAID's definition of 
reproductive health.

    Question. Do you commit to uphold U.S. laws that prohibit funding 
for abortion overseas?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to uphold U.S. laws, including 
the Helms and Siljander amendments.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Human Rights
    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. Promoting human rights and democracy has been central to my 
work as a writer, advocate, and diplomat. In 2002, after years of 
extensive reporting and research, I published ``A Problem From Hell'': 
America and the Age of Genocide, which documented inaction in the face 
of genocides over the course of the 20th century. The book was 
integrated into high school and university curriculums, and some of its 
lessons were embraced by student activists, faith groups, and others 
seeking to promote human rights. In addition, many readers have 
informed me that the book's central message encouraged them to take 
action in the face of genocide in Darfur.
    While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant 
to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human 
Rights, I worked with President Obama to develop new processes aimed at 
ensuring that atrocity warnings rapidly reached senior policy makers, 
and to make creative use of the policy toolbox when signs of potential 
atrocities arose--efforts that helped ensure that, in the face of mass 
atrocities, the American response did not come down to a choice between 
doing nothing or using U.S. military force. This work produced 
significant outcomes, such as the highly-effective deployment of U.S. 
military advisers to support African Governments combating the Lord's 
Resistance Army, proactive peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast to prevent 
spiraling mass atrocities following a stolen election, and relentless 
high-level diplomacy in support of Sudan's independence referendum, 
which paved the way for the birth of an independent South Sudan. Also, 
during my time as Senior Director, I worked with my NSC colleague Gayle 
Smith to spearhead the creation of the Open Government Partnership 
(OGP), a multilateral initiative that secures governmental commitments 
to promote transparency, fight corruption, empower citizens, and 
strengthen governance. Since its founding in 2011, the OGP has grown to 
include 78 country members and a growing number of local members--
representing more than two billion people--that work alongside 
thousands of civil society organizations.
    As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., my top priorities included working 
to prevent and end conflicts, addressing the humanitarian needs of 
vulnerable communities, and advancing the human rights and dignity of 
all individuals. I spearheaded the effort to convene two successive 
summits that mobilized unprecedented commitments to U.N. Peacekeeping 
of over 50,000 new troops and police from more than 60 countries. In 
response to the global refugee crisis, I led efforts to convene a 
summit in which participating nations agreed to increase their total 
annual contributions to U.N. appeals and international humanitarian 
groups by approximately $4.5 billion and to double the number of formal 
refugee resettlement slots made available to the U.N.'s refugee agency, 
while a range of private sector companies made $650 million worth of 
pledges in support of refugees. Finally, I used intensive public and 
private diplomacy to secure the release of political prisoners and 
enhance the rights of LGBTQ individuals. Among various efforts to 
advocate on behalf of those unjustly imprisoned, in the #FreeThe20 
campaign, I publicized the cases of 20 female political prisoners 
around the world--16 of whom were ultimately freed. As part of my work 
to advance LGBTQ rights, I helped create for the first time a mandate 
for an Independent Expert to monitor and report on the violence and 
discrimination faced by LGBTQ persons around the world, convened the 
first-ever U.N. Security Council meeting on threats to LGBTQ persons , 
and was able to push the Security Council to condemn (for the first 
time in its 70-year history) violence against individuals due to their 
sexual orientation.

Diversity and Inclusion
    Question. In response to a request that I led, GAO reported in June 
2020 that USAID still has much work to do in order to create and 
sustain a truly diverse workforce. What plans do you have for improving 
diversity and inclusion at USAID?

    Answer. Diversity, equity, and inclusion must be a guiding 
principle--in our people, funding and programs, and policies. If 
confirmed, as I noted in my testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion 
foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how 
we support our workforce. The report you requested, for example, 
presented data demonstrating that ``promotion outcomes at USAID were 
generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites in 
early to mid career.'' I will engage the staff to understand the 
challenges facing them, solicit advice on how we can create a workforce 
that is more diverse and inclusive, and treat these issues with the 
urgency they demand. Ensuring that USAID remains the world's leading 
development agency requires that diversity, equity, and inclusion be 
guiding principles when it comes to our people, our funding and 
programs, and our policies.

    Question. Do you commit to regularly and transparently monitoring 
the Agency's progress towards its diversity goals?

    Answer. Yes.

Basic Education
    Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that USAID's 
efforts to support remote learning and re-enrollment efforts in the 
context of COVID-19 will support marginalized learners, including 
girls, refugees, and children with disabilities?

    Answer. COVID-19 interrupted the education of more than 1.6 billion 
learners. The risk of not returning to the classroom is especially high 
for those who experience multiple vulnerabilities based on economic 
status, gender, disability, refugee and displacement status. Since the 
beginning of the pandemic, USAID has adapted its education programming 
to respond to the shifting needs of students and educators in more than 
50 countries. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID continues to 
support partner countries to sustain investments in inclusive distance 
learning so that education systems are more resilient and equitable. I 
will also ensure that USAID continues to leverage its partnerships and 
global leadership to ensure continued learning opportunities, 
especially for the most marginalized. I will also ensure that USAID 
continues to leverage its partnerships and global leadership with 
groups like the Global Partnership for Education, Education Cannot 
Wait, the LEGO Foundation, the Inter-agency Network for Education in 
Emergencies, the Partnership to End Violence, and UNICEF, among others, 
to ensure continued learning opportunities, especially for the most 
marginalized, including girls, refugees, and children with 
disabilities.

    Question. What more can USAID be doing to help build back school 
systems around the world so that they are capable of serving all 
students, both during and after the pandemic, and are more resilient in 
the face of future challenges?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue to build 
more resilient and equitable education systems and societies, 
especially for the most marginalized and those in vulnerable 
situations, by building emergency preparedness and response capacity, 
institutionalizing remedial and accelerated education, and engaging 
youth and higher education institutions as leaders. USAID has 
opportunities to leverage its experience and expertise in accessible 
and safe distance learning, non-formal and accelerated education, 
inclusive education, youth workforce development, and private sector 
engagement to scale. Institutionalizing these approaches within 
education systems to meet the diverse needs of all children and youth 
while also building resilience within education systems will help 
minimize disruptions to learning in the event of future emergencies.

Conflicts of Interest
    Question. Do you commit to bring to the attention of the committee 
(and the USAID Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S. actions 
that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's business 
or financial interests, or the business or financial interests of any 
senior White House staff?
    I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

   Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any reason to 
        suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
        controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any 
        of the President's business or financial interests, or the 
        interests of senior White House staff?

    Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws, 
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through 
appropriate channels.

    Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have 
any financial interests in any foreign country?

    Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual 
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international 
presence, or directly in U.S. companies that have an international 
presence, but none of these holdings represent conflicts of interest 
with the position for which I have been nominated. I am committed to 
following all applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining 
vigilant with regard to my ethics obligations. I have already committed 
to divest investments the USAID Designated Agency Ethics Official 
(DAEO) has identified as possible conflicts of interest. Additionally, 
the separate U.S. literary agents that represent my spouse and me, have 
international offices that negotiate publication or republication of 
our writings in various foreign countries. The DAEO has reviewed these 
business arrangements and has determined that they do not represent 
conflicts of interest, but has advised me that we will need to monitor 
and report any overseas re-publications that occur during my tenure in 
Government.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the Interim 
President of Venezuela Juan Guiad" and prioritize working with 
implementing partners in support of President Guaido's humanitarian 
efforts in Venezuela?

    Answer. The United States recognizes Juan Guaido as the interim 
president and the democratically-elected National Assembly as the only 
legitimate democratic institutions in Venezuela. If confirmed, I commit 
to working with the interim government and to support the people of 
Venezuela.

    Question. Will you commit to working with non-governmental 
organizations and civil society groups to restore democracy and a 
pathway to free, fair, and transparent elections in Venezuela and to 
keep my office informed of that progress?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with non-
governmental organizations and civil society groups to restore 
democracy and a pathway to democratic elections in Venezuela. I look 
forward to consulting with you about how we might strengthen those 
efforts, given the devastating costs of Maduro's repression.

    Question. Do you commit to supporting the Interim President of 
Venezuela, Juan Guaido, and the National Assembly?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support to support Interim President 
Juan Guaido, the democratically elected National Assembly, and the 
people of Venezuela to determine their own future through free and fair 
elections.

    Question. If confirmed, what would your priorities be for Central 
America?

    Answer. If confirmed, my priorities in Central America will include 
expeditiously strengthening programs that seek to improve conditions in 
the region and tackle the major drivers of migration. While the 
specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be generalized across 
countries or even communities, they are generally tied to insecurity, 
lack of economic opportunity, and the effects of poor governance and 
corruption, and I will work with other U.S. Government agencies to 
build the political will of partner nations to address these drivers. 
COVID-19 has exacerbated these conditions, as have major natural 
disasters (including hurricanes) recently hitting the region.
    As you know, in recent years, USAID programs have been designed to 
combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth; addressed 
corruption and impunity; disrupted the activities of transnational 
criminal organizations; civil society; and provided vulnerable citizens 
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection. As 
USAID restarts and ramps up those programs and as USAID missions in the 
region seek new or expanded partnerships, the agency will draw on 
evidence of what works in order to help foster an environment where 
families can envision their futures in their home countries and 
communities. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's current approach of 
tailoring and adapting programs to the unique needs of each country and 
community. I will also continue the Agency's practice of using 
migration data to focus resources geographically in response to 
specific, local drivers of migration. USAID will work with a wide range 
of stakeholders from civil society and the private sector to increase 
the impact of our efforts. And I look forward to further consultations 
with Congress on how to further improve the effectiveness of these 
programs.

    Question. Regional coordination is essential to the effectiveness 
of the U.S. Strategy for Central America. Will you commit to working 
closely with our partners in this region?

    Answer. Yes, I will commit to working closely with our partners in 
the region. I understand that USAID works closely with multiple 
stakeholders in the region both in the public and private sectors as 
well as with civil society organizations and international non-
governmental organizations.

    Question. How will USAID, under your leadership, work to address 
the drivers of violence, corruption, and migration in the Northern 
Triangle?

    Answer. The specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be 
generalized across communities or even countries. Accordingly, USAID 
tailors and adapts programs that address the root causes of irregular 
migration to the unique needs of each country and community; the 
extensive use of data is critical and is an integral part of these 
efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able to 
concentrate resources geographically in response to local drivers of 
migration.
    I understand that USAID is addressing the security, governance, and 
economic drivers of irregular migration to the United States from 
Central America in partnership with other U.S. Government agencies, 
including the development of a forthcoming strategy on addressing the 
root causes of irregular migration as mandated in Executive Order 
14010. Critical to the success of our efforts is generating political 
will on the part of governments in the region to address the reasons 
people choose to migrate. USAID combats crime and violence through its 
programming by reaching at-risk youth, addressing corruption and 
impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational criminal 
organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater economic 
opportunity, social services, and protection. Through this work, USAID 
seeks to foster an environment where families can envision their 
futures in their home countries and communities. If confirmed, I will 
work to build and expand on this foundation. I look forward to 
deepening consultations with Congress on how to further improve the 
effectiveness of these programs.

    Question. Last year, in the FY 21 SFOPS conference report, $25 
million was allocated for programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador to implement the national sexual gender-based violence (SGBV) 
prevention strategies in fiscal year 2021. The bill required, within 
120 days, and in consultation with the USAID Administrator, a report on 
the implementation of the national SGBV prevention strategies in such 
countries. Also included in the FY21 appropriations bill, were 
recommendations for the State Department to create programs in the 
Northern Triangle for programming and enhancing the capacity of police, 
judicial systems, and child protection systems to identify, investigate 
and prosecute cases of sexual violence. If confirmed, will you commit 
to briefing my staff on how USAID intends to implement this funding?

    Answer. I share your desire to prevent sexual and gender-based 
violence in Central America, which has some of the highest rates of GBV 
in the world. If confirmed, I commit to briefing you on how USAID 
intends to implement the funding appropriated in FY 21 and how the 
Agency currently works across the region supporting initiatives to 
reduce impunity for gender-based violence (GBV) cases. GBV was 
prioritized by President Biden in Executive Order 14010 which mandated 
a new strategy on the root causes of irregular migration from the 
Northern Triangle.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba 
democracy programs as well as civil society and human rights defenders 
in Cuba?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, support for human rights will remain at 
the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of the most repressive 
countries in the world, and is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly 
abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its people from accessing even 
basic independent information, inhibits meaningful civil society 
activity--including free press--and criminalizes political dissent. As 
one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case 
of Oswaldo Pay  directly with the Cuban Foreign Minister pressing him 
to allow an independent investigation of the circumstances in which 
Paya had been killed, and I continued to advocate publicly in support 
of Pay 's family. During my time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out 
Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of civil society and human rights 
defenders like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer, 
and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against 
Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
    The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential to 
Cuban democracy. I understand USAID has a portfolio in place to 
continue supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba 
who will push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The 
Agency will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political 
prisoners and persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue 
defending the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for 
their political beliefs.

    Question. Colombia has been directly impacted by the man-made 
crisis created by Nicol s Maduro and his brutal regime in Venezuela. 
Currently, Colombia hosts about 1.7 million Venezuelans, according to 
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. How should we support Colombia 
in responding to the impacts it faces due to the Venezuelan crisis?

    Answer. USAID is addressing immediate humanitarian needs and 
supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia resulting 
from the Venezuelan crisis. I understand that the USAID Mission in 
Colombia is providing more than $77 million for Venezuelans in health, 
education, governance, citizen security, human rights, and economic 
integration. Since 2018, USAID has also provided more than $298 million 
in humanitarian assistance supporting Venezuelan migrants, refugees, 
and host communities with food assistance, direct cash assistance, and 
health support. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to 
all Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it 
possible for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important 
step for Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many 
Venezuelans it hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting 
with you on how USAID can support this effort.

    Question. In 2017, Colombia signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
with NATO and became the first NATO partner country in Latin America. 
Today, Colombia and the U.S. are a success story that have forged a 
bond through shared commitments in support of stability, the defense of 
human rights, respect for democracy and the rule of law, and the 
protection of citizens' safety and security throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Do you view our partnership with Colombia as one of the 
strongest in the Western Hemisphere?

    Answer. The United States and Colombia enjoy a decades' long 
strategic partnership that is among the strongest in the region. If 
confirmed, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic 
freedoms will be at the center of our relationship with Colombia.

    Question. Do you believe that Colombia's shared goals with the 
United States should be an example for younger democracies in the 
Western Hemisphere? How do we take that model and focus our efforts on 
other nations in the region?

    Answer. I agree that the U.S.-Colombia partnership has proven 
successful, and USAID's work with Colombia over the past decades on 
peace and stability has achieved a number of successes. The peace 
accords signed with the FARC in 2016 present a tremendous opportunity 
for Colombia to end a conflict that had raged for more than 50 years, 
and to end a continuous cycle of violence by transforming the long-
neglected parts of the country prioritized in the accords.
    If confirmed, I will work with Colombia, and with Congress, to 
collectively find ways to make USAID's assistance even more supportive 
of Colombia's own efforts toward an enduring and inclusive peace. While 
taking into account the context of each country's unique set of 
circumstances, I agree that Colombia's advances provide important 
lessons that may be applicable elsewhere within the region. At the same 
time, as with other countries in the region, I will also speak up in 
support of human rights: since 2016, more than 400 Colombian human 
rights defenders have been killed, underscoring the importance of 
USAID's continued assistance in helping the country achieve the 
commitments and overall transformation envisioned by the peace accords.

    Question. USAID foreign assistance programs must continue to 
strengthen democratic institutions and bolster transparency and 
accountability to underpin democratic resilience, but they also need to 
provide targeted support to local stakeholders to understand CCP 
influence and counter those malign efforts. Such funding should be 
integrated into existing democracy programs at the country level, with 
support from international actors who understand these issues, to 
incorporate them into existing programs at the country level. If 
confirmed, how will you ensure USAID supports these efforts?

    Answer. U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
is a defining challenge of the 21st century. The administration's 
approach is to provide an alternative vision to Beijing's--a vision 
that promotes democratic governance, transparency, and local ownership 
in our global development work. USAID will draw on America's 
comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the 
PRC's, by ensuring that good governance, sustainability and social and 
economic safeguards are built into projects we support. USAID will 
strengthen local capacity to ensure that development investments are 
both beneficial and sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies 
and partners to better leverage our collective resources and influence, 
and I will be an advocate for human rights, governance, environmental, 
social, and labor standards in order to promote investments that are 
sustainable for the long term.

    Question. How can USAID support administering some of the 
Countering Chinese Influence Fund?

    Answer. I would like to thank you and your colleagues for the 
Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) resources that were made 
available in the FY21 appropriations act. I understand that USAID is 
working with the Department of State on programming these funds, as 
well as others, to counter China's foreign policy strategy and 
influence in critical countries and regions. The approach is to offer 
alternatives to China's predatory development model and instead improve 
inclusive, democratic governance; advance rules-based economic 
competition and fair trade practices; strengthen our security 
partnerships to counter transnational crime and terrorism; combat 
digital authoritarianism and malicious cyber activities; and promote 
energy security and independence. If confirmed, I look forward to 
consulting with you on this and to further assessing how USAID can best 
support these efforts.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to pushing for greater 
humanitarian assistance and access for the Syrian people, while making 
sure that such aid does not fall into the hands of a corrupt and 
bloodthirsty Assad regime?

    Answer. Yes. USAID remains committed to ensuring that all 
assistance reaches those in need and does not benefit the Assad regime. 
Across Syria, USAID takes all possible steps to minimize the risk of 
diversion, whether to the Assad regime or to terrorist groups, by 
working through experienced and trusted U.N. partners, other 
international organizations, and non-governmental partners in Syria, 
including through the use of third-party monitoring. USAID has zero 
tolerance for fraud, waste, or abuse of American taxpayer resources and 
requires partners to have robust safeguards and risk mitigation systems 
in place to ensure that humanitarian assistance is reaching only those 
for whom it is intended.

    Question. Do you agree that long-term stabilization in Syria will 
not be achieved as long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power?

    Answer. Bashar al-Assad has perpetrated the most chilling, barbaric 
crimes imaginable against the Syrian people for the past decade. 
Despite political isolation, economic pressure, and weak control over 
much of Syrian territory, Assad clings to power with no indication that 
he is willing to bring an end to the war and the suffering of the 
Syrian people, and indeed with Assad's increasingly ruinous economic 
mismanagement exacerbating the horrific costs of conflict, repression, 
and mass atrocities for the Syrian people. Members of Congress spoke 
out clearly on this issue when they voted for the Caesar Civilian 
Protection Act in the last Congress imposing military, political, and 
accountability benchmarks for the Assad regime before it can receive 
sanctions relief. Countless brave Syrians have risked their lives to 
preserve evidence of Assad's war crimes, and Assad and his 
collaborators must be held accountable for their atrocities.

    Question. As an expert on genocide, do you agree that the Chinese 
Communist Party is committing genocide and crimes against humanity 
against Uyghurs and other its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang?

    Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have 
studied the facts that China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.
    I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue, including the 
passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds perpetrators 
accountable for human rights violations and abuses against Uyghurs and 
other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my platform to draw 
attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that USAID actively 
engages with you, the committee and the interagency to determine any 
further steps that can be taken.

    Question. You have written extensively about the failure of past 
administrations to prevent and respond to genocide. You are now in a 
unique position to put your aspirations into action. We have seen what 
has happened to Iraq's Yazidi and Christian community at the hands of 
ISIS. We know about the atrocities and likely genocide committed 
against the Rohingya by Burmese military forces. Now, we are reading 
weekly reports about the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang against Uyghurs 
and other Muslim minorities by the Chinese Communist Party.

   Can you assure this committee that you will not only support, but 
        also strengthen, USAID's commitment to victims of religious 
        persecution?

    Answer. Yes. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human 
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of atrocities, especially 
for religious minorities. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform 
to elevate the voices of religious minorities. I called for the release 
of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to 
denounce her Christian faith, and for Sudan to repeal the laws that put 
her in jail in the first place. I was the first person to bring a young 
Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad to the U.N. Security Council, after her 
family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS and she had been 
forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a history of helping the world's 
most vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in 
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of 
their faith. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring with you, the 
Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships office , and diverse faith communities, to mobilize 
resources and, as appropriate, to tailor our programs to support 
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.

    Question. If so, how do you plan to use your position to do so?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to stand up for victims of 
religious persecution, and I will review USAID's approach to ensure 
that our programs are most effectively supporting them, making 
adjustments as appropriate.

    Question. The past several months have been historic for Israel's 
relationships with regional Arab neighbors. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, 
and Sudan joined Egypt and Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations 
with Israel--paving the path to peace through recognition and 
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel. What role do 
you see for USAID in supporting these new relationships? Do you see 
opportunities for increased trilateral cooperation in the region?

    Answer. USAID has the opportunity to support these relationships 
through identifying opportunities for increased trilateral and 
multilateral cooperation, such as by leveraging the inherently 
collaborative power of science, technology and innovation in order to 
address common challenges. USAID supports cooperation between Israel 
and countries in the Middle East region through the Middle East 
Regional Cooperation (MERC) program, which has long supported programs 
between partners throughout the region. If confirmed, I look forward to 
building upon such efforts to further peace and normalization across 
the Middle East.

    Question. During your tenure as U.N. Ambassador, the United States 
abstained at the United Nations Security Council on a one-sided 
resolution that sought to impose solutions to final status issues on 
the parties. Seventy-nine senators subsequently backed a resolution 
objecting to the abstention. In hindsight, do you believe that vote 
advanced American interests or moved the peace process forward?

    Answer. During my time as Ambassador to the U.N., I worked 
tirelessly to combat bias against Israel and end Israel's unfair 
isolation at the United Nations. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations 
helped secure several notable firsts for Israel under my leadership, 
including bringing about recognition of Yom Kippur as a U.N. holiday; 
convening an unprecedented session on antisemitism in the U.N. General 
Assembly; spearheading Israel's full and equal participation across 
numerous U.N. bodies; and lobbying to ensure Israel's historic 
selection as chair of a powerful U.N. committee (the Sixth Committee, 
the main U.N. forum for addressing questions of international law).
    This context is important in addressing the Obama administration's 
vote on UNSCR 2334. President Obama instructed me to abstain on UNSCR 
2334 in order to try to preserve prospects for a two-state solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He saw the vote as consistent with 
bipartisan policy, dating back almost 50 years at the time, of 
supporting two states and opposing unilateral measures by either side 
that could impede prospects for two states. The resolution included a 
condemnation of all acts of violence against civilians, including acts 
of terrorism and incitement, and it expressed concern about Israeli 
settlement activities, reaffirming the long-standing U.S. position on 
settlements.
    During my explanation of the U.S. vote, I denounced persistent 
anti-Israel bias at the U.N. and described our numerous efforts 
(including those mentioned above) ``to fight for Israel's right simply 
to be treated just like any other country.'' I also explained President 
Obama's posture on the resolution: ``It is because this forum too often 
continues to be biased against Israel; because there are important 
issues that are not sufficiently addressed in this resolution; and 
because the United States does not agree with every word in this text, 
that the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution. But it 
is because this resolution reflects the facts on the ground--and is 
consistent with U.S. policy across Republican and Democratic 
administration throughout the history of the State of Israel--that the 
United States did not veto it.''
    (The full explanation of vote, from December 23, 2016, is available 
here: https://web.archive.org/web/20161231232014/https://
usun.state.gov/remarks/7621)
    If confirmed, I will work to advance President Biden's strong 
support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance 
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian 
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in accordance with 
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.

    Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds 
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of 
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice 
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict 
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign 
assistance?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully abides by 
all U.S. laws, including the Helms Amendment.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. After enduring a decade of conflict, humanitarian needs 
in Syria are projected to onlyincrease. President Biden pledged to 
recommit the U.S. to lead on humanitarian issues including to pursue 
political solutions, protect vulnerable Syrians and facilitate the work 
of NGOs.

   What specific actions will USAID take under your direction to 
        reassert U.S. humanitarian leadership and efforts in Syria? 
        What tools are available to the U.S. to ensure continued 
        humanitarian access into and within Syria?

    Answer. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I worked tirelessly to hold 
the Assad regime and its backers accountable for their war crimes, and 
to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people. Among these 
efforts, in 2014 I helped lead the U.N. Security Council to authorize 
U.N. agencies to deliver relief into Syria without explicit approval 
from the Syrian Government, allowing millions of people to receive 
assistance that the Assad regime had been blocking. Today, USAID's 
humanitarian assistance is reaching an estimated 4.8 million people per 
month inside Syria and 1.1 million Syrian refugees in the region. The 
United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance inside 
Syria and across the region, contributing close to $13 billion since 
the start of the conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to be a 
forceful advocate for delivering critically-needed humanitarian aid to 
the Syrian people, and ensure that the United States continues to play 
a leading role in protecting vulnerable civilians by advocating for 
unhindered humanitarian access, coordinating with other donors, and 
encouraging other donors to increase their support to the response. I 
will also work with Secretary of State Blinken and Ambassador Linda 
Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the U.S. Government continues to 
advocate in the U.N. Security Council and on the international stage to 
improve the lives of the Syrian people, including through the 
reauthorization of the aforementioned U.N. cross-border assistance and 
to advance a long-overdue negotiated political settlement to end the 
Syrian conflict.

    Question. How can USAID play a role in bringing about a political 
solution in Syria? What tools are available to the U.S. through USAID 
to better support our allies in Northeastern Syria?

    Answer. While assistance will not solve the conflict in Syria, it 
is a vital component of the effort to create conditions for peace by 
saving lives, providing some measure of stability to vulnerable 
populations, and uniting partners and allies in support of the Syrian 
people. If confirmed, in addition to ensuring that as many Syrians as 
possible are able to receive critically-needed assistance, I will 
support administration-wide efforts to advance a negotiated political 
settlement, which is the only way to end this conflict. I will also 
explore USAID support for civil society actors who are documenting war 
crimes and pursuing accountability, a critical complement to pursuit of 
a stable peace. The Biden administration redoubled the U.S. commitment 
to our allies in northeast Syria by lifting the previous 
administration's freeze on stabilization funds. If confirmed, I will 
ensure not only that these critical programs continue, but that they 
complement the larger administration-wide efforts to advance a 
negotiated political settlement.

    Question. It is imperative for U.S. foreign assistance to aim to 
break down gender-related barriers to educational attainment in 
countries where there is persistent gender disparity. This is 
particularly important in secondary school when girls are the most 
likely to drop out. In many contexts, poverty and entrenched social and 
cultural norms can limit girls' access to quality learning 
opportunities.

   How can USAID better provide holistic support to ensure adolescents 
        stay enrolled in and complete secondary school?

    Answer. USAID promotes a ``whole-of-girl'' approach, reducing 
gender-based violence and increasing the capability of all learners, of 
all gender identities, to realize their rights, determine their life 
outcomes, and make independent decisions. If confirmed, I commit that 
USAID will continue to break down gender-related barriers to education 
so that all learners, especially girls and the most marginalized, have 
access to safe, quality education from early childhood through 
adulthood, especially during adolescence, a crucial time in girls' 
lives. Part of this approach is recognizing that menstrual health and 
hygiene is an integral part of dignity and empowerment for adolescent 
girls, including their ability to attend and stay in school. USAID will 
also continue to prioritize the needs of the most marginalized and 
those in vulnerable situations, and address inequalities that have been 
exacerbated by COVID-19. Ensuring that we continue to make progress in 
this area is critically important not just for empowering young women, 
but for achieving lasting advances on behalf of society as a whole and 
creating conditions for a more equitable response to the fallout from 
the pandemic. For example, addressing gender inequality in education 
contributes to closing gender gaps in employment and wages, which have 
in turn been shown to reduce income inequality and lead to overall 
increases in GDP.

    Question. USAID's global health programs are critical to providing 
sexual and reproductive health care for women and girls. However, 
research has shown that a 10 percent decline in the use of 
contraceptives--such as due to the COVID-19 pandemic--could result in 
more than 48 million women with an unmet need for modern contraception 
and more than 15 million additional unintended pregnancies. If 
confirmed, I hope you will not only support international family 
planning as a priority for USAID, but also the partners on the ground 
who implement these programs.

   How will you work to expand and improve USAID's family planning and 
        reproductive health programs?

    Answer. I believe that reproductive health care is essential to 
women's health and well-being and also positively impacts infant and 
child health. Now more than ever, as countries battle COVID-19 and the 
secondary effects from the pandemic, we must strengthen our efforts to 
reach those most vulnerable, including women who benefit from voluntary 
family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH) programs. The 
administration is committed to ensuring that foreign assistance 
programs prioritize women's health needs globally, including robust 
support for voluntary family planning and maternal health programs, and 
for preventing gender-based violence.

    Question. What needs to be done to increase access to sexual and 
reproductive health care amidst the COVID-19 pandemic?

    Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected all global 
health efforts, including routine vaccination programs for children, 
voluntary family planning and reproductive health programs , women and 
children's access to basic health care, and the distribution of 
treatments to control neglected tropical diseases, as well as 
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. If confirmed, I will work with 
USAID global health experts to ensure funding is prioritized to 
activities, including voluntary family planning and reproductive health 
activities, that will support regaining the progress lost during the 
pandemic.

    Question. Is there a way for the U.S. to better engage with 
partners and allies on the provision of family planning services? What 
would that look like?

    Answer. USAID is the largest bilateral donor for voluntary family 
planning and reproductive health assistance globally. Other donors, 
partner governments, and civil society actors have historically looked 
to USAID for leadership because of its strong reputation for technical 
excellence. The administration is committed to restoring U.S global 
health leadership, including as it relates to voluntary family planning 
and reproductive health, which will require effective partnerships to 
improve coordination and investments and strengthen linkages across 
diverse global health programs. If confirmed, I will look for ways that 
USAID can advance voluntary family planning and reproductive health 
programming with our partners and allies around the globe.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
             to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Rob Portman

Extremism and the Global Fragility Act
    Question. Despite the best efforts of both parties and their 
respective administrations, the threat from Salafi-Jihadi extremism 
persists to this day. The Global Fragility Act passed by Congress last 
year changed our approach to conflict-prone states that can be vectors 
of violent extremism, uncontrolled migration, and extreme poverty by 
dedicating $1.5 billion toward this space and establishing a new Bureau 
for Development, Democracy and Innovation at USAID.

   How will you effectively use this legislation to direct our 
        approaches toward countering fragile states?

    Answer. this is a key priority. We need a comprehensive approach 
and more tools to prevent conflict and increase stability. If 
confirmed, I will consult with Congress on the implementation of the 
U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (the ``GFA 
strategy''). It is my understanding that the list of priority countries 
is currently being considered by the interagency, with USAID 
participation. After country selection, we will need to bring a range 
of U.S. policy tools to bear in implementing the GFA strategy and 
associated country and regional plans. If confirmed, I commit to 
consulting with you and Congress frequently to support the 
implementation of the Act with State and DOD.

Latin America
    Question. I would like to talk about the importance of Latin 
America and the role of the United States in the economic and 
democratic development of this region.
    Last week I led a bipartisan CODEL to El Paso to see firsthand the 
crisis on the border. We are seeing people fleeing extreme poverty from 
the Northern Triangle countries-- Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. 
I am very supportive of building a robust border protection system to 
physically protect our border, but I also understand the necessity to 
help these fragile countries address the root causes of illegal 
immigration such as extreme poverty and breakdown in security.
    The latest numbers are deeply concerning. 550 kids per day are 
coming into the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle 
countries, which is five or six times more than in January, when there 
were less than 100 in terms of families. In terms of families, 1,500 
per day last week, as compared to 1,000 in February--on average, less 
than 100 in January. This is a 15 times increase when compared to 
previous data.

   Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us spending 
        what President Biden has now suggested, which is another $4 
        billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been sent in the 
        last five years?

    Answer. As you note, President Biden proposed a multi-year, $4 
billion comprehensive regional strategy to address the root causes of 
irregular migration. I agree that any funding needs to be accountable 
and channeled to evidence-based programming. Since the specific drivers 
of irregular migration cannot be generalized across communities or even 
countries, USAID tailors and adapts programs that address the root 
causes of irregular migration to the unique needs of each country and 
community; the extensive use of data is critical and is an integral 
part of these efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able 
to focus resources geographically in response to local drivers of 
migration.
    I gather that USAID is addressing the distinct and overlapping 
security, governance, and economic drivers of irregular migration to 
the United States from Central America in partnership with other U.S. 
Government agencies, including, as mandated in Executive Order 14010, 
by working with the State Department to develop a forthcoming strategy 
on addressing the root causes of irregular migration from the region. 
USAID seeks to combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth, 
addressing corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of 
transnational criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens 
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection. 
Through this work, USAID helps to foster an environment where families 
can envision their futures in their home countries and communities. If 
confirmed, I will work to build and expand on this foundation and look 
forward to consulting with you about how best to ensure these programs 
are tailored to optimize results.

    Question. Do you commit to work with Congress on asylum seekers to 
have them apply from their home country or a safe third country?

    Answer. Under President Obama, in my capacity as White House 
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees while serving at the NSC, I saw the 
importance of the in-country processing efforts in Iraq that had 
initially been established in 2008, and as U.N. Ambassador, I supported 
President Obama's establishment of the Central American Minors (CAM) 
Refugee program, which President Biden has announced will continue 
under his administration. As you know, USAID is not involved in asylum 
policy or enforcement of border security, so if confirmed, I would 
defer to the Departments of Homeland Security and the State Department.

    Question. Do you commit to placing an emphasis on combating 
corruption, especially through the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
through programming in the northern triangle countries?

    Answer. Yes. Corruption can itself be a driver of migration and of 
course makes it more difficult to address a wide range of development 
challenges--from global health and food security, to economic 
development and fair trade, to maintaining strong alliances. If 
confirmed, I plan to renew USAID's focus on governance and anti-
corruption programs in the Northern Triangle and, in my role on the 
Board of Directors at the MCC, I commit to placing an emphasis on 
combating corruption.

    Question. Do you commit to emphasizing an adherence to transparency 
and rule of law in Latin America and beyond?

    Answer. Yes, I commit to the importance of transparency and the 
rule of law in Latin America and beyond.

Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA)
    Question. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), which is a 
program I created during my time serving in the House, remains a top 
priority for me. This is a ``debt-for-nature'' swap program that offers 
eligible developing countries options to relieve or restructure 
concessional debt owed to the U.S. in exchange for supporting 
conservation activities for tropical forests and coral reefs. Through 
the TFCA program, approximately $233 million in appropriated funds from 
the U.S. Government have generated nearly $340 million through interest 
and leveraging from NGOs and private entities.
    To date, 20 agreements have been carried out with 14 different 
countries to save more than 67 million acres of tropical forest. 
Tropical forests are valuable tools for carbon storage. These TFCA 
agreements have led to the sequestration of more than 56 million metric 
tons of carbon dioxide--that's the equivalent of taking 11.8 million 
cars off the road--and without losing a single American job. In fact, 
this program has helped developing countries by improving their balance 
sheet through debt-for-nature swaps.
    TFCA was provided $15 million in appropriations for both fiscal 
years 2020 and 2021. USAID, in coordination with the Treasury 
Department and the State Department, is one of the key agencies 
responsible for carrying out TFCA agreements.

   If you are confirmed to be Administrator of USAID, will you commit 
        to prioritizing additional TFCA deals using the funding that 
        Congress has provided?

    Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue, 
which I was grateful to have the chance to discuss with you. I 
certainly agree that this is win-win programming. I gather that USAID 
works closely with the State Department and Treasury in an effort to 
program TFCA agreements, including those addressing coral reef 
conservation. I understand that TFCA programs have generated 
substantial additional resources through capital gains from fund 
investments, cost-sharing by grant recipients, and co-financing with 
other donors. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing additional deals 
with TFCA funding.

Africa and Great Power Competition
    Question. China has focused heavily on Africa as a part of their 
Belt and Road Initiative. While China has provided much needed 
infrastructure spending and benefits to some countries on the 
continent, I am concerned about shifts in Chinese investment away from 
development initiatives toward projects that are more aligned with 
military purposes. At the same time, many countries have traded 
infrastructure and development for natural resource rights and 
burdensome debt obligations.

   How will you effectively lead USAID to counter China's influence in 
        Africa? How can we do a better job of highlighting the benefits 
        of working with America rather than the CCP?

    Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of 
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African 
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security, 
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening 
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone 
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African 
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in 
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States offers a 
meaningful alternative to China's predatory economic approach, and we 
must continue to work to ensure that American companies can compete on 
an even playing field at the same time we promote local 
entrepreneurship and fair practices. Despite the massive amounts of 
money that Beijing has invested in Africa, people in many African 
nations are voicing growing concerns over China's lack of transparency, 
lending practices, poor environmental record, and failure to invest in 
relationships with local communities. In these and other areas, the 
United States has multiple comparative advantages that we must work 
across agencies to demonstrate. If confirmed, I look forward to 
consulting further with you and to working with other Departments and 
Agencies as well as the business community to help ensure that the U.S. 
is pursuing trade and investment initiatives from a position of 
strength. I also look forward to digging into the communications 
dimension of this challenge, because we need to be strategic about how 
we amplify the tenets of the U.S. approach and how we highlight for our 
local partners the ways in which U.S. investments are responsive to 
local needs and priorities.

    Question. China has also exported a number facial recognition and 
security software programs for law enforcement, the same systems that 
are being used to enable the genocide in Xingjian against the Uyghurs, 
to effectively ``coup-proof'' authoritarian regimes on the African 
continent.

   Do you see this as a threat for democracy promotion in Africa, and 
        how can we help you to be successful in pushing back against 
        this threat?

    Answer. Yes. China's use of facial recognition and security 
software programs for law enforcement are a threat to democracy and 
freedom of expression in Africa. Freedom has been declining globally 
for 15 consecutive years, and China and Russia are using their 
resources, influence, and technology to buttress autocrats and 
undermine and interfere with democratic institutions. In Africa, USAID 
supports efforts to uphold civil society efforts to advocate for 
fundamental rights, such as freedoms of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly, and to hold credible, free, and fair elections. I 
appreciate your offer of support. If confirmed, I will continue to 
prioritize this critical work and look forward to working with you and 
your colleagues to devise new strategies for countering this growing 
threat.



                               __________


           Responses to Additional Questions for the Record 
         Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Tim Kaine

Virginia Tech Innovation Lab
    Question. The Feed the Future Integrated Pest Management Innovation 
Lab (IPMIL), funded by USAID and managed by Virginia Tech, has been in 
operation since 1993. In that time, the program has generated nearly $2 
billion in economic benefits for developing countries, funded 500+ 
graduate students, and collaborated with more than 100 institutions. 
Unfortunately, in a deviation from its historic review process for 
innovation labs, USAID has not renewed IPMIL for a full five-year 
contract since 2014; rather, it is now operating on its second one-year 
no-cost extension that is set to expire in November 2021. USAID's 
Bureau for Resilience and Food Security has also established a new 
Future Innovation Lab for Current and Emerging Threats to Crops (CETC), 
for which the agency is now soliciting proposals.
    Given the potential overlap between IPMIL and the CETC, I recently 
led a letter with Senate and House colleagues to Acting Administrator 
Steele in support of IPMIL, including seeking clarity on the status of 
the program at Virginia Tech moving forward. Should you be confirmed, I 
look forward to USAID's attention to the matter

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into this matter and 
getting back to you.

USAID Collaboration with Research Universities
    Question. USAID has a strong tradition of working with universities 
to utilize their expertise to help address some of the most challenging 
global development challenges. Feed the Future Innovation Labs are one 
part of that partnership and are critical in advancing the solutions 
needed to help reduce global hunger, poverty, and undernutrition. If 
confirmed, are there new programs and collaborations you envision with 
strong research universities like those in Virginia? Will you consider 
expanding innovation labs to help reach more countries?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would explore opportunities to deepen 
USAID's collaboration with research universities. USAID greatly values 
its partnership with the U.S. university community and the unparalleled 
research capacity that these institutions bring to the U.S. 
Government's global hunger and food security initiative, Feed the 
Future. The U.S. university-led Feed the Future Innovation Labs are 
central to leveraging American science and innovation to solve problems 
facing food-insecure regions, and they are doing so in ways that build 
local and national capacity in partner countries. I gather that the 
cutting-edge portfolio of Innovation Labs evolves as new challenges 
emerge and new research pathways open up for making progress in food 
security, strengthening climate resilience and accelerating improved 
nutrition, and if confirmed, I look forward to engaging in that process 
and discussing any new opportunities with you.

New Partnership Initiative (NPI)

    Question. The New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) was established to 
diversify USAID's partner base by creating avenues for new and 
underutilized partners to work with USAID. Through NPI, the Agency 
promotes local leadership, seeks bold and innovative approaches to 
fostering self-reliance, and identifies new sources of funding to 
sustain partnership and scale impact. It is one of the only tools the 
agency has to effectively work with new partners.

   How will you work to ensure that mechanisms like the New 
        Partnerships Initiative are maintained as effective tools in 
        partnering with new, innovative, and locally established 
        organizations?

    Answer. I recognize the longstanding challenge of enlisting new and 
non-traditional partners. It is my understanding that approximately 80 
percent of USAID funding went to just 75 organizations in 2017, and by 
2019 only 69 organizations were receiving the same share. The number of 
new partners has declined every year since 2011. Reducing the barriers 
to engaging with and accessing resources from USAID is important, and I 
strongly believe in diversifying the Agency's partnership base. Doing 
so will help to broaden the USAID's perspectives and approaches in 
order to address development and humanitarian challenges. If confirmed, 
I will ensure that USAID continues to build on and expand efforts to be 
more inclusive in partnering with a broader set of organizations to 
achieve our objectives, while ensuring that the Agency meets relevant 
requirements.

Community Health Workers
    Question. Community health workers, the vast majority of whom are 
women, have been a critical part of the response to COVID-19 and other 
endemic diseases around the world. According to a recent report 
commissioned by Malaria No More and the United Nations Foundation, 
investments in community-based health programs help prevent 75 million 
malaria cases annually, reducing the burden on the health systems of 
low-income countries. Unfortunately, in many countries community health 
workers are not well supported or compensated.

   How can USAID support community health workers so that they have 
        the resources they need?

    Answer. Community health workers (CHWs) have long been central to 
responding to basic health needs, confronting global health threats 
(including Ebola, Zika, malaria, and now of course COVID-19), and 
providing life-saving assistance in humanitarian emergencies. CHWs are 
an essential part of the global health workforce and often the only 
source of care for their communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has only 
exacerbated the need for CHWs, placing additional demands on these 
critical frontline workers and requiring communities to redirect 
resources to support COVID-19 response, when other health threats 
remain. USAID recommends that host country governments include CHWs in 
health systems as a professional cadre that are a critical part of a 
sustainable health workforce. If confirmed, I commit to continuing to 
advance programs that support and equip CHWs with the resources they 
need.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. The coronavirus worsened the existing global food crisis. 
An estimated 130 million more people were on the brink of starvation 
last year due to factors caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Many of 
these individuals are in countries already experiencing instability 
from locust infestations, military conflict, and extreme poverty.

   In what ways would you alter the previous planning and strategies 
        for U.S. food security efforts in light of the coronavirus 
        impacts?

    Answer. The pandemic has exacerbated food insecurity and 
malnutrition worldwide, with the most vulnerable bearing the brunt of 
its impact. The World Bank estimates that in 2020 as many as 124 
million people fell into poverty and hunger as a result, and expects 
this number to increase significantly this year to as much as 163 
million people. The nutrition impacts are equally devastating, putting 
millions more children at risk. In the face of COVID-19, the U.S. 
Government's Feed the Future initiative to end global hunger, is 
adapting its vital programming to mitigate and deal with the impacts on 
food systems and nutrition. Specifically, I understand that Feed the 
Future is leveraging its existing global portfolio to respond to the 
crisis in the following ways: (1) engaging governments on trade and 
inclusive economic growth policies; (2) bolstering small and medium 
sized enterprises throughout the food system and unlocking private 
sector funds to accelerate economic recovery, growth and employment; 
(3) transitioning households and communities off of assistance through 
economic inclusion models; and (4) supporting governments to create and 
strengthen their existing social protection systems, including shock-
responsive safety nets and risk financing. It will be critical to 
further leverage Feed the Future as countries rebuild economically in 
the long wake of the pandemic, and I understand that USAID is currently 
looking at ways to do this.

    Question. For more than 50 years, USAID's global health programs 
have focused on saving lives and protecting vulnerable populations from 
disease. The United States works extensively with countries across the 
globe to strengthen public health systems. There are a finite amount of 
resources available to address the current global pandemic. Yet, the 
needs continue to expand.

   What is your strategy to ensure USAID is assisting those countries 
        most in need due to the coronavirus pandemic?

    Question. What indicators or criteria will you rely upon to make 
decisions on how to best utilize U.S. resources to combat the 
coronavirus?

    Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID's COVID-19 work is 
needs-based and evidence-driven. If confirmed, I will work with the 
team at USAID to ensure that we prioritize resources based on rigorous 
needs-analysis and clear performance metrics. It is my understanding 
that USAID is developing a COVID-19 response plan, in coordination with 
interagency partners, to meet critical and immediate health and 
humanitarian needs such as vaccine readiness and acute food insecurity, 
but also to address the wide range of second-order impacts of the 
pandemic. If confirmed, I will support the development of this response 
plan and ensure USAID invests new COVID-19 resources in a way that best 
responds to the pandemic. I will also work with experts within USAID 
and across the inter-agency to apply epidemiologic indicators and other 
criteria to guide resource allocations, recognizing the complex and 
dynamic nature of the first- and second-order impacts of the pandemic. 
And across the board, I will prioritize transparency and accountability 
in decision-making, and use data and analysis to guide the use of 
funds.

    Question. In 1985, USAID created the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network to provide objective, evidence based analysis to plan for and 
respond to acute food insecurity.

   Is this something that USAID can use as a model to work on an early 
        warning system for global health pandemics?

    Answer. Yes, I believe that the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network is a useful model to inform our efforts to improve early 
warning systems for infectious disease epidemics and pandemics, in 
terms of establishing a data-driven approach to predict outbreaks. The 
challenge will be to establish objective, evidence-based epidemiologic 
criteria for tiered risk classification systems, and to link relevant 
data to recognize threats early and take actions to prevent new 
outbreaks from becoming epidemics or pandemics. If confirmed, I pledge 
to work with other U.S. government departments and agencies, and the 
international community, to improve early warning systems for 
infectious disease epidemics and pandemics.

    Question. What role should USAID play in the U.S.'s global health 
security strategy to make us better prepared to combat any future 
global health pandemic?

    Answer. Ensuring global health security for the United States will 
require that all countries be capable of preventing, detecting, and 
responding effectively to health security risks and public health 
emergencies. USAID will work in partnership with other international 
organizations and public and private stakeholders to help implement the 
U.S.'s global health security strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure 
that USAID continues to work in close collaboration with the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of State, and 
other interagency partners, to strengthen global health security across 
the globe to ensure we are positioned to prevent or respond to future 
pandemics.

    Question. In July 2019, USAID's Inspector General testified before 
Congress on the management challenges impacting USAID. One major 
management challenge identified was assessing and responding to the 
risk in providing humanitarian and stabilization assistance.
    Inspector General Ann Barr's testimony stated, ``Insufficient risk 
assessments not only leave USAID programs and services vulnerable to 
exploitation, but they also put USAID in the position of attempting to 
mitigate threats it does not understand. The adverse effects of poor 
planning, monitoring and evaluation were demonstrated in the fraud 
schemes that our agents uncovered in Iraq and Syria and across Africa, 
some of which involved diversions of USAID-funded commodities to 
terrorists.''

   How will you address the issues of insufficient risk assessments, 
        monitoring and evaluations at USAID?

    Answer. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the 
American people, and to provide foreign assistance and build 
partnerships where there is the greatest need, which is often in 
difficult situations. Risks that are inherent to operating in conflict 
settings and challenging environments can be mitigated, but never 
eliminated. Monitoring risk, and measuring and analyzing results-and 
adapting when programs fall short-is part of the day-to-day management 
of USAID's operations. Of course, there is always room for improvement 
and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing USAID even 
further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather information to 
adapt programs and better achieve results, while also ensuring proper 
vetting and accountability to U.S. taxpayers.

    Question. What steps will you take to strengthen current procedures 
aimed at preventing diversions of U.S. taxpayer resources going to 
terrorists?

    Answer. USAID conducts extensive screening to mitigate risk and 
safeguard U.S. foreign assistance from diversion to organizations or 
individuals posing a threat to national security. USAID has a robust 
system for partner vetting to mitigate the risk of funds supporting 
terrorist groups. I understand that since it began tracking these 
figures in 2015, USAID estimates that it has prevented more than $800 
million from supporting or benefitting people and entities that do not 
meet USAID vetting requirements. Further, USAID applicants are required 
to sign certifications and assurances stating that they have not 
knowingly provided material support or resources to terrorist groups or 
individuals/entities affiliated with terrorist groups. This risk 
mitigation has allowed USAID to continue to work in the highest-risk 
environments, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the 
committee on this important priority.

    Question. Will you commit to doing a full audit of USAID funds and 
programs to ensure U.S. resources are not going to support terrorist 
groups and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block 
Persons list?

    Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall 
into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I 
understand that USAID has numerous safeguards, financial accountability 
mechanisms and an independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I 
am committed to supporting if I am confirmed.

    Question. During a Senate investigation into the World Vision's 
interactions with the Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA), redacted emails 
were uncovered implying that when you were the U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations you were involved in efforts to delist the ISRA from the 
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. 
Specifically, your office appears to have requested OFAC review the 
designation without a formal request from ISRA. The U.S. Treasury 
sanctioned ISRA for its support of terrorism including direct financial 
support to Usama bin Landen, Al Qaida, the Taliban, and Hamas.

   Why were you and your office involved with seeking a review of the 
        ISRA's placement on the SDN list?

   What efforts did you and your office take to discourage the 
        delisting of ISRA from the SDN list?

   Please describe all the efforts you and your office took while 
        serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to advocate 
        for or provide assistance in the delisting process for entities 
        on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block Persons list.

   As Administrator of USAID, when would you consider it appropriate 
        to assist entities in requesting a review of their placement on 
        the SDN list outside the general Office of Foreign Assets 
        Control (OFAC) parameters?

   Will you commit to providing this committee and the rest of 
        Congress timely and substantive responses to oversight 
        inquiries?

    Answer. As U.N. Ambassador, I was not involved in any effort to 
delist ISRA; nor did I do anything to ``assist'' this or any other 
entity on the SDN list. Indeed, the opposite is true. Under my 
leadership, as is documented in public records, the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations (U.S.-U.N.) worked tirelessly to rebut ISRA's false 
claims that it had been wrongly designated on the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons list by the U.S. Government. During my 
tenure, U.S.-U.N. repeatedly raised questions about ISRA's status and 
funding in order to force the United Nations Committee on Non-
Governmental Organizations to postpone the consideration of ISRA for 
accreditation.
    In support of these efforts to prevent the accreditation of ISRA by 
the United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, U.S.-
U.N. maintained the standard practice of regularly coordinating with 
the U.S. State and Treasury Departments to ensure U.S. diplomats at the 
U.N. had the most up-to-date information available.
    Please find records of some of U.S.-U.N.'s actions at the January 
2014, January 2015, and May 2015 sessions of the United Nations 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations:

   https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ecosoc6593.doc.htm;
   https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6662.doc.htm;
   https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6694.doc.htm;

    As Ambassador, in addition to repudiating ISRA's efforts to 
rehabilitate itself, I often used my platform to draw attention to the 
crimes and dangerous activities of organizations on the Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. If confirmed, I can 
assure you that I share the goal of ensuring that the U.S. Agency for 
International Development takes all appropriate measures to prevent 
misuse of its funding-whether for terrorism, corruption, or any other 
types of abuse. I further confirm my commitment to cooperate and 
provide Congress with timely and substantive responses to inquiries, if 
confirmed.

    Question. With a national debt over $28 trillion, it is more 
important than ever for the government to be good steward of taxpayer 
funds. USAID must design and implement programs in the most effective 
and efficient manner. Every agency needs to be carefully evaluated and 
streamlined to eliminate duplicative and wasteful spending.

   What reforms will you take to improve the effectiveness of U.S. 
        international development assistance?

    Answer. I agree with the principle of aid effectiveness and that 
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. My 
vision for USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It 
also applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance 
within core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing 
democracy and human rights, mitigating the effects of conflict, and 
promoting global health in a collaborative manner with civil society 
partners and governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound, 
evidence-based development and humanitarian programming that continues 
to improve aid effectiveness, self-reliance, and sustainability.

    Question. What actions will you take, if any, to prevent fraud, 
waste and abuse at USAID?

    Answer. All USAID employees have a statutory duty and 
responsibility to promote accountability in the Agency's programs and 
activities. Every USAID employee is responsible for assisting the 
Office of Inspector General, by promptly reporting instances of waste, 
fraud, or abuse. Furthermore, I understand that USAID has a number of 
policies and requirements in place to prevent fraud throughout the 
solicitation, award, and management of our grants and contracts. I 
understand that when instances of fraud, waste, and abuse do occur, the 
Agency considers a variety of award remedies, such as disallowed costs, 
special award conditions, and/or award suspension or termination. In 
addition, implementing partners and individuals who have committed 
fraud, waste, abuse, or other serious misconduct are subject to a 
number of accountability actions, including exclusion from receiving 
future U.S. Government funds through USAID's suspension and debarment 
program.

    Question. What opportunities exist for streamlining, efficiencies 
and savings at USAID?

    Answer. I agree that streamlining, efficiencies, and savings of 
taxpayer dollars is a priority. If confirmed, I look forward to looking 
for opportunities and continuing this conversation with you.

    Question. A January Wall Street Journal article reported that you 
requested the ``unmasking'' of nearly 300 people in the last year of 
working for the Obama Administration as U.S. Ambassador to the United 
Nations. When U.S. intelligence agencies intercept the communications 
of private U.S. citizens, those individuals are ``masked'' to ensure 
their privacy is protected.

   How many U.S. citizens did you unmask during the time you worked as 
        U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?

   What criteria did you use in determining whether it was appropriate 
        to request the unmasking of a U.S. citizen?

   Given the large number of reported requests for unmasking made in 
        your name, do you plan to refine your criteria going forward to 
        ensure Americans privacy is appropriately protected?

   How will you protect the privacy of U.S. citizens as USAID 
        Administrator?

    Answer. Safeguarding classified information and protecting the 
privacy of US persons are serious responsibilities for anyone serving 
in a national security role within the US government. I have protected 
classified information and guarded the privacy of US persons throughout 
my career as a public servant, and I will continue to do so if I am 
confirmed as USAID Administrator.
    While serving as U.N. Ambassador and as a cabinet member advising 
the President on the full range of national security threats, I was a 
recipient of information prepared by intelligence professionals, which 
I used to do my job of protecting and defending the United States and 
advancing US national security interests. I did not discuss the 
contents of classified material with unauthorized personnel. On 
occasion, in order to understand the intelligence briefed to me, I 
asked questions about the individuals or entities referenced in 
intelligence. Any requests I made for identifying information were made 
solely for the purpose of understanding the intelligence in order to do 
my job. While I do not recall the specific number of such requests I 
made as U.N. Ambassador, the number attributed to me in press reports, 
including in the Wall Street Journal Editorial board opinion piece 
referenced here, is false. It is my understanding that the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for matters 
related to how intelligence professionals manage and record matters 
related to intelligence.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Samantha Powell by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. In the waning days of the Trump administration, USAID 
unveiled its 2020 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy. 
Unfortunately, the policy was drafted behind closed doors and erased 
key LGTBQI+ rights, and denied comprehensive sexual and reproductive 
rights to all people. Will you commit to reviewing the 2020 Gender 
Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy, and updating it to make sure 
it is rights-affirming and inclusive of all marginalized identities, 
including LGBTQI+ individuals?

    Answer. I understand that a review of the USAID Gender policy 
commenced March 2021. If confirmed, I will consult with you and other 
Members of the committee on the review. President Biden has been clear 
that he supports protections for LGTBQI+ people, as do I. If confirmed, 
I will ensure that USAID programs and policies contribute to these 
efforts, by advocating for LGTBQI+ rights and programs around the 
world.

    Question. What is your vision for elevating USAID's leadership 
within the executive branch to tackle the existential threat of climate 
change?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with 
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and the National 
Security Council's climate and energy directorate. The Biden 
administration's top priorities are developing an ambitious U.S. target 
and working with countries around the world to raise their ambition 
alongside the United States. President Biden is inviting leaders from 
major economies to a Leaders' Summit on Climate to discuss climate 
impacts and-more importantly-what more can be done on a number of 
fronts moving forward climate action to keep a 1.5 degree Celsius 
warming trajectory in sight. Given that unsustainable land use accounts 
for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, USAID will work with 
countries and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich 
landscapes to reduce deforestation and improve conservation, as well as 
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems 
that serve as global carbon sinks.

    Question. We must support the developing world in the transition 
towards renewable energy, while also better forecasting climate-driven 
disasters to minimize human impacts before they occur. Will you commit 
to increasing climate change mitigation and adaptation programming as a 
part of a proactive and robust USAID climate strategy?

    Answer. Yes, I commit to increasing USAID's efforts to support 
reduced carbon emissions combating climate change, including climate 
change mitigation and adaptation programming. Addressing climate change 
will be a top priority for me, as it is for President Biden. If 
confirmed, I will expand the scale and urgency of USAID's programming, 
building on USAID's strong foundation of local partnerships to address 
climate change. I will ensure that USAID continues to be a leader in 
supporting countries to reduce carbon emissions and that USAID provides 
further support for early warning systems which help communities 
prepare for and mitigate the impacts of climatic events.

    Question. The coup in Burma has temporarily severed the democratic 
hopes for the Burmese people. The situation continues to devolve as the 
threat of civil war rises. As USAID Administrator, will you work to 
quickly increase and pivot U.S. assistance to strengthen civil society, 
protect the fundamental civil and political rights of the Burmese 
people, and lead the humanitarian community in contingency planning for 
increased humanitarian assistance levels?

    Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military 
coup in Burma and the junta's ongoing violent crackdown against 
peaceful demonstrators. If confirmed, I look forward to working with 
and empowering the brave local and civil society actors who are 
advocating for civil and political rights under extraordinarily 
difficult and dangerous circumstances. I support the action taken by 
USAID immediately after the coup to redirect $42.4 million from work 
that would have benefitted the Government to civil society and programs 
that directly benefit the people of Burma. Those programs focus on a 
range of objectives, such as improving health outcomes, strengthening 
the ability of civil society to guard democratic space, fostering food 
security, supporting independent media, and promoting peace and 
reconciliation in Burma's conflict-affected regions. If confirmed, 
USAID will also continue to provide critical life-saving humanitarian 
assistance to Rohingya and other vulnerable populations including in 
Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Shan states.

    Question. Recent reports and statements from Secretary Blinken 
indicate an ethnic cleansing likely occurred in western Tigray. 
Humanitarian and media access continues to be constrained in rural 
areas. Concerns are mounting regarding the instability in the run up to 
the June elections. How will you work with the interagency to increase 
access and transparency, pursue accountability for victims, and provide 
oversight and capacity building assistance in a surge to promote a free 
and fair election?

    Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the 
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The 
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access 
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what 
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties 
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides. 
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and 
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. The administration, 
with support from members of Congress and U.N. representatives, has 
undertaken numerous diplomatic efforts to end the violence and provide 
humanitarian access. As a result of these efforts, Prime Minister Abiy 
recommitted to unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray. I understand 
that USAID staff in Addis and in Washington continue to push for real 
progress on these important issues. To your question on accountability 
for victims, while Prime Minister Abiy has recently acknowledged human 
rights abuses and violations and committed to ensuring that those 
responsible are held accountable, it will be essential to hold him to 
these commitments. If confirmed, I will both ensure that USAID 
continues to work with the interagency on these critical issues and 
work with the Secretary to ensure we can find a way to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Ethiopian people and support, as 
appropriate, the pursuit of accountability.

    Question. During the campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that 
his top foreign policy priority would be ``rallying the free world to 
push back against rising authoritarianism'' and that ``human rights 
will be at the core of U.S. foreign policy.'' Will you commit to re-
vamping the role of human rights programming as a central pillar of 
USAID's development mandate?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will seek to deepen Agency investments 
in democracy, human rights and governance. With freedom in its 
fifteenth straight year of decline, there is more that the United 
States and USAID need to do on all fronts to counter authoritarian 
trends, support civil society, promote independent media, and protect 
human rights defenders.

    Question. The U.N. has called gender-based violence (GBV) against 
women and girls a ``shadow pandemic'' during the COVID-19 crisis. Will 
you commit to utilizing newly appropriated COVID-19 funds in working to 
curb GBV and other secondary impacts of the pandemic?

    Answer. Yes. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence 
(GBV) is a critical component in the global response to COVID-19 and it 
is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I will prioritize USAID's 
support for the prevention of and response to GBV that has emerged as a 
result of COVID-19. Various types of GBV become particularly pervasive 
during emergencies. As such, addressing GBV in emergencies is central 
to USAID's efforts, including our COVID-19 response. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that USAID programming continues to address GBV and that 
our programming prioritizes women and girls' health, psychological 
well-being, and safety. I understand that USAID is currently developing 
a COVID-19 Response Plan, a strategy that will seek to address second-
order impacts of the pandemic, including increased rates of GBV, and 
improve protection and target the needs of the most vulnerable and 
marginalized families and individuals.

    Question. For the past 15 years USAID has promoted a ``One Health'' 
approach, bringing togetherdisciplines such as medicine, veterinary 
medicine, public health, and ecosystem health to more effectively 
address emerging pandemic challenges. Tufts University is leading a new 
effort consistent with the ``One Health'' approach to analyze, 
communicate, and mitigate risks of zoonotic viral spillover in priority 
countries. Will you commit tostrengthening this type of USAID 
programming that ensures lasting reduction of the riskof viral zoonotic 
spillover and disease so we can avoid repeating the experience of 
COVID-19?

    Answer. COVID-19 is a grave reminder that biological threats- 
whether naturally emerging, accidental, or deliberate-pose a 
significant and potentially existential threat to humanity. USAID's 
partnership with countries throughout the world makes the Agency well-
placed to prevent avoidable outbreaks, detect threats early, and 
respond rapidly when outbreaks occur. Preventing the next pandemic 
requires an approach that recognizes that the future well-being of 
humans, animals, and the environment are inextricably linked. History 
has shown us that we need to significantly increase resources for both 
risk reduction and the discovery of unknown viruses. To do this, we 
should focus on the discovery of new viruses and address current 
zoonotic diseases (e.g., Ebola viruses, coron aviruses) that pose the 
greatest risk of spilling from wildlife to humans. If confirmed, I 
commit to continuing this critical programming.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
          Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Ted Cruz

U.S. Foreign Assistance
    Question. On December 10, 2020, President Trump issued Executive 
Order (EO) 13964, ``Rebranding United States Foreign Assistance To 
Advance American Influence'' which required U.S. Government Departments 
and Agencies to use a single logo for all U.S. foreign assistance.

   Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure consistency 
        and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of 
        American soft power in general?

    Answer. I am committed to branding and believe that branding sends 
a strong public diplomacy message, contributing to American soft power 
by conveying that our assistance is due to the generosity of the 
American people. Branding is also a critical element of a counter China 
strategy. Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to 
USAID awards, and partners must continue to follow the branding 
requirements outlined in their assistance agreements.

China
    Question. Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure 
consistency and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of 
American soft power opposite Chinese development efforts?

    Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's 
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under 
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt; 
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being 
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency 
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion 
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain 
projects. USAID needs a far-reaching strategy that addresses the 
challenges of OBOR, and I believe that frustrations around the world 
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S.
    In addition to branding, the U.S. has a range of tools we can bring 
to bear including development aid, finance, and our innovative 
corporate sector. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on 
America's comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach 
from the PRC's, by engaging directly with our partner countries and 
ensuring that good governance, sustainability, and social and economic 
safeguards are built into projects we support. If confirmed, I will 
look forward to working with my colleagues across many agencies to help 
ensure the U.S. is responding to Chinese development efforts from a 
position of strength.

    Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing genocide 
against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had 
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration 
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22, 
2021, Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to 
commit genocide and crimes against humanity.'' USAID had and has a 
significant role to play in countering the CCP's genocide, and the 
agency had initiated a number of programs and outreach in that space. 
Those programs included efforts to preserve the cultural heritage of 
the Uyghurs, which is being directly targeted by the CCP.

   Do you agree with the assessment that the Chinese Government is 
        engaged in a genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities 
        in the XUAR that is ongoing?

    Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have 
studied the evidence that.China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.

    Question. What role do you see for USAID in countering that ongoing 
genocide, and more broadly the human rights atrocities being committed 
by the Chinese Communist Party?

    Answer. I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue, 
including the passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds 
perpetrators accountable for human rights violations and abuses against 
Uyghurs and other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my 
platform to draw attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that 
USAID actively engages with you, the committee, and the interagency to 
determine any further steps that can be taken.

    Question. What is the status of programs aimed at preserving the 
cultural heritage of the Uyghurs within USAID?

    Answer. I gather that USAID is developing programs to preserve the 
cultural heritage and promote the human rights of Uyghurs and other 
ethnic and religious minorities in the Asia region. If confirmed, I 
will be eager to discuss these programs with you.

International Religious Freedom
    Question. The Obama administration repeatedly failed to speak out 
on critical issues of religious liberty, including the plight of 
imprisoned Christians in Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba, 
and Mexico. The result was a vacuum of American leadership. USAID has a 
critical role to play in highlighting and countering such persecution, 
as well as the plight of dissidents more broadly. Advancing 
international religious freedom (IRF) is a major foreign policy 
priority of the United States with bipartisan support, and I strongly 
believe that the agency must maintain and deepen decisions and 
commitments made by the Trump administration in that context.

   The Trump administration allocated resources to IRF-related 
        projects in Iraq, Nigeria, and elsewhere. If confirmed, do you 
        intend to maintain these projects?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support international religious 
freedom programs at USAID. I have a longstanding commitment to human 
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of persecution faced by 
religious minorities. While serving at the NSC in the Obama 
administration, I advocated on behalf of Coptic Christians in Egypt who 
were experiencing violent attacks, and I met with Iraqi Christians 
while visiting Iraq to show support for their community. As Ambassador 
to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the voices of religious 
minorities. I called for the release of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese 
woman sentenced to death for refusing to denounce her Christian faith, 
and called on Sudan to repeal the laws that put her in jail in the 
first place. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her first 
major public platform, inviting her to speak before the U.N. Security 
Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS 
and she had been forced into sexual slavery. In addition, I worked with 
the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious 
Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition of ISIS's 
violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and Shiite 
Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized in 
March of 2016. USAID has a history of helping the world's most 
vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in 
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of 
their faith. If confirmed, I will review USAID's approach to ensure 
that our programs are most effectively supporting victims of religious 
persecution. Additionally, if confirmed, I look forward to exploring 
with you, the Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and 
Neighborhood Partnerships office, and diverse faith communities, how to 
mobilize resources and, as appropriate, tailor our programs to support 
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.

    Question. Until recently the agency held monthly sessions for 
USAID's cross-Agency Sector Council on Strategic Religious Engagement 
and International Religious Freedom. Have such sessions of the 
Strategic Religious Engagement and International Religious Freedom been 
frozen, and if so why?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into USAID's cross-Agency 
Sector Council on Strategic and Religious Engagement and International 
Religious Freedom and whether it is still holding sessions. I look 
forward to discussing with you.

    Question. The Trump administration invested significantly in 
programs promoting IRF through USAID's Democracy, Human Rights and 
Governance (DRG) Center. What is the status of those programs?

    Answer. USAID continues to implement programming, including through 
the DRG Center, that supports religious minorities. USAID is deeply 
committed to supporting the world's most vulnerable people, including 
members of religious minorities. USAID will continue to play a critical 
role in supporting communities around the world that are persecuted 
and/or discriminated against because of their faith.

    Question. The Trump administration was considering support for a 
Yezidi Genocide Museum in Kocho. What is the status of that program? If 
it has been suspended or canceled, why?

    Answer. I am not familiar with these deliberations or this program. 
If confirmed, I commit to learning more about it and consulting with 
you on this issue.

    Question. The persecution of Christians in Nigeria has over the 
last decade emerged as a systematic problem that the U.S. and the 
global community have struggled to counter. Policy responses have been 
broadly inadequate, and have been hampered by disputes over the factors 
explaining the violence, including the degree to which the crisis is a 
function of farmer-herder clashes or religious extremism. In December 
2020, the Department of State designated Nigeria as a country of 
particular concern (CPC) in response to pervasive and egregious 
violations of religious freedom, and USAID in particular engaged 
Nigerian bishops as part of countering the persecution of Christians by 
Boko Haram.

   What is your assessment of the degree to which the persecution of 
        Christians in Nigeria is a function of farmer-herder clashes 
        vs. explanations that the persecution is driven by religious 
        violence?

    Answer. Nigeria's deep structural problems have manifested in 
various violent conflicts which have escalated across the country. As I 
witnessed in my trip in 2016 to the Boko Haram-affected regions of 
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad, while these conflicts may have been 
originally rooted in resource competition, which includes farmer-herder 
clashes, they have evolved over time to include targeted attacks based 
on religion or ethnic identity. The violence is exacerbated by the 
proliferation of illicit weapons and a weak state security 
architecture.

    Question. Have USAID officials, including and especially those 
tasked with advancing IRF, engaged Nigeria's community of bishops since 
February 1, 2021?

    Answer. I gather that USAID works closely with the State Department 
at U.S. Embassy Abuja to advance religious freedom. For example, in 
March 2021, USAID supported the U.S. Ambassador's participation in a 
major gathering of Nigerian Christian leaders hosted by Cardinal John 
Onaiyekan. This meeting followed a July 2020 roundtable hosted by USAID 
with senior Christian clerics, including bishops. USAID regularly 
engages with religious leaders and faith-based organizations across 
multiple sectors of programming to respond to the impacts of Boko Haram 
in Northeast Nigeria. In mid-March 2021, USAID met with leaders from 
the Christian Association of Nigeria, the Heads of Church 
Denominations, and the Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace Center.

    Question. The Trump administration made a particular point of 
engaging churches and other faith organizations globally, and of 
increasing the amount of direct aid that is disbursed through local 
churches rather than international aid agencies. The move was driven by 
several considerations, including concerns about corruption that is 
endemic to many such agencies, e.g. on March 19, 2021, the Department 
of Justice announced that the International Rescue Committee had agreed 
to pay $6.9 million to settle allegations that it performed procurement 
fraud by engaging in collusive behavior and misconduct on programs 
funded by USAID. Critics of the policy have suggested that it entangles 
USAID in faith-based organizations in violation of USAID principles 
related to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles.

   If confirmed, will you continue the Trump administration's policy 
        of increasing the amount of direct aid disbursed through local 
        churches? If not, why not?

    Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and 
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often 
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important 
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive 
development. As I understand it, USAID has a robust history of engaging 
faith organizations to advance Agency goals and priorities. The Code of 
Federal Regulations (22 CFR 205.1) clarifies that faith organizations 
may compete for federal assistance funding on the same basis as other 
organizations, and that all funding decisions are made on the basis of 
merit, not religious or secular affiliation. If confirmed, I will 
support USAID's strong engagement with faith-based organizations, 
whenever and wherever appropriate, by ensuring field staff are equipped 
with the requisite skills and resources to advance development and 
humanitarian assistance goals.

    Question. Do you believe that channeling aid through faith based 
organizations is in tension with USAID principles related to unbiased 
partnering or humanitarian principles? If so, please explain why.

    Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and 
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often 
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important 
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive 
development and principled humanitarian assistance.

    Question. Do you believe that channeling aid specifically through 
Nigerian Christian groups is in tension with USAID principles related 
to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles? If so, please 
explain why.

    Answer. Faith-based and community organizations are eligible to 
participate in USAID programs on the same basis as any other 
organization without regard to their religious character or 
affiliation. USAID humanitarian assistance is delivered solely on the 
basis of need regardless of political, religious, or other affiliation, 
in accordance with U.S. law and policy, and does not discriminate 
against nor favor one group over another. Delivering humanitarian 
assistance to the most vulnerable people, including ethnic and 
religious minorities, is central to our work in Nigeria and a core 
value of USAID's humanitarian efforts worldwide. USAID takes 
significant steps to ensure our assistance reaches those who need it 
most and does not jeopardize their safety.

Israel
    Question. In recent years Congress has passed a range of 
legislation limiting assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and 
for activities that benefit the PA, e.g. the Taylor Force Act (TFA) 
(Title X of P.L. 115-141), which limits funding for activities that 
``directly benefit'' the PA. TFA included certification language 
regarding a range of concerns related to PA policies and governance, 
including ``payments for acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and 
United States citizens.'' Part of the policy rationale for TFA's 
restrictions is that money is fungible: any aid that directly benefits 
the PA indirectly supports the PA's payments for acts of terrorism. 
Officials in the Biden administration have recently suggested that 
regardless of restrictions imposed by Congress the administration 
intends to pursue projects and increase assistance that ``benefit[]. 
ordinary Palestinians,'' implicitly in contrast to programs that would 
directly benefit the PA and therefore be noncompliant with TFA. Please 
describe your understanding of restrictions imposed by Congress on aid 
to the PA, especially your understanding of the distinction between aid 
that ``directly benefits'' the PA and other forms of aid.

   Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will 
        not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that 
        directly benefit the PA?

   Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will 
        not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that 
        are the same as, materially similar to, or successor projects 
        to USAID projects and assistance that were suspended pursuant 
        to TFA?

    Answer. President Biden publicly supported passage of the Taylor 
Force Act, and he has never hesitated to condemn terrorism or 
incitement by Palestinian actors. He has made clear that this will 
continue during his administration. I appreciate Congressional concerns 
regarding U.S. aid that may benefit the PA and I can assure you that, 
if confirmed, USAID will continue to ensure that any provision of aid 
strictly adheres to relevant U.S. laws governing the provision of 
assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, including the Taylor Force Act. 
To comply with various legislative restrictions, including the Prisoner 
Payment Restriction (Section 7041(k)(3) of the FY 2020 SFOAA) and 
Taylor Force Act ( P.L. 115-141), USAID conducts case specific analysis 
to ensure that USAID assistance is neither ``for'' nor ``directly 
benefiting'' the PA, consistent with the requirements and exceptions 
set forth in relevant statutes.''

    Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional 
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader 
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration 
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish 
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That 
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration 
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334, 
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan 
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish 
Quarter.
    The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out and 
render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by recognizing 
Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing Jerusalem 
as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by seeking to 
end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and for the 
purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli communities, and by 
taking several other steps.

   Can you commit to ensuring that USAID's approach to Israel, 
        including cooperative projects, will not distinguish or 
        discriminate between Israeli communities in places Israel 
        controlled before and after 1967? If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance the administration's 
strong support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance 
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian 
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in compliance with 
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.

    Question. Do you believe that a) Israel has sovereignty over the 
Golan Heights?; b) Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem, including the 
Old City of Jerusalem? c) Israel is in illegal occupation of any part 
of Jerusalem?; d) Israel is in illegal occupation of the Old City of 
Jerusalem?

    Answer. The administration's position is that our embassy will 
remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The 
administration has made clear that the ultimate status of Jerusalem is 
a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in 
the context of direct negotiations. I agree that the current Syrian 
regime and its Iranian allies poses a significant security risk to 
Israel and that the Golan Heights is critically important to Israel's 
security.

Yemen
    Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three 
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden 
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those 
sanctions. The issue of aid was central to the public explanation of 
the decision: officials at the State Department have justified the 
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of 
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's 
population live under areas controlled by the group. Since then the 
Houthis have escalated their violence across the region, bombarding 
civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was already one of the worst 
humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in large part because the 
Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid, steal aid, and attack 
civilians.

   Please describe the role played by Iran and the Houthis in 
        deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen.

    Answer. Iran's support for the Houthis-and the Houthis use of food 
as a weapon of war-during the long-running conflict in Yemen has 
contributed to the gravest humanitarian crisis in the world. Moreover, 
I agree that Iran's malign influence in the region, including in Yemen, 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, has clear destabilizing effects. Iran's 
support for terrorism and human rights abuses threatens U.S. forces and 
partners in the region in places like Iraq and Lebanon and hinders our 
ability to provide humanitarian assistance in places like Yemen and 
Syria. The U.S. Government continues to call on all parties to 
implement a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire in Yemen. The crisis in 
Yemen will only be resolved when all parties to the conflict agree to a 
durable and peaceful resolution to the conflict.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to 
Yemeni civilians in general.

    Answer. The Houthis are far from benign actors, and their actions 
contribute to prolonging the suffering of the Yemini people. However, 
the administration takes seriously the warnings from the U.N. and 
international humanitarian organizations that these designations could 
lead to a wide-scale famine. At the same time, the administration has 
been clear that it will not hesitate to apply pressure to push the 
Houthis to curb their abuses against the Yemeni people and to negotiate 
an end to the war. With the lifting of the terrorist sanctions, the 
U.S. can continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemen, and 
critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can flow freely. 
USAID has announced $336 million in FY 2021 humanitarian funding that 
implementing partners can now use to provide lifesaving assistance to 
more than 13 million Yemenis. As this assistance moves forward, USAID 
will continuously monitor the Houthis' interference and our partners' 
access to populations in need to determine if our assistance is able to 
reach those for whom it is intended.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to 
Yemeni civilians in Marib.

    Answer. As referenced in the prior question, Houthi operations in 
Yemen exacerbate the already-catastrophic humanitarian situation in 
Yemen, and the Houthi leadership should be held accountable for their 
actions. However, while seeking to counter Houthi conduct, we must also 
consider the highly credible voices urging the United States not to 
make the country's humanitarian crisis worse or make it even harder to 
end Yemen's civil war. The Biden administration's action has enabled 
the U.S. to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis, 
including to those affected by the recent escalation of conflict in 
Marib, and critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can 
resume.

Classified Information
    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.

   Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not 
        unnecessarily comingled with classified information in 
        notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If 
        not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that 
information provided to Congress by USAID is in a format that 
facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying with 
Executive Order 13526, USAID's classification guide, and the executive 
branch rules on the handling and storage of classified information.

U.S. Foreign Policy
    Question. U.S. foreign policy is a responsibility which cannot be 
delegated to foreign powers or international institutions. On the 
contrary, the weight of U.S. foreign policy comes in three parts from 
Congress: treaty ratification or rejection, domestic law that forms the 
basis for enforcing foreign policy positions, and the power over the 
purse.

   Do you agree that U.S. foreign policy is non-delegable to foreign 
        powers, including international institutions, and that any 
        enforcement of commitments made by the United States 
        bilaterally or multilaterally must be authorized by Congress in 
        the form of treaty ratification or domestic law?

    Answer. I agree that the U.S. Government is solely responsible for 
conducting foreign policy on behalf of the American people, and that 
this responsibility cannot be delegated outside the Government. 
Collaboration with other nations and private actors, including using 
platforms like international institutions, can be used to effectively 
implement U.S. foreign policy.

    Question. In a 2003 piece for the New Republic you wrote, ``And the 
American approach must cease its reliance on gratuitous unilateralism. 
We make rules and create international institutions precisely in order 
to bind states when their short-term interests would otherwise lead 
them toward defection. The United States is willing to bind itself to 
the World Trade Organization, because it knows it benefits more than 
any other country from free trade, but not to the ICC, because there is 
no good selfish reason to expose American citizens to external 
scrutiny. But the truth is that only U.S. resources and leadership can 
turn such institutions into forces for the international stability that 
is indispensable to U.S. security. Besides, giving up a pinch of 
sovereignty will not deprive the United States of the tremendous 
military and economic leverage it has at its disposal as a last 
resort.''

   Is it your view that the United States federal Government, through 
        the resources of its taxpayers spent at international 
        institutions, is responsible morally and legally for 
        ``international stability?''

    Answer. The United States is not the world's policeman. It is a 
critically important global leader and catalyst, and it has often used 
its resources and foreign policy tools to promote stability, 
development, democracy, and human rights, as well as to alleviate 
suffering in humanitarian contexts. As the COVID-19 pandemic 
demonstrates, the welfare of Americans is often connected to the fate 
of people living elsewhere. As a result, to take but one example, 
investments in global health security are investments in the security, 
prosperity, and overall well-being of the American people. In addition, 
when the United States works with partners and allies and succeeds in 
exerting its influence at the United Nations and other global forums, 
we can be more effective in countering malign actors such as China, 
Russia and Iran-who would like nothing more than to undermine the 
democratic values, human rights norms, and rules of the international 
system that benefit the American people and contribute to global 
stability.

    Question. Additionally, is it your view that in joining 
multilateral institutions and international agreements outside the 
treaty ratification process and changes in domestic law by Congress, 
the United States only ``gives up a pinch of sovereignty?'' If yes, do 
you believe it is appropriate for the president to unilaterally cede 
sovereignty to a foreign power or international governing body?

    Answer. The President should always act to advance what is best for 
the American people. I believe that foreign policy should be conducted 
in accordance with U.S. law. I also believe that Congress has an 
important voice and should be consulted in foreign policy deliberations 
including with respect to international agreements and engagement with 
multilateral institutions.

    Question. You note in the same piece that the United States 
constitutes,''the very runaway state international law needs to 
contain.'' Please elaborate on this view, and please specifically 
address how this view reconciles with the oath you will take if 
confirmed to'' support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic.''

    Answer. This quote from eighteen years ago does not represent my 
view of the United States. I should not have used that language, 
especially because the article itself is an extended and passionate 
call for America's moral leadership in the world.
    In 2009, before I became NSC Senior Director for Multilateral 
Affairs and Human Rights, I took the oath to ``support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic.'' It was one of the greatest honors of my life. I did so 
again in 2013 when I became U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. As a public 
servant, I have been a tireless advocate for American values around the 
world and a relentless defender of the United States at the U.N. and 
elsewhere, standing up to malign actors such as China, Russia, 
Venezuela, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and others who seek to undermine 
U.S. interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to 
determine how to be maximally effective in promoting and protecting the 
interests of the American people, drawing on the important tools that 
USAID can bring to bear to promote freedom and prosperity.

    Question. Religious liberty is a foundational American value 
enshrined in our First Amendment. USAID policy should respect and 
affirm life and religious liberty at all stages of the program cycle. 
This includes adherence to, at minimum, the Silijander and Helms 
amendments.

   If confirmed, do you commit to following these provisions of law in 
        crafting and implementing USAID policies, procedures, and 
        programs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the law and ensure compliance 
with all applicable laws and regulations, including the Helms and 
Siljander amendments.

Food for Peace
    Question. Food aid delivered to people in need abroad under the 
Food for Peace program currently falls subject to a requirement that 50 
percent of the commodities are transported on U.S. built, flagged, and 
crewed vessels. Unfortunately, this requirement results in higher 
shipping costs, limited availability of vessels or vessels not 
appropriately outfitted for carrying food aid, and less food arriving 
to people in need due to food spoilage. A 2018 GAO report estimates 
that ``for each $40-million increase in shipping costs, food aid 
reaches one-million fewer recipients each year.''

   Is it your view that cargo preference requirements prevent vital 
        aid from reaching intended recipients in a timely manner?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to 
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity as effective 
and efficient as possible, and to build the resilience of vulnerable 
communities. Each of the food assistance modalities-U.S. in-kind food, 
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming-
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and 
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need, 
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of 
our programs is of the utmost importance.

    Question. Is it your view that USAID should be spending more of 
their resources allotted for Food for Peace on the aid products and 
commodities as opposed to transportation costs?

    Answer. As USAID responds to an increasing number of complex and 
protracted humanitarian crises, the costs of providing emergency food 
assistance have unfortunately grown to reflect increased security and 
logistical needs. In FY 2020, USAID shipped more than 1.4 million 
metric tons of U.S.-grown agricultural commodities using Food for Peace 
Title II resources. Volatility in shipping costs is just one complex 
element USAID faces in the management of the Food for Peace Title II 
account as it responds to increasing food insecurity worldwide.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID contribute to 
efforts by the United States and our partner nations to counter the 
People's Republic of China's predatory and malign Belt and Road 
Initiative, including by bringing together governments, the private 
sector, and civil society to promote global infrastructure development. 
China's Belt and Road Initiative uses predatory financing, debt-trap 
diplomacy, bribery, corruption, and other means to promote 
infrastructure projects in developing nations, with the goals of 
creating new markets for China's ``national champion'' companies, 
capturing the loyalty of foreign government and business elites, and 
drawing developing nations-especially those in strategic locations or 
with strategically important resources-into Beijing's geopolitical 
orbit.

    Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of 
the 21st century for the United States. By advancing security, 
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening 
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth, USAID can play an 
integral role in helping the U.S. meet the challenges you have 
identified that are posed by the Belt and Road Initiative. The 
administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision to 
Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance, transparency, 
and local ownership in our global development work. If confirmed, I 
will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative advantages in 
distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by engaging directly 
with our partner countries and ensuring that good governance, 
sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are built into 
projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to ensure that 
development investments are both beneficial and sustainable. If 
confirmed, I will work with allies and partners, including at the DFC 
and in the private sector, to better leverage our collective resources 
and influence, and I will be an advocate for the highest human rights, 
governance, environmental, social, and labor standards in order to 
promote investments that are sustainable for the long term.

    Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID not only promote 
effective U.S. development assistance and humanitarian assistance, but 
also advance America's long-term competition with the Chinese Communist 
Party's broader malign influence and predatory efforts around the 
world?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) approach to 
development through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raises deep 
concerns for me and many of USAID's partners. Projects connected to BRI 
have come under significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; 
unsustainable debt; environmental degradation; preferencing of Chinese 
firms over local enterprises for construction contracts and jobs; lack 
of transparency and local consultations; and even worries about the 
potential erosion of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached 
to certain projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-
reaching strategy that addresses the challenges posed by the BRI. There 
is no question that the frustrations many around the world have voiced 
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S. 
U.S. support for transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance 
gives us another advantage, especially in communities that have 
experienced repression and corruption. If confirmed, I will continue to 
promote human rights, democracy and transparency and I will ensure that 
USAID works with partners to better leverage our collective resources 
and influence for sustainable and beneficial development pursued in a 
spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.

    Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support and strengthen 
USAID's commitment to combat religious persecution, which is all the 
more important after the State Department's recent determination of the 
Chinse Communist Party's genocide and crimes against humanity with 
respect to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang? You have 
written extensively about the failure of past U.S. presidential 
administration to prevent and respond to genocide.

    Answer. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human 
rights, and have seen firsthand how religious minorities are at risk of 
being targeted with atrocities. I also agree with you, President Biden, 
and experts who have studied the facts that China is committing 
genocide in Xinjiang.
    While serving in the Obama administration, I advocated on behalf of 
Coptic Christians in Egypt who were experiencing violent attacks and 
met with Iraqi Christians while visiting Iraq to show support for their 
community. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the 
voices of religious minorities, such as by pushing for the release of 
Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to 
denounce her Christian faith. I also called for Sudan to repeal the 
laws that put her in jail in the first place. In addition, I worked 
with the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International 
Religious Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition 
for ISIS's violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and 
Shiite Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized 
in March of 2016. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her 
first major public forum, inviting her to speak before the U.N. 
Security Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out 
by ISIS and she had been forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a 
history of helping the world's most vulnerable people, and, if 
confirmed, I will invest in efforts to support communities persecuted 
or discriminated against because of their faith, and I will make it a 
priority to prevent and address ongoing violence and atrocities 
perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities including Rohingya; 
Yezidis and Christians in Iraq, Syria and other parts of the Middle 
East; and Tigrayans.

    Question. Do you believe that the People's Republic of China should 
be classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade 
Organization? China-as the world's second largest economy-is still 
classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade Organization.

    Answer. No, I do not believe China should be classified as a 
``developing country.'' Indeed, by any number of measures, China today 
is a global economic powerhouse. China is already the world's largest 
trading nation, having surpassed the United States in 2013, and its 
investments in research and development are second only to those of the 
United States-having increased by more than 15 percent a year on 
average over the past two decades. And in 2020, half of the top ten 
largest public companies in the world were Chinese companies. If 
confirmed, I will work with Congress and the administration to counter 
China's tactics whether in global forums or at the country and regional 
level, including in Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

    Question. What is your assessment of USAID's ``Clear Choice'' 
strategy under the last presidential administration? If you are 
confirmed, do you commit to continuing and improving USAID's ``Clear 
Choice'' strategy? As DevEx-a media platform that tracks the 
international development efforts-reported in December 2020, your 
predecessor, USAID Administrator Mark Green ``spearheaded a broad 
agency strategy called `Clear Choice,' intended to denote that 
countries have a `clear choice' between the U.S. and China when they 
consider investment partnerships for infrastructure and other 
development initiatives.'' The ``Clear Choice'' strategy sought to 
better organize USAID's regional and functional efforts on development 
and humanitarian assistance while also meeting the China Challenge and 
countering China's malign influence, and better informing and 
coordinating with interagency partners in the U.S. Government.

    Answer. I applaud former Administrator Mark Green's efforts to 
proactively counter malign Chinese influence in international 
development. If confirmed, I will review and build on these efforts, 
and I will work with allies and partners to better leverage our 
collective resources and influence.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to modernize the 
concept of foreign assistance to include also the development and 
adoption of next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology in 
partner nations that receive U.S. foreign assistance?

    Answer. Digital tools hold immense potential to help people live 
freer and more prosperous lives. They also present significant risks to 
citizen privacy and data, freedom of the press, and individual 
expression. I gather that USAID's work in this area builds upon the 
Agency's twenty-five year legacy of bringing internet access points, 
strengthening national broadband strategies and universal service 
funds, and advancing multi-stakeholder models of internet governance to 
USAID partner countries around the world. Today, such efforts are more 
important than ever as the foundations of next-generation 
telecommunications technologies like 5G are developed and adopted by 
our partner countries to enable their citizens to participate in the 
digital economy and ultimately become more self-reliant. If confirmed, 
I will continue USAID's commitment to open, inclusive, secure and 
competitive communications infrastructure and mobile technology, as 
outlined in USAID's Digital Strategy.

    Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID use foreign 
assistance to help ensure that partner nations-especially those that 
receive U.S. foreign assistance-reject or move away from next-
generation telecommunications and mobile technology from Huawei or 
other untrusted China-based vendors?

    Answer. USAID is already addressing the challenges presented by 
untrusted vendors of mobile and next-generation telecommunications 
equipment. I understand that USAID provides developing countries with 
technical assistance to encourage reforms to related regulations and 
policies, including those that support secure networks, vendor 
diversity, and cybersecurity best practices. USAID programs also 
include work with civil society to bolster messaging for autonomy, 
security, and privacy in their telecoms sectors, and with the private 
sector to increase investment in and deployment of secure 
communications technologies. If confirmed, I will continue this 
commitment to next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology 
built upon trustworthy vendors.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to supporting the 
Abraham Funds or similar development initiatives with other countries 
in the Middle East in order to advance U.S. national security 
interests, support the Abraham Accords, and promote further peace and 
regional economic cooperation between Israel and Arab nations?

    Answer. President Biden rightly welcomed the Abraham Accords as an 
important contribution to peace in a divided region. If confirmed, I 
will join others in the Biden-Harris administration in efforts to build 
on these agreements to further strengthen cooperation between Israel 
and its neighbors and to encourage other Arab and Muslim countries to 
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will seek to take 
steps that advance the cause of peace, as well as Israel's integration 
in the region and the world-something that I was able to make great 
headway on at the United Nations, securing Israel's integration into 
important U.N. bodies from which it had been excluded, recognition of 
Yom Kippur as an official U.N. holiday, and the convening of the first-
ever U.N. General Assembly session on antisemitism.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in 
Room SD-106, Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, 
chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, 
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Paul, Cruz, and Hagerty.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Let me turn to--again to the second part of 
our business meeting or hearing. Before I do, I want to say 
that I understand the administration will be coming up next 
week to brief senators on the decision to withdraw from 
Afghanistan. This committee will also receive a classified 
briefing next Monday.
    The administration, in my view, was dealt a terrible hand 
by the last administration on Afghanistan, manifested in a 
withdrawal agreement, then negotiated away all of our leverage 
with the Taliban. President Biden was left only with bad 
options. Most Senators would agree that the war in Afghanistan 
has gone on too long and that we want to see our troops home. 
But as I have said before, how we draw down matters, as does 
the political arrangement left in our wake. I have many 
questions. How can the U.S. maintain the capability to conduct 
counterterrorism operations in the region without a military 
presence in Afghanistan? What will this decision portend for 
the women of Afghanistan? Without a U.S. military presence, how 
long does our intelligence community think the Afghan 
Government can survive in the face of punishing Taliban 
attacks? So I look forward to these conversations next week.
    Let me turn to our------
    Senator Risch. May I respond?
    The Chairman. Absolutely. The ranking member.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of 
all, I concur in the questions that you have. I do not concur 
in the initial statement about the prior administration. There 
is no good answer to this. There are just questions. I think 
that at this point we should look forward rather than 
backwards, and I think we should get answers to those questions 
and decide what--how we can assist in the path forward because 
that is the most important role we will play here. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to our two nominees, 
Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya. Congratulations on your 
nominations, and our thanks to both of you for your willingness 
to return to the State Department and distinguished careers in 
the Foreign Service. At this pivotal moment for our foreign 
policy for democracy and for the State Department, I am 
heartened that President Biden nominated both of you. You are 
experienced and accomplished diplomats, and you have both 
demonstrated the strength and commitment necessary to defend 
our values.
    The positions you have been nominated for--Undersecretary 
of State for Political Affairs, Undersecretary of State for 
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights--are among the 
most important in the Department. Ms. Zeya, I understand that 
the distinguished Senator from Virginia is going to introduce 
you this morning, so I will turn to him at this time. Senator 
Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to members of the 
committee, it is a real honor for me to introduce a wonderful 
public servant, Uzra Zeya, the nominee for the post described 
by the chair. Virginia is one of the most connected States in 
the country to our military mission, but I am also proud that 
it is one of the most connected States to our diplomatic and 
development missions, with many diplomats and State Department 
staffers calling Virginia home.
    Ms. Zeya is a 20-year Virginia resident. She is a 
distinguished diplomat and nonprofit leader who has dedicated 
virtually her entire adult life to public service, the 
advancement of human rights, and U.S. national security. The 
duty to serve runs in her family. She is here with her husband, 
Tom, a United States Marine. Together, they have more than 60 
years of public service to the American public, which is just 
wonderful, and I love that we have got a diplomat and a 
military union in the household. That is a wonderful balance.
    Ms. Zeya served five presidents, three Republicans and two 
Democrats, with distinction for 28 years as a Foreign Service 
officer on four continents. She is fluent in Arabic, French, 
and Spanish. She was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor. In that post, she led U.S. 
human rights dialogue with China, Egypt, and Bahrain, among 
others. She vigorously defended religious freedom around the 
globe and expanded public/private partnerships to advance LGBT 
equality and counter gender-based violence.
    She was charge d'affaires in Paris, and she led the U.S. 
response to, sadly, three major terror attacks in that city, 
took U.S.-French cooperation on counterterrorism and Russia to 
unprecedented levels, and elevated U.S. engagement against 
antisemitism and online hate. In India, she crafted a strategic 
partnership framework over a decade ago that still enjoys broad 
bipartisan support and today serves as the cornerstone of the 
U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement. She helped overcome India's 
longstanding aversion to external democracy promotion, and 
launched new bilateral initiatives to support gender equality 
in Afghanistan, and to support free and fair elections abroad. 
As a young human rights officer in Syria, she documented the 
brutality of the Assad regime and led U.S. outreach to Syria's 
minority, religious, and ethnic communities under siege. Since 
leaving the State Department, Ms. Zeya served for 2 years as 
CEO and president of the leading nonpartisan Peacebuilders 
Network where she worked to strengthen the evidence base for 
successful political transitions and support greater 
accountability for taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. She also 
drafted the Council on Foreign Relations report on revitalizing 
the State Department.
    Ms. Zeya is a trailblazer. She is the proud daughter of 
Indian-American immigrants. She would be the first Asian-
American woman to serve as an undersecretary of state, and I 
believe she is very, very well prepared to take on this post, 
and we are proud to support this exemplary Virginian. Thank 
you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine, for the robust 
endorsement of Ms. Zeya. Let me conclude. The State Department 
faces unprecedented challenges from restoring America's place 
in the world to managing the health and economic crisis created 
by COVID-19, and China and Russia is at the top of the list of 
foreign policy crises confronting America today. As you know 
well, Ambassador Nuland, the United States needs to act now to 
stop a resurgent Russia with Putin once again threatening 
Ukraine, continuing his attacks on our democracy, and 
threatening his grip on the Russian people and those who dare 
to oppose him. I want to applaud the administration for the 
actions that were announced today. They are robust. It is a 
type of action I would have wanted to see, and I look forward 
to their continuing engagement.
    On China, we must both confront Chinese attempts to 
undermine democracy and human rights and compete with them 
economically. That is why I am pleased that Senator Risch and I 
have authored a bipartisan bill which will make the United 
States competitive with China, and provide us with a clear and 
coherent national security strategy on China. And while I look 
forward to a more in-depth discussion on Russia and China 
during our time for questions, I want to quickly highlight 
three additional policy areas: Iran, Turkey, and the Western 
Hemisphere.
    Although I did not support the JCPOA, I felt strongly that 
the Trump administration's decision to withdraw without a 
coordinated diplomatic strategy would embolden Iran and leave 
us less safe, and Iran's behaviors only validated my 
predictions. I recently led a bipartisan letter supporting a 
diplomatic path forward, but let me be clear. That path must go 
beyond the scope of the JCPOA. I expect that this 
administration will pursue what the President and Secretary 
themselves have endorsed, a stronger and longer agreement, and 
I will expect you to provide the committee with details of any 
agreement and on exactly what ``longer and stronger'' means. 
Iran, not surprisingly, is seeking to control the timetable for 
these discussions by taking provocative actions against vessels 
in the Arabian Gulf and U.S. military facilities in Iraq.
    In Turkey, President Erdogan got a free pass from the 
previous administration, and we are seeing the effects: the 
purchase of a Russian missile, systematic military aggression 
in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, bellicose actions against Greece 
and Cyprus. Long considered a NATO ally, Turkey seems to want 
to break with us instead of being our partner now. Now, I do 
not agree with Erdogan's choice, but we have to begin to 
reorient ourselves in the Eastern Mediterranean towards 
democracies that share our values and our security interests. 
The administration has an important opportunity here, and I 
hope they seize it.
    Finally, in our own hemisphere, we must strengthen our 
alliances and address forced migration. I am particularly 
concerned about the challenges Columbia, our top strategic 
partner in Latin America, currently faces, including the 
monumental task of implementing the 2016 Peace Accord, the 
violence related to drug trafficking, and the destabilizing 
influence of the Madura regime's crimes against humanity in 
Venezuela.
    And, Ms. Zeya, I cannot close the day without raising a 
crisis that goes to the core of American values and American 
leadership: the state of democracy around the world. We are in 
the midst of a 15-year democratic recession. From Nicaragua to 
Hungary, democracy is marching backwards. Even worse, 
authoritarians are using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to 
steamroll free and fair elections, independent media, and other 
hallmarks of democracy, and they have assumed that their 
violations will be met with little resistance. It is time for 
the United States to step up and speak out on democracy, and I 
expect that both of you will help lead the charge to restore 
democracy throughout the world.
    At a time of unprecedented challenges around the world, 
America needs outstanding leadership at the State Department. I 
have no doubt that you are both up to that task, but I expect 
to hear from both of you today about how you plan to restore 
America's place in the world, repair democracy, and confront 
the immense challenges facing us.
    With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening 
comments.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. We all 
know that undersecretaries of state serve an important role at 
the Department. They are responsible for day-to-day management 
of and policy coordination for their respective bureaus, and we 
want to thank both of you for your willingness to serve in 
those capacities.
    In the case of Ambassador Nuland's nomination to be 
undersecretary for political affairs, this role oversees all 
regional, bilateral, and multilateral policy issues for the 
Department. This is no small task obviously. While this 
position has a broad scope, there are a few specific areas of 
concern I would like to address today, the first of which, of 
course, is China. Next week, this committee will mark up the 
Strategic Competition Act. This legislation, introduced by 
Senator Menendez and myself, counters the Chinese Communist 
Party's malign influence globally, including by expanding the 
scope of the Committee on Foreign Investment and the United 
States' review of foreign money flowing into U.S. higher 
education institutions; advances concrete cooperation with 
allies and partners in technology, infrastructure, development, 
and defense; shines a light on China's predatory economic 
practices; pushes back on the Chinese Communist Party's 
influence at the U.N.; highlights China's growing nuclear 
missile capacities; and calls on President Biden to assure our 
extended deterrence to allies and engage China in arms control 
talks.
    These are just a few of the issues we face when it comes to 
strategic competition with China. The Biden administration's 
highest priority and ours here in Congress must be to 
prioritize resources and respond to the challenges posed by the 
Chinese Communist Party, as well as opportunities presented by 
expanded and concrete cooperation with allies and partners, 
especially in the Indo-Pacific region and in Europe.
    I want to take this opportunity once again to thank the 
chairman and the majority party for the negotiations we have 
had on the China bill. I think this has been a very positive 
step forward, and it is certainly bipartisan. And obviously, as 
with all these kinds of things, there are parts of it that I am 
not in love with, but, on the other hand, it is always a give 
and take proposition to get where we want to go. I specifically 
want to thank the staffs of both of the majority and the 
minority for the give and take that they have entered into and 
the many hours they have spent negotiating the details of the 
many pages. I hope we can move this forward. I am a little bit 
concerned about the overall idea of taking this and wrapping it 
with six other committees who have ideas along this line. I 
think these are always difficult enough, but the more of those 
you wrap together, the more difficult it will be. So whatever 
happens, I hope we are able to move this bill forward in a 
bipartisan fashion.
    Next, I would like to address the administration's ongoing 
desire to re-enter the failed JCPOA. Many of us on both sides 
in the Senate are closely following negotiations with the P5+1 
in Vienna. I concur with the chairman that this is difficult. 
This is not an easy proposition. And at the outset, many of us 
are deeply concerned with the administration's promises to 
lengthen and strengthen. Unfortunately, it sounds like a bumper 
sticker, and, like the chairman, I am interested in hearing 
what the details are. Unfortunately, to me, it is starting to 
look a lot more like a straight re-entry into the 2015 deal, 
which is not acceptable to me and I think not acceptable to 
most members of this committee on both sides of the aisle. 
Discussions with the parties have led me to conclude that, and 
I hope I am wrong on this.
    Negotiators have established working groups to address 
nuclear compliance and sanctions relief, but they have not 
established a working group on Iran's regional terrorism, 
something that a lot of us have repeatedly said must be 
addressed in any deal with Iran. Our national security 
interests on Iran must last longer than a single 
administration. If the administration chooses to continue on a 
path of straight re-entry into the nuclear deal, it will be 
short-lived. Either the next Republican administration will 
tear down the deal, or the nation most directly affected, who 
is remarkably always excluded from the deal, will take 
unilateral action, which will not end well. To avoid this 
outcome, the administration must seek bipartisan congressional 
support for any agreement with Iran. I am feeling that the 
administration is walking down a well-worn, partisan path that 
will repeat the mistakes of the original administration that 
entered into the deal. I hope I am wrong on all of this and all 
of us here who have a lot of experience in this will be 
listened to as we move forward.
    In Europe, Russia remains a pressing concern. Although 
Russia is amassing tens of thousands of troops on Ukraine's 
border as we speak, they have still been allowed to continue 
construction of the malign Nord Stream 2 pipeline. And, 
Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your candid discussion with me 
in that regard. Actually, in front of this committee, Secretary 
Blinken testified that he sees the pipeline as a bad deal and 
has told us that he would like to see it stopped. Yet despite 
having the power to stop it, we have not seen real action, and 
I am very disappointed in this. He was personally handed, by 
myself and other members of this committee, a vetted list of 
people who need to be sanctioned.
    I am not happy with what has happened. They keep telling us 
that, well, they need to vet this and prepare a case so that 
when they put the sanctions on, they can be prepared to do it 
at Court. I have told them, no, you do not. You have probable 
cause on every one of those people that we have put in front of 
you, and you need to sanction them. Now, when you go to Court, 
you need lawyers that have a case well prepared, but there is 
probable cause on every one of these to be sanctioned that will 
shut down the pipeline.
    The committee drafted and pushed through legislation on a 
bipartisan basis to prevent the completion. We continue to be 
concerned by the administration's refusal to fully implement 
the law and sanction all parties--all parties--involved in the 
construction of the pipeline. It is past time that the 
administration take meaningful action on this issue.
    I would remind everyone, on day one of this administration, 
they stopped the XL pipeline, on day one. They have in hand 
direction from this Congress on a bipartisan basis to do the 
same thing on a Russian pipeline. If we are going to put 
American workers out of work, we ought to put the Russian 
workers out of work on the Nord Stream pipeline. Many on this 
committee bemoan the previous administration's posture on 
Russia. What is clear is that the Trump administration was 
tougher on them than the present Biden administration has been 
so far.
    Next, we have Ms. Zeya's nomination to be undersecretary of 
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. This 
position is tasked with a broad functional portfolio, which 
encompasses human rights, counterterrorism, refugees, 
migration, and trafficking in persons. We must continue to lead 
on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights around the world, not just because those 
democratic values form the core of our values as a Nation, but 
also because they lead to stronger partnerships with other 
nations. I know virtually every member of this committee agrees 
with me on that proposition.
    With regard to the rule of law, I share the 
administration's concern about the International Criminal 
Court's decision to investigate U.S. personnel in Afghanistan 
and Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories. It is 
completely unacceptable that the ICC has decided to pursue 
cases clearly outside of their jurisdiction. The Department 
must continue its efforts to protect our personnel from these 
politically-motivated efforts.
    Again, I thank you both for being here today and your 
willingness to serve, and your family's willingness to 
undertake the sacrifices necessary to do so. With that, thank 
you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. We will now turn to 
our two nominees. We ask you to summarize your statements in 
about 5 minutes or so, so we can have a conversation with you. 
Your full statements will be included in the record. We welcome 
your family members who may be with you either virtually or 
presently. We understand that it is a family affair. There are 
sacrifices that are made by all in this process, and we 
appreciate the willingness of your family members as well as 
yourselves to make the sacrifice. With that, let me turn to 
Ambassador Nuland.

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE 
        AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)

    Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 
Member Risch, and the members of this committee for the 
opportunity to appear before you today. I also want to thank my 
husband, Bob Kagan, and my kids, Lanie and David, for their 
love and their wise counsel. Bob and David are with me today. 
Lanie is studying for her law exams.
    It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and 
Secretary Blinken to serve as undersecretary of state for 
political affairs. If confirmed, I will rejoin the profession 
and the Department that I love, determined every day to 
strengthen America's capacity to protect our freedom, our 
security, and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary 
Blinken in his vision to re-energize American diplomacy, to 
strengthen our alliances and partnerships, and to build the 
closest possible collaboration with this committee and with 
both houses of Congress.
    Over 32 years in the Foreign Service, I have served five 
presidents and nine secretaries of state from both Republican 
and Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that 
America is at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys 
broad bipartisan support both in Washington and at kitchen 
tables across America, and the move that you have made together 
on a bipartisan China bill is really important in that regard.
    The Chairman. Could I just ask you to turn--move your 
microphone closer to you? It is a little difficult.
    Ambassador Nuland. Is that better?
    The Chairman. Yes, thank you.
    Ambassador Nuland. Okay. My foreign service career was full 
of adventures, and challenges, and historic moments, from my 
first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985, to watching the Soviet 
flag come down and the Russian flag go up over Red Square in 
1991, to being at NATO when it invoked Article 5, an attack on 
one is an attack on all, 20 years ago in solidarity after the 
Twin Towers fell. And, of course, I had the opportunity to work 
closely with many of you in this room, both when I was 
ambassadored in NATO in the Bush administration, and as 
assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the 
Obama administration. I take pride that, together, we built 
strong bipartisan approaches to policy, and many members of 
this committee and the Senate contributed with their own travel 
and diplomacy.
    Today, our Nation faces a confluence of challenges as 
daunting as at any time in my professional life. China, under 
Xi Jinping, does not simply want to compete with us, it wants 
to dominate the international system and change its rules to 
benefit autocrats and undercut freedom around the world. 
Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters and weapons on almost 
every continent and accelerated its disinformation, election 
interference, and snuff campaigns against its opponents. Iran 
is again enriching uranium at 20 percent, while continuing to 
destabilize its neighborhood from Syria, to Yemen, to Lebanon, 
to Iraq. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are weakened, but they are not 
defeated, and too many of the world's citizens are suffering 
under corrupt and/or illegitimate leaders with blood on their 
hands. Add to this the urgent global challenges we share: 
restoring global health and security, tackling climate change, 
and building our democracies and economies back better with 
more equity and more justice.
    If confirmed as undersecretary of state for political 
affairs, my job will be threefold; first, to take on any 
negotiations or diplomatic assignments and management issues 
that the Secretary deems necessary; second, to oversee the work 
of the regional bureaus and the Bureau of International 
Organizations, ensuring that this orchestra of talent plays in 
harmony; and third, to maintain the closest coordination with 
fellow political directors around the world, especially in 
allied and partner capitals, to build communities of common 
action.
    If confirmed, I will also be the senior lifer in the State 
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to 
respect and empower our great workforce and to have their 
backs. That was also a powerful motivator for me to return to 
service to help revitalize and modernize American diplomacy. We 
must give our foreign, and civil service, and local employees 
more professional opportunities, support, training, career 
flexibility, and better technology, while strengthening 
diversity at all levels of the Department.
    I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America 
is safer and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has 
said, the alternatives are far worse, a chaotic vacuum or a 
global takeover by the enemies of freedom. I also share 
President Biden's conviction that we are at a global inflection 
point. Democracy will and must prevail, but democracy does not 
happen by accident. We have to defend it, we have to fight for 
it, strengthen it, and renew it. If confirmed, it will be the 
honor of a lifetime to play my part in that effort.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Nuland follows:]


               Prepared Statement of Hon. Victoria Nuland

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of 
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I also want to thank my husband, Bob Kagan and my kids, Leni and 
David, for their love, their wise counsel and the sacrifices they made 
as a foreign service family.
    It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken to serve as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. If 
confirmed, I will rejoin the profession and the Department that I love, 
determined every day to strengthen America's capacity to protect our 
freedom, our security and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary 
Blinken in his vision to reenergize American diplomacy; strengthen our 
alliances and partnerships; and build the closest possible 
collaboration with this committee and both houses of Congress.
    Over thirty-two years in the Foreign Service, I served five 
Presidents and nine Secretaries of State from both Republican and 
Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that America is 
at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys broad bipartisan 
support both in Washington and at kitchen tables across America. 
President Biden and his team have pledged to lead a foreign policy that 
represents and benefits the American people. This will require more 
listening, more consultation with each of you, and with American 
business, workers, and committed citizens across our country. If 
confirmed, I look forward to doing as much hard work at home as abroad.
    My foreign service career was full of adventures, challenges and 
historic moments:


   From my first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985 when our 
        relationship seemed to have so much promise;

   To watching the Soviet flag come down and the Russian flag go up 
        over Red Square in 1991;

   To working on tough arms control problems and conflicts from Rwanda 
        to Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo;

   Too serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at NATO when our great 
        Alliance invoked Article 5--an attack on one is an attack on 
        all--in solidarity with the United States the day after the 
        twin towers fell.


    And, of course, I had the opportunity to work closely with many of 
you when I was Ambassador to NATO in the Bush administration and 
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Obama 
administration. Together, we built strong bipartisan approaches to 
policy, and many members of the Senate contributed with their own 
travel and diplomacy.
    Today, our nation faces a confluence of challenges as daunting as 
at any time in my professional life. China, under Xi Jinping, does not 
simply want to compete with us; it wants to dominate the international 
system and change its rules to benefit autocrats and undercut democracy 
and freedom around the world. Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters 
and weapons on almost every continent and accelerated its 
disinformation, election interference, and snuff campaigns against 
opponents. Iran is enriching uranium at 20 percent again, while 
continuing to destabilize its neighborhood from Syria to Yemen to 
Lebanon and Iraq. ISIS and AQ are weakened but not defeated. And too 
many of the world's citizens are suffering under corrupt and/or 
illegitimate leaders with blood on their hands. Add to this the urgent 
global challenges we share: restoring global health security, tackling 
climate change, and building our democracies and economies back better, 
with more equity and justice.
    If confirmed as Under Secretary of State, my job will be three-
fold:


   First, to take on any negotiations, diplomatic assignments or 
        management issues that the Secretary deems necessary;

   Second, to oversee the work of the regional bureaus and Bureau of 
        International Organization Affairs, ensuring this orchestra of 
        talent plays in harmony, not at cross purposes;

   And third, to maintain close coordination with fellow Political 
        Directors around the world, especially in allied and partner 
        capitals, to build communities of common action to meet today's 
        challenges.


    If confirmed, I will also be the senior ``lifer'' in the State 
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to respect 
and empower our great workforce, and to have their backs. That is a 
powerful motivator for me to return to service--to help revitalize and 
modernize American diplomacy. We must give our Foreign and Civil 
Service personnel and local employees more professional opportunities, 
support, training, career flexibility, and better technology while 
strengthening diversity at all levels of the Department. For years, the 
State Department scored the highest among government agencies for 
workforce satisfaction. I believe it can and will again.
    I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America is safer 
and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has said, the 
alternatives are far worse: a chaotic vacuum or a global take-over by 
the enemies of freedom. I share President Biden's conviction that we 
are at a global ``inflection point''--``democracy will and must prevail 
. but democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight 
for it, strengthen it, renew it.''
    If confirmed, it will be the honor of a lifetime to play my part in 
that effort. I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Zeya?

 STATEMENT OF UZRA ZEYA, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE AN UNDER 
  SECRETARY OF STATE (CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN 
                            RIGHTS)

    Ms. Zeya. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 
Member Risch, Senator Kaine for your kind words, and 
distinguished committee members. It is also the honor of my 
lifetime to be President Biden's nominee as undersecretary of 
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. I am 
deeply grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for the 
confidence they have placed in me.
    I also want to thank those who made my journey here 
possible: my husband, Tom, for always having my back and his 
decades of service to our Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian. 
I also want to thank our two children, Kiera and Lexi, who 
could not be here today, but whose idealism never ceases to 
inspire me. Ours is a family rooted in public service and the 
advancement of freedom. For my father-in-law, a World War II 
veteran who fought tyranny on the shores of Okinawa; to my 
grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's quest for 
independence; to my mother, whose own education was cut short 
by marriage at the age of 16, and invested all her brilliance 
in raising four independent-minded, opinionated daughters to 
seize opportunities never afforded to her. I thank my parents, 
brother, and sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually 
today.
    In today's disrupted world, the work of the State 
Department's ``J'' family of bureaus and offices has never been 
more important. Authoritarianism, violent antisemitism, 
islamophobia, and xenophobia are on the rise as the world 
enters the 15th year of a democratic recession. The Chinese 
Government is perpetrating genocide and crimes against humanity 
in Xinjiang, strangling autonomy in Hong Kong, and repressing 
Tibetans, Christians, and other religious and ethnic 
minorities. Global human displacement is at record levels while 
the scourge of human trafficking is ever present and while 
terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to South Asia.
    Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead, 
I would like to emphasize three core areas where, if confirmed, 
I would gladly partner with all of you to address. First, the 
United States needs to take on the China challenge from a 
position of strength, rooted in human rights and our democratic 
values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I know 
the severe repression that has only grown more acute under the 
CCP. I have met with courageous Chinese human rights activists 
and their families, gave voice to their concerns at the United 
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of 
conscience who put their quest for liberty above their personal 
welfare. I am proud to have been banned on Weibo for denouncing 
systematic Chinese human rights abuses in Beijing in 2013. We 
also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which 
have killed far too many Americans.
    Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home in 
tandem with allies and partners. We are stronger when we work 
together to address not only China's human rights abuses and 
Russia's efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also 
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyberthreats, 
and violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage 
decades of experience from Europe to South Asia, shoring up 
alliances in service of shared democratic values, and champion 
administration initiatives, such as the Quad Summit and the 
planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly committed to using 
tools developed by Congress, such as the Global Magnitsky Human 
Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy 
Act to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and 
kleptocrats, and to encourage parallel action by allies and 
partners.
    Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective 
foreign policies and programs that deliver for the American 
people. If confirmed, I would build on my experiences inside 
and outside government to ensure that our assistance and 
policies have measurable impact and help support reliable 
rights respecting burden-sharing partners for the United 
States. To this end, I will support meaningful implementation 
of key bipartisan legislation, such as the Global Fragility 
Act, the Child Soldiers Protection Act, and the Women, Peace, 
and Security Act. And with the devastating impact of COVID-19, 
we need to ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy 
work in tandem towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and 
durable solutions.
    And finally, with research showing that diverse 
organizations produce greater impact and innovation, I will 
gladly champion Secretary Blinken's effort to build a more 
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect 
to the ``J'' family workforce.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here and potentially 
return to public service. If confirmed, I will work intensively 
with all of the members of this committee on policies that seek 
to deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the 
American people. I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Zeya follows:]


                    Prepared Statement of Uzra Zeya

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished Committee Members. It is the honor of my lifetime to be 
President Biden's nominee for Under Secretary of State for Civilian 
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. I am deeply grateful to the 
President and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in 
me.
    I also want to thank those who made my journey here possible: my 
husband, Tom, for being here today and his decades of service to our 
Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian. I also want to thank our two 
children, Kira and Lexi, who could not be here today but whose idealism 
never ceases to inspire me.
    Ours is a family rooted in public service and the advancement of 
freedom--from my father-in-law, a World War II veteran who battled 
tyranny at Okinawa; to my grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's 
quest for independence; to my mother, whose education was cut short by 
marriage at the age of 16, so she invested her brilliance in raising 
four independent-minded and opinionated daughters to seize 
opportunities never afforded her. I thank my parents, brother, and 
sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually today.
    In today's disrupted world, the work of the State Department's ``J 
family'' of bureaus and offices to advance civilian security, 
democracy, and human rights has never been more important. 
Authoritarianism, violent anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia 
are on the rise worldwide, with a global democratic recession entering 
its fifteenth year. The Chinese Government is perpetrating genocide and 
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang while strangling autonomy in Hong 
Kong and continuing to suppress Tibetans, Christians, and other 
religious and ethnic minorities. Global human displacement is at the 
highest levels ever recorded and the scourge of human slavery is ever 
present, while terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to 
South Asia.
    Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead, I'd like 
to emphasize three core areas where--if confirmed--I would partner with 
members of this committee to address:


    First, the United States needs to take on the China challenge--what 
Secretary Blinken has called our greatest geostrategic test--from a 
position of strength, anchored in America's support for human rights 
and democratic values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I 
know the severe repression of human rights in China that has grown even 
more acute. I met with courageous Chinese human rights activists and 
their family members, gave voice to their concerns at the United 
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of conscience 
who put their quest for liberty above their personal welfare. I am 
proud to have been banned on Weibo--a state-controlled social media 
platform--for denouncing systematic Chinese human rights abuses in 
2013. We also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which 
have killed too many Americans.

    Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home and abroad, in 
tandem with allies, the ``force multipliers'' for our national 
security. We are stronger when we work together with democratic allies 
and partners to address not only China's human rights abuses and 
Russia's malign efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also 
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyber threats, and 
violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage decades of 
experience, from Europe to South Asia, shoring up alliances and 
partnerships in service of shared, democratic values, and champion 
Biden-Harris administration efforts to empower democratic partnerships, 
such as the Quad Summit and the planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly 
committed to using tools developed by Congress, such as the Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights 
Policy Act, to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and 
kleptocrats--and to encourage parallel actions by allies and partners.

    Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective foreign 
policies and programs that deliver for the American people. If 
confirmed, I would build upon my experiences inside and outside 
government, most recently as CEO of a non- partisan global 
peacebuilders' network. We must be careful stewards of taxpayer dollars 
while ensuring our policies and assistance have a measurable impact and 
help support reliable, rights-respecting, burden-sharing partners for 
the United States. In consultation with Congress, we must also exercise 
greater leadership to implement bipartisan legislation such as the 
Global Fragility Act, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, and the Women, 
Peace, and Security Act. And with the impact of COVID-19, we need to 
ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy work in tandem 
towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and durable solutions.

    Finally, research shows diverse organizations produce more 
impactful and innovative results. If confirmed, I will champion a more 
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect to the 
talented, 1,000-plus J family workforce.


    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. If confirmed, I 
will work with members of this committee on policies that seek to 
deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the American 
people. I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much to both of you, and we 
will start a round of 5 minutes questioning.
    Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your leadership over the 
years in countering Kremlin malign influence. I do not think 
they were very happy to hear of your nomination, which is a 
good thing, but a lot has changed since you were in government. 
Thanks to Congress, we have the CAATSA law, which forced the 
last administration to take some sanctions measures. However, 
the last administration also ignored key mandatory provisions 
in CAATSA and did little to galvanize our friends in Europe to 
counter Russian aggression in all of its forms. So what 
specific new measures would you recommend the Biden 
administration take to build cohesion among our European allies 
to show a united front against Kremlin aggression?
    Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for 
your leadership on this issue. I am going to guess you are 
right about Kremlin's attitude to today's proceedings. I think 
we made a very important step today with the strong package of 
sanctions and measures that the President announced, including, 
very importantly, constraining Russia's access to our financial 
markets, to hold them to account for the SolarWinds attack, and 
other things. I think you have also seen that the 
administration has already been working hard to align with 
allies and partners when it moves on Russia. For example, the 
sanctions that were imposed after Navalny's arrest in February 
were matched in Europe and in other parts of the world.
    I agree with you completely that the U.S. can confront 
Russia alone, but that is not the smart policy, and we are far 
stronger when we do it together. I was very pleased to see 
Chancellor Merkel, for example, issue a parallel, very strong 
warning to President Putin with regard to his aggression in and 
around Ukraine and the buildup of forces. That is the kind of 
thing we need to do, and we need to continue to build sanctions 
packages together so that the costs are borne born equally, and 
we highlight what Russia is doing collectively.
    The Chairman. Can we count on you to robustly implement the 
CAATSA law?
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely, as well as Global Magnitsky, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to China, which we 
collectively agree is probably biggest strategic challenge 
whether it is the broader Indo-Pacific region, getting that 
right, which I think is the way in which we ultimately face the 
China challenge correctly, or the previous administration, 
which I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of 
our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South 
China Sea. How do you intend to be part of implementing a new 
approach that we know that such claims are not self-enforcing? 
It is critical that we make a legal position of reality, not 
just rhetoric in the South China Sea, among other things. How 
do you see your role in that regard?
    Ambassador Nuland. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you, 
and, as I said in the opening, China is not just competing with 
us. It wants to change the rules of the global system. This is 
the challenge of our time, and having strong bipartisan 
consensus, not just in this committee, but across the Congress 
and across the country, makes us stronger. So does investing in 
our strength at home. But as you have said, and as we talked 
about with regard to Russia, doing this in tandem and 
addressing all of China's issues in tandem with our allies and 
partners is absolutely essential.
    So we have to build a coalition of allies and partners to 
combat unfair trade practices, to the aggressive security 
policies of China in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan 
Straits, the cybersecurity, disinformation, all of these 
things, and protect against a PRC takeover of international 
organizations. I am particularly gratified to see more 
countries joining us, as you said, in the South China Sea with 
freedom of navigation patrols, et cetera, and we need to take 
this new quad and build on it, and get Europe and other parts 
of the world more involved.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Nuland. If confirmed, obviously every bureau 
that I will oversee will have to play a very strong role in our 
China policy, and I would be responsible for weaving that into 
everything that we do.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Zeya, let me ask you 
one last question. The previous administration, in my view, 
deprioritized human rights and weakened U.S. credibility on 
this important value. From abdicating our role in the Human 
Rights Council to failing to call out dictators' human rights 
abuses, the previous administration disregarded one of the most 
critical pillars, I view, of U.S. foreign policy. Can you speak 
to the importance of U.S. leadership on human rights in terms 
of our values and interests, and will you make it a priority to 
ensure that we are working to hold both our allies and our 
adversaries to the same standards on human rights?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership on 
bipartisan human rights issues as seen in the Strategic 
Competition Act, and I think it is a very pertinent question. I 
would commend the administration's approach to reasserting U.S. 
leadership on human rights by reclaiming an American seat at 
the table. I think the U.S. decision to rejoin the recent Human 
Rights Council session and to seek reelection to the Human 
Rights Council reflects its commitment to make the aspiration 
of centering human rights and democratic values in our foreign 
policy a reality.
    I would say that they are doing this eyes wide open, 
recognizing many of the endemic flaws within the Human Rights 
Council itself, starting with the fact that you have almost a 
who is who of the world's worst human rights violators as 
members of that grouping. But I think even within the session 
that just took place where the U.S. was an observer, we are 
seeing the positive impact of American engagement and 
leadership.
    And, you know, one of the very important issues that I 
would continue to focus on is working to eliminate pervasive 
anti-Israel bias in the U.N. At the just concluded Human Rights 
Council session, they were able to reduce the number of agenda 
items for Article 7. You know, the only country in the world is 
Israel in having a specific agenda inclusion in that fashion. 
And also work with like-minded partners on issues like Sri 
Lanka, Belarus, Iran, on so many of the core concerns of this 
committee, and I would work to expand and sustain that 
leadership.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of 
all, Ms. Nuland, I want to talk about the JCPOA for a moment. 
Look, all of us have been through this exasperating exercise 
now for many, many, many years. Can you give me your thoughts 
on how we can get together on this, the administration and 
Congress? I mean, words alone cannot explain to you how 
frustrated we were in dealing with the negotiators the last 
time as they dealt with Iran. Totally ignored everything we 
asked them to do, and then came back and wanted us to agree to 
what they had agreed to. How are we going to work through this? 
Help me out here.
    Ambassador Nuland. Senator Risch, I agree with you 100 
percent that whatever agreements we reach with Iran need to be 
supported in a bipartisan fashion, not only on this committee, 
but across the Congress and across America, and, you know, that 
will ensure that they are binding across administrations and 
for the long term. So we have to do our job and consult at 
every phase, and hear your ideas and incorporate them, and use 
your expertise and the expertise that we have on this committee 
and throughout the Congress.
    We also have to get on with the job because as we sit here, 
Iran is now enriching again at 20 percent. It is deploying IR2 
centrifuges again. Its breakout time has shortened. So, you 
know, first job, get them back in the box, and then together 
define what ``longer and stronger'' means, and work together as 
we go through these negotiations.
    You know, I think you know from our time together working 
on Ukraine, we built that policy together, and it was enduring 
because of that. And if confirmed, I would pledge to be here as 
often as we need to be to ensure that we all support what is 
going--what is happening.
    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. One of the things 
that strikes me, and I have just become so disgusted with this 
over the years. I have listened very carefully to the nation 
that is most directly affected by what happens with Iran's 
nuclear ambitions, and they are very clear that it does not 
matter what kind of an agreement you make, they are going to 
take care of themselves. And so, look, however we go forward in 
this, they have got to be brought into the fold here to come 
along because they do not believe they are bound by this. They 
believe that their existence depends on Iran not having a 
nuclear weapon, and they are going to see that they do not, 
regardless of what the agreement says. So this is an issue that 
really has to be addressed.
    And the question I keep asking the administration is, what 
happens when you get the call, because that is going to be the 
question. What do we do when we get the call? And so I think 
that is something that is obviously appropriate for a closed 
session, but somebody has got to answer that question.
    In any event, let's talk for just a minute. Well, my time 
is running out. Let me, again, express my frustration on the 
U.N. Human Rights Council. I understand all the criticism that 
was given to the last administration for getting up and walking 
out of the Council. Frankly, I was not as shocked as a lot of 
people were. I do not know how you sit at a table with--Ms. 
Zeya, as you indicated, you are sitting around a table with the 
who is who of human rights violators on the planet, and how do 
you talk to these people? How do you say to them, you guys got 
to behave yourself even a little bit more, and they are telling 
us mind your own business, you know, we will handle our things 
internally. How do you handle that?
    Ms. Zeya. Senator, I share your concern and even 
frustration over that issue, but I think it is a question of 
tactics where U.S. disengagement from the multilateral system 
leaves a vacuum that others are very gladly there to fill, 
starting with China, but also Russia and other countries allied 
to basically entirely distort the framework of universal human 
rights, arguments of sovereignty, to reject any notion of 
international scrutiny or accountability for human rights 
violations.
    So I think the United States needs to be there, but I think 
the critical element as well, as I cited, is really leveraging 
our alliances and partnerships, something that China and Russia 
do not have and does not compare, as a force multiplier to 
basically integrate universal human rights and our democratic 
values to make bodies like the Human Rights Council much more 
effective, and upholding the mission that they were set out to 
pursue.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you. That is really good 
description of what they do and their malign activities, but I 
think the general statement that we want to make things better, 
as you talked about it, getting them to move forward on this, I 
wish you well. I really, really do. But, boy, I will tell you, 
watching what they have done and how they defend it, I am sure 
not optimistic in that regard. But I wish you well, and we will 
support you every way we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin?
    Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me 
thank both Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya for your public 
service, your incredible record to our country, and your 
willingness to continue. And I also want to express my thanks 
to your family for putting up with public service. It is not 
always easy, so thank you both.
    You both have mentioned that our foreign policy mission 
must be defined by our values, and I agree completely with 
that. I have listened to President Biden express that on 
several occasions as well as Secretary of State Blinken. Both 
of you mentioned Global Magnitsky, and I am pleased that you 
underscored the importance of that particular statute that was 
passed by Congress and incorporated in an executive order by 
the President. You might be aware that there is a limitation on 
that, a sunset clause, and there is legislation to remove that 
sunset clause. And I take it we will have your support for 
making clear that that statute needs to be made permanent by 
Congress.
    Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. I got both of your answers. 
Thanks. Appreciate that. And, Ambassador Nuland, I want to just 
underscore your point about President Biden's action taken 
against Russia. It was not only a decisive action, as it was. 
It was very clear on its findings, which was refreshing to see 
the President of United States be very clear about Russia's 
accountability under Mr. Putin in regards to incursions on 
borders of other countries, in regards to the treatment of Mr. 
Navalny, in regards to interference in our cybersecurity, all 
those. It was a very clear finding, so that was refreshing to 
see. So knowing your record, it looks like the President is 
following in your footsteps about being very direct about 
issues, and we appreciate that very much.
    I also want to underscore the point that both of you made, 
that we have to engage our allies. If we are going to be 
effective in our foreign policy objectives, it is not only 
having bipartisan support here in Congress. It is having the 
support of like-minded countries, and that requires effort, and 
we have done that in regards to the sanctions under Global 
Magnitsky. We have gotten more and more countries to go along 
with us, but I think we need to do more of those, that type of 
outreach.
    Ms. Zeya, I want to just mention one area that is under 
your portfolio, and that is trafficking in persons. We have a 
pretty clear statute on trafficking in persons. It is pretty 
objective findings as to what tier a country would find itself. 
But we have had problems under previous administrations where 
political considerations interfered with the objective findings 
of countries because of other bilateral considerations. Do we 
have your commitment that you will maintain the integrity of 
the TIP reports so that it is based solely on the facts and not 
interfered with by other politics?
    Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. And I use that as an example 
because there is legislation that I hope will move in this 
Congress that will use that model for dealing with anti-
corruption activities in countries. All countries have problems 
with trafficking. All countries have problems with corruption. 
Many of the issues that you have talked to, the root problem is 
corruption. Mr. Putin does what he does because he gets a lot 
of money. Oligarchs support his operations, his corruption, and 
we need to increase the capacity in our country missions to 
evaluate the corruption situations as we did with trafficking, 
and then evaluate and use that for foreign policy 
considerations, and that legislation does exactly that. So can 
I have both of your commitments to work with us on passing 
legislation that would use the trafficking model to deal with 
corruption so that we have capacity in each of our mission 
countries to deal with corruption in those countries?
    Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. I confirm to consult with you and 
would certainly support the elevation of U.S. anti-corruption 
efforts, and view corruption as both a violation of human 
rights, a means to sustain autocracy, as well as an inherent 
danger to democracies.
    Ambassador Nuland. Senator, same from me. Corruption is a 
country killer. It is also a tool of malign outside actors. I 
think we have got to do a better job of pulling together the 
tools of government to help countries attack corruption, so 
combining the efforts of the State Department, intelligence 
services, Treasury, Justice into a fusion, and we can do that 
off the embassy platforms, but we also have to train and 
educate and support our officers out in the field better. And 
if confirmed, I look forward to working with you on these 
issues.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. My last point--it is not a 
question--is that, dealing with diversity in the State 
Department is a very high priority, and I know both of you have 
mentioned that. Recognize that you have support in the Senate 
to advance diversity within the Department of State. We have--
it is a challenge because we are looking for senior positions 
as well as entry positions, and I hope that you will work with 
us on a strategy as to how we can improve the record of 
diversity within the State Department.
    Ms. Zeya. Yes, I will.
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin, and I think you 
have spoken to the ranking member as well. We look forward in 
the near future to have your legislation on corruption, which I 
understand is bipartisan, for a markup soon.
    I am going to see if we have some of our colleagues 
virtually. Senator Paul?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. All right. Senator Cruz?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. Okay. Then as we wait for them to get 
connected, let me turn to Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 
congratulations to both of you on your nominations. And thank 
you both for your willingness to come back into the State 
Department and continue your public service, which has been 
admirable on both counts.
    Ambassador Nuland, I have expressed disappointment in the 
President's decision to set the September deadline in 
Afghanistan to remove all of our troops. Given that we have a 
very limited time there, is there anything that we should be 
looking for in terms of benchmarks that we should try and reach 
before that September deadline?
    Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for 
your long commitment to Afghanistan, and particularly to the 
women of Afghanistan. As you mentioned, when we prepare for the 
U.S. redeployment of forces, that puts an emphasis even more 
strongly on the diplomatic aspects of our work and on the 
embassy as the platform for that. So we have really got to bear 
down on this peace process and on bolstering civilian, and 
economic, and humanitarian assistance programs, and 
particularly those that protect the gains that have been made, 
and the gains of women and human rights, Afghan people. We have 
got to, as the President has pledged to do, expand and expedite 
special immigrant visas for those Afghans who helped us. We 
have got to ensure that, as we find a new place to stage our 
counterterrorism efforts, that we are successful in the 
diplomacy to establish that, but also in their ability to 
deploy as needed. I think we also have to look at our embassy 
platform, particularly when we do not have military security 
around it.
    So I would expect we are going to be coming back to this 
committee and to the Congress as a whole for more support, and 
particularly also to get you involved in the diplomacy. I know 
that has been something you have been willing to do in the 
past, so watch this space. Thanks.
    Senator Shaheen. And can you expand a little bit on post-
withdrawal strategy with respect to how we can continue to 
support the gains that women and girls have made in 
Afghanistan?
    Ambassador Nuland. Well, Senator, I want to be careful here 
because I obviously------
    Senator Shaheen. Assuming you have been confirmed.
    Ambassador Nuland. Yes. Yeah. I was not part of the 
deliberations, but, as you know, we have very robust support 
programs, assistance programs, and civilian training programs 
for women and girls both in Afghanistan and outside. I think we 
need to ensure that our allies and partners are also 
contributing to that effort. And we have to hold the Afghan 
Government and the Taliban to account for their commitments in 
this regard, and it needs to be a fundamental measure of 
whether Afghanistan is making progress or retaining the gains 
or sliding backwards.
    Senator Shaheen. Ms. Zeya, I appreciate your mentioning the 
Women Peace and Security Act in your opening remarks. I think 
it is a very important tool that we have, and I was 
disappointed that it was not used by the previous 
administration in Afghanistan as they were negotiating with the 
Taliban. But can you talk about how you will work with the 
Office of Global Women's Issues, if you are confirmed, to 
ensure that the ``J'' family is aligned with the gender 
concerns of GWI and the GPC?
    Ms. Zeya. Absolutely, Senator, and I want to thank you for 
your leadership on building bipartisan consensus for, you know, 
greater women's empowerment and ultimately achieving women, 
peace, and security goals. And I think the Afghanistan example 
is critical, as you discussed with Ambassador Nuland. I would 
say, from my own perspective, I think it is very important with 
this decision for the U.S. to continue to strongly support 
increased women's participation in the peace process. As you 
are well aware, women's participation in peace processes, most 
of which fail, you know, by record of history, makes them 35 
percent more likely to last 15 years or more. This is critical, 
I think, at the inflection point we find ourselves.
    It is also critical to take an integrated approach in the 
State Department. I think since the GWI Office was created, 
and, you know, it has been a bipartisan effort with important 
progress made, it is really critical to recognize this is not 
the work of one office. So if confirmed, I would certainly seek 
to further integrate gender equality across the full spectrum 
of ``J'' family activity, obviously on democracy and human 
rights, but also on issues like counterterrorism, counter-
narcotics, and, quite obviously, trafficking in persons. So 
this work is too important, it is too enormous for anyone 
office to accomplish alone, and I certainly would seek to 
leverage the talent and expertise in the ``J'' family to make 
WPS goals a reality. And I think we have a critical task ahead 
of us in Afghanistan to make that possible.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much. If you are 
confirmed, and I assume you will be, I look forward to working 
with you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Thank you for 
your leadership on global women's issues. With that, I 
understand now that Senator Hagerty is with us virtually?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much. I have a question for 
Ms. Zeya, please. Ms. Zeya, this is a matter of deep concern to 
me. It is a serious problem in my home State of Tennessee. 
December 1st, 2018, President Xi promised then-President Trump 
to halt the export of fentanyl and all of the ingredients used 
to make fentanyl. Since that promise was made, we have had over 
100,000 American lives lost to synthetic opioids, directly 
traceable to CCP-produced fentanyl. If I think about it, 
America has done a great job, in the current administration and 
the administration that preceded it, in dealing with the COVID-
19 situation, but there is no vaccine for the addiction to 
fentanyl that we are experiencing at the hands of communist 
China. Can you tell me what your plan is to address this and to 
hold President Xi to his promise made in December of 2018?
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a critically-
important issue, and I just want to express my own concern for 
the welfare of your constituents, and this was one of the 
reasons I raised this point in my opening remarks. And as you 
recounted, I think there was progress made under the previous 
administration where China agreed to implement controls and 
schedule fentanyl analogs, but sadly, what happened is we saw 
transnational criminal organizations adapt and basically shift 
to using precursor chemicals from China, negating the gains 
from the previous effort, which was the result of considerable 
U.S. diplomacy and negotiation. So I absolutely believe that 
the Chinese Government can and must do more to hold its 
citizens and companies accountable that are supplying these 
precursors to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico 
and elsewhere.
    I think the United States needs to take a whole-of-
government approach where the State Department, our embassy in 
Beijing, plays a very important role, but we also need to work 
with the Department of Homeland Security, DEA, and DOJ, to take 
on the Chinese Government's willful ignorance on this issue and 
to really prioritize saving the lives. As you mentioned, the 
record numbers of American losses due to opioid-related 
overdoses is unacceptable, and this is something I would intend 
to prioritize if confirmed.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate your prioritization of that, 
and I would also underscore the fact that our border has become 
far more porous at Mexico, and that is where this fentanyl is 
coming in and being produced in mass quantities. I was just 
back in my home State of Tennessee talking with sheriffs, with 
mayors, and what they have told me is something I think is 
probably being experienced across America. There has been a 
huge uptick in the number of overdoses since the borders 
collapsed after the 20th of January. So this situation has 
become even more critical at this point, and very much 
appreciate your attention to it.
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for sharing that information, 
and I will certainly work to prioritize that in the work of the 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, and I know 
this remains a significant priority in terms of our counter-
narcotics engagement with Mexico.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Next is Senator Kaine, and there 
is a vote that is ongoing. It is the intention of the chair to 
work through the vote, so I would urge members to possibly vote 
and return. The order I have in order of appearance is--and, 
course, we will flip back and forth to the extent that there 
are members on the other side who are available. It is Senator 
Kaine, Senator Merkley. I do not know if they will be here, but 
Senator Schatz, Senator Van Hollen, Senator Coons, Senator 
Booker, and Senator Murphy. That is the order I have. With 
that, Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Great to see both of you, and 
congratulations on your nominations. Ambassador Nuland, 
briefly, I am about to reintroduce a bill that this committee 
acted on last year but that never saw action on the floor that 
would clarify that no President can withdraw unilaterally from 
NATO without congressional action. NATO is a Senate-affirmed 
treaty. I view this as a statement of congressional 
prerogative, but also just simply an effort to demonstrate to 
our NATO allies that congressional support for the alliance's 
near 75 years is still very, very strong. You have a lot of 
experience with our NATO allies. Would they see that statement 
of strong intent from Congress in a positive light?
    Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator Kaine. When you 
introduced it last year, you could hear the huzzahs on the 
other side of the Atlantic. I think there was quite a lot of 
concern. And, you know, I also think that it is really 
interesting that over the last 3 years, public opinion polling 
on the United States with regard to NATO has gone up to record 
levels over the last 20 years. You know, Americans want to work 
with allies and partners, so I think you are reflecting the 
bipartisan commitment to our great alliance as well across the 
country. So I commend you.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. And when that bill was acted on 
by the committee last year, just to specify, it was a very 
bipartisan vote. It was bipartisan in introduction. The version 
that we will introduce, again, is very bipartisan. Ms. Zeya, 
thank you for the conversation that we had the other day. One 
of the issues I would like to ask you about is the issue of the 
refugee cap. The past administration dramatically scaled back 
U.S. acceptance of refugees, and the Biden administration sort 
of in its campaign and earlier today said we wanted to kind of 
return more to the norm where the U.S. was accepting refugees 
who go through a careful vetting process because our Nation has 
been such a haven for those seeking refuge from circumstances 
that are just nearly unspeakable. Tell me, is it your 
understanding that it is still the administration's intent to 
revert back to a norm on refugee admission? Some of us are a 
little bit discouraged at the timing and pacing of that, but 
please let us know what the administration's plans are, to your 
knowledge.
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator. I can assure you that I 
strongly support President Biden's public commitment to raise 
the ceiling for refugee admissions to 125,000 for fiscal year 
2022. Now, as a nominee I am not privy to policy discussions 
that are under way, but I know that the President is committed 
to regrowing this program and doing it in the most effective, 
orderly, and humane way possible. So if confirmed, I will do 
everything in my power to make this a reality.
    Senator Kaine. My surmise is that when the past 
administration cut the program down so dramatically in terms of 
the admissions, they may have also reassigned staff who were 
working on vetting and other issues. And so I do not think we 
want to just go back to the number without having the staff to 
make sure the program is run well, so I think we would all 
understand if it takes a while to get back to the norm. But 
should you be confirmed, we would really love your reporting to 
us about the progress toward that, recognizing it is not just a 
State Department issue, but multiple agencies work on this, and 
we would love to be in dialogue with you about that going 
forward.
    Human rights questions, I cannot think of anybody whose 
background is better suited than yours to dealing with these 
tough human rights issues. And one of the things that, you 
know, I have often found on this committee in dealing with 
human rights issues is, it is one thing to raise them against 
adversaries, you know, what is happening with the Uyghurs in 
China, what is happening with Hong Kong pro-democracy 
activists, and we need to be muscular in raising this with 
adversaries, but it is one of the most difficult sets of human 
rights issues when you are dealing with allies. And, you know, 
whether it is a--we have had an alliance with Saudi Arabia, we 
have an alliance with Egypt, but we run into significant human 
rights challenges with them.
    And when you raise human rights issues with an ally, one of 
the stock responses we used to hear from the past 
administration, but not just them, from others, is, well, if 
you push us too hard on human rights, of course, we will just 
buy our arms or do our, you know, diplomatic activities with 
Russia or others. Just talk about how we balance aggressive 
promotion of our human rights values with this sort of oft-
repeated threat that, well, if you push us, we will deal with 
countries that are not interested in human rights.
    Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising, you know, what 
is a challenging and a critically-important issue, this issue 
of consistency with respect to centering human rights and 
democratic values in our foreign policy. And in this case, the 
way I see it, the administration is absolutely committed to 
democratic renewal at home and abroad. And what this means is 
it is important, as we seek to shore up our alliances and 
partnerships, for us to hold one another accountable. And 
ultimately, I think we have seen how a selective U.S. approach 
to human rights, one that only targets U.S. competitors or 
adversaries, ultimately undermines U.S. credibility and 
leadership. So I can pledge to you, if confirmed, I would work 
very closely with Ambassador Nuland, with counterparts in 
regional bureaus, our 270 missions in the field, to strike the 
right balance and to make sure that we are truly centering 
human rights and democratic values in our foreign policy.
    I think that the initiative of the Democracy Summit, which 
the President is committed to, is a very important one where we 
can help carry a concrete agenda forward on issues like 
corruption, countering rising authoritarianism, and really 
defending human rights at home and abroad.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you much. I am over my time. Thank 
you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to echo Senator 
Kaine's concern about the presidential declaration on refugees. 
There is a difference between refugee resettlement and the 
question of those who seek asylum at our border. They are 
fundamentally different, and they should not be conflated, and 
I do hope and I believe the President is committed to that, but 
the sooner he signs the declaration, the greater the 
crystallization of that commitment will be realized. So thank 
you.
    I am not sure if there are any members presently waiting 
virtually. If you are, please speak up at this time.
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. I am not hearing any. I do understand that 
Senator Coons is coming back and there is another member on his 
way. So let me take advantage of the time to ask one or two 
questions that I had intended to wait to the end.
    Ambassador, Azerbaijan's attack on the Armenian people last 
fall with Turkey's full support was, in my view, an unspeakable 
tragedy. The absence of top-level United States diplomacy 
throughout the war was inexcusable, and we have to prevent it 
from repeating in the future. I also believe the U.S. must 
press Azerbaijan to release the prisoner of war numbers that it 
has, which it is refusing to release them, in violation of 
international law, and to ensure that the Armenians displaced 
from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh get the assistance they 
need. So if you are confirmed, will you commit to advocating 
for robust humanitarian assistance, including de-mining funds, 
to help the Armenians in the South Caucasus who have been 
displaced from their homes or otherwise affected by 
Azerbaijan's attack? And secondly, what can we do to revitalize 
the OSCE Minsk Group and create a more sustainable peace 
process?
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, I think you 
know that I have worked on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-
Karabakh issues for some 25 years, and the way things went down 
last year was absolutely tragic for so many in the region. So 
as you say, we have to get prisoners released. We have to get 
humanitarian support back in. We have to ensure the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Armenia and that it can make its 
own decisions, and we have to talk to our ally, Turkey.
    You know, the Secretary has spoken about needing to be 
clear eyed regarding trends in Turkey. I think we have got a 
lot of work to do there in our bilateral relationship to make 
clear our concerns about not only what Turkey is doing outside 
its country, but also what it is doing inside its country. So I 
think we have got to get back into the business of strong 
support for the Caucasus countries, being active 
diplomatically, getting high-level leadership there, showing 
support, et cetera, and using all of our economic and 
humanitarian tools.
    The Chairman. And I hope we will be a strong advocate for 
getting POWs back. I mean, it is just in violation of 
international law.
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. With that, let me turn to Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to both the 
nominees. Congratulations on your nominations. I have enjoyed 
conversations with both of you in my office.
    Ms. Nuland, I want to turn to a topic that is not going to 
surprise you, and it is a topic we have discussed at great 
length, and that is Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I have deep 
concerns that the Biden administration is on the verge of 
squandering what was an enormous bipartisan victory won by this 
committee, by Congress, and the previous administration last 
year. Nord Stream 2 was 90 percent complete when Congress 
passed bipartisan sanctions that I authored, along with Senator 
Shaheen, that stopped the pipeline in its tracks, immediately 
stopped the pipeline for a year.
    Russia has begun again building the pipeline. It did so in 
the weeks following Joe Biden's election, and it did so because 
Russia believes the Biden administration is not going to follow 
the law, that they are not going to enforce the bipartisan 
sanctions that have passed now both houses of Congress with the 
chairman's support, with the support of virtually every member 
of this committee, passed twice now, sanctions targeting Nord 
Stream 2. And yet there are voices within the Biden 
administration that I think are arguing not to enforce the law 
and enforce the sanctions.
    Ms. Nuland, in your judgment, can you assess the damage to 
American national security and to the energy security of our 
European allies if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is completed?
    Ambassador Nuland. Senator Cruz, thank you for your 
leadership on this issue. We did have a robust conversation 
about this, and we also worked on the energy security together 
when I was in the European assistant secretary job. Look, this 
is not just a bad deal for Germany and Europe. It violates 
their own climate policy, their energy policy to go greener. It 
deepens their dependence on Russia just at a time when Moscow 
is rearming around and inside Ukraine and when they are letting 
Navalny wither in prison. So I want to thank you for the tools 
you, and this committee, and this Congress have given us. I 
think we need to use all the tools at our disposal to stop this 
pipeline before it is finished. We need to press the German 
Government to do the same.
    As I said earlier, I was very pleased to see a strong 
statement from Chancellor Merkel warning President Putin about 
his arming in Ukraine. Nothing would send a stronger signal to 
him than the cancellation of this pipeline, and I think we have 
got to make that point. And if confirmed, it will be a top 
early priority of mine.
    Senator Cruz. So if you are confirmed, what steps would you 
anticipate taking to stop the completion of Nord Stream 2?
    Ambassador Nuland. I understand there are sanctions 
packages in development, some of them based on information that 
has been provided and circulated from the Congress. I think we 
have to accelerate the sanctions packages. I also think we have 
to be much clearer and stronger with our German allies that 
this is a matter of bipartisan concern across the United 
States, and it is taking Germany in the wrong direction in 
terms of its relationship with Russia. And all of us together 
now need to stand up to an increasingly aggressive Putin. So 
lots to do.
    Senator Cruz. So I very much agree with you. I also think 
time is of the essence. The Russians are trying to jam through 
and finish this pipeline before the administration takes 
action. As you know, I have tried to work with the 
administration, using both carrot and stick, to prompt the 
administration to comply with the law and use the tools that 
are available. I appreciated Secretary of State Blinken putting 
out a strong statement on Nord Stream 2. And, as you know, 
because you were in the room when we negotiated that agreement 
in my office, that in exchange for that statement, I lifted two 
holds that I had placed on nominees from this administration. I 
very much hope to lift other holds as well, but the agreement 
that we worked out was designed to be incremental and staged, 
and in order for the next set of holds to be lifted, we need to 
see sanctions on the entities responsible for Nord Stream 2.
    And the Biden State Department has indicated that those 
would be forthcoming, but they have not been, and I will say 
there are reports of ongoing resistance within the 
administration to doing so. If that resistance manifests in 
delays that will turn into an unequivocal win for Putin, a loss 
for Europe, and a loss for America. And so let me urge the 
administration to honor the commitments that it has made, 
follow the law, and issue the sanctions that are mandatory 
under law. We can stop this pipeline. We have stopped this 
pipeline, and it is only the signals of weakness and a 
willingness to disregard the law that have enticed Russia into 
returning once again to building the pipeline. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is 
online with us virtually.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and let 
me thank both of our witnesses here today. Ambassador Nuland, 
let me start with you. I was pleased to see President Biden 
impose sanctions yesterday and today on Russia given Putin's 
continuing aggression, given their cyberattacks on the United 
States, including on our democracy and in working to interfere 
in our elections. And, of course, we see increased aggressive 
activity in eastern Ukraine from Putin.
    Meanwhile, the chairman mentioned in his opening statement 
a number of actions being taken by one of our allies, Turkey. 
Under President Erdogan, Turkey has purchased the advanced air 
defense system, the S400, from Russia. Turkey has violated the 
airspace of another NATO ally, Greece, and invaded the 
territorial waters of Cyprus. Under Erdogan, they have attacked 
our Syrian Kurdish allies who were critical to our fight 
against ISIS, additional measures taken in Armenia, so this 
does not sound like a faithful NATO ally to me. Can you talk 
about how you and the administration propose to deal with the 
challenges we are facing now under President Erdogan's Turkey?
    Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I agree 
with you that this is a very challenging allied relationship 
that is going to require a whole lot more work. As I said to 
the chairman, I agree with the Secretary. We have got to be 
clear eyed and firm about it. It makes zero sense to me that a 
NATO ally is buying new Russian weapons systems. It is also a 
matter of bipartisan concern across the United States. We need 
to continue to press Turkey on this issue, as well as all of 
the other issues that we have together, and we have got to--you 
know, including democracy and human rights inside the country, 
freedom of the press. We have got to get on the same page 
together with regard to Syria and Libya, and, as we talked 
about earlier, Nagorno-Karabakh.
    And, more broadly, I think we have got to start a 
conversation in NATO about backsliding on our values among 
allies. The United State is far from perfect itself as we all 
know, but it is very important that we all recommit at that 
table to the things that make us strongest, and, particularly, 
in the context of a rise of autocracy and illiberalism across 
the world. NATO allies have to stand for freedom, democracy, 
and governments that serve their people. So if confirmed, I 
look forward to rolling up sleeves, getting back to Ankara, and 
having these conversations.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I was also pleased to 
see the Biden administration, first of all, reaffirm our 
ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and, you know, 
deepen those ties even further. And also I was pleased to see 
them reaffirm what had been longtime bipartisan support for a 
two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. There 
are a lot of people who think it is too late for a two-state 
solution given the changes on the ground in the territories and 
other factors. Do you believe it is too late, and, if not, what 
needs to be done to ensure that we preserve the option of a 
viable two-state solution?
    Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator. It remains profoundly 
in U.S. national interests to support a two-state solution. As 
you know, Senator, it is going to require willing and ready 
partners on both sides in the Israeli context where, again, in 
a government formation period in the Palestinian Authority, 
there needs to be will as well. And in the meantime, we need to 
ensure that both Israel and the PA refrain from any unilateral 
steps that could exacerbate tensions and make it harder to get 
to a two-state solution.
    I think the United States has got to remain a steady 
partner and continue to say to both Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority that this is the best path for peace, so. I think 
that is where we have got to go. And I think it is important 
that the National Security Council is running almost weekly 
sessions with Israeli counterparts, particularly in this period 
of transition in Israel, to keep us connected not only on these 
issues, but on Iran and other vital issues in the region.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I know 
I have run out of time. I will submit my questions for our 
other witness, and congratulations to both of you on your 
nominations.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. Chairman 
Menendez has gone to the floor to vote. As you both, as 
seasoned public servants, know, the schedule of the Senate is 
not entirely predictable, so for those watching and may be 
surprised that I just popped in--Senator Coons--I am sitting in 
for a few moments for the chairman as he goes to vote.
    Thank you so much, Ambassador Nuland, Ms. Zeya, for your 
willingness to serve our Nation again and for the support and 
love that your family and your circle of supporters have 
offered throughout your decades of service. I look forward to 
working with both of you to address the many foreign policy 
challenges facing our country, how to build a bipartisan China 
strategy, something I am really encouraged about progress being 
made here by Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch and 
their staff. There is bipartisan legislation being introduced 
that will be marked up next week. I am very excited about that 
and look forward to joining as a sponsor and supporting their 
work on that; the work to address Iran's nuclear program and 
other threats regionally from the Islamic Republic, efforts to 
support stability in the Middle East while avoiding additional 
long-term entanglements, efforts to push back on and contain 
the malign influence of the Russian Government. There are so 
many challenges, I could take all of 5 minutes in summarizing 
them, and I hope we will get to work closely together on 
prioritizing human rights, defending democracy, revitalizing 
the State Department, confronting shortcomings in workforce 
diversity, and others.
    Let me just ask both of you, if I could, about the Global 
Fragility Act. Ms. Zeya you were kind enough to reference it in 
your opening remarks. This is a tool provided by Congress on a 
bipartisan basis, I helped co-author, to address the root 
causes of extremism and violence in fragile countries. Will you 
commit to reviewing it, and to promptly selecting the priority 
countries for the Global Fragility Act, and submitting a 
revised strategy that takes into account the post-COVID 
context?
    Ms. Zeya. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
    Ambassador Nuland. I think one of the fun things here, if 
we are both confirmed, is that we would work on these issues 
together because it will obviously cross the remits of both of 
our jobs, so looking forward to it.
    Senator Coons. It is my hope and expectation we will use 
this tool to balance assistance around security, democracy, 
human rights, and to make sure that between diplomacy 
development and defense, we have got the order right.
    The Moscow Bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is 
under intense pressure, really under siege by the Kremlin, just 
one of many recent examples of an authoritarian crackdown on 
press freedoms around the world. How would you support, if 
confirmed our RFE/RL's efforts to ensure that Russian citizens 
have access to unbiased news about their own country, and what 
actions would you take to support free press around the world? 
If I might, Ms. Zeya.
    Ms. Zeya. Senator, I think it is critical for, you know, 
for the United States to take a whole-of-government approach on 
these issues. So certainly, if confirmed, I would work closely 
with the undersecretary for public diplomacy as well as USAGM 
on this critical closing space for civil society and free 
expression in Russia that is critical to holding the Putin 
Government accountable for their widespread violations of human 
rights. So I would look to work with partners in government as 
well as the mission in the field to elevate this issue and act 
accordingly.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Ambassador Nuland on press 
freedom broadly?
    Ambassador Nuland. Yeah, just to pile on, Senator, and 
thank you for raising RFE/RL. I agree with you that they are at 
a critical moment here. Really interestingly, I think one of 
the reasons the Kremlin is cracking down is because 
listenership and viewership at RFE/RL has gone up exponentially 
over the last recent years, and not just in Russia, but also in 
Belarus and other parts of the world where press is 
constrained. So one of the things that Moscow understands is 
reciprocity. If confirmed, I would be interested in looking at 
whether we are being reciprocally constraining with regard to 
RT Sputnik and other Russian Government organs. Press freedom 
is an absolutely essential human right and part of good 
governance around the world.
    I would just lay down a marker here that I am also 
concerned about press freedom in the NATO space. We have a 
number of allies backsliding here, and it is very important 
that we keep that front of agenda. And we also have a number of 
American companies that, you know, broadcast freely in these 
countries, and their ability to do that is being constrained by 
government. So a lot of work to do.
    Senator Coons. I introduced a bipartisan Libya 
Stabilization Act in the last Congress and recently 
reintroduced it. This would support a diplomatic resolution to 
the ongoing grinding conflict in Libya, a country where there 
are 280,000 IDPs and 570,000 refugees. What additional action 
should we be taking to ensure that elections actually take 
place in December of this year and to enable the Government to 
be successful, and would movement by this committee on a bill 
like the Libya Stabilization Act be constructive? Ambassador 
Nuland, if you might.
    Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. We have a sliver of light 
now in Libya with these elections, agreed, and we have got to 
ensure that they are free, fair, that they are internationally 
observed. This is a place where, again, working with allies and 
partners, Europeans obviously, but countries in the--in the 
region to support Libya as it goes forward with all of this, we 
may need more resources to do that. I, you know, if confirmed, 
look forward to opening up the hood and seeing what we are 
already doing and working with allies and partners to ensure 
that the Libyan people feel that support and get this chance 
that they have suffered so much for.
    Senator Coons. Any additional comments before I turn to my 
colleague, Senator Murphy?
    Ms. Zeya. Senator, I would just add on Libya, endorsing 
Ambassador Nuland's comments, I think we should also leverage 
all tools available, including U.N. and U.S. Government 
sanctions, to bring an end to foreign military intervention, 
hold violators of human rights accountable, and ultimately 
support the goal of a sovereign, stable unified Libya.
    Senator Coons. Wonderful. Thank you both. Let me now turn 
to my colleague, Senator Murphy of Connecticut.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Coons. Welcome 
to you both. Thank you for your willingness to serve once 
again. Ms. Zeya, I look forward to building a working 
relationship with you. To Ambassador Nuland, I am glad to have 
you back as a partner. I will tell you, your candor and your 
reputation for candor, we appreciate it here on the Foreign 
Relations Committee. We often get a lot of spin from 
administration officials on both sides of the aisle, but I 
think you are well respected here on both sides of the aisle 
because of your ability and willingness to talk to us about 
facts on the ground as they are, not as we wish. So great to 
see you again.
    Speaking of facts on the ground, I wanted to bring us back 
to the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, and just note 
a statement from the Saudi foreign ministry dated yesterday or 
today in which an official there said we can begin with a 
nuclear deal and move on to another format that we will discuss 
all these other issues in a positive manner. Some folks took 
note of that statement, but it, frankly, likely acknowledges 
two realities: one, that our partners in the Gulf would like to 
be at the table when we discuss broader regional security 
concerns, in particular, Iran's support for terrorist 
organizations or their ballistic missile program, but also, 
that it is much more likely to have that conversation 
constructively if we get back into the JCPOA and get back on 
the same page with the P5+1.
    And so I wanted to ask you whether you think that the 
likelihood of getting a comprehensive agreement, where we 
litigate all of our disputes with Iran, is more likely today 
than it was in 2013, 2014, and 2015, when we were negotiating 
the JCPOA.
    Ambassador Nuland. Senator Murphy, it is great to see you. 
Although I am a citizen in Senator Kaine's region at the 
moment, I grew up in Connecticut, so Connecticut strong. Look, 
on Iran, I think we have got to pursue all of these problems in 
tandem. Whether that is a question of a comprehensive 
agreement, I think there are many players in many different 
pieces of this. What is most urgent today is that Iran is 
breaking out again of its nuclear box. It is enriching at 20 
percent. It is using these advanced centrifuges. We have got to 
get them back in the box on the nuclear front. But at the same 
time, we can and should be countering their malign regional 
influence by being stronger diplomatically in Syria.
    I have concerns that the diplomatic table, the future of 
Syria's political structure, et cetera, is being run by Russia 
and Iran, and the United States needs to be more active there. 
We need to support Lebanon more strongly against malign Iranian 
influence, and I was glad to see the undersecretary for 
political affairs, David Hale, smake a trip to Lebanon. You 
have worked a lot on the Yemen issue.
    So I believe we can be working on Iran's malign influence 
at the same time that we are having these conversations about 
the nuclear problem, and, frankly, the players are different in 
some of those things. And we have also got a build the basis 
for people to understand better than they do now what Iran is 
doing on the missile front. So walk and chew gum would be my 
answer to your question.
    Senator Murphy. Yeah, so I agree that our goal should be to 
walk and chew gum at the same time. Do you think we have to be 
driven by realities on the ground? And I, for instance, do not 
believe that we are going to be able to make progress in Yemen 
while we are still outside of the JCPOA. I think while we are 
still engaged in maximum pressure, the Iranians are likely to 
use every opportunity they can find to provoke. And so I do 
think that there is some argument to sequence here, and I will 
continue to make that argument on this committee.
    In the remaining time I have left, I just wanted to turn to 
the subject that you and I have spent a lot of time working on 
together, and that is Ukraine. Obviously, you know, we have 
taken strong steps today to send a strong message to the 
Russians about the message we need to send regarding the array 
of Russian forces on the border. But it has always been, I 
think, our belief that while Russia wants to use that front in 
order to put pressure on the Ukrainian Government, their 
longer-term plan is not likely a full military takeover of 
Ukraine, but to try to politically and economically weaken that 
country to the point where they ultimately just make the 
decision to install pro-Russian or a Russia-friendly government 
again.
    And so I would just ask this question. It is still 
incredibly important for us to view this as a multi-systemic 
effort that, while we have to have a military answer and 
support Ukraine in a military way, we also have to be equally 
focused on supporting their economy, supporting their political 
reform agenda, because that is maybe the most likely mechanism 
for Russia to eventually get a state of affairs that aligns 
with their interests.
    Ambassador Nuland. I absolutely agree completely, and, you 
know, your leadership on Ukraine was essential the last time I 
was in government, and the fact that you continue to support 
Ukraine is important. The number one thing Ukraine needs to be 
a strong, stable, sovereign state is to tackle endemic 
corruption. The United States has put a huge amount of effort 
into that, but corruption is also a tool that the Kremlin uses 
to corrode Ukraine from the inside and by governments, et 
cetera. So it is in all of our interests to continue to work on 
those issues.
    And the Zelensky Government has taken some important steps 
in recent weeks, but there is a lot more to be done. And we 
also need to get--support them and getting back into alignment 
with the IMF and all of those things that you have worked on. 
And the strong support from the Congress for Ukraine has been 
important, but they need to take the steps to walk the walk.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you to you both. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. My understanding is there are no 
members seeking recognition on either side of the aisle, and 
with that, thanks to both nominees for their time today.
    The record will remain open until the close of business on 
Friday, April the 16th. I would urge the nominees to answer 
questions expeditiously in order for their nominations to be 
able to move forward to a business meeting.
    The Chairman. And with that, the committee is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Too often, regional bureaus have sidelined DRL and other 
essential functional bureaus. If confirmed, how will you ensure better 
consultation and coordination between DRL, other functional bureaus, 
and the regional bureaus you will lead as P?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the regional bureaus 
under my supervision, as well as to the functional bureaus, that the 
President's vision of placing human rights and democracy at the heart 
of the foreign policy of the United States necessitates full inclusion 
of DRL in the Department's policy-making processes. I intend, if 
confirmed, to work with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security and 
Human Rights, and with DRL's leadership, to ensure full policy 
coordination among regional bureaus and across the Department.

    Question. What actions will you take, including with our partners, 
to address the global forced migration crisis? How specifically will 
you work to address the root causes of displacement such as new and 
unresolved conflicts; support populations on the move and those 
enduring lengthy displacement; and seek innovative solutions to assist 
low-income countries who host the majority of refugees and displaced 
people around the world?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue comprehensive strategies for 
addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change, help 
rebuild the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and stand up for 
democratic values and human rights. I will also encourage stronger 
partnerships between humanitarian and development actors, including 
multilateral development banks, in situations of protracted 
displacement and fragility, conflict, and violence.

    Question. Do you think we are doing enough to counter threats to 
democracy right now? What more should the United States be doing, and 
how will you elevate the importance of democracy promotion efforts and 
a democracy-centered foreign policy within the State Department and 
abroad given the President and Secretary of State's public commitment 
to these goals?

    Answer. As President Biden said, ``The United States will stand up 
for democracy wherever it is under attack.'' We know well from our own 
experience that sustaining democracy requires hard work, careful 
stewardship, and constant vigilance. If confirmed, I intend to support 
the Biden Harris administration's commitment to putting the promotion 
and protection of democracy at the center of U.S. foreign policy. This 
means working to bolster to democratic resilience at home and abroad, 
and holding ourselves, our allies, and our partners accountable to 
promote, respect, and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms.

    Question. What shifts must be made in our foreign policy to ensure 
we are working to hold our allies and adversaries to the same standard 
on human rights? How will you prioritize this parity in expectations on 
upholding human rights?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the tradition of seeking to 
report the facts on human rights fully and objectively on every country 
in the Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, using 
the standards found in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. I 
also intend to raise human rights issues with allies and adversaries 
alike, regardless of the other interests we may have in our 
relationships with other countries.

    Question. How will you engage with international counterparts to 
pursue effective accountability measures to address violations and 
abuses of human rights around the world? What role do you believe 
multilateral bodies like the United Nations have in this endeavor?

    Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that the United 
Nations promotes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
holds those countries with the worst human rights records to account. 
The United States supports U.N. investigatory mechanisms designed to 
enhance accountability for human rights violations and to end impunity. 
If confirmed, I will consider all possible tools and actions to promote 
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and 
abuses.

    Question. We must be clear-eyed about the nature of President 
Erdogan's Turkey. Turkey is among the top jailers of journalists and 
lawyers in the world, which is unbelievable for a member of an alliance 
founded on democratic values. In addition to its many domestic abuses, 
Turkey's aggression throughout the region and its refusal to give up 
the S-400 underscore the fact that Turkey is not a reliable NATO ally. 
How the U.S. decides to define its relationship with Turkey is 
critically important to security in the region and our ability to 
support democratic values abroad. Is there any circumstance under which 
the U.S. should reconstitute the F35 program with Turkey if it does not 
get rid of its S-400 system?

    Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior 
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. Turkey's 
acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 was incompatible with NATO 
principles, Turkey's commitments to NATO, and its participation in the 
F-35 program, and thus resulted in Turkey's suspension and pending 
removal from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership. If 
confirmed, I will continue to press Turkey to abandon the S-400 system, 
and I would not support reconstitution of the F-35 program so long as 
Turkey retains the Russian system.

    Question. What is your position on the Cyprus question, in advance 
of 5+1 talks next month?

    Answer. I continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive 
settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation, 
something which would benefit all Cypriots as well as the wider region. 
The United States has welcomed and should stand ready to assist the 
U.N. Secretary-General's initiative to convene an informal 5+UN meeting 
in Geneva. Consistent with the October 2020 U.N. Security Council 
Presidential Statement, I am deeply concerned by the Turkish Cypriots' 
unilateral decision, with the support of Turkey, to reopen Varosha. If 
confirmed, I will urge a reversal of this decision.

    Question. Do you commit to the full implementation the Eastern 
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and 
colleagues in the interagency to support robust ties between the United 
States and Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, as envisioned in the 
legislation. The U.S.-Greece security relationship remains vital to our 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and has grown significantly as 
bilateral ties have improved, beginning in the Obama-Biden 
administration. If confirmed, I will work to continue to deepen ties 
between the United States and Greece and the United States and Cyprus.

    Question. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify, this 
committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Turkey?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing close 
consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations committee regarding 
U.S. policy toward Turkey.

    Question. Last year's NDAA included provisions which would require 
the Department to be more forthcoming with Congress on the peace 
process. The Department was required to provide a certification in 
January to confirm that the Senate has been provided with all relevant 
documents associated with the February 29th agreement. We have yet to 
receive this certification. Will you commit to providing this 
information to Congress upon your confirmation?

    Answer. Yes, I understand that the Department is preparing to 
provide a response regarding section 1217(b) of the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
(P.L. 116-283) to Congress. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring 
that the Department provides this response and other required 
notifications, reports, and certifications promptly.

    Question. The law also requires regular consultation with Congress 
on the peace process. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify, 
this committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Afghanistan?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to consult fully with theon 
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.

    Question. The continued spread of COVID-19 in Latin America and the 
Caribbean is deeply concerning. Despite initial vaccination campaigns 
in the region, cases are on the rise and many health systems are 
overwhelmed. The current situation in Brazil is alarming and 
unrestrained spread only raises risks for new variants. What steps will 
you take to ensure vaccine access for nations in the Western 
Hemisphere, as well as other developing nations? What other vaccine-
related initiatives will you prioritize?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. commitment to leading 
the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through 
supporting global vaccine distribution via COVAX. Latin America and the 
Caribbean are suffering a disproportionate share of global COVID-19 
cases and deaths, posing a threat to the United States given our strong 
economic ties. However, the President's first priority must be to take 
care of the American people, and given the unpredictability of this 
virus, we must be prepared for a variety of scenarios. As the United 
States moves toward having enough vaccine here at home, I will support 
efforts to pursue options for sharing doses abroad, if confirmed. I 
will also support efforts to work with partners to expand the global 
manufacturing of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, and their needed 
supplies, to increase worldwide capacity and availability.

    Question. As Colombia works to implement its 2016 peace accord, it 
is facing an uptick in violence against civil society leaders by 
irregular armed actors and drug traffickers, including criminal groups 
that receive safe haven inside Venezuela. Additionally, there are 
concerns about the role of Russia in the region, including its presence 
in Venezuela and its disinformation efforts targeting Colombia. What 
steps will you take to strengthen U.S.-Colombia relations and ensure 
that the United States helps our Colombian partners consolidate the 
gains of peace?

    Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our 
democratic values. If confirmed, I will support the efforts the 
Colombian Government and people as they continue to work towards a just 
and lasting peace and a prosperous future. Through diplomatic 
engagement and foreign assistance, the United States must work with 
Colombia to promote sustainable peace and reconciliation by expanding 
security, state presence, access to justice, and licit economic 
opportunities throughout the country. If confirmed, I will support 
efforts to work together with the Colombia Government to combat 
narcotics trafficking and transnational crime, coordinate a regional 
response to the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, and 
promote and protect human rights.

    Question. President Biden has outlined his strategy for a COVID-19 
response, and has committed to making vaccines more widely available 
here in the United States. Part of what we need to do to safeguard 
American lives is ensure that other countries-especially poor 
countries-can do the same. As I've said before, COVID-19 didn't start 
here, but it came here. Americans are not safe until the world is safe. 
What do you see as the most important actions the United States can 
take to lead international efforts to end the COVID-19 pandemic for 
once and for all?

    Answer. To keep U.S. citizens safe, build back the economy, and 
curb the emergence of variants, the United States is committed to 
leading the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and strengthening 
global health security and pandemic preparedness to prevent future 
biological threats. I will support those efforts if confirmed. Under 
President Biden's direction, the United State has already taken 
significant steps, including: re-engaging with the WHO; committing to 
provide the most funding--$4 billion to COVAX--of any country to 
accelerate the pace and ambition of global vaccination efforts; and 
collaborating with our Quad partners (Japan, India, and Australia) to 
expand the manufacture and supply of safe and effective COVID-19 
vaccines.

    Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in achieving that 
goal?

    Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have committed to a 
whole-of-government response to COVID-19 and building longer term 
global health security. If confirmed, I will work with all the regional 
bureaus under my supervision, our functional bureaus, the U.S. 
interagency and the international community--including the private 
sector, civil society, and other partners--to help bring the COVID 19 
pandemic to an end and build back better preparedness to prevent, 
detect, and respond to public health threats both at home and abroad, 
including through initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda 
(GHSA).

    Question. The situation in Ethiopia is alarming. Not only is there 
conflict in Tigray, ongoing tensions in other parts of the country have 
the potential to cause sustained violent conflict and political space 
continues to close. The administration has taken a robust multilateral 
approach to resolving the Tigray crisis, working through the U.N. and 
with our African partners to achieve results, which I applaud. It also 
sent a strong, positive signal of its engagement by dispatching Senator 
Chris Coons to Addis Ababa. However there is much more to be done to 
put Ethiopia's democratic transition back on track. 3. Can Ethiopia 
hold credible elections in June under the current circumstances?

    Answer. I share Secretary Blinken's concern that a number of 
factors could undermine inclusive, free, fair, and credible national 
and regional elections, including: continued violence, harassment and 
detention of opposition figures, human rights abuses and violations, 
growing insecurity, more than 2 million internally displaced, 
interference with media freedom, and regional and local government 
interference in political processes. If confirmed, I will pursue 
sustained engagement to press the Government of Ethiopia to move 
towards inclusive political dialogue, to ensure a free political 
environment, and to address ongoing inter-ethnic tensions across the 
country to help mitigate these risks.

    Question. If confirmed, what will you do to encourage the Abiy 
administration to take meaningful action to open political space, and 
engage with all political stakeholders?

    Answer. The United States strongly supports democratization in 
Ethiopia. Political space for all Ethiopians is critical for advancing 
this process and building strong, inclusive institutions. If confirmed, 
I will work with the newly appointed Special Envoy for the Horn of 
Africa and the Bureau of African Affairs to press the Ethiopian 
Government to ensure freedoms of assembly and expression, political 
participation, access to information, including through the internet, 
and political resolution of inter-ethnic conflict across the country. 
If confirmed, I will continue to underscore to the Government of 
Ethiopia the need for broad and inclusive dialogue and for opposition 
parties and civil society to be able to participate freely in the 
political process and organize and work without the fear of harassment 
or intimidation.

    Question. What will you do to help resolve the Tigray crisis should 
Russia and China continue to block U.N. Security Council efforts to 
address this urgent matter, or the African Union fail to take a more 
prominent leadership role?

    Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with U.S. Ambassador 
to the U.N. Linda Thomas Greenfield and the newly appointed Special 
Envoy for the Horn of Africa to use every opportunity to address the 
crisis across U.N. agencies. The U.N. plays a vital role in delivering 
humanitarian assistance and in protecting refugees in Ethiopia. As 
conflict in Ethiopia poses a threat to the broader region, if 
confirmed, I will work with the African members of the Security Council 
in New York and the African Union to push for an end to fighting and 
press for a political settlement, protection of civilians, withdrawal 
of Eritrean forces, immediate unhindered humanitarian access, 
restoration of all communications to the region, independent 
investigations into reported human rights violations, abuses, and 
atrocities, and accountability for those responsible. I will also work 
closely with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to build a broad 
coalition of likeminded countries willing to work together to achieve 
these objectives and to take the necessary steps to hold all parties 
accountable to their commitments and their international obligations.

    Question. The administration's recent suspension of drone strikes 
outside select war zones has significant implications for the situation 
in Somalia, where AMISOM and Somali operations against Al Shabaab have 
long depended on the support of US drones. The current election crisis 
in the country, which has been made significantly worse by parliament's 
ill-conceived attempt to extend the term of President Farmajo, and an 
earlier withdrawal of US troops under the Trump administration, are 
additional complicating factors. What is your view on how best to 
achieve a breakthrough both in the struggle against Al Shabaab, and on 
the broader democratization and stabilization of Somalia?

    Answer. A holistic approach is needed to ensure sustainable gains 
in countering terrorist violence, achieving stability, and building 
adequate governance. Such an approach will require not only continued 
international support to counter al-Shabaab but also robust support to 
build the capacity of Somali security institutions, promote sustainable 
development, and improve governance. Engagement with all Somali 
stakeholders and international partners, including the U.N. and AU, on 
a pathway forward for Somalia is required. With respect to the current 
political crisis, it is vital for the peace, stability, prosperity, and 
governance of Somalia that the Federal Government and Federal Member 
States reach a consensus on a way forward for the electoral process 
without delay.

    Question. Recent flawed elections in Uganda require a robust USG 
response that advances of democracy, governance, and human rights in 
this important African country. I was pleased to see the 
administration's recent announcement of visa restrictions on Ugandan 
persons engaged in undermining democracy. But Uganda's status as a 
security partner in East Africa has complicated the willingness of past 
administration's to apply meaningful pressure on Kampala for its 
shortcomings in this area. How can the USG better prioritize democracy 
and governance in its relationship with Uganda, and ensure that our 
regional security interests do not crowd out or trump these essential 
priorities?

    Answer. Uganda's positive contributions to regional stability, 
particularly as the largest troop contributing country to AMISOM and as 
Africa's largest host of refugees do not give the Government of Uganda 
a free pass regarding the importance of respecting human rights, 
democracy, and good governance. If confirmed, I intend to support the 
Department's efforts to ensure that U.S. policy appropriately reflects 
the centrality of strong democratic institutions and respect for human 
rights in our partnership with Uganda.

    Question. The Central African Republic (CAR) faces ongoing violence 
and a humanitarian crisis in the wake of elections that suffered from 
low participation, and were fraught with irregularities. The U.S. 
supported an increase to the United Nations peacekeeping force but 
stability remains elusive, complicated by CAR government-aligned 
Russian and Rwandan military involvement and an anti-government 
coalition of militia groups representing roughly two-thirds of the 
country that are committed to the overthrow of President Touadera. What 
steps should the U.S. take to reduce tensions, encourage inclusive 
political dialogue, build a participatory democracy, and help put the 
country on a path toward sustainable peace?

    Answer. The United States has been a steadfast supporter of the 
democratic will of all Central Africans and their efforts to build 
resilient, responsive, and representative democracy. This is the best 
way to move the country towards peace and away from its repeated 
crises. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue working with 
our partners to encourage an inclusive dialogue between all legitimate 
actors in the country with the support of neighbors, regional 
organizations, and the United Nations. If confirmed, I will work with 
partners and allies to ensure countries providing assistance, military 
or otherwise, do so in a transparent and coordinated way, and 
consistent with the U.N. arms embargo.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. There are several vacant ambassadorial posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa without a named nominee to be considered by the Foreign 
Relations Committee, including such high-priority posts as Sudan, 
Kenya, and South Africa. Many other posts will become vacant in the 
coming year with little evidence that candidates are in the pipeline 
for consideration. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 
if confirmed, are you committed to working with the White House to 
ensure that Ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by 
qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the White 
House to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.

    Question. Under your leadership as Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure 
that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and 
consistently staffed?

    Answer. I recognize that State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF) is 
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If 
confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the world to ensure 
that staffing is aligned with our most pressing interests. I will 
explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including 
those in Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our 
vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive workplace and will 
support AF's efforts as they work to implement management reforms for 
recruitment, hiring, and retention.

    Question. With 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are myriad 
opportunities and challenges to the security, economic, health and 
humanitarian interests of the United States. The U.S. Government is 
presently engaged on a variety of fronts. The White House and Secretary 
Blinken have repeatedly stated that ``Africa is a priority for the 
Biden administration''. In the early days of your tenure as Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, if confirmed, how will you 
make clear inside the Department, across the administration and 
externally, that Africa is a priority for the Biden administration?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support the Secretary's efforts 
to engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our 
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate 
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. If confirmed, I 
intend to participate in the interagency policy process as the Biden-
Harris administration develops a whole-of-government Africa strategy 
and consider additional banner initiatives to signal the critical 
importance of this region. I believe active, consistent engagement of 
senior officials in Africa will be critical to advance U.S. interests 
on the continent and a signal of our commitment.

    Question. How will you ensure the United States respects and values 
our African partners, while also representing our values and interests, 
particularly as it relates to respect for the rule of law, protecting 
human rights, and advancing democracy?

    Answer. I believe we must continue to build partnerships in Africa, 
investing in civil society and strengthening democratic institutions. 
If confirmed, I look forward to implementing the Secretary's plan to 
engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our 
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate 
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. Senior-level 
engagement on a consistent basis will be a signal of our commitment.

    Question. Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing a massive ``youth 
bulge.'' While programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative and 
its Mandela Washington Fellowship are vital, what can the United States 
do to expand its reach and effectively engage with Africa's enormous 
youth population?

    Answer. Empowering youth is at the heart of the longstanding U.S.-
Africa partnership. If confirmed, I will direct Department of State 
resources to expand youth engagement initiatives. In addition to the 
Mandela Washington Fellowship, I intend to leverage YALI's USAID-run 
Regional Leadership Centers, the online YALI Network, and other public 
diplomacy and Department programs, including U.S. youth exchange 
programs like the Pan-Africa Youth Leadership Program, to help identify 
and dedicate resources for youth and alumni engagement to empower youth 
leaders in their communities, particularly around issues of 
entrepreneurship, civic engagement, democracy, governance, and respect 
for human rights.

    Question. What are your views on the role trade and investment 
could and should play in building stronger ties between the United 
States and the African continent? How should U.S.-African trade and 
investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter 
China, particularly in Africa?

    Answer. Strengthening and expanding U.S.-Africa trade and 
investment is critical to our primary objective of building stronger 
ties between the United States and the African continent. Stronger 
trade and investment ties with the United States also offers Africa an 
alternative to the PRC. If confirmed, I will engage in our commercial 
and economic diplomacy and use the tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and 
Treasury. I will also work with the U.S. private sector, African 
governments, and international financial institutions to increase trade 
and investment in Africa and promote U.S. business.

    Question. One vital area of Prosper Africa that requires greater 
emphasis is improving the enabling environment within African partner 
countries to better attract U.S. business investment. Improvements in 
anti-corruption initiatives, human rights, the rule of law, and overall 
good governance would create better conditions for U.S. investment 
conditions. Such enhancements would also counterbalance efforts by 
Chinese firms and the Chinese Communist Party to undermine free-market 
competition in African markets to their advantage. How can the U.S. 
Government most effectively support efforts to improve the enabling 
environment for competitive foreign investment by U.S. firms in Africa? 
What types of partnerships work best, and how can the United States 
best incentivize reforms and other actions necessary to foster economic 
opportunity and expand two-way trade and investment with the African 
continent?

    Answer. A conducive business climate is essential to building 
sustainable economies. If confirmed, I will deploy the full set of 
diplomatic and development tools to promote enabling environments in 
our African partners that foster robust economic growth and respect for 
human rights and democracy. For example, the Prosper Africa Initiative 
will help clear impediments to economic growth in Africa, create new 
export and investment opportunities for U.S. companies, and increase 
prosperity at home. If confirmed, I will work to provide a meaningful 
alternative to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic 
approach, and I will help build countries' resilience in order to 
respond to PRC economic coercion.

    Question. What should be guiding principles for increasing two-way 
trade and investment between the United States and Africa in light of 
the presence of China, Russia and other malign actors that often 
operate within several of these countries by their own rules?

    Answer. The President is particularly focused on rebuilding the 
middle class at home by creating new and better jobs, raising wages, 
and strengthening communities. Increasing two-way trade and investment 
is critical to building stronger ties between the United States and 
Africa, and it will benefit the American middle class. The competition 
with China, Russia, and other malign actors is one of the central 
challenges that will define the 21st century. If confirmed, I will 
advance the Department's efforts to ensure that American companies can 
compete on an even playing field in Africa, which will allow them to 
provide an attractive alternative based on entrepreneurship and free-
market principles, and which will be of benefit to African economies.

    Question. How can the Department better leverage the Bureau of 
African Affairs and encourage better coordination with the Bureau of 
Near East Affairs on Red Sea Corridor issues?

    Answer. A comprehensive and coordinated interagency approach to the 
Greater Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor better serves U.S. 
national security interests. To this end, Secretary Blinken has 
appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa. If confirmed, I will 
ensure close coordination between the Bureau of African Affairs and the 
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the new special envoy for the Horn of 
Africa, and the special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan on Red Sea 
Corridor issues, and ask senior leadership to identify and implement 
mechanisms for further coordination.

    Question. President Biden has proposed a $4 billion plan for 
Central America. Please describe specifically how this plan will build 
off of the successes and failures of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement 
for Central America, and the importance of garnering sustained 
political will from the individual governments.

    Answer. As I understand it, the Root Causes Strategy seeks to build 
on the lessons learned from the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central 
Americas. Place-based strategies, including targeted security and 
economic programs, helped Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador reduce 
violence and increase job growth prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 
Root Causes Strategy seeks to use similar tools and reforms to increase 
transparency, combat corruption, and create conditions conducive to 
economic growth a top priority, and to use data to support decisions 
and technology to increase efficacy. If confirmed, I would work to 
support a strategy to engage the governments, civil society, and 
private sectors of countries throughout the region as partners in this 
endeavor to address the factors that cause people to leave their homes. 
If confirmed, I will work with these countries, including by bolstering 
civil society, to build the necessary political will to undertake tough 
reforms. I am under no illusions that will be easy. It will require a 
consistent, committed effort from the United States and our partners.

    Question. There have been more than a dozen failed attempts at 
negotiating with Maduro in Venezuela. They have occurred in an 
environment of engagement favored by the Obama administration, and 
under the pressure of punitive measures implemented by the Trump 
administration. Describe the conditions that would need to be met for 
the administration to engage in negotiations with the Maduro regime in 
Venezuela.

    Answer. Only good faith negotiations among Venezuelans can 
establish the conditions required for free and fair elections. That is 
the best framework for a political resolution to the political, 
economic, migratory, and health crises afflicting Venezuela. This was 
the clearly stated sense of Congress when it passed the bipartisan 
VERDAD Act in 2019, co-sponsored by nearly twenty Democrats and 
Republicans, and it remains true today. As the Act states, ``direct, 
credible negotiations led by the Interim President of Venezuela and 
members of Venezuela's democratically elected National 
Assembly.represent the best opportunity to reach a solution to the 
Venezuelan crisis.'' The Venezuelan democratic opposition to Nicol s 
Maduro has assembled a broad alliance for free and fair elections and 
has made clear its willingness to establish the conditions for such 
elections through negotiations, while also relying on coordinated 
domestic and international pressure to bring Maduro to the negotiating 
table. If confirmed, I will work with Venezuelan and international 
partners to press Maduro to commit to participate in credible 
negotiations with the Venezuelan opposition. If confirmed, I will also 
work with international partners to press for respect for human rights, 
restoration of democratic norms, and the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance in Venezuela.

    Question. What is your assessment of what it would take to achieve 
those conditions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would support diplomatic engagement in 
order to advance a negotiated, peaceful solution to Venezuela's 
political, economic, and humanitarian crises, an approach consistent 
with the VERDAD Act of 2019. Venezuelans themselves must meet this 
challenge. Past negotiations have fallen short because Nicol s Maduro 
and his supporter used negotiations as a tactic to distract the 
international community and to centralize power. Negotiations can 
promote a peaceful transition toward free and fair elections if the 
international community is united in pressuring Maduro to engage in 
good faith and Venezuela's democratic forces remain united. Credible 
negotiations must incorporate the views and reflect the interests of 
Venezuelan civil society. They need to produce elections that comply 
with international standards of freedom, fairness, and transparency and 
allow Venezuelans to restore their democracy and the rule of law. To 
create the conditions for such a process, Maduro must free political 
prisoners and allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the same 
time, the President has made clear that the United States will continue 
to pursue regime supporters involved in criminal activity and 
violations of human rights.
    If confirmed, I would work with partners inside Venezuela and 
internationally to pressure Maduro and those who support him to commit 
to a serious process.

    Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in 
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted 
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of 
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua 
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by 
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in 
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you 
commit to prioritizing and maintaining policies and programs to create 
acceptable conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining 
policies and programs to create acceptable conditions for free and fair 
elections in Nicaragua. I will support the continued use of the 
economic and diplomatic tools at our disposal, including targeted 
sanctions, bilateral and multilateral engagement, and support for 
democratic processes, to advance free and fair elections. It is not too 
late for the Ortega regime to make the meaningful reforms by the May 
OAS deadline, and the United States continues to urge them to do so.

    Question. Please describe the long-term implications for Nicaragua 
and the region if Ortega fraudulently extends his time in office.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will press for meaningful electoral reforms 
by the May OAS deadline toward free and fair elections in November. I 
understand that the Department is working multilaterally, in 
coordination with the European Union, Canada, and the UK, as well as 
our partners in the OAS, to use the tools at our disposal to create the 
conditions for free and fair elections in November. If Ortega chooses a 
non-democratic path, and if confirmed, I will join the Department's 
efforts to work with those partners to hold accountable those 
responsible and encourage a return to democracy.

    Question. Despite reassurances from Secretary Blinken acknowledging 
the importance of the Abraham Accords, there are concerns that 
encouraging additional normalization agreements between Muslim majority 
countries and Israel isn't a priority for the Biden administration. 
Specifically, Senator Risch is concerned with the staffing, resourcing, 
and messaging the Biden administration has dedicated to this issue thus 
far. On the staffing front, the previous administration had an 
empowered agent in the White House to pursue normalization agreements. 
This has been pushed back down to the State Department, where it 
currently falls under the purview of the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
(DAS) for Israel Palestinian Affairs (IPA). On messaging, we've seen 
more out of the Department on restarting assistance to the Palestinians 
than on additional normalization agreements. The Biden admin's interim 
strategic guidance makes no mention of normalization in its section on 
the Middle East. Can you share your thoughts on the Abraham Accords and 
where it, as well as other prospective normalization agreements, rank 
among your policy priorities?

    Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have welcomed the 
recent normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the 
Arab and Muslim world. The Department is leading the U.S. Government's 
efforts, working with the National Security Council and the U.S. 
Government interagency to deepen existing agreements and urge other 
countries to normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, fostering 
peace in the Middle East will remain a top priority and I will look for 
opportunities to build on the Abraham Accords and expand cooperation 
among countries in the region.

    Question. Apart from the Abraham Accords, Senator Risch's top 
priority in the Middle East is Iran policy. He led a letter to 
President Biden, along with other national security Ranking Members 
that outlined his position. We've engaged in extensive Iran discussions 
with Sec Blinken, Wendy Sherman, and have just started consultations 
with Rob Malley. How would you define this administration's strategic 
aims with Iran? Where does regional activity fall in our strategic 
aims? How does engagement with allies and partners fit in to this wider 
strategy with respect to Iran?

    Answer. The President is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires 
a nuclear weapon and believes diplomacy, in coordination with our 
allies and regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal. 
The administration has fundamental problems with Iran's actions across 
a series of issues, including its support for terrorism, its ballistic 
missile program, its destabilizing actions throughout the region, and 
its abhorrent practice of using wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals as political tools. If confirmed, I will support the 
Biden-Harris administration's continuing commitment to addressing these 
challenges using the various tools at its disposal, including 
sanctions, and working in close coordination with our allies and 
partners.

    Question. The administration has said that regional terrorism and 
ballistic missiles will be addressed in follow-on agreements. Do you 
think this is possible? Assuming we grant financial relief as a part of 
a nuclear negotiation, what leverage would the US have in terms of 
securing follow-on agreements?

    Answer. President Biden has committed to try to achieve a mutual 
return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), and then use that as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the 
constraints on Iran's nuclear program, regional support for terrorism, 
and other issues of concern. If confirmed, I will work to achieve this 
vision. If confirmed, I would ensure the framework of U.S. sanctions on 
Iran remains robust. Many layers of that sanctions architecture would 
remain in place, even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This 
includes the primary U.S. embargo on Iran and many other U.S. sanctions 
on Iran. If confirmed, I would work with allies and partners, and use 
other avenues to place pressure on Iran to address these critical 
issues.

    Question. President Obama argued in favor of granting sanctions 
relief, stressing ``.our best analysts expect the bulk of this revenue 
to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits the lives of 
the Iranian people'' and that ``Even a repressive regime like Iran's 
cannot completely ignore those expectations.'' Yet, we now know that a 
majority of the sanctions relief went to Iran's defense industry and 
proxies. We actually saw an increase in Iran's malign regional 
activities since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was 
signed in 2015. Do you still believe Iran prioritized the needs of its 
people over its defense industry and proxies?

    Answer. I do not believe that Iran has prioritized the needs of its 
people, as evidenced by its abysmal human rights record. The U.S. 
Government maintains a range of tools to counter Iran's destabilizing 
activities in the region and support for proxy organizations. If 
confirmed, I will support continuing U.S. efforts to maintain and, 
where available, impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals 
providing support to designated terrorist groups in the region. I will 
also support action by the Biden-Harris administration, in coordination 
with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these 
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely 
with Congress on the path forward.

    Question. Russia and China are increasingly encroaching in the 
Middle East in ways that are contrary to US interests--we see joint 
R&D, basing, and a growing cooperation with US partners and allies in 
the region. Russia's continues to use its support for Bashar al Assad 
in Syria as a platform to further its influence in the region, while 
China is trying to make deeper inroads into the Gulf and Israel and 
thereby advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Biden 
administration has advertised its commitment to de-prioritizing the 
Middle East North Africa region, in favor of a greater presence in the 
Indo-Pacific and Europe. Yet Great power competition has historically 
taken place outside the Indo-Pacific and Europe regions, favoring 
combat in weak and failed states. The moves made by the Biden 
administration is occurring against backdrop of recalibrating 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, de-emphasis on Abraham Accords, and 
renewed focus on Palestinian issues. How do we compete with Russia and 
China in the Middle East? How do we remain the partner of choice and 
strike right balance between human rights and the national interest?

    Answer. There is no question that the People's Republic of China's 
(PRC) and Russia's coercive behavior threatens our collective security, 
and that these countries are actively working to undercut the rules of 
the international system and the values we and our allies share. If 
confirmed, I will press our Middle East partners to be clear-eyed about 
the risk of doing business with Russia and the PRC, highlighting that 
partnerships with the United States bring tangible benefits to the 
people of the region, while protecting human rights. The U,S. also 
should support investment and economic growth in the region in a 
transparent manner that respects workers, strengthens labor rights, and 
serves as a counter to authoritarian business models.

    Question. Lebanon is moving quickly towards financial collapse. 
Despite the August 4 port explosion, political elites lack the will to 
execute necessary reforms and unlock IMF, World Bank funds that will 
save the country from collapse. According to many, Lebanese political 
players are interpreting US outreach to Iran as a precursor to 
sanctions relief and an excuse not to implement reforms. Can you 
outline your thoughts on appropriate Lebanon policy? What role do 
sanctions play in that policy?

    Answer. Lebanon needs to execute significant reforms in cooperation 
with the IMF to address its economic challenges. Lebanon can never be 
truly stable and will never prosper if corruption remains rampant, and 
Hezbollah continues to operate with impunity. If confirmed, I would 
seek to use all available tools to push Lebanese officials to implement 
the reforms necessary to root out corruption and terrorism and unlock 
critical support from international financial institutions.

    Question. Secretary Blinken has been vocal on the importance of 
renewing and maintains cross-border humanitarian assistance, which we 
agree with, but when discussing Syria policy or strategy, we return to 
the same mantra of UNSCR 2254, progress on which remains stalled. What 
changes would you propose for Syria policy? How can the administration 
accelerate progress under UNSCR 2254?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will join the Biden-Harris administration 
in continuing to engage diplomatically to press for an end to the 
Syrian people's suffering and to encourage all possible efforts to 
advance the legitimate political track in keeping with UNSCR 2254, and 
will advocate for accountability for the most serious crimes committed 
against the Syrian people, including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. The United States seeks a nationwide ceasefire, unhindered 
aid access through all possible routes, the release of those 
arbitrarily detained, and free and fair elections under U.N. auspices. 
If confirmed, I will support the use of a variety of tools to ensure 
the Assad regime and its supporters do not profit from the conflict or 
any post-conflict reconstruction, and will consult closely with our 
partners and allies on the best way forward in Syria.

    Question. What role does the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act 
play in US policy? Do you feel it can be used as an effective tool to 
containing Russian influence in Syria, and preventing US partners and 
allies from normalizing relations with Bashar al Assad?

    Answer. The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act is an important 
tool to limit the ability of Assad and his enablers to profit from the 
ongoing conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. If confirmed, I will 
use it and all available tools to stop those responsible for grave 
human rights abuses against the Syrian people, and will coordinate with 
our allies and partners on policies toward Syria, including in 
preventing normalizing relations with Assad, in order to push for 
meaningful progress on our shared political objectives.

    Question. In light of the rocket attack on Erbil by an Iranian 
proxy group in February, and the continuing presence of ISIS forces in 
remote areas of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, what steps is the Biden 
administration prepared to take to reaffirm America's commitment to the 
territorial integrity and safety of the Kurdistan Regional Government?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the United States' top 
priorities of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and increasing the 
capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including Peshmerga 
forces. I understand that the administration is in constant contact 
with Kurdistan Regional Government leaders to address security 
concerns, and the United States provides assistance to support the 
continued development and professionalization of the ISF, increasing 
their ability to respond to threats and conduct counter-terrorism 
operations, as well as defend Iraq--its people and borders--while 
upholding the rule of law. If confirmed, I will support U.S. continued 
efforts with Iraq on our shared vision of a secure, stable, democratic, 
and prosperous Iraq that can stand on its own and defend its autonomy 
against malign regional influence.

    Question. In light of the threats posed to the Kurdish people of 
Syria by ISIS, the Assad Government, Assad's backers in Moscow and 
Tehran, and the Government of Turkey, what are the Biden 
administration's policies on the U.S.-Syrian Kurd security and 
diplomatic relationship, and the appropriate Kurdish role in Syria's 
political roadmap under UNSCR 2254?

    Answer. Stability in Syria and the greater region can only be 
achieved through a political process that represents the will of all 
Syrians. The Syrian Democratic Forces remain a capable and committed 
military partner in the fight against ISIS. The United States also 
supports the ongoing Intra Kurdish Dialogue and looks forward to its 
continued progress. The dialogue complements renewed U.S. efforts to 
stabilize areas of northeast Syria liberated from ISIS and to promote 
greater transparency and inclusivity in local governance, and if 
confirmed I will work to support it.

    Question. In your opinion, does the Treaty for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons threaten the integrity of U.S. alliances, especially 
regarding extended deterrence commitments?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration does not believe that 
progress toward nuclear disarmament can be decoupled from the 
prevailing security threats in today's world. If confirmed, I will 
support the administration's view that the Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence 
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and 
security, and may reinforce divisions that hinder the international 
community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation 
and security challenges. U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear 
deterrence--which includes all NATO Allies, plus Australia, Japan, and 
the Republic of Korea--share the administration's view that the TPNW is 
incompatible with our extended nuclear deterrence arrangements.

    Question. In December 2020, NATO re-affirmed the Allie's 
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO 
will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your view, do you believe that 
this principle requires the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in 
NATO countries?

    Answer. The United States is fully committed to its Article 5 
obligations. If confirmed, I will strongly support U.S. continued 
coordination with Allies in support of NATO's deterrence and defense 
posture, including U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe.

    Question. How can we get NATO allies to invest more in their own 
defense?

    Answer. This is an issue I have spared no effort on since my days 
as NATO Ambassador, and if confirmed, one I will continue to pursue 
vigorously. At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies agreed to increase their 
defense spending for the mutual benefit of the Alliance. If confirmed, 
I will work to ensure Allies continue to share the responsibility of 
our collective security against new and existing threats and appeal to 
them to do more. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the burden-
sharing conversation at NATO also focuses on capabilities, readiness, 
and force generation. I look forward to consulting with NATO Allies, as 
well as with Congress, on the best strategy to ensure NATO has the 
capabilities, readiness, and forces it requires to maintain a credible 
defense and deterrence posture, as well as fulfill NATO missions and 
operations.

    Question. Why does Japan spend only about 1 percent of its GDP on 
defense? Given increasing threats from China, is this acceptable and 
sustainable? If confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding 
defense spending with the Japanese Government?

    Answer. Japan has become one of our strongest allies in maintaining 
peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The 
Government of Japan has increased its defense budget every year since 
2012. The U.S. Japan Alliance advances our shared vision for a free and 
open Indo-Pacific and beyond. If confirmed, I will work with Japan to 
bolster its national defense capabilities to further strengthen the 
alliance and regional security.

    Question. Taiwan is set to increase its defense spending to about 
2.4 percent of GDP for this year. However, some senior U.S. defense 
officials have indicated that is still an insufficient amount for 
Taiwan to be able to ensure resilient defense in the face of an 
increasing Chinese threat. Do you agree with those concerns? If 
confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding defense 
spending with the Taiwanese Government?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining the U.S. rock-solid 
commitment to Taiwan. The United States will continue to make available 
to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan 
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy. At the same time, 
Taiwan needs to maintain robust defense budgets. The United States sold 
nearly $30 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales 
alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding 
security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize cost-
effective, mobile, resilient, and asymmetric capabilities, including an 
effective civil defense force for defense in depth.

    Question. How can we resolve the current impasse with Turkey over 
the S-400?

    Answer. One of President Biden's top priorities with respect to 
Turkey is urging it not to retain the S-400 and to refrain from 
additional Russian arms purchases. If confirmed, I will support efforts 
to persuade Turkey to forego the S-400. The CAATSA sanctions announced 
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400 
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of 
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence. 
Turkey's suspension and pending removal from the F-35 partnership 
represents an additional significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward 
to working with Congress to review the impact of the sanctions imposed 
in response to the S-400 acquisition and to determine whether 
additional measures are required or warranted.

    Question. What is your understanding of how China has expanded and 
modernized its nuclear forces?

    Answer. I understand that during this decade, the People's Republic 
of China (PRC) is likely to more than double the size of its nuclear 
stockpile. This rapid expansion includes new delivery systems as 
Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which will include a long-
range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs, multiple-warhead silo-
based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic missile submarines. The 
PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-glide vehicles, air-
launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear weapons that will 
fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making additional advances 
towards developing a launch-on-warning posture.

    Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing 
threat to the United States and its allies?

    Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) ongoing rapid 
expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages a more dangerous future, with 
a considerably larger number of sophisticated nuclear delivery systems 
able to reach the United States and our allies and partners than in the 
past. This larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military 
build-up and its increasingly assertive and threatening behavior to 
U.S. allies and partners.

    Question. How can we bring China to the negotiating table for arms 
control?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to pursue arms 
control to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
(PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. To date, the PRC has failed to 
meaningfully engage on these issues. If confirmed, I will support 
efforts to work with U.S. allies and partners to press Beijing to 
engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control to reduce 
global nuclear risks.

    Question. Do you believe that China's professed no first use policy 
is credible?

    Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing 
would act outside of its professed no first use policy. Some People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) officers have written publicly of the need to 
spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear 
weapons first. There has been no indication that national leaders are 
willing to attach such nuances and caveats publicly. However, ongoing 
PRC advances in their nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield 
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise 
questions regarding PRC intent and undermine their claims to seek a 
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no-first use policy.

    Question. Until now, analysts have estimated that the growth of the 
Chinese arsenal would be constrained by the lack of fissile material. 
However, recent reports indicate that Chinese plans to reprocess 
plutonium will greatly increase its stocks of weapons-grade material. 
Do you see this as threatening to the U.S. and its allies? Why do you 
believe China is pursuing these activities?

    Answer. Yes, this would be threatening to the United States and its 
allies. China's ongoing rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages 
a more dangerous future, with a considerably larger number of 
sophisticated nuclear delivery systems able to reach the United States 
and our allies and partners than in the past. Precisely because Beijing 
is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapon states, 
accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and intentions are 
difficult. I would defer to the intelligence community for specific 
assessments. In general, the United States has a longstanding position 
that seeks to limit the further development of sensitive fuel cycle 
technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing, beyond those 
facilities already in existence.

    Question. What is your understanding of how Russia has expanded and 
modernized its nuclear forces?

    Answer. Russia's strategic forces are undergoing a comprehensive 
modernization in their force structure, operations, and planning. If 
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's intention 
to engage Russia in comprehensive negotiations that address the full 
range of systems that threaten international security, including 
Russian novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.

    Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing 
threat to the United States and its allies?

    Answer. The United States monitors Russian nuclear policy, 
strategy, doctrine, and current and projected nuclear forces. If 
confirmed, I would work to sustain a safe, secure, and effective 
strategic deterrent and ensure that our extended deterrence commitment 
to our allies remains strong and credible. If confirmed I would also 
support efforts to use the time provided by the five-year extension of 
the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with 
Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control measures that 
address all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems 
and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

    Question. After the United State ratified the New START Treaty, 
Russia refused to engage in follow-on negotiations regarding its non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and other arms control issues. The United 
States recently agreed to a five-year extension to the New START 
Treaty. Given Russia's refusal to negotiate in the latter years of the 
Obama administration, do you expect Russia to behave differently this 
time, and to be willing to engage in arms control negotiations in the 
next few years? Why or why not?

    Answer. President Biden and President Putin have agreed to explore 
strategic stability discussions on a range of arms control and emerging 
security issues. The administration is in the process of establishing 
the terms of these discussions and, if confirmed, I commit to 
consulting with Congress and allies on the path forward. While Russian 
intentions regarding possible negotiations remain unclear, the United 
States must enter any talks on future arms control from a position of 
strength.

    Question. How should we account for Russian non-strategic nuclear 
weapons and exotic delivery systems in future arms control agreements?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support an approach in which the 
United States uses the time provided by a five-year extension of the 
New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress 
and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian 
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons.

    Question. Would Russia view a U.S. no first use or sole purpose 
policy as credible? Would such a policy affect the confidence of U.S. 
allies in extended deterrence?

    Answer. President Biden is committed to maintaining a strong, 
credible deterrent to defend the United States and our allies, while 
also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. The Biden-
Harris administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that 
will certainly include declaratory policy and, if confirmed, I will 
ensure we consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or 
actions in this area.

    Question. The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions 
Act (CAATSA) and other U.S. legislation and policy tools have failed to 
deter Russia from attacking our democratic systems, especially through 
means of cyberattacks. How can we deter Russia from conducting 
cyberattacks?

    Answer. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major 
threat to U.S. Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and 
critical infrastructure networks. If confirmed, I will support efforts 
to combat Russian cyber threats through a whole-of-government approach 
that leverages the full range of U.S. Government capabilities--
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military. If 
confirmed, I will work with the Department to communicate to the 
Russian Government when its behavior is unacceptable, coordinate with 
interagency partners to impose costs in response to destabilizing 
activity, and build international coalitions to actively deter malign 
Russian activities--including those carried out through cyberspace.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you balance the International 
Organizations bureau within the Political Affairs family regarding 
decision-making?

    Answer. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) is 
the State Department's gateway to advancing U.S. foreign policy 
priorities across the multilateral system. The IO Bureau was an 
invaluable partner when I served as Assistant Secretary for European 
and Eurasian Affairs, and if confirmed, I will rely heavily on the IO 
Bureau's U.N. system and international organizations expertise to 
advance U.S. interests and address global challenges. IO is also 
central to our efforts to protect international organizations from 
Chinese domination and efforts to flood the staff with their nationals.

    Question. There is growing concern about the aggressive efforts of 
the Chinese Communist Party to stack U.N. agencies with Chinese 
nationals and secure leadership positions in order to exert undue 
influence in International Organizations. Do you share this concern?

    Answer. I do. The PRC engages in conduct to reshape the 
international system to accommodate and more closely align with its 
ideology. Its actions undermine the foundations of the international 
system that has provided peace and stability since the end of World War 
II. At the U.N., the PRC drives an authoritarian agenda that stands in 
opposition to the values of the United States and the U.N. itself, 
including on human rights, labor rights, transparency, and poor 
economic practices. If confirmed, I will work to stop the PRC's efforts 
to harm international organizations and their transparency, efficiency, 
and influence.

    Question. Do you believe the United States should craft a 
comprehensive strategy to ensure the open and transparent processes for 
the selection and promotion of Directors, Secretary Generals, and 
Director Generals of all international organizations, including the 
U.N. and its specialized bodies?

    Answer. I believe in the independence and integrity of the U.N. and 
other international organizations, including specialized agencies, and 
agree with the importance of having qualified, independent candidates 
in key positions. If confirmed, I will prioritize robust strategies 
that include working with our allies and partners to select or elect 
qualified, independent candidates that support democratic values 
through a transparent and fair process.

    Question. What do you believe is the most appropriate level of 
funding to the United Nations? Should the U.S. leverage our 
contributions to promote necessary reform within U.N. specialized 
bodies and committees?

    Answer. The most appropriate funding level for the U.N. is the one 
that enables the U.N. to fulfill its mission effectively and 
efficiently, as determined by the U.N. General Assembly in accordance 
with its established procedures. If confirmed, I will work with the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the other IO missions to U.N. 
organizations to promote reforms that ensure that the U.N. and U.N. 
specialized agencies are transparent, accountable, and well-managed.

    Question. The United States has accrued peacekeeping arrears due to 
incongruence between U.S. law and U.N. assessment levels. How will you 
advocate for the lowering of U.S. peacekeeping assessments to 25 
percent during the scales of assessment negotiations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Mission to the 
United Nations and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs on 
a strategy to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N. 
General Assembly to lower the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate, 
thereby reducing or eliminating future peacekeeping arrears.

    Question. Do you support paying the backlog of U.S. arrears, 
including the pre-Helms-Biden agreement arrears, or will you honor the 
bipartisan agreement negotiated in the current President's name?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with Congress on the 
issue of whether to pay the ``contested'' arrears that are subject to 
the Helms-Biden agreement. As indicated in the President's FY 2022 
budget request, the Department is seeking funds and authority from 
Congress to enable payment of peacekeeping arrears that accrued over 
the past four years. These arrears are not subject to the Helms-Biden 
agreement.

    Question. Given the potential conflict with U.S. policy that U.N. 
membership would cause, what actions would the Biden administration 
take if the Palestinian Authority submitted a new application for 
membership to the U.N. or attempt to accede to any new U.N. body?

    Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join 
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are 
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations 
between the parties, a process I would support, if confirmed.

    Question. Do you support establishing an office of U.N. Integrity 
within the Political Affairs family to counter malign influence within 
the U.N. system and to promote free and fair elections within the U.N. 
system?

    Answer. The IO bureau has taken steps in recent years to strengthen 
its capacities to counter malign influence and I would support building 
on those efforts, if confirmed. I look forward to working with Congress 
to ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively 
to strengthen the U.N. system and ensure the transparency, 
effectiveness, and integrity of multilateral institutions. If 
confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to elect qualified and 
independent candidates to lead the U.N. and other international 
organizations bodies, including highly specialized agencies.

    Question. In 2014, your phone call with then-Ambassador to Ukraine 
Geoff Pyatt was leaked, and, among other things, it revealed less than 
flattering opinions about the European Union. At the time, how did you 
address this comment with your European Union colleagues?

    Answer. I made immediate contact with senior partners in the EU and 
key Allied capitals to make clear that this phone call was leaked by 
the Russians to try to drive wedges between us, and that my comments in 
no way reflected my larger view of the EU, but reflected only a short 
term, tactical frustration that the EU had chosen not to send an envoy 
to help negotiate a transitional Ukrainian Government. In fact, I was 
seeking more EU collaboration on Ukraine. I also apologized for the 
crude language I used. I went on from that incident to have very 
productive and collaborative relations with EU diplomats and Allied 
partners for the next three years on Ukraine, energy security, Russia 
relations, the Balkans, Cyprus settlement talks and a host of other 
issues.

    Question. Do you believe this statement will present issues in your 
job as Under Secretary and impede your ability to work well with the 
political directors of European Foreign Ministries? How will you 
fulfill President Biden's intent to strengthen our relationship with 
our allies, including the European Union as a bloc?

    Answer. As noted, I went on from that incident to have very 
productive and collaborative relations with the EU and Allied partners 
on a wide variety of issues. If confirmed, I look forward to building 
on that experience to support the President and Secretary's efforts to 
repair, revitalize, and raise the level of ambition in the U.S. 
relationship with the European Union. U.S.-EU cooperation will be 
critical to our ability to control the pandemic, fight climate change, 
address the challenge posed by China, secure a digital future that 
favors free societies, and manage other global issues. If confirmed, I 
will work closely with my EU and other European counterparts to deepen 
cooperation on these issues on the basis of our shared values.

    Question. Which nations do you believe the U.S. should work most 
closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and actions 
around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned with U.S. 
goals and values vis-a-vis China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the 
center of our foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that 
underpin peace and security and compete with the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) from a position of strength. This includes working closely 
with our Indo-Pacific and NATO and EU Allies, within groupings like the 
Quad and the G7, and with other likeminded partners to preserve our 
democracies, protect the integrity of the U.N. system, strengthen our 
vital security partnerships, and secure the technologies of the future.

    Question. What are your views on the recently agreed EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the U.S. be engaging with 
the European Parliament to stop its ratification?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with 
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including 
those related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on 
China to show that its pledges on forced labor, state-owned 
enterprises, and subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not 
just cheap talk, and the Chinese Government will need to follow 
through. If confirmed, I will seek to engage with European 
counterparts, including members of the European Parliament, on how to 
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive 
and coercive actions, as well as on China's failures to uphold its past 
international commitments.

    Question. Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe 
telecoms companies out of their networks. What do you view as the next 
priority areas for cooperation between the U.S. and EU?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued collaboration with 
European Allies and partners to build a vibrant and diverse supply 
chain of trustworthy telecommunications equipment and services. This 
includes support for open, interoperable approaches like Open RAN 
(radio access network) technologies that promise to increase vendor 
diversity and market competition and have the potential to lower costs 
and improve security. The United States encourages others to join us in 
our support of trustworthy vendor diversity, open networks, and 
transparent standards. National measures must be crafted to fully 
exclude untrustworthy and high-risk suppliers, regardless of national 
origin, from providing equipment and software in 5G networks.

    Question. To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging 
Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the U.S. should try to drive 
wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do you 
agree with that analysis?

    Answer. I believe the alignment between Russia and China on many 
issues amplifies the challenges that both countries pose to the United 
States. China and Russia cooperate in certain areas, touting their 
relationship as a ``comprehensive strategic partnership,'' but remain 
competitors in others. Beijing and Moscow share the same goal of 
undermining U.S. leadership and reshaping the international rules-based 
order, particularly in the defense, democracy, and human rights realms. 
They complement these efforts with their military capabilities, 
technological innovation, and disinformation campaigns. If confirmed, I 
will ensure the United States is vigilant in imposing costs on coercive 
and reckless behavior that undermines the rules-based order.

    Question. In an article last year in Foreign Affairs, you said the 
U.S. should ``resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from 
the outside world and speak directly to the Russian people.'' As 
Putin's tightens the screws on his people, not least through the 
``foreign agents'' law, independent media is being suppressed, and RFE/
RL is on the brink of withdrawing from the country altogether. How do 
you propose we resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from 
the outside world? What actions do you believe the U.S. should take?

    Answer. The United States is committed to maintaining ties with the 
Russian people despite the Russian Government's efforts to increase 
government control over its population using new and existing 
legislation and regulations adopted under the guise of regulating 
``foreign influence.'' If confirmed, I will ensure the United States 
continues to promote the courageous work of Russia's independent media, 
civil society organizations, and democratic elements of the society and 
call out the Russian Government for abusing the fundamental freedoms of 
the Russian people and will join with partners and allies to amplify 
that message. If confirmed, I will work to enhance people-to-people 
ties, seek ways to ensure continued communication with the Russian 
people, and draw attention to Russia's increasing repression.

    Question. In the same article, you wrote ``U.S. and allied 
sanctions, although initially painful, have grown leaky or impotent 
with overuse and no longer impress the Kremlin'' and the ``U.S. and 
European leaders should be clearer about their conditions for rolling 
back or removing sanctions.'' What do you believe the role of sanctions 
should be in the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy?

    Answer. Sanctions remain an important tool in our broader arsenal 
of instruments for countering Russian malign behavior and signaling to 
Russian leaders that their actions will have costs, as most recently 
demonstrated by the President's April 15 executive order. If confirmed, 
I will work with allies and partners to enhance coordination and 
amplify the effect of U.S. sanctions actions, as well as the imposition 
of new sanctions if warranted.

    Question. With respect to Russia, how do you believe the sanctions 
imposed on that country since 2014 have affected the Russia's economy 
and foreign policy decision making?

    Answer. U.S. and allied sanctions impose costs on Russia for its 
destabilizing activities. Russia might well have sought to take even 
more territory in Ukraine and elsewhere had tough sectoral sanctions 
not been imposed. Economically, sanctions have sharply curtailed new 
foreign investment in Russia. Moscow now has few opportunities to 
achieve sustained growth absent significant structural reforms to 
improve competitiveness and the business environment, which the Kremlin 
shows little willingness to undertake. The economic role of the state 
has steadily expanded, growing from roughly 35 percent of GDP in 2000 
to 60-70 percent today. This is detrimental to Russia's long-term 
interests and growth.

    Question. Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can 
the U.S. (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of being 
clearer about the policy aims of sanctions and any conditions needed 
for rolling back or removing sanctions with respect to Russia?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Allies and 
Partners, as well as with Congress, to examine all options for how to 
calibrate sanctions actions to best meet U.S. and allied policy aims.

    Question. Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on 
Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures 
besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect 
to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia?

    Answer. I do, if they are properly targeted and maintained. I see 
value to using other tools as well including multilateral visa bans and 
international pressure campaigns. If confirmed, I will support the 
Biden-Harris administration's commitment to using all available tools, 
including but not limited to sanctions, to stop Russian malign 
influence, and will also continue to seek ways to engage the Russian 
people.

    Question. What outreach to every day Russians do you intend to do 
as Under Secretary for Political Affairs?

    Answer. As the Russian Government increases its suppression of 
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Russia, it is even more 
critical for us to engage with everyday Russians through public 
statements, broadcast and digital media, and the remaining educational 
and people-to-people programs that the Kremlin still allows. And even 
as we focus on responding to the Russian Government's aggression, as 
the President has stated, ``the Russian people, like the American 
people, are invested in a peaceful and secure future for our world.'' 
We need to nurture these inclinations, and Mission Russia has been able 
to adopt a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid engagements for 
this purpose. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing and finding 
new ways to expand our outreach to the Russian people.

    Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian 
Affairs between 2013 and 2017, you were responsible for U.S. policy on 
Turkey during the 2016 coup attempt and as Turkey descended into the 
authoritarianism under President Erdogan we see today. What did you and 
the State Department do in those years to try to prevent Turkey from 
purchasing the S-400 missile defense system from Russia?

    Answer. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs, I oversaw the successful effort in coordination with our NATO 
Allies to convince the Government of Turkey to overturn its 2013 
decision to move forward with a Chinese air defense system. I 
consistently and repeatedly pushed for Turkey to choose a NATO-
interoperable air defense system, emphasizing that PATRIOT would be the 
best choice for Turkey. I also worked within the U.S. interagency to 
address Turkey's concerns about the PATRIOT. More broadly, I 
successfully pushed other NATO Allies to reduce their dependence on 
legacy Russian military equipment and procure NATO interoperable 
military equipment.

    Question. Is there anything you think the U.S. should have done 
differently in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt?

    Answer. Following the devastating July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey 
in which more than 250 people lost their lives, the United States 
promptly condemned the coup and extended its heartfelt sympathy to the 
Turkish people. Since then, we have supported Turkey's efforts to bring 
perpetrators of the attempted coup to justice in evidence-based 
prosecutions. However, I am concerned by the significant expansion of 
scope of the prosecution for attempted coup-related activities to 
include opposition politicians, the media, and others whose views 
differ from the Government's.

    Question. How should the U.S., the European Union, and NATO deal 
with an increasingly authoritarian Turkey whose decisions are 
problematic for its people, its allies, and its larger neighborhood?

    Answer. I share the concerns about the Turkish Government's curbs 
on freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly that erode 
the foundations of a democratic society. It is in our shared interest 
to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. If confirmed, I 
commit to press Turkey to do more to bolster the rule of law, protect 
human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold the rules-based 
international order, and stand united with the Transatlantic community 
in addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and China.

    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. should try to drive a wedge 
between Russia and Turkey?

    Answer. Russia attempts to interfere in domestic processes and 
drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including 
Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, weapons sales, corrupt 
business deals, and disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are 
transactional and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For 
example, Russia and Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional 
conflicts (e.g., Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily 
dependent upon Russian energy supplies and Russian tourists, 
construction sector projects, and Russian agricultural purchases are 
important for the Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work to prevent 
Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally.

    Question. Recently, Senator Menendez and I re-introduced the 
Ukraine Security Partnership Act, which aims to support Ukraine in its 
fight against Russian-backed separatists in the east and push the 
country to continue necessary reforms of its military and defense 
sectors. In the bill, we propose placing of conditions on Foreign 
Military Financing and International Military Education and Training 
(IMET). With your experience working on Ukraine policy, what is your 
view on Ukraine's historical response to conditionality? Do you believe 
that increasing conditionality on a portion of military support for the 
country would provide incentive for further reforms?

    Answer. Reform conditionality on security assistance to Ukraine has 
been an important driver of positive change in the armed forces, 
including in ensuring U.S. support is properly used. If confirmed, I 
will work with Congress to provide robust security assistance to 
Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and to support continued 
reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee the execution of $115 
million in FMF, $3 million in IMET, and $6 million in Nonproliferation, 
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds that 
Congress appropriated for FY 2021. If confirmed, I will also coordinate 
with the Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that 
Congress appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative 
(USAI) in FY 2021, including certifying that Ukraine has taken 
substantial actions to make defense reforms before the final tranche of 
$150 million in USAI funding is released. I will continue to urge the 
implementation of defense reforms, for which Ukraine has made moderate 
strides. If confirmed, I also look forward to consulting with Congress 
as we engage the Ukrainian Government on these issues to ensure we have 
the right mix of incentives for Ukraine to continue its reforms.

    Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was 
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a 
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and 
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. The 
U.S. gives a huge amount of money to support Ukraine's transition, yet 
much of the country remains under the influence of oligarchs. What do 
you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what 
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down 
its previously positive path?

    Answer. Ukraine needs to make more progress in combatting 
corruption, institutionalizing rule of law, deepening economic reforms, 
and strengthening democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will work 
with Ukraine to hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of 
reforms or try to undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.

    Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian 
Affairs, you had responsibility for Europe during years of upheaval in 
the region: the 2014 Ukraine Revolution of Dignity, the 2014 the 2015 
European migration crisis, the Russian meddling in the 2016 
presidential election, and the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, to name a 
few. Looking back from today, what would you do differently? What 
should the U.S. have done differently?

    Answer. I am proud that the U.S. provided crucial political, 
economic, and security support to Ukraine during my tenure as Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, in close 
collaboration with the EU, NATO, and our democratic allies around the 
world. I regret that the U.S. was not a direct participant in the 
Normandy negotiations to implement the Minsk agreements because we 
might have been able to push the process faster and more effectively. 
As I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 
2017 and 2018, I also believe we should have done more in 2016 to 
expose and deter Russian election interference in the U.S.

    Question. What do you believe you and the U.S. got it right?

    Answer. The U.S. provided crucial political, security, and economic 
support to Ukraine, coordinated closely with Allies and conditioned our 
assistance on meaningful reform. We assembled a global coalition to 
censure and sanction Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. We also 
strengthened deterrence along NATO's Eastern border with Russia, 
reversed the flow of gas in Europe to help Ukraine when Russia tried to 
cut it off, collaborated with the EU to bring new non-Russian energy 
sources to Europe, and provided intensive support to the U.N.-
facilitated Cyprus peace talks. We also worked intensively in the 
Balkans to support good governance and reform, and called out those 
NATO Allies that were backsliding on their democratic commitments.

    Question. There were reports that you supported arming Ukraine with 
lethal weaponry during your time as Assistant Secretary, a position at 
odds with key officials in the Obama administration. Do you remain 
willing to disagree, when appropriate, with the administration to 
ensure the best policies are put into place?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed, as I always have 
been, to providing my best counsel in the formulation of administration 
policy, even if that input is at odds with others. Once the President 
and Secretary have decided on a policy, I will faithfully implement it 
to the best of my ability. If confirmed, I would look forward to 
working with Congress to continue providing the assistance that Ukraine 
requires to defend itself against Russia's aggression, including lethal 
weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense 
requirements. This includes the provision of defensive lethal 
assistance that has already expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as 
armed Mark VI patrol boats this year, for instance.

    Question. In the number three spot in the State Department, how do 
you propose the U.S. reinvigorates the Minsk process and the Normandy 
Format to pressure Putin to withdraw from Eastern Ukraine? Though not a 
member of the Normandy Format, what can the U.S. do to support Ukraine 
and end the war that is in its 7th year?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's 
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic 
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia 
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and 
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk 
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our 
allies and partners, will seek opportunities to leverage U.S. 
engagement on Ukraine-Russia conflict diplomacy.

    Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting Europe's 
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a mandatory or 
discretionary authority?

    Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law. 
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy 
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I 
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential 
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify 
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the 
statute and is considering designations.

    Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the 
completion of Nord Stream 2, or is it inevitable?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with allies and 
partners to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to ensure that 
Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that enhances, rather 
than undermines, its collective security. The administration has made 
clear that Nord Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Russian malign influence 
project that is a threat to Europe's energy security. If confirmed, I 
will ensure the Department continues work to bring an end to the 
project.

    Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the 
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power) 
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations 
with Congress?

    Answer. In the spirit of our Transatlantic partnership, the 
administration is prepared to listen to the concerns of our Allies. 
That said, to the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If 
confirmed, I will consult early and often with Congress on all 
sanctions matters. The Department looks forward to continuing to 
consult with Congress on this matter and others, and if confirmed I 
would look forward to doing the same.

    Question. Do you believe that the State Department should implement 
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, 
consistent with congressional intent to stop the completion of the 
pipeline? Do you commit to ensuring that the State Department adopts an 
interpretation of PEESA, as amended, consistent with Congress' intent 
that the sanctions target a broad range of pipe-laying activities, 
support services, insurance and certification activities, and other 
conduct that supports or facilitates the construction of the pipeline?

    Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law. 
The administration is thankful for the tools that Congress has provided 
to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that 
enhances rather than undermines its collective security. Furthermore, 
the Department continues to work to bring an end to the pipeline, which 
it views as a threat to European energy security and as a tool of 
Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to 
continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to determine the 
applicability of PEESA, as amended.

    Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have been 
an afterthought in much of U.S. foreign policy. However, the region 
sits between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S. 
involvement and investment. Former Secretary Pompeo visited Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan in 2020, and USAID has recently expanded its presence in 
the region. Over the past few years, the coordination between the 
United States and EU on development programs in Central Asia has 
markedly strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia 
engagement strategies. Will you commit to ensuring that Central Asia is 
a priority region for engagement by the State Department and to 
continuing to coordinate the U.S.'s Central Asia engagement with the 
EU?

    Answer. Changes in Central Asia in the last several years have 
created both new opportunities and new challenges. If confirmed, I will 
work with the SCA bureau to continue to advance the U.S. Central Asia 
Strategy by providing strong support for the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Central Asia countries, encouraging 
regional cooperation and connectivity, working to reduce terrorist 
threats, and promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights. If 
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain 
U.S. diplomatic support and engagement in the region, including the 
continued routine contact between EU and U.S. officials overseeing 
engagement with Central Asia.

    Question. In your opinion, what are the immediate priority areas in 
which the U.S. should engage these nations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. Central Asia 
Strategy, which lays out six priority policy objectives, including 
support for the independence and territorial integrity of the Central 
Asia countries, reduction of terrorism, support for stability in 
Afghanistan, encouraging regional cooperation and connectivity, 
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and 
furthering regional development. If confirmed, I would look forward to 
working with Congress to sustain U.S. diplomatic support for these 
priorities and engagement in the region

    Question. 1Do you believe that the U.S. should continue to look at 
the Central Asian nations through an Afghanistan-centric, ``War on 
Terror'' lens?

    Answer. While promoting regional security will remain critical, the 
U.S. Central Asia Strategy lays out several priorities beyond 
preventing terrorism. If confirmed, I will support these priorities, 
including support for the independence and territorial integrity of the 
Central Asia countries, regional cooperation and connectivity, 
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and 
fostering economic opportunities for U.S. businesses in the region. If 
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain 
U.S. diplomatic support for these priorities and engagement in the 
region.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. The Saudi regime's human rights abuses are well-
documented, and while Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman has tried to 
present himself as a ``modernizer,'' his social reforms have been 
accompanied by vast crackdowns on independent voices. He has imprisoned 
women's rights activists, journalists, and academics, and of course 
most infamously, our own intelligence services have assessed him to be 
behind the brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi 
in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The administration is to be 
applauded for taking the important steps of releasing the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) report confirming MBS's 
complicity in the Khashoggi murder, adopting the ``Khashoggi Ban,'' and 
applying sanctions to 76 Saudis behind Khashoggi's murder. But MBS was 
not among those, and continues to face no direct consequences for his 
role. If confirmed, what steps would you take to hold Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman accountable?

    Answer. I agree that the Saudi Government must be held accountable 
for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and I support the steps the 
Biden-Harris administration has taken to elevate the role of human 
rights within the relationship, address past behavior, and deter future 
abuses. As you note, the administration followed the law and submitted 
an unclassified report to Congress on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi; 
imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on a former senior Saudi official 
and the group whose members were involved in the killing, which 
includes members of the Presidential Guard close to the Crown Prince; 
and took action pursuant to a new visa restriction policy against 76 
Saudi individuals believed to have been engaged in threatening 
dissidents overseas, including but not limited to the Khashoggi 
killing. The Department has committed to report on any such 
extraterritorial activities by any government in its annual Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices. If confirmed, I will push to ensure 
that human rights concerns remain a central element of our bilateral 
conversations, and that we obey all aspects of U.S. law in this regard.

    Question. Since the fraudulent election last August, freedom of 
expression has been under attack in Belarus. The U.S. has sanctioned 
some entities and individuals over their roles in the election and the 
subsequent crackdowns on protesters; yet, the question remains what 
more the U.S. Government should do to signal its support for the 
Belarusian people. If confirmed, what measures would you support to 
hold the Lukashenko regime accountable and support the people of 
Belarus in their fight for a democratic future?

    Answer. I condemn the Lukashenko regime for its violent and 
repressive tactics against the Belarusian people peacefully protesting 
for the right to choose their own leaders. If confirmed, I will call 
for the release of all political prisoners, new elections, and a 
national dialogue inclusive of the opposition and civil society. I will 
support coordinated actions with our allies on sanctions and visa bans 
against individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses and 
other efforts to undermine democracy. I am committed to finding ways to 
bolster assistance to support brave Belarusians advocating for 
democratic change and standing up for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.

    Question. I applaud the Biden administration's new sanctions 
designations against the Russian Federation for its malign activities 
on American soil that undermine U.S. national security. I urge the 
administration to now follow through with congressionally mandated 
sanctions against Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This pipeline, if 
completed, would further undermine U.S. national security by increasing 
the Kremlin's influence in Europe, exacerbating divisions within 
Europe, and stripping Ukraine of its only source of leverage over 
greater Russian military activity at a time when Putin is substantially 
increasing his military capabilities along Ukraine's Eastern border. 
The Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting 
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA) impose mandatory 
sanctions on all entities involved in pipe-laying activities for Nord 
Stream 2. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the imposition of 
sanctions as required under PEESA and PEESCA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate using to all available tools 
to stop the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I understand that 
the Department is actively examining entities involved in potentially 
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as 
appropriate. If confirmed, I will use all tools, to include these 
authorities as appropriate, to counter Russian malign influence and to 
work with allies and partners to support Transatlantic energy security 
goals.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese 
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are 
compatible with our own?

    Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian, 
and increasingly aggressive. I believe the Chinese leadership seeks not 
just to compete with the U.S. but to change the global rules of road to 
favor autocracy. As such, we are in a fundamental struggle with China, 
and it will be the challenge of our generation to defend and advance 
democracy, liberalism, universal human rights, and freedom in the face 
of Chinese ambitions.

    Question. Is there any doubt in your mind that the goal of the 
Chinese Communist Party is to become the world's predominant political, 
military, and economic power, and for the United States to decline in 
relation to it?

    Answer. I have no doubt that is China and the CCP's goal.

    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government's past approach 
towards the PRC was effective at meeting this challenge?

    Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in 
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad 
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political 
liberalization, the opposite has happened. China has grown more 
authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad. The Chinese Communist 
Party is illiberal, authoritarian, and intends for China to become a 
dominant world power. Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete 
with and challenge the United States. This necessitates a new, tougher 
U.S. approach, working with allies and partners.

    Question. Do you believe that the CCP can be trusted to uphold its 
commitments? How do you think the United States' approach to diplomacy 
with China should change because of its long record of broken promises 
to the international community?

    Answer. Beijing has a long track record of failing to honor its 
international obligations, including in Hong Kong and around the world. 
As such, the United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not its 
words, and work with allies and partners to impose costs on China when 
it violates international norms and agreements.

    Question. In 2018, during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, 
you said that Beijing is adapting and improving on Russia's methodology 
and is now running disinformation campaigns and influence operations in 
Taiwan, Australia and other neighboring countries. Do you believe China 
is doing the same in the U.S.?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Given this broad consensus around Confucius Institutes 
and their role in supporting CCP propaganda, how do you believe the 
United States should counter Chinese influence operations through 
programs such as their Confucius Institutes?

    Answer. A clear understanding of the organizations and entities 
that China uses to attempt to influence U.S. policy is important. If 
confirmed, I commit to review these policies to ensure organizations 
are properly designated and inform relevant stakeholders within the 
United States, including state and local governments, universities, and 
business associations, as appropriate.

    Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department under your 
leadership push for transparency and accountability to ensure we learn 
what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent the next pandemic? 
Do you commit to follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure 
of new information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, 
and share with Congress-and with the public as appropriate-further 
details on those disclosures, including the names of the researchers 
who fell sick in the fall of 2019 and the nature of the research they 
were conducting at the time?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to pursuing transparency and 
accountability as we seek to determine the origins of the COVID-19 
pandemic, assess the shortcomings of the global response, and support 
necessary reforms to prevent future pandemics. I will continue to urge 
the WHO to ensure the second phase of the study in China is timely, 
transparent, expert-led, and free from interference. We do not know and 
cannot know the full origins of the virus and its spread until we have 
full transparency from the PRC.

    Question. Do you concur with Secretary Pompeo's and Secretary 
Blinken's determination that genocide and crimes against humanity are 
currently being committed by the CCP against Uyghurs and other Turkic 
and Muslim communities in Xinjiang? If so, what are the appropriate 
tools for holding the CCP and its officials accountable for its 
atrocities?

    Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that 
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing 
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups in Xinjiang. These atrocities shock the conscience and 
must be met with serious consequences. If confirmed, I will support 
using all appropriate tools, including those provided for in the Uyghur 
Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC to end these atrocities 
and to promote justice and accountability for the victims.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights 
concerns are integrated into every senior bilateral engagement with the 
PRC, and that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, 
both publicly and privately?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights concerns are 
at the forefront of our China policy, and I will commit to integrate 
our human rights concerns into senior bilateral engagements with PRC 
counterparts. I recognize that advocacy on behalf of individuals who 
have been abused by PRC authorities should be a critical component of 
the U.S. Government's approach, and I will engage both publicly and 
privately to urge the PRC authorities to release unjustly detained 
individuals unconditionally, consistent with their international human 
rights commitments.

    Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious 
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a 
responsible global actor?

    Answer. Yes. I am clear-eyed about China's failure to uphold key 
past commitments, including on human rights, and ongoing abuses. I will 
keep these failures in mind as I deal with my PRC counterparts. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to address 
these challenges from a position of strength, re-engage in 
international institutions, and push back against attempts to rewrite 
the rules and procedures of the international system.

    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State Department 
maintains a high degree of pressure on Beijing for its violations of 
Hong Kong's long-cherished autonomy, and prioritizes this key issue 
above all other competing interests in Hong Kong?

    Answer. Yes. The United States must clearly address Beijing's 
assault on freedom, democracy, and autonomy in Hong Kong, in violation 
of its international obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I will 
work with partners and allies to strengthen a coordinated approach to 
the crackdown.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthening the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship, including support for the Taiwan Travel Act and 
supporting and encouraging senior U.S officials to travel to Taiwan, 
and senior Taiwanese officials to travel to D.C. to meet their 
respective counterparts?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining and strengthening our 
rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. We must deepen our ties with Taiwan--a 
leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, as 
guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and 
the Six Assurances provided to Taipei. Consistent with the ``one 
China'' policy, I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is 
looking for opportunities for visits between Washington and Taipei that 
advance our unofficial relationship and enable substantive exchanges on 
issues of mutual concern.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to a regular and robust 
arms sales process with Taiwan that does not fluctuate in accordance 
with U.S.-China relations?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that the United States 
continues to maintain its commitment under the 1979 Taiwan Relations 
Act to maintain Taiwan's defensive capabilities.

    Question. Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister recently called Taiwan 
the ``red line'' of the Indo-Pacific region and expressed Japan's hope 
that President Biden would come to Taiwan's defense if the PRC attacks 
it. How would you work together with your counterpart in Tokyo to 
enhance Taiwan's defense and prevent PRC aggression against it?

    Answer. The United States and Japan share concerns over Chinese 
activities that are inconsistent with the international rules-based 
order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion, and 
we oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East 
China Sea. Given Taiwan's strategic location in the East China Sea, its 
security is closely linked to Japan's. If confirmed, I will work with 
Japan to promote peace and stability in the region, including in the 
Taiwan Strait, and help create an environment in which Taiwan and the 
PRC can reach a peaceful resolution of their differences, consistent 
with the wishes of the people of Taiwan.

    Question. Do you believe we should have a bilateral Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) with Taiwan? If confirmed, will you work with Secretary 
Blinken to urge USTR to prioritize the launch of trade talks with 
Taiwan?

    Answer. I support strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade 
relationship as part of a broader effort to strengthen the U.S. 
geostrategic position, diversify global supply chains, and benefit U.S. 
industry.

    Question. Mongolia sits between two authoritarian states, the PRC 
and Russia, both of which have taken aggressive action against 
neighboring countries. Mongolia also plays an important role in Tibetan 
Buddhism. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthen U.S. relations 
with Mongolia and shore up its sovereignty if it comes under pressure 
from its revisionist neighbors? If President Biden follows through with 
his campaign promise to assembly a summit of democracies, will you 
ensure that Mongolia is invited to participate?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with my counterparts in 
Ulaanbaatar and will also push back against the attacks of the Chinese 
Government on Mongolian language and culture, as well as Tibetan 
Buddhism. I understand planning for the Summit for Democracy remains in 
the early stages, and the invitation list is yet to be determined. I 
understand participating countries will be expected to deliver on both 
domestic and international commitments that advance democracy, fight 
corruption, and protect human rights.

    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure the 
U.S. promotes free speech in Russia, including by protecting the 
remaining outlets that count as free and independent press in Russia?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by Russia's intensifying crackdown on 
freedom of expression, including for members of the media. A prime 
example of the Russian Government's campaign against independent media 
is the use of its ``foreign agent'' law to harass and inhibit the work 
of USAGM-funded entities in Russia. Another example is the Russian 
Government's targeting for repression of those who are seeking 
transparency and accountability from their government. Russia's recent 
legislative changes further restrict the freedom of expression for 
members of the media, the political opposition, and civil society. If 
confirmed, I will press the Russian Government to end its repression of 
independent media, raise the plight of embattled journalists and 
outlets in multilateral fora, call out the climate of impunity for 
violent attacks against journalists, and defend freedom of expression 
in Russia.

    Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions, 
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the 
Kremlin's most malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These 
sanctions are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy 
Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security 
Clarification Act (PEESCA). Will you commit, if confirmed, to using 
your position to ensure full implementation of the law including 
sanctions to prevent the completion of Nord Stream 2? Do you believe 
this is in the interest of the security of the United States and our 
allies and partners?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to stop the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline from being completed. I understand that the 
Department continues to examine entities involved in potentially 
sanctionable activity, is considering designations, and has made it 
clear that companies risk sanctions if they are involved in the 
project.

    Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter 
and supporter of terrorism?

    Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its 
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces, 
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. If 
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's continuing 
commitment to counter any Iranian threat to U.S. personnel and 
interests, and will respond to any such threat using all appropriate 
means.

    Question. The Biden administration is making clear its intention to 
return to the fundamentally flawed JCPOA. Do you support the lifting of 
sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions, against Iran in an 
effort to return to the JCPOA?

    Answer. The framework of U.S. sanctions remains robust, and there 
are many aspects of our sanctions architecture that would remain in 
place even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. I understand 
that the Biden-Harris administration intends to continue to use its 
considerable leverage--including sanctions that would remain in place, 
the threat of sanctions re-imposition, and other joint action with our 
allies and partners--to protect U.S. interests. In the meantime, I 
understand the administration's intention is to maintain and 
potentially impose new sanctions on Iranian entities providing 
financial and material support to designated terrorist groups in the 
region. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely with 
Congress on the path forward.

    Question. Secretary Blinken in his confirmation hearing was asked 
if it was in America's national security interests to lift terrorism 
sanctions against Iran, including sanctions on the IRGC, Central Bank 
of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company. He answered that it was 
not in America's interest to lift these sanctions and that he backed 
``the toughest possible sanctions to deal with Iranian support for 
terrorism.'' Do you agree with Secretary Blinken?

    Answer. Yes, I agree with Secretary Blinken. The U.S. Government 
maintains a range of tools to combat Iran's support for terrorism, and 
if confirmed, I support continuing to use these tools to counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities.

    Question. Do you acknowledge that there are gaps in the JCPOA that 
must be addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear 
weapon?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris 
administration's unshakable commitment to preventing Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon. The administration's intention is to build 
on the JCPOA with respect to its constraints on and transparency into 
Iran's nuclear program and to address other issues of concern.

    Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be 
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?

    Answer. Yes. A bipartisan approach to Iran is the strongest way to 
safeguard U.S. interests for the long term.

    Question. Do you believe that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?

    Answer. Yes. Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and 
facilitates a wide range of terrorist activity. Iran's support for 
terrorism threatens U.S. forces, diplomatic personnel, and our partners 
in the region and elsewhere. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance 
with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and as a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.

    Question. Do you believe that a credible option to use military 
force is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from 
obtaining nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?

    Answer. Yes.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. As you know, I am the Co-Chair of the Ukraine Caucus 
along with Senator Dick Durbin. I am very concerned with the recent 
buildup of Russian forces on the eastern border of Ukraine and on the 
Crimean Peninsula as well as the recent rise in attacks on the Line of 
Contact that has resulted in the death of over 20 brave Ukrainian 
soldiers. Russia's diplomatic, information, military, and economic 
aggression throughout Eastern Europe is a stark reminder of the danger 
revisionist powers pose to the free world. Recent escalations and 
displays of military strength in the Arctic, the basing of Russian 
troops in Belarus, and the constant drumbeat of misinformation threaten 
America's national security. Russia's actions constitute a very 
different vision, where international relations are singularly focused 
on Russian interests, where its neighbors play a subservient role to 
Putin's wishes and desires. These actions by Russia are regressive and 
incompatible with the aspirations of freedom loving people everywhere. 
Senator Durbin and I recently led a letter with our fellow members of 
the Caucus to President Biden expressing our appreciation for his 
support to Ukraine and encouraging him to provide critical material 
support in the near and long term to help Ukraine protect from this 
unwarranted, unprovoked aggression. Over the past 7 years, we have made 
great strides in our support of Ukraine. I personally feel this is 
important because not only does this serve as a direct check against 
the Russians, but also sends a strong signal to our European allies 
that we will stand and support those nations that seek freedom and 
democracy. We have done a great deal in Congress, to include:

   Over $1.6 billion in military aid through the Ukraine Security 
        Assistance Initiative Fund and over $3 billion in aid overall.

   Provided Island Class patrol boats and anti-ship missiles to defend 
        their coast

   Lethal and non-lethal assistance to include medical support for 
        wounded Ukrainian soldiers.

   In this recent NDAA, one of my initiatives was included to have a 
        Department of State and Defense report to identify capability 
        gaps in the Ukrainian military and develop a strategy to 
        address the shortfalls.

    Can I get your commitment to work with me and my Senate Colleagues 
to find ways to continue our support for Ukraine and other eastern 
European countries as they work to become democratic countries aligned 
with our Western ideals?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and 
economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's democratic institutions and 
lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians. I will bring the same 
commitment to reform to relations with other eastern European 
countries, such as Moldova.

    Question. Last year, Ukraine received Enhanced Opportunity Partner 
status from NATO. Ukraine has also been working hard to make much 
needed military organization and security sector reforms to meet NATO 
standards. From your perspective, do you see pathway to NATO membership 
for Ukraine, and how would that impact the security environment in 
Eastern Europe?

    Answer. NATO's Open Door Policy has long served to promote 
democratic values and common security across Europe, and that door 
should remain open to Ukraine. In the 2008 Bucharest Summit 
Declaration, Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO 
members, and in 2019 Ukraine was granted Enhanced Opportunities Partner 
status. Ukraine is now working to implement its Annual National Program 
(ANP), which is NATO's primary tool for guiding aspirants' reforms 
towards Euro-Atlantic standards. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's 
chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of 
law, economic, and security sector reforms.

    Question. Since 2014 Congress has made very strong statements in 
regards to sanctioning Russia for their invasion of Crimea and backing 
separatists in the Donbas. While I am supportive of diplomatic efforts 
to solve the Donbas issue through the Minsk Process, I do not want to 
do so at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty or acknowledging the Russian 
annexation of Crimea as legitimate-which of course, it is not. What are 
your thoughts on how to best support the peace process and what do you 
see as a viable way ahead to solve this very complex issue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's 
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic 
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia 
should remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and 
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk 
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our 
Allies and partners, seek opportunities to use U.S. leverage to see 
Minsk implemented.

    Question. Regarding Crimea, do you share my views on the 
illegitimacy of the Russian claims on what is Ukrainian land? Do you 
anticipate keeping the sanctions in place?

    Answer. Let me be perfectly clear: Crimea is Ukraine. If confirmed, 
I will continue to oppose vigorously Russia's occupation and attempted 
annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia must remain in place until 
Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine. 
Successive administrations have been clear that the United States will 
never recognize Russia's attempted annexation. Russia must end its 
occupation of Crimea and return the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine.

    Question. Combatting corruption has been a central tenant of the 
Ukrainian Government after the Revolution of Dignity. In opinion polls 
of the Ukrainian public, respondents consistently rank corruption as 
top concern along with Russia. However, after the March 2020 government 
reshuffling, the future of anti-corruption measures have been 
uncertain. How can the United States utilize the tools of the State 
Department and interagency to assist Ukraine in tackling corruption?

    Answer. I am committed to strengthening our bilateral relationship 
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will pursue tight interagency 
coordination to support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including 
by pushing for progress on rule of law, corruption and economic reforms 
that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter future 
for all Ukrainians. If confirmed, I will continue working with Ukraine 
to hold accountable those who stand in the way of reforms or try to 
undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Advancing reforms, particularly anticorruption efforts, is just as 
important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.

    Question.  Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over 
the last 4 years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through 
our efforts have gotten increased funding and personnel for the Center. 
Senator Murphy and I recently sent a letter to Secretary Blinken asking 
that he increase the funding for the GEC to at least $138 million. The 
GEC budget was flatlined last year at $60 million and I am concerned 
that the Department will not request robust funding this year. I hope 
that when you are confirmed you will see the value of the GEC and fund 
it properly to accomplish its critical mission of pushing back against 
Russian and Chinese disinformation. We have done too much work on a 
bipartisan basis to allow the GEC to not reach its full potential. 
Secretary Blinken kept the former director Lea Gabrielle on for a 
month, and I really appreciated that. Now there has been a gap in 
leadership at the GEC and I hope that when confirmed you will work the 
Secretary to bring on a new director quickly. I feel that the 
disinformation efforts led by China, Russia, and Iran are a very 
dangerous threat to the freedom and democracy of our allies and we 
should do all we can to support and help them.

   Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and me to 
        continue strengthening the capabilities of the GEC as well as 
        increased funding?

    Answer. Yes, you have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you 
and your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the Global 
Engagement Center (GEC) and our full range of public diplomacy 
programs. The GEC's efforts are an important part of the work we must 
undertake with allies and partners to counter disinformation, define an 
affirmative and democratic global information space, and ultimately 
sustain an information environment in which audiences around the world 
can freely access, contribute to, make informed judgments about, and 
trust transparent and truthful communication.

    Question. Recently, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the 
Office of the Prosecutor could proceed with an illegitimate 
investigation into alleged crimes occurring in the West Bank, Gaza, and 
East Jerusalem. As you are aware, both the United States nor Israel are 
signatories to the Rome Statute, and the ICC is ignoring its mandate 
that stipulates it only initiate a case where there is the absence of a 
robust legal and justice system. Neither the United States nor Israel 
fit this criteria, yet the ICC has decided to proceed with this 
politically motivated investigation anyway. Senator Cardin and I wrote 
a letter to Secretary Blinken signed by over 30 Senators commending him 
on coming out against this statement by the ICC and encouraging him to 
do everything he can to push back against this effort. We have also 
authored language together that was included in the Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA) law of 2015, which leverages ongoing trade negotiations 
to discourage prospective U.S. trade partners from engaging in economic 
discrimination against Israel. Governments that call upon their own 
companies to participate in a political boycott of Israel run afoul of 
clear guidelines in the law.

   On the ICC issue and BDS in general--will you work with me and 
        Congress to push back against efforts to marginalize and 
        discriminate against Israel?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to push back 
against efforts to marginalize and discriminate against Israel, 
including the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign, which 
unfairly singles out Israel. While the Biden-Harris administration will 
respect First Amendment rights, I understand that it will not hesitate 
to voice disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to 
delegitimize Israel on the world stage. If confirmed, I will also 
support the administration's continued objection to the International 
Criminal Court's efforts to assert jurisdiction over Israeli personnel.

    Question.  For the last six years, I was the Chairman of the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. During that time, I worked in 
a bipartisan way to uncover the ways China exerts its influence here in 
the United States. We held several hearings issued bipartisan reports 
that documented how China stifles speech and academic freedom on 
college campus through its Confucius Institutes, and how it uses talent 
recruitment programs (like the Thousand Talents Plan) to steal our 
taxpayer funded research and Intellectual Property. Based on those 
findings, we proposed legislative fixes to these issues and I look 
forward to working with you on them. Last Congress, I introduced the 
Safeguarding American Innovation Act alongside Senator Carper and group 
of 19 bipartisan senators (including Chairman Risch) to combat the 
theft of American taxpayer funded research and intellectual property. 
Recently, both FBI Director Wray and Attorney General Barr have spoken 
about this threat, with the FBI opening a new China-related 
investigation every 10 hours with around 2,500 open counterintelligence 
investigations across the country. This legislation is designed to get 
the federal government's house in order to respond to the threat of 
China's talent recruitment programs. It also ensures that individuals 
are held accountable for failing to disclose their foreign ties on 
federal grant applications. Reforms the State Department's vetting 
process for issuing visas to foreign researchers, and requires more 
safeguards on sensitive research from our research institutions. One 
particular section of the legislation would grant the State Department 
a new authority to deny visas to individuals we know are coming to the 
United States to steal our research and IP through loopholes in our 
export control laws. This an authority that career attorneys at the 
Department have requested across multiple administrations. And we 
worked closely with those same career attorneys at the State Department 
to craft the language in our legislation, including with safeguards to 
ensure that the new authority is not abused.

   Do you agree that government sponsored theft of US intellectual 
        property and technology by the CCP is a serious problem that 
        needs to be addressed?

    Answer. Yes. Theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) from sources 
within China, including state sponsored entities, spans the entire 
spectrum of IP, and costs U.S. companies hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners 
and allies to ensure we are taking the most effective steps to combat 
all forms of IP theft from the PRC.

    Question.  I understand that as of last week the administration has 
entered indirect negotiations with Iran to discuss a return to the 2015 
JCPOA. Last month I signed a letter with the other GOP ranking members 
of national security committees outlining our shared vision for a 
return to new negotiations. While I understand the need to prioritize 
the nuclear aspect of the Iranian threat to the region, Iran's support 
for terror proxies must be addressed in these negotiations. Their 
support for Hezbollah, Shia-backed militias in Iraq, and the Houthi 
rebels in Yemen are destabilizing the region with innocent civilians 
paying the highest price. As we witnessed with the previous JCPOA, the 
money earned through sanctions relief went not to the Iranian people 
but directly to support terrorism beyond Iran's borders.

   What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian backed proxy 
        networks, and how will you balance that assessment with the 
        need to contain Iran's nuclear program and their conventional 
        ballistic missile program?

    Answer. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, 
as well as its support for violent proxies and groups across the 
region, pose a threat to international security, and remain significant 
challenges. If confirmed, I commit to work on all aspects of the Iran 
threat, including its nuclear program, its missile program, and its 
support for extremist groups across the region.

    Question.  The Abraham Accords were an historic achievement that 
will lead to a new era of peace and prosperity between Israel and its 
neighbors. Last month, I introduced legislation with Senator's Booker, 
Cardin, Young, Risch, and Kaine that would strengthen and expand these 
normalization agreements. This legislation requires the Department of 
State to develop a comprehensive strategy to expand these agreements, 
as well as require the State to report on Arab countries anti-
normalization laws which punish community and people to people 
engagement with Israelis

   Do I have your commitment to expand and strengthen the Abraham 
        Accords while using all tools at your disposal to push back on 
        the barriers that still prevent the normalization of Israel in 
        the region?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to urge other countries to 
normalize relations with Israel and support other opportunities to 
expand cooperation among countries in the region.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Todd Young

    Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take or oversee to 
enhance the level of our diplomacy in Afghanistan and to help ensure 
that basic human rights--such as the ability of girls to go to school--
are preserved?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the U.S. stays actively 
engaged in supporting the peace process, economic development, and 
promoting human rights, women's rights, and girls' education in 
Afghanistan, consistent with U.S. policy and values. The results of 
U.S. investment in the social and economic development of Afghanistan 
over the past 20 years have been significant, particularly with regards 
to access to education. In 2001, fewer than 900,000 children--almost 
all boys--were in school. Today, more than 9.2 million children--40 
percent of them girls--are in school. Through robust diplomacy and 
coordinated assistance, I will work to see these gains further advanced 
and strengthened.

    Question. Pakistan, India, and Iran have different views on what 
the future of Afghanistan should look like. How should the U.S. engage 
with those in the region on the path forward for Afghanistan?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to put the full weight of our 
government behind diplomatic efforts to reach a peace agreement between 
the Afghan Government and the Taliban. All of Afghanistan's neighbors 
share an interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that can serve 
as an effective partner in combating terrorism, criminal networks, and 
narcotics trafficking. I would welcome diplomatic efforts by all 
countries to encourage the negotiating parties to accelerate the peace 
process though meaningful negotiations. I would also welcome the U.N. 
playing a constructive role as a convener and facilitator of 
discussions. Additionally, I recognize that peace, regional 
connectivity, and economic growth and development are mutually 
supportive and indispensable to each other. If confirmed, I will 
encourage regional and international partners to commit to greater 
cooperation with Afghanistan in support of regional security and 
economic growth.

    Question. India has moved closer to the United States and the Quad 
in recent years and away from their traditional ``non-alignment 
posture.'' They have adopted something they've termed ``strategic 
autonomy.'' This is clearly a nuanced shift but a shift nonetheless. As 
the only Quad member that shares a land border with China, and as a 
place where fighting between China and India has occurred, they are 
undoubtedly an important partner. How will you help the U.S. to pursue 
closer relations with India?

    Answer. The United States and India share a comprehensive global 
strategic partnership. The recent Quad leaders' summit marked a new 
milestone for our collaboration to address a range of security, 
economic and governance challenges across the Indo-Pacific. Our two 
nations also enjoy a robust defense and security partnership as 
evidenced by Defense Secretary Austin's recent visit. If confirmed, I 
will strive to work with my Indian counterparts to further strengthen 
our partnership, including our defense and economic cooperation, COVID-
19 response, and climate change.

    Question. On February 11th Secretary Blinken revoked the Foreign 
Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
designations of the Houthis, while retaining the designations of five 
Houthi individuals as Specially Designated Nationals. I supported this 
call because of what that designation would have meant for the 
humanitarian situation on the ground as it would have likely led to a 
famine and further devastated those on the ground. However, despite 
these steps, fighting in Yemen has intensified, and Houthi forces have 
been emboldened and have advanced on the city of Marib, the last 
northern city controlled by the internationally-recognized Republic of 
Yemen Government. I am glad to have a trusted hand with Tim Lenderking 
serving as Special Envoy but the situation seems increasingly grim. 
Should the United States do more to counter Iranian weapons smuggling 
to the Houthis and protect Saudi territory from Houthi missile strikes? 
If so, how?

    Answer. I understand that the Department has been working closely 
with interagency partners to disrupt the Iranian threat network and the 
smuggling that occurs over land and via sea routes. It is also 
essential that the U.S. continues to support the Republic of Yemen 
Government (ROYG) Coast Guard and Border Guard with non-lethal training 
so they can police their own borders. The Export Control and Related 
Border Security program builds the capacity of the ROYG to interdict 
the illicit transfers of arms and mitigate Iran's malign influence. If 
confirmed, I would support continued work with Saudi Arabia to bolster 
its defenses against various Houthi capabilities. These efforts will 
prevent the Houthis from gaining access to further advanced 
capabilities, and also encourage all parties to reach a ceasefire 
agreement and subsequently end the war.

    Question. What potential incentives can the international community 
provide the warring parties to reach an immediate cease-fire?

    Answer. A ceasefire is just one step in an overall peace process. 
For a ceasefire to be durable, the warring parties must believe it is 
in their interest. Toward that end, internationally facilitated 
incentives should include: a roadmap to an inclusive resolution of the 
conflict that addresses political grievances, accountability for human 
rights violations, future reconstruction assistance, and the removal of 
economic restrictions in support of engagement in negotiations. I 
understand that Special Envoy Lenderking continues to work in support 
of U.N. Special Envoy Griffiths' efforts and with the Republic of Yemen 
Government and Saudi Arabia, with the support of the Sultanate of Oman, 
and with our European partners, to align these incentives and bring 
about an end to the conflict. However, I also understand that the 
Houthis appear intent on continuing their offensive on the city Marib 
and have been resistant to negotiating the terms of a durable 
ceasefire. We need more pressure from the international community, to 
include the U.N., our European partners, and Oman, to encourage the 
Houthis to engage constructively with the U.N. and other parties if we 
hope to end the conflict. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting 
those efforts.

    Question. How can the United States influence local actors to 
create an agreed-upon political framework that maintains national unity 
while addressing regional concerns?

    Answer. The United States must remain committed to a unified, 
stable Yemen that contributes to wider regional security and economic 
cooperation. As the conflict continues, the country becomes 
increasingly fragmented, and local stakeholders will expect to maintain 
their new-found autonomy in a post-conflict setting. The buy-in of 
these local stakeholders will be critical for any future political 
settlement, and ultimately the long-term stability of Yemen. The future 
of the Yemeni state is for Yemenis to determine. I understand that 
Special Envoy Lenderking is working in lockstep with U.N. Special Envoy 
Griffiths to achieve a ceasefire so we can transition to an intra-
Yemeni political process that is representative and can be sustained 
over the long-term.

    Question. There have been reports regarding the appointment of a 
special envoy for Nord Stream 2. Presumably, such a position would 
coordinate with U.S. partners and allies the imposition of additional, 
mandatory sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required under 
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting 
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). It would not be, 
in my view, to negotiate a deal that allows the Russian pipeline to be 
completed. If confirmed, would you support the appointment of a special 
envoy to ensure full implementation of U.S. sanctions laws and make 
sure Nord Stream 2 is never finished?

    Answer. Should the U.S. decide to appoint a Special Envoy for Nord 
Stream 2, I believe that person's task should be to coordinate and 
advance increased U.S. pressure consistent with U.S. law to stop the 
pipeline before it is finished, and to work with European allies toward 
the same goal.

    Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions, 
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the 
Kremlin's malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These sanctions 
are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security 
Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification 
Act (PEESCA). In your view, why did the Biden administration fail to 
sanction Nord Stream 2?

    Answer. Without being inside the Biden-Harris administration, I 
can't speak to why certain decisions were or were not made. I 
understand that the Department continues to actively examine entities 
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate 
additional persons as appropriate. If confirmed, I commit to use all 
available tools to try to stop the pipeline before it is completed.

    Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the administration 
to implement U.S. sanctions laws on the Kremlin's Nord Stream 2 
pipeline?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to use all available tools, 
including bipartisan legislation passed in the NDAA, to try to stop the 
pipeline before it is completed, and to engage with key European 
partners and allies to seek their support in that goal.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a 
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had 
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration 
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22, 
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit 
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the 
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against 
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?

    Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that 
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing 
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment, 
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through 
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or 
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience 
and must be met with serious consequences.

    Question. What role do you see for the State Department in 
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights 
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?

    Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and 
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, 
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I 
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners 
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these 
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden 
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered 
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools, 
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to 
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability 
for those responsible and justice for victims.

    Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional 
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader 
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration 
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish 
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That 
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration 
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334, 
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan 
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish 
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out 
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by 
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing 
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by 
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and 
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli 
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that 
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?

    Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights, 
Israel's security must remain paramount. As long as Bashar al-Assad is 
in control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part 
with the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides 
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over 
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?

    Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time, 
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and 
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem 
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to 
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of 
any part of Jerusalem?

    Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time, 
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and 
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem 
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to 
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of 
the Old City of Jerusalem?

    Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time, 
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and 
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem 
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to 
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.

    Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three 
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden 
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those 
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public 
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have 
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' 
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large 
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group. 
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the 
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was 
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in 
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid, 
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by 
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Yemen.

    Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training, 
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting 
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi 
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping through the Bab Al 
Mandeb. Further, the Houthis use this support to threaten Yemeni 
civilians, especially at this time in the city of Marib. The Houthis 
also impede humanitarian access in the areas they control. If 
confirmed, I am committed to working with our interagency partners to 
counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and with our partners on the 
ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision of 
critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.

    Question.  Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide 
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.

    Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring 
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already 
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. 
The Biden-Harris administration heeded concerns from the United 
Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among 
others, that the designations could have had a devastating impact on 
Yemenis' access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could 
increase the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the 
designations and the revocations limited the impact the designations 
could have had on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports, 
including food and other essential supplies.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide 
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.

    Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring 
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already 
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. 
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of 
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The 
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food, 
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non 
food items, such as blankets and water containers.

    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that 
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified 
information in notifications provided by the State Department to 
Congress? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.

    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for 
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics 
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the 
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden 
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with 
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your 
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.

    Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to 
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or 
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will be vocal about 
Iran's human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary or 
unlawful detention of numerous individuals, some of whom have faced 
torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, 
and execution after unfair trials. If confirmed, I intend to work with 
my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to promote 
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and 
abuses.

    Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that 
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations 
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related 
concessions.

    Answer. I believe we can and must work to ensure Iran never obtains 
a nuclear weapon, at the same time we continue to pressure Iran 
regarding its gross human rights violations and abuses, and use all 
tools at our disposal to promote accountability for those responsible.

    Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions 
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?

    Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights, 
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful 
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and 
freedom of expression. I support continuing to maintain and impose 
sanctions on Iranian entities perpetrating human rights violations and 
abuse.

    Question. Russia and Germany appear to have assessed that the Biden 
administration will not respond forcefully to their effort to complete 
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Can you please describe your assessment of 
the damage to American national security and to the energy security of 
our European allies, if Nord Stream 2 was completed?

    Answer. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline deepens Europe's energy 
dependence on Russia, threatening European energy security and the 
security of Ukraine and Central and Eastern European NATO and EU 
countries, while dividing the continent. It enriches the Kremlin and 
President Putin's allies at a time when Russia is amassing forces in 
and around Ukraine and continuing its cyber and disinformation 
campaigns in the U.S. and globally, among other malign activities.

    Question. Could you please describe what steps you would take, if 
you're confirmed, to ensure that Nord Stream 2 is stopped?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with allies and 
partners, using all the tools at our disposal, including legislation 
you have authored, to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to 
ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that 
enhances rather than undermines its collective security.

    Question. There have been public reports that the State Department 
is considering the appointment of an envoy to specifically oversee the 
State Department's efforts around Nord Stream 2. Additional reports 
suggest that foreign diplomats have expressed hope that the envoy will 
work for a deal with the Russians or Germans to allow the pipeline to 
be completed, or at least serve as a short-term substitute for 
sanctions. The State Department should absolutely spare no effort or 
resource in blocking Nord Stream 2, and an envoy position would help 
mobilize action in that regard--but the envoy must be someone who 
ensures and oversees the immediate application of congressionally 
mandated sanctions and makes sure Nord Stream 2 is never completed. 
Appointing an envoy who negotiated terms for completing Nord Stream 2 
would be an absolutely unacceptable outcome. This envoy must not be a 
substitute for sanctions: it must be someone who immediately delivers 
them. Do you intend to seek the appointment of an envoy who would work 
on Nord Stream 2 specifically?

    Answer. I understand the Biden-Harris administration is considering 
appointing an envoy to work on Nord Stream 2 and other issues. 
Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could help give focus 
and energy to the interagency effort to stop the pipeline, and to 
diplomacy with key countries.

    Question. What responsibilities would such an envoy have?

    Answer. I have not been privy to any formal position description if 
it exists. If named, the envoy, I presume, would work inside the U.S. 
Government to accelerate and sharpen policy and sanctions options and 
diplomatically to stop the pipeline, using all available tools, 
including the legislation you authored.

    Question. What role do you envision such an envoy playing?

    Answer. Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could 
help give focus and energy to the interagency effort to stop the 
pipeline, and to diplomacy with key countries.

    Question. The administration regards rejoining the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or signing a successor agreement a 
top priority. The JCPOA was classified by the Obama administration as 
merely ``political commitments'' rather than an executive agreement or 
a treaty. In your hearing you noted the importance of securing 
``bipartisan support [for rejoining the JCPOA or singing a successor 
agreement] so an agreement is binding.'' Is it your understanding that 
any form of international agreement between the United States and 
foreign nations does not hold any legally binding commitment unless 
Congress ratifies the agreement as a treaty and passes legislation 
implementing those commitments?

    Answer. I share President Biden's conviction that a bipartisan 
approach to Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for 
the long term. The JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in 
2015. Numerous other important international arrangements have been 
done in this way. With respect to international agreements, the Supreme 
Court has long held that not all such agreements require approval as 
treaties pursuant to the procedures set out in Article II of the 
Constitution, and the Congress has recognized this through the 
enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes procedures 
regarding oversight of legally binding international agreements other 
than treaties.

    Question. Can you commit that, if the administration plans to 
rejoin the JCPOA or signs any successor agreement, such agreement will 
be submitted by the administration to Congress for ratification as a 
treaty?

    Answer. I understand that President Biden has pledged to work 
closely with Congress, and this includes briefing on any plans 
regarding his administration's future course of action on Iran. The 
JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in 2015. If 
confirmed, I will ensure the Department carefully considers the facts 
and circumstances of any U.S. return to the JCPOA to determine the 
implications under INARA and would also assess the appropriate form of 
any future agreement. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to 
ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.

    Question. The administration continues to emphasize working and 
coordinating with ``allies and partners,'' especially in the context of 
multilateral forums and in addressing major security challenges of our 
time such as the rise of authoritarian China and the threat of a 
nuclear Iran. In your view, do the alliances and partnerships of the 
United States with other nations always produce a net-positive benefit 
to U.S. foreign policy and homeland defense priorities?

    Answer. I believe that alliances and partnerships serve as a force-
multiplier for the United States in advancing its foreign policy and 
homeland defense priorities. While we must always maintain our 
prerogative to operate unilaterally if it is in our national interest, 
working with allies and partners to address shared challenges often 
achieves the best outcomes for the United States. Some of the most 
significant threats we face today--from the COVID-19 pandemic to 
climate change--cannot be solved by one country alone. Our ability to 
shape the behaviors of China, Iran, or others with whom we have serious 
concerns will only be strengthened with likeminded partners by our 
side.

    Question.  In situations where our allies and partners take a 
differing or less stringent approach to a major foreign policy or 
homeland defense priority, in your view is it appropriate for the 
United States to exercise unilateral leadership? In your response, 
please address the example of differing postures toward China between 
the United States and the European Union.

    Answer. The United States should work with its Allies and partners 
whenever it can but should always reserve the right to act unilaterally 
if and when necessary. While European views on China have evolved, the 
U.S. remains more cautious about the challenges and threats China poses 
to our security, economic interests and global norms and standards. If 
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to discuss China with Europeans 
both at NATO and in the U.S.-EU China Dialogue to align positions more 
closely.

    Question. Do you believe burden sharing in both monetary costs and 
international commitments between the U.S. and our allies and partners 
must be addressed before re-engaging or forming new multilateral 
treaties or forums?

    Answer. I believe in appropriate burden-sharing with allies and 
partners in all shared endeavors and international commitments. The 
U.S. should have full knowledge of the monetary and other consequences 
before entering into any international commitments, whether through a 
treaty or other means. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to 
ensure that the implications of any such commitments are well 
understood by both branches of the Government.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. Do you agree with the State Department's determination 
that CCP-controlled China is committing genocide and crimes against 
humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang? Secretary of State 
Antony Blinken has sustained former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's 
determination that CCP-controlled China is engaging in genocide and 
crimes against humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have stated the 
evidence--including from satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony, 
as well as the Chinese Government's own documents--is overwhelming. 
China's extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on 
religious freedoms, the used of forced labor, mass detention in 
internment camps, forced sterilization, and the destruction of Uyghur 
heritage.

    Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that 
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing 
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment, 
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through 
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or 
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience 
and must be met with serious consequences.

    Question. In your view, should U.S.-based corporations remain 
silent on the issue of genocide and crimes against humanity in CCP-
controlled China?

    Answer. No. Uyghurs have suffered unspeakable oppression at the 
hands of China's authoritarian government. The People's Republic of 
China is engaged in gross human rights violations that shock the 
conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The United States 
must speak out consistently and jointly with allies and partners, 
impose costs and sanctions on those responsible, and help those 
persecuted find safe haven in the United States and other countries. I 
have been heartened by bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and, 
if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on this crucial 
issue.

    Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support the State 
Department's efforts to compel U.S.-based corporations that conduct 
substantial business in China to pitch in to immediately stop genocide 
and crimes against humanity in CCP-controlled China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts by the U.S. 
Department of State, along with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to 
entities that engage in human rights abuses, including forced labor, in 
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) and elsewhere in 
China. I will also support sanctions imposed on people and 
organizations complicit in genocide and crimes against humanity against 
Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, in Xinjiang. I am heartened by 
bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and, if confirmed, I look 
forward to working with Congress on this crucial issue.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
           Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. How will the State Department invest more resources into 
protecting fundamental human rights? How will the State Department help 
protect civic space around the world to ensure local human rights 
activists, peacebuilders, and humanitarians, particularly women and 
youth, have the space and resources to prevent violence and promote 
sustainable peace?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to consult closely with Department, 
interagency, and Congressional colleagues to ensure we have systems in 
place that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I 
will also work with bureaus and offices that administer democracy 
programs to capitalize on emerging opportunities, including by pivoting 
quickly to support programs tailored for these situations. In all 
cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower democratic reformers 
and activists on the ground. In addition, I intend to work bilaterally 
and multilaterally with U.S. allies and partners to increase mutually 
reinforcing efforts and burden-sharing in these areas.

    Question. How will you increase support for members of civil 
society that champion the full inclusion of disabled persons and 
expansion of disability rights?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support timely appointment of a Senior 
Advisor or Special Envoy for International Disability Rights and 
prioritize disability-inclusive programming that recognizes persons 
with disabilities among the beneficiaries, supports projects to address 
gaps in their inclusion, and bolsters the work done by civil society to 
advance the rights of disabled persons. I also will support the full 
inclusion of persons with disabilities through Department of State 
training, data collection, programming, and communication about 
disability rights. An empowered and knowledgeable workforce can best 
support members of civil society championing the full inclusion of 
disabled persons and expansion of disability rights.

    Question. How will the Biden administration right-size and 
rebalance what many experts believe are over-militarized interventions 
to address violent extremism? What steps can you take in this role to 
restore a more balanced approach to prevention and countering violent 
extremism?

    Answer. Military forces and kinetic tools have played an important 
role in U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts, but it is 
clear that balanced, sustainable, whole-of-government and whole-of-
society approaches are needed to sustainably defeat terrorism and 
prevent terrorist radicalization and recruitment. If confirmed, I will 
promote civilian-led counterterrorism approaches that address 
underlying grievances that fuel violent extremism and reduce the need 
for military interventions. I will also work to ensure that U.S. 
countering violent extremism (CVE) programs--especially prevention 
work--are prioritized and adequately resourced, and that all U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts advance the rule of law and respect for human 
rights.

    Question. The J Under Secretary and the bureaus he or she oversees 
can find themselves disadvantaged when working with the regional 
bureaus during the policy-making process. Do you agree that this is a 
challenge and, if so, how would you empower the bureaus under you?

    Answer. I agree that siloing between regional and functional 
bureaus is a long-standing challenge for State Department policymaking. 
If confirmed, I would leverage my 27-plus years of service in four 
regional and three functional bureaus to elevate and achieve better 
integration of J family issues in the full spectrum of U.S. 
policymaking, including through improved coordination within the State 
Department, the interagency, and with the 270-plus U.S. diplomatic 
missions worldwide. I would elevate the voice and expertise of J family 
bureaus and office by taking a burden-sharing approach with regional 
and other functional bureaus on addressing challenges that know no 
borders--from corruption and narcotics to rising autocracy and 
extremism worldwide.

    Question. What steps would you take to attract more individuals - 
particularly from the Foreign Service - to work in the J family 
bureaus?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will create an inclusive environment that 
is welcoming to all employees--both foreign and civil service--and of 
all races, ethnicities, and backgrounds, because diverse teams make 
strong teams. I will work collaboratively with the new Chief Diversity 
and Inclusion Officer and the Bureau of Global Talent Management to 
ensure that J family bureaus and offices are appropriately staffed and 
attractive to all applicants. I also will focus on retention and 
advancing a more meaningful professional development and advancement 
path for all J family team members. This includes increasing training 
opportunities for all and advocacy for J family Foreign Service 
Officers in the DCM and Chief of Mission selection processes.

    Question. Given President Biden and Secretary Blinken's strong 
emphasis on re-centering human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign 
policy, do you believe any changes should be made to the Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor bureau to ensure that it can effectively play a 
much larger role in U.S. foreign policy than it has in the past?

    Answer. Democracy and human rights are under increasing threat 
globally from democratic backsliding and growing authoritarianism. 
Responding effectively to these challenges requires more than any one 
bureau or agency acting alone; it requires a whole-of-government 
approach. If confirmed, I intend to empower the Bureau of Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor while also working with partners across the 
Department, other U.S. agencies, and Congress to bolster democratic 
resilience and promote, protect, and defend human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.

    Question. How do you think the U.S. arms transfer process should 
change to better incorporate human rights and civilian harm concerns, 
and what changes would you advocate for as Under Secretary?

    Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have said human rights 
must be at the center of our foreign policy, including arms transfers 
and other security assistance. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 
human rights remains key to reviews of potential Foreign Military Sales 
and State Department-licensed Direct Commercial Sales. If confirmed, I 
will encourage the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's 
continued participation in arms transfer deliberations. I understand 
the administration has been clear that the United States will insist on 
adherence to agreements on the use of U.S.-origin defense equipment, 
compliance with international law, including the law of armed conflict, 
and respect for human rights, and it will consider appropriate 
consequences when violations occur.

    Question. Do you agree that the U.S. Government should refrain from 
exporting arms to fragile states or countries at risk of atrocities?

    Answer. I understand that, consistent with the Conventional Arms 
Transfer (CAT) Policy, all arms transfers are subject to comprehensive 
case-by-case considerations of U.S. interests - including any risk the 
transfer may contribute to human rights abuses, including acts of 
gender-based violence, violence against children, violations of 
international law, including the law of armed conflict, terrorism, mass 
atrocities, or transnational organized crime. If confirmed, I will work 
to ensure human rights remains a key focus of CAT policy documents and 
discussions, and I will promote measures for the mitigation of harm to 
civilians.

    Question. What specific actions will the State Department take 
under your direction to reassert U.S. peacebuilding and humanitarian 
leadership and intervention in Syria?

    Answer. I fully expect the United States will continue to be a 
leader in the Syria humanitarian response. On March 29, Secretary 
Blinken called on the UN Security Council to reauthorize all three 
international border crossings for humanitarian assistance. If 
confirmed, I will support efforts to increase multilateral diplomatic 
engagement at the Security Council and will be in close consultations 
with our allies, in addition to Russia and China, at the UN to find a 
formula that keeps humanitarian aid flowing. I understand the 
administration supports the UN-facilitated, Syrian-led process laid out 
within the parameters of UNSCR 2254. If confirmed, I will use a variety 
of tools to push for a sustainable end to the conflict to end the 
Syrian people's suffering and to bring stability, accountability, and 
security to the Syrian people.

    Question. How specifically will the United States ensure continued 
principled humanitarian access into and within Syria?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with partners across the U.S. 
Government to use a range of tools, including diplomacy, advocacy, 
multilateral and bilateral engagement with other donors, information-
sharing, and financial support, to promote the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to those most in need across Syria, whether in areas 
controlled by the Syrian Government or elsewhere. If confirmed, I 
intend to do everything I can to realize Secretary Blinken's call to 
the UN Security Council on March 29 to reauthorize all three border 
crossings for humanitarian assistance and to urge the international 
community to allow humanitarian agencies to use the safest, quickest 
pathway to reach civilians in need.

    Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all 
but one of the special coordinators for Tibetan issues have been an 
individual who served as Undersecretary for Civilian Security, 
Democracy and Human Rights. If you are designated as the US Special 
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, will you commit to promoting 
substantive dialogue without pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and 
the Chinese Government that leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet, 
as mandated by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for 
Tibetan Issues, I will work intensively with U.S. allies and partners 
to press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or 
his representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful 
autonomy for Tibetans.

    Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to 
face significant challenges following last fall's attack by Azerbaijan. 
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has provided 
some funding to address this humanitarian situation, but I believe a 
lot more needs to be done. If confirmed, what will be your plan of 
action for providing needed assistance to Armenians from Nagorno-
Karabakh, including those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and 
long term?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure continued support to address 
the humanitarian situation of persons displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. I understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration closely monitors and assesses the situation on the ground 
with the support of relevant embassies and humanitarian organizations. 
I understand the administration is deeply committed to working on 
lasting solutions for all those displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, including persons now in Armenia. If confirmed, I will 
support the administration's efforts to seek short-term and long-term 
solutions to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.

    Question. What do you view as PRM's role in responding to the 
situation versus the role of other U.S. Government agencies and 
offices, such as USAID?

    Answer. Pursuant to the legislative authorities of each, I 
understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has 
lead responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance, protection, 
and solutions for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in situations of 
vulnerability, and stateless persons, while USAID's Bureau of 
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) leads in response to natural and man-made 
disasters, for internally displaced persons, and providing emergency 
food assistance to refugees. If confirmed, I intend to ensure 
complementary efforts that utilize the strengths of the humanitarian 
expertise of both PRM at State and USAID/BHA.

    Question. The United States continues to suffer the devastating 
impact of our nation's opioid epidemic, with over 90,000 deaths in 
2020, a large portion of which are caused by fentanyl overdoses. China 
continues to be the largest source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl 
precursors. How will you prioritize combatting the illicit fentanyl 
trade and what diplomatic tools will you use to ensure that countries 
around the world, including China, take steps to place greater controls 
on fentanyl and fentanyl precursors?

    Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) manufacture the 
vast majority of the illicit fentanyl driving the opioid crisis using 
People's Republic of China (PRC)-sourced chemicals, and traffic the 
fentanyl into the United States via the southwest border. If confirmed, 
I intend to continue and strengthen the Department's diplomatic efforts 
to press the PRC to better regulate its chemical industry to prevent 
chemical diversion, including through targeted engagement on this issue 
in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. I also intend to continue 
efforts to work with Mexico to bring justice to TCOs that contribute to 
the deaths of thousands of Americans Mexicans each year.

    Question. Last year, a United Nations fact-finding mission cited 
evidence of a systematic campaign of extrajudicial killings, forced 
disappearances, and torture in Venezuela since 2014. According to the 
report, the Maduro regime's human rights abuses and torture constitute 
crimes against humanity. How will you use the tools available to you, 
including oversight for the various bureaus that have equities in this 
issue, to ensure accountability for and prevent further crimes against 
humanity in Venezuela?

    Answer. Human rights conditions in Venezuela are horrendous. I 
understand the United States is committed to supporting justice and 
accountability measures and programs with our allies and partners that 
strengthen democratic institutions, transparency, rule of law, 
inclusion, economic empowerment, and access to information. The United 
States has employed sanctions and imposed visa restrictions on 
Venezuelan officials and their family members believed to be 
responsible for undermining democratic governance, perpetrating human 
rights abuses, or engaging in corrupt practices. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support efforts to hold the Maduro regime accountable.

    Question. How will you support efforts to mobilize international 
attention to this issue?

    Answer. The Department should continue to regularly engage the 
international community to raise awareness of human rights violations 
and abuses in Venezuela and to urge allies and partners to condemn the 
Maduro regime's human rights record, hold human rights abusers 
accountable, and call for the peaceful return to democracy and the rule 
of law. The Department should continue to encourage international 
bodies, in accordance with their respective mandates, to investigate 
crimes committed by the regime and its enablers. If confirmed, I will 
promote increased efforts to mobilize the international community to 
hold the Maduro regime accountable.

    Question. The European movement to ban ritual slaughter by 
mandating stunning prior to slaughter threatens the existence of 
religiously observant national Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe. 
Bans such as those passed in Belgium in 2018 and 2019 make no exception 
for religious purposes. Most recently, in December 2020, the European 
Court of Justice dismissed appeals by Jewish and Muslim groups, setting 
a precedent that may open the door to more such laws. This ruling and 
the laws it upholds are an infringement on religious freedom and 
endanger communities sustained by adherence to halal and kosher legal 
traditions. How will you work to encourage individual European 
countries to refrain from such legislation and support religious 
pluralism in Europe?

    Answer. Religious freedom extends to the observance and practice of 
religion or beliefs, including dietary regulations. Slaughter in 
accordance with religious beliefs is a fundamental practice for members 
of certain religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. If confirmed, 
I intend to work with the Governments of Belgium, other European 
countries, and elsewhere, as well as Jewish, Muslim, and other groups, 
to ensure laws, such as those intended to protect animal welfare, do 
not have an undue negative impact on religious freedom.

    Question. Atrocities are being perpetrated by armed actors 
throughout Ethiopia's Tigray region, including extra-judicial 
executions, sexual violence, forced displacement, and starvation 
crimes. Other Ethiopian communities outside of Tigray have also been 
the target of serious human rights abuses in recent months and years. 
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights are set to begin a joint investigation; 
however it is unclear what level of access and cooperation the 
organizations will be given to conduct their inquiry. How can the U.S. 
best ensure that there is accountability for atrocities and other grave 
human rights abuses across Ethiopia?

    Answer. I understand the United States will support the work of a 
joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 
and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a first 
step in the accountability process. I understand the Special Envoy for 
the Horn of Africa will monitor this process closely and work with 
international partners to press to ensure that the Ethiopian Government 
provides the promised access necessary for these investigations to 
proceed and respects their independence. If confirmed, I will work with 
international partners and organizations, including the UN and AU, to 
press for credible, independent, and transparent investigations into 
human rights violations and abuses. These investigations are critical 
for long-term transitional justice efforts, including criminal 
accountability, which are also necessary for reconciliation.

    Question. Samia Suluhu Hassan has recently assumed the Tanzanian 
presidency and there is considerable hope she will turn the page on the 
repressive policies of her predecessor, John Magufuli. However, it 
remains to be seen whether the new President will pursue a concrete 
package of much needed political reforms. How can the U.S. best 
encourage the new administration to urgently improve Tanzania's 
political climate?

    Answer. Although I am encouraged by President Hassan's first steps, 
including reinstating licenses for previously suspended media outlets, 
the new Tanzanian leadership is still in its early days and much 
remains to be seen. I understand the U.S. ambassador to Tanzania has 
already met with representatives of the new administration and has 
raised ongoing U.S. human rights concerns. If confirmed, I will support 
further engagement with the new Tanzanian Government at the highest 
levels, to both communicate our expectation of improvement on democracy 
and human rights markers and to explore how the United States can best 
support strengthening democratic institutions and preventing further 
democratic backsliding.

    Question. Sudan has made significant progress over the last year in 
moving its political transition forward. Yet deep challenges remain, 
including persistent violence in Darfur and the still shaky political 
arrangements between the civilian and military components of the 
transitional government. What action should the U.S. take to better 
support a civilian-led, democratic transition in Sudan?

    Answer. Sudan's civilian-led transitional government has made 
important progress in implementing economic and political reforms, 
improving human rights protections, and creating a pathway for ending 
conflict in Darfur and other areas in Sudan. However, more needs to be 
done to facilitate a transition to democracy as established under 
Sudan's Constitutional Declaration, to implement the Juba Peace 
Agreement, to establish peace accords with other armed groups, and to 
address the root causes of conflict. If confirmed, I will work with the 
Africa bureau, the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and J 
family bureaus and offices to develop comprehensive strategies to 
address these issues and support a peaceful democratic transition.

    Question. The United States has recently taken actions to address 
the insurgency in northern Mozambique including terrorist designations 
of ISIS-Mozambique and its leader, the deployment of a Special Forces 
training mission, and publicly-acknowledged consideration of an 
antiterrorism assistance program for the Mozambican police. These 
actions seem to suggest a security-focused approach to 
counterterrorism, but I believe that a successful counterterrorism 
strategy must appropriately balance diplomacy, development, and 
defense. If confirmed, will you pursue a ``3 D's'' approach to 
counterterrorism in Mozambique?

    Answer. Yes. A successful response to the threat from ISIS-
Mozambique must include more than a focus on security. If confirmed, I 
will support a strategy that focuses equally on development, diplomacy, 
and security, along with strategic communications, in coordination with 
regional partners and D-ISIS coalition members.

    Question. The interim government in Mali has announced that a 
referendum on a new constitution will take place on October 31 of this 
year, followed by general elections in February of 2022. What role 
should the U.S. play in helping ensure a restoration of democracy in 
Mali?

    Answer. I believe the United States should continue its support for 
regional efforts, including those by the Economic Community for West 
African States (ECOWAS), to broker a restoration of democracy in Mali. 
The ECOWAS-led effort to push for a civilian-led transition led to the 
establishment of a transitional government, the recent announcement of 
the constitutional referendum, and the scheduled series of elections. 
If confirmed, I will continue the United States' role of coordinating 
assistance and support with our African and other international 
partners to continue these positive developments.

    Question. What actions will you take if confirmed to support a 
civilian-led transition in Mali?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the ECOWAS-brokered transition 
effort, including by encouraging the transitional government to 
maintain its course toward a return to constitutional rule. I 
understand that due to the manner in which the security services 
overthrew the last democratically elected government, the United States 
restricts most bilateral assistance that benefits the Government of 
Mali except for certain specified categories including humanitarian 
needs and election support. I understand assistance can resume only 
once a democratically elected government is in place and, if confirmed, 
I will coordinate actions by other donor and partner states in support 
of timely democratic elections.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
            Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. How will you work to ensure efficient communication and 
facilitation among bureaus within the J family, the department, and in 
the interagency?

    Answer. Today's challenges are too complex for any one agency, 
bureau, or individual to undertake alone. Similar to the U.S. 
Government's efforts on the global stage, the Department's efforts are 
strengthened when done in partnership with others. If confirmed, I will 
work tirelessly to facilitate cooperation and ensure efficient 
communication, not only among the J family of bureaus and offices but 
across the Department, the interagency, and our branches of government. 
These efforts will build on my 27-plus years of public service and 
longstanding efforts to strengthen the Department by empowering staff, 
incentivizing innovation, and promoting a workforce that is diverse in 
both its personnel and perspectives.

    Question. If confirmed, you will be in a position historically 
dual-hatted as the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. How will you 
engage with the Tibetan community? Will you commit to hosting the 
Tibetan administration representative at the State Department?

    Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for 
Tibetan Issues, and consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, I 
will maintain close contact with Tibetan religious, cultural, and 
political leaders, including by seeking to travel regularly to Tibetan 
areas of the People's Republic of China and to Tibetan refugee 
settlements in India and Nepal. This engagement will include hosting 
the Representative to North America of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and 
the Central Tibetan Administration at the Department of State.

    Question. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force is a key tool to 
understanding and targeting crises around the globe before they become 
atrocities. This task force lacks structure and a clear mandate. How 
will you bolster the efforts already in place to ensure this task force 
can fully mobilize?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government approach 
to prevent, mitigate, and respond to atrocities in line with the Elie 
Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018. I understand 
there is collaboration across the J family and interagency to support a 
White House review of the structure, process, and interagency 
coordination of the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. I understand 
that effort includes examining how best to integrate atrocity 
prevention across related administration priorities, including the 
Global Fragility Act and the Women, Peace, and Security Act. If 
confirmed, I will support these efforts and work closely with 
interagency partners, Congress, and civil society to improve U.S. 
atrocity prevention.

    Question. The administration has announced a resumption of funding 
to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East (UNRWA) without securing any reforms. What reforms will 
you seek to ensure that UNRWA's textbooks and materials will not be 
anti-Semitic? How many UNRWA beneficiaries have citizenship in another 
country where they reside?

    Answer. I understand the Department has urged reforms in UNRWA and 
received commitments from the Agency prior to announcing the funding 
resumption. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure 
UNRWA upholds the highest level of neutrality and a commitment to 
tolerance in educational materials; if confirmed, I will prioritize 
further progress in this area.
    A significant majority of the 2.2 million registered Palestinian 
refugees in Jordan hold citizenship. Not all Palestinian refugees seek 
access to UNRWA services.

    Question. How will you ensure there is not overlap between the work 
of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor 
and USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Development and Innovations?

    Answer. President Biden has made clear in his Interim National 
Security Strategic Guidance that revitalizing democracy is a priority 
for U.S. foreign policy. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and USAID's Bureau of 
Democracy, Development and Innovations (DDI) to ensure their close 
coordination continues in support of this objective. The bureaus have 
complementary approaches to strengthen democratic institutions, 
including empowering and protecting local voices and strengthening 
government bodies. Using a complementary, holistic framework consistent 
with best practices reinforces prospects for success.

    Question. Over the last 15 years, we have seen democratic 
backsliding around the world from countries in every hemisphere. Where 
is the democracy promotion tool-kit failing? How can we improve our 
democracy promotion efforts?

    Answer. I share your concerns about the 15-year global trend of 
democratic backsliding. The United States must continue to respond and 
adapt to growing authoritarianism and new challenges such as the rise 
of surveillance tools and the use of COVID by some governments to 
justify repression. If confirmed, I will utilize all of the diplomatic 
and programmatic tools available to address these trends, in close 
partnership with other U.S. agencies, Congress, and like-minded 
international partners. If confirmed, I also intend to ensure that U.S. 
efforts to promote democracy are driven by data to improve 
effectiveness, measurability and impact.

    Question. Secretary Blinken has announced that the U.S. will be 
seeking a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council for next year without 
securing reforms to the deeply flawed body. He has also indicated that 
the reforms the U.S. would seek are the same as the previous 
administration 1) Agenda Item 7 (Israel Bias) and 2) membership reform. 
What steps will you take to ensure that true reform is achieved? And if 
true reform is not achieved, what will the United States do?

    Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights 
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's disproportionate 
focus on Israel and to its membership. When the United States plays an 
active and constructive role on the Council, it can better advocate to 
protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council. This year, there has 
been a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel under 
Agenda Item 7. I believe the United States can also better engage, in 
consultation with its partners, to keep some of the countries with the 
worst human rights records off the Council and encourage countries with 
better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will ensure the United 
States continues to prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-
engagement with the Council.

    Question. Earlier this month, the State Department released its 
annual Human Rights Report, press reporting indicates that the 
Department decided to delete paragraphs which listed out abuses, 
including murder of Iranian citizens. If confirmed, would you work to 
ensure that instances like this do not occur in the Human Rights 
report? Do you believe this occurred because of administration's plan 
to re-open negotiations with Iran?

    Answer. The most recent State Department Country Report on Human 
Rights Practices for Iran lays out in detail-based on credible sources-
Iran's abysmal human rights record. It includes numerous reports of 
unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearance and torture by 
government agents; life-threatening prison conditions; hundreds of 
political prisoners and detainees; serious problems with independence 
of the judiciary, particularly the revolutionary courts; and severe 
restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet. If 
confirmed, I will not pull any punches in calling out Iran's human 
rights violations and abuses and will consider all appropriate tools to 
promote accountability for those responsible for these actions.

    Question. The administration has announced that it will host a 
Summit of Democracies. Can you please provide more details on this 
proposed summit? What will be the definition of democracy will be used?

    Answer. I understand the administration is currently formulating 
its vision for the Summit of Democracy, which is intended to advance 
concrete commitments on pressing challenges to established and emerging 
democracies, including corruption, rising autocracy, and defending 
human rights at home and abroad. If confirmed, I promise to consult 
with the committee as details become available, including on 
definitional issues. I also commit to work with the committee to make 
the Summit as results-oriented as possible.

    Question. We have multiple allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific 
region with poor human rights records, but who we also cooperate with 
on economic and security issues that are important to the United 
States. Some of the allies, like the Philippines, are crucial to 
overarching U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. In your view, what are 
the most effective ways to address human rights issues with countries 
that fall into this category?

    Answer. I understand the United States promotes a free, open, and 
rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Upholding U.S. values, including 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a 
key pillar of U.S. foreign policy and an enormous contributor to 
security, prosperity, and stability as well as U.S. influence across 
the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will utilize the full range of 
diplomatic tools to strengthen bilateral and multilateral 
relationships, to promote our values, to candidly address human 
security challenges with allies and partners, to support accountable 
government institutions, to strengthen local civil society capacity to 
hold their governments accountable, and to counter malign authoritarian 
influence.

    Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in 
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted 
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O-20)] calling for the restoration of 
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua 
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by 
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in 
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you 
commit to prioritizing programs and policies that support the efforts 
of democratic actors in Nicaragua to be a credible challenger to Ortega 
ahead of the November 2021 elections.

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining U.S. 
efforts to create conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua. 
The United States should continue to use the economic and diplomatic 
tools at its disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and 
multilateral engagement, to support the democratic opposition and 
advance free and fair elections. It is not too late for the Ortega 
regime to make the meaningful reforms required before the May 
Organization of American States deadline.

    Question. How can the United States best reconcile its defense 
commitments to allies and partners, including through arms sales, with 
its need to adhere to U.S. values?

    Answer. As President Biden has said, America's values--defending 
freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, 
respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity--are 
the grounding wire of our foreign policy and our abiding advantage 
globally. U.S. diplomacy must be rooted in those values, and our 
defense commitments, including arms sales, are no exception. If 
confirmed, I will work to ensure we are mindful of both our values and 
our interests as we engage allies and partners, and that our partners 
respect their commitments to the United States in turn.

    Question. The Trump administration began initiatives to mitigate 
civilian casualties caused by the actions of U.S.-supported partner 
forces. How can we best build off of these efforts?

    Answer. Human rights and civilian harm concerns should continue to 
be a critical consideration for every U.S. arms transfer review. The 
President and Secretary Blinken have said that human rights must be at 
the center of our foreign policy, and that includes policy regarding 
arms transfers and other security assistance.
    If confirmed, I will build upon U.S. efforts to assist partners to 
mitigate risks of civilian casualties and ensure our partner forces are 
taking steps to comply with international law, including the law of 
armed conflict, and protect human rights. If confirmed, as programs are 
re-examined, I intend to make sure they promote these policies with our 
security partners.

    Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under 
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral 
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting 
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several 
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders applied authoritarian 
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and frameworks, including 
in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. If confirmed as Under 
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights, 
will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa be a 
priority? What is your perspective on balancing competing U.S. 
priorities in the areas of security, democracy, and human rights in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially when some of our top security partners--
including Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mali--periodically or 
consistently engage in undemocratic practices? In your view, which 
should take priority in Africa?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize encouraging governments 
across Africa to support democratic processes, strengthen democratic 
institutions, and respect the rights to freedom of expression, 
association, and peaceful assembly. I will also work to ensure that 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a pillar of U.S. 
foreign policy and that the United States takes a holistic approach to 
security challenges, ensuring that U.S. security and governance 
approaches are mutually reinforcing.

    Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked 
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was, 
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly 
mobilizing adequate resources has been a challenge in both cases. If 
confirmed, how would you support the Department to respond to rapid 
democratic transitions and opportunities that emerge unexpected?

    Answer. Democratic breakthroughs present an excellent opportunity 
for the U.S. Government to help consolidate democratic progress. Doing 
so often requires marshaling resources quickly to put in place 
effective programming. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with 
Department and USAID counterparts to ensure we have systems in place 
that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I will also 
work with embassies in the field and bureaus and offices that 
administer democracy programs to capitalize on these opportunities, 
including by pivoting quickly to support programs tailored for these 
situations. In all cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower 
democratic reformers and activists on the ground.

    Question. In Africa, USAID maintains a large democracy and 
governance portfolio. In recent years, it has been the policy of the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to limit programming 
to countries in Africa without an active USAID presence. Do you agree 
with this approach? What benefits could be seen from complimentary 
efforts by USAID, DRL and other State Department bureaus?

    Answer. I understand the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor (DRL) is currently active in over 90 countries in the world, 
including many where there is a USAID presence. I believe that DRL's 
focus on empowering local activists and grassroots organizations to 
hold their government accountable complements USAID's work to build 
more effective government institutions. If confirmed, I will support 
DRL's efforts to coordinate closely with U.S. embassies, USAID, and 
other programming entities to maximize their collective impact.

    Question. Since Georgian Dream's 2012 electoral win, democracy and 
governance in the Caucasian country has steadily declined. The 
political situation came to a head after the October 2020 parliamentary 
election culminated in an opposition boycott of parliament and a 
breakdown of negotiations between the major parties. What more can be 
done to steer Georgians of all political parties back on a democratic 
trajectory? Does U.S. assistance to Georgia need to be conditioned on 
political progress? What would incentivize the major political parties 
to come to the negotiating table and compromise? Do you believe the 
U.S. should consider targeted sanctions on individuals or entities that 
are exacerbating or prolonging the crisis?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will call on both sides to deescalate the 
situation, engage in constructive dialogue, and make compromises to 
allow Georgia to move forward. I believe U.S. assistance is integral to 
advancing democratic reforms, boosting economic growth, and helping 
Georgia resist Russian aggression. I understand the United States also 
assists Georgian civil society and independent media to raise public 
awareness and advocate for positive change. Any proposed conditionality 
should be approached with this in mind. I believe it is important that 
Georgia continues to make progress on institutionalizing democratic 
values. If progress continues to wane in these areas, and if confirmed, 
I would consider the deployment of additional tools to address these 
issues and would seek consultation with Congress.

    Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was 
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a 
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and 
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. What 
do you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what 
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down 
its previously positive path? While Ukraine's democracy and electoral 
process is fairly robust and free, the country continues to struggle 
with entrenched corruption. What further steps can the U.S. take, 
either through its aid programs or political influence, to help propel 
forward Ukraine's fight against corruption in all areas of its society? 
How can we work better with European nations and the EU to leverage our 
collective support for Ukraine into real reforms? How well do you 
believe State and USAID coordinate their activities in Ukraine? What 
would you change to better utilize scarce resources in such a needy 
country?

    Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship 
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law, anti-
corruption, and economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions 
and lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians, in coordination with 
Allies and partners, including the EU. State and USAID are very well 
coordinated in Ukraine thanks to Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and 
Central Asia (AEECA) appropriations and the role of the Coordinator of 
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. If confirmed, I will promote 
accountability for those who try to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and 
territorial and institutional integrity. I believe advancing reforms is 
just as important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.

    Question. Several high-profile scandals have exposed the Western 
financial system's difficulty in preventing corruption. In the FY21 
NDAA, the U.S. Congress updated its anti-money laundering laws to shift 
the burden of disclosure from the banks to the corporations and 
beneficial owners. And the EU has been working on a rule-of-law 
mechanism to link EU funds to good governance, as well as cracking down 
on ``golden visas.'' This corruption hurts both the citizens of the 
countries where the money was stolen and where it is stored. European 
countries have found themselves at both ends of this corruption cycle. 
How will the Biden administration collaborate with our democratic 
allies to tackle corruption in our interconnected financial systems, 
and what concrete actions will you take? How will State collaborate 
with the interagency on this goal? With the Treasury Department? How 
important is it that the United States and its European allies take 
steps to make our own systems less friendly to kleptocracy and less 
penetrable by dirty money?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support enhanced coordination with our 
partners to apply diplomatic pressure, bilaterally and through key 
multi-stakeholder fora, to prevent and combat corruption, building upon 
recent Congressional legislation. I will prioritize foreign assistance 
to strengthen governments' and civil society's capacity to do so as 
well. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Department of the 
Treasury and our other partners to utilize tools, such as the Global 
Magnitsky sanctions program and visa restrictions, to protect our 
financial systems and prevent kleptocrats from using their ill-gotten 
gains in the United States. It is critical that the United States and 
European allies work in tandem to curb corruption's destabilizing 
impact.

    Question. Several members of the EU's eastern bloc have experienced 
a rise in corruption, a decline in rule of law, and a strain on 
democratic institutions. Free and independent media in Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria, to name a few, has been reduced and persecuted. 
Ruling parties have consolidated power in important industries and in 
the government. The EU has begun the process of implementing rule-of-
law conditionality to the disbursement of EU funding as a means to 
combat this trend. Does the United States have a role to play in EU and 
EU member states' anti-corruption efforts? If yes, what is that role?

    Answer. I am concerned about the rise of corruption and attacks on 
the rule of law, media, and democratic institutions in a number of 
European states. I firmly support democratic values, including the rule 
of law and media freedom, and, if confirmed, will work to advance these 
values in multilateral fora to include the U.N. Convention against 
Corruption's Conference of States Parties and the G20 Anticorruption 
Group. These shared values underpin the United States' relationship 
with the EU and, I understand, are a topic of frank discussions with 
member state governments. If confirmed, I intend to use all tools at 
our disposal to address corruption within Eastern Europe and will 
encourage our EU partners to establish similar tools.

    Question. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 
(J/TIP) authors one of the most important diplomatic tools we have each 
year, the Trafficking in Persons Report, which countless bodies rely on 
for crucial information, including Congress. Yet, this report is 
criticized for undue influence from regional bureaus or other parts of 
the department. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that 
the information and tier rankings in the TIP report accurately reflect 
anti-trafficking efforts and the real situations on the ground in-
country?

    Answer. The United States has always been a global leader in the 
fight against human trafficking. The Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 
report is one of the most important diplomatic tools and information 
sources on this issue. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure the TIP 
Report is as objective and accurate as possible, and that tier rankings 
are based solely on each country's efforts to combat trafficking, as 
required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.

    Question. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
(TVPRA) mandates that foreign assistance restrictions placed on 
countries receiving a ``Tier 3'' ranking can be waived. The previous 
administration used this tool, but the rollout was messy due to lack of 
guidance on what exactly non-trade, non-humanitarian assistance was. 
Will you continue to recommend to the Secretary that these Tier 3 
restrictions be used for appropriate countries? Will you commit to 
working with Congress on clarifying the scope of non-trade, non-
humanitarian assistance?

    Answer. I understand the Department considers Tier 3 restrictions 
and waivers carefully every year. This review informs the Secretary's 
recommendations to the President, whom the TVPA requires to impose or 
waive restrictions. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the State 
Department's recommendations to the President on restrictions and 
waivers are grounded by the facts on the ground in each country and an 
assessment of what would most effectively lead to improvements in those 
countries. I will welcome consultation with Congress on how to apply 
the trade-related exception.

    Question. The International Criminal Court has open investigations 
in Afghanistan and the West Bank and Gaza. How will GCJ plan to engage 
with this court on these two cases? Do you agree that both cases are 
squarely outside of the court's jurisdiction?

    Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to 
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert 
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. The United States and 
Israel are not States Parties, and the Palestinians do not qualify as a 
sovereign State. If confirmed, I will work to address U.S. concerns 
about these cases through engagement with all stakeholders in the ICC 
process. The Office of Global Criminal Justice provides critical 
subject-matter expertise, advising the Secretary and other senior 
leaders formulating U.S. policy on accountability for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide. If confirmed, I intend to ensure 
engagement with the Court on these cases is part of an administration-
wide strategy.

    Question. Secretary Blinken has agreed to examine a genocide 
determination for the Rohingya. Do you agree with this examination and 
how would you execute it?

    Answer. I am appalled by the Burmese military's reign of terror 
against Rohingya and members of other ethnic and religious minority 
groups, as well as those related to the devastating military coup. If 
confirmed, I will support the Secretary in any review process, and 
ensure the Department remains focused on promoting accountability for 
those responsible for abuses, seeking justice for victims, advocating 
for unhindered humanitarian access, supporting the return to Burma's 
democratic transition, and promoting reforms that will help prevent the 
recurrence of atrocities and other human rights violations and abuses 
across Burma.

    Question. How will this administration engage with the office of 
Global Criminal Justice? Given crises like the Rohingya and Syria, 
engagement from you, if confirmed, alongside GCJ is important to 
curbing the atrocities being committed against some of the most 
vulnerable populations.

    Answer. The Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) provides policy 
advice and technical expertise to the Secretary of State and the Under 
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights on 
preventing, mitigating, and responding to atrocities, including war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The office also plays a 
central role in coordinating U.S. policy to promote transitional 
justice and accountability, which is vital to atrocity prevention and 
prospects for lasting peace and stability. If confirmed, I will ensure 
GCJ's expertise is incorporated into U.S. policy formulation on these 
issues as part of the administration's efforts to promote respect for 
human rights and the rule of law.

    Question. The CCP is actively committing genocide against the 
Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang. However, the IOC has 
given it the prestige of holding the Winter 2022 Olympics and 
Paralympics. Do you support China hosting the Winter Games in 2022? 
What other alternatives would you propose?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support extensive U.S. engagement and 
coordination with allies and partners to deny the CCP the ability to 
use the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to obscure China's abysmal human 
rights record. This would include outreach to the U.S. Olympic and 
Paralympic Committee, Olympics sponsors, and equipment and apparel 
suppliers to raise awareness of and promote accountability for the PRC 
Government's atrocities and human rights abuses, including genocide and 
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, as well as forced labor. I will 
also consult closely with allies and partners to define our common 
concerns and establish a shared approach to the PRC in advance of and 
during the 2022 Winter Olympics.

    Question. Can you please explain the mandate and operations of the 
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations? How does it add value 
to the work of the Department? How does CSO's work differ from or 
overlap with USAID's Office of Transitions Initiative?

    Answer. I understand the mission of the Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations (CSO) is to anticipate, prevent, and respond 
to conflicts that undermine U.S. national interests. CSO's work differs 
from USAID/OTI in that, as part of the State Department, CSO plays a 
vital role in enhancing the Department's strategies, policies, and 
programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. Top CSO priorities 
include implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities 
Prevention Act of 2018 and the Global Fragility Act of 2019, which 
builds upon the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review and the Women, 
Peace, and Security agenda. If confirmed, I welcome Congressional 
consultation on CSO's mandate and operations.

    Question. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) required the formulation 
of a whole-of-government strategy to identify and address the drivers 
of violence and conflict in fragile states and regions. Under the 
previous administration, a broadly accepted strategy was released. 
Unfortunately, the process for selecting the target countries and 
regions in which the strategy would be tested was fraught with 
challenges. Moreover, pilot initiatives brought to light how competing 
interests--namely between the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization 
Operations and U.S. Embassies and USAID Missions--and a lack of 
appropriate consultation with the field could undermine the future 
success of GFA initiatives. The Biden administration will now be 
charged with relaunching the GFA country and region selection process 
and implementation plans in a manner that reflects these critical 
lessons learned. If confirmed, how will you approach the GFA selection 
process for target countries and regions? What, if anything, within the 
country/region diagnostic and selection process needs to be changed? 
Should the Sahel and the Northern Triangle automatically be included as 
priority regions given the national security interests at stake, or 
would you recommend reserving judgement and allowing selection to be 
strictly guided by the data?

    Answer. It is my understanding that the White House is leading a 
renewal of the GFA country and region selection process to evaluate 
previous recommendations and consider others, followed by Congressional 
consultation and final approval by the President. I understand the 
review takes into account the impact on fragility of COVID-19, the 
global economic crisis, gender inequality, and climate change. I also 
understand the selection process is based on objective criteria 
outlined in the GFA, including assessed levels and risks of fragility, 
violent conflict, atrocities, gender inequality, and resilience; 
political will and capacity; opportunity for impact; as well as U.S. 
national security and economic interests. If confirmed, I will support 
these efforts.

    Question. There are also concerns about an apparent lack of senior-
level buy-in from the Department of Defense, poor coordination between 
the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other key 
functional bureaus within the Department of State (such as 
Counterterrorism and Political Military Affairs), and poor 
communication with U.S. Embassies and Missions in the field. If 
confirmed, how would you work across departments and agencies to 
implement the GFA? How will Embassy and Mission priorities be reflected 
in selection and implementation plans? Should GFA implementation 
continue to be run out of CSO, or should leadership be elevated to a 
higher level, as Congress intended?

    Answer. Successful GFA implementation will require fundamental 
changes in the way the U.S. Government works on issues of fragility and 
conflict, integrating more closely the work among functional and 
regional bureaus, different agencies, the field, and Washington. If 
confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs to ensure strong partnerships with embassies and missions. I 
believe elevated senior staff buy-in and CSO's expertise and 
coordination role are critical to effective implementation of the GFA, 
which will require ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive 
management to inform policy and programming decisions.

    Question. A criticism of the previous administration was its focus 
on international religious freedom issues. How will you, if confirmed, 
ensure this administration does not overcorrect on IRF issues and 
therefore ignore the serious concerns of religious freedom issues 
globally?

    Answer. I am committed to promoting and defending religious 
freedom, which has long been a key U.S. foreign policy objective I was 
proud to advance in my prior role as Acting Assistant Secretary of 
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I will look 
to leverage the tools of U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance to 
advance this universal right, ensuring that efforts to promote respect 
for religious freedom are fully integrated into broader policies that 
promote freedom and dignity for all people.

    Question. How will you work to empower the office of the Special 
Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism?

    Answer. I am deeply committed to combatting anti-Semitism at home 
and abroad and share the concerns of Congress about rising anti-
Semitism around the world. If confirmed, I will work closely with the 
Special Envoy to reinforce her or his efforts, elevate the fight 
against global anti-Semitism in our engagements with foreign 
interlocutors, and ensure the office of the Special Envoy has the staff 
and resources it needs to execute its mission effectively.

    Question. The Office of Global Women's Issues continue to be a 
separate office within the S bureau. Under the last administration, 
there was an effort to align this office within the J family. Will this 
continue to be an S office, or do you, if confirmed, plan to continue 
re-alignment of S/GWI under the J family? What steps will you take to 
integrate global women issue initiatives throughout the J family and 
the interagency, especially on projects like Women, Peace, and 
Security, and Women's Global Development and Prosperity Fund (WGDP)?

    Answer. I am committed to supporting President Biden's goal of 
advancing gender equality and the full empowerment of women and girls 
around the world. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/
GWI) plays a pivotal coordination role in ensuring the Department is 
bringing the full diplomatic toolbox to bear in support of gender 
equality goals, including through robust collaboration with J family 
bureaus and offices. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring how the 
J family can enhance coordination with S/GWI and mobilize its unique 
resources to support women and girls as part of a comprehensive U.S. 
Government gender equality strategy.

    Question. The 2020 DEA report on fentanyl flows to the United 
States identifies the People's Republic of China as the primary source 
of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked to the United 
States, increasingly through Mexico. Mexican transnational criminal 
organizations are producing increased quantities of fentanyl and 
cartels, such as the Sinaloa and the New Generation Jalisco Cartel, are 
the primary trafficking groups responsible for smuggling fentanyl into 
the United States from Mexico. If confirmed, what specific actions 
would you take to ensure the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs programs are focusing on meaningfully reducing the 
flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids to the United States?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to stop fentanyl trafficking by: 
reducing diversion and illicit production of synthetic drugs; 
strengthening the capacity of our partners to detect, interdict, and 
share information on synthetic drug threats; building capacity to 
target illicit online sales; shrinking the drug market by reducing 
global drug demand; and enhancing partnerships with governments, 
industry, and international organizations. If confirmed, I will work 
with partners such as Mexico to reduce production and improve 
interdiction, and I will continue U.S. efforts to press the People's 
Republic of China to better regulate its chemical industry and 
synthetic opioid precursors.

    Question. On March 1st, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report with specific recommendations for the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to strengthen 
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative (GAO-21-335). 
If confirmed, do you commit to ensure INL takes swift action to 
implement the recommendations in this report?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) swiftly implements 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations to strengthen 
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative. I understand 
the Department concurred with GAO's important recommendations, and, for 
programs under the Merida Initiative, INL is in the process of 
completing an anti-fraud risk assessment; developing and implementing 
an anti-fraud strategy; developing and implementing a mandatory fraud 
awareness training program for staff; and re-evaluating practices for 
local vetting of non-security personnel.

    Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship 
between the Government of Cuba, the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and the Maduro 
regime in Venezuela.

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by the actions of the Government of 
Cuba, from its treatment of its own people, to its connection to and 
substantial support for the brutal Maduro regime. I understand members 
of the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army (ELN), including 
senior leadership, traveled to Cuba in 2018 for now-defunct peace 
negotiations with the Government of Colombia. When negotiations failed, 
Cuba continued to provide safe haven to ELN leadership. In January 
2019, ELN claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Colombia. 
Citing peace protocols signed before the ELN negotiators traveled to 
Cuba, Cuba has refused to extradite ELN leaders to Colombia. With 
respect to Venezuela, Maduro and his associates use criminal activities 
to help maintain their hold on power, fostering a permissive 
environment for known terrorist groups, including the ELN and its 
sympathizers.
    If confirmed, I will commit to closely reviewing the status of ELN 
leadership in Cuba and consulting with Congress as the Biden-Harris 
administration reviews U.S. policy toward Cuba.

    Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters at various 
detention facilities, including 2,000 foreign fighters (FTF) that U.S. 
Central Command (CENTCOM) characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist 
fighters.'' Internally Displace Camps (IDP) in Syria, like al Hol, have 
become areas of systemic ISIS indoctrination of IDPs and refugees. The 
process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of 
former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to 
peace. Yet, countries around the world with foreign terrorist fighters 
have failed to make any progress to date. How does the Biden 
administration plan to address this problem?

    Answer. I understand the Department urges countries of origin to 
repatriate their foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated 
family members from detention facilities and camps in northeast Syria, 
and to rehabilitate, reintegrate and prosecute those individuals as 
appropriate. I understand the Department does this through intensive 
diplomatic engagement, including through the Global Coalition to defeat 
ISIS, by helping to repatriate individuals whose countries of origin 
are willing to accept them, and helping develop rehabilitation and 
reintegration protocols and programs. If confirmed, I will urge FTF 
repatriation and leverage multilateral platforms in those efforts to 
prevent ISIS from reconstituting capability in Syria and Iraq.

    Question. 10 USC 127e authority allows the Secretary of Defense, 
with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission, to expend up to 
$100 million each year to support foreign forces, irregular forces, 
groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating authorized 
ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces 
to combat terrorism. Despite the important counterterrorism (CT) 
collaboration between Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department, 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee (HFAC) lack visibility into this space. 
Traditionally, SFRC and HFAC have not been afforded any insight into 
127e programs and what our Chiefs of Mission are concurring with. Do we 
have your commitment to return to this committee and brief on areas of 
DoD and State CT cooperation, particularly the integration between 10 
USC 127e and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs?

    Answer. I understand the Department of State works closely with the 
Department of Defense on a broad range of counterterrorism issues, 
including in the Department of Defense's activities under its Title 10, 
Section 127e authorities. I recognize that Congress has an important 
oversight role to play in the U.S. Government's counterterrorism 
efforts, and if confirmed, I will be committed to engaging with 
Congress to discuss these and other counterterrorism lines of effort.

    Question. The previous administration disbanded the Defense 
Department's Defeat- ISIS Task Force, leading its then director 
Christopher Maier to resign in November 2020. Former President Trump 
similarly moved State Department's Special Envoy to the Global 
Coalition to Defeat ISIS under the Bureau of Counterterrorism, with 
Acting John Godfrey serving as that special envoy. Is this the right 
staffing and organizational structure to prevent an ISIS resurgence?

    Answer. I understand that achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS 
remains a central priority of the administration. I do not believe the 
dual-hatting of the CT Coordinator and Special Envoy reflects a 
diminution of the position of the Special Envoy for the Global 
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It instead reflects the evolving nature of 
the ISIS threat to encompass areas outside Iraq and Syria, and a desire 
to situate the enduring D-ISIS mission within the established CT Bureau 
architecture. Doing so enables effective leverage of CT Bureau's 
civilian counterterrorism capacity-building assets and closer 
coordinate with other bureaus. If confirmed, I will ensure that both 
roles are prioritized and sustainably resourced.

    Question. The Biden administration has launched a review of the 
February 29 agreement with the Taliban, including the CT assurances and 
posture issues associated with it. This is an issue with obvious and 
important CT ramifications given the origins of this war and the 
terrorist threats that endure. What role do you anticipate your bureau 
playing in this review? How do you plan on ensuring U.S. CT interests 
in Afghanistan are addressed?

    Answer. I understand the Department of State, including the Bureau 
of Counterterrorism, is a part of the interagency effort to monitor and 
disrupt significant terrorist threats not only in Afghanistan but 
anywhere else they might arise. If confirmed, my focus will be to 
ensure our counterterrorism efforts maintain consistent pressure on 
terrorist groups to deny them the time, space, and resources they need 
to conduct complex, international attacks, including against the U.S. 
homeland.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
          Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. My most meaningful achievements in promoting human rights 
and democracy involve expanding coalitions to advance universal human 
rights, countering malign influence, and elevating protection for human 
rights defenders worldwide. In prior State Department leadership roles, 
I expanded the first public-private partnership (PPP) for LGBT equality 
to include private sector stakeholders, launched the first global PPP 
against gender-based violence, and created new regional platforms to 
protect journalists under siege. I helped persuade France to cancel a 
multi-billion dollar defense sale to Russia in the wake of the Crimea 
invasion, and successfully countered Russian disinformation efforts to 
interfere with France's 2017 election. I persuaded India to launch its 
first-ever third-country democracy promotion efforts with the United 
States, including programs to generate self-employment opportunities 
for Afghan women and build other nations' capacity to conduct free and 
fair elections.

    Question. The Hong Kong National Security Law, which mainland 
Chinese authorities have imposed on Hong Kong, has already begun to 
fundamentally transform the space for democracy and human rights in the 
city. In your view, what steps should the U.S. Government take to help 
defend the space for press freedom, free expression, and democracy in 
Hong Kong?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will stand united with our allies and 
partners against the PRC's assault on Hong Kong's freedoms and its 
blatant disregard for its international obligations and commitments. I 
will use all available diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's 
disposal, including sanctions, visa restrictions, and other measures, 
to promote accountability for the egregious actions of authorities in 
Hong Kong and Beijing, and I will urge our allies and partners to do 
the same. If confirmed, I will also help those who have been persecuted 
by the Hong Kong and Beijing authorities find safe haven in the United 
States and other countries.

    Question. Since the February 1 coup by the Burmese military, the 
space for free expression and association has dramatically constricted 
as the junta attempts to suppress a sustained and countrywide civil 
disobedience movement against its rule. More than 700 civilians have 
been killed, and several thousand are currently detained. The 
solidarity already shown by the U.S. Government to the protestors is 
encouraging, but what further specific steps do you envision that this 
administration can take to ensure maximum support for human rights 
activists, journalists, and prominent voices of conscience at risk, and 
to urge the military to peacefully return power to the duly-elected 
government as soon as possible?

    Answer. The United States, under the Biden-Harris administration, 
has condemned in the strongest possible terms and taken actions against 
those responsible for the military coup in Burma, the horrific violence 
against protesters, and the ongoing, unjust detentions of State 
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other 
democratically-elected leaders as well as more than 3,000 civil society 
actors from across ethnic and religious groups. If confirmed, I will 
use all available U.S. diplomatic tools, including sanctions, visa 
restrictions, and other measures, to promote accountability and build 
global coalitions to support the Burmese people's efforts to 
reestablish and safeguard their path to democracy.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
             Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. You were listed in the acknowledgements section of a 1990 
book titled ``Stealth PACs: How Israel's American Lobby Took control of 
U.S. Middle East Policy,'' published by your employer at the time, the 
American Educational Trust. Can you confirm today that you do not share 
the anti-Israel claims in this book or of the American Educational 
Trust? Do you believe pro-Israel Americans, and pro-Israel members of 
Congress, have dual loyalties?

    Answer. I categorically reject the anti-Israel claims in this book 
and espoused by the American Educational Trust. Further, I had nothing 
to do with the content of the book. My entry-level employment at the 
American Educational Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no 
contact with the organization since then, and I reject the 
organization's positions with respect to Israel. I deplore any 
suggestion that American Jews or members of Congress who advocate for a 
strong U.S.-Israel relationship have dual loyalties or are disloyal to 
the United States.

    Question. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs routinely 
publishes a list of members of Congress who receive donations from pro-
Israel Americans. Do you believe there is something untoward about pro-
Israel Americans engaging in the political process?

    Answer. I strongly support the right of every American, including 
those who strongly support the U.S.-Israel alliance, to engage in the 
U.S. political process, and see nothing untoward in this activity. As I 
noted, my entry-level employment at the American Educational Trust 
ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the organization 
since then, and I categorically reject the organization's positions 
with respect to Israel. I strongly support the Biden administration's 
commitment to renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the 
latter is underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise 
their constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's 
government, and equal protection under the law.

    Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Israel relationship?

    Answer. I support the United States' unwavering and ironclad 
commitment to Israel's security. If confirmed, I will support the 
administration in working to further strengthen all aspects of the 
U.S.-Israel alliance, including with respect to countering Iranian 
state-sponsored terrorism, increasing international solidarity against 
Hezbollah and other Iran-supported foreign terrorist organizations, 
expanding global coalitions against anti-Semitism, building upon 
Israel's normalization agreements with key Arab Governments, and 
eliminating anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, including the U.N. 
Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court.

    Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best 
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?

    Answer. Yes. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest 
supporters over the last fifty years. I understand the U.S.-Israel 
alliance is deeply personal to him and, indeed, he's met and worked 
closely with every Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. I 
understand the President believes the ties between our two countries, 
rooted in strategic interests and shared values, should transcend 
domestic politics. In this vein, I understand the administration will 
not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance, but also ensure 
that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If confirmed, I will support the 
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include building 
on normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel 
and its neighbors.

    Question. Do you fully support Israel's right to defend itself from 
terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive action to disrupt 
weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?

    Answer. Israel has the right to defend itself from terrorist 
attacks, and I understand the Biden-Harris administration's commitment 
to Israel's security to be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. I 
support the administration's policy to continue U.S. security 
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, 
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself. If 
confirmed, I will support action, in coordination with our allies and 
partners, to deter and counter Iran's destabilizing activities. If 
confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's goals regarding 
Israel's security.

    Question. Do you support full funding for United States security 
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year MOU? Do you 
support the position of President Biden that conditioning aid to Israel 
is wrong?

    Answer. I understand President Biden's commitment to Israel's 
security is ironclad. The President played an important role in helping 
to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security 
assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the 
terms of the MOU without reservation.

    Question. What is your view of the Iranian regime and the country's 
human rights record?

    Answer. The Iranian Government has the dubious distinction of being 
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, a destabilizing force 
in the region, and a longtime and systematic human rights violator. 
Iran severely restricts the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of 
association, freedom of religion or belief, and freedom of expression. 
If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations and 
abuses, which include arbitrary or unlawful detention of numerous 
individuals, some of whom have faced torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, and execution after unfair trials. I 
also will work with my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to 
promote accountability for human rights violators.

    Question. Are you committed to robust human rights programming in 
Iran, regardless of how such programming may impact nuclear 
negotiations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support robust human rights programs 
in Iran. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to exercise 
their human rights, including through severe restrictions on the rights 
to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or 
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will support all 
appropriate diplomatic tools to support the Iranian people so their 
voices are heard and they can hold their government accountable for its 
actions.

    Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all 
but one of the U.S. Special Coordinators for Tibetan Issues have 
concurrently held your position. If you are designated the Special 
Coordinator, will you commit to promoting substantive dialogue without 
pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government that 
leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet, as mandated by the Tibetan 
Policy and Support Act of 2020?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for 
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press 
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy 
for Tibetans.

    Question. If Beijing continues to refuse to engage in dialogue, as 
it has done since 2010, will you insist that our dialogue with Beijing 
on some issues of importance to them be linked to their resumption of 
dialogue with the Tibetans?

    Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for 
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press 
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives to achieve meaningful autonomy. I will also call upon 
Beijing to respect the human rights of Tibetans and to preserve Tibet's 
environment as well as to respect its distinct cultural, linguistic, 
and religious traditions.

    Question. If confirmed, will you stand firm in communicating to 
Beijing the United States position that we will not under any 
circumstances accept a Chinese-controlled process to select the Dalai 
Lama's successor? If the Chinese authorities attempt to force a 
politically chosen successor on the Tibetan people, will you commit to 
imposing serious sanctions in response?

    Answer. The PRC Government must have no role in the succession 
process of the Dalai Lama. PRC authorities' interference in the 
succession of the Panchen Lama 26 years ago, including disappearing the 
Panchen Lama as a child and attempting to replace him with a PRC 
Government-chosen successor, remains an outrageous abuse of religious 
freedom that I denounced as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I am committed to 
promoting respect for Tibetans' religious freedom and to taking all 
appropriate measures to promote accountability for PRC Government 
officials who attempt to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession, 
consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.

    Question. Do you believe that the CCP is committing cultural 
genocide, also known as cultural erasure, against the Tibetans, whose 
civilization is distinct from that of China and boasts its own rich 
language, literature, religious tradition, and culture? Will you commit 
to undertaking programmatic and policy initiatives that will protect 
Tibetan culture and language in Tibet and in exile?

    Answer. The Chinese Government has been relentless in seeking to 
suppress the distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions of 
Tibetans. If confirmed, I will call on Beijing to end these policies 
and will explore every opportunity, including through policy and 
program initiatives, to help Tibetans preserve their traditions. This 
will include working with allies and partners to press Beijing to 
return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, 
without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy for Tibetans.

    Question. Will you commit to regularly raise the case of the 
Panchen Lama and press for his release? Will you ensure that no U.S. 
official meets with, or provides a public platform, for the individual 
that Beijing appointed in his place?

    Answer. Yes. I am saddened that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima--the Panchen 
Lama--remains disappeared since his 1995 forced disappearance by PRC 
authorities, separated from his community and denied his rightful place 
as a prominent Tibetan Buddhist leader. If confirmed, I am committed to 
supporting Tibetans' religious freedom, including their ability to 
select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders, like the Dalai 
Lama and the Panchen Lama, according to their own beliefs and without 
government interference. I will also call on the PRC Government to 
publicize verifiable proof of the Tibetan-selected Panchen Lama's 
whereabouts and wellbeing and allow him to speak for himself.

    Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden 
administration will not provide aid to the PA if Palestinian officials 
have not ceased payments to those convicted of terrorist acts according 
to U.S. law?

    Answer. I understand that the administration has been clear that 
all U.S. assistance for the Palestinians, including the recently 
announced assistance, will be provided consistent with U.S. law.

    Question. UNRWA currently only discloses contracts over $100,000 in 
its quarterly filings. However, the Annual Statistical Report on U.N. 
Procurement states that U.N. agencies must disclose all contracts over 
$30,000. Will you hold UNRWA accountable for disclosing all contracts 
over $30,000?

    Answer. I understand UNRWA discloses all of its awards, including 
those above the $30,000 threshold, to the United Nations Office for 
Procurement Services which then reports them together with all other 
U.N. agencies in the Annual Statistical Report on U.N. Procurement, 
published on the U.N. Global Market website (UNGM.org). If confirmed, I 
will seek to ensure UNRWA continues to abide by all relevant U.N. 
policies and regulations.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba 
democracy programs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that support for 
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the 
Cuban people to determine their own future. The recently released 2020 
Human Rights Report notes the significant human rights abuses 
perpetrated by Cuban Government officials. If confirmed, I will ensure 
the U.S. Government continues its steadfast support for and engagement 
with Cuban human rights defenders, activists, and civil society members 
to bolster their important work. I also will promote human rights, 
fundamental freedoms, and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow 
of information to the Cuban people.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you support Cuba's democracy, 
civil society and human rights defenders in Cuba?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the U.S. Government continues 
its steadfast support for and engagement with Cuban human rights 
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their 
important work. I also will promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, 
and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow of information to the 
Cuban people. I will also denounce the Cuban Government's abuses and 
push for democratic reform. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress 
about Cuba policy.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
             Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. North Korea is a topic of personal significance to me. 
Last year I gave a speech on the Senate floor to honor Otto Warmbier on 
the third anniversary of his passing, and I remain in contact with Fred 
and Cindy--Otto's parents who are constituents. How will this 
administration approach the challenge of North Korea from a national 
security and human rights perspective?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to placing human rights at the 
center of our foreign policy, including with North Korea, and working 
with like-minded partners to call out human rights abuses. I am deeply 
concerned by North Korea's deplorable human rights abuses, including 
its network of political prison and labor camps, use of forced labor, 
and severe restrictions of religious freedom, and horrific treatment of 
unjustly detained Americans like Mr. Warmbier. If confirmed, I will 
prioritize addressing North Korea's egregious human rights record and 
promoting respect for human rights in the closed country. I will also 
prioritize increased coordination with our allies and partners and will 
use all diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's disposal to promote 
accountability for those responsible for the unspeakable abuses that 
occur in the country.

    Question. I am deeply concerned regarding the ongoing reports of 
atrocities and human rights abuses occurring in the ongoing civil war 
in Ethiopia. As you are aware, civil wars are a unique threat, as this 
type of conflict often destabilizes neighboring states, attracts 
foreign fighters as well as third party proxy support for sides in the 
conflict. How can we ensure that Ethiopia's fragile transition toward 
democracy can continue given the current circumstances, and how can the 
United States ensure accountability for crimes occurring not just in 
the Tigray region, but all of Ethiopia?

    Answer. The President and the Secretary of State have made clear 
that securing a ceasefire and supporting a political dialogue to defuse 
the political crisis in Ethiopia, including in Tigray, is an urgent 
priority, and I understand they plan to appoint a special envoy to lead 
a robust diplomatic effort to advance these goals. If confirmed, I will 
work closely with the special envoy in this regard. In addition, I will 
support the work of a joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian 
Human Rights Commission and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights as a first step in the accountability process. 
Credible, independent, and transparent investigations into human rights 
violations and abuses are critical for long-term justice, 
accountability, and reconciliation.

    Question. Yesterday, President Biden announced his intention to 
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of the 
September 11th attacks. While the American people are understandably 
weary after two decades of war, any move to draw down our military 
presence in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on the ground, 
not in accordance with an arbitrary date. The Taliban have not upheld 
their commitments during the peace negotiations process. Before any 
withdrawal, we must ensure that the Taliban respects the legitimate 
governing authority of Afghanistan and see a de-association from 
extremist groups such as Al 'Qaeda and ISIS. We cannot repeat the 
mistakes of the past, such as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq 
in 2011. That decision lead to more military intervention from the 
United States, not less, while giving rise to new extremist groups that 
filled the vacuum of instability. Do you share in my concern that a 
complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces in September without any sign 
that the Taliban is prepared to become a responsible partner in 
governing? What are the chances that Afghanistan becomes a failed state 
and a haven for terrorists who could once again strike the United 
States Homeland?

    Answer. I support the administration's decision to complete a full 
military withdrawal by September 11, and to focus on diplomatic efforts 
to facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the 
Afghan Government. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we remain 
vigilant to the terrorist threat and that U.S. humanitarian assistance 
preserves gains for Afghan women and civil society and mitigates 
prospects for state failure. I understand the administration will work 
with Afghan partners and Allies to counter any reemergence of a 
terrorist threat and to hold the Taliban to its commitment to ensure al 
Qaeda does not threaten the United States, our interests, or our 
allies.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
               Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a 
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had 
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration 
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22, 
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit 
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the 
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against 
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?

    Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that 
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing 
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment, 
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through 
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or 
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience 
and must be met with serious consequences.

    Question. What role do you see for the State Department in 
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights 
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?

    Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and 
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, 
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I 
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners 
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these 
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden 
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered 
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools, 
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to 
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability 
for those responsible and justice for victims.

    Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional 
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader 
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration 
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish 
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That 
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration 
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334, 
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan 
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish 
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out 
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by 
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing 
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by 
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and 
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli 
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that 
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?

    Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights, I 
understand the administration gives great weight to Israel's security. 
The current Syrian regime and its Iranian allies pose a significant 
risk to Israel. It is apparent that the Golan Heights is critically 
important to Israel's security. As long as Bashar al-Assad is in 
control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part with 
the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides 
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over 
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?

    Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem 
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status 
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts 
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity 
that they deserve.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of 
any part of Jerusalem?

    Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem 
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status 
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the 
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts 
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity 
that they deserve.

    Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of 
the Old City of Jerusalem?

    Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem 
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. 
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final 
status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in the 
context of direct negotiations. If confirmed, I will support the 
administration's efforts to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with 
the care and sensitivity that they deserve.

    Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated 
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi, 
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three 
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists 
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden 
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those 
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public 
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have 
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' 
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large 
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group. 
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the 
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was 
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in 
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid, 
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by 
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Yemen.

    Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training, 
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting 
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi 
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping. Further, the Houthis use 
this support to threaten Yemeni civilians, especially at this time in 
the city of Marib. If confirmed, I am committed to working with our 
interagency partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.
    The Houthis impede humanitarian access in the areas they control. 
If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to work with our partners on 
the ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision 
of critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide 
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.

    Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring 
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already 
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. I 
understand the administration heeded concerns from the United Nations, 
humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others, 
that the designations could have had a devastating impact on Yemenis' 
access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could increase 
the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the designations 
and the revocations limited the impact the designations could have had 
on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports, including food and 
other essential supplies.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden 
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the 
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide 
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.

    Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring 
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already 
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. 
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of 
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The 
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food, 
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non-
food items, such as blankets and water containers.

    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.

   Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not 
        unnecessarily comingled with classified information in 
        notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If 
        not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.

    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for 
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics 
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the 
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden 
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with 
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your 
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.

    Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to 
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or 
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's 
systematic human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary 
or unlawful detention of numerous individuals, including American 
citizens. I will work with my colleagues and U.S. allies and partners 
to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for regime 
officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses, including 
torture, executions, persecution of religious minorities, and digital 
repression.

    Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that 
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations 
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related 
concessions.

    Answer. President Biden has been clear that Iran must never obtain 
a nuclear weapon. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic 
missiles pose a threat to international security and remain a 
significant nonproliferation challenge. The President has also 
emphasized that human rights must be at the center of our foreign 
policy. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations 
and abuses, which I did forcefully in my prior role as Acting Assistant 
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If 
confirmed, I intend to work with colleagues and U.S. allies and 
partners to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability 
for Iranian regime officials responsible for pervasive human rights 
violations and abuses.

    Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions 
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?

    Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to 
exercise their human rights, including through severe restrictions on 
the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of 
religion or belief, and freedom of expression.
    I support continuing to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian 
individuals and entities perpetrating human rights violations and 
abuses. Human rights sanctions are independent of JCPOA provisions and 
remain an invaluable, bipartisan tool to achieve the Biden-Harris 
administration's commitment to center human rights and democratic 
values in U.S. foreign policy.

    Question. In July 1989, you were hired as director of the American 
Educational Trust's speakers' bureau, according to the Washington 
Report on Middle East Affairs, which is published by the organization. 
The organization and outlet routinely suggest that American Jews who 
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship invite hostility and 
even violence because of their advocacy, that political expenditures 
and activities by Americans and especially American Jews are unseemly, 
and that such activities raise questions about their loyalty to the 
United States. The Washington Report has also lists of members of 
Congress who receive donations from Americans who politically advocate 
for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship.

   Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes, including 
        accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong U.S.-
        Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are 
        inappropriate?

    Answer. Yes. I deplore any suggestion that American Jews who 
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the 
United States. My entry-level employment at the American Educational 
Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the 
organization since then, and I categorically reject the organization's 
positions with respect to Israel.

    Question. Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes, 
including accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong 
U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are anti-
Semitic?

    Answer. Yes, I agree that accusations of dual loyalty against 
American Jews supportive of the U.S.-Israel alliance constitute anti-
Semitic speech. I fully endorse the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of anti-Semitism, under which 
certain criticisms leveled against Israel, or Jewish persons as a 
collective, can be considered anti-Semitic. I strongly support the 
Biden administration's embrace of the IHRA working definition of anti-
Semitism and join the Biden administration in categorically condemning 
all forms of anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I intend to combat anti-
Semitism and intolerance in all forms and will work to expand 
international coalitions towards this objective.

    Question. Do you agree that it is inappropriate to suggest that 
Americans who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be 
excluded from engaging in political activities, including donating to 
members of Congress?

    Answer. Yes. I categorically reject any suggestions that Americans 
who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be excluded 
from engaging in political activities, including donating to members of 
Congress. I strongly support the Biden administration's commitment to 
renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the latter is 
underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise their 
Constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's government, 
and equal protection under the law.

    Question. Do you believe that a strong U.S.-Israel relationship 
boosts American national security?

    Answer. Yes. I strongly support the Biden-Harris administration's 
unwavering and ironclad commitment to Israel's security and, if 
confirmed, will work to further strengthen all aspects of U.S.-Israel 
partnership. The ties between the United States and Israel are rooted 
in strategic interests and shared democratic values, and in this vein, 
I understand the Biden-Harris administration will seek to further 
strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance. If confirmed, I will support the 
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include 
countering anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, strengthening 
international coalitions against anti-Semitism, and building on 
normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel and 
its neighbors.

    Question. The term ``universal human right'' is frequently used 
throughout the international community, and it was a reference you made 
consistently throughout the hearing. Please provide in your own words a 
definition of universal human right.

    Answer. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) represents 
a common understanding, which I share, of universal human rights and 
freedoms around the globe. The UDHR begins by stating that all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. It sets out, for 
the first time at the international level, rights and freedoms to be 
universally protected. To me, many of these rights are inspired by 
those enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and hold U.N. member states to 
a common standard. The universality of human rights articulated in the 
UDHR also counters false arguments put forth by China, Russia, and 
other autocracies of a U.S. or Western agenda being imposed on the rest 
of the world.

    Question. In your view, is the concept of a ``human right'' fluid 
or relative?

    Answer. As human rights are universal, they are neither fluid nor 
relative. As an example, the right to freedom of expression has not 
changed since it was articulated even though our understanding of the 
application of the right has been challenged as we adapt to new methods 
of communication. From time to time, our understanding of rights may 
expand; for example, where once societies held other human beings in 
bondage, it is now universally recognized that slavery is a violation 
of one's human rights. This does not make human rights fluid or 
relative, but reflects the reality that the understanding and 
application of human rights standards can evolve in a positive 
direction alongside societal progress.

    Question. Do you believe that certain rights are unalienable?

    Answer. In its preamble, the Declaration of Independence states, 
``We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness.'' I believe that these unalienable rights and those 
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution apply to all Americans, cannot be 
denied by government, and that there is no hierarchy of rights. 
Similarly, in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
I understand and support the concept of ``inalienable'' rights that 
cannot be denied or taken away from people, and which governments have 
a duty to protect and to refrain from violating.

    Question. The Biden administration rejoined the United States to 
the United Nations Human Rights Council, a body that features some of 
the worst human rights violators in the world including China, Cuba, 
Somalia, and Venezuela. In your hearing you argued a lack of U.S. 
presence at the Council would create a ``vacuum'' for bad actors to 
direct policy initiatives. What substantive policy areas does the U.N. 
Human Rights Council hold jurisdiction over or govern?

    Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), while not without 
flaws, provides a venue to raise human rights violations from around 
the world. It can play an important role in shining a spotlight on the 
world's worst human rights violators. For example, the HRC is one of 
the few places in the U.N. where China has been called out for its 
abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. HRC engagement allows the United 
States to keep countries with the worst human rights records off the 
Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to run for seats. 
U.S. engagement decreased unfair HRC bias against Israel.

    Question. If we accept the ``vacuum argument,'' is it your view 
that United States participation in the U.N. Human Rights Council 
should include the following (please explain your response for each): 
Advocate for the removal of well-known human rights violators from the 
Council; Withhold funding for certain activities or initiatives as a 
tool to produce changes in behavior from malign actors; Use the voice 
and vote of the United States at the Council to highlight human rights 
atrocities, including violations of protecting the right to life, by 
other nations, including nations who sit on the Council.

    Answer. I understand the administration is committed to working 
with partners to ensure the Human Rights Council shines a spotlight on 
countries with the worst human rights records and serves as a forum for 
those fighting injustice and tyranny. U.S. re-engagement should 
advocate to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights 
records off the Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to 
run for seats. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States 
continues to seek Council reforms, including elimination of anti-Israel 
Article Agenda Item 7, and promote all appropriate, available, and 
effective accountability mechanisms for those who commit atrocities, to 
include forced abortions and sterilization, rape, torture, and mass 
killings.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
             Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. What is your understanding of U.S. law with respect to 
engagement with Hamas? News media reports indicate the Biden 
administration has committed to ``resetting the U.S. relationship with 
the Palestinian people and leadership,'' including robust engagement 
and provision of aid. On April 7, the State Department announced its 
intent to ``restart U.S. economic, development, humanitarian assistance 
for the Palestinian people'' by providing $75 million in aid to the 
West Bank and Gaza.

    Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under 
Executive Order 13224. I strongly support the Biden-Harris 
administration commitment to disrupt and deter terrorist organizations 
worldwide, including Hamas. I understand U.S. engagement in the West 
Bank and Gaza and with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and 
involves no engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO.

    Question. What are the implications for U.S. engagement and 
provision of aid if the Palestinian Legislative Council includes, or is 
led by, members of Hamas? Under the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of 
2006, the United States is prohibited from providing assistance to a 
Palestinian Authority effectively controlled by Hamas.

    Answer. I understand U.S. assistance for the Palestinians is 
provided consistent with U.S. law. I also understand the Department 
routinely assesses its foreign assistance programming, and would do so 
following Palestinian elections or any other significant change related 
to the Palestinian Authority.

    Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden 
administration will not engage with Hamas officials and will not seek 
to find technical loopholes to engaging with Hamas officials such as 
considering them as members of the PLO, which they are not?

    Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization 
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive 
Order 13224. I understand U.S. engagement in the West Bank and Gaza and 
with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and involves no 
engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO. If confirmed, I will comply 
with U.S. law and seek to ensure that ``J family'' bureaus and offices 
do the same.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in 
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Markey, 
Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, and Hagerty.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Ambassador Jenkins, former Secretary Fernandez, 
congratulations on your nominations and my thanks for your 
willingness to return to the State Department with your 
demonstrated experience, strength, and commitment to advancing 
our national interests.
    I have spoken often of the pivotal foreign policy 
challenges facing our country and the State Department, and 
this hearing will be no different. If confirmed, both of you 
will confront serious issues and challenges and a department in 
need of repair and rebuilding.
    I am heartened by the Biden administration's emphasis on 
nominating knowledgeable and seasoned leaders with rich foreign 
policy experience.
    Ambassador Jenkins, the Under Secretary for Arms Control 
and International Security is one of the most vital senior 
positions in the Department of State. Its portfolio ranges from 
nuclear weapons to terrorism and from nonproliferation to 
landmines. It requires orchestrating global cooperation with 
both allies and adversaries on critical issues.
    As you and I have discussed, I have long been concerned 
over the way that the Department of Defense has assumed the 
security assistance mission that should be the exclusive 
purview of the State Department and the Secretary of State.
    I greatly respect the service of the men and women in our 
armed forces and particularly your own 20 years of naval 
service. But the person delivering assistance to officials of a 
foreign government should not be wearing a uniform. They 
should, instead, have the authority to advance and promote a 
comprehensive foreign policy vision consistent with our core 
values.
    We also discussed the need for the State Department to 
respect this committee's crucial statutory oversight role over 
the arms sales process, including when the laws and regulations 
governing those sales may have been violated.
    This relationship was poisoned by the last administration. 
Thus far, the relationship has been much improved, but more 
work is necessary to create an effective partnership.
    Make no mistake. One way or another, this committee will 
conduct effective oversight, and I hope and expect that we can 
depend on your cooperation.
    Finally, we stand at a crossroads in our nuclear 
relationship with Russia and China. We have extended the New 
START Treaty with Russia for five years. The question is now 
where do we go from here.
    Do we seek deeper reductions in Russian strategic forces? 
Should we focus on shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons 
not covered by New START?
    Should we focus on engaging China which, although its force 
structure remains smaller than the United States or Russia, is 
rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces?
    So I look forward to hearing your thoughts on those matters 
today.
    Mr. Fernandez, if confirmed, I expect that your previous 
experience as Assistant Secretary for Economics, Energy, and 
Business Growth will serve you well. This is vitally important 
because the last four years have been especially difficult for 
the bureaus that you have been nominated to lead.
    They suffered from neglect, a loss of an institutional 
experience, and an undervaluing of diplomacy at the highest 
levels. The former administration never even bothered to 
nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
    Given the sad state of affairs, your first priority, I 
believe, has to be rebuild the E Bureaus, restore morale, and 
provide clear leadership. This is especially important because 
President Biden has elevated the mission of the E Bureau by 
prioritizing climate change as a foreign policy imperative.
    Energy, the environment, economic growth, leadership in all 
of these arenas is necessary to restore U.S. leadership and 
successfully combat the climate crisis.
    If confirmed, you will also head the economic diplomacy 
wing at the State Department. I am interested in hearing about 
your views on building back better America's economic 
statecraft toolkit.
    Economic diplomacy is an absolutely critical domain for 
competition in the 21st century, and there are many questions 
to be answered about a strategy for the post-COVID 
reconstruction of the global economy, as well as how to help 
poor countries administer vaccines and build resilience to the 
economic strains brought by the pandemic.
    I am particularly interested in your views on Secretary 
Yellen's proposed $650 billion in special drawing rights and 
how it promotes global economic stability and growth, and I 
would like to understand how you plan to engage on economic 
sanctions both within the department and in the interagency 
process.
    So, Ambassador Jenkins and Mr. Fernandez, both of you face 
steep challenges ahead, but I have no doubt that you are up to 
the task.
    And with that, we look forward to your testimony and turn 
to the distinguished ranking member for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The two nominations before us today are important and, 
indeed, really critical to our nation's foreign policy. I would 
first like to start with the nomination to be Under Secretary 
of State for Arms Control and International Security.
    For the past few decades, the global threat landscape has 
been going through a paradigm shift. Unfortunately, many in the 
West have clung to the notion that we can simply rely on the 
policies of the past to keep us secure today.
    Nothing could be further from the truth. In just the last 
10 years since the New START Treaty was ratified, the threats 
facing the United States, its allies, and our collective 
security have only grown.
    Russia has completely modernized its nuclear forces and has 
done so outside existing treaty limits. It is growing its 
nuclear stockpile and is developing new so-called exotic 
missile delivery systems.
    In addition, State Department compliance reports have laid 
out a consistent pattern of Russian noncompliance, also known 
as cheating, with a majority of the international arms control 
obligations it has signed.
    Meanwhile, China is on pace to at least double its nuclear 
stockpile over the next decade. It has tested more ballistic 
missiles in 2018 and '19 than the rest of the world combined, 
and is likely engaged in nuclear testing activities.
    Currently, China is modernizing every element of its 
nuclear triad, including larger land-based intercontinental 
ballistic missiles, new ballistic missile submarines, and long-
range stealth bombers, and the Department of Defense assesses 
that China is raising the alert level of much of its nuclear 
force indefinitely.
    Combined with lack of transparency, these actions 
contribute to potential miscommunication or inadvertent 
escalation in a conflict and each of these threats demands 
immediate attention.
    Beyond Russia and China, we continue to face mounting 
threats from other malign actors like Iran and North Korea, who 
continue to vie for a place on the world stage by advancing 
their nuclear and missile programs and engaging in proxy and 
cyber warfare.
    This arms race encourages other nations to question whether 
they too need to develop nuclear weapons--certainly, not a 
pretty picture--and in the process, it undermines--all of this 
undermines Cold War--the Cold War architecture.
    The role of the Under Secretary for Arms Control is our 
lead negotiator and accountability monitor to keep other 
countries honest on these issues. This person must not only 
have a deep level of technical knowledge but also the skills 
and wherewithal to sit across the table from leaders of these 
nations and push back against empty offers and veiled threats.
    It is also critical that this administration recognize the 
interdependence between arms control and nuclear modernization, 
as explicitly as explicitly codified in the ratification of the 
New START Treaty.
    The Obama administration committed to nuclear modernization 
in order to win ratification of the New START Treaty but 
promptly scrapped those promises and abandoned those 
commitments just a year later.
    Trust must be rebuilt between Congress and the executive. 
To rebuild this trust, the Biden administration must commit to 
a full modernization of the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons 
complex.
    This is vital to reassure our allies who have forgone 
developing nuclear weapons and instead rely on our nuclear 
umbrella that we provide for them. Dismantling our capabilities 
while our adversaries build their stockpiles, is inherently 
destabilizing and undermines international security.
    Which brings me to the last but, certainly, one of the most 
important topics for this nominee, the Senate's role in 
approving arms control agreements and treaties. The 
Constitution plainly lays out the Senate's role in approving 
these types of international agreements.
    I cannot stress enough that any international agreement in 
the arms control space, including reentry into a previous 
agreement, must be put to the Senate for its advice and 
consent, as demanded by the Founding Fathers and our 
Constitution.
    And to win consent, the administration should take concrete 
steps to rebuild the trust previous congresses have placed in 
the executive branch.
    Next, we have the nomination of the Honorable Jose 
Fernandez to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, 
Energy and Environment. Our economy is one of our greatest 
assets and we all know economic policy is a crucial part of 
foreign policy.
    The United States represents about 4.5 percent of the 
world's population, but we account for 22 percent of the 
world's economic activity. American creativity, innovation, and 
determination are hallmarks of the U.S. economic model and it 
is not surprising that countries around the world long to 
duplicate our success.
    More government spending of borrowed money or of 
government-appropriated private capital is simply not the 
answer to our problems or those of other countries. Spending 
enormous sums at home and abroad in the hope that it will 
create a better world is not sustainable.
    Instead, we must carefully define our objectives. Whether 
it is economic energy or environmental policy, we must be 
advocates of a free market system that resists the temptation 
to impose a one-size-fits-all solution to these incredibly 
diverse and difficult issues.
    Further, how we steward our economy and help other 
countries develop is important to expanding the rule of law, 
encouraging compliance to international norms, and pushing back 
on corruption.
    We must continue to promote the private sector-driven 
market-based economy that has led to the United States and its 
allies achieving a level of prosperity for our citizens never 
before seen in history.
    It is only through promoting this system that the West will 
truly be able to offer the world a better alternative to the 
socialists and parasitic Chinese economic policies and to 
reinforce the system of fair play rules we, along with other 
free and democratic countries, have constructed.
    This is the economic landscape that lies ahead of us. With 
our allies, we must rise to this challenge. I look forward to 
hearing from both the witnesses on how they plan to address 
these very important issues.
    Thank you, Senator Menendez.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    So we will turn to our two nominees. Your full statements 
will be included in the record. We ask you to summarize them in 
about five minutes or so we can have a conversation.
    And we will start off with Ambassador Jenkins.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BONNIE D. JENKINS OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO 
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL 
                            SECURITY

    Ms. Jenkins. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today.
    I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, 
and Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating 
me to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and 
International Security.
    It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. 
If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly for the American 
people and in close coordination with members of Congress and 
this committee to advance our shared ideals for this great 
nation.
    I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my 
family, and my friends and colleagues who have inspired and 
supported me for so many years. I have been honored to serve 
the U.S. Government as both a civilian and in uniform from 
working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s to over 20 years in 
the U.S. Air Force and Navy Reserves.
    Most recently, I had the honor of being confirmed to serve 
as ambassador for the State Department Threat Reduction 
Programs from 2009 to 2017, working to bring the issues of 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security front 
and center.
    My commitment to public service has always included 
advancing opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded 
the nonprofit Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and 
Conflict Transformation in an effort to make sure that our 
nation's policymakers are engaging in and constitute all of our 
experts, regardless of race, gender, or background.
    I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington 
Universities teaching our future generation of policymakers. If 
confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on 
the challenges that our country is facing today.
    An increasingly authoritarian People's Republic of China is 
pursuing a destabilizing military modernization project and 
rapid nuclear buildup, endangering the international rules-
based order and inflaming regional and global tensions.
    Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear 
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its 
ongoing support for terrorist groups and violent armed 
militias.
    Russia continues to violate arms control agreements and 
commitments, and we face new cybersecurity and emerging 
technology threats from our adversaries. Reducing the risk of 
war through effective arms control, limiting Russian and 
Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in 
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical 
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top 
priorities, if confirmed.
    We must strengthen deterrence alliance in the Euro Atlantic 
and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against growing 
threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible 
behavior in outer space.
    We must grapple with advancements and emerging technologies 
that can threaten strategic stability. If confirmed, I will 
strive to ensure that arms transfers and security assistance 
are focused on building value-based security partnerships.
    I will carefully assess all critical factors, including 
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will 
ensure other key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's 
qualitative military edge, are upheld.
    I look forward to working with this committee, if 
confirmed, to look strategically at how our security assistance 
authorities are structured and how they are balanced and 
resourced across the Departments of State and Defense to ensure 
that our tools, including our security cooperation agreements, 
are the most efficient for the U.S. taxpayer and the most 
effective for U.S. national security.
    Renewed American leadership, as set out in the 
administration's interim national security strategic guidance, 
will be essential to reducing the dangers from chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their 
delivery systems.
    Further, working with allies and partners the United States 
must continue to stand up for an open, interoperable, reliable, 
and secure internet and stable cyberspace where international 
law and voluntary nonbinding norms apply to state behavior.
    You have my commitment that if I am confirmed I will work 
in close coordination with you in our efforts to restore 
Congress' role in formulating foreign policy and to ensure the 
policies we enact are in the greatest interest of our national 
security of the American people.
    The interests we face are numerous, but our commitment to 
our allies and to our American people is rock solid. We have 
much work to do and I am ready to get started.
    With that, I welcome your questions and I look forward to 
our discussion today. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, and 
Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating me to be the 
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. 
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If confirmed, 
I pledge to work tirelessly for the American people and in close 
coordination with Members of Congress and this committee to advance our 
shared ideals for this great nation.
    I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my family, and my 
friends and colleagues who have inspired and supported me for so many 
years.
    I have been honored to serve the U.S. Government as both a civilian 
and in uniform, from working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with 
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s, to over 20 
years in the Air Force and U.S. Navy Reserves. Most recently, I had the 
honor of being confirmed to serve as Ambassador for the State 
Department's threat reduction programs from 2009 to 2017, working to 
bring the issues of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
security front and center.
    My commitment to public service has always included advancing 
opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded the non-profit 
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation in 
an effort to make sure that our nation's policy makers are engaging in 
and constitute all of our experts, regardless of their race, gender, or 
background. I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington 
Universities, teaching our future generation of policy makers.
    If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on 
the challenges that our country is facing today. An increasingly 
authoritarian People's Republic of China is pursuing a destabilizing 
military modernization project and rapid nuclear buildup, endangering 
the international rules-based order and inflaming regional and global 
tensions. Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear 
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its ongoing 
support for terrorist groups and violent armed militias. Russia 
continues to violate arms control agreements and commitments. And we 
face new cybersecurity and emerging technology threats from our 
adversaries.
    Reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control, 
limiting Russian and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our 
efforts in biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical 
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top 
priorities, if confirmed. We must strengthen deterrence alliances in 
the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against 
growing threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible 
behavior in outer space. And we must grapple with advancements in 
emerging technologies that can threaten strategic stability.
    If confirmed, I will strive to ensure that arms transfers and 
security assistance are focused on building values-based security 
partnerships. I will carefully assess all critical factors, including 
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will ensure other 
key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military 
Edge, are upheld.
    I look forward to working with this committee, if confirmed, to 
look strategically at how our security assistance authorities are 
structured, and how they are balanced and resourced across the 
Departments of State and Defense, to ensure that our tools, including 
our security cooperation agreements, are the most efficient for the 
U.S. taxpayer, and the most effective for U.S. national security.
    Renewed American leadership--As set out in the administration's 
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance--will be essential to 
reducing the dangers from chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Further, working with 
allies and partners, the United States must continue to stand up for an 
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet and a stable 
cyberspace, where international law and voluntary, non-binding norms 
apply to state behavior.
    You have my commitment that if confirmed I will work in close 
coordination with you in our efforts to restore Congress' role in 
formulating foreign policy, and to ensure the policies we enact are in 
the greatest interest of our national security and of the American 
people. The threats we face are numerous, but our commitment to our 
allies, and to the American people, is rock solid. We have much work to 
do, and I am ready to get started. With that, I welcome your questions 
and look forward to our discussion today.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Mr. Fernandez?

 STATEMENT OF HON. JOSE W. FERNANDEZ OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO 
 BE AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY, AND 
   THE ENVIRONMENT); UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE 
 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT; UNITED 
  STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK; AND UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE EUROPEAN BANK 
               FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

    Mr. Fernandez. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. 
Thank you, Ranking Member Risch, and other members of this 
committee for the opportunity that you have given me before--to 
appear before you today.
    I would like to take a couple of seconds to introduce my 
family. I am blessed to have a supportive and loving family 
made up of three remarkable women. All three of them walk the 
talk of public service and I am very proud of them.
    My wife, Andrea Gabor, is a professor at Baruch College in 
New York and the author of four books, in addition to being the 
mother of Sarah and Annie. Sarah, who is also here, spent a big 
chunk of her law school years volunteering at a death penalty 
clinic and is on her way to a graduate degree in psychology.
    And not with us but very much in our thoughts is our second 
daughter, Annie, who is pursuing a joint public health and 
medical degree in California. I could not be here without them. 
So thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce them.
    I am honored to come before you as President Biden's 
nominee for Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, 
Energy, and the Environment. I am grateful for the confidence 
shown in me by the president and by Secretary Blinken.
    If confirmed, I will consult frequently with this committee 
as we work to serve the interests of the American people.
    Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great 
Recession, I appeared before this committee as the nominee for 
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business 
Affairs.
    I come to you today under circumstances that are different 
from those that we faced in 2009. But the reasons that brought 
me here have not changed.
    My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed 
in food kitchens by charities and we lost the lease in our 
first home. But when we settled in New Jersey in the town next 
to Union City in Hudson County, we began to rebuild lives that 
had been upended by revolution, fear, and deprivation.
    A decade later, a country that owed us nothing had given me 
scholarships at Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School where 
I was challenged and nurtured by educators I will never be able 
to repay.
    In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that 
trading essential liberties for economic security is a false 
bargain, and I believe to my core that a humble but confident 
nation that celebrates its diversity while striving to reach a 
more perfect union can inspire others to tackle the existential 
challenges of our time.
    With the exception of my four years here as Assistant 
Secretary, I practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I 
have represented U.S. investors doing business abroad and 
foreign investors operating in the United States.
    I have advised governments in Africa, Latin America, and 
elsewhere on pro-growth policies, and, unfortunately, over the 
last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses 
everywhere have suffered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
    If confirmed, I will advance--seek to advance foreign 
policy initiatives that will benefit the American people and, 
particularly, our middle class, and I will focus on five 
priorities.
    My first will be to support the State Department's critical 
role in stopping COVID-19. As Undersecretary, I would work to 
advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains, 
promote economic recovery, and promote effective global 
systems.
    My second priority will be to work on environmental and 
energy policies to accelerate economic growth. President 
Biden's executive order on tackling the climate crisis has 
established this goal as a national priority.
    There is no greater challenge than climate change and we 
must work to include all countries in the effort while ensuring 
that our workers will share in the benefits of the new economy.
    My third priority will be to ensure that our country will 
benefit from free, fair, and reciprocal trade. We need to focus 
on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove 
trade irritants.
    We also need to support American innovation by protecting 
intellectual property rights overseas and preventing strategic 
competitors from gaming the system.
    A fourth priority of mine will be to help maintain American 
leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies.
    U.S. technology companies face increasing challenges in 
maintaining U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and 
technology, and we need to engage diplomatically and with 
industry stakeholders so that international norms and standards 
are fair and transparent.
    Finally, my last task will be to do what I have been doing 
now for almost 40 years and that is to facilitate new market 
opportunities for U.S. firms. Competing in the international 
arena is a strategic imperative for the United States and an 
opportunity for our companies and our workers.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Jose W. Fernandez

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of 
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for 
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the 
Environment. I am grateful for the confidence shown in me by the 
President and Secretary Blinken. If confirmed I will consult frequently 
with this Committee as we work to serve the interests of the American 
people.
    Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great Recession, I 
appeared before this committee as the nominee for Assistant Secretary 
of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs. I now come to you 
at a moment that is no less dire. A pandemic has robbed the lives of 
more than 570,000 Americans and millions more around the world. 
Generations wonder whether we can avert a climate cataclysm. Emboldened 
rivals seek to expand their influence at America's expense. And 
traditional allies question whether the United States will remain at 
their side.
    I come to you today under circumstances different from those we 
faced in 2009, but the reasons that brought me here have not changed. 
My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed in food 
kitchens run by charities and lost the lease in our first home, but 
when we settled in New Jersey and my mother took a job as a seamstress 
in a local factory and my father became a bank clerk, we began to 
rebuild lives upended by revolution, fear and deprivation. A decade 
later, in a country that owed us nothing, I had received scholarships 
to Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School, where I was challenged 
and nurtured by educators I will never be able to repay.
    In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that trading 
essential liberties for economic security is a false bargain. And I 
believe to my core that a humble but confident nation that celebrates 
its diversity while striving to reach a more perfect union can inspire 
others to tackle the existential challenges of our time.
    With the exception of my four years in Washington as Assistant 
Secretary, I have practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I 
have represented U.S. investors operating in troubled countries, and 
foreign investors seeking to raise funds in our capital markets or 
navigate the U.S. foreign investment system. I have advised governments 
in Africa and Latin America on pro-growth policies. Unfortunately, over 
the last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses 
everywhere have foundered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
    If confirmed I will seek to advance foreign policy initiatives that 
will benefit the American people, and particularly our middle class, 
focusing on five priorities:


 1. The State Department's critical role in stopping COVID-19: As 
        Secretary Blinken has said ``This pandemic won't end at home 
        until it ends worldwide.'' As Under Secretary I would work to 
        advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains, 
        support safe international transportation systems, and--more 
        broadly-- promote inclusive economic recovery and effective 
        global health systems.

 2. Environmental and energy policies to accelerate economic growth: 
        President Biden's Executive Order on tackling the climate 
        crisis established as a national priority raising global 
        climate ambition and integrating climate considerations across 
        a wide range of international fora. There is no challenge 
        greater than climate change, and we must work to enlist all 
        countries. We also need to ensure that our workers will share 
        in the benefits of the new economy.

 3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade: The United States needs to focus 
        on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove 
        trade irritants. We also need to support American innovation by 
        enlisting partners to protect intellectual property rights 
        overseas and prevent strategic competitors from circumventing 
        the rules.

 4. Leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies: U.S. 
        technology companies face increasing challenges in maintaining 
        U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and technology. We 
        need to engage diplomatically and with industry stakeholders to 
        maintain U.S. competitiveness and ensure that international 
        norms and standards are fair and transparent.

 5. Facilitating new market opportunities for U.S. firms: As the 
        Department's senior economic official, I would direct our 
        network of economic officers in embassies around the world to 
        help U.S. firms expand overseas, creating jobs in the United 
        States and contributing to our economic growth. Competing in 
        the international arena is a strategic imperative for the 
        United States and an opportunity for our companies and workers.


    Let me conclude by stressing that, if confirmed, I would be honored 
to serve with Secretary Blinken and my counterparts throughout the U.S. 
Government in support of the President's economic policy agenda. I will 
also seek your counsel throughout my tenure.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. We 
will begin a series of five-minute rounds for members, and I 
will at the beginning say I have to go to introduce two judges 
to the Judiciary Committee. So I will----
    Senator Risch. I will take over.
    The Chairman. Yeah, absolutely. I know you would be happy 
to.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. I have no doubt about that. So I will start 
off with my questions. Then I will turn to Senator Risch. I 
should be back by then. But if not, Senator Risch, if you would 
acknowledge according to the list that we have here.
    Let me start off with you, Ambassador. I am glad I heard in 
your statement about your commitment to work with the 
committee. The leadership of State in the last administration 
had a very contentious relationship with this committee on arms 
sales matters, and it was clear that our legitimate statutory 
oversight role was neither recognized nor respected.
    So far, Secretary Blinken has fostered a very different 
relationship that is professional, respectful, and 
consultative. Will you continue and broaden this relationship 
on arms sales oversight and will you commit to consult with us 
regarding policy changes and initiatives and not merely inform 
us of your decisions?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your questions, Senator.
    Yes, I can confirm that I am more than happy to consult 
with you.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Now, I have been concerned for some time that a Democracy, 
Human Rights, and Labor Bureau does not have appropriate 
influence on the arms sales process. The Biden administration 
seems better disposed to consider the human rights components 
of the arms sales process.
    I plan to reintroduce my Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms 
Sales Act, which seeks to reemphasize and enhance DRL's role. I 
have no ideological prohibition to having U.S. arms be sold 
abroad. I have no problem with that.
    I do have a problem when we sell it to countries that 
violate human rights or act outside of the international norm 
and the use of those weapons.
    So, if confirmed, will you enhance DRL's role in the arms 
sales process?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, Senator. What I can certainly say is, as 
I said in my statement, I view human rights as forefront and 
fundamental to arms sales and arms transfers. So I will, 
certainly, do what I can, if I am confirmed, at State to 
include all issues and individuals in terms of promoting human 
rights.
    The Chairman. Now, I want to turn to the question that I 
raised earlier, and I think you and I had an opportunity to 
discuss this. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, DOD has 
reproduced more and more of State's security assistance 
authority.
    It has recently attempted to reproduce State's 
international military education and training program with a 
focus on its own priorities as it has done with other 
duplicated programs. It, essentially, runs its own foreign 
military financing grant program, which is considered far more 
flexible than State's.
    If confirmed, will you give equal focus to all the issues 
in all of the bureaus and offices under your supervision and 
actively defend State's equities and authorities in this 
regard?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, Senator.
    Yes, I am very concerned and would, certainly, be working 
with all the authorities and the offices within State and the 
interagency to strengthen the role of the State Department in 
this issue.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Mr. Fernandez, it is good to see your family here, 
incredibly gifted family, I must say. You have got all the 
bases covered. You can get educated, your health care is going 
to be taken care of, and that is a pretty good deal.
    So I want to know--I hope you have had an opportunity maybe 
to see what this committee did last week, in a 21 to 1 vote, 
passed out the Strategic Competition Act, which is something 
that Senator Risch and I authored, along with many members of 
this committee, intended to restore our global economic 
leadership, including passages calling on the president to work 
with our G-7 allies in matters relevant to economic and 
democratic freedoms.
    We see in this committee on a bipartisan basis as China 
being our most strategic competitor, a nation that we must 
confront when they violate international norms but we must also 
compete with.
    If confirmed, what will be your goals when it comes to the 
global economy and in its post-COVID recovery, particularly as 
it relates to competing with China?
    Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I 
commend you and the committee for the work that you did last 
week on the China bill. It is an issue that I think will be an 
important part of my role at the State Department.
    The fact of the matter is that, as you know, China is no 
longer biding its time. It is challenging us in the economic 
sphere every chance that it gets and it is doing so through 
practices that are inimical to many of the rules that it had to 
follow in order to get to where it is. The Chinese are now 
trying to challenge those rules.
    We have pushed back but I think we must do more, and I 
think the bill that you worked on last week will be--will give 
us an additional tool to do that.
    One of the areas on which I think I would like to 
concentrate my efforts will be to work with our allies more, to 
work with our private sector more, and to provide alternatives 
to other countries doing business with China.
    Oftentimes, they may not have other choices, and I think 
part of what we need to do is to work with our allies and to 
work with our companies to talk to them about the opportunities 
abroad and to get them much more involved in international 
business.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I am going to turn to Senator 
Risch. I am going to let Senator Risch preside in this period 
of time. After Senator Risch, Senator Cardin is next and then 
Senator Hagerty after that. But I should be back by that time.
    Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch [presiding]. I appreciate that. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    I am going to ask a few questions here and then we will 
turn to Senator Cardin.
    Ambassador Jenkins, as you know, the United States withdrew 
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, commonly known as 
the INF Treaty. We believed it was the right thing to do--that 
is, the United States did--and so did NATO. NATO found that the 
U.S. was justified in withdrawing from INF. I am told you do 
not particularly agree with that decision. Is that correct?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir.
    At the time the decision was made, my concern was whether, 
in fact, in my view, we had a significant strategy as a next 
step after that. So that was my concern at the time.
    Senator Risch. Do you still--are you still in the same spot 
you were?
    Ms. Jenkins. I think that after I had time to see this, I 
am still concerned about the strategy, going forward. But I, 
certainly, understand why the U.S. withdrew. Senator Risch: All 
right. And, of course, that was the result of the fact that the 
treaty was a one-way street. That is, we were complying but the 
Russians were not. Fair statement?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes, a fair statement.
    Senator Risch. Do you have any plans of turning that 
around?
    Ms. Jenkins. The statement or----
    Senator Risch. No.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Risch. The statement is the statement. I am talking 
about the--about the facts, about trying to get them back in 
the lane they are supposed to be in.
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what we--what the administration 
does have planned for the future, and if I am confirmed I would 
be, hopefully, involved in these kind of discussions, is a way 
forward to work with Russia, and the idea would be to have what 
they are calling strategic stability talks, in which time it 
would be an opportunity to really look at all the different 
issues with Russia. But also we want to continue to engage our 
allies on issues in--regarding Europe and NATO.
    So I think that the idea now is to have some of these 
discussions with our allies and, of course, we will have our 
discussions with Russia, and then we will see where we are 
after we have had a chance to start these dialogues.
    Senator Risch. How about the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and Russia's compliance or, rather, noncompliance? Do you have 
thoughts on that?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, the use of chemical weapons is 
reprehensible and I--you know, I know the U.S. has instituted 
sanctions against Russia as a result of the use of nuclear--
chemical weapons against their own citizens.
    The U.S. continues to make the point at the OPCW in The 
Hague and also to raise the point with our allies as well. So 
my view is that that use of chemical weapons is, as I said, 
reprehensible.
    Senator Risch. I think we all agree with that. But the 
question is, how do you get them--how do you bring them to heel 
to comply with the convention that they have subscribed to?
    Ms. Jenkins. Sir, you continue to use sanctions. You 
continue to work with our allies to put pressure on them. You 
continue to work with multilateral organizations like the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
    You work through the U.N. You use all the tools that you 
have--in my view, use all the tools that you have at your 
disposal, whether they are diplomatic or others, to actually 
try to get the Russians to actually abide by what they are 
supposed to be doing.
    Senator Risch. How about the Biological Weapons Convention?
    Ms. Jenkins. The Biological Weapons Convention is a 
convention that is significant and we need to continue to put 
more emphasis on the Biological Weapons Convention, to 
reinvigorate it.
    It is another opportunity and another way that we can 
encourage Russia to abide by things that we think they should 
be abiding by.
    Senator Risch. And what about nuclear testing with Russia?
    Ms. Jenkins. The concern there is, as you probably know, 
all of the P-5 countries, all the nuclear weapons countries, 
currently have a moratorium on nuclear testing. The concern 
there is if countries start to test again it can open a box to 
nuclear testing.
    We have had a moratorium for a number of years so we want 
to try to prevent a situation where countries feel that that is 
something that they could be doing again.
    Senator Risch. I am assuming you are familiar with the 2020 
State Department compliance report that Russia is, in fact, 
violating each one of these agreements. Are you familiar with 
that from the agency that you are about to join, that report?
    Ms. Jenkins. I am aware of the compliance report. 
Obviously, I did not have any input on that.
    Senator Risch. Of course.
    Ms. Jenkins. And I will have much more time to examine it 
after--of course, after--if I am confirmed, but after today.
    Senator Risch. Are you in disagreement with their 
conclusions that Russia is in noncompliance and violating all 
of these conventions and treaties that we have just talked 
about?
    Ms. Jenkins. No, I am not in--I would not be in 
disagreement with that, sir.
    Senator Risch. Well, I think that underlies the heavy lift 
that you have ahead of you. You have talked to me generally 
about that. Can you give me any more specifics on your--on how 
you intend to go down that road?
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, sir, I mean, I think that what we need 
to do is as the Government is planning--and I am not there so I 
cannot really attest to all of the discussions that are 
actually taking place in their interagency.
    But as I said, what I am aware of are the next steps in 
terms of engaging on issues of nuclear weapons, the use of 
sanctions against Russia that have just been done. We can 
continue to do sanctions, continue to put pressure on them in 
other ways using the whole-of-government and all of the 
different tools that we have, using diplomacy, which is--which 
we have different avenues for that both bilaterally, 
multilaterally, through our multilateral organizations.
    You know, we think--I think we just have to use all the 
tools that we have at our disposal to try to convince and to 
push Russia to comply with treaties.
    Senator Risch. In looking over some of the things that you 
have written, I was a little perplexed. On April 21st, 2019, 
you wrote, and I quote here, ``Men make nuclear weapons more 
dangerous,'' end quote.
    I am a little perplexed by that. How do I make nuclear 
weapons more dangerous? What--could you drill down on that a 
little bit for me?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yeah. I do not quite recall that statement. I 
am not saying I did not make it, but out of context I do not 
recall. If it is--I would have to know which article that was.
    But I know that I have written about the importance of 
having diverse perspectives in terms of national security and 
foreign policy, in terms of having different viewpoints, in 
terms of having more women at the table. I assume that that is 
the context that you are--you are pulling that from.
    Senator Risch. Well, the--I am looking at it here and the 
exact quote is, ``Men make nuclear weapons more dangerous,'' a 
completed sentence. And I guess I am just perplexed as to how 
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous.
    Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what--if I can recall what you 
are pulling it from, essentially, what I am saying there is 
that we have a situation now where we have to reassess where we 
are in terms of where we have been.
    We need to look at bringing more different diverse people 
to the table. To date, we have not had enough significant 
diversity, and it has been a situation where it has been, 
essentially, men at the table.
    So it is more of an issue of we need to include more people 
and more diverse people because we only know what we have right 
now, and we do not have that.
    Senator Risch. I do not think anyone is in disagreement 
that diversity is appropriate. But I just do not understand how 
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous. That is very 
perplexing.
    Ms. Jenkins. I think--yeah, what you are pushing at is that 
the context that men--without having to make any certain 
statements here, that the belief that women in conflict 
situations, and there has been study on this, that when women 
at the table that there is more peace and peace tends to last 
longer.
    Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, you are up.
    [No response.]
    Senator Risch. Okay. We will go down in the list of people 
who signed up. Senator Van Hollen, are you with us by WebEx?
    [No response.]
    Senator Risch. How about----
    Senator Cardin. No, I am sorry. Mr. Chairman?
    Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, it sounds like you, but I do 
not see you.
    Senator Cardin. I think I am now with you. Thank you very 
much, and let me thank both of our nominees for their 
willingness to serve in these two very important roles.
    In both of your testimonies, you have indicated the 
importance of American values in our policies. Ambassador 
Jenkins, you specifically said that we need a value-based 
policy as it relates to our arms issues.
    And certainly, Mr. Fernandez, your family experience points 
out the importance of value-based policies. So I want to ask 
both of you a question but, first, let me start with Ambassador 
Jenkins. And that is, our arms policy needs to be based upon 
our values and our values are respect for human rights.
    So when we get involved in arms sales with countries that 
allow these arms to be used inappropriately against their own 
people, or to deny human rights to others, we should not permit 
that to happen. We need to filter our considerations of arms 
sales through our human rights concerns.
    What commitments can we have from you that, as you are at 
the table as these types of decisions are being made that, 
indeed, we will promote our values, our human rights, even 
though at times it might run some challenges in our bilateral 
relations with other countries?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question, Senator.
    Yes, as I said, that we need to look at our values but also 
we need to highlight the importance of human rights. In that, I 
can--what I am aware of is that there is now a review ongoing 
on our conventional arms transfer policy which will inform 
decisions on transfers, and that I can certainly say, if I am 
confirmed, that things will change. It will not be business as 
usual.
    So we need to continue to look at these on a case by case 
basis. We need to look at our national security concerns. We 
need to look at our strategic concerns that we have in the 
region, region stability, and we also need to continue to 
reassess anything that we decide to transfer to another 
country.
    But, ultimately, we have to consider human rights in these 
issues, and if I am confirmed, I will be looking at the revised 
CAT policies that are being discussed right now.
    Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. I will be working with you on those areas. 
I have introduced some legislation in this regard, and I am 
glad to see it is not business as usual. It is absolutely 
essential that, as we talk about arms sales that human rights 
be a component of those discussions.
    Mr. Fernandez, I want to raise a subject I have raised 
consistently with nominees that have come before our committee, 
and that is the importance to standing up against corruption.
    We have several tools that are available that are in your 
toolkit, including the use of the Global Magnitsky statute. 
There are pieces of legislation pending before this committee 
that I have authored on a bipartisan basis with other members 
of our committee that would set up a requirement that our 
missions evaluate every country's commitment to anti-corruption 
and evaluate how well they are doing, as well as making funds 
available to fight corruption.
    Can I get your commitment--I have gotten this from so many 
of the members of the Biden administration--that you will be 
focused in your work on an anti-corruption agenda, recognizing 
that corruption many times is the fuel for anti-democratic 
regimes being able to stay in power and abuse power?
    Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question. 
Absolutely. You have my commitment. In fact, I will tell you 
that I am a firm believer from my time in the private sector 
that we are never going to out compete other countries through 
low environmental standards, intellectual property theft, 
corruption, or lack of respect for human rights.
    Transparency is part of our DNA. It is part of what we are 
about as a country and it is also--I have seen it. I have seen 
it be a competitive advantage.
    I have seen countries say, we are going to use an American 
company to build this road because we know that that contract 
was not obtained through illicit means. So you have my 
commitment and, in fact, I would love to work with you some 
more on these issues. It is something that is in my DNA as 
well, and I very much would welcome the opportunity to discuss 
it further with you.
    Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, and again, I want to thank 
both of our nominees and their families. This is a tough time 
to serve in government.
    Both of your roles that you have been nominated for are 
critically important to our national security and have 
challenges, and thank you for stepping forward and I look 
forward to working with both of you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I 
understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. You are recognized, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch. I appreciate your holding this meeting.
    My first question is for Ambassador Jenkins. Thank you for 
being here today, Ambassador.
    We are in a period right now where China is ramping up its 
nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, Russia is 
articulating a strategy of ``escalate to de-escalate''. They 
are developing weapons like the Poseidon that has the 
capability of destroying cities.
    So at this time, I want to get your perspective on which 
way the Biden administration is going to go, and if I could, I 
would like to read a couple of quotes and then get your 
thoughts on what direction we are going.
    During her nomination hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Kath Hicks said that ``The Triad has been the bedrock of our 
nuclear deterrent and I think it must be modernized in order to 
be safe, secure, and credible.''
    Yet, on April 10th, 2021, two Biden administration 
officials gave an interview in Japan with the Asahi Shimbun 
with a fundamentally different message about U.S. nuclear 
policy.
    During that interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance 
Alexandra Bell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Nuclear Missile Defense Policy Leonor Tomero said that, quote, 
``There is no doubt that President Biden's goal is to reduce 
the role of nuclear weapons.''
    So, Ambassador Jenkins, if you are confirmed, will you 
commit to supporting the modernization of nuclear weapons?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. I think I, like President 
Biden, really support a safe, secure, and strong nuclear 
arsenal for as long as we do have our nuclear arsenal, and I 
know that this is a--this has been something that has had 
bipartisan support.
    I know that right now this is being led--issues of 
modernization are led by our Department of Defense, our Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and Department of Energy. So what I can say is 
that, obviously, I am not in the Government right now to know 
what is being discussed.
    But I can, certainly, say that if I am confirmed I look 
forward to engaging with military components as well as 
Department of Energy in the modernization and process.
    And, you know, I think we can agree--as I said, it is 
bipartisan--that we do need a safe, secure, and effective 
arsenal.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, help me rectify this, because we are 
at a time right now when China and Russia are both stepping up 
their nuclear programs and you have got people in the 
department that, if you are confirmed, the department that you 
will run, who are saying that they feel that President Biden 
wants to see us reduce our nuclear capability.
    How do you square that?
    Ms. Jenkins. I think the way to square it is it is going to 
be a whole-of-government approach in terms of how we--how we 
approach these issues. I think having a strong nuclear arsenal 
is not necessarily a contradiction in terms of looking at how 
we can also find a way in which we can safely and adequately 
reduce our arsenal.
    I think a lot will depend on what is decided in terms of 
how we work with countries like Russia. It will determine, I 
assume, on ongoing discussions with China. So I cannot say 
because I am not in the Government.
    But I think that we should be able to square this by having 
a whole-of-government approach in how we look at all of these 
issues of the nuclear Triad, the Nuclear Posture Review, and 
also the way in which we will approach countries on arms 
control and disarmament.
    Senator Hagerty. Ambassador, thank you. I will just say 
this. We live in a competitive world. We need to take account 
of what China is doing, what Russia is doing. We need not be 
naive in our process.
    So I hope you will take a very careful look at what your 
staff, if you are to be confirmed, are saying and make certain 
that we have a consistent policy and that we are not 
articulating a confusing position to our own nation and to our 
adversaries.
    Can I turn now to a discussion that I have been looking 
forward to having with Mr. Fernandez?
    Mr. Fernandez, I would like to talk with you about the 
Clean Network initiative that you and I have discussed. It has 
been an undisputed success with some 60 countries that have 
already signed up. Two hundred companies have been involved in 
the Clean Network initiative, again, an initiative that enables 
us to keep untrusted vendors out of our infrastructure.
    We have talked about this in the past. It has built 
tremendous brand equity, and given your background in mergers 
and acquisitions, I am certain you realize that that type of 
momentum has a great deal of value, something that we would 
certainly like to see captured and the momentum continue.
    If you are confirmed, would you commit to working with 
Congress to secure the resources and any new authorities that 
you may need to continue to move this program forward?
    Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question, and we 
had a conversation yesterday about this and let me repeat what 
I said then, which is I very much agree that the stakes could 
not be higher, that we need to trust that--and our allies need 
to trust that the 5G equipment that they purchase will not 
threaten national security, privacy, or basic infrastructure, 
and the Biden administration has reaffirmed the importance of a 
5G strategy.
    The Clean Network Initiative is currently under review. We 
share the goal. There has been lots of progress, and it is my 
intent to try and further those goals.
    In a new administration, there may be some tweaks. But you 
have my commitment and you have my word that we will pursue the 
same goals because they involve national security at its core, 
not just for the United States but for the entire world.
    And so I look forward to working with you on that and I 
would be delighted to spend some time working on furthering 
that objective.
    Senator Hagerty. Excellent, Mr. Fernandez, and I look 
forward to working with you, actually taking this approach 
across other sectors--technology sectors, energy sectors--as we 
think about, you know, the new infrastructure of the future, 
autonomous vehicles, et cetera. I think there is a lot of 
opportunity there.
    One follow-up question. The State Department compiled a 
list of 1,100 companies that are involved in financing the PRC 
military. That list is very helpful to investment advisors as 
they think about and advise their clients on which companies to 
divest.
    When will the State Department update that list of 1,100 
companies?
    Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for the question. I am 
not familiar with those plans. I would be happy to get back to 
you on that. But I am not familiar with the--with that list of 
the names that are there or the plants that the State 
Department has to update them. I will certainly get back to you 
on that.
    Senator Hagerty. Great. It is very useful tool, and I 
appreciate the update schedule when you can get it. Thank you 
so much.
    Mr. Fernandez. Of course.

         Mr. Fernandez's Response to Senator Hagerty's Question

    Mr. Fernandez. I understand that the State Department, in 
consultation with the Treasury Department, is currently evaluating 
entities based on required criteria under Executive Order 13959, as 
amended, and relevant published Frequently Asked Questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is 
with us virtually.
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member, and congratulations to both witnesses on their 
nominations. Thank you for your willingness to serve.
    Madam Ambassador, I want to follow up a little bit on some 
of the questions that Senator Hagerty raised, at least that 
line of questioning. I think we have long agreed on a 
bipartisan basis that our sort of strategic defense depends on 
a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.
    But we have also recognized that we can make ourselves 
safer through smart arms control agreements with previously the 
former Soviet Union and now with Russia and others, and I was 
pleased to see that President Biden chose to extend the New 
START agreement by five years.
    That had some bipartisan support here. I had introduced a 
resolution with Senator Young to encourage that and I am glad 
that the administration moved forward, and that has the 
support, as you know, of our military leadership as well, who 
recognizes--who recognized that that is an important part of 
our stability, predictability, and verification regime.
    But this five years will now give us an opportunity to look 
at follow-on negotiations, strategic nuclear negotiations, or 
other nuclear weapons negotiations with Russia.
    How do you anticipate moving forward on that? Do you agree 
that we should be looking for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear 
weapons and looking at some of the Russian capabilities and 
bringing them within the fold of the next arms control 
agreement?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. And I think, looking forward, 
and as I said, this is something also being looked at by the 
administration and they are also in the process of planning the 
next steps for engagement with Russia on these issues, 
certainly, I think the idea would be deeper cuts.
    But I think a lot of that depends. A lot of that depends on 
what happens with the strategic stability talks that are being 
planned.
    We, certainly, want to include discussions on some of the 
novel weapons that Russia have. We, certainly, want to look at 
their nonstrategic nuclear weapons that they have, which they 
have a lot more and are planning to build more of these type of 
weapons.
    So we, certainly, want to have a discussion in which we 
will bring in all of these weapons systems, as I said earlier, 
so we can--we can determine exactly where we need to have a 
conversation on deeper cuts.
    And as you--and as you have acknowledged, this will be a 
decision by the administration looking at all the different 
relevant factors, including having a strong nuclear arsenal.
    Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
    Let me turn quickly to China. While China is working to 
develop and modernize its nuclear forces, there remain big, you 
know, differentials between both the size and the quantitative 
edge with respect to our nuclear arsenal.
    That does not mean, however, that there is not room for 
some negotiations with China to avoid miscalculations. Could 
you talk a little bit about your vision of how we engage with 
China when it comes to nuclear arms control?
    Ms. Jenkins. China is an important country in terms of 
nuclear arms issues. They are a significant threat to us, as we 
have noted earlier. As noted, they are trying to increase their 
nuclear arsenal two times by the end of the year. They are 
strengthening their nuclear Triad. They are looking at trying 
some novel systems.
    So, certainly, we have to find a way to have a--to get them 
at the table. As you know, it has been a challenge to do that. 
There have been attempts to try to make that happen.
    But I think we have to focus on results more than form. We 
do think and I think the administration thinks that a bilateral 
effort is the way to go and because there are certain security 
issues that I think that we want to look at specifically with 
China.
    So we want to engage them and I believe the administration 
is discussing next steps for to engage--to engage China 
bilaterally to try to start the discussion so we can prevent 
miscalculation, we can have more transparency, and get a much 
better understanding of what is happening for everybody's 
security.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
    And, Mr. Fernandez, just briefly, I want to mention Power 
Africa and whether you would agree that that has been a very 
useful tool in terms of engaging with Africa and trying to 
accomplish some of our objectives there and whether it makes 
sense to expand the use of Power Africa.
    Mr. Fernandez. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your 
question, and I am very familiar with your interest and 
commitment to working in Africa.
    I think Power Africa has been a success. It has been a 
success on the renewables front. It has been a success on 
regulatory reform in Africa. I think we need to expand it. I 
think, as I said in my opening statement, one of the benefits, 
one of the competitive advantages that we have over countries 
such as China is a private sector, and we need to get our 
private sector involved in infrastructure in Africa.
    That may be a tall order. But I think programs such as 
Power Africa are programs that we ought to deepen, and you have 
my commitment to work with this committee to do that, going 
forward.
    I have spent a fair amount of time in Africa. I used to 
commute to Ghana for about two years, privatizing its phone 
company. It is a country that has great potential and it also 
presents an opportunity for U.S. business and U.S. workers.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Markey, I understand, is with us virtually.
    Senator Markey?
    Senator Markey. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
    The Chairman. Thank you. You are recognized.
    Senator Markey. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
    The Chairman. I can, and you are recognized.
    Senator Markey. Beautiful. Thank you.
    Ambassador Jenkins, President Trump systematically 
dismantled the arms control architecture that you will oversee 
as undersecretary. He was egged on--President Trump--by John 
Bolton.
    But, ultimately, President Trump tossed aside the 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Arms Trade Treaty, the 
Iran nuclear deal, the treaty on open skies, and he flirted 
with taking a wrecking ball to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty by signaling an interest in conducting a, quote, 
``demonstration'' nuclear test just last year.
    And at home, President Trump broke with his predecessors by 
increasing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in military 
strategy by deploying a low-yield warhead on our strategic 
ballistic submarines and developing a new nuclear sea launch 
cruise missile after President George Herbert Walker Bush 
retired them three decades again.
    So it is clear we need to build back a better nuclear 
posture, and so my question to you is are--is the Biden 
administration going to carry out a review of its nuclear 
policy and do you agree that every effort should be made to 
follow the tradition of presidents on a bipartisan basis, going 
back to George Herbert Walker Bush but exempting Donald Trump?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. It is my understanding that 
there is review taking place on the Nuclear Posture Review. 
There are reviews and interagency discussions, to my 
understanding, on a number of issues relating to arms control, 
relating to nonproliferation issues, and all the other--many of 
the other issues that we are discussing today.
    So there is a review of that and I, certainly, look forward 
to and hope, if I am confirmed, that we can have a bipartisan 
process for going forward on all these issues that are within 
the T Bureau, particularly the ones we are talking today about 
arms control and nonproliferation, and finding ways that we can 
reassert the U.S. leadership role in arms control and 
nonproliferation.
    Thank you.
    Senator Markey. Yeah, thank you.
    Well, in 2013, President Obama's nuclear employment 
guidance concluded that we could reduce our deployed stockpile 
by up to one-third and still meet our deterrence and 
reassurance commitments, and I hope that is the position that 
the Biden administration is once again going to reaffirm.
    The Trump administration reportedly flirted with conducting 
the first U.S. nuclear test in over a generation in a clumsy 
attempt to bring Russia and China to the negotiating table. My 
PLANET Act last year helped to deny funds to make good on those 
Dr. Strangelove visions.
    In your view, if we were to carry out such a test, what 
would the consequences be to the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime?
    Ms. Jenkins. Sir, for the U.S.--if the U.S. did a test that 
would certainly--we, certainly, would not be considered leaders 
in the nonproliferation area. We have--we would go against our 
moratorium that we have on nuclear testing.
    There would be lots of questions about why we are testing, 
what that mean in the future. So that would create a lot of 
confusion in the international community. It would create a lot 
of confusion by countries in terms of our overall role and 
obligations in arms control and it, certainly, would not bode 
well, in my opinion, in terms of our role and our position on 
nuclear testing.
    Senator Markey. Good, thank you. And one final question. If 
confirmed, will you advocate for the president to recommit to 
the Arms Trade Treaty and work with members of this committee 
to build support for future senate advice and consent on that 
treaty?
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question. If I am confirmed, 
I would, certainly, be interested in conversations and in the 
interagency on next steps or next possible steps for the U.S. 
in the Arms Trade Treaty.
    Senator Markey. Okay. Beautiful. Thank you, and thank you 
for your service to our country.
    Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Schatz?
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both 
of you for being willing to serve.
    Ambassador Jenkins, there was a recent DOD report in which 
they essentially conceded an inability to track--to do end-use 
monitoring of arms in conflict areas like Ukraine and 
Afghanistan. We have seen American-made so-called nonlethal 
weapons used in Egypt and in Hong Kong.
    I have a couple of questions about how we do end-use 
monitoring. I know there is a good partnership at the--at the 
State Department with the Department of Defense to track the 
weapons that we sell or provide to our foreign partners.
    My understanding is that the Security Cooperation Office at 
our embassies is responsible for conducting these end-use 
checks. But often the people in these offices are stretched 
thin, and I am wondering if this is an area where a few more 
people or some new use of technology could strengthen our 
oversight in terms of weapons exports.
    Can you comment on this and talk about what opportunities 
you see to improve the resources we dedicate to end-use 
monitoring checks?
    Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you. Thank you, sir, for that 
question.
    Yes, end-use monitoring is very important in terms of 
ensuring that the arms transfers actually end up where they are 
supposed to be.
    So we, certainly, want to do everything we can to 
strengthen and make sure that end-use monitoring is happening. 
I am aware that there are cases, and I cannot recall which--in 
which case at the moment, but I know that it has been more 
successful I know in some cases where countries have actually 
gone out and done--have done more in terms of end-use 
monitoring and have more agreements.
    I think one thing that we need to do, as you said, I think 
we should always look at more options if there is technology 
that can help. I think that, you know, if I were confirm happy 
to look at different options that can help us. Strengthening--
if there is a need for more people to help out with that, I 
think that is great.
    But I think, as I was saying earlier, as we have much more 
emphasis in the future on human rights, as we more have a much 
stronger emphasis on these issues in general in terms of where 
these--where these arms end up, I am, certainly, open to more 
discussion on what we can do to make it better, in particular, 
in light of the fact that we are relooking at our CAT policy 
and everything else.
    Senator Schatz. So I think there are a couple areas for 
improvement.
    First of all, technology. Second of all, just flat out 
resources. You need more human beings to do this work. And then 
third, sort of undergirding that, you do not want to just lay 
down a layer of technology on an old system under old 
assumptions.
    And so I do think we need to do a comprehensive look and 
just concede it is not working right now. It may be working to 
greater and lesser degrees in certain countries, but where it 
needs to work it is not working.
    Now, there is another question that I think is essential to 
this, which is that it is not just the geographic location of 
whatever arms have been transferred. It is how they are used, 
right, and that is a policy question.
    I am wondering if we can work together on that, because it 
may be that it is in the possession of those--of that country 
that we transferred it to but used for something that is 
antithetical to our values.
    And I think that is a more ticklish kind of difficult 
policy question to get to because it is after the fact. But I 
still think that is our basic obligation when we think about 
and use monitoring. I wonder if you can comment on that.
    Ms. Jenkins. No, I think--I think you are right. I think--I 
think, I mean, obviously, as you said, one question is where do 
the arms land and the other one is how are they used, you know, 
and giving them to a country for one purpose and they are being 
used for something else.
    You know, it is a challenge. You know, it is a challenge to 
always--to know exactly how it is going to be used. But I think 
that we, certainly, want to strengthen whatever we have now to 
make sure that we can do that.
    If I am confirmed I am, certainly, happy and ready to work 
with you on that.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Fernandez, just a final question. Our science bureaus 
play an important role in terms of our relationships with 
countries in Oceania. Their work is key to protecting marine 
resources and combating IUU fishing and tackling the climate 
crisis.
    But I worry that these issues get a little bit isolated, 
stovepiped, from the day-to-day diplomacy run out of the East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau.
    Can you talk about how we can make sure that oceans and 
climate are elevated in our approach to Oceania so that it is 
not that we are separating science and conservation questions 
from the sort of big boy and big girl conversation around 
geopolitics, but that those are one and the same, especially in 
those areas where when you are dealing with heads of state 
where climate is their main issue, right?
    When you have an inundated runway or you have an inability 
to farm or fish, climate is not some secondary optional 
conservation question. It is an existential question.
    But I think that our bureaucratic systems have to reflect 
that prioritization, particularly in Oceania but also 
elsewhere.
    Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I 
could not agree with you more that this is an existential 
question for the countries in Oceania. They are--they are 
facing, in some cases, extinction because of climate change. So 
I share very much your concern.
    I also think that many of them--it also cuts across a 
number of other areas. They also are targets of Chinese 
influence, and so that is another national security challenge.
    On the pollution front on the ocean, illegal fishing and 
those kinds of crimes, we have offices that are all over that 
and I have spoken to a number of them already, and I think 
there is more we could do, going forward.
    So I would very much welcome, if confirmed, the opportunity 
to talk to you about that and you have my commitment that we 
will certainly look at those again, because I do agree with 
you. Sometimes these issues do get overlooked.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now, I understand there are no 
other colleagues seeking recognition, virtually or otherwise. 
So I have one final question.
    Mr. Fernandez, during my time in this committee, I focused 
on reinvigorating the tools and instruments of our economic 
statecraft so that the Department of State, Treasury, Commerce, 
U.S. Trade Representative, and other elements of the U.S. 
Government are working in tandem to promote international 
development, U.S. business opportunities, and U.S. best 
practices for corporate social responsibility.
    I am amazed--you know, we have the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, which we should. It does not allow U.S. 
businesses to suborn some entity or official abroad. Other 
countries do not have that. This has been one of Senator 
Cardin's passions on the question of corruption.
    I go abroad and I see the chancellor of Germany with a 
trade mission directly engaged in trying to promote her 
country's services and products. Until recently, the Brazilians 
had a very powerful economic tool in their centralized effort.
    So my question is what tools do we have, in your opinion, 
that are currently working? What tools are not working as 
effectively?
    What additional authorities might you believe you might be 
needing and how do we bring a whole-of-government approach to 
an economic statecraft that creates greater opportunities for 
U.S. companies in selling their products and services abroad, 
opening up more markets, also instilling the business practices 
that are better than many others in the world so it has an 
economic benefit here at home?
    We sell products abroad, our services abroad. We create 
jobs here at home. When we instill the right business 
practices, we improve governance in those countries.
    Can you give me some insights as to how you are thinking 
about this?
    Mr. Fernandez. Sure. Thank you for the question. That is a 
big question and I am glad that you asked.
    The Chairman. That is why you are going to get paid the big 
bucks if you get confirmed.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Fernandez. I am very glad that you brought it up. You 
know, when I was here in--between 2009 and 2013, I was amazed 
by the fact that I would go to countries in the Middle East 
and, you know, I would go on my regular commercial flight and 
next to me would be the president of another country, and that 
president would come down the aisle and right behind them were 
a number of companies, were a number of business people.
    It was not so much of a presidential visit as much as a 
Chamber of Commerce visit. We do not have that kind of ethos 
yet at the State Department. We are working on it and you have 
given us a number of tools.
    I think what was done with the DFC is something that that 
ups the ante on where we can compete with the Chinese and with 
others.
    We need to--and I intend to do this, if confirmed, at the 
State Department--we need to do more on the training front. Our 
State Department employees have to have economic statecraft at 
the forefront of their tasks. It has got to be part of what 
they get graded on.
    And I think I would like to focus more on the training 
side. I think getting more whole-of-government cooperation, for 
example, on deal teams that where we embed economic officers in 
some of the embassies to support American business.
    We need to do more of that because at the end of the day, 
becoming involved in international opportunities are not just a 
strategic imperative for the United States but also business 
opportunities for companies and an opportunity to create better 
jobs in the United States.
    And so, if confirmed, I will continue my push to try and 
get economics at the forefront of what the State Department 
does.
    The Chairman. Well, I am thrilled to hear you say that. I 
think that one of our challenges is trying to permeate 
throughout the State Department and its offices, particularly 
our embassies abroad, the concept that economic statecraft is 
one of the core missions that are critical for an ambassador 
and their staff to promote.
    When I go abroad and visit our embassies--and they do 
incredible work and our people are just fantastic individuals--
but I do not get the--I hear about the political component of 
what is happening in the country or our bilateral relations in 
dimensions that are everything but economic, in most cases.
    And having that permeate to the thought that, in fact, what 
we are doing to promote U.S. economic interests, which I would 
argue also are about good governance issues as well within the 
country and better products and services for the nations 
receiving it, is, I think, an incredibly important element.
    So we look forward upon your confirmation and working with 
you on this because I think this is a critical issue and it 
creates a real connection to Americans to understand if my 
business or the company I work for gets to sell X product 
abroad, my job here is not only more secure but maybe more 
prosperous. And so that is something we need to do a better job 
of.
    Let me thank--oh, I am sorry.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. Okay. So we look forward to working with you 
on that. I am going to say we have a colleague who is 
supposedly on his way here and in deference to him I will wait.
    But I will say that when he finishes his line of 
questioning, the record will remain open until the close of 
business Friday, April 30th. I would urge both of you there 
will be questions for the record. I would urge both of you to 
respond to them fully and expeditiously as possible so that--
excuse me, so that your nominations can be considered at a 
business meeting of the committee and move the process forward.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. Excuse me for one moment.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. All right. I am not quite sure when our 
colleague would be here, and in deference to the rest of the 
committee, I am sure he will be able to pursue his questions 
for the record. He may call you as well.
    I do not know if Senator Kaine has had an opportunity to 
engage with both of you. But if he has then I would urge you to 
do so.
    And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
     Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Robert Menendez

Arms Control with China
    Question. The recently passed ``Strategic Competition Act'' 
provides a blueprint for using all of the United States' strategic, 
economic, and diplomatic tools to effectively compete with China. One 
section of this bipartisan bill lays out the need for effective arms 
control in the face of China's military modernization and expansion. 
The previous administration made a clumsy attempt to engage China in 
arms control, which the PRC firmly rejected.

   What approach should the United States use to begin strategic 
        stability talks or arms control with China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in 
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to 
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed 
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and 
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to 
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the 
administration foresees pursuing with China.

    Question. What issues do you believe the United States should focus 
on? Risk Reductions? Arms limitations?

    Answer. The United States should pursue arms control, in the form 
of both numerical limitations and broader risk reduction measures, that 
advances the security of the United States, U.S. allies, and partners.

    Question. What role should U.S. Indo-Pacific allies play in our 
arms control dialogue with China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in 
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to 
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed 
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and 
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I will work 
with U.S. allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to regularly urge 
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control, 
as doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.

    Question. Should the United States seek trilateral arms control 
talks involving both Russia and China?

    Answer. The United States should pursue arms control measures with 
Russia and China that advance the security of the United States, U.S. 
allies, and partners. While there may be opportunities for trilateral 
initiatives that meet this criterion, I believe the United States 
should engage each country on a bilateral basis as well.

Open Skies
    Question. In November of last year, the Trump administration made 
the reckless decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, leaving 
the United States and our allies less secure against Russia. The 
administration's decision to abandon the Treaty fits into a broader 
pattern of discarding arms control and non-proliferation agreements, 
which has raised deep concerns among our allies about our commitment to 
their security. I have urged the Biden administration to rejoin the 
Treaty in a manner consistent with our constitutional structure, but 
recognize that it will not be easy, and that the Open Skies treaty, 
while valuable, does not address many of the current security 
challenges we face from Russia.

   Do you believe the United States should seek to rejoin the Open 
        Skies Treaty?

    Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to 
withdraw from the Treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues. 
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns 
impacted the overall operation of the Treaty. That said, leaving a 
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are 
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies 
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the 
internal discussions on the matter.

    Question. The State Department and Congress have consistently 
expressed concerns about Russia's violation of some its treaty 
obligations; for example, limiting the length of flights over 
Kaliningrad and restricting flights near Russia's border with Georgia. 
If the United States decided to rejoin the treaty would the United 
States insist on resolving these compliance issues?

    Answer. The United States has made it quite clear that Russia must 
return to compliance and that Russia's violations are an important 
consideration in our review of U.S. policy on the Treaty. I know the 
administration is committed to effective arms control that advances 
U.S., Allied, and partner security and will only join agreements that 
are deemed to be in our security interests. Compliance is an essential 
consideration in that regard.

    Question. If the Biden administration decides not to rejoin the 
treaty, what steps should we take to reassure our allies that we still 
seek a European security system based upon transparency and 
cooperation?

    Answer. I know the United States is committed to effective arms 
control, transparency and confidence building measures that advance 
U.S., Allied, and partner security. If confirmed, I would continue the 
ongoing U.S. effort to work closely with our allies in this regard and 
on a host of broader security issues at NATO and OSCE. These include 
ongoing efforts to modernize the Vienna Document to strengthen 
transparency on military activities and increase stability in Europe.

Firearms Export Control
    Question. As a candidate, President Biden pledged to return the 
export control jurisdiction of semiautomatic weapons from the 
Department of Commerce to the Department of State. As part of ``THE 
BIDEN PLAN TO END OUR GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC'', the following commitment 
was made:

          Additionally, Biden will ensure that the authority for 
        firearms exports stays with the State Department, and if 
        needed, reverse a proposed rule by President Trump. This will 
        ensure that the State Department continues to block the code 
        use to 3D print firearms from being made available on the 
        Internet.

    Just this week, the appeals court for the Ninth Circuit lifted an 
injunction that prevented the transfer of 3D Printed firearm technical 
information from also being transferred to the Department of Commerce, 
whose regulations and ability to control the publication of such 
information is significantly more limited than that of the State 
Department's International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regulations. This is 
a loosening of controls on these very dangerous ``ghost guns''.
    I am concerned that the Department of State is not doing all it can 
to fulfill the President's promise to the American People. State has 
not yet even answered a letter I sent to Secretary Blinken on February 
1 on this issue.

   If confirmed, what will you do, specifically, to fulfill the 
        President's campaign promise?

    Answer. I share the concerns expressed regarding the unregulated 
proliferation of ``ghost guns.'' If confirmed, I commit to working, 
together with my interagency colleagues, to ensure that there are 
effective controls over the export of information necessary for the 
manufacture of firearms, or any defense articles, no matter how those 
items are manufactured.

    Question. What options exist in the ITAR or other State authorities 
to maintain controls on 3D Gun Printing information?

    Answer. The Arms Export Control Act provides the President with the 
authority to designate those items which shall be considered defense 
articles and defense services and to promulgate regulations for the 
import and export of such articles and services. That authority has 
been delegated to the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Executive Order 13637. It is 
my understanding that the Department conducts regular reviews of the 
United States Munitions List, in consultation with the Department of 
Defense and other relevant U.S. Government agencies, to ensure that any 
defense article or defense service designated on the USML provides a 
critical military or intelligence advantage such that it warrants 
control under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

    Question. ITAR Sec. 126.2, ``Temporary suspension or modification 
of this subchapter,'' states that ``[T]he Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Defense Trade Controls may order the temporary suspension or 
modification [emphasis added] of any or all of the regulations of this 
subchapter in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the 
United States.''

   Do you construe that passage to mean that you, if confirmed, could 
        direct this Deputy Assistant Secretary to, on a temporary 
        basis, alter the provisions of Category 1 of the ITAR to retain 
        the technical information that enables the 3D Printing of 
        firearms and components?

    Answer. Under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act and 
Executive Order 13637, the authority to designate defense articles and 
defense services on the United States Munitions List for the purpose of 
export and temporary import is delegated to the Secretary of State. If 
confirmed, I commit to working, together with my interagency 
colleagues, to control those defense articles and defense services that 
provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence 
advantage. In so doing, I will ensure that the United States Munitions 
List is appropriately revised and updated using the regulatory 
mechanisms that best clarify the controls and offer the greatest 
transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency 
consideration.

    Question. Will you do so, if confirmed?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States 
Munitions List is appropriately revised and updated using the 
regulatory mechanisms that best clarify applicable controls and offer 
the greatest transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency 
consideration.

Compliance with Committee Oversight
    Question. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau has refused to 
provide answers to my questions or those from my staff about their 
investigative and compliance activities. They have claimed that ``it 
was not the policy or practice'' to answer such questions, even to 
questions concerning whether certain activities are considered 
``defense services'' and subject to licensing. In response, I have 
initiated a GAO investigation.

   If confirmed, will you continue this policy of blocking the 
        legitimate oversight of this committee, or will you change this 
        ``policy and practice''?

    Answer. I appreciate the critical role that Congress plays in 
providing oversight. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure 
that it is able to effectively perform its oversight activities. In 
addition, if confirmed, I will seek to maintain the integrity of the 
Department's investigations into potential export control violations, 
which includes pursuing investigations of potential export control 
violations in a vigorous and timely manner.

CAATSA 231
    Question. CAATSA section 231 imposes secondary sanctions on 
entities that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense 
and intelligence sectors. The law has been instrumental in denying 
billions of dollars to the Russian defense sector, but there was no 
senior level leadership under the last administration in pushing for 
full implementation. I expect that to change and that the State 
Department will renew its diplomatic efforts at every post to ensure 
that every effort is being made to deter these transactions from taking 
place.

   Do I have your commitment to reinvigorate the department's efforts 
        to ensure robust implementation of this law? Do you commit to 
        report back to me on the specific actions taken by the 
        department on CAATSA 231 implementation?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to full implementation of CAATSA 231 
and to ensuring that the Department keeps you and other appropriate 
Congressional Members fully apprised of our implementation efforts.

Nagorno-Karabakh
    Question. Azerbaijan's use of cluster munitions, rockets, and other 
such weapons during its attack on Nagorno-Karabakh last fall has 
increased the need for demining funding there, which the previous 
administration cut off. In his QFR responses, Secretary Blinken said 
that he ``strongly support[s]'' U.S. funding for demining efforts in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.

   If confirmed, will you support the resumption of U.S. funding for 
        humanitarian demining in Nagorno-Karabakh?

    Answer. The administration is deeply concerned by the renewed 
hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the ongoing humanitarian 
needs in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Secretary Blinken has signaled 
strong support for funding demining efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh, as 
well as his intent to work with Congress, international organizations 
such as the U.N., and our allies and partners to meet humanitarian 
needs in the region. I understand that the Department is evaluating the 
needs of affected populations and clarifying practical questions 
related to the United States' ability to commit funding and implement 
programs effectively.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Do you believe there is a symbiotic connection between 
nuclear deterrence and arms control?

    Answer. Yes, a credible, modern deterrent and arms control should 
work together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.

    Question. Is it your understanding that that the New START Treaty 
was ratified only after the Obama administration agreed to modernize 
the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons complex, and that any unilateral 
reduction of these programs would make the Senate far less likely to 
ratify future arms control treaties?

    Answer. I understand that the Obama administration pursued a 
combination of diplomacy, arms control, and nuclear deterrence to 
reduce nuclear dangers. If confirmed, I will provide analysis and 
advice to the Secretary of State on measures for reducing nuclear 
dangers, and I will be prepared to consult with members of Congress.

    Question. Do you believe that unilateral U.S. reductions in the 
nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex would enable the United 
States to negotiate with Russia and China from a position of strength?

    Answer. I am committed to ensuring the United States maintains an 
effective, credible and modern deterrent, while simultaneously using 
arms control to address nuclear threats and increase our security.

    Question. Do you believe the President can rejoin the Open Skies 
Treaty without it being submitted to the Senate for advice and consent 
per the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution?

    Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be 
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.

    Question. How should Russia's long-standing and ongoing violation 
of the Biological Weapons Convention and China's disinformation 
surrounding COVID-19 affect our efforts to strengthen U.S. biosecurity 
initiatives?

    Answer. Russia's Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) violation and 
the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate the need to address the full range of 
biological threats--whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in 
origin. We must counter known BW programs and, increasingly, organized 
disinformation efforts. If confirmed, I will work with allies and 
partners to strengthen the BWC's ability to manage the risks of dual-
use research and advanced biotechnologies and to improve global 
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, as well as international 
preparedness. I will take a clear-eyed approach, recognizing that not 
all countries will share our goals, and I will work with Global 
Engagement Center colleagues to counter COVID-19 related and other 
disinformation campaigns.

    Question. How can we best ensure accountability for Russia and 
Syria's use of chemical weapons?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with allies and partners, 
including through the U.N. and the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to hold Russia and Syria to account for their 
repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the 
OPCW, the United States supported actions to add two Novichok families 
to the CWC Annex on Chemicals and to suspend Syria's rights and 
privileges under the CWC. The United States has also used other 
measures, including sanctions authorities against Russia and Syria. If 
confirmed, I will explore further measures to address any violation of 
the CWC.

    Question. Which emerging technologies most threaten strategic 
stability, and why? How can we best address these technologies?

    Answer. I would be most concerned about any technology that 
undermines the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces, especially the 
credibility of our second-strike capability. The best way to address 
potential threats is by taking steps to ensure our strategic deterrent 
remains effective and credible and pursuing arms control that enhances 
U.S., allied, and partner security.

    Question. In your testimony, you reference building ``values-based 
security partnerships.'' How do you define a values-based security 
partnership? Do you believe that the U.S. should only pursue security 
partnerships with liberal democracies?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the administration's foreign 
policy will reflect our values and human rights will be at the center. 
We will stand firm behind our commitments to human rights, democracy, 
and the rule of law, and our security partnerships are no exception. 
While the United States will necessarily have security relationships 
with countries that are not liberal democracies, if confirmed, I will 
champion values like accountability, transparency, professionalism, and 
respect for human rights as we engage our security partners and help 
build their capacity to address shared challenges.

    Question. Should the United States re-sign and then ratify the Arms 
Trade Treaty? Why or why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of 
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the 
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to 
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I 
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of 
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the 
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S. 
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values, 
and interests.

    Question. The Obama administration repeatedly declassified the 
topline number of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. Russia and China 
never reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear 
stockpile number without any reciprocity by Russia or China today?

    Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile 
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to 
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further 
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to 
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification 
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has 
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our 
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the 
same.

    Question. In your opinion, why does Russia maintain a nuclear-
capable missile defense system consisting of 68 nuclear-armed 
interceptors?

    Answer. Despite Moscow's complaints regarding U.S. ballistic 
missile defense programs and capabilities, it is clear that the Russian 
Federation also believes in the importance of developing, deploying, 
maintaining, and modernizing its ballistic missile defense 
capabilities.

    Question. It was a significant concern of the Senate during the 
ratification of the New START treaty that it not constrain U.S. missile 
defense. Do you agree it is imperative that the U.S. not commit to arms 
control agreements that would limit U.S. missile defenses?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective 
missile defense programs and will only pursue agreements that enhance 
U.S., allied, and partner security.

    Question. The administration has made clear its intent to negotiate 
another United States-Russia arms control treaty. At the same time, 
U.S. intelligence leaders have found that Russia now ``possesses up to 
2,000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New Start 
Treaty'' and now has ``dozens of these [nonstrategic delivery] systems 
already deployed or in development''. Indeed, 10 years after New START 
was ratified, Russia's advantage under the treaty is now so profound 
that, according to Secretary of State Pompeo ``[o]nly 45 percent of 
Russia's nuclear arsenal is subject to numerical limits.[m]eanwhile, 
that agreement restricts 92 percent of America's arsenal.'' Do you 
agree, as expressed in its Resolution of Ratification for New START, 
that the next arms control treaty between the United States and Russia 
must include these unconstrained nuclear weapons, and not just so-
called strategic nuclear weapons?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time 
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue 
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and 
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, 
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control 
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.

    Question. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proffered a 
``deployment freeze'' on intermediate range missiles in Europe. What is 
your view on this plan? In your opinion, what are President Putin's 
motivations for making this proposal?

    Answer. While the United States plans to pursue arms control that 
addresses all Russian nuclear weapons and engage Russia in strategic 
stability discussions, we must be clear that Russia's proposed 
deployment moratorium proposal, which the administration opposes, would 
not actually prevent a Russian build-up of ground-launched 
intermediate-range missiles because Russia has already produced and 
deployed multiple battalions of the 9M729, including in Western Russia.

    Question. Stakeholders are generally disappointed by the results of 
U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Treaties, despite the best 
efforts of both nations. In your opinion, why have the treaties not 
fulfilled their promise? What can the State Department or the 
interagency do to make them more useful?

    Answer. I understand that, initially, companies did not take 
advantage of the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation 
Treaties (DTCTs), as they found the requirements for using them to be 
overly burdensome and costly. Subsequently, many of the benefits 
envisioned under the DTCTs were superseded by the success of Export 
Control Reform, which moved many less sensitive items to the more 
flexible jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. The Department 
continues to work closely with U.S. interagency colleagues and our UK 
and Australian counterparts to pursue novel solutions to defense trade 
issues.

    Question. In your opinion, why did China stop reporting to the IAEA 
on its plutonium activities and holdings after 2017? What are the 
potential implications for U.S. security as a result of China's 
decision to stop reporting.

    Answer. While I cannot speculate on why China stopped reporting, if 
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the 
IAEA per Information Circular INFCIRC/549 concerning ``Guidelines for 
the Management of Plutonium.'' China's lack of transparency on nuclear 
issues is very troubling, and if confirmed I will pursue measures with 
the PRC that preserve our national security interests.

    Question. Given China's rapidly growing nuclear and conventional 
military capabilities and pattern of aggression against many of its 
neighbors, do you believe that China has become over-confident in its 
ability to control escalation in a conflict? If so, how do you propose 
the United States deal with that reality.

    Answer. I agree that China has increased its aggressive behavior in 
many spheres, but defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific 
assessment regarding China's confidence to control escalation in a 
conflict.

    Question. You have previously advocated for the United States to 
adopt a No First Use (NFU) policy for nuclear weapons. Do you still 
hold that view today?

    Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory 
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might 
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase 
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the 
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to 
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find 
the best ways to do this.

    Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles 
Richard, recently commented that the exceptions in China's No First Use 
policy are ``large enough to drive a truck through''. What are your 
thoughts on the efficacy of China's No First Use policy? Why would one 
support a NFU policy for the United States when China's NFU policy is 
so ambiguous?

    Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing 
would act outside of its professed no first-use policy. China's ongoing 
advances to its nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield 
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise 
questions regarding China's intent and undermine its claims to seek a 
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no first-use policy. I understand 
that the administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that 
will include declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in 
that process and will consult with Congress and our allies on any 
policies or actions in this area.

    Question. Do you believe the United States should adopt a No First 
Use policy without the same concessions and policy reciprocity from 
Russia and China?

    Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. I have 
thought, as many do, that the United States might consider changes to 
U.S. declaratory policy that could increase stability. I understand 
that there are varying perspectives on the issue, but I believe most 
agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to the United States and our 
allies. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency 
and allies and Congress to find the best ways to do this.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States should adopt a Sole 
Purpose doctrine? How would adopting such a doctrine impact our 
deterrence options?

    Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory 
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might 
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase 
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the 
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to 
the United States and our allies. If confirmed, I look forward to 
working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find the best 
ways to do this, while ensuring that the United States maintains a 
credible strategic deterrent.

    Question. Our extended deterrence commitments to allies in the 
Indo-Pacific are foundational to U.S. strategy in the region. That has 
been the case for seven decades. Do you agree that extended deterrence 
is key to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, and that the United 
States must continue to honor, uphold, and strengthen these 
commitments?

    Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in 
advancing U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and 
our strategic deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins 
extended deterrence. It does so by providing assurance to allies and 
partners, which are our greatest strategic asset. If confirmed, I would 
work to ensure, in coordination with the rest of the Biden-Harris 
administration, that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S. 
allies remain strong and credible.

    Question. How would the adoption of a No First Use policy or a Sole 
Purpose doctrine impact our extended deterrence commitments? If we 
weaken or dilute our extended deterrence commitments in the Indo-
Pacific, what do you assess would be the impact on the security 
environment in the region, given the threats from China and North 
Korea?

    Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. If 
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with 
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area. This 
administration is committed to reinvigorating and modernizing alliances 
and partnerships around the world; this includes ensuring U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies remain strong and credible.

    Question. The PRC currently has thousands of missiles pointed at 
Taiwan, and Admiral Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 
has noted that ``Taiwan is clearly one of [the PRC's] ambitions. during 
this decade.'' How can the United States best support Taiwan's defense 
against this threat?

    Answer. The United States has long maintained our abiding interest 
in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I commit to 
maintaining America's rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. The United 
States will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles 
and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our 
``one China'' policy. The United States sold nearly $30 billion worth 
of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure 
Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation 
seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric capabilities 
including reserve force reform.

    Question. Please describe your views on U.S. export control 
policies as they relate to China. What types of technologies should we 
seek to limit or cut off from nefarious end users in China?

    Answer. Export controls are a critical tool to counter Chinese 
President Xi Jinping's strategy to bolster the PRC's military and 
security services and to challenge U.S. and allied technological 
leadership. It is imperative that U.S. arms embargo on China remains in 
place. If confirmed, I will work with the Commerce Department and other 
Departments, as appropriate, to keep dual-use controls as tight as 
possible for products and end-users that pose national security 
concerns, as called for by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.

    Question. Do you believe Huawei and its affiliates should remain on 
the Entity List? Are there any circumstances under which you would 
consider recommending the removal Huawei or any of its affiliates from 
the list?

    Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed 
from the Entity List. Parties are placed on the Entity List for several 
reasons, including posing a threat to U.S. national security and 
foreign policy, and the threat that Huawei poses will remain a key 
factor moving forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with 
colleagues at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin 
technology from being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.

    Question. Do you agree that it is in our national interest to 
strengthen our security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand? If so, please elaborate. If 
confirmed, what specific steps will you take to advance security 
partnerships with these nations, including your views on continuing 
arms sales, engaging in capacity-building, and cooperating on advanced 
technology with South and Southeast Asian partner countries facing 
China's coercion and growing military power?

    Answer. It is absolutely in the national interest of the United 
States to strengthen security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Security cooperation with these 
allies and partners is essential to ensuring a free and open Indo-
Pacific region, building interoperability and bolstering U.S. force 
projection, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, upholding 
rule of law, countering transnational crime and terror organizations, 
responding to natural and humanitarian crisis, and reassuring our 
allies and partners of U.S. commitment to the region, empowering them 
to stand up to coercion and malign influence. It also provides 
opportunities to reinforce our allies' and partners' commitment to the 
rules-based international order.
    If confirmed, I will work to expand engagement with these nations 
at all levels, including by promoting the United States as the region's 
security partner of choice and ensuring they have the arms and training 
capabilities they need to protect and advance our shared interests in 
the region. I will also seek to deepen and expand our overall defense 
cooperation with these nations by advancing key foundational defense 
agreements, which will help enable the transfer of defense articles and 
establish mechanisms that allow for greater overall defense 
cooperation.

    Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Philippine 
relationship and its importance to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific 
region more broadly? Do you support continuing a robust security 
partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including through 
appropriate arms transfers consistent with existing U.S. law?

    Answer. The alliance with the Philippines is foundational to the 
U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific, and the relationship is based on shared 
strategic interests, shared history, culture, and strong connections 
between our nations. If confirmed, I support continuing our robust 
security partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. I would 
ensure that all arms transfers are appropriate and consistent with 
existing U.S. laws, including the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, 
Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. In this 
regard, I would continue the current global policy of reviewing 
proposed arms sales according to a number of factors, which include: 
the degree to which the transfer contributes to ally and partner 
burden-sharing and interoperability in support of strategic, foreign 
policy, and defense interests of the United States; the recipient's 
ability to field, support, and employ the requested system effectively 
and appropriately in accordance with its intended end use; and the risk 
the transfer may be used to undermine international peace and security 
or contribute to abuses of human rights. When appropriate, that review 
includes consultations with Congress and input from DoD and other 
interagency partners.

    Question. In your view, can U.S. security partnerships be a force 
for good in improving human rights conditions in a particular country?

    Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have stated that human 
rights must be at the center of our foreign policy. Strong U.S. 
security partnerships around the world come with a multitude of 
benefits, including the opportunity to positively influence a country's 
human rights practices. These relationships allow us to work closely 
with partners, set an example for human rights standards, and provide 
training, when appropriate.
    If confirmed, I will support assistance to help ensure our partner 
forces are taking steps to comply with international law and protect 
human rights. Additionally, I will work to ensure human rights concerns 
are given full weight in arms transfer decisions, and I will support 
the Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to foreign security forces 
units that are credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.

    Question. Will you ensure that the U.S. Department of State 
consults with Congress before taking action on issues that could 
jeopardize U.S. access to or create significant tensions in our 
relationships with key defense partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially 
those in Southeast Asia?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the Department 
engages with Congress, as appropriate, on actions affecting our 
security partnerships.

    Question. What is your understanding of the Russian Federation's 
nuclear doctrine and how it may be enacted in practice? Which aspect of 
Russia's nuclear doctrine do you find potentially most problematic for 
U.S. defense and strategy?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence 
community on Russian nuclear policy, strategy, doctrine, and forces. It 
is clear that Russia has a large arsenal of up to 2,000 non-strategic 
nuclear weapons that is projected to grow. It has developed a wide 
range of new dual-capable ground-, sea-, and air-based short- and 
intermediate-range missile systems. Such weapons can range U.S. allies 
and partners in Europe and East Asia--as well as U.S. forces stationed 
there--and both our deterrence strategy and our approach to arms 
control must address these threats.

    Question. Which of the Russian Federation's new, so-called 
``exotic'' weapons systems do you find the most geostrategically 
concerning? Please enumerate your specific concerns and explain why 
this system worries you more than the others.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence 
community on Russia's ``exotic'' weapon systems and I will engage with 
the Department of Defense on the military implications of these 
systems. Based on the unclassified information that is available, the 
nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile appears to be volatile, 
unreliable, and dangerous, posing a threat to the entire world, 
including Russia.

    Question. It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in 
Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in 
occupied Crimea. How should the U.S. respond, if at all, should Russia 
place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in your view, 
dramatically change the way that the U.S. looks at Black Sea security?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence 
community on the location of Russian theater-range nuclear weapons and 
I will engage with the Department of Defense on the military 
implications of Russia's nuclear posture.

    Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was founded 
in 2005. Over the last 15 fiscal years, GPOI has received almost $1.3 
billion in funding. This funding has accomplished several objectives, 
including building self-sufficient peace operations training, 
supporting partner country development, enhancing partner country 
operational readiness, and expanded the participation, integration, and 
leadership women in peace operations, to name a few.

   GPOI has improved the capacity and operations of U.N. peacekeeping 
        forces in Africa and globally. Please describe the efforts you 
        will take to continue to integrate women into GPOI's work in 
        both peacekeeping troops and in leadership positions in 
        peacekeeping missions.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support GPOI's continued work to 
increase the meaningful participation of women in peace operations by 
promoting efforts to: encourage partners to increase recruitment, 
training, and deployment of women in all levels and aspects of peace 
operations--including in leadership and decision-making positions; 
train women peacekeepers; incorporate women, peace, and security (WPS) 
topics into peacekeeping training for all peacekeepers; invest in 
gender-responsive upgrades at partner countries' training centers, 
including female barracks and latrines; and support the U.N.'s 
development of WPS training materials.

    Question. GPOI provides critical training to partner countries 
looking to deploy peacekeepers, which includes topics like preventing 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), violence against women, as well as 
technical training. Given the high number of instances of SEA committed 
by peacekeeping troops globally, how would you direct GPOI to enhance 
trainings to counter these occurrences?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct GPOI to pursue activities that 
enhance existing SEA prevention and accountability training 
incorporated into pre-deployment training assistance. I will also 
support GPOI's joint efforts with the U.N. to launch a training-of-
trainers course for National Investigation Officers who investigate 
allegations of SEA against military peacekeepers, as well as to fund a 
U.N. pilot course to train engagement platoons, at least half of which 
are women, to interact with the local population, identify vulnerable 
areas and at-risk populations, and conduct gender-responsive 
assessments to improve situational awareness.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. My entire professional life has been dedicated to public 
service, often in direct promotion of human rights and democracy. For 
example, while at the Ford Foundation, I oversaw the funding of 
activities, programs and research on issues of human rights and 
democracy in my role as Program Officer of U.S. Foreign and Security 
Policy, and approved joint funding with the Human Rights officer. In 
addition, I also had a pool of funds for organizations doing work in 
the area of ``conflicts,'' where the funds went to the issues of child 
soldiers, women in peacekeeping, and the problem of illicit trafficking 
of diamonds and its negative effects. At Women of Color Advancing 
Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, of which I am now the 
Executive Director, I have started a working group on Human Rights to 
host events and activities on issues of human rights. I am also engaged 
in several activities at the U.S. Institute of Peace, including serving 
on the Women Building Peace Council. Finally, my 22 years in the Air 
Force and Naval Reserves have been dedicated to promoting democracy 
both in the U.S. and internationally.

    Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when 
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of 
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote, 
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups?

    Answer. My commitment to public service has always included 
advancing opportunities for all Americans. Fostering diversity and 
inclusion in the national security workforce is incredibly important to 
me personally, and I strongly support President Biden's policy of 
prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a 
national security imperative to ensure critical perspectives and 
talents are represented in the national security workforce. If 
confirmed, I commit to working with the new Chief Diversity and 
Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent Management, the 
Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other Department leadership to 
foster an inclusive workplace in the T family so that every employee's 
contribution is valued. If confirmed, I will hold T family senior 
leadership accountable for the conduct of their teams and for 
promulgating an environment where each individual is heard and seen.

    Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways 
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps 
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which 
you are nominated?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with experts across the 
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the 
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and 
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human 
rights abuses. I will also prioritize working with allies, seeking 
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together.

    Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S. 
policies to combat global corruption?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will commit to working with Congress 
to strengthen U.S. policies, to the extent that my portfolio allows, to 
combat global corruption, including efforts to improve global standards 
of transparency, accountability, and good governance.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Marco Rubio

China
    Question. Do you agree that Chinese state-directed Huawei is a 
threat to U.S. and global security?

    Answer. Yes. Telecommunications equipment made by untrusted 
vendors, including Huawei, is a threat to U.S. and global security. 
Allowing untrusted telecommunications suppliers to participate in or 
control any part of a 5G network creates unacceptable risks to critical 
infrastructure, privacy, and human rights. In addition, the Chinese 
Government provides significant support to Huawei, including through 
subsidies and coercive tactics against host governments, that unfairly 
disadvantages market-based rivals. Huawei's history of unethical and 
unlawful behavior, including intellectual property theft, compounds the 
national security risks that it poses.

    Question. Do you commit to use your position to oppose any measure 
to remove Huawei from the Commerce Department Entity List, including 
any measure to water down or provide licenses under that listing or the 
Foreign Direct Product Rule?

    Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed 
from the Entity List. If confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues 
at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin technology from 
being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.

    Question. On January 15, 2021, the State Department issued a fact 
sheet on activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which raised the 
possibility that the COVID-19 epidemic could have emerged from a 
laboratory accident. Do you agree that this is possible?

    Answer. Yes, my understanding is that a range of possibilities 
exist, including the possibility of a laboratory accident. I believe 
that the full range of these possibilities should be considered. I 
understand that the Biden-Harris administration supports a robust and 
transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. An 
impartial public health investigation, based on science, is vital to 
protecting against future health security threats.

    Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the administration will 
take steps to investigate the origins of COVID-19, including pressing 
for a full forensic investigation of the labs in question?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has been clear about its 
concerns with the PRC's lack of transparency regarding the pandemic, 
including Beijing's refusal to provide the international health 
community timely and full access to data, scientists, records, and 
samples. This information is essential to our full understanding of the 
origins of the virus and how it spread. If confirmed, I am committed to 
providing the appropriate diplomatic and technical support to any 
relevant efforts as they relate to my portfolio.

    Question. Are you concerned about China's development of biological 
and chemical weapons? If confirmed, how do you plan to address these 
issues?

    Answer. In 2021, the State Department's Compliance Report found 
that the PRC engaged in biological activities with dual-use 
applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with 
Article I of the BWC. The report also noted uncertainty regarding the 
status of China's assessed historical biological warfare program. This 
year's Condition 10(c) report raised similar concerns related to 
chemical activities that prevented the U.S. from certifying the PRC's 
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
I understand that the U.S. was unable to engage with the PRC on these 
issues in 2020 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and the PRC's 
unwillingness to meet virtually. If confirmed, I will continue efforts 
to address these concerns, including in bilateral meetings.

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
    Question. If confirmed, would you advise the Biden administration 
in the next nuclear posture review to return to language closer to the 
2010 NPR?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of 
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If 
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with 
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear posture is 
also critical for our allies and partners?

    Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in 
advancing U.S. national security objectives, and our strategic 
deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins extended 
deterrence. It provides assurance to allies and partners, which are our 
greatest strategic asset. The Biden-Harris administration is committed 
to reinvigorating and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around 
the world; this includes ensuring our extended deterrence commitments 
to our allies remain strong and credible.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear arsenal is 
an effective deterrent against the use of these non-nuclear weapons 
against our allies?

    Answer. All U.S. military capabilities contribute to extended 
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies. The Biden-Harris administration 
is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that will certainly include 
declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process 
and will consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or 
actions in this area.

    Question. The Obama administration declassified the topline number 
of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. However, Russia and China never 
reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear stockpile 
number without any reciprocity by Russia or China?

    Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile 
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to 
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further 
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to 
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification 
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has 
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our 
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the 
same.

North Korea
    Question. Do you agree that the only path forward for North Korea 
that the U.S. could accept is the complete, irreversible, verifiable, 
denuclearization of North Korea?

    Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international 
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. The Biden-
Harris administration recently completed a comprehensive review of U.S. 
policy towards North Korea that reiterates the goal of complete 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I look forward 
to supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and 
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our 
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United 
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.

    Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that 
the voices of North Korean defectors are included in negotiations of 
any agreement with North Korea?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned about North Korea's egregious human 
rights record and how to promote respect for human rights in the closed 
country. If confirmed, I will be committed to placing human rights at 
the center of our foreign policy with North Korea and to integrating 
the voices of the North Korean defector community into our approach, 
including by meeting with North Korean escapees to hear their thoughts 
and recommendations.

Russia
    Question. Do you agree that Russia was in violation the Treaty on 
Open Skies?

    Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the 
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action 
to return to compliance. As stated in the most recent compliance 
report, Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit 
over Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to 
allow observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its 
border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While 
not a violation, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea as a 
Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize the 
treaty.

    Question. Do you agree that Russia's abuses the Open Skies Treaty 
and its actions posed an unacceptable risk to our national security?

    Answer. In my view, while concerning, Russia's violations of the 
Treaty on Open Skies by themselves do not pose a direct and immediate 
threat to our national security. Russia's use of the treaty to collect 
information on military and civilian infrastructure, while not 
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand 
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.

    Question. Russia has been implicated in the use of chemical weapons 
on several different occasions in the last several years, including 
assassination attempts. What should be done to counter Russia's use of 
chemical weapons and its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC)?

    Answer. Russia's use of chemical weapons in assassination attempts 
against not only Sergei Skripal and his daughter, but also Aleksey 
Navalny, is reprehensible. In response to these attacks, the United 
States exercised its sanctions authorities and imposed other measures 
to send a clear signal that Russia's use of chemical weapons and abuse 
of human rights have severe consequences.
    At the OPCW, the United States has worked with allies and partners 
to address Russia's violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, 
including submitting a technical change proposal to add two families of 
Novichoks to the CWC Annex on Chemicals, which the OPCW Conference of 
the States Parties adopted in 2019.
    If confirmed I will work within the administration to take steps to 
deter Russia's use of chemical weapons, including engaging Russia 
bilaterally and multilaterally as well working with allies and partners 
at the OPCW Executive Council and Conference of the States Parties, and 
in U.N. fora, including the Security Council. If confirmed, I will 
explore further measures to address Russian non-compliance with the 
CWC. There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. For all of the missteps in converting the Singapore 
Summit Communique that President Trump agreed to with Chairman Kim Jong 
Un in 2018 into meaningful action, it did lay out a useful framework 
that committed the two countries to work towards better relations, 
cooperate on the return of Prisoner of War remains, and work towards 
peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Given the reality 
that any full denuclearization agreement is a long term endeavor, will 
you support efforts that make progress on the other elements agreed to 
in Singapore, provided such actions are in concert with U.S. allies and 
partners, and achieve the objective of lessening the nuclear weapons 
threat from North Korea as well as the threat of war?

    Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international 
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. I understand 
that the administration recently completed a comprehensive review of 
U.S. policy towards North Korea that both reiterates the goal of 
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and seeks to build on 
the Singapore Summit commitments. If confirmed, I look forward to 
supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and 
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our 
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United 
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.

    Question. I understand the total number of Washington DC-based 
full-time equivalents in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and 
Compliance as of January 2017 was 113. The number of Washington DC-
based FTEs as of late 2019 in the AVC Bureau was 94. In 2014, the 
Office of Inspector General reported 48 percent of the AVC workforce 
would be eligible to retire by 2019. If confirmed, what actions will 
you take to address the large number of FTEs eligible to retire, how 
can the ``T cone'' prioritize recruitment and hiring of diverse 
candidates, and what additional flexible hiring authorities--if any--
does the Department need to fill this gap?

    Answer. Rebuilding the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and 
Compliance is one of my top priorities. If confirmed, I will exercise 
the Excepted Service Appointment Authority to bring in a diverse cadre 
of arms control experts. Diversity is the key to unlocking an 
organization's potential because diverse teams consistently demonstrate 
high performance due to their creativity and innovation. The Department 
must rebuild the AVC workforce and ensure it is well-equipped to 
address the dangers posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. If confirmed, I commit to 
uphold and fully implement the Department's leadership and management 
tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to strengthen 
teams across the T family of bureaus.

    Question. Has the President provided any guidance to the 
Departments of State, Defense, and any other agencies, detailing his 
instructions for a review of U.S. nuclear policy and posture? If so, 
approximately when will that review be completed?

    Answer. I understand that the President has directed his 
administration to conduct reviews of various nuclear policies. In 
accordance with the Biden administration's Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance, the administration will take steps to reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, while 
ensuring the U.S. strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and 
effective and that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies 
remain strong and credible. In that process, the administration will 
consult with U.S. allies and partners, including those in the Indo-
Pacific, as well as with Congress.

    Question. The United States is not one of the 164 States Parties to 
the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, which bans 
the production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. President 
Trump opened up the geographies where the United States can use 
landmines provided they have a self-destruct mechanism, which 
superseded an Obama administration policy which narrowed persistent 
landmine use to the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration has yet 
to rescind the permissive Trump administration-era policy. When 
confirmed, can you commit to advocate as the head of the ``T cone'' for 
President Biden to adopt a U.S. policy that brings us closer in line 
with the obligations under the Ottawa Convention? Additionally, will 
you support a robust budget request for de-mining activities in 
conflict zones?

    Answer. As Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield noted last month, 
``President Biden believes we need to curtail the use of landmines. 
[L]et me speak plainly: President Biden has been clear that he intends 
to roll back [the Trump administration] policy, and our administration 
has begun a policy review to do just that.'' If confirmed, I will 
commit to supporting the administration's landmine policy review and 
will advocate for a clear and explicit role for the State Department in 
any future policy on landmines. I also will commit to consult with 
experts inside and outside of the Department, and with you in Congress, 
on the question of whether and how the United States should bring its 
policies closer in line with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.
    Thanks to bipartisan Congressional support, the United States has 
been the world's leader in fighting proliferation by safely destroying 
at-risk conventional weapons and saving lives by clearing of landmines 
and other explosive hazards for more than 25 years.

    Question. The Biden administration is currently undertaking a 
global sanctions review to ensure that U.S. and multilateral sanctions 
do not inadvertently prevent humanitarian aid from getting to those in 
need. While food and medicine is exempt under U.S. and U.N. sanctions, 
aid workers are often forced to navigate massive red tape just to bring 
laptops to North Korea, which are considered ``luxury goods,'' or even 
treatments for drug resistant tuberculosis. If confirmed, can you 
commit to work with interested Members to make practical changes to the 
implementation of existing exemptions to U.S. sanctions and seek 
additional exemptions in the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee 
of items related to providing life-saving assistance to North Koreans?

    Answer. Sanctions are in place to address the threat posed by North 
Korea, including its ability to continue developing its nuclear and 
ballistic missile programs. The U.S. Government maintains a number of 
sanctions exemptions and authorizations related to humanitarian aid, 
and has also led efforts to streamline the process for humanitarian 
exemptions in the U.N. sanctions committee. North Korea itself has 
created the most significant barriers to the delivery of aid by closing 
its borders and limiting access for the personnel responsible for 
implementing such projects. If confirmed, I will work to support 
efforts aimed at helping humanitarian aid reach the people of North 
Korea.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. The position of arms control and international security 
is one of paramount importance to our nation's defense. Both Russia and 
China have made strides in their own force modernization and we must 
take steps to ensure that our adversaries are in compliance with 
existing arms control agreements while we look to new initiatives as 
well.
    New START and U.S. Nuclear Force Modernization: In January 2021, 
the Biden administration agreed to an extension of the NEW Start treaty 
for a period of five years, while committing to pursue new arms control 
agreements with both Russia and China. As you are aware, New START does 
not limit non-strategic nuclear warheads which are a growing concern as 
Russia outnumbers the United States 10-1 in this category. China is on 
pace to more than triple its nuclear force in the coming decade. 
Cleary, more work is needed to ensure that our adversaries do not 
outpace U.S. capabilities in this space.

   The Obama administration in 2010 committed to Congress that it 
        would address the disparity between the United States and 
        Russia regarding non-strategic nuclear warheads, however 
        several administrations have failed to make progress. What 
        actions will you take, if confirmed, that will address this 
        disparity?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that we use the time 
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue 
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and 
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, 
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control 
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.

    Question. Both Russia and China are in the process of expanding, 
diversifying, and modernizing its nuclear arsenals. The United States 
is just beginning this effort. Do you believe that a modernization of 
the U.S. Triad is necessary to negotiate from a position of strength?

    Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work 
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.

    Question. Do you believe that a unilateral reduction of our nuclear 
forces endangers U.S. national security?

    Answer. I would never support any reductions in nuclear forces that 
endanger U.S. national security, but I do not believe that any type of 
reduction would automatically undermine U.S. and allied security.

    Question. Iran's Ballistic Missile Program and the Abraham Accords: 
Iran's ballistic missile program and armed drones, including 
proliferation of these technologies to terrorist organizations, are 
increasingly becoming a regional threat in the Middle East. The 
continued threat from Iran is just one of the many reasons why many 
neighbors of Israel decided to sign normalization agreements such as 
the Abraham Accords last year.
    Last month, I introduced a bill called the Israel Relations 
Normalization Act with Senator's Booker, Cardin, Risch, and Young, to 
require the Department of State to expand and strengthen these 
normalization agreements.

   Do you support these normalization agreements as a means to 
        strengthen security in the region and pledge, if confirmed, to 
        pursue additional normalization agreements?

    Answer. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have said, this 
administration welcomes and strongly supports the recent normalization 
agreements between Israel and countries in the Arab and Muslim world. I 
understand that the Department is leading the U.S. Government's 
efforts, working with the National Security Council and U.S. Government 
interagency, to deepen existing agreements and urge other countries to 
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will look for other 
opportunities to expand cooperation among countries in the region, 
which is critical to strengthening regional security.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. In April 2019, President Trump notified the Senate that 
he had decided to withdraw the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty from 
the Senate and requested the Senate return the treaty to the President. 
The United States notified the United Nations Secretary General that 
the ``United States does not intend to become a party'' to the United 
Nations Arms Trade Treaty despite its signature, adding that the United 
States ``has no legal obligations arising'' from its treaty signature.

   What is the current status of the United States with regards to the 
        United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?

    Answer. On December 9, 2016, the Department transmitted the Arms 
Trade Treaty (ATT) to the Senate for its advice and consent to 
ratification. On July 18, 2019, the Trump administration informed the 
Treaty Depositary that the United States did not intend to become a 
State Party to the Treaty and that the United States had no legal 
obligations arising from its signature. The United States is 
participating in ATT meetings as an observer to protect U.S. national 
security interests, economic interests, and industry equities.

    Question. Based on your knowledge and experience in this field, 
what position have you formulated on whether the United States should 
ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?

    Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of 
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the 
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to 
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I 
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of 
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the 
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S. 
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values, 
and interests.

    Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in 
writing or in speech, the United States joining the United Nations Arms 
Trade Treaty? Please provide details.

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, I have not made any 
statement on the issue of the United States joining the U.N. Arms Trade 
Treaty.

    Question. What changes to our nation's policies, regulations, or 
laws would be needed to comply with the United Nations Arms Trade 
Treaty?

    Answer. It is my understanding that the United States would not 
need to change any policies, regulations, or laws to comply with the 
Arms Trade Treaty. U.S. national control systems and practices to 
regulate the international transfer of conventional arms already meet 
or exceed the requirements of the Treaty.

    Question. The United States Constitution protects the rights of 
Americans to keep and bear arms. The Arms Trade Treaty would infringe 
on the second amendment. Article 12 of the Arms Trade Treaty encourages 
countries to maintain records on the importation of conventional arms 
including small arms. It specifically requests that states maintain 
records on the quantity, value, model/type and end user. These records 
must be maintained for a minimum of ten years. Article 13 requires 
signatory states to issue annual reports to the United Nations on all 
imports and exports.

   Do you support the United Nations establishing and maintaining a 
        gun registry on law abiding U.S. gun owners?

    Answer. No. If confirmed, I will not support the United Nations 
establishing and maintaining a gun registry on law-abiding U.S. gun 
owners. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) establishes standards for 
regulating only the international trade in conventional arms, not 
domestic trade or possession. The ATT does not touch on purely domestic 
arms transfers or private ownership, which are matters of national 
sovereignty.

    Question. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces. 
U.S. intelligence analysts estimate that China could double its nuclear 
warheads in the next decade.

   How is China modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal?

    Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is 
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. According 
to open-source reporting I have read, this rapid expansion includes new 
delivery systems as Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which 
will include a long-range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs, 
multiple-warhead silo-based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic 
missile submarines. The PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-
glide vehicles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear 
weapons that will fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making 
additional advances toward developing a launch-on-warning posture.

    Question. What is the projected size and composition of China's 
strategic nuclear forces by 2026 when the New START would expire?

    Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is 
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. Precisely 
because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear 
weapon states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and 
intentions are difficult. I defer to the intelligence community for a 
specific assessment on the projected size and composition of China's 
nuclear forces in 2026.

    Question. Secretary of State Blinken noted his intent to ``pursue 
arms control to reduce the dangers from China's modern and growing 
nuclear arsenal.'' China has so far refused U.S. efforts to engage in 
arms control negotiations.

   What specific steps would you take to reduce the dangers posed by 
        China's modern and growing nuclear arsenal?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in 
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to 
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed 
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and 
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to 
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the 
administration foresees pursuing with China.

    Question. What specific leverage does the United States have to 
force China to participate in future arms control negotiations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in 
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to 
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed 
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and 
the chances of uncontrollable arms races, which is in the interest of 
both our countries. If confirmed, I will seek to work with U.S. allies 
and partners to urge Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United 
States on arms control, as doing so is essential to reducing global 
nuclear risks.

    Question. Has the United States ever effectively used the leverage 
you mentioned in question 8? Please provide details.

    Answer. As I understand, the People's Republic of China has thus 
far resisted engaging with the United States in any meaningful nuclear 
arms control discussions. If confirmed, I will work with the 
administration, along with U.S. allies and partners to regularly urge 
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control. 
Doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.

    Question. There is a very large disparity regarding non-strategic 
nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. During the New 
START debate, there were a number of Senators including myself who were 
extremely concerned that the treaty did not include tactical nuclear 
weapons. The New START Resolution of Ratification specifically provided 
the President was to address the massive disparity in the tactical 
stockpiles prior to contemplating further reductions in the strategic 
arsenal.

   Can you assure the United States Senate that the next arms control 
        agreement with Russia will focus on the massive numerical 
        advantage Russia has over us and our allies in tactical nuclear 
        weapons rather further reductions in the strategic arsenal?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time 
provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue 
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and 
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, 
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control 
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.

    Question. For more than six decades, the United States has employed 
an effective and credible nuclear deterrent. The U.S. nuclear triad is 
made up of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-capable heavy bomber 
aircraft. All three legs of the triad work hand-in-hand to deter our 
adversaries and reassure our allies and partners. It provides weapon 
systems that are survivable, stabilizing and flexible.

   Please describe how each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad contributes 
        to the effective and credible nuclear deterrent?

    Answer. SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad. 
Nuclear-capable bombers are the most flexible. ICBMs are the most 
responsive and contribute to deterrence by requiring an adversary to 
exhaust a large number of warheads to destroy a smaller portion of the 
U.S. deterrent.

    Question. Based on your expertise, are ICBMs on ``hair trigger'' 
alert or are they safe and secure?

    Answer. In overall terms, U.S. ICBMs are not on ``hair trigger'' 
alert. U.S. nuclear forces are safe and secure as the United States 
maintains multiple redundant technical and procedural measures in place 
to prevent the unauthorized or accidental launch of U.S. missiles. I 
defer to the Department of Defense to discuss the specifics.

    Question. Do you believe the ground based strategic deterrent will 
start an arms race with Russia and China?

    Answer. No, replacing elements of the U.S. nuclear triad will not 
cause an arms race. If confirmed, I will work with the administration 
to head off costly arms races and re-establish U.S. credibility as a 
leader in arms control. I will also work to pursue new arms control 
agreements and arrangements by engaging in meaningful dialogues with 
Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological 
developments that implicate strategic stability.

    Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to 
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is 
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and 
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.

   Have you ever expressed, implicitly or explicitly in writing or in 
        speech, support for eliminating any leg of the nuclear triad? 
        Please provide details.

    Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not made any statement 
saying that any leg of the nuclear triad should be eliminated.

    Question. Based on your knowledge and background, what is your 
position on the United States modernizing our ICBMs with the Ground 
Based Strategic Deterrent, our submarines with the Columbia class, and 
our bombers with the B-21 Raider?

    Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work 
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security. If 
confirmed, I will review each element of the current modernization 
program during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review, and I will 
advise that the United States undertake the modernization necessary to 
sustain a credible strategic deterrent.

    Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in 
writing or in speech, any delay or budget cuts related to or the 
elimination of any of the U.S. nuclear modernization programs? Please 
provide details.

    Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not explicitly 
supported any delay or budget cuts to, or elimination of, the 
modernization program. I have asked questions about the total amount of 
funding that will be spent on the modernization program.

    Question. What specific steps will you take to advocate for 
modernization of the U.S. nuclear program?

    Answer. The United States will ensure its strategic deterrent 
remains safe, secure, and effective. If confirmed, I will advise that 
the United States undertake the modernization necessary to sustain a 
credible strategic deterrent.

    Question. On December 4, 2019, you retweeted a post from PSR 
Nuclear Weapons Abolition supporting the United States adopting a no 
first use of nuclear weapons policy.

   Please explain why you support the United States adopting a ``no-
        first use'' policy.

    Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory 
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might 
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase 
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the 
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to 
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find 
the best ways to do this.

    Question. As our country continues to face threats from around the 
world, we should not take any action that will hinder our missile 
defense options. The United States must always remain in charge of our 
missile defense, not Russia or any other country. I have concerns about 
the efforts of Russia to limit our missile defense and actions the 
Obama administration took on this issue.

   Can you commit to me that, in any arms control discussions with 
        Russia for which you are responsible, the United States will 
        never agree to any limitation on our missile defense programs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective 
missile defense programs and will only pursue arms control agreements 
that enhance U.S., allied, and partner security.

    Question. President Putin announced Russia's development of new 
strategic nuclear weapons. The weapons include a nuclear powered cruise 
missile, a nuclear powered underwater drone that could be armed with a 
nuclear warhead, and a hypersonic missile. President Putin declared 
that these new additions to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would 
render U.S. missile defense ``useless.''

   How would you ensure the new weapons are covered under Russia's 
        treaty and arms control obligations?

    Answer. The New START Treaty limits Russia's Avangard hypersonic 
glide vehicle and will limit the Sarmat heavy ICBM at the appropriate 
point in its development cycle. If confirmed, I will work to ensure 
that we use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New 
START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and 
U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian 
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and non-strategic 
nuclear weapons.

    Question. Does the United States have a current or prospective 
missile defense system to intercept these weapons? If not, what 
specific actions would you recommend the U.S. Government take to 
respond to and counter these new strategic nuclear weapons?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department 
of Defense to better understand their capabilities to deter, and if 
deterrence fails, defend against, attack from the novel strategic 
systems being developed by the Russian Federation. If confirmed, I 
anticipate working closely with the Department of Defense to review 
U.S. capabilities to ensure the United States has robust capabilities 
to deter, and if deterrence fails, defend against, attacks on the U.S. 
Homeland and to examine ways that our allies can contribute to 
enhancing U.S. national security.

    Question. During your testimony, you discussed pursuing deeper cuts 
to our nuclear weapons systems.

   At a time when Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear 
        weapons, would you advocate for the United States to make 
        unilaterally cuts to our nuclear deterrent?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will review all relevant information on 
specific programs during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review and 
report my conclusions back to the committee. Prior to the review, it 
would be premature to speak to the sizing, including possible 
reductions, of U.S. forces.

    Question. The U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Force Treaty (INF), the Open Skies Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action. You opposed the United States withdrawing from each of 
these international agreements.

   Given your tweet confirming your statement that U.S. actions to 
        withdraw from the INF treaty undermines global security, what 
        is your view on whether the United States should rejoin the INF 
        treaty?

    Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the U.S. withdrawal, it 
is not possible to re-enter it. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019, 
statement that ``Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the 
Treaty.'' Russia's material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to 
return to compliance led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the 
Treaty's termination. The United States should work with its allies and 
partners to ensure Russia gains no advantage by possessing this class 
of missile.

    Question. Based on your detailed knowledge on this treaty and 
strong statements opposing the United States leaving the treaty, do you 
believe the United States should rejoin the Open Skies Treaty?

    Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to 
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues. 
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns 
impacted the overall operation of the treaty. That said, leaving a 
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are 
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies 
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about 
internal discussions on the matter.

    Question. Why do you support the United States rejoining the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that Iran 
does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many other 
issues of concern related to Iran. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure 
Iran never acquires nuclear weapons, and it provides the most intrusive 
verification and monitoring procedures ever negotiated. I understand 
that the Biden-Harris administration is engaging in meaningful 
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA 
commitments as a first step, but the work will not end there. The 
administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use it as a platform 
to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear program 
and to address other critical issues.

    Question. The United States has not ratified the 1996 Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

   Do you support the United States ratifying the Comprehensive 
        Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? If so, why?

    Answer. Yes. The United States maintains the safety, security, and 
effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal without having to conduct nuclear 
explosive tests. It is in our national security interest to prevent a 
world in which states are completely unconstrained from conducting such 
tests. An in-force CTBT would aid in that effort.

    Question. The United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons entered into force in January 2021. It is the first 
multilateral legal document to outlaw nuclear weapons.

   Based on your experience and background in arms control, what is 
        your view of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of 
        Nuclear Weapons?

    Answer. While I understand and share the desire to make progress 
toward a world without nuclear weapons, the TPNW is not the right way 
to achieve that goal. The TPNW risks undermining U.S. deterrence 
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and 
security and may reinforce divisions that hinder our ability to work 
together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. All 
NATO Allies remain opposed to the TPNW, as repeatedly stated by the 
North Atlantic Council, most recently in December of 2020. The best way 
to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a process that 
takes into account the international security environment and seeks 
effective, verifiable arms control and disarmament measures.

    Question. On January 3, 2020, you tweeted, ``What is the U.S. logic 
to the strike on Qasem Soleimani?''

   The United States took decisive action on January 3, 2020, to 
        prevent an imminent attack by a ruthless terrorist on Americans 
        and our allies in the region. As the head of the Quds Force, 
        General Soleimani created, supported, and directed a network of 
        terrorist organizations that launched attacks across the 
        region. As a war criminal, Soleimani was responsible for 
        wounding and killing hundreds of Americans and he would have 
        killed many more if given the chance.

   Based on your tweet, why did you disagree with the top U.S. 
        commander in the region that the Soleimani strike re-
        established a deterrent in the region?

    Answer. The tweet you referenced above was a retweet, without 
commentary, of a CNN article titled, ``What is the U.S. logic to the 
strike on Iran's Qasem Soleimani?'' The article was an analysis of the 
likely factors that went into the previous administration's decision to 
strike Soleimani. I have not expressed disagreement on this issue with 
the ``top U.S. commander in the region.''

    Question. Why do you believe America is not safer today because 
Qasem Soleimani is gone?

    Answer. Qasem Soleimani was a key architect of much of Iran's 
malign behavior. He had blood on his hands, including American blood, 
and I do not regret the killing of such an enemy of the United States. 
The question is not whether Soleimani was good or bad; the question is 
whether this action made the American people safer, based on the 
likelihood of Iranian retaliation and the broader strategic context in 
which the strike took place. I did not comment that America is not 
safer today because Qasem Soleimani is gone, nor do I have access to 
strategic assessments that would enable that conclusion, but it is a 
question that I and others have raised.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. The Trump administration made great progress unwinding 
the United States from outdated Cold War-style arms control agreements 
with Russia. Many of those treaties--and the approach behind them--
eroded American national security by constraining us, permitting 
Russian noncompliance, and of course not constraining the Chinese at 
all.

   One significant step was to end U.S. participation in the Open 
        Skies Treaty (OST). The Russians had been in chronic 
        noncompliance for a decade, and were declared noncompliant in 
        2017: certain overflights of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad, 
        flights in the vicinity of the enclaves that they essentially 
        invaded and carved off of the country of Georgia, not allowing 
        some overflights of Russian military exercises, etc. It was 
        long past time to withdraw.

   You've publicly indicated that the U.S. withdrawing from the OST 
        was a mistake.

   Do you believe the U.S. should reenter OST or a similar agreement?

    Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to 
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues. 
That said, leaving a treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia 
continues to violate it are two different things. I believe we should 
carefully consider the costs and benefits of rejoining before making 
any decision. As part of this analysis, we should consult with Allies 
and partners who are States Parties to the treaty, including on any 
future steps.

    Question. Do you believe that if the U.S. did reenter OST or a 
similar agreement, such a step would require the advice and consent of 
the Senate?

    Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be 
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.

    Question. If you believe that the U.S. should reenter OST or a 
similar agreement, please describe your strategy for ending chronic 
Russian noncompliance.

    Answer. If the administration were to decide to take steps to 
rejoin OST, I would recommend working with the interagency on ways to 
expand and enhance our work on compliance as it relates to the 
agreement.

Treaties/INF
    Question. Another Cold War-style treaty from which the Trump 
administration withdrew was the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty. China had arguably been the biggest beneficiary of the 
INF Treaty. According to then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command 
Harry Harris (now U.S. ambassador to South Korea), roughly 95 percent 
of China's missile forces would fall within INF Treaty parameters. The 
Treaty held us back from developing the technologies we needed to 
counter the Chinese.

   Do you believe it was a mistake to exit the INF?

    Answer. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019, statement that ``Russia 
bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty.'' Russia's 
material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to return to compliance 
led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the treaty's termination. The 
United States should work with its allies and partners to ensure Russia 
gains no advantage by possessing this class of missile.

    Question. Do you believe the U.S. should reenter the INF or a 
similar agreement?

    Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the United States' 
withdrawal, it is not possible to re-enter it. I look forward to 
working with Congress and relevant agencies and departments on ways to 
create new arms control agreements that serve U.S. interests.

    Question. How do you believe that the missile asymmetry created by 
INF compliance in the Pacific affects America's efforts to operate 
within the first and second island chains in a conflict over Taiwan or 
the South China Sea?

    Answer. China's expansion of its nuclear and missile arsenal 
presages a more dangerous future, with a larger number of sophisticated 
intermediate-range delivery systems able to target U.S., allied, and 
partner forces in the Indo-Pacific. I defer to the Department of 
Defense for a direct assessment of their effects on regional U.S. 
military operations and posture.

    Question. How should the U.S. craft an arms control framework that 
secures its ability to operate within contested zones in the Indo-
Pacific?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit 
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's 
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal, coupled with efforts 
designed to bolster deterrence in the region. It is critical that the 
United States consult closely with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to 
ensure arms control efforts both reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
U.S. security strategy and ensure U.S. extended deterrence commitments 
remain strong and credible.

Treaties/CEF
    Question. The 1996 Flank Agreement to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is one of the canonical examples where the 
United States negotiated arms control restrictions that the Russians 
serially violated, but nevertheless it took years for the U.S. or its 
allies to formally unwind from the Treaty. Under most interpretations, 
Russia was never in compliance with the 1996 limits, though it arguably 
complied with parts of the Adapted treaty. You participated in 
negotiations regarding the Flank agreement. Please describe--

   Your assessment about whether the Russians ever came into 
        compliance with the Flank parameters.

   Your assessment of whether the Flank Agreement enhanced U.S. 
        national security.

   Your role in formulating, reviewing, and approving the Flank 
        Agreement, including--

     Your overall role in formulating, reviewing, and 
            approving the Agreement.

     Your role in the delegation, including who you 
            reported to.

    Answer. My understanding is that Russia has not been in compliance 
with the May 1996 flank limits, but is within the overall treaty 
limits. If Russia remains within the overall conventional treaty 
limits, I believe such limits continue to promote both U.S. and U.S. 
allied national security interests as envisioned when the treaty was 
negotiated.

   As noted, the flank limits text was negotiated in 1996, at a time 
        when I had already transitioned to working on the Comprehensive 
        Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was working on CTBT 
        backstopping in Washington, DC. I was therefore not involved in 
        the drafting of the final text of the agreement. I refer you to 
        the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.

    Question. Any role you had in reviewing the final text of the 
Agreement. If you did not have a role in reviewing the agreement, why 
not and who provided legal advice for reviewing?

    Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the 
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to 
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.

    Question. Any role you had in approving the final text of the 
Agreement. If you did not have a role in approving the agreement, why 
not and who provided legal advice for approving?

    Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the 
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to 
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.

China/NPT
    Question. The Chinese plan to triple their nuclear arsenal in the 
coming years.

   What leverage does the U.S. have to get China to the negotiating 
        table?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in 
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to 
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed 
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and 
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. U.S. allies and partners will 
be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them to 
regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States on 
arms control.

    Question. What is your plan to realistically get China to the 
negotiating table for a credible arms control agreement?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit 
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's 
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal. U.S. allies and partners 
will be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them 
to regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States 
on arms control. I understand that the administration is in the process 
of crafting specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to 
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the 
administration foresees pursuing with China.

    Question. I introduced a bill last session that would impose 
sanctions on parts of the Chinese military sector unless they come into 
compliance with their already-existing NPT Article VI obligations for 
`good faith' negotiations.

   Do you believe China is meeting its NPT Article VI obligations?

    Answer. China's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades 
of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. If confirmed, I 
will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State 
on a variety of matters related to China's behavior in the nuclear 
weapon arena, including its compliance with Article VI.

Iran/NPT
    Question. As traditionally understood, Article IV of the NPT 
entitles member states to the benefits of peaceful civil-nuclear 
technology to the extent that they are members in good standing with 
the NPT. In the last administration, Special Representative of the 
President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed 
to the SFRC in writing that ``Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon 
State Party to the NPT cannot be described as `good.'''

   Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive 
        seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive 
        relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute 
        non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on 
        the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). If yes, please 
        explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work 
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT 
compliance. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the 
serious, outstanding issues related to potential undeclared nuclear 
material in Iran. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran 
is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. 
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed this commitment, and if confirmed, I 
will work to ensure that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.

    Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to 
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is 
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and 
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.

   Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear Archive 
        seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive 
        relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute 
        non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT. If 
        yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. Iran's long history of denial and concealment regarding its 
past nuclear weapons program is of serious concern. The Biden-Harris 
administration has stated that it will not take Iran at its word 
regarding assertions about its nuclear program, and fully supports the 
IAEA as it uses its safeguards authorities to investigate any 
indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iran. If 
confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that Iran never acquires 
a nuclear weapon.

    Question. Do you consider Iran a member in good standing of the 
NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work 
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT 
compliance. Given Iran's past noncompliance with both its safeguards 
agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully and 
substantially address IAEA questions related to past activities 
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, its 
retention and concealment of documents, equipment, and personnel 
related to its past nuclear weapons program, and its failure to fully 
address current IAEA questions related to potential undeclared nuclear 
materials and activities in Iran, Iran's nuclear activities are cause 
for serious concern.

    Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from 
nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please 
explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination 
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, 
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking 
nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the 
NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.

    Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from 
nuclear technology for any reason? If yes, please explain why. If no, 
please explain why.

    Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the 
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production 
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination 
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must, 
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking 
nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the 
NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.

Iran/UNSCR 2231 Snapback
    Question. UNSCR 2231 ended a long-standing international arms 
embargo against Iran, described across the previous six resolutions 
terminated by paragraph 7(a) of the resolution. After an effort to 
extend that embargo, the Trump administration took two measures. First, 
it invoked the ``snapback mechanism'' described in paragraphs 10-15 of 
UNSCR 2231, reversing the termination of those resolutions. You and 
others have publicly suggested that the U.S. was not entitled to invoke 
that mechanism. Second, the Trump administration implemented EO 13949, 
``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional 
Arms Activities of Iran,'' which authorizes sanctions for transfers to 
and from Iran of arms or related material or military equipment. As a 
result, the U.S. established a baseline deterrent against major arms 
sales to Iran. Multi-billion dollar arms agreements publicly described 
and anticipated by Russia, China, and Iran did not occur.
    However, in February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded that 
decision.

   Do you agree with the decision to rescind invoking the snapback 
        mechanism?

    Answer. The snapback mechanism was designed to provide leverage to 
help ensure Iran performed its commitments under the JCPOA. The 
previous administration invoked snapback in a way that was never 
contemplated by the deal, namely after unilaterally exiting it. 
Virtually none of our allies or partners recognized this invocation of 
snapback. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the United 
States will be in a stronger position to counter the full range of 
threats posed by Iran, including its nuclear program, by working in 
close concert with our allies.

    Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply, 
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms 
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed 
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing 
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons 
from Russia. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on 
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced 
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability 
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous 
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of 
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') 
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.

    Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Russia purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which 
ones?

    Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply, 
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October 
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our 
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the 
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will 
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade 
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's 
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The 
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O. 
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to 
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers 
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.

    Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if China sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply, 
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms 
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed 
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing 
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons 
from China. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on 
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced 
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability 
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous 
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of 
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') 
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.

    Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if China purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply, 
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October 
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our 
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the 
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will 
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade 
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's 
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The 
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O. 
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to 
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers 
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.

    Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles 
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including 
launches using such ballistic missile technology?

    Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231 
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic 
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, 
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United 
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and 
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's 
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security 
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic 
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and 
urging the Council to address such activities.

    Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such 
ballistic missile technology?

    Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231 
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic 
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, 
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United 
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and 
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's 
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security 
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic 
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and 
urging the Council to address such activities.

JCPOA/Treaty
    Question. I believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) and any similar arms control agreement with Iran should be 
brought to the U.S. Senate as a treaty for the Senate's advice and 
consent. Officials from the Biden administration have indicated in 
public and private they disagree with that stance, because it is 
important in the context of such agreements to allow the U.S. to act 
``without the constraints of international treaty law.'' I disagree 
with that analysis, which fails to account for the Senate's 
prerogatives in general, and in the context of the JCPOA cannot be 
reconciled with the Obama-Biden administration's move to lock in the 
JCPOA at through United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 2231, 
which sought to constrain U.S. behavior at the level of international 
law.

   Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement should be 
        brought to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent? If not, why 
        not?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to 
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the 
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the 
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's 
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.

    Question. Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement 
should not be brought to the Senate for advice and consent specifically 
because it would constrain U.S. options? If so, please describe those 
constraints.

    Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to 
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and 
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the 
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the 
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's 
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.

    Question. If a future agreement with Iran is not submitted to the 
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, do you believe that a future 
administration would be within its legal prerogatives to dismantle it?

    Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with 
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called 
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was 
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to 
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and 
public scrutiny. If there were to be a U.S. return to the JCPOA, the 
arrangement would impose no legal constraints on the United States' 
ability to protect its interests, including, for example, by ceasing 
participation in the deal if Iran were to fail to adhere to its JCPOA 
commitments.

State Department
    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.

   Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not 
        unnecessarily comingled with classified information in 
        notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If 
        not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.

    Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?

    Answer. I have several priorities I would like to engage on if 
confirmed, the broadest and most important of which is to play a role 
in reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control. I 
believe it is also critical that we make progress on limiting Russian 
and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in 
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical weapons, 
and promoting a diverse workforce. If confirmed I hope to work to 
strengthen deterrence alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific 
to better deter and defend against growing threats, and to help 
position the U.S. Government and State Department to grapple with 
advancements in emerging technologies that can threaten strategic 
stability. Finally, I intend if confirmed to strive to ensure that arms 
transfers and security assistance are focused on building values-based 
security partnerships.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. China voluntarily agreed, in 1997, to report its annual 
civil plutonium production figures and related activities to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with the U.S., UK, 
France, Russia, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany. The last 
Chinese report, which covered 2016, was submitted in 2017.
    There is no public record of the U.S. taking them to task for no 
longer reporting this information, which is troubling due to their 
development of a fast-breeder reactor program.
    Furthermore, the Commander of USSTRATCOM indicated, at an open 
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 14 April 2021, that ``this 
will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do, if they 
wanted to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear 
capabilities.''

   Do you know if this has been discussed, with the Chinese, in 
        diplomatic circles? Will you commit to meeting with me, if 
        confirmed, to discuss this issue further?

    Answer. I have not been privy to such conversations. However, if 
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the 
IAEA per Information Circular (INFCIRC)/549 concerning ``Guidelines for 
the Management of Plutonium.'' If confirmed, I would be happy to meet 
with you to discuss this issue further.

       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Bill Hagerty

Nuclear Modernization
    Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit supporting the 
modernization of U.S. nuclear forces? Please begin your answer with yes 
or no.

    Answer. Yes, the United States should have a modern, credible, and 
effective deterrent.

    Question. In your view, why is the modernization of U.S. nuclear 
forces critical to protecting the security of the United States?

    Answer. The United States must maintain a credible nuclear 
deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Nuclear weapons will 
continue to exist beyond the planned service lives of existing U.S. 
nuclear forces and modernization is necessary to sustain a credible 
deterrent.

    Question. In your view, do you agree that the role of nuclear 
weapons should be reduced in U.S. foreign policy, as stated by two 
Biden administration officials in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun? 
Please begin your answer with yes or no. In an interview with Asahi 
Shimbun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms 
Control, Verification, and Compliance Alexandra Bell and Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Missile Defense Policy 
Leonor Tomero publicly stated that ``there is no doubt that President 
Biden's goal is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.''

    Answer. Yes, as the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance 
states, ``We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent 
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence 
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.''

No First Use Policy
    Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit to upholding the 
longstanding U.S. policy of not adopting a ``no first use'' policy? 
Please begin your answer with yes or no. Admiral Charles Richards, who 
heads the U.S. Strategic Command, said that his ``best military advice 
would be not adopt a no-first-use policy.'' During her nomination 
hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks said that a ``no first 
use'' policy is not in the interest of the United States.

    Answer. The President of the United States determines U.S. 
declaratory policy. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory 
policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process and will 
consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this 
area.

    Question. In your view, what are the conditions in which the United 
States can actually use a nuclear weapon? On January 2021, you argued 
for declaring a ``no first use'' policy, stating that ``the United 
States needs to define the conditions where we can actually use a 
nuclear weapon.''

    Answer. The President of the United States determines the 
conditions under which the United States would consider the use of 
nuclear weapons. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a 
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory 
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might 
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase 
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the 
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to 
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find 
the best ways to do this.

    Question. What risks might U.S. allies face if the United States 
were to adopt a ``no first use'' policy?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of 
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If 
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with 
Congress and U.S. allies on any policies or actions in this area. It 
would be premature to speculate about risks prior to the completion of 
this review.

China & Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons
    Question. In your view, if a country with nuclear weapons, which is 
a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 
deliberately and repeatedly refuses to engage in good faith 
negotiations on the issue of arms control, would you agree that country 
is in violation of Article VI of the NPT? Please begin your answer with 
yes or no. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons clearly stipulates that countries with nuclear weapons should 
``pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race.'' In recent years, the United 
States repeatedly attempted to engage China on the issue of arms 
control, but Beijing refused, asserting that ``the time is not yet 
ripe'' for such discussions.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts 
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's 
behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its compliance with 
Article VI of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater 
responsibility, transparency, and restraint with respect to its nuclear 
weapons arsenal.

Security Assistance
    Question. If you are confirmed, what metrics would you rely upon to 
determine whether China is violating VI of the NTP Treaty?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts 
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's 
behavior in the nuclear weapons arena, including considerations 
relevant to assessing compliance with Article VI of the NPT.

On the Next Arms Control Treaty
    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms 
control treaty should include China? Please begin your answer with yes 
or no.

    Answer. No. While the United States will pursue arms control 
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's 
growing nuclear arsenal, arms control agreements and arrangements must 
be tailored to the security challenges they are intended to address.? 
Although there may be opportunities for the United States and Russia to 
engage the PRC in a trilateral forum, I do not believe that all future 
arms control endeavors with Russia must include the PRC.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms 
control treaty with Russia must address all nuclear warheads, to 
include Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons? Please begin your 
answer with yes or no.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time 
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue 
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and 
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons, 
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control 
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to regularly briefing 
Congress on the status of diplomatic engagements with China on the 
issue of arms control?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed I commit to regularly consulting Congress 
on the status of the Biden-Harris administration's approach to China 
and arms control.

Iran and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
    Question. In your view, is Iran in compliance with the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Please begin your answer with 
yes or no.

    Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the 
NPT, and if confirmed, I will work with legal and policy experts to 
monitor and assess Iran's NPT compliance. President Biden has made 
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear 
weapon, and I share that commitment.

    Question. If yes, how is Iran in compliance when it has not 
answered the IAEA's questions on undeclared nuclear material and 
activities?

    Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the IAEA's ongoing 
safeguards investigations and Iran's failure to provide the IAEA with 
the cooperation necessary to resolve them. If confirmed, I will work 
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT 
compliance. Iran must engage and cooperate fully with the IAEA in a way 
that leads to credible, concrete progress and toward resolution of 
these issues. Like President Biden, I have full confidence in the IAEA 
to pursue any indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material 
that could contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear 
weapon.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to providing no 
sanctions relief to Iran until they comply with the IAEA's requests to 
resolve the outstanding issues on undeclared nuclear materials and 
activities? The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments noted that 
during the 2020 reporting period, the IAEA Director General (DG) issued 
several reports on Iran that make clear that serious, outstanding 
concerns remain regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in Iran today.

    Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards 
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear 
activities in Iran. Iran's failure to provide substantive or 
technically credible responses to the IAEA's questions related to 
possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran is cause 
for serious concern. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA's 
ongoing investigation in Iran into indications of possible undeclared 
nuclear material and, along with the rest of the international 
community, expect full Iranian cooperation with inspectors--without 
delay--as the IAEA works toward conclusions. President Biden has made 
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear 
weapon.

Open Skies Treaties
    Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia has violated, and 
continues to violate, the Treaty on Open Skies? Please begin your 
answer with yes or no. The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms 
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments 
noted that in ``2020, the United States continued to assess that Russia 
was in violation of the Treaty on Open Skies (OST).'' In May 2020, the 
Director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center 
said: ``For years, Russia has used the Open Skies Treaty to collect 
intelligence on civilian infrastructure and other sensitive sites in 
America, posing an unacceptable risk to our national security.''

    Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the 
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action 
to return to compliance. As stated in this year's compliance report, 
Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit over 
Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to allow 
observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its border with 
the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While not a 
violation of the treaty, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea 
as a Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize 
the treaty.

    Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia abuses the Treaty 
on Open Skies and its actions posed an unacceptable risk the security 
of the United States and our allies?

    Answer. My view is that Russia's violations of the Treaty on Open 
Skies, while concerning, by themselves do not pose a direct and 
immediate threat to U.S. national security. Russia's use of the treaty 
to collect imagery of military and civilian infrastructure, while not 
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand 
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.


                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Robert Menendez

Rebuilding the Bureaus
    Question. Neglect of the Economic Growth, Environment, and Energy 
Bureaus has resulted in a serious brain drain from the bureaus and hurt 
morale among the dedicated workforce of these Bureaus. The previous 
administration's skepticism and outright hostility towards 
environmental stewardship, climate change, clean energy diplomacy and 
economic cooperation were not only tone deaf and out of touch with the 
interests of the rest of the world, but were demoralizing to the very 
thoughtful and engaged personnel within these bureaus.

   How will you restore morale among personnel, build back the ranks 
        of the ``E'' bureaus and offices, and demonstrate leadership 
        and interest in the E Bureaus' priorities?

    Answer. Rebuilding the ``E'' family will require commitment and 
dedication, not only in recruiting but in training and retention 
efforts. We will also need to pay special attention to groups whose 
lack of representation at the State Department predates the previous 
administration. If confirmed, with your support and the help of my 
colleagues at State, I intend to pay special attention to this effort.

    Question. How will you continue and build on this tradition of 
leadership to advance the values of transparency and accountability 
that the U.S. Government has championed across MDBs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will champion the values of transparency 
and accountability across all U.S. engagements with the multilateral 
development banks. In large part due to our significant shareholding 
size, the United States is in a position to continue to work with 
fellow shareholders to ensure the MDBs promote transparency and 
accountability in order to build more support among all stakeholders 
for the very important work they do to address systemic barriers to 
economic development.

    Question. The U.S. National Contact Point (NCP) to the OECD is one 
of the only avenues for justice for harm caused by companies; however, 
reports have documented meaningful shortcomings in the NCP's ability 
for facilitating accountability and remedy. How will you ensure that 
the U.S. NCP is strong and effective to address business and human 
rights grievances?

    Answer. The U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) serves an important role in 
promoting and implementing the Guidelines, and in facilitating the 
resolution of allegations brought against a company. The Guidelines 
provide important recommendations by governments to companies on 
responsible business practices, including with respect to human rights. 
If confirmed, I will review the current work of the U.S. NCP, consider 
feedback from concerned stakeholders, and take appropriate steps to 
ensure that the mechanism we have in place to address grievances is a 
meaningful one.

    Question. What is your assessment of the push for an Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) capital increase?

    Answer. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is a vital source 
of development finance for Latin America and the Caribbean and provides 
a high-quality alternative to unsustainable borrowing from China or 
other creditors. IDB lending and policy advice will be important for 
supporting the region in emerging from the multiple crises it faces. If 
confirmed, I intend look closely at the IDB's plans and current 
financing needs in collaboration with Treasury and other agencies.

    Question. How can Congress best work with the administration to 
advance this goal (of an IDB capital increase)?

    Answer. Discussions on the Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB) 
resources should occur from the bottom up, considering the views of all 
shareholders, including Congress and IDB management. Such discussions 
should include fulsome analyses of financial conditions, how its use of 
resources addresses the region's challenges, and the IDB's role within 
the larger financing and policy landscape for the region. If confirmed, 
I would look closely at the IDB's plans and current financing needs in 
collaboration with Congress, Treasury, and other agencies.

    Question. How do you see the Under Secretary facilitating climate 
into the operations of State Department bureaus where the concept of 
``Climate Diplomacy'' may still be new?

    Answer. Among the many pressing international priorities on 
President Biden's agenda, reasserting American leadership in combating 
the global climate crisis is among the most critical--having been 
identified by the President as one of the four ``historic'' crises 
confronting the United States. If confirmed, I plan to work closely 
with Secretary Kerry and his team to advance our climate diplomacy 
work. I understand that Secretary Kerry's climate diplomacy work is 
closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am also 
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E'' family 
of bureaus and offices, and supporting the Biden-Harris 
administration's broader diplomatic engagement.

    Question. Can you describe how you see yourself, if confirmed, 
working in cooperation with the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate 
in realizing the full-scale integration and consideration of climate 
into our foreign policy apparatus?

    Answer. If I am confirmed, while I will report to Secretary 
Blinken, I plan to work closely with Special Presidential Envoy Kerry 
and his team to advance our climate work. Addressing the climate crisis 
is going to take a whole-of-government and whole-of-Department of State 
approach. If confirmed, I will have the privilege of overseeing two of 
the bureaus most actively engaged in climate change diplomacy: the 
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate a close 
working relationship with SPEC to ensure we are working together to 
advance this policy priority.

    Question. Is it in the U.S. interest, or a sound reflection of U.S. 
values, to respond to BRI investments in fossil fuels by offering 
financing for comparable fossil fuel energy projects that have 
significant environmental impacts?

    Answer. It is in the U.S. interest to work with countries to 
understand the full economic and environmental impact of energy 
investments and the availability of cost-effective, clean, and low-
carbon alternatives to fossil fuels. This includes, but is not limited 
to, countries where the PRC is investing through its One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) initiative. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating across U.S. 
Government agencies to work with international partners and expand 
competitive financing options for cost-effective, low carbon 
alternatives to PRC-backed, heavy-emitting infrastructure projects.

    Question. Should the U.S. compete by providing better clean energy 
alternatives that provide wide ranging health, economic growth and 
social benefits to BRI energy projects that exacerbate the climate 
crisis and harm local health and the environment?

    Answer. It is critical that countries' energy needs be met in a 
safe, and fiscally and environmentally sustainable, manner. If 
confirmed, I commit to working with institutions like DFC and EXIM to 
advance U.S. clean energy financing options, with a focus on building 
partners' capacities to assess and mitigate financial and environmental 
risks in the energy sector. I also commit to supporting international 
initiatives, such as the Blue Dot Network, to certify quality 
infrastructure projects that uphold global standards and are vital to 
strengthening shared climate, social, and environmental standards.

    Question. Do you believe it is in the U.S. economic interest, and 
sound environmental policy, for the U.S. to pay foreign entities to 
take our plastic waste to create energy?

    Answer. It is in the economic and environmental interest of the 
United States to support environmentally sound management of plastic 
waste and scrap. If confirmed, I will work with international partners 
to better understand international trade flows of plastic waste and 
scrap as the State Department and other Departments and agencies 
consider these important policy questions.

    Question. Would you support a prohibition on export of U.S. plastic 
waste for foreign energy production?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would support upholding and implementing 
U.S. export laws for waste and scrap, and supporting U.S. industry in 
understanding the policies of other countries related to trade in 
plastic waste and scrap. I understand that the Biden-Harris 
administration is still reviewing its position on international waste 
and scrap issues, and if confirmed I look forward to participating in 
that review.

    Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to 
increase U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy and address climate 
change?

    Answer. I understand that U.S.-India cooperation on climate and 
clean energy is a core element of the bilateral relationship. President 
Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-India Climate and Clean 
Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders Summit on Climate on 
April 22, 2021. Advancing India's ambitious 2030 climate and clean 
energy targets, such as reaching 450 GW of renewable energy, will be 
critical to confronting the climate crisis. If confirmed, I intend to 
ensure that the State Department plays a leading role in advancing 
U.S.-India collaboration, including by building on existing initiatives 
through the Bureau of Energy Resources to mobilize clean energy finance 
and integrate renewable energy into a flexible power system.

    Question. What role would you anticipate having in the 
implementation of the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 
Partnership?

    Answer. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-
India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders 
Summit on Climate on April 22, 2021, elevating climate and clean energy 
collaboration to the core of the bilateral relationship. The 
Partnership goals are to support India's deployment of 450 GW of 
renewable energy by 2030, scale up innovative technologies, and build 
capacity for climate adaptation. If confirmed, I intend to ensure the 
State Department plays a leading role in this Partnership--through 
promoting clean energy finance, technical assistance on regulatory 
reform, and support for innovation and technology scale-up--and 
provides the resourcing to achieve the ambitious 2030 agenda.

    Question. If confirmed, will you support the establishment of a 
U.S.-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center?

    Answer. I am familiar with the goals of the Eastern Mediterranean 
Security and Energy Partnership Act and, if confirmed, I will work with 
Congress and the Department of Energy to support the U.S.- Eastern 
Mediterranean Energy Center. I understand that the Department of Energy 
is working with counterparts from Israel, Greece, and the Republic of 
Cyprus, along with the State Department's Bureau of Energy Resources, 
to determine the Center's scope of activities, and expects to have a 
framework for establishment of the Center in the coming weeks.

    Question. Will you commit to prioritizing labor rights and support 
for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh, if confirmed?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing labor rights 
and support for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh. In 2013, 
President Obama suspended Bangladesh's trade benefits under the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because the Government of 
Bangladesh had made insufficient progress in affording Bangladeshi 
workers internationally recognized worker rights. Since then, 
Bangladesh has made a few amendments to its labor law, but workers 
continue to face dismissals, blacklisting, and violence for attempting 
to join or form unions or demonstrate for their due wages and benefits. 
In response, the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Labor 
fund programs to improve workers' rights and safety in the garment, 
shrimp, and domestic work sectors, as well as for migrant workers. I 
understand that the State Department also coordinates with USAID, the 
International Labor Organization, and other partners to encourage 
Bangladesh to enact reforms to bring its labor legislation in line with 
international standards. If confirmed, I will ensure my team amplifies 
this work, and raises concerns about labor rights at the highest levels 
of the Government of Bangladesh.

    Question. How specifically will you ensure that labor rights and 
labor unions are prioritized in initiatives such as High-Level 
Consultations on Economic Partnership with Bangladesh?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with leadership in the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of Labor, and U.S. 
Trade Representative to ensure labor rights and labor unions are 
prioritized in initiatives with Bangladesh, including the High-Level 
Consultation on Economic Partnership. President Biden made clear in his 
address to a joint session of Congress on April 28: middle class 
workers grow the economy and unions build the middle class. Likewise, 
economic partnerships are only possible because of workers, so labor 
rights must be viewed as a priority across topics and sectors, rather 
than a standalone issue.

    Question. Will you commit to working with international partners to 
combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the oceans?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with international 
partners to combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the ocean. I 
plan to work with colleagues at the Department and across the 
interagency, along with stakeholders, as the United States prepares for 
negotiations under the fifth United Nation Environment Assembly 
meeting, which is expected to deliberate on options for global action 
to address ocean plastic pollution in February 2022. If confirmed, I 
will also work with staff to implement the Department's activities 
under Save Our Seas 2.0, including building international partnerships 
to build capacity to address marine debris.

    Question. Will you help guide the State Department, working with 
other relevant federal agencies and multilateral institutions, to 
examine the environmental risks and social impact of foreign plastic 
waste processors that claim to recycle plastic waste?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will help guide the Department, 
including collaborating interagency partners and relevant multilateral 
institutions, to better understand the environmental and social impacts 
of foreign plastic waste processors that claim to recycle plastic 
waste.

    Question. Will you make exploring the potential for new 
international agreements on land-based sources of marine debris and 
derelict fishing gear a priority for the Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to addressing ocean plastic 
pollution and working with countries and stakeholders to find 
innovative solutions to address land-based sources of marine debris as 
well as derelict fishing gear. The Biden-Harris administration has not 
taken a position on launching a new global instrument and is still 
developing its perspective on the best approaches to addressing marine 
litter and plastic pollution. If confirmed, I will work with 
interagency, stakeholders and international partners as we consider 
different approaches, including new global instruments.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively 
executing U.S. foreign policy, to include diplomatic engagement to 
advance U.S. global health security interests overseas--the Department 
of State, USAID, or CDC?

    Answer. I understand that the United States takes a whole-of-
government approach, under the President's leadership, and in 
coordination with the National Security Council, to advance U.S. 
foreign policy, including advancing U.S. global health security 
interests overseas. The President appointed a Coordinator for the 
Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security at the Department of 
State. This role leads diplomatic engagement on behalf of the U.S. 
Government on health security matters, coordinating closely with 
relevant departments and agencies. I understand that the Chief of 
Mission ultimately has authority and responsibility for U.S. activities 
in a respective country and is responsible for coordinating and 
effectively executing U.S. foreign policy. Staff across the U.S. 
interagency, including from the Department of State, USAID, and CDC, 
have critical roles to contribute to this effort.

    Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively 
executing U.S. foreign assistance overseas, to include diplomatic 
engagement to advance U.S. global health security interests in 
countries of all income categories--the Ambassador (Department of 
State), the Mission Director (USAID), or CDC country representatives?

    Answer. I understand that under the direction of the President, the 
Secretary of State is responsible for the supervision and general 
direction of U.S. foreign assistance. I understand that the U.S. 
Ambassador, with Chief of Mission authority and responsibility for U.S. 
activities in a country, is responsible for ensuring adequate 
coordination among U.S. departments and agencies in country, as to best 
utilize the expertise of technical agencies such as USAID and CDC and 
ensure coordination across equities. The implementation of specific 
programs falls under USAID Mission Directors and CDC country 
representatives, who have important roles in directing country teams in 
the responsible and effective use of U.S. foreign assistance overseas.

    Question. Who is best placed to coordinate the execution of a 
comprehensive U.S. global health security strategy overseas, including 
by resolving conflicts between implementing agencies and 
organizations--the Department of State, USAID, or CDC?

    Answer. I understand that the Chief of Mission in a given country 
has ultimate responsibility for U.S. activities in the country, and the 
National Security Council coordinates implementation of U.S. foreign 
policy across agencies. I understand that the Department of State, 
USAID, CDC, DOD, and other agencies collaborate closely to coordinate 
and resolve conflicts in the execution of U.S. global health security 
strategy overseas.

    Question. Given the leading role assigned to the Department of 
State by National Security Memorandum-1 (21 January 2021) and Executive 
Order 13747 (4 November 2016) in advancing U.S. global health security 
and diplomacy, the enormity of U.S. foreign assistance dedicated to 
advancing global health priorities overseas, and the fact that the 
major implementer of U.S. global health assistance overseas--USAID--
falls under the foreign policy guidance of the Department of State, do 
you believe the Office of International Health and Biodefense, as 
currently structured, is fit for purpose?

    Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of global 
health security. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs' Office of International Health and Biodefense 
(OES/IHB) advances these interests through diplomacy and foreign policy 
implementation bilaterally and multilaterally, in close coordination 
with the interagency. I understand that OES leadership will continue 
coordinating with relevant Department of State bureaus and offices and 
interagency partners to review global health security needs and assess 
the need for any additional resources, working with Congress.

    Question. Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the 
coordinating role played by the Department of State and the 
implementing roles played by USAID and the CDC, has been successful?

    Answer. Yes. PEPFAR uses a whole-of-government model to harness the 
comparative advantages of seven U.S. Government implementing agencies, 
including USAID and CDC, with leadership and coordination through the 
U.S. Department of State, including at the country level through U.S. 
Chiefs of Mission worldwide. It may be the most rigorous global health 
program in terms of data collection. PEPFAR's interagency program 
implementation has been critical to PEPFAR's success in controlling the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic. As PEPFAR's work continues, it is seen as a model in 
global health, even in the context of COVID-19.

    Question. As more and more countries approach epidemic control, do 
you believe this (PEPFAR) model could be adapted to advance broader 
global health security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama 
administration envisioned under the GHI?

    Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of 
strengthening global health security capacity and health systems. 
Various models for U.S. foreign assistance programs, including PEPFAR, 
have successfully bolstered health outcomes globally. Bureaus and 
offices at the Department of State--including the Office of the U.S. 
Global AIDS Coordinator, Office of International Health and Biodefense, 
and Office of Foreign Assistance--continue efforts to leverage the 
successes of various aid models to effectively strengthen global health 
security capacity, and I will look forward to reviewing those efforts 
and models if confirmed.

    Question. As the Department and U.S. interagency work to help 
developing nations build their infrastructure and provide their energy 
needs, will you commit to considering all energy sources and fuels 
types that make the most sense for each project, particularly with 
respect to the needs of developing countries? Will you commit not to 
make general prohibitions on coal, oil, or natural gas projects?

    Answer. I am committed, if confirmed, to help developing countries 
address their energy needs and support the Biden-Harris 
administration's whole-of-government approach to ensure that climate 
considerations are fully integrated into our energy-related 
engagements. This includes supporting developing countries as they plan 
for a low-emissions future that decarbonizes key sectors, increases 
competitive energy and infrastructure development, and increases energy 
access to sustainably meet growing demand. If confirmed, I will work 
within the Department and interagency to coordinate support to 
countries to meet their climate, energy access, and energy security 
needs in ways that further our climate and energy goals.

    Question. If a capital increase is authorized for the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) this Congress, if confirmed, will you 
commit to working to establishing appropriate safeguards, transparency 
and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable IADB member 
countries of that borrow from the IADB to restructure Chinese bilateral 
debt held by such countries? Do you also commit to establishing 
measures to protect such countries from incurring subsequent Chinese 
bilateral debt?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and 
partners to distinguish our approach to development from China's by 
ensuring that economic viability and transparency are built into the 
projects we support at the Inter-American Development Bank. I will also 
work to confront China's economic abuses and advocate for the highest 
transparency and accountability standards to promote development 
investments that are both beneficial and sustainable over the long 
term.

    Question. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, is financing 
and constructing infrastructure projects around the globe. These 
projects build relationships that will last years if not decades 
between China and other countries. Depending on the terms of the 
financing and the quality of the construction, China may secure an 
unfair advantage in the relationship to the detriment of the interests 
of the host country as well as the United States. How do you propose 
the United States counter these practices and strengthen relationships 
with countries in need of infrastructure development?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States 
distinguishes itself from Beijing's state-led approach to development, 
including the ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative, by promoting private-
sector driven alternatives. The United States' approach focuses on 
partnerships that strengthen local capacity and promote 
entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance, fair practices, and 
internationally recognized environmental, social, and labor standards. 
If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies, and through 
existing U.S. Government agencies such as the Development Finance 
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and others, to promote and support 
infrastructure investments with high standards that ensure such 
projects are beneficial and sustainable over the long term.

    Question. People's Republic of China (PRC) companies are making 
significant headway an important but often overlooked technology area: 
undersea cables. The prior administration focused on this issue through 
its Clean Cable initiative, and by providing financing for specific 
cable projects in the Indo-Pacific. Please describe your understanding 
of PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications for 
United States interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this area of 
technology if you are confirmed?

    Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration views 
undersea cables as critical to America's national security and economic 
prosperity. If confirmed, I will fully support Department efforts that 
prioritize protecting this critical infrastructure and work with allies 
and partners to prevent untrusted, high-risk, and unproven vendors, 
like those with ties to the PRC, from increasing their market share 
through unfair practices.

    Question. After years of negotiations, on December 30th, 2020-
nearly the final day of the German Council presidency--the European 
Union (EU) announced it had reached an agreement with China on an 
investment deal. What is your view of the EU's decision to conclude 
this agreement at this moment?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with 
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including 
through the recently relaunched U.S.-EU dialogue on China and on issues 
related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on China 
to show that any new pledges in the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment (CAI) on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and 
subsidies are not just cheap talk, and the EU will need to hold the 
Chinese Government accountable. If confirmed, I will seek to engage 
with European counterparts on how to advance our shared economic 
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, as well 
as on China's failures to uphold its past international commitments.

    Question. What are the economic and geopolitical implications of 
this agreement? Please be specific. Will it affect the EU's willingness 
to push back on China for its malign behavior, such as using the EU's 
new human rights sanctions regime? Do you believe that this agreement 
with affect, negatively or positively, U.S. attempts to hold China 
accountable for its malign trade and investment practices?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active 
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our 
shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive 
actions, including trade and investment practices. The economic and 
geopolitical implications of the deal will depend on whether it is 
ratified and, if so, whether the Chinese Government follows through on 
its commitments. The United States applauded the EU's imposition of 
sanctions in March under its global human rights sanctions regime 
against PRC individuals in connection with serious human rights abuses 
in Xinjiang, an action taken in unity with the United States, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom.

    Question. The prior administration stood up an initiative called 
the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, designed to 
advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening capacity-
building programs; providing transaction advisory services and project 
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and 
coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the 
development of infrastructure. If confirmed, do you commit to 
supporting and continuing this program?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continuing the Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN). Public financing alone 
cannot fulfill the $15 trillion global infrastructure gap over the next 
twenty years--we must mobilize private financing of quality 
infrastructure, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Participants in ITAN 
representing 14 U.S. agencies have collaborated to identify and provide 
support for dozens of projects with a market value of $190 billion. I 
will work to continue helping foreign partners build better enabling 
environments to mobilize greater private sector financing in quality 
infrastructure investment through ITAN.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing advocacy, 
assistance, and other necessary initiatives to encourage, promote, and 
support greater investment in and economic and commercial engagement 
with Southeast Asia?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to supporting increased 
investment, economic, and commercial engagement in Southeast Asia. 
Transparent, inclusive, and resilient economic growth is key to 
ensuring that Southeast Asia remains free and open. Through our Indo-
Pacific programs, if confirmed, I will work with U.S. Government 
economic agencies to help countries in the region attract quality 
investments, increase transparency, secure project financing for key 
transactions, and advocate for U.S. firms. I will also seek to work 
through multilateral organizations, such as APEC and ASEAN, to improve 
regional business environments, reduce trade barriers, and increase 
commercial ties between U.S. businesses and the region.

    Question. How can the United States build more reliable trade and 
investment partnerships with African countries, particularly when the 
region faces severe economic impacts from the coronavirus pandemic, 
external debt, and inflationary pressures? What will it take to 
overcome these myriad challenges, and how do you believe the United 
States can assist?

    Answer. I believe that fostering debt transparency is a key 
requirement for building back better in Africa. I understand that the 
United States supports the Paris Club-G20 Debt Service Suspension 
Initiative and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, both of which 
include debt transparency requirements. If confirmed, I will advance 
U.S. engagement in the multilateral debt initiatives, as well as 
ongoing World Bank and IMF support for economic recovery in Africa. The 
World Bank has provided $50 billion for African countries, while a 
significant portion of the IMF's $110 billion in COVID-related rapid 
financing has gone to Africa. If confirmed, I will also support 
development of a plan for a $650 billion IMF special drawing rights 
allocation.

    Question. Our strategy to counter malign foreign actors like the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) in African countries cannot be limited 
to still-nascent programs like Prosper Africa and aged initiatives like 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The United States' plan 
will also require strategic, targeted, and well-resourced ``whole-of-
country'' initiatives that address not only the economic side of the 
issue, but the governance, cultural, and diplomatic sides as well. How 
can the United States better develop country- or city-level strategies 
(for Africa's ever-growing mega-cities) to properly incentivize U.S. 
private sector engagement in critical sectors to ensure they are well-
positioned to compete?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that U.S. companies can 
compete on an even, transparent playing field. I will enhance our work 
to improve the investment climates on a country-by-country basis and 
inform U.S. firms of Africa's opportunities. U.S. businesses provide 
world-class products and services that Africans seek to grow their 
economies. If confirmed, I will examine how we can better coordinate 
our financing support across U.S. agencies. The Prosper Africa 
initiative has been working to coordinate many of these efforts, but we 
can do more. If confirmed, I will also support our soft power efforts, 
including engaging with youth and diaspora, and encouraging educational 
opportunities.

    Question. Should the United States prioritize support of Africa's 
efforts to realize implementation of the African Continental Free Trade 
Area (AfCFTA) or carve out strategic Free Trade Agreements with 
countries like Kenya? For regional economic blocs like the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)?

    Answer. I understand that the United States, while not a party to 
the AfCFTA, supports its goals of improved harmonization and 
coordination of trade in Africa. The agreement has the potential to 
foster a better business climate that would increase opportunities for 
U.S. businesses. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting USTR on any 
trade matters and strengthening alliances with our key partners, like 
Kenya and the Regional Economic Communities across Africa. With respect 
to Kenya, I understand USTR is closely reviewing the negotiations that 
have taken place to date.

    Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes 
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If 
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to 
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?

    Answer. Yes. I share the Department's appreciation for Congress's 
deep and continued involvement in sanctions issues. If confirmed, I 
will work to leverage available expertise and resources throughout the 
Government on sanctions issues, including as the Department works to 
stand up the Office of Sanctions Coordination established in the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, and will work with your office and the 
committee.

    Question. Do you anticipate that the Office of the Special Envoy 
for Climate will coordinate with the E bureau? If so, how? Do you have 
an understanding of what the reporting structure would look like? In 
the event of a disagreement between your office and the Special Envoy's 
office, to whom would the matter be elevated?

    Answer. While the Under Secretary position I have been nominated to 
reports to Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I plan to work closely with 
Special Envoy for Climate (SPEC) Kerry and his team to advance our 
climate work. I understand Special Envoy Kerry's climate diplomacy work 
is closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am 
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E'' 
(Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment) family. If confirmed, I 
will have the privilege of overseeing the two bureaus most engaged in 
climate diplomacy: the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate 
a positive working relationship with SPEC.

    Question. One of the irritants in the United States' relationship 
with our closest allies is the question of taxation of digital 
companies. Understandingly, European countries would like to tax 
companies operating in their territories, but this would have a direct 
and targeted harm on U.S. companies, since the U.S. is home to most of 
the largest tech companies. Resolving this issue is of primary 
important both for our relationship with Europe, for pushing back on 
the influence of Chinese tech companies, and for the health of the U.S. 
tech companies. In this role, you would have a large part to play in 
the negotiations to resolve this issue. How do you view the issue? What 
do you believe is the right compromise? What are the consequences for 
not resolving it?

    Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is 
committed to finding a multilateral solution to the current set of 
international tax issues?that require collective action.??If confirmed, 
I would seek to work within my role to pursue a strong international 
minimum tax?to?end?the race to the bottom in corporate taxation, 
ensuring multinational enterprises pay their fair share. This should 
also include?an equitable way to address the allocation of profits 
generated through the deployment of intangible property, including to 
resolve the issues that have been used to justify?Digital Services 
Taxes. If confirmed, I look forward to working alongside colleagues 
throughout the U.S. Government to advance these efforts.

    Question. Do you commit to continuing the previous administration's 
support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to assist the 
infrastructure development of Eastern Europe in a sustainable way and 
to counter China's Belt and Road and 17 + 1 Initiative?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to continuing strong U.S. 
Government support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a commitment 
already voiced by Secretary Blinken on several occasions. 3SI meets 
multiple strategic objectives of the Biden-Harris administration, 
including promoting the economic development and critical 
infrastructure resilience of some close U.S. Allies. 3SI contributes to 
closing development deficits left by communism; fostering the overall 
integration of Europe; strengthening Central and Eastern European 
resilience against, and Western alternatives to, Russian malign 
influence and the PRC's Belt and Road and 17+1 initiatives; and 
advancing multilateral partnership and transatlantic ties.

    Question. What do you view as the DFC's role in this (3 Seas) 
Initiative? What additional steps can, and should, the U.S. Government 
take to incentivize the private sector to take the risks necessary to 
invest in the region?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the 
Development Finance Corporation to maximize U.S. investment in Three 
Seas Initiative (3SI) projects and in finding other ways, in 
coordination with members, international financial institutions, and 
private capital markets to support 3SI goals in the energy, digital, 
and transport sectors. The needs in the 3SI region cannot be addressed 
solely by the public sector; the United States must incentivize private 
capital and U.S. business to invest in this stable region whose 
economic indicators have long been strong and positive. The U.S. 
Government should also promote U.S. business investment in 3SI 
projects.

    Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting European 
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a statutory requirement or 
an optional authority??

    Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law. 
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy 
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I 
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential 
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify 
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the 
statute.

    Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the 
completion of NordStream 2, or is it inevitable?

    Answer. Nord Stream 2 is a threat not only to Europe's energy 
security, but also to strategic stability on the continent. The 
administration will continue to work with allies and partners, using 
the tools at its disposal, to prevent the completion of the pipeline 
and to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply 
that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security. If 
confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to work to bring an 
end to the project.

    Question. Are U.S. sanctions on entities involved in NordStream 2 
extraterritorial, as some have claimed?

    Answer. The administration has made clear that any entity involved 
in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should 
immediately abandon work on the pipeline. I understand the 
administration continues to engage European allies and partners to make 
our opposition to the pipeline and the potential sanctions risk clear 
and will continue to underscore strong, bipartisan U.S. opposition to 
this Russian malign influence project.

    Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the 
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power) 
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations 
with Congress?

    Answer. To the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If 
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on this matter 
and others.

    Question. Do you commit to upholding U.S. law and sanctioning 
entities that are building or supporting the building of the NordStream 
2 pipeline?

    Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law. 
I understand the Department continues to work to bring an end to the 
pipeline, which it views as a threat to European energy security and as 
a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the 
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to 
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.

    Question. How will you use your position as Under Secretary of 
Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment to use U.S. economic power to 
partner with, rather than coerce, European allies and partners to 
strengthen their mechanisms to push back on China, including 
strengthening and diversifying their economies, incentivizing western 
investment into eastern and southern Europe, building strong export 
control regimes, and reinforcing their investment screening mechanisms?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the People's Republic of China 
is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and 
technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open 
international system. To address this challenge, the United States must 
engage from a position of strength, which requires working with allies 
and partners since this combined weight is much harder for Beijing to 
ignore. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with European 
partners who share our concerns to build resilience and reduce reliance 
on the PRC, and look forward to making progress on the issues you raise 
in upcoming G7 meetings, the U.S.-EU Summit and U.S.-EU China Dialogue, 
and in other venues.

    Question. What are the most immediate and critical areas for State 
to prioritize in this effort? Will you have the capacity to prioritize 
both the removal of irritants in our relationship AND work to weaken 
China's economic power over Europe?

    Answer. Our European partners share many of our concerns regarding 
the PRC's efforts to challenge the current economic order, but we will 
not always see eye to eye, even with our closest allies. We must work 
together to build resilience by both protecting and promoting our 
technological advantages. We must work together to ensure global norms 
and standards reflect our values. We must work together to secure our 
global supply chains and promote fair trade. Managing our differences 
is essential to achieving our shared objectives and, if confirmed, I 
will ensure we find the common ground that will allow us to do so.

    Question. The EU struck an investment deal with China last 
December, and yet, the U.S.-EU talks on trade and investment, through 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations, 
have crumbled. While the U.S. Trade Representative has primacy over 
trade talks, in this role, how will you push for enhanced trade and 
investment between the United States and the EU? What do you see as 
areas ripe for immediate cooperation in trade and investment? Do you 
believe there is room, despite protectionist instincts on both sides of 
the Atlantic, to complete any trade and investment agreements during 
the Biden administration? Will you push both sides to compromise for 
the sake of economic growth and unity against malign economic actors?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active 
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our 
shared economic interests. Failed FTA negotiations and tariff wars have 
badly damaged the U.S.-EU trade relationship over the past seven years. 
Resolving the trade disputes including Airbus-Boeing, Section 232 steel 
and aluminium, and Section 301 determinations in response to digital 
services taxes, in a manner that supports domestic jobs and growth in 
the United States, would remove key irritants in the relationship and 
allow us to focus on future challenges.

    Question. Will you support a trade agreement between the United 
States and the United Kingdom? Do you believe that a US-UK free trade 
agreement would be a benefit to the United States as well as the UK? 
How will you work with the UK and EU to ensure that both sides of the 
Brexit deal uphold their commitments, which is to the benefit of the 
U.S., EU, and UK?

    Answer. President Biden has been clear that he will make 
significant new investments in the United States for American workers 
before he signs any new trade deals. Now that a U.S. Trade 
Representative has been confirmed, I understand that the administration 
is reviewing the status of the negotiations and the text of the U.S.-UK 
FTA to determine the best way forward. If confirmed, I look forward to 
working closely with Department colleagues and USTR to engage with the 
UK Government on strengthening our ties across a wide range of economic 
issues. Further, President Biden has warned that any trade deal is 
contingent upon respect for the Good Friday Agreement.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in 
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the 
impact of your actions?

    Answer. While chairing the American Bar Association's Interamerican 
Law Committee at the height of the internal wars in Central America, I 
organized a network of lawyers from the hemisphere who sought to 
promote human rights and help mediate labor law conflicts in the 
region. Together with bar associations from Central America, from 1986 
to 1989 we organized conferences in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala 
and Costa Rica that focused on the use of arbitration. The conferences 
received much attention in these jurisdictions, and at least in one 
country resulted in draft labor law legislation that incorporated 
arbitration procedures. While the results were modest and violence 
against labor unionists continues to this day, our efforts served to 
highlight alternative dispute resolution methods to adjudicate often-
bloody conflicts.
    In 1999 journalist Horacio Verbitsky filed a complaint with the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the Republic of 
Argentina over his conviction for publishing criticisms of Argentine 
Government officials, including then-President Menem. At the request of 
a Columbia Law School professor, my team and I researched the 
applicable law and prepared a first draft of Mr. Verbitsky's legal 
brief. The case was ultimately decided in favor of Mr. Verbitsky.
    In 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh collapsed, 
killing more than 1,100 garment workers and injuring an additional 
2,500-plus. The disaster followed several accidents in garment 
factories in the country. Shortly afterwards, as Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economics, Energy and Business, I led a U.S. Government visit 
to Bangladesh, where we informed Bangladeshi officials that the United 
States would revoke GSP privileges over worker conditions. I followed 
up with several meetings in Washington DC with two industry groups that 
had been created by European and U.S. clothing retailers to improve 
worker conditions in Bangladesh. My main concern was that, although 
both groups had similar objectives, they were often in competition and 
were dissipating efforts that could not be wasted. Our meetings led the 
groups to agree on common standards and greater coordination. I 
understand that, largely through the efforts of both industry groups, 
safety has improved at the larger factories in Bangladesh, although 
more work remains to be done in smaller enterprises.

    Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when 
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of 
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote, 
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and 
underrepresented groups?

    Answer. Successful international economic policy is predicated on 
having a diverse and representative staff. President Biden has made 
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility a national security 
imperative. Secretary Blinken has committed to recruit and retain a 
workforce that truly reflects the American people. Diversity and 
inclusion make our diplomatic team stronger, smarter, more creative, 
and more innovative. If confirmed, I commit to working with the new 
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent 
Management, the Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other 
Department leadership to foster an inclusive workplace in the E 
``family,'' promoting, mentoring, and supporting the advancement of 
diverse staff.

    Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways 
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps 
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which 
you are nominated?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to work with experts across the 
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the 
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and 
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human 
rights abuse. I will prioritize working with allies, seeking 
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together. I will work to 
expand opportunities for U.S. companies to compete for and win business 
globally by advancing the fight against foreign bribery and corruption, 
strengthening transparency and good governance, and promoting 
responsible business conduct.

    Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S. 
policies to combat global corruption?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to 
strengthen U.S. policies to combat global corruption, including efforts 
to bolster enforcement of foreign bribery laws and improve global 
standards of transparency, accountability, and good governance. These 
efforts directly support the American middle class through job creation 
by helping to level the playing field for U.S. business.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. In 2015, you wrote an article stating that the loosening 
of restrictions on telecommunications investments in Cuba ``had the 
greatest potential to accelerate the growth of civil society in Cuba.'' 
Although I believe that increasing connectivity and allowing the free 
flow of information to the Cuban people will help increase the 
communication among the Cuban people, ETECSA, Cuba's only 
telecommunication company sets high prices, and shuts down the access 
to those who voice opposition against the regime. Just recently the 
regime shut down internet access in response to the San Isidro 
protests. Can you describe your views towards Cuba today?

    Answer. As a refugee from Castro's Cuba, I have no illusions about 
the Cuban Government. Many human rights activists from across the 
island rely on expanded internet access to communicate with each other 
and strengthen networks with other groups in Cuba and abroad, but the 
Cuban Government has restricted the country's internet access to keep 
independent media and journalists from reporting on government 
repression. If confirmed, I will seek to engage directly with Cuban 
civil society, and will work to design policies to empower Cuban civil 
society and recognize their leadership on these issues. Further, I will 
directly engage the Cuban Government on human rights issues, including 
freedom of expression.

    Question. As you know, the Cuban military plays a large role in 
controlling the flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this 
control to support the Cuban regime. Do you support restricting 
financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to promote 
freedom in Cuba?

    Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the 
pandemic and decades of an oppressive government's economic 
mismanagement. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration has 
committed to reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the U.S. posture 
regarding economic sanctions, to ensure they help empower the Cuban 
people to determine their future. If confirmed, I will support the 
Department's review, and I look forward to consulting with Congress on 
this issue.

    Question. As you know, Taiwan has long pursued a bilateral trade 
agreement with the United States. Late last year, the Taiwanese 
Government expended tremendous political capital to lift a ban on the 
import of American pork, which was the last major stumbling block to an 
agreement with Washington. If confirmed, will you urge the U.S. trade 
Representative to prioritize free trade agreement negotiations with 
Taiwan?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to deepening trade, investment, 
and other economic ties with Taiwan, which is a critical economic 
partner. Trade with Taiwan advances U.S. interests and helps create 
economic opportunity and prosperity in the United States. If confirmed, 
I will work with the U.S. Trade Representative to strengthen U.S. 
economic ties with Taiwan as an important priority.

    Question. China engages in economic predatory behavior through 
initiatives like Belt and Road, conducts malign influence operations 
around the world, steals IP, and is working to reshape the 
international rules-based system to its benefit. If confirmed, how will 
you use your role to counter China's malign activities?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with partners and allies 
to promote democratic governance and transparency. In contrast to the 
PRC's approach to development, I will work to ensure that we continue 
to focus on strong fiscal, social, and environmental safeguards in the 
projects we support. This includes building partnerships and local 
capacity, and promoting U.S. leadership in science, technology, and 
innovation. Further, if confirmed, I will work to promote the highest 
standards in development investments that are both beneficial and 
sustainable over the long term, and advocate for these standards in 
international standard-setting bodies. If confirmed, I look forward to 
working with Congress on this issue.

    Question. Do you think that the Belt and Road Initiative challenges 
U.S. strategic and economic interests? If so, could you expand on that?

    Answer. The PRC's opaque and unilateral approach to its overseas 
lending and investments creates unknown financial risks and undermines 
the efforts of the international community to advance development in a 
transparent, accountable, and sustainable manner that includes 
appropriate social and environmental safeguards. If confirmed, I will 
actively contribute to the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to 
counter this malign PRC influence, including by working with partners 
and allies to offer sustainable, market-based alternatives and help 
countries increase transparency and accountability of existing PRC 
lending.

    Question. How do you think the U.S. should work with our allies to 
make them aware of the repercussions of tightening economic engagement 
with China?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the PRC is the only country with 
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to 
seriously challenge the stable and open international system. The 
United States must address this challenge from a position of strength, 
which requires working with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will 
work to ensure our partners and allies are aware of the risks posed by 
Beijing's economic statecraft. These risks include vulnerability to 
predatory and unsustainable lending, malign investment, economic 
coercion, ICT networks with equipment that can be manipulated or 
controlled by the PRC, pressure to prioritize the PRC's interests in 
international organizations, and unfair competition from the PRC's 
state-owned enterprises.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. If confirmed, you will serve as the Alternate Governor at 
the World Bank, the EBRD and the IDB. All three of these banks are 
involved and have influence in countries where sexual minorities are 
discriminated against and where there is violence and persecution based 
on sexual identity and gender preference. Will you commit for the 
United States to use its vote and voice to improve the situation in 
these countries and ensure that all citizens can benefit from 
development programs supported by these multilateral banks?

    Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that programs 
financed by the multilateral development banks are inclusive and reach 
the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in society, including those 
who may be victims of persecution based on their sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or sex characteristics. If confirmed as Alternate 
Governor, I will work with the U.S. Governor to promote inclusivity in 
the development programs we support.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. As the senior economic officer of the State Department, 
your responsibilities often overlap with those of the Department of 
Commerce, the Treasury Department, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), among other agencies. I am interested in hearing 
what you see as your role in this effort and how you will work with 
other agencies to advance our goals?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the U.S. Trade 
Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the 
Treasury, and others in the administration to ensure that all U.S. 
trading partners live up to their commitments in trade agreements, and 
I will encourage a whole-of-government approach to addressing these 
challenges. If confirmed as the State Department's senior economic 
officer, I will work to ensure the interagency considers the foreign 
policy implications of all decisions while taking into account the 
economic impacts on U.S. businesses, as well as those of our allies and 
partners.

    Question. You have spoken in the past about how our trading 
partners must live up to their commitments, especially as it pertains 
to workers' rights. Currently, in the Xinjiang region of China, Uyghurs 
are currently being forced to produce products in atrocious conditions. 
How do you recommend we deal with this situation and how should we hold 
China accountable?

    Answer. The PRC is engaged in human rights violations and abuses in 
Xinjiang, including forced labor, that shock the conscience and must be 
met with serious consequences. The United States has used several tools 
to confront the PRC's use of forced labor, including sanctions and 
Withhold Release Orders to prevent products made with forced labor from 
entering the United States. If confirmed, I will work with our 
interagency partners to use all appropriate levers available to us as 
we seek to eliminate all forms of human trafficking. In addition, I 
will work with allies and partners to promote accountability and call 
on Beijing to respect the human rights of Uyghurs and all other 
religious and ethnic minorities across China.

    Question. The State Department, in concert with the Treasury 
Department and USAID, works to negotiate and executive conservation 
agreements under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) program. 
If you are confirmed to be Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, 
and the Environment, will you commit to prioritizing additional TFCA 
deals using the funding that Congress has provided?

    Answer. If confirmed I would welcome new TFCA deals and would 
actively seek such, including for coral reefs.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. If confirmed, what role would you have in formulating 
U.S. policy at the multilateral development banks?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will lead three bureaus at the Department 
of State that play an important role in formulating the agency's views 
on projects and policies at the multilateral development banks, 
including the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which 
coordinates that process. In support of the Department of Treasury's 
role as the U.S. Government lead on multilateral development banks 
issues, the Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights, 
and recommendations that contribute to our Government's oversight of 
those institutions.

    Question. How are the authorities divided up between the State 
Department and the U.S. Department of Treasury when it comes to 
international financial institutions?

    Answer. The Department of the Treasury is the lead agency for U.S. 
engagement with the international financial institutions. The 
Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights, and 
recommendations in support of the Department of the Treasury's role.

    Question. How does ending financing of fossil fuel projects at 
multilateral development banks help alleviate poverty and promote 
development?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support multilateral development 
banks' (MDBs) continued focus on energy policies that increase energy 
access, accelerate development, and reduce poverty. I will encourage 
MDBs to recognize and address the linkages between climate change and 
poverty, food insecurity and migration. The lack of recurring fuel 
costs for many clean energy systems allows countries to spend funds on 
development priorities rather than on the unpredictable costs of fuel.

    Question. What role will you play in the administration's U.S. 
international climate finance plan?

    Answer. The U.S. International Climate Finance Plan (``Plan'') 
outlines how U.S. agencies will work with each other, the private 
sector, and other partners to most strategically mobilize investment 
for energy transformation and climate adaptation. The Plan recognizes 
the importance of suitable investment climates, leveraging private 
capital, and positioning the United States to seize the economic 
opportunity of a low-emissions future by promoting U.S. exports and 
private investment into low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies 
and services, which can be a catalyst for job growth here at home. If 
confirmed, I would leverage the resources of the Department to advance 
these objectives.

    Question. What specific steps will you take to help U.S. businesses 
increase exports of American energy resources, including coal, oil, and 
natural gas?

    Answer. America's energy resource abundance and exports have helped 
stabilize global markets, increased energy access and, in some cases, 
reduced energy costs, spurring economic growth and prosperity. If 
confirmed, I will work within my role at the State Department to help 
ensure that U.S. energy exporters are treated fairly in foreign 
markets. I also look forward, if confirmed, to further expanding the 
scope of U.S. solutions and U.S. businesses that can be supported 
through our diplomatic efforts as we embrace a diverse array of energy 
technologies, such as carbon capture, that can assist countries with 
their decarbonization goals, energy security, and development 
priorities.

    Question. How will you ensure the State Department is helping 
developing countries with all types of energy projects, including oil, 
gas, and coal?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with developing countries to 
optimize technologies according to nationally integrated resource 
plans, which will cost-effectively meet clean energy deployment and 
energy access goals, while also driving economic growth. As developing 
countries navigate the transition to a clean energy economy and build a 
climate-resilient future, finance will play a crucial role. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's climate finance plan to 
promote the flow of capital toward climate-aligned investments and to 
assist developing countries' implementation of emissions reduction 
measures.

    Question. With billions of people without power, do you believe the 
United States should be promoting fossil fuels that are affordable and 
reliable, such as coal and natural gas, while supporting new 
technologies that reduce their carbon output?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support a foreign energy policy that 
advances energy access and energy security alongside decarbonization 
goals. While renewable energy and energy storage are increasingly the 
cheapest, most effective way of promoting energy access, carbon capture 
and storage technologies, if commercialized, could abate or decarbonize 
power generated by existing fossil-fuel infrastructure. If confirmed, I 
will work within the Department and with other agencies to coordinate 
efforts to support countries to meet their climate, energy access, and 
energy security needs in ways that further our climate and energy 
goals.

    Question. Instead of regulating and placing impossible restrictions 
on the undeveloped energy sectors of the developing nations, we should 
be encouraging growth so that these countries can compete in the 
international marketplace, create jobs, and alleviate poverty. Do you 
agree?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to encouraging growth in 
developing nations and creating jobs and alleviating poverty. I 
understand that the Biden-Harris administration seeks to support 
developing nations' energy sectors to achieve this goal, while also 
comprehensively addressing multiple diplomatic goals, including climate 
change. Often, energy resources with the lowest costs--which can also 
offer health and environmental benefits--cannot compete due to barriers 
in existing regulatory and market structures, as well as country risk 
factors. If confirmed, I hope we can work together to ensure 
multilateral development banks support investments to increase access 
to affordable and reliable energy for development and support cleaner 
energy to support our climate change efforts.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Ted Cruz

State Department
    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
    Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not 
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in notifications 
provided by the State Department to Congress? If not, why not?

    Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information 
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format 
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying 
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification 
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of 
classified information.

    Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?

    Answer. During my confirmation hearings I listed five priorities 
for the ``E'' family, which I would like to summarize here:

   Support the administration's efforts to end COVID-19 globally, in a 
        manner that reinforces America's global leadership, strengthens 
        our alliances, and counteracts Russian and Chinese ``vaccine 
        diplomacy.''

   Promote environmental and energy policies that tackle climate 
        change, and ensure that our companies and workers lead the 
        world in the clean energy revolution.

   Insist on free, fair and reciprocal trade rules that our trade 
        partners--both allies and adversaries--must adhere to, and that 
        enable U.S. companies and workers to compete on a level playing 
        field. Based on my experiences in the private sector, I am 
        convinced that U.S. businesses and workers can thrive in the 
        global marketplace if given fair shot.

   Help create alliances to maintain U.S. leadership in the 
        technologies of the future. This includes confronting efforts 
        to undermine American innovation, impose biased norms and 
        standards and appropriate our intellectual property.

   Expand the international footprint of our workers and companies by 
        providing information about opportunities abroad and 
        facilitating U.S. participation in international projects. In 
        particular, meeting the developing world's infrastructure needs 
        should be a strategic imperative for the United States and a 
        business opportunity for our companies.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses child labor 
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that 
include critical minerals.

    Answer. I understand that the U. S. Government is conducting a 
review of the critical minerals supply chain in accordance with 
Executive Order 14017 (America's Supply Chains). I understand that the 
State Department has found that PRC authorities are increasingly 
placing the young children of interned Muslims in Xinjiang in state-run 
boarding schools, orphanages, and ``child welfare guidance centers.'' 
Reportedly, older children among these groups are placed in vocational 
schools, where some may be victims of forced labor. If confirmed, I am 
committed to helping end the forced labor of children in all sectors, 
including those involving critical minerals.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses slave labor 
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that 
include critical minerals.

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything in my authority to 
help end State-sponsored forced labor, which is increasingly prevalent 
in China. In 2013, the National People's Congress ratified a decision 
to abolish ``re-education through labor'' (RTL), a punitive system that 
subjected individuals to extra-judicial detention involving forced 
labor, from which the Government reportedly profited. I understand that 
the Government closed most RTL facilities by October 2015; however, the 
Government reportedly converted some RTL facilities into state-
sponsored drug rehabilitation facilities or administrative detention 
centers where, according to civil society and media reports, forced 
labor continues.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which supply chains for 
critical minerals, and products made with critical minerals, run 
through the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

    Answer. State-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the PRC 
Government's mass detention and political indoctrination campaign 
against predominantly Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities have detained more than one 
million members of ethnic and religious minority groups, including 
Uyghurs, Hui, ethnic Kazakhs, and ethnic Kyrgyz, in as many as 1,200 
``vocational training centers.'' If confirmed, I am committed to 
eliminating forced labor from critical mineral supply chains, including 
any that run through Xinjiang.

    Question. Over the last several years, the United States has taken 
a bipartisan, bicameral, whole-of-government approach to stopping the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Production halted for a year after President 
Trump signed into law the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act 
(PEESA) and remained halted until after now-President Biden was 
elected. According to public reports, the Germans and Russians believe 
that the Biden administration will not impose crippling sanctions 
mandated by PEESA, as amended--and unfortunately, thus far, they have 
proven correct. Can you commit to using your role, if confirmed, to 
ensure the imposition of sanctions pursuant to PEESA, as mandated by 
Congress?

    Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law. 
Congress has provided tools that ensure that Europe has a reliable, 
diversified energy supply that enhances rather than undermines its 
collective security. The Department of State continues to work to bring 
an end to the pipeline, which is a threat to European energy security 
and a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the 
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to 
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.

    Question. Please assess the effect that allowing Nord Stream 2 to 
come online would have on American national security and European 
energy security.

    Answer. The administration has made clear its belief that Nord 
Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Kremlin malign influence project that 
threatens European energy security, including that of Ukraine and 
eastern flank NATO Allies and partners, while dividing the continent. 
The administration will continue to work with allies and partners, 
using the tools at its disposal, to ensure that Europe has a reliable, 
diversified energy supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its 
collective security.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the 
Blue Dot Network under the Biden administration's State Department?

    Answer. The Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the development of 
quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by certifying 
projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I understand the 
State Department and the interagency continue to work with our 
Australian and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of 
the initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying 
quality infrastructure projects in the developing world.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to advancing and fully 
implementing the Blue Dot Network?

    Answer. If confirmed, I fully intend to advance and implement the 
Blue Dot Network initiative to certify quality infrastructure projects 
in the developing world. As the global economy recovers from the 
pandemic, infrastructure financing will play a central role in creating 
an economic recovery that is sustainable and long-lasting. Rigorous 
standards will ensure that infrastructure investment in developing 
countries serves the best interests of their citizens and are 
consistent with their economic, climate, environmental, and social 
goals.

    Question. Do you plan to replicate the model created by the Clean 
Network Initiative across other tech sectors, infrastructure, and 
energy?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration views emerging 
technologies, infrastructure, and energy as critical to America's 
future national security and economic prosperity. If confirmed, I will 
support Department efforts to work with allies and partners to create 
an international environment that is competitive and open to innovation 
by American technology, infrastructure, and energy providers.

    Question. What is your understanding of the Indo-Pacific Business 
Forum and what it accomplished when it was held in November 2019?

    Answer. The 2019 Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) underscored the 
U.S. commitment to broad-based economic and commercial engagement in 
the Indo-Pacific. The IPBF is the premier conference where business 
leaders and government policy makers meet to discuss economic issues in 
the Indo-Pacific region. At the 2019 Forum, over 1,000 U.S. and Indo-
Pacific business and government leaders discussed investment 
opportunities and new policy initiatives in infrastructure, energy, 
digital, and healthcare. Building on this success, in 2020 the United 
States organized an IPBF which attracted record attendance with 2,900 
participants--including three U.S. cabinet secretaries--and over $10 
billion in deal signings and announcements.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you plan to continue and improve 
the Indo-Pacific Business Forum that the Biden administration 
inherited?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with U.S. Government 
economic agencies to continue and improve upon the Indo-Pacific 
Business Forum (IPBF). The event draws together business leaders, 
policymakers, and media from across the Indo-Pacific and serves as a 
venue to highlight U.S. economic policy developments, sign commitments 
for new investments, and build relationships between the private sector 
and governments. As with the 2020 forum, I understand that the 2021 
forum will likely be a hybrid in-person and online event for maximum 
flexibility and engagement, and to help American businesses bring key 
commercial transactions to closure.

    Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to consulting with 
Congress on ways to make progress in the Indo-Pacific with respect to 
sectors such as energy, tech, and infrastructure?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to open and robust 
communication with Congress, including through consultations on energy, 
technology, and infrastructure issues in the Indo-Pacific. Central to 
our efforts, the United States will promote private-sector alternatives 
in these areas. I intend to focus on partnerships that strengthen local 
capacity and promote entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance, 
fair practices, and internationally recognized environmental, social, 
and labor standards.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in 
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Young, Cruz, 
Rounds, and Hagerty.
    Also present: Senator Whitehouse

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Ambassador Nichols, Ambassador Sison, congratulations on 
your nominations, and thank you for your willingness to 
continue serving our country, as well as your families.
    We understand that that is a sacrifice of all of those who 
are part of the family and in terms of this continuing service, 
so we appreciate that as well.
    At this pivotal moment for our foreign policy in the State 
Department, I am heartened that President Biden has nominated 
individuals to two critical positions.
    I believe that your experience and commitment will be 
assets to the department and critical to the defense of our 
interests and values.
    I understand that the Senator from Rhode Island will be 
introducing Ambassador Nichols this morning, and that the 
Senator from Maryland, a member of this committee, will be 
introducing Ambassador Sison.
    I do not see Ambassador Whitehouse yet. I know he is very 
busy in Judiciary affairs. So he is probably is on his way 
here.
    So let us recognize the Senator Van Hollen first for an 
introduction.

              STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 
congratulations to both the nominees.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, colleagues, thank you 
for the opportunity to introduce to you the president's nominee 
to serve as our next Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, Ambassador Michele Sison.
    And in this nomination, President Biden has not only 
selected a nominee with impeccable credentials, unimpeachable 
character, and a deep knowledge of foreign policy, he has also 
wisely selected a longtime Marylander.
    I had met Ambassador Sison before, but my conversation with 
her yesterday makes me even more confident that she has the 
knowledge and experience we need at this critical moment in our 
history.
    President Biden is determined to renew American engagement 
around the world and leadership in international organizations 
and, if confirmed, I am confident Ambassador Sison will 
faithfully help achieve this goal.
    Ambassador Sison has had a distinguished career at the 
highest levels of the United States Foreign Service. Her 
experience spans nearly four decades and six presidents.
    She has served as our ambassador four times to different 
places: first, to the UAE, then to Lebanon, then to Sri Lanka 
and the Maldives, and most recently, to Haiti, a post she was 
appointed to in 2018 and a post which brought her full circle 
from her first diplomatic position as the human rights officer 
at Embassy Port-au-Prince in 1982.
    Throughout her 39 years at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy, 
she has served in a variety of roles that have taken her across 
the world, representing our nation's interests in West Africa, 
South Asia, and elsewhere.
    She also spent four years as the United States deputy 
representative to the United Nations from 2014 to 2018, a 
position that makes her ideally prepared for this new post.
    She also has a long track record of collaborating with U.N. 
peacekeepers and has gained a firsthand knowledge of the U.N. 
entities responsible for development, humanitarian relief, and 
human rights in the field.
    Her superb talents have been recognized by our country many 
times. She is decorated with numerous awards for her service, 
including Superior Honor awards, the ambassadorial level awards 
for her contributions to counter proliferation and combating 
trafficking in persons, and she has received both a 
Distinguished Service Award and the Presidential Rank Award of 
meritorious service.
    Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I could go on, but 
it would consume the entire hearing. So let me end with this. I 
grew up in a Foreign Service family and lived in some of the 
countries where Ambassador Sison has served.
    I know a good diplomat when I see one, and Ambassador Sison 
fits the bill. She exemplifies the very best of what it means 
to serve our country as a career Foreign Service officer.
    I urge the committee to support her nomination.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
    And after that sterling recommendation, Ambassador, maybe 
you should just rest your case. But we are not going to let you 
off that easy.
    In any event, thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I understand 
that Senator Whitehouse is with us virtually.
    Senator Whitehouse. I am, Chairman.
    The Chairman. Please proceed. Welcome.

             STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE,
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND

    Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank 
you, Ranking Member Risch, for welcoming me to your committee 
today.
    Like Senator Van Hollen, I come from a Foreign Service 
family. I am the black sheep in a family of--my grandfather, 
father, uncle, and cousin who were all Foreign Service 
officers.
    So it gives me particular pleasure to be here to recommend 
a career Foreign Service officer and a native Rhode Islander, 
Brian Nichols, as the nominee for Assistant Secretary of State 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
    My father served for decades, not exactly on the champagne 
circuit but in countries embroiled in conflict and upheaval, 
where the comforts and security of America often felt very far 
away. But he always felt he was doing rewarding and deeply 
important work.
    Brian Nichols has had a similar career serving in 
challenging State Department roles in South and Central 
America, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
    He has won department honors for his contributions to 
State's trade development mission and helped lead the 
department's international narcotics and law enforcement work.
    He has been our United States ambassador to both Peru and 
Zimbabwe, a country emerging from decades of dictatorial rule 
and dire economic hardship. So he knows the ropes and he has 
skills developed in our small, tight knit, and diverse state.
    Rhode Islanders have, I think, an unusual ability to reach 
beyond seeming difference and even simmering enmity to find 
shared values and common humanity, and Ambassador Nichols is a 
shining example of that skill.
    Building consensus is as simple, he says, as understanding 
people, a very Rhode Island quality, a very diplomatic quality, 
and one which Ambassador Nichols has demonstrated throughout 
his distinguished career.
    I am confident that if we confirm his nomination, he will 
serve all Americans well and make us proud.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse, for your 
introduction of Ambassador Nichols.
    Ambassador Nichols, your nomination comes at a time when 
the Western Hemisphere is reeling under a cascade of 
challenges: the devastation wrought by COVID-19, the fraying of 
democratic consensus, major migration crises, and a void a four 
years of American absence that China is seeking to fill. The 
task at hand is immense.
    With death rates among the highest in the world, COVID-19 
is inflicting a terrible toll on the hemisphere, and the United 
States has to step up. As we accumulate surplus vaccines, we 
must prioritize vaccine access for countries in the hemisphere 
as part of our global efforts to ensure that the most 
vulnerable are vaccinated.
    And as the region's economic health has a direct impact on 
the United States, we have to take bold steps to facilitate its 
recovery. That is why this committee voted to authorize a 
capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank last 
month.
    Additionally, Latin America is facing the recurrence of 
flawed elections, deterioration of the separation of powers, 
attacks on journalists and freedom of the press, and entrenched 
autocrats in Havana, Caracas, and Managua.
    Indeed, we know where democratic decay can lead. After two 
decades, Venezuela is now a land of unbridled criminality and 
kleptocracy, where a humanitarian crisis has forced more than 5 
million people to flee their homeland.
    While the scale is distinct, we also know that irregular 
migration from Central America is rooted in decades of low 
levels of democratic governance.
    Deficit, or I should say, deficient institutions are unable 
to meet the needs of the people and too many leaders have 
exploited weak rule of law to place their personal interests 
over those of their citizens.
    Given the scale of the challenge, I am pleased to see that 
Vice President Harris is heading the administration's 
diplomatic efforts in Central America.
    Under her leadership, we are already seeing an increased 
humanitarian response and a strong reaction to leaders that 
seek to undermine democracy.
    So, Ambassador Nichols, I look forward to discussing with 
you. I appreciate our visit yesterday. We had a whole tour de 
force of the Western Hemisphere, and we look forward to 
discussing with you how we will address some of these 
challenges and best to collaborate to ensure your success.
    Ambassador Sison--I am sorry, Sison. I do not know why I 
am--it is in my mind. But, Ambassador Sison, I apologize.
    Welcome to your sixth Senate confirmation hearing. It is 
deeply reassuring that President Biden nominated you, a 
diplomat with extensive experience, immense skill, and a 
demonstrated management record to be the next Assistant 
Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
    Over the course of the Trump administration, we witnessed a 
dramatic and troubling erosion of U.S. government leadership at 
the U.N. We tried to pull out of the World Health Organization 
in the middle of a pandemic.
    We undermined international protections for women, girls, 
and LGBTI individuals, and we defunded or reduced funding to 
key agencies. We refused to pay our dues in full to U.N. 
peacekeeping operations and, as a result, the United States has 
accrued $1.1 billion in arrears.
    When we shun our responsibilities and fail to lead, other 
countries take note and seek to take advantage, to the 
detriment of our interests and security.
    China and Russia have sought to fill the vacuum left by our 
absence. It is time for renewal and engagement with the United 
Nations and its agencies, like the World Food Programme and 
UNFPA.
    In the wake of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, we must 
redouble the Biden administration's effort at restoring U.S. 
leadership at the WHO and other international health and 
humanitarian organizations.
    The world will be closely watching how we more effectively 
engage within and work to strengthen international 
organizations.
    So I look forward to hearing your views and working with 
you to ensure we restore our critical leadership role.
    In closing, at a time of unprecedented challenges around 
the world, America needs outstanding leadership at the State 
Department. We look forward to your testimony.
    And now I am going to return to the distinguished ranking 
member for his remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both 
of you for your willingness to serve. Certainly, outstanding 
credentials. It is not often we see a panel like this with the 
depth of experience that the two of you have.
    I want to start at where the chairman started and that is 
on the issues in the Western Hemisphere. I am increasingly 
concerned that while a majority of nations in our hemisphere 
are considered democracies, authoritarian regimes in Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba have systematically dismantled democratic 
institutions and have committed some of the world's worst human 
rights abuses.
    These bad actors undermine their own countries, but they 
also undermine their neighbors. Transnational criminal 
organizations and malign state actors benefit from and 
contribute to these authoritarian regimes and pose a 
significant threat to the peace and stability of our 
hemisphere.
    More broadly, I remain exceedingly concerned about the 
malign influence of China and Russia throughout our hemisphere 
and the apparent increase of that.
    China's predatory lending practices and spread of 
corruption threaten the sovereignty and the privacy of our 
southern neighbors.
    At the same time, Russia has exported repressive tactics to 
allow authoritarian regimes to maintain control and crackdown 
on dissent.
    Beyond external malign influence, poor governance, 
violence, and lack of economic opportunity in countries like El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have prompted waves of 
illegal migrants to show up at our southern door.
    The previous administration negotiated a number of 
agreements with these countries, and the current 
administration's failure to capitalize on those agreements has 
only fueled a surge of migrants over the past few months, along 
with other precipitating factors, and demonstrates a 
significant challenge to our government's ability to protect 
our homeland.
    Lastly, as you know, Ambassador Nichols, the Columbia River 
Treaty between the United States and Canada is a great example 
of two nations managing a shared resource. I want to impress 
upon you the importance of a successful and timely conclusion 
to these negotiations for the entire North West congressional 
delegation.
    As you know, a number of us on a bipartisan basis have been 
working diligently with the department to move the negotiations 
forward. We stand ready to continue to assist the 
administration however we can in this effort.
    I look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of these 
important matters. Next, we have the nomination for Secretary 
of State for International Organization Affairs. This position 
oversees a wide range of multilateral organizations, the 
largest being the United Nations. The United States remains the 
biggest donor to the U.N. in both assessed and voluntary funds.
    While the Chinese Communist Party has increased its 
assessed dues, it is still severely lags behind the United 
States and our allies in voluntary contributions.
    The Chinese Communist Party uses its minimal donations to 
leverage a large-scale malign influence campaign to reform 
global governance, as they call it, such that the international 
system is more conducive to its own interests.
    As detailed in my report last fall on transatlantic 
cooperation on China, the Chinese Communist Party does so in 
part by inserting favorable language into U.N. resolutions, 
orchestrating the election of its top diplomats at U.N. 
agencies, and using its veto power as a member of the U.N. 
Security Council to block efforts to expose human rights 
violations.
    This fall, the United States will have an opportunity to 
negotiate the scales of assessment of U.N. peacekeeping to be 
consistent with U.S. law. Currently, the United Nations 
assesses the United States at 27.9 percent.
    As you know, this is not congruent with U.S. law. No 
country should pay more than 25 percent, and in 1994, the 
Congress of the United States enacted a bill that imposed 25 
percent on U.S. contributions for this program. That law 
remains in effect today.
    This mandate should be upheld during the upcoming 
negotiations. I will remind the administration that this is 
U.S. law and it must be used in the negotiating position.
    I also remain concerned, really concerned, by the 
administration's recent decision to resume funding to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees 
in the Near East, also known as UNRWA.
    This was done without securing, without insisting on, 
without even asking for any reforms. Over the years, the agency 
has employed individuals affiliated with Hamas, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization.
    UNRWA schools have been used to store Hamas weapons and 
there have been numerous cases of UNRWA textbooks containing 
material that is anti-Semitic. U.S. government assistance to 
UNRWA should cease unless true reform, as described above, is 
secured.
    Finally, I am also concerned about the administration's 
decision to seek a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council, 
again, without seeking any reforms.
    The Council is a broken body that focuses the majority of 
its time on bullying our ally, Israel, and allows some of the 
greatest human rights abusers like China, Cuba, Russia, Iran, 
and Venezuela a seat at the table.
    I know it is a bumper sticker to say, oh, we are always 
better off with a seat at the table when issues are being 
discussed than not being there. That is not always true, 
particularly in this instance, when you are sitting there 
rubbing elbows with the worst human rights abusers on the 
planet.
    Only true reform will bring legitimacy back to that Council 
and the administration should work to secure substantial 
changes.
    With that, I thank both of you for being here today, your 
willingness to serve, and recognize the sacrifices of both you 
and your families in this effort.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    We will now turn to the two nominees. We ask you to 
summarize your testimony in about five minutes. Your full 
statements will be included in the record.
    And we will start off with Ambassador Nichols.

 STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN A. NICHOLS OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER 
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER MINISTER, 
   NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (WESTERN 
                      HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS)

    Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to 
appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as 
the next Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere 
Affairs.
    I owe a deep debt of gratitude to President Biden, Vice 
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the confidence that 
they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our 
hemisphere.
    The opportunity to appear before this committee for the 
third time as a nominee to serve the American people steels my 
resolve to fight for the values that our nation holds dear--
democracy, the rule of law, and the innate dignity of every 
individual.
    With over 32 years serving our nation at some of our most 
challenging missions around the world, if confirmed, I look 
forward to bringing all my skills and experience to bear in 
that fight.
    President Biden has said that democracy holds the key to 
freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity, and if we work 
together with our democratic partners with strength and 
confidence, we will meet every challenge and outpace every 
challenger.
    My experience serving in our embassies in North, Central, 
and South America, as well as directing our policy towards the 
Caribbean, convinces me of the vital urgency of the President's 
words.
    Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to 
America's welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's 
fortunes cannot be separated from those of our closest 
neighbors.
    If confirmed, I look forward to drawing on the enormous 
talent and dedication of the community of professionals within 
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, as well as civil 
society throughout the Americas, our own private sector, and, 
of course, our Congress to advance America and the region's 
progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous 
region.
    I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an 
inclusive, compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our 
nation's prowess and professionalism.
    We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships 
throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with our closest 
neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
    The situation in Central America demands our urgent 
attention and unflagging efforts to promote democracy, 
prosperity, and security, addressing the root causes of 
irregular migration.
    The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate 
change, and a recession in many countries have opened the door 
to malign influences from outside our region.
    We will build upon the shared values, family ties, economic 
opportunities, and commitment to fundamental freedoms to 
counter those malign actors and deliver a better future for the 
people of our region.
    My professional achievements owe to the women who surround 
me: my wonderful wife, Geri, a retired senior Foreign Service 
officer, my talented daughters, Alex and Sophie, and my 
brilliant mother, Mildred.
    They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrifice for my 
career, and nurtured me with their love and support.
    In 1959, my late father began our family's adventure in 
diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving as a Fulbright Scholar 
and then partnering with the U.S. Information Agency on various 
projects in Europe, and helping to start the American Studies 
Program at the Free University of Berlin.
    My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the 
Senate confirm me, to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my 
tenure as ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. I have led my 
team in responding to the multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis 
in Zimbabwe.
    As ambassador to Peru, I led a large mission that focused 
on improving the rule of law, fighting transnational crime and 
corruption, and promoting respect for human rights, 
particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups.
    I also led a unified mission initiative to promote American 
businesses and grow American jobs, earning the department's 
Charles Cobb Award for those efforts.
    Prior to that, as the principal deputy assistant secretary 
for international narcotics and law enforcement, I helped 
direct a team of nearly 7,000 professionals who worked to 
expand access to justice, protect civilians, and combat crime 
around the world.
    I have hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs 
in Mexico and Central America, as well as crafting innovative 
justice sector outreach to Afro descendant and indigenous 
populations in the Americas.
    Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the 
highest standards of our great nation and strengthen our 
diplomacy. I look forward to partnering with you to advance 
America's interests in the Western Hemisphere.
    I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now 
and in the future. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian A. Nichols

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members 
of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the 
President's nominee to serve as the next Assistant Secretary of State 
for Western Hemisphere Affairs. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to 
President Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the 
confidence they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our 
Hemisphere.
    The opportunity to appear before this committee for the third time 
as a nominee to serve the American people steels my resolve to fight 
for the values that our nation holds dear: democracy, the rule of law, 
and the innate dignity of every individual. With over 32 years serving 
our nation at some of our most challenging missions around the world, 
if confirmed I look forward to bringing all my skills and experience to 
bear in that fight. President Biden has said that ``democracy holds the 
key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity. . . . And, if we work 
together with our democratic partners, with strength and confidence, we 
will meet every challenge and outpace every challenger.'' My experience 
serving in our embassies in North, Central, and South America as well 
as directing our policy towards the Caribbean convinces me of the vital 
urgency of the President's words.
    Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to America's 
welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's fortunes cannot be 
separated from those of our closest neighbors. If confirmed, I look 
forward to drawing on the enormous talent and dedication of the 
community of professionals within the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs, as well as civil society throughout the Americas, our own 
private sector, and, of course, our Congress to advance America and the 
region's progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous 
region.
    I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an inclusive, 
compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our nation's prowess and 
professionalism. We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships 
throughout the Western Hemisphere--and especially with our closest 
neighbors Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. The situation in Central 
America demands our urgent attention and unflagging efforts to promote 
democracy, prosperity, and security--addressing the root causes of 
irregular migration. The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
climate change and a recession in many countries have opened the door 
to malign influences from outside our region. We will build on the 
shared values, family ties, economic opportunities, and commitment to 
fundamental freedoms to counter those malign actors and deliver a 
better future for the people of our region.
    My professional achievements owe to the women who surround me: my 
wonderful wife Geri, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, my 
talented daughters Alex and Sophie, and my brilliant mother Mildred. 
They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrificed for my career, 
and nurtured me with their love and support. In 1959, my late father 
began our family's adventure in diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving 
as a Fulbright Scholar, then partnering with the U.S. Information 
Agency on various projects in Europe, and helping to start the American 
studies program at the Free University of Berlin.
    My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the Senate 
confirm me to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my tenure as 
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. I have led my team in responding to the 
multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. As Ambassador to 
Peru, I led a large mission that focused on improving the rule of law, 
fighting transnational crime and corruption, and promoting respect for 
human rights, particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups. I 
also led a unified mission initiative to promote American businesses 
and grow American jobs, earning the Department's Charles Cobb Award for 
those efforts.
    Prior to that, as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, I helped direct a 
team of nearly 7,000 professionals who work to expand access to 
justice, protect civilians, and combat crime around the world. I have 
hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs in Mexico and 
Central America, as well as crafting innovative justice sector outreach 
to Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations in the Americas.
    Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the highest 
standards of our great nation and strengthen our diplomacy. I look 
forward to partnering with you to advance America's interests in the 
Western Hemisphere.
    I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now and in the 
future.
    Thank you.


    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Sison?

 STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE JEANNE SISON OF MARYLAND, A CAREER 
     MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER 
  AMBASSADOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
              (INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS)

    Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee.
    I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's 
nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organization Affairs, IO. I am grateful to 
President Biden and to Secretary Blinken for this opportunity.
    I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica, 
who are watching virtually today. Their love has supported me 
as I represented our country around the world and at the United 
Nations.
    Over the past 39 years, I have been privileged to serve 
under six U.S. administrations and as ambassador four times 
overseas to the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and 
Maldives, and Haiti.
    Given that experience, as well as service in Togo, Benin, 
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and at the U.S. 
mission to the United Nations, I know that the United States 
cannot address today's global challenges alone.
    From climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic, we must work 
in partnership with other nations. President Biden has made it 
clear that we will put our core U.S. values at the center of 
our foreign policy.
    As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New 
York, I saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in 
crafting strategic cross-regional partnerships. These alliances 
are key in safeguarding multilateral institutions from those 
such as the People's Republic of China that seek to bend the 
U.N. system to their authoritarian agendas.
    We must actively out compete efforts by nations that stand 
in opposition to our U.S. values on human rights, democracy, 
labor rights, and transparent economic practices.
    If confirmed, this will be at the top of my agenda. It is 
important that we uphold the rules-based order that upholds and 
promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and 
protects human rights.
    The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to 
preserve a free and open market, a free and open internet, and 
in advancing global governance in areas such as technology, 
trade, and climate change.
    These rules and values benefit American interests and the 
American people. From the World Food Programme to UNICEF to the 
International Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in 
leading the international system, driving forward reforms with 
our partners.
    We must also ensure that the voices of civil society, 
women, ethnic and religious minorities, and other marginalized 
communities are heard.
    I have seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and 
humanitarian workers protect civilians and save lives in places 
critical to U.S. national interests.
    I have witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership 
when we insist on results and when we press for accountability, 
including accountability related to sexual exploitation and 
abuse.
    We are the largest contributor to the U.N. system. It is in 
our interest to lead in promoting genuine reform. Thus, 
ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral bodies 
is a key priority.
    We must promote qualified independent candidates to lead 
multilateral institutions and we must leverage the commitments 
of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are shared.
    We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N. 
system. The IO bureau support strong U.S. leadership at the 
U.N. and multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national 
interests, protect the American people, promote U.S. 
prosperity, and drive the reforms needed to ensure the 
effectiveness of international organizations.
    As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled 
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and 
our amazing civil service subject matter experts are our force 
multipliers in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global 
action.
    If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and 
building strong morale within the IO bureau will be at the top 
of my list, and if confirmed, I also pledge, number one, to 
look hard at U.N. and international organization management and 
budgeting practices and at how agencies implement ethics rules, 
including whistleblower protection; number two, to insist on 
effective peacekeeping operations that advance political 
solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates, and include 
women's participation; number three, to consult with you as we 
work together to meet the challenges of today's strategic 
competition and as we prove that respect for human rights, 
transparency, and democratic norms can and will prevail.
    If confirmed, I know that you will be counting on me to 
make sure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are well spent and that 
our multilateral policies and programs improve the lives of the 
world's most vulnerable citizens, contribute to international 
peace and security, and serve the American people.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I 
welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sison follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Michele J. Sison

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee.
    I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to 
serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization 
Affairs, IO. I am grateful to President Biden and to Secretary Blinken 
for this opportunity.
    I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica, who are 
watching virtually today. Their love has supported me as I represented 
our country around the world and at the United Nations.
    Over the past 39 years, I've been privileged to serve under six 
U.S. administrations and as U.S. Ambassador four times overseas: to the 
United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and Haiti.
    Given this experience--as well as service in Togo, Benin, Cameroon, 
Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq and at the U.S. Mission to the 
U.N.--I know that the United States cannot address today's global 
challenges alone.
    From climate change to the COVID 19 pandemic, we must work in 
partnership with other nations. President Biden has made clear that we 
will put our core U.S. values at the center of our foreign policy.
    As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New York, I 
saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in crafting 
strategic, cross-regional partnerships. These alliances are key in 
safeguarding multilateral institutions from those, such as the People's 
Republic of China, that seek to bend the U.N. system to their 
authoritarian agendas.
    We must actively out-compete efforts by nations that stand in 
opposition to U.S. values on human rights, democracy, labor rights, and 
transparent economic practices. If confirmed, this will be at the top 
of my agenda. It's important that we uphold the rules-based order that 
upholds and promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and 
protects human rights.
    The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to preserve 
a free and open internet, and in advancing global governance in areas 
such as technology, trade, and climate change.
    These rules and values benefit American interests and the American 
people. From the World Food Program, to UNICEF, to the International 
Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in leading the 
international system--driving forward reforms with our partners.
    We must also ensure that the voices of civil society, women, ethnic 
and religious minorities, and other marginalized communities are heard. 
I've seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian workers 
protect civilians and save lives in places critical to U.S. national 
interests.
    I've witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership when we 
insist on results, and when we press for accountability--including 
accountability related to sexual exploitation and abuse. We are the 
largest contributor to the U.N. system; it is in our interest to lead 
in promoting genuine reform.
    Thus, ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral 
bodies is a key priority. We must promote qualified, independent 
candidates to lead multilateral institutions, and we must leverage the 
commitments of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are 
shared.
    We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N. system.
    The IO Bureau supports strong U.S. leadership at the U.N. and 
multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national interests, protect the 
American people, promote U.S. prosperity, and drive the reforms needed 
to ensure the effectiveness of international organizations.
    As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled 
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and our 
amazing Civil Service subject matter experts are our force multipliers 
in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global action.
    If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and building 
strong morale within the IO Bureau, will be at the top of my list. And, 
if confirmed, I also pledge:


   to look hard at U.N. and international organization management and 
        budgeting practices, and at how agencies implement their ethics 
        rules, including whistleblower protections;

   to insist on effective peacekeeping operations that advance 
        political solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates, 
        and include women's participation; and,

   to consult with you as we work to meet the challenges of today's 
        strategic competition--and as we prove that respect for human 
        rights, transparency, and democratic norms can and will 
        prevail.


    If confirmed, I know you will be counting on me to make sure that 
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral 
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable 
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the 
American people.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome 
your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
    We will start a series of five-minute rounds and I will 
start.
    Ambassador Nichols, we had a good tour of the hemisphere 
yesterday so I am not going to revisit all of those. But there 
is one or two I do want to drill down on.
    As Miguel Diaz-Canel assumed the leadership of Cuba's 
Communist Party and completed his transition to what I believe 
is dictator and chief, the Cuban regime repeatedly has used the 
mantra of ``somos continuidad,'' which means ``we are the 
continuation,'' to make it clear that they need to maintain a 
single-party authoritarian state.
    Nevertheless, in a renewed wave of civic activism, 
including protest by artists, singers, and others in the San 
Isidro movement, a, largely, Afro-Cuban movement, there is a 
demanding greater respect for democratic values and an end to 
human rights abuses.
    So what our policy is, moving forward, is going to be 
incredibly important. Let me ask you a couple of questions. Do 
you believe that the attacks on our diplomatic personnel, known 
as the Havana syndrome, either were conducted by the Cubans or 
are known in terms of who conducted them by the Cubans?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would just note, by way of entry, that I know that our 
Cuba policy is under review within the administration. But let 
me offer a few thoughts, and if confirmed, I look forward to 
contributing to that process.
    Our priority in Cuba, as the rest of the hemisphere, needs 
to be democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Countries 
should not be grandfathered because they have failed to respect 
those tenets.
    The new First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba does 
not appear to me to be significantly different from his 
predecessors. But time will tell on that point.
    With regard to the Havana syndrome--my knowledge of the 
process of looking into that is limited, but I certainly 
believe that, given the amount of control that the Communist 
Party has in Cuba, there are more things that they can tell us 
about what was going on at that time.
    And I think that the process that the Secretary has 
designated, led by Ambassador Pamela Spratlen and the Health 
Incident Response Team, working with our interagency partners, 
is an important opportunity to get to the bottom of these 
incidents, and if confirmed, I commit to contributing to that 
process.
    The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that.
    It is impossible, if you understand Cuba's state-controlled 
system and its security apparatus to believe that anything can 
happen in the island without some knowledge of the Cuban 
regime, which they, certainly, have not shared with us, and now 
we find these attacks proliferating in other parts of the 
world.
    Do you believe that the practice of the Cuban regime of 
taking 20 percent of remittances to Cuban families, then 
converting the balance of the remittance to Cuban pesos that 
are worth a fraction of what Americans send to their families, 
that can only be used at state-owned stores is an acceptable 
practice?
    Mr. Nichols. Again, the Cuba policy is under review. But I 
do believe that those who are most responsible for abuses of 
human rights and democracy in Cuba should not benefit from 
remittances going to the Cuban people.
    Our priority needs to be what is best for the Cuban people 
and focus our efforts on supporting them, and I believe that 
the best ambassadors for doing that are the American people 
and, particularly, the Diaspora here.
    The Chairman. Well, let me hone in on my question because I 
have a limited time.
    I appreciate all of that but here is the point. If we want 
to help the Cuban people, taking 20 percent off of the $100 I 
send to my aunt, converting the other $80 of U.S. dollars into 
pesos, which is worth a fraction, and then being able, largely, 
to only buy at a government store, which is jacked up in 
prices, is not helping the Cuban people.
    It is, certainly, helping the regime. So I am for sending 
my remittances to my aunt, but I want her to get the 
remittances I send.
    Let me ask you this. Do you believe that sending, as the 
regime does, Cuban doctors abroad, then taking away their 
passports and getting paid for their services without fully 
paying the doctors is human trafficking?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe that their labor rights are being 
violated in large measure, and I think it has many 
characteristics of human trafficking, yes.
    The Chairman. And do you believe that the militarization of 
the Cuban economy, whereas Raul Castro's son and son-in-law, 
high-ranking officers of the Cuban military, is an acceptable 
practice for U.S. businesses to engage with?
    Mr. Nichols. I think that we should be working to promote 
diversity in the economy in Cuba and focusing our efforts on 
what is best for the Cuban people.
    The roles of senior officials and family members in the 
economy goes in the opposite direction and, if confirmed, I 
look forward to contributing to the department's review of our 
policies within the interagency.
    The Chairman. Yeah. Well, let me just say that, and I will 
end on this note, so an American business wants to do business 
in Cuba or they want to do, you know, tourism or they want to 
sell agricultural products.
    They either have to go to Raul's son or son-in-law, both 
high-ranking officials of the Cuban military who control the 
two, quote/unquote, ``companies'' that are run by the regime.
    You become a partner with the state, in essence, a partner 
with those who oppress its people, and your partner is high-
ranking officials of the Cuban military.
    I do not know if we, for example, would accept that in 
China. I do not know if we would accept it elsewhere. And it 
is, certainly, not a help to the Cuban people.
    So I look forward to continuing that conversation.
    Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Nichols, I want to talk about a parochial issue. 
That is the Columbia River Treaty. How engaged have you been on 
that issue or have you been, prior to coming on board here?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you. I have received a briefing on the 
treaty from our negotiators and legal team. I have not 
participated in the deliberations with regard to the 
negotiation.
    Senator Risch. Okay, thank you.
    I hope you will familiarize yourself with this. I can tell 
you, this is not a partisan issue. Indeed, we have been--we--
when I say we I am talking about the Senators, particularly 
from the Northwest, have been working with the negotiating team 
from the State Department, and we found them really good to 
work with.
    They are working on an issue that is incredibly complex and 
incredibly difficult with a friend and neighbor but with whom 
we have, obviously, competing interests as we try to complete 
the negotiations.
    I have trouble with some of my colleagues here whose last 
brush with the Columbia River was when they took geography in 
either grammar school or high school.
    So they are learning how important the Columbia River is to 
those of us that have water that flows into the Columbia and 
the effects that it has upstream on us.
    So, first of all, I do want to tell you, you have got a 
good team in place. We intend to continue to work with them, 
and it is bipartisan and I hope that we will continue down that 
road, and I look forward to your help in that regard.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I look forward to 
working with you on that, if confirmed.
    The Columbia River and its basin have important 
implications for hydroelectric power, green energy, the 
environment and, obviously, flood control and the economy of 
the western part of our nation.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Sison, I want to underscore to you the 
disappointment a lot of us had when the administration jumped 
right back into UNRWA.
    What UNRWA has done over the years is very disheartening 
and it is impossible to explain to the United States taxpayers, 
particularly my constituents, how the funds that--U.S. taxpayer 
dollars that flowed into UNRWA could be used to print textbooks 
that I have no doubt you have seen that have anti-Semitic 
materials in them--and this is paid for by U.S. dollars--and 
also the other things that UNRWA has done, allowing their 
facilities to be used for military facilities and that sort of 
thing.
    Again, we want to participate always in these things. But 
when they are doing stuff like that, it becomes very difficult, 
and particularly when the funds have now been freed up for 
UNRWA to get those funds again, and we are a huge contributor 
to that operation.
    What are your thoughts on that?
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and thank you for that 
question.
    The issue of transparency, accountability, and oversight 
with regard to the U.N. Relief Works Agency, UNRWA, and across 
the U.N. system would be a key priority, if confirmed.
    On UNRWA specifically, it is absolutely critical that we 
insist on neutrality, and that goes for the staff of UNRWA, the 
policies, the programs, the educational materials, that you 
have mentioned.
    If confirmed, I will be insisting on these red lines of 
complete neutrality, no educational materials, whether it is 
textbook or online educational resources that contain 
references to anti-Semitism, incitement.
    These are important issues and, if confirmed, I would be 
working with U.N. counterparts and others in the IO bureau and 
across our State Department to insist that these red lines are 
not crossed and that internal controls are maintained.
    Thank you.
    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate 
your commitment and your thoughts in that regard. It always 
amazes me when something like this happens where the funds were 
freed up without a commitment.
    I mean, if they will not make the commitment before they 
get the money, how in the world can you possibly think they 
will make the commitment after they get the money?
    So it amazes me how we transfer funds like this without 
getting anything back for it.
    And my time is up and I thank you for that commitment.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    I understand Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
    Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want 
to thank both of our distinguished nominees for their service 
to our country.
    Ambassador Sison, I am proud that you are a Marylander. I 
heard Senator Van Hollen's introductions. We are very proud of 
your career service, diplomatic service, to our country.
    It is, clearly, going to be challenged as we reassert 
America's diplomacy globally in the work that we do with our 
international organizations.
    So I look forward to working with you.
    Ambassador Nichols, I, again, thank you for your career of 
public service. Both of you have served our nation with 
distinction and honor, and I join the chairman in thanking you 
and your families for your willingness to continue in public 
service.
    Ambassador Nichols, you and I had a chance to talk. I just 
want to underscore a few of the points.
    One area that affects both of the individuals that are 
before us is the U.S. role in the OAS. I mention that because 
Senator Wicker and I had introduced legislation that became law 
for a parliamentary dimension within the Organization of 
American States.
    And I point that out, the more that we can get legislators 
working with our diplomats, particularly in international 
organizations or regional organizations, I think the more 
effective it will be.
    So I look forward to a stronger parliamentary arm within 
the OAS. We have a very strong parliamentary arm within OSCE. I 
think we could improve our representation at the United 
Nations.
    We have two of our members who are designated to represent 
the Senate. I think working with each other we can strengthen 
unity in U.S. foreign policy goals.
    Ambassador Nichols, I want to ask you about a subject that 
we talked about at some length and that is making anti-
corruption a key part of our policy in our hemisphere. We have 
seen an erosion of good governance.
    We knew that in Northern and Central America. We see 
significant challenges as countries have gone back on their 
commitment for their anti-corruption institutions.
    We see this in so many countries, of course, and Cuba is a 
country that the chairman has mentioned frequently is a corrupt 
country, Venezuela, et cetera.
    We have legislation that you and I have talked about that 
passed our Senate last Congress that we are going to try to get 
to the finish line this time that will fine tune the missions--
each of our missions in each of our countries on anti-
corruption.
    I want to just get your comments as to how high a priority 
this will be when you are confirmed.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Fighting corruption is vital to our efforts to strengthen 
democracy in our hemisphere and around the world. I want to 
thank you and the other members of this body for the tools that 
you have given us.
    I believe that we should robustly use our Treasury OFAC 
sanctions, our 7031(c) sanctions, and the full range of tools 
available to deal with those who would steal from the public 
purse, deprive the peoples of the region of their resources and 
their wealth.
    And given my experience in my current assignment and 
previously in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement, I look forward to deploying those tools robustly 
in support of democracy around the region.
    I would also like to note that I fully concur that the 
Article One branch of government and its engagement around the 
hemisphere with other legislatures will be an important tool in 
supporting democracy.
    Senator Cardin. Let me raise one more issue with you, if I 
might, and that is the Caribbean states. For too long we have 
not given them the attention that they need. We have not done 
well with their voting at the United Nations or at OAS, for 
that matter, and there are many Caribbean states. It does not 
take too much attention or resources to strengthen our ties.
    What strategy do you have in order to increase our 
partnership with the Caribbean states?
    Mr. Nichols. If confirmed, I look forward to building on 
our shared values with the Caribbean and their commitment to 
democracy and the rule of law.
    I believe that our engagement with the Caribbean region 
needs to include a robust presence and, if confirmed, I look 
forward to advocating for that.
    We need to leverage our development tools around the 
region, work with our multilateral partners, and international 
financial institutions to get them the resources that they 
need, and to make sure that we are attending to those issues 
that hold them back in their development.
    Senator Cardin. Dr. Sison, I would just underscore the 
point that we could do much better in getting support at the 
United Nations if our missions recognized how important those 
votes are to United States foreign policy.
    We have got to connect the dots in more capitals around the 
world so that we have stronger support at the United Nations, 
and letting us know in Congress where we can be helpful and 
getting those types of relationships that can help us advance 
our foreign policy.
    I hope you have a strategy to help us do that.
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and, indeed, the 
necessity of building broad cross-regional alliances and 
partnerships is critical across the U.N. and multilateral 
venues, whether we are talking about New York or Geneva, 
really, across the multilateral space.
    And I do appreciate the offer that I just heard for the IO 
Bureau and, if confirmed, I will take you up on this. I think 
that so many of the members of this committee have built deep 
relationships with leaders across the world and, if confirmed, 
I would hope that I would be able to turn to you and ask for 
some help but with enough advance notice and placing a call or 
two when and if needed.
    Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to working with 
you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young, I understand, is with us virtually.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. I am not sure my 
picture is appearing. Can I be heard?
    The Chairman. You are certainly heard but not seen.
    Senator Young. Okay. Well, I will just go ahead and dive 
in.
    So building on Senator Cardin's questions pertaining to the 
Caribbean Basin, as you know, Mr. Nichols, the Senate is 
considering a far-reaching China package, which includes 
American policies towards the Western Hemisphere, which, if 
confirmed, you will be tasked with overseeing.
    One of your first responsibilities would be managing the 
creation of a strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, 
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin 
America and the Caribbean.
    I want to know what policies you believe have worked in the 
past in these areas and how we might better work to improve 
some of these policies across the region to reduce our 
neighbors' vulnerability to Chinese influence.
    And, you know, you might include specifically how the 
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative could be utilized to push 
back on Chinese infrastructure developments.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    I think that we have a robust menu of policies and options 
that I would seek to leverage, if confirmed. We need to work 
across the board in institution strengthening, using our Agency 
for International Development for political party 
strengthening, for grass roots policy support at the human 
level.
    I think we've got to take advantage of our international 
financial institution partners and make sure that they are 
helping to advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
in the region, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank 
as a tool within our own region.
    The Organization of American States is similarly an 
important tool that, within its Charter, it is committed to 
those tenets of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law 
that we hold dear.
    Working throughout the region, as I have, justice sector 
support has been crucial and, I think, very successful in many 
countries around the region, and providing units and 
organizations that respect human rights and the rule of law 
that support democracy and the extent to which we can build 
upon those resources will be important.
    I think CBSI has been an important tool throughout the 
region. In terms of the future and the way forward, we need to 
look to leverage that asset in building institutions, making 
trade, communication, service sector improvements.
    Senator Young. Okay. All right.
    I am sorry to interject. Our time is just somewhat limited, 
understandably, in this format. So, my apologies, sir, I am 
going to move on because I have some other things I would like 
to turn to.
    I just returned from our southern border with Mexico. I 
spent all day Friday down there in the Yuma, Arizona, area, 
where I actually spent some time years ago as a United States 
Marine, participating in counter trafficking operations and 
monitoring some of the activities there, working with other 
agencies.
    The challenges continue. In fact, I think it is fair to say 
we are hearing this, Republicans and Democrats alike, that we 
have an ongoing crisis at the southern border, and that crisis 
has underscored the importance of identifying the root cause of 
unchecked immigration from the Northern Triangle region.
    Despite $3.6 billion in U.S. aid over the 2016 to 2021 
fiscal years, immigration policy from the new administration 
has still resulted in a staggering number of migrants fleeing 
these countries.
    And I suppose we do not need to really fixate on the 
massive uptick we have seen in the last couple of months. 
Everyone is aware of it.
    Despite billions of dollars in U.S. aid to these 
economically distressed countries, why have we seen a recent 
surge in immigration when it was, largely, controlled for the 
past several years?
    Mr. Nichols?
    Mr. Nichols. I think there are a variety of reasons but I 
point to a couple that are driving the uptick. One is a loss of 
economic opportunities driven by climate disasters and climate 
change in the region, corruption, violence, rule of law, a lack 
of hope, and we need to work to address the root causes of 
those challenges urgently.
    I will keep my answer brief, but happy to go into it 
further, if you would like, sir.
    Senator Young. Well, thank you for your time. I would also 
add the message from the White House has not been particularly 
helpful. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for your past service to 
this country and for your willingness to be considered for 
these important posts at this critical time.
    Ambassador Nichols, I want to begin with you. As we heard 
from Senator Young, so much of the focus on America's borders 
has been on the southern border between the United States and 
Mexico.
    But I want to ask about our northern border with Canada, 
because for states like New Hampshire that border Canada, the 
border closures have been very disruptive both for businesses 
that go back and forth across the border to do business, but 
also for many of our residents who have relatives in Canada and 
have been limited in their travel.
    Now, I understand that these were done because of the 
pandemic. But we are coming up on an end to the most recent 
extension of that border closure in May, and I wondered if you 
have any sense of what will happen on May 21st when the current 
restrictions expire and whether we need to keep this border 
closed or how soon we might be able to safely reopen it.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    I am not yet confirmed. I have not been privy to the 
deliberations on that topic. I know that the HHS and Homeland 
Security are looking at this issue carefully.
    I believe that the decision will be driven by the best 
science available. We are making important progress in our own 
country against the pandemic, and I hope that we'll be able to 
see progress with regard to the border soon.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Do I have your commitment 
that, once confirmed, that you will look at this issue closely 
and urge an examination that recognizes the challenges that are 
faced by that border closure?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Sison, I still have fond memories of my visit to 
Lebanon during your tenure there as ambassador. Sadly, things 
have significantly declined in Lebanon since that time, and I 
know that you are very familiar with UNIFIL's mission in 
Lebanon, how important it has been to the country and to its 
relations with its neighbors.
    If confirmed, how will you approach the mandate renewal in 
August and how can the U.S. be a moderator between the Lebanese 
Armed Forces, UNIFIL, and Lebanon's neighbors?
    Ms. Sison. Good to see you again, Senator, and good 
morning.
    As with all peacekeeping missions, we want to make sure 
that at the time of mandate renewal and discussion at the U.N. 
Security Council that we are looking at realistic and 
achievable mandates, that we are looking at mandates that 
include women in peacekeeping as both military and police 
peacekeepers, that when possible that this mandate promotes the 
political solution, and that we look at the reforms in terms of 
effectiveness, efficiency, to deliver on that mandate, and, of 
course, the mandates need to be well resourced as well to be 
effective.
    UNIFIL has played a stabilizing role in southern Lebanon, 
and we are seeing this at the present time as well. If 
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to consult with you, 
Senator, and other members of this committee on how we can make 
peacekeeping the most effective and efficient investment and 
that the peacekeepers are resourced to perform their mandates 
effectively.
    Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. One of the most pressing issues 
facing the Security Council at the U.N. is the need to maintain 
humanitarian aid in Syria.
    How can you and the State Department and those of us in 
Congress support Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's efforts to push 
back against Russia's obstructionism in allowing that 
humanitarian aid to those who need it?
    Ms. Sison. Senator, I absolutely agree with you on the 
urgency of keeping humanitarian delivery, these corridors open.
    The reauthorization of Bab al-Hawa for another 12 months is 
completely a priority and, if confirmed, would be looking to 
push on the other two cross-border points that are not 
currently authorized to be used.
    The suffering that we see, particularly in northeast and 
northwestern Syria, is alarming: food insecurity, the inability 
to deliver badly-needed medical and other items, particularly 
in this period of the COVID pandemic.
    So, if confirmed, I do look forward to consulting closely 
with you and with working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield and her team on this critical issue of the 
reauthorization of the cross-border delivery.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. But I just want to weigh in 
in support of your point about the Havana syndrome and our 
efforts that we should be making with the Cuban regime to press 
them more on what they know.
    And, Ambassador Nichols, I would also just like to weigh 
in. I appreciate the administration's appointment of Ambassador 
Spratlen.
    But the fact is, in Congress, we are still not getting the 
information we need on what is actually happening with so-
called Havana syndrome government wide, nor are we seeing the 
coordination that I think we would all hope to see and the 
assurance that those people who are affected are getting 
absolutely the best health care that they need.
    So I hope you will share that with the State Department.
    Mr. Nichols. I will, Senator, and those who were injured in 
those attacks and the health of our people throughout our 
service and throughout our government are my highest priority.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to both of you for your service to our country. 
You, clearly, are both very well qualified and we appreciate 
your offer of continued service.
    Ambassador Nichols, I am concerned about, I guess, the 
ongoing and, in some cases, increasing Chinese and Russian 
engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
    One example is China's launching of a vaccine diplomacy 
strategy into Latin America, while Russia is launching 
countless disinformation campaigns in Latin America to 
discredit the West, specifically, the United States.
    What do you think should be done to address this and what 
resources are available to you for that purpose? I know that 
you have indicated that there are some organizations and so 
forth.
    But when it comes to their very aggressive approach to 
provide misinformation about our country but also to gather 
additional leverage within the Western Hemisphere, share with 
me your thoughts and what tools you would see available to you.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I fully share your 
concerns.
    We have a number of tools available to us. We have the 
Global Engagement Center pushing back on disinformation. We are 
bolstering our public diplomacy at the embassy level throughout 
the hemisphere, and I think that is a very important tool.
    We have shared values, and we need to point out to the 
peoples of the region the shared values that we have, and the 
difference between what we consider important and what the real 
costs of the engagement that the malign actors from outside our 
hemisphere, like China and Russia, are engaging in.
    The Chinese offer all sorts of things. They don't come for 
free. The Chinese are getting something out of it, and we need 
to push back aggressively with a variety of tools.
    They also offer in their economic engagement unfair 
competition practices and corruption, and when we see that we 
need to call it out.
    Senator Rounds. I think sometimes their offer of assistance 
to a contrary is seen as a first step in where, later on, they 
will start asking for small favors and then move into more 
demands.
    In our case, I would suspect that there are times in which 
we are seen as looking at some of our neighbors and saying, we 
expect you to behave in a particular way, and rather than 
talking about our shared values we try to impose values upon 
them.
    Share with me your thoughts about the differentiation 
between our shared values and times in which we might be seen 
as placing our values upon them. I think it is a critical 
difference.
    Mr. Nichols. I think that there are advantages in our 
hemisphere and that our founding documents in this hemisphere 
lay out what the nations of this region believe in and what 
they have committed to.
    The OAS is the world's oldest regional multilateral 
organization, and its Charter lays out values very clearly that 
all of the nations in this hemisphere have signed onto, and I 
think we can point to those.
    We can point to polling of the publics in this hemisphere 
and their value for democracy, human rights, and the rule of 
law, and I think when we talk about what the Chinese and the 
Russians are really offering, what they are really asking of 
governments, there is a big difference between what one 
individual official in a government might want and what, I 
think, the people of that nation might want.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Ambassador Sison, the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly, put a 
spotlight on the World Health Organization. Concerns have been 
expressed that the WHO lacks sufficient resources to manage a 
global pandemic as well as maintain its integrity.
    Do you think that the WHO is resourced to handle a global 
pandemic, and do you believe that it is still an unbiased 
organization, despite Chinese influence?
    And, finally, how do you think the Department of State can 
help to strengthen the organization?
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator.
    Indeed, the issue of the World Health Organization--WHO's 
need to be fit for purpose and modernized is an important one, 
and there is an issue, of course, of the need for sustained 
financing.
    We do not want to start down a road and only to find that 
we are not able to continue down the road as we work to 
strengthen WHO's ability in surveillance detection, in 
infectious disease prevention, the ability to respond, to 
insist that all member states report transparently.
    But, of course, that sustained financing needs to be 
matched with a strong focus and, if confirmed, this would be a 
top priority on transparency, accountability, and oversight of 
the WHO's operations.
    You mentioned the word integrity and, absolutely, we need 
to make sure that the WHO's assessments, findings, reports, are 
science based, expert led, free from outside influence.
    And, again, we need to insist that all member states comply 
with the international norms on infectious disease reporting, 
international health regulations. We need full transparency on 
this. Could not agree more, Senator.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
    Senator Murphy?
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you both for your willingness to continue to serve, especially 
in these very important roles.
    Ambassador Nichols, I wanted to turn to the topic of 
Venezuela. You know, by no metric can anyone suggest that 
President Trump's policy in Venezuela was a success. Maduro was 
more cemented in power at the end of his four years.
    But there has been some interesting developments over the 
past few months. We have seen some compromises by the Maduro 
government on humanitarian access, the creation of a new 
electoral council, willingness to join the Norway-hosted talks.
    And so I am interested to learn from you your early 
thoughts about how the United States can help push this 
momentum along, capitalize it, and then, specifically, whether 
this is the time to talk about restoring diesel swaps.
    I have believed for a while that the United States should 
be engaged in this policy as a way to relieve humanitarian 
suffering inside the country.
    But I wonder if this policy now makes even more sense, 
because not only does it provide an avenue to try to get much-
needed economic relief to people who are suffering, but it also 
may be a way to show that the United States is open to helping 
to be a part of these sort of grass shoots of negotiating room.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    There needs to be a key focus in our policy, in my view, 
which I should caveat that I understand is under review within 
the administration. So this will be my personal views.
    But I believe that we have a major advantage in dealing 
with Venezuela, that there is a broad multilateral coalition 
working to promote democracy in Venezuela, and that is 
something that we need to leverage aggressively to push the 
Maduro regime towards free and fair elections.
    We need to support the Venezuelan people, both at the 
political level in the form of opposition leaders and interim 
President Guaido, as well as pushing for humanitarian 
assistance and ensuring that the people of Venezuela do have 
access to the help that they need.
    With regard to diesel swaps right now, as I understand it, 
there is enough diesel capacity within Venezuela, at least for 
the next six months or so.
    I think that is something that needs to be watched, and if 
we see that there is a problem there for the Venezuelan people 
I think that is something to be looked at.
    But I think maintaining economic pressure to negotiate on a 
government that has shown that it will use dilatory tactics to 
prevent progress toward free and fair elections in addition to 
things like releasing political prisoners and allowing a free 
press, we have to be very cautious on.
    Senator Murphy. Yeah, no doubt, as Senator Menendez 
regularly reminds us, this is Maduro's game is to sort of 
entertain hopes of reform, stringing the international 
community and the United States along with, you know, nothing 
to be found at the end of the rainbow.
    And so I think we go into this with eyes wide open. But it 
is also interesting that Guaido himself has proposed the 
incremental lifting of U.S. sanctions as an incentive to try to 
continue along this path.
    But I look forward to working with you on this as the 
review continues.
    Ambassador Sison, I wanted to talk to you about a topic 
that regularly comes up in this committee, and that is Yemen. 
We have a U.N. and WFP appeal that is right now about one-third 
funded.
    Now, it is never 100 percent funded, but in prior years we 
have been able to stave off famine by making sure that we are 
at least 80, 90 percent funded on that appeal. There are some 
pretty important countries like Qatar that have made sort of no 
contribution.
    There is talk of a second donors conference to try to make 
sure that we put our foot onto the pedal, because we are 
looking at a 2021 famine, a new outbreak of cholera, if we do 
not rally the world community through the U.N., through WFP, to 
make sure that the money is there.
    And by the way, the United States put in less money this 
year than we did last year, which is not exactly helping the 
situation.
    Just your thoughts on how we can make sure we get the 
humanitarian dollars we need in Yemen.
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and share your concern 
about the food insecurity and the need for humanitarian access 
to the vulnerable populations in Yemen and, in fact, just flew 
up for the hearing from Haiti.
    But we did have WFP Executive Director David Beasley with 
us a couple of weeks ago, and we actually discussed Yemen and 
the alarming situation there with the mounting food insecurity.
    So, if confirmed, you have my absolute commitment that I 
would be working both with stakeholders to create these broad 
partnerships with other donors and like-minded countries, also 
to support Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and her team up 
in New York because, of course, the U.N. Security Council has 
put an enormous amount of effort and work into maintain 
Security Council voice--united Security Council voice on Yemen.
    If confirmed, I look forward to consulting and talking with 
you more on this important topic.
    Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you very much to you both.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty?
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch, thank you. And, Ambassadors, thank you for your service. 
Greatly appreciated.
    I would like to, first, talk about the Western Hemisphere. 
I am from Tennessee. Since the border collapsed in late 
January, we have experienced a dramatic increase in drug 
trafficking, in overdoses, in human trafficking.
    We have now got unaccompanied minors coming into Tennessee. 
Our schools and hospitals are asking whether we have the 
capacity to deal with this.
    This has become the most urgent crisis in America from a 
national security standpoint, from an economic security 
standpoint, from a humanitarian standpoint.
    So earlier this month, I traveled to Guatemala and to 
Mexico to meet with leaders there to try to get at the bottom 
of what the problem is, what is driving this.
    I did not hear much talk about climate change. What I heard 
was that we are sending messages from here, whether it is talk, 
election talk, about how people will be treated if a certain 
outcome occurs, whether it is talk about the potential for a 
$15 minimum wage, whether it is talk about checks for illegal 
immigrants, or the fact that we have extended unemployment--
plussed-up unemployment benefits all the way to September, 
which is creating a giant job opening here in America.
    Coyotes are taking these messages and marketing them to 
very vulnerable people. They are encouraging these vulnerable 
people to put their life savings on the line and to risk their 
lives, to make a very dangerous journey, a journey in which 
more than half of them are involved in some--in some way in 
crime, whether they become part of the drug trafficking, part 
of the sex trafficking, or in some other way violated horribly.
    This is a very dangerous humanitarian crisis that is 
occurring at our border. The leaders of these countries are not 
happy about this at all. They blame us, in large part, but they 
also see opportunity.
    That is what I was trying to get at and I want to share 
these with you, Ambassador Nichols, these observations, that 
when I met with the president of Guatemala, he said, look, I am 
not asking for you to send money or fund NGOs, but help us 
technically--night vision goggles, technical training, so we 
can manage our own border. Our own national sovereignty is 
being violated, he told me. We want to cooperate. We think we 
can cooperate, and if we can get our border under control and 
bring the rule of law more in line, we will see more 
infrastructure investment, which is what they desperately need.
    We have tools here. This committee has jurisdiction over 
some of the tools that we can help them with infrastructure 
investment, but we need to get the rule of law and public 
safety in order there.
    I think there are great opportunities to cooperate with 
them, and I would look forward to working with you toward those 
ends.
    They also want to see us stop the national security problem 
that they have got too because they do not know who is entering 
their country. It is a real issue.
    It sounded even more so when I talked with the Mexican 
Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economy of Mexico. They 
have a grave concern about who is coming across their southern 
border and, again, they highlighted that opportunity for us to 
cooperate on a security basis, again, with training, with 
technology, with equipment. These are ways to help them address 
the problem.
    But the most clear and urgent problem is dealing with our 
own border, to stop sending the wrong messages that are 
encouraging this sort of behavior. And what is happening, 
particularly in Mexico, is that with the movement of coyotes, 
the overwhelming force that is occurring at our southern 
border, that it is creating an opening for the cartels to move 
even more drugs, more sex trafficking, more contraband across 
our borders.
    The cartels are getting larger and more powerful by the day 
and it is making it that much more difficult to manage the 
situation in Mexico, in Guatemala, and other countries in that 
region.
    So I would look forward to working with you on this grave 
national security crisis, and I hope that you will commit to do 
that with me.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to working 
with you and the other members of this body, if confirmed, on 
these issues.
    I know that colleagues within the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Population, Refugees and 
Migration, under the leadership of Vice President Harris and 
with the participation of Special Envoy Zuniga are working hard 
on the issues that you have discussed.
    Senator Hagerty. We need to do more, but thank you for that 
commitment.
    Ambassador Sison, again, thank you for your service.
    Still related to this area, what was very clear to me is 
that China is increasing the movement of fentanyl and fentanyl 
precursors into Mexico. These are getting manufactured and then 
trafficked across our border. It appears that all the 
cooperation between Mexico and the United States to interdict 
this has collapsed.
    I would be very interested in your thoughts on how, in the 
position that you are, hopefully, going to go to how you can 
increase our cooperation with Mexico to push back against China 
and their importation of this illegal drug that is killing our 
children.
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and I share your concerns 
about these illegal drugs coming into our country, as both a 
mother and a grandmother.
    There is, definitely, an important role within the U.N. and 
multilateral space to push this U.S. priority forward and, if 
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you, working with 
you and with stakeholders, in organizations such as the 
Universal Postal Union because there is a postal piece of this.
    And the work that we have done on some of the standards has 
actually made a difference in the multilateral sphere in 
enforcing and moving these norms into the international space 
as well as in the U.N. body that deals with drugs and crime.
    Senator Hagerty. I look forward to working with you, and I 
will just add this. The Mexican authorities made clear to me 
that they do not have the technology to examine the cargo that 
is coming in from China. They felt like we could help them 
significantly there.
    You think about x-ray technology, heat-sensing technology, 
the types of things that they could use to deal with the fact 
that China has become very clever at hiding fentanyl and the 
precursors that are being shipped in to their country and then 
being remanufactured.
    So I appreciate that commitment and look forward to working 
with you.
    And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine is recognized and he has graciously agreed to 
preside while I go to the Finance Committee. After Senator 
Kaine, at this point, no Republican colleagues who have sought 
recognition virtually are present.
    So it would be Senator Booker, who is with us virtually, 
and then Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and 
congratulations to the witnesses for your service and for your 
nominations.
    I want to ask three Western Hemisphere questions to--
Ambassador Nichols, to you about the Northern Triangle, and 
then I cannot resist taking advantage of having the Haitian 
ambassador with us today to ask a question about Haiti, 
Ambassador Sison.
    So, Ambassador Nichols, the Northern Triangle. We have seen 
real backsliding in the Northern Triangle on governments' 
transparency, corruption, violence, economic opportunity 
issues.
    Recently, in both Guatemala and El Salvador, there have 
been a sacking of judges and prosecutors who have been known 
for trying to prosecute corruption. Even more troubling, in 
Honduras the Honduran election of 2016 was a sham and the OAS 
called for it to be rerun.
    Instead of supporting the OAS, the U.S. recognized the 
government of Honduras, and what did we get for it? What we got 
for it was the government canceling transparency initiatives, 
canceling anti-corruption initiatives, and now the president of 
Honduras is implicated in a couple of high-profile drug 
smuggling prosecutions in the United States.
    Obviously, if we are going to try to deal with this 
migration problem, one of the key pillars to it is 
strengthening governance, security, transparency in the 
Northern Triangle.
    I suspect that there will be a request that we invest funds 
to do that, and I want to be supportive. But how can we invest 
funds to promote those ends when the governments in the 
Northern Triangle are often the causes or at least, in some 
cases, the causes of the problems rather than the solutions?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    It is not enough to win office democratically. People have 
to govern democratically, and central to that is the importance 
of the separation of powers and a strong independent judiciary, 
and that is something, if confirmed, that I will argue for 
vociferously with our partners throughout the hemisphere and, 
particularly, in the Northern Triangle.
    We have programming that has been successful around the 
world in strengthening the justice sector, and we need to press 
forward with those efforts, particularly in the Northern 
Triangle countries.
    Corruption is a noxious influence in that region, in that 
part of our hemisphere, and we need to leverage the tools that 
you have given us to call out those corrupt actors who are 
preventing the course of justice from flowing properly.
    We also need to leverage our development assistance and our 
multilateral partners to ensure that the institutions are built 
and people get the support that they need so they are not 
attracted to populist and easy solutions that quickly turn to 
ashes in their mouths.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Ambassador, I think all those are the 
right answers and I also think they are the things that we have 
tried to do for years with very little effect. So I hope we 
will not be in a Groundhog Day of repeatedly doing something 
and seeing it not work.
    Let me make one point on economic opportunity in the 
region. Again, we would want there to be stronger economic 
opportunities so people can stay. But how do we invest in 
stronger economies with governments that have not proven to be 
reliable partners?
    I have an idea. U.S. employers employ a lot of people in 
the Northern Triangle in the retail sector, in the textile 
sector.
    Rather, if we are going to try to increase economic 
opportunities, I would hope State and Commerce and others, the 
vice president's office, would pull together American employers 
who employ folks in the region and say, for example, what could 
we do as policy that would make you hire and invest more in the 
Northern Triangle.
    I will give you an example. There is probably a couple 
hundred thousand textile workers in the Northern Triangle who 
are employed by American firms.
    This is just a brainstorm, but if we were to say, for 
example, the purchase of PPE during the pandemic was revealed 
to be a critical national security issue, we should only buy 
PPE that is American made or that is made with American product 
in nations with whom we have free trade agreements.
    That would pull a huge part of the PPE supply chain out of 
China and it would give a strong preference for the production 
of PPE in the Northern Triangle, which is produced with 
American cotton in factories in that region. Something like 
that would lead to significant economic expansion or 
opportunities there.
    So I hope, as we focus on economic opportunities, get the 
advice of the American companies that are already there.
    Ambassador Sison, there is this, you know, obviously, huge 
challenge in Haiti, deep unrest over the term of the president, 
and a five-year term, but there is huge unrest over when did it 
start.
    What is the U.S. doing to try to help solve this dilemma 
and pave a way for a less corrupt Haiti, going forward?
    Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and good to see you 
again.
    The U.S. and, I will say as the sitting ambassador, U.S. 
ambassador to Haiti, we have been really urging all 
stakeholders, so the political actors, the economic leaders, 
civil society leaders, to come together and work in an 
inclusive manner to reach an accord that will serve the Haitian 
people.
    And I say this because the political impasse has had an 
impact over the last two years on the security situation. We 
see increased gang violence has had a negative effect on the 
economic side, including economic development side.
    The focus has got to be, I believe, on rule of law, 
combating corruption, promoting justice sector reform, and 
moving ahead on insisting that these overdue legislative 
elections, which should have been held in late 2019, do move 
ahead.
    The president has been ruling by decree because there is no 
legislature. So to get a president out of ruling by 
presidential decree, there need to be free, fair, and credible 
legislative elections later this year, as announced by the 
government of Haiti, followed by a presidential election, so 
that at the end of the sitting president's term there is an 
elected president to take his place. The----
    Senator Kaine. And thank you, Ambassador. I am over my time 
and I need to gavel myself out of order and--but thank you for 
that answer.
    I believe Senator Cruz is on his way, but I believe Senator 
Markey, we are going in seniority and you are up next.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
    Ambassador Nichols, thank you for your service over the 
years. I want to talk a little bit about climate change and the 
United States government and its ability to use Global 
Magnitsky to strike back at those who are committing crimes 
against environmental defenders.
    I know that you have experience in working on these issues. 
So could you please tell us what you believe we can do as a 
country to counter environmental human rights violations in the 
Western Hemisphere?
    Because, clearly, we are at a tipping point and we have to 
make sure that we are using all of the influence of our 
government.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
    It is a complex question. I will touch on a few examples.
    For example, if you are dealing with a company that is 
illegally dumping mining tailings in a river, suborning local 
officials, and improperly taking resources out of a nation, 
that seems to me like an example where you could leverage the 
full range of anti-corruption tools in response to illegal 
mining practices.
    In Peru, artisanal and illegal gold mining was a huge 
problem and linked to narcotics trafficking, and when I was 
ambassador there, we worked intensively on leveraging law 
enforcement tools against those responsible, especially in that 
nexus of narcotics and illegal mining.
    Senator Markey. Yeah, gold mining, logging, wildlife 
trafficking, environmental degradation, all of that. I have 
introduced legislation, the Targeting Environmental and Climate 
Recklessness Act, and it is just to reinforce the reality that 
all across these countries, brave climate defenders in Central 
and South America are risking their lives peacefully in order 
to ensure that these carbon-intensive industries and 
unsustainable business practices are wreaking havoc on local 
communities.
    And what my legislation would do is it would give the 
United States, give you, the ability to target foreign 
individuals and companies engaged in destructive climate 
actions to ensure that existing human rights and corruption 
sanctions under Global Magnitsky are used to strike back at 
those committing crimes against environmental defenders.
    Can I just follow up? Just looking at the Amazon, if I may, 
and the degradation of that forest, which are, as we know, the 
lungs of the planet, how can we better work to prioritize its 
protection with the countries that it spans across in South 
America, in your opinion, Mr. Ambassador?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
    I think engaging with the key Amazon nations, starting with 
Brazil but also Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia that is crucial. Our 
diplomacy can have an important effect on their policies.
    I know Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry is 
deeply engaged in that exercise. Programmatically, we can 
leverage our development assistance on the issue of climate, 
particularly on the protection of forests and rain forests in 
the region.
    We also need to think about how do we leverage our trade 
agreements, which include environmental provisions, to protect 
the environment and, if confirmed, I look forward to working 
with you on these issues.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. And just moving to 
Colombia, quickly, if I could, I am very concerned about the 
escalation of violence in Colombia.
    My question to you is what do you believe we should be 
doing? What steps should the United States government be doing 
in order to use our political influence to decrease the--that 
violence and the suppression of ordinary citizens in that 
country?
    Mr. Nichols. The situation in Colombia is a complicated 
one. Colombia is a long-term ally of the United States and we 
need to be engaging with President Duque, as I know, our 
ambassador and key leaders in the administration are, one, to 
work to deescalate the challenges, two, to address the economic 
crisis caused by the pandemic, which sort of was one of the 
reasons why the fiscal package that President Duque introduced 
was introduced, and three, to prioritize getting back on track 
to implementation of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia.
    And if confirmed, I look forward to working towards those 
goals.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. Thank you both for your 
service.
    The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, and again, congratulations to both of you on your 
nominations.
    Ambassador Sison, in my introduction this morning, I 
mentioned your experience in the area of international 
humanitarian relief, and in your new position and confirmed you 
will be a key player in that arena.
    Now, I support an immediate ceasefire in the fighting 
between Israel and Hamas. But whenever the rockets and the 
bombs stop falling, we will have a humanitarian disaster in 
Gaza.
    As you well know, there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza 
before the fighting started and now it is much worse. We all 
know that Hamas is a terrorist organization that controls Gaza.
    We also know that Israel has the right to self-defense, and 
I am glad that the United States and this committee have 
assisted Israel in the development and the deployment of the 
Iron Dome, which has intercepted thousands of Hamas rockets.
    But I also think that the United States and the 
international community needs to do everything we can when the 
fighting stops to assist the millions of innocent Gazans who 
are trapped there and have nothing to do with Hamas.
    So my first question is a simple one. Do you agree?
    Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I certainly share your concern 
about the human suffering associated with this outbreak in 
violence, and I do believe that providing humanitarian 
assistance to the Palestinian population with, again, all the 
transparency, accountability, and oversight built into that, 
while maintaining our long-standing security relationship with 
Israel is in the U.S. interest.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Madam Ambassador.
    Just to give an extent of the challenge we are going to 
face with the international community, this is--I am just 
quoting here from the New York Times' report today in terms of 
the humanitarian crisis:
    ``The fighting has destroyed 17 hospitals and clinics in 
Gaza, wrecked its only coronavirus test laboratory, sent fetid 
wastewater into its streets, and broke water pipes serving at 
least 800,000 people.
    Sewage systems inside Gaza have been destroyed. A 
desalinization plant that helped provide fresh water to 250,000 
people in the territory is offline. Dozens of schools have been 
damaged or closed, forcing some 600,000 students to miss class 
and some 72,000 Gazans have been forced to flee their homes.''
    Now, as your answer did and my question did, I am focused 
now on post-conflict humanitarian relief to millions of people 
who have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza.
    So do you agree that the United States and international 
relief agencies should insist that all parties involved give 
access consistent with security requirements, but access to 
provide humanitarian relief in Gaza?
    Ms. Sison. Senator, yes, the issue of humanitarian access 
to provide needed food, medical items, particularly in this 
time of the COVID pandemic, is absolutely critical.
    If confirmed, I would be working with the IO team and other 
stakeholders across our government and with U.N. partners not 
only to emphasize the urgency of working towards sustainable 
calm, but to ensuring that needed humanitarian relief with the 
built-in safeguards on transparency, accountability, oversight 
is delivered to the most vulnerable populations.
    Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
    Now, we also have an ongoing humanitarian disaster in 
Ethiopia. President Biden has called for a ceasefire in that 
conflict and we, the United States, are working with 
international relief agencies to try to get humanitarian relief 
to those there.
    This committee two days ago had a briefing with Ambassador 
Feltman and I had a follow-up conversation with Ambassador 
Feldman, the Special Envoy, yesterday. Can you just talk 
briefly about what we need to be doing and demanding in terms 
of providing humanitarian assistance in that conflict?
    Ms. Sison. Indeed, Senator, I share your concern about the 
increasing food insecurity that we see. The U.N. and the 
International Organizations Bureau have an important role to 
play and, if confirmed, I would be working with a number of 
these U.N. agencies, including World Food Programme and others.
    There are other associated human rights issues that I also 
believe the IO Bureau would be working on and, if confirmed, 
calling out those who are perpetrating these human rights 
abuses, these armed actors, widespread reports of sex- and 
gender-based violence and other atrocities.
    We would want to continue to speak with one voice at the 
U.N. Security Council on these issues, and I look forward, if 
confirmed, to working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield 
up there in New York as well as the U.N. agencies providing 
this humanitarian relief and using the appropriate space to 
call out those armed actors and others perpetrating these 
atrocities and abuses.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
    Senator Coons and I were in Sudan just a short time ago and 
visited one of the refugee camps that have been set up by 
UNHCR, and I think it is important the United States continues 
to support that effort as well as the World Food Programme. 
They are doing essential humanitarian work.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz?
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 
your service. Congratulations on your nominations.
    Ambassador Sison, let me start with you. You have 
emphasized repeatedly that you intend to work to ensure that 
American taxpayer dollars are well spent at the U.N. and other 
organizations.
    But Americans are deeply concerned about the structure and 
leadership of those organizations. Organizations like the Human 
Rights Council are hopelessly biased, especially against the 
nation of Israel, and they are mendaciously sympathetic to 
countries like Iran that commit atrocious human rights abuses.
    It is no surprise why that is the case, given that those 
are the sorts of countries that make up a majority of the 
members of the Human Rights Council.
    To take another example, the U.N.'s Commission on the 
Status of Women, the body's top legislative body on women's 
rights, recently elected Iran as a member. The Iranian regime, 
of course, enforces a broad array of gender apartheid policies 
and, concerningly, when asked, the Biden administration 
declined to condemn that farce.
    I worry that no amount of financial accountability can 
reform these deeply problematic organizations as long as we 
allow them to be led by countries that are antithetical to 
their purpose.
    I would like your opinion on that. How can financial 
oversight, which you have discussed, fix these deep problems, 
especially if the Biden administration is unwilling to speak 
out clearly against them?
    Ms. Sison. Senator, the issue of U.S. leadership is 
critical, I believe, to addressing the need for reform, and I 
agree with you there is a need for reform in many of these 
institutions.
    We need the U.S. back at the table pushing for these 
reforms. There is the issue, yes, of financial accountability, 
transparency, oversight, but there is also the issue of U.S. 
leadership building strong cross-regional partnerships and 
alliances so that our U.S. core values--protection of human 
rights, labor rights, and economic transparency--are at the 
forefront.
    We need to remind some of our like-minded of what we all 
signed on to in the Charter of the United Nations because its 
foundational document is strong on the human rights.
    On the Human Rights Council, Senator, I do believe that 
when we are at the table and as we are coming back to the--to 
the HRC, we have the ability to better defend Israel from de-
legitimization, from unfair targeting, from discriminatory 
efforts because we are there and we are present.
    We have seen when we are there that the number of items 
brought up under this article, Agenda Item 7, the only single 
country targeting of Israel in that space, that we are able to 
push back by coming back also and, of course, with our 
candidacy better able to create these cross-regional alliances 
to encourage more human rights right-minded countries to firm 
up its members.
    Senator Cruz. But does the hypocrisy of some of the worst 
human rights abusers being themselves members, does that 
concern you?
    Ms. Sison. Indeed, it does. But we have also seen, Senator, 
the Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on Venezuela. 
The Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on China and the 
treatment of Uighurs, has put the spotlight on Hong Kong.
    So the issue of our people-to-people diplomacy creating 
these strong cross-regional alliances of like-minded countries 
to make sure that our core U.S. values are at the forefront. 
This is why we need to be at the table and back.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    Ambassador Nichols, I would also like to ask you, briefly, 
about Mexico, and our relationship with Mexico is complicated. 
They are a neighbor. We share a land border.
    But they are also a country with its own interests, and 
when it comes to foreign policy we need to use all the foreign 
policy tools we have.
    Recently, the Mexican Government has taken a range of steps 
to downgrade counternarcotics cooperation with the United 
States, and in one incident, Mexico even released sensitive 
information that we provided to them in violation of the U.S.-
Mexico Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
    I have introduced legislation to try to address some of 
these concerns. But, of course, there is an enormous role for 
the State Department to play in conveying American concerns and 
priorities.
    Do you also share these concerns with Mexico's behavior in 
connection with, cooperation with, the United States in 
counternarcotics and treaty violations, and how should we 
address those issues?
    Mr. Nichols. Our cooperation with Mexico on rule of law, 
counternarcotics, justice issues, is vital. It is long 
standing. I had the pleasure of working on those issues when I 
was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.
    If confirmed, I look forward to engaging proactively with 
the government of Mexico on our security cooperation. It is 
vital for both of our nations. Mexican cooperation is something 
that we need and they need.
    The challenges as was discussed in terms of things like 
fentanyl and precursors, other opiate trafficking into the 
United States, illegal activities on the border--we need each 
other to resolve those, and I look forward to working with our 
law enforcement colleagues on the U.S. side, with our embassy 
Law Enforcement Working Group in Mexico City, and with Mexican 
officials, if confirmed, to press forward to ensure the highest 
level of cooperation, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    We normally do not have second rounds. But as I understand 
it, Senator Hagerty has--I am going to extend the courtesy to 
you.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, and Senator 
Kaine, I am actually following up on a point that you raised. 
If I could borrow you for two minutes. But I just wanted to add 
a comment that Senator Kaine inspired.
    In my recent visit to Guatemala and to Mexico, one thing 
that was clear to me that they were very interested in 
cooperating on was the fact that we are working very 
aggressively to reshore businesses from China.
    We are all very concerned about security of our supply 
chain. Those companies that are coming back to the United 
States, I want to get every job I can. Let me be clear. I want 
every one of those jobs in America that I can get.
    But to the extent that they are not coming back to America, 
rather than have them go to some other Southeast Asian country, 
why not find a way to work together to bring them into our 
hemisphere and to bring them to our friends there who need the 
economic opportunity, which this may help stem some of the root 
cause?
    I do not want to overlook the immediate concern. We have to 
fix the border crisis now. But mid- and long-term, there is a 
real opportunity here.
    Leaders cited CAFTA as a way to address this. You wisely 
brought this up, Senator, and I think taking a look at CAFTA, 
which actually presents now some restrictions and some 
constraints on what they can do, all of those constraints are 
being actually picked up by China right now because they are 
not part of that free trade agreement.
    We need to look very aggressively at what we can do with 
the FTAs that are in place, what we can do with economic 
development on a joint basis.
    I think that the United States can do a great deal to help 
these countries improve the rule of law and create the proper 
constructs.
    Again, we have the mechanisms to help them with 
infrastructure because of the various funding mechanisms that 
exist here in Washington and elsewhere.
    But creating that economic opportunity and seizing this 
trend right now coming from China is something that I encourage 
you very much to focus on.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with you on that.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
    The Chairman. Thank you. One or two final questions.
    Venezuela, despite the recent charm offensive, and that is 
what I consider it, the fact remains that Nicolas Maduro is a 
brutal dictator whose regime has committed, from my 
perspective, crimes against humanity, perpetrated fraud in the 
country's presidential and legislative elections, responsible 
for Venezuela's massive humanitarian crisis.
    So I, first of all, want to commend the president, 
President Biden, for providing TPS for Venezuelans. But with 
Venezuela descending into a failed state status, I know that 
interim President Guaido and a coalition of democratic actors 
are pushing for comprehensive negotiations, both presidential 
and legislative ones, as well as a return to democratic 
governance and increase aid to address the humanitarian crisis.
    So, Ambassador Nichols, is not that something that we 
should be able to get our arms around and supportive of and 
seek an international mobilization for a simple proposition, 
internationally supervise the fair and free presidential and 
legislative elections?
    Mr. Nichols. Mr. Chairman, I agree that is something that 
the international coalition should be focused on. Our 
multilateral partners play an important role.
    As you wisely state, the Maduro regime's goal is to delay, 
to deflect, to distract, and I think, cognizant of that, we 
need to take an approach that limits the regime's ability to do 
those things.
    As I said earlier, our multilateral partners are a vital 
tool in that regard. But the protagonists of this need to be 
the Venezuelan people and the Venezuelan opposition, led by 
interim President Guaido.
    The Chairman. Mm-hmm. You are familiar, or maybe I should 
add, are you familiar with the roles that, for example, Russia, 
China, and Turkey are playing in Venezuela? Russia, not only 
through its entity there that they use for what I call 
mercenary soldiers, but also I hope you are familiar with 
reports of Russia taking out gold bars out of Venezuela and 
part of the national patrimony going to Russia, the realities 
of Turkey's banks being used to flush the cash out of Venezuela 
and try to evade our sanctions. Are you familiar with those 
elements?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and the broad efforts by 
China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, others, to work around the 
sanctions regime that exists is deeply worrisome, and I think 
that the--those of us who wish to see democracy in Venezuela 
need to aggressively challenge those actions and work to ensure 
that the profits of their criminal activities are not returned 
to the regime.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    One last question for you. President Bukele in El 
Salvador--we had President Bukele here. We met with him before 
after he was elected but before he took office. He said all the 
right things then. He has done all the wrong things since then.
    His firing of the attorney general, his elimination of 
the--all of the judges of the Constitutional Court, have all of 
the elements of a massive power grab consolidation in an 
autocratic way.
    You know, he probably thinks that if we do not just go 
along with him he will turn to China. How should we face the 
challenges there?
    Because I think beyond El Salvador it is going to send a 
hemispheric message that is very bad if we do not, you know, 
stand up for the principles of observance of the Constitution, 
rule of law, and other elements.
    Mr. Nichols. As I said, Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to 
win office democratically or win elections democratically. Our 
friends and our rivals need to respect the rule of law and 
govern democratically and we need to hold them to account when 
they fail to do so.
    El Salvador is a country that has been a long-time ally. I 
served there from 1991 to 1993. We, as a nation, have 
sacrificed much and provided a great deal of assistance to El 
Salvador to try and put it on a path towards success, and we 
need to use all of the tools that we can to ensure that El 
Salvador remains on a forward path and that the challenges that 
it faces can be overcome.
    And I look forward to working on those issues, if 
confirmed.
    The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
    And finally, Ambassador Sison, I do not want you to feel 
that I have no affection for your position. So our legislation 
that Senator Risch and I put together on a bipartisan basis 
here passed the committee 21 to 1.
    The Strategic Competition Act creates a special 
representative for advancing U.S. leadership in the United 
Nations.
    That person would be responsible for, among other things, 
promoting U.S. leadership and participation in the U.N. system 
with a particular focus on issue areas in which authoritarian 
countries are increasing their influence and steering the U.N. 
agenda.
    We are alarmed, as you have heard here from several 
members, about the increasing influence and role of 
authoritarian countries in U.N. bodies. What is your assessment 
as to how we can best counter those efforts?
    And I know that there has been within your department to be 
a section that has been created. How do you see the role of 
this Special Representative playing within it?
    Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman, for this question and also 
thank you to the members of this committee for the bipartisan 
focus on this need for the U.S. to engage vigorously in this 
strategic competition, and if confirmed, this is at the top of 
my agenda.
    Indeed, the International Organizations Bureau is in the 
process of establishing and launching a new Multilateral 
Strategy and Personnel office. You mentioned the Special 
Representative position, and I look forward, if confirmed, to 
working with all stakeholders in this space.
    The Special Representative, the IO Office of Multilateral 
Strategy and Personnel, what are we going to focus on? A, 
making sure that we get independent qualified U.S. candidates 
or like-minded candidates if there is no U.S. appropriate 
individual into these top U.N. leadership positions.
    This is critical running the State Department and the 
Secretary of State, have put their weight behind, for example, 
an excellent U.S. candidate at the International 
Telecommunication Union, focused on that issue of candidates' 
long game, looking ahead at investing in the U.N.'s Junior 
Professional Officer program one to two years, having young 
Americans gain this experience and then be set up for mid-level 
and beyond positions to bring in our core U.S. values--
adherence to democratic norms, protection of human rights.
    China uses this program extensively. We need to be in 
there. Work with our embassies abroad, our ambassadors and 
charges, our USAID missions, to make sure we are looking into 
the weeds as well.
    We do not want to see U.N. agency documents coming out of 
these field offices that have Belt and Road Initiative or 
Communist Party of China language in their strategic program 
strategy documents out in the field. We need to be alert to 
this.
    And I would add to this list of priorities preserving this 
space for Taiwan's participation at the expert technical level 
in the World Health Assembly, which is coming up next week up 
at ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and at 
Interpol.
    These are transnational threats: global health security, 
civil aviation safety and security, transnational crime. 
Taiwan's experts' input should be heard.
    Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you, and I strongly support your views 
on Taiwan being included at those levels internationally.
    Finally, for you, it was reassuring to hear Ambassador 
Greenfield reiterate her commitment to countering anti-Israel 
bias and unilateral Palestinian actions in international fora 
and multilateral organizations like the U.N. and U.N. agencies.
    I think such a commitment is more pressing than ever as we 
search for ways to deescalate the current conflict and return 
to a two-state solution process.
    If confirmed, will you work to counter anti-Israel bias at 
the U.N. and other multilateral organizations?
    Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I will. I will push back, if 
confirmed, as I have done in the past in many different tours 
of duty against the de-legitimization of Israel, unfair bias, 
discrimination against Israel, anti-Semitism.
    Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Well, Senator Risch?
    [No response.]
    The Chairman. With that, we appreciate your testimony. This 
record will remain open two business days. So right at--close 
of business Thursday.
    Okay, I have to check with my ever-ready staff.
    This record will remain open until the close of business on 
Thursday. There may be questions for the record that are 
submitted by members.
    I urge both of you to answer them fully and expeditiously 
as soon as possible so that your nominations may be considered 
at a business meeting.
    And with the thanks of the committee for your presence, 
this hearing is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Canada is a NATO ally, a NORAD partner, a member of the 
Five Eyes, and a top trade partner to the United States, and our two 
countries have worked in close strategic partnership around the world 
in recent decades. However, the Trump administration introduced 
unnecessary friction into this important relationship, including 
imposing Section 232 tariffs on Canada. What is your assessment of the 
U.S.-Canada relationship and what steps will you take to repair this 
important bilateral partnership?

    Answer. Our relationship with Canada is very strong. Relations with 
the United States remain the centerpiece of Canada's foreign policy. 
President Biden and PM Trudeau issued the ``Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-
Canada Partnership'' at their February virtual meeting. If confirmed, I 
look forward to supporting the roadmap priorities, which include 
combatting the pandemic and cooperating on economic recovery, 
accelerating climate ambitions, advancing diversity and inclusion, 
bolstering security and defense, and building global alliances.
    Our two governments coordinate daily at multiple levels and across 
multiple agencies on matters ranging from major global issues to our 
shared border, rivers, and lakes, our trade relationship, and joint 
security through NORAD and NATO. If confirmed, I look forward to 
furthering that cooperation.
    The United States and Canada enjoy the most extensive and 
integrated economic partnership of any two nations in the world. While 
the Section 232 actions were deeply unpopular in Canada, the almost 
400,000 people in pre-pandemic times and the nearly $1.7 billion worth 
of goods and services that crossed our border daily are a testament to 
the importance and scale of our economic relationship. Canada is the 
primary foreign market for more than 30 U.S. states. Millions of U.S. 
and Canadian middle-class jobs--including well-paying jobs in the 
manufacturing sector--depend on our partnership. Given the thousands of 
businesses and the various, complex sectors operating across our 
borders, disagreements arise from time to time. That is understandable 
and expected. If confirmed, I would commit to working with our U.S. 
interagency colleagues to resolve these issues with Canada in a fair 
and transparent manner and ensure we put the interests of U.S. workers, 
farmers, ranchers, and businesses at the forefront of our foreign 
policy so that they are treated fairly under the terms of the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.

    Question. The Government of China arbitrarily detained two Canadian 
citizens--Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor--in retaliation for 
Canada's decision to detain Meng Wanzhou at the request of U.S. 
prosecutors. For two years, Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor have been held in 
substandard conditions and routinely denied consular access by the 
Canadian Government. What is your assessment of the detention of Mr. 
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor and how will you work with the Trudeau Government 
to help secure their release?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would make clear that the United States 
stands with Canada in calling on Beijing to immediately release Mr. 
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor. I will work closely with my counterparts in the 
Canadian Government to help secure their release. The United States 
rejects the PRC's use of arbitrary detention as a political tool. Human 
beings are not bargaining chips.
    The United States has endorsed the Canada-led multilateral 
Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, 
together with over 60 countries. We are in discussions with Canada and 
other likeminded partners through the Partnership Action Plan to 
coordinate collective action against the practice of politically 
motivated, arbitrary detentions of foreign nationals to exert pressure 
on their governments.

    Question. Mexico was the deadliest country in the world for 
journalists in 2020, accounting for almost a third of journalists 
killed this year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. 
Despite President Lopez-Obrador's pledge to tackle violence against 
journalists in 2018, his government continues to underfund the Federal 
Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists. 
How will you engage on the issue of press freedoms in Mexico and 
advocate for increased protections for journalists?

    Answer. Respect for human rights is fundamental, and a free and 
active press is an integral part of a healthy democracy. The killing of 
journalists and human rights activists undermines freedoms of 
expression and association, as well as regional security.
    The Department is committed to supporting efforts to increase 
respect for human rights and press freedom. Through USAID, the 
Department supports Mexico's National Protection Mechanism for 
Journalists and Human Rights Defenders and works with state-level 
counterparts to expand the protection measures available for these 
groups. USAID also supports the Specialized Prosecutor's Office for 
Crimes Against Freedom of Expression to investigate and sanction 
aggressions against journalists and defenders.
    If confirmed, I will strongly promote respect for human rights and 
the rule of law and end impunity. We will continue to urge Mexican 
authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes 
against journalists and human rights activists wherever they occur.

    Question. Arms trafficked from the United States into Mexico have 
reached disturbing levels and, in some cases, transnational criminal 
organizations operating in Mexico possess more sophisticated weapons 
than those of Mexican law enforcement, all of which is enabling 
dangerous groups to expand their influence and activities in the 
country. If confirmed, what steps would you take to address 
international arms trafficking from the U.S. into Mexico?

    Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national 
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico 
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and 
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the 
rule of law in Mexico. I recognize that illegal weapons trafficking 
from the United States constitutes a major source of the arms used by 
criminal organizations in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working 
with you and other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency 
colleagues, and Mexican Government officials to address border security 
and arms trafficking.

    Question. Central America's Northern Triangle struggles with 
widespread insecurity, weak rule of law and extreme levels of poverty. 
These challenges are the main causes pushing people to leave their 
countries. If confirmed, what priorities will you establish to address 
citizens security, strengthen democratic governance, and facilitate 
conditions for equitable economic growth in the Northern Triangle?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize programs that directly 
impact everyday Central Americans to improve citizen security, 
strengthen democratic governance, and create the conditions for 
equitable economic growth, especially in areas prone to high 
emigration. To build political will, I will work across the U.S. 
Government to utilize a broad range of tools of diplomacy, public 
diplomacy, sanctions and visa revocations, and targeted foreign 
assistance programs to combat corruption, strengthen judiciaries, and 
promote transparency.
    Our citizen security programs seek to transform the relationship 
between police and the communities they serve. We will work with civil 
society and partner governments to address community needs, including 
health and education, promote transparency, and hold government 
institutions accountable. Finally, if confirmed, I will work with our 
interagency partners to help create conditions for equitable economic 
growth, including by supporting businesses owned by women and 
disadvantaged groups.

    Question. Across Central America, citizens have fled their homes 
and migrated from their countries in search of safety and opportunity. 
Additionally certain undemocratic leaders have facilitated the 
criminality that leaves many Central Americans unable to see a future 
in their country. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the use of 
foreign assistance to support democratic civil society and struggling 
citizens, while also holding accountable certain leaders that have 
facilitated criminality and placed their own interests above their 
citizens?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support assistance programs to 
strengthen civil society and their efforts to denounce corruption, 
promote justice, protect human rights, and advocate for the needs of 
vulnerable populations. I will seek to build on administration efforts 
to consult with civil society representatives, both throughout the 
region and in the United States, to ensure their perspectives and input 
inform our policies and program design. It is critical that we work to 
guard civic space that allows for the free exercise of rights, and use 
all available tools to promote accountability for corrupt actors in the 
region.

    Question. In November 2020, more than 7 million people were 
affected and hundreds of thousands were forced into shelters after two 
devastating hurricanes struck Central America, positioning already 
vulnerable individuals at greater risk. If confirmed, how will 
prioritize support for recovery and relief efforts from these 
hurricanes and how will this align with a broader, longer-term effort 
to aid Central America in mitigating the impacts of climate change?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate closely within the 
Department and the interagency, including by supporting international 
engagement efforts led by Vice President Harris to internationalize the 
effort and secure more donor commitments for responding to the immense 
humanitarian needs in Central America. The Department, together with 
USAID and others, provided immediate humanitarian relief in the 
aftermath of the hurricanes and continues to remain actively engaged in 
rebuilding efforts. In April, the U.S. Government announced an 
additional $310 million in humanitarian support to the region and is 
working to secure increased donor commitments to address acute needs. 
We will continue to work to address the immediate needs while 
strengthening the capacity of Central American Governments for disaster 
risk mitigation and preparedness.

    Question. Since taking office in 2007, Nicaraguan President Daniel 
Ortega has conducted widespread, systematic attacks against civilians, 
including murder, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Moreover, in 
recent weeks and months, the Ortega Government has taken a number of 
steps to undermine the possibility of free, fair and transparent 
elections in November 2021. If confirmed, how will you prioritize 
support for Nicaraguan civil society in light of the enactment of these 
troubling laws and how will you work with international partners to 
promote a free, fair and transparent electoral process in Nicaragua?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by a series of 
repressive laws that have been passed since October 2020 which aim to 
suffocate civil society in Nicaragua and quash freedom of expression. 
The regime has taken repressive action against several media outlets, 
and the administration has publicly denounced these actions. President 
Ortega's actions against civil society, the media, and the democratic 
opposition will only further distance him from the global community. If 
confirmed, I will actively work to defend Nicaragua's civil society 
groups, and will continue to work through diplomatic efforts, 
coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy actors, 
and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for free 
and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The 
administration will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS, 
EU, and elsewhere to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free 
and fair elections.

    Question. During his campaign, President-elect Biden characterized 
Colombia as a ``keystone'' of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, 
pledging that restoring the partnership our countries would be a 
priority. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for and approach 
to strengthening the U.S.-Colombia relationship?

    Answer. I agree with President Biden that Colombia is a vital 
strategic partner. If confirmed, I will support efforts to advance the 
many priorities we share with Colombia, including promoting sustainable 
peace and reconciliation; combatting narcotics trafficking and the 
transnational criminal groups that threaten hemispheric security; 
coordinating an effective diplomatic and humanitarian response to the 
crisis in Venezuela; protecting human rights; addressing the climate 
crisis; assisting Colombia to strengthen its health system; expanding 
economic ties, and promoting inclusive economic growth that will 
benefit the citizens of both countries.

    Question. Five years ago, Colombia signed a historic peace accord 
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, there 
have been delays in implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
Venezuela crisis, and the economic impacts of both, as well as 
continued security challenges. How will you support Colombia as it 
implements the accord amidst these many growing challenges?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Colombian 
Government and people as they continue to work towards a just and 
lasting peace and a more prosperous future. I believe that successful 
implementation of the 2016 peace accord is vital to sustainable 
progress on a broad range of priorities, including security, stability, 
counternarcotics, human rights, justice, and economic development. I 
will ensure that the United States continues to support the 
implementation of the accord through diplomatic engagement and foreign 
assistance programming. Our priorities include assisting Colombia to 
extend the benefits of the accord to vulnerable populations in 
conflict-affected areas.

    Question. In recent weeks, Colombia has confronted nationwide 
protests. While the majority of the protests have been peaceful, there 
have been incidents of violent protests, vandalism, and blockades--
which have had a negative impact on the broader population. There also 
have been acts of violence and excessive use of force committed by 
Colombian security forces. Additionally, there have been incidents of 
citizens taking up arms and firing on protesters. What is your 
assessment of the protests, the acts of excessive force committed by 
security forces, and the attacks by armed citizens? How can the United 
States best support Colombia during this difficult period?

    Answer. Colombia is a long-time and close partner. I am saddened by 
the loss of life during protests in Colombia this May. Citizens in 
democratic countries have the unquestionable right to protest 
peacefully. Violence and vandalism is not acceptable; nor are acts of 
vigilantism. If confirmed, I will encourage the Colombian Government to 
continue investigating all allegations of police misconduct and address 
any violations of human rights. I will also support the efforts of the 
Colombian Government and people as they continue to engage in dialogue 
to resolve the current situation and work together toward a more 
prosperous and peaceful future, particularly through continued 
implementation of the 2016 peace accord.

    Question. Over the past four years, the U.S.-Ecuador relationship 
has improved significantly. After a decade of tensions, both countries 
have advanced multiple security, development, and economic agreements. 
What is your assessment of the U.S.-Ecuador relationship and if 
confirmed, what steps will you take to support the U.S.-Ecuador 
partnership?

    Answer. Over the last few years, the United States and Ecuador have 
improved relations and built a cooperative bilateral relationship based 
on shared values related to democracy, sustainable development and 
prosperity, transparency, security, and the fight against drug 
trafficking, organized crime, and corruption. Ecuador is a steadfast 
regional partner. The United States seized this opening to increase 
bilateral cooperation across the board.
    If confirmed, I will continue to pursue increased cooperation with 
the Ecuadorian Government in areas of mutual benefit for both our 
countries. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency to 
ensure we are exploring all areas of cooperation with Ecuador and 
seeing where the U.S. can strategically provide assistance. The United 
States will continue supporting Ecuador's efforts to implement much-
needed economic reforms to strengthen the economy, balance public 
finances, and revive growth in Ecuador, which is imperative given the 
devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States is proud 
to stand with the Ecuadorian people as they continue on the path to 
sustainable prosperity.

    Question. The Bolsonaro Government in Brazil has been highly 
criticized for its role in deforestation and forest destruction. While 
annual deforestation has increased over the past 11 years, the spike 
seen in 2019 is, according to many experts, was a direct result of the 
Government's actions. President-elect Biden has been outspoken about 
the need for a better approach to deforestation in the Amazon. If 
confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing environmental issues as a core 
agenda item for our bilateral relationship with Brazil and how will you 
approach the issue of Amazon deforestation?

    Answer. Addressing deforestation is key to achieving Brazil's 
climate and development goals. If confirmed, I look forward to 
prioritizing efforts to combat the climate crisis and other 
environmental issues. We want to work with the Brazilian Government, 
Indigenous and Quilombo communities, and civil society to build 
economic value for Brazilians through forest management and protection 
rather than deforestation and to explore ways to increase investment 
into forests, combat conservation crimes, improve land titling, and 
create sustainable value chains to conserve biodiversity.

    Question. As the crisis in Venezuela poses continued risks for U.S. 
national security and regional stability, what priority will you place 
on strengthening coordination with our closest partners to improve the 
effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department 
continues to prioritize strengthening coordination with our closest 
partners to improve the effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian 
aid, and diplomacy. The United States needs to work with partners and 
allies to build multilateral pressure on the illegitimate Maduro 
regime, promote accountability for regime officials' and their 
enablers' criminal activities, implement appropriate sanctions against 
those who undermine democracy or abuse human rights, and provide 
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan 
people.

    Question. Given the Maduro regime's fraudulent legislative 
elections in December 2020 and the seating of a new, illegitimate 
National Assembly, what diplomatic efforts will you pursue to support 
Interim President Juan Guaido and Venezuela's democratic opposition, as 
well as their ability to address the suffering of the Venezuelan people 
and counter Maduro's dictatorship?

    Question. If confirmed, I will remain committed to working with our 
Venezuelan and international partners to foster an environment where 
all Venezuelans can chart a peaceful course out of the current crisis, 
with full respect for the freedoms of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly, and an end to attacks against human rights 
defenders, journalists, and political opposition actors.
    I will work with partners and allies to increase multilateral 
pressure on the illegitimate Maduro regime, promote accountability, 
including through the use of appropriate sanctions, of regime officials 
and their enablers for their criminal activities, undermining 
democracy, or abuse of human rights. If confirmed, I will also 
prioritize providing humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of people 
affected by the Venezuelan regional crisis.

    Question. What is your assessment of efforts by our geopolitical 
competitors and adversaries--Russia, China, and Cuba--to prop up the 
Maduro regime in Venezuela?

    Answer. I understand Russian support for the Maduro regime includes 
military advisors and proxies, disinformation mechanisms, political 
influence on the world stage, and financial backing. PRC companies such 
as ZTE support the Maduro regime by providing technology to surveil 
Venezuelans and reward regime supporters while punishing critics. Cuban 
military and intelligence advisors actively support Maduro through the 
provision of security forces, intelligence officers, and providing 
direction to regime actors. Collectively, these efforts provide 
substantial and worrisome support to the Maduro regime, which I will 
work to counter, if confirmed.

    Question. China's presence in Latin America has grown over the past 
four years amidst a combination of U.S. neglect and aggression towards 
the region, as well as increased Chinese economic, diplomatic, and 
military engagement. How will you improve cooperation with our 
hemispheric partners, so as to reassert our leadership, deepen our ties 
with partner governments, and improve our competitiveness in the 
region?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious 
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security 
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team 
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the 
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners' 
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response, 
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic 
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery. 
If confirmed, I will work to broaden our diplomatic presence, promote 
increased educational and cultural exchanges, and help our partners 
face rule of law challenges.

    Question. As the Government of China has expanded its presence in 
Latin America, aspects of its engagement have been characterized by 
predatory foreign investment, unsustainable loans to the region, or 
even through aggressive violations of international boundaries as we 
saw in the case of large Chinese illegal fishing off of the coast of 
the Galapagos Islands. What is your assessment of these aspects of 
China's engagement in Latin America and as Assistant Secretary of State 
what tools will you utilize to strengthen U.S. engagement and 
competitiveness in the region?

    Answer. The hemisphere faces longstanding challenges of economic 
inequality, corruption, and weak democratic institutions, all of which 
have been exacerbated by the pandemic and make the region more 
vulnerable to aggressive and coercive practices, including by the 
People's Republic of China (PRC).
    If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to work with partners 
and share resources and expertise to support COVID-19 response, 
entrepreneurship, and economic development that creates jobs essential 
for regional pandemic recovery. With likeminded partners and allies, I 
will continue efforts to offer higher-standard, transparently governed 
infrastructure alternatives and push back on PRC economic pressure. I 
will also continue to raise concerns and distinguish ourselves from PRC 
infrastructure projects to advocate for the highest environmental, 
social, and labor standards to ensure investments are beneficial, 
sustainable in the long term, transparent and respect the rule of law. 
If confirmed, I will support the continued engagement of constructive 
actors who share our values, such as Taiwan.
    I will also continue to work with the interagency and partners in 
our region to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, 
which impacts local fisheries and national economies, including through 
developing a coordinated regional response to increase regional 
capacity to counter IUU fishing activities by PRC fleet and those of 
other flag states.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific 
timeline to complete its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Venezuela?

    Answer. I understand the interagency is working diligently on the 
Venezuela policy review, which remains ongoing. There is widespread 
agreement on the need to restore democracy through free and fair 
elections, and to adopt a multilateral approach toward a negotiated 
solution to the crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime. If 
confirmed, I will continue our work to encourage free and fair 
elections, urge the release of political prisoners, confront the 
escalating humanitarian crisis, and bring relief to the Venezuelan 
people, including the millions who have fled Venezuela.

    Question. Do you commit to thoroughly and promptly brief the 
committee on the outcome of this policy review as soon as it is 
complete?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with 
Congress as we seek to address the Venezuela crisis.

    Question. In your view, how would you describe the nature of the 
Maduro regime?

    Answer. The United States does not recognize Maduro's dictatorial 
regime as the Government of Venezuela. His repression, corruption, and 
mismanagement have created one of the worst humanitarian crises this 
hemisphere has seen. The Maduro regime enables criminal and terrorist 
networks and openly cooperates with many malign actors, which poses a 
serious threat to U.S. national security.

    Question. What would you say are the pitfalls and potential 
incentives that could persuade such a regime to peacefully give up 
control of Venezuela?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support a negotiated solution to the 
Venezuelan crisis that leads to free and fair presidential and 
parliamentary elections and a return of the rule of law and democracy 
in Venezuela. The United States stands ready to support such a 
negotiation, led by the Venezuelans themselves. I am committed to work 
with our partners inside Venezuela and in the international community 
to pressure Maduro to commit to a serious process. Recognizing the 
difficulties of engaging with such a regime, a potential incentive 
would be the lifting of economic sanctions and acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of a Government in Venezuela--which, as the administration 
has noted previously, can and will only occur if democracy is restored.
    A pitfall of engaging with the Maduro regime is that the regime 
continues to buy time while dividing the opposition and the 
international community, seeking only minimum concessions to obtain 
some domestic and international legitimacy without addressing the main 
issues that will lead to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. I 
commit to remaining clear-eyed about these risks, if confirmed. I will 
seek to engage with Interim President Guaido and other Venezuelans who 
wish to promote democracy and the international community to promote 
positive change and mitigate the risks laid out above.

    Question. To what extent is the Maduro regime providing safe haven 
to transnational criminal organizations, including U.S.-designated 
foreign terrorist organizations?

    Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime allows and tolerates the use 
of its territory by terrorist organizations and non-state armed groups, 
including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident members of 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, among others. The regime's 
practically nonexistent international drug control cooperation, 
usurpation of the judicial system and military and security services 
for its own illicit ends, public corruption, and cooperation with 
criminal elements have provided ideal conditions for transnational 
criminal organizations to thrive.

    Question. To what extent do senior members of the Maduro regime 
support and protect various transnational criminal groups operating 
within the borders of Venezuela?

    Answer. I understand that, at times, regime officials have openly 
welcomed transnational criminal groups' presence in Venezuela. During 
the closing remarks of the 2019 Sao Paolo Forum in Caracas, Maduro 
stated that Iv n M rquez and Jesus Santrich (former Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) leaders who were at that time missing and 
widely presumed to have left the peace process and returned to 
terrorist activities) were both welcome in Venezuela. The regime 
leverages drug trafficking, illegal and illicit gold mining, and a 
variety of black-market financial transactions to enrich its leaders 
and evade sanctions, necessarily working with transnational criminal 
organizations. These operations could not take place without 
acquiescence or approval at the highest levels.

    Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships 
between senior members of the Maduro regime and transnational criminal 
organizations?

    Answer. I understand the regime is complicit with transnational 
criminal organizations, including dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin National Liberation 
Army (ELN), and Hezbollah sympathizers. Maduro and his associates use 
criminal activities to help maintain their illegitimate hold on power. 
Profit-seeking networks between FARC dissidents, ELN, and other 
Venezuelan non-state armed groups facilitate the regime's public 
corruption and graft schemes, to include those involving senior members 
of the Maduro regime.

    Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships 
between Venezuelan security forces and transnational criminal 
organizations?

    Answer. Profit-seeking ties between dissident members of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin 
National Liberation Army (ELN), and Venezuelan paramilitary groups 
facilitate the public corruption and graft schemes of the regime to 
include other members of the armed forces. According to the Department 
of Justice indictments of Maduro and 14 other regime officials unsealed 
in March 2020, some senior Venezuelan political, intelligence, and 
military officials have facilitated drug trafficking through the 
country since at least 1999. Venezuelan security services have also 
clashed with transnational criminal organizations, such as FARC 
dissident groups and the ELN. While Venezuelan security services do 
occasionally confront and even kill non-state armed group members, it 
is difficult to know if that reflects national strategy or local 
conflicts of interest on the part of regime commanders.

    Question. Do actions by the Maduro regime related to transnational 
criminal activities undermine U.S. counter-narcotics cooperation with 
Colombia? Do actions related to transnational criminal activities 
undertaken by the Maduro regime undermine the 2016 Colombian agreement 
with the FARC?

    Answer. The historically weak government presence at the border 
between Colombia and Venezuela has allowed terrorist groups to operate, 
particularly Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents, 
the National Liberation Army (ELN), and other criminal networks 
involved in trafficking and smuggling. A number of FARC dissidents 
engage in terrorist and other criminal activities, particularly in 
border regions and areas previously controlled by the FARC. Colombian 
drug-trafficking organizations--including various dissident FARC 
factions, the ELN, and other criminal groups--orchestrate the shipment 
of illicit drugs through Venezuela.

    Question. Is the National Electoral Council named on May 5, 2021, a 
credible step to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution to 
Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian crises?

    Answer. The goal of the United States is a peaceful, stable, and 
democratic Venezuela. While the National Electoral Council (CNE) that 
was named was slightly less imbalanced than others in recent memory, it 
is no substitute for a comprehensive process leading to free and fair 
presidential and parliamentary elections and other guarantees, which 
are long overdue.
    The CNE in question was composed by an illegitimate body--a 
national assembly Maduro installed based on fraudulent elections on 
December 6, 2020. The real test is whether the CNE guarantees the right 
of Venezuelans to freely choose their representatives, not merely its 
composition.
    Given Maduro's track record, if confirmed, I will work assiduously 
with our international partners to continue to press for the 
fundamental changes needed, including lifting bans on political 
parties, the unconditional release of political prisoners, invitations 
to credible international electoral observers, a public electoral 
calendar, and the unhindered access and distribution of humanitarian 
aid.

    Question. Can the humanitarian crisis affecting Venezuela be 
resolved under Maduro's watch?

    Answer. Venezuelans are suffering from one of the worst economic 
and humanitarian crises outside of a war in modern history. Since 2017, 
more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have been forced to flee their 
country.
    The illegitimate Maduro regime mismanages the economy, plunders 
public coffers, and impedes access to critical humanitarian assistance, 
including lifesaving food and nutrition aid. If confirmed, I will work 
to open more possibilities for humanitarian workers, organizations, and 
assistance to reach the Venezuelan people in Venezuela and beyond.
    Since 2017, the United States has provided more than $1.2 billion 
in humanitarian, economic, development, and health assistance to help 
Venezuelans, including more than $1 billion in humanitarian assistance, 
both inside Venezuela and throughout the region.

    Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific 
timeline for completion of its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Cuba?

    Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully 
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, to ensure it advances the goals the 
administration is trying to achieve in empowering the Cuban people to 
determine their future. I understand there is no set timeline for the 
review, and the administration is eager to consider views from a 
variety of stakeholders from various sectors and viewpoints. If 
confirmed, I will support the Department's review with an eye toward 
assessing its impact on the political and economic wellbeing of the 
Cuban people as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights, 
and I look forward to consulting with Congress regularly on this issue.

    Question. Should Cuba be removed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism (SST) while they continue to provide safe harbor to violent 
U.S. fugitives?

    Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully 
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the 
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. If 
confirmed, I look forward to supporting the administration's review of 
Cuba policy and consulting regularly with Congress. Our priority in 
Cuba, as the rest of the Hemisphere, needs to be democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. Countries should not be grandfathered 
because they have failed to respect those tenets.

    Question. If confirmed, would you support Cuba's removal from the 
SST list without verifiable assurances that it would cease to foster a 
permissive environment for international terrorists?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully and thoroughly review all 
material related to the decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor 
of Terrorism, including the underlying rationale. I look forward to 
supporting the administration's review of Cuba policy, if confirmed.

    Question. The United States has extradition treaties with 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties cover crimes that 
are often committed in relation to human trafficking activities feeding 
the illegal migration crisis at our southern border. If confirmed, do 
you commit to consider and report to the committee ways in which the 
U.S. could better leverage existing bilateral extradition treaties with 
the countries in Northern Central America to combat illegal migration 
from the region?

    Answer. If confirmed, I plan to evaluate our extradition treaties 
with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties can be 
powerful tools for combatting crime, including human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling. I will consider all available tools at the 
Department's disposal to help address the root causes of irregular 
migration in and from Central America, including corruption and 
impunity, and I will continue to consult closely with Congress on these 
issues.

    Question. The United States has leveraged sanctions and diplomatic 
efforts, but what other actions do you think are needed to 
significantly ramp up pressure ahead of the November general elections 
in Nicaragua?

    Answer. I believe we need to continue to work through diplomatic 
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for democratic 
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for 
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The 
United States will continue working closely with our partners in the 
OAS, EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free 
and fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful 
reforms by the May OAS deadline, if confirmed, I will work with our 
partners to use the diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal, and 
will continue to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU, 
and the United Kingdom. The United States will keep using our voice, 
vote, and influence so that international financial institution lending 
does not support non-democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important 
that the United States and our allies clearly state that we will give 
credibility to and work with the winner of a free and fair election, 
but it will be extremely difficult to work constructively with a 
government emerging from a fraudulent election.

    Question. If confirmed, would you recommend reviewing Nicaragua's 
continued participation in--and access to--the full benefits afforded 
under the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) should the 
November elections fail to meet international standards?

    Answer. CAFTA-DR has improved the lives of the people of Nicaragua 
and the United States. In order to continue to build on that 
partnership and expand our economic partnership, the U.S. should make 
clear that Nicaraguans would benefit from good governance, 
transparency, and the rule of law. Given the deterioration of those 
democratic principles in Nicaragua, we are already ensuring that trade 
capacity building and technical assistance, including joint efforts on 
customs and border management, labor, environment, and agriculture, are 
not directed toward the Nicaraguan Government. If the November 
elections are not free and fair, the U.S. would continue to review the 
Nicaraguan Government's participation in these trade-related 
activities, with a view toward promoting good governance and 
transparency in the region.

    Question. According to the 2019 State Department Report on Human 
Rights in Nicaragua, ``there were numerous reports that the Government 
or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings'' in response to 
the April 2018 pro-democracy protests, where the Government's violent 
crackdown left at least 325 people dead; over 2,000 injured; hundreds 
illegally detained; tortured, and disappeared; and more than 80,000 
exiled in neighboring countries. An Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR) team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security 
forces' actions could be considered crimes against humanity. The Office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights also describes Nicaragua 
as suffering from a ``climate of widespread terror.'' If confirmed, 
what specific actions would you support to hold members of the Ortega-
Murillo regime accountable for serious human rights abuses and crimes 
against humanity?

    Answer. The administration is committed to promoting accountability 
for Ortega and his collaborators who undermine democracy or violate 
human rights, and will continue to call out abuses when they occur. The 
United States was a co-sponsor, along with 51 countries, of the March 
2021 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution which called for justice and 
accountability in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will intensify our efforts 
to promote and protect freedoms of expression, association, and 
peaceful assembly, and I will urge the Ortega regime to fully and 
unconditionally release all arbitrarily detained persons. The United 
States will continue to use the economic and diplomatic tools at our 
disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and multilateral 
engagement, to support Nicaraguans' calls for human rights, democracy, 
and justice.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work with my office to 
clear the backlog of extraditions from Mexico to the United States?

    Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national 
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico 
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and 
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the 
rule of law in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and 
other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency colleagues, and 
Mexican Government officials to ensure we are working closely together 
to move extradition requests as quickly and effectively as possible.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. How can the State Department and interagency partners 
encourage Northern Triangle governments to promote a culture of tax 
compliance among their citizens and businesses? Will you commit to 
ensure that the State Department works with these governments to 
fulfill the legal and financial obligations necessary to foster an 
attractive investment environment and stimulate economic growth, 
including the timely refund of excess taxes paid by U.S. companies?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to 
provide technical assistance to host governments as they pursue more 
efficient, transparent, fair governance, including support for e-
government solutions. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the Department 
works with governments to foster a more attractive business environment 
as an important component of our efforts to address the root causes of 
migration.

    Question. How can we work with Central American governments to 
improve the operating environment for business, including U.S. 
companies? What steps will you take to promote the speedy and fair 
resolution of commercial disputes, especially in Honduras?

    Answer. I share your commitment to support U.S. investor and 
property interests in Central America. The Department urges foreign 
governments, including at the highest levels when appropriate, to 
resolve outstanding commercial disputes. The Department generally takes 
no position on the merits of any specific claim or dispute but 
advocates for a fair, transparent, and expeditious resolution. The 
Department will continue to assist in resolution of outstanding U.S. 
citizen claims as appropriate.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. What is your view of the state of democracy in Latin 
America?

    Answer. Our hemisphere is overwhelmingly committed to democracy, 
but there are troubling signs of backsliding in the region that require 
sustained and serious attention. September 11 will mark the 20th 
anniversary of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which 
reflects the commitment of OAS member states to promote and defend 
democracy in the region. Through public diplomacy, increased engagement 
by civil society, and coordination with like-minded partners, the 
United States is promoting accountability for the actions of the Maduro 
regime and Cuba that undermine democracy and human rights; using 
diplomatic and economic measures and working multilaterally with 
partners to urge Nicaragua to hold free and fair presidential and 
legislative elections in November; and holding the government of Haiti 
to its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential 
elections in 2021 to put an end to Haiti's prolonged rule by decree and 
facilitate a peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected president in 
February 2022.
    The weakening of democratic institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Honduras, is troubling. If confirmed, I will join the 
administration's commitment to supporting the rule of law and democracy 
in these countries, including through the use of Congressionally 
mandated corrupt actors lists to designate and sanction those 
responsible for the degrading of democracy in Central America. If 
confirmed, I will intensify efforts to work with allies and partners to 
further strengthen democratic institutions and support democracy 
throughout the region.

    Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to bolster our 
democratic partners in the region?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work toward our strategic goal of a 
more inclusive, secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere aligned 
with U.S. values and interests. I will lead our team to support 
independent civil society throughout the region, and will encourage 
governments to support and promote press freedom and the safety of 
journalists and to counter those who may seek to undermine democracy 
and security. We will seek to work with allies, partners, and 
multilateral institutions to promote a shared vision to respect human 
rights and fight corruption and impunity, such as we do with our 
support of the Citizen Corruption Observatory. This initiative stemmed 
from the 2018 Summit of the Americas and builds the capacity of civil 
society to monitor governments' implementation of anticorruption 
efforts. In addition, we will work with USAID to enhance the region's 
anti-corruption efforts by bolstering the capacity of stakeholders to 
engage in advocacy, oversight, and monitoring.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting ongoing U.S. 
programs which promote democracy and human rights in Cuba, such as 
through funding the office of Cuba Broadcasting?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that support for 
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the 
Cuban people to determine their own future. I will also ensure the U.S. 
continues its steadfast support and engagement with Cuban human rights 
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their 
important work; promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, and 
democracy; and facilitate the Cuban people's uncensored access to 
information.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensure that the U.S. does 
not lift restrictions or sanctions on Cuba until conditions are met 
pursuant to U.S. law?

    Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing 
U.S.-Cuba policy, including how it implements relevant legislation and 
our posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they 
advance the goals the administration is trying to achieve in empowering 
the Cuban people to determine their future. We will do so in adherence 
to U.S. law. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of 
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and 
economic wellbeing of the Cuban people and the promotion of democracy. 
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting regularly with Congress on 
this issue. Throughout my career, I have worked diligently to promote 
respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Democracy and 
support for human rights will be at the core of our policy toward Cuba.

    Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to prioritize Venezuela, 
and continue to work with regional allies, to hold the Maduro regime 
and his cronies accountable?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with international 
partners and regional allies to promote accountability for the Maduro 
regime by building multilateral pressure and implementing appropriate 
and coordinated sanctions against regime officials and their enablers 
who undermine democracy, abuse human rights, or engage in other corrupt 
or criminal activity. A secure, democratic, and prosperous Venezuela 
would mean a more secure, democratic, and prosperous region. In this 
fundamental aspect, Venezuela is a top priority for the region.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to supporting the legitimate 
government of Venezuela under President Juan Guaido and working to 
unify the opposition to the Maduro regime?

    Answer. If confirmed, my team and I will continue to support the 
efforts of the interim government led by Juan Guaido to peacefully 
restore democracy and rule of law in Venezuela via free and fair 
presidential and parliamentary elections. We are encouraged by and will 
continue to support unity on the fundamental goal of free and fair 
elections, and the pursuit of the guarantees required to restore 
democracy and rule of law to the country.

    Question. If confirmed, what would you propose the United States do 
to support a free and fair elections?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to work through diplomatic 
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy 
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for 
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The 
United States will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS, 
EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan government to implement free and 
fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful reforms 
by the May OAS deadline, we will work with our partners to use the 
diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal. We will continue efforts 
to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU, and the United 
Kingdom. We will continue to use our voice, vote, and influence so that 
international financial institution lending does not support non-
democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important that the United States 
and our allies clearly state that we will give credibility to and work 
with the winner of a free and fair election, but it will be extremely 
difficult to work constructively with a government emerging from a 
fraudulent election.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing efforts to 
counter vaccine diplomacy by China in the region?

    Answer. COVID-19 is the most pressing challenge to our collective 
health, well-being, and economic security in a century. If confirmed, I 
will continue the U.S. commitment to collaborate with partners across 
the globe, including Taiwan, to end the pandemic and mitigate its 
severe public health and economic impacts. The Biden administration has 
already loaned AstraZeneca vaccines to Mexico and Canada. If confirmed, 
I will work to support a science-based approach that prioritizes an 
equitable distribution of vaccines to countries in our region.
    President Biden announced the United States will donate at least 80 
million vaccine doses to meet global needs by the end of June, far more 
than any other nation has donated, including the People's Republic of 
China or Russia. Importantly, our shots do not come with strings 
attached; the United States views vaccines as a tool to end the 
pandemic, not a means to achieve political outcomes.
    The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi for the COVAX 
Facility, having contributed $2 billion with plans to donate an 
additional $2 billion by 2022. I understand all countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean have received one or more COVAX shipments, 
except for Cuba and Haiti who do not participate in COVAX. If 
confirmed, I will continue to ensure our close coordination with COVAX 
and other partners to ensure safe and effective vaccines are delivered 
in a way that is equitable and follows the science and public health 
data.

    Question. What are your views on the need to prioritize the region 
for distribution of excess and surplus vaccines?

    Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region. If 
confirmed, I will work within the administration to coordinate with our 
partners in the region to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including 
through the distribution of vaccines. The United States has loaned 
Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of AstraZeneca 
vaccines, respectively, and the administration is currently considering 
the best manner in which to implement President Biden's further 
commitment to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If 
confirmed, I will work to prioritize the region and advocate that it 
has the tools necessary, including via both bilateral and multilateral 
mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic and prepare 
for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.

    Question. How might the United States support Ecuador's efforts to 
diversify its economy and decouple from China?

    Answer. The United States remains Ecuador's largest trading 
partner, with $10.2 billion in total two-way trade in goods in 2020. In 
December of 2020, the United States and Ecuador finalized the 
negotiation of a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, an agreement 
that is a positive step forward in our trade relationship.
    The United States is committed to increasing investment in Ecuador 
through projects that support long-term sustainable growth and 
prosperity. This includes enabling private sector investment in climate 
mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, as well as investments in clean 
energy. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) 
will also look to support investments in gender equality, financial 
inclusion, and recovery from COVID-19. The United States has provided 
funding and training to help the energy ministry and electric utility 
adopt new regulations to attract private investment in the electricity 
sector, as well as design and conduct Ecuador's first-ever competitive 
and transparent tenders for power sector projects, resulting in awards 
to qualified companies. The United States also is helping women with 
small businesses, through programs such as the Academy for Women 
Entrepreneurs and providing lines of credit to Ecuadoran banks to 
secure loans for small and medium enterprises. USAID in Ecuador is also 
working to pursue the most impactful projects investing in the most 
underserved communities. If confirmed, I will work with Ecuador to 
expand our partnership.

    Question. What steps can the administration take to support other 
countries that would like to develop 5G networks without Huawei or 
other Chinese tech support?

    Answer. The Biden administration is working throughout the region 
to communicate the risks associated with telecommunications equipment 
from untrusted, high-risk vendors and to support the growing number of 
governments and businesses concerned with safely capturing the benefits 
of 5G without jeopardizing national and economic security or personal 
privacy.
    If confirmed, I would connect countries interested in developing 
secure 5G networks with trusted equipment and service providers, 
highlight available U.S. government financing tools, and underscore the 
potential for emerging technologies like open radio access networks 
(open RAN) to increase diversity, innovation, and transparency in 5G 
supply chains.

    Question. As Colombia is facing many challenges, including the 
influx of almost 2 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants, in 
addition to violence presented in the country. What U.S. assistance to 
Colombia do you think would be most effective to ensure Colombia can 
face these challenges while also respecting the civil rights of 
protesters?

    Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our 
democratic values. I recognize the devastating impacts the COVID-19 
pandemic has had on the Colombian people and economy, as well as the 
fiscal challenges associated with its generous reception of Venezuelan 
refugees and migrants. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States 
continues to leverage diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to 
help Colombia address urgent needs, including strengthening its health 
system, promoting inclusive economic growth to recover from the 
pandemic, facilitating an effective humanitarian response to the 
Venezuela crisis, and expanding security, state presence, and access to 
justice throughout the country, including continuing human rights 
training for security personnel.

    Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage the 
government of Haiti conducts upcoming presidential elections in a 
manner that is free and fair?

    Answer. I believe the Haitian people deserve the opportunity to 
elect their leaders and restore Haiti's democratic institutions. If 
confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to hold the government of Haiti to 
its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential 
elections in 2021, and to work with Haitian political, economic, and 
civil society stakeholders across the spectrum, as well as 
international partners, in support of elections this year.
    I recognize that the legitimacy of Haiti's 2021 elections and the 
government's credibility with the Haitian population will depend on 
factors such as whether there is consensus on a political accord, the 
participation of credible political actors, widespread voter 
registration, and security and voter turnout on election day. The U.S. 
government is providing more than $3 million to the Consortium for 
Elections and Political Processes Strengthening, which includes the 
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The Consortium's pre-
elections activities include focusing on improving electoral 
administration, strengthening the competitiveness of political parties, 
educating voters on electoral processes, promoting transparent 
electoral processes, and ensuring inclusive voter participation in 
Haiti. The United States also provides advice, training, and equipment 
to build the Haitian National Police's capacity to provide security. 
U.S.-supported training and equipment for the police's public order 
unit will help them prevent and respond to potential violence at voting 
centers.
    Observers from organizations such as the Organization of American 
States (OAS) provide a regional voice and can help ensure free and fair 
elections. If confirmed, I will seek support from multilateral 
organizations, such as the OAS, and would welcome other international 
observers.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. What are the Biden administration's plans to address 
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering 
the growing number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the 
border?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding 
a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while ensuring public 
safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the weeks ahead, working with 
the world's democracies, if confirmed I will help coordinate a 
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will 
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to 
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will 
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The 
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement 
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million 
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi 
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with 
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.

    Question. Do you believe that the Biden administration should 
prioritize providing COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and 
South America given the proximity to the United States and the growing 
number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the border?

    Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region, and if 
confirmed, I will work with the interagency, COVAX, and other partners 
to prioritize the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines in a way that 
follows the science and public health data. The administration has 
loaned Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of 
AstraZeneca vaccines, respectively, and is currently considering the 
best manner in which to implement President Biden's further commitment 
to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If confirmed, I will 
work to prioritize the region and advocate that it has the tools 
necessary, especially vaccines, including via both bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic 
and prepare for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.

    Question. What is the United States currently doing to counter 
China's growing influence in Central and South America and what can the 
United States do more?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious 
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security 
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team 
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the 
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human 
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners' 
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response, 
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic 
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery.
    If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies and partners 
in Central and South America to help the region address the pandemic 
and recover from the related economic crisis. We will work to ensure 
competitive and transparent investment environments that help level the 
playing field for U.S. and other trusted businesses, strengthen our 
security and law enforcement cooperation, and promote secure 
telecommunications networks. We will draw attention to and counter 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. We will support and 
expand Taiwan's bilateral relationships in Central and South America.

    Question. Do you believe that Taiwan's ability to maintain formal 
diplomatic relations with countries in the Western hemisphere benefits 
U.S. strategic interests? Nine out of fifteen countries with formal 
diplomatic relations are in the Western hemisphere. As part of China's 
push to de-legitimize Taiwan, Beijing has used various tactics, 
including COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure assistance, elite 
capture, corrupt practices, to compel countries in the Western 
hemisphere to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

    Answer. As a strong democracy, Taiwan is an essential partner in a 
region overwhelmingly committed to democratic values, human rights, and 
the rule of law. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to support 
Taiwan's diplomatic and unofficial relationships across the Western 
Hemisphere region. Together with like-minded countries we can support 
good governance, transparent investments, and economic growth.

    Question. What is the Biden's administration's plans to address the 
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering 
the high number of migrants that are crossing the border each day?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains committed to 
rebuilding a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while 
ensuring public safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I 
look forward to working with the world's democracies to coordinate a 
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will 
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to 
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will 
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The 
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement 
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million 
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi 
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with 
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.

    Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration should 
prioritize COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and South America 
considering the proximity to the United States and the high number of 
migrants that are crossing the border?

    Answer. I agree that the United States should continue to do more 
to help the world by taking a leading role in ending the pandemic 
globally and building a coordinated, multilateral effort around the 
world aimed at ending the pandemic. Our overarching aim is to get as 
many safe and effective vaccines to as many people as fast as possible. 
If confirmed, I will work with COVAX and other partners to prioritize 
the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines that follows the science 
and public health data.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Brian Schatz

    Question. The Caribbean region has abundant solar and wind 
resources, yet its electricity is overwhelmingly generated by fossil 
fuels. In 2012, Aruba set a target of 100 percent renewable energy by 
2020. In 2019, 81 percent of its electricity still came from fossil 
fuels. Likewise, in 2011, Grenada established a goal of 100 percent 
renewable energy by 2030. With diesel currently providing 98.5 percent 
of the island's electricity, it is not on track to meet its goal.

    Question. The United States works with Caribbean partners to 
promote energy supply diversification, to develop cost-effective and 
resilient power systems, and to help create investment opportunities 
for U.S. and Caribbean firms.
    The Department has identified diversification of energy supplies 
away from a single source of fuel and promotion of U.S. exports, 
particularly renewable energy, as two primary objectives in promoting 
Caribbean energy security.
    If confirmed, I will redouble our commitment to these efforts. The 
Caribbean's high dependency on imported diesel for power generation and 
low reliability of electric service and frequent power outages have led 
to the highest average electricity prices in the Western Hemisphere.

    Question. What are the barriers to renewable energy development in 
the Caribbean, and how will you work to address these barriers and 
expedite renewable energy development as Assistant Secretary of State 
of Western Hemisphere Affairs?

    Answer. Barriers to renewable energy development in the Caribbean 
include limited economies of scale, inadequate policy and regulatory 
frameworks, and antiquated transmission and distribution 
infrastructure. Integrating clean power generation also requires 
significant investments in transmission infrastructure and technologies 
such as battery storage to accommodate variable generation.
    Caribbean nations have nevertheless made progress in energy 
diversification and U.S. cooperation has worked to advance stronger, 
more resilient, and more efficient power systems.

    Question. Would it make sense to help an initial island or two 
decarbonize as models for the region?

    Answer. Several Caribbean islands, including Jamaica and Nevis, 
have engaged with the United States to develop renewable energy 
sources. These are indeed model projects.
    Our whole of government effort promotes energy diversification and 
resilient energy systems through improved governance, increased access 
to financing, and donor coordination. If confirmed, I will work with 
interagency partners, multilateral organizations, and Caribbean nations 
to advance those efforts.
    We address the barrier of high-cost financing for energy project 
development through a $25 million guarantee agreement with National 
Commercial Bank of Jamaica to help provide loans for clean energy 
projects across the Caribbean and a $10 million credit guaranty to 
catalyze $20 million in loans for clean energy borrowers, focused on 
off-grid solar projects.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. President Biden's recent Presidential Memorandum on 
Advancing the Human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, 
Queer and Intersex Persons Around the World calls on the State 
Department to build coalitions of like-minded nations in international 
organizations to fight against LGBTQI+ discrimination. What more could 
the International Organization Bureau do to advance that mandate?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to utilizing the diversity and 
talent within the IO Bureau to play a leadership role in promoting the 
human rights and social inclusion of LGBTQI+ persons abroad. IO leads 
an Interagency Working Group on leveraging multilateral tools to 
address LGBTQI+ issues and, if confirmed, I will ensure this group 
works to advance these issues across various multilateral fora, to 
include the United Nations, regional organizations, international 
development banks, and multi-stakeholder coalitions, such as the Equal 
Rights Coalition as well as the U.N. LGBTI Core Group. If confirmed, I 
will also work to strengthen existing multilateral mandates like the 
U.N. Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and 
advance efforts to increase Global South support for the human rights 
of LGBTQI+ persons. If confirmed, I will also work to increase civil 
society engagement in the IO Bureau's efforts to advance the human 
rights of LGBTQI+ individuals.

    Question. Debates at the U.N., and the programmatic activities of 
U.N. agencies, often revolve around government repression that leads to 
refugee flows, terrorism, and civil conflict.? Some of the populations 
most directly impacted by that repression are minority populations--
whether sexual, ethnic, gender or racial in character. How can the U.N. 
be more active and impactful in heading off the causes of this 
repression, and in condemning it when it occurs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage U.N. leadership to enhance 
its advocacy as well as U.N. monitoring and implementation efforts to 
address such repression. I will work closely with our U.N. partners to 
condemn violations of international law and continue the United States' 
strong support for the promotion and protection of human rights, 
including through access to justice, and humanitarian response and 
durable solutions for displaced persons. I will maintain strong U.S. 
engagement with and support for key U.N. mechanisms and bodies such as 
the Human Rights Council. I will encourage U.N. partners to take 
concrete measures to protect minority rights and deepen partnerships 
with stakeholders to address the root causes of repression.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The upcoming U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Syria Cross 
Border mandate renewal is of grave concern to me and my colleagues in 
Congress. Not only should this administration work to renew the one 
remaining crossing, Bab Al-Hawa, but it should actively work to build 
consensus in the Security Council to re-open two previously closed 
crossings, Bab Al-Salam and Yarubiyah.

   If confirmed, how would you engage with partners in the UNSC to 
        ensure this mandate renewal passes?

    Answer. Unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in Syria is an 
urgent priority for the United States, as it should be for all nations. 
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues its sustained 
high-level engagement with Security Council members and regional 
stakeholders, as well as with U.N. leadership, to include Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres, to underscore the importance of the 
reauthorization and expansion of the U.N. cross-border humanitarian 
assistance mechanism.

    Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that Secretary Blinken 
and even President Biden engage at the highest possible levels on this 
important issue?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will recommend that senior Department 
and White House officials continue to engage with key stakeholders on 
this issue, as that engagement is already underway. President Biden 
encouraged Security Council action on Syria when he hosted Permanent 
Representatives from the U.N. Security Council in March during the U.S. 
presidency of the Security Council. Also in March, Secretary Blinken 
represented the United States in the Syria humanitarian briefing to the 
Security Council and made clear the importance of this issue to help 
relieve the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

    Question. How will you, if confirmed, work to ensure that U.S. 
taxpayer dollars that fund U.N. humanitarian assistance are not being 
used to effectively subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades 
assistance to innocent Syrians through seizure of cross-line assistance 
attempts?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with Department of 
State and USAID colleagues, U.N. stakeholders, and NGOs to ensure that 
aid intended for Syrians in need reaches its intended recipients and 
does not benefit the Assad regime. The United States remains the single 
largest humanitarian donor to the Syrian people. The United States 
further supports all methods of delivering humanitarian assistance to 
the Syrian people throughout the country, including both cross-border 
and cross-line deliveries; however, cross-line deliveries from Damascus 
alone, even if executed properly and unhindered, do not have the 
capacity to fully address the needs of the Syrian people.

    Question. The recent establishment of the office of ``Multilateral 
Personnel and Strategy'' within the bureau of International 
Organizations structure presents new avenues to address the growing 
malign influence across the U.N. system.

   How will you empower this office to address the systematic Chinese 
        and/or Russia malign influence within the U.N.?

    Answer. I believe the establishment of the new office of 
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more 
strategically engage across the multilateral system to counter 
authoritarian countries' efforts to undermine its institutions, values, 
and principles. The U.S. approach toward China and Russia at the U.N. 
will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S. policy agenda 
centered on human rights, individual freedoms, transparency, and good 
governance. When China and Russia seek to undermine the international 
rules-based order, the United States will take decisive action to 
oppose those efforts. If confirmed, I will work to empower the new 
office and look forward to working with Congress to ensure it is well-
equipped to lead this work.

    Question. What is your strategy for increasing American 
representation in the U.N. system including through the Junior 
Professional Officer program, appointments, and elections?

    Answer. Successfully increasing the number of U.S. citizens 
employed at all levels of the U.N. system requires a multifaceted 
approach that will involve identifying and recruiting qualified 
candidates, providing information on the application or election 
process, and advocating for their selection where appropriate. If 
confirmed, I will institutionalize efforts to establish and expand 
these capabilities on behalf of qualified U.S. candidates, and to 
consult closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts are 
sufficiently resourced. I will also work with the interagency and our 
allies and partners to support the election of qualified, independent 
U.S. citizens and other likeminded candidates for key leadership roles 
in the U.N. system.

    Question. Do you believe that a designated U.N. Integrity 
Coordinator should be appointment and empowered to work across the 
Department to lead this effort?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that the IO Bureau 
has the resources and staffing it needs to coordinate across the 
Department and with our partners and allies to advance an affirmative 
agenda and counter efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and 
other countries to undermine the values at the foundation of the U.N. 
and multilateral system. That includes working with all relevant 
players, and in consultation with Congress. Addressing the challenges 
posed by these countries requires strong U.S. leadership to defend the 
foundational principles, values, and rules of the international system, 
and to support qualified and independent candidates for key leadership 
roles. I understand that IO appreciates the support that Congress has 
provided to date on strengthening these efforts, and has already begun 
to adapt its structure to prioritize this work.

    Question. Please detail your strategy for engaging with the 
International Criminal Court, including with relevant bureaus like 
Global Criminal Justice, regarding their ongoing investigations into 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Israel.

    Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to 
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert 
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. President Biden and 
Secretary Blinken have been clear that the United States will continue 
to oppose attempts by the ICC to assert such jurisdiction. The United 
States and Israel are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, and the 
Palestinians do not qualify as a State.

    Question. U.S. Taxpayers have sent billions to U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency since the 1950s when it was originally established. Given 
the administrations resumption of funds without securing much needed 
reform, please detail your engagement plans to ensure no more taxpayer 
dollars are sent to a bloated organization straying from its mandate.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will insist that UNRWA adhere to the U.N. 
principles of neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination, and 
protection of human rights, as well as insist on strict UNRWA internal 
controls. The best way for the United States to influence UNRWA's 
operations and ensure its provision of quality education, health 
services, and emergency humanitarian relief consistent with U.N. 
principles is to maintain our close working relationship with and 
assistance to UNRWA. This allows the United States to direct funding to 
priority areas of focus, especially ensuring neutrality in teaching 
materials, staff activities, and operations, while strengthening 
transparency, accountability, and internal oversight. If confirmed, I 
commit to working with you to ensure the Agency has the capacity to 
fulfill its service delivery mandate from the U.N. General Assembly in 
line with U.N. principles, and to achieving meaningful and sustainable 
reforms to UNRWA's operations.

    Question. Preparations for the next scales of assessment 
negotiation are underway. The Biden administration should make this a 
top priority by negotiating a 25% cap on peacekeeping assessments 
without compromising the existing fixed rate of 22% for the regular 
budget. No one nation should pay over 25% for either budget. What 
strategies will you use, if confirmed, to negotiate our assessed 
peacekeeping dues to 25%?

    Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N. 
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand the 
administration is strategizing for engagement on this issue. If 
confirmed, I will work with Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and her team 
to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N. General 
Assembly to lower the U.S. assessment rates and to make sure other 
countries pay their fair share.

    Question. Do you believe this administration should pay back 
arrears accrued before 2017?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with 
Congress to determine how best to meet our financial obligations, 
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have 
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on 
peacekeeping funding.

    Question. U.S.-assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N., as 
appropriated under the Contributions to International Organizations 
(CIO), Contributions for International Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA), 
and International Organizations and Program (IO&P) accounts, represent 
only a small fraction of total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system.

   If confirmed, will you assist in compiling and sharing with 
        Congress a comprehensive report on total U.S. contributions, 
        from all sources, to the U.N. and its specialized agencies and 
        programs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the efforts of the State 
Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs to meet its 
statutory responsibility to publish annual reports to Congress on all 
U.S. Government contributions to international organizations.

    Question. Will you ensure that other donors remain apprised of the 
full depth and breadth of U.S. contributions from all sources?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the annual reports on 
contributions created by the Bureau of International Organization 
Affairs are published on the Department of State's public website, 
thereby ensuring that they are available to other donors and the public 
generally.

    Question. Whereas assessed contributions are determined on a scale 
and provide no discretion to nations, voluntary contributions are 
provided to advance specific U.S. goals and objectives. Moreover, 
voluntarily funded agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), must compete for resources and 
are subject to rigorous transparency and accountability measures. If 
confirmed, will you seek to ensure that the Secretary General adopts a 
rigorous performance matrix, transparency requirements, and 
accountability measures that apply across the U.N. system, including to 
agencies and programs funded through assessed contributions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to achieve a coordinated, 
government-wide effort to assess the performance of, and promote 
transparency and accountability at, international organizations in the 
U.N. system, including those funded through assessed contributions.

    Question. Last Congress, I introduced the Multilateral Aid Review 
Act to assess the value of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral 
entities, including the U.N. and its affiliated agencies. If confirmed, 
would you support a comprehensive review of U.S. investments in 
multilateral organizations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this issue 
closely and working with Congress to ensure effective oversight of the 
U.N. and its affiliated agencies. I am committed to ensuring prudent 
management of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral entities, 
including a constant focus on results, accountability, and the 
elimination of waste, fraud, and mismanagement.

    Question. What is your view of the relationship between the United 
States and the United Nations (U.N.)?

    Answer. I agree with the view of President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken that many of the biggest threats we face are transnational in 
nature and must be addressed collectively, including through 
international organizations. Since the U.N.'s founding 75 years ago, 
the United States has been critical to the U.N.'s success, and the 
United Nations, in turn, has been central to U.S. efforts to secure 
international peace and security. If confirmed, I will look forward to 
working with Congress to ensure the U.S. relationship with the United 
Nations remains constructive, continues to serve America's national 
security interests, and promotes our core U.S. values.

    Question. What are your thoughts regarding the U.N. Human Rights 
Council (HRC)?

    Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council plays an important role in 
promoting and protecting human rights, humanitarian access, and 
fundamental freedoms globally, but has serious flaws as well. I am 
committed to seeking HRC reforms, particularly regarding the Council's 
disproportionate focus on Israel, and to its membership. When the 
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we 
can better advocate to protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council. 
Recently, our engagement has helped lead to a reduction in the number 
of resolutions targeting Israel. Our engagement also helps us in our 
efforts to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights 
records off the Council, and to encourage countries with better records 
to run.

   If confirmed, I will ensure the United States continues to 
        prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-engagement with the 
        Council.

    Question. Now that the Biden administration has stated its intent 
to run for re-election to the HRC, what reforms will the Biden 
administration seek?

    Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the 
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's 
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. When 
we have had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate on 
Israel's behalf, and we have seen changes like a reduction in the 
number of resolutions targeting Israel. We have also seen that when the 
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we 
have been able to engage with our allies and partners to keep off some 
of the countries with the worst human rights records and to encourage 
countries with better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will 
ensure the United States prioritizes these specific reforms.

    Question. Does the Biden administration believe the HRC devotes a 
disproportionate amount of attention to criticizing Israel while 
ignoring more pressing human rights crises?

    Answer. Yes. The United States remains concerned about the 
disproportionate focus by the U.N. Human Rights Council on Israel, 
including Agenda Item 7. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to 
unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided 
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations, 
including at the Human Rights Council. It is critical that the U.S. 
show up and engage with the Council directly. U.S. engagement at the 
Council can be a force for positive change and for holding countries 
with the worst human rights records to account.

    Question. Understanding that the HRC has been ``broken,'' in large 
part, by allowing human rights abusers to obtain seats on the Council, 
do you believe that conditioning U.S. participation on reform is 
beneficial?

    Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights 
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's membership and its 
disproportionate focus on Israel. We have seen that when the United 
States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we can 
engage with our allies and partners to keep some of the countries with 
the worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage 
countries with better records to run for seats. We can also advocate on 
Israel's behalf. With U.S. engagement, we have seen changes such as a 
reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed, 
I will ensure the United States continues to prioritize needed reforms 
as part of our re-engagement with the Human Rights Council.

    Question. There have been efforts to have the United States rejoin 
the World Tourism Organization. If confirmed, would you support the re-
entry of the United States to the World Tourism Organization? What 
benefits would the United States receive by re-joining this 
organization?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure careful consideration and 
review before any efforts are made to rejoin the World Tourism 
Organization.

    Question. What are your views on the need for management reform at 
the U.N.?

    Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to look hard at U.N. and 
international organization management and budgeting practices, and at 
how agencies implement their ethics rules, including whistleblower 
protections.

    Question. How will you work to address barriers to advancing U.N. 
management reforms, especially those created by the different 
priorities among member states?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to harness allies and likeminded 
member states who strongly support U.N. management reform to overcome 
any barriers that stand in the way of advancing reforms. It must be in 
the interests of all members to make implementation of reforms an 
urgent priority to make the United Nations the effective, efficient, 
and responsive organization it needs to be in the 21st century.

    Question. How will you measure success in implementing management 
reforms at the U.N.?

    Answer. If confirmed, my metric of success will be to ensure that 
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral 
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable 
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the 
American people.

    Question. What policies does the U.N. need to implement to maintain 
fiscal responsibility and accountability within the U.N. system?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that international 
organizations within the U.N. system are accountable and responsible 
for the U.S. taxpayer resources they receive. This includes continuing 
the longstanding U.S. policy of promoting budget discipline, as well as 
continuing efforts to ensure that other countries pay their fair share.

    Question. While the U.N. has taken steps to improve its efficiency, 
operational effectiveness, and accountability, the continuing need for 
reform is obvious to most observers, including strong supporters of the 
institution. The U.N. Secretary-General has committed to an agenda of 
reform. The push for reform by the United States is one of the main 
drivers behind the reform movement's progress to date.

   In your opinion, what are the top three reforms that the U.N. could 
        undertake over the next two years that will have the greatest 
        impact?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure international 
organizations in the U.N. system adhere to the best management and 
oversight practices, including in the areas of protecting 
whistleblowers, addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, promoting 
zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and managerial 
transparency. This means greater transparency not only in budgeting 
practices, but also in U.N. procurement practices.
    The United States expects to see tangible results from management 
reforms, including improved program delivery and greater 
accountability. Delegating more authority to U.N. teams in the field, 
closer to the point of mandate implementation, is also a key and 
necessary reform.

    Question. The United States is the largest donor to the World Food 
Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and other U.N. 
agencies. Will you continue this pattern of voluntary donations to 
address some of the world's most pressing issues?

    Answer. I am fully committed to upholding the Biden-Harris 
administration's promise to restore U.S. leadership and support for 
U.N. agencies, and to advance U.S. priorities in multilateral fora and 
at the United Nations. Voluntary contributions are an effective tool of 
U.S. leadership that allow us to ensure organizations are accountable, 
transparent, and responsive to humanitarian needs. The United States 
has long been the largest global contributor of humanitarian assistance 
and has increased its contributions due to the devastating impacts of 
COVID-19. Of course, we owe it to U.S. taxpayers and to the 
beneficiaries whose lives depend on U.N. programs to insist on 
continued reforms aimed at greater U.N. effectiveness and efficiency.

    Question. How do you plan to monitor the activities of the U.N. 
Population Fund (UNFPA) and ensure that it is not complicit in China's 
campaign of coercive abortion and sterilization of Uyghur women?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our government's due 
diligence through our membership on the U.N. Population Fund's (UNFPA) 
Executive Board, including through the Board's country program document 
review mechanism. UNFPA does not condone China's coercive population 
policies nor does it operate in Xinjiang.

    Question. There have been credible allegations that the U.N. Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights shared the names of Chinese 
dissidents who were attending U.N. Human Rights Council sessions with 
the Chinese Government.

   If confirmed, how will you investigate these allegations?

    Answer. President Biden has said he would defend the rights of 
activists, political dissidents, and journalists around the world to 
speak their minds freely without fear of persecution and violence. If 
confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for a detailed 
understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S. Government 
personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights.

    Question. What reforms will you seek to ensure that this practice 
is never again used?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for 
a detailed understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S. 
Government personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.

    Question. The United States is the single largest financial 
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping activities. Congress authorizes and 
appropriates U.S. contributions, and it has an ongoing interest in 
ensuring such funding is used as efficiently and effectively as 
possible.

   Do you believe that any nation, including the United States, should 
        pay more than 25 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget?

    Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N. 
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand that 
the administration is currently strategizing on how to engage on this 
issue. If confirmed, my team and I will do everything we can to make 
sure that other countries pay their fair share. If confirmed, I commit 
to consulting with you and your staff on this important matter.

    Question. What is your position on U.S. repayment of U.N. 
peacekeeping arrears? As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden 
agreement, the Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-
Secretary General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that 
the United States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay, 
the roughly $500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly 
excluded from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since 
then, the U.N. has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama 
administration sought to pay over Congressional objections. Do you 
commit not to pay these ``contested arrears'' per Congressional intent 
as outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with 
Congress to allow the United States to meet our financial obligations, 
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have 
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on 
peacekeeping funding.

    Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the U.N. should 
take to reduce the overall size of the U.N. peacekeeping budget? If so, 
what are they?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing and assessing all 
existing peacekeeping missions to ensure they are still necessary for 
the promotion of international peace and security. I will also work to 
ensure they are as effective and efficient as possible, while providing 
they have the necessary resources to fully implement their mandates, 
including well-trained and well-equipped troops and police. I would 
press for structural changes, including aligning U.N. procurement with 
industry best practices, right-sizing mission support components, and 
reforming human resources to reduce staff costs. I would also press for 
the U.N. to implement financial reimbursement penalties for troop- and 
police-contributing countries for poor or under-performance, in line 
with the U.N. Security Council resolution 2436.

    Question. Are there any specific U.N. peacekeeping missions you 
would support reducing or terminating in order to reduce U.N. 
peacekeeping costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you 
believe should be reduced or terminated?

    Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations are among the most effective 
mechanisms of burden-sharing in addressing the global challenges to 
international peace and security. We must ensure peacekeeping 
operations are using their resources as effectively and efficiently as 
possible to promote sustainable political solutions to conflict. Toward 
that end, I will, if confirmed, closely scrutinize missions, especially 
when their mandates come up for renewal by the U.N. Security Council.

    Question. There have been numerous proposals to expand U.N. support 
for regional peacekeeping operations-particularly those deployed under 
the auspices of the African Union-ranging from providing limited 
logistical support to fully financing training, equipment, deployment, 
and sustainment costs through the use of assessed U.N. peacekeeping 
contributions. Whether regional missions would initially be subject to 
approval by the U.N. Security Council (like the AMISOM mission in 
Somalia was) is a topic of debate. However, using the U.N. as a 
financing mechanism for peacekeeping operations that do not fall under 
the command and control of the U.N.; lack adequate accountability 
measures; and place long-term political and financial obligations upon 
Member states absent Security Council oversight is a matter of serious 
concern. If confirmed, will you pledge to ensure that any peacekeeping 
mission funded by U.N. peacekeeping dollars is mandated and overseen by 
the Security Council?

    Answer. The United States has long supported strengthening 
strategic AU-U.N. partnerships to better address collective peace and 
security threats on the continent. If confirmed, I will strive to 
ensure that any AU peace operation that receives U.N. financial support 
is mandated by and preserves the primacy of the U.N. Security Council 
and complies with applicable international human rights law and U.N. 
conduct and discipline standards.

    Question. The United Nations maintains several particular bodies 
and departments that focus on the Palestinians. These include the 
Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR), the Committee on the Exercise of 
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and the 
United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine 
(UNISPAL).

   Will you work to challenge the existence and funding of these 
        departments?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to unfairly single out 
or delegitimize Israel through one-sided resolutions, reports, and 
other actions across the United Nations.

    Question. The United States lacks a veto over membership decisions 
in U.N.-specialized agencies that the Palestinians could target for 
membership. When the Palestinians obtain membership, the United States 
must cut funding to that organization as required under two laws 
enacted by a Democratic-led Congress in the early 1990's. U.S. Code 
Title 22, Section 287e note, states:

        No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other 
        Act shall be available for the United Nations or any 
        specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine 
        Liberation Organization the same standing as member states.'' 
        (Adopted as Public Law 101-246 in 1990.)
          The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed 
        contribution: (1) to any affiliated organization of the United 
        Nations which grants full membership as a state to any 
        organization or group that does not have the internationally 
        recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United 
        Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a 
        state in the United Nations to any organization or group that 
        does not have the internationally recognized attributes of 
        statehood, during any period in which such membership is 
        effective.'' (Adopted as Public Law 103-236 in 1994.)

    The language in these provisions is clear and provides no 
discretion or waiver authority. Will you support their enforcement as 
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support compliance with U.S. laws.

    Question. Over the past several years, the Palestinian Authority 
has received votes in various U.N. bodies to upgrade its status. Such 
attempts undermine the long-held belief that peace between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority can only come about as a direct result of 
direct negotiations.

   What is your plan to stop initiatives like this from even coming 
        before U.N. entities, or the General Assembly, for a vote?

    Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join 
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are 
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations 
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both 
with the parties and with international partners, that the only 
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct 
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.

    Question. How will you address future attempts by the Palestinian 
Authority to achieve statehood through the United Nations?

    Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join 
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are 
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations 
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both 
with the parties and with international partners, that the only 
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct 
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.

    Question. The United States has long maintained a policy of 
opposing many one-sided Security Council resolutions that, more often 
than not, criticize Israel but fail to address other issues such as 
Palestinian terrorism.

   Do you support the use of an American veto to block one-sided anti-
        Israel resolutions in the Security Council?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to uphold President Biden's 
strong commitment to Israel and its security. This includes opposing 
efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided 
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations, 
including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights 
Council, and other bodies.
    Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis of U.S. 
policy interests and how they relate to the issue under consideration.

    Question. What do you believe should be the standard employed in 
deciding whether to veto or not?

    Answer. Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis 
of U.S. policy interests and how they relate to the issue under 
consideration.

    Question. Do you believe that there is a disproportionate focus on 
Israel at the U.N.? How would you counter this at the U.N.?

    Answer. Yes, and if confirmed I will continue the United States' 
opposition to efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel 
through one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the 
United Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, 
the Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look 
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues to promote 
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N. 
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N. 
positions.

    Question. In a report requested by the U.N. Human Rights Council, 
the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi said in September 2020 that there 
had been ``little'' in the way of ``positive changes'' since President 
Evariste Ndayishimiye ``assumed office'' in June 2020, and concerns 
remain about human rights abuses committed both domestically against 
Burundian citizens and through Burundi's engagements in the region.

   What are your views on the human rights situation in Burundi? Do 
        you believe the United States is in a position to reset its 
        relationship with Ndayishimiye's Government, given the seeming 
        continuity in human rights abuses from the former Nkurunziza 
        Government?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by ongoing serious human rights 
violations in Burundi, while recognizing some recent positive signs. 
The Government has committed to releasing over 4,000 prisoners and 
released some journalists jailed during the 2020 elections, convicted 
perpetrators of elections related crimes, started dialogue with 
previously banned local media, and engaged the international community. 
If confirmed, I will carefully assess the human rights situation in 
Burundi and seek to build on that progress.

    Question. How would you evaluate the performance of Burundian 
troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? How can the 
U.S. better monitor their human rights record in Somalia? Are there 
opportunities to build in stronger human rights reporting for AMISOM, 
including to better monitor the human rights record of Burundian troops 
in Somalia? How can the U.S. push for greater capabilities of AMISOM to 
monitor the human rights performance of Burundi and other peacekeeper 
contributing countries under mission? What can the U.N. do regarding 
the AMISOM Mission to decrease dependency on Burundian troops in 
Somalia?

    Answer. I share your concerns about AMISOM's abilities to monitor 
the performance and conduct of contingents assigned to it. Somalia is a 
very challenging operating environment. The United States attempts to 
mitigate these challenges by drawing on multiple sources, including 
NGOs, media, U.N. agencies, intelligence reporting, and diplomatic 
contacts. We also regularly urge the AU to monitor contingents' 
performance and conduct and investigate and respond to reported abuse. 
If confirmed, I will work with the U.N., the Bureau of African Affairs, 
and AMISOM to continue to improve these efforts.

    Question. The Anglophone conflict in Cameroon is one of the world's 
most neglected yet intensely brutal conflicts.

   How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security Council to hold 
        regular formal briefings and discussions on the Anglophone 
        crisis in Cameroon, adding it formally to its agenda? If so, 
        how do you propose the U.S. engage member states that have 
        worked to block previous efforts to prioritize and regularize 
        the Anglophone crisis within the U.N. Security Council?

    Answer. The United States engages U.N. Security Council member 
states regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone crisis and the 
severity of the humanitarian crisis in Cameroon. For example, we raise 
the Anglophone crisis during briefings by the Secretary-General's 
Special Representative and Head of the U.N. Office for Central Africa 
(UNOCA) Francois Fall. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage UNOCA 
to engage the Government of Cameroon and ask other U.N. member states 
to play a constructive role to resolve the Anglophone crisis.

    Question. Do you agree that the U.N. has a vital role in supporting 
inclusive internationally-mediated dialogue among the many actors in 
the Anglophone Crisis to find a lasting and sustainable solution to the 
crisis, addressing root causes and underlying grievances? If yes, what 
precisely should that role be, and how will you push for that within 
the U.N.?

    Answer. Yes. The United States fully supports the U.N. Office in 
Central Africa (UNOCA)'s role in promoting inclusive political dialogue 
in Cameroon, which includes the resolution of the Anglophone crisis. 
The importance of this work was reinforced in the strategic review of 
UNOCA conducted in 2020. If confirmed, I will support UNOCA's role and 
priorities when its mandate expires on August 31, 2021. The United 
States also fully supports the Swiss-led mediation of the Anglophone 
crisis, which the U.N. also supports.

    Question. The Cameroonian Government has consistently failed to 
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of atrocities committed against 
its civilians. It has proven itself unable to hold high-ranking 
government and military officials responsible for these crimes. How can 
the U.S. engage other like-minded countries in the U.N. to pursue 
accountability for atrocities committed in Cameroon, both by government 
and armed group actors?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will review the tools we have at the United 
Nations to press for a resolution to this conflict and to hold 
accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses. I 
will also seek opportunities to engage with like-minded countries that 
share a desire to bring this conflict to an end. If confirmed, I will 
also engage other U.N. member states on the importance of the rule of 
law and ending impunity in Cameroon and explore ways we can work 
together to move toward a resolution.

    Question. How can the United States more effectively encourage 
France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the 
government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the Anglophone 
conflict?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will review the different tools we have to 
press for a resolution of this conflict, including through discussions 
with counterparts from France and the UK. The United States routinely 
raises the situation in Cameroon with French officials and will 
continue to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the 
Anglophone regions.

    Question. Russia's dominant presence in CAR is alarming on several 
fronts, not just as it relates to the Central African country's 
internal and regional security, but also vital U.S. national security 
interests. Will you commit to closely monitoring Russia's presence in 
CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., particularly as it relates 
to internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Russia's presence 
in CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., with a particular focus 
on internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo. 
Russia's close ties to the Touadera Government, involvement in CAR's 
security sector, and stake in its natural resources are extremely 
concerning. If confirmed, I will carefully review all the diplomatic 
tools available to respond appropriately to Russia's activities in CAR.

    Question. How can the United States best protect its interests in 
CAR and the broader region while also ensuring that other members of 
the U.N. Security Council are prioritizing the MINUSCA mission over 
their own foreign military operations in the country?

    Answer. The humanitarian situation and ongoing conflict in CAR is 
deeply concerning. So, too, are reports of anti-MINUSCA propaganda and 
allegations that foreign security actors are failing to deconflict 
their activities with MINUSCA, committing human rights abuses, and 
impeding humanitarian access. MINUSCA continues to provide crucial 
stabilization support, human rights monitoring, assistance to CAR's 
justice sector, and support for elections. If confirmed, I will engage 
with our partners in the region and in Europe, as well as in the U.N., 
to ensure that MINUSCA remains well-resourced and can fully carry out 
its mandate, especially the protection of civilians.

    Question. How does the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) contribute to 
the peace and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? How 
effective is MONUSCO's current mandate and what changes might you 
propose should you be confirmed? What should the U.S., our European 
allies, and the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) be doing to support 
a peace process and end of the conflict in Eastern Congo?

    Answer. MONUSCO serves U.S. national security interests by 
assisting the DRC Government in its stabilization and peace 
consolidation efforts and supporting DRC's security forces to combat 
threats posed by armed groups and transnational criminal networks. The 
mission also uses its good offices to assist President Tshisekedi's 
efforts to end impunity for certain human rights violations and to 
advance security sector reform. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. 
engagement through our ambassador, the U.N., and regional and 
international partners to support efforts to stabilize the region. I 
will also press for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to implement 
reforms to improve performance and for MONUSCO's responsible and 
sustainable transition and drawdown.

    Question. How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security 
Council to hold regular formal briefings and make statements about the 
ongoing conflicts and humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, including but 
not limited to the conflict in the Tigray region? How should the US. 
engage member states that have worked to block previous efforts to 
prioritize and regularize discussion of Ethiopia by the U.N. Security 
Council?

    Answer. Opposition from Russia, China, and other member states to 
formal meetings and public statements on the deeply troubling 
humanitarian and security situation in Ethiopia impedes the Security 
Council from speaking with one voice. If confirmed, I am committed to 
calling out those member states for their unwillingness to uphold the 
fundamental responsibility of the Security Council to address threats 
to international peace and security like the crisis in Ethiopia. I will 
also work closely with likeminded partners to raise the profile of 
Ethiopia in other fora and press for other U.N. bodies like the Human 
Rights Council to take up this important issue.

    Question. There has been considerable discussion about modifying 
the mandate of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and 
AMISOM to better address the challenges faced in Somalia.

   In your view, how can the U.S. engage in future mandate renewal 
        processes, including with the penholder (U.K.), to have frank 
        discussions about what we hope to achieve through UNSOS/AMISOM 
        and how to push the government of Somalia to make progress?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing AMISOM's mandate 
closely with the UK, the AU, and other key stakeholders to ensure that 
it advances an approach that is sustainable, holistic, and 
appropriately geared toward supporting stabilization, counterterrorism, 
and transitioning security responsibilities to more capable, 
professional, and accountable Somali security forces. While military 
operations remain critical, addressing the drivers of Somalia's 
persistent instability, and the evolving hybrid threat posed by al-
Shabaab, will require the Somalis and the international community, 
including AMISOM and the U.N., to utilize a broader range of tools.

    Question. U.N. Special Representative James Swan commented in 
November 2020, following Somalia's decision to forgo direct universal 
suffrage elections for a selection process similar to that of 2016, 
that ``we urge Somali leaders to prepare consensually a roadmap with 
clear timelines and benchmarks to ensure one-person-one-vote elections 
take place in 2024/25.'' To what extent do you feel, in reviewing the 
mandate for AMISOM, that consideration should to be given as to how the 
U.N. could play a bigger role in supporting and making preparations for 
universal suffrage elections in the future?

    Answer. The U.N. plays a critical role in assisting Somalia with 
stabilization and democratic development reforms. Among the U.N. 
elements operating in Somalia, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia 
(UNSOM) is mandated with advising and assisting Somalia on political 
reforms, and is best suited to lead U.N. efforts in preparing the 
country for universal suffrage in the future. If confirmed, when 
UNSOM's mandate comes up for renewal in August 2021, I will work to 
ensure that support for democratic and electoral reforms, including 
supporting preparations for universal suffrage elections, remain at the 
core of UNSOM's responsibilities.

    Question. The United States voted with other members of the 
Security Council in December to end the mandate of the United Nations--
African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), despite warnings 
that Sudan's Government had not yet demonstrated its ability to protect 
civilians in Darfur. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights notes 
``severe gaps in protection by State authorities, as well as a lack of 
accountability for violations.''

   What, in your view, should UNITAMS' role be in helping to address 
        these issues?

    Answer. The United States is committed to supporting Sudanese 
efforts to address civilian protection concerns in Darfur and 
throughout the country. I believe UNITAMS can play an important role in 
supporting Sudan's civilian-led transitional government as it works to 
address protection concerns, strengthen rule of law institutions, and 
build trust among the Sudanese people. If confirmed, I will push the 
Security Council to provide UNITAMS the resources and tools to support 
these important initiatives.

    Question. What is your view of the request by Sudan's transitional 
government to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Darfur? What changes if any 
should be made to the U.N. sanctions regime established pursuant to 
resolution 1591 (2005)?

    Answer. U.N. sanctions remain an important tool in the 
international community's response to the situation in Darfur. With the 
adoption of resolution 2562, the U.N. Security Council has requested 
the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur 
and to provide by July 31, 2021 a report containing recommendations for 
clear and well identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding the 
Security Council to review the measures on Darfur under the 1591 
regime. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the appropriateness of 
adjustments to the U.N. Sudan sanctions regime.

    Question. How does the United Nations Interim Security Force for 
Abyei (UNISFA) contribute to the peace and security of Sudan and South 
Sudan? How effective is UNISFA's current mandate and what changes might 
you propose should you be confirmed?

    Answer. UNISFA has effectively prevented tensions over the status 
of Abyei or other border areas from escalating into conflict between 
Sudan and South Sudan. It has also played an important role in 
preventing and responding to conflict between local communities in the 
absence of local administration. However, both Sudan and South Sudan 
need to renew efforts to establish interim administrative and security 
bodies and restart talks on resolving Abyei's political status. If 
confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure that UNISFA's mandate 
remains appropriately focused, particularly with regard to the 
protection of civilians.

    Question. One of the key lessons from the Brahimi Report was that 
if a peace operation is to be part of implementing a peace agreement, 
it should have a role in the process and a seat at the table--in South 
Sudan, though the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) does 
not. Should UNMISS's political strategy be reexamined, and if so how, 
and how would you go about building support within the Council for a 
more robust role for the mission? Should UNMISS have a greater role in 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and/or security 
sector reform (SSR)?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor closely the U.N. Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) with a view to making it as efficient and 
effective as possible to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians, 
facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting implementation of the 
Revitalized Peace Agreement and supporting respect for human rights. 
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector 
reform are essential building blocks for the peace process in South 
Sudan. If confirmed, I will evaluate the role of UNMISS in these areas.

    Question. The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and 
Response recently released its final report, in which the authors 
evaluated the WHO's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and made 
recommendations to prevent future pandemics from occurring. Included 
were recommendations to reduce the WHO Director General's term to a 
single seven-year term and adopt merit-based recruitment standards for 
other leadership staff; refocus the WHO on its core capabilities 
(upholding norms, providing policy and technical guidance, collecting 
and sharing critical global health data, and coordinating--rather than 
implementing--emergency responses); strengthen the International Health 
Regulations, including by giving WHO the right to conduct assessments 
without advance approval by Member States; create a Heads of State-
level Global Health Threats Council; and create a multilateral 
incentive fund to sustainably finance pandemic preparedness and 
response. Do you agree that the World Health Organization is in need of 
reform and, if so, what specific reforms should the United States seek 
to advance at the upcoming World Health Assembly?

    Answer. Yes, the World Health Organization is in need of reform, 
and if confirmed I will support our efforts to make the WHO stronger, 
more independent and efficient. Proposed reforms will be informed by 
assessments of the COVID-19 response and past outbreaks, including the 
Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response and the other 
two independent reviews of WHO and Member State performance. The United 
States is working with partners in bilateral and multilateral fora to 
improve WHO's functioning, transparency, and accountability. This 
includes a focus on core areas such as science, data collection, and 
evaluation and promotion of evidence-based approaches. Reform requires 
improved human resources and financial management practices. Reform 
proposals should also incorporate policies throughout the organization 
that are gender-sensitive and respect human rights as well as the 
social determinants of health. Member states also need to live up to 
their commitments as expressed within the International Health 
Regulations.

    Question. Do you agree with the recommendations of the IPPPR? Which 
ones?

    Answer. I understand that the State Department and other agencies 
are reviewing the IPPPR recommendations alongside those of other 
assessments. After so many lives lost, the global community and each 
country must take immediate, tangible actions to both end this pandemic 
and to prepare for the next by taking steps to improve preparedness and 
response capabilities, including by increasing sustainable financing, 
enhancing biosurveillance with clear ``triggers'' for action, and 
expanding pandemic-related manufacturing with rapid surge capacity. If 
confirmed, I will seek to strengthen the global health architecture to 
promote preparedness, transparency, accountability, innovation, and 
impact, so that the global community will be better prepared to 
successfully prevent the next outbreak from becoming a pandemic.

    Question. If the U.S. is unwilling to leverage contributions, how 
will you ensure that far-reaching reforms are enacted?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will advance reforms at the WHO through 
advocacy, diplomacy, and dialogue, and will work with a broad coalition 
of like-minded member states to ensure that WHO reforms advance and 
apply lessons learned from the pandemic response. I would also seek to 
implement innovative approaches such as the non-binding U.S.-WHO 
Partnership Arrangement, a model pioneered by the United Kingdom, to 
include defined metrics and timelines for improvement. If confirmed, I 
look forward to consulting with you and your staff on this important 
matter.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. If confirmed, what will you advise the Biden 
administration do regarding UNRWA?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will advise that the administration 
continue to make clear to UNRWA that adhering to the U.N. principles of 
strict neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination and protection of 
human rights is non-negotiable. UNRWA's mandate is set by the U.N. 
General Assembly and is to provide essential services directly to 
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure UNRWA 
provides cost-efficient and effective services to its beneficiaries and 
that UNRWA upholds the highest level of transparency, accountability, 
tolerance, and neutrality. If confirmed, I would work with others in 
the Department to advise the administration on meaningful and 
sustainable reforms to UNRWA's operations, including strengthening 
UNRWA internal controls and the Advisory Committee's oversight of UNRWA 
management.

    Question. If confirmed, will you continue U.S. efforts to push back 
against international organizations, like the U.N., as they single out 
and attack Israel?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the United States' work in 
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through 
one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United 
Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the 
Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look 
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues, to promote 
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N. 
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N. 
positions.

    Question. Iran was recently elected to the U.N. Commission on the 
Status of Women. Given Iran's treatment of women, this election damages 
the credibility of this institution. If confirmed, will you actively 
work to oppose Iranian membership in such international bodies?

    Answer. I deeply share the concern that is the premise of your 
question, which is that some U.N. bodies include countries that do not 
live up to the objectives of the organization. In some cases, this is 
because the objectionable country runs on a clean regional slate which 
the majority of U.N. member states are unwilling to oppose.
    For the CSW, the United States wants to see member state candidates 
who champion gender equality, oppose discrimination against women, 
promote women's empowerment, and further their well-being. In the case 
of this election, the U.S. called for a vote despite a clean regional 
slate due to the presence of countries on the slate that do not uphold 
these values. If confirmed, for each particular election, I will ensure 
we examine the entire list of candidates and determine who we should 
support and who we should oppose.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to direct U.S. 
representatives at international organizations to oppose growing 
Russian and Chinese influence at these institutions?

    Answer. At the U.N., the People's Republic of China drives an 
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the 
United States and is inconsistent with the founding documents and 
principles of the U.N. itself, including on human rights, labor rights, 
transparency, and coercive economic practices. The PRC's efforts harm 
international organizations and their transparency, efficiency, values, 
and influence. If confirmed, I commit to work with U.S. representatives 
to international organizations to oppose the influence of the People's 
Republic of China, Russia, and others and to work with our partners and 
allies to lead on an affirmative agenda that strengthens the 
international rules-based order and its foundational values and 
principles.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Todd Young

    Question. Do you agree that international organizations and 
multinational forums have become a key battleground in the strategic 
competition between the United States and China?

    Answer. Yes, and strategic competition with the People's Republic 
of China is one of the central challenges of the 21st century. The 
United States is able to respond to this challenge from a position of 
strength when we are engaged and leading international organizations, 
not pulling back and ceding the terrain to China to write the rules and 
norms that animate international institutions. If confirmed, I will use 
our engagement in the U.N. system to push back against the influence of 
China, and any country that seeks to undermine the rules-based order. I 
will steadfastly oppose activities that undermine the values, 
principles, and rules of the U.N. and other international 
organizations, and I will promote U.S. values and interests alongside 
our allies and partners.

    Question. The United States has repeatedly been boxed out by 
China's comprehensive strategy of whipping votes for leadership 
positions of specialized agencies: how would you lead the IO Bureau to 
ensure that the United States is laying the groundwork years in advance 
of vacancies to increase American or allied representation of these 
agencies?

    Answer. The integrity of the U.N. and other international 
organizations is vital to U.S. multilateral interests. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that the IO Bureau, including the new Office of 
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, prioritize and implement a robust 
and timely strategy to identify opportunities across the U.N. system to 
increase the representation of qualified and independent American and 
likeminded candidates at all levels. I will also coordinate closely 
with our allies and partners to plan for and support the election of 
qualified, independent candidates who will uphold the U.N.'s 
foundational principles, values, and norms, including a focus on human 
rights and economic transparency.

    Question. What lessons can be learned by the 2020 election for the 
Director General role at the World I.P. Organization--or, WIPO--and how 
the United States proactively helped win support for the Singaporean 
candidate, beating out a Chinese official?

    Answer. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2020 
election was a powerful example of the strength of U.S. diplomacy and 
the importance of ensuring strong leadership in standard-setting 
bodies. Coordinating with partners and allies to rally support for 
qualified and independent candidates who promote transparency, 
accountability, and the rule of law is and will continue to be a recipe 
for success in future leadership elections within U.N./international 
bodies. We also need to emphasize that the PRC is driving an 
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the 
United States and the U.N.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. What more should the United States do to ensure China 
does not achieve its objective of reshaping and dominating 
international institutions? PRC nationals now lead four of the United 
Nations' 15 specialized agencies and groups, and have added many 
Chinese nationals to the staff of these organizations. Some 30 United 
Nations agencies and institutions have signed memorandums in support of 
China's Belt and Road project.

    Answer. I believe the United States must engage strategically to 
defend, strengthen, and revitalize the international order and its 
foundational values, rules, and principles, including through 
rebuilding and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. If 
confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness and 
transparency, support qualified and independent candidates for key 
positions in U.N. agencies, advance strong reforms including 
whistleblower protections, and take targeted actions to oppose efforts 
by the PRC that undermine a rules-based international order. If 
confirmed, I commit to combatting PRC attempts to insert its domestic 
ideology and policy language into U.N. and multilateral policy 
documents. We must also work with the boards of U.N. organizations to 
increase oversight of the U.N.'s work in order to uphold the U.N.'s 
values rather than the promotion of a single country's flagship 
program.

    Question. If confirmed, do you support standing up an office within 
the Bureau of International Organization to specifically address the 
threat of growing Chinese influence in global institutions?

    Answer. Yes, I believe the establishment of the new office of 
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International 
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more 
strategically engage across the multilateral system and uphold its 
foundational principles, values, and norms. Our approach toward the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) at the U.N. and other international 
organizations will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S. 
policy agenda, and when the PRC seeks to undermine the international 
rules-based order, we will take action to oppose those efforts. If 
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress to consider 
other ways to effectively outcompete the PRC and advance U.S. 
multilateral priorities.

    Question. Do you agree that China under the Chinese Communist Party 
is pursuing a systematic, decades-long campaign to achieve global 
preeminence and reshape the international order to the CCP's benefit?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages in conduct 
around the world that undermines the international system that has 
supported global peace and security, stability, prosperity, and human 
rights for more than 75 years. The PRC drives an authoritarian agenda 
that stands in opposition to the foundational values and principles of 
the U.N. and other international organizations. If confirmed, pushing 
back against the PRC's attempts to reshape the international system 
will be a top priority of mine. I will rally support with allies, 
partners, and other countries to oppose the PRC's efforts to undercut 
international institutions, values, and rules, and will ensure that the 
United States advances an affirmative agenda centered on human rights, 
individual freedoms, transparency, and good governance.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to pushing the World Health 
Organization to conduct a transparent and thorough investigation 
regarding the origin of COVID-19 as a critical step to preventing the 
next pandemic?

    Answer. Yes. If I am confirmed, I will press the WHO to conduct a 
thorough second phase of the COVID-19 study in China. The world needs 
to understand how this pandemic originated so that we can better 
prepare our governments, our people and our public health institutions 
for future health crises. That is why we are continuing to work with 
the WHO and with other Member States to support a science-based and 
expert-driven study of the pandemic's origins that is free from 
interference or politicization.

    Question. Do you believe it is prudent for the United States to 
support gain-of-function research in China?

    Answer. As underscored by the COVID-19 pandemic, all nations, 
including China, must commit to cooperation that is rooted in openness, 
transparency, and scientific independence. As a general matter, I 
believe scientific cooperation between nations is crucial to addressing 
transnational threats to global health.
    On the particular matter of research funding, I would defer to the 
relevant authorities, including the Department of Health and Human 
Services and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. via 
Videoconference, Hon. Chris Van Hollen, presiding.
    Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Kaine, Booker, 
Young, and Rounds.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

    Senator Van Hollen. The nominations hearing of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
    Welcome, everybody, to the committee, and I do want to 
begin by giving a special salute and shout out to my colleague, 
Senator Mike Rounds, who is the ranking member of the Global 
Health and Africa Subcommittee, and look forward to working 
with him and all our colleagues on the subcommittee and the 
full committee on the large range of pressing issues that are 
before the subcommittee and the full committee.
    I see we have also been joined by my colleague, Senator 
Kaine from Virginia, and I am sure others will be joining us as 
we go.
    Let me acknowledge our nominees and congratulations to all 
of you on your nominations to be ambassadors to these 
countries, and thank you for your service.
    We have with us today Ambassador Larry Edward Andre, Jr., 
to be the United States Ambassador to Somalia, Ambassador Maria 
E. Brewer to be the United States Ambassador to Lesotho, 
Ambassador Tulinabo Mushingi to be U.S. Ambassador to Angola 
and Sao Tome and Principe, and Ms. Elizabeth Moore Aubin to be 
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and Mr. Eugene S. Young to be 
the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, and 
finally, last but not least, Mr. Christopher John Lamora to be 
the United States Ambassador to Cameroon.
    Again, welcome everybody, and I am going to give some brief 
opening remarks, turn it over to my colleague, Senator Rounds, 
and then we will hear from each of you.
    Today's hearing is first and foremost a nominations 
hearing. But in the broader sense, it is an opportunity for us 
to reexamine our nation's diplomatic relationships with 
countries across Africa.
    President Biden has made clear his mission to restore 
America's role on the world stage as a force for democracy, for 
diplomacy, for human rights, and for international cooperation.
    Those principles must be front and center in our ongoing 
engagement with African countries and with their citizens. The 
best way to advance that cause is by focusing on the 
opportunities for action, opportunities to invest in and engage 
with some of the fastest growing countries and economies in the 
world.
    By 2050, the population of Africa is expected to double and 
will account for one quarter of the world's population. Africa 
is also the youngest continent in the world, and 60 percent of 
Africans are under the age of 25.
    These young people will be at the vanguard of the next 
global generation, helping to lead the charge in innovation, 
technology, business, and economic growth. Our investment in 
their futures will help ensure greater prosperity, opportunity, 
peace, and security, both abroad but also here at home.
    That cause holds an added measure of urgency as we confront 
the reality that many of our biggest threats are interconnected 
and global.
    As we have seen throughout the past year, viruses know no 
borders and our ability to defeat COVID-19 and tackle future 
outbreaks as well as outbreaks of other diseases requires our 
participation and our leadership in a global and coordinated 
response.
    The same is true for taking on the climate crisis, which, 
obviously, has impact here at home and everywhere in the world. 
It is a key driver of the plight of displacement in many 
countries like Somalia.
    It also represents a real opportunity at home and around 
the world for the production of new sources of clean energy, 
both for Africa and for the global economy.
    We are engaging in projects that advance these goals and 
others through ventures lie the Power Africa initiative and 
President Biden's pledge on the coronavirus fight front to 
donate now hundreds of millions of doses worldwide and our 
contribution to COVAX.
    So the United States has now pledged $4 billion to fight 
COVID-19 through COVAX. Prior to today, the president has 
announced 80 million doses that we would contribute to 
countries around the world, and just this afternoon it was it 
was indicated that tomorrow the president will announce the 
United States intends to purchase another 500 million doses to 
help defeat COVID-19 around the world.
    Of the 25 million original doses, the first tranche of 
doses that the United States will distribute 5 million will be 
devoted to Africa. So this is an important moment for the 
United States to take a leadership role in that area, and so 
many others.
    My colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and 
Democrats, have been right to also recognize that China is 
using its mercantilist and debt trap strategies to gain more 
influence in countries around the world, including Africa, and 
if we keep up business as usual we will give China a free pass 
to use that leverage to export its model of authoritarianism to 
governments in developing countries.
    I think we are all pleased that just yesterday the United 
States Senate passed on a bipartisan basis legislation to 
significantly increase our competitiveness here at home but 
also to reassert U.S. leadership in many of these areas 
overseas.
    So, for example, a part of that bill that emerged from the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee included an increase of $100 
billion authorization for the U.S. International Development 
Finance Corporation, which we hope will be investing in Africa.
    Africa, of course, is not a monolith. All of you know that 
better than anybody. You are all going to countries that have 
their own unique histories and own complex issues and 
challenges.
    And so today gives us an opportunity both to address those 
individual issues as well as a take a look at the broader 
situation.
    So let me now turn it over to Senator Rounds for any 
opening statement he wishes to give, and then I will introduce 
our nominees and then turn it over to them for questioning.
    Senator Rounds?

                 STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROUNDS,
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I most 
certainly appreciate your opening comments, and I think that 
this is one of those committees where bipartisan agreement can 
be found and I think we begin today in a very good way.
    I am very pleased to see such a qualified panel of nominees 
before us today, with three previously confirmed by the 
committee to serve in ambassadorial posts as well as 
experienced State Department personnel with great records of 
service.
    I want to thank you and your families for your service to 
our country.
    Ambassador Andre, your deep background with Africa will 
serve you well if you are confirmed to be our next ambassador 
to Somalia. I look forward to hearing your views on Somalia, a 
country struggling to overcome 30 years of instability in order 
to achieve democratic development and viable national 
institutions.
    Somalia's successful revolution, socially, politically and 
economically, is vital for our interests in the region to 
include significant counterterrorism efforts against the 
violent extremist group al-Shabaab.
    If confirmed, it will be critical that you maintain a close 
relationship with Congress to help assure a prudent way 
forward.
    Ambassador Brewer, if confirmed, your experience as 
ambassador to Sierra Leone, a small nation where the U.S. 
relationship focuses on foreign assistance, particularly in the 
health sector, would make you well placed to serve as our 
ambassador to Lesotho, and I commend you for your desire to 
lead a U.S. embassy and a USAID team, a small mission to help 
mentor the next generation of the Foreign Service.
    Given the challenges in fully staffing posts in Africa, 
seasoned diplomats willing to serve in such a mentorship role 
are definitely needed. I look forward to hearing your thoughts 
on how USAID programs and trade relations with Lesotho can help 
that nation advance politically and economically.
    Ambassador Mushingi, if you are confirmed, I will be glad 
that we will be sending such an experienced diplomat with 
experience in five African countries to be our next ambassador 
to Angola and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
    Seems to me that Angola's reformist President Lourenco 
continues to provide an opportunity to deepen our relationship 
with that nation. I look forward to hearing how you, if 
confirmed, would support those reform efforts.
    Ms. Aubin, your experience in Algeria would well qualify 
you, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to that nation. I 
look forward to hearing from you about how you would lead our 
embassy in Algiers, in context of the problem sets facing the 
North African region, and Algeria's ongoing political 
challenges.
    Also Of particular interest to me are your views on how we 
can best meet the challenges of Morocco's unfortunate 
annexation with U.S. approval, I might add, of Western Sahara, 
an action which I find deeply troubling.
    Mr. Young, your experience in sub-Saharan Africa and as an 
economic and commercial officer at numerous posts will prepare 
you well, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to the 
Republic of Congo. I look forward to hearing from you about 
Congo and particularly how you would advance our relationship 
with that nation in the face of tremendous corruption and 
increased Chinese influence.
    Mr. Lamora, your Africa experience makes you well prepared 
for the difficult post for which you have been nominated.
    I am interested in your views on how the U.S. can work with 
the Cameroonian institutions as well as with other nations to 
address violent extremism, as well as the Anglophone crisis 
affecting the northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon.
    I would also like to hear from you on the tremendous 
challenges to democratic development posed by the Government's 
crackdown on political opposition and press, the president's 
reelection to a seventh term in 2018 election marred by 
violence and absence of a clear successor with concerns for 
further instability should he die or become incapacitated.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you 
for providing some background on each of these nominees.
    I am going to provide a little more background on each of 
them because I think it is important that people who are tuning 
in to the committee recognize the breadth and depth of 
experience that these diplomats have, and I think we can take 
great pride in the fact that the president has nominated this 
distinguished group of individuals.
    So Ambassador Andre, Jr., is currently the charge 
d'affaires ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan. 
He is a former ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
and to the Republic of Djibouti, which has a majority ethnic 
Somali population and a peacekeeping contingent in Somalia.
    Ambassador Andre's earlier assignments also include service 
as the political counselor in Nairobi, Kenya, at which time his 
section oversaw Somali affairs.
    He is the recipient of more than a dozen notable senior 
State Department awards, including the Director General Award 
for reporting. So thank you for joining us.
    Ambassador Brewer recently served as the United States 
Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. Prior to that role, 
Ambassador Brewer was the Deputy Director of Career Development 
and Assignments at the State Department's Bureau of Human 
Resources, and she also served as the deputy chief of mission 
and charge ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria.
    In Nigeria, she oversaw a $500 million annual PEPFAR 
program as part of a global campaign to fight HIV/AIDS. She 
earned the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award.
    Ambassador Mushingi is currently the U.S. ambassador to 
Senegal and the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Earlier in his 
career, Ambassador Mushingi served as the United States 
Ambassador to Burkina Faso and as the deputy chief of mission 
to the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
    In Washington, Ambassador Mushingi served as executive 
director at the Executive Office of the Secretary of State, and 
in 2017 he received the prestigious Palmer Award for the 
Advancement of Democracy.
    Ms. Aubin is currently the acting Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 
Throughout her three decades of service she has held the posts 
as executive director of the Joint Executive Office of the 
Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian 
Affairs, deputy chief of mission of the United States Embassy 
in Ottawa, Canada, executive director of the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, and deputy chief of mission at the United 
States Embassy in Algiers, Algeria.
    Ms. Aubin has received numerous State Department awards, 
including multiple performance awards for her work in the 
senior Foreign Service.
    Mr. Young is the economic counselor at the U.S. Embassy in 
Jerusalem, Israel. Previously, Mr. Young was the charge 
d'affaires and ad interim and deputy chief of mission at the 
United States Embassy in Vienna, Austria, and counsel and 
senior civilian representative at the U.S. consulate in Herat, 
Afghanistan, and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in 
Ljubljana, Slovenia.
    He has also served as the economic counselor at the United 
States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and U.S. Consul General in 
Durban, South Africa. His service has been honored with several 
State Department awards, and I welcome him as well.
    Mr. Lamora is currently the deputy chief of mission at the 
United States Embassy in Accra, Ghana, which is the fifth 
largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa. Previously, he was 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Africa 
and African Security Affairs.
    Mr. Lamora has nearly 30 years of Foreign Service 
experience, 12 of which has been spent focused on African 
policy security, economic development, and partnerships, and he 
has served in three African countries including Cameroon. He is 
the recipient of numerous State Department awards as well.
    So thank you all very much, again, for your prior service. 
We look forward to the discussion today.
    And with that, I call upon Ambassador Andre to deliver an 
opening statement.
    Ambassador Andre?

  STATEMENT HON. LARRY EDWARD ANDRE, JR., OF TEXAS, A CAREER 
    MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINSTER-
    COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND 
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FEDERAL 
                      REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA

    Mr. Andre. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished 
members of the committee, greetings from South Sudan. I am 
honored to come before you today as President Biden's nominee 
to be the next United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic 
of Somalia.
    I am grateful to the president and Secretary Blinken for 
their confidence in me. My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my 
children, Ruhiyyih and Isidore Andre, are watching online.
    I thank all my family, friends, and colleagues for their 
support.
    Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace 
Corps volunteer in Senegal. I then worked in Chad on post-war 
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990, 
intending to continue my focus on Africa. I am now serving my 
tenth tour on the continent.
    My three domestic assignments were also Africa related. I 
have served at our embassies in each of the countries that 
border Somalia.
    If confirmed, I will draw on these experiences to lead our 
U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team in advancing our partnership with 
Somalia's people and their federal and state governments for 
greater peace and prosperity.
    I commit to keep you and your staff informed of our 
progress.
    Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving in 
dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an 
ambassador toward all resident Americans and toward all U.S. 
Government employees in country.
    If confirmed, I will promote the safety of American 
citizens and of my embassy colleagues.
    Mr. Chairman, the United States needs a stable Somalia as 
do the Somali people, East Africa, and the international 
community. If confirmed, I will work with Somalia's federal and 
state governments, Somali civil society, regional organizations 
and like-minded international partners to promote stability 
through credible elections and governance reforms that advance 
peace and prosperity.
    Mr. Chairman, among other needed reforms, Somalia would 
benefit from a compromise leading to national consensus on the 
relationship between the federal government and state 
governments. The nature of Somali federalism has remained an 
open question for too long.
    Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are 
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch al-Shabaab. 
There is a smaller ISIS Somalia presence in the north. Both 
international terrorist networks threaten our interests in the 
region and aspire to attack Americans.
    If confirmed, I will continue the work of Ambassador 
Yamamoto, applying the full range of tools to help Somalis 
defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism.
    I will also coordinate with the African Union's 
peacekeeping operation in Somalia. I will be guided by our 
shared goal of more operationally capable and professional 
Somali security forces that respect human rights, protect 
civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for abuses.
    In recent years, Somali security forces have made progress 
in this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and 
the United Nations has contributed to that progress.
    Mr. Chairman, aside from political and security challenges, 
Somalis also confront a variety of natural calamities, economic 
dysfunction, and deficient educational and other public 
services. These difficulties contribute to poverty, hunger, and 
displacement.
    If confirmed, I would support the work of our development, 
humanitarian, and economic professionals in coordination with 
Somali authorities and international organizations to provide 
aid from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote 
inclusive economic growth.
    Ethnic Somali communities around the world are known for 
their resourcefulness, dynamism, and entrepreneurial spirit. 
Under the right conditions, Somalia will thrive due to the 
qualities of the Somali people.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I 
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager 
to respond to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre 
follows:]


           Prepared Statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr.

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the 
committee, greetings from Juba, South Sudan. I am honored to come 
before you today as President Biden's nominee to be the next United 
States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia. I am grateful to 
the President and Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me.
    My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my children, Ruhiyyih Andre and 
Isidore Andre, are watching online. I thank all my family, friends, and 
colleagues for their support.
    Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace Corps 
Volunteer in Senegal, and then in Chad working on post-war 
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990. I am now serving 
my tenth tour in Africa. With an additional three domestic Africa-
related assignments, my over 31-year diplomatic career has focused 
almost exclusively on the continent. I have served at our embassies in 
each of the countries that border Somalia. If confirmed, I will draw on 
these experiences to advance our partnership with Somalia's people and 
their federal and state-level governments toward greater peace and 
prosperity.
    The United States needs a stable Somalia, as do the Somali people, 
East Africa and the international community. If confirmed, I will work 
with the Somali federal government, Somalia's state governments, 
regional organizations, and like-minded international partners to 
promote stability through credible elections that advance peace and 
prosperity. Mr. Chairman, Somalia's political stability also requires 
compromise leading to national consensus on the relationship between 
the federal government and state governments. The nature of Somali 
federalism has remained an open question for too long.
    Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are 
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch, al-Shabaab. There 
is a smaller ISIS-Somalia presence in the north. Both international 
terrorist networks threaten our interests in the region and aspire to 
attack our country. If confirmed, I will continue the work of 
Ambassador Yamamoto to bring to bear the full range of tools to help 
Somalis defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism. I will 
also coordinate with AMISOM, the African Union's peacekeeping 
operation. I will be guided by our shared goal of more operationally 
capable and professional Somali security forces that respect human 
rights, protect civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for 
abuses. In recent years, the Somali National Army has made progress in 
this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and the United 
Nations have contributed to that progress.
    Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving at U.S. 
embassies in dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an 
Ambassador toward all resident Americans and to all U.S. Government 
employees and contractors. If confirmed, I will lead our team in 
Somalia to take all necessary measures to promote the security of 
American citizens and of U.S. Government colleagues while we work with 
the Somali people, their government, and our international partners to 
advance shared objectives.
    Aside from political and security challenges, Somalis also confront 
a variety of natural calamities, economic dysfunction, and deficient 
educational and other public services that contribute to poverty, 
hunger, and displacement. If confirmed, I would support the work of our 
development, humanitarian, and economic professionals, in coordination 
with Somali authorities and international organizations, to provide aid 
from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote inclusive 
economic growth.
    If confirmed, I will lead our U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team to 
advance peace and prosperity through diplomacy, defense, and 
development efforts in partnership with the Somali people and their 
federal and state governments. I commit to keep you and your staff 
informed.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I thank you 
for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager to respond to 
your questions.


    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    And next, we will hear from Ambassador Brewer.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA E. BREWER OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER MEMBER 
  OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, 
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF 
     THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO

    Ms. Brewer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds, 
members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you 
as you consider my nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom 
of Lesotho.
    I thank President Biden for this opportunity and for the 
trust that he and Secretary Blinken have shown in my ability to 
serve our country again as U.S. Ambassador.
    If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this 
committee as we advance U.S. objectives in Lesotho. I would 
like to thank my husband, Mark, and our 12-year-old daughter, 
Arina, for their love and support, along with my parents, 
William and Maria Pallick, who are watching from their home in 
Texas. Also, today is my father's 77th birthday. So I would 
like to say happy birthday, Dad.
    Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of 
State, I have substantial experience working on African 
affairs, most recently as the U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone.
    My experience has taught me the need to develop diverse 
teams that reflect the countries we serve and to foster high 
morale in challenging environments.
    If confirmed, I will draw on this experience to pursue U.S. 
goals and protect U.S. interests in Lesotho. Promoting 
democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and of what 
we wish to accomplish in Lesotho.
    Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to reduce political 
instability, strengthen its institutions, and professionalize 
its military. These goals align with our own.
    Our embassy has made great strides in promoting the rule of 
law, civilian control of the Lesotho's military, and government 
accountability.
    If confirmed, I will collaborate with this committee, the 
interagency, and the Government of Lesotho to strengthen 
Lesotho's institutions, reinforce its ability to meet the needs 
of its people, and build capacity to be a better partner to us.
    Last year taught every country that promoting the health of 
its people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system 
strengthening is at the center of our assistance.
    With one in four adults afflicted by HIV/AIDS, and many 
children orphaned by it, shoring up the Lesotho's capacity to 
fight HIV/AIDS will remain a critical component of U.S. 
engagement.
    The President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR, 
generously funded by Congress, has transformed the Lesotho. 
Lesotho is one of the first countries to reach epidemic 
control, surpassing U.N. AIDS targets and cutting new 
infections by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered 
Lesotho's capacity to confront COVID-19.
    Curbing the spread of these pandemics contributes to global 
health security, which benefits Americans here at home. To 
increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective 
partner, Lesotho needs economic development.
    AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, 
revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating more than 45,000 
private sector jobs. More progress is needed improving work 
conditions and preparing Lesotho for its post-AGOA future.
    I will support economic diversification, continued progress 
on AGOA eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the 
business climate, if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the 
lives of Basotho, but also improves conditions for U.S. 
companies seeking to do business with Lesotho.
    The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the 
countries whose governments do not fully comply with the 
minimum standards in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. 
The State Department has worked with the Government of Lesotho 
to urge it to devote resources to combating trafficking in 
persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this message 
and we are seeing real progress.
    If confirmed, I commit to pressing Lesotho for increased 
prevention and prosecution of these crimes and increased 
protection for victims. I will paramount the safety and 
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho and the entire U.S. 
Embassy team, including U.S. citizen employees, their families, 
and our Lesotho colleagues.
    If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the 
security of our mission and oversee its operation.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. 
If confirmed, I welcome the challenge and privilege of 
protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as the U.S. 
ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer follows:]


               Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee, 
It is an honor to appear before you as you consider my nomination as 
U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. I want to thank President 
Biden for this opportunity and for the trust that he and Secretary 
Blinken have in my ability to serve our country again as U.S. 
ambassador. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this 
committee as we advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in Lesotho. I am 
honored and fortunate to have my husband, Mark, and our twelve-year-old 
daughter, Arina, here with me today. I thank them for their constant 
love and support, along with my parents, William and Maria Pallick, who 
are watching from their home in Texas.
    Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of State, I 
have substantial experience working on African affairs, most recently 
as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone. My experience has taught me the 
need to develop diverse teams that reflect the country we serve and to 
foster high morale in challenging environments. If confirmed, I will 
draw upon this wealth of knowledge and management experience to pursue 
U.S. goals and to protect U.S. interests in Lesotho.
    Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and 
of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. As Secretary Blinken noted, 
``strong democracies are more stable, better partners to us, more 
committed to human rights, less prone to conflict, and more dependable 
markets for our goods and services.'' Along with its Southern African 
Development Community partners, Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to 
reduce political instability, strengthen its institutions, and 
professionalize its military. Our embassy has already made great 
strides in promoting the rule of law, civilian control of Lesotho's 
military, and government accountability. If confirmed, I will 
collaborate with this committee, the interagency, and the Government of 
Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to reinforce its ability 
to meet the needs of its people, and to build its capacity to be a 
better partner to us.
    The last year taught every country that promoting the health of its 
people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system strengthening is 
at the center of our assistance efforts. With one in four adults living 
with HIV/AIDS and many more children orphaned by it, shoring up 
Lesotho's capacity to confront HIV/AIDS will remain a critical 
component to U.S. engagement. PEPFAR, which Congress generously funds, 
has transformed Lesotho, which was one of the first countries to reach 
epidemic control, surpassing UNAIDS targets and cutting new infections 
by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered Lesotho's capacity 
to confront COVID-19. Curbing the spread of these pandemics in Lesotho 
contributes to global health security which benefits Americans at home. 
If confirmed, I will seek to sustain momentum in these areas.
    To increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective 
partner, Lesotho needs economic development. AGOA--the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act--revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating over 
45,000 private sector jobs in Lesotho, making it the second largest 
sub-Saharan supplier of textiles and apparel to the United States. 
Nevertheless, there is still important progress to be made, 
particularly improving work conditions and preparing Lesotho for its 
post-AGOA future once the Act expires in 2025. I will work diligently 
to support economic diversification, continued progress on AGOA 
eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the business climate, 
if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the lives of Basotho, but also 
improves conditions for U.S. companies seeking to do business with 
Lesotho.
    The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the countries 
whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards in the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act and which are not making significant 
efforts to comply. The Department has worked assiduously with the 
Government of Lesotho to urge it to devote resources to combatting 
trafficking in persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this 
message and making real progress. If confirmed, I will commit to 
pushing Lesotho for increased prevention and prosecution of these 
crimes and increased protection for victims.
    In addition to these policy aims, I hold paramount the safety and 
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho, and the entire U.S. Embassy team, 
including U.S. citizen employees, their families, and our Basotho 
colleagues. If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the 
security of our Mission and oversee its operations.
    In closing, I would like to thank you all again for the opportunity 
to appear before you today. If confirmed, I would welcome the challenge 
and privilege of protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as 
the U.S. Ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.


    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. I think 
the full committee would like to extend a happy birthday to 
your father.
    And now we will turn to Ambassador Mushingi. The floor is 
yours.

 STATEMENT OF HON. TULINABO S. MUSHINGI OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER 
MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO 
 BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED 
   STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, AND TO SERVE 
CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR 
   EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
  AMERICA TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

    Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the 
committee, it is a privilege, indeed, to appear before you 
today as President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. 
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola and to the Democratic 
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
    I thank the president and the secretary of state for their 
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished 
committee's consideration.
    I appear today with unfailing support of my wife of 40 
years, Rebecca, who has also served our country, working for 13 
years with the U.S. Peace Corps, and of our beloved daughter, 
Furaha.
    My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, from 
Ethiopia to Senegal, as well as through various assignments in 
Washington, D.C., have prepared me to deliver meaningful 
results for the American people in the role for which I have 
been nominated.
    If confirmed, I will work to foster stronger ties between 
the United States and Angola and Sao Tome and Principe.
    President Lourenco's economic and political reform agenda 
aligns with U.S. interests and presents us a unique opportunity 
to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with this fast-
emerging economy and rising African nation.
    As the Government of Angola fosters a better business 
climate, U.S. companies seek tremendous trade and investment 
opportunities, and recently, U.S. companies have achieved major 
successes in the energy and IT sectors.
    Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic 
development and conservation efforts. Since 1995, U.S.A. has 
been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola, investing 
more than $145 million dollars to clear land mines.
    The 2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened 
Animals Act helps to combat wildlife trafficking and to protect 
land and water resources.
    If confirmed, I will reinforce our commitment to help 
Angola eliminate the threat of land mines and protect its 
natural resources.
    Deep ties bind the United States and Angola. An estimated 
one-quarter of all African Americans have Angolan roots. In 
fact, the first enslaved Africans to arrive in what is now the 
United States in 1619 were from what is now Angola.
    If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this history 
while sharing the experience of the United States of America as 
we continue to seek to improve our nation.
    Turning to Sao Tome, Sao Tome and Principe has a small land 
footprint but a large and strategically important maritime 
domain in the Gulf of Guinea shipping lanes.
    Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters and 
share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key 
component to improve regional security. Sao Tome and Principe 
also has a long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers 
of power.
    I will focus on these priorities, if confirmed. As the 
world hopefully emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, we expect 
to see more Americans coming to Angola and Sao Tome and 
Principe. The safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always 
paramount.
    Finally, American diplomacy works best when our diplomats 
best exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an 
interagency embassy team that reflects the values of our 
country.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished 
members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before 
you today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi 
follows:]


            Prepared Statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the 
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as 
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Republic of Angola and to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and 
Principe. I thank the President and the Secretary of State for their 
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished 
committee's consideration.
    I appear today with the unfailing support of my wife Rebecca, who 
has also served our country working for 13 years with the U.S. Peace 
Corps, and our beloved daughter Furaha.
    My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, Ethiopia to 
Senegal, as well as through assignments in Washington, DC, has prepared 
me to deliver meaningful results for the American people in the role I 
have been nominated for. If confirmed, I will work hard to foster 
stronger ties between the United States and Angola and Sao Tome & 
Principe.
    Bilateral relations between the United States and Angola have 
markedly improved in recent years. President Lourenco's economic and 
political reform agenda aligns with U.S. interests and presents a 
unique opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with 
this fast-emerging economy and rising African nation.
    Angola plays an influential role in Africa and is looking to 
diversify its ties away from historic alliances. As such, it has 
attracted high-level U.S. visits and interaction since 2019, and if 
confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the U.S.-Angola 
partnership.
    Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and good 
governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and promoting 
accountability for human rights violations. Angola still faces many 
challenges as it addresses a stagnant economy, exacerbated by the 
impacts of the COVID pandemic. If confirmed, I will continue to press 
for political and economic reforms, support the fight against 
corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
    As the Government of Angola fosters a better business climate, U.S. 
companies see tremendous trade and investment opportunities. Recently, 
U.S. companies have achieved major successes in the energy and IT 
sectors. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency team to 
advocate for U.S. businesses while supporting Angolan efforts to comply 
with international standards and improve regulatory adherence.
    Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic 
development and environmental conservation. Since 1995, the United 
States has been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola, 
investing more than $145 million to clear landmines and other dangerous 
explosive hazards so the people of Angola can advance a wide range of 
social and economic development efforts safe from buried bombs. The 
2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened Animals (DELTA) Act 
helps to combat wildlife trafficking and coordinate with transboundary 
land and water resource governance authorities. If confirmed, I will 
reinforce our commitment to help Angola eliminate the threat of 
landmines and protect its natural resources.
    Deep ties bind the United States and Angola: an estimated one-
quarter of African-Americans have Angolan roots. The first enslaved 
Africans to arrive in what is now the United States in 1619 were from 
what is now Angola. If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this 
history, while sharing the experience of the United States as we 
continue to seek improve our nation. I will seek to expand our growing 
people-to-people ties and promote programs focusing on talented Angolan 
youth.
    Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large 
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea 
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters 
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key 
component to improve regional security. STP successfully completed a 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program in 2011, and 
further MCC engagement is a priority for the future. STP also has a 
long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers of power. I will 
focus on these priorities if confirmed.
    As the world hopefully emerges from the COVID pandemic, we expect 
to see a resurgence in the number of Americans coming to Angola. The 
safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always paramount.
    Finally, American diplomacy works best when American diplomats best 
exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an interagency 
Embassy team that reflects the values of the United States.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look 
forward to your questions.


    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    Next, we will turn to Ms. Aubin for her testimony.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH MOORE AUBIN OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER 
    MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
    COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND 
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PEOPLE'S 
                 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA

    Ms. Aubin. Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member 
Rounds, and members of this committee for the opportunity to 
appear before you today.
    As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel 
an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and 
Virginia Moore, who raised me to put country over self, and I 
owe them everything for preparing me to take on my chosen 
vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign Service officer, and to my 
husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible love and support.
    It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to 
serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic People's 
Republic of Algeria, and I appreciate deeply the confidence he 
and Secretary Blinken have shown.
    I served in Algeria from 2011 to 2014 as the Deputy Chief 
of Mission, so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the 
Amenas gas production facility, and I, along with every member 
of the embassy, did not stop working until American hostages 
were released and three deceased Americans brought back to 
their families.
    It was a formative experience. If confirmed, my highest 
priority will be to keep all Americans in Algeria safe.
    If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities: 
first, strengthening our security cooperation to fight 
terrorism and promote regional stability; second, expanding 
investment opportunities for U.S. companies to deliver economic 
benefits to the American people; third, advocating for 
necessary political and economic reforms to foster stability as 
Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
    Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an 
important relationship with Algeria, and I will work to 
increase the impact of U.S. activities there. I also believe in 
the enduring value of deepening people-to-people ties. Embassy 
Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs that 
strengthen our security, economic governance, educational, and 
cultural ties.
    Algeria's large youth population is curious about America 
and wants to learn English. That is an opportunity I hope to 
make the most of.
    If confirmed, I will return to a country that has changed 
in important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the 
Algerian Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms 
to strengthen Algeria's political system. Legislative elections 
will occur in three days. The Algerian public continues to 
demonstrate peacefully for core civil rights and liberties.
    I will continue to press for expanding observance of human 
rights, including freedoms of expression and association and 
space for civil society.
    Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s and 
it has maintained its stability through rigorous 
counterterrorism efforts, national reconciliation programs, and 
de-radicalization initiatives.
    Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a 
difficult neighborhood. It played a critical role in brokering 
reconciliation in Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord.
    Algeria provides security assistance to Tunisia and Niger. 
It actively participates in the African Union, the Arab League, 
the OIC, and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union Center for 
Study and Research on Terrorism.
    While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains 
one of the key regional producers of oil and gas, ranking ninth 
in the world in gas reserves and sixteenth in oil reserves, and 
has vast promise for renewables.
    If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to 
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this 
vital energy sector for our mutual benefit.
    The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which 
to continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with 
the U.S. signed in Algiers in 1795 to American troops 
liberating Algeria in World War II, to the United States being 
the first country to recognize Algerian independence on July 
3rd, 1962 to Algeria playing a role of creative and active 
mediation to help release the 52 American diplomat hostages 
from Iran, we have an enduring partnership that can face the 
opportunities and the challenges of the 21st century together.
    Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Rounds, and 
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you. 
If confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent 
America to the Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and 
talented mission there.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin 
follows:]

            Prepared Statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin

    Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and 
members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel an 
immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and Virginia Moore, 
who raised me to put country over self, and I owe them everything for 
preparing me to take on my chosen vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign 
Service Officer; and to my husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible 
love and support.
    It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve as 
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and I deeply appreciate the confidence 
he and Secretary Blinken have shown in me.
    I served in Algeria from 2011-2014 as the Deputy Chief of Mission, 
so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas gas 
production facility. I, along with every member of the Embassy, did not 
stop working until American hostages were released, and three deceased 
Americans brought back to their families. It was a formative 
experience. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to keep every 
American safe in Algeria.
    If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities. First, 
strengthening our security cooperation to fight terrorism and promote 
regional stability. Second, expanding investment opportunities for U.S. 
companies to deliver economic benefits to the American people. Third, 
advocating for necessary political and economic reforms to foster 
stability as Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
    Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an important 
relationship with Algeria, and I will work to increase the impact of 
U.S. activities there.
    I also believe in the enduring value of deepening people-to-people 
ties. Embassy Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs 
that strengthen our security, economic, governance, educational and 
cultural ties. Algeria's large youth population is curious about 
America and wants to learn English. That's an opportunity I hope to 
make the most of.
    If confirmed, I will return to a country that is changed in 
important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the Algerian 
Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms to strengthen 
Algeria's political system. Legislative elections will occur in three 
days. The Algerian public continues to demonstrate peacefully for core 
civil rights and liberties. I will continue to press for expanding 
observance of human rights, including freedoms of expression and 
association, and space for civil society.
    Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s. It has 
maintained its stability through rigorous counterterrorism efforts, 
national reconciliation programs, and de-radicalization initiatives. 
Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a difficult 
neighborhood: it played a critical role in brokering reconciliation in 
Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord; it provides security assistance to 
Tunisia and Niger; it actively participates in the African Union, the 
Arab League, and the OIC; and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union 
Center for Study and Research on Terrorism.
    While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains one of 
the key regional producers of oil and gas ranking ninth in the world in 
gas reserves and 16th in oil reserves, and has vast promise for 
renewables. If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to 
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this vital energy 
sector for our mutual benefit.
    The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which to 
continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with the U.S. 
signed in Algiers in September of 1795, to American troops liberating 
Algeria in World War II; from the United States being the first country 
to recognize Algerian independence on July 3, 1962, to Algeria playing 
a role of creative and active mediation to help release the 52 American 
diplomat hostages from Iran. We have an enduring partnership that can 
face the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century together.
    Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and 
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you. If 
confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent America to the 
Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and talented mission there.
    I look forward to your questions.


    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you very much for your 
testimony.
    Next, we are going to hear from Mr. Young.

 STATEMENT OF EUGENE S. YOUNG OF NEW YORK, A CAREER MEMBER OF 
   THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, 
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF 
     THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO

    Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of 
the committee, it really is an honor to appear before you today 
as the president's nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of 
the Congo.
    I am very grateful for the trust and confidence that 
President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. I want 
to acknowledge my remarkable wife, Zoe, and our two boys today. 
I know they are watching and I thank them for their enduring 
support and love.
    I believe my mother, Margaret, is also watching from home 
and I am so grateful to her and my late father, Sanford, for 
their encouragement, their care, and their rock-solid 
upbringing. I think my brother, Roland, is out there too, and I 
am grateful to him as well with his family. So thanks for this 
chance.
    Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in 
Brazzaville and the local staff at the embassy, the United 
States has built a strong relationship with the Republic of the 
Congo. We have been able to deepen the ties between our 
governments, engage in regular and serious dialogue, and work 
on issues of mutual concern.
    Our countries are working together to effectively fight 
COVID, to protect our shared environmental heritage, and to 
combat trafficking in persons. If confirmed, I will seek to 
maintain this improved U.S.-Congo partnership.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well 
know, the Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous 
position in Central Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies 
in a region beset with challenges.
    In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola 
outbreak from across the Congo River and accommodated refugees 
fleeing the Central African Republic.
    Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain Forest, an 
invaluable ecological treasure known as the second lung of the 
world, but one--I am sorry, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. It is okay. Take your time.
    Mr. Young. Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain 
Forest, an invaluable ecological treasure known as the second 
lung of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent 
exploitation.
    Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its 
economy but also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to 
the country's immediate future.
    Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to 
address these challenges and to ensure the safety and security 
of American citizens in Congo as well as for our American and 
Congolese staff at the embassy.
    Working with this committee, the various agencies of the 
U.S. Government active in Congo, other donor nations, and 
multilateral organizations, I will continue the good work our 
mission is supporting across key economic and social sectors in 
Congo.
    If confirmed, I will focus on encouraging democratic 
progress, supporting efforts to protect the Congo Basin, 
working with Congo to protect against this, our current 
pandemic and future pandemics, as well as encouraging the 
diversification of the Congolese economy.
    And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our 
embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more 
transparent and inviting business environment.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, 
thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee 
and other interested members of Congress to advance U.S. 
interests in Congo, and I am very happy to respond to any 
questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]


                 Prepared Statement of Eugene S. Young

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the 
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President's 
nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. I am grateful 
for the trust and confidence that President Biden and Secretary Blinken 
have placed in me.
    I would like to acknowledge my wife, Zoe, and our two sons today 
and thank them for their enduring support and love. I believe my mother 
Margaret is also watching from home and I am so grateful to her and my 
late father, Sanford, for their encouragement, care and rock solid 
upbringing.
    Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in 
Brazzaville and the local staff at the Embassy, the United States has 
built a strong relationship with the Republic of the Congo. We've been 
able to deepen the ties between our governments, engage in regular and 
serious dialogue, and work on issues of mutual concern. Our countries 
are working together to effectively fight COVID, to protect our shared 
environmental heritage, and to combat trafficking in persons. If 
confirmed, I will seek to maintain this improved U.S.-Congo 
partnership.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well know, the 
Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous position in Central 
Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies in a region beset with 
challenges. In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola 
outbreak from across the Congo river and accommodated refugees fleeing 
the Central African Republic. Congo is also home to the great Congo 
rainforest, an invaluable ecological treasure, known as the second lung 
of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent exploitation. 
Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its economy, but 
also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to the country's 
immediate future.
    Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to address these 
challenges and to ensure the safety and security of American citizens 
in Congo as well as for our American and Congolese staff at the 
Embassy. Working with this committee, the various agencies of the U.S. 
Government active in Congo, other donor nations and multilateral 
organizations, I will continue the good work our mission is supporting 
across key economic and social sectors in Congo. If confirmed, I will 
focus on encouraging democratic progress, supporting efforts to protect 
the Congo Basin, working with Congo to protect against this and future 
pandemics, as well as encouraging the diversification of the Congolese 
economy. And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our 
Embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more transparent 
and inviting business environment.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank 
you once again for the opportunity to appear before you today. If 
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and other 
interested members of Congress to advance U.S. interests in Congo and I 
am happy to respond to any questions you may have.


    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you for your testimony.
    And now we will turn to Mr. Lamora. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER JOHN LAMORA OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER 
    MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
    COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND 
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC 
                          OF CAMEROON

    Mr. Lamora. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds, 
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege and 
an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's 
nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of 
Cameroon.
    I thank the president and the secretary of state for their 
confidence in me, and I am equally grateful for this 
distinguished committee's consideration.
    While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my 
family from joining us in person, I nonetheless want to 
recognize my husband, Eric, my sister, Michelle, and my 
nephews, Jack and Patrick, who have all supported and 
encouraged me over many years and who are watching today from 
home.
    I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and 
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be 
here today.
    The United States was one of the first countries to 
establish diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since 
then, nearly 4,000 Peace Corps volunteers have served in 
Cameroon. It is a country with great cultural and geographic 
diversity, a capsule of the entire continent: active volcanoes, 
rain forest jungles teeming with wildlife, broad savannas, and 
a beautiful coastline.
    I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to experience 
much of this personally when I served in Cameroon previously. 
Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that 
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces 
significant challenges, as you well know.
    The United States is deeply concerned by the continued 
violence in Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as 
peaceful protests in late 2016 have tragically escalated into a 
protracted violent crisis with more than 3,000 persons killed 
and more than 1 million internally displaced.
    Children have been threatened and in some places killed for 
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have 
been attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous 
obstacles in carrying out their work.
    We condemn violence in all its forms regardless of who is 
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the 
civilian population, regardless of their location or 
affiliation.
    No one undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or our 
tolerance, whether members of the security forces or of armed 
separatists groups. We are acting vigorously to help resolve 
the crisis and, if confirmed, I commit that that will be my 
highest priority.
    This week, secretary of state established a policy imposing 
visa restrictions on those undermining efforts to peacefully 
resolve the situation.
    We continue to have discussions about Cameroon with the 
Cameroonian Government and to other Cameroonians, as well as 
with key international partners to foster greater, stronger, 
and more unified engagement. This will remain our highest 
priority in our Cameroon policy.
    Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are 
all too common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including 
health, security, and governance.
    The Cameroonian people have enormous potential. I have seen 
it firsthand. If I am confirmed, our embassy team and I will do 
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon 
make that potential a reality.
    The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to 
reaching that day. As a global health security agenda Phase 1 
country, Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen 
its ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious 
diseases with pandemic potential.
    Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR 
and the president's Malaria Initiative, such that it has 
reduced its HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic 
control within the next two years.
    On security, the United States continues to support 
Cameroon and its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint 
effort to defeat Boko Haram and its offshoot, ISIS West Africa.
    This is a key element of the fight against global 
terrorism. Our support, however, is neither limitless nor 
without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must abide by 
accepted human rights norms and those who violate those norms 
must be held appropriately accountable.
    In the same vein, there is still substantial work to be 
done to promote democracy, human rights, combat corruption, and 
ensure accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or 
the citizens' trust.
    We must continue to press on all these important issues 
while helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including 
civil society, to find a path to peace.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee, 
I thank you once again for this opportunity to appear before 
you, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and 
others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in Cameroon.
    I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Christopher John Lamora 
follows:]


                  Statement of Christopher John Lamora

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the 
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as 
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the 
Republic of Cameroon. I thank the President and the Secretary of State 
for their confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this 
distinguished committee's consideration.
    While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my family from 
joining us in person, I nonetheless want to recognize my husband Eric, 
my sister Michelle, and my nephews Jack and Patrick, who have all 
supported and encouraged me over many years and who are watching today 
from home. I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and 
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be here 
today.
    I'm grateful as well to my Africa Bureau family, whose 
collegiality, confidence, friendship, and mentoring have sustained me 
and fostered my personal and professional growth for nearly three 
decades -- from my first assignment at the U.S. Consulate in Douala, 
Cameroon from 1992-1993 to my past three years as Deputy Chief of 
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana.
    The United States was one of the first countries to establish 
diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since then, nearly 4,000 
Peace Corps Volunteers have served in Cameroon. It is a country with 
great cultural and geographic diversity, a capsule of the entire 
continent: active volcanoes, rainforest jungles teeming with wildlife, 
broad savannahs, and a beautiful coastline. I was fortunate to have had 
the opportunity to experience much of this personally when I served in 
Cameroon previously.
    Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that 
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces significant 
challenges, as you well know.
    The United States is deeply concerned by the continued violence in 
Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as peaceful protests in late 
2016 has tragically escalated into a protracted violent crisis with 
more than 3,000 persons killed and more than one million internally 
displaced. Children have been threatened, and in some cases killed, for 
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have been 
attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous obstacles in 
carrying out their work.
    We condemn violence in all its forms, regardless of who is 
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the civilian 
population regardless of their location or affiliation. No one 
undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or tolerance, whether 
members of the security forces or of armed separatist groups.
    We are acting vigorously to help resolve the crisis. This week, the 
Secretary of State established a policy imposing visa restrictions on 
those undermining efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis. We continue 
to have discussions about Cameroon with the Cameroonian Government and 
other Cameroonians, as well as with key international partners to 
foster greater, stronger, and more unified engagement. Working to 
resolve this crisis is, and will continue to be, the single highest 
priority in our Cameroon policy.
    Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are all too 
common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including health, security, 
and governance. The Cameroonian people have enormous potential; I've 
seen it first-hand. If I am confirmed, our Embassy team and I will do 
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon to make 
that potential a reality.
    The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to 
reaching that day. As a Global Health Security Agenda Phase I country, 
Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen its ability to 
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases with pandemic 
potential. Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR 
and the Presidential Malaria Initiative, such that it has reduced its 
HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic control within the 
next two years.
    On security, the United States continues to support Cameroon and 
its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint effort to defeat Boko 
Haram and its offshoot, ISIS-West Africa. This is a key element of the 
fight against global terrorism. Our support, however, is neither 
limitless nor without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must 
abide by accepted human rights norms, and those who violate these norms 
must be held appropriately accountable.
    In that same vein, there is still substantial work to be done to 
promote democracy, and human rights, combat corruption, and ensure 
accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or the citizens' 
trust. We must continue to press on all these important issues while 
helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including civil society 
find a path to peace.
    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you once again 
for this opportunity to appear before you. If confirmed, I look forward 
to working with you and others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in 
Cameroon. I would be happy to answer any questions.


    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Lamora, and thank you 
all very much for your testimony. And as somebody who grew up 
in a Foreign Service family, I understand and grateful you 
acknowledged that representing United States is a family affair 
and a team effort.
    With that, given my colleague's, Senator Rounds, time 
constraints, I think I will just turn it over to you, Mike, if 
you want to begin the questioning. I understood you said you 
had to leave shortly. So I do not know how much time you have 
got.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were cutting 
out a little bit there. But if you would allow me, I would make 
quick work of my time and ask a few questions if that is okay 
with you, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Absolutely. No, I want to make sure you 
have a chance to ask whatever you want. So why do you not lead 
off?
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
courtesy.
    Ambassador Andre, as you know, Somalia is wracked by a 
political crisis over the September 17th agreement to forego a 
``one person one vote'' election in favor of an indirect 
selection process similar to that of 2016 and 2017.
    However, I am particularly curious about how you see 
Somalia as a longer-term political situation. Looking past the 
current political crisis, what are the reasonable benchmarks 
the United States should expect with regard to Somalia's 
democratic development?
    Mr. Andre. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Looking 
forward to the immediate situation, as you said, we need to 
assist the Somalis to develop a permanent constitution.
    They are using a provisional one right now. The Somali 
political class recognizes that the indirect method that they 
have used in the past and that they are intending to use this 
time is a stop-gap measure until they are able to have the 
``one person one vote'' direct elections, which all seem to 
agree is their ending point.
    They do not control all of their territory at this point 
and they do not want to disadvantage Somalis who, having 
nothing to do with their own will, are trapped behind the lines 
and territory controlled by terrorist networks.
    So the constitution and getting to that direct election 
that you refer to.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
    Ms. Aubin, I am very concerned about the recent U.S. policy 
change to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
    I have been to the Sahrawi people's refugee camps twice. I 
was impressed by their strong desire for independence and 
frustration with the long delay of the time period for a 
referendum to determine whether Western Sahara should become a 
part of Morocco or be an independent nation.
    Please tell me how you think this change in U.S. policy has 
impacted U.S.-Algeria relations, and also under what 
conditions, if any, might Algeria increase military assistance 
to the Polisario to support it against Morocco?
    Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Rounds.
    Algeria has supported the political process led by the U.N. 
and by the U.N. Secretary General's personal envoy for Western 
Sahara.
    So I think Algeria welcomes the fact that we are resuming 
active diplomacy and supported of the U.N., and together with 
our international partners want to bring a halt to the violence 
and restart a credible U.N. process.
    We are working privately with all the parties involved and 
discussing the path forward. To your question about military 
assistance, I do not believe Algeria is providing military 
assistance. It is not something they highlight.
    But, most definitively, they have called for a de-
escalation of violence and for the political process to 
continue.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple questions that I will 
offer for the record. But I appreciate your courtesy in 
allowing me to move forward first and I thank you, and at this 
point I will have to step out of the meeting.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the nominees 
before us. I most certainly have appreciated your comments 
today.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you 
for your questions, and look forward to working with you. So I 
am going to also start with Ambassador Andre.
    And, you know, as was referenced earlier in this hearing, 
we have a continued al-Shabaab presence in Somalia. We also 
have the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Somalia, a 
decision made by the previous president.
    How has that decision to withdraw U.S. forces impacted the 
situation in Somalia, in your opinion?
    Mr. Andre. Well, Senator, in my capacity as ambassador in 
Djibouti, I was present in January when AFRICOM took on that 
instruction. It was a repositioning of U.S. forces from Somalia 
to elsewhere in the region, which has slowed the tempo of our 
efforts to assist the Somali people with their security but it 
has not stopped it.
    We continue to build the capacity of Somalia security 
forces, support AMISOM, African Union's peacekeeping force, and 
to keep the U.S. embassy open and operational.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, I appreciate that. In fact, I was 
just speaking the other day with the mayor of the city of 
Salisbury, Maryland, who happens to be a member of the Maryland 
National Guard and was recently deployed to Djibouti as well, 
and we talked a little bit about that sort of redeployment, as 
you said.
    I have also heard concerns from others in the region that 
there has been some vacuum created, although there is, 
obviously, an attempt to compensate for that.
    You referenced in your testimony Somali federalism. So how 
does the--and we are heading into elections here. Can you just 
talk a little bit about how the situation in Somalia compares 
with the regional situation in Somaliland and then Puntland? 
And I know that Somaliland and Puntland have different 
relationships than with the national sort of government, at 
least as seen by Puntland.
    So could you just describe that and what the challenges are 
and what role, if any, the United States should play in 
mediating this effort, especially in the context of elections?
    Mr. Andre. Yes, Senator.
    I want to emphasize, as I said in the testimony, the 
importance of establishing, through consensus and compromise, a 
consistent pattern, a framework, for the relations between the 
central government and the states.
    Twenty years ago, I spent some time in Puntland. I was 
there looking mostly at fisheries issues, and they have been 
able to govern themselves well.
    They see themselves very much as a part of Somalia. But 
they are also very interested in having significant control 
over their own governance.
    There are other federal states of Somalia that have 
different understandings and different relationships. 
Somaliland, as you know, does not consider itself part of 
Somalia.
    The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which 
includes Somaliland. So the picture here is a bit confused 
because there is not a consistent relationship between the 
center and the states.
    That is something for Somalis to work out. They have many 
international examples to choose from, to consider, as the 
Somali people build that compromised national consensus on what 
the nature of Somali federalism should be.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. 
Ambassador.
    Turning to Ambassador Brewer and Lesotho, you referenced in 
your testimony the AGOA agreement, which has helped the Lesotho 
economy. But at the same time, I think Lesotho would like to 
see greater diversification in its economy outside the textile 
sector.
    Are there things that the United States can do to be 
helpful to that effort by the Government of Lesotho?
    Ms. Brewer. Thank you, sir, for that question. Thank you, 
Senator.
    We do see that AGOA has been a massive help to that 
country. About 12 percent of the GDP in 2019 came from AGOA 
from the export of mainly textiles, as you note, sir.
    But there are many opportunities for U.S. companies, and 
one of the challenges of serving in Africa, particularly in 
smaller countries such as Sierra Leone and Lesotho, is how to 
attract those U.S. companies, how to encourage them that they 
will have their goods and services treated fairly and they will 
have a level playing field when they get there.
    So one of the issues that, if confirmed, I will be carrying 
forward with the host nation will be the need to have a 
welcoming climate, a business climate that encourages 
international companies, including those from the U.S., to 
come. That means anti-corruption. That means a rule of law. 
That means political stability.
    All of these are ingredients that lead to, you know, 
diversification. So, certainly, we see potential in the energy 
sector through Power Africa, through a whole of U.S. Government 
engagement.
    We understand that the Government of Lesotho would like to 
increase their agricultural output.
    I am originally from Indiana, a state with a proud 
agricultural tradition, and I think there is a lot that America 
can do, certainly, through the commercial sector to be able to 
help them with goods, services, and equipment.
    So I think there is great potential and I believe that the 
U.S. is there ready to help. We are the partner of choice, we 
have a great reputation, and I think we can assist them through 
a commercial context, not just through foreign assistance.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    And you mentioned also the success of our efforts on HIV/
AIDS in Lesotho and we look forward to keeping in touch with 
you on that, especially the extent to which Lesotho has been 
able to take ownership of that.
    I am told that there are no other committee members on 
right now. And if that is the case, I will continue asking 
questions of our nominees.
    Ambassador Mushingi, the United States has signed a number 
of cooperative agreements with Angola in recent years, 
including engagements with Prosper Africa, the Women's Global 
Development and Prosperity Initiative, Young African Leaders 
Initiative.
    Could you talk about the areas that you think create the 
most, you know, fruitful opportunities of engagement with 
Angola and also what you see is our biggest challenges? And I 
should say a lot of you covered a lot of our questions in your 
opening statements.
    That will cut down on the questions. But I do want to talk 
to you about some of the issues that do remain.
    Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator. Clearly, we see an 
opportunity here to engage now with Angola, especially since 
the new regime took over about three years ago.
    Where we have a big opening here is really on promoting 
economic recovery, promoting a two-way trade between our two 
countries, and opening these opportunities to U.S. companies in 
Angola, a country of more than 30 million people, and we see 
this desire of the Angolans to move away from their traditional 
historic alliances and that is where we come in as the U.S.
    The majority of the Angolans, as you described in your 
opening remarks about the youth born in Angola or in many of 
the other African countries, know what is going on outside of 
Angola, know what the U.S. can bring to the table.
    And each American company, what I call the U.S. model, has 
these three ingredients that so far have been missing in Angola 
and that really--Angolans want to take advantage of.
    One of them is the transparency, the second one is the 
transfer of technology, and the third one is creation of jobs. 
So those are the opportunities that I see for American 
companies in Angola.
    But moving forward as far as extending the cooperative 
agreement you were talking about, on the security cooperation 
we see also an opportunity here to get into the door because 
the history of Angola has been--their security cooperation with 
Russia has been there for a long time, and now the signing of 
our cooperative agreement a few years ago between the ministry 
of defense and our DOD we see an opening where the security 
forces are eager to be trained by us, are eager to be equipped 
by us, are eager to see the intelligence technologies and how 
they can use that for their own security in the region.
    Finally is, of course, the security of the region and to 
everyone that Angola can help us in the region, whether we are 
talking about southern Africa region but also Central Africa 
and what is in that, in the Central African Republic, in the 
DRC--Democratic Republic of the Congo--in Uganda and Rwanda as 
well.
    Over to you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think you 
have covered some of this. You mentioned Russia. But I think of 
all the countries that we are talking about at this hearing, 
China probably has established the greatest amount of influence 
and footprint in Angola.
    To what extent does China's economic and diplomatic and 
military influence in Angola impact our interests there?
    Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
    Yes, China and Russia have these traditional relations with 
Angola. It is no secret to anybody that, indeed, when we look 
at the major infrastructure projects many of them have been 
developed by China. But also, when we look at the debt issue, 
again, China is at the top of the list for that country.
    Now, where we come in is, again, as I said, for our U.S. 
companies, and we saw a few successes that I referred to 
earlier in my testimony, in the last few months three American 
companies that have been able to penetrate the market and win 
over the competition in various sectors.
    We have looked at telecommunication, IT, solar energy, but 
also energy, and both were U.S. companies, the latest three 
successes we have seen. And I think, for me, the way I see this 
is for us to talk about what we, the U.S.A, are bringing to the 
table and let the Angolans decide themselves.
    At the end of the day, I am confident that we can compete 
in this market and, indeed, not only compete, but we can win in 
this market. Over to you, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Just one question on Sao Tome and Principe, which is you 
mentioned their sort of government structure and process, which 
has been, I think, one that we have encouraged and supported.
    With respect to their economy, my understanding is they 
would also like to diversify their economy a little bit more. 
What role can the United States play with respect to that 
objective?
    Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator.
    One role that we can play is, really, to build on what we 
already have. As I said, it is a small land footprint but the 
long maritime borders and for us talking about maritime 
security, that is one thing where, really, we can play the 
biggest role.
    But I was really happy to see that when I looked at the 
American companies that are on the ground--Kosmos Energy, 
Caterpillar, Dell--so that gives me an idea of the openness 
that Sao Tome has to American businesses with American models 
and, if confirmed, that is what I will be pushing, and 
especially many of those companies or agencies that work in the 
security area when we are talking about maritime security in 
the Gulf of Guinea. Over.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    Ms. Aubin, the United States, as you know, has praised 
Algeria for its cooperation on counterterrorism issues and 
regional matters, and you referenced in your testimony its role 
as a mediator, notably, in Mali in 2015.
    At the same time, its close ties to and its arms deals with 
Russia, especially in the aftermath of the CAATSA legislation 
passed here in Congress, have been concerning.
    So what do you see as the main areas of agreement between 
the United States and Algeria and some of the areas of 
friction?
    Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Van Hollen.
    I see the U.S. and Algeria having a lot of areas of 
agreement: regional stability in the Maghreb, the desire to 
have a more inclusive economic environment, and, certainly, 
they are very interested in the Human Rights Report--
Trafficking in Persons Report and other reports that we do, and 
they are working to make gains in those areas.
    You are right about Russia and Algeria's military 
relationship. Algeria procured two-thirds of its arms from 
Russia between 2015 and 2019. So that is an issue, and the sale 
of C-130s were part of the United States' larger policy goal of 
deterring Algeria from engaging in sanctionable activity.
    And if confirmed, I will prioritize that in my 
conversations with Algerian officials.
    Senator Van Hollen. No, I appreciate that, because there 
were the arms sales, as you say, dating back to 2015 and 
before. But I think more concerning have been some of the arms 
sales since the CAATSA legislation passed.
    What impact, if any, have you seen has that had on the 
calculations of the Algerian Government in terms of purchases?
    Ms. Aubin. So thank you for allowing me to clarify that I 
think the C-130 sales helped deter that, and I think the United 
States needs to continue conversations with Algeria to explain 
what Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
really means and how that will impact our relationship, moving 
forward.
    And so that is something that I will prioritize in my 
conversations when I get there. Algeria has had a policy of 
sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs and that is 
how they have moved forward in their bilateral relationships.
    But I think this is a really important point and if 
confirmed, I will continue to raise that with Algerian 
colleagues.
    Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. No, I appreciate that, and 
Senator Rounds mentioned his opposition to the former 
administration's policy change with respect to recognition of 
Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
    You already answered that question. I do want to go on 
record in agreement with my colleague, Senator Rounds, on that 
matter.
    So let me turn now to Mr. Young, if I may, and a couple 
questions, because you covered a lot of it in your testimony 
with respect to the Republic of Congo.
    One of the concerns I am sure you have seen expressed here 
on the Hill, in the United States, and elsewhere, has been the 
regional impact of weak control over the security sector and 
abuses committed by Congolese peacekeepers and park rangers.
    Can you speak a little bit to that issue and, you know, 
what role you can play in expressing our concerns and what kind 
of changes that we can expect?
    Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think it is really important that we continue to direct 
dialogue with the Government on issues like these that my 
predecessor and our embassy is still having at this point, to 
have that regular dialogue, to have an open discussion.
    In terms of the peacekeepers that you mentioned, sir, my 
understanding, and this is one of the positive signs that we 
have seen, and that is that those peacekeepers that I think you 
are referring to were, in fact, held accountable for the crimes 
that they committed.
    So that was one plus that we have seen recently. But it is 
important that we--across this and across all of these issues 
around democratic progress that we have a dialogue with the 
Government, we have dialogue with civil society, with youth, 
with the security and maintain some of the training programs we 
have had with security forces and with law enforcement. I think 
those can help address the issues that you are referring to, 
sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, right. No, I am referring to the 
situation in Central African Republic, their troops there, and 
we do look forward to working with you to make sure that 
everyone is held accountable in what happened there.
    Let me turn to Mr. Lamora. And as you referenced in your 
testimony, Cameroon has seen significant violence in recent 
years owing to the Anglophone Conflict as well as the Boko 
Haram insurgency in the far north.
    I represent a very active and engaged and terrific 
Cameroonian-American constituency in the state of Maryland and 
I have been engaged with them in conversations about their 
concerns about what is happening.
    Can you talk a little more about what the United States can 
do to support a peaceful resolution of Cameroon's Anglophone 
Conflict?
    Mr. Lamora. Thank you, Senator.
    Yes. One of the things that we have been trying to do and 
will try to do with Cameroon is to bring the parties together 
to get them to talk. There has not been complete willingness on 
any side thus far to come to the table.
    As you are aware I know, sir, the Swiss have led a process 
of trying to do that and we have supported and aligned 
ourselves with that. I think an important thing that we have 
been doing increasingly in recent weeks is to engage the French 
at higher levels.
    France has a long-standing close relationship with the 
Government in Yaounde. Secretary Blinken recently raised his 
concerns, our concerns, about Cameroon with his French 
counterpart. I think greater French engagement certainly would 
help. We are hopeful that we can move that forward.
    As I mentioned in my testimony also, following on the 
resolution that the Senate passed, S.R. 684, that talked about 
the possibility of sanctions, Secretary Blinken announced these 
visa sanctions, visa restrictions, earlier this week on those 
who are impeding peace in the Anglophone regions, in 
particular.
    So I think there is a variety of things that we can do and 
that our international partners can do. But, ultimately, we can 
help move them all in the best direction we can.
    But it will have to be the Cameroonian Government, the 
parties to the violence, and the Cameroonian people who really 
commit themselves to finding a peaceful way forward.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Thank you all. I am getting word that another committee I 
serve on with the attorney general may be wrapping up and I 
hope to get over there and have a chance to ask him some 
questions.
    So let me thank all of you, again, for your previous 
service to our country. I look forward to supporting your 
nominations and, again, thank you for what you do and to your 
families.
    And with that, this hearing is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Robert Menendez

Gulf Influence in Somalia
    Question. Countries such as the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
Turkey are playing an increasing role in the Horn of Africa, 
particularly in Somalia, though much of their efforts remain bilateral 
and somewhat opaque. What seems certain, however, is that despite all 
four of these countries being allies and friends of the United States, 
their agendas and efforts often do not align with our own.

   What is your assessment of the influence of these actors in the 
        Horn of Africa?

    Answer. The Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Qatar, have 
significant influence in Somalia by virtue of their political, 
economic, and security engagement.
    Our NATO ally Turkey's relationship with Somalia is strong. Turkey 
has built schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in Somalia. It also 
provides extensive security assistance focused on the recruitment, 
training, and equipping of both police and Somali National Army forces.

    Question. Are their collective efforts contributing to or taking 
away from peace and stability in the region?

    Answer. The Gulf rift has had a destabilizing impact on Somalia, as 
Gulf states vied for influence with the Federal Government (FGS) in 
Mogadishu and Federal Member States (FMS). The dispute distracted the 
FGS and its FMS from implementing security sector, political, and 
economic reforms critical to stabilizing the country, including 
countering the influence of al-Shabaab and ISIS.
    Meanwhile, in recent months Turkey joined other countries when the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) issued a joint 
statement welcoming the May 20 Summit. It did not join statements of 
concern about President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's term extension or 
subsequent violence in Mogadishu, which were issued immediately prior.

    Question. If the latter, what is the United States doing to try and 
bring their efforts more in line with our own?

    Answer. The United States repeatedly has urged external actors, 
including the Gulf states, not to use Somalia as a proxy battleground 
for bilateral disputes. We hold regular consultations with these 
governments and demarche them to join us and likeminded partners in 
seeking political progress and stability in Somalia.

Vision for Somalia
    Question. Infighting between Somalia's Federal Member States and 
the central member states continues to threaten the stability of the 
country; the United States conducted airstrikes in Somalia against Al 
Shabab and Al Qaeda for over a decade while Al Shabab continues to 
carry out major attacks in cities and in the countryside; and Gulf 
actors compete for influence. Tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia threaten the stability of the entire Horn 
of Africa.

   What are the United States' goals in Somalia in the short, medium, 
        and long term?

   With the grave potential for instability in yet another country in 
        the Horn of Africa, what will be your priorities if confirmed?

   How do you plan to work with Special Envoy Feltman and other 
        Ambassadors in the region to develop a coherent and integrated 
        approach to U.S. policy in the Horn?

    Answer. The United States' near- and medium-term objectives in 
Somalia are to degrade terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S. 
persons and interests; strengthen Somalia's security forces so that 
they can assume greater responsibility from the African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM); advance political reconciliation and governance 
reforms necessary for lasting stability; and promote economic growth 
and opportunity that will reduce Somalia's dependence on U.S. and 
international assistance, while delivering humanitarian aid to people 
in need. It is our hope that, over time, these efforts will lead to a 
peaceful, stable, democratic Somalia that respects human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and that can provide security and services for its 
citizens.
    If confirmed, I will build on the work of Ambassador Yamamoto to 
bring to bear the full range of tools to help Somalis defend themselves 
and rid their country of terrorism. I will support Somalia's completion 
of a peaceful, inclusive, transparent, and timely electoral process and 
strengthened cooperation among Somalia's national and federal member 
state governments. And I will support the work of our development, 
humanitarian, and economic professionals to provide aid to Somalis in 
need and to promote inclusive economic growth.
    The stabilization of Somalia is an international challenge that 
requires close coordination with its neighbors and other international 
stakeholders. I am committed to working closely with our Special Envoy 
for the Horn of Africa Envoy Jeffrey Feltman and our ambassadors in 
East Africa and in other critical partner capitals to ensure a cohesive 
and coordinated approach.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
       to Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr. by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons 
Report, Somalia was identified as a special case due to ongoing 
conflict, insecurity, and protracted humanitarian crises. Given the 
complicated security situation and sustained insurgency by Al-Shabaab 
across the country, how will you work with the host government and U.S. 
Government interagency to help Somalia improve efforts of protection, 
prosecution, and prevention?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Government's 
interagency commitment to working with the Somali federal and member 
state governments to help build the capacity of Somali institutions to 
prevent trafficking, prosecute those engaged in the illicit activity, 
and protect victims.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious 
Freedom report, the Somalian Government is listed as continuing to 
discriminate against non-Islamic religions, including Christianity. In 
addition, Al-Shabaab has committed egregious crimes against those who 
practice religions other than Islam. What is your assessment of this 
particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of 
International Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-
country?

    Answer. Al-Shabaab's brutal treatment of those whose beliefs differ 
from their own is appalling. If confirmed, I would condemn Al-Shabaab's 
ruthless acts and urge that Somalia's laws allow all people to worship 
in a manner of their choosing. If confirmed, I would engage senior 
officials in the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as its Federal 
Member States, to advocate for religious freedom and express concern 
over actions by authorities against individuals and groups attempting 
to practice their faith freely. If confirmed, my team will continue to 
work closely with the Office of International Religious Freedom.

    Question. In the 2020 Human Rights Report, Somalia was identified 
as having committed or baring witness to severe human rights abuses 
specifically committed by Al-Shabaab.

   If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances 
        with the host government?

   How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society 
        organizations to improve the human rights situation on the 
        ground?

    Answer. Al-Shabaab is the leading perpetrator of human rights 
violations in Somalia. Working with the Somali Government, AMISOM, and 
like-minded partners to degrade al-Shabaab militarily and economically 
while bolstering Somali governance and institutions should reduce their 
operational space to commit abuses against Somali and foreign 
nationals.
    If confirmed, I would continue to engage with the highest levels of 
the Somali Government, sub-national authorities, and local communities, 
members of the diplomatic corps, the U.N., and NGOs to promote respect 
for human rights for all Somalis.

AMISOM
    Question. There is much discussion about AMISOM's mandate in 
Somalia and potential realignments. If your opinion, what adjustments 
to AMISOM's mandate are needed to improve its effectiveness?

    Answer. AMISOM remains critical to Somalia's stabilization, and its 
continued presence is necessary to provide time and space to build 
effective Somali security institutions. The United States supports a 
smart and deliberate conditions-based transition from AMISOM to Somali 
security forces. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with 
the African Union, AMISOM troop contributors, the U.N., EU, and other 
international stakeholders to support revisions to AMISOM's mandate to 
enable it to conduct more effective operations against al-Shabaab, 
while supporting the development of Somali security forces that can 
ultimately take over the country's security.

Somaliland
    Question. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward 
Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity 
over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a 
more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?

    Answer. The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which 
includes Somaliland. Given Somalia's federal system, I believe it is in 
the U.S. interest to maintain positive engagement with Somalia's 
national and regional government authorities, while also encouraging 
those authorities to strengthen cooperation with one another. In June 
2020, in my capacity as U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, I attended 
Djibouti-hosted talks between senior representatives of Somaliland and 
Somalia. This experience provided insights into the points of view of 
both sides and where their interests overlap. If confirmed, I am 
committed to continuing to engage with regional administrations like 
Somaliland to promote good governance, stability, and economic 
development, and to explore opportunities to strengthen cooperation.



                               __________


      'Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Cory A. Booker

Violence and Instability in Cameroon and Beyond
    Question. U.S. relations with Cameroon have been mostly positive, 
although?they have been adversely affected by concerns over human 
rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest 
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization. 
Cameroon plays a key role in regional stability and remains a regional 
partner in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.

   Last year, I joined with 19 of my Senate colleagues to sign a 
        resolution calling for a ceasefire in Cameroon, and remain 
        deeply concerned by the ongoing violence there. I am curious as 
        to what you think it will take to conclude and uphold a 
        ceasefire, guaranteed humanitarian access, and establish a 
        process of political dialogue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will make resolving the Anglophone crisis 
my top policy priority. Our position remains that all sides must end 
violence and engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The 
Government is focused on countering armed separatists in the field and 
maintains that its convening of a Grand National Dialogue in 2019 and 
decentralization efforts thus far, including regional elections in late 
2020 and the establishment of a special status for the two Anglophone 
regions, address the root causes of the crisis. I believe the 
Government must do more to resolve the crisis. Specifically, it must be 
willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The 
armed separatist groups, as well, must be willing to engage peacefully 
in such a dialogue and cease human rights abuses, as called for in the 
Senate resolution.
    If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to 
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and 
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on 
the ground and look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. In 2019, the United States took the relatively rare step 
of terminating Cameroon's AGOA eligibility due to persistent gross 
violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have 
impacted the Government's behavior in the ongoing conflict. If 
confirmed, what other measures do you plan to take to hold state and 
non-state actors in Cameroon accountable for human rights abuses?

    Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the 
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on 
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, 
undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone 
regions of Cameroon. This decision reflects the continuing U.S. 
commitment to advance dialogue and promote respect for human rights. 
This decision followed cuts in security assistance in recent years, 
and, as you noted, the determination that Cameroon was ineligible for 
AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S. 
Government's resolve to back up words with actions.
    If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to 
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and 
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on 
the ground, as well as the Cameroonian Government and people, to 
identify tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. In addition to the internal violence related to the 
Anglophone Crisis, Cameroon is also facing threats from Boko Haram and 
ISIS West Africa. How do we square our support for Cameroon's efforts 
against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa with our concerns about human 
rights abuses and political abuses inside Cameroon? In other words, how 
can the State Department ensure that President Biya does not use 
foreign counterterrorism assistance to fund its efforts against 
Anglophone separatists in the Southwest and Northwest part of the 
country?

    Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional 
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, 
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and 
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining 
stability in the region is even more important. Since early 2019, we 
have significantly reduced security assistance because the Government 
of Cameroon had not taken sufficient action to investigate credible 
accusations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces 
or hold the perpetrators accountable. The United States continues to 
review security assistance on a case-by-case basis so that assistance 
we provide aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect 
for human rights. We vet potential recipients of security assistance, 
consistent with the Leahy laws, and do not provide assistance to 
Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information 
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S.-
granted assistance is explicitly prohibited from being used in the 
Anglophone regions. We have made this prohibition clear at all levels 
of the Cameroonian Government and we carefully monitor the use of U.S. 
assistance to ensure this commitment is followed. Risk of misuse or 
potential diversion to the Anglophone regions are key criteria in our 
security assistance decision-making.
    Since our cuts, the Cameroonian Government has taken some limited 
steps towards holding security forces accountable, including the 
conviction of four soldiers for murder in August 2020 and the arrest of 
soldiers believed to be responsible for one case of extrajudicial 
killings and one case of alleged torture of a detainee. While we hope 
these steps indicate a willingness to address the problem, abuses by 
government forces continue.
    Between FY 2019 (the last year for which there is full obligation 
data) and FY 2020 funding, the State Department has obligated 
approximately $8.3 million in assistance to support the Cameroonian 
military. This funding supported professional military education; 
technical support for unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance platforms; small boat training; communications training; 
and air-to-ground integration training. If confirmed, I would work to 
ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is not misused by Cameroonian 
security forces, and would actively and fully address verified reports 
of such misuse.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. Ambassador Andre, The U.S. maintains a very modest 
embassy on the compound of the Mogadishu International Airport, and our 
diplomats are extremely limited in their ability to leave the airport 
complex.
    What is your perspective on this posture, and what do you believe 
is its impact on U.S. diplomatic relations with Somalia and our allies?

    Answer. If confirmed, the safety of U.S. citizens in Somalia and of 
U.S. Embassy personnel will be my highest priority. I will work with 
the Diplomatic Security Service to maximize the ability of our 
diplomats to advance our goals and interests through engagements 
throughout Somalia whenever possible through effective risk mitigation 
and management decisions. I am doing that now in my role as Charge 
d'affaires in South Sudan, which can be a dangerous place. I will 
consider both the security environment in Somalia and specific 
opportunities to advance the goals assigned to us through an 
interagency process. I will ensure we remain able to engage effectively 
with all levels of the Somali Government as well as with our 
international partners, many of whom are also located on the Mogadishu 
International Airport compound.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
           to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Ambassador Brewer, as you know, Lesotho has been plagued 
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime 
minister has served a full term for the past decade.

   In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are 
        some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the 
        development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?

    Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S. 
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a 
complicated history with several instances of political and armed 
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security 
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to 
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve 
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security 
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to 
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with 
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals. 
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control 
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I 
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the 
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further 
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to 
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement. 
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to 
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build 
its capacity to be a better partner to us.

    Question. Ambassador Brewer, support to the health sector, mainly 
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a 
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.

   What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S. 
        support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health 
        emergencies in Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?

    Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving 
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public 
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody 
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security 
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health 
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and 
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a 
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social 
stability.
    Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR 
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover, 
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These 
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free 
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
    U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but 
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms 
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting 
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and 
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to 
infectious disease threats.
    If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers' 
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the 
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing 
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also 
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons 
Report (TIP), Lesotho was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of 
significant efforts by the Government to increase prosecution, 
protection, and prevention. How will you work with the Lesotho 
Government to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?

    Answer. I understand Lesotho was placed on Tier 3 due to chronic 
poor progress towards addressing our recommendations and credible 
allegations of official complicity. The Government of Lesotho has taken 
many steps to combat trafficking in persons since the release of the 
2020 TIP Report. The Government convicted and sentenced the first 
trafficker in four years; closed key legislative gaps in anti-
trafficking laws; criminalized all forms of sex trafficking and 
outlined stringent penalties; increased its investigations into 
official complicity; and launched a five-year anti-trafficking national 
action plan. The Secretary will release the 2021 TIP Report with 
updated tier rankings and updated prioritized recommendations this 
summer. If confirmed, I will continue to press for progress on 
recommendations in the TIP Report.

    Question. Given Lesotho's enclosure by South Africa, a Tier 2 
country, are there connections to be made with South Africa and the 
U.S. Embassy there to improve trafficking regionally?

    Answer. Trafficking is indeed a regional problem that demands a 
regional response. If confirmed, I will not only lead our bilateral 
engagement urging the Government of Lesotho to pursue and punish 
traffickers and better protect victims, but will also work with the 
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 
and the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria to encourage regional solutions and 
inter-governmental cooperation to combat cross-border trafficking.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious 
Freedom report, Lesotho was identified as partially tolerant of 
religious freedom. What is your assessment of this particular issue and 
if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of International 
Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-country and expand on 
the work the U.S. Embassy is currently undertaking to prevent further 
discrimination of religious minorities?

    Answer. As noted in the 2020 International Religious Freedom 
report, the constitution of Lesotho prohibits religious discrimination 
and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion, 
including the freedom to change religion or belief and to manifest and 
propagate one's religion. Religious leaders of all faiths have told the 
U.S. Embassy that there is broad religious tolerance among the people 
of Lesotho.
    Some business and government leaders occasionally express distrust 
of entrepreneurs of South Asian origin, many of whom are Muslim. 
Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy is unaware of any act of discrimination 
targeting Lesotho's Muslims, whether those who have recently immigrated 
to Lesotho or the longstanding Muslim communities in the north of the 
country.
    If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Embassy's regular contact 
with religious, government, business, and civil society leaders to 
discuss religious freedom and tolerance and the need to be proactive in 
preventing discrimination against adherents of the country's growing 
minority religions, particularly Islam.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, 
Lesotho was identified as having committed human rights abuses, 
including using the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown as a 
fac*ade to stifle freedom of assembly and movement.
    If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances 
with the host government?

    Answer. Many observers argued that Lesotho's previous 
administration used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to stifle 
freedoms of peaceful assembly and movement. That was a clear human 
rights concern, as are ongoing problems such as trafficking in persons, 
police brutality, and child labor. The United States is also concerned 
about prolonged pretrial detentions and prison conditions. Some other 
concerns detailed in the 2020 Human Rights Report include reports of 
unlawful or arbitrary killings by security forces, arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and mistreatment while in custody. There are also issues 
with official corruption, a lack of judicial independence, violence 
against women, and continued criminalization of consensual same-sex 
sexual conduct between adults.
    The mission pushes for greater accountability in cases of police 
abuse and encourages the Lesotho Mounted Police Service to strengthen 
its police complaints board, with some success. The mission also works 
to promote better understanding of community-based policing via 
training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy in 
Botswana. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts as I engage the 
Government of Lesotho to address concerns detailed in the 2020 Human 
Rights Report.

    Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil 
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the 
ground?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy maintains excellent relationships with all 
of Lesotho's major civil society organizations, who rely on us to act 
as a voice of conscience both in the public sphere and in our private 
consultations with the Government. If confirmed, I will continue to 
work closely with Lesotho's community of civil society organizations. I 
will also encourage them to focus their attentions on the most pressing 
human rights concerns and will look for synergistic opportunities to 
cooperate with these groups to advocate for reform, accountability, and 
protection of human rights.

    Question. In your opinion, is Lesotho a potential target for 
improved U.S. trade and investment? What tools should the U.S. apply in 
Lesotho to encourage export diversification and investment by American 
firms?

    Answer. Yes. Several economic sectors in Lesotho have growth 
potential, including water (hydropower and pipeline infrastructure), 
diamonds, tourism, agriculture, and power generation. The Government 
has also noted that it seeks to improve transportation and its 
information technology infrastructure. In 2019, the United States 
exported about $1 million in goods to Lesotho, mostly machinery, 
medical instruments, and aircraft. In the same year, the United States 
imported around $325 million in goods, mostly apparel, precious stones, 
and some machinery.
    Lesotho is a long-time beneficiary of trade benefits under the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has helped create over 
45,000 jobs in the textile industry. According to 2019 numbers, AGOA 
exports accounted for approximately 12% of Lesotho's GDP ($325 million 
out of $2.7 billion). One of the AGOA eligibility requirements is that 
a country must have established, or make progress towards establishing, 
a market-based economy. This creates a more-level playing field for 
U.S. companies and serves as a useful counterweight to actors seeking 
to influence Lesotho to adopt policies that would be counter to U.S. 
interests. By creating a more-level playing field for U.S. companies 
overseas, we contribute to economic prosperity at home, too. Several 
U.S. brands already manufacture products in Lesotho. If confirmed, I 
will utilize initiatives such as Prosper Africa to actively seek 
opportunities to increase reciprocal trade and investment.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
             to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. Ambassador Brewer, As you know, Lesotho has been plagued 
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime 
minister has served a full term for the past decade.

   In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are 
        some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the 
        development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?

    Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S. 
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a 
complicated history with several instances of political and armed 
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security 
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to 
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve 
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security 
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to 
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with 
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals. 
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control 
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I 
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the 
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further 
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to 
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement. 
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to 
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build 
its capacity to be a better partner to us.

    Question. Ambassador Brewer, Support to the health sector, mainly 
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a 
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.
    What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S. 
support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health emergencies in 
Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?

    Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving 
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public 
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody 
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security 
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health 
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and 
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a 
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social 
stability.
    Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR 
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover, 
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These 
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free 
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
    U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but 
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms 
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting 
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and 
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to 
infectious disease threats.
    If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers' 
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the 
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing 
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also 
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. What role can the United States play in efforts of the 
Lourenco administration to root out corruption and repatriate stolen 
assets?

    Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its 
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen 
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also 
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and 
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the 
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The 
Government should also ensure that private sector financial 
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the 
appropriate authorities for action.
    U.S. engagement includes technical assistance for Angola's 
Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance. If confirmed, I 
would seek to expand cooperation on potential corruption 
investigations, capacity building in the justice system in constructing 
corruption cases, and capacity building in the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting mechanisms.

    Question. In advance of elections in 2022, what can the U.S. 
Embassy do to ensure free political expression and the conduct of fair 
elections?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has encouraged the Government of Angola 
to follow through on its commitment to hold local government elections, 
which would be a positive step in the democratization process of 
Angola, giving people direct representation at the local level of 
government. If confirmed, I will continue to communicate this message.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that Embassy Luanda 
exercises proper management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao 
Tome and Principe?

    Answer. If confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the 
U.S. partnership with both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. I have 
experience being accredited as ambassador to two countries 
concurrently, and will draw on that experience to ensure proper 
management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao Tome and Principe.

    Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in 
your career to date to support democracy and human rights? What has 
been the impact of your actions?

    Answer. Promoting democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights has been a central theme throughout my 30-year career at the 
Department of State. From my early postings to the current one, I have 
endeavored to share with host country counterparts the U.S. position on 
human rights and democracy. My strategy has always been to honestly 
explain our position showing the benefits of respecting human rights 
and promoting democratic principles, a winning proposition for the host 
country as well.
    I have supported the conduct of peaceful elections, passing laws on 
inclusive participation in elections, and raising disability awareness. 
I have advocated against restrictive LGBTQI+ laws, empowered women's 
participation in elections, given a voice to civil society, and 
emphasized the importance of a free press.
    As Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, our promotion of free and fair 
elections with credible and appropriately transparent processes led to 
the first ever peaceful transition of power between two civilian 
presidents in the history of the country.
    During my tenure as Ambassador in Burkina Faso, I advised against a 
proposed constitutional amendment to presidential term limits, designed 
to extend the time in office of an already long-term sitting president. 
Additionally, I pushed the Government of Transition of Burkina Faso for 
timely elections during a sensitive time when some voices were 
considering a delay. Finally, following the free and fair presidential 
election, Burkina Faso and its people witnessed the first ever peaceful 
transition of power from one civilian government to another. 
Previously, in Mozambique I participated as an international observer 
in the country's first-ever democratic elections and worked closely 
with the rest of the Embassy team to empower the Mozambican people as 
they freely elected their leaders.
    As the Deputy Chief of Mission in Ethiopia from 2009-2011, I 
encouraged the Ethiopian Government to allow civil society and 
opposition political parties to operate freely. Our Embassy efforts 
helped provide a path for opposition parties in Ethiopia to publicize 
their platforms, thus allowing a broader range of Ethiopian citizens to 
have a voice in their government, resulting in an increase in voter 
registration and participation.
    Based on my dedication to promote and support respect for human 
rights and democracy during my career, I am honored to have been 
selected for the AFSA's Mark Palmer Award for the Advancement of 
Democracy in 2017. This award is given to members of the Foreign 
Service, by their peers, for the promotion of U.S. policies focused on 
advancing democracy, freedom and governance through bold, exemplary, 
imaginative and effective efforts during one or more assignments.

    Question. What issues are the most pressing challenges to democracy 
or democratic development in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe? These 
challenges might include obstacles to participatory and accountable 
governance and institutions, rule of law, authentic political 
competition, civil society, human rights and press freedom. Please be 
as specific as possible.

    Answer. Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and 
good governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and 
promoting accountability for human rights violations and abuses. 
However, the legacy of corruption, lack of capacity and weak 
institutions are the biggest challenges, along with the need for 
increased professionalism in law enforcement. Civil society, press 
freedoms and political competition exist in Angola, but would benefit 
from further strengthening.
    Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large 
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea 
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters 
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key 
component to improve regional security. If confirmed, I will continue 
to encourage Sao Tome's support for democracy, human rights, and rule 
of law and to support its development efforts.

    Question. What steps will you take--if confirmed--to support 
democracy in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What do you hope to 
accomplish through these actions? What are the potential impediments to 
addressing the specific obstacles you have identified?

    Answer. The Government of Angola has made significant improvements 
on human rights-related issues over the last few years, and if 
confirmed, I will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials 
to support progress in this area. I will work to ensure the United 
States and Angola hold a human rights dialogue in 2021, which will give 
the United States an opportunity to assess progress and press on 
remaining human rights and democracy issues. Finally, the United States 
has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow through on its 
commitment to hold local government elections in 2022, which would be a 
positive step in the democratization process of Angola, giving people 
direct representation at the local level of government and if 
confirmed, I will continue to encourage the Government to prioritize 
forward progress in this area.
    Sao Tome and Principe has a long record of good governance and 
support for democracy and human rights, and if confirmed, I will work 
with its government to encourage and support these priorities.

    Question. How will you utilize U.S. Government assistance resources 
at your disposal, including the Democracy Commission Small Grants 
program and other sources of State Department and USAID funding, to 
support democracy and governance, and what will you prioritize in 
processes to administer such assistance?

    Answer. U.S. Government assistance to Angola currently advances 
democracy and governance through several avenues, including by 
providing assistance to advance electoral reforms, enhance fiscal 
transparency and accountability, and promote increased participation by 
women in the political process. Additionally, the United States 
supports the introduction and expansion of good governance within 
financial administration and service delivery systems, which bolsters 
transparency, citizen participation, and accountability within planning 
and financial management processes. If confirmed, I will continue to 
engage within the Department and with interagency partners to support 
the establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded 
programs that advance U.S. interests in Angola and Sao Tome and 
Principe. I also will emphasize the importance of making continual 
progress on democracy and governance as an element of both countries' 
AGOA eligibility.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with civil society 
members, human rights and other non-governmental organizations in the 
U.S. and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil 
society in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What steps will you 
take to pro-actively address efforts to restrict or penalize NGOs and 
civil society via legal or regulatory measures?

    Answer. Human rights NGOs--local, regional, and international--are 
active in both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. Civil society 
organizations, regardless of where they are registered or where they 
operate, can be critical allies in advancing democratic governance, 
expanding respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
assisting the United States to strengthen its bilateral and 
multilateral relationships. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging 
broadly to help advance these objectives. I will leverage our strong 
relationships in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to communicate 
privately or publicly (as the situation dictates) to proactively 
address efforts to restrict or penalize civil society through legal or 
regulatory measures.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with democratically 
oriented political opposition figures and parties? What steps will you 
take to encourage genuine political competition? Will you advocate for 
access and inclusivity for women, minorities and youth within political 
parties?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to meet with democratically 
oriented political opposition figures and parties, and I will advocate 
openly in support of access and inclusivity for all individuals in 
Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe, including women, minorities, and 
youth. If confirmed, I will work with the host governments, civil 
society, and like-minded missions to encourage genuine political 
competition. I will emphasize the importance of promoting diverse 
viewpoints and supporting an open arena for peaceful, good faith 
discussions of political differences.

    Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with 
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on freedom of the press and address 
any government efforts designed to control or undermine press freedom 
through legal, regulatory or other measures? Will you commit to meeting 
regularly with independent, local press in both Angola and Sao Tome and 
Principe?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with media practitioners, like-
minded missions, civil society, government, and international partners 
to underscore the importance of an independent, professional, and open 
media to a free and democratic society. I will seek resources to 
continue support to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe's media, including 
professional exchanges, targeted training programs, and seminars to 
educate journalists and media stakeholders about their rights. Angolan 
and Sao Tomean journalists have participated in U.S. Government-
sponsored professional exchange programs on investigative reporting, 
safeguarding freedom of expression, and the media's role in 
strengthening democratic institutions.

    Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with civil 
society and government counterparts on countering disinformation and 
propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-state actors in the 
country?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with civil society and 
government actors on countering disinformation and malign propaganda by 
foreign state and non-state actors. I also will commit to working with 
like-minded partners in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to counter 
disinformation and malign propaganda campaigns.

    Question. Will you and your embassy teams actively engage with 
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on the right of labor groups to 
organize, including for independent trade unions?

    Answer. The United States has a long and proud tradition of 
supporting the rights of workers, including to form labor 
organizations, internationally. If confirmed, I will commit to engage 
with unions, relevant government offices, and the private sector to 
support labor rights.

    Question. Will you commit to using your position, if confirmed, to 
defend the human rights and dignity of all people in Angola and Sao 
Tome and Principe, no matter their sexual orientation or gender 
identity?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will strive to defend the human rights 
and dignity of all individuals in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, no 
matter their sexual orientation or gender identity.

    Question. What challenges do the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face in Angola and in Sao Tome and 
Principe?

    Answer. President Lourenco has expanded legal protections for 
LGTBQI+ persons since he was elected, including decriminalization of 
homosexuality. However, LGBTQI+ persons in Angola tell us culturally 
they face resistance in being accepted, even at the family level. While 
not criminalized, homosexuality is stigmatized in Sao Tome and 
Principe. Members of the LGBTQI+ community can face ostracism and 
violence.

    Question. What specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ 
people in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to defend the human rights and 
dignity of all individuals in Angola, no matter their sexual 
orientation or gender identity. I will seek ways to expand Embassy 
support for the efforts of LGBTQI+ NGOs in Angola, including through 
advocacy, leadership development opportunities, and programmatic 
support. Similarly, I will reach out to the LGBTQI+ community in Sao 
Tome and Principe to respond to its concerns.

    Question. Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensuring that you fully 
brief Members of Congress and/or their staff each time you are in 
Washington for visits or consultations during your tenure as Ambassador 
to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit, in coordination with the State 
Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to appropriately respond to 
requests for briefings and information by this committee.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator James E. Risch

Strengthening Angola and the Region
    Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under 
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable 
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under 
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda 
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to 
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.

   Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in 
        the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at 
        political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What 
        can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to 
        diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue 
        combatting corruption?

    Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high 
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions, 
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement. 
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in 
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I 
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the 
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts. 
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing 
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption 
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in 
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify 
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I 
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.

    Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently 
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda. 
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do 
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in 
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?

    Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has 
systematically raised its level of active participation in 
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the 
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates 
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a 
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's 
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging 
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
    Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the 
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. 
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive 
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan 
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and 
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.

    Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and 
economic reforms that have pleased international financial 
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in 
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's 
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?

    Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine 
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans 
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within 
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of 
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target 
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will 
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the 
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs 
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Cory A. Booker

Strengthening Angola and the Region
    Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under 
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable 
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under 
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda 
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to 
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.

   Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in 
        the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at 
        political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What 
        can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to 
        diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue 
        combatting corruption?

    Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high 
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions, 
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement. 
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in 
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I 
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the 
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts. 
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing 
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption 
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in 
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify 
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I 
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.

    Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently 
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda. 
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do 
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in 
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?

    Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has 
systematically raised its level of active participation in 
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the 
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates 
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a 
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's 
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging 
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
    Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the 
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. 
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive 
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan 
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and 
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.

    Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and 
economic reforms that have pleased international financial 
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in 
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's 
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?

    Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine 
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans 
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within 
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of 
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target 
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will 
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the 
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs 
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. Ambassador Mushingi, the election of a new president in 
Angola in 2017 provided a clear opportunity for the U.S. to support 
political and economic reforms, including in the areas of anti-
corruption and human rights. While the Angolan administration continues 
to make progress, there continues to be limited U.S.-support for Angola 
in the democracy and governance space.

   What opportunities do you see for U.S. engagement and assistance in 
        this space?

    Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its 
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen 
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also 
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and 
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the 
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The 
Government should also ensure that private sector financial 
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the 
appropriate authorities for action.
    U.S. engagement in this space will include technical assistance for 
Angola's Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance. 
Additional opportunities exist for the USG to cooperate further on 
potential corruption investigations and possible sanctions, capacity 
building in the justice system in constructing corruption cases/
prosecutions in international courts, and capacity building in the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting 
mechanisms.
    The Government of Angola has made significant improvements on human 
rights-related issues over the last few years, and if confirmed, I and 
the Embassy will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials 
to support progress in this area. In 2020, the United States and Angola 
held their third ministerial level dialogue on human rights, discussing 
the need for respect for freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of 
expression as well as the continued need for training of law 
enforcement, which the U.S. will continue to support, consistent with 
Leahy law and Department policy. I understand the United States and 
Angola are planning the 2021 human rights dialogue, which will give the 
U.S. an opportunity to assess progress and press on any remaining 
issues. Finally, Post has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow 
through on its commitment to hold local government elections, which 
would be a positive step in the democratization process of Angola, 
giving people direct representation at the local level of government.

    Question. Ambassador Mushingi, China's presence looms large in 
Angola. Angola is one of China's largest borrowers in Africa, with more 
than $20 billion in outstanding debt to some Chinese entities.

   How can the United States help Angola to begin chipping away at 
        that debt and the restraint put on Angola's economy and 
        political system by China?

    Answer. As a key condition of its IMF program, Angola cannot hold 
new oil collateralized debt. The United States supports the Debt 
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) agreed to by the G-20 which has 
suspended official bilateral debt payments for 40 countries including 
Angola since May 2020. Rolling back dependency on oil will require 
significant investment in other economic sectors to stimulate growth. 
The Embassy has leveraged U.S. interagency technical assistance and 
high-level messaging to support Angola's anti-corruption campaign and 
economic reforms, especially ongoing efforts to improve transparency 
and compliance in the financial sector. An improved environment will 
make U.S. firms more competitive in Angola. I understand that the 
Embassy has successfully advocated for U.S. investors to break into 
sectors long dominated by Chinese companies, such as 
telecommunications. President Lourenco lobbied U.S. private sector 
representatives in a December 2020 virtual roundtable to invest in 
Angola, demonstrating the high-level desire to attract U.S. investment 
in various sectors. If confirmed, I will lead the Embassy to continue 
reporting on opportunities for American companies and advocate for them 
to compete for tenders and other investment opportunities as the 
Angolan economy diversifies. Programs such as the DFC and Prosper 
Africa will also help target alternatives to Chinese investment and 
commercial interests.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons 
Report, Algeria was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of significant 
efforts to combat human trafficking in the reporting period. The 
Government made little to no attempts to improve resources for victims, 
including punishing victims for crimes their traffickers forced them to 
commit. What steps would you take as Ambassador, if confirmed, to 
engage with the host government and civil society organizations on 
bolstering efforts to improve prosecution and protection efforts?

    Answer. If confirmed, improving Algeria's efforts to combat human 
trafficking will be one of my highest priorities. The Embassy is 
already working with the Algerian Government to improve its efforts to 
investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and proactively 
identify and assist trafficking victims, including by offering 
technical support. If confirmed, I will urge Algerian officials to pass 
a standalone Trafficking in Persons (TIP) law this year to bring their 
legal framework in line with international commitments and to formalize 
their victim referral mechanism. We will continue to support Algerian 
efforts to raise awareness of TIP in the law enforcement community, 
including through trainings for prosecutors and judges.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious 
Freedom Report and the 2021 U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom Annual Report, the U.S. identified Algeria as having poor 
religious freedom conditions, with the Government continuing its 
repression of Christian and minority Muslim communities. What is your 
assessment of this particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work 
with the Office of International Religious Freedom to bolster religious 
freedom in-country?

    Answer. Government-led persecution of marginalized minorities, 
including Christian and minority Muslim and non-Muslim religious 
groups, continues to be a significant issue in Algeria. Our Embassy is 
in regular contact with a wide variety of religious leaders in Algeria 
and maintains an active dialogue with the Algerian Government on 
religious freedom issues. The United States Government has publicly and 
privately stressed the importance of religious tolerance and the equal 
and transparent application of the laws governing religious 
organizations. If confirmed, I will raise issues of religious 
persecution identified by the Office of International Religious Freedom 
with the Algerian Government and encourage embassy reporting on 
specific cases.

    Question. Algeria was subsequently designated as a Special Watch 
List country by USCIRF for its actions to systematically repress 
religious minorities. If confirmed, will you suggest Algeria for the 
State Department's Special Watch List for engaging and tolerating 
severe violations of religious freedom?

    Answer. USCIRF's Special Watch List (SWL) functions as a warning to 
avoid possible Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation by the 
Department of State. For countries designated as CPCs, the 
International Religious Freedom Act provides the Secretary of State 
with a range of policy options to address serious violations of 
religious freedom. The SWL applies to countries that we deem to have 
engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom, but 
that do not meet all of the CPC criteria. If confirmed, I will 
prioritize the promotion of religious tolerance and impress upon the 
Algerian Government the seriousness of the potentiality of a SWL or CPC 
designation, and actions that could be taken now to preclude these 
designations.

    Question. If confirmed, will you encourage embassy officials to 
attend public country proceedings on church closures to emphasize USG 
concern regarding this issue?

    Answer. The Algerian Government continues to use COVID-19 
restrictions and the status of churches as un-registered associations 
to justify closures. If confirmed, I will encourage embassy officials 
to attend public proceedings on church closures, as appropriate, to 
emphasize U.S. Government concern regarding this issue and to urge the 
Algerian Government to allow the legalization of religious minority 
groups by approving their requests to be registered associations.

    Question. The constitutional referendum passed in November 
indicates a further erosion of religious freedom conditions in country. 
Please describe your potential engagement with the Algerian Government 
regarding this referendum.

    Answer. The Algerian constitution provides for freedom of worship, 
but religious minorities continue to face difficulty registering as 
legally recognized organizations. Though the new constitution allows 
for the creation of a religious organization by declaration, the 
Government needs to amend the 2012 Law of Associations to implement 
this change. The State Department's Annual Human Rights and Religious 
Freedom Reports for Algeria cite this need and, if confirmed, I will 
continue to advocate for religious freedom.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, 
Algeria was identified as having committed severe human rights abuses, 
including government sanctioned attacks on freedom of assembly for 
protestors in early 2020. If confirmed, what steps will you take to 
address these instances with the host government?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the promotion of human 
rights and impress upon Algerian leaders the importance of these 
issues. The annual Human Rights Report regularly garners press 
attention and is studied carefully in Algeria. If confirmed, I commit 
to continuing my predecessors' tradition of meeting with human rights, 
civil society, and other non-governmental organizations in the United 
States and in Algeria to support their efforts on advancing human 
rights. Our embassy is in regular contact with human rights activists 
and journalists in Algeria and maintains an active dialogue with the 
Algerian Government on human rights issues.

    Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil 
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the 
ground?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will direct my embassy to maintain contact 
with civil society organizations in Algeria to support civil society 
development. Funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 
and other civil society assistance programs will empower nascent civil 
society in Algeria, building capacity to better represent citizens' 
interests and hold the Government accountable. If confirmed, I will 
also urge the Algerian Government to issue an updated NGO law to ease 
restrictions on registering and operating civil society organizations.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. During the last two years we have seen significant 
political events in Algeria. These include a mass leaderless protest 
movement, a contentious election resulting in a successor to the long 
serving former president and a new constitution. What are your thoughts 
about how the events of the past two years have affected the U.S.-
Algeria partnership and what opportunities do you think it creates for 
the U.S.?

    Answer. The U.S.-Algeria bilateral relationship has remained strong 
through the momentous events of the last two years. Algeria has taken 
steps towards political and economic reform and the United States will 
continue to support efforts that expand observance of human rights, 
including freedoms of expression and association. We will also work to 
facilitate U.S. investment opportunities to deliver economic benefits 
to the American and the Algerian people. If confirmed, I will also 
promote the embassy's entrepreneurship programs for youth and women as 
well as pursue a grant-funded project to expand English language 
instruction in Algeria to better prepare Algerians for professional and 
commercial opportunities at home and abroad.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
              to Eugene S. Young by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons 
Report, Republic of the Congo was upgraded to Tier 2 due to increased 
efforts to eliminate trafficking, but the Government still lacks 
adequate resources to screen vulnerable populations and lacks a 
national action plan and clear understanding of anti-tracking laws. How 
will you work with the host government and local civil society 
organizations to address these issues if you are confirmed as 
Ambassador?

    Answer. As you note, the Congolese Government has shown the 
political will to address trafficking issues. The Government has 
drafted a national action plan against Trafficking in Persons but has 
yet to ratify it. The Congolese successfully prosecuted seven human 
traffickers and successfully repatriated eight victims in the past 
year. If confirmed, I will continue the positive work begun under my 
predecessor. My team and I will use the resources available from the 
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 
to help train and equip the Congolese police, judiciary, and 
legislators, as well as support the NGOs on the ground doing the heroic 
day-to-day work of identifying trafficking victims and their 
traffickers.

    Question. The U.S. Embassy is actively engaging with government 
officials and organizations on religious freedom issues, including 
supporting virtual events with religious leaders and youths. How will 
you, if confirmed, continue this work and bolster efforts already 
underway?

    Answer. One of the major components of Congo's stability is the 
ability of different religious groups to coordinate and work together 
to promote civil society and meet the needs of the Congolese people. 
This collaboration dates all the way back to the 1960s at the formation 
of Congo as an independent country. If confirmed, I will continue our 
Embassy team's efforts to bring together religious organizations, 
international partners, private businesses, and members of the 
Government to ensure international religious freedom continues to be a 
priority of our bilateral relationship.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, the 
Republic of the Congo was identified as having committed human rights 
abuses, notably that political activists and civil society members, 
including human rights defenders, continued to face intimidation, 
harassment and arbitrary detention by the Government or other state 
actors.

   If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances 
        with the host government?

   How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society 
        organizations to improve the human rights situation on the 
        ground?

    Answer. I share your concern about these developments and the 
treatment of journalists and human rights activists in the Republic of 
the Congo. This concern is something repeatedly conveyed by our staff 
at Embassy Brazzaville to the highest levels of the Government. This 
focus on human rights is a practice that I will continue if confirmed.
    While Congo's human rights record is far from clean, we have seen 
some progress. Congolese peacekeeping troops who were accused of human 
rights violations while in CAR in 2016 did face consequences, and our 
ongoing training with the Congo military educates troops about human 
rights protections. If confirmed I would work alongside civil society 
organizations to bring increased attention to human rights violations 
and abuses and to offer what we can in terms of training programs and 
other resources to promote respect for human rights.

    Question. As U.S. Ambassador, how will you engage with the 
international financial institutions, including the IMF, in the 
Republic of Congo over their engagement with the Sassou Nguesso 
administration despite significant corruption and lack of transparency 
in finances and debts?

    Answer. Across Africa our goal is to increase debt transparency. 
Debt transparency is vital for maintaining debt sustainability, 
facilitating resolutions when necessary, and minimizing corruption. The 
Republic of Congo is in debt distress in part due to non-transparent 
Chinese lending. We can't always stop governments from excessive and 
corrupt borrowing, but setting the standard of transparency makes it 
harder to borrow corruptly and unsustainably. In fora such as the IMF 
where we can better control the terms of loan and financial programs, 
if confirmed, I will seek to engage in the process to insist on the 
inclusion of transparency measures.

    Question. The Congo River Basin is one of the major focuses of U.S. 
supported conservation and environment programming, including through 
the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). How 
can the U.S. better engage with the Republic of Congo these efforts?

    Answer. Our embassy in Brazzaville has been hard at work ramping up 
our environmental cooperation with the Congolese. Thanks to the team's 
efforts, Congo's Minister of Tourism and Environment was the first 
African to speak at the international round table discussion before the 
recent Leaders' Summit on Climate. Our embassy is also working with the 
Congolese to develop side events focusing on the Congo rainforest for 
the upcoming COP 26 conference. Finally, a new USAID position in 
Brazzaville is set to come online later this summer. If confirmed, I 
will continue these efforts to engage Congo on this important area of 
bilateral cooperation.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
               to Eugene S. Young by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. As you know, Congo's president is one of Africa's longest 
serving leaders with power vested in him and a network of family and 
associates. One result has been prolific corruption in the oil sector. 
I'm curious about your thoughts on what tools you think you would 
employ as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Congo to encourage anti-
corruption and democratic development in one of the most kleptocratic 
and closed political and civic environments in Africa?

    Answer. Corruption inhibits economic and democratic development and 
runs counter to American values. It damages trade, guts institutions, 
and destroys citizens' confidence in their government. Recent calls for 
more American investment in Congo to counter malign influence show me 
the Congolese people want to address this problem as well. If 
confirmed, I will push hard for that investment, and the transparency 
and fair dealing it brings. In addition, I will work with international 
partners such as the World Bank and IMF to increase transparency in 
Congo's borrowing, procurement, and financial systems.

    Question. Congo has seen a rapid accumulation of debt over the past 
decade--much of it owed to China. Given this increase in China's 
influence, what opportunities do you think there are for us to increase 
our engagement with the Republic of Congo, both to support development 
in line with American values and to counter China's role in the 
country?

    Answer. China's investment in the Republic of Congo is 
considerable. Chinese debt of over $4 billion risks permanent damage to 
Congo's future growth. However, there are important strengths in the 
U.S.-Congolese relationship that we can focus and build on to help 
counter Chinese influence. America's continued appeal as a country of 
ideas, future trends, and freedom resonates with the Congolese, 
especially the youth. Drawing a distinction with China by highlighting 
and demonstrating America's strengths is our best way of countering 
China's influence over the long term. Our areas of collaboration with 
the Government of Congo include environmental protection, human rights, 
and health development, among many others. These are areas where we 
believe the United States can do the most good for the American and 
Congolese people.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Robert Menendez

Politics and Economy
    Question. How do you intend to capitalize on the heightened 
attention Secretary Blinken and recent sanctions have brought to the 
Anglophone crisis, and how will you advance engagement with the French 
to work toward a peaceful resolution?

    Answer. The Secretary's decision to impose visa restrictions on 
those involved in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects the U.S. 
commitment to advance dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone 
crisis and support respect for human rights. This decision followed 
cuts in security assistance in recent years and the determination that 
Cameroon was ineligible for AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These 
actions demonstrate the U.S. Government's resolve to back up words with 
actions. The United States will continue to consider all potential 
diplomatic tools to advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone 
Northwest and Southwest Regions.
    We continue to engage other UN member states, particularly the 
French, in bilateral and multilateral fora and at all levels on the 
importance of rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to 
explore ways we can work together to move towards a resolution of the 
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. If confirmed, I will 
make resolving the Anglophone crisis my top policy priority and will 
engage in discussions with France and other partners on the ground and 
look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. What have been the impacts on Cameroon's economy and 
U.S.-Cameroon commercial ties of the termination of Cameroon's AGOA 
eligibility, and how would you seek to expand and protect U.S. 
commercial interests there?

    Answer. Cameroon was found ineligible for AGOA in 2019 and lost 
AGOA benefits starting on January 1, 2020 under the criterion that 
excludes countries that engage in gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights. Cameroon can regain AGOA eligibility by 
preventing such violations, by strengthening human rights protections 
in the law, and by impartially and transparently investigating reports 
of such violations and holding accountable those responsible.
    In 2018, Cameroon exported roughly $220 million in goods and 
services to the United States; of that figure, $63 million was exported 
under AGOA, over 90 percent of which was crude petroleum. The United 
States will continue to pursue robust and diverse commercial ties, 
deploying other tools at our disposal toward realizing the enormous 
potential of this relationship for our mutual prosperity and economic 
growth. More than any government program, however, the entrepreneurial 
initiative of Cameroonian and American businesses and a business 
climate that helps them flourish will be the key to stronger commercial 
ties between the United States and Cameroon. If confirmed, I will urge 
the Government to take tangible steps to improve the business climate, 
advocate on behalf of U.S. companies, and direct our embassy to 
continue to look for opportunities to expand commercial ties, using all 
the tools and resources that we have at our disposal.

    Question.  It was recently reported that most of a $335 million 
loan to fight COVID-19 from the IMF could not be accounted for. How 
will you address endemic corruption and work to increase transparency 
and accountability of the Government of Cameroon?

    Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the challenges in the 
fight against corruption in Cameroon. The United States is concerned 
about allegations about misuse of funding aimed at helping Cameroon 
respond to the pandemic. The Embassy provides financial and technical 
support to the fight against corruption. The Department of Treasury's 
Office of Technical Assistance assists the Ministry of Finance, 
specifically the Taxation Directorate, to identify and manage 
compliance and institutional risks and facilitate the efficacy of 
internal audit and employee anti-corruption investigations. Another 
transparency and good governance activity is the Fiscal Transparency 
Innovation Fund (FTIF). In 2018, the Department of State, through the 
FTIF, granted $276,500 to a financial auditing firm to train financial 
practitioners in the public and public sector on modern financial 
reporting norms and develop a plan for the adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards.
    If confirmed, I would continue to explore opportunities like these 
to address endemic corruption in Cameroon and engage other diplomatic 
and international missions with a view to leveraging our resources and 
voices to advocate for change. I would also urge the Government to take 
meaningful steps to hold those complicit in corrupt practices 
accountable, change institutional practices that facilitate corruption, 
and do so transparently to help restore public faith in governance 
practices.

COVID-19
    Question. How has COVID-19 impacted our health programs, and how do 
you intend to leverage U.S. Government bilateral global health program 
platforms to help the people of Cameroon respond to and address the 
impacts?

    Answer. Cameroon has made significant efforts in managing the 
COVID-19 outbreak, despite challenges around national coordination, 
resurgence of cases fueled by limited adherence by the general 
population to mitigation measures, and concerns about mismanagement of 
COVID-19 funds. The COVID-19 pandemic has interrupted routine 
immunizations and service delivery across Cameroon's health sector, but 
we continue to support recovery of health systems and sustain gains 
made through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global 
Health Security Agenda, the President's Malaria Initiative, and other 
global health programs.
    Across U.S. agencies present in the health sector, including the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense 
(DOD), and Peace Corps, we have invested over $600 million since 2010 
to strengthen the health system and fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, 
malaria, and other diseases, including COVID-19. U.S. public health 
experts have worked hand-in-hand with Cameroonian officials on COVID-19 
preparedness and response efforts, helping to build capacity for 
emergency management, surveillance, laboratory testing, case 
management, and infection prevention and control. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that health diplomacy remains a priority. I will encourage the 
Government of Cameroon to increase spending on health, support efforts 
to improve accountability in the provision of health care nationwide 
and continue to work towards reaching epidemic control of HIV/AIDs 
within the next two years.

Democracy & Human Rights
    Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in 
your career to date to support democracy and human rights? What has 
been the impact of your actions?

    Answer. I have spent most of my career as a consular officer, 
focused on the protection of U.S. citizens and the application and 
enforcement of U.S. immigration law. I also served as an election 
observer in both Cameroon (1992) and the Central African Republic 
(1993), and I worked to improve prison conditions in the Dominican 
Republic (2002-05). In Ghana, where I was Deputy Chief of Mission 
(2018-21), we dedicated significant effort to combatting child labor in 
the fishing and cocoa sectors, addressing trafficking in persons, and 
promoting respect for the human rights of all individuals in Ghana. 
Through our DOJ Resident Legal Adviser, we also worked with the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Justice and court system to implement reforms on 
pre-trial detention, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and 
strengthening the public defender corps, all of which gave Ghanaians 
greater and more equitable access to justice.

    Question. What issues are the most pressing challenges to democracy 
or democratic development in Cameroon? These challenges might include 
obstacles to participatory and accountable governance and institutions, 
rule of law, authentic political competition, civil society, human 
rights and press freedom. Please be as specific as possible.

    Answer. Many Cameroonians and outsiders perceive poor governance to 
be the root of most problems in the country. They view the bureaucracy 
as slow-moving and suffering from internal competition, cite corruption 
as an endemic problem, and point to the ongoing investigation into the 
alleged misused of funds aimed at helping Cameroon to combat the COVID-
19 pandemic as a tangible example of the issue. There are also concerns 
about the lack of space for political opposition leaders, human rights 
defenders, journalists, and others to operate in if they espouse views 
that run counter to the Cameroonian Government's views and policies. 
Cameroonians are also frustrated with lapses or failure of delivery of 
public services, deteriorating infrastructure, poverty, and lack of 
progress on decentralization. They hope that the Government will 
address the root causes of extremism in the Far North and those that 
led to the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and address 
allegations of human rights violations and abuses by security forces.

    Question. What steps will you take--if confirmed--to support 
democracy in Cameroon? What do you hope to accomplish through these 
actions? What are the potential impediments to addressing the specific 
obstacles you have identified?

    Answer. Building the capacity of civil society to promote respect 
for human rights and democracy is a top priority for our mission in 
Cameroon. The United States provides funding to local organizations 
focused on supporting dialogue and peace initiatives related to the 
crisis in Anglophone regions, strengthening the rule of law, improving 
the legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil 
engagement and human rights.
    Civil society actors focused on the protection of human rights and 
the promotion of democracy and good governance operate in a difficult 
political environment. They often face consistent harassment and 
arrests for exercising their oversight role and exposing human rights 
violations and abuses committed by the Government.
    If confirmed, I will continue to advance opportunities to 
strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and amplify 
their voices, encourage the Government to collaborate with these 
organizations for the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we 
coordinate our efforts with diplomatic and international missions. 
Strengthening civil society will allow them to better advocate for 
change to improve the lives of ordinary Cameroonians.

    Question. How will you utilize U.S. Government assistance resources 
at your disposal, including the Democracy Commission Small Grants 
program and other sources of State Department and USAID funding, to 
support democracy and governance, and what will you prioritize in 
processes to administer such assistance?

    Answer. Supporting democracy and governance is a priority for our 
mission in Cameroon. Through a $550,000 grant from the Bureau of 
Conflict and Stabilization Operations, we conducted programming from 
August 2019 through December 2020 that sought to strengthen civil 
society's capacity to support dialogue and peace initiatives related to 
the crisis in Anglophone regions. Each year, we support organizations 
with an estimated $400,000 through Africa Regional Democracy funding, 
with projects focused on strengthening the rule of law, improving the 
legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil 
engagement. We use Ambassador's Special Self-Help Funds, approximately 
$75,000 each year, to support grassroots community organizations to 
find local solutions to basic problems.
    In 2019, USAID launched for the first time the Civil Society 
Sustainability Index (CSO SI) in Cameroon. The CSO SI assesses the 
capacity of civil society to serve as both a short-term partner in 
implementing development solutions and a long-term actor in ensuring 
that development outcomes are sustained. To further bolster the 
capacity of the civil society sector, USAID designed a new Civil 
Society Strengthening and Community Resilience program. The anticipated 
program will primarily focus on strengthening civil society capacity to 
deliver services and promote citizen engagement.
    If confirmed, I will continue these efforts to bolster Cameroon's 
civil society capacity, exploring all potential funding options that 
could help us achieve this objective. I will also assess what 
additional resources we can tap and programs we can undertake to 
advance democracy.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with civil society 
members, human rights and other non-governmental organizations in the 
U.S. and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil 
society in Cameroon? What steps will you take to pro-actively address 
efforts to restrict or penalize NGOs and civil society via legal or 
regulatory measures?

    Answer. The promotion of respect for human rights is a central 
pillar in our relations with Cameroon. If confirmed, I will continue 
and strengthen the relationships built by the mission and the 
Department of State more broadly with civil society members, human 
rights and other non-governmental organizations in the United States 
and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil society in 
Cameroon. I will continue to advance opportunities to strengthen the 
capacity of civil society organizations and amplify their voices, 
encourage the Government to collaborate with these organizations for 
the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we coordinate our efforts 
with diplomatic and international missions.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with democratically 
oriented political opposition figures and parties? What steps will you 
take to encourage genuine political competition? Will you advocate for 
access and inclusivity for women, minorities and youth within political 
parties?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continue and strengthen the 
relationships our mission has built with democratically oriented 
political opposition figures and parties. I will strive to support the 
efforts of these figures and parties to develop a more inclusive 
political environment in Cameroon, including their efforts to advance 
electoral reform. I will urge the Government to ensure the freedoms of 
association and peaceful assembly for all political actors, even those 
who do not agree with the Government. Through public statements, small 
grants and other programming, and direct engagements, I will advocate 
for a political environment that is inclusive of women, youth, 
minorities, and Cameroonians who might otherwise be marginalized.

    Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with 
Cameroon on freedom of the press and address any government efforts 
designed to control or undermine press freedom through legal, 
regulatory or other measures? Will you commit to meeting regularly with 
independent, local press in Cameroon?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will actively engage with Cameroon on press 
freedom issues. I will call on the Government to prevent and stop the 
harassment and arrests of journalists whose reporting is critical of 
the Cameroonian Government's policies, which has a negative impact on 
press freedom. I will also underscore the need for the Government to be 
transparent as doing so would make independent media outlets better 
positioned to share accurate information with ordinary Cameroonians. We 
will also continue to prioritize providing training and other capacity 
building opportunities for journalists. If confirmed, I will commit to 
meeting regularly with independent, local press in Cameroon.

    Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with civil 
society and government counterparts on countering disinformation and 
propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-state actors in the 
country?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue and, as appropriate, expand 
upon the Embassy's ongoing engagements with civil society and 
government counterparts to promote the importance of countering 
disinformation and propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-
state actors in the country.

    Question. Will you and your embassy teams actively engage with 
Cameroon on the right of labor groups to organize, including for 
independent trade unions?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will commit to actively engage with 
Cameroon on the right of labor groups to organize, including for 
independent trade unions, and call out incidents when this right is 
restricted.

    Question. Will you commit to using your position, if confirmed, to 
defend the human rights and dignity of all people in Cameroon, no 
matter their sexual orientation or gender identity?

    Answer. Promoting human rights and democracy is a priority for our 
mission in Cameroon. If confirmed, I will use all diplomatic tools at 
my disposal to defend the human rights and dignity of all people in 
Cameroon, no matter their sexual orientation or gender identity.

    Question. What challenges do the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face in Cameroon?

    Answer. Cameroonian society is conservative, with many Cameroonians 
vehemently opposed to the idea that basic civil, legal, and human 
rights extend to Cameroon's LGBTQI+ citizens. The constitution provides 
for equal rights for all citizens, but Cameroonian laws do not 
explicitly prohibit discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in housing, 
employment, and access to government services such as health care. 
Since 2020, there has been an uptick in arrests of LGBTQI+ individuals. 
The overwhelming majority of these cases do not meet basic due process 
standards. Defendants have been accused and convicted based on their 
manner of walking or appearance, as well as unsubstantiated rumors. The 
recent sentencing of two transgender women to five years in prison for 
``attempted homosexuality'' highlights the threats and stigma LGBTQI+ 
Cameroonians face.

    Question. What specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ 
people in Cameroon?

    Answer. Promoting the basic human rights of LGBTQI+ people is a 
challenging endeavor in a society as conservative as Cameroon. It is, 
however, a priority of the Biden-Harris administration, and, if 
confirmed, I commit to carrying out the President's mandate. It is 
critically important that we remain aware and take account of the local 
context in carrying out this mandate. As I saw most recently in Ghana, 
the embassy's overriding principle must always be ``First, Do No 
Harm.'' Even as we have the best intentions, we must not inadvertently 
make the situation worse. For instance, it may not always be 
appropriate to issue public statements in response to a given arrest, 
but to engage in quiet, closed-door diplomacy that minimizes additional 
risks to LGBTQI+ people. In gauging how, when, and whether to engage on 
this topic, it is invaluable to understand the local LGBTQI+ community, 
and I commit that, if confirmed, the Embassy team and I will engage 
with the LGBTQI+ Cameroonians and their allies.

Congressional Consultations
    Question. Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensuring that you fully 
brief Members of Congress and/or their staff each time you are in 
Washington for visits or consultations during your tenure as Ambassador 
to Cameroon?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit, in coordination with the State 
Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to appropriately respond to 
requests for briefings and information by this committee. As a former 
Pearson Congressional Fellow, I firmly believe that Congress has an 
important role to play not only in foreign policy legislation but also 
during the implementation process. It cannot be a one-way street in 
which the State Department merely advises Congress after the fact of 
the actions we have undertaken. Our foreign policy is stronger when the 
two branches of government coordinate.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Christopher John Lamora by Senator James E. Risch

Anglophone Crisis Negotiations
    Question. In January, the Senate passed a bipartisan resolution 
(S.Res.684), which calls on the State Department to engage other 
partners in helping end the Anglophone conflict, and specifically calls 
out the French, whom the Senate believes could get all the parties to 
the table. Secretary Blinken reportedly raised Cameroon with his French 
counterpart at a recent G7 meeting.

   How is the Department mobilizing other partners to assist Cameroon 
        to find peace and justice, and how do you plan to lead such an 
        effort once in-country?

    Answer. The Secretary's decision to impose visa restrictions on 
those involved in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects the U.S. 
commitment to advance dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone 
crisis and support respect for human rights. This decision followed 
cuts in security assistance in recent years and the removal of 
Cameroon's AGOA eligibility on January 1, 2020. These actions 
demonstrate the U.S. Government's resolve to back up words with 
actions. The United States will continue to consider all potential 
diplomatic tools to advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone 
Northwest and Southwest Regions.
    We continue to engage other U.N. member states, particularly the 
French, in bilateral and multilateral fora and at all levels on the 
importance of rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to 
explore ways we can work together to move towards a resolution of the 
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. If confirmed, I will 
make resolving the Anglophone crisis my top policy priority and will 
engage in discussions with France and other partners on the ground and 
look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. What is your stance regarding U.S. leadership in 
mediating an end to the conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon 
and do you classify it as an armed conflict at this stage of the 
crisis?

    Answer. The United States has an important role to play in pushing 
for a resolution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions. If confirmed, 
I will continue to support the Swiss Government's efforts to advance 
dialogue with all sides and explore ways with the international 
community to move this effort forward. I will also support other 
meaningful initiatives that could advance peace on the ground, 
including local initiatives, and to amplify the voices of Anglophones 
who support peace. The United States stands ready to provide additional 
support if asked to do so and if appropriate.
    Per the Geneva Conventions, which the United States has ratified, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross has the purview to 
designate a conflict as a non-international armed conflict. To date, 
they have not done so.

    Question. Why do you think the Government of Cameroon has not 
heeded the U.S. calls for cessation of hostilities and a negotiated 
resolution of the conflict in the North West and South West regions?

    Answer. The Cameroonian Government continues to focus on 
neutralizing the armed separatists through combat in the field and to 
advance disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in both 
regions to put an end to the violence and insecurity. The Government 
also believes that implementation of the recommendations offered during 
the Grand National Dialogue held in 2019 will address the grievances 
held by many Anglophone Cameroonians. This includes advancing 
decentralization, such as by holding regional elections in December 
2020. If confirmed, I will continue to call for an inclusive dialogue 
without preconditions and for all parties to end violence.

    Question. Would you support mediation or accountability efforts by 
international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council or the 
African Union?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages U.N. Security Council 
member states and other countries regarding the need to resolve the 
Anglophone crisis. We also regularly raise the Anglophone crisis with 
the Secretary General's Special Representative and Head of the U.N. 
Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) Francois Fall. The United States 
supports UNOCA's role in promoting inclusive political dialogue in 
Cameroon and the resolution of the Anglophone crisis. We will continue 
to encourage UNOCA to engage the Government of Cameroon and encourage 
other U.N. member states, specifically including our P3 partners France 
and the UK, to play a constructive role to resolve the crisis. The 
United States has engaged and will look to increase our engagement with 
the African Union on Cameroon. If confirmed, I will highlight the need 
for efforts by international actors to be complementary and not compete 
with one another.

Sanctions
    Question. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the 
United States would impose visa restrictions on individuals who are 
believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the 
peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone regions of 
Cameroon. While I did applaud this important first step, I believe 
additional accountability measures are needed.

   What is your view regarding the use of sanctions to bring those 
        responsible to account for their abuses and undermining of 
        peace in Cameroon?

    Answer. The decision to impose visa restrictions on those involved 
in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects U.S. commitment to advance 
dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone crisis and support 
respect for human rights. This decision followed cuts in security 
assistance in recent years and the removal of Cameroon's AGOA 
eligibility on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S. 
Government's resolve to back up words with actions. The United States 
will continue to consider all potential diplomatic tools to advance 
dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest 
Regions.

Trafficking in Persons
    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons 
Report, the U.S. downgraded Cameroon to Tier 2 Watch List for 
recruiting child soldiers, a lack of standard operating procedures and 
convicting fewer trafficking crimes. Additionally, the Government has 
not passed anti-trafficking legislation to conform to international 
law. Yet, the Government did investigate more trafficking cases and 
identify more victims.

   If confirmed, how will you build on Cameroon's successes and 
        strengthen their weaknesses, most notably, aiding in 
        establishing a national framework for anti-trafficking?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages with Cameroon on the 
issue of human trafficking. We have provided training to government and 
civil society stakeholders through the International Visitors 
Leadership Program and presented draft language for anti-trafficking 
legislation that would bring national law in line with international 
norms. We will continue to work with the Government of Cameroon to 
ensure that its security forces do not violate their internal 
regulations and recruit or use child soldiers. We will also encourage 
the Government to urge vigilance committees to refrain from doing so.
    If confirmed, I will ensure that we will continue to engage 
constructively with the Inter-ministerial Committee on Trafficking in 
Persons and encourage the Government to make progress in the fight 
against human trafficking by focusing on milestones that need to be 
achieved on key deficiencies and by engaging more robustly with civil 
society.

International Religious Freedom
    Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious 
Freedom Report, the Department noted Cameroon as having poor religious 
tolerance, including threats of non-state actors like ISIS-WA and Boko 
Haram.

   What is your assessment of this particular issue, and if confirmed, 
        how will you work with the Office of International Religious 
        Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-country?

    Answer. Religious leaders wield significant influence and are 
potential allies in bringing peace to the Northwest, Southwest, and Far 
North Regions where persistent violence from non-state actors, armed 
separatists, and government actors infringes upon religious freedom and 
all aspects of life in the affected communities. The United States will 
continue to work with religious leaders and the Government to encourage 
greater cooperation and respect for the right to practice religion 
freely and unencumbered.
    If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to resolve the ongoing 
conflict in the Anglophone regions through a framework that supports an 
inclusive peace process. Peaceful resolutions to the many ongoing 
conflicts in Cameroon will be pivotal in reducing the incidence of 
abuses against religious freedom. Under my direction, if confirmed, the 
embassy will also engage with the Office of International Religious 
Freedom and other key offices to determine how best we could assist 
religious leaders.

Human Rights
    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, the 
Department identified Cameroon as having committed severe human rights 
abuses. Amnesty International categorized the state-sanctioned behavior 
as ``Security forces and armed groups continued to commit human rights 
violations and abuses. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced 
due to violence; and gender-based violence against women was 
widespread.''

   If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances 
        with the host government?

    Answer. Promotion of human rights remains a key element of our 
bilateral relations with Cameroon. While we have seen some progress in 
this area with specific cases, we would like the Government of Cameroon 
to share information about what it is doing to address human rights 
violations by security forces and to take steps to address violations 
writ-large beyond training. If confirmed, I will continue to call for 
accountability and transparency related to allegations of human rights 
violations committed by the Government. I will direct the embassy to 
look for opportunities to work with the Government to reduce incidences 
of human rights violations and urge them to hold accountable those 
found responsible for these violations.

    Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil 
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the 
ground?

    Answer. Building the capacity of civil society is a top priority 
for our mission in Cameroon. We provide funding to local organizations 
focused on supporting dialogue and peace initiatives related to the 
crisis in Anglophone regions, strengthening the rule of law, improving 
the legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil 
engagement and human rights.
    If confirmed, I will continue to advance such opportunities to 
strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and amplify 
their voices, encourage the Government to collaborate with these 
organizations for the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we 
coordinate our efforts with diplomatic and international missions.

    Question. In December 2019, the Trump administration curtailed U.S. 
military assistance to Cameroon because of gross human rights 
violations, including women and children's extrajudicial killings. To 
date, has there been an improvement in the Cameroon military's human 
rights record? If confirmed, how do you intend to work with the 
Government of Cameroon and its military leadership to improve on this 
issue?

    Answer. Since early 2019, the United States has significantly 
reduced security assistance due to the Government of Cameroon's 
unwillingness to share information in response to credible accusations 
of gross violations of human rights by its security forces. The 
Government has since taken some steps towards holding security forces 
accountable, which we commend. These include the murder conviction in 
August 2020 of four soldiers for the 2015 killing of two women and two 
children in the Far North, the arrest and ongoing prosecution of 
soldiers believed to be responsible for the February 2020 extrajudicial 
killings in Ngarbuh, Northwest Region, and the arrest of soldiers 
involved in a case of alleged torture of a detainee in early 2021. 
However, the United States would like to receive more information from 
the Government of Cameroon on actions it has taken and plans to take to 
address allegations of human rights violations and to put measures in 
place that advance human rights that go beyond human rights training.
    If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the Government to 
provide updates on investigations into allegations of human rights 
violations and continue to work with Cameroonian armed forces on areas 
of mutual interest. I will continue to review security assistance on a 
case-by-case basis so that assistance we provide aligns with U.S. 
interests, including promotion of human rights, and U.S. law requires 
those receiving our security assistance be vetted prior to receiving 
assistance.

Biya Succession
    Question. If confirmed, you will arrive in Cameroon at a time when 
there is a lot of speculation about the wellbeing of the country's 
president, Paul Biya, who is 88 years old and has been in power for 
four decades. Does the State Department have a contingency plan in 
place should the country be thrust into a succession battle during your 
tenure?

    Answer. President Biya's current term of office doesn't end until 
2025, and Biya has not made clear whether he intends to run for 
reelection at that time. The State Department has a plethora of 
experience responding to various political transitions around the 
world, should such a scenario arise. We will draw on that experience, 
and our regularly updated emergency plans for all scenarios, including 
natural disasters or other major events. If confirmed, I will ensure 
that crisis management planning will remain a top priority for our 
Mission.

    Question. In several Francophone African countries--Togo, Gabon, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and recently Chad--dying and long-serving 
presidents have manipulated fragile constitutions to pave the way for 
their sons to replace them should they pass away while in office. Is 
such a scenario likely in Cameroon, and if so, what should be the U.S. 
position if this occurred?

    Answer. The United States supports peaceful, timely, and civilian-
led transitions of power to a democratically elected government 
throughout the world. We advocate for free, fair, and secure elections 
that reflect the will of the people in all countries, including 
Cameroon. President Biya is serving a seven-year term, and the next 
elections are to be held in 2025. The Cameroonian constitution outlines 
a democratic process in the event of a succession. If confirmed, I will 
advocate for good governance, peace, prosperity, and the promotion of 
human rights in Cameroon, as well as for efforts by Cameroon to support 
stability in the region despite the ongoing conflicts within its 
borders.

Security
    Question. Another crisis that confronts Cameroon is in the Far 
North region, where the country is part of the multinational Task Force 
battling Boko Haram and other violent extremists in the Lake Chad 
Basin. In the past year, Boko Haram attacks on civilian populations 
have increased. Some analysts believe that Cameroon may have moved 
military equipment and personnel initially assigned to this region of 
the country into the Anglophone areas of the North West and South West.

   To what extent is this divided focus undermining Cameroon's 
        contribution to fight against Boko Haram and broader 
        counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel?

    Answer. Cameroon has always played a crucial role in regional 
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, 
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and 
ISIS-West Africa and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining 
stability in the region is even more important.
    Cameroon has been a leader in both the efforts to address piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against terrorism and has contributed 
troops to the United Nation's peacekeeping mission in the Central 
Africa Republic since 2014. The ongoing violence in the Anglophone 
regions and the Far North, along with insecurity on its eastern border, 
could put at risk Cameroon's ability to continue to lead these efforts 
to ensure the security of Central African region.
    If confirmed, I will continue to push for the Government to pursue 
dialogue with separatists armed groups in order to end the violence in 
the Northwest and Southwest. We will also continue to push the 
Government hold those found responsible for violations of human rights 
accountable for these violations.

    Question. While restrictions currently exist, which security 
assistance, if any, should the U.S. prioritize to Cameroon in the 
future?

    Answer. All U.S. security cooperation activities with Cameroon take 
place in full coordination with the Government of Cameroon. The United 
States works with Cameroonian armed forces on areas of mutual interest. 
If confirmed, I will ensure that our security assistance will continue 
to focus on assisting the Cameroonian military in its efforts against 
ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram as part of the Multinational Joint Task 
Force, maritime security, training, and assistance to develop 
professional military forces, and health security through disease 
vector research and HIV/AIDS assistance.

Regional Impact
    Question. Do you agree that a further escalation of the conflict in 
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon contributes to greater instability 
in neighboring Nigeria and could soon jeopardize vital U.S. interests 
in the Gulf of Guinea and most of West and Central Africa?

    Answer. Cameroon has always played a crucial role in regional 
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, 
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and 
ISIS-West Africa and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in achieving and maintaining 
stability in the region is even more important, despite the continuing 
crises within the country's borders.
    Cameroon has been a leader in both the efforts to address piracy in 
the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against terrorism. The country has 
also contributed troops to the United Nation's peacekeeping mission in 
the Central Africa Republic since 2014. The ongoing violence in the 
Anglophone regions of the country, combined with the need to address 
the continuing threats posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the Far North 
Region and insecurity on its eastern border, could put Cameroon's 
ability to continue to lead these efforts to ensure the security of the 
Central Africa region at risk.
    If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Government to pursue 
dialogue with separatists armed groups in order to end the violence in 
the Northwest and Southwest Regions. We will also continue to call on 
the Government to hold those found responsible for violations of human 
rights accountable for these violations.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Anglophone Crisis
    Question. The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon has killed thousands, 
displaced more than 800,000, and kept more than one million children 
out of school. In January, the Senate passed S.Res.684, which I 
introduced with Senator Risch, calling on the Government of Cameroon 
and separatist armed Anglophone groups to end all violence, respect the 
human rights of all Cameroonians, and pursue a genuinely inclusive 
dialogue toward resolving the ongoing conflict. The resolution also 
called on the U.S. Government to help bring about and support that 
dialogue.

   If confirmed as Ambassador to Cameroon, what steps would you take 
        to help initiate the dialogue process, and how would you ensure 
        that all relevant stakeholders are represented?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to urge all parties to end 
violence and to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. 
I would make clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to 
advance mediation between the Government and separatist armed group 
leaders and encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move 
this effort forward.
    The United States regularly engages U.N. Security Council member 
states regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone crisis. We raise 
the Anglophone crisis regularly during briefings by the Secretary-
General's Special Representative and Head of the U.N. Office for 
Central Africa (UNOCA) Francois Fall. We will continue our engagement 
with France and other key allies both bilaterally and in multilateral 
fora to find ways to work together to achieve tangible progress towards 
peace. The U.S. Government will continue to consider all the tools at 
our disposal aimed at promoting a peaceful resolution of the ongoing 
violence, which has resulted in much suffering.

    Question. I appreciate Secretary Blinken's recent decision to 
impose visa restrictions on some of those responsible for undermining 
peace in Cameroon. Are any financial measures, such as Global Magnitsky 
sanctions, also being considered?

    Answer. The recent decision to impose visa restrictions on some of 
those responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is one of many 
possible approaches we can take to push for peace and dialogue. It is 
yet another sign of our commitment to back up words with actions. The 
U.S. Government will continue to consider all the tools at our disposal 
to encourage a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Northwest and 
Southwest Regions.

    Question. How could we be better engaging our international 
partners, especially France, to address this conflict?

    Answer. The United States remains closely engaged with France and 
other international partners regarding the crisis in Cameroon, 
including at the highest levels. For example, Secretary Blinken 
discussed Cameroon in May with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le 
Drian, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland 
discussed Cameroon in high-level meetings with the French. We continue 
to support the efforts by the Swiss-led process to encourage dialogue 
between the Government and the armed separatist groups. We also support 
efforts by the U.N. Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) to advance peace 
in Cameroon.
    If confirmed, I will engage with all of these actors and determine 
how best we can work together to make a positive difference on the 
ground. Advancing peace in Cameroon will be my top priority.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. As you know, the U.S. has limited leverage with Cameroon 
regime, particularly since the suspension of security assistance. With 
these limitations, I am curious about your view on potential U.S. 
leadership in mediating an end to the crisis in the Anglophone regions?

   If this is even feasible, are there resources you think could help 
        mediation?

    Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about continued 
violence in Cameroon and condemn all attacks against civilians. There 
is no military solution to this crisis; dialogue is needed to restore 
peace and improve respect for human rights. The United States appeals 
to all parties to enter into a broad-based dialogue without pre-
conditions.
    The United States has an important role to play in pushing for a 
resolution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions. If confirmed, I 
will continue to support the Swiss Government's efforts to mediate 
dialogue and explore ways with the international community to advance 
this effort and other meaningful efforts. I will also review the 
different tools, including the implementation of appropriate measures 
under U.S. law such as the visa restrictions that the Secretary 
recently announced and coordinating with appropriate Department of 
Justice prosecutions of those inciting violence. We have to press for a 
resolution to this crisis, including through discussions with French 
Government officials and P3 counterparts. The United States has 
provided and will continue to provide strong support for peace, but the 
responsibility for the resolution of the crisis in the Northwest and 
Southwest Regions ultimately lies with the Cameroonian people.

    Question. In the north of Cameroon, terrorism has accelerated. 
Meanwhile, in other regions, violence between security forces and armed 
separatists claiming to represent the Anglophone minority has spurred 
concerns over Cameroon's territorial unity.

   Do you think the U.S. is adequately leveraging diplomatic and 
        assistance tools, both with Cameroonian stakeholders and our 
        European and African allies, to address these challenges as 
        well as challenges to democratic development?

    Answer. I understand we continue to engage Cameroonian stakeholders 
and key international actors bilaterally and multilaterally on the 
importance of the rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to 
explore ways we can work together towards a peaceful resolution of the 
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and advance good 
governance and promote respect for human rights nationwide.
    Our diplomatic engagement is deployed at various levels, including 
at the most senior level of the U.S. Government. For example, Secretary 
Blinken discussed Cameroon in May with French Foreign Minister Jean-
Yves Le Drian, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland 
discussed Cameroon in high-level meetings with the French. We also 
engage regularly with U.N. Special Representative Francois Fall who 
heads the U.N. Office for Central Africa.
    The United States regularly reviews our assistance to ensure that 
we do no harm, that we support civil society, human rights defenders, 
and humanitarian workers, and that we comply with Leahy laws. We have 
consistently said all those responsible for human rights violations and 
abuses must be held accountable, and we have taken actions to back up 
this principle. If confirmed, I will continue to consider what more can 
be done to address Cameroon's complex challenges, always with a view to 
benefit the Cameroonian people.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Cory A. Booker

Violence and Instability in Cameroon and Beyond
    Question. U.S. relations with Cameroon have been mostly positive, 
although they have been adversely affected by concerns over human 
rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest 
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization. 
Cameroon plays a key role in regional stability and remains a regional 
partner in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.

   Last year, I joined with 19 of my Senate colleagues to sign a 
        resolution calling for a ceasefire in Cameroon, and remain 
        deeply concerned by the ongoing violence there. I am curious as 
        to what you think it will take to conclude and uphold a 
        ceasefire, guaranteed humanitarian access, and establish a 
        process of political dialogue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will make resolving the Anglophone crisis 
my top policy priority. Our position remains that all sides must end 
violence and engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The 
Government is focused on countering armed separatists in the field and 
maintains that its convening of a Grand National Dialogue in 2019 and 
decentralization efforts thus far, including regional elections in late 
2020 and the establishment of a special status for the two Anglophone 
regions, address the root causes of the crisis. I believe the 
Government must do more to resolve the crisis. Specifically, it must be 
willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The 
armed separatist groups, as well, must be willing to engage peacefully 
in such a dialogue and cease human rights abuses, as called for in the 
Senate resolution.
    If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to 
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and 
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on 
the ground and look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. In 2019, the United States took the relatively rare step 
of terminating Cameroon's AGOA eligibility due to persistent gross 
violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have 
impacted the Government's behavior in the ongoing conflict. If 
confirmed, what other measures do you plan to take to hold state and 
non-state actors in Cameroon accountable for human rights abuses?

    Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the 
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on 
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, 
undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone 
regions of Cameroon. This decision reflects the continuing U.S. 
commitment to advance dialogue and promote respect for human rights. 
This decision followed cuts in security assistance in recent years, 
and, as you noted, the determination that Cameroon was ineligible for 
AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S. 
Government's resolve to back up words with actions.
    If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to 
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and 
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on 
the ground, as well as the Cameroonian Government and people, to 
identify tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.

    Question. In addition to the internal violence related to the 
Anglophone Crisis, Cameroon is also facing threats from Boko Haram and 
ISIS West Africa. How do we square our support for Cameroon's efforts 
against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa with our concerns about human 
rights abuses and political abuses inside Cameroon? In other words, how 
can the State Department ensure that President Biya does not use 
foreign counterterrorism assistance to fund its efforts against 
Anglophone separatists in the Southwest and Northwest part of the 
country?

    Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional 
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, 
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and 
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining 
stability in the region is even more important. Since early 2019, we 
have significantly reduced security assistance because the Government 
of Cameroon had not taken sufficient action to investigate credible 
accusations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces 
or hold the perpetrators accountable. The United States continues to 
review security assistance on a case-by-case basis so that assistance 
we provide aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect 
for human rights. We vet potential recipients of security assistance, 
consistent with the Leahy laws, and do not provide assistance to 
Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information 
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S.-
granted assistance is explicitly prohibited from being used in the 
Anglophone regions. We have made this prohibition clear at all levels 
of the Cameroonian Government and we carefully monitor the use of U.S. 
assistance to ensure this commitment is followed. Risk of misuse or 
potential diversion to the Anglophone regions are key criteria in our 
security assistance decision-making.
    Since our cuts, the Cameroonian Government has taken some limited 
steps towards holding security forces accountable, including the 
conviction of four soldiers for murder in August 2020 and the arrest of 
soldiers believed to be responsible for one case of extrajudicial 
killings and one case of alleged torture of a detainee. While we hope 
these steps indicate a willingness to address the problem, abuses by 
government forces continue.
    Between FY 2019 (the last year for which there is full obligation 
data) and FY 2020 funding, the State Department has obligated 
approximately $8.3 million in assistance to support the Cameroonian 
military. This funding supported professional military education; 
technical support for unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance platforms; small boat training; communications training; 
and air-to-ground integration training. If confirmed, I would work to 
ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is not misused by Cameroonian 
security forces, and would actively and fully address verified reports 
of such misuse.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in 
Room SD-106, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Kaine, Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Portman, Young, 
Cruz, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    We are here today to consider nominees for three important 
positions, Ambassador Todd Robinson to be Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink to be Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. 
Brett Holmgren to be Assistant Secretary of State for 
Intelligence and Research.
    So congratulations to the three of you on your nominations. 
We appreciate your commitment and willingness to serve our 
country and your families as well.
    Ambassador Robinson, it is nice to have you back before 
this committee for another confirmation hearing, this time as 
the nominee to lead the Bureau of International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, which we know as INL, one of the most 
important offices for strengthening democratic governance and 
the rule of law globally.
    INL's work around the world is critical to countering 
narcotics trafficking, criminal syndicates, money laundering, 
and other financial crimes, addressing the criminal use of 
ransomware and malware, combating illegal mining and fishing, 
and supporting efforts to combat gender-based violence.
    Over the last decade, authoritarian leaders have 
increasingly wielded criminality and kleptocracy as tools to 
debilitate democracy at home and foment instability beyond 
their borders.
    I welcome President Biden's recent directorate establishing 
the fight against kleptocracy as a key national security 
priority and making it clear that we will tackle its corrosive 
impact.
    INL has a central role to play in that fight. INL is also 
at the forefront of our international efforts to combat 
narcotics trafficking. CDC data shows that over 70,000 
Americans died from drug overdoses in 2019, including over 
2,800 in my home state of New Jersey.
    I am particularly concerned about the lethal impact of 
fentanyl as well as the illicit production and trafficking 
routes that extend through Mexico and back to China. While we 
must improve our public health responses to address drug abuse 
domestically, INL's work is essential to countering drug 
trafficking by transnational criminal organizations.
    So I look forward to hearing from you about your vision for 
the Bureau and your plans for strengthening justice systems and 
law enforcement cooperation to advance our national security 
interests.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink, I am also pleased to have you back 
before this committee for another confirmation hearing. I think 
the last time we saw each other was in China, and your post 
there--your career as a public servant and your extensive 
experience in the region will be critical as you take on this 
important role.
    In recent years and under administrations and Congresses of 
both parties the United States has reassessed and rebalanced 
our approach to the Indo-Pacific to take into account the 
reality of our competitive relationship with China.
    Although this new era of strategic competition may not be 
what many of us had hoped for in the U.S.-China relationship, 
it is our reality and we must deal with it with clear-eyed 
pragmatism, starting with rebuilding and replenishing the 
sources of our national strength here at home and our alliances 
and partnerships abroad.
    The recently passed Senate China competition package, 
including the Strategic Competition Act that the ranking member 
and I and other members of this committee authored, marks our 
effort to contribute to that process.
    Beyond China, the region you will be responsible for is 
rich with pressing challenges, from North Korea's nuclear and 
missile programs, which only grew stronger under President 
Trump's ill-conceived North Korea policy, to a coup plunging 
Burma back into chaos, to a roll back in human rights and 
democracy across the region.
    I know that you are intimately familiar with these issues 
and we look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can best 
position the United States for success there in the years 
ahead.
    Mr. Holmgren, the independent analysis of the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has long been 
recognized as among the best, most reliable, and most careful 
of the intelligence community.
    We have today a nominee for the Assistant Secretary of INR 
that brings a great breadth of experience to its mission.
    Mr. Holmgren has held significant experience relevant to 
INR's mission, including serving as a senior director for 
intelligence and for counterterrorism at the National Security 
Council, as well as service at the Central Intelligence Agency 
and the Pentagon.
    I have little doubt that such experience would be of 
immense benefit to the State Department Bureau.
    INR is an invaluable resource for the Secretary of State, 
senior officials, and department overall. Indeed, the Bureau 
could also be of immense benefit to this committee.
    Our oversight of U.S. foreign policy would be better served 
by more regular contact and briefings from INR, and I look 
forward to that engagement with you should you be confirmed, 
something that has been missing in the past and I hope, under 
your leadership, we can engage with the committee more 
robustly.
    In closing, the three of you have an immense task ahead, 
but I have no doubt about your knowledge and experience will 
serve you well and the nation well as you take on these new 
responsibilities.
    I look forward to each of your testimony. Let me turn to 
the ranking member for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, these 
are important nominations we are hearing today. There is a 
broad swath of responsibility here and an important 
responsibility.
    Personally, my top two foreign policy priorities are China 
and global health. Regarding China, my main concerns are the 
Chinese Communist Party's aggression and coercion in the Indo-
Pacific and the urgency of the Taiwan issue.
    To counter Chinese aggression, I believe we must ensure 
that the State Department is appropriately resourced in terms 
of funding and personnel in the Indo-Pacific.
    I am interested to hear from you, if confirmed, plans to 
advocate for this critical region in this--in the State 
Department budgeting process.
    Additionally, our network of alliances and partnerships is 
key to advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The U.S. 
security commitments, including extended deterrence and 
commitments to help allies and partners develop advanced 
capabilities, are crucial to this effort, and it is important 
to remember U.S. policy will only be successful if we work 
closely with our allies.
    Also, I am particularly concerned about Chinese aggression 
against Taiwan. Taiwan is an important democratic partner, and 
how we support and work with Taiwan will have significant 
implications for our strategy in the region and our alliance 
system. Taiwan must be a main focus of the administration and 
the State Department.
    Regarding global health, the Indo-Pacific region is in 
great need of more COVID-19 vaccines, especially given China's 
aggressive vaccine diplomacy.
    Supporting our partners as well as countries in need during 
this global health crisis will be a mark of U.S. commitment to 
the region.
    Finally, I believe it would be a mistake to use U.S. 
taxpayer dollars to buy and distribute Chinese vaccines.
    Moving on to the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State 
for Intelligence and Research, I am concerned about reports of 
directed energy attacks against State Department personnel, 
both abroad and here at home.
    This has been widely written about, greatly discussed, but 
the amount of information available is pretty de minimis. The 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research will play an important role 
in helping to identify the perpetrator and the means of these 
attacks.
    The Assistant Secretary also has a responsibility to 
provide our committee and the Intelligence Committee with up to 
date information on all investigations into these attacks.
    If confirmed, I expect to be in regular contact on this 
important issue. In addition to supporting the intelligence 
needs of the Secretary of State, INR must also work closely 
with the intelligence community.
    It is imperative that the Bureau maintain its analytical 
independence from policymakers within the State Department to 
ensure information is objective and accurate.
    Finally, the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 
Transnational criminal organizations, money laundering, and 
trafficking of people, narcotics, and weapons undermine 
international stability and pose complex threats to U.S. public 
health and security.
    INR plays an important role in improving the capacity of 
our foreign partners to disrupt and dismantle transnational 
criminal activity. But these efforts do not exist in a vacuum.
    I am concerned about the negative impact the 
administration's decision to reduce our military presence in 
Afghanistan will have on narcotics production and associated 
criminal activities, including funding terrorism.
    I am also concerned that the administration's open borders 
policy has incentivized record-breaking waves of illegal 
migrants and undermine U.S. efforts to improve governance, 
security, and economic prosperity in Mexico and in the North 
and Central America.
    I look forward to hearing plans you have to overcome these 
and other international law enforcement challenges, should you 
be confirmed.
    We have a lot to cover today, and with that, I yield back 
my time, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    With that, we will start with our nominees and their 
testimony. All of your full records will be included in the--I 
am sorry. Your full statements will be included in the record. 
We ask you to summarize in about five minutes or so so we can 
have a conversation with you.
    We will start with Ambassador Robinson and work our way 
down. Thank you.

  STATEMENT OF HON. TODD D. ROBINSON OF NEW JERSEY, A CAREER 
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER MINISTER, 
NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (INTERNATIONAL 
   NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS), VICE KIRSTEN DAWN 
                            MADISON

    Mr. Robinson. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today as the nominee to be the Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs.
    I am honored by President Biden's nomination and the 
support of Secretary Blinken for the opportunity to continue to 
serve the American people.
    I would like to take the opportunity to recognize the 
support of my friends, colleagues, and, most importantly, my 
family, my mother, Willetta BaCote, and my brothers, Mark 
Robinson and Jeffrey BaCote. Their encouragement has been 
invaluable to me.
    The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement 
Affairs, INL, which I called home for three and a half years as 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, is a key component in 
protecting the American people by countering crime and 
supporting the rule of law to maintain stability abroad.
    I look forward to the possibility of leading my Foreign 
Service, civil service, contractor, and local staff INL 
colleagues working in Washington and more than 90 countries.
    If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to tackle 
the great challenges laid out in the president's national 
security agenda, including combating narcotics trafficking, 
addressing transna-tional organized criminal threats, 
corruption and cybercrime, countering Chinese malign influence, 
and tackling issues of bias and discrimination in criminal 
justice systems.
    Stopping illegal drugs like synthetic opioids from reaching 
America will be among my highest priorities. We know some 
terrorist organizations traffic drugs to fund their illicit 
activities. Transna-tional criminal organizations have 
seemingly limitless appetites for illicit profits from 
synthetic drugs.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize INL's critical engagement 
with partners and allies to combat this threat. Transnational 
criminal organizations are not static, so INL cannot be either.
    Working with our interagency partners, such as the 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, INL can lead the 
effort to ensure that our programs are better coordinated and 
show results.
    Example--after the People's Republic of China scheduled 
fentanyl as a regulated chemical class in 2019, direct flows of 
fentanyl from the PRC to the United States dropped 
precipitously.
    However, nonfentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals 
continue to flow from the PRC to Mexican criminals that 
manufacture the fentanyl and traffic it to the United States.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize continued diplomatic 
engagement at all levels to decrease the shipment of these 
precursors from the PRC and to reinvigorate shared security 
cooperation between the United States and Mexico.
    In fact, U.S.-Mexico cooperation must continue to address 
another high priority issue, the management of migration across 
the region and to the U.S. southern border.
    Strategic thinking and data will help us address irregular 
migration and build a smarter border. INL is working closely 
within the administration to shape a central America--Central 
America root causes strategy to look at the drivers of this 
migration.
    I know this topic is a high priority to members of the 
committee and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we 
can make our foreign assistance dollars more effective on this 
issue.
    If confirmed, I vow to respond to these complex challenges 
using the experience gained in relationships built over my 35-
year Foreign Service career.
    Another global challenge we confront today is corruption. 
Simply put, corruption kills. I saw its effects in Guatemala 
where political, economic, and social elites, at times working 
with criminal organizations, buy judges and threaten 
independent and courageous judicial actors.
    I saw it in Venezuela, where the Maduro regime reaps ill-
gotten profits by selectively distributing food and pillages 
that nation's natural resources.
    As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have noted, 
corruption undermines U.S. foreign policy and national security 
interests around the world, and damages the credibility of 
countries where U.S. businesses may want to invest.
    INL, with our interagency partners, acts as a bulwark 
against global corruption, and if confirmed, I would seek to 
enhance this work by identifying like-minded crime fighters 
around the world, build their capacity to prevent, investigate, 
and prosecute corruption, and reinvigorating multilateral 
global anti-corruption networks.
    INL can also use rewards and visa restrictions to promote 
accountability for corrupt actors globally. If confirmed, I 
commit to working with the Congress on advancing America's 
interests at home and abroad.
    Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your 
questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Hon. Todd D. Robinson

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as 
the nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. I am honored by the President's 
nomination and the support of Secretary Blinken for the opportunity to 
continue to serve the American people.
    I would like to take the opportunity to recognize the support of my 
friends, colleagues and, most importantly, my family--my mother, 
Willetta BaCote, and my brothers Mark Robinson and Jeffrey BaCote. 
Their encouragement has been invaluable to me.
    The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs--
INL--which I called home for three and a half years as a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, is a key component in protecting the American 
people by countering crime and supporting the rule of law to maintain 
stability abroad. I look forward to the possibility of leading my 
foreign service, civil service, contractor, and local staff INL 
colleagues working in Washington and more than 90 countries.
    If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to tackle the great 
challenges laid out in the President's national security agenda 
including combating narcotics trafficking; addressing transnational 
organized criminal threats, corruption and cybercrime; countering PRC 
malign influence; and tackling issues of bias and discrimination, in 
criminal justice systems.
    Stopping illegal drugs, like synthetic opioids, from reaching 
America will be among my highest priorities. We know some terrorist 
organizations traffic drugs and other commodities to fund their illicit 
activities. Transnational criminal organizations have seemingly 
limitless appetites for illicit profits from synthetic drugs. If 
confirmed, I will prioritize INL's critical engagement with partners 
and allies to combat this threat.
    Transnational criminal organizations are not static, so INL cannot 
be either. Working with our interagency partners such as the 
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, INL can lead the effort 
to ensure that our programs are better coordinated and show results. 
Example: after the People's Republic of China (PRC) scheduled fentanyl 
as a regulated chemical class in 2019, direct flows of fentanyl from 
the PRC to the United States dropped precipitously. However, non-
fentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals continue to flow from the PRC 
to Mexican criminals that manufacture the fentanyl and traffic it to 
the U.S. If confirmed, I will prioritize continued diplomatic 
engagement at all levels to decrease the shipment of these precursors 
from the PRC, and to reinvigorate shared security cooperation between 
the United States and Mexico.
    In fact, U.S.-Mexico cooperation must continue to address another 
high priority issue--the management of migration across the region and 
to the U.S. southern border. Strategic thinking and data will help us 
address irregular migration and build a smarter border. INL is working 
closely within the Administration to shape a Central America Root 
Causes Strategy to look at the drivers of this migration. I know this 
topic is a high priority to many Committee Members and I look forward 
to hearing your thoughts on how we can make our foreign assistance 
dollars more effective on this issue. If confirmed, I vow to respond to 
these complex challenges using the experience gained and relationships 
built over my 35-year Foreign Service career.
    Another global challenge we confront today is corruption. Simply 
put, corruption kills. I saw its effects in Guatemala where political, 
economic, and social elites--at times working with criminal 
organizations--buy judges and threaten independent and courageous 
judicial actors. I saw it in Venezuela where the Maduro regime reaps 
ill-gotten profits by selectively distributing food rations and 
pillages that nation's natural resources. As President Biden and 
Secretary Blinken have noted, corruption undermines U.S. foreign policy 
and national security interests around the world and damages the 
credibility of countries where U.S. businesses may want to invest.
    INL, with our interagency partners, acts as a bulwark against 
global corruption. If confirmed, I would seek to enhance this work by 
identifying like-minded crime fighters around the world; building their 
capacity to prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption; and 
reinvigorating multilateral global anticorruption networks. INL can 
also use rewards and visa restrictions to promote accountability for 
corrupt actors globally.
    Criminals and state-actors use technology to target the American 
people, our institutions, and critical infrastructure. The detrimental 
impact of cybercrime on America is clear, with one in four U.S. 
households affected, and annual losses reported to the FBI last year of 
$4.2 billion. If confirmed, I will want INL to build the necessary 
know-how and cross-border cooperation to address 21st century 
transnational security challenges.
    Finally, given its decades of criminal justice sector reform 
experience, INL has a unique responsibility to work with foreign 
partners to recognize, prevent, and counter bias and discrimination 
within their criminal justice systems. If confirmed, INL programs and 
partnerships will continue to reflect a respect for human rights and 
best practices in balancing individual rights with public safety.
    If confirmed, I commit to working with the Congress on advancing 
America's interests at home and abroad. Thank you for this opportunity 
and I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Holmgren?

STATEMENT OF BRETT M. HOLMGREN OF MINNESOTA, NOMINATED TO BE AN 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH), VICE 
                       ELLEN E. MCCARTHY

    Mr. Holmgren. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you 
today as the nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of intelligence and Research.
    I am deeply grateful to President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me, and to 
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines for supporting 
my nomination.
    I would not be here today if it were not for the love and 
support of my family, my wife, Dana, my son, Teddy, my parents, 
Michael and Mary, and my siblings, Stacy, Christa and Ryan. 
Each of them has inspired me to live my life with a sense of 
purpose, love, and humility.
    Like many Americans of my generation, the tragic events of 
9/11 were a turning point in my life. I left my home state of 
Minnesota 18 years ago to pursue a career in public service, to 
defend the freedoms, values, and liberties we all cherish.
    I came to Washington with a sense of optimism, and a deep 
and abiding belief in the ideals of this country, that America 
is a force for good in the world and that all men and women are 
created equal with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness.
    Those ideals derived from my upbringing in Minnesota, where 
I was surrounded by family who believed deeply in the role of 
public service.
    Both of my grandfathers were World War II veterans, and my 
parents, both of whom were public school teachers for 40 years, 
instilled in my siblings and me the importance of service.
    I still share that same sense of optimism and commitment to 
public service that I brought with me to Washington two decades 
ago.
    While I may be a new face to members of this committee, I 
have a long track record of working on intelligence and foreign 
policy issues. As an analyst first at the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and later at the CIA, I authored all sorts of analytic 
products to inform policy decisions.
    Through deployments overseas, including in war zones, I 
have seen firsthand the key role that intelligence plays in 
shaping national security and the tremendous sacrifices of our 
diplomats, intelligence officers, and warfighters.
    Throughout my career, I have also served in policy roles in 
the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff at the 
White House.
    These experiences gave me a richer understanding of the 
vital role and the limitations of intelligence in shaping 
policy. Most significantly, I gained through these experiences 
a greater appreciation for the importance of analytic 
objectivity and the need for the intelligence community to tell 
the policymaker what they need to know, not what they want to 
hear.
    I have been nominated for this position at a time when the 
United States and its allies are facing a diverse 
interconnected array of threats against the backdrop of a 
global pandemic that is straining governments and societies, 
fueling unrest, and accelerating global competition.
    From China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, the continuing 
threat of terrorism, cyber, emerging technologies, these 
threats pose new challenges and opportunities.
    Mr. Chairman, I believe that INR has a unique role to play 
in addressing these challenges. As the oldest civilian 
intelligence agency in the United States, the Bureau has a long 
and proud history of providing policymakers with valuable 
insights into America's most pressing national security issues, 
while empowering diplomats with the information and analysis 
needed to advance U.S. foreign policy.
    If confirmed, I look forward to leading this remarkable 
institution. I understand the role comes with important 
responsibilities, including serving as the principal 
intelligence adviser to the Secretary of State and as the head 
of one of the nation's 18 intelligence agencies, providing 
timely objective all-source information to inform consideration 
of foreign and national security policies, and finally, 
assuring that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement 
activities are conducted consistent with and supportive of U.S. 
foreign policy objectives.
    If confirmed, four inter-related imperatives will shape my 
approach to leading INR.
    First, I will ensure that INR's capabilities and resources 
are aligned and strategically prioritized to address the most 
pressing challenges and opportunities to include China, Russia, 
Iran, North Korea, as well as global health security, cyber, 
climate change, and how to capitalize on the revolution in open 
source intelligence.
    Second, I will prioritize investments in INR's greatest 
assets, its people. We must continue to attract, train, and 
retain the best and brightest while placing much greater 
emphasis on diversity recruitment.
    Third, I will focus on upgrading INR's technology to 
empower its analysts with the tools they need to improve the 
delivery of INR's products and services to better support its 
customers, especially U.S. diplomats overseas.
    Finally, I will insist on strong cybersecurity practices 
throughout INR to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of its data systems and networks.
    In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize the important 
role that I believe congressional oversight plays in ensuring 
that U.S. intelligence activities are lawful, ethical, and 
consistent with our values.
    If confirmed, I look forward to partnering closely with 
Congress as we confront the many challenges ahead.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Holmgren follows:]


                Prepared Statement of Brett M. Holmgren

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to 
be Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research. I am deeply grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken 
for the confidence they have placed in me, and to Director of National 
Intelligence, Avril Haines, for supporting my nomination.
    I would not be here if it were not for the love and support of my 
family: my wife, Dana, our son Teddy, my parents, Michael and Mary, and 
my siblings Stacie, Krista and Ryan. Each of them has inspired me to 
live my life with a sense of purpose, love, and humility.
    Like many Americans of my generation, the tragic events of 9/11 
were a turning point in my life. I left my home state of Minnesota 
nearly 18 years ago to pursue a career in public service to defend the 
freedoms, values, and liberties we all cherish. I came to Washington 
with a sense of optimism and a deep and abiding belief in the ideals of 
this country--that America is a force for good in the world, and that 
all men and women are created equal with the right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.
    Those ideals derive from my upbringing in Minnesota, where I was 
surrounded by family who believed deeply in the role of public service. 
Both of my grandfathers were World War II veterans. My parents, both of 
whom were public school teachers for 40 years, instilled in my siblings 
and me the importance of service. I still share the optimism and 
commitment to public service that I brought with me to Washington 
nearly two decades ago.
    While I may be a new face to many of the members here today, I have 
a long track record of working in and with the Intelligence Community. 
As an analyst, first at the Defense Intelligence Agency and later at 
Central Intelligence Agency, I authored all-source intelligence 
products to inform policy decisions. Through deployments overseas, 
including in warzones, I have seen firsthand the key role that 
intelligence plays in shaping national security and the tremendous 
sacrifices of our diplomats, intelligence officers, and warfighters.
    Throughout my career, I have also served in policy roles at the 
Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff at the White House. 
These experiences gave me a richer understanding of the vital role and 
the limitations of intelligence in shaping policy. Most importantly, I 
gained a greater appreciation for the importance of analytic 
objectivity and the need for the Intelligence Community to tell the 
policymaker what they need to know, not what they want to hear.
    I have been nominated for this position at a time when the United 
States and its allies are facing a diverse, interconnected array of 
threats against the backdrop of a global pandemic that is straining 
governments and societies, fueling unrest, and accelerating global 
competition. From China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, to terrorism, 
cyber, climate change, and evolving technologies, these threats pose 
new challenges and opportunities for the Intelligence Community.
    INR plays a unique role in addressing these challenges. As the 
oldest civilian intelligence agency in the United States, the Bureau 
has a long and proud history of providing policymakers valuable 
insights into America's most pressing national security issues, while 
empowering our diplomats with the information and analysis to advance 
U.S. foreign policy.
    If confirmed, I look forward to leading this remarkable 
institution, serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the 
Secretary of State and the head of one of the Nation's 18 intelligence 
agencies. INR's responsibility to provide timely, objective, all-source 
analysis and to assure that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement 
activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign policy 
objectives is more critical than ever.
    If confirmed, four interrelated imperatives will shape my approach 
to leading INR. First, I will ensure that our capabilities and 
resources are aligned and strategically prioritized to address the most 
pressing challenges and opportunities, to include China, Russia, Iran 
and North Korea, as well as global health, cyber, climate change and 
how to capitalize on the revolution in open-source intelligence.
    Second, I will prioritize investments in INR's greatest asset--its 
people. We must continue to attract, train, and retain top talent while 
placing greater emphasis on diversity recruitment.
    Third, I will focus on upgrading INR's technology infrastructure to 
empower our analysts with the tools they need to improve the delivery 
of our products and support our customers, especially our diplomats 
overseas.
    Finally, I will insist on strong cybersecurity practices throughout 
INR to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of 
our data, networks, and systems.
    In closing, I want to recognize the important role that 
Congressional oversight plays in ensuring that U.S. intelligence 
activities are lawful, ethical, and consistent with our values. If 
confirmed, I look forward to partnering with Congress as we confront 
the many challenges ahead.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Holmgren. Thank you.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink?
    Am I pronouncing your name correctly?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

 STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER 
    MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
  COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
     (EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS), VICE DAVID STILWELL

    Mr. Kritenbrink. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today. I am deeply grateful to President 
Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their 
confidence in me.
    I want to thank my wife, Nami, children, Mia and Joe, my 
parents, Don and Joyce, and sisters, Kay and Nancy, for their 
love and support.
    It would be the honor of a lifetime to serve as Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a region 
in which I have been engaged for 24 out of my 27 years in the 
U.S. Foreign Service.
    If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with the 
Senate and, of course, with this committee.
    President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed diplomacy 
at the center of U.S. foreign policy and emphasize the 
centrality of a free and open Indo-Pacific to the security and 
prosperity of the American people.
    If confirmed, I would focus on the following six 
priorities.
    First, revitalizing ties with allies and partners. Our 
network of alliances and partnerships is our greatest strategic 
asset, enabling us to pool our strengths to advance shared 
interests, deter common threats, and promote universal values, 
to include our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that 
is rules based and unconstrained by coercion, the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation and over flight, 
and respect for human rights.
    If confirmed, strengthening these relationships will be my 
top priority. The priority placed on our treaty alliances was 
demonstrated by President Biden's hosting of his Japanese and 
Republic of Korea counterparts in April and May.
    The president's hosting of the first ever Quad leaders 
summit in March showed the resolve of the Indo-Pacific 
democracies--Australia, India, Japan and the United States--to 
work together to support the region.
    I support ASEAN's centrality and, if confirmed, will work 
to strengthen our partnership, our strategic partnership, with 
ASEAN, including treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines.
    If confirmed, I will reinforce our partnership with friends 
in the Pacific Islands, including our unique relationship with 
the Freely Associated States. I will also further develop our 
robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan.
    Second, prevailing in our strategic competition with China. 
The People's Republic of China is our biggest geopolitical 
test.
    I support approaching the PRC from a position of strength 
by working with allies and partners, engaging with 
international organizations, standing up for our values, and 
investing in our diplomatic and military capabilities and the 
American people.
    Secretary Blinken has said our approach to China will have 
competitive, adversarial, and cooperative aspects. The United 
States will counter PRC attempts to erode the international 
rules-based order, push back on unfair PRC trade practices, 
secure critical supply chains, protect sensitive U.S. 
technology, and build our strength at home.
    We will continue holding Chinese authorities responsible 
for the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang, the trampling of autonomy 
and civil liberties in Hong Kong, and systematic repression in 
Tibet.
    We will bolster partners' capacity to resist PRC 
intimidation and oppose China's unlawful maritime claims. We 
will also cooperate with Beijing when in our interests, such as 
on the climate crisis, counter narcotics, and nonproliferation.
    As President Biden has said, we are not looking for 
conflict, but welcome stiff competition and will defend U.S. 
interests across the board.
    Third, reducing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear 
and missile programs. President Biden has stated we remain 
committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula and will work with allies to address that threat 
through diplomacy and deterrence.
    If confirmed, I will work to ensure North Korea and others 
abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions while supporting a 
calibrated and practical diplomatic approach that prioritizes 
the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed 
military forces.
    Fourth, supporting inclusive economic policies that benefit 
all Americans. If confirmed, I will ensure that our diplomats 
in the region fight for every job in the interests of American 
workers by insisting on market access and fair treatment, 
stopping intellectual property theft and currency manipulation, 
and combating corruption.
    Fifth, promoting democracy and human rights. Our values and 
our example are critical to successful diplomacy in Asia.
    If confirmed, I would work with our allies and partners to 
support democracy, promote human rights, and stand against 
abuses wherever they occur.
    In Burma, I would work with partners to press the military 
to reverse course following the February 1 coup, cease 
violence, release those unjustly detained, including American 
citizens, and return Burma to the democratic path chosen by its 
people.
    I would work to support the people of Burma by holding 
accountable those responsible for violence. I would also 
promote accountability for PRC officials responsible for human 
rights violations across China.
    Sixth, if confirmed, I pledge to address global priorities 
in the region, particularly combating COVID-19 and the climate 
crisis.
    If confirmed, I will also prioritize the safety and well 
being of my team, maintain their focus on top goals, and ensure 
they represent the diverse talents of the American people.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:]


            Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 
am deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, and 
Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me. I want to thank my wife 
Nami, children Mia and Joe, my parents Don and Joyce, and sisters Kay 
and Nancy, for their love and support.
    It would be the honor of a lifetime to serve as Assistant Secretary 
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a region in which I have 
been engaged for 24 out of my 27 years in the Foreign Service. If 
confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with the Senate.
    President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed diplomacy at the 
center of U.S. foreign policy, and emphasized the centrality of a free 
and open Indo-Pacific to the security and prosperity of the American 
people. If confirmed, I would focus on the following six priorities.

    First, revitalizing ties with allies and partners. Our network of 
alliances and partnerships is our greatest strategic asset, enabling us 
to pool our strengths to advance shared interests, deter common 
threats, and promote universal values--including our commitment to a 
free and open Indo-Pacific that is rules-based and unconstrained by 
coercion; the peaceful resolution of disputes; freedom of navigation 
and overflight; and respect for human rights. If confirmed, 
strengthening these relationships will be my top priority. The priority 
placed on our treaty alliances was demonstrated by President Biden's 
hosting of his Japanese and Republic of Korea counterparts in April and 
May. The President's hosting of the first-ever Quad Leaders Summit in 
March showed the resolve of the Indo-Pacific democracies Australia, 
India, Japan, and the United States to work together to support the 
region. I support ASEAN centrality and, if confirmed, will work to 
strengthen our strategic partnership with ASEAN, including treaty 
allies Thailand and the Philippines. If confirmed, I will reinforce our 
partnership with friends in the Pacific Islands, including our unique 
relationship with the Freely Associated States. I will also further 
develop our robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan.

    Second, prevailing in our strategic competition with China. The 
People's Republic of China is our biggest geopolitical test. I support 
approaching the PRC from a position of strength, by working with allies 
and partners, engaging with international organizations, standing up 
for our values, and investing in our diplomatic and military 
capabilities--and the American people. Secretary Blinken has said our 
approach to China will have competitive, adversarial, and cooperative 
aspects. The United States will counter PRC attempts to erode the 
international rules-based order, push back on unfair PRC trade 
practices, secure critical supply chains, protect sensitive U.S. 
technology, and build our strength at home. We will continue holding 
Chinese authorities responsible for the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang, 
the trampling of autonomy and civil liberties in Hong Kong, and 
systematic repression in Tibet. We will bolster partners' capacity to 
resist PRC intimidation and oppose China's unlawful maritime claims. We 
will also cooperate with Beijing when in our interests, such as on the 
climate crisis, counternarcotics, and nonproliferation. As President 
Biden has said, we are not looking for conflict but welcome stiff 
competition and will defend U.S. interests across the board.

    Third, reducing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and 
missile programs. President Biden has stated we remain committed to the 
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and will work with 
allies to address that threat through diplomacy and deterrence. If 
confirmed, I will work to ensure North Korea and others abide by U.N. 
Security Council resolutions while supporting a calibrated and 
practical diplomatic approach that prioritizes the security of the 
United States, our allies, and our deployed military forces.

    Fourth, supporting inclusive economic policies that benefit all 
Americans. If confirmed, I will ensure our diplomats in the region 
fight for every job and the interests of American workers by insisting 
on market access and fair treatment, and by stopping intellectual 
property theft and currency manipulation. We will also work with 
regional partners to foster economic development that is transparent 
and sustainable, including via APEC.

    Fifth, promoting democracy and human rights. Our values and our 
example are critical to successful diplomacy in Asia. If confirmed, I 
would work with our allies and partners to support democracy, promote 
human rights, and stand against abuses wherever they occur. In Burma, I 
would work with partners to press the military to reverse course 
following the February 1 coup, cease violence, release those unjustly 
detained, including American citizens, and return Burma to the 
democratic path chosen by its people. I would work to support the 
people of Burma by holding accountable those responsible for violence. 
I would also promote accountability for PRC officials responsible for 
human rights violations across China. Throughout the region, we will 
champion transparency, the rule of law, civil society, and independent 
media.

    Sixth, addressing global priorities, particularly combating COVID-
19 and the climate crisis. On COVID-19, if confirmed, I pledge to 
support our work with regional partners and international initiatives 
such as COVAX and the Quad Vaccine Partnership to provide U.S. 
leadership in the fight to end the pandemic. On the climate crisis, I 
would work to advance climate solutions with countries in the region, 
which include some of the world's largest emitters as well as those 
most vulnerable to climate change.

    If confirmed, I will also prioritize the safety and well-being of 
my team, maintain their focus on top goals, and ensure they represent 
the diverse talents of the American people.
    Thank you for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your 
questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you all. We will start a round with 
five minutes. I am going to ask, first, before that some 
perfunctory questions that we ask all of our nominees.
    It is very brief questions that speak to the importance 
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials 
in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking 
from you.
    So I would just simply ask you each to provide a yes or no 
answer.
    Do you agree to appear before this committee and make 
officials from your office available to the committee and 
designated staff when invited?
    Mr. Robinson. Yes.
    Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    The Chairman. Do you commit to keep the committee fully and 
currently informed about the activities under your purview?
    Mr. Robinson. Yes.
    Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    The Chairman. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful 
consultation while policies are being developed, not just 
providing notification after the fact?
    Mr. Robinson. Yes.
    Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    The Chairman. And finally, do you commit to promptly 
responding to requests for briefings and information requested 
by the committee and its designated staff?
    Mr. Robinson. Yes.
    Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
    Now, Ambassador Kritenbrink, as you know, and I think the 
Senate has spoken with collectively and nearly one voice and 
that is not easy these days, we believe that China is our major 
geostrategic challenge in the world, and you address some of 
that in your remarks.
    The Senate passed a sweeping China competitive bill. That 
includes the strategic competition that this committee put out 
led by the ranking member and myself and supported by the 19 
members of the committee, a truly bipartisan effort.
    What do you think of that legislation? What tools would 
you, if confirmed, want to see in your toolbox that Congress 
can provide? And can you elaborate on how you plan on 
approaching the China challenge?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me say again what an honor it is to be here today and I 
think, Mr. Chairman, you have identified, obviously, very 
correctly the major challenge that the United States faces 
today, and I would argue that our friends and partners around 
the world face today.
    I do believe, Mr. Chairman, as I attempted to outline in my 
statement, for us to prevail in this strategic competition with 
China we need to do so from a position of strength.
    I think we are stronger when we do that together with our 
like-minded partners around--our like-minded partners and 
allies around the world.
    But, Mr. Chairman, I think we will do our best when we are 
fully united here at home as well. I am very grateful to you 
and members of this committee for the support and leadership 
that you have shown on these issues. I know when Secretary 
Blinken testified last week he stated his strong support for 
the bill that you described.
    And I might say, as a career diplomat, the more tools and 
resources that the Senate and other members of Congress can 
give us as diplomats the more effective we can be.
    Of course, to prevail in this long-term competition with 
China, I think it will be, largely, determined by how we do as 
a nation together and many of the investments we make here at 
home.
    But I am very grateful for the leadership that the Senate 
has shown on these issues, and I can pledge to you that with 
the resources made available to us we will compete and we will 
prevail in this competition with China in every domain.
    The Chairman. Let us talk about some of the elements of 
that competition. In Taiwan, given the increased muscle flexing 
and threatening rhetoric from Beijing, some policymakers and 
analysts have called for an end to the policy of strategic 
ambiguity with regard to Taiwan.
    There is increasing concern that Beijing may seek to make 
the cross-straits an early test for this administration. How 
can the United States most effectively signal our resolve and 
deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    I do think showing strength and clarity and deterrence is 
key. What I think is crystal clear to me, Senator, is the 
United States commitment, rock-solid commitment, to meeting our 
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, to provide Taiwan 
with the means to maintain a credible self-defense.
    If I were confirmed, I pledge to the committee that I will 
work very hard to support meeting those obligations and, 
further, to support further developing our very robust 
unofficial relationship with our Taiwanese democratic partners. 
It is one of our most important partners in----
    The Chairman. Let me ask you--I agree. Do you support 
strategic ambiguity or do you think we need additional clarity 
or a new framework for managing the cross-strait relations?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, my own view is that the 
framework outlined by our long-standing one-China policy based 
on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqus, and 
the six assurances to Taiwan provides the framework that has 
ensured cross-strait stability and Taiwan security for these 
many decades.
    I do think that maintenance of that status quo and of that 
security is a dynamic situation. As the threat from the PRC 
grows, as Beijing's aggressive and bullying behavior vis-a-vis 
Taiwan grows, I think that our response has to be calibrated as 
well.
    But I am confident that the framework that we have and 
meeting those obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act gives us 
the tools to do so.
    The Chairman. Mr. Holmgren, let me ask you, we rely on the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research for insights and particular 
perspective that sometimes varies from the rest of the 
intelligence community, and when there is an opinion or 
assessment that is different for the IC, it is critical that we 
understand those differences.
    Do you agree to be candid with the committee when those 
differences occur and to make sure we understand where and why 
INL comes to different conclusions?
    Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think that, as you know, INR has a long and proud history 
of speaking truth to power and telling it like it is, and if 
there are instances where INR reaches a conclusion that is 
different than the rest of the intelligence community, I 
believe, absolutely, that it would require informing and 
engaging with this committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    One other question. The Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research's analysis is going to be critical to our 
understanding as policymakers and in response to a number of 
pressing issues, including the apparent attacks on U.S. 
personnel and the origins of COVID-19.
    Do you commit to engaging proactively with the committee as 
INR's work on these matter advances and to keep us fully 
informed on your assessments both on these and other critical 
matters?
    Mr. Holmgren. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to follow up, Mr. Kritenbrink, on the Taiwan issue 
that was raised by the chairman.
    What--I had the same questions he had, and I think all of 
Congress does, really. But what--from your expertise and your 
experience in this area, what do you think the end game is here 
for the--for the Chinese Communist Party as far as Taiwan is 
concerned? And what do you think the end game is and how do you 
think they intend to achieve it?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I am reluctant 
to try to put myself in the shoes of the leadership in Beijing, 
but they have stated that their long-term goal is 
reunification.
    I think where I believe that we should remain focused and, 
if confirmed, where I would remain focused as EAP Assistant 
Secretary would be on meeting our obligations and 
responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. I am confident 
that we have the tools to do so.
    For example, through the support of this committee and 
others in Congress, the United States has made available to the 
authorities on Taiwan more than $30 billion in arms sales since 
2009.
    I think it is also incumbent upon us to further develop our 
robust relationship with Taiwan in every sector. They are a top 
10 trading partner, which is vitally important. We have 
important cultural and other relations as well.
    They play a very critical important role, we believe, in 
international health and, therefore, we should support growing 
Taiwan's international space as well to make sure that they 
fully participate in organizations where sovereignty is not 
required and have a meaningful role in those that do.
    So I believe, Mr. Ranking Member, that we have the tools to 
continue to grow this robust partnership with Taiwan and to 
meet our commitments to ensure that Taiwan can maintain a 
credible self-defense.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate your thoughts in that regard. 
All good thoughts. I guess what crosses my mind is that we all 
know that the Communist Party wants reunification.
    We also know that that is not the same view that Taiwan 
has, and, obviously, where you have two different views that 
are very much opposed, at some point in time it is going to 
come to a crossroads and that is what I am concerned about is 
what happens at that point.
    What--how is that resolved?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Mr. Ranking Member.
    I think the best thing that we can do is to continue to 
demonstrate our resolve and our commitment to meeting our rock-
solid obligations, and I think by doing so I am confident that 
we can continue to effect the stability across the strait that 
we have benefited from for many years.
    But, Mr. Ranking Member, I would, again, reemphasize we are 
deeply concerned by the increase in aggression and harassment 
and coercion that we have seen directed at Taiwan, and we 
continue--we intend and if I were confirmed I would intend to 
continue to show our resolve to, again, meeting our obligations 
under the Taiwan Relations Act.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. There is no doubt that 
the coercion and harassing and everything else has ratcheted up 
tremendously to the point, for instance, where Taiwan is having 
trouble scrambling jets every time that there is an incursion 
into airspace.
    And that is done intentionally, there is no doubt, and that 
is something that is going to be on our plate, I think, sooner 
rather than later.
    Mr. Holmgren, the matter of the Havana syndrome issue, as 
you know, has been kicking around for some time and, obviously, 
we are in an open session and cannot talk about all the details 
of it.
    But I am assuming that you have been involved in that in 
some fashion. Am I right on that or not?
    Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Ranking Chairman. I very much 
share the concerns about these incidents. I have spoken to some 
of the victims of these attacks, and I can tell you they are 
they are suffering and their families are suffering.
    And, if confirmed, I would have no higher priority than 
ensuring the safety and security of U.S. citizens, their 
families, and U.S. personnel overseas and would commit to 
ensure that INR is continuing to support the department and the 
interagency, especially CIA and DOD, with information and 
analysis around the origins of these incidents. So I believe it 
is a serious increase.
    As a testament, I have committed to asking for a classified 
briefing, if confirmed, on my first day in office.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you. This is, certainly a vexing 
problem and I can tell you it is very high up on the priority 
of this committee and the Intelligence Committee, particularly 
since it affects our hard-working people around the world and 
outside the United States.
    Mr. Robinson, the--Afghanistan produced and, I guess, 
continues to produce about 90 percent of the world's opium, and 
with us downsizing in Afghanistan, this is going to be the 
problem that it was before we ratcheted up there. It is going 
to raise its ugly head again.
    What are your thoughts on this?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
    I share your concerns, frankly, about the production and 
distribution of opioids from Afghanistan. We know that they are 
also interested in, perhaps, trying to get back into government 
and my--what I would say to the Taliban and to anybody there 
who is producing narcotics or opioids is that, you know, if you 
want to be seen as credible and you want to be treated as part 
of the international community, then you cannot do these 
things.
    The other part of that, though, is while we may be drawing 
down in Afghanistan, there are programs that INL would wish to 
continue in that region. The hard part is figuring out how to--
how to do that and keep our people safe.
    So those are the two--sort of the two priorities we would 
have. One, you know, making sure that we are continuing 
programs that would go against, obviously, narcotics 
trafficking and sending very strong messages to those in 
government that they also have to commit to fighting against 
the narcotics trafficking.
    But it is also very important if we are going to continue 
our programs there, and we want to continue our programs there, 
to make sure that we are taking care of our people and making 
sure that they can be there safely.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I understand that Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And let me start by thanking all three of our nominees for 
their prior service to our country and their willingness to 
serve in these critical positions that they have been appointed 
to.
    I want to talk about the issue of fighting corruption, and, 
Ambassador Robinson, I must tell you, I think you said it very 
succinctly in your--in your statement--in your testimony when 
you said that corruption kills. It also is the fuel for 
autocrats in fighting democracies and trying to bring our 
democratic countries down.
    Freedom House just recently issued their 2021 report that 
shows that we have the continuing trend of erosion of 
democratic states, and one of the principal reasons has been 
the growth of corruption that fuels this type of activity.
    I enjoyed our conversation, but I just really want to drill 
down a little bit more on specifics. You laid out part of that 
in your comments to our committee. But I want to just get your 
assurance that you will work with Congress and leverage both 
branches of government in fighting corruption.
    There is legislation pending in the United States Senate 
that I have introduced with Republican colleagues, bipartisan 
legislation that would establish a greater capacity within our 
missions and State to understand the circumstances of 
corruption in each country, to use a rating system similar to 
what we do in trafficking in persons so that we can have 
consequences and international standards as to what we expect 
countries to do to fight corruption.
    We have legislation that would establish specific funds so 
we can respond quickly to opportunities to help countries deal 
with corruption, and we have the Magnitsky sanctions to make 
them permanent.
    So do I have your assurances that you will work with 
Congress to strengthen our tools to fight corruption globally?
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Senator. You have a firm 
commitment to work with Congress, to use all of the tools that 
we have in our toolbox to fight corruption, and I will further 
commit that you will not find a more stronger advocate to fight 
corruption than me.
    It was to my--to my great joy to see the Biden/Harris 
administration raise corruption to the national security level. 
I think that that will--that will help us go after official 
corruption, unofficial corruption, in the region and around the 
world.
    And further, it will give us greater tools to identify 
crime fighters around the world that we can partner with to 
fight this--to fight this scourge. There is no doubt corruption 
undermines democratic institutions around the world, and I know 
the bread and butter--INL's--one of INL's main jobs is going 
after those who would--who would take part in corrupt acts.
    Senator Cardin. I would just quote from my friend, Kara-
Murza, who is one of the leading opposition leaders in Russia, 
who says that Putin steals from the Russians to spend it in the 
West.
    So he uses the corrupt resources in order to try to 
undermine our system, and we have got to speak out against 
that. The Magnitsky sanctions are, of course, one area at some 
of these other tools that we are suggesting can help.
    I just really want to underscore that we are all sincere 
about this. But we need the push of Congress to help prioritize 
within each of the missions countries that have significant 
problems of corruption to focus on this issue.
    So I am going to hold you to your commitment to work with 
us to strengthen those tools so that we can all fight this a 
little bit more effectively.
    Mr. Kritenbrink, Asia--China, of course, is the most 
significant country in that region from the point of view of 
concern about the United States on the erosion of governance.
    Their One Road policy is, certainly, based upon using 
marketing--government-controlled economies and corruption to 
try to control the economics of the world. The Belt and Road 
Initiative really needs to be addressed.
    Do you--are you committed to working with us to root out 
the way that it is based in corruption, stealing intellectual 
property, intimidating countries, so that we can take China on 
in a more aggressive way?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator, absolutely. I would--I would 
simply say that I agree with you wholeheartedly that we need to 
counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, as it is offered 
through means of coercion, corruption, lack of transparency, 
unsustainable debt loads, and the like.
    Countries, I think, need to be very careful in signing on 
to the Belt and Road. But I think even more importantly, 
Senator, we need to have an affirmative agenda, affirmative 
programs that we can offer as an alternative, and I am very 
grateful to you and other members of Congress for giving us 
those tools, whether it is the BUILD Act or other resources we 
have at our disposal.
    I would also note, Senator, that I was encouraged by the 
communiqu that came out of the G-7, and it is quite clear to me 
that our democratic partners around the world see eye to eye 
with us on this challenge.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to working with 
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty?
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 
thank each of you for your service.
    I would like to start with you, Mr. Robinson, if I might. 
The issue that I have been deeply concerned about is fentanyl, 
and the impact on youth in my home state has been significant, 
particularly so since the borders have collapsed. In late 
January, we have seen an increase not only in overdoses but in 
deaths from fentanyl.
    And I would like to read a definition to you, if I might, 
to see if we are on the same page. According to United States 
law, a weapon of mass destruction is defined as the following. 
One of these definitions is a weapon that is designed to cause 
death or serious injury through toxic or poisonous chemicals.
    Would you define fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction 
under these sort of circumstances?
    Mr. Robinson. Senator, that is a great question. I do not 
know if I would define it as a weapon of mass destruction. But 
I absolutely am heartbroken by what fentanyl is doing to our 
communities across the United States.
    I think--I think that we have a lot of work to do here at 
home on the demand side. But, more importantly, I think that 
there is very much we can do in terms of diplomatic engagement 
to work with our partners in Mexico, to work with our partners 
in--well, to work with China to stop the flow of precursors to 
Mexico and stop the distribution from Mexico by narcotic----
    Senator Hagerty. Yes. I was just in Mexico about two weeks 
ago meeting with their foreign minister and economic minister, 
and they are deeply concerned at the increase in inflow of 
fentanyl and its precursors from China coming into Mexico. It 
is being mixed there, shipped across the borders, and killing 
our children.
    So as a parent, as an American, I very much appreciate your 
efforts here and I look forward to working with you, should you 
be confirmed, in pushing back against what I would call a 
weapon of mass destruction that is being unleashed against our 
population here.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Hagerty. Ambassador Kritenbrink, it is wonderful to 
see you again. My regards to Nami and to your two children.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. Again, thank you for your service at a 
most challenging time. I think you are the perfect person----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.--be brought forward for this position. I 
would like to talk with you about an area that you and I have 
had plenty of conversations before, and that is--that is the 
Quad and the Indo-Pacific.
    I think that we have made great strides with our allies in 
the Quad. I think there is a lot more that we can do. I would 
love to get your perspective on how we might engage other 
nations in that effort.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator, very much for your 
comments.
    I fully agree. I think the Quad is a vitally important 
mechanism. I was deeply impressed and grateful for the 
president's hosting of the first ever leaders level Quad 
summit, and I think it truly has shown that the four Quad 
democracies in the region have decided to stand together and 
advance these interests and these values that we share.
    But they have also agreed, we have also agreed, to work in 
very practical areas, and I think, as a career diplomat, I am 
focused on the ways in which we, together with our partners, 
can move the needle in the region in practical ways.
    So the Quad leaders summit issued a roadmap and a work plan 
for the rest of the year focused on public health, 
particularly, combating COVID-19, focusing on climate, but also 
issues related to technology, and I know you and I have 
discussed that in detail.
    I think--I think we need to focus in those practical ways, 
but I do agree with you, Senator, it cannot be just the Quad. 
It has to be all of our like-minded partners, whether it is our 
treaty allies, whether it is our important friends and partners 
in ASEAN or across the region.
    I think most of the region is united behind the vision of a 
region that is peaceful, stable, where countries large and 
small play by the rules, large countries do not bully small 
countries. I think that is where we need to focus our energy.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate your perspective on----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, the Quad is central.
    Senator Hagerty. Yeah, I appreciate your perspective on 
that.
    I would just like to turn to one more thing and that is the 
movement of supply chains from China out--you know, companies 
that are trying to derisk their exposure to China.
    Of course, I want every one of those companies to come back 
to American shores, to see those jobs back in America. But to 
the extent that those jobs do not come back here, what are the 
opportunities that we might have with some of our allies in the 
region to work together for joint economic prosperity, to work 
together to strengthen our economic ties, and that will bring 
our national security ties even closer?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    I fully agree. I think we need to focus on supply chain 
resiliency, security, to make sure that neither we nor the 
world are completely dependent upon and vulnerable to one 
country.
    Again, as we do that, the preference, of course, would be 
to bring most of those home. Where that is not possible, I 
think ensuring that those supply chains are diversified and 
resilient and strong is key, particularly, working with like-
minded democratic partners, I think, especially in the 
technology space, especially related to semiconductors, but 
also, as we discovered in COVID-19, even personal protective 
equipment and other medical equipment as key.
    But I think--when I think about our competition with China, 
I do think these issues related to our economic competition, 
particularly related to technology and the resilience of our 
supply chains, will probably be central to that competition.
    And I would be committed to doing everything possible, both 
within the State Department and across the U.S. Government, to 
advance----
    Senator Hagerty. Should you be confirmed, I look forward to 
working with you closely.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you for your service, Ambassador 
Kritenbrink.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine?
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to this 
panel of nominees. I think you are all very highly qualified 
for these positions. Look forward to supporting you.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink, I think I am going to spend my five 
minutes with you talking about a topic that matters a lot to 
me, the Chinese persecution of Uighurs in the Xinjiang 
province.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    Senator Kaine. There is a sizable Uighur population in 
Virginia, and I have talked to many of my constituents as well 
as just following news about this.
    The leadership of Xi Jinping has seen China not only become 
bolder and more effective in projecting malign influence and 
power worldwide, but the Government has become more ruthless in 
many ways--uses of technology, forced sterilization, separation 
of families, and attempting to reduce and disperse its Uighur 
Muslim population.
    Both Secretaries of State Pompeo and Blinken have indicated 
that this is a genocide under the technical term, an 
intentional and very strategic effort, in the words of China's 
own officials, to, basically, carry out the elimination or 
reduction of the Uighur population and other Muslim populations 
in Xinjiang province.
    Last week, we had a joint subcommittee hearing in this 
committee. It was the first joint subcommittee hearing we had 
had in seven years and it was about China's atrocities in the 
Xinjiang province.
    The chair--the subcommittee I chair on Western Hemisphere, 
Global Democracy, and Human Rights worked together with the 
Subcommittee on East Asia, chaired by Senator Markey. Senators 
Rubio and Romney were very involved in this.
    And we heard from a number of witnesses in very powerful 
ways. One was my constituent, Ms. Rushan Abbas. She spoke very 
movingly about her sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, who has been in 
detention for three years. Her birthday was last Saturday, her 
third birthday in prison.
    They know she is in prison. They do not know where she is, 
but they did find out that she was secretly sentenced in a 
secret trial to a 20-year prison term. She is a physician who 
had made her career in the Xinjiang province just helping 
patients.
    U.S. efforts, global efforts thus far to combat the 
terrible atrocity have not been effective. So what more can we 
do as a committee, as an administration, as a country, to 
increase pressure on China to end this grim persecution of the 
Uighur and other Muslim populations in Xinjiang?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your 
comments and your leadership on this issue.
    I agree completely with your assessment of the challenge. I 
had the privilege of viewing most of your hearing last week and 
I, too, was moved by the testimony, particularly of Ms. Abbas.
    The ongoing genocide in Xinjiang shocks the conscience. We 
estimate more than 1 million Uighurs have been forcibly 
detained, put into reeducation camps, forced to provide labor, 
and many other disturbing allegations about how they are being 
treated.
    I think, Senator, working together with this committee, our 
obligation is to continue to shine a very bright light on this 
ongoing genocide, and I have been gratified to see that our 
other partners around the world, whether it is the G-7 or 
Japanese and Korean partners or our Quad partners as well have 
all spoken out against the abuses happening there.
    But more importantly, Senator, I think we need to continue 
to take steps using all the tools that the U.S. Government has 
at its disposal to hold to account the leaders who are carrying 
out these atrocities.
    And if I were confirmed, I would be committed to doing just 
that. I know that we have used a variety of tools, including 
Global Magnitsky tools, to sanction a number of the leaders, 
officials, and entities who are carrying out this repression in 
Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang party secretary, Chen Quanguo.
    And if I were confirmed, Senator, I pledge that we will 
continue to work not just to shine a bright light on the 
abuses, but also to take steps to hold those responsible 
accountable.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
    Two additional items in my last 40 seconds is related to 
the same topic.
    First, a lot of U.S. companies may be directly or 
indirectly, even unknowingly, facilitating this persecution in 
Xinjiang through their contacts in the region.
    Human Rights Watch had witness before us last week, Dr. 
Sophie Richardson, who indicated that they have written U.S. 
companies to get information to try to make sure the companies 
are aware of the dangers and they, generally, have not gotten 
responses.
    It is my hope that we might work together with you, should 
you be confirmed, so that a request by the U.S. Government 
might produce a response from some of these companies.
    And then, in addition, we need to work with allies outside 
the region. China is engaged in a pretty aggressive practice of 
having Uighurs arrested----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    Senator Kaine.--in countries like the UAE and Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia, allies in the United States, and then deported 
back to China, and we need to work with our allies to make sure 
that they do not facilitate the long arm of this gruesome 
persecution campaign all over the globe.
    And I would look forward to working with you on that 
together as well.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator, again, I fully agree with your assessment and your 
recommendation on both points. If confirmed, I look forward to 
working with you and members of the committee on both of those 
issues.
    Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    I understand Senator Young is with us virtually.
    Senator Young. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.
    Ambassador Robinson, in the midst of this global pandemic, 
Americans have continued to suffer under the scourge of 
narcotics trafficking, much of that being trafficked through 
our southern border.
    Despite some public calls for the designation, the Trump 
administration notably refrained from designating the Mexican 
drug cartels as a foreign terrorist organization.
    As the cartels use kidnapping, execution-style killings, 
the targeted killing of journalists and politicians, and with 
the flow of narcotics and violence into the United States 
continuing unabating it seems clear that the legal standard for 
this designation of foreign terrorist organization has been 
met.
    But I understand that Mexico may oppose such a designation. 
If confirmed, Mr. Ambassador, would you consider such a 
designation?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that--for that 
question, and I absolutely share your concerns with--about the 
malign influence of narcotics traffickers and the threats they 
pose to communities throughout the region.
    I think, you know, it is probably worth, you know, looking 
at. I am not a lawyer so I do not know what the legal 
definition is.
    But there is no doubt that the influence of narcotic 
traffickers throughout the region is crushing to communities, 
not just in the United States but in Mexico, in Colombia, and 
throughout Central America.
    And I will, certainly, commit to you that we will use all 
of the necessary tools to go after these criminal organizations 
and traffickers.
    Senator Young. Well, I thank you for that. Perhaps you 
could--I understand you are not being--you are not an attorney, 
and you will want to refer to others' analysis.
    I am an attorney. I do not want to overstate my 
qualifications to make this assessment, and attorneys can 
disagree.
    But it seems to me that the legal definition is, indeed, 
met as I look at the different pillars that need to be 
analyzed. Time does not permit me to get into those.
    But I also understand that there will be diplomatic 
considerations that play into this. What secondary effects may 
undermine the effectiveness of such a designation? This would 
be diplomatic analysis on your part.
    Mr. Robinson. I think that is--I think that is a great 
question. I would--you know, I would have to talk to--you know, 
should I be confirmed, I would make it my--one of my missions 
to talk to governments in the region to find out what secondary 
effects there may be.
    I, certainly, do not see why there would be obstacles to 
using maximum efforts to go after the narcotics traffickers and 
criminal organizations, and if this is a tool that we could 
effectively use, I would, certainly, want to engage with the 
governments in the region and governments globally to see what 
further we could do to sanction these groups.
    Senator Young. Like I said, I will look forward to working 
with you on that. I am encouraged by what seems to be an 
aggressive bias for action on this. I expect the Mexicans may 
indicate a lack of motivation to work with us on other matters 
if we go this direction.
    That can be a concern, and there may be some--an increased 
migration flow into this country of Mexican nationals fleeing 
terrorism if the terrorist designation is made.
    But with that said, would you commit to working with my 
office in working through this matter should you be confirmed, 
sir?
    Mr. Robinson. Should I be confirmed, absolutely, Senator. I 
will work with your office.
    Senator Young. Okay, thank you. I know our time is winding 
down. I just wanted to put one other matter, a stake sort of in 
the ground about my interest in it. Perhaps we can work 
together, should you be confirmed.
    One of the missions of your bureau is to enforce maritime 
rights and practice law enforcement at sea in the Indo-Pacific 
region. Admittedly, Ambassador Robinson, this is a mission 
larger than any single federal agency.
    It will involve collaboration and cooperation with the Navy 
and the Coast Guard and other entities and agencies and 
individuals.
    And given China's predatory actions at sea throughout the 
Pacific, I would be interested in exploring your priorities for 
INL's practicing of maritime law enforcement throughout the 
Pacific, especially in Oceania, and seeing where INL might 
better coordinate with the Coast Guard, moving forward. I would 
like to help do anything I can to ensure that INL is successful 
in this mission.
    So thank you for your desire to serve.
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. And I agree, I think that 
that INL has a fairly good story to tell about cooperation in 
that region on maritime security.
    I know when I was deputy assistant secretary we worked very 
closely with partner countries, allies in the region, on that 
issue. We did the same in West Africa.
    And so I would be happy to, should I be confirmed, work 
with your office on this.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Shaheen?
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
each of you for your willingness to be considered for these 
critical posts at this time.
    I would like to begin with you, Ambassador Robinson, 
because I come from a state that has been very hard hit by the 
opioid epidemic, and fentanyl has been the killer.
    We have one of--have had one of the highest overdose death 
rates in the country, and so I share the concerns that have 
been expressed on both sides of the aisle about how we respond 
to this and I appreciated your comments.
    Senator Portman, who is also a member of this committee, 
and I recently introduced legislation to build the capacity of 
foreign law enforcement agencies to detect an interdict 
fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, and also to try and 
increase collaboration between the United States and foreign 
countries.
    As someone who has worked in this arena in the past, can 
you tell me if you think there are particular best practices or 
areas where cooperation has really worked to make a difference 
to address this issue?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, and it is a very 
important point. I just want to emphasize how heartbreaking it 
is to know--to see the ravages of this drug on American 
communities and, particularly, communities like your state--in 
your state.
    Actually, INL, working on the--with the interagency, 
working with our partners in DEA and the Department of Justice, 
we have been able to do lots of training and capacity building 
globally, working with like-minded police organizations in 
countries around the world on training, identifying strategies, 
you know, making sure they are looking at going after the money 
and going after governments that participate in these things.
    So there is a--there is a whole range of tools that we can 
use to work with police organizations on these issues, and I 
would be happy to explore that with your office, should I be 
confirmed.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Perhaps you could look at 
the legislation that we are introducing and see if there are 
ways that we can make it more effective and other 
authorizations or other needs that you might have at INL.
    Mr. Robinson. Yeah, absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Mr. Holmgren, you have been asked about Havana syndrome, 
and this is something that my office heard about almost 
immediately after the attacks because I have some constituents 
who have been affected by it.
    And I am still concerned that six months into this new 
administration that we are still hearing from some of those 
people who have been affected about the lack of coordination, 
about the inability to meet with leadership, and particularly 
at State about the willingness of State to cooperate with the 
Department of Defense and the red tape that is still involved 
with getting treatment.
    So can you commit to not just trying to get to the bottom 
of that but to finding out what is causing it and why there is 
not more, at this point, coordination around how we are 
responding to this serious concern that is affecting too many 
employees within the federal government?
    Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator, for that important 
question and for your leadership--excuse me--on this issue.
    I absolutely commit to understanding if there are ways in 
how we can improve the interagency coordination process on this 
and, in particular, what role INR can and should be playing to 
both support the department but also, as you mentioned, the 
interagency.
    I understand that the NSC has established a coordination 
cell. I think that is a good--a very good positive development 
to bring together the different parts of the interagency and 
that State has now--has a lead, a person responsible for 
coordinating the State Department's efforts.
    And so, if confirmed, I am--I am eager to be involved in 
that. As I said up front, I have friends and former colleagues 
from CIA and other places that are affected by this, and so I 
think it is--I take it as a personal responsibility to address 
the issue.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I really appreciate that.
    And I will say to you what I have said to others, that I 
think one of the challenges with this issue is the classified 
nature of all of the information, and it makes it very 
difficult when there is an unwillingness of our State 
Departments and agencies to share with members of Congress what 
is going on and also to share with members of the public.
    So I would urge you to look at ways in which we can 
unclassify information that is not going to be harmful so that 
people really understand what is going on.
    Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator. I hear your concern and I 
pledge to do that.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Schatz?
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Schatz. I was giving you--I do not 
know if it is a promotion.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Some would consider it a promotion.
    Senator Schatz. We can ask Ambassador Hagerty if that is a 
promotion or not.
    The Chairman. He is here, so I do not know. That may be the 
answer. I am sorry.
    Senator Schatz?
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 
your service.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink, I want to start with Oceania. 
Secretary Blinken spoke at the Pacific Island Conference of 
Leaders a week ago.
    These kinds of engagements are really meaningful. They 
underscore our commitment to the region, including helping them 
to confront COVID and the climate crisis.
    Can you just talk about how you will engage in Oceania and 
your role to ensure that it will be elevated in our Indo-
Pacific strategy?
    And I think, you know, generally speaking, as we think on 
this committee, in the broader Senate, in the media, when we 
think about our Asia Pacific strategy, when we think our Indo-
Pacific strategy, everyone is immediately thinking about China 
and China only.
    And it occurs to me that there is a vast ocean full of 
nations----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Schatz.--that we need to reengage with that are our 
longtime partners and allies and friends, and for both moral 
reasons and strategic reasons, we need to reengage, and I am 
wondering if you can comment on that.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your 
comments and for your leadership on these issues.
    I fully agree with your assessment. If confirmed, I would 
be committed to making sure we expand our robust engagement 
with the countries--with the Pacific Island countries.
    I think, Senator, the first issue that you identified is 
one of the most important. First, we have to show up. We have 
to demonstrate our commitment by engaging and participating in 
meetings and organizations like the PIF.
    Secondly, Senator, I believe that we need to engage across 
the board because we have a number of vital national interests 
that are implicated amongst our Pacific Island friends.
    You mentioned climate, of course. Important security issues 
at play, issues related to illegal and unregulated fishing. Of 
course, climate change is an existential threat for many of 
these partners and, of course, COVID-19 is a great challenge 
across the region.
    If I were confirmed, Senator, I would be committed to 
upping our engagement across the board to advance those 
interests and to ensure that our strategic competitors like 
China as well do not take advantage or use their malign 
influence to advance their interests at the expense of ours or 
our partners in the Pacific Islands.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    Ambassador Robinson, I want to stay on Oceania for the 
moment. I introduced a bill with Senator Murkowski to elevate 
all of Oceania in U.S. foreign policy.
    One aspect of this bill is to increase our ability to 
counter the Chinese Government's foreign practices--foreign 
corrupt practices in Oceania, and much of that work runs 
through INL.
    We have heard, though, that INL does not have the resources 
to be present in the Oceania region to the extent that you may 
wish and that they have had to make quote/unquote, ``hard 
choices'' about not prioritizing the Pacific Islands.
    I was glad, however, to see that the president's budget 
carves out funding in INL to counter the Chinese Government's 
global malign influence campaign. But we need to make sure that 
Oceania is part of that effort.
    Can you talk about what you see in Oceania and what we 
ought to do about it through INL?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. I think that is a--that 
is a very important question.
    You know, as you have pointed out, most of our focus has 
been on focusing on the malign influence of China in the 
region. I suspect I would have to look more closely, but I 
suspect much of the work we are going to do INL would do in the 
region, if I am confirmed, would focus on China's malign 
influence.
    But there are--you know, there are other issues in the 
region that we can--that we can and should focus on, and we 
spoke about it a little earlier. Working with like-minded 
partners on maritime safety, for instance, will be key.
    And, you know, INL can take a look at issues a little bit 
outside of our area. We do work on wildlife trafficking. We do 
work on illegal mining. We do work on illegal fisheries.
    And so all of those issues or many of those issues might 
get us closer to the region and closer to the issues that you 
are raising.
    Senator Schatz. Final question. I will make it quick.
    You know, I have been working on Lacey Act amendments. I 
know Senator Merkley and others have prioritized this over the 
many, many years.
    The thing with the Lacey Act is it does not quite get to 
about half of all of the tropical deforestation, which is the 
result of illegal deforestation for commercial agriculture.
    And so I am wondering if we can work with you and the other 
relevant federal agencies to get more supply chain transparency 
and also to dig into the root causes that result in 
deforestation, clear cutting for agriculture and for commodity 
development.
    The Lacey Act was a very important start, but we are sort 
of stuck there, and even our partners in the business community 
who want to do the right thing have great difficulty in terms 
of the supply chain transparency.
    So I think it is time for another round of collective 
thinking about what is the next iteration of the Lacey Act so 
that we can actually make sure that we do not just declare that 
we find illegal deforestation offensive to us and to the globe 
but that we are actually going to crack down on it, and I am 
wondering if I can have your commitment to work with us on 
that.
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Senator, you have my commitment.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 
Member. Congratulations to all of you on your nominations.
    Let me start with you, Ambassador Kritenbrink.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. I was pleased to see the statements 
made by President Biden and others at the recent NATO summit 
regarding a more coordinated coherent strategy with respect to 
China's efforts to use its centralized economic power to export 
its authoritarian model, and I was pleased to hear your 
response to Senator Hagerty with respect to the Quad and you 
also mentioned other allies in the area including, of course, 
South Korea and others.
    One of the important issues that has come up with respect 
to the situation in the South China Sea is the importance of 
something many of us have been in favor of for a long time, 
which is ratifying the Law of the Sea Treaty.
    In your opinion, would that be an important step that the 
United States could take along with the international community 
to provide clear rules of the road that would benefit not just 
the United States but others in the region and around the 
world?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your 
question.
    I know that when Secretary Blinken was asked that same 
question in testimony last week, he stated that he was not yet 
aware if there was an administrative--administration position, 
but that he personally supported the ratification and believed 
it would be helpful.
    I think what I would say, Senator, is whatever we can do to 
reinforce the rules-based international order where countries 
large and small play by the rules the better.
    The great irony, of course, is that even though the United 
States has not ratified UNCLOS we do abide by it because we 
believe it represents customary international law.
    China, of course, has ratified it and violates it on a 
daily basis.
    Nonetheless, Senator I am--I would be supportive of any 
action that strengthens our position on maritime issues, 
including our legal rates.
    Senator Van Hollen. So would not it put the United States 
in a stronger position vis-a-vis China and its violations of 
the Law of the Sea Treaty if the United States were a party to 
the agreement?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, I would associate myself with 
Secretary Blinken's comments on that last week.
    Senator Van Hollen. I will take that--I understand. He said 
he was personally in favor of it and I----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. So----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. But can I just underscore? I think you 
have hit the nail right on the head that we have to advance our 
interests in supporting the rules-based international order.
    Many other things we need to do in the maritime domain as 
well, but that is a key one. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Let me ask you about a piece of legislation that we passed 
a couple years ago here. It was called the BRINK Act. I 
authored it together with Senator Toomey, and it was designed 
to close some of the loopholes in the sanctions that we have 
imposed on North Korea.
    There was a recent U.N. panel of experts report on the 
implementation of international sanctions against North Korea, 
and they painted a picture of a very leaky sanctions regime, 
especially with respect to some goods flowing from China.
    They also mentioned key imports, refined petroleum and 
coal, had surged into North Korea last year. So the BRINK Act 
establishes a secondary sanctions regime similar to the earlier 
Iran sanctions regime that helped bring Iran to the table for 
the JCPOA.
    Could you commit to working with us and the Department of 
Treasury to make sure that we fully apply this law? And what is 
your current assessment of, you know, the role sanctions can 
play in putting pressure on the North Korean regime?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much.
    If confirmed, I can assure you that I would look forward to 
working with you and your team on these issues.
    As I noted at the outset, the Biden ministration--Biden/
Harris administration is committed to the denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula, and, if confirmed, I would support an 
approach that relies both on sanctions enforcement and 
deterrence as well as a practical calibrated approach open to 
democracy.
    If confirmed, I would be delighted to learn more about the 
BRINK Act and how we can strengthen the sanctions regime.
    But, Senator, I do agree, enforcing the sanctions regime 
with tools that we have, together with U.N. tools, I think is 
vitally important to the denuclearization goals that we have.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. And again, thank all of you 
for your service.
    And Mr. Holmgren, let me just say I think INR is one of 
those great agencies in the federal government that punches way 
above its weight.
    So I hope you will hold your own within the IC because, in 
my experience, INR has called it right more than the other 
agencies, on average.
    Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator. It is an honor to be 
nominated to lead INR.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz?
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to 
each of the three of you.
    Mr. Holmgren, let us start with you. If confirmed, you 
would be the principal intelligence adviser to the secretary 
and other State Department principals.
    You would be charged with driving the intelligence 
apparatus advising the secretary of state on the risks and the 
benefits of reentering any nuclear deal with Iran.
    I want to ask you about that. One of the most troubling 
aspects of the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal were the 
enormous holes in verifying Iranian compliance.
    Some of those holes were obvious, such as giving Iran weeks 
to clean up sites before inspections and functionally 
prohibiting inspection of military facilities.
    Others were less obvious but even more damaging. One side 
deal forced the IAEA, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, to 
prematurely close investigations into past Iranian nuclear 
weapons work, leaving the scope and the nature of Iran's 
weapons program unknown.
    According to Bloomberg, the Obama administration provided 
Congress with a classified annex, saying that the deal could 
still be verified if Iran fully complied and did not cheat.
    Today, we know, of course, the deal failed to detect vast 
portions of Iran's nuclear weapons program. We know it because 
of daring raids and revelations by our Israeli allies.
    We know that between the implementation of the deal in 
January 26 to May 2018 the IAEA was not aware that Iran was 
concealing a nuclear weapons archive, nor was the IAEA aware 
that Iran was contained--had containers at a warehouse called 
Turqazabad where the IAEA later reportedly discovered traces of 
man-altered uranium.
    The agency subsequently visited three other undisclosed 
sites and found nuclear material at two of them. The IAEA has 
never inspected any facility run by the SPND, a military 
organization employing nuclear weapons scientists, which, until 
last year, was run by the founder of Iran's nuclear weapons 
program. That is unknown sites and zero military facilities 
inspected.
    Despite all of this, the Biden administration is rushing to 
reenter the Iran deal.
    Mr. Holmgren, do you support reentering the deal in light 
of those failures?
    Mr. Holmgren. Senator Cruz, thank you for that question.
    As a former intelligence analyst who focused on the Middle 
East, I very much appreciate the multi-dimensional threat that 
Iran poses--their state sponsorship of terrorism, their nuclear 
ambitions, cyber, human rights violations, and their ballistic 
missile capabilities.
    So I very much appreciate the threat. If confirmed to lead 
INR, which is part of the intelligence community, my commitment 
to you and to this entire committee is that we will supply 
objective information and analysis regarding all of Iran's 
malign activities to include its compliance with the--with the 
nuclear requirements as part of the JCPOA even if those 
conclusions diverge from your policy interests, but especially, 
because I think it is even more important, if the intelligence 
community has a different view based on all sorts of 
information of where policymakers are that we would absolutely 
provide that information to support the secretary but also 
other policymakers as well as this committee.
    Senator Cruz. In your assessment, what additional measures 
would be required to close the loopholes that allowed these 
failures in the prior deal?
    Mr. Holmgren. Senator, I am not--I am not privy to--I have 
not been in government the last few years so I am not privy to 
the--any classified details and additional measures.
    But what I could tell you is that, from an intelligence 
perspective, I think having an incredibly strong collection and 
analytic regime focused on Iran's compliance would be--
certainly, would be a top priority.
    As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I view Iran as one of 
the top big four threats we face, and so making sure that INR 
has the resources and the expertise to provide objective 
analysis would absolutely be a priority for me, sir.
    Senator Cruz. Okay.
    And, Mr. Kritenbrink, the Obama administration implemented 
a policy that forbade our Taiwanese allies from displaying 
symbols of their sovereignty, whether flags or medals or 
uniforms, on U.S. soil.
    During the Trump administration, I pressed the Trump 
administration to change that policy to reverse the ban, and 
they did so.
    Unfortunately, after Secretary Blinken came through his 
confirmation hearing where I asked him about it and he 
committed to maintaining the policy of allowing Taiwan to 
display its symbols of sovereignty, subsequently, the Biden 
State Department reversed that policy and now prohibits our 
Taiwanese allies from displaying their symbols of sovereignty.
    This committee just a few weeks ago took up legislation I 
had to reverse the new Biden ban and to return to the 
preexisting policy that allowed Taiwan, like our other allies, 
to display their symbols of sovereignty.
    This committee passed that overwhelmingly. The Senate 
passed it overwhelmingly in a bipartisan manner. If confirmed, 
will you restore the previous policy allowing our Taiwanese 
allies to display their symbols of sovereignty, and if not, why 
not?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for the 
question.
    I want to emphasize at the outset, Senator, if confirmed, I 
would be absolutely committed to growing our robust and vitally 
important partnership with democratic Taiwan.
    I would argue that our partnership with Taiwan is perhaps 
stronger than it has ever been, from our commitments 
demonstrated under the Taiwan Relations Act, including $30 
billion in arm sales since 2009, to the provision of vaccines, 
to our close health cooperation to the visit by three members 
of the Senate in just the last few weeks.
    I think we have made clear our commitment to growing that 
partnership with Taiwan.
    Senator, since 1979, for decades now, the United States has 
followed a set of contact guidelines for our engagement with 
Taiwan, and my understanding, Senator, is for decades now those 
guidelines have outlined that during our important engagements 
with our unofficial--our Taiwan counterparts to advance our 
unofficial relationship that symbols of sovereignty are not 
allowed on U.S. Government property.
    And those guidelines, as I understand them, Senator, have 
been in place for decades and were in place for the vast 
majority of the previous administration as well.
    Based on the briefings and discussions that I have had, 
Senator, the new guidelines that have been enacted under the 
Biden administration are significantly liberalized. They are 
explicitly designed to further develop our relationships and 
our partnership with Taiwan, and they have been welcomed by the 
Taiwan leadership, including President Tsai herself.
    So I can assure you, Senator, that I am committed in every 
way to growing our partnership with Taiwan and I will hasten to 
add that, of course, I will always enforce U.S. law.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
    Ambassador Robinson, I am going to close up with you, I 
think, because this will be the last set of questions. I do not 
want you to think I--you have no--none of my attention. So let 
me just, briefly, make a statement about Mexico.
    I had some deep concerns about Mexico over the last year. 
In the fall, the United States arrested Mexico's former defense 
minister on drug trafficking charges. Very literally this case 
highlighted that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are 
capable of co-opting individuals at the highest levels of 
Mexico's Government.
    When we released General Cienfuegos, albeit under some 
rather murky circumstances, the Lopez Obrador government 
responded by publishing U.S. law enforcement documents, in 
violation of our mutual legal assistance treaty and then 
pushing a law to the Mexican Congress that seemed intent on 
constraining bilateral law enforcement cooperation.
    I understand how important the U.S. trade, economic, 
political, and security relationship is with Mexico and I am 
fully supportive of efforts to strengthen it.
    However, we have to be clear eyed. We cannot ignore 
evidence about the links between certain members of Mexico 
security forces and drug traffickers.
    So, if confirmed, I trust you will give these issues your 
full attention?
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
    I share your concerns and look forward, should I be 
confirmed, to working with the interagency and working with the 
Congress to addressing and focusing on these issues.
    The Chairman. And one last question for you. We had a very 
good in-depth discussion so a lot of the issues have been 
raised.
    As I thought, fentanyl and others have been raised. I am 
increasingly concerned by reports that the Assad regime is 
earning hard currency in the face of international sanctions 
and cratering currency and economy by manufacturing and 
exporting Captagon, a potent and addictive amphetamine, often 
with the cooperation of Hezbollah.
    This drug is being smuggled, often by Hezbollah, across 
Lebanon's border with Syria and through Lebanon's weak import 
and export controls to be distributed throughout Europe and the 
Middle East, prompting bans on Lebanese exports recently that 
the Lebanese economy can ill afford.
    What steps can we take to counter such drug smuggling, 
including assistance to strengthen the Lebanese border and 
customs enforcement?
    Mr. Robinson. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question.
    INL has a great track record on working with the government 
of Lebanon on training and capacity building, and we will 
continue. Should I be confirmed, I would make sure that we 
would continue to do that.
    I would also say that we can work with the interagency--we 
have been working with the interagency to track these 
shipments, particularly with DEA, and working with like-minded 
partners in the region.
    We know Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about this, 
the trafficking of this drug, and we can continue to work with 
like-minded partners on this issue.
    The Chairman. Well, I just want to highlight it because, of 
course, we often hear about fentanyl, as we should because it 
is causing deaths in America. But in this case of this 
Captagon, you have got a lot of bad players.
    You have Hezbollah, you have Assad, and undermining what 
little is left of the Lebanese economy. That is a bad trifecta, 
at the end of the day.
    So I hope that you will make it one of your priorities upon 
confirmation.
    Mr. Robinson. I share your concern, Chairman, and should I 
be confirmed, we will absolutely track it.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator? All right.
    With that, with the thanks of the committee, this record 
will remain open until tomorrow at the close of business.
    There may be questions for the record. We would urge the 
nominees to answer those questions expeditiously so you can be 
considered for a business meeting.
    And with that, this hearing is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator James E. Risch

Central America/Illegal Migration
    Question. Given your previous experience in Central America and at 
INL, can you describe the nexus between transnational criminal 
organizations and human smuggling/trafficking across Central America 
and Mexico? What financial benefits would you estimate drug trafficking 
groups are reaping from the increased flows of illegal migrants 
arriving at our Southwest border?

    Answer. Systemic corruption and impunity contribute to the 
permissive environments that enable the illicit activities of 
transnational criminal organizations across Central America and Mexico, 
some of which are involved in smuggling migrants across countries' 
borders or are profiting from the exploitation of individuals in sex 
trafficking or forced labor, including forced criminal activity. I 
understand corruption, insecurity, and low levels of trust in 
institutions are among the root causes driving irregular migration in 
the region, including to the United States, and undermine economic 
growth and development, weaken the rule of law, and lead to a loss of 
hope. If confirmed, I will continue to press these governments to take 
concrete actions to combat corruption and impunity, improve democratic 
governance, and strengthen the rule of law. Reliable estimates of the 
ill-gotten financial gains of drug trafficking groups or transnational 
criminal organizations are hard to confirm, but remain a concern.

Mexico/Illicit Narcotics
    Question. What specific actions would you encourage Mexico take to 
meaningfully tackle transitional criminal activities through its 
territory, including trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit 
narcotics?

    Answer. INL strengthens Mexico's capacity to reduce the production 
and trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit drugs. I understand that 
INL supports Mexico's recent steps to regulate fentanyl precursor 
chemicals and encourages Mexico to increase and better integrate its 
investigations into precursor chemical diversion, drug production, and 
trafficking. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department works to 
strengthen cooperation on this vital issue through the cabinet-level 
security dialogue committed to during Vice President Harris' June 8 
meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.

Venezuela
    Question. Can you describe how the Maduro regime's involvement in 
transna-tional criminal activities impacts peace and stability in 
Colombia?

    Answer. Colombia has worked hard to extend effective state presence 
throughout its national territory, but the Maduro regime's 
mismanagement and its tolerance of illicit activities and evident lack 
of interest in controlling such activities within its own borders has 
made Colombia's task vastly more difficult. The Maduro regime's profit-
seeking ties with dissident members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia, the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army, and 
Venezuelan paramilitary groups facilitate illicit activity, public 
corruption, and graft schemes. These relationships, combined with 
historically weak government presence at the border between Colombia 
and Venezuela, have allowed Colombian terrorist groups and 
narcotraffickers to operate with impunity. Venezuelans and Colombians 
are the victims of the Maduro regime's inability or unwillingness to 
provide security within Venezuela and of the predatory behavior of 
these criminal groups.

Cuba/State Sponsor of Terrorism
    Question. Should Cuba be removed from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism (SST) while they continue to harbor U.S. fugitives and U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations?

    Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully 
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the 
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
    If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the administration's 
review of Cuba policy. Our priority in Cuba, as the rest of the 
Hemisphere, needs to be democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.

Afghanistan
    Question. Given the Biden administration's decision to withdraw 
troops from Afghanistan, how can INL realistically and effectively 
counter Afghanistan's opium problem or provide oversight of existing 
counternarcotic programs?

    Answer. I understand that most cultivation and production of poppy 
in Afghanistan occurs in areas under Taliban influence or control, 
compounding the challenge of implementing effective counternarcotics 
projects. INL has a constructive working relationship with the Afghan 
Government and supports specialized counter-drug enforcement units in 
Afghanistan, such as the National Interdiction Unit and the polygraphed 
Sensitive Investigative Unit, with enablers including a modern wiretap 
system and a team of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration mentors. 
These units have mounted successful operations in insurgent-held areas. 
Additionally, INL funds border and customs police to effectively search 
and profile passengers and cargo at ports of entry, treatment for 
Afghans suffering from substance use disorders, licit alternatives to 
poppy for farmers, and capacity building for the Afghan Government. If 
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to utilize a tiered approach to 
monitoring existing projects, including third party monitors for end-
use monitoring and implementation activities, and multiple 
organizations to provide assessments and evaluations on INL activities.

Lebanon-Internal Security Forces (ISF)
    Question. As Lebanon faces a potential state collapse, please 
comment on continued assistance to the ISF in Lebanon.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize our support to 
the ISF, a key partner in maintaining peace in Lebanon. Following the 
August 2020 Port of Beirut explosion, I understand INL increased 
efforts to provide basic equipment support to the ISF, including PPE as 
it dealt with the COVID crisis, address internal corruption, and 
improve internal and external cooperation through cross functional 
collaboration. This includes human resource automation efforts, which 
can reduce administrative demands, increase productivity, reduce costs, 
and provide more transparency and accountability within the ISF. 
Continued support to the ISF can help mitigate further instability in 
Lebanon.

West Bank-Palestinian Security Forces (PASF)
    Question. Is this an appropriate focus for the PASF without 
securing concessions on pay to slay? How have Israeli attitudes towards 
the PASF evolved following recent violence with Hamas and Gaza? USSC 
has also suggested that PASF should be allowed to attend US military 
training and schools. Is this an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars 
given the PASF's non-state status?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure INL delivers its assistance 
consistent with its authorities and other U.S. laws. The shift in focus 
reflects improved performance and maturity by the PASF since we began 
providing assistance in 2007. I understand that INL believes taking 
this new focus will sustain that trend. The PASF units INL assisted 
performed well in their daily missions as well as during crises, 
especially including the latest round of violence, when they had to 
coordinate with Israeli security forces. The PASF will receive their 
operational training at their own training centers in Jericho. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that any decision to send a small selection of 
well-vetted senior officers to U.S. military institutions is based 
solely on a commitment to provide them the best leadership training 
available that will make them better officers and further improve the 
performance of the PASF.

Libya
    Question. How does INL plan to work with the MOI in Libya to re-
establish a governmental monopoly on the use of force and reduce the 
presence of non-state militias and mercenaries?

    Answer. A move away from the informal and hybrid relationships that 
have developed over the past war-torn years will require a combination 
of different strengths across the Department to address these 
challenges, particularly with disbarment, demobilization, and 
deradicalization, and to facilitate the movement towards 
relegitimization of criminal justice institutions and law enforcement.
    To that end, I understand INL aims to help build the capabilities 
of legitimate institutions that can provide for civilian security 
focused on their needs, incorporate the rule of law, and include 
greater emphasis on appropriate use of force that is compliant with 
international standards on human rights. INL is developing 
opportunities with the Ministries of Interior and Justice to return 
criminal justice facilities previously damaged by the hostilities 
witnessed in Libya back to Ministry of Justice control and out of the 
hands of militias.

Tunisia
    Question. How does INL plan to work to ensure allegations of police 
violence and credibility and transparently investigated, and those 
found responsible held to account? Are there ways in which INL can 
tailor programming to ensure police officers and unit commanders are 
held accountable for instances of excessive use of force? What role 
should Tunisia's police unions play moving forward?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure INL continues to work across 
the Tunisian criminal justice sector to foster and institutionalize 
transparency and accountability. INL's law enforcement programming 
incorporates international best practices, including the use of modern 
policing techniques, methods of internal accountability, transparency 
to the public, and citizen-oriented approaches. INL complies with 
statutory provisions to vet units and individuals for potential gross 
violations of human rights and encourages the Government to investigate 
and hold accountable those responsible. The 2014 Tunisian constitution 
permits internal security forces to unionize; however, it does not 
define the unions' role beyond the prohibition to strike, and INL does 
not work with the unions.

    Question. Are there specific steps that INL can take to advance 
security sector reform in Tunisia? What does INL consider to be the 
most pressing priorities in terms of advancing a wider security sector 
reform agenda?

    Answer. Given security challenges, the need for broad reform, and 
limited resources, security sector reform in Tunisia has not been 
linear. Within this dynamic environment, INL designs its programming in 
Tunisia to address civilian criminal justice sector reform holistically 
across law enforcement, justice, and corrections. INL prioritizes 
assistance to the Government of Tunisia to improve core operational 
capacities and competencies in support of fair, transparent, and 
independent criminal justice organizations responsive to citizens' 
needs.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Addressing Corruption and Kleptocracy
    Question. The Combating Global Corruption Act obliges the Executive 
to identify corruption in countries and rank them; establishes minimum 
standards for combating corruption; and evaluates foreign persons 
engaged in grand corruption for consideration under the Global 
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.

   If confirmed, in what ways will you strengthen efforts at the State 
        Department to focus on combating corruption abroad?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the department to combat 
corruption as a top foreignpolicy priority of the Biden-Harris 
Administration. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs plays a key role in the promotion of 
internationally recognized standards and commitments to prevent and 
combat corruption, provides targeted foreign assistance to strengthen 
criminal justice systems and institutions to both resist and root out 
corruption abroad, and implements visa restrictions to promote 
accountability for corrupt actors. I will work to expand these efforts 
and our partnerships and coordination across the interagency to ensure 
the range of foreign assistance and diplomatic tools are brought to 
bear in cultivating strong, transparent institutions to prevent and 
combat corruption abroad.

    Question. Do you see opportunities to improve our whole-of-
government approach towards fighting corruption?

    Answer. The United States enforces one of the most robust 
anticorruption frameworks in the world. The President's National 
Security Study Memorandum on the fight against corruption presents a 
unique opportunity to further integrate the expertise of U.S. federal 
agencies into these efforts and create a more expansive and effective 
whole-of-government response to this complex threat. The Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs maintains deep 
partnerships across the interagency in support of our shared mission to 
disrupt and deter transnational organized crime and corruption, both at 
home and abroad. If confirmed, I will continue to support these vital 
partnerships, and the State Department's commitment to this 
Administration priority.

Strengthening the Global Magnitsky Act
    Question. The Global Magnitsky Act has proven valuable as a tool 
that can penalize human rights abusers and corrupt actors without 
rupturing bilateral relations. The Global Magnitsky Act sunset was 
removed in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act of 2021.

   Do you agree that ``Magnitsky-like'' sanctions are an effective 
        tool for countering human rights abusers and corruption around 
        the world?

    Answer. The Global Magnitsky sanctions program is an effective and 
impactful tool as part of our broader efforts to combat corruption and 
promote human rights globally. The Global Magnitsky sanctions program, 
along with other similar tools, such as Section 7031(c) visa 
restrictions, promotes accountability of corrupt actors and human 
rights abusers and deters future corruption and human rights abuse 
abroad.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to robustly implementing 
the Global Magnitsky Act through high-impact sanctions designations, 
including by appropriately staffing relevant State Department offices 
and bureaus?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department and 
interagency to use all available tools, including the Global Magnitsky 
sanctions program, to combat corruption globally. The Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a 
dedicated team focused on implementing a range of deterrence tools, 
including supporting implementation of the corruption prong of Global 
Magnitsky. If confirmed, I will continue to support robust 
implementation of these tools in conjunction with INL's foreign 
assistance and diplomatic efforts to disrupt and deter corruption 
abroad.

    Question. If confirmed, would you support the permanent 
authorization of Global Magnitsky sanctions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would support the permanent authorization 
of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. This sanctions 
program has demonstrated its impact and supports our broader efforts to 
prevent and combat corruption and protect human rights abroad.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
            to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Marco Rubio

Guatemala
    Question. Given your extensive background and experience in Central 
America, most recently as United States Ambassador to Guatemala, you 
understand the threats these nations are facing--not just from violent 
transnational criminal organizations, but also from external malign 
actors like China and Russia, which are trying to gain a foothold in 
our hemisphere.

   Do you believe that the United States' approach should be to 
        disengage from these governments and cut our assistance to 
        them?

    Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Central American 
countries to have strengthened democratic governance, expanded economic 
opportunity for their citizens, and the capacity to address the 
security challenges that cause many to flee the region and present 
direct harms to the United States. U.S. foreign assistance is an 
essential element of our regional strategy that includes strengthening 
civil society, promoting transparency and rule of law, combating 
corruption, and improving respect for human rights. If confirmed, I 
will work to ensure that our foreign assistance is accompanied by 
robust U.S. diplomatic engagement and appropriate oversight. President 
Biden is clear-eyed about the challenge and has insisted governments 
step up as true partners in creating the conditions for economic 
opportunity and security, which includes fighting corruption and 
impunity.

    Question. During your time as United States Ambassador to 
Guatemala, please describe your knowledge, if any, of Russia's 
involvement in Guatemala's mining sector.

    Answer. During my tenure, our embassy kept track of various issues 
affecting Guatemala's economy, including in the area of energy and 
mines. If confirmed, I will prioritize countering the malign influence 
of Russia and other actors in Guatemala and elsewhere as part of our 
efforts to bolster good governance and combat corruption.

    Question. What is your knowledge of the legal issues related to the 
EXIMBAL nickel mine, owned by Russian interests, and the (then) 
Canadian-U.S.-owned San Rafael mine?

    Answer. According to news reports, the Constitutional Court (CC) 
initially suspended operations of the EXIMBAL nickel mine in July 2019 
for failure to conduct consultations with affected indigenous 
communities under International Labor Organization convention 169 (ILO 
169), confirming the decision again in June 2020. However, the mine, 
owned by Switzerland-based Solway Investment Group, continued 
production until February, when the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) 
suspended the mine's exploitation license to conform with the CC's July 
2019 ruling, confirmed again by the CC on March 1.
    Operations of the San Rafael mine have been suspended since 2017, 
also for failure to conduct community consultations in accordance with 
ILO 169. In 2018, the CC ordered the Guatemalan Government to conduct 
community consultations prior to reopening the mine.

    Question. Can you provide the most recent update on the cases 
mentioned above?

    Answer. I understand that in June, deputies from the political 
party Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza alleged to the MEM that Fenix 
mine continues to conduct some operations illegally, despite its 
ordered suspension. Pre-consultations with local indigenous groups 
under ILO 169 are scheduled to begin July 15 in Izabal. The pre-
consultation process for the San Rafael mine began on May 21 in Santa 
Rosa. The next meeting is scheduled for June 20.

    Question. Can you describe the role played by Gazprombank and VTB 
Bank, two entities sanctioned by Treasury, in the mining sector in 
Guatemala?

    Answer. I do not have current information about the role played by 
Gazprombank and VTB in Guatemala's mining sector. On the issue of 
sanctions, if confirmed, I will prioritize working with colleagues 
across the interagency to pursue appropriate measures, including visa 
revocations and sanctions, to promote accountability for corruption.

    Question. Are you aware of any evidence that Guatemalan authorities 
worked with VTB Bank through CICIG?

    Answer. No. To my knowledge, CICIG was an independent, U.N.-backed 
commission that helped Guatemala build capacity and make progress in 
the fight against corruption during its tenure.

Assistance with Law Enforcement Agencies
    Question. If confirmed, will you ensure strict oversight of U.S. 
support for security forces under the control of the Palestinian 
Authority and ensure any assistance complies with all U.S. legislative 
restrictions on these funds?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure strict oversight of U.S. 
support for security forces under the control of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA). I will ensure any assistance complies with all U.S. 
legislative restrictions on these funds. I understand INL provides its 
assistance through letters of agreement that ensure strict oversight, 
and conducts end-use monitoring of the materials it supplies to ensure 
it is accounted for and being used for the purposes it was provided. I 
understand INL will implement a robust vetting process, including Leahy 
vetting and vetting through the Department's Risk Analysis and 
Management Office, to mitigate the risk that U.S. Government resources 
could benefit terrorist groups or their supporters. If confirmed, I 
will ensure INL also vets all recipients of PA assistance, including 
students enrolled in training programs, for suspected terrorist 
organization affiliation and human rights violations. If the vetting 
results show any level of doubt, INL will exclude them from the 
program.

    Question. If confirmed, what actions do you intend to take in order 
to combat Hezbollah?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continuing our support to Lebanon 
and exploring ways to adapt our support to address the pressing needs 
of key partners in the security and judicial sectors such as targeted 
interventions to improve criminal information collection, analysis, and 
sharing; build on efforts to eliminate security vacuums that criminals 
and terrorists exploit by expanding police professionalization efforts; 
and solidify and sustain anti-crime gains through the delivery of 
specialized skills. Such support bolsters legitimate institutions in 
Lebanon and can help counter Hezbollah's malign influence.

    Question. What is your position on reports of Hezbollah financing 
itself with networks involved in the drug trade in Latin America?

    Answer. I am concerned about Hezbollah's purported role as a 
facilitator of the narcotics trade. Financial supporters, facilitators, 
and sympathizers of Hezbollah operate in the Western Hemisphere, 
raising funds in support of the organization through a variety of 
illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and trade-based 
money laundering. As a part of INL's broader efforts to combat 
transnational crime, I understand INL will continue to prioritize anti-
money laundering and counternarcotics programming globally.

    Question. What is your view on U.S. cooperation with law 
enforcement authorities in Ukraine?

    Answer. I understand the United States has worked closely with 
Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs to advance sweeping law 
enforcement reforms since 2014, starting with the creation of the 
Patrol Police. The Ministry continues to be a constructive partner on 
law enforcement reform, to include providing support and development of 
the Patrol Police in the major cities and rolling out the newly 
established Territorial Community Police Officer initiative in rural 
communities throughout Ukraine. The foundation of both reform efforts 
incorporates the respect for human rights and adopts international best 
policing practices to ensure officers are trained to be accountable, 
service-oriented, and transparent. If confirmed, I look forward to 
continuing this cooperation on advancing meaningful law enforcement 
reform in Ukraine.

    Question. What actions will you take to work with the law 
enforcement agencies of our partners and allies to prevent the export 
of products produced with the forced labor of Uyghurs in China?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working 
with partners and allies to address the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) Government's ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang and will consider and 
support the use of all appropriate tools to promote accountability for 
those involved, including import restrictions for goods made with 
forced labor. If confirmed, I will support Secretary Blinken's call on 
other governments to take ``concrete actions'' to ensure no companies 
or governments provide the PRC with products or services that 
facilitate repression in Xinjiang or purchase goods from Xinjiang made 
with forced labor. If confirmed, I will also strengthen our law 
enforcement partnerships and coordination with allies to ensure we are 
taking a multilateral approach to stopping the genocide and crimes 
against humanity in Xinjiang, including by working with the interagency 
in its efforts to identify and block the import to the United States of 
goods produced through forced labor.


    Question. Please elaborate with specificity on the issues you kept 
track of with respect to energy and mines during your tenure.

   For example, did you discuss litigation involving the U.S.-based 
        Tahoe Resources' El Esocabal silver mine (Minera San Rafael), 
        owned by Canadian-U.S. interests, with anyone, and if so, with 
        whom? Please detail what was discussed.

   Did you discuss the nickel mine owned by the Russian concern CGN, 
        located in Izabal, known variously as EXIMBAL?

    Answer. I had several discussions on this issue with various 
persons during my time in Guatemala. In fact, for the purposes of 
advocacy for U.S. business, Tahoe Resources was treated as an American 
company despite its ownership being largely Canadian. I believe we made 
this determination after consultation with the Department of Commerce. 
I know I had at least two (maybe more) meetings with representatives of 
Tahoe Resources in Guatemala and one in Washington, DC. I discussed the 
issue with Guatemalan congressional representatives. I discussed the 
issue with members of Guatemala's court system (both Supreme Court and 
Constitutional Court). I also discussed the issue with members of 
Guatemala's executive branch (both the President, the Vice President, 
and cabinet members). In addition, I discussed the issue with visiting 
U.S. congressional delegations.
    Among the issues discussed were:


 1. The possibility of clearing a path for the mine to open or reopen 
        successfully;

 2. The value of the mine to the community around the mine and the 
        value of the mine to Guatemala to show it was open for foreign 
        direct investment;

 3. The obstacles to full functionality of the mine and the role of a 
        consultative process between the mining company and the local 
        community;

 4. The mining company's journey through Guatemala's judicial process.


    I do not recall that I ever discussed EXIMBAL. However, that is not 
to say it was not discussed by other U.S. officials at the embassy. 
These issues--San Rafael and/or EXIMBAL--would have been largely 
handled by the Economic Section and/or the Commercial office.

    Question. Did you ever meet with any legal representative of either 
Gazprombank or VTB Bank?

   If so, what dates and how many times?

   Did you discuss Russia's involvement in the mining sector with 
        them, or litigation involving EXIMBAL or Minera San Rafael? If 
        so, please provide details.

    Answer. I do not recall that I ever met with any representative of 
Gazprombank or VTB Bank.

    Question. How frequently did you meet with the attorney general of 
Guatemala?

   In your meetings and conversations, did you discuss Russia's 
        involvement in the mining sector with the attorney general?

   Did you discuss litigation involving Minera San Rafael? If so, 
        when?

    Answer. I met formally and informally with the attorney general of 
Guatemala on a fairly regular basis between 2014-2017. I do not believe 
the attorney general and I ever discussed Russia's involvement in the 
mining sector. I also do not believe we discussed litigation involving 
Minera San Rafael.

    Question. How frequently did you meet with members of Guatemala's 
Constitutional Court?

   In your meetings and conversations, did you discuss Russia's 
        involvement in the mining sector with them?

   Did you discuss litigation involving Minera San Rafael?

    Answer. Over the course of my three years in Guatemala, I met with 
members of the Constitutional Court both formally and informally on a 
regular basis. Other embassy representatives did as well. Apart from 
the political upheaval that occurred during that time, we had technical 
programs with the supreme and constitutional courts involving case 
tracking systems and equipment to expand the ability of the courts to 
reach beyond the capital.
    I do not believe I discussed Russia's involvement in the mining 
sector with any court members. The Minera San Rafael issue was 
discussed as the case wound its way through the Supreme and 
Constitutional Courts.

    Question. Did you meet with any non-governmental organizations 
involved in court-ordered consultations with respect to the Minera San 
Rafael to discuss issues related to the mining sector?

    Answer. Since I met with several NGOs on numerous topics during my 
time as Ambassador over four years ago, I do not recall specific 
conversations with respect to the Minera San Rafael issue. If this 
issue was discussed, it would have been to understand Tahoe Resources' 
concerns to see if any agreement could be brokered between the two 
sides.

    Question. What past information did you have with regard to the 
role played by Gazprombank and VTB in Guatemala's mining sector dating 
back to your tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala or as Senior 
Advisor for Central America in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs?

    Answer. I do not recall that I had any prior knowledge of either 
Gazprombank or VTB in Guatemala's mining sector. It was not something I 
was tracking during my time in Guatemala or later in Washington.

    Question. Did you meet with any agents of either Gazprombank or VTB 
bank? If so, how many times? Was CICIG discussed?

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, I have never met with any 
representatives of either bank.

    Question. According to testimony from Bill Browder before the CSCE 
in 2018, VTB Bank--an entity sanctioned by the U.S. Department of 
Treasury--gained legal status as an ``interested party'' in a legal 
case against the Bitkov family. In 2015, a criminal case was opened 
against the Bitkovs at CICIG's direction. Immediately after, officers 
raided the Bitkov's home and detained the family.
    During your time as Ambassador to Guatemala, were you ever briefed 
on this issue? If so, when? If so, what was your takeaway when you were 
in this post?

    Answer. To the best of my recollection, I was never briefed on this 
issue. Any knowledge I had of this issue came from open sources. There 
were some local newspaper articles on the Bitkovs and I also remember a 
long in-depth article about their case in either the Atlantic Monthly, 
Vanity Fair, or the New Yorker magazine. To my knowledge, while I was 
in Guatemala (2014-17), the State Department was not tracking the 
Bitkov case beyond the fact that they had been swept up in a larger 
probe of corruption within the Guatemalan Government.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. In recent months the Mexican Government has shifted to a 
confrontational and in some senses even adversarial approach to the 
United States, including by undermining the Drug Enforcement Agency's 
(DEA) capability to operate in Mexico, publishing sensitive information 
that had been shared by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and 
maneuvering to ensure the freedom of former Defense Minister Salvador 
Cienfuegos Zepeda from drug charges. To what degree are you concerned 
about the status of the U.S.-Mexican relationship in these dimensions?

    Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national 
security priority. If confirmed, I look forward to comprehensive 
conversations with the Mexican Government to deepen our security 
cooperation and ensure it works for the benefit of the United States 
and Mexico. I look forward to working to strengthen collaboration 
through the cabinet-level security dialogue committed to during Vice 
President Harris' June 8 meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.

    Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Mexican 
Government understands their recent actions against the DEA are 
unacceptable and returns to a posture of cooperation?

    Answer. Law enforcement cooperation between the United States and 
Mexico is vital to countering the shared threat of transnational crime. 
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Mexican Government to 
strengthen this cooperation, including through the cabinet-level 
security dialogue committed to during Vice President Harris's June 8 
meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.

Nicaragua
    Question. What role, if any, should INL play in regards to the 
situation in Nicaragua?

    Answer. I condemn the Ortega regime's repression of its own people 
and the clear erosion of democratic norms in Nicaragua. Civil society 
must be supported to promote accountability for human rights abuses and 
corruption. INL engages with relevant elements of civil society in 
Nicaragua--including independent media, human rights, and 
anticorruption organizations--to address narcotics and criminal 
threats, improve civic education, and strengthen the rule of law 
through discreet programs aimed at minimizing the risk to individuals 
from government persecution. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing 
these efforts.

Bolivia
    Question. How do you plan to engage with the Government of Bolivia 
on drug production, trafficking, and interdiction?

    Answer. I am concerned about drug production and trafficking in 
Bolivia. Should the Arce administration be interested in partnering 
with the United States to combat narcotics trafficking and associated 
criminality, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to enhance 
coordination with Bolivia.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator James E. Risch

Directed Energy Attacks/Havana Syndrome
    Question. INR plays a role in supporting the U.S. Government's 
efforts to identify the perpetrator and means of the directed energy 
attacks against State Department personnel, as well as a key role in 
providing SFRC with up to date information on all USG investigations 
into these attacks.

   How is INR contributing to the investigation into these nefarious 
        sonic attacks on our US diplomats?

    Answer. My understanding is that INR has provided intelligence 
support to the Department on the anomalous health incidents since 
January 2017, and is facilitating the passage of available information 
and material between relevant elements of the Intelligence Community 
and the Department. If confirmed, I am committed to getting up to speed 
quickly on this matter, and I will have no higher priority than 
supporting the Department and the IC in ensuring the safety of U.S. 
personnel, their family members, and U.S. citizens overseas.

    Question. Will you commit to keeping this committee fully informed 
as this investigation progresses?

    Answer. Yes. Secretary Blinken has committed to working with 
Congress on this matter. If confirmed, I will also commit to working 
closely with Congress on this issue and will keep this committee fully 
informed of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's assessment of 
these incidents.

    Question. Will you commit to redoubling efforts to identify the 
culprit? And will you do a survey of the policy issues/regional focus 
the victims were working on?

    Answer. My understanding is that INR is coordinating with multiple 
agencies to identify the cause and culprit of these incidents, to 
include understanding where the various incidents occurred. If 
confirmed, I will make sure INR continues to leverage its deep 
expertise to assist the Department, the Intelligence Community, and the 
interagency in protecting all U.S. personnel overseas.

State Department and Membership in the Intelligence Community
    Question. INR also plays an important role in supporting the 
intelligence needs of the Secretary of State, but it also plays a role 
in the intelligence community (IC). It is imperative that INR maintain 
its analytical independence from policymakers within the State 
Department while also best supporting those same policymakers.

   How do you propose to ensure that INR remains in-step with the 
        intelligence community while maintaining an autonomous 
        analytical State Department point of view?

    Answer. I believe that constant training and adherence to the 
Intelligence Community's analytic tradecraft standards, as well as a 
willingness of leadership to support analysts in speaking truth to 
power, are at the core of protecting the independence and integrity of 
INR analysts and Intelligence Community products. INR has a well-earned 
reputation for deep expertise and analytic independence while still 
supporting State Department policymakers. If confirmed, I commit to 
ensuring that INR maintains both its analytic objectivity and quality 
and timely support to policymakers.

    Question. Do you feel that detailees from other IC components would 
be beneficial for INR? Will you commit to increasing the number of 
detailees at INR from other IC components to better plug into IC 
capabilities and improve the connection of intelligence to policy?

    Answer. Having served as a detailee when I was in the Intelligence 
Community (IC), I believe strongly in the value of exposing IC analysts 
to other departments and agencies and believe that the receiving 
agencies receive an extraordinary benefit from bringing in outside 
expertise and perspectives. Such detail assignments can build bridges 
across the IC and provide useful points of view to both agencies. If 
confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the status of detailees to INR 
and will look for ways to strengthen joint duty assignments to benefit 
both INR and the broader IC.

    Question. If confirmed, will you make more resources available to 
ensure the Department employees have more access to the classified 
email systems used by other agencies to share and discuss intelligence 
relevant to policy makers?

    Answer. I understand that INR allows appropriately cleared 
Department personnel to access intelligence reporting and analysis 
directly through a classified system, which includes an e-mail 
capability. I believe that we can balance the need to protect sensitive 
information with the need for access for appropriately cleared 
Department personnel. If I become aware of sensitive intelligence that 
Departmental personnel need to see in order to do their jobs, I would 
advocate for and seek to facilitate that access, consistent with 
appropriate clearances and the need to protect sensitive sources and 
methods.

    Question. How do you propose to better distribute timely 
intelligence to regional bureaus? Is there more INR can do to improve 
communication between INR and the regional bureaus to improve 
collection guidance?

    Answer. I believe INR has a responsibility to help facilitate 
access to intelligence and analysis by regional bureaus for 
appropriately cleared personnel. Customer feedback (including from 
regional bureaus) into collection guidance is also key to improving 
intelligence support to policy. If confirmed, I will review INR's 
existing processes for providing intelligence to regional bureaus and 
for receiving collection requirements and will make improvements, if 
necessary.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to fully uncover 
the origin of SARS-CoV-2? Do you commit to make this a priority?

    Answer. It is vital that we understand the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in 
order to prevent or minimize the risk of another global pandemic in the 
future. On May 26, 2021, the President asked the Intelligence Community 
(IC) to redouble its efforts to collect and analyze information that 
could bring us closer to a definitive conclusion, and to report back to 
him in 90 days on the origins of SARS-CoV-2. If confirmed, I am 
committed to prioritizing INR's efforts to support the IC's work to 
understand the origins of SARS-CoV-2.

    Question. What actions do you believe are important to take to 
prevent the next pandemic?

    Answer. I believe the Intelligence Community, of which INR is a 
component, has an important warning function to play in evaluating all 
sources of information and providing assessments that could shed light 
on an emerging pandemic in the future. If confirmed, I commit to 
reviewing INR's analytic resources and expertise related to global 
health security and will ensure that INR provides accurate and timely 
intelligence to policymakers on such matters moving forward.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
           Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator Ted Cruz

JCPOA Verification
    Question. Under a plan aimed at facilitating the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) prematurely closed its file on the Possible Military 
Dimensions (PMDs) of Iran's nuclear program. The decision rendered 
permanently opaque the scope and nature of Iran's weapons program, and 
was broadly criticized for foreclosing the possibility of baselining 
that program--a critical prerequisite to robust monitoring and 
verification. According to Bloomberg, the Obama administration provided 
Congress with a classified annex saying that the deal could still be 
verified if Iran fully complied and didn't cheat.
    It has now been confirmed that under the deal, the IAEA failed to 
detect vast portions of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Between the 
implementation of the deal in January 2016 to May 2018, the IAEA was 
not aware that Iran was concealing a nuclear weapons archive. Nor was 
the IAEA aware that Iran was storing containers at an alleged nuclear 
warehouse reportedly called Turquzabad, where the IAEA later reportedly 
discovered traces of man-altered uranium. The agency subsequently 
visited three other undisclosed sites and found nuclear material at two 
of them. According to public reports, the IAEA has never inspected any 
facility run by SPND, a military organization employing nuclear weapon 
scientists, which until last year was run by the founder of Iran's 
nuclear weapons program

   Do you support reentering the deal, in light of these failures?

    Answer. I believe it is critically important that the Intelligence 
Community (IC) and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) focus 
on the range of threats posed by Iran--from its state sponsorship of 
terrorism and nuclear ambitions to its development of ballistic 
missiles. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for 
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that INR, which is a component 
of the IC, provides the Secretary of State and other policymakers with 
the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran to inform 
policymakers as they assess the best possible options to address Iran's 
nuclear ambitions.

    Question. In your assessment what additional measures would be 
required to close the loopholes that allowed these failures?

    Answer. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for 
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a component of the 
Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of State and other 
policymakers with the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran 
to inform policymakers as they assess the best possible options to 
address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also ensure that INR has the 
resources and expertise to address this threat.

Iran/NPT
    Question. As traditionally understood, Article IV of the NPT 
entitles member states to the benefits of peaceful civil-nuclear 
technology to the extent that they are members in good standing with 
the NPT. In the last administration, Special Representative of the 
President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed 
to the SFRC in writing that ``Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon 
State Party to the NPT cannot be described as `good.' ''

   Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive 
        seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive 
        relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute 
        non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on 
        the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). If yes, please 
        explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. nuclear activities and will ensure that INR provides the 
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and 
intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear 
Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive 
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-
compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT. If yes, please 
explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear 
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available 
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of 
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you consider Iran a member in good standing of the 
NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear 
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available 
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of 
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from 
nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please 
explain why. If no, please explain why.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear 
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available 
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of 
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from 
nuclear technology for any reason? If yes, please explain why. If no, 
please explain why.

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear 
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available 
intelligence and analysis with respect to its use of nuclear 
technologies.

Iran/UNSCR 2231 snapback
    Question. UNSCR 2231 ended a long-standing international arms 
embargo against Iran, described across the previous six resolutions 
terminated by paragraph 7(a) of the resolution. After an effort to 
extend that embargo, the Trump administration took two measures. First, 
it invoked the ``snapback mechanism'' described in paragraphs 10-15 of 
UNSCR 2231, reversing the termination of those resolutions. You and 
others have publicly suggested that the U.S. was not entitled to invoke 
that mechanism. Second, the Trump administration implemented EO 13949, 
``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional 
Arms Activities of Iran,'' which authorizes sanctions for transfers to 
and from Iran of arms or related material or military equipment. As a 
result, the U.S. established a baseline deterrent against major arms 
sales to Iran. Multi-billion dollar arms agreements publicly described 
and anticipated by Russia, China, and Iran did not occur.
    However, in February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded that 
decision. In June, it was revealed that Iran had dispatched two 
warships believed to be carrying arms intended for transfer to Caracas. 
The Biden administration declared it would take ``appropriate 
measures'' to counter this ``threat.''

   What measures does the administration believe it has to counter the 
        reported shipment of arms to Venezuela by Iranian warships?

    Answer. I have never publicly suggested that the United States was 
not entitled to invoke the ``snapback mechanism.'' If confirmed in my 
role as the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, I will 
ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a 
component of the Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of 
State and other policymakers with the best available intelligence and 
analysis on Iran to inform policymakers as they assess the best 
possible options to address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also 
ensure that INR has the resources and expertise to address this threat.
    According to press reports on June 17, 2021, the Iranian ships 
believed to be headed towards Venezuela recently changed course and are 
currently headed towards the coast of Africa.

    Question. Do you agree with the decision to rescind invoking the 
snapback mechanism?

    Answer. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for 
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that the Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a component of the 
Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of State and other 
policymakers with the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran 
to inform policymakers as they assess the best possible options to 
address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also ensure that INR has the 
resources and expertise to address this threat.

    Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and Russia. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on 
Iran's destabilizing activities and cooperation with Russia and will 
ensure that INR provides the best available intelligence and analysis 
that describes the actions and intentions of Iran and Russia to help 
inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Russia purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which 
ones?

    Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and Russia. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on 
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the 
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and 
intentions of Iran and Russia to help inform treaty compliance 
verification.

    Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if China sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and China. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on 
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the 
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and 
intentions of Iran and China to help inform treaty compliance 
verification.

    Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if China purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which ones?

    Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and China. If 
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on 
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the 
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and 
intentions of Iran and China to help inform treaty compliance 
verification.

    Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles 
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including 
launches using such ballistic missile technology?

    Answer. I believe it is critically important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
Iran's ballistic missile program and nuclear ambitions. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's ballistic 
missile program and nuclear ambitions and will ensure that INR provides 
the best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions 
and intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.

    Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any 
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such 
ballistic missile technology?

    Answer. I believe it is critically important for the Intelligence 
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on 
Iran's ballistic missile program and nuclear ambitions. If confirmed, I 
will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's ballistic 
missile program and nuclear ambitions and will ensure that INR provides 
the best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions 
and intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
EO 14034
    Question. On June 11, the Biden Administration published in the 
Federal Register Executive Order 14034, which revoked Executive Order 
13942 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and 
Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect 
to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply 
Chain), Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat 
Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National 
Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology 
and Services Supply Chain), and Executive Order 13971 of January 5, 
2021 (Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software 
Developed or Controlled by Chinese Companies). Those three EOs had 
restricted applications controlled by Chinese companies. According to 
EO 13971, ``[b]y accessing personal electronic devices such as 
smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software 
applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from 
users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and 
private information. This data collection threatens to provide the 
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and 
proprietary information--which would permit China to track the 
locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of 
personal information.''

   Please assess the potential intelligence risks associated with 
        these applications including the risk to State Department 
        personnel and their families overseas.

    Answer. Since I have not been in government for the last five 
years, I am not privy to any classified assessments or intelligence 
that has informed this administration's or the last administration's 
executive orders. However, I take seriously the threat posed by the use 
of Chinese-developed software, hardware, firmware or Chinese-operated 
communication networks, and I believe it is vitally important that U.S. 
departments and agencies conduct threat and risk assessments of any and 
all foreign-owned--especially Chinese--software, firmware and hardware 
to minimize the risk posed to U.S. government employees and their 
family members.
    If confirmed, I will ensure that INR provides the best available 
intelligence and analysis to help inform policy decisions about what 
steps to take the minimize the Chinese counterintelligence risk to 
State Department personnel and their families.

State Department
    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.

   Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not 
        unnecessarily comingled with classified information in 
        notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If 
        not, why not?

    Answer. I have a deep and sincere commitment to transparency and 
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities. If confirmed, I am 
committed to working to ensure that information provided to Congress 
is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format that facilitates its 
access by authorized personnel, while complying with Executive Order 
13526, the Department of State classification guide, and the executive 
branch rules on the handling and storage of classified information.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Robert Menendez

North Korea
    Question. If confirmed, how would you recommend that the Biden 
administration approach North Korea?

    Answer. Our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula. Our policy toward the DPRK will not focus on 
achieving a grand bargain, nor will it rely on strategic patience. 
Instead, the United States will take a calibrated, practical approach 
that is open to, and seeks to establish diplomacy with, the DPRK to 
make progress that increases the security of the United States, our 
allies, and our deployed forces. At the same time, the United States 
will continue to implement sanctions and work with our partners and 
allies to promote the full implementation of U.N. Security Council 
resolutions. The United States will continue to consult closely with 
the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners at every 
step of the way. If confirmed, I will work to support the 
administration's approach as we work toward this goal.

    Question. What is the pathway to denuclearization and a stable, 
peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula?

    Answer. The United States will pursue diplomacy and dialogue, based 
on previous commitments such as those in the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration 
and Singapore Joint Statement, while continuing to implement U.S. 
sanctions and working with partners and allies to promote 
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. This will be 
essential to achieve the complete denuclearization of and a permanent 
peace on the Korean Peninsula. The United States will take a 
calibrated, practical approach to make progress that increases the 
security of the United States, our allies and our deployed forces. The 
United States has and will continue to consult closely with the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, and other partners as we pursue complete 
denuclearization and a stable, peaceful and prosperous Korean 
Peninsula. If confirmed, I will work to support that objective and 
advance our diplomacy to that end.

    Question. What does success with North Korea look like?

    Answer. Our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula. The United States will take a calibrated, practical 
approach that is open to and seeks to establish diplomacy with the DPRK 
to make progress that increases the security of the United States, our 
allies and our deployed forces. This will be essential to achieve the 
complete denuclearization of and a permanent peace on the Korean 
Peninsula. If confirmed, I will work to achieve that goal.

Burma
    Question. If confirmed, what are the first three steps that you 
would recommend to the Secretary to reset our policy towards Burma?

    Answer. If confirmed, first, I will continue to use all tools 
available to exert pressure on the junta and deny the regime 
international credibility. I will encourage the international community 
to do the same in order to restrict the junta's access to financial 
institutions and enhance scrutiny of any financial ties to or 
transactions with the military. I will further strengthen our robust 
engagement within the U.S. interagency to identify ways to exert 
pressure on the military regime, including financial pressure applied 
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Second, if confirmed, I would work 
to continue to support Burma's pro-democracy movement, including the 
``National Unity Government'' (NUG), various ethnic and religious 
groups, and others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic 
transition. The United States will continue to encourage our partners, 
allies, and other members of the international community to engage 
representatives of the pro-democracy movement, including in 
international organizations and major international events. Third, if 
confirmed, I will continue to promote human rights, justice, and 
protections for members of Burmese civil society and all people from 
Burma, and encourage other countries to adopt programs similar to the 
Temporary Protective Status (TPS) extended to people from Burma in the 
United States in March for 18 months. In sum, if confirmed, I will 
utilize every tool and opportunity available to the United States and 
the international community to expose the junta's horrific brutality, 
deny the junta credibility, promote accountability, and support the 
human rights and aspirations of the people of Burma, who yearn for 
democracy and do not want to live another day under military rule.

South China Sea
    Question. I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of 
our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South China Sea. 
But, as you know, international law is not self-enforcing, and having 
now taken this position, it is critical that we make our legal position 
a reality, not just rhetoric.

   What does the Biden administration intend to do to implement this 
        new approach? What consultations are you planning with partners 
        and allies on how to forge a unified approach to the South 
        China Sea?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has reaffirmed the July 
2020 policy statement on the U.S. position on maritime claims in the 
South China Sea and regularly consults with partners and allies to 
support international law in this crucial waterway. The United States 
has made clear that we stand with Southeast Asian claimant states in 
resisting Chinese intimidation. The administration is committed to 
using all of the tools at its disposal--diplomatic, military, economic, 
and informational--to uphold a free and open South China Sea. If 
confirmed, I would support U.S. efforts across each of these domains.
    Freedom of navigation and adherence to international law in the 
South China Sea are vital interests for the entire international 
community. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts with allies and 
partners in Asia and beyond, we have seen a greater willingness by 
countries to underscore the importance of making and pursuing maritime 
claims in accordance with international law. Ten nations, including the 
United States, have formally protested China's unlawful maritime claims 
through the United Nations. An increasing number of countries are also 
demonstrating their commitment to freedom of navigation through 
transits, presence operations, and working with Southeast Asian 
claimants to strengthen their maritime domain awareness and law 
enforcement capacity. If confirmed, I would support the many U.S. 
programs designed to build our partners' maritime capacity. Moreover, 
if confirmed, I would also support the activities of the U.S. military, 
including freedom of navigation operations and presence operations, 
designed to demonstrate that U.S. forces will fly, sail, and operate 
anywhere that international law allows.

Hong Kong
    Question. How can the United States--working with our partners in 
the international community--be effective in exercising leverage to 
support the people of Hong Kong?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will stand united with our allies and 
partners in speaking out for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
promoting accountability for the PRC's assault on Hong Kong's autonomy, 
and seeking to support people in Hong Kong. I will strengthen 
coordination with allies and partners on joint actions and messaging, 
recognizing that a multilateral approach will have the greatest effect 
in promoting accountability and stopping Beijing's erosion of Hong 
Kong's autonomy. Together with partners and allies, I will continue to 
demonstrate the depth of international concern about Hong Kong and the 
strength of international support for Hong Kongers.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator James E. Risch

Indo-Pacific Strategy
    Question. What should our main goals be in the short-, medium-, and 
long-term be in the Indo-Pacific? What are the areas in which the State 
Department can strengthen its role in pursuing these goals?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to a free and 
open Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, to achieve this, I will work to 
revitalize ties with our allies and partners; prevail in our strategic 
competition with China; reduce the threat posed by North Korea's 
nuclear and missile programs; support inclusive economic policies that 
benefit all Americans; promote democratic resilience and respect for 
human rights; and address global priorities, particularly combating 
COVID-19 and the climate crisis. Investing in our capabilities and 
working with allies and partners, including in regional organizations, 
will be critically important to prevailing in our strategic competition 
with China and in defending the international rules-based order, its 
foundational values, and international law. If confirmed, I pledge to 
work closely with Congress in advancing these priorities.

    Question. In terms of specific regional initiatives, what aspects 
of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy will be retained; 
what will be changed; and what will be discarded?

    Answer. The Trump administration recognized that the United States 
has deep and enduring interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific 
region accounts for half the world's population and two-thirds of 
global economic growth, and it sits on the front lines of our strategic 
competition with China. To protect U.S. interests in this important 
region, if confirmed, I will deepen ties with our allies and partners, 
including regional organizations, and promote the values we share, 
including the rules-based international order and freedom of the seas 
and skies, prosperity, good governance, and human rights. I will work 
to prevail in our strategic competition with China while countering PRC 
attempts to erode the international rules-based order. The United 
States will remain focused on enhancing U.S. economic engagement in the 
region, including on infrastructure, clean energy, and the digital 
economy. If confirmed, I will also work together with partners to 
address shared challenges such as transnational crime, climate change, 
pandemic recovery, global health security, and the threat posed by the 
DPRK's nuclear program.

Vaccines for the Indo-Pacific
    Question. Several Indo-Pacific countries, such as the Philippines--
a U.S. treaty ally-have purchased U.S. vaccines directly from U.S. 
companies. Do you believe the United States should lift export controls 
on its vaccines so that these countries can secure the supplies they 
have purchased? Do you believe U.S. allies and partners should receive 
priority for delivery of vaccines purchased?

    Answer. The administration's top priority is saving lives and 
ending the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge that 
requires a global response, and we have not imposed any bans on the 
export of vaccines or vaccine inputs. If confirmed, I will work with 
the rest of the U.S. Government to facilitate access to vaccines to 
countries in need. We are working with partners to increase vaccine 
manufacturing and distribution, as well as to respond to country 
requests. Our principles for sharing U.S. vaccines include achieving 
broad global coverage and responding to surges and other urgent 
situations and public health needs, while being responsive to country 
requests. The administration considered public health criteria, 
including the potential impact of the donated doses in reducing the 
global burden, incidence, and severity of COVID-19 and limiting the 
emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. We also 
considered factors such as the effect on U.S. national and economic 
security and recipient countries' access to other sources of vaccines.

    Question. Which countries would you consider to be priority 
countries for U.S. vaccines in the Indo-Pacific? What is the country-
by-country breakdown of the vaccine donations that the Biden 
administration has already announced in the Indo-Pacific, whether 
through COVAX or through bilateral donations?

    Answer. On June 3, the administration announced that the United 
States will share at least three-quarters of its first 25 million 
donated vaccine doses (approximately 19 million) through COVAX. Of 
these doses, approximately seven million will go to the Indo-Pacific: 
India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Maldives, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Papua New 
Guinea, Taiwan, and the Pacific Islands. Of the remaining 25 percent of 
the 25 million vaccine doses (approximately six million) to be shared 
directly, the Republic of Korea has received one million Johnson & 
Johnson doses. Our principles for sharing U.S. vaccines include 
achieving broad global coverage and responding to surges and other 
urgent situations and public health needs, while responding to country 
requests. We also considered factors such as the effect on U.S. 
national and economic security and recipient countries' access to other 
sources of vaccines. If confirmed, I commit to making combating the 
COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening global health security in the 
region a top priority.


    Question. With regard to U.S.-purchased vaccines: Your answer 
indicates that the United States has not imposed any sort of export 
restrictions with respect to U.S. manufactured COVID-19 vaccines. Does 
this mean the administration has no restrictions--including de facto 
restrictions--on U.S. companies delivering vaccines purchased via a 
commercial contract? Please explain.

    Answer. The United States has not imposed any bans on the export of 
vaccines or vaccine inputs. The United States is committed to using all 
available tools, including the Defense Production Act (DPA), to expand 
domestic vaccine manufacturing and ensure that all Americans can be 
vaccinated quickly, effectively, and equitably. But these actions are 
not export prohibitions, and manufacturers in the United States are 
free to export such products so long as they first fulfill the terms of 
their contracts with the U.S. Government. What we're all dealing with 
here is a global shortage of materials-that's a very different issue 
and separate from the DPA. Pfizer and Moderna are now exporting doses 
abroad and we have already lifted the DPA priority ratings for 
AstraZeneca, Novavax, and Sanofi.

    Question. With regard to U.S.-donated vaccines: The United States 
is also buying up vaccine stocks and donating them to other nations. 
Are our donations being prioritized over commercial orders? If so, how 
are we prioritizing those donations (including for countries seeking 
vaccines commercially and through COVAX simultaneously)?

    Answer. On the 500 million Pfizer doses, thanks to our work scaling 
up Pfizer's manufacturing, they will be able to deliver on these 500 
million doses without relying on the Defense Production Act. The world 
is embarking on an unprecedented vaccine production effort and there is 
more production demand than can be supplied at this time. At the same 
time, the United States Government orders make up a small part of the 
demand on supply, and the manufacturing companies are making the 
allocation decisions.
    Our work on a vaccine supply strategy is guided by a three-part 
approach. First, having successfully secured enough vaccine supply for 
Americans, we are donating surplus U.S. vaccine supply and encouraging 
other countries with surplus supplies to do the same. We will continue 
to donate additional vaccine doses across the coming months as supply 
becomes available--but we know that won't be sufficient. So, second, we 
are working with U.S. vaccine manufacturers to significantly increase 
vaccine supply for the rest of the world. And third, we are working 
with our partners, investment entities, pharmaceutical companies and 
other manufacturers to create the kind of global vaccine production and 
manufacturing capacity and capabilities that can not only help the 
world beat this pandemic, but also help prepare the world to respond to 
potential future threats.

    Question. Please provide a country-by-country breakdown of vaccine 
donations to the Indo-Pacific as stated in the question. Of all the 
donations announced, how many doses will each country receive (and 
when)?

    Answer. On June 4, 1.1 million doses of the J&J vaccine arrived in 
the Republic of Korea. On June 20, 2.5 million doses of the Moderna 
vaccine arrived in Taiwan. We are in active conversations with 
potential recipient countries about needs, absorptive capacity, and 
national vaccine plans, as well as logistics and legal considerations, 
and that will in part determine allocation and distribution plans. As 
we do so, we will work through logistics like coordinating with country 
health ministries and organizations like UNICEF and the World Health 
Organization, as appropriate. Our immediate goal is to get doses on the 
ground as quickly as possible--but again, this is a complex logistics 
operation. We will continue to work to keep you all updated as these 
doses land in country.
    On June 21, the Biden-Harris administration announced plans to 
allocate the remaining 55 million doses towards the commitment to 
donate 80 million doses by the end of June, including: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands. We continue to work 
with the White House and the interagency to facilitate access to these 
doses.

COVID Origins
    Question. Do you support a thorough investigation by the U.S. 
Government into the origins of COVID-19? Do you commit, if confirmed, 
that EAP will prioritize this issue and contribute to any State 
Department or interagency processes? Will you commit that EAP will not 
prevent the release of findings or outcomes of the investigation that 
could potentially strain our relationship with China?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it supports 
a robust and transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 
pandemic. The administration has called for a second phase of the World 
Health Organization's investigation into COVID-19 that must take place 
in China and have full access to all information on the origins of the 
virus. An impartial public health investigation into the origins and 
early spread of any novel outbreak is vital to protecting against 
future health security threats. It is imperative to have transparency 
on the early events of the pandemic and determine how COVID-19 spread 
so future emergence events with pandemic potential can be averted. The 
Biden-Harris administration has committed to continuing to review all 
available information about the origins of COVID-19, and President 
Biden has requested the U.S. intelligence community redouble their 
efforts to collect and analyze information relevant to the origins of 
the virus, report back on their analysis and their recommendations for 
areas of further inquiry that may be required, including specific 
questions for the PRC. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring EAP continues 
supporting these efforts to identify the origins of the pandemic and 
will share relevant information with Congress as appropriate.

Biosecurity Issues
    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Department of State has a 
role to play in determining whether the United States conducts, funds, 
or engages in research and development or other cooperation on gain-of-
function research or other potentially high-risk research related to 
pathogens, viruses, or toxins? From your perspective, what role should 
EAP play in cases where these concerns relate to Indo-Pacific countries 
within EAP's purview?

    Answer. The Department of State participates in the interagency 
processes, led by the National Security Council and the White House 
Office of Science and Technology Policy, that address oversight 
policies for research that might pose particular concerns. These 
policies require careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where 
appropriate, measures to mitigate risks. Subject to these policies, 
decisions about the funding of specific research proposals are made by 
the responsible funding agency. If confirmed, I will work with other 
State Department bureaus and the interagency to make sure that EAP 
provides any necessary information in a timely manner to make informed 
decisions in the best interest of the United States.

    Question. Should the United States conduct, fund, or engage in 
research and development or other cooperation on gain-of-function 
research or other potentially risky research related to pathogens, 
viruses, or toxins with countries where we have concerns about any or 
all of the following: (1) biosecurity standards, (2) violations of the 
International Health Regulations, (3) intellectual property theft of 
vaccines or health-related technology, or (4) compliance with the 
Biological Weapons Convention?

    Answer. Factors that bear on the risk of accident, misuse, or 
misappropriation should be taken fully into consideration in 
considering whether to conduct, fund, or engage in such research. 
Federal funding and oversight policies help guide these decisions for 
research that might pose particular concerns. These policies require 
careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where appropriate, 
measures to mitigate risks. If confirmed, I will work with other State 
Department bureaus and the interagency to make sure that EAP provides 
any necessary information in a timely manner to make informed decisions 
in the best interest of the United States.

    Question. What is the benefit to the United States and to global 
health more broadly of providing to China innovative intellectual 
property related to vaccines?

    Answer. Incentives for innovation, including the protection of 
intellectual property (IP), are crucial to support innovative new 
treatments against COVID-19 and other devastating diseases. The United 
States supports voluntary licensing agreements on mutually agreed terms 
and opposes forced technology transfer. The administration believes 
strongly in IP protections and the importance of safeguarding U.S. 
innovation from illicit acquisition. The decision to support a waiver 
of IP protections for COVID-19 vaccines reflects the extraordinary 
circumstances of this pandemic. We are committed to working with other 
WTO members and will be clear-eyed about potential risks as we enter 
text-based negotiations. These negotiations will take time given the 
consensus-based nature of the WTO and the complexity of the issues 
involved. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to support efforts to 
combat the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthen global health security in 
the region.

Defense Issues
    Question. Do you believe that extended deterrence is foundational 
to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region? Will you commit that you 
will advocate against policies, whether declaratory policy or 
otherwise, that erode or dilute U.S. extended deterrence commitments?

    Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence is foundational to U.S. strategy 
in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I commit to advance policies 
that strengthen our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and 
partners.

    Question. In your experience, how would U.S. treaty allies react to 
major change in U.S. declaratory policy with respect to nuclear 
weapons, such as the declaration of a sole purpose doctrine? What 
impact would declaration of a sole-purpose doctrine have on U.S. 
extended deterrence commitments in the region, and therefore overall 
stability and security in the region?

    Answer. The United States is committed to maintaining a strong, 
credible deterrent to defend the United States and our allies, while 
also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Extended 
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region plays a critical role in 
advancing U.S. national security interests, including providing 
assurance to allies and promoting nonproliferation. If confirmed, I 
commit to advance policies that strengthen our extended deterrence 
commitments to our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will also 
consult closely with our allies and with Congress as we review the 
vital role the U.S. nuclear arsenal plays in extended deterrence.

    Question. Will you prioritize the issue of overseas basing by the 
People's Liberation Army, as raised by Deputy Secretary Sherman on her 
recent trip to Cambodia?

    Answer. I have serious concerns about the PRC's military presence 
and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of 
Thailand. During her recent trip to Cambodia, Deputy Secretary Sherman 
sought clarifications on the demolition of two U.S.-funded buildings at 
Ream without notification or explanation and observed that a PRC 
military base in Cambodia would undermine its sovereignty, threaten 
regional security, and negatively impact U.S.-Cambodia relations. 
Maintaining an independent and balanced foreign policy is in the best 
interests of the Cambodian people. If confirmed, I will make this a 
priority issue.

    Question. Is the status of the Philippines and Thailand as States 
Parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons consistent 
with their treaty alliances with the United States?

    Answer. U.S. alliances with the Philippines and Thailand are forged 
in common experiences and shared values, and they serve as an anchor 
for peace and security across the Indo-Pacific region. The United 
States remains fully committed to these deep and abiding alliances. If 
confirmed, I will consistently convey current U.S. policy to oppose the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which does nothing to 
address pressing proliferation and security challenges.

    Question. How can the United States expedite providing advanced and 
critical capabilities to Indo-Pacific treaty allies and other key 
partners? Do you commit to prioritizing expediting such capabilities to 
regional allies and partners?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with the Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs and Congress to ensure Indo-Pacific 
treaty allies and key partners are receiving the advanced and critical 
defense and security capabilities necessary for their national security 
and to advance the U.S. national interest in peace and stability of the 
region.
    Each year, the United States provides hundreds of millions of 
dollars in security assistance and cooperation to critical allies and 
partners to advance our foreign and national security goals for the 
region. This assistance provides training, equipment, and assets to 
security partners across the Indo-Pacific region.
    The United States arms export regime ensures close allies and 
partners have access to advanced capabilities, provided they have a 
track record of protecting the technology, respecting human rights, and 
using the equipment for its intended purpose. The State Department 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs continually reviews exports 
available for important Indo-Pacific allies.

Economic Engagement
    Question. What role can the State Department play in expanding U.S. 
economic engagement in Southeast Asia? What are the current obstacles 
to U.S. commercial activity in that part of the region?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to 
address Southeast Asia's most pressing economic needs: access to 
expertise and capital to help build the infrastructure, energy, and 
digital foundation to allow these countries to grow their economies. 
Through major economic initiatives like the Infrastructure Transaction 
and Assistance Network, Asia Enhancing Development and Growth through 
Energy, and the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, the 
State Department and our interagency partners are providing technical 
assistance, commercial advocacy, and financing for projects. We will 
also continue to engage through APEC, ASEAN's economic track, and 
further deepen our commercial engagement through events like the annual 
Indo-Pacific Business Forum to underscore the U.S. commitment to the 
region's economic growth. If confirmed, I will also ensure that our 
diplomats in the region fight for every job and the interests of 
American workers by insisting on market access and fair treatment, 
stopping intellectual property theft and currency manipulation, and 
combating corruption.

    Question. Do you commit to robust support of the Infrastructure 
Transaction and Assistance Network? Will you prioritize coordination 
and cooperation with the interagency on deployment of U.S. Government 
tools to support infrastructure abroad?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing coordination 
and cooperation with the interagency to promote quality infrastructure 
development in the Indo-Pacific region. The Infrastructure Transaction 
and Assistance Network plays a key role in providing the technical 
assistance, advocacy, and financing tools necessary for the region's 
growth. I commit to continuing the program's efforts to promote 
transparent, private-sector infrastructure investments in the region.

Energy Policy
    Question. The Biden administration has taken multiple steps to 
prevent the United States from engaging with other countries on coal, 
oil, and natural gas. This includes disallowing the U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation from financing fossil fuel development 
projects. In the Indo-Pacific, nations like Vietnam and Indonesia are 
still heavily reliant on coal and gas and are not in an economic 
position to switch to other alternative fuels quickly. In the absence 
of U.S. engagement or engagement from other partners like Japan, what 
alternatives will Southeast Asian countries have in satisfying growing 
energy demands? Is it in the U.S. interest, for example, for these 
countries to become reliant on coal from China, which is building and 
financing coal plants all over the world?

    Answer. The Indo-Pacific presents concurrent challenges of rapidly 
growing energy demand coupled with reliance on unsustainable fossil 
fuels, aging infrastructure, and outdated market mechanisms to deliver 
energy requirements. U.S. engagement to address these challenges, while 
simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions, will focus on 
bolstering partners' energy security, supporting sustainable 
development goals, and implementing decarbonization strategies.
    If confirmed, I will work with other State Department bureaus as 
well as with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation--
and through the Asia Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy 
(EDGE) program and the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance 
Network (ITAN)--to support countries' improved energy efficiency, the 
deployment of renewable energy infrastructure and technologies, and 
financing for projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

Counter PRC Malign Influence Fund
    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to conduct oversight of how 
funds are appropriated to the Countering PRC Malign Influence Fund 
(originally called the Countering Chinese Influence Fund) and how they 
are used by the Department? Do you commit that these funds will only be 
directed to projects and initiatives that have a direct nexus to malign 
influence from China? Do you commit that you will take steps to ensure 
this fund will not be pulled from to support efforts unrelated or 
tangentially related to China that the Department wants to fund for 
advancing other priorities?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Deputy 
Secretary and other senior leaders in the Department and at USAID to 
engage in a full review of the CCIF to ensure the funds are used 
strategically in a manner that advances U.S. economic, diplomatic, 
military, and technological leadership in our strategic competition 
with China and in support of a stable and open international system. 
The PRC's use of coercive and corrupting tools of influence to 
undermine and interfere in countries are a major concern for the United 
States and our partners around the world. I support the CCIF's overall 
goals and objectives, including efforts to increase transparency and 
accountability associated with the Belt and Road Initiative.

International Organizations and Human Rights
    Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that the 
Government of Thailand respects freedom of expression and internet 
freedom?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize human rights in 
our relationship with Thailand, including on freedom of expression and 
Internet freedom. I believe that free and open access to, and the free 
exchange of, information and ideas, including through the Internet, is 
fundamental to democracy and important to all people. I will urge the 
Royal Thai Government to respect the rights of those who exercise their 
freedom of expression and to protect human rights across the board, 
consistent with Thailand's international obligations and commitments.

China Human Rights
    Question. If confirmed, how will you work to pressure the 
Government of China to respect the rights of minority groups, in 
particular the Uyghurs, Turkic Muslims, Tibetans?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting 
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing 
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will 
work with partner and allies to address our shared concerns regarding 
the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China, and will 
consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those 
responsible for abuses.

Hong Kong
    Question. As the Chinese Communist Party has increased its 
repression of the people of Hong Kong, how will you work to promote 
freedom of speech and expression?

    Answer. The State Department will consider all available tools to 
promote freedom of speech and expression, including public diplomacy 
and statements, joint messaging with like-minded partners, the 
imposition of sanctions and visa restrictions, and the use of the Hong 
Kong Policy Act to underscore that Hong Kong is no longer autonomous. 
If confirmed, I will proactively support these efforts.

Trafficking in Persons
    Question. In last year's State Department Trafficking in Persons 
Report, Singapore was ranked as a Tier 1 country after spending 10 
years on Tier 2. Singapore has made significant strides in 
identification and protection of victims, partnering with NGOs and 
foreign governments to develop trainings for police and civil society, 
as well as building trafficking shelters.
    In last year's State Department Trafficking in Persons Report, 
Singapore was ranked as a Tier 1 country after spending 10 years on 
Tier 2. Singapore has made significant strides in identification and 
protection of victims, partnering with NGOs and foreign governments to 
develop trainings for police and civil society, as well as building 
trafficking shelters.

   If confirmed, what steps will you take to work with Singapore and 
        like-minded stakeholders to capitalize on this success?

    Answer. Singapore has taken steps to curb human trafficking, 
including through adoption of the 2014 Prevention of Human Trafficking 
Act, which criminalizes all forms of human trafficking. The State 
Department works closely with the Singapore Interagency Task Force on 
Trafficking in Persons and Singaporean civil society to address this 
challenge. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working closely with 
Singapore on anti-trafficking efforts.

    Question. How can we use Singapore as a model for the region to 
support victims and eventually eradicate human trafficking?

    Answer. The State Department believes Singapore's efforts can offer 
a positive example in combating trafficking in persons for other 
countries in the region. After spending ten years as a Tier 2 country, 
Singapore ranked Tier 1 in the 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report for 
the first time since 2006. Singapore has demonstrated serious efforts 
in prosecuting labor trafficking, as well as with the identification 
and protection of victims. Singapore has also partnered with foreign 
governments to offer victim identification trainings for its officials. 
The Government is also taking steps to prevent trafficking within its 
large migrant worker population by introducing new measures to decrease 
the risk of indebtedness for foreign workers. If confirmed, I will make 
combating trafficking in persons a priority, and will look for ways to 
use the Singapore experience as an example for other countries to study 
in making progress on these issues.

Human Rights Regionally
    Question. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an already 
precarious human rights situation across Southeast Asia. Authoritarian 
governments have used COVID-19 restrictions as a facade to further 
squash dissent, protestors, online expression and discussion, as well 
as other practices of human rights. If confirmed, what are you 
priorities for protection of human rights regionally?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to promote 
human rights in the region and hold accountable perpetrators of 
violations and abuse. At the center of our whole-of-government efforts 
for a free and open Indo-Pacific is building the capacity of our 
partners to promote civil society, rule of law, transparency, and good 
governance across the region. I will prioritize addressing systemic 
challenges that enable malign influence, including the atrocities 
against Uyghurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang, as well as 
repression in Tibet; a further crackdown on freedom online; attacks 
against Burmese protesters; the assault on freedoms in Hong Kong; and 
the targeting of activists and journalists in places like Cambodia and 
Malaysia.

    Question. How will you work with other stakeholders at the 
department, interagency, and on the ground regionally to combat the 
growing encroachment on human rights by authoritarian governments?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our partners within the 
State Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 
Labor, as well as interagency partners such as USAID, Treasury, and 
DoJ, to promote anti-corruption and fiscal transparency, democracy 
assistance, youth and emerging leader development, media and internet 
freedom, and to protect fundamental freedoms and human rights for all 
in the region. I will also work with likeminded governments, civil 
society, and private sector partners to support and empower human 
rights defenders and civil society organizations.

Burma
    Question. It has been roughly four and a half months since the 
violent military coup in Burma, endangering thousands and threatening 
ending democracy in country. Since the coup, we have seen thousands of 
arbitrary arrests, detentions, and a severe crackdown on human rights. 
If confirmed, how will you engage with the relevant stakeholders to 
support human rights defenders in country and work to return Burma to a 
civilian-led rule?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will utilize every tool and opportunity to 
expose the junta's horrific brutality, promote accountability, and 
support the aspirations of the people of Burma, including ethnic and 
religious communities, who yearn for democracy and do not want to live 
another day under military rule. The United States will continue to 
support Burma's pro-democracy movement, including the ``National Unity 
Government'' (NUG), various ethnic and religious communities, and 
others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic transition. In 
addition, the United States will continue to encourage our partners, 
allies, and other members of the international community to engage 
representatives of the pro-democracy movement, including in 
international organizations and major international events.
    The United States has also engaged the pro-democracy movement, 
including the NUG, at high levels, and has encouraged other countries 
to do so as well, which has served to further empower and support human 
rights defenders in the country. If confirmed, I will make it a top 
priority to support the Burmese people and work to return Burma to the 
democratic path chosen by its people.

    Question. The plight of the Rohingya must also not be forgotten. I 
am deeply concerned about the potential forced return of Rohingya 
refugees from Bangladesh to Burma, which constitutes a violation of 
international law. What steps will you take alongside the bureaus of 
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor (DRL), and alongside our international partners to support 
the already robust United States Government (USG) response to the 
Rohingya refugee crisis?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to promote justice and 
accountability for the atrocities and other abuses the military has 
committed against the people of Burma, and humanitarian assistance for 
all vulnerable communities in and from Burma, including Rohingya. The 
United States will continue providing this life-saving humanitarian 
assistance, including through ongoing coordination with international 
partners.
    In addition to urging the military to restore the democratically 
elected government, release all those unjustly detained, and end 
violence, I will ensure achieving justice and accountability for 
atrocities against Rohingya remains pivotal to our policy. The United 
States continues to support the voluntary, safe, dignified, and 
sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced 
persons, when conditions allow.
    During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Blinken promised a 
comprehensive review of military atrocities against Rohingya. If 
confirmed, I intend to support that process and secure international 
support for any determination made by the Secretary.

Vietnam
    Question. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) bore witness or 
committed significant human rights abuses during the reporting period 
for the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, including torture, 
arbitrary killings, serious restrictions on free expression, the press, 
and the internet, significant corruption, trafficking in persons, as 
well as substantial interference with the freedom of assembly and 
association. If confirmed, please describe your action plan for 
engaging with the CPV regarding the improvement of human rights in 
country.

    Answer. I am concerned about the human rights situation in Vietnam, 
and if confirmed, I would be committed to pushing for improvements. 
Despite progress in some areas, including labor rights, the trend of 
escalating harassment, unjust arrests and convictions, and increasingly 
harsh prison sentences of journalists and activists for peacefully 
exercising their right to express their opinions is deeply troubling. 
Vietnam is an extremely important partner in the Indo-Pacific region, 
but that partnership will reach its fullest potential only when the 
Vietnamese Government improves its human rights record.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Vietnam to improve 
its implementation of its human rights obligations and commitments. I 
will urge the Government of Vietnam to encourage law enforcement and 
the judicial system to effectively and fairly enforce existing 
constitutional guarantees and laws protecting human rights, including 
freedom of religion or belief. I will continue to raise our concerns 
with the Government of Vietnam, including during the annual U.S.-
Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, and call on Vietnam to respect and 
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, consistent with its 
international obligations and commitments.

Repatriation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters
    Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters housed at various 
detention facilities around the world. This includes at least 2,000 
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist fighters.'' Many of these 
FTFs are housed at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, like al 
Hol in northeastern Syria. The al-Hol IDP camp has become fertile 
ground for ISIS recruitment of vulnerable populations, posing a serious 
risk to global security. Despite this risk, countries with foreign 
terrorist fighters have failed to make any progress to date towards 
repatriating their nationals.

   Can you commit to working with countries in the East Asia Pacific 
        region to help mitigate the threat posed by FTFs including 
        through increased support to humanitarian agencies providing 
        assistance to vulnerable IDP populations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with countries in the 
East Asia Pacific region to help mitigate the threat posed by FTFs, 
including through encouraging increased support to humanitarian 
agencies providing assistance to vulnerable IDP populations. I will 
also urge partners to provide additional support to vulnerable IDP 
populations within Syria. The U.S. Government strongly believes that 
repatriations--followed by appropriate prosecution of the FTFs in 
domestic courts of law--is the best way to keep these fighters off the 
battlefield and hold them accountable for their crimes. The United 
States regularly engages in diplomatic discussions with our local 
partners (including the Syrian Democratic Forces) and foreign allies on 
this dire issue. We have and will continue to work through ASEAN fora 
to address FTF issues and capacity building for the ASEAN Humanitarian 
Centre for disaster management.

    Question. How do you plan to engage with EAP countries to advance 
repatriation efforts of their nationals, which remains a critical to 
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS?

    Answer. The U.N. has expressed serious concern at the deteriorating 
security and humanitarian situation at al-Hol and Roj camps in 
northeast Syria, and is urging all member states to repatriate their 
citizens without delay. If confirmed, I will urge partner nations to 
repatriate their citizens without delay. We continue to strongly 
encourage countries to take back their citizens from Syria and Iraq. 
The United States believes that repatriations, followed by a.) 
prosecution of FTFs would be the best way to keep fighters off the 
battlefield and address security threats; and b.) rehabilitation and 
reintegration of associated family members are the best ways to end the 
humanitarian crisis in al-Hol and Roj IDP camps.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. In your engagements with Beijing, will you require 
meaningful progress as a precondition for further rounds of dialogue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's approach 
to work with China when it is in our national interest to do, 
conducting practical, results-oriented diplomacy that will require 
meaningful progress from Beijing.

    Question. Do you commit to raise issues that Beijing deems 
``sensitive''--such as human rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the 
Uyghurs--regardless of whether doing so may affect the CCP's 
willingness to engage in further dialogue?

    Answer. Yes. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to 
putting democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to 
standing up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If 
confirmed, I will always be willing to speak out on behalf of our 
values.

    Question. As you know, the CCP has failed to uphold many of its 
agreements with the United States. Xi Jinping told President Obama that 
Beijing would not use its intelligence services to steal intellectual 
property for commercial gain. Xi made the same promise to President 
Trump in 2017 and 2018, but this theft has not stopped. Xi promised 
President Obama that China would not militarize the South China Sea. 
And in Hong Kong, Beijing has violated its commitments under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.

   Can you name a single bilateral agreement between the United States 
        and the PRC that Beijing has honored in full and without later 
        reneging?

    Answer. China's failure to uphold past international commitments is 
a significant factor in how we will develop our approach to China. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's approach of remaining 
clear-eyed and keeping these past shortcomings in mind as we deal with 
Beijing.

    Question. Do you believe that the CCP can be trusted to uphold any 
of its commitments, including those pertaining to climate change?

    Answer. I believe the United States must judge Beijing by its 
actions, not its words, and work with allies and partners to impose 
costs on China when it violates international norms and agreements. We 
know that addressing the climate crisis will require significant 
additional action by China. As such, we will continue to press Beijing 
to raise its climate ambition significantly during this critical 
decade. At the end of the day, we will consider what Beijing actually 
does--not what it says it will or won't do--to determine whether the 
PRC is serious about climate action.

    Question. How will you ensure that Beijing fulfills its climate 
change commitments given its record of broken promises?

    Answer. We know the climate crisis will not get addressed 
successfully without significant additional action by China. The Paris 
Agreement sets forth a robust transparency framework, under which 
Parties, including China, will need to report and be reviewed with 
respect to their greenhouse gas emissions and the extent to which they 
implement and achieve their respective nationally determined 
contributions. The United States will continue to press Beijing to 
raise its climate ambition significantly, including to update and 
implement existing Paris Agreement targets as ambitiously as possible. 
If confirmed, I would consider what Beijing actually does--not what it 
says it will or won't do--to determine whether the PRC is serious about 
climate action.

    Question. Do you believe that the Chinese Communist Party's united 
front and intelligence activities inside the borders of the United 
States, and those of our allies and partners, challenge the integrity 
of our policymaking? Why and how should we address this problem?

    Answer. It is important that we bring greater transparency to bear 
on PRC influence activities in the United States and abroad. China's 
use of information operations and other coercive and corrupting efforts 
to undermine and interfere in democracies poses a threat to the United 
States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will push back on 
Beijing's attempts to write the rules of the information age by working 
with allies and likeminded partners to support an affirmative, 
democratic vision for the global information space, while building 
resilience against these threats and exposing China's influence 
activity. I would also work to educate important U.S. constituencies, 
including state and local governments, on these threats.

    Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the requirements that PRC 
diplomats report certain categories of meetings to the U.S. Government, 
including meetings with educational institutions and Chinese community 
groups?

    Answer. It is important that there is transparency in China's 
influence activities in the United States. If confirmed, I commit to 
review this policy carefully.

    Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the prior 
administration's designation of multiple Chinese media outlets as 
foreign missions, as well as its visa restrictions on PRC reporters 
(who frequently act as intelligence gatherers as much as reporters)? 
Are you prepared to explain and defend the difference between these PRC 
media outlets and a genuine free press?

    Answer. It is important that there is transparency in China's 
influence activities in the United States. If confirmed, I will always 
be prepared to explain and defend the difference between China's state-
run media outlets and a genuine free press.

    Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the prior 
administration's policy of denying visas to certain classes of PRC-
national researchers, including those who have concealed their 
affiliation with the People's Liberation Army?

    Answer. National security is the State Department's top priority 
when adjudicating visa applications. It is a critical U.S. interest to 
make sure that we protect the technology and intellectual property that 
is produced in this country and that, if used to advance the PRC's 
military modernization, could undermine our security. We must likewise 
guard against efforts by visa applicants to unlawfully conceal 
information in the course of the visa application process and, where 
appropriate, take legal action. If confirmed, I will review the tools 
available to address these challenges, including visa policy.

Chinese Influence Operations
    Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to support Australia, and 
other victims of PRC economic coercion and United Front activities, to 
build resistance to the CCP's political influence inside their 
countries?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would not leave Australia and other allies 
and partners alone in the face of PRC economic coercion and United 
Front activities. We will face down these threats from a position of 
collective strength. I will work with the Global Engagement Center 
(GEC) to counter PRC propaganda and disinformation, including through 
programs that identify and expose the PRC's malign influence tactics 
and techniques and puncture Beijing's false narratives. I will also 
support continued coordination and cooperation through the counter 
disinformation working group with Australia, announced at Australia-
United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) last year. U.S. and 
other foreign firms have also faced economic coercion such as boycotts 
and other pressure tactics for challenging PRC preferred narratives. If 
confirmed, I will work to align our actions with those of democratic 
and like-minded partners to counter these threats and to advance 
bilateral and multilateral efforts that build resilience abroad to PRC 
covert, coercive, and corrupt activities. Efforts to diversify supply 
chains, support increased trade between like-minded partners, and 
encourage best practices to screen potentially threatening investments 
will help to build resilience and reduce the impact of PRC coercion.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights 
concerns are integrated into every senior bilateral engagement, and 
that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, both 
publicly and privately?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting 
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing 
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will 
work to ensure that human rights issues are integrated into bilateral 
engagements with the People's Republic of China at all levels. This 
requires not only general statements but also raising specific cases, 
both publicly and privately, as appropriate.

    Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious 
human rights abuses, and its failure on so many other fronts to be a 
responsible global actor?

    Answer. I am alarmed by human rights violations and abuses in China 
and call on PRC authorities to respect the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms to which their citizens are entitled, consistent with China's 
international obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I will work to 
continue holding accountable PRC authorities responsible for abuse, 
while also countering PRC attempts to erode the international rules-
based order.

    Question. What are the appropriate tools for holding the PRC and 
its officials accountable for its atrocities against Uyghurs and other 
Muslims in Xinjiang? If confirmed, do you commit to using such tools in 
a timely fashion?

    Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing crimes 
against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang against Uyghurs, who are 
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious 
minority groups. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to 
promote accountability for those responsible and deter future abuses, 
to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S. 
Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export 
restrictions, and financial sanctions.

    Question. What actions can the U.S. take to address the issue of 
forced labor in Xinjiang, including to protect against retaliatory 
actions from China?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has condemned the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) Government's retaliatory actions against individuals, 
businesses, and organizations that stand up for human rights. If 
confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote 
accountability for PRC Government actors and entities responsible for 
the atrocities and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced 
labor, and work with interagency partners to address PRC actions. I 
also commit to working with the like-minded countries and the private 
sector to counter economic retaliation against companies when they take 
actions to avoid complicity in PRC human rights and forced labor 
abuses.

    Question. How can the U.S. best provide support to civil society 
actors in Muslim-majority countries who are conducting advocacy on this 
issue?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to working with partners and 
allies, civil society, advocates, and other groups around the world to 
address our shared concerns over the PRC Government's atrocities in 
Xinjiang.

    Question. Will you work to ensure that discussions over arbitrary 
mass detention and forced labor in Xinjiang are integrated into trade 
discussions?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting 
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing 
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will 
work to ensure we continue integrating our Xinjiang concerns into 
bilateral engagements with the People's Republic of China at all 
levels.

    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with 
countries hosting Uyghur communities to ensure they do not summarily 
deport Uyghurs to China?

    Answer. The PRC Government's atrocities in Xinjiang raise serious 
refoulement concerns. If confirmed, I will work with other governments 
to ensure that Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of 
other ethnic and religious minority groups that have escaped repression 
in Xinjiang are not forcibly returned to China.

    Question. Do you believe the United States can and should use its 
diplomatic and economic leverage to protect Uyghurs from unjust 
deportation from other countries back to China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consider all available tools to ensure 
that Uyghurs and other vulnerable individuals are not forcibly returned 
to China.

    Question. Do you believe that the CCP is engaged in a deliberate 
campaign of cultural erasure against Tibetans, whose civilization is 
distinct from that of China and boasts its own rich language, 
literature, religion, and culture?

    Answer. The PRC Government has deliberately suppressed the distinct 
cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of Tibetans. If confirmed, 
I will make addressing these abuses a priority.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to convey clearly to Beijing 
the United States position that we will not accept a Chinese-controlled 
process to select the next Dalai Lama?

    Answer. The PRC Government should have no role in the succession 
process of the Dalai Lama or any other Tibetan Buddhist lama. If 
confirmed, I will call on the PRC to respect the religious freedom of 
Tibetans, including by ending its interference in the selection, 
education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders.

    Question. If the Chinese authorities attempt to force a politically 
chosen successor on the Tibetan people, will you commit to impose 
serious sanctions in response?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will consider the use of all appropriate 
tools, including financial sanctions and visa restrictions, to promote 
accountability for PRC officials responsible for abusing the religious 
freedom of Tibetans, including by interfering in the succession process 
of the Dalai Lama, consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act 
of 2020.

    Question. Would you, if confirmed, personally commit to pressing 
the PRC leadership to address Tibetan concerns through the resumption 
of dialogue with the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, without 
preconditions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our allies and partners to 
press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his 
representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy 
for Tibetans.

    Question. Will you commit to regularly raise the case of the 
Panchen Lama and press for his release?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to engaging the PRC Government on 
the case of the Panchen Lama.

    Question. Will you ensure that no U.S. official meets with, or 
provides a public platform to, the individual that Beijing appointed in 
his place?

    Answer. The PRC Government should have absolutely no role in the 
succession process of the Dalai Lama. If confirmed, I will work to 
ensure all U.S. engagements reflect this position.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to direct our diplomatic 
missions in the region, including in Hong Kong, to do their utmost to 
assist Hong Kongers who fear political persecution under the National 
Security Law, and use all consular options, including Special Public 
Benefit Parole, to provide safe harbor?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our diplomatic missions in 
the region, including Hong Kong, will continue to do their utmost to 
assist Hong Kongers who fear persecution, to include working to pursue 
all options, as appropriate, to provide avenues for those who seek to 
depart.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that the State 
Department maintains a high degree of pressure on Beijing for its 
violations of Hong Kong's autonomy and prioritizes this issue above all 
other competing interests in Hong Kong?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the State Department 
will continue to put pressure on PRC and Hong Kong officials 
responsible for undermining Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy as 
promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic Law. 
Maintaining Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy is a central focus of 
our policy toward Hong Kong.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to appoint only senior 
officers as Consul General who are strongly committed to the 
democratization of Hong Kong?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work with State Department leadership 
and human resources to identify suitable candidates for Consul General 
who will carry out the Department's policy of advocating for Hong 
Kong's high degree of autonomy, promote fundamental freedoms and human 
rights, and build support for international pressure on the PRC to meet 
its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to advocate on behalf of 
Hong Kong protesters who are imprisoned for violations of the so-called 
National Security Law, or for similar politically motivated charges, 
both in your private conversations with Hong Kong and PRC central 
government officials, as well as in public diplomacy?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate by any available means on 
behalf of Hong Kong people imprisoned on politically motivated charges. 
We continue to stand with the people of Hong Kong and for their human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms. I will ensure that we continue to 
support the aspirations of people in Hong Kong and for the system and 
rights that the PRC promised them.

    Question. Did you agree with former Secretary Pompeo's decision to 
decertify Hong Kong as sufficiently autonomous to warrant special 
treatment under U.S. law?

    Answer. On March 31, in conjunction with the Hong Kong Policy Act 
Report, Secretary Blinken again certified to Congress that Hong Kong 
does not warrant differential treatment under U.S. law in the same 
manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. If 
confirmed, I am committed to continuing to work with Congress and our 
allies and partners around the world to stand with people in Hong Kong 
against the PRC's egregious policies and actions that undermine the 
autonomy and freedoms promised in the Sino--British Joint Declaration 
and Hong Kong's own Basic Law.

    Question. If confirmed, will you use decertification and all other 
available means to deny legitimacy to the government of the Hong Kong 
Special Administration Region until the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
under Basic Law are restored?

    Answer. The State Department has a variety of policy tools 
available to deny credibility to the government of Hong Kong, including 
the Hong Kong Policy Act, under which we certified again this year that 
Hong Kong is no longer autonomous. In addition, under Executive Order 
13936, the Department has authority to impose sanctions on Hong Kong 
and People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in connection with 
efforts to undermine Hong Kong's autonomy. The Hong Kong Autonomy Act 
also authorizes sanctions on foreign persons that materially contribute 
to the failure of the PRC to meet its obligations under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration or Hong Kong's Basic Law, as well as on 
foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage in significant 
transactions with such persons. If confirmed, I will continue to 
evaluate all available tools and use them as necessary to pressure the 
Government.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to robust efforts to 
increase Taiwan's international space and to counter Beijing's attempts 
to isolate Taiwan in international organizations and beyond?

    Answer. Yes. The Biden-Harris administration's support for Taiwan 
is rock-solid. If confirmed, I plan to continue to deepen our ties with 
Taiwan in the face of PRC efforts to constrain its international space 
and to support Taiwan's membership or meaningful participation in 
international organizations.

    Question. If President Biden follows through with his campaign 
promise to assemble a summit of democracies, will you ensure that 
Taiwan is invited to participate and at the same level as other 
participants?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support President Biden's commitment 
to host a Summit for Democracy. I believe the global community of 
democracies would benefit from Taiwan's participation in such events 
and could learn from Taiwan's experience of democracy under pressure 
due to foreign malign influence, including disinformation campaigns 
that seek to undermine its democratic processes.

    Question. Do you agree with former Vice President Pence's statement 
that ``America will always believe that Taiwan's embrace of democracy 
shows a better path for all the Chinese people?''

    Answer. Yes. Taiwan is a leading democracy and a critical economic 
and security partner. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen U.S. 
ties with Taiwan as an important priority.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to use your position as 
Assistant Secretary to promote Taiwan as a model of democratic success 
that China and others should emulate?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and 
partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan plays in addressing 
global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending 
against threats to its democratic values.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to do your utmost to ensure 
that Taiwan's requests for the sale of military equipment will be 
processed as quickly as possible?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support making available to 
Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.

    Question. Will maintaining Taiwan's defense capabilities be a top 
priority for EAP under your leadership?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, in response to the growing PRC threat, I 
will continue deepening our unofficial security relationship with 
Taiwan to ensure it has sufficient capabilities to defend itself, 
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
    The United States notified more than $32 billion worth of arms to 
Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability 
to defend itself, nor should the impact of arms sales be judged on 
total value alone. Our expanding security cooperation seeks to 
encourage Taiwan to prioritize cost-effective, resilient, distributed, 
and sufficient capabilities. We are also encouraging Taiwan to 
prioritize reserve force reform, civilian defense capabilities, and 
cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience.
    U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan is calibrated to meet the 
threat from the PRC and is consistent with the U.S. ``one China'' 
policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three 
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. If confirmed, as part of that 
cooperation, I also will encourage Taiwan to spend on defense an amount 
commensurate with the growing threat it faces.

    Question. Do you commit to wholeheartedly support the full scope of 
bilateral defense cooperation, including joint trainings and exercises 
and any other substantive exchanges that will enhance Taiwan's security 
posture?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support engagement that would 
advance U.S. interests and foreign policy objectives. The United States 
has long maintained our abiding interest in peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait.
    In response to the growing PRC threat, we will continue deepening 
our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it has 
sufficient capabilities to defend itself.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work with our U.N. Ambassador to 
look for bold and creative ways to promote Japan's candidacy for 
permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council?

    Answer. A reformed Security Council that is representative, 
effective, and relevant is in the best interest of the United States 
and all U.N. member states. If confirmed, I would support a modest 
enlargement of the Security Council for both permanent and non-
permanent members, provided doing so does not diminish its 
effectiveness or its efficiency, and does not alter or expand the veto. 
Regarding member state suitability, we remain principally focused on a 
country's ability and willingness to contribute to international peace 
and security.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work with your counterpart in 
Tokyo, and at the Department of Defense, to ensure that U.S. forces and 
Japanese forces are planning for possible Taiwan contingencies?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United 
States and our allies and partners pool our collective strength to 
advance shared interests and deter common threats. We will underscore 
the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

    Question. Will you encourage Tokyo to engage in security 
cooperation with Taiwan to complement existing U.S. cooperation with 
Taiwan?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will encourage our allies and partners 
to continue to work together to advance our shared prosperity, 
security, and values in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is a capable, 
thoughtful, and dynamic ally that has helped us to secure our interests 
and values in Asia more effectively than we could have done alone.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to strengthen U.S. relations 
with Mongolia and protect its sovereignty against potential 
encroachment by the People's Republic of China?

    Answer. Yes. Mongolia is a democracy and our strategic partner, and 
if confirmed, I will work to continue strengthening our bilateral 
relationship and supporting Mongolia's sovereignty.

    Question. If President Biden follows through with his campaign 
promise to assemble a summit of democracies, will you ensure that 
Mongolia is invited to participate?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support President Biden's commitment 
to host a Summit for Democracy. Participating governments will be 
expected to deliver on both domestic and international commitments that 
advance democracy, fight corruption, and protect human rights. As a 
vibrant democracy, I expect Mongolia will be favorably considered for 
participation.

   Will you, as a matter of policy, seek to increase U.S. investment 
        in Mongolia and bilateral trade ties?

    Answer. Yes. As Mongolia's strategic partner and proud ``third 
neighbor,'' the United States will continue to seek opportunities to 
increase both bilateral trade and U.S. investment in Mongolia.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work with your counterpart in 
Ulaanbaatar to promote programs to protect the Mongolian language, 
culture, and Buddhism, and wherever possible, to extend such promotion 
to Mongolians in the PRC?

    Answer. Yes. Mongolia holds a unique place in world history and 
possesses a rich culture stretching back centuries. If confirmed, I 
will work to promote programs that protect Mongolian language, script, 
culture, and Buddhism, wherever they are found.

    Question. Mongolia's presidential election on June 9, 2021 was 
conducted in a manner that was free and fair, but the incumbent 
president was blocked from running for reelection in a manner that many 
Mongolians found troubling. The Mongolian People's Party (MPP) now 
controls the presidency in addition to holding a supermajority in the 
parliament and yielding significant influence over the judiciary. If 
confirmed, do you commit to efforts to guard against democratic 
backsliding in Mongolia and to ensure that the MPP does not revert to 
its authoritarian past under the influence of its authoritarian 
neighbor?

    Answer. Mongolia recently conducted a free and fair presidential 
election, its eighth since the country's peaceful transition to 
democracy in 1990. As strategic partners, Mongolia and the United 
States share a common commitment to democratic values and the 
strengthening of democratic institutions. The U.S. has a strong 
strategic interest in ensuring Mongolia remains a stable and viable 
democracy. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. tradition of working 
closely with our Mongolian counterparts to deepen their democracy and 
to strengthen good governance and civil society in Mongolia.

Korea
    Question. If confirmed, what will you do to expand U.S.-ROK trade 
and investment ties, and encourage Seoul to diversify its trade and 
investment away from China in order to reduce its vulnerability to 
Chinese economic coercion?

    Answer. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is bolstered by our strong and 
growing economic relationship and grounded in our shared democratic 
values. If confirmed, I will support the full and faithful 
implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which remains 
the foundation of our bilateral trade and investment relationship and 
an important pillar of our bilateral relationship. I will work, in 
cooperation with my U.S. Government colleagues, to continue to expand 
robust U.S.-ROK economic ties, promote Korean investment in the United 
States, and enhance our mutual prosperity and security through close 
collaboration on supply chain diversification, regular coordination on 
economic security matters, and enhanced cooperation between our two 
countries to advance our common vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific 
and world.

    Question. What is your opinion of the South Korean Government's 
decision to ban the distribution of leaflets and other materials into 
North Korea by North Korean human rights organizations?

    Answer. As a global policy, the United States advocates for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world. 
With regards to the DPRK, if confirmed, I will continue to promote the 
free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK. It is 
critical for the North Korean people to have access to fact-based 
information not controlled by the North Korean regime. The United 
States promotes and supports freedom of expression around the world, 
including with valued allies like the Republic of Korea.
    The United States has been in close contact with the ROKG to 
express our strong views about the importance of the free flow of 
information into the DPRK and freedom of expression.
    We respect the fact that the ROK, as a democracy with an 
independent and strong judiciary, has tools in place to allow for 
review of the law.
    If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners in the NGO 
and North Korean escapee community to promote human rights in North 
Korea and North Koreans' access to information.

    Question. If confirmed, how would you respond to a resurgence of 
the protest movement in Thailand?

    Answer. The United States supports freedom of expression and the 
right to peaceful assembly as essential to Thailand's democracy. The 
United States does not support any political party or position in 
Thailand; we support the democratic process, human rights, and the rule 
of law. If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Royal Thai Government 
to respect the human rights of those who exercise their freedom of 
expression. I will also call on the Royal Thai Government to respect 
the human rights of those who have been arrested or detained, including 
adequate access to medical care and the legal counsel of their 
choosing. Thailand is a valued U.S. ally and partner, and the strong 
relations we have built up over time allow the United States to engage 
constructively with the Royal Thai Government.
    Our shared history, shared interests, and the common values that 
unite our peoples make me confident that we can continue to navigate 
these challenges for the good of both countries.

    Question. How will U.S. policy promote human rights and democracy 
in Thailand going forward?

    Answer. The United States strongly supports human rights and 
democracy in Thailand, the Indo-Pacific, and around the world. We are 
committed to a long-term partnership with Thailand, and the promotion 
of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms has been a major 
part of U.S. engagement with Thailand for many years. If confirmed, I 
will continue to support our robust diplomatic engagement to advance 
democracy and the protection of human rights in Thailand. I will call 
on the Royal Thai Government to respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and to act in a manner consistent with its international 
obligations and commitments.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you work to counter PRC influence 
in Thailand and increase awareness of the risks of dependency on trade 
and investment from China?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our alliance with 
Thailand and our partnerships in Southeast Asia, while also working to 
counter the PRC's malign influence in the region. I will review our 
approach to enhancing economic engagement with Thailand and regional 
partners. I will encourage internationally accepted best practices in 
trade and investment and an open and inclusive approach to economic 
development. Furthermore, if confirmed, I am committed to working with 
Thailand to combat COVID-19 and climate change; to strengthen our 
defenses, including in cyberspace; and to produce and secure the 
technologies of the future. Additionally, I will support Thailand as a 
regional leader in the Mekong region and key partner in the Mekong-U.S. 
Partnership.

    Question. If confirmed, what would you do to deny legitimacy to the 
junta that seized power in February?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use all tools available to 
exert pressure on the junta and deny the regime international 
credibility. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, we worked quickly 
to impose sanctions on those responsible for the coup, as well as 
state-owned enterprises and military-affiliated companies that are 
providing financial resources to the military regime. The United States 
has worked with our international partners to deny the regime access to 
hundreds of millions of dollars in resources in international financial 
institutions, as well as pushed for an arms embargo and restriction on 
the export of dual use technology. We have encouraged the international 
community to use all levers available to restrict the junta's access to 
financial institutions and enhance scrutiny of any financial ties to 
the military.
    In addition, the United States has engaged the pro-democracy 
movement, including the ``National Unity Government'' (NUG), at high 
levels, which has served to further deny international credibility to 
the regime. If confirmed, I will utilize every tool and opportunity to 
expose the junta's horrific brutality, promote accountability, and 
support the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma, including 
ethnic and religious communities, who yearn for true democracy and do 
not want to live another day under military rule.

    Question. Do you commit to block the junta's efforts to replace the 
legitimate representatives of Myanmar at international organizations?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to support the 
Burmese people and work to return Burma to the democratic path chosen 
by its people. The United States has strongly condemned the military's 
actions to overturn the will of the people of Burma as freely expressed 
in elections in November 2020. The United States has also engaged the 
pro-democracy movement, including the ``National Unity Government'' 
(NUG), at high levels, which has helped deny international credibility 
to the regime. The United States will continue to support Burma's pro-
democracy movement, including the NUG, various ethnic and religious 
groups, and others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic 
transition. If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to continue 
encouraging our partners, allies, and other members of the 
international community to engage representatives of the pro-democracy 
movement, including in international organizations and major 
international events, and push for dialogue among all relevant 
stakeholders to secure a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma.

    Question. If confirmed, will you work with the Treasury Department 
to impose punishing sanctions on all industries that fund the Tatmadaw, 
including the oil and gas industry and the mining industry?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our robust engagement within 
the U.S. interagency, including the Treasury Department, to identify 
ways to exert additional pressure on the military regime, including 
financial pressure. The United States has already sanctioned over 30 
military leaders, adult family members, commanders, and military units 
responsible for the coup and the horrific violence. We have sanctioned 
top revenue generators for the military, including the largest military 
conglomerates, the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar 
Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). We have designated the largest state-
owned enterprises in the gems, timber, and other sectors that the 
military has used to enrich itself at the expense of the people of 
Burma. In addition, we have successfully led an international effort 
with partners and allies, including the UK, Canada, and EU, to sanction 
the same individuals and entities, further denying the military 
international credibility and access to revenue.
    While we have sought to impose significant sanctions on the regime, 
the United States has also been careful to avoid steps that could hurt 
the interests of the people of Burma and deepen the humanitarian 
suffering caused by the coup, and negatively impact our partners in the 
region. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that, in identifying 
potential additional targets designed to exert pressure on the military 
regime, including the oil and gas industry and the mining industry, we 
also continue to study and take into account the impact on the people 
of Burma.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Ted Cruz

Taiwan
    Question. If confirmed, will you restore the Trump administration's 
policy allowing our Taiwanese allies to display symbols of their 
sovereignty? If not, why not?

    Answer. In keeping with longstanding U.S. policy across Democratic 
and Republican administrations, the United States Government does not 
permit displays of Taiwan sovereignty, including flags, on United 
States Government premises. Though the United States does not maintain 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, U.S. support for Taiwan has never 
been stronger, as demonstrated by, for example, ongoing arms sales 
designed to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense 
capability, the provision of vaccines announced by three U.S. Senators 
during their visit to Taipei on June 6, and the repeated and 
unprecedented public mentions of Taiwan in the recent U.S.-Japan joint 
statement, U.S.-ROK joint statement, U.S.-EU joint statement, and G7 
leaders' communique.
    To deepen and broaden our unofficial relationship with Taiwan, the 
Biden-Harris administration also issued new Guidelines for Interacting 
with Taiwan (``contact guidance''), which are more permissive than any 
previous iterations. Taiwan has welcomed the new contact guidance, 
including through statements by President Tsai, Foreign Minister Wu, 
and TECRO Representative Hsiao. If confirmed, I will work to further 
develop our robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan and ensure 
we fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.

EO 14034
    Question. On June 11, the Biden administration published in the 
Federal Register Executive Order 14034, which revoked Executive Order 
13942 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and 
Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect 
to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply 
Chain), Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat 
Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National 
Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology 
and Services Supply Chain), and Executive Order 13971 of January 5, 
2021 (Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software 
Developed or Controlled by Chinese Companies). Those three EOs had 
restricted applications controlled by Chinese companies. According to 
EO 13971, ``[b]y accessing personal electronic devices such as 
smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software 
applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from 
users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and 
private information. This data collection threatens to provide the 
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and 
proprietary information--which would permit China to track the 
locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of 
personal information.''

   Please assess the potential intelligence risks associated with 
        these applications including the risk to State Department 
        personnel and their families overseas.

    Answer. Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, Securing the 
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain, 
the Secretary of Commerce evaluates potential threats to the United 
States presented by information and communications technology or 
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons 
owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of 
the People's Republic of China and other designated foreign 
adversaries.
    To enhance this effort, on June 9 President Biden issued E.O. 
14034, which instructs the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate 
transactions involving foreign adversary-connected software 
applications that may pose a risk to Americans' data, utilizing clear 
criteria that may indicate a heightened risk, including software 
applications that are owned, controlled, or managed by persons that 
support foreign adversary military or intelligence activities, or are 
involved in malicious cyber activities, or involve applications that 
collect sensitive personal data. If confirmed, I will work with 
colleagues at the Department of Commerce in assessing these risks, as 
well as the risk to State Department personnel and their families 
overseas.

State Department
    Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized, 
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling 
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice 
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily 
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate. 
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices: 
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on 
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism 
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily 
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that 
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified 
information in notifications provided by the State Department to 
Congress? If not, why not?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that 
information provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in 
a format that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while 
complying with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State 
classification guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling 
and storage of classified information.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
    Submitted to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Bill Hagerty

    Question. Ambassador Kritenbrink, I would like to bring to your 
attention the case of Greg Kelly, a Tennessee constituent who, in my 
view, has been wrongly detained for nearly three years in Japan. I'm 
deeply concerned about Mr. Kelly's treatment by the Japanese legal 
system.
    After being taken into custody in November 2018, Mr. Kelly--who 
maintains his innocence--was forced to wait for nearly two years for 
his trial in Japan even to begin in September 2020. News media now 
report that it has been proven at trial that the entire case against 
Greg Kelly was fabricated for the sole purpose of preventing Renault 
from taking over Nissan. There is no deadline by which the court in 
Japan must deliver a verdict in Mr. Kelly's case, and he likely faces 
the prospect of no decision until well into next year.

   If confirmed, do you commit to working with me and to using every 
        tool at your disposal to get Greg Kelly back to the United 
        States and home with his family?

    Answer. One of the most important tasks of the Department of State 
and U.S. embassies and consulates is to provide assistance to U.S. 
citizens who are incarcerated or detained abroad. We take this 
obligation to assist U.S. citizens arrested or detained abroad 
seriously. Mr. Kelly's case is a high priority for the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The 
Department is actively monitoring Mr. Kelly's case and Embassy Tokyo's 
American Citizens Services unit has been in frequent, regular contact 
with Mr. Kelly and his legal teams. While the Department cannot 
intercede on the merits of his case, the Department monitors 
developments in his case very closely. The Department continue to urge 
the Japanese authorities to ensure Mr. Kelly's trial and verdict are 
concluded as expeditiously as possible. If confirmed, I will make Mr. 
Kelly's case a priority, and I look forward to working closely with you 
and your office on his case.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in 
Room SD-G50, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee, 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Kaine, 
Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, and Hagerty.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee shall come to order. We are here to 
consider nominees for four important positions: Ambassador 
Gentry Smith to the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic 
Security, Ambassador Rena Bitter to be Assistant Secretary of 
State for Consular Affairs, Ms. Monica Medina to be the 
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International 
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Mr. Marc Knapper to 
be the Ambassador to Vietnam.
    Congratulations to the four of you on your nominations, our 
thanks for your willingness to serve our country in this 
capacity, and the members of your family because this is a 
family sacrifice as well. So we appreciate their sacrifices.
    I see that our distinguished colleague and member of this 
committee, the senator from Massachusetts, is going to be 
introducing Ms. Medina this morning.
    So we will turn to him first before any opening statements.
    Senator Markey?

              STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
                U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much and 
Ranking Member Risch, thank you so much as well.
    It is my pleasure this morning to introduce President 
Biden's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific 
Affairs, and my friend for 38 years, Monica Medina.
    It is impossible to think of anyone more qualified for this 
job.
    The Chairman. You knew her in your infancy then?
    Senator Markey. And, again, I am now in the infancy of my 
second adulthood, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
makes it possible for us to enjoy extended political life 
expectancy.
    It is impossible to think of anyone more qualified for this 
job. Monica has been working for decades and across multiple 
administrations on environmental law and policy.
    She understands the interconnected world we live in and 
knows that the 21st century U.S. foreign policy goes not simply 
beyond the water's edge, but to the seas and the skies and the 
sands of the world where universal threats and their solutions 
lie.
    Monica won a Reserve Officers Training Corps scholarship 
while at Georgetown University, and while working at the 
Defense Department in the Obama administration, she worked to 
end discrimination against women in the military, to provide 
them with opportunities that were previously closed to them 
simply because of their gender.
    Monica has always been a fierce fighter for justice and 
never backs down from a tough challenge, and she has confronted 
some of the world's toughest global challenges.
    Ms. Medina has called out the connection between illegal 
wildlife trafficking and organized criminal networks. She has 
fought against illegal fishing, which is tied to global piracy 
and human rights violations.
    Just like the climate crisis, these are global spanning 
threats to our national security, and Monica's expertise in 
these areas is why former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies have turned 
to her as an expert and advisor.
    Monica knows that we cannot protect ourselves at home 
without a robust strategy abroad, and diplomacy is not just 
something that she has practiced in international work. She has 
worked across the aisle with stakeholders from different states 
and industries in the United States to protect our oceans and 
our ocean economy.
    After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, she worked with the 
five Republican governors of affected states to get $1 billion 
in restoration funds from oil company BP so that states could 
quickly start rebounding from the disaster.
    Her work at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration was praised by groups like the Seafood 
Harvesters of America, who support her experience and legacy of 
protecting our oceans, and the workers and communities that 
depend upon them.
    Louis Pasteur once said that science knows no country 
because knowledge belongs to humanity, and is the torch which 
illuminates the world.
    Science is the highest personification of the nation 
because that nation will remain the first which carries the 
furthest the works of thought and intelligence.
    Monica Medina has dedicated her career to promoting 
America's excellence in these two realms, the tools of science 
and the values of humanity, because it is there where America's 
excellence and promise to the world is to be found.
    She knows that, and throughout her distinguished career, 
she has become supremely prepared for the role of Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and 
Science.
    She has been training for it in every position in which she 
has served, every mission that she has fulfilled, every 
discussion she has held with key stakeholders.
    I am so grateful for her continued commitment to our 
country and planet, as well as for our years of friendship, and 
I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting her for this 
important position.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey. A rather glowing 
introduction----
    Senator Markey. Well deserved.
    The Chairman [continuing]. And we know that you have, I am 
sure, well earned. I know that you may have other committee 
business to do, and so at your leisure you are welcome to 
depart from us, and thank you for your introduction.
    Let me turn to our panel, speak briefly about each of them, 
turn to Senator Risch, and then we will listen to your 
testimony.
    Ambassador Smith has served the United States and the State 
Department during his entire professional career with two and a 
half decades, ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic 
personnel and U.S. citizens here and abroad.
    He has been a special agent protecting the secretary of 
state, the regional security officer in multiple foreign posts, 
a deputy assistant secretary and senior advisor in the Bureau 
of Diplomatic Security.
    He has served as director for the Office of Foreign 
Missions for which he was previously confirmed by the Senate. 
There is no question in my mind that he is fully qualified and 
deeply experienced for this position.
    Ambassador Smith's experience and commitment will be 
needed, as the State Department faces multiple challenges in 
keeping its personnel safe, including a relatively new one.
    Indeed, U.S. personnel have recently faced the prospect of 
silent stealthy assaults from what may be some sort of directed 
energy weapons, first employed in Cuba and now showing up in 
other parts of the world.
    These incidents deserve the full attention of the United 
States in order to ensure accountability and that the parties 
responsible are brought to justice, but most of all, to protect 
personnel.
    So, Ambassador Smith, I trust that, if confirmed, you will 
be devoted in your efforts to meet this and all threats against 
U.S. diplomatic and other personnel.
    Ms. Medina, as our colleague, Senator Markey has said, your 
knowledge and experience, including as Principal Deputy 
Undersecretary of Oceans and Atmosphere at the Department of 
Commerce and in various leadership roles focused on ocean 
conservation and environmental policy, suits you well for this 
position.
    If confirmed as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
Oceans, International, Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 
you will be responsible for maintaining U.S. leadership on 
cooperative efforts to maintain the health and sustainability 
of the world we all share.
    If confirmed, you will also be responsible for managing 
U.S. diplomacy on addressing global plastic pollution, 
protecting endangered species, and combating wildlife 
trafficking, representing the U.S., the Montreal Protocol, and 
the Arctic Council, among others.
    I know you are up to that challenge. As you may know, I co-
authored the Save Our Seas 2.0 Act, and I look forward to 
working with you on the next steps to combating plastic 
pollution and other global environmental problems.
    Ambassador Bitter, I am pleased to see you back before the 
committee. Your service in Laos these past several years, 
apparently, may not have made headlines in Washington, but it 
has been with distinction.
    The position you are nominated for as Assistant Secretary 
for Consular Affairs is perhaps one of the most challenging 
positions in the department today.
    The effects of the COVID pandemic have been particularly 
felt in the CA on the massive repatriation of American citizens 
abroad carried out by the department last year, to the 
financial challenges resulting from the consular office fee-
for-service model at a time when fees have dried up as a result 
of decreased international travel.
    That is something that has changed dramatically. We have 
now a huge demand and a big backlog on passports, which several 
colleagues on the committee have raised with me. I am sure that 
may be raised with you as to how we deal with it.
    The mismanagement of the department, broadly speaking, and 
the Consular Affairs in particular over the past four years 
leaves the next Assistant Secretary with no shortage of 
challenges.
    As Consular Affairs is also the part of the department that 
has the most engagement with American citizens processing 
passports and visas, supporting overseas travelers in need, and 
the like, it is also a bureau that receives a high level of 
congressional scrutiny.
    While the challenges in the bureau are evident, I am 
confident in your abilities and capacity to serve capably in 
this position.
    Finally, I am pleased to see Marc Knapper before the 
committee for consideration as our next ambassador to Vietnam.
    We look to develop a genuine strategic partnership with 
Hanoi, one animated by our shared interests and our values, and 
I can think of few more qualified Foreign Service professionals 
than Mr. Knapper to be entrusted with this important task.
    In closing, while the four of you have a series of 
challenges ahead, I am confident that your knowledge and 
experience will serve you well as you take on your new 
responsibilities upon confirmation. I look forward to each of 
your testimonies.
    And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking 
member for his opening comments.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 
the witnesses for being here today and being willing to serve 
in these positions, and your families, who we know share the 
sacrifices that you make.
    I want to start with the nomination of Assistant Secretary 
of State for Oceans and International Environment and 
Scientific Affairs.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed what I believe to be 
serious gaps in U.S. international pandemic prevention, 
preparedness, and, importantly, response efforts. This includes 
the failure of the Department of State over multiple 
administrations of both parties to adequately prioritize global 
health policy and diplomatic engagement beyond the PEPFAR 
program.
    We now realize how important that is. PEPFAR, of course, 
was an exception to that. It was very successful, and it is 
important that we duplicate the success that we had in PEPFAR 
in what will undoubtedly be future challenges of a global 
health nature.
    Ms. Medina, if confirmed, you will lead the bureau 
responsible for ensuring foreign policy coherence and program 
integrity for global health and biosecurity.
    I look forward to hearing from you how you plan to improve 
State's leadership in these vital areas, which, as I said, I 
think suffer some shortcomings, which have become painfully 
obvious as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    In addition, COVID-19 has brought to light the risks of 
collaboration on life sciences research with countries that do 
not share our interests like China.
    If confirmed, you will have a role in overseeing 
international scientific cooperation and global health 
security, and it is critical that you work across the 
department to prevent the misuse of such research.
    Lastly, as we discussed when we met last month, the 
Columbia River Treaty remains an important issue to myself and 
the rest of the Northwest delegation. I look forward to hearing 
more about how you plan to make Columbia River Treaty 
negotiations a priority.
    Next, we have the nomination of Assistant Secretary of 
State for Diplomatic Security. For decades, the State 
Department has struggled with what has been dubbed colloquially 
a bunker mentality, which greatly over-prioritizes security to 
the detriment of our diplomatic effectiveness.
    Security is undoubtedly very important, but as with all 
things, it must be put in its proper place. This severe risk 
aversion often keeps our diplomats cooped up behind embassy 
walls instead of engaging with the local community and 
conducting traditional diplomacy.
    America's adversaries do not place similar burdens on their 
diplomats, putting the United States at a strategic 
disadvantage.
    Earlier this year, I introduced legislation to improve the 
process for investigating security incidents abroad so that the 
department's diplomats can safely do their jobs, promote U.S. 
interests with host countries, and engage local populations 
with appropriate protection.
    If confirmed, it will be vitally important to ensure the 
department learns to manage risk more effectively.
    Ambassador Smith, I look forward to hearing your thoughts 
on these issues.
    Moving on to the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State 
for Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Consular Affairs has a 
unique opportunity to demonstrate how the State Department 
assists U.S. citizens every day while also advancing our 
national interests.
    Whether it is helping Americans who lost a passport on 
vacation get home or visiting U.S. citizens who have been 
incarcerated abroad, Consular Affairs often directly serves the 
American people.
    However, last year's travel restrictions and resulting loss 
of visa fee revenue greatly hurt the Bureau's finances, 
potentially affecting its ability to provide these important 
services.
    As vaccination rates climb, there will be more people 
seeking to travel. Demand for passports and visas are rapidly 
increasing, leading to significant delays in processing times.
    Ambassador Bitter, I look forward to hearing your plan to 
get Consular Affairs fully operational and to reduce these 
extremely irregular passport processing times.
    Finally, we have the nomination of Ambassador to Vietnam. 
Vietnam is an important U.S. partner and an ASEAN member. I am 
very glad to see the recent U.S. donation of 2 million Moderna 
vaccine through COVAX to Vietnam in addition to separate 
donations to Indonesia and Malaysia.
    Southeast Asian countries need vaccines. Given the 
importance of this region to the United States and the pressure 
some countries are facing from China to accept its clearly 
substandard vaccines, it is crucial that the United States 
continue to prioritize deliveries to our partners there.
    We need to redouble our efforts following the 
nontransparent COVAX procurement deal announced earlier this 
week that will allow China to profit mightily from the 
distribution of its substandard vaccines, all of this very 
erotic.
    Beyond vaccines, I think it is crucial that we advance 
collaboration with Vietnam in important areas such as the South 
China Sea and the Mekong region, and the crisis in Myanmar.
    We should also continue to prioritize all forms of energy 
engagement, including liquefied natural gas.
    Finally, in closing, I continue to support engagement with 
Vietnam to promote freedom of speech and religion.
    Mr. Knapper, I look forward to hearing how you will tackle 
all these issues if you are confirmed.
    We have a lot to cover today, and I will yield back.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    All right. We will start our testimony from our nominees. 
We would ask you to summarize your statement at about five 
minutes.
    All of your full statements will be included in the record, 
without objection, and we will start with Ambassador Smith and 
then move down the aisle.
    Ambassador Smith?

 STATEMENT OF GENTRY O. SMITH, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE AN 
       ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (DIPLOMATIC SECURITY)

    Mr. Smith. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 
today as President Biden's nominee to be the Department of 
State's Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security.
    I am grateful for the confidence that the president and 
Secretary Blinken have placed in me and I am humbled by the 
opportunity to lead such an outstanding organization.
    In the 105-year history of diplomatic security, I am just 
the third DS agent to be nominated to serve as Assistant 
Secretary.
    In my 30-year career with the Foreign Service, I am proud 
to have served as a DS agent for 27 years prior to my 
appointment as the director for the Office of Foreign Missions, 
a position that I held into my retirement in 2017.
    I would like to thank you for your continued and unwavering 
support for both the department and for diplomatic security. I 
am very proud to be associated with the outstanding women and 
men who labor tirelessly to protect America's diplomatic 
facilities, critical information, and, most importantly, 
American lives.
    They also conduct extensive important law enforcement 
investigations necessary to keep our country safe.
    I want to thank my wife, Georgette, our adult children and 
their spouses, and our six adorable grandchildren for the love 
and support and for allowing me to return to rejoin an 
institution that I love.
    It is, indeed, an honor to lead the dedicated special 
agents, security engineers, diplomatic couriers, security 
technicians, and other specialized personnel in providing a 
secure environment in which to conduct U.S. foreign policy.
    I first joined Diplomatic Security in 1987 after proudly 
serving as a police officer in Raleigh, North Carolina. These 
were the early days of building the Diplomatic Security 
Service.
    I grew up in the organization as it grew to meet increasing 
global security challenges as well as domestic challenges and 
U.S. national security interests.
    Having served in Cairo during both Gulf wars and Rangoon 
during a period of unrest and uncertainty that rivals the 
current situation, I am familiar with the importance of strong 
leadership and requisite security operations.
    Upon returning to the U.S. and serving in senior positions 
in Diplomatic Security, I am proud to have collaborated closely 
with other department colleagues, the intelligence community, 
DOD, and members of Congress to construct and improve 
diplomatic facilities here and abroad while enabling our 
personnel to project U.S. Government interests around the 
world.
    I am also proud and honored to have received Senate 
approval to lead the Office of Foreign Missions during my last 
tenure with the department.
    My body of work within the department and subsequent 
experiences as an independent consultant in the private sector 
is what has prepared me to assume leadership as the assistant 
secretary for Diplomatic Security.
    I am aware that there will always be challenges as we seek 
to advance U.S. interests around the world. With support and 
continued guidance from members of this committee and Congress 
as a whole, my top priority, if confirmed, will be to help to 
ensure that the department effectively protects its physical 
assets, information, and, most importantly, lives.
    At the same time, however, I recognize that effective 
diplomacy is virtually impossible without the ability to take 
considered risk in service of strategic goals and objectives.
    It will be my responsibility to evaluate various threat-
mitigating strategies and help the department make the best 
possible calculations in support of American diplomacy.
    Risk management is particularly critical in high-threat 
countries, most notably at the moment in Afghanistan as 
American troop levels are drawn down.
    Closer to home, we need to do more to promote diversity, 
equity, inclusion, and accessibility within our ranks, while 
empowering diplomatic security agents to conduct effective 
investigations in support of protective details, as well as 
passport and visa fraud.
    The recent SolarWinds intrusion has underlined the 
importance of DS' role in maintaining a 24/7 watch on the 
department's global cyber infrastructure, a challenge which 
promises to intensify over the coming years.
    I also look forward to overseeing further improvements in 
our law enforcement and other security training at the 
department's new Foreign Affair Security Training Center in in 
Blackstone, Virginia.
    Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely 
with this body to ensure your interests and concerns are 
properly address and that we work together to protect our 
personnel, facilities, and national interests abroad and 
domestically.
    Thank you for your time and consideration, and I am happy 
to entertain any of your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]


               Prepared Statement of Hon. Gentry O. Smith

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee. I am honored to appear before you today as President Biden's 
nominee to be the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for the 
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. I am grateful for the confidence that 
the President and Secretary Blinken have placed in me, and I am humbled 
by the opportunity to lead such an outstanding organization. In the 
105-year history of Diplomatic Security, I am just the third DS agent 
to be nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary.
    In my 30-year career with the Foreign Service, I am proud to have 
served as a DS Agent for 27 years prior to my appointment as Director 
of the Office of Foreign Missions--a position I held until my 
retirement in 2017. I would like to thank you for your continued 
unwavering support for both the Department and Diplomatic Security. I 
am very proud to be associated with the outstanding women and men who 
labor tirelessly to protect America's diplomatic facilities, critical 
information, and, most importantly, American lives. They also conduct 
extensive, important law enforcement investigations necessary to keep 
our country safe.
    I want to thank my wife Georgette, our adult children and their 
spouses, and our six adorable grandchildren for their love and support, 
and for allowing me to rejoin an institution that I love. It is indeed 
an honor to lead the dedicated Special Agents, Security Engineers, 
Diplomatic Couriers, Security Technicians, and other specialized 
personnel in providing a secure environment in which to conduct U.S. 
foreign policy.
    I first joined Diplomatic Security in 1987, after proudly serving 
as a Police Officer in Raleigh, North Carolina. These were the early 
days of building the Diplomatic Security Service. I grew up in the 
organization as it grew to meet increasing global security challenges, 
as well as domestic challenges to U.S. national security interests. 
Having served in Cairo during both Gulf Wars and in Rangoon during a 
period of unrest and uncertainty that rivals the current situation, I 
am familiar with the importance of strong leadership and requisite 
security operations. Upon returning to the U.S. and serving in senior 
positions in Diplomatic Security, I am proud to have collaborated 
closely with other Department colleagues, the Intelligence Community, 
DoD and Members of Congress to construct and improve diplomatic 
facilities here and abroad while enabling our personnel to project U.S. 
Government interests around the world. I am also proud and honored to 
have received Senate approval to lead the Office of Foreign Missions 
during my last tenure with the Department.
    My body of work within the Department, and subsequent experience as 
an independent consultant in the private sector, is what has prepared 
me to assume leadership as the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic 
Security. I am aware that there will always be challenges as we seek to 
advance U.S. interests around the world.
    With support and continued guidance from members of this committee 
and Congress as a whole, my top priority, if confirmed, will be to help 
ensure the Department effectively protects its physical assets, 
information, and, most importantly, lives. At the same time, however, I 
recognize that effective diplomacy is virtually impossible without the 
ability to take considered risks in service of strategic goals and 
objectives. It will be my responsibility to evaluate various threat 
mitigation strategies and help the Department make the best possible 
calculations in support of American diplomacy. Risk management is 
particularly critical in high threat countries, most notably at the 
moment in Afghanistan as American troop levels are drawn down.
    Closer to home, we need to do more to promote diversity, equity, 
inclusion, and accessibility within our ranks while empowering 
Diplomatic Security agents to conduct more effective investigations in 
support of protective details, as well as passport and visa fraud.
    The recent SolarWinds intrusion has underlined the importance of 
DS's role in maintaining a 24/7 watch on the Department's global cyber 
infrastructure--a challenge which promises to intensify in the years to 
come.
    I also look forward to overseeing further improvements in our law 
enforcement and other security training at the Department's new Foreign 
Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia.
    Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this 
body to ensure your interests and concerns are properly addressed, and 
that we work together to protect our personnel, facilities, and 
national interests abroad and domestically.
    Thank you for your time and consideration. I am happy to answer any 
questions you may have.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Bitter?

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RENA BITTER, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA, 
    A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF 
 MINISTER-COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
                    STATE (CONSULAR AFFAIRS)

    Ms. Bitter. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you 
today and grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken for 
the trust they have placed in me.
    It is with no small measure of humility that I approach the 
responsibility before me, if confirmed. I believe there is no 
part of the Department of State more directly responsible for 
the security and well-being of Americans at home and abroad 
than the Bureau of Consular Affairs.
    In fact, diplomats have been serving their fellow citizens 
abroad in consular missions since before the Constitution was 
written.
    These are the oldest and most vital functions of the 
Department of State. Consular work is not glamorous and it can 
often be heartbreaking. But colleagues in the bureau do not do 
this work for recognition. They are the truest of public 
servants, working under sometimes very difficult conditions on 
behalf of the American people.
    For a recent example, the men and women of the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs led the repatriation of nearly 100,000 
Americans at the beginning of the pandemic, often risking their 
own health and safety.
    The Senate recognized this effort with Senate Resolution 
567 commending the department for its efforts on behalf of our 
fellow citizens.
    I would also like to add my thanks to the Bureau for all it 
does on behalf of the American people, much of which takes 
place below their notice.
    If confirmed, it would be the honor of a lifetime to lead 
this extraordinary team. I have had many jobs and many proud 
moments during the span of my 27-year career, but the proudest 
have revolved around Consular Services.
    In Amman, my team issued the very first Special Immigrant 
Visas for Iraqi translators at the start of that program in 
2006. I understand on a very personal level the U.S. 
Government's commitment to the men and women who serve beside 
us.
    Another proud moment was more recent as ambassador when I 
received a letter from two grieving New England families whose 
newlywed children were tragically killed while on their 
honeymoon in Laos.
    The families wrote to thank me for the compassionate 
support they received from our embassy team during their time 
of immeasurable grief. They enclosed their children's joint 
obituary from their hometown paper, in which the families 
thanked our consular officer by name.
    As I said, the work can often be heartbreaking, but it is 
vital and never more so than now. President Biden promised to 
craft a foreign policy for the middle class. A strong healthy 
Bureau of Consular Affairs will be critical to this effort.
    But the global pandemic has taken a toll on the bureau. I 
know the department is very grateful to Congress for its 
support for consular services over the last several months.
    I am aware that the bureau has had to make some difficult 
decisions due to pandemic-related constraints on space and 
resources. More difficult decisions lie ahead. But prior to the 
pandemic, international visitors contributed more than $260 
billion to the U.S. economy and directly supported millions of 
jobs, and we must get back there again.
    If confirmed, my top priority will be that we do, to see 
that the bureau is able to meet the need for consular services 
even in this constrained resource environment and with the 
continued uncertainty of the global pandemic.
    A related priority, if confirmed, I will work with 
department stakeholders and our partners in Congress to develop 
a more resilient funding model so the bureau will always have a 
stable platform from which to carry out its mission.
    Finally, I believe the Bureau of Consular Affairs has no 
more important partner than Congress. The Department of State 
is charged with representing the interests of U.S. citizens 
around the world with reminding foreign governments that the 
United States has no higher priority than the welfare of its 
citizens, and with ensuring that our foreign policy reflects 
that goal.
    I believe executing these responsibilities are at the heart 
of the mission that the president and secretary have entrusted 
me with and to which I am prepared to dedicate all my energy.
    If confirmed, I will advocate for your constituents. On a 
personal note, I would like to thank my family and my family of 
friends, who have put up with long absences over the course of 
my career, and then generously welcomed me home as if I had 
never been gone. Many of them are here today or watching.
    When I last had the honor to appear before this committee, 
my nephew, Josh, was among them sitting behind me. He died in 
December, and today, as every day, we mourn his absence.
    But I think he would be pleased to know that our love for 
him would be memorialized in the Congressional Record, and I 
thank the committee for indulging me in doing so.
    With that, I thank you and I welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Bitter follows:]


                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rena Bitter

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, I am honored to appear before you today and grateful to 
President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the trust they have placed in 
me. It is with no small measure of humility that I approach the 
responsibility before me if confirmed. I believe there is no part of 
the Department of State more directly responsible for the security and 
well-being of Americans at home and abroad than the Bureau of Consular 
Affairs. In fact, diplomats have been serving their fellow citizens 
abroad in consular missions since before the constitution was written. 
These are the oldest and most vital functions of the Department of 
State.
    Consular work is not glamorous and can often be heartbreaking. But 
colleagues in the Bureau do not do this work for recognition. They are 
the truest of public servants, working under sometimes very difficult 
conditions on behalf of the American people. For a recent example, the 
men and women of the Bureau of Consular Affairs led the repatriation of 
100,000 Americans at the beginning of the pandemic, often risking their 
own health and safety. The Senate recognized this effort with Senate 
Resolution 567, commending the Department for its efforts on behalf of 
our fellow citizens. I, too, would like to add my thanks to the Bureau 
for all it does on behalf of the American people, much of which takes 
place well below their notice. If confirmed, it would be the honor of a 
lifetime to lead this extraordinary team.
    I have had many jobs and many proud moments during the span of my 
27-year career. But the proudest have revolved around Consular 
services. In Amman my team issued the first Special Immigrant Visas for 
Iraqi translators at the very start of that program in 2006. I 
understand on a very personal level the U.S. Government's commitment to 
the men and women who serve beside us. More recently, as Ambassador, I 
received a letter from two grieving New England families whose newlywed 
children were tragically killed while on their honeymoon in Laos. The 
families thanked me for the compassionate support they received from 
our Embassy during their time of immeasurable grief, and they enclosed 
their children's joint obituary from their hometown paper, in which 
they thanked our consular officer by name. As I said, the work can be 
heartbreaking.
    But its vital and never more so than now. President Biden promised 
to craft a foreign policy for the middle class -- a strong, healthy 
Bureau of Consular Affairs will be critical to this effort. But the 
global pandemic has taken a toll on the Bureau. I know the Department 
is grateful to Congress for its support for Consular Services over the 
last several months. I am aware that the Bureau has had to make some 
difficult decisions due to pandemic-related constraints on space and 
resources. More difficult decisions lie ahead. But prior to the 
pandemic international visitors contributed more than $260b to the U.S. 
economy and directly supported millions of jobs. We must get back there 
again. If confirmed, my top priority will be to ensure that we do--that 
the Bureau is able to meet the need for Consular services, even in this 
constrained resource environment and with the continued uncertainty of 
the global pandemic.
    A related priority--If confirmed I will work with Department 
stakeholders and our partners in Congress to develop a more resilient 
funding model so the Bureau will always have a stable platform from 
which to carry out its mission.
    Finally, I believe that Bureau has no more important partner than 
Congress. The Department of State is charged with representing the 
interests of U.S. citizens around the world, reminding foreign 
governments that the United States has no higher priority than the 
welfare of its citizens, and ensuring that our foreign policy reflects 
that goal. I believe executing that responsibility is at the heart of 
the mission that the president and secretary have entrusted me with, 
and one to which I am prepared to dedicate all my energy. If confirmed, 
I will advocate for your constituents.
    On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and my family 
of friends who have put up with long absences over the course of my 
career, then generously welcomed me home as if I'd never been gone. 
Many of them are here today or watching. When I last had the honor to 
appear before this committee, my nephew Josh was among them, sitting 
behind me. He died in December and today, as every day, we mourn his 
absence. I think he would be pleased to know that our love for him 
would be reflected in the congressional record and I thank the 
committee for indulging me to do so.
    I welcome your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, and our sympathies to 
you and your family for the loss of your nephew.
    Ms. Medina, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF MONICA P. MEDINA, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE AN 
    ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL 
             ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS)

    Ms. Medina. I want to begin by thanking Senator Markey.
    Make sure my microphone is on. There. Can you hear me now?
    Thank you, Chairman Menendez. I want to begin by thanking 
Senator Markey for that very kind introduction and for decades 
of friendship.
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today 
as the president's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for 
the Bureau of Oceans, International, Environmental, and 
Scientific Affairs, or OES.
    I am deeply honored to be nominated by President Biden and 
for the trust that he and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. 
I am also thrilled to have the chance to serve my country 
again.
    I would like to begin by thanking my family. I am eternally 
grateful to my husband, Ron, and our grown children, Hannah, 
Michael, and Daniel, for their constant support and 
encouragement as I pursued a career in environmental 
conservation, even when it took me far from home.
    I also must thank my mother, Jeanne, a retired middle 
school teacher, who, through her passion for elephants and 
other wildlife, taught me the importance of biodiversity to 
life on Earth.
    If confirmed, I am eager to consult, engage, and 
collaborate with members of this committee and to build on your 
great work on ocean conservation, ending wildlife trafficking 
and illegal fishing, stemming the rise of future pandemics, 
fighting plastic pollution, and other OES issues of interest to 
you.
    I would not be here today if it were not for the 
opportunity the U.S. Army gave me to attend Georgetown 
University on an Army ROTC scholarship at a time when there 
were not many women who received them.
    Both my parents were teachers, and I could not have 
afforded a private university like Georgetown otherwise, and my 
dream was for a career in government and law.
    I could not have imagined then that my scholarship would 
lead me to where I sit today, that I would serve twice in the 
Pentagon, once in uniform, work in positions of responsibility 
on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee staff, at 
the Department of Justice, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and the Department of Commerce twice, and now, 
with your approval, at the State Department.
    OES is at the forefront of our responses to the global 
challenge of the present and also the global challenge of the 
future. Clearly, our nation must continue to work to defeat 
COVID-19 globally and better prepare for and prevent future 
pandemics.
    Likewise, there is no greater long-term threat to our 
safety and security than climate change. I look forward to 
supporting the administration's work on both these fundamental 
threats to our health, security, and prosperity.
    I would, additionally, raise three areas of particular 
concern to me. My decades of experience attending and 
representing the U.S. at international meetings leads me to 
believe that there will be increasing global tensions over 
limited natural resources.
    If confirmed, I would dedicate special attention to the 
following.
    First, the loss of biodiversity is a crisis and it is often 
overlooked. But there is great bipartisan work being done here 
in Congress to conserve species globally and to assist 
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas in their efforts to 
do the same.
    I greatly admire the International Conservation Caucus' 
efforts to work collaboratively with legislative counterparts 
from around the world to ensure that we do not lose elephants 
or rhinos or tigers or penguins or pangolins to extinction.
    Second, the ocean needs our attention. There is too much 
tension, damage, and lawless behavior in the seas due to deep 
disagreements over a plethora of hot-button issues, such as 
excessive maritime claims, illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing, the dramatic changes and rapid development in the 
polar regions, and the disregard by bad actors of global 
shipping, safety, and security rules as well as pervasive 
plastic pollution and ocean chemistry changes.
    I am very impressed by the work of the Ocean Caucus on 
these issues, and if confirmed, implementing the recently 
passed Save Our Seas 2.0 Act will be a priority of mine.
    Finally, given the rapid growth and competition in space 
exploration and commercialization, space policy is at a key 
inflection point.
    A new space race could escalate global tensions among 
superpowers and create problems for future generations if we do 
not work to ensure today that space actors are complying with 
their obligations under international law and space activities 
are pursued in a manner that is safe, responsible, and 
sustainable.
    All of these issues also merit special attention by OES, in 
my view, because they are central to addressing our nation's 
strategic competition with China. Moreover, each of these 
challenges must be handled in a way that ensures the equitable 
inclusion of diverse stakeholders and the private sector in our 
solutions.
    In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure 
the committee that I will work every day on behalf of the 
American people with the goal of ensuring that our efforts 
around the world support Americans at home and make their lives 
better.
    Thank you for considering me for this position, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Medina follows:]


                 Prepared Statement of Monica P. Medina

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today as the 
President's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of 
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, or OES.
    I am deeply honored to be nominated by President Biden, and for the 
trust he and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. I am also thrilled to 
have the chance to serve my country again.
    I would like to begin by thanking my family. I am eternally 
grateful to my husband Ron, and our children, Hannah, Michael and 
Daniel, for their constant support and encouragement as I pursued a 
career in environmental conservation even when it took me far from 
home. I also must thank my mother, Jeanne, a retired middle school 
teacher, who through her passion for elephants and other wildlife, 
taught me the importance of biodiversity to life on Earth.
    If confirmed, I am eager to engage, consult, and collaborate with 
members of this committee and to build on your great work on ocean 
conservation, ending wildlife trafficking and illegal fishing, stemming 
the rise of future pandemics, fighting plastic pollution, and other OES 
issues of interest to you.
    I would not be here today if it were not for the opportunity the 
U.S. Army gave me to attend Georgetown University on an R.O.T.C. 
scholarship at a time when there were not many women who received them. 
Both my parents were teachers and I could not have afforded a private 
university like Georgetown otherwise--and my dream was for a career in 
government and law. I could not have imagined then that my scholarship 
would lead me to where I sit today--that I would meet my husband, 
attend Ivy League law schools, serve twice in the Pentagon, work in 
positions of responsibility on the Senate Environment and Public Works 
Committee staff, at the Department of Justice, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce twice, and 
now, with your approval, at the State Department.
    OES is at the forefront of our responses to the global challenge of 
the present and the global challenge of the future. Clearly, our nation 
must continue to work to defeat COVID-19 globally and better prepare 
for and prevent future pandemics. Likewise, there is no greater long-
term threat to our safety and security than climate change. I look 
forward to supporting the administration's work on both of these 
fundamental threats to our health, security and prosperity.
    I would additionally raise three areas of particular concern to me, 
and ones that, if confirmed, I would dedicate special attention to:

   The loss of biodiversity globally is a crisis and it is often 
        overlooked. But there is great bi-partisan work being done here 
        in Congress to conserve species globally and to assist 
        countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas in their efforts to 
        do the same. I greatly admire the International Conservation 
        Caucus' efforts to work collaboratively with legislative 
        counterparts from around the world to ensure we don't lose 
        elephants or rhinos or tigers or penguins or pangolins to 
        extinction.

   The ocean also needs our attention. There is too much tension, 
        damage and lawless behavior in the seas due to deep 
        disagreements over a plethora of hot button issues such as 
        excessive maritime claims, illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
        fishing, the dramatic changes and rapid development in the 
        polar regions, and disregard by bad actors of global shipping 
        safety and security rules, as well as pervasive plastic 
        pollution and ocean chemistry changes. I am very impressed by 
        the work of the Ocean Caucus on these issues. If confirmed, 
        implementing the recently passed Save Our Seas 2.0 Act will be 
        a priority of mine.

   Finally, given the rapid growth and competition in space 
        exploration and commercialization, space policy is at a key 
        inflection point. A new space race could escalate global 
        tensions among superpowers and create problems for future 
        generations if we don't work to ensure today that space actors 
        are complying with their obligations under international law 
        and space activities are pursued in a safe, responsible, and 
        sustainable manner.

    All these issues also merit special attention by OES, in my view, 
because they are central to addressing our nation's strategic 
competition with China. Moreover, each of these challenges must be 
handled in a way that recognizes the disparity between developed and 
developing nations, and ensures the equitable inclusion of diverse 
stakeholders and the private sector in our solutions. In tackling these 
and other challenges, I want to assure the committee that I will work 
every day on behalf of the American people, with the goal of ensuring 
that our efforts around the world support Americans at home and make 
their lives better. Diplomacy, cooperation, and compassion for our 
fellow residents of the planet we call home have never been more 
important.
    Thank you again for considering me for this position, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Knapper?

STATEMENT OF MARC EVANS KNAPPER, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER MEMBER 
  OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, 
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF 
   THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF 
                            VIETNAM

    Mr. Knapper. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, distinguished members of this committee, for the 
opportunity today to appear before you. I am honored in the 
faith that President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in 
me.
    I also want to express my deep love and gratitude to my 
wife, Suzuko, and our son, Alex, for their support and their 
sacrifice. They have repeatedly changed homes and schools and 
have been distant from family and friends so that we could 
serve the United States overseas. Without them, as well as my 
parents, Jay and Yolanda Saltsman, I would not be here today.
    The United States-Vietnam relationship has undergone a 
profound transformation since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations 26 years ago, and my own family history tracks the 
arc of our relationship with Vietnam.
    My late father, Marine Colonel Roger Knapper, was a 
decorated Vietnam combat veteran who often recounted difficult 
memories from his time at war. Yet, he also talked many times 
of his earnest wish to return to Vietnam and see that beautiful 
country at peace and thriving.
    This wish was fulfilled three times during my previous 
service at our embassy in Hanoi, and although he will not make 
it back for a fourth visit, we will always be grateful for the 
efforts and sacrifices he and millions of other Americans have 
made during our long journey with Vietnam.
    Our two countries have moved from a history of conflict to 
a comprehensive partnership that spans political, security, 
economic, and people-to-people ties.
    If confirmed, I will work to continue developing the U.S.-
Vietnam relationship across a wide range of shared interests in 
four key areas.
    First, security. Our two countries have significantly 
expanded our security cooperation, including through U.S. 
support to strengthen Vietnam's maritime capabilities.
    The U.S. and Vietnam share an interest in upholding 
international law and resisting China's provocative behavior in 
the South China Sea and Mekong region, and, if confirmed, I 
will make every effort to deepen our cooperation in this area.
    Second, trade and investment. Bilateral trade with Vietnam 
has grown significantly, increasing from nearly nothing in 1995 
to more than $90 billion in 2020, benefiting American 
manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers as well as consumers.
    But despite this growth, challenges remain, and if 
confirmed, I will advocate for a level playing field for U.S. 
companies and investors, including by urging Vietnam to 
maintain equitable market access for U.S. digital services and 
agricultural products.
    Third, war legacy and humanitarian issues. If confirmed, 
providing the fullest possible accounting for U.S. personnel 
missing from the Vietnam War era will be my solemn duty. 
Furthermore, for decades, Vietnam has provided critical 
assistance to those efforts and we are grateful.
    Since 1993, the U.S. has also contributed more than $160 
million to mitigate lingering threats posed by unexploded 
ordnance, and together with Vietnam, we have successfully 
completed the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang, 
and in 2019, we broke ground on another project to remediate 
dioxin at the Bien Hoa airbase.
    Our cooperation on these issues as well as providing $125 
million since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, supporting over 
a million persons with disabilities regardless of the cause, 
has been an important foundation for our bilateral 
relationship.
    Fourth, and finally, people-to-people ties. The bonds 
between the American and Vietnamese people are strong and 
growing.
    Prior to the pandemic, nearly 700,000 Americans traveled to 
Vietnam annually, including more than 1,200 American students, 
and here in the U.S., we welcome 30,000 Vietnamese students 
each year. These people-to-people ties are an important bridge 
between our two countries.
    All that said, our thriving relationship is not without its 
challenges. We remain deeply concerned about Vietnam's human 
rights record, in particular, reports of the troubling trend of 
harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust convictions, 
and harsh sentences of journalists and activists.
    If confirmed, I will press the government of Vietnam to 
respect the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful 
assembly, and religion and belief.
    Only when we see significant progress on human rights can 
our two countries' partnership reach its full potential, and as 
always, my number-one priority will be protecting the safety 
and welfare of all United States citizens in Vietnam and I will 
also make the safety and welfare of Mission Vietnam personnel a 
top priority.
    The thriving U.S.-Vietnam partnership is a result of the 
courage, goodwill, and painstaking work of dedicated people in 
both countries who believed in the possibility of peace and 
reconciliation between two former enemies.
    Our overarching goal remains to advance American interests 
and support the development of a strong, prosperous, and 
independent Vietnam that contributes to international security 
and respects human rights and the rule of law.
    Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Knapper follows:]


                 Prepared Statement of Marc E. Knapper

    Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished 
members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. I am honored in the faith that President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken have placed in me.
    I also want to express my deep love and gratitude to my wife, 
Suzuko, and our son, Alex, for their support and their sacrifice. They 
have repeatedly changed homes and schools and been distant from family 
and friends so that we could serve the United States overseas. Without 
them, as well as my parents Jay and Yolanda Saltsman, I would not be 
here today.
    The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has undergone a profound 
transformation since the normalization of diplomatic relations 26 years 
ago. My own family history tracks the arc of the United States' 
relationship with Vietnam. My late father, Marine Colonel Roger 
Knapper, was a decorated Vietnam combat veteran, who often recounted 
difficult memories from his time at war. Yet, he also talked many times 
of his earnest wish to return to Vietnam and see that beautiful country 
at peace and thriving. This wish was fulfilled three times during my 
previous service at our Embassy in Hanoi. Although he will not make it 
back for a fourth visit, we will always be grateful for the efforts and 
sacrifices he and millions of other Americans have made during our long 
journey with Vietnam.
    Our two countries have moved from a history of conflict to a 
Comprehensive Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and 
people-to-people ties. If confirmed, I will work to continue developing 
the U.S.-Vietnam relationship across a wide range of shared interests 
in four key areas.
    First, security. Our two countries have significantly expanded 
security cooperation, including through U.S. support to strengthen 
Vietnam's maritime capabilities. Last year, Vietnam welcomed the USS 
Theodore Roosevelt, the second U.S. aircraft carrier to visit since we 
established diplomatic relations. The United States and Vietnam share 
an interest in upholding international law and resisting provocative 
behavior in the South China Sea and Mekong region, and if confirmed I 
will make every effort deepen our cooperation in this area.
    Second, trade and investment. Bilateral trade with Vietnam has 
grown significantly, increasing from nearly nothing in 1995 to more 
than $90 billion in 2020, benefiting American manufacturers, farmers 
and ranchers, and consumers. Despite the growth, challenges remain. If 
confirmed, I will advocate for a level playing field for U.S. companies 
and investors, including by urging Vietnam to maintain equitable market 
access for U.S. digital services and agricultural products.
    Third, war legacy and humanitarian issues. Providing the fullest 
possible accounting for U.S. personnel missing from the Vietnam War era 
remains our most solemn duty. For decades, Vietnam has provided 
critical assistance to those efforts. Since 1993, the United States has 
contributed more than $160 million to mitigate lingering threats posed 
by unexploded ordnance. Together with Vietnam, we successfully 
completed the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang in 2018, 
and in 2019 we broke ground on the 10-year dioxin remediation project 
at the Bien Hoa airbase area. We have provided more than $125 million 
since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, directly and indirectly 
supporting over a million persons with disabilities, regardless of the 
cause. Our cooperation on these issues continues to build a foundation 
of trust to expand our relationship.
    Fourth, people-to-people ties. The bonds between the American and 
Vietnamese people are strong and growing. Prior to the COVID-19 
pandemic, nearly 700,000 Americans traveled to Vietnam annually, 
including more than 1,200 American students. Here in the United States, 
we welcome 30,000 Vietnamese students each year. On the occasion of the 
25th anniversary of U.S.-Vietnam relations last year, we signed an 
agreement to bring Peace Corps volunteers for the first time ever, a 
significant and symbolic milestone.
    Our thriving relationship is not without its challenges. We remain 
deeply concerned about Vietnam's human rights record, in particular 
reports of the troubling trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful 
arrests, unjust convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and 
activists. If confirmed, I will press the Government of Vietnam to 
respect the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and 
religion or belief. Only when we see significant progress on human 
rights can our partnership reach its fullest potential.
    As always, my number one priority will be protecting the safety and 
welfare of all United States citizens in Vietnam. I will also make the 
safety and welfare of Mission personnel a top priority.
    The thriving U.S.-Vietnam partnership is the result of the courage, 
goodwill, and painstaking work of dedicated people in both countries, 
who believed in the possibility of peace and reconciliation between two 
former enemies. Our overarching goal remains to advance American 
interests and support the development of a strong, prosperous, and 
independent Vietnam that contributes to international security, and 
respects human rights and the rule of law.
    Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your 
questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    We will start a round of five-minute questions, and before 
I start my own line of questions, I have some overarching 
questions for the committee.
    First, I have a few questions that speak to the importance 
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials 
in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking 
from all of you.
    So I would like to ask each of you to provide a simple yes 
or no answer to the following questions.
    Do you agree to appear before this committee and make 
officials from your office available to the committee and 
designated staff when invited?
    Ms. Bitter. Yes.
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    Mr. Knapper. Yes.
    Ms. Medina. Yes. Yes.
    The Chairman. All right. Do you commit to keep the 
committee fully and currently informed about the activities 
under your purview?
    Ms. Medina. Yes.
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    Mr. Knapper. Yes.
    Ms. Bitter. Yes.
    The Chairman. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful 
consultation when policies are being developed, not just 
providing notification after the fact?
    Ms. Bitter. Yes.
    Ms. Medina. Yes.
    Mr. Knapper. Yes.
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    The Chairman. And finally, do you commit to promptly 
responding to requests for briefings and information requested 
by the committee and its designated staff?
    Ms. Bitter. Yes.
    Ms. Medina. Yes.
    Mr. Knapper. Yes.
    Mr. Smith. Yes.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Bitter, let me ask you, there is a lot of issues 
under what will be your portfolio. From the question of COVID 
vaccines for American citizens abroad, which will not be only 
within the responsibility of the Bureau of Consular Affairs but 
I cannot imagine that you will not be engaged in it, what do 
you think are the primary challenges for CA and the department, 
more broadly, on administering such a vaccine program in the 
face of a global pandemic for American citizens abroad?
    Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator, I am aware of the concern 
that members of Congress have and also this issue, I know, is 
of great concern to many Americans. You know, the way that the 
department has approached this is that it has worked in the 
interagency to try to make sure that vaccines are available to 
countries who have yet to acquire them.
    And then within the department, we have tried to make 
available consular information to Americans abroad to ensure 
that they are aware of how they can get access to vaccines 
where they are available and make sure that they have 
information about local medical providers in healthcare, and 
that is the general form of consular services to those abroad.
    And if there are particular needs, of course, the embassies 
abroad are always prepared to address consular services and 
whatever needs American citizens have.
    The department has not typically provided medical care to 
private citizens. So I think there would be many challenges 
attendant upon that, not least of which would simply be the 
issues involved in just administering the vaccines. It would be 
quite challenging.
    The Chairman. I hope we will think about--and I understand 
that the department has not been involved in delivering health 
care services to citizens abroad, but in the global pandemic, I 
hope we will think about how we help an American citizen living 
abroad, maybe because of work or some other reason, to find 
access to a vaccine, because when a country has its own 
vaccination program, of course, it is focused on its own 
citizens and so that leaves an American citizen in limbo, 
potentially.
    So I hope we will give a little thought to how we can 
create a greater connection for American citizens abroad in 
that context.
    Let me turn to the question of passports. As you may know, 
an artifact of the COVID crisis is the department remains 
considerably backed up on passport processing at the National 
Passport Center.
    I was listening to several of our colleagues on the 
committee and my own experience back in New Jersey of citizens 
for months who have applied for their passport and cannot get a 
response and, of course, with the opening of the world and the 
surge in demand, there is a greater demand.
    Do you have a sense--I know you are not there, but in your 
briefings do you have a sense of the current backlog and what 
is your thoughts about working to clear it up?
    Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator.
    I am very aware of this issue and I know it is very 
important to you and to your constituents. It is important to 
the department as well, and just I share your concern about the 
length of time that it is currently taking, and the department 
takes very seriously its responsibility in this area.
    It is a very visible part of the work that the department 
does and it is important to get secure and efficiently issued 
visa--passports, rather, out to American citizens as quickly as 
possible.
    You know, like many organizations, the bureau and its 
partners have been faced with ramping up in a situation where 
COVID restrictions are lifting more slowly than demand is 
rising. So it is a pretty fast-moving situation.
    The department is reviewing each passport agency according 
to the science and deciding when they can fully reopen. So it 
is an evolving situation.
    I know, again, that this is something of great concern to 
you and I would be very happy to work with my colleagues in 
Congressional Affairs to make sure that members and your staff 
can get up to the minute briefings and the most recent 
information.
    But right now, I think it is taking, between the passport 
office and its partners, up to 18 weeks for passports that are 
not expedited to be processed.
    The Chairman. Yeah. Well, I will say that briefings are 
great. Actions are more important. What we really need is some 
type of surge capacity for a period of time to deal with the 
backlog.
    I do not think that we can--many Americans, it is not just 
a question of travel for leisure, but it is travel for business 
again. It is travel to see family members who they may not have 
seen for well over a year and a half, two years, because of 
COVID. So it is about a family reunification issue as well.
    I will tell the secretary as well, but I really urge you 
all to think about a surge capacity for a period of time to get 
us into a more reasonable period of time in which people have 
to wait.
    Finally, not because there are not many more issues, but I 
appreciate the important work the department does to vet visas 
to assure there is no fraud and abuse.
    But I can tell you I have a regular stream of complaints 
about the department's transparency and communication and 
sometimes its agility and responsiveness when it comes to 
processing visas for non-American family of U.S. citizens to 
visit the United States, student visas and work and business 
visas.
    I am interested in your thoughts about where and how we can 
improve the visa application and processing system so that 
applicants, even if they are turned down, face an open, 
transparent, and rapid process that speaks to our best values 
as a nation.
    I cannot tell you how many times--I know that an applicant 
has to overcome the hurdle of showing that they have roots in 
their country, that they are likely to return, that they are 
not likely to stay in the United States. I am very familiar 
with the immigration law in that respect. So that is a hurdle 
they must meet.
    But I cannot tell you how many times I have had individuals 
who have properties in their country, businesses in their 
country, deep family ties in their country, and no reasonable 
expectation that they would stay in the United states, and many 
of them feel they get arbitrarily and capriciously just 
rejected.
    So there is the feeling, you know, we want people in the 
world to think of the United States as a place that is 
welcoming and follows rules of law.
    Yet, they feel that they have not had, so to speak, their 
day in court. I understand the incredible crush on consular 
officers. But we have to think of how we can process in a 
better way.
    Do you have any thoughts on that?
    Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator. I would not be telling the 
truth if I had not said to you that I have not heard those 
comments as well. I have. And I think they speak to issues of 
respect and issues of making sure that our consular officers 
are able to have what are sometimes quite quick interactions in 
a respectful and clear way. It can be a very challenging job.
    But I am very conscious of the fact and we all are, in the 
department, and I know the Bureau of Consular Affairs is as 
well, that these officers are often the first or sometimes the 
only Americans that these host country nationals will meet, and 
it is enormously important that that interaction does reflect 
our values and does reflect the best that we have to offer.
    So I take your point, and I share it and I share your 
concern, and if confirmed it would be my goal to make sure that 
every consular officer in every embassy and every interaction 
that they have with host country nationals reflects the 
diplomats that they are and reflects the best values of 
America.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you.
    Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks 
regarding a surge to get caught up on the visas and passports.
    Certainly, one of the great freedoms Americans have is the 
freedom to travel and also to welcome their non-American family 
members here to the United States and it is important we get 
caught up on that, as we go forward.
    I want to focus, however, on another area that the chairman 
and I are working together on and that is global health. We are 
here where we are on the pandemic and we are really focused on 
vaccines today, and that is important. It is very important.
    I think the only way we are going to get past this is a 
good vaccine program not only in the United States but around 
the world.
    But, more importantly, I think we need to look to the 
future, and I think one of the most important things that this 
committee can do is to work on a protocol for the future and 
establishing protocols and infrastructure that will get all of 
the countries pulling the wagon together to address a global 
pandemic.
    That did not happen this time. We all know that. There were 
major flaws, major holes in various countries attempted to get 
through this.
    And so the chairman and I have been working on global 
health policy and a global health bill, and I hope, Ms. Medina, 
that you will familiarize yourself with that and commit to 
helping us get in place an infrastructure protocol for dealing 
with these things when they happen immediately.
    There is no substitute for being able to address the 
challenge immediately, and that is primarily what our 
legislation is designed to do.
    We all know, and the stories are legion, as far as the 
failures right at the beginning of this pandemic that caused no 
end of problems for the world, including the number of deaths. 
And so I would like to hear your thoughts on that.
    Ms. Medina. Senator Risch, thank you very much for that 
question. And as you know, when we discussed it in your office 
and with your staff, there is no higher priority for the Bureau 
of Oceans, Environment, and Science than dealing with the 
current crisis and preventing and preparing for future crises, 
and I look forward to working with you, if confirmed, to try 
and build up, bulk up, the ability of the bureau to be that 
repository of expertise and to prepare the U.S. for what is 
likely to be additional challenges like the one we faced in the 
future.
    And I look forward to working with you on your legislation 
and to hearing your thoughts, if confirmed, about how we could 
do that together.
    Senator Risch. Well, thanks. And I will tell you that we 
all know the United States Government is big, it is complex, it 
has got many agencies, and there is an important function that 
Congress can play and, hopefully, we will play with legislation 
that the chairman and I have been working on as far as 
resolving who is in charge and who makes those decisions 
because, again, sometimes you get people of equal stature in 
the Government making conflicting decisions, and somebody has 
got to straighten that out, and this legislation attempts to 
address that and, hopefully, will address that.
    In addition to that, of course, it is the same thing 
internationally, and that is establishing some type of 
structure internationally where these kind of questions can be 
answered and answered clearly.
    We had a lot of gray areas particularly during the early 
parts of the pandemic, and these, in the best interest of the 
American people, in the best interest of the world, need to be 
straightened out and that responsibility is right here with the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
    So we are attempting to discharge that responsibility. We 
will, certainly, look to you for your assistance and help, and 
we believe that the State Department is the appropriate place 
as a clearinghouse for making these kind of decisions.
    And, again, I fully appreciate that we are focused on 
vaccine right now. But it is really important that we walk and 
chew gum at the same time and prepare for the next pandemic.
    So with that, my time is up. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin [presiding]. I understand we have Senator 
Booker by WebEx who is next.
    [Pause.]
    Senator Cardin. I understand he is not available. We will 
go to Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you to my colleagues and 
congratulation to the nominees for your appointments. I have 
questions. I have a million questions for all of you. But in 
five minutes, I am going to ask questions of Mr. Smith and Mr. 
Knapper.
    Mr. Smith, Virginia is the home for training of security 
professionals who work not only for the State Department in the 
capacity center that you referenced in your opening statement 
at Fort Pickett in Blackstone, Virginia, but also the Marine 
security guards that protect our embassies around the world are 
trained at a wonderful facility at Quantico.
    I have worked very hard as a member of this committee over 
the nine years I have served on it to advance the security 
training of our State Department professionals.
    The siting of the training center at Fort Pickett was 
something I was very involved in in the early part of my time 
on the committee.
    It has come a long way and I think there is even more that 
can be done there, and I would hope at some point, should you 
be confirmed, to possibly visit with you so we could assess 
together its current status and what more might be done to 
enhance the security training of State Department personnel.
    Mr. Smith. If confirmed, Senator, I look forward to that, 
and thank you for your support.
    Senator Kaine. Right. Thank you so much.
    And, Mr. Knapper, with respect to Vietnam, I traveled on a 
bipartisan CODEL to Vietnam in April of 2019. It was a 
tremendous visit, and we found so much interest in deeper 
partnerships with the United States on military cooperation.
    There was appreciation for the U.S. role, led by Senator 
Leahy for decades now, to work on cleanup of dioxins and other 
contaminants at military bases in Vietnam, and the warm welcome 
we received from Vietnamese officials and the Vietnamese public 
was very heartwarming.
    But of the number of concerns I have about Vietnam, one 
that is most significant is the deplorable absence of press 
freedom. The organizations that rank countries in the world for 
press freedom put Vietnam very low on the list of recent 
ranking. Had them 175th out of 180.
    One of the things that seemed pretty vibrant in 2019 was, 
while the press was being cracked down on, there was still a 
pretty vibrant and open internet culture. But that has also 
been significantly constrained in the last two years.
    What can the United States do? What would you do as 
ambassador, should you be confirmed, to try to promote broader 
notions of press and freedom and freedom of speech in Vietnam?
    Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you to you 
and your colleagues for the great support that Congress has 
provided our bilateral relationship over the years.
    As for press freedoms and other freedoms in Vietnam, I 
fully agree. We have serious, serious concerns. This is 
something that, if confirmed, I will make a focus of mine.
    I think one way we can seek to improve the situation is 
just to never miss an opportunity to raise with senior 
Vietnamese officials our deep concerns and to underline the 
point that our relationship will never reach its full potential 
unless we are able to see improvements in some of these areas, 
whether it is freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom 
of assembly.
    As you noted, the internet is increasingly a contested area 
for these basic freedoms and, you know, among the messages we 
can deliver to the Government of Vietnam is that they have 
signed on to a number of international treaties in which they 
have committed to support universal rights, such as those of 
freedom and assembly.
    And so I think a point we can strongly make is that should 
Vietnam seek to earn its place in the international community 
as a leader it is going to have to abide by some of the 
commitments it has made internationally.
    Senator Kaine. The last thing I will say about the U.S.-
Vietnam relationship is one of the powerful, I think, 
attraction of the U.S. relationship to the Vietnamese people: 
Their deep concern about China and the historic animosity that 
they have had because of Chinese incursions into Vietnam.
    Shortly before our visit, there were massive protests all 
around Vietnam that were a little bit unusual, street protests, 
and they were fomented by the Communist Party leadership of 
Vietnam prepping to do sort of a sweetheart deal where China 
and Chinese companies would be able to come into an economic 
zone without really any competition from anyone else.
    And it was notable to see that the Vietnamese Government 
wanted to do it, that the Vietnamese people took to the streets 
to stop them from doing it, and that at least in some temporary 
way it caused the Communist Party leadership of Vietnam to step 
back.
    There is a deep desire for deeper relationship with the 
United States to be a counterpoint to a China that has been so 
often an aggressor against Vietnam, and that is important for 
us to know and it is important for us to contemplate as we seek 
to build a deeper relationship with Vietnam.
    I look forward to working with all of you should you be 
confirmed. Very high qualified panel.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty?
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Cardin, and 
congratulations to each of you for being nominated today.
    I take particular interest in one of our nominees. That is 
Ambassador-to-be Marc Knapper.
    Marc, I am delighted to see that Suzuko and Alex have 
joined you today. I would say this--that I am certain Colonel 
Roger Knapper is smiling today, too. I am sure he takes a great 
deal of pride in your career.
    It has been my great honor to have served with you for the 
past four years working with you, and I also take a great deal 
of pride in the fact that you are sitting here today.
    I am also very optimistic. I think that you will be 
confirmed and I think that you are going to work with a great 
team--my former DCM, Joe Young, Dan Kritenbrink, I think, at 
EAP. We are going to be very well represented in an area that 
presents great strategic challenges for America today.
    So I am very, very pleased to see you here. You know, 
America is challenged in the South China Sea like never before. 
The world is challenged in the South China Sea like never 
before, because of the claims that China continues to maintain, 
I think, without foundation to sovereignty over much of that 
region.
    You have had unique experience, Marc. You have had 
experience in Japan. You have had experience in Hanoi. You have 
had experience dealing with India on the India desk, with China 
and Mongolia, and, certainly, you did a wonderful job as DCM 
and charge d'affaires in South Korea.
    You understand this region. I see great opportunity between 
Vietnam and the United States from an economic standpoint that 
has been manifest. We have seen great trajectory there. I think 
economic ties support strategic ties.
    But what I would really like to talk about for a moment is 
the strategic opportunity that Vietnam presents for the United 
States, for our Quad partners, and for the safety and security 
of that region. I would love to get your thoughts on the role 
that you would play and help lead as our Ambassador to Vietnam.
    Mr. Knapper. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you 
very much for your kind words about my family.
    I mean, you are absolutely right. Right now, I think our 
shared view with Vietnam is that there is no greater challenge 
we face right now than that of China, China's aggressive and 
provocative behavior, particularly some of its sweeping and 
unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, what it is 
doing along the Mekong River, damming and releasing water, 
causing deep, deep problems for 66 million people who live 
along that river and rely upon it for their livelihoods.
    If confirmed, Senator, I will make a priority deepening our 
strategic relationship with Vietnam. Right now, we have what we 
call a comprehensive partnership. We hope to raise it to a 
strategic partnership, and I will take steps to do that by 
strengthening even further our security relationship with 
Vietnam.
    This is something that you mentioned, Ambassador 
Kritenbrink. He did a great job over three years in bringing us 
to the next level.
    I would like to take us further. I think deepening our 
economic partnership by opening the market there further to 
American agricultural goods, digital services.
    As you said, strengthening our trade and economic ties can 
only benefit our strategic sort of interactions and our 
strategic sort of interdependence. And so this, if confirmed, 
will be a priority of mine, as well as deepening our people-to-
people ties.
    The shoulders upon which all of our efforts with Vietnam 
stand are the ties between our two peoples, whether it is young 
people going back and forth, students studying in each other's 
countries. And so that will also be, sir, a priority of mine, 
if confirmed.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, thank you very much. I look forward 
to working with you along all of those lines and know that you 
have a strong ally in the United States Senate, only with me 
but with the members of this committee, in achieving these 
goals.
    Could I turn to you, Ambassador Bitter?
    There is an area, again related to China, which is a deep 
concern of mine. I am certain that you are aware of this 
concern, and that is overseas students coming from China that 
pose a security threat to the nation.
    I would just like to ask you in very specific terms if you 
are familiar with the Executive Order 10043. That executive 
order suspends the entry of certain students and researchers 
from the People's Republic of China.
    Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. And if you are confirmed, do you agree to 
notify me and this committee if there are any changes made to 
that executive order?
    Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. And in the meantime, do you agree to 
uphold the tenets of that executive order?
    Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I 
appreciate it.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin?
    Senator Cardin. Well, first, let me thank all four of our 
nominees for their service to our country and our willingness 
to continue to serve our nation. We thank you. We thank your 
families. We know that this is very much a family commitment.
    Ambassador Bitter, I would like to start with you. I just 
want to concur with Senator Menendez's comments in regards to 
the passport issues. And as Senator Menendez said, you are not 
responsible for the current backlog. Eighteen weeks is 
unacceptable. Unacceptable.
    We have constituents who, in good faith, have made travel 
plans, expecting that if they requested a passport document 
that it would be done in a matter of a few months, not four 
months.
    And some are suffering now extreme economic hardships as 
well as personal hardships not being able to get those 
documents and they do not fall into the narrow definition of a 
life's emergency that would require more immediate action.
    We are also concerned that some have requested passport 
support months ago, may not even be at the front of the line in 
regards to people who are now requesting help. And again, we 
recognize that you are not responsible for the current 
circumstances.
    I thought Senator Menendez made an excellent point about 
the need for surge. I would like to get your commitment that 
this will receive your priority, if confirmed, and that we 
cannot allow an 18-week backlog in passport applications.
    Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator, you have my commitment. I share 
your concern and it will be my top priority, if confirmed.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Knapper, I want to follow up on the questions that were 
asked by Senator Kaine in regards to Vietnam. I have been to 
Vietnam. Vietnam, certainly, is a much different country than 
it was when we were at war with Vietnam.
    We have made significant progress in improving our 
relationship between our two countries. We were on the path 
towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership on a good governance 
section that was important to deal with the corruption in the 
country and good governance.
    Vietnam was making progress, I would suggest, on basic 
human rights even though it is an authoritarian government, and 
now we have seen a backsliding, as Senator Kaine said, on 
freedom of the media.
    I could also add the right of their citizens to peacefully 
protest their government has been very much infringed upon. And 
they have now changed their cyber laws in regards to comments 
about history can be now challenged by the Government and 
infringing upon the use of the internet.
    These are trends that are very disturbing, and I would like 
to drill down a little bit more about your strategies for 
dealing with the human rights issues in Vietnam, and how you 
will keep us informed and work with us as we look at the tools 
that we have given the administration to advance human rights 
and making sure that they are used fully in Vietnam.
    Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator.
    I think one area in which we have seen progress over the 
past few years have been in the expansion of rights afforded to 
women, minorities, people with disabilities, members of the 
LGBT community, and I think one of the ways we were able to 
secure and see these advances was thanks to sort of increased 
cooperation with and assistance to the NGOs and activists 
within Vietnam who work within these specific areas and with 
these groups.
    And so, if confirmed, I would seek to not only continue the 
great work that the U.S. Government has done, not just with 
activist groups and NGOs within Vietnam but also groups in the 
United States--the Vietnamese-American community, for example--
to identify problematic areas, to try and identify potential 
strategies and tactics, going forward, because this is 
absolutely a priority area for me personally.
    I worked on these issues 15 years ago when I previously 
served in Vietnam, and it will continue to be an area of focus 
for me and for Mission Vietnam. And you absolutely have my 
commitment to work with you and your colleagues, sir, in the 
Congress to look for opportunities and tools to further seek to 
improve the situation there in Vietnam.
    Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. I would just add that it is very important 
that our mission in Vietnam support the NGOs and civil society 
groups that are working to advance these priorities so that our 
embassy is always a home for those who have roles to improve 
the governance in Vietnam and sometimes need the support of our 
embassy.
    And I see you are shaking your head yes and I will just put 
your shaking of the head yes into the record.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
    The Chairman. All right. I prefer an oral answer when I ask 
you a question, but I do not want to interpret your headshaking 
as a yes and then maybe you tell me later on it was a no. So--
--
    Mr. Knapper. Well, it was actually a head nodding, Senator.
    [Laughter.]
    The Chairman. Okay.
    I understand there are no other members.
    Oh, I am sorry. Senator Van Hollen just walked in.
    Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
Ranking Member Risch, and to all of you, congratulations on 
your nomination.
    And let me start, if I could, with you, Ambassador Bitter, 
and I know Chairman Menendez asked you some questions about the 
current backlog in passport processing.
    You know, obviously, we have been through a very difficult 
time with COVID. I recognize that, and the State Department has 
had to deal with all of the pressures that that brings.
    In our state office, we have gone from things like small 
business access to PPP loans being the top priority and other 
issues to now number one relates to getting passports, where my 
understanding is we now have about a four-and-a-half-month 
average backlog.
    And the other big issue, of course, is as families now have 
the opportunity to reunite and visit with friends, the issue of 
visas for people coming just to visit family and friends in the 
United States.
    Can you talk about what we can do right now to address 
these issues and what, if confirmed, you would do?
    Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator.
    I am very aware of these issues, and I should take this 
opportunity, of course, to thank Congress for the support that 
it has given to the bureau over the last several months.
    As all of you know, the bureau is under tremendous 
financial pressure since the start of the pandemic, and 
Congress has been enormously responsive in filling some of 
those gaps and allowing the bureau to continue to deliver 
consular services.
    But so I know that the bureau is very grateful and that it 
will be continuing to engage with Congress on future budgets.
    I just want to point out that these issues are not just 
money related. So while the U.S. is experiencing a return to 
what feels a little like normal, our posts overseas are still 
working under some pandemic space constraints, which means that 
they cannot offer the same number of appointments that they 
used to because they cannot have the same number of people in 
their waiting room.
    So these restrictions are very important. They protect our 
staff, they protect the customers, they protect the community, 
but they do limit possibility to provide services.
    And as a result, what has happened is my colleagues 
overseas have had to make some difficult prioritization 
decisions about how to use the space that is available to them.
    If confirmed, this is very much job one. I recognize that 
visas also impact your community with respect to small 
businesses maybe relying on workers overseas that are unable to 
get back, family reunification, all of those issues. Right now 
it is a very difficult time.
    Senator Van Hollen: Well, thank you for that statement. You 
know, this is the area where our constituents most frequently 
interact with the State Department, right, and so that is where 
they are really feeling the presence or lack of responsiveness 
and services.
    So our office is working very closely with the team at the 
State Department. We are grateful for the relationship we have. 
But this is a big, big issue, the visa part but also just 
getting a passport for U.S. citizens who is here.
    Ms. Medina, thank you for your testimony, and I appreciate 
your mentioning the issue of biodiversity, as you mentioned, 
and we are seeing a disappearance of biodiversity at alarming 
rates around the world and look forward to working with you on 
those issues, going forward.
    Mr. Smith, thank you for taking on this assignment. As you 
well know, you know, Foreign Service officers go into the 
Foreign Service to really get to know and interact with the 
countries where they are serving.
    And so while it is absolutely true that we have to provide 
security, I hope, as you think this through, you will also find 
ways to make sure that our Foreign Service officers overseas 
can interact with the rest of the population. Otherwise, they 
might as well just be in D.C.
    In Kabul, we have, of course, a particularly immediate 
situation, and I know you will be monitoring that very 
carefully with respect to the situation there.
    Finally, if I could, Mr. Knapper, congratulations on your 
nomination to Vietnam. Lots of issues to cover.
    But let me just ask you about one, because over the past 
several years we have seen Vietnamese authorities increase 
their scrutiny over Vietnamese citizens' activities on the 
internet and social media, cracking down on any kind of free 
expression, requiring U.S. and other internet-based companies 
and social media companies to force them to comply with laws 
that can crack down on people's speech or try to force them.
    Can you just talk briefly about how we are dealing with 
that situation?
    Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator.
    The one specific case right now that is attracting the most 
attention, of course, is that of Facebook, and the Vietnamese 
Government, in some instances, demanding that Facebook removed 
certain posts that it finds offensive or contrary to political 
order, so to speak.
    And right now, the U.S. embassy in Hanoi, we are working 
very closely with Facebook folks on the ground there as well as 
the Vietnamese Government to try and find a way forward that, 
again, preserves the space on Facebook and other social 
networking sites to allow for free speech and to allow for the 
free expression of political and other views, and also just 
allowing an American company to be able to operate without a 
threat of its data being cut off or throttled, is the term that 
they use.
    But, if confirmed, Senator, I will absolutely focus on this 
as a human rights issue, but also as a press freedom issue.
    Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen: I appreciate that. As you say, it is 
really part of the larger, I think, growing challenge in 
Vietnam with respect to human rights. But thank you all for 
your testimony.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Some final questions.
    Ambassador Smith, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I 
am deeply concerned about what seems to be an emerging threat 
of directed energy attacks targeting U.S. personnel and our 
ability to pivot and adequately protect them and their families 
in the face of these attacks.
    I hope that will be a major focus for you upon your 
confirmation?
    Mr. Smith. Yes, it will, Senator, and I look forward to 
engaging as we progress on this issue.
    The Chairman. Well, that is incredibly important to us 
because, you know, we ask our people to do incredible work for 
the United States. We put them, sometimes, in harm's way. We 
need to do everything possible to protect them.
    And this is something that seems to be challenging and 
escaping us. So I hope this will become one of your highest 
priorities upon taking office.
    One of the most significant challenges I can see on the 
horizon is the security at Embassy Kabul. What is your current 
assessment--I know you are not there yet but from your 
experience of our ability to ensure the safety and security of 
the embassy compound?
    And will you commit to keeping the committee updated on the 
steps that Diplomatic Security has taken to ensure the safety 
of U.S. personnel?
    Mr. Smith. If confirmed, Senator, yes, I will commit to 
that. Afghanistan will continue to garner a lot of attention, 
particularly as U.S. forces continue to withdraw, and it is 
going to be important for Diplomatic Security to remain very 
much engaged both with our colleagues and contacts here and 
also with the Afghan forces on the ground to see how they can 
help to enhance our security operations.
    The Chairman. Well, if you, when you get confirmed, I hope 
you will give us an assessment of what is needed, if anything 
is needed beyond what we have.
    And also Port-au-Prince--we, obviously, have an ongoing 
difficult situation in Port-au-Prince. I know you will pay 
attention globally. But these are some hotspots that I think we 
need to pay attention to.
    Do you have any sense of that, our embassy at Port-au-
Prince?
    Mr. Smith. Again, I agree with you that Port-au-Prince is 
definitely a point of concern at this moment. I have not 
received any additional briefings on the activities there 
beyond what is in the open source.
    But look forward, if confirmed, to focusing very, very 
clearly and specifically on that activity as well.
    The Chairman. Okay. We will look forward to hearing from 
you once you are confirmed.
    Mr. Knapper, finally, as you contemplate the possibilities 
of taking the relationship that we have with Vietnam to the 
next level and inaugurating a genuine strategic partnership, an 
aspiration I certainly support, how will you balance our very 
real shared strategic interests with Vietnam with our ongoing 
human rights concern?
    A couple years back we had the president of Vietnam here. 
It was a very interesting exchange. First time in my 30 years 
of doing foreign policy and sitting with foreign dignitaries 
that he did not take any questions.
    And it is not our process in the committee when we are 
meeting with a head of state to allow them to ramble along and 
eventually never take a question.
    That was emblematic, in my mind, of what is going on in 
Vietnam. What sort of linkages or conditioning do you think is 
appropriate and constructive as we consider additional military 
security, economic or diplomatic engagement, with Vietnam?
    Mr. Knapper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    I think you really have nailed the challenge that we face. 
It is, you know, how do we address our shared strategic 
interests in the region with Vietnam while staying true to our 
values regarding human rights, religious freedom, other areas.
    And I think, if confirmed, I would like to build upon the 
good progress we have made so far. We have been able to keep 
that balance, I believe, between ensuring that our values 
related to universal human rights are upheld and asserted in 
our high-level conversations with the Vietnamese Government, 
but at the same time recognizing that in Vietnam we have no 
stronger or more vocal partner within ASEAN when it comes to 
speaking out against the challenge that China poses in the 
South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.
    So as I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, I think there are 
ways to point out to our Vietnamese Government and Communist 
Party of Vietnam interlocutors that there will be limitations 
to how much our relationship can grow under the circumstances 
in which we have concerns about human rights and religious 
freedom.
    And I think we have to make clear that as we do consider 
ways to expand the relationship that we will let them know that 
there are potential breaks on progress that we will have to 
consider.
    The Chairman. All right.
    Ms. Medina, I do not want you to think that I--you have no 
object of my affection or interest. So but between your 
statement--your answers with Senator Risch and Senator Markey's 
incredible description of your history, I think you have 
answered the issues I am concerned about.
    So we look forward to working with you upon your 
confirmation. Global health for myself and for the ranking 
member is a critical issue, and while it may not seem in the 
title of your position to be the focal point, it is a focal 
point for this committee. So we will look forward to working 
with you on that.
    With no other member, as I understand it, either virtually 
or present, to come before the committee, the record will 
remain open until the close of business on Wednesday, July the 
14th for questions.
    I would urge the nominees if you get questions for the 
record to answer them fully expeditiously so we can consider 
your nominations at a business meeting.
    And with the thanks of the committee for your willingness 
to serve, this hearing is adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator James E. Risch

Risk Tolerance for Diplomats Abroad
    Question. Diplomacy is an inherently dangerous business, and 
effective diplomacy cannot be conducted without accepting some degree 
of risk.

   How do you think the culture should change at the State Department 
        to accommodate more risk management as opposed to risk 
        avoidance?

    Answer. I agree that the Department must balance the essential need 
to protect our people with the need to engage our partners around the 
world to advance U.S. interests. Department leadership acknowledges 
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is 
committed to managing it appropriately. The Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security (DS) goes to great lengths to facilitate our nation's 
diplomacy in challenging places, including high-threat locations, and 
welcomes further efforts, including with Congress, to ensure that the 
Department is able to meet mission objectives while protecting our 
personnel.
    To quote Secretary Blinken, ``The safety and security of our 
personnel abroad should not be politicized, nor should we assume 
negligence if, and when, prudent, calculated risk decisions play out 
with negative consequences.''

    Question. How do you view your role in promoting that cultural 
shift in the department? What specifically could you do as assistant 
secretary--if confirmed--that would better enable our diplomats to get 
outside our posts abroad and advance America's interests?

    Answer. This is an issue that, if confirmed, I intend to examine 
closely, in concert with senior Department leadership, especially with 
regard to what the Department can do to further enable diplomacy in 
High Threat/High Risk locations. Department leadership acknowledges 
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is 
committed to managing these risks appropriately. My experience has been 
that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security goes to great lengths to 
facilitate our nation's diplomacy in challenging places, including 
high-threat locations, and welcomes further efforts, including with 
Congress, to ensure that the Department is able to meet mission 
objectives while protecting our personnel.

Talent Retention
    Question. The Bureau for Diplomatic Security (DS) loses a lot of 
mid-level officers at the senior-two and senior-three levels for many 
reasons, but two frequent ones are lack of jobs at their level that 
reflect interest/ability and lack of promotion opportunities due to the 
limited number of positions available.

   If confirmed, what can you do as Assistant Secretary to address the 
        loss of mid-level officers?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with senior 
Department leadership to look at ways to retain existing staff and 
expand opportunities for mid-level officers. We will continue to engage 
with Global Talent Management to assess the availability of positions 
at all levels and ensure that we provide all officers ample 
opportunities to compete for promotion.

    Question. What policies or internal measures can you pursue to help 
address the loss of mid-level officers who leave due to the lack of 
promotion potential?

    Answer. DS recognizes that mid-level officers have expressed 
concerns regarding assignments and the slow pace of promotions. In the 
past we sought to address concerns by reclassifying some positions to 
provide more opportunities for advancement. If confirmed, I look 
forward to working with Global Talent Management's leadership to 
explore additional ways to address these concerns.

Resources
    Question. DS has multiple responsibilities that sometimes lead to a 
competition for resources. How do you feel DS should prioritize 
resources to the various missions?

    Answer. The safety of our personnel and security of our information 
and facilities are among the Department's highest priorities. Congress 
has been very supportive to DS in providing the resources it has 
requested. If confirmed, I intend to work with Department leadership 
and this committee to prioritize resources to its various missions.

Key Personnel Skills
    Question. The State Department faces a shortage of speakers of 
critical languages. Many of our pool of qualified speakers have close 
family ties to countries where the language is needed. Do you feel the 
current DS system of issuing preclusions adequately mitigates CI 
vulnerabilities that are identified during the background 
investigation?

    Answer. The State Department is committed to a diverse, skilled 
workforce. Some assignment limitations are preclusions that reflect the 
Department's inability to accredit diplomats to foreign countries of 
which they are citizens or to foreign countries that consider them 
citizens. In adjudicating security clearances, the Department utilizes 
the whole person concept to determine whether facts and circumstances 
indicate that eligibility is clearly consistent with the national 
security interests of the United States. Any doubt is resolved in favor 
of national security. Part of this process identifies potential CI 
vulnerabilities and considers whether they are mitigated under the 
National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. The Department is committed 
to protecting its employees and national security information.

Programming
    Question. Where does DS programming fit within the broader 
Department of State and interagency security sector capacity building 
structure and related planning processes?

    Answer. Diplomatic Security is an important contributor to security 
capacity building in partner nations around the globe. DS serves as the 
primary implementer of the Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 
program, which provides selected foreign governments with 
counterterrorism training, equipment, and technical assistance in 
coordination with policy guidance and funding provided by the Bureau of 
Counterterrorism. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) frequently work 
with host country governments, local organizations, and other 
diplomatic missions to provide advisory security opinions to schools, 
hospitals, and similar institutions.

    Question. What are DS's comparative advantages in the U.S. 
Government's security sector capacity building framework and tool set?

    Answer. Numerous U.S. Government agencies have resources and skills 
that can contribute to assisting foreign development beneficial to the 
national interest. While Diplomatic Security possess its own impressive 
cadre of security professionals and world class training and assistance 
programs, DS' greatest asset is in the organization's status as a 
security and law enforcement agency and integral part of the Foreign 
Service. DS personnel are trained investigators, cyber experts, 
security engineers, analysts, and diplomats. That broad functionality 
allows DS to soundly evaluate and deploy needed security and training 
assistance, whether those efforts ultimately originate from within DS 
or from another agency.

    Question. How can DS better leverage these advantages to further 
political goals?

    Answer. Diplomatic Security should continue its role as the lead 
law enforcement representative on an embassy's Country Team. A Regional 
Security Officer's ability to advise a Chief of Mission on both 
diplomatic and security consequences assures that U.S. foreign policy 
goals are examined from both a political and security dimension.

Havana Syndrome
    Question. Between late 2016 and May 2018, the State Department 
found that certain Embassy Havana community members suffered a series 
of unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. 
Many other U.S. Government officials in other countries have 
experienced similar incidents.

   If confirmed, will you commit to continuing the investigation into 
        the circumstances surrounding the sonic attacks?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue to prioritize the 
application of DS' technical and investigative talent to support the 
investigation to identify the source and cause of these unexplained 
health incidents. I look forward to working with Congress on this very 
important issue.

    Question. Will you seek to ensure the safety and security of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel in Havana and other posts where personnel were 
injured?

    Answer. There is no higher priority for the Department or for me 
than the safety and security of our personnel and this certainly 
includes mitigating against unexplained health incidents. I know that 
this issue is a top priority for Secretary Blinken. If confirmed I will 
work closely with the interagency to fully apply DS technical and 
investigation resources to ensure that our efforts to determine cause 
and attribution remain a priority.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work constructively with 
other government agencies on finding the cause of the attacks as well 
as on how best to support those U.S. Government employees who have been 
injured?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue coordinating with 
multiple agencies to identify the source and cause of these reported 
injuries. In addition, I intend to focus on ways to strengthen the 
already robust mitigation efforts that are taking place to further 
enhance the safety and security of all USG personnel and family members 
overseas under our security responsibility.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly sharing new 
information, including updates on any live investigations, to Congress?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work through the Bureau of Legislative 
Affairs to ensure that Congress promptly has the information it needs 
to perform its Constitutional obligations, consistent with obligations 
involving interagency information and existing practices for the 
protection of law enforcement activities.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
         to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Risk Management
    Question. Some former State Department officials, Members of 
Congress, and other stakeholders have expressed concern with what they 
view as a growing level of risk intolerance at U.S. missions abroad, 
especially at high-risk posts, which they maintain inhibits U.S. 
diplomats from effectively fulfilling their mandates. I am considering 
a hearing on this topic in my subcommittee.

   What is your view on the State Department's current diplomatic 
        security risk management approach? In your view, how, if at 
        all, should the current approach be adjusted more towards risk 
        tolerance or, alternatively, more towards mitigating risks 
        facing U.S. diplomats and other personnel under Chief of 
        Mission Authority?

    Answer. I agree that the Department must balance the essential need 
to protect our people with the need to engage our partners around the 
world to advance U.S. interests. Department leadership acknowledges 
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is 
committed to managing it appropriately. The Bureau of Diplomatic 
Security (DS) goes to great lengths to facilitate our nation's 
diplomacy in challenging places, including high-threat locations, and 
welcomes further efforts, including with Congress, to ensure that the 
Department is able to meet mission objectives while protecting our 
personnel.
    To quote Secretary Blinken, ``The safety and security of our 
personnel abroad should not be politicized, nor should we assume 
negligence if, and when, prudent, calculated risk decisions play out 
with negative consequences.''

    Question. What is your view of the Accountability Review Board 
(ARB) process? Do you believe the ARB process is excessively tilted 
toward finding someone to blame in the case of a security incident, or 
alternatively, does action need to be taken to ensure accountability? 
What kinds of adjustments, if any, would you suggest Congress make to 
the ARB process?

    Answer. The Department recognizes that the advancement of foreign 
policy inherently involves diverse types of risk, and that taking 
considered risks can be essential to advancing U.S. interests. If 
confirmed, I would welcome working with Congress to look at ways to 
improve the ARB process.



                               __________


      Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted 
             to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Since 2016, U.S. personnel posted to the Embassy in 
Havana, Cuba have reported a common set of symptoms now referred to as 
``Havana Syndrome.'' Since then, these symptoms have been reported in 
many other countries hosting U.S. diplomats, including China and 
Russia. These often debilitating injuries present a major risk to U.S. 
diplomatic personnel there.

   What is your assessment of the risks present to U.S. diplomatic 
        personnel assigned to Havana?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will closely assess the situation in 
coordination with Department of State stakeholders and interagency 
partners.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Last year's travel restrictions and the resulting loss of 
visa fee revenue negatively impacted Consular Affairs' finances. Now, 
as vaccinations rates climb and more people seek to travel, demand for 
passports and visas are rapidly increasing, leading to significant 
delays in processing times for passports and visas. Some of these 
delays take extra months. If confirmed, what is your plan to reduce 
lengthy passport processing times?

    Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction 
of service backlogs impacting both our domestic passport agencies and 
our overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our domestic passport service 
standards were up to three weeks for expedited applications, and up to 
eight weeks for routine applications. It is my goal to return to these 
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime 
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize 
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity. 
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to 
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team 
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.

    Question. It appears that the Biden administration is not currently 
prioritizing visas for seasonal workers and other business-related 
needs. How are you going to better balance the needs of our small and 
medium-sized businesses, who often rely on seasonal workers to survive?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to sustain the long-
standing program of temporary workers coming to the United States, 
which is vital to maintaining supply chains for food and other critical 
items. In addition, I will seek to continue existing policies to waive 
the in-person interview requirement for certain first-time H-2 
applicants and those renewing within 48 months. These provisions will 
continue to permit the processing of many H-2 applications without the 
need for an in-person appearance, which creates efficiencies in 
processing while still adhering to COVID health protocols.

    Question. Upon a determination by the Secretary of State that the 
detention of a United States national abroad is unlawful or wrongful, 
how will you work to efficiently transfer such cases from the Bureau of 
Consular Affairs to the Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs?

    Answer. The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) works closely with the 
Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (S/SPEHA) 
and other Department offices to implement the Robert Levinson Hostage 
Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act. CA works hand in hand 
with S/SPEHA, the relevant regional bureau, post, and the Department's 
Office of the Legal Adviser to develop recommendations on individual 
cases. When a detention is determined to be wrongful, the transfer of 
the case to S/SPEHA is a smooth and efficient process. If confirmed, I 
pledge to help facilitate continued close collaboration.

    Question. How do you plan to ensure that all families with 
relatives held abroad are given timely access to information?

    Answer. The U.S. Department of State has no greater responsibility 
than the protection of U.S. citizens overseas. Some of our most 
vulnerable U.S. citizens abroad are those who are arrested or detained 
in a foreign country. Consular officers stand ready to provide all 
appropriate consular services in cases where U.S. citizens are detained 
and arrested abroad. We will continue to work with local authorities to 
ensure our embassies or consulates are notified of a U.S. citizen 
arrest, and our consular officers will seek access to the citizen 
without delay. Consistent with the decision of the detained citizen and 
in line with the Privacy Act, consular officers provide status updates 
to family members as soon as possible. I pledge, if confirmed, that CA 
will continue to prioritize service to these U.S. citizens including 
providing as much information as possible to their families.

    Question. What steps will you take to improve the Bureau of 
Consular of Affairs with regards to United States nationals held 
abroad?

    Answer. With all detentions, consular officers seek prompt access 
to ensure detained U.S. citizen prisoners are:

   receiving adequate food and necessary medical care;

   not being mistreated;

   able to access legal counsel;

   having communications facilitated with their families consistent 
        with their preferences under the Privacy Act, and

   receiving all substantive and procedural protections under local 
        law and fair trial guarantees consistent with international 
        obligations, including human rights law.

    If confirmed, I will seek to ensure individuals have access to any 
medication or medical attention they may need and highlight our 
concerns to local authorities, that officers also assist with the 
transfer of funds from family and friends in the United States to pay 
for attorneys' fees, food, and medicine while incarcerated, and that 
they raise concerns and protests regarding credible allegations of 
mistreatment. In cases where potential indications of a wrongful 
detention exist, I will ensure CA consults with S/SPEHA and other 
relevant Department offices on whether a wrongful detention 
determination by the Secretary as called for under the Levinson Act 
might be appropriate.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
           Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. State Department statistics released this month show 
fewer children are being successfully returned to the U.S. following 
parental abduction than before--See https://bit.ly/3nExd6J
    The percentage of children returned to the U.S. as share of all 
reported outgoing abductions has steadily dropped from 2011 to 2020.) 
While recognizing that not all returns to the U.S. are for cases that 
happened in previous years, we are nonetheless concerned by the 
apparent decreases in proportion of children returned to the U.S.

   To what do you attribute this decline?

    Answer. Each child's case, and each country, is unique. If 
confirmed, I will ensure the Bureau of Consular Affairs continues to 
assist parents seeking the return of their abducted children and to 
engage with countries to promote procedures to achieve better outcomes 
for children and families in child abduction cases. I will direct our 
focus to those countries cited for demonstrating a ``pattern of 
noncompliance'' in our Annual Report to Congress on International Child 
Abduction, and those countries that are not party to the Hague 
Abduction Convention, as these are the countries from which it may be 
the most challenging to resolve cases.
    In referring to the data publicly shared by the Department, I am 
also encouraged to observe that from 2010 to 2019, there was more than 
a 50 percent drop in the number of international parental child 
abductions reported to the Department. If confirmed, I will ensure the 
Bureau of Consular Affairs continues its robust efforts in 
collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to prevent these 
abductions from occurring in the first place.

    Question. What would you do as Assistant Secretary to more 
forcefully and effectively advocate for the return of abducted children 
to the U.S.?

    Answer. Consular Affairs has no more important role than the 
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, especially children wrongly removed 
or retained abroad by a parent from their U.S. homes. If confirmed, I 
will prioritize our engagement on international parental child 
abductions with both our Hague Convention partners and non-partner 
countries, with special focus on the 11 countries cited for 
demonstrating a ``pattern of noncompliance'' in our 2021 Annual Report 
to Congress on International Child Abduction. I will ensure we use 
every effective means to get these countries to work with the United 
States to quickly resolve these cases and help parents bring their 
abducted children home.

    Question. If confirmed, would you support efforts to routinely 
inform parents applying for passports for minor children about the 
potential for international child abduction?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain the Bureau of Consular 
Affairs' priority focus on the prevention of international parental 
child abduction. All recipients of a U.S. passport currently receive a 
flyer advising them of the risks of international parental child 
abduction and providing contact information for the Office of 
Children's Issues. I am also encouraged that close to 55,000 children 
are actively enrolled in the Children's Passport Issuance Alert 
program, and I will continue the Department's work to strengthen this 
important child abduction prevention program.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
          Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an incredible strain on 
the State Department's ability to process visas. This is, in part, due 
to the need to protect the safety and health of our diplomats in 
countries where the pandemic is still uncontrolled. However, as 
countries increase the vaccination of their citizens and the spread of 
the pandemic decreases, the U.S. should resume regular consular 
services in many countries.

   If confirmed, how do you plan to address the consular services 
        backlog?

    Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction 
of service backlogs at both our domestic passport agencies and our 
overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our domestic passport service 
standards were up to three weeks for expedited applications, and up to 
eight weeks for routine applications. It is my goal to return to these 
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime 
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize 
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity. 
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to 
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team 
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.

    Question. One consequence of the shutdown of consular services in 
most embassies has been the practice of referring citizens in one 
country to have their interviews conducted in another country. For 
example, ordinary Cubans have had to travel to Guyana.

   In your opinion, what message does it send to ordinary Cubans when 
        they have to travel to Guyana to process their visas, but the 
        Cuban baseball team was able to get visas in Havana to play a 
        game in the U.S. earlier this year?

    Answer. I am sympathetic to the financial and other difficulties 
Cuban citizens face in applying for visas and recognize there are 
humanitarian reasons that individuals may want to seek an appointment 
with the consular section in Havana. The U.S. Embassy suspended routine 
visa services following the ordered departure of non-emergency 
personnel in September 2017. The consular section must also comply with 
Cuban COVID-19 restrictions. Embassy Havana continues to provide 
emergency assistance to U.S. citizens in Cuba, and to provide limited 
non-immigrant visa services including for medical emergencies and 
official and diplomatic travelers. I am hopeful future conditions may 
permit a reevaluation of what services can be provided by the Embassy.

    Question. During the Trump administration, the State Department 
decided to allow Americans born in Jerusalem to list ``Israel'' as 
their place of birth in their passports. This is a policy and is 
reflective of U.S. law that recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel.

   If confirmed, do you commit to upholding this policy decision?

    Answer. If confirmed, I have no plans to seek to change the 
Department's current policy regarding the place of birth listed on U.S. 
passports for U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.

    Question. The Visa Waiver program is an initiative that allows 
citizens of participating counties to travel to the U.S. for 90 days 
without a Visa. Many of the participating countries are among our 
strongest allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. For several years, the State Department 
has worked to include Israel in the Visa Waiver program.

   If confirmed, do you commit to working with Israel on these 
        efforts?

    Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State, may designate countries for participation in 
the Visa Waiver Program when and if the country meets established 
statutory and policy criteria. I commit to continuing the efforts to 
work with Israel on its progress to qualify for designation into the 
program.

    Question. In 2014 the Obama administration agreed to afford multi-
entry, non-immigrant visas (B1/B2) with ten years' validity to 
qualified PRC nationals. Now that two subsequent administrations have 
determined that the PRC is a strategic competitor, and have sought to 
calibrate U.S. policy accordingly, it is time to revisit the risks 
associated with visa policy.

   If confirmed, do you commit to evaluate the security risks of 
        providing multi-entry visas of such long duration to PRC 
        nationals, particularly Chinese Communist Party members and 
        military personnel?

    Answer. Yes, I will work with the administration and the Department 
to evaluate all security risks posed by the People's Republic of China. 
We maintain robust vetting of all non-immigrant visa applications, 
including for B1/B2 visas, under our longstanding Security Advisory 
Opinion process. In addition, the Department and its partners 
continuously vet all visa holders and may revoke a visa at any time if 
we identify potential security concerns. Currently, B1, B2, and B1/B2 
non-immigrant visas are limited to one-month, single-entry for members 
of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as their spouses and unmarried 
children under the age of 21. This change went into effect in December 
2020 and is being applied at all visa units worldwide. We will continue 
to assess how to update and adapt visa vetting processing to best 
address threats to U.S. national security. Presidential Proclamation 
10043, which went into effect on June 1, 2020, has also suspended the 
entry of PRC students and researchers with ties to China's Military-
Civil Fusion.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Cory A. Booker

    Question. COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the State Department's 
ability to meet passport and visa demand. Right now, wait times for a 
new U.S. passport are 18 weeks for routine services and 12 weeks for 
expedited services.
    Relatedly, many U.S. embassies and consulates around the world are 
still only processing non-immigrant visas in emergency situations. For 
those that are issuing visas, the estimated wait time to receive an 
interview appointment can range from a couple of weeks for a student 
visa to months for a tourist visa.
    As you can imagine, I have received a great deal of correspondence 
from constituents who are exasperated for themselves and family members 
as they seek to travel around the world.

   What plans do you have in mind to address these severe backlogs? 
        What do you intend to do on Day 1 to help get Consular Affairs 
        back on track?

    Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction 
of service backlogs impacting both our domestic passport agencies and 
our overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our passport service standards 
were two to three weeks for expedited applications, and six to eight 
weeks for regular applications. It is my goal to return to these 
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime 
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize 
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity. 
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to 
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team 
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.

    Question. Through nearly two decades of U.S. assistance programming 
in Afghanistan, the United States has funded, through cooperative 
agreements and grants, multiple programs on human rights, democracy 
assistance, support for independent media, and the empowerment of women 
and marginalized groups.
    Thousands of Afghan nationals directly implemented U.S.-funded 
civilian aid and development programs across the country, alongside 
U.S. and international personnel. They demonstrated a commitment and 
dedication to this important work for their country despite the fact 
that the association with the United States placed their lives at risk.
    I visited Afghanistan in 2018, and have seen firsthand the 
dedication and sacrifice that Afghan nationals have given to support 
our efforts. These brave men and women are now under threat as the 
Taliban has stated in no uncertain terms that it plans to target those 
who helped the United States as translators, interpreters, and in other 
ways over the years. Many of these nationals have applied for Special 
Issuance Visas to come to the United States with their families, but 
the backlog for processing their applications runs into the thousands.

   What is your plan for addressing this backlog and potentially 
        saving the lives of thousands of Afghans who helped us in our 
        war efforts over the past two decades?

    Answer. I take seriously our commitment to the Afghan men and women 
who have assumed enormous risks to support our military and civilian 
personnel. I am very cognizant of the threats they face and fully agree 
that assisting them is a top priority. The Department has increased 
resources and undertaken steps to streamline the process at every 
application stage. If confirmed, I will ensure my team completes 
processing of SIV applications to the fullest extent possible. We will 
also keep working with Congress to identify where we can make the SIV 
application process more efficient and adjust requirements that do not 
impact national security.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
        Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious gaps in U.S. 
international pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response efforts, 
including the failure of the Department of State--over multiple 
administrations--to prioritize global health policy and diplomatic 
engagement beyond the PEPFAR program. What is your plan to improve 
State Department leadership on global health security?

    Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how global health 
security is essential to U.S. national and economic security. The State 
Department is strongly positioned to lead the global effort to beat 
COVID-19 and increase the global capacity to prevent, detect, and 
respond to future outbreaks, and the Secretary has appointed a 
Coordinator who reports directly to him to work across the Department 
and with other agencies to elevate global health policy in the 
Department's diplomatic efforts. If confirmed, I will immediately look 
closely at the bureau's structure and resources and come back to you to 
discuss this issue further, with a view to working with the committee 
as it considers how to strengthen health security at the Department. If 
confirmed, I am committed to work with Coordinator Gayle Smith of the 
Secretary's Office of Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security, 
other offices across the interagency, and with partners to improve 
global health security capabilities, as well as to increase 
transparency and accountability. This includes modernizing and 
strengthening international institutions including the World Health 
Organization, and International Health Regulations.

    Question. Do you agree that the Department needs to play a more 
active role in the interagency on global health security, including by 
ensuring foreign policy and program coherence among the U.S. agencies 
implementing global health programs overseas (CDC and USAID) as well as 
with other international partners?

    Answer. Yes. The Department is playing an active and robust role on 
global health security within the interagency process. But the Bureau 
needs to build up greater capacity to deal with this and other health 
crises in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to working with 
Coordinator Gayle Smith of the Secretary's Office of Global COVID-19 
Response and Health Security on these issues, as well as other offices 
in the Department and across the interagency. The Biden-Harris 
administration recognizes that COVID-19 and health security are global 
challenges that require global responses, and I will engage with 
international partners and allies on this important issue. The United 
States will continue to engage multilaterally to respond to and recover 
from COVID-19 as well as to prepare for, detect, and rapidly respond to 
emerging biological threats.

    Question. Is there currently a review process within the United 
States Government for approving or disapproving life sciences or 
biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose 
dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and 
toxins? What role, if any, does the Department of State play in this 
review process? Within the Department of State, what role does OES play 
in this process?

    Answer. Because I am not currently an employee of the State 
Department, and I understand that much of this work is outside the 
purview of OES, I have not taken a hard look at this process. It is my 
understanding that there are a variety of review processes that may 
apply to international life science collaboration, depending on the 
nature of that collaboration and the pathogens or other materials 
involved. These include reviews undertaken by agencies before funding 
certain types of research deemed to pose particular risks, and, where 
applicable, export licensing and visa vetting. The Department of State 
is in general not involved in the decisions of funding agencies to 
support specific research activities. I understand that much of this 
work is outside of the purview of OES. If confirmed, I will work 
colleagues in other bureaus at the State Department and across the 
interagency to learn more about these issues, and will work with you to 
assist any committee oversight over such activities.

    Question. If such a process exists, what type of evidentiary 
information must be included to determine whether such research 
collaboration is appropriate?

    Answer. Because I am not yet in the Department, I have not looked 
into this question or been specifically briefed on it. I have been 
advised that the types of information required depend on the nature of 
the research collaboration and the pathogens or other materials 
involved. However, it is my understanding that they would typically 
include the pathogens, if any, to be worked with, the nature of the 
activity, the identities of the individuals involved, and the purposes 
for which the activity would be conducted. Information regarding the 
location of the work and the applicable biosafety standards may also be 
required. If confirmed, I will look further into this issue and will 
work with you and your staff on it.

    Question. What steps has the Department of State taken to act on or 
implement the recommendations of the following guidance documents? 
Please be specific with respect to each document listed below:


   United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual 
        Use Research of Concern, available at https://bit.ly/2YYcFvs

   National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework 
        for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: 
        Strategies foR Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research 
        Information (2007), available at https://bit.ly/3AfOqGZ

   Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review 
        Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight 
        (P3CO) (2017), available at https://bit.ly/3u2cMSt

   U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Framework for Guiding 
        Funding Decisions About Proposed Research Involving Enhanced 
        Potential Pandemic Pathogens (2017), available at https://
        bit.ly/3CmAQ5o

   National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Recommendations 
        for the Evaluation and Oversight of Proposed Gain-of-Function 
        Research (2016), https://bit.ly/3zkTRTQ.


    Answer. As I understand it, these policy documents primarily 
provide guidance for other Federal agencies considering funding of 
certain types of research or work with potential pandemic pathogens. I 
am advised that the Department of State does not fund such research. 
However, the Department of State has been involved in actively 
promoting the development and adoption of such oversight systems 
abroad, including through presentations and discussions at 
international meetings. If confirmed, I will look further into how 
these documents are being used and implemented by agencies with such 
research funding and will work with you and your staff to understand 
how each is being implemented.

    Question. As we discussed when we met last month, the Columbia 
River Treaty remains an important issue to myself and the rest of the 
northwest delegation. This treaty has been in the process of being 
renegotiated for years and will determine energy production and costs 
as well as water flows. If confirmed, you will lead the bureau 
responsible for overseeing some of the technical inputs that 
negotiators will consider.

    Answer. The Columbia River is the lifeblood of the region. I am 
generally familiar with the complicated issues regarding this key 
shared resource from my time at NOAA. If confirmed, I will give a close 
look into the whole range of negotiating issues as they stand now and 
determine how OES can best provide greater support to the U.S. 
negotiating team. Canada and the United States have a shared interest 
in building back the regional economy and being good stewards of the 
region's water resources.

    Question. If confirmed, will you make Columbia River Treaty 
negotiations a priority?

    Answer. I understand the importance of reaching agreement with 
Canada on the modernization of the Columbia River Treaty regime. Canada 
and the United States have a shared interest in building back the 
regional economy and being good stewards of the region's water 
resources. If confirmed, I will look into the whole range of 
negotiating issues and determine how OES can best support the U.S. 
negotiating team.

    Question. What was the total amount of appropriations in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 2019 used by the Department of State on global climate change 
programs? From which accounts did the funding come? Please provide 
specific details about all global climate change programs funded, 
including the objectives, results, and amounts of FY 2019 
appropriations spent. If confirmed, how would you adjust this spending, 
if at all?

    Answer. The Department of State used $13,500,000 of FY 2019 
Economic Support Funds on global climate change programs. These 
programs protect the environment while promoting economic growth and 
enhancing sustainable landscapes, clean energy, and adaptation. In 
FY19, allocated funds went to the following programs:

   SilvaCarbon--U.S. Forest Service

   Climate Fellows--U.S. Forest Service

   Clean and Advanced Technology for Sustainable Landscapes--U.S. 
        Department of Energy

   Caribbean Natural Infrastructure Partnership for Resilience--U.S. 
        Forest Service

   Offset National Emissions through Sustainable Landscapes--U.S. 
        Aviation Industry Groups

   Carbon Accounting and Reporting for Wetlands--Environmental 
        Protection Agency

   Avoiding Deforestation through a Commodities Jurisdiction 
        Approach--Competitively Awarded Program

   Private Investment for Enhanced Resilience--Competitively Awarded 
        Program

   Clean Energy Ministerial--U.S. Department of Energy

    Question. In your March 31, 2020, opinion piece in the Washington 
Post, you wrote about the environmental ``unexpected bright side'' of 
the pandemic and point out the economic tradeoffs of doing with less. 
How will you measure and report on economic and social tradeoffs of 
climate programs at the State Department?

    Answer. The pandemic has been an immense tragedy. It is clear that 
it and the climate crisis impact our economies and societies in complex 
and challenging ways. It is imperative that we learn from this 
experience and use that knowledge to build back better. If confirmed, I 
hope to work within the E family, and with the Department and the 
interagency, to address these issues holistically.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
      Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Authorities
    Question. The position of Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs has not been 
held by a Senate-confirmed official since 2014.

   Secretary Blinken has noted that the State Department likely 
        requires additional hiring authorities to bring in more 
        personnel to address emerging, complex foreign policy 
        challenges that fall within the remit of OES, including climate 
        change, global health, and technology. Do you share this view? 
        Could you elaborate on the kinds of skill sets you think need 
        to be added to the Bureau's work?

    Answer. Yes, I agree. The Bureau has in its purview two of the 
major crises facing our country and the world today-climate and health-
and they are likely to be difficult challenges for the foreseeable 
future, requiring more resources for the Bureau. OES needs the right 
mix of people, fresh and diverse perspectives, and people who 
understand how to apply the latest scientific understanding and 
technologies to these problems.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
          Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. If confirmed, how will you work with our allies and 
partners in the region to counter the Chinese Communist Party's illegal 
territorial claims?

    Answer. This matter is an important problem, and if I am confirmed, 
it will be a priority for me. I have been to China and Japan with the 
Secretary of Defense, and I understand the issue well. The United 
States can and should push back on the PRC's coercive behavior, 
unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, and disregard for the 
marine environment. Countering the PRC's tactics requires a government-
wide effort that leads with diplomacy, development, and economic 
engagement. Secretary Blinken recently affirmed in his statement on the 
5th anniversary of the Arbitral Ruling on the South China Sea that 
freedom of the seas is an enduring interest of all nations and is vital 
to global peace and prosperity. If confirmed, I will look forward to 
working with our ASEAN partners along with other partners and allies 
including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the European Union to preserve the rules-based order in 
the Indo-Pacific region including the East and South China Seas.

    Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to work with other 
federal agencies and international partners to crack down on illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices in the South China 
Sea?

    Answer. Ending IUU fishing is a top priority of mine because of the 
detrimental food security impacts it has in the regions where it is 
occurring, as well as because of the human rights and environmental 
harms it is causing. Nowhere is this security and environmental 
challenge more urgent than in the South China Sea. When I worked for 
Secretary Panetta at the Department of Defense, I witnessed the growing 
tensions in this region and the national security concerns it creates 
first-hand.
    I understand that the State Department and OES work with 
interagency partners to monitor and address IUU fishing by PRC vessels, 
support capacity building for coastal states threatened by it, and 
implement multilateral fisheries enforcement and management schemes. 
OES and its interagency partners also engage directly with the PRC on 
broader fisheries conservation and management issues to push for 
Being's responsible oversight of its fleet. I understand the State 
Department and other agencies have also done work with Southeast Asian 
coastal States to strengthen fisheries law enforcement and maritime 
domain awareness in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to 
continuing the Department's leading role in the recently formed 
Maritime SAFE Act Interagency IUU Fishing Working Group, where we are 
working with our interagency partners, as well as with key 
stakeholders, to coordinate and strengthen U.S. efforts to combat IUU 
fishing wherever it occurs. It is imperative, in my view, that we step 
up our efforts in international fora and at international meetings to 
confront China on its aggressive actions that undermine the rule of law 
on the seas.

    Question. Is there currently a review process within the United 
States Government for approving or disapproving life sciences or 
biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose 
dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and 
toxins? What role, if any, does the Department of State play in this 
review process? Within the Department of State, what role does OES play 
in this process?

    Answer. Because I am not currently an employee of the State 
Department, and I understand that much of this work is outside the 
purview of OES, I have not yet taken a hard look at this process. It is 
my understanding that there are a variety of review processes that may 
apply to international life science collaboration, depending on the 
nature of that collaboration and the pathogens or other materials 
involved. These include reviews undertaken by agencies before funding 
certain types of research deemed to pose particular risks, and, where 
applicable, export licensing and visa vetting. The Department of State 
is in general not involved in the decisions of funding agencies to 
support specific research activities. I understand that much of this 
work is outside of the purview of OES. If confirmed, I will work 
colleagues in other bureaus at the State Department and across the 
interagency to learn more about these issues, and will work with you to 
assist any committee oversight over such activities.

    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with our 
allies and partners in Africa and Latin America to combat Chinese 
illegal fishing?

    Answer. Department's continued close work with the U.S. Coast 
Guard, NOAA, and other agencies and partner governments around the 
world to strengthen the rules and improve enforcement processes and 
capabilities for international fisheries. The Bureau plays a role in 16 
bilateral cooperative fisheries law enforcement agreements between the 
U.S. Coast Guard and partner countries in the Pacific and West Africa, 
and I fully support its efforts to pursue additional agreements 
throughout the world, including in Latin America and Africa. These 
agreements allow for the United States to assist coastal and flag 
States to enforce their domestic laws, strengthening and supporting 
development of partner nations' capabilities. In addition, I understand 
that the Maritime SAFE Act IUU Fishing Working Group has recently 
determined that a number of regions in Africa and Latin America are 
``priority regions,'' as described by the Act. OES will continue to 
collaborate with its interagency partners through that Working Group to 
determine the best approaches to strengthening the capabilities of 
countries in those regions to address IUU fishing individually and 
through regional cooperation.

    Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with 
other agencies in investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic?

    Answer. Like many, I very much want to know the origins of COVID-
19. It is imperative that we learn what caused this tragedy and act to 
do everything we can to prevent it from happening again. President 
Biden recently requested a deeper review of the origins of COVID-19 by 
the U.S. intelligence community, with support from the National Labs 
and other agencies of the U.S. Government. As part of this review, 
President Biden has asked for investigation into all areas that may be 
relevant. I look forward to the results of this report and, if 
confirmed, identifying next steps for follow-up and assisting in 
whatever capacity I can. Additionally, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) is currently working on developing Phase 2 of its study of the 
origins of COVID-19, including in China.

    Question. If confirmed, and absent passage of my bill, what actions 
will you take to combat the deplorable action of finning sharks in 
foreign nations?

    Answer. Shark populations are declining globally and in my view we 
need to do more to conserve them. The United States, through the 
Department of State and the NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, has 
spearheaded a series of agreed shark finning prohibitions in RFMOs in 
both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The United States works through 
RFMOs to strengthen enforcement of current fishing prohibitions--and 
strengthen the measures themselves when needed--as part of our work to 
support the conservation and sustainable management of key shark 
species. If confirmed, I will press for continued and expanded U.S. 
leadership in these and other international organizations to ensure the 
sustainability of these vital species, as well as continuing to work 
with other countries to develop and enforce national conservation and 
management measures, including species-specific data collection 
programs for sharks.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. As you contemplate the possibilities of taking this 
relationship to the next level and inaugurating a genuine strategic 
partnership what is your vision of what such a partnership should look 
like and encompass?

    Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have 
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive 
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
    I am confident that the positive momentum in our relationship will 
continue. The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose 
and a common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We 
seek to deepen our cooperation that spans our close collaboration on 
war legacy and humanitarian issues to regional security and shared 
prosperity. We also seek to deepen cooperation on climate change, 
pandemic disease, wildlife and drug trafficking, maritime security, and 
transnational crime..
    Our interests include maintaining the peace and stability that has 
allowed regional and bilateral trade to flourish over the last quarter 
century.
    If confirmed, I commit to consulting closely with Congress as the 
administration considers next steps in the relationship.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you balance our very real shared 
strategic interests with Vietnam with our on-going human rights 
concerns? What sort of linkages or conditioning do you think is 
appropriate and constructive as we consider additional military-
security, economic or diplomatic engagement with Vietnam?

    Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have 
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive 
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
    The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose and a 
common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We must 
continue to build on the progress in the bilateral relationship, but as 
the Biden-Harris administration has committed to putting human rights 
back at the center of American foreign policy, we must also bring all 
the tools of our diplomacy to defend human rights, including freedom of 
expression, and religion or belief. If confirmed, I will continue to 
press Vietnam to improve its implementation of human rights obligations 
and commitments.

    Question. As Beijing continues to pursue its aggressive and 
expansionist tactics in the South China Sea, where are the 
opportunities--and necessity--for greater US-Vietnam maritime 
partnership?

    Answer. We will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of its 
maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better monitor 
its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea.
    In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to 
Vietnam through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 
program two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving 
in in Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in 
Vietnam's fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security 
capabilities. The United States has also transferred to Vietnam 24 
Metal Shark patrol boats and six Scan Eagle UAV, as part of our effort 
to work with Vietnam to make it better able to protect its sovereignty 
and rights in the South China Sea. Through the State Department's 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program, we are developing 
four training facilities for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing 
U.S. Coast Guard personnel to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard 
and DFIRES Fisheries Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law 
enforcement skills to ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities 
forces are modern, resilient, and capable. If confirmed, I will 
continue to seek opportunities for maritime capacity building.
    Vietnam sent its first cadet to the U.S. Air Force Academy in 
August 2020, and we are hopeful to have more Vietnamese cadets attend 
U.S. service academies in the coming years.

    Question. How and where can the United States work with Vietnam to 
assure continued ASEAN centrality as a strategic counterweight and to 
develop functional problem-solving regional architecture?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to deepening 
our engagement with ASEAN as part of reinvigorating our multilateral 
partnerships. ASEAN plays a central role in the U.S. vision of a free 
and open Indo-Pacific. Secretary of State Blinken has publicly 
reaffirmed the United States' steadfast support for ASEAN centrality 
and to expanding our work together.
    Vietnam, as Chair of ASEAN in 2020, helped the organization respond 
to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and we applauded them for 
their leadership.
    We will continue to seek opportunities to partner with Vietnam and 
other ASEAN partners to advance U.S. priorities and interests on 
pressing regional issues. This extends beyond our meetings with ASEAN 
to ASEAN-related fora such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional 
Forum, and Mekong-U.S. Partnership. As part of the non-traditional 
security pillar of this partnership, the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement is developing a program to combat 
Transnational Organized Crime in the region, building Vietnam's 
capacity to investigate and prosecute crime in cooperation with its 
neighbors.
    We will also continue our work to build the capacity of the ASEAN 
Secretariat on political, economic, and socio-cultural issues, and 
broader efforts to develop human capital and support the next 
generation of ASEAN leaders, including through capacity building 
seminars at the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI) 
Academy at Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV).

    Question. What would be your priorities--resilience, zero-carbon 
energy resources--to work with Vietnam on climate change?

    Answer. The 2020s will be the decade for climate action, and no 
region of the world has a more pivotal role in realizing the global 
goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 than the economies in the Indo-
Pacific region. We will continue to work with Indo-Pacific countries to 
increase regional ambition, implement 2030 targets and net-zero goals, 
enhance the impact of climate financing, and increase adaptation and 
resiliency through regional frameworks such as the Quad as well as 
bilateral engagements.
    I was pleased that Vietnam was invited to the Leaders' Summit on 
Climate and appreciated hearing from President Nguyen Xuan Phuc about 
the challenges Vietnam faces from climate change. Vietnam is 
increasingly vulnerable to the threats associated with climate change, 
evidenced by record floods that caused horrible devastation last year. 
Vietnam is also a significant greenhouse gas emitter.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize elevating climate change in my 
discussions with Vietnamese Government and business leaders and urging 
Vietnam to transition to a cleaner energy environment and to commit to 
setting a net-zero emissions date.

    Question. Cyber and Human Rights: in recent years Vietnam has 
cracked down on numerous bloggers and journalists, and adopted 
troubling new laws and regulations, that have closed down freedom of 
expression in cyberspace. How and where can we work with Vietnam to 
assure that civil society actors and journalists have space and freedom 
to operate in the cyber realm--and to convince Vietnam that China's 
model of digital authoritarianism is contrary to Vietnam's interests.

    Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the 
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online and offline. 
The trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust 
convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and activists for 
exercising their human rights is deeply troubling.
    If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to 
respect freedom of expression, both offline and online, and engage with 
social media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of 
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
internet.

    Question. Fulbright Vietnam University: The establishment of FVU, 
with congressional support, has been a really success story for the 
bilateral relationship in recent years. Where do you see opportunities 
for FVU to continue to grow and contribute to Vietnam's development? 
For example, is there a role for FVU to serve as a hub for cyber-
security education and training for Vietnam and for the region?

    Answer. Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) is an incredible symbol 
of the strength of our partnership with the people of Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia. It is the first private, independent, non-profit 
Vietnamese university, and is based on American higher education 
traditions of open inquiry, research, and critical analysis.
    The U.S. Government has helped FUV develop into a center of 
academic independence that models core principles, including academic 
freedom, meritocracy, transparency, and equal access. FUV has brought 
world-class university standards to Vietnam and helped unlock 
tremendous potential in Vietnam's education sector.
    We are proud to partner with FUV to create the YSEALI Academy at 
FUV, which offers executive-level capacity-building seminars for entry- 
to mid-level professionals from ASEAN countries and Timor-Leste around 
the themes of technology and innovation, public policy, and 
entrepreneurship.
    If confirmed, I look forward to exploring all possible avenues to 
use FUV as a platform, including for cybersecurity training and 
educational programs on the Mekong Delta, for increased engagement with 
the Vietnamese people and with leaders across Southeast Asia.

    Question. Even though we are many decades from the end of the war, 
legacy issues including cleaning up of UXO and addressing the use of 
Agent Orange continue to be important to both the Vietnamese and 
American people. What priorities would you have in addressing these or 
other war legacy issues, if confirmed?

    Answer. Addressing humanitarian and war legacy issues is a 
foundational element of the strong relationship between the United 
States and Vietnam. Providing the fullest possible accounting for U.S. 
personnel missing from the Vietnam War era remains our most solemn 
duty. I acknowledge the Senate's longstanding support of U.S. 
initiatives in this regard.
    Since 1993, the United States has contributed more than $160 
million to conventional weapons destruction (CWD) efforts to clear 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), risk education, victims' assistance, and 
capacity building. The U.S.-funded UXO clearance program targets high-
priority sites in the most UXO-contaminated provinces of central 
Vietnam: Quang Tri, Quang Binh, and Tha Thien Hue. Our progress with 
UXO authorities in these areas is a prime example of how provincial 
level success can be replicated at the national level going forward. If 
confirmed, I will advocate for these successes to be adopted at the 
national level for effective implementation of U.S. taxpayer funding, 
and to make real progress for the people of Vietnam.
    Separately, the United States and Vietnam successfully completed 
the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang in 2018, and in 2019 
we broke ground on the 10-year dioxin remediation project at the Bien 
Hoa airbase area. The United States has provided more than $125 million 
since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, directly and indirectly 
supporting over a million persons with disabilities, regardless of the 
cause.
    Our cooperation on these issues continues to build a foundation of 
trust to expand our relationship and, if confirmed, I will prioritize 
deepening our cooperation in these efforts.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
       Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. What should our main goals for the Indo-Pacific region be 
in the short-term, medium-term, and long-term?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to advancing a 
free and open Indo-Pacific region. To achieve this, I will work to 
revitalize ties with our allies and partners, advance inclusive 
economic policies that support all Americans, and promote democratic 
resilience and respect for human rights. I will invest in capabilities 
and work with allies and partners, including in regional organizations, 
to defend the international rules-based order, its foundational values, 
and international law. I will also work closely with Congress and 
partners in the region to address pressing challenges, including the 
threat posed by the DPRK nuclear program, transnational crime, recovery 
from COVID-19, and climate change.

    Question. What are realistic goals for the U.S.-Vietnam strategic 
partnership in the next decade? Please be specific.

    Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have 
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive 
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
    I am confident that the positive momentum in our relationship will 
continue. The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose 
and a common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Over 
the next decade, we seek to deepen our cooperation that spans our close 
collaboration on war legacy and humanitarian issues to regional 
security and shared prosperity. We also seek to deepen cooperation on 
climate change, pandemic disease, wildlife and drug trafficking, 
maritime security, and transnational crime..
    Our interests include maintaining the peace and stability that has 
allowed regional and bilateral trade to flourish over the last quarter 
century..

    Question. If confirmed, what are the three main things you will 
seek to accomplish in your first 100 days as U.S. Ambassador to 
Vietnam?

    Answer. The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has undergone a profound 
transformation since normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995, and 
our ties are thriving. President Biden's Interim National Security 
Strategic Guidance noted that the United States will deepen our 
partnership with Vietnam to advance shared objectives. I look forward 
to leading those efforts.
    If confirmed, I will seek to deepen our security ties with the 
conclusion of a General Security of Military Information Agreement with 
Vietnam, which would enhance information sharing and expand defense 
trade. I will also press Vietnam to take bold steps to commit to a 
cleaner energy future, using the November COP 26 Conference in Glasgow 
as a catalyst for action. Finally, I will seek to expand on the 
progress that ethnic and religious minorities, the disabled, and 
LGBTQI+ citizens in Vietnam have made, but will express serious concern 
to Vietnam's leadership to underscore our commitment to supporting 
universal human rights--and stress that improvements in this area can 
only strengthen our overall relationship.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to continuing economic 
cooperation with Vietnam on cultivating liquefied natural gas in 
addition to other renewable resources? In light of recent policy 
changes by the Biden administration, what tools will you have at your 
disposal to advance such energy cooperation with Vietnam?

    Answer. Vietnam is projected to be one of the fastest growing 
energy demand markets in the region. The State Department is committed 
to supporting Vietnam's economic aspirations, energy security and 
sustainable development, and to support U.S. companies seeking 
opportunities to invest and trade in this dynamic market.
    At the same time, the United States is committed to working with 
key partners around the world, like Vietnam, to encourage them to 
select policies, measures, and investments that direct their economic 
growth toward a climate-aligned pathway. Those decisions will be 
critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and a global net 
zero future by 2050. The science is unequivocal: we have no 
alternative. We must keep the Earth's warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius to 
avoid catastrophe. To get there, the science says the world needs to 
get to a state of net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by around 
mid-century.
    As we head further into the 2020s, we must grow more discerning of 
the future role for natural gas in achieving the world's climate goals. 
If we are to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, the world must be 
especially judicious about new gas infrastructure. That said, Vietnam 
has an opportunity to eliminate coal projects and continue the 
impressive growth of solar and wind power over the past two years.
    If confirmed, I will work with U.S. companies and U.S. agencies to 
plan their energy investments in a way that ensures access to cleaner 
and affordable energy and advances our climate goals.

    Question. What else do you think the U.S. should provide to Vietnam 
in terms of security assistance, especially with respect to South China 
Sea issues?

    Answer. We will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of its 
maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better monitor 
its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea.
    In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to 
Vietnam through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 
program two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving 
in in Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in 
Vietnam's fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security 
capabilities. The United States has also transferred to Vietnam 24 
Metal Shark patrol boats and six Scan Eagle UAV, as part of our effort 
to work with Vietnam to make it better able to protect its sovereignty 
and rights in the South China Sea. Through the State Department's 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program, we are developing 
four training facilities for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing 
U.S. Coast Guard personnel to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard 
and DFIRES Fisheries Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law 
enforcement skills to ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities 
forces are modern, resilient, and capable. If confirmed, I will 
continue to seek opportunities for maritime capacity building.
    Vietnam sent its first cadet to the U.S. Air Force Academy in 
August 2020, and we are hopeful to have more Vietnamese cadets attend 
U.S. service academies in the coming years. We are also providing 
Vietnam with T-6 trainers, so that Vietnam's future Air Force pilots 
will learn on state-of the art, American-model aircraft.

    Question. What are your views on Vietnam's use of a maritime 
militia in the South China Sea? What are your views on the new unit 
Vietnam just stood up in this maritime militia?

    Answer. The United States supports maritime law enforcement within 
the bounds of international law and has consistently opposed the threat 
or use of force to settle maritime and territorial disputes.
    The United States opposes the use of coercion and intimidation by 
any claimant seeking to assert its maritime claims in the South China 
Sea and calls for all states to ensure that all of its maritime forces 
and other vessels act in accordance with international law, avoid 
provocative behavior, and behave in a professional manner.

    Question. Apart from maritime cooperation, what do you see as the 
major opportunities for growth in the U.S.-Vietnam security 
relationship?

    Answer. Our defense relationship has become one of the strongest 
pillars of the overall relationship. While much of our current or 
future planned security assistance to Vietnam aims to enhance the 
country's ability to enforce international maritime law and police its 
EEZ, we hope to expand upon peacekeeping efforts, search-and-rescue 
abilities, humanitarian/disaster relief capacity, military medicine, 
and the development of Vietnam's Coast Guard and Air Force.

    Question. What challenges does Vietnam's reliance on Russian 
defense technology and weapons present to the growth of the U.S.-
Vietnam security relationship?

    Answer. Vietnam is working to diversify defense partners and 
suppliers, and is evaluating and exploring future procurement 
opportunities with the United States. In this context, the United 
States is focusing support on strengthening maritime law enforcement 
and domain awareness capabilities, peacekeeping efforts, search-and-
rescue abilities, humanitarian/disaster relief capacity, military 
medicine, and the development of Vietnam's Coast Guard and Air Force.

    Question. If confirmed, what will be your top three priorities for 
working with Vietnam on Mekong issues?

    Answer. The United States has long been a presence in the Mekong 
subregion and has long been a partner of Vietnam. The Mekong subregion 
matters to America. Not only is the subregion home to Vietnam, one of 
the fastest growing economies in the world, it is also home to a 
growing and incredibly dynamic population. Helping the subregion's 
economy thrive and innovate, including by ensuring opportunities for 
marginalized populations and helping talented young people realize 
their full potential, benefits us all and also helps fulfill President 
Biden's foreign policy for the middle class. The subregion is also the 
front line for strategic competition with PRC, and we want to ensure 
the Mekong states are secure, independent, and prosperous. Vietnam 
supports our efforts through the Mekong-U.S. Partnership to ensure the 
subregion is prosperous, resilient, and that the people of the region 
enjoy good governance and security.
    If confirmed, I will prioritize support of a sustainable Mekong 
basin development plan, work with Vietnam on its efforts to combat 
climate change, and press for greater economic connectivity across the 
sub-region.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Congress on 
matters related to the financial sustainability of Fulbright University 
Vietnam?

    Answer. Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) is an incredible symbol 
of the strength of our partnership with the people of Vietnam and 
Southeast Asia. It is the first private, independent, non-profit 
Vietnamese university, and is based on American higher education 
traditions of open inquiry, research, and critical analysis.
    The U.S. Government has helped FUV develop into a center of 
academic independence that models core principles, including academic 
freedom, meritocracy, transparency, and equal access. FUV has brought 
world-class university standards to Vietnam and helped unlock 
tremendous potential in Vietnam's education sector..
    If confirmed, I will work with Congress to continue our work to 
help FUV continue to flourish and achieve financial sustainability.

    Question. Vietnam has signed and ratified the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and was among the original 50 
states parties to the treaty when it entered into force on January 22, 
2021. Will you commit to raising U.S. concerns about TPNW with 
counterparts in Vietnam?

    Answer. Yes, as appropriate. While the United States understands 
and shares the desire to advance nuclear disarmament goals, we do not 
support the TPNW. The TPNW is incompatible with U.S. extended 
deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international 
peace and security and may reinforce divisions that hinder the 
international community's ability to work together to address pressing 
proliferation and security challenges. The U.S. position on this issue 
has spanned administrations. Seeking to ban nuclear weapons through a 
treaty that does not include any State Parties that possess nuclear 
weapons will not reduce nuclear arsenals.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to raise with the 
Vietnamese Government its alleged use of extraterritorial tactics 
against dissidents and others? For example: Vietnam's hacking of its 
own dissidents' accounts overseas; the alleged abduction of a 
Vietnamese oil executive from Berlin; and the alleged abduction of a 
Radio Free Asia journalist from Bangkok?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by report of such tactics against 
individuals for exercising their fundamental human rights. These 
activities run counter to Vietnam's international human rights 
obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I commit to engage with the 
Government of Vietnam to underscore our strong objection to these 
tactics and ensure Vietnam adheres to its international human rights 
commitments.

    Question. According to Freedom House's Freedom of the Net report, 
internet freedom in Vietnam dropped to an all-time low in 2020. What 
will you do to ensure that the internet in Vietnam remains free and 
open?

    Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the 
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online and offline. 
The trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust 
convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and activists for 
exercising their human rights is deeply troubling.
    If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to 
respect freedom of expression, including online, and engage with social 
media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of 
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
internet.

    Question. In the State Department's 2021 Trafficking in Persons 
Report, Vietnam was identified as a Tier 2 Watch List country for the 
third consecutive year. Because Vietnam was listed for three years on 
the Watch List, it was subject to a downgrade to Tier 3, but was 
provided a waiver for its general efforts to eliminate trafficking. It 
is clear the Vietnamese Government must improve its protection, 
prevention, and prosecutorial efforts in this coming reporting period 
in order to improve its ranking. How will you work with the host 
government to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?

    Answer. In recent years, the Vietnamese Government has demonstrated 
significant efforts by providing trafficking victims the affirmative 
right to legal representation, increasing TIP funding for law 
enforcement and victim support, passing new legislation that better 
protects workers migrating overseas and prohibits brokerage fees for 
overseas migrant workers, continuing large-scale awareness campaigns in 
communities vulnerable to trafficking, and training law enforcement 
officials.
    Significant challenges remain, however, including insufficient 
victim screening, cumbersome and ineffective victim identification and 
assistance procedures, limited interagency coordination, and the need 
to better address predatory recruitment practices that charge workers 
seeking overseas employment higher fees than the law allows.
    If confirmed, I will encourage the Government of Vietnam to 
vigorously prosecute all forms of trafficking and convict and punish 
traffickers, especially in cases involving forced labor or complicit 
officials. I will also encourage the Government to expand victim 
screening amongst vulnerable groups such as migrant workers, 
individuals in commercial sex, and child laborers, and improve victim 
identification and referral mechanisms.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Report on International 
Religious Freedom, Vietnam was depicted as a country which is not 
particularly tolerant of religious freedoms. In one example, Vietnam 
continues to enforce a Law on Belief and Religion (LBR), which requires 
religious groups to register with the State and allows government 
entities to harass unregistered groups. What is your assessment of this 
particular issue and, if confirmed, how will you work with the 
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom to bolster 
religious freedom in-country?

    Answer. Vietnam's Law on Belief and Religion, while imperfect and 
inconsistent with international standards, reduces registration times 
and grants legal status to some religious groups. Some groups who 
remain unregistered in remote areas continue to face harassment from 
local authorities.
    The United States remains concerned that the law maintains 
significant government control over religious practices and exacerbates 
uneven implementation of the law at the subnational level. The State 
Department's annual international religious freedom report to Congress 
detailed these concerns, and if confirmed, I will continue to raise 
them with Hanoi.
    If confirmed, I will also continue to work closely with the 
Ambassador-at-Large to emphasize the importance of religious freedom 
with Vietnam's leaders, including cases of individuals harassed or 
imprisoned for their beliefs.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, 
Vietnam was identified as continuing to undermine fundamental human 
rights like speech, assembly, press, religion, and association. If 
confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances with the 
Vietnamese Government?

    Answer. I am very concerned about the human rights situation in 
Vietnam and committed to pushing for improvements. Despite progress in 
some areas, the trend of escalating harassment, unjust arrests and 
convictions, and increasingly harsh sentences of journalists and 
activists for peacefully exercising their right to express their 
opinions is deeply troubling. Vietnam is an important partner in the 
Indo-Pacific region, but that partnership can only reach its fullest 
potential if the Vietnamese Government improves its human rights 
record.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Vietnam to improve 
its implementation of its human rights obligations and commitments. I 
will urge the Government of Vietnam to ensure law enforcement and the 
judicial system effectively and fairly enforce existing constitutional 
guarantees and laws protecting human rights, including freedom of 
religion or belief. I will continue to raise our concerns with the 
Government of Vietnam, including during the annual U.S.-Vietnam Human 
Rights Dialogue, and call on Vietnam to respect and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, consistent with its international 
obligations and commitments.

    Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, 
Vietnam was identified as continuing to undermine fundamental human 
rights like speech, assembly, press, religion, and association. If 
confirmed, how will you direct your embassy to work with civil society 
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the ground in 
Vietnam?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage my team to continue its 
longstanding work with civil society organizations who are trying to 
make space for positive progress in Vietnam. I will also continue the 
strong engagement with human rights and civil society organizations in 
the United States, including the Vietnamese-American community and 
local human rights NGOs in Vietnam, as previous Ambassadors have done.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Cybersecurity
    Question. Over the past several years, Vietnamese authorities have 
increased their scrutiny over Vietnamese citizens' activities on the 
Internet and in social media. Vietnam's new cybersecurity law, which 
went into effect in recent months, criminalizes the ``distortion of 
history, denial of revolutionary achievements, undermining national 
solidarity, taking advantage of cybersecurity protection activities to 
violate national security, national interests or sovereignty, or 
disrupt public order.'' What has been the impact of measures such as 
these on Vietnamese citizens' online activities?

    Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the 
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online. The trend of 
harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust convictions, and 
harsh sentences of journalists and activists for exercising their 
rights, both offline and online, is deeply troubling.
    If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to 
respect freedom of expression, including online, and engage with social 
media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of 
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure 
Internet.



                               __________


            Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
         Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. If confirmed, how will you support the Vietnamese 
Government's efforts to counter the Chinese claims in the South China 
Sea?

    Answer. The U.S. position on the South China Sea is principled and 
longstanding. In keeping with its global policy, the United States does 
not take a position on the territorial disputes over land features 
among the many South China Sea claimants, while at the same time taking 
a strong principled position on compliance with the international law 
of the sea. Like Vietnam, the United States has a national interest in 
upholding international law, including freedom of navigation and 
overflight, and opposing the use of coercion to resolve disputes.
    The United States will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of 
its maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better 
monitor its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea. 
In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to Vietnam 
through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program 
two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving in in 
Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in Vietnam's 
fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security 
capabilities. Through the State Department's International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement program, we are developing four training facilities 
for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing U.S. Coast Guard personnel 
to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard and DFIRES Fisheries 
Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law enforcement skills to 
ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities forces are modern, 
resilient, and capable.
    If confirmed, I will continue to support the development of a 
strong and independent Vietnam through its maritime capacity building, 
and will remain united in our support for peaceful resolution of 
disputes, including through international dispute resolution 
mechanisms.

    Question. Since the Vietnam War, the United States and Vietnam have 
repaired their relationship. Vietnam is now a key strategic partner in 
the Indo-Pacific. However, it is my sincere belief that that that 
relationship cannot reach its full potential unless Vietnam commits to 
respecting the human rights of its people. For example, in April, 
journalist Tran Thi Tuyet Dieu was sentenced to eight years in prison 
for reporting news on Vietnamese political figures. If confirmed, what 
steps will you take to press for the release of Dieu and other 
Vietnamese people who are unjustly targeted by Vietnamese security 
services?

    Answer. I am deeply concerned by the convictions of individuals for 
exercising their freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. These 
convictions run counter to Vietnam's international human rights 
obligations and commitments. Vietnam should ensure its laws and actions 
are consistent with those obligations and commitments.
    If confirmed, I will engage with activists, their family members, 
and lawyers to determine the facts in specific cases and urge 
authorities to release all persons detained for exercising their rights 
in Vietnam.
    I will stress, above all, the need to follow through on the 
commitment that the Vietnamese Government has made to fundamentally 
reform the laws under which activists have been targeted in the past, 
to bring the country's laws into full compliance with its constitution 
and with its international obligations.

    Question. How will you promote U.S. cooperation with Vietnam, which 
is important, while simultaneously encouraging Hanoi to embrace 
meaningful political reforms and protect the basic rights of its 
citizens?

    Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic 
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have 
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive 
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
    The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose and a 
common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We must 
continue to build on the progress in the bilateral relationship, but as 
the Biden-Harris administration has committed to putting human rights 
back at the center of American foreign policy, we must also bring all 
the tools of our diplomacy to defend human rights, including freedom of 
religion or belief. If confirmed, I will continue to press Vietnam to 
improve its implementation of human rights obligations and commitments.



                               __________





                              NOMINATIONS

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in 
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Shaheen, Coons, 
Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, and Young.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
    We are here today to consider four important nominations, 
Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen, to be a Deputy Administrator for 
Management and Resources at the Agency for International 
Development, Dr. Karen Donfried to be Assistant Secretary of 
State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Mary 
Catherine Phee to be Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, and Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky to be Assistant Secretary of 
State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
    Congratulations to the four of you on your nominations. We 
appreciate your willingness to serve our country in these 
capacities, as well as those members of your family, because we 
recognize that this is a family sacrifice as well. So we thank 
them as well.
    Ms. Adams-Allen, your lifelong dedication to international 
development and distinguished career of government service, 
including as Deputy Assistant Administrator at the Latin 
American Caribbean Bureau of the United States Agency for 
International Development, I believe makes you eminently 
qualified for this position.
    If confirmed, your knowledge and experience as a 
development professional and your distinguished tenure as the 
President and CEO of the Inter-American Foundation will be 
needed as you take the role of Deputy Administrator for 
Management and Resources at USAID.
    I am pleased to see that President Biden's budget aims to 
restore the value and use of international development and 
foreign assistance as part of the overall goal of achieving 
U.S. foreign policy objectives. I know Administrator Power is 
entirely committed to this vital task, and I appreciated her 
testimony in the budget last week. I have no doubt you will 
share that commitment.
    Dr. Donfried, your nomination is a testament to the Biden 
administration's efforts to rebuild the trans-Atlantic 
relationship, which, I believe was significantly damaged during 
the last administration. If confirmed, I believe your knowledge 
and experience, including as Senior Director for European 
Affairs at the National Security Council will serve you and the 
country well, as the Biden administration works to advance a 
renewed trans-Atlantic relationship.
    It is imperative that this position be filled as soon as 
possible as we need to see forward movement on critical issues 
including those related to Russia, Turkey, Belarus, and our 
support for Ukraine, among others. I look forward to hearing 
from you about these and other issues.
    Ambassador Phee, I am pleased to see you back before the 
committee, the position you are nominated for to be the 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs comes at a 
critical time for Africa, a Continent with enormous promise and 
challenges. However, the impacts of the third wave of COVID-19 
on top of political and security challenges could roll back 
years of democratic progress and economic growth.
    Indeed, the Biden administration faces a series of 
challenges in Africa, from China and Russia, which continue to 
pursue actions that are inimical to U.S. interest to conflict, 
to instability, and a flawed electoral exercise in Ethiopia, to 
a fragile transition in Sudan, which could be destabilizing to 
the entire Horn of Africa.
    These are just a few among the many challenges facing 
Africa and U.S. interests there. In short, the challenges in 
the region are pressing and vast, I know that you are well 
equipped, based on your experience, to carry on and meet those 
challenges, and trust that if confirmed you will do so with 
skill and commitment.
    Ms. Witkowsky, your knowledge and experience, including as 
a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and 
Humanitarian Affairs will be critical, if you are confirmed, to 
be the next Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations. Indeed, your commitment and expertise 
with many of today's complex conflicts from Burma, Venezuela, 
Ethiopia, the Sahel, Yemen, to Afghanistan will be needed as 
CSO develops long-range, strategic policies and plans in order 
to address ongoing conflicts, as well as to prevent future 
ones. I will look forward to hearing from you about how you 
will approach this task.
    In closing, while the four of you have a series of 
challenges ahead, I am confident that your commitment and 
experience will serve you well, as you take on these new 
responsibilities upon confirmation. I look forward to your 
testimonies.
    And now I turn to the ranking member for his opening 
remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I certainly 
embrace a number of the issues that are going to be facing 
these people.
    And thank you, each of you, for your willingness to serve, 
and your families, because they always share the sacrifice.
    I want to start with the nomination of Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Eurasian Affairs. For starters, I am 
concerned the administration has refused to use visa sanctions 
to shut down the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, this is a continued 
aggravation for us, and I would like to see that resolved.
    Putin has boasted that its completion will be a victory for 
Russian power. I would also note that any deal with the 
Russians would be in violation of U.S. law. And I expect to 
hear more from you on this topic, Dr. Donfried.
    On Chinese maligned influence, Europe is a key partner, I 
have been encouraged to see the increased U.S.-European 
discussions on working together to combat China's actions.
    In Georgia, I am increasingly worried by steps backward. 
The past weeks more than 50 journalists were beaten. One of 
them died from his injuries, and several judges were pushed 
onto the Supreme Court in contravention of the April 19th 
Agreement.
    I know Senator Shaheen shares my concerns in that regard, 
and we had a number of discussions on that. I hope you will 
work to address the issues with Georgia's Government.
    Ukraine remains a big focus on The Hill. We are 
disappointed to see the administration refusal to send 
additional help to Ukraine this spring in order that they might 
defend from their belligerent neighbor. I hope you will address 
this today.
    On to the nomination of Assistant Secretary for African 
Affairs, the Biden administration has stated that Africa is a 
priority, but it is unclear where Africa fits in that priority 
list. First, I am troubled by the conflict and humanitarian 
situation in Tigray, however, I am concerned that the U.S. is 
so focused on the Tigray crisis, that it is ignoring the 
significant challenges to peace, democracy that we face across 
Ethiopia.
    This is a complex challenge. I get that. I look forward to 
hearing how we navigate Ethiopia's challenges, and the other 
crises across the Horn of Africa, which is becoming more and 
more of a focus and a crisis.
    Aside from Ethiopia, I remain deeply concerned about the 
lack of initiative the international community has shown, 
including our European, French, and African partners, in 
pushing for a resolution to the crisis in Cameroon, as well as 
corruption challenges by the regimes in Zimbabwe and South 
Sudan.
    African countries are crucial partners in our fight to 
combat malign Chinese influence. The United States remains the 
top contributor of health and humanitarian assistance to 
Africa, but we must do more to commit ourselves to building 
strong economic and security partnerships with our African 
allies.
    Next we have the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State 
for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Like many, I am 
concerned by this administration's response to the crisis 
unfolding in Afghanistan. It is clear that the administration 
had no plans in place to manage the withdrawal and provide for 
the people that worked side by side with our troops.
    President Biden publicly stated that his administration 
was, ``Working closely with Congress to change the 
authorization legislation in order to expedite the processing 
of Afghan special immigrant visas.'' But I have yet to see such 
outreach on the specific legislative fixes they are seeking.
    Finally, we have the nomination of a Deputy Administrator 
of the USAID for Management and Resources. U.S. foreign 
assistance can help advance the national security, economic and 
humanitarian interests of the United States, but it must be 
thoughtfully targeted and designed to ensure the greatest 
possible impact. The responsibility for aligning roughly two-
thirds of the U.S. foreign assistance budget, with the 
strategic objectives of the United States overseas falls here.
    I am eager to hear about the modernization of USAID's 
workforce, and operations to stretch the aid dollars further so 
we can save lives and advance U.S. interests. We have a lot to 
cover today.
    I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Okay. So we will turn to our nominees. All of your 
statements will be included in the record without objection.
    We will start with Ms. Adams-Allen, and move down the aisle 
as I introduce you.
    So the floor is yours, Ms. Adams-Allen.

 STATEMENT OF PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
  NOMINATED TO BE A DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES 
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES)

    Ms. Adams-Allen. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the 
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as 
President Biden's nominee to be Deputy Administrator for 
Management and Resources of the United States Agency for 
International Development.
    I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power 
for their trust in me. I am grateful for the opportunity to 
return to USAID, an agency dear to my heart, at a moment when 
its leadership and development expertise are so urgently 
needed.
    I am here today before you because of the love and support 
of so many. My mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who 
instilled in me a deep sense of fairness and justice; my 
father, Llewelyn Adams, who I credit for my strong Jamaican 
work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen, still the best human I 
know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose creativity and 
empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended family, 
friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank 
you all.
    My international development and diplomacy experience 
started early, informed by the duality of my upbringing: 
summers spent in the relative wealth and safety of my mother's 
community in the United States, and the school year spent in 
the beauty and vulnerability of my father's home country in 
Jamaica. It was in the jarring journey back and forth between 
these worlds that I settled on what I wanted to do with my 
life: pay forward the incredible privilege I have as an 
American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in 
communities like the one that helped raise me.
    This early decision informed my 20-plus years working in 
the foreign assistance arena, primarily Latin America and the 
Caribbean. During a decade in policy and programming roles at 
the Organization of American States, I saw the potential of 
multilateralism to calm tensions between neighboring countries, 
and mobilize regional support for humanitarian crises like the 
2010 earthquake.
    But it has been my experience in the federal government, 
serving in leadership and management positions at USAID, and 
now as Head of the Inter-American Foundation, where I have been 
able to effect the change I dreamed of as a child. During a 
decade of public service, I have had the honor of investing in 
and learning from young people bravely building peace in El 
Salvador; smallholder farmers in Colombia selling their coffee 
to global corporations, and proud grandmothers in Haiti 
financing businesses through their savings and loans 
associations.
    Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to 
successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward 
resources, create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and 
advance reforms designed to enhance the impact and 
sustainability of development investments.
    And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and 
respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in U.S. foreign 
assistance. If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to 
effectively oversee USAID's management and resources needs.
    As the U.S. Government's lead the global development 
agency, USAID needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-
evolving set of geopolitical challenges and crises, and to do 
so with the management and oversight commensurate with the 
responsibilities given to it by the American people through the 
Congress.
    If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to 
further maximize its development impact, by [1] better aligning 
strategy and resources to deliver results; and [2] expanding 
the Agency's partner base to include more nontraditional U.S. 
and local implementing partners with strong in-country 
knowledge, expertise, and a commitment to sustainability.
    In order to maximize impact, we must support and invest in 
USAID's greatest strength, its people. If confirmed, my focus 
will be on making sure the Agency has a staff equipped with the 
right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture, one that 
recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on 
USAID, and embraces the values of diversity, equity, and 
inclusion.
    And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing 
USAID's ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of 
emerging opportunities as conditions change on the ground. 
There are multiple layers to this goal, but perhaps most 
important is building on prior efforts to enhance the Agency's 
procurement capabilities so that it programs resources in a 
faster, more responsive manner.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Adams-Allen follows:]


                Prepared Statement of Paloma Adams-Allen

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, 
it is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee 
to be Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources of the United 
States Agency for International Development.
    I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power for 
their trust in me. I'm grateful for the opportunity to return to USAID, 
an Agency dear to my heart, at a moment when its leadership and 
development expertise are so urgently needed.
    I am here before you today because of the love and support of so 
many--my mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who instilled in me a 
deep sense of fairness and justice; my father, Llewelyn Adams, who I 
credit for my strong Jamaican work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen, 
still the best human I know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose 
creativity and empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended 
family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank 
you all.
    My international development and diplomacy experience started 
early, informed by the duality of my upbringing: summers spent in the 
relative wealth and safety of my mother's community in the United 
States, and the school year spent in the riotous beauty and 
vulnerability of my father's home country of Jamaica. It was in the 
jarring journey back and forth between these worlds that I settled on 
what I wanted to do with my life: pay forward the incredible privilege 
I have as an American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in 
communities like the one that helped raise me.
    This early decision informed my 20+ years working in the foreign 
assistance arena, primarily focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. 
During a decade in policy and programming roles at the Organization of 
American States, I saw the potential of multilateralism to calm 
tensions between neighboring countries and mobilize regional support 
for humanitarian crises like the 2010 Haiti earthquake. But it has been 
my experience in the federal government, serving in
    leadership and management positions at USAID and now as head of the 
Inter-American Foundation, where I have been able to affect the change 
I dreamed of as a child. During a decade of public service, I have had 
the honor of investing in and learning from young people bravely 
building peace in El Salvador; small holder farmers in Colombia selling 
their coffee to global retailers; and proud grandmothers in Haiti 
financing micro and small businesses through their savings and loans 
associations.
    Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to 
successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward resources, 
create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and advance reforms 
designed to enhance the impact and sustainability of development 
investments. And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and 
respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in US foreign assistance. 
If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to effectively oversee 
USAID's management and resources needs.
    As the U.S. Government's lead global development agency, USAID 
needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-evolving set of 
geopolitical challenges and crises--and to do so with the management 
and oversight commensurate with the responsibilities given to it by the 
American people through the Congress.
    If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to further 
maximize its development impact, by (1) better aligning strategy and 
resources to deliver results; and (2) expanding the Agency's partner 
base to include more non-traditional U.S. implementing partners and 
local organizations, with strong in-country knowledge, expertise, and a 
commitment to sustainability.
    In order to maximize our impact, we must support and invest in 
USAID's greatest strength and resource: its people. If confirmed, my 
focus will be on making sure the Agency has enough staff, equipped with 
the right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture--one that 
recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on USAID, and 
embraces the values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.
    And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing USAID's 
ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of emerging opportunities 
as conditions change on the ground. There are multiple layers to this 
goal, but perhaps most important is building on prior efforts to 
enhance the
    Agency's procurement capabilities--so that it programs resources in 
a faster, more responsive manner.
    Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, 
and I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Donfried?

 STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
   NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (EUROPEAN 
                 AFFAIRS AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS)

    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to 
appear before you today.
    I have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this 
committee, dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work 
on Europe at the Congressional Research Service. If confirmed, 
it would be a pleasure to work with you from the State 
Department on issues I care passionately about and on which the 
United States is and shall remain a force for good.
    It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve 
under Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Eurasian Affairs. If confirmed, I will work 
enthusiastically to serve the American people, and advance the 
interests of the United States, to reinvigorate our alliances 
and partnerships, to strengthen democracy in Europe and 
Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face around the 
world.
    My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will 
come from my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah, 
and our son, Michael. They are an endless source of love and 
inspiration. Although born in New York City, I spent my early 
childhood in Heidelberg, where my father, a theologian, did his 
doctoral work, and my mother worked as a nurse at U.S. Army 
Headquarters.
    That experience gave me the gift of speaking German 
fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades later, to 
complete a Master's degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a 
fellow American studying abroad. Trans-Atlantic relations have 
been an integral part of my life story.
    Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush 
administration as a member of the State Department's Policy 
Planning Staff, and in the Obama administration both as the 
National Intelligence Officer for Europe, and as the Senior 
Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council. 
For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States.
    If confirmed, I will have the responsibility, and the honor 
and joy of leading EUR, covering 50 countries, with 79 posts 
and 12,000 hard-working, dedicated public servants. I will 
treat each and every one of them with the care and respect they 
deserve, as well as work energetically to recruit and develop 
more diverse talent for the Bureau.
    President Biden defines his number one job as ensuring that 
America's foreign policy benefits the American people and the 
American middle class. I am eager to support him in achieving 
this goal, including by revitalizing our alliances and 
partnerships. The strength of America's alliances is one of our 
greatest assets. Whether we are confronting the COVID-19 
pandemic, economic or social inequality, climate change, 
corruption, threats to energy security, an aggressive Russia, 
an increasingly assertive China, cyber threats, or 
technological competition, the United States is most effective 
when we cooperate with our allies.
    Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners. 
Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of 
destabilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of 
mutual interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and 
partners must work together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to 
undermine democracies and democratic institutions.
    We must confront Russian aggression against its neighbors 
by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. 
And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in 
Russia. The Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such 
as Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing.
    Additionally, we must work with our allies to counter an 
assertive China in the political, diplomatic, economic, 
military, and technological domains. How we manage our 
relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of the 
21st century.
    We must work to preserve the free and open rules-based 
order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in 
the wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the 
most compelling examples of the United States exercising 
enlightened leadership.
    But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to 
meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that 
while we applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have 
made in improving defense investments, we need to do more. The 
common threats we face demand it.
    Allies share values and interests, but we will not always 
agree. To manage those differences requires trust; if 
confirmed, I will work to deepen that trust to achieve policy 
successes that advance U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will 
seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and this committee to 
ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American people.
    I look forward to your questions. And thank you for your 
consideration.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]


              Prepared Statement of Dr. Karen E. Donfried

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I 
have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this committee, 
dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work on Europe at the 
Congressional Research Service. If confirmed, it would be a pleasure to 
work with you from the State Department on issues I care passionately 
about and on which the United States is and shall remain a force for 
good.
    It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve under 
Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Affairs (EUR). If confirmed, I will work enthusiastically to 
serve the American people and advance the interests of the United 
States, to reinvigorate our alliances and partnerships, to strengthen 
democracy in Europe and Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face 
around the world.
    My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will come from 
my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah, and our son, 
Michael. They are an endless source of love and inspiration. Although 
born in New York City, I spent my early childhood in Heidelberg, where 
my father, a theologian, did his doctoral work and my mother worked as 
a nurse at U.S. Army Headquarters. That experience gave me the gift of 
speaking German fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades 
later, to complete a Masters degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a 
fellow American studying abroad. Transatlantic relations have been an 
integral part of my life story.
    Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush administration as a 
Member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and in the Obama 
administration both as the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and 
as the Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security 
Council. For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund 
of the United States .
    If confirmed, I will have the responsibility--and the honor and 
joy--of leading EUR, covering 50 countries, with 79 posts and 12,000 
hard-working, dedicated public servants. I will treat each and every 
one of them with the care and respect they deserve, as well as work 
energetically to recruit and develop more diverse talent for the 
bureau.
    President Biden defines his number one job as ensuring that 
America's foreign policy benefits the American people and the American 
middle class. I am eager to support him in achieving this goal, 
including by revitalizing our alliances and partnerships. The strength 
of America's alliances is one of our greatest assets. Whether we are 
confronting the COVID-19 pandemic, economic or social inequality, 
climate change, corruption, threats to energy security, an aggressive 
Russia, an increasingly assertive China, cyber threats, or 
technological competition, the United States is most effective when we 
cooperate with our allies.
    Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners. 
Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of 
destabilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of mutual 
interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and partners must work 
together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to undermine democracies and 
democratic institutions. We must confront Russian aggression against 
its neighbors by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Belarus. And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in 
Russia; the Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such as 
Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing Additionally, we must work 
with our allies to counter an assertive China in the political, 
diplomatic, economic, military, and technological domains. How we 
manage our relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of 
the 21st century.
    Most importantly, we must work to preserve the free and open rules-
based order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in the 
wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the most 
compelling examples of the United States exercising enlightened 
leadership. But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to 
meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that while we 
applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have made in 
improving defense investments, we need to do more. The common threats 
we face demand it.
    Allies share values and interests, but we will not always agree. To 
manage those differences requires trust. If confirmed, I will work to 
deepen the trust our partners in Europe have in the United States so we 
can achieve policy successes that advance U.S. interests.
    If confirmed, I will seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and 
this committee to ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American 
people. I look forward to your questions and thank you for your 
consideration.


    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Ambassador Phee?

  STATEMENT OF HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE OF ILLINOIS, A CAREER 
    MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
  COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE 
[AFRICAN AFFAIRS] AND A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE 
                 AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

    Ambassador Phee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee; I am honored to be 
President Biden's nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary 
of State for African Affairs, and grateful to the President and 
to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.
    I began my career as a public servant in these halls in the 
office of Senator Pat Moynihan. Senator Moynihan kept only two 
documents on his desk: the U.S. Constitution, and the U.N. 
Charter. He inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and 
taught me an abiding respect for this institution, and this 
committee.
    My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the 
United Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced 
to the talent and generosity of the African people. Kenyan 
politics were also my first exposure to the enduring challenges 
of governance, security, and sustainable development. Applying 
U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such challenges has been the 
dominant theme of my career.
    I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of 
the growing political, economic and cultural power of the 
diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State 
Department to translate this recognition into respectful 
partnerships that advance our shared interests, values, and 
aspirations.
    If confirmed, I will work to support President Biden's 
agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement 
with African Governments, institutions such as the African 
Union, and critically, African publics.
    To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has 
charged us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system 
to meet the challenges of our interconnected world. Africans 
agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for 
their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the 
Sudanese people in demanding a civilian-led government is 
another extraordinary example.
    Across the Continent we will reinvigorate our focus on 
human rights, accountability, and good governance. President 
Biden has declared the fight against corruption, especially the 
theft of public assets for private gain, to be a core national 
security interest.
    We see a direct correlation between African Governments 
that are authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict, 
displacement, and migration. Many are contending with an active 
threat from the Islamic State, and other violent extremists 
like al-Shabaab in Somalia.
    Diverse societies struggle to uphold inclusive and 
equitable power-sharing arrangements, and collaboration with 
regional and international partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic, 
development and security assistance can play a critical role to 
support peace and security.
    This imperative is driving our current intensive effort to 
urge all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia to implement an 
immediate and unconditional ceasefire to put a halt to 
atrocities against civilians.
    Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in 
the Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of 
thousands, and reckless exploitation threatens the rainforest 
in the Congo Basin, and the Continent's biological diversity. 
It is in our mutual interests to work together on environmental 
sustainability.
    Africa is the fastest-growing and the youngest continent. 
By 2050, one in four persons in the world will be African. 
Workforce development and job creation will be necessary to tap 
the ambitions of the youth bulge. We are committed to expanding 
two-way trade and investment, and
    to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental 
Free Trade Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector 
offers innovative American options for green energy, and 
digital economies, as well as a commitment to social 
responsibility.
    All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating 
human toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous 
tradition of investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified 
by the landmark PEPFAR program, the White House has just 
announced the donation of 25 million COVID-19 vaccines for 
Africa. The Development Finance Corporation is also investing 
in vaccine production in South Africa and Senegal.
    Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the 
challenges in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and 
affirmative U.S. policy agenda that enlists African partners in 
building free-market democracies that offer liberty and 
prosperity and realize the Continent's full potential.
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, with the Strategic 
Competition Act, you have given us our marching orders and new 
tools. If confirmed, I commit that U.S. embassies in Sub-
Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to 
the international rules-based order.
    Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a 
champion of the people of the State Department's Africa Bureau, 
to unleash their full potential with a vigorous commitment to 
diversity and inclusion, and to cultivate the special esprit de 
corps that has traditionally defined the Bureau. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Phee follows:]


             Prepared Statement of Hon. Mary Catherine Phee

    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, distinguished members of 
the committee, I am honored to be President Biden's nominee for the 
post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and grateful 
to the President and to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.
    I began my career as a public servant here in the office of Senator 
Pat Moynihan. To guide his work, Senator Moynihan kept only two 
documents on his desk: the U.S. constitution and the U.N. Charter. He 
inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and taught me an abiding 
respect for this institution, and this committee.
    My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the United 
Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced to the talent 
and generosity of the African people, and the beauty and richness of 
the African landscape. Kenyan politics were also my first exposure to 
the enduring challenges of governance, security and sustainable 
development. Applying U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such 
challenges has been the dominant theme of my career.
    I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of the 
growing political, economic and cultural power of the diverse countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State Department to translate 
this recognition into respectful partnerships that advance our shared 
interests, values and aspirations. If confirmed, I will work to support 
President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our 
engagement with African Governments, institutions such as the African 
Union, and, critically, African publics.
    To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has charged 
us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system to meet the 
challenges of our interconnected world. We know that the majority of 
Africans agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for 
their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the Sudanese 
people in demanding a civilian-led government is another extraordinary 
example. Across the continent we will reinvigorate our focus on human 
rights, accountability, and good governance. President Biden has 
declared the fight against corruption, especially the theft of public 
assets for private gain, to be a core national security interest.
    We see a direct correlation between African Governments that are 
authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict, displacement, and 
migration. Many are contending with an active threat from the Islamic 
State and other violent extremists like al-Shabaab in Somalia. Diverse 
societies struggle to uphold inclusive and equitable power-sharing 
arrangements. In collaboration with regional and international 
partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic, development and security assistance 
can play a critical role to support peace and security. This imperative 
is driving our current intensive effort to urge all parties to the 
conflict in Ethiopia to implement an immediate and unconditional 
ceasefire that puts a halt to atrocities against civilians, to permit 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to restore stability 
through political dialogue.
    Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in the 
Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of thousands, and 
reckless exploitation threatens the world's second largest rainforest 
in the Congo Basin and the continent's wonderland of biological 
diversity. It is in our mutual interests to work together on 
environmental sustainability.
    Africa is the fastest growing and the youngest continent. By 2050, 
one in four persons in the world will be African. Workforce development 
and job creation will be necessary to tap the ambitions of the youth 
bulge. We are committed to expanding two-way trade and investment and 
to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental Free Trade 
Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector offers innovative 
American options for green energy and digital economies, as well as a 
commitment to social responsibility.
    All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating human 
toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous tradition of 
investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified by the landmark 
PEPFAR program, the White House has just announced the donation of 25 
million COVID-19 vaccines for Africa. Earlier the President committed 
the United States to providing 500 million Pfizer vaccine doses to 
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, for distribution by COVAX to 92 low- and 
lower middle-income countries and economies, and the African Union. The 
Development Finance Corporation is also investing in vaccine production 
in South Africa and Senegal. This pandemic highlights how our fates are 
intertwined.
    Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the challenges 
in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy 
agenda that enlists African partners in building free market 
democracies that offer liberty and prosperity and realize the 
continent's full potential. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, 
with the Strategic Competition Act you have given us our marching 
orders and new tools. If confirmed I commit that U.S. embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to the 
international rules-based order.
    Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a champion of 
the people of the State Department's Africa bureau, to unleash their 
full potential with a vigorous commitment to diversity and inclusion 
and to cultivate the special esprit d'corps that has traditionally 
defined the bureau.
    Thank you.


    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Witkowsky?

 STATEMENT OF ANNE A. WITKOWSKY, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT 
SECRETARY OF STATE (CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS), AND 
      TO BE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

    Ms. Witkowsky. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an 
honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee 
to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations, and Coordinator for Reconstruction 
and Stabilization.
    I am deeply grateful to President Biden and to Secretary 
Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me for this 
nomination.
    I am joined here today by my husband, John, and our son 
Jack, with our daughter Elizabeth watching remotely. I want to 
underscore how much their love and support means to me, as well 
as that of my mother, sister, and all family members.
    Growing up in the Midwest, I am grateful my parents modeled 
for me the values of public service. My father served in the 
Army Corps of Engineers in World War II, and as the first 
Chairman of the Illinois State Board of Education, while my 
mother volunteered for many civic organizations.
    I have by now had the opportunity to serve in the Executive 
Branch across four administrations; within the Department of 
Defense, the Department of State, and on the White House 
National Security Council staff. While I have held positions 
outside government as well, there has been no greater privilege 
than to serve alongside the talented and dedicated men and 
women in the national security community, in the civil service, 
foreign service, the military services, law enforcement and 
intelligence.
    Throughout, I have learned the critical importance of 
effectively using all U.S. national security tools, including 
diplomacy, development and defense to support U.S. policy 
priorities and advance U.S. interests and values.
    From my experience pursuing conventional arms control in 
Europe at the end of the Cold War, to advancing 
counterterrorism policies and programs in the post-9/11 period, 
to supporting the Department of Defense response to the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, I have learned that the U.S. 
Government is most effective when integrating our policies, 
programs, and activities to work at common purpose. That is a 
key lesson I intend to bring to my position as Assistant 
Secretary, if confirmed.
    The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, or 
CSO, has a vital role to play in developing and carrying out 
U.S. conflict prevention and stabilization policy and programs, 
working in close cooperation with USAID and the Department of 
Defense. Preventing conflict is hard, and outcomes can be tough 
to measure. Yet, when we do not address instability at the 
front end, too often we find ourselves having to address it in 
different, more costly ways at the back end.
    The strategic environment for the CSO mission is growing 
more challenging. The number and duration of violent conflicts 
is increasing. Democracy is backsliding for the 15th straight 
year, and authoritarianism is on the rise. We see territory 
controlled by governments being reduced, as non-state armed 
actors gain ground.
    The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on populations 
globally. The displacement of people is at a recorded high; 
climate change, corruption, gender inequality, and the rapid 
spread of disinformation pose additional underlying challenges.
    Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on 
strengthening the Bureau's contributions to the U.S. 
Government's effectiveness in meeting these challenges.
    Policies and best practices should be regularly adapted, 
drawing from lessons learned. We will deepen and renew U.S. 
partnerships on these issues, bilaterally and with multilateral 
organizations, to advance common objectives. And we must work 
collaboratively with civil society.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the 
Members of this committee, including those who have been 
instrumental in providing new tools to break the costly cycle 
of conflict. Among those tools are the Global Fragility Act of 
2019, and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention 
Act of 2018, as well as the Women, Peace and Security Act of 
2017, all bipartisan legislation.
    CSO will exercise leadership, working with other State 
Department bureaus and interagency partners, to advance their 
implementation, together with the 2018 Stabilization Assistance 
Review.
    And as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work 
of CSO can reinforce support for democratic values and human 
rights at the heart of our foreign policy. That work must be 
anchored in understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine 
democracies and exploit instability, and the geostrategic 
challenge of China's ambitions.
    Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong 
workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity, 
equity, and inclusion.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO 
Bureau, to advance American interests and values toward a more 
peaceful and safer world.
    I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Witkowsky follows:]


                Prepared Statement of Anne A. Witkowsky

    Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before 
you today as President Biden's nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary 
of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization. I am deeply grateful to President 
Biden and to Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in 
me for this nomination.
    I am joined here today by my husband, John and our son Jack, with 
our daughter Elizabeth watching remotely. I want to underscore how much 
their love and support means to me, as well as that of all my family 
members. Growing up in the Midwest, I am grateful my parents modeled 
for me the values of public service. My father served in the Army Corps 
of Engineers in World War II and as the first chairman of the Illinois 
State Board of Education, while my mother volunteered for many civic 
organizations.
    I have by now had the opportunity to serve in the Executive Branch 
across four administrations, within the Department of Defense, the 
Department of State, and on the White House National Security Council 
staff. While I have held positions outside government as well, there 
has been no greater privilege than to serve alongside the talented and 
dedicated men and women in the national security community, in the 
civil service, foreign service, the military services, law enforcement 
and intelligence.
    Throughout, I have learned the critical importance of effectively 
using all U.S. national security tools--including diplomacy, 
development and defense--to support U.S. policy priorities and advance 
U.S. interests and values. From my experience pursuing conventional 
arms control in Europe at the end of the Cold War, to advancing 
counterterrorism policies and programs in the post 9/11 period, to 
supporting the Department of Defense response to the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa, I have learned that the U.S. Government is most effective 
when integrating our policies, programs, and activities to work at 
common purpose. That is a key lesson I intend to bring to my position 
as Assistant Secretary, if confirmed.
    The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (or CSO) has a 
vital role to play in developing and carrying out U.S. conflict 
prevention and stabilization policies and programs, working in close 
cooperation with USAID and the Department of Defense. Preventing 
violent conflict is hard, and outcomes can be tough to measure. Yet, 
when we do not address instability at the front end, too often we find 
ourselves having to address it in different, more costly ways at the 
back end.
    The strategic environment for the CSO mission is growing more 
challenging. The number and duration of violent conflicts is 
increasing. Democracy is backsliding for the 15th straight year, and 
authoritarianism is on the rise. We see territory controlled by 
governments being reduced, as non-state armed actors gain ground. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on populations globally. The 
displacement of people is at a recorded high. Climate change, 
corruption, gender inequality, and the rapid spread of disinformation 
pose additional underlying challenges.
    Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on strengthening the 
Bureau's contributions to the U.S. Government's effectiveness in 
meeting these challenges. Policies and best practices should be 
regularly adapted, drawing from lessons learned. We will deepen, and 
renew, U.S. partnerships on these issues, bilaterally and with 
multilateral organizations, to advance common objectives. And we must 
work collaboratively with civil society.
    If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the members of 
this committee, including those who have been instrumental in providing 
new tools to break the costly cycle of conflict. Among those tools are 
the Global Fragility Act of 2019 and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, as well as the Women, Peace and 
Security Act of 2017, all bipartisan legislation. CSO will exercise 
leadership, working with other State Department Bureaus and interagency 
partners, to advance their implementation, together with the 2018 
Stabilization Assistance Review.
    And, as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work of CSO 
can reinforce support for democratic values and human rights at the 
heart of our foreign policy. That work must be anchored in 
understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine democracies and 
exploit instability, and the geostrategic challenge of China's 
ambitions.
    Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong 
workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity, equity, and 
inclusion.
    Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO Bureau, to 
advance American interests and values toward a more peaceful and safer 
world. I look forward to your questions.


    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all very much. So first 
I have a series of questions on behalf of the committee as a 
whole, and a simple yes or no to the question by each of you, 
is what we request. These are questions that speak to the 
importance that this committee places on responsiveness of all 
officials in the executive branch and that we expect and will 
be seeking from you.
    So with a simple yes or no answer: Do you agree to appear 
before this committee and make officials from your office 
available to the committee and designated staff when invited?
    Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
    Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
    Dr. Donfried. Yes.
    The Chairman. Ambassador?
    Ambassador Phee. Yes.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Do you commit to keeping the committee fully and currently 
informed about the activities under your purview?
    Ambassador Phee. Yes.
    Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
    Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
    Dr. Donfried. Yes.
    The Chairman. Did I hear a yes from you, Doctor?
    Dr. Donfried. Yes.
    The Chairman. Okay.
    Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while 
policies are being developed? Not just providing notification 
after the fact?
    Ambassador Phee. Yes.
    Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
    Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
    Dr. Donfried. Yes.
    The Chairman. And do you commit to promptly responding to 
request for briefings and information requested by the 
committee and its designated staff?
    Ambassador Phee. Yes.
    Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
    Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
    Dr. Donfried. Yes.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you, all.
    So we will start a round a five-minute questions. I will 
start with myself. There is a lot of room, a lot of waterfront 
to cover here with all four of you. So it will be difficult.
    But let me start by focusing with you, Dr. Donfried, on a 
series of issues that I am very much concerned about. Section 
231 of CAATSA is a provision that imposes sanctions on entities 
that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense 
and intelligence sectors. I help write that law. Do you agree 
to section 231 of CAATSA has prevented significant funding from 
going to the Russian defense and intelligence sectors? And do 
you support its full implementation?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, it is such an honor to 
appear before the committee, and I will turn to your question, 
but I do not want to let this opportunity pass to thank you for 
your support of GMF. And as you were giving your opening 
comments earlier, I had a flashback to 2019 when you delivered 
an important keynote speech about the importance of trans-
Atlantic relations on GMF stage in Brussels. And I just want to 
thank you for not only your leadership of this committee, but 
also being such an important public voice on these issues.
    You mentioned your role on CAATSA, and I would absolutely 
agree with you that that legislation has been important in 
pushing back against Russian influence and countering its 
malign activities. And if confirmed, I would, indeed, commit to 
the full implementation of CAATSA.
    The Chairman. Very good. Do you commit to regularly 
engaging with me in efforts to ensure its full implementation?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez? If confirmed, I would look 
forward to working closely with you on its full implementation.
    The Chairman. Now what do you think about CAATSA sanctions 
on Turkey unless Ankara gets rid of its Russian S-400 system?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I would say that we have 
to keep sanctions on Turkey for as long as it has the S-400s.
    The Chairman. All right. So, let me turn to a few other 
things. The administration has yet to impose congressionally 
mandated sanctions in response to the attempted murder of anti-
corruption activist, Alexei Navalny, as required under the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Act. These sanctions were due 
on June the 2nd. I will note that they were pending since the 
past administration and neither have yet acted on it.
    If confirmed, will you commit to briefing us on why the 
administration continues to ignore the law?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I find Russia's use of 
chemical weapons chilling and shocking. And if confirmed, I 
will follow the law and I will stand up to Russia's reckless 
and aggressive behavior. And I will look forward to the 
opportunity to consult with you in so doing.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now let me turn to the Eastern 
Mediterranean. This is an increasingly important, I think, part 
of the world, we passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and 
Partnership Act, which I think enhanced our relationships with 
critical countries in the region: Greece, Cyprus, Israel, to 
mention some, and creating a new paradigm in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in both energy and security.
    But we wake up today to see a statement by President 
Erdogan of Turkey with reference to Cyprus saying that peace 
talks on the future of ethnically-divided Cyprus can take place 
only between two states, only between two states.
    Now this is in violation of U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 550 that called upon members to not recognize the 
Government in the North, that calls for Varosha to come under 
U.N. administration, and that considers any attempt to resettle 
Varosha by other than its inhabitants, to be inadmissible.
    And it further violates the U.N. Resolution 789, that 
called for a significant reduction in foreign troops, that 
calls for U.N. peacekeepers to be deployed to Varosha, and 
called for a recommitment to the peace process.
    Erdogan is violating all of the U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions. He is in the north of Cyprus today instigating, 
and creating a challenge to a country that is part of the 
European Union. Now I will say that over several 
administrations, we have been rather passive, from my view, 
about this engagement. And all we see is Erdogan encroaching in 
the exclusive economic zone of not only Cyprus, seeking to do 
so with Greece.
    It has played, in my view, a nefarious role in a variety of 
things in the region. And unless we take an assertive role and 
push back, we are going to find ourselves with a significant 
challenge.
    Now I would like to hear from you, if you were to be 
confirmed, what role you would take, what position you would 
take as it relates to these issues?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, thank you for your 
engagement on the Eastern Med. It has made a real difference. 
And I have been following the breaking news from Cyprus as I 
entered this hearing room, and this latest announcement by the 
Turkish Cypriot leader and by Turkish President Erdogan about 
the Turkish Cypriots taking control over parts of Varosha is 
exactly part of the narrative you are talking about.
    This is a move that is clearly inconsistent with U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions. I do not know if the U.S. 
Government has yet issued a statement about this, but I am 
certain this action will be condemned, and these actions are 
provocative, they are destabilizing for the region, and they 
are an impediment to any settlement for Cyprus, that will be on 
the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
    And if I were to be confirmed, I would want to work closely 
with you on this. In this particular case of Varosha I think 
that we need to refer the situation to the U.N. Security 
Council. We need to encourage the international community to 
give a strong response to this action. We also need to work to 
deescalate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and I do 
appreciate your engagement on this.
    The Chairman. So I have your commitment that if you are 
confirmed, this will be one of your priorities in your 
portfolio?
    Dr. Donfried. Yes, Chairman, it would.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly 
want to associate myself with those remarks regarding Erdogan 
and his actions throughout the globe.
    Ms. Donfried, I want to start with our relationship with 
our friends in Europe, and particularly as it relates to both 
of ours and Europe's relationship with China. One of the ways, 
as we push back on the Chinese challenge, is it is going to 
take a real partners to do that. No country is going to be able 
to do it alone. If we put our population, Europe's population 
together, we are still only about a third of what the Chinese 
population is.
    Because we have common and shared values with our European 
allies, it is the most natural alliance there is to push back 
against China. I authored a report on this, and I think others 
have given speeches on it, and also done reports on it. What 
are your thoughts on how we can work together with Europe to 
push back on the challenges we are going to get from China?
    Dr. Donfried. Ranking Member Risch, thank you for that 
question. I have read your November 2020 Report and I would 
commend it. The comprehensiveness and breadth of the view you 
took on how the United States can work more closely with Europe 
on these key challenges in the relationship with China, I think 
in many ways is path-breaking.
    And I would commit to you that I would look forward to 
working with you on how we flesh out what you called a concrete 
agenda for trans-Atlantic cooperation on China. I think there 
is no better moment for us to be doing this because I think 
Europe understands today much more than it has over the past 
decade, the challenge China poses.
    And when President Biden made the trip to Europe just last 
month, at the G7, at the NATO Summit, at the U.S.-EU Summit, we 
saw this commitment on the part of our allies to work with us 
on the agenda. I think that we can put U.S. diplomatic muscle 
to good effect here. Thank you.
    Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. And I think we have 
all got to commit ourselves to getting China to comply with 
international norms, and rule of law, and enforcement of rule 
of law. And if we do not, it is going to be a long 21st century 
for all of us if we do not, if we do not do that.
    Let us turn to Georgia for a minute. I and other members of 
this committee, have been disappointed in what has been 
happening in Georgia. Senator Shaheen and I were there when 
they had their elections in October of 2012, which we thought 
was a new dawn, and a new beginning. And after that we have 
been regularly disappointed as to what happens there.
    And they come to Washington, D.C., all the time, the 
different parties, and each of them try to engage us and get us 
to take sides in their political maneuvering, which every 
country does. And we keep telling them that they have got to 
resolve this themselves. We are not going to take sides in 
this.
    But they are not making much progress. You get to a point 
where you wonder whether or not it is time to just reevaluate 
where you are with this. What are your thoughts Georgia?
    Dr. Donfried. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch. And I am 
grateful to you and Senator Shaheen for that trip that you 
made. And I also would point to the CODEL that Senator Shaheen 
and Senator Portman took to Georgia quite recently, and I think 
that broad bipartisan engagement is critical in the 
relationship.
    If confirmed, I would continue to push for the full and 
prompt implementation of the agreement that was signed on April 
19, and urge all parties in Georgia to support that agreement. 
And I cannot underscore enough how important electoral reform 
and judicial reform is for Georgia. As you well know, Georgia 
has made substantial strides to strengthen its democracy, but 
it has much more distance to travel, and I will press for them 
to cover that distance.
    At the same time, I would reaffirm U.S. support for 
Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and continue 
to support for Georgia's integration in the Euro-Atlantic 
community, which is tied to the strength of Georgia's 
democracy. And I would look forward to working with you on 
these issues.
    Senator Risch. Well, thank you. I certainly appreciate 
those thoughts.
    My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Coons?
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch. And thank you to our nominees today. And particularly to 
your families who have supported you in your careers in Foreign 
Service, so far.
    Dr. Donfried, if I might? I want to associate myself with 
the concerns raised by the chairman about Turkey's nefarious 
role, both in Cyprus and in the region, and my concerns about 
that. We will have a hearing about Turkey, I believe tomorrow, 
where we will explore that more thoroughly. And the ranking 
member raised concerns about China that I might well have just 
echoed, but I would like to ask you specifically about the path 
forward in U.S.-German relations.
    President Biden just welcomed Chancellor Merkel to the 
White House. We have long enjoyed a close and positive 
relationship. There are upcoming elections. I think Germany is 
one of the central powers in all of Europe. One of our core 
allies, one of the most important nations in the world in terms 
of sharing our values and an economy built on advanced 
manufacturing.
    What do you see as the future of U.S.-German relations, and 
how does our work with them in Europe, around collective 
security, and in the rest of the world, in terms of pushing 
back on China, have positive and negative aspects? How do you 
intend to navigate all this?
    Dr. Donfried. Senator Coons, thank you very much for that 
question. And I remember being at a site event at the Munich 
Security Conference with you in Germany.
    Senator Coons. Mm-hmm.
    Dr. Donfried. And I am mindful of how very knowledgeable 
you are about these issues as well. As you know, Germany is a 
critical partner and ally of the United States. It is, of 
course, the largest and wealthiest member of the European 
Union. And we just saw Chancellor Merkel visit President Biden 
last week, where the discussion based on the press conference, 
seemed to cover many of the issues you just referred to.
    There is an election in Germany on September 26th, so as we 
saw last week, in many ways, this was a farewell visit by 
Angela Merkel as Chancellor after 16 years in office. So we are 
all expecting change in this relationship. It may well be that 
her party, the center-right party, maintains the chancellery, 
but the coalition is likely to look different.
    And that will matter for German policy, particularly with 
regard to countries like China and Russia, where if you had the 
Greens in coalition, I think you would see a greater 
sensitivity to the human rights violations that we see those 
countries make. So I think it is an exciting moment for the 
relationship with Germany. While on the one hand we can 
celebrate what has been, I think there will be opportunities 
for the U.S. Government to forge and deepen cooperation on 
issues like China. Thank you.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. And I am looking forward, 
hopefully, to participating in the Munich Security Conference 
again with the leadership of this committee and many other 
colleagues.
    Ambassador Phee, if I might? Great to see you again, since 
we last visited in Juba in 2017. Congratulations on your 
nomination.
    There is so much to discuss across the Continent. Let me 
just bear down on a few things quickly, if I might. Since my 
visit to Ethiopia a few months ago, on behalf of our President, 
the situation in Tigray, and the U.S. bilateral relationship 
with Ethiopia, has deteriorated significantly.
    Could you just, briefly, outline your plans to make 
progress in opening up humanitarian relief, making progress 
towards a ceasefire and then, God willing, peace and some 
reconciliation in Tigray? And what do you think might be the 
path towards accountability for those who have committed human 
rights violations, and for possibly rebuilding the U.S.-
Ethiopia relationship on the other side of this, if possible?
    Ambassador Phee. Thank you, Senator. And it is an honor and 
a privilege for me to see you again, in this environment.
    I want to thank you and other members of the committee, 
including Ranking Member Risch who introduced a resolution on 
Ethiopia, for the efforts you have made to make clear, U.S. 
concerns about the situation that has resulted from the 
conflict in Tigray.
    Your efforts have been instrumental in making sure that all 
parties to the conflict understand that the United States 
urgently seeks an immediate end to hostilities, unconditional 
humanitarian access, accountability for atrocities, and a new 
course to achieve the political and economic reforms sought by 
the Ethiopian people.
    And if confirmed, I am committed to using all available 
tools in partnership with this committee to achieve those 
critical objectives, and to working with you to help Ethiopia 
get back on track.
    The Prime Minister started his premiership with a positive 
direction, with important rhetoric that was responsive to the 
desire of the Ethiopian people for economic and political 
reforms.
    That initial positive start has gone badly off track, and 
it is in our interest to work across the political spectrum in 
Ethiopia to get it back on track, both for the immediate 
concern for the civilians who are suffering, but also so that 
Ethiopia can regain its leadership role in the Horn. Thank you.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Mr. Chairman, could I continue, or should I have a number 
of additional questions? I did not know if you were doing a 
second round or not.
    The Chairman. Did you say you have a hundred additional 
questions?
    Senator Coons. A few.
    The Chairman. Oh, a few.
    Senator Coons. A very few.
    The Chairman. Because I have at least a hundred.
    Senator Coons. Maybe two.
    The Chairman. Actually, happy to let you go on.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your 
forbearance.
    If I might, Ms. Witkowsky; the Global Fragility Act is a, I 
think, promising new tool. There are many areas of fragility, 
Ambassador Phee and I might have gone on at greater length if 
we had the opportunity about the Sahel, and about Mozambique, 
and other places where there are significant conflicts.
    The CSO Bureau has an important role to play in the 
implementation of the Global Fragility Act that Senator Graham 
and I wrote and was signed into law last December. And it tries 
to come up with strategies that will prevent instability. Can 
you just briefly share your vision for how you will employ this 
new tool?
    Ms. Witkowsky. Senator Coons, thank you very much. And 
thank you so much for your leadership on this important issue, 
and for providing the opportunity of this new tool to the U.S. 
Government, to move forward on the complex and difficult 
challenges of addressing fragility.
    The Global Fragility Act maps an important new way of doing 
business on fragility, with its ten-year commitments, its 
emphasis on solutions being locally led, and its requirements 
for tighter integration among bureaus, agencies, the field, and 
Washington.
    If confirmed, I see that CSO will play a leadership role in 
the day-to-day implementation, of the Global Fragility Act 
implementation, one of coordination, and working with all 
relevant agencies who are participating in moving forward to 
implement the Act and supporting our embassies, working with 
civil society. And that process will amass to the higher-level 
process that you have mandated under the Steering Committee in 
the Act.
    I look forward to drawing in my many years of leading large 
agency and interagency efforts to move forward successfully 
with its implementation. And I can assure you that implementing 
the Global Fidelity Act will be a high priority for me.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Ms. Witkowsky.
    My last question for Ms. Adams-Allen; you have been 
involved in the Inter-American Foundation. Ambassador Phee will 
be on the Board of the Africa Development Foundation, both of 
them relatively small, agile responsive. One of my real 
concerns is about increasing localization and flexibility of 
our assistance programs.
    I just visited Guatemala, and had a chance to visit a 
shelter for trafficked children, a site that I know Samantha 
Power, the Administrator, also visited. I am really concerned 
about the lack of credible partners for us to work with in a 
number of the countries, in Central America, and in other 
places in the world.
    What is your strategy for increasing the localization of 
assistance programs so that we are not solely reliant on 
government partners? And what would you think about piloting 
that in Central America, where I think we are genuinely 
constrained in terms of the quality of the government partners 
we have available to do robust development projects with?
    Ms. Adams-Allen. Thank you for the question, Senator. I 
could not agree more about the need to localize U.S. foreign 
assistance and make sure that it is sustainable and it is 
really locally owned. As you mentioned, this is precisely what 
The American Foundation does, and it is my contention that 
there are actually numerous potential local partners across the 
world.
    But I know particularly in Central America that USAID could 
tap into a pipeline of existing, vetted, tested local partners 
who are working on issues of livelihoods, crime prevention, 
peace building, and governance in the affected communities.
    In terms of a strategy, you know, if confirmed, I think it 
will be important for USAID to build on existing efforts, not 
only looking at the model of the USADF, OIF, but also building 
on the new Partner's Initiative and the Local Works program 
that they have been testing at USAID.
    I think it is going to be crucial to streamline the 
procurement processes at USAID so that small local 
organizations can have access to partnership potentials with 
USAID.
    Third, I think it is going to be crucial to strengthen the 
capabilities within USAID, in particular, the technical staff, 
and the contracting staff who are the ones we are going to need 
to support local organizations.
    Senator Coons. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panel.
    Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen?
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Risch. Congratulations to all of you on your nominations.
    Dr. Donfried, it is good to see you, it was good to catch 
up with you a little bit the other day. You know, one of the 
key responsibilities I think of this portfolio you have will be 
to work with our European partners to counter China's use of 
unfair economic policies, and trade policies, to establish a 
set of agreed-upon rules of the road. And I know that it is 
going to be part of what you are focused on.
    I want to also associate myself with the comments the 
chairman made regarding CAATSA, and the importance of fully 
enforcing CAATSA, and making sure that, you know, Turkey 
continues to see those sanctions applied because of the 
purchase of the S-400s.
    I heard in your response to Chairman Menendez, a reference 
to Erdogan's, President Erdogan's visit to Cyprus today, which 
of course is the anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus. And he is taking some very provocative steps, including 
talking about resettling parts of the Varosha, which would be a 
gross violation of numerous United Nations Security 
Resolutions, and U.S. policy statements with respect to not 
changing the status quo, except for through a negotiated 
settlement.
    Senator Menendez and I, and Senator Rubio, and others, sent 
a letter to the President Biden last week on this issue. It has 
now come to pass. So in addition to just making strong 
statements condemning the action, I think it is important that 
we work with our European allies in the EU to look at other 
sanctions that can be imposed for the violation of law here, 
rule of law.
    President Biden has sort of recentered U.S. policy on rule 
of law. So do you agree that it is important to stand firm, 
together with our partners in the EU, on this violation?
    Dr. Donfried. Senator Van Hollen, thank you for taking the 
time last week to meet with me. I appreciated that. And to your 
question, yes, I do agree we should work closely with the 
European Union, with our European allies on how we pushed back 
against this. I think we will be stronger for doing so.
    And I also look forward to working closely with you and 
with the chairman, if confirmed, on these critical issues 
around stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. We are going to be 
having a hearing. I know that the chairman has organized a 
hearing tomorrow on Turkey specifically. So I will have a 
greater chance to talk about that. But we just see this series 
of very provocative moves in Cyprus, in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, also walking away from the parameters of a 
bizonal Federation that had defined the talks for peace in 
Cyprus.
    Ambassador Phee, if I could? You have a huge portfolio. I 
look forward to working with you on all the issues including 
trying to really increase U.S. investment in Africa. My 
question relates specifically to Sudan. Senator Coons and I 
visited Sudan, I think back in May now, and Sudan, of course, 
is one of those countries where in a world where we see 
retrenchment, and people moving in the wrong direction, i.e. 
issues of democracy and rule of law, Sudan is a bright spot.
    And I know you agree that we should do everything we can to 
support their transition from dictatorship to democracy. At the 
end of June, Prime Minister Hamdok gave a very important 
speech. And one of the things he focused on was the importance, 
the urgent importance of consolidating the military, which 
consists, as you know, of various militia, including the RSF, 
under a unified command, and that command be under civilian 
control.
    The U.S. continues to have a law in place based on the 
Bashir Government coup decades ago that limits our ability to 
engage with the armed forces through security systems.
    Would you agree that we should look at ways of changing 
that? Given the fact that we now have seen a peaceful 
revolution and where the United States could play, I think, a 
constructive role, carefully, but a constructive role in 
helping Sudan, integrate and consolidate its military under 
unified command under civilian control?
    Ambassador Phee. Senator, it is an honor and pleasure to 
see you again. And I thank you for your leadership of the 
Africa Subcommittee. And I thank you for your efforts, such as 
the recent trip that you took with Senator Coons.
    You have perfectly captured, I think, this critical moment 
in the Sudanese transition. The Senate has already played such 
a vital role in supporting the transition by giving us the 
tools, helping to dismantle. As you note, some of the 
architecture that was put in place during the Bashir regime. 
And if confirmed, I absolutely commit to review the important 
option you have suggested here today, about how we might work 
more effectively with the security forces.
    In tandem with the Prime Minister's announcement, there 
were also statements made by the military leadership about the 
importance of working together. So there are real opportunities 
for us to continue to support this very critical transition, 
which will have such a transformative impact on the Continent. 
Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I look forward to 
working with you. And while it has taken a long time, I know 
AID is finally finalizing its $700 million commitment. So the 
committee looks forward to working with you as that moves 
forward as well.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. All right. There are presently no other 
members seeking recognition. But there is one member on their 
way here, so I have a few extra questions, so I am just going 
to pursue them now.
    Let me go back to you, Dr. Donfried. You have a very large 
universe to cover. Earlier this year the Biden administration 
recognized the Armenian genocide. Do you support the 
administration's decision to recognize the Armenian genocide?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I do. And I would like to 
thank you for your leadership on that issue. You have been a 
long-time champion of the U.S. Government officially 
recognizing the Armenian genocide. And I think it puts the 
United States in a very good place to be on the right side of 
history on this issue.
    The Chairman. There is another issue in the region that is 
a little more complicated--well, that it took a long time for 
us to recognize the genocide, but I am glad. And I give credit 
to President Biden for doing so.
    But given Azerbaijan's aggression last August in Nagorno-
Karabakh war, the administration continued the use of waivers 
for Section 907 restrictions. I have to be honest with you, and 
based on the declared meaning of Section 907 as I read it I am 
not quite sure--it was quite a stretch, to go ahead and waive. 
What are your views on that?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, if I am confirmed, I would 
look forward to working closely with you on that issue, of the 
waivers for that assistance to Azerbaijan. I think it is 
critical that we make sure that any support we are giving to 
Azerbaijan is not in any way affecting the balance of power 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that we are committed to 
resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh.
    The Chairman. No, I appreciate that. The Azerbaijanis are 
now interfering in the physical territory of Armenia, and a 
border issue. And it just seems to me they will continue to be 
aggressive unless they have a clear message that it is not 
acceptable.
    I understand that you have had the chance to review the 
Ukraine Security Partnership Act. Do you support the 
legislation which would give increased security assistance to 
the country?
    Dr. Donfried. I am grateful for the broad and bipartisan 
support there is on this committee for U.S. support for 
Ukraine. And I would read with great interest, the Act, which 
has many interesting and important ideas captured in it. And if 
confirmed, I would very much look forward to working with you 
on how we can increase our support for Ukraine.
    The Chairman. Finally, last week the British Government 
proposed halting all prosecution of British soldiers and 
militants involved in three decades of conflict in Northern 
Ireland, which sparked an angry response from victims' 
families, and politicians in Belfast and Dublin. The Stormont 
House Agreement provides a framework to deal with legacy issues 
from the troubles. Do you support the implementation of the 
Stormont House Agreement as a way to deal with legacy issues?
    Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I mentioned earlier that I 
spent 10 years at the Congressional Research Service, and one 
of the issues, I spent a great deal of time on then, was 
Northern Ireland. And it was a bright time because actually we 
saw the peace process move forward, and that Stormont House 
Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement, I think has to be the 
basis for U.S. policy toward the Island of Ireland to maintain 
peace there. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Phee, let me ask you. The situation in Tigray 
and across Ethiopia is rather bleak. The Ethiopian Government's 
unilateral cease fire does not appear to be getting much 
traction, and worryingly, it appears to me that we may be 
entering a new phase of the conflict characterized by the 
mobilization of ethnic militia, and even more mass atrocities.
    What more can the United States do to get the parties, to 
reach a negotiated ceasefire? If you were to be confirmed, what 
advice would you be giving?
    Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, thank you for raising 
this very disturbing issue, which poses such a threat to the 
civilians of Ethiopia, and to this stability of the Horn. If 
confirmed, I would enthusiastically endorse the efforts of our 
Special Envoy, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, who is working right 
now to mobilize the support of partner nations in Africa, of 
the partner nations in the Gulf who are engaged in Ethiopia, 
our partners in Europe, and our partners in the United Nations.
    This problem requires all of us pulling together to help 
Ethiopia stop the current fighting, to stop the spread that you 
have correctly identified as a genuine threat, and to work on a 
national dialogue, to address the political and economic 
performance that are so desperately needed.
    The Chairman. Yeah. And I think we have to look at, if the 
type of atrocities that are being reported are such, I think we 
have to look about what other consequences for such atrocities. 
If we look away then, you know, at the end of the day, others 
in other parts of the world will do it.
    Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, I fully agree with that 
sentiment. We have, as you know, a longstanding and 
multifaceted partnership with Ethiopia, and there are options 
for us to act in that direction if it becomes necessary. And if 
confirmed, I would commit to pursuing those options to make 
clear, just as you have said, that this kind of action is 
unacceptable.
    The Chairman. Let me turn to the situation of the Sahel, 
which continues to be deeply concerning, with violence in the 
region fueling what U.N. agencies deemed the world's ``fastest-
growing displacement crisis''. As you may know, I am the lead 
sponsor of S615, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
Program Act, which calls for a whole-of-government strategy for 
the Sahel.
    Do I have your commitment, if you are confirmed, to develop 
a strategic approach to the Sahel?
    Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, you absolutely do. If 
confirmed, I would address the concerns that are outlined in 
your legislation, and I would do our best to pull together all 
the elements of the U.S. Government capability to help support 
a better outcome in the Sahel.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Now, Sudan's civilian-led 
transition to democracy is in a critical phase of the 
transitional government led by Prime Minister Hamdok, has 
initiated laudable reforms over the last two years, but there 
are several intractable problems that need to be addressed. 
What in your view are the major obstacles to democratic 
transition and stability in Sudan?
    Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, in my view, the main 
obstacle to the transition in Sudan is helping the military 
understand that there is a new way of governance in the 
country, and that it is time for the civilians to remain at the 
forefront. That is the most important challenge we face, and it 
is incumbent upon us to do all we can to help them realize that 
transition.
    The Chairman. Yes, Senator Risch?
    Senator Risch. Briefly. Ambassador Phee, I wanted to talk 
about this one detail that Senator Van Hollen mentioned. And it 
prodded me into thinking about it some more. And that is, 
regarding the $700 million that has been provided for Sudan as 
a result of the legal peace settlement, what are your thoughts 
on how the U.S. should use that amount?
    Ambassador Phee. Ranking Member Risch, I understand that we 
should use that money exactly for the purposes for which you 
appropriated it, which is to help consolidate support for the 
transition to help provide economic sustainability in Sudan, so 
that there is popular support for this transition to continue. 
I understand there is frustration in the pace of disbursement, 
and if confirmed, I would undertake to immediately look at that 
issue.
    Senator Risch. Yeah. Frustration would be an 
understatement. The mechanics that are in place, are you 
familiar with those or?
    Ambassador Phee. No, sir. I am not as familiar as I should 
be.
    Senator Risch. I might do that as an additional question 
for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Well thank you.
    Senator Risch. I do not want our other two nominees to 
think I have no affection for your work. I do. And I will be 
submitting a series of questions for the record. For that fact, 
there will be a series of questions to all of the nominees from 
me, and I am sure from other members.
    The Chairman. I would urge you to answer them fully and 
expeditiously so that the committee can consider your 
nominations at a business meeting.
    With no other members before the committee, this hearing 
will be adjourned. The record will remain open until the close 
of business tomorrow, which, questions for the record will be 
submitted.
    And with thanks to the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.


    [Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]



                              ----------                              



              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator Robert Menendez

Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI)
    Question. Last July, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
issued a report depicting extensive demographic data demonstrating the 
serious challenges the Agency faces when it comes to building a diverse 
workforce. The GAO concluded ``mixed progress'' in the Agency's efforts 
to increase diversity, and presented a number of troubling findings, 
including numerous barriers to promotion for racial and ethnic 
minorities in early- or mid-career Civil Service positions.

   Will you commit to prioritizing actions to address these problems?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing actions to 
address these problems.

    Question. Please describe what actions you believe USAID should 
prioritize to realize and advance the goals of USAID's Diversity, 
Equity, and Inclusion initiative?

    Answer. Ensuring USAID remains the world's leading development 
agency requires the Agency center the principles of diversity, equity, 
and inclusion in everything it does--reflecting them in its people, 
it's workplace culture, policies and practices, and funding and program 
approaches. If confirmed, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion 
foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how 
we support and invest in our workforce. The report you referenced, for 
example, presented data demonstrating that ``promotion outcomes at 
USAID were generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for 
whites in early to mid career.'' If confirmed, I will engage staff 
across the agency to understand the challenges facing them as they seek 
to advance in their USAID careers, solicit their advice on how to 
create more internal ladders and equitable opportunities for 
professional development and promotion, and treat these issues with the 
urgency they demand. I understand that one of Administrator Power's 
first acts at the Agency was to approve the new DEI Strategy, affirming 
her commitment to integrate diversity, equity, and inclusion throughout 
the Agency's work with a workforce that reflects the diversity of our 
country. If confirmed, I commit to implementing this Strategy, 
including by ensuring that staff's perspectives and experiences are 
reflected in USAID's plans for recruiting, retaining, and investing in 
a workforce that reflects the rich diversity of our country.

    Question. That same GAO report indicated significant understaffing 
in USAID's Office of Civil Rights and Diversity, a deficiency that 
reduces USAID's capacity to respond effectively to allegations of 
discrimination, identify potential barriers to equal employment 
opportunity, and submit required reports on diversity and inclusion 
efforts.

   Will you commit to ensuring that this Office is adequately staffed 
        and empowered to responsibly execute its mission?

    Answer. Answer: Yes, if confirmed, I will immediately review 
staffing and resource needs for USAID's Office of Civil Rights and 
Diversity (OCRD) and commit to enhancing its ability to deliver its 
mandate. I understand the Agency increased OCRD's operating budget from 
less than $400,000 in FY 2017 to $2,723,000 in FY 2021, exclusive of 
salaries and benefits, while doubling OCRD's staff allocation from 13 
to 25 in FY 2020. In addition, I understand that OCRD's Acting Director 
has a regular channel through which to engage with USAID's senior 
management to discuss EEO Program matters, should OCRD have additional 
needs or seek additional resources in the future. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that OCRD has the resources and the access needed to address 
concerns about discrimination and to advance the Agency's diversity, 
equity, and inclusion goals.

    Question.  How will you approach restoring expertise and recruiting 
new talent?

    Answer. Attracting and retaining purpose-driven development 
professionals with deep technical expertise and broad programmatic and 
management experience is key to the Agency delivering on its mission, 
and doing so nimbly and effectively in increasingly complicated 
settings. Rebuilding the Agency's workforce must include examining what 
the practice of development will look like 10-15 years from now, and 
identifying and recruiting talent to position the agency for the 
future. If confirmed, I commit to leading a thoughtful, forward-looking 
workforce planning effort.
    Tapping into needed new talent demands that USAID expand its 
recruitment pipelines beyond traditional sources, to include U.S. 
community colleges, minority serving institutions, and professional 
organizations. I understand that USAID is currently engaging and 
recruiting diverse high-quality talent through targeted outreach and 
recruitment events and expanded partnerships with organizations serving 
underrepresented groups. If confirmed, I will focus on expanding the 
Agency's external recruitment pipelines so as to bolster its staffing 
overall, as well as prioritizing the retention and promotion of 
underrepresented groups as part of a broader effort to fill gaps in 
expertise by tapping into internal talent pools.

    Question. USAID's greatest asset are the international development 
and humanitarian experts on staff.

   How will you establish a culture where the Agency's actions are 
        based on the insights and talents of its experts?

    Answer. USAID cannot accomplish any of its national security and 
development priorities without the top-notch development professionals 
who everyday tackle global development and humanitarian challenges with 
passion, integrity, and skill, so as to empower partners (communities, 
governments, local and international organizations) as they build a 
better world for all of us. I experienced this commitment and expertise 
firsthand in my time at the Agency and now in my current role at the 
Inter-American Foundation. Building a culture that draws on and 
leverages the expertise and experience of development and humanitarian 
professionals requires that leaders look to the experts and seek out 
their input into and leadership on policy, programming, and operational 
considerations.
    Throughout my career, I have created and led diverse, purpose-
driven teams; fostered open, inclusive, and transparent workplaces; and 
empowered staff by removing obstacles to growth and success, while 
relying on their expertise and championing their creativity and know-
how. If confirmed, I will continue that approach and work to empower 
USAID staff by always seeking their input, promoting their leadership, 
and unlocking the support and resources they need to thrive.

    Question. Workforce planning is essential to ensuring USAID has 
expertise and capacities to successfully execute the Agency's wide 
range of activities and achieve results that often require years of 
work and engagement.

   Will you commit to advising each Bureau in developing a workforce 
        plan for its programs and missions?

    Answer. Yes. I agree that comprehensive workforce planning is 
essential to ensuring that USAID has the expertise and capacities 
required to address the increasing global needs and manage increasingly 
complex programs in more than 100 countries. If confirmed, I commit to 
working with USAID's office of Human Capital and Talent Management, 
Bureaus, and Missions, to conduct comprehensive strategic workforce 
planning that positions the Agency to meet the needs of the moment, as 
well as adapt to future challenges and opportunities. This effort must 
include analyzing the Agency's current workforce, identifying skills 
gaps, anticipating future staffing and expertise needs, and developing 
and implementing an Action Plan to secure and support the range of 
expertise (policy, technical, operational, and management) needed to 
ensure the Agency's continued success. I look forward to working with 
you to support that strategy, if confirmed.

    Question. What do you think USAID can do to improve FSNs' standing 
within USAID and ensure these hardworking professionals are afforded 
ample opportunities for professional growth, promotion, and recognition 
for their work?

    Answer. Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), which constitute nearly 
half of USAID's global workforce, are an integral part of achieving the 
Agency's mission. They are a critical link to cultivating and 
maintaining trust and strong relationships with local communities, 
which is the foundation for successful development and humanitarian 
assistance. I understand that USAID is currently working on various 
initiatives designed to enhance recognition for the value that FSNs 
bring to the Agency, and to enhance morale among this critical part of 
the workforce. Specifically, USAID is working to promote leadership 
opportunities for FSNs at all levels; increase virtual FSN fellowship 
programs; increase the number of senior-level FSN-13 positions; expand 
professional development and training opportunities; and expand the use 
of ladder positions within the FSN workforce to enhance career 
development. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID leadership in 
Washington and its overseas Missions to further advance initiatives 
that will afford FSNs with opportunities for inclusion, professional 
growth, promotion, and recognition for their contributions to the 
Agency.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator James E. Risch

China and COVAX
    Question. Global health is one of the largest parts of USAID's 
annual budget and, in 2021, the agency received significant additional 
resources to support U.S. international COVID-19 relief efforts. 
Importantly, USAID also is responsible for managing U.S. engagement 
with COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 
Tools (ACT). Unfortunately, while the United States has made $4 billion 
(as well as 580 million vaccine doses) available to COVAX, China has 
contributed nothing. Worse yet, China now stands to profit from a 
pandemic that it unleashed upon the world through the sale of its 
state-owned vaccines to COVAX.

   If confirmed, how will you ensure U.S. contributions to COVAX will 
        not be used to underwrite or subsidize the purchase and 
        distribution of China's state-owned, substandard COVID-19 
        vaccines?

   If confirmed, will you prioritize resources for bilateral, in-kind 
        contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to 
        COVAX? If not, why not?

    Answer. I understand that funds from the generous $4 billion U.S. 
contribution to Gavi in support of COVAX were not used to purchase 
vaccines made by Chinese companies. These funds were allocated by Gavi 
prior to the facility's decision to purchase Sinopharm and Sinovac 
vaccines. I also understand that there are no further contributions of 
U.S. funds to COVAX planned at this time. If confirmed, I will work to 
ensure that the U.S. continues to signal concern about procurement of 
lower-efficacy vaccines, and urges China to pick up its fair share of 
the global burden on vaccine access rather than simply profiting off of 
other donors' generosity.
    I understand that the decision on when to use bilateral, in-kind 
contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to COVAX 
was based on multiple factors including global and domestic vaccine 
supply variables. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency 
colleagues to review the current facts, supply projections and needs in 
order to continue to advance global COVID vaccine availability as fast 
and safely as possible.

U.S. International Food Aid and Cargo Preference
    Question.  The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has released a 
memo which, among other things, directs the new OMB Made in America 
Office to ``review how best to ensure agency compliance with cargo 
preference requirements to maximize the utilization of U.S.-flag 
vessels, in excess of any applicable statutory minimum, to the greatest 
extent practicable.'' This is likely to increase pressure upon USAID to 
exceed existing cargo preference requirements for food aid under the 
Food for Peace Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) repeatedly has found that such requirements 
significantly increase the cost of food aid while failing to advance 
the statutory purpose of the Cargo Preference Act of 1954.

   Do you agree that U.S. cargo preference requirements for food aid 
        have outlived their statutory purpose?

   If confirmed, will you work with OMB to mitigate the deleterious 
        impact of U.S. cargo preference requirements on life-saving 
        food aid?

   In your estimation, how would an increase of cargo preference 
        requirements impact USAID's budget and ability to meet historic 
        levels of need for food aid?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and the 
interagency, including OMB, to make USAID's food assistance programming 
as effective and efficient as possible. Each food assistance modality 
(U.S. in-kind food, locally and regionally procured food, and cash-
based programming) is critical to USAID's ability to appropriately 
respond to unprecedented global humanitarian needs. An increase in 
cargo preference requirements would directly result in increased 
transportation costs for food assistance programs, which would reduce 
the amount of resources USAID can dedicate to purchasing agricultural 
commodities to respond to historic levels of global hunger.

Material Support
    Question. The United States has strict laws prohibiting the 
provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist groups.

   If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that USAID and its 
        implementing partners strictly adhere to all relevant material 
        support laws, regulations, policy directives, and vetting 
        requirements?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID staff and 
partners to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. 
I understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring 
safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an 
independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to 
supporting if I am confirmed.

    Question. If confirmed, what measures will you seek to put in place 
to ensure not only that all contracts and agreements contain the 
required material support clauses, but also that adherence is closely 
monitored and transparently reported to Congress by USAID?

    Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall 
into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I 
understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring 
safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an 
independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to 
supporting if I am confirmed.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department 
of State to eliminate ambiguity and ensure that USAID's implementing 
partners, including USAID's humanitarian assistance partners, have 
clear guidance on what constitutes material support, how to identify 
intentional and incidental breaches, and how to respond?

    Answer. Understanding that USAID does not administer U.S. sanctions 
programs, if confirmed, I do commit to working with the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of State to 
ensure that all implementing partners, including those who support 
humanitarian programs in some of the most challenging operating 
environments in the world, have clear guidance about applicable 
sanctions.

USAID Staffing
    Question. Whether Foreign Service, Civil Service, Foreign Service 
Limited, Foreign Service National, or other, USAID's most valuable 
asset is its people. Unfortunately, with at least 22 different hiring 
mechanisms and outdated assumptions about how specific missions, 
bureaus, and offices should be supported, the agency is in desperate 
need of a modernized strategic staffing plan that is flexible and 
adaptive to today's challenges. The budget request includes an increase 
for USAID's operating expenses and proposes to increase the number of 
Foreign Service Limited positions, including for global health and 
humanitarian assistance.

   If confirmed, how will you approach modernizing USAID's arcane 
        staffing mechanisms?

   Should an increase in resources for additional direct-hire 
        positions be paired with a decrease in the number of 
        contractors USAID retains using program funds? If not, why not?

   If the requested increase for direct-hire positions is approved, 
        how will positions be prioritized? Should the recruitment, 
        hiring, and deployment of competent, field-based contracting 
        and agreement officers (COs and AOs) be a priority?

    Answer. I understand that USAID is committed to strengthening its 
global workforce to advance the Agency's mission and U.S. national 
security priorities. In my experience, USAID has complex requirements 
and needs to increase both the size and agility of the career workforce 
while also improving non-career employment mechanisms.
    As the administrator stated in her recent testimony before the 
committee, USAID's staffing has not increased at the same rate as the 
programmatic needs and requirements. With regard to USAID's Contracting 
and Agreement Offices, she noted in her testimony that each USAID 
acquisition and assistance officer has managed over $65 million 
annually over the past four years: more than four times the workload of 
their colleagues at the Department of Defense who manage an average of 
approximately $15 million. I will work to rationalize non-career hiring 
mechanisms and strategically grow the Civil Service and Foreign 
Service, while building the overall cohesiveness of the Agency's 
workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to updating you on the Agency's 
progress in this area.

USAID Budget Allocations
    Question. Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2413) requires that ``not later than thirty days after the 
enactment of any law appropriating funds to carry out any provision of 
this Act (other than section 451 or 637) or the Arms Export Control 
Act, the President shall notify the Congress of each foreign country 
and international organization to which the United States Government 
intends to provide any portion of the funds under such law and of the 
amount of funds under that law, by category of assistance, that the 
United States Government intends to provide to each.'' Unfortunately, 
delays in the appropriations process, the imposition of overlapping 
spending directives, and other factors relating to the relationship 
between OMB, the Department of State, USAID, and the Congress have 
contributed to excessive delays in submission of the mandated 653(a) 
Report. Moreover, it has become common practice for the relevant 
agencies to consult only with the committees of Appropriations--rather 
than with the authorizing committees responsible for oversight of the 
Foreign Assistance Act--in finalizing such report.

   In your view, what are the chief constraints to delivering the 
        653(a) report in a timely fashion? How can the process be 
        fixed?

   If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Committees on 
        Foreign Relations in the Senate and Foreign Affairs in the 
        House on the development and execution of the 653(a) report in 
        an open and transparent manner?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working in an open and 
transparent manner with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 653(a) report. As you note, 
while Section 653(a) of the FAA requires that the report be submitted 
within 30 days of enactment, I understand that has not been possible in 
years past. If confirmed, I commit to working within the Agency and 
with interagency stakeholders to improve the timelines for the 
submission of the 653(a) report.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
        to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

USAID Transformation
    Question. The Trump administration had submitted proposals to 
Congress under its Transformation initiative to make changes to the 
Bureau for Management and create a Bureau for Policy, Resources, and 
Planning (PRP). PRP would have combined the functions of the Bureau for 
Policy, Planning and Learning and the Office of Budget and Resource 
Management (among others). Congress did not approve such changes and 
the Biden administration withdrew the proposed changes in May, 2021. 
Prior to the withdrawal, some international stakeholders had 
recommended that the Biden administration complete the proposed 
changes, in particular realizing the PRP Bureau.

   How do you respond to those who advocated for the completion of 
        USAID's organizational restructuring?

   In your view, do additional structural changes need to be made to 
        USAID's central bureaus and/or independent offices? If so, what 
        challenges would those changes seek to address?

    Answer. I understand that USAID successfully completed the majority 
of its restructuring efforts, co-locating vital capabilities related to 
humanitarian assistance; food security and water; and the Agency's 
technical assistance to the field. I also understand that USAID's staff 
were heavily involved in the prior organizational restructuring and so 
any further changes need to be thoughtfully considered. If confirmed, I 
will engage with the administrator, my co-deputy, and the Agency's 
internal and external stakeholders, to assess the need for any further 
change to USAID's organizational structure.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Dr. Karen Donfried by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Will you commit to providing vital humanitarian 
assistance to the people Nagorno-Karabakh including supporting the 
clearance of unexplored ordnance?

    Answer. From the onset of last years fighting between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States has worked 
to meet urgent humanitarian assistance needs for vulnerable populations 
fleeing the violence and the communities that host them. If confirmed, 
I will support the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas 
affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I understand the Department 
continues to work with other relevant agencies to evaluate the needs of 
the region and explore opportunities to fund possible programs to clear 
post-conflict unexploded ordnance in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

    Question. I do not support the administrations decision to waive 
sanctions on Nord Stream 2. I think it was a mistake that will only 
bolster Russias position in Europe. The measures announced last week 
when the German Chancellor visited Washington fall well short of what 
is needed to support Ukraine right now.

   What specific further measures do you think the U.S. should take to 
        bolster Ukrainian security and energy transit in the wake of 
        the administration's decision to waive sanctions on Nord Stream 
        2?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's policy 
of supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity against Russian aggression in any form. I commit to providing 
the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself, including lethal 
weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraines defense 
requirements. On energy security, I believe an extension to Ukraines 
gas transit agreement with Russia will help to preserve gas transit 
revenues for Ukraine and provide time for Ukraine to eliminate its 
dependence on Russian gas and transit fees, as it has long sought to 
do. Ukraine should also diversify its energy resources, with an 
emphasis on clean and sustainable energy.

    Question. The Belarusian opposition leader is in Washington this 
week. The U.S. has yet to announce long overdue sectoral sanctions.

   If confirmed, do you commit to advocate for the imposition of these 
        sanctions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I commit to advocate for additional measures, 
including sanctions, to apply continued pressure to the Lukashenka 
regime to release all political prisoners and start a facilitated 
dialogue, inclusive of the opposition and civil society, that will lead 
to free and fair elections.

    Question. Will you also commit to ensure that the administration 
produces a new Executive Order on Belarus that would authorize new 
sanctions?

    Answer. In the May 28 White House statement following the forced 
diversion of the RyanAir flight, the U.S. Government previewed the 
Treasury Departments development of a new draft executive order 
designed to increase pressure on the Lukashenka regime. If confirmed, I 
will support these efforts.

    Question. How does the Biden administration's public commitment to 
counter corruption correspond with the U.S.-led effort to push for an 
amendment to Bosnias election law, which could significantly strengthen 
the positon of ethnic party leaders?

    Answer. The administration has made clear that by countering 
corruption and demonstrating the advantages of transparent and 
accountable governance, we can secure a critical advantage for the 
United States and other democracies. Efforts to strengthen democratic 
processes and reduce corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are 
mutually reinforcing. If confirmed, I will work with others in the 
administration to encourage reforms that address corruption and 
implement relevant decisions of BiHs Constitutional Court and the 
European Court of Human Rights. I will also support efforts to ensure 
that BiHs electoral system meets international recommendations for 
electoral integrity, including those made by the OSCEs Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Council of Europe.

    Question. Does this not undercut U.S. efforts to counter patronage 
and machine politics in the country?

    Answer. Limited constitutional and election law reforms are 
necessary to further BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path, a primary goal of 
U.S. foreign policy for the Western Balkans. The United States welcomes 
efforts among BiHs political and civic leaders to reach solutions that 
will increase the integrity, transparency, fairness, and legitimacy of 
BiHs democratic processes. If confirmed, I will work to bring all 
actors to the table to forge compromise and local ownership of an 
improved electoral system that represents and protects the rights of 
all citizens of BiH.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
            to Dr. Karen Donfried by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Which country or countries do you believe are the most 
important to U.S. interests in Europe?

    Answer. NATO is indispensable for the advancement of U.S. interests 
in Europe and to our security. NATO, founded 72 years ago and 
comprising 30 Allies, is a pillar of stability for the world and the 
essential forum for Transatlantic security and political issues. The 
United States is firmly committed to advancing NATO's founding values, 
enshrined in the Washington Treaty, of democracy, individual liberty, 
and the rule of law. The United States' commitment to Article 5 is 
ironclad. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with all of 
our NATO Allies and the Alliance's partners to safeguard our shared 
interests in our challenging security environment. The European Union 
is also a fundamental partner for the United States, as many issues on 
which we coordinate, including economic security issues, climate 
policy, and sanctions, among others, are EU competencies.

    Question. Do you believe that the U.S. should err on the side of 
undertaking diplomacy with the European Union, or should it focus its 
diplomatic efforts bilaterally?

    Answer. The United States and the European Union are natural 
partners to write the rules of the road for the 21st century economy, 
rules based on our shared democratic values and harnessing the power of 
the largest economic relationship in the world. At the June 15 U.S.-EU 
Summit, the leaders of the European Union and the United States renewed 
our transatlantic partnership and committed to resolving long-standing 
disputes in order to work together on common challenges. If confirmed, 
I will endeavor to support that renewed partnership. The U.S.-EU 
partnership does not supplant the need for bilateral diplomatic efforts 
with member states and other likeminded countries. If confirmed, I will 
pursue diplomacy with the EU and bilaterally to further U.S. policy 
objectives.

    Question. How do you believe relationship between the United States 
and the European Union (EU) has changed since the United Kingdom 
removed itself from that bloc? What challenges has the United Kingdom's 
departure from the EU presented for American diplomacy?

    Answer. The Biden administration has already worked in concert with 
both the EU and the UK on sanctions actions targeting Russian officials 
linked to the poisoning of Alexey Navalny and Chinese officials due to 
human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The administration supports a strong 
UK and a strong EU and welcomed the entry into force of the EU-UK Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. The United 
States has been unequivocal in its support for the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement, which is an historic achievement that must be protected. If 
confirmed, I look forward to working with both partners to address the 
range of global challenges as the UK and the EU continue to adjust to 
their new post-Brexit relationship. I support the renewed commitment to 
the U.S.-EU partnership made by leaders at the June 15 U.S.-EU Summit. 
The UK's post-Brexit foreign policy presents opportunities for even 
closer cooperation on shared priorities. If confirmed, I look forward 
to collaborating with the UK as it works with a broad range of partners 
to carry out its Global Britain agenda, including global economic, 
health, and climate priorities.

    Question. In your opinion, what do you believe the United States 
will gain from the deal that was recently struck between the United 
States and Germany that will allow the NordStream 2 pipeline to go 
forward?

    Answer. The package announced on July 21 puts in place measures in 
order to prevent the worst-case scenario--an operational Nord Stream 2 
pipeline without any risk-reduction measures for Ukraine or other 
countries that stand to be impacted by the pipeline. The measures 
represent a significant commitment by Germany, supported by the United 
States, to push back against the Kremlin's malign activities and to 
advance a more secure and sustainable energy future for Ukraine and 
other frontline NATO and EU countries. It also makes clear that the 
United States will not allow the Kremlin to weaponize energy resources 
against our allies and partners and commits Germany to take national 
measures and pursue measures at the European Union-level to impose 
costs on Russia should it attempt to use Nord Stream 2 or any other 
pipeline to achieve aggressive political ends.

    Question. Which nations do you believe the United States should 
work most closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and 
actions around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned 
with U.S. goals and values vis-a-vis China?

    Answer. The United States must engage the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) from a position of strength, which includes acting in close 
cooperation with our Allies and partners across Europe and Eurasia. 
There has been a convergence of views among the world's democracies on 
PRC activities as evidenced by the outcomes of last month's G7, NATO, 
and U.S.-EU summits. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. Allies and 
partners to respond to the PRC's non-market practices, speak out 
against Beijing's human rights abuses and forced labor practices, and 
address the systemic challenges from the PRC to the rules-based 
international order.

    Question. What are your views on the recently agreed-upon EU-China 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the United States be 
engaging with the European Parliament to stop its ratification?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with 
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), including through the recently relaunched 
U.S.-EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. 
The European Parliament has conditioned any further action on the 
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on the lifting of the PRC's 
retaliatory sanctions. Ultimately, the onus will be on the PRC to 
uphold its commitments on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and 
subsidies.

    Question. Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe 
telecommunications companies out of their networks. What do you view as 
the next priority areas for cooperation between the United States and 
the. and EU?

    Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our engagement 
with European allies and partners on secure development and deployment 
of 5G networks, including through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology 
Council. The United States advocates for measures that exclude 
untrusted vendors, in line with the Prague Proposals and the EU 5G 
Toolbox. If confirmed, I will continue working with allies and partners 
to support a diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications 
equipment and services. This includes support for open, interoperable 
approaches like Open RAN (radio access network) technologies that 
promise to increase vendor diversity and market competition and have 
the potential to lower costs and improve security.

    Question. To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging 
Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the United States should try to 
drive wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do 
you agree with that analysis?

    Answer. It is not surprising that Beijing and Moscow would seek to 
deepen their ties, but we should not overestimate this alignment. 
Russia and the PRC collaborate when it is mutually beneficial, but a 
deep-seated lack of trust realistically limits their so-called 
``strategic comprehensive partnership.'' Areas of friction between the 
two suggest they may each have reasons to hedge against over reliance 
and potentially slow their convergence for their own reasons. If 
confirmed, I would work closely with European partners and Allies to 
push back effectively against Russian and PRC actions that run contrary 
to our values and the international standards of rule-based behavior.

    Question. It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in 
Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in 
occupied Crimea. How should the United States respond, if at all, 
should Russia place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in 
your view, dramatically change the way that the United States looks at 
Black Sea security?

    Answer. The administration will continue to oppose Russia's 
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, which is sovereign 
Ukrainian territory. If Russia were to deploy nuclear weapons in 
Crimea, it would represent a significant escalation of tensions not 
just with Ukraine, but in the Black Sea region, and in Europe. If 
confirmed, I will continue to work bilaterally and through NATO with 
Ukraine and other partners and Allies in the Black Sea region and 
across the entire Eastern Flank to improve their ability to deter and 
defend against the full spectrum of Russian military threats.

    Question. Russia has increased its provocations in the Black Sea 
and is increasingly turning the region into a Russian lake. Do you 
believe that the U.S. and NATO responses to Russia's actions and 
growing militarization of Crimea have been adequate? If yes, why? If 
no, what more would you like to see done to push back on Russia in the 
Black Sea?

    Answer. Russian provocations in the Black Sea and other parts of 
Europe, including its military build-up and exercises, require robust 
NATO deterrence and strong support for NATO partners. The United States 
continues to work bilaterally and through NATO with our Allies, as well 
as Ukraine, Georgia, and other NATO partners, to improve their ability 
to deter and defend against threats to their security. Since Russia's 
2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has implemented the most significant 
reinforcement of its eastern flank in the post-Cold War era. In the 
Black Sea region, these crucial deterrence activities include tailored 
Forward Presence, a series of land, air, and maritime measures that 
have increased NATO's presence and exercises and improved situational 
awareness and readiness in Romania and Bulgaria. All of this is a 
necessary and proportionate response to Russia's aggressive behavior. 
If confirmed, I will work with our NATO Allies and partners to 
modernize their militaries and enhance their capabilities in order to 
enhance deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region.

    Question. Does Turkey's behavior with regard to increasing ties 
with Russia change how we and our allies think about future NATO 
expansion and the evolution of the NATO Strategic Concept?

    Answer. Turkish-Russian relations are transactional and fraught 
with strategic rivalries. If confirmed I will urge Turkey not to retain 
the Russian S-400 system it took delivery of in 2019 and remind Ankara 
that any new major Russian purchase risks additional CAATSA sanctions. 
Turkey is a critical ally, it has NATO's second-largest military, and 
it is a key contributor to Allied missions. Ankara's support for 
Ukraine's and Georgia's sovereignty, and Turkey's efforts to counter 
Russia in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya create significant pressure on 
Turkey-Russia relations. If confirmed I will work to advance the U.S. 
and Turkey's many shared interests while also being frank with Turkish 
counterparts on areas of disagreement.

    Question. Since undersea gas fields were discovered in the Eastern 
Mediterranean some years ago, littoral nations have been developing 
strategies to harvest and export it. Turkey and the Eastern 
Mediterranean Gas Forum have emerged as competitors over the future 
economic development of the zone.

   How should the U.S. engage with parties to ensure that economic 
        development is executed in a safe, stable, and fair way?

    Answer. The United States supports regional cooperation to bring 
durable energy security to the region, create new markets, and provide 
economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden 
administration is committed to ensuring stability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean. If confirmed, I commit to encouraging peaceful and 
diplomatic resolutions to disagreements in the region.

    Question. What are the challenges and threats we face surrounding 
the issue?

    Answer. Recent offshore gas discoveries in Israel, Egypt, and the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) have redefined regional relationships, which 
presents both challenges and opportunities. These new energy sources, 
if managed well, can continue to improve economic and political 
cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on 
Russian and Iranian supplies. This gas would also serve as a useful 
transition fuel as the region continues to reduce emissions and moves 
to greater reliance on renewable resources. New routes and types of 
fuel for European and Middle Eastern partners help to end dependence on 
Russian gas. Turkey added more LNG to its energy mix in 2020, some of 
it from the United States, in part to reduce its reliance on Russian 
and Iranian pipeline gas.

    Question. What are the security implications in the region?

    Answer. Long unresolved maritime boundary disputes have led to 
naval confrontations between littoral states. The United States 
supports all efforts to reduce tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Resource development in the Eastern Mediterranean should promote 
cooperation and provide a foundation for durable energy security and 
economic prosperity throughout the region. The ``3+1'' format including 
Greece, Israel, the ROC, plus the United States, and the East 
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which Egypt hosts and in which the 
United States is an observer, are venues to promote greater 
cooperation, energy security, and economic prosperity. The United 
States supports the EMGF as a technical platform.

    Question. President Biden and his administration have repeatedly 
made commitments to upholding universal rights at home and abroad. In 
Turkey, authorities are abusing people's human rights and attacking 
peaceful dissidents at an alarming rate.

   How will you work to address human rights violations in Turkey?

    Answer. President Biden's administration has elevated democracy, 
human rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. If 
confirmed, I will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to 
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, fair trials, and association, 
which are important to any healthy democracy. If confirmed, I will 
reinforce at the highest levels of the Turkish Government that 
addressing democratic backsliding could positively impact our bilateral 
relationship. I will also ensure a continued strong focus in our own 
assistance on media freedom and freedom of expression and will work 
with the EU and international partners to defend fundamental freedoms.

    Question. How is Turkey's declining human rights record impacting 
its relationship with the United States?

    Answer. I share your concerns about the steps the Turkish 
Government's has taken which have weakened the freedoms of expression, 
association, fair trial, and peaceful assembly. Such moves erode the 
foundations of democratic society, stifle growth, and undermine the 
rights of Turkish citizens as guaranteed by their constitution. Turkey 
is a key Ally and critical regional partner. It is in our shared 
interest to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. That 
means effectively pressing and supporting Turkey to do more to bolster 
rule of law, protect human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold 
the rules-based international order, and stand united with the 
Transatlantic community in addressing global challenges from Iran, 
Russia, and the PRC.

    Question. Do you believe that the United States should try to drive 
a wedge between Russia and Turkey? If so, how should we undertake that 
task?

    Answer. Russia attempts to harmfully influence domestic processes 
and drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including 
Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, corrupt business deals, and 
disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are dynamic, transactional, 
and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For example, Russia and 
Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional conflicts (e.g., 
Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily dependent upon 
Russian energy supplies. Russian tourists, construction sector 
projects, and agricultural purchases are important for the struggling 
Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work with Turkey to prevent 
Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally or harming our 
bilateral relationship with Ankara.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the EU and its 
member states to ensure that North Macedonia and Albania are given a 
true and fair chance at admission to the EU?

    Answer. The United States recognizes that a prolonged delay in 
starting accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania will 
have significant political consequences in both countries and could 
severely set back recent reform progress in North Macedonia and the 
entire Western Balkans. Both countries have enacted difficult and 
essential reforms to meet conditions for opening negotiations and 
deserve to advance on their accession paths. If confirmed, I will work 
closely with the EU and its member states as part of our shared 
political and financial commitment to the Western Balkan region.

    Question. France and Bulgaria, for two different reasons, have 
stymied efforts to open accession negotiations with Macedonia and 
Albania. If confirmed, will you engage with France and Bulgaria on this 
topic? If so, how?

    Answer. Although the EU approved opening accession negotiations 
with North Macedonia and Albania in March 2020, Bulgaria has blocked 
the official start of negotiations since November due to its ongoing 
dispute with North Macedonia. On June 10 in Paris, French President 
Macron reaffirmed support for North Macedonia's EU accession without 
delay. On May 21, the Portuguese EU Council Presidency presented to 
both countries' leaderships a promising, creative resolution proposal, 
to which the current Slovenian EU Presidency committed its continued 
support. If confirmed, I will work with all countries involved to see 
the EU hold the first Intergovernmental Conferences with North 
Macedonia and Albania as soon as possible.

    Question. How do you believe the United States should interact with 
the EU as we work together to find a solution to the issues between 
Kosovo and Serbia? Should the United States be in the lead on these 
efforts? The EU?

    Answer. From its inception, the United States has strongly 
supported the EU-facilitated Dialogue to normalize Kosovo-Serbia 
relations. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate with our EU partners 
and engage both Kosovo and Serbia to advance the process. A 
comprehensive normalization agreement remains the only way for Kosovo 
and Serbia to unlock their EU futures. The United States believes 
normalization should be centered on mutual recognition, as the best way 
for these two neighbors to put this dispute behind them. Both parties 
have re-engaged in the EU-facilitated talks--the most recent high-level 
session took place on July 19 in Brussels--and both countries have 
reiterated their commitments to normalizing their relations.

    Question. Russia and China have voiced their shared belief that the 
Office of the High Representative to Bosnia should be shut down in 
2022, saying that Bosnia has achieved the progress necessary to have 
such oversight removed. Do you agree that the Office of the High 
Representative has outlived its usefulness? If yes, why? If no, what do 
you believe should be the path forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

    Answer. The United States remains steadfast in our support of the 
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH). The OHR plays a critical role in pressing for BiH's progress 
towards reconciliation, consolidation of democratic institutions, and 
further Euro-Atlantic integration. The conditions for closing the OHR 
were clearly laid out in 2008 in the 5+2 Agenda with the support of the 
Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, including Russia. These 
conditions have not yet been achieved, and urgent reforms are still 
necessary. Focus on the fulfillment of the 5+2, plus anti-corruption 
initiatives, will advance BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path. If confirmed, 
I will collaborate with incoming High Representative Christian Schmidt 
on these priorities.

    Question. Earlier this year, Senator Menendez and I passed the 
Ukraine Security Partnership Act out of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee. It aims to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian-
backed separatists in the east and push the country to continue 
necessary reforms of its military and defense sectors. In the bill, we 
propose placing conditions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding.

   What is your view on Ukraine's historical response to 
        conditionality?

    Answer. It is my belief that certain types of conditions on 
assistance, such as those imposed by the IMF or Department of Defense, 
can be powerful drivers for reform. The Department of Defense, in 
consultation with the Department of State, has annually certified that 
Ukraine has met the certification requirements described in Section 
1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 
(c)(2). If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the 
Department of Defense and my colleagues in the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs to ensure the conditions placed on future assistance 
further advance Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and military 
transformation efforts.

    Question. Do you believe that increasing conditionality on a 
portion of military support for the country would provide incentive for 
further reforms?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance our objectives of 
ensuring Ukraine has the military capabilities it needs to defend 
itself against ongoing Russian aggression, is systematically advancing 
security sector reform priorities, and is taking full advantage of U.S. 
assistance programs like IMET. I am committed to working with my 
colleagues in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs to support a policy approach that most effectively achieves 
these objectives.

    Question. What do you believe are the areas that are most ripe for 
reform in Ukraine?

    Answer. Ukraine has made tremendous strides in its thirty years of 
independence, and particularly since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. 
These gains have been made often with significant U.S. support. There 
remains a real need to continue to make progress, and, if confirmed, I 
will push for further progress on economic and rule of law reforms that 
address corruption and strengthen the independence, transparency, and 
integrity of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I will also work with 
Ukraine to help hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of 
reforms or try to undermine Ukraine's efforts to ensure a bright, 
prosperous, and secure future for all Ukrainians.

    Question. China is increasingly making inroads in Ukraine, wooing 
it with appealing business deals and the promise of vaccines. What 
steps should the United States and its allies take to keep Ukraine 
firmly rooted in the West and to keep Ukraine's valuable technological 
know-how from falling into the wrong hands?

    Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that American 
companies can operate on an even playing field in Ukraine, providing a 
meaningful alternative to China's predatory approach as well as 
promoting entrepreneurship and fair practices. If confirmed, I will 
focus on supporting Ukraine's economic and corporate governance 
reforms, countering the PRC's predatory business practices, and 
leveraging U.S. assistance to ensure outcomes in line with U.S. and 
Ukrainian national security interests.

    Question. Ukraine continues to fight two wars: one with the Kremlin 
and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and 
independence; and a second with its own demons, particularly the 
entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic 
transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.

   Should the United States continue to condition certain types of 
        assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms? 
        Should existing conditions for aid be expanded?

    Answer. It is my belief that certain types of conditionality, such 
as those imposed by the IMF for financial assistance to Ukraine, can be 
powerful drivers for economic and anti-corruption reform. At this time, 
I consider the conditions for continued IMF disbursement, if met by 
Ukraine, an important motivator of crucial judicial and corporate 
governance reform and protecting central bank independence. If 
confirmed, I will continue to encourage Ukraine to address the concerns 
of the IMF and the U.S. over backsliding on legislative action and 
empowerment of anticorruption institutions.

    Question. What further incentives does the United States, along 
with our European partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its 
land reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-
enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive judiciary?

    Answer. If confirmed I will continue to work in coordination with 
our European partners, and directly with Ukraine, to support its chosen 
Euro-Atlantic path, including by providing assistance and pushing for 
progress on economic and rule of law reforms that strengthen the 
independence and transparency of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I 
welcome the judicial reform laws recently passed by Ukraine's 
parliament with the strong backing of the President of Ukraine and have 
been encouraged by Ukraine's willingness to challenge the influence of 
corrupt oligarchs. For Ukraine to be a strong, secure, and democratic 
state, it must tackle endemic corruption and ensure the protection of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Ukrainians.

    Question. Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good 
progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic 
reforms and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the 
EU and NATO. However, over the past few years, the country has suffered 
democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the judiciary, media, 
and the ruling political party.

   What levers can be used to push Georgians, including and especially 
        the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary 
        and complete electoral reforms? Should we consider sanctions?

    Answer. Much work remains to reverse backsliding and strengthen 
democratic institutions and norms in Georgia. Deeper electoral and 
judicial reforms, and the effective implementation of reforms, are 
needed to level the playing field and introduce transparency, 
independence, impartiality, and accountability. If confirmed, my team 
and I will support Georgia in these efforts, employing diplomatic 
engagement, exchanges, and assistance programs. We will also seek to 
take lessons learned from across the region to advance important 
reforms, which will strengthen Georgia's resilience to Russia's 
aggression and ongoing occupation of 20 percent of Georgia's territory. 
We will evaluate all available tools and forms of leverage to push 
Georgia's governing party to complete these reforms inclusively and 
transparently.

    Question. Has the political and governance situation in Georgia 
reached the point at which we should re-evaluate our relationship with 
the country, including by conditioning certain aid to Georgia?

    Answer. I share your concern about the current political tensions 
and lack of progress on urgently needed reforms. It is in the U.S. 
interest, however, to continue to support Georgia in becoming more 
democratic, more capable of countering Russian and other malign 
influence, more able to defend the rights of its citizens throughout 
its internationally recognized territory (included that occupied by 
Russia), and more economically prosperous. U.S. foreign assistance 
programs are an integral part of furthering U.S strategic interests in 
Georgia and any proposed conditionality should be approached with this 
in mind. If confirmed, my team and I will evaluate all available tools 
and forms of leverage, and I would welcome the opportunity to work 
closely with you to advance U.S. interests in Georgia.

    Question. The U.S. Embassy in Russia has been working under duress 
for a number of years and is now facing extreme pressure due to 
restrictions on the hiring of locally employed staff. The Russian 
Embassy in Washington and the Russian Government in Moscow have not 
proved terribly willing to work with the United States to make sure 
that our embassy is fully staffed and able to continue operations.

   What can be done to negotiate a solution with Russia and restore 
        our full embassy operations?

    Answer. I am disappointed by the decision of the Russian Government 
to impose restrictions on the U.S. mission to Russia. It is at times 
like these that we need more open channels of communication between our 
governments, including through our respective embassies. Locally 
employed staff are key members of our workforce around the world. Their 
contributions are important to our operations and to our bilateral 
missions. If confirmed, I am committed to working to put our Mission on 
better footing to advance on our vital national security priorities.

    Question. What can be done to support our embassy until we reach a 
solution, or if we cannot?

    Answer. I look forward to working across the Department to identify 
how we can best leverage resources--both financial and personnel--to 
support Embassy Moscow. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring our 
embassy colleagues receive the support needed to continue executing 
core functions.

    Question. What do you believe should be the role of sanctions in 
the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy? With respect to 
Russia, how do you believe the sanctions imposed on that country since 
2014 have affected the Russia's economic and foreign policy decision-
making?

    Answer. Sanctions are a critical tool in both the formulation and 
implementation of U.S. foreign policy, serving as a key deterrent to 
Russia as well as conveying U.S. intent. U.S. sanctions on Russia, 
especially those implemented in coordination with allies, send a clear 
message: that the international community will not stand by while 
Russia continues to violate international norms and laws. The sanctions 
imposed since 2014 have deterred and deprived Russia of the resources 
to carry out its aggressive and destabilizing activities around the 
globe. The legislative tools that Congress has created are key to the 
effective use of sanctions, and if confirmed, I will advocate to use 
them to promote accountability and impose costs for Russia's harmful 
activities.

    Question. Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can 
the United States (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of 
more clearly defining the conditions necessary for rolling back or 
removing sanctions with respect to Russia?

    Answer. Sanctions are designed to cause a change in behavior, and 
the most useful sanctions are those with clearly defined intent. The 
administration sent a clear message to Russia that its activities 
against the United States would no longer be tolerated via the 
sanctions imposed in its April 15 action, ``Imposing Costs for Harmful 
Foreign Activities by the Russian Government'' including through the 
issuance of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. This EO is an important 
complement to existing legislative sanctions tools, providing the 
flexibility to target Russian entities engaged in hostile or 
destabilizing activity around the globe. If confirmed, I will advocate 
to use all these tools to push back against harmful behavior by Russia.

    Question. Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on 
Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures 
besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect 
to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia?

    Answer. U.S. sanctions on Russia, especially those implemented in 
coordination with allies, send a clear message: the international 
community will not stand by while Russia continues to violate 
international norms and laws. The sanctions imposed since 2014 have 
imposed a measure of deterrence and diminished the resources to carry 
out Russia's aggressive and destabilizing activities around the globe. 
The administration has been clear that it will use every tool 
available--including economic sanctions--to promote accountability and 
impose costs on Russia for its continued acts of aggression.

    Question. As relations between the U.S. and Russia have worsened, 
the level of people-to-people contact has likewise diminished.

   If confirmed, what outreach do you intend to undertake with to 
        everyday Russians, if any?

    Answer. The Russian Government has intensified its crackdown on 
civil society and independent media and is specifically targeting 
programs promoting cultural and academic exchanges with Western 
countries, including shutting down Bard College's 25-year-old joint 
degree program with Russia's Smolny University. It is therefore even 
more critical now for us to engage with everyday Russians and to share 
our values and insights from the American experience in democracy. The 
U.S. Embassy Russia has been able to adopt a wide range of new virtual 
tools, hybrid engagements, and exchange programming for this purpose. 
If confirmed, I am committed to continuing and finding new ways to 
expand outreach to the Russian people.

    Question. Are there new, more creative mechanisms (perhaps through 
technology) that the United States can use to rebuild person-to-person 
relationships between Americans and Russians?

    Answer. I support the continued use of new technology and other 
tools to facilitate person-to-person interaction between Americans and 
Russians, who continue to be interested in engagement with the West 
despite obstacles. In addition to the work the U.S. Embassy is already 
doing with virtual and hybrid engagements, the U.S. Agency for Global 
Media is exploring ways to enhance its ability to reach Russian 
audiences, including through the Open Technology Fund, even if the 
Kremlin forces Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to leave its physical 
bureau in Russia. If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening civil 
society partners and people to people engagements to foster mutual 
understanding.

    Question. The State Department just released the 2021 Trafficking 
in Person's Report, which identified a troubling trend of backsliding 
on trafficking prevention, prosecution, and protection efforts from a 
number of Western European nations, including Norway, Switzerland, 
Ireland, Portugal and more. It is clear that something must be done to 
address this serious, ongoing issue to curb this scourge.

   If confirmed, please outline what steps you would take in your 
        various bilateral relationships to address this problem.

    Answer. Trafficking in persons is an appalling crime. If confirmed, 
I will prioritize bilateral engagement across Europe and Eurasia to 
press governments, including Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and 
Switzerland, to address the concerns the Department has highlighted in 
this year's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, and to take concrete 
action to combat trafficking. If confirmed, I will call out 
shortcomings where they exist, and use the annual reports to assist 
each government to identify priority areas for improvement and 
encourage each to implement the TIP Report's recommended improvements.

    Question. If confirmed, will you raise this issue with Foreign 
Ministries at the first opportunity?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will raise this issue with foreign 
ministries as combating human trafficking is a priority for the United 
States and will also be a priority of mine.

    Question. Anti-Semitism is on the rise globally, but especially 
across Europe. If confirmed, what steps will you take alongside the 
Office of the Special Envoy To Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism to 
address this concerning and growing problem?

    Answer. Anti-Semitism is abhorrent. If confirmed, I will prioritize 
combating anti-Semitism in the region alongside the Office of the 
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I 
intend to work with Congress and implement the following priorities: 
securing Jewish communities; reporting, investigating, and prosecuting 
hate crimes; countering anti-Semitism both on- and off-line; promoting 
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of 
Antisemitism; building and strengthening coalitions across different 
faith communities, civil society, and the private sector; and promoting 
Holocaust education, remembrance, and commemoration, and combating 
Holocaust distortion and denial.

    Question. Across Europe, there are over 100 detained journalists 
who were imprisoned for simply doing their jobs. In 2021, the Council 
of Europe notes 6 journalists have been killed in Europe alone. These 
statistics are staggering and require immediate attention and action 
from the United States Government. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, 
how will you address this problem and assure our partners and allies 
that we will not allow the abuse and imprisonment of journalists 
anywhere in the world?

    Answer. Promoting and defending independent media is key to an 
informed citizenry and healthy democratic institutions and processes. 
If confirmed, I will seek to deepen our engagement with partners in 
Europe to address the challenges facing journalists in Europe and the 
media globally. This includes working through regional organizations 
including the Council of Europe. Additionally, I will support efforts 
to promote accountability for those who commit abuses against 
journalists through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; public 
messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and foreign assistance 
programs, including rapid response resources that support journalists, 
civil society activists, and human rights defenders under threat.

    Question. The lack of meaningful progress regarding Cyprus on the 
political front and the subsequent peacekeeping mission, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is quite troubling.

    Answer. The status quo is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will 
continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify 
the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation to benefit all Cypriots 
and the wider region. The United States appreciates the U.N. Secretary-
General's efforts to restart political discussions on Cyprus. If 
confirmed, I will encourage both sides to demonstrate the necessary 
openness, flexibility, and compromise to find common ground to restart 
formal talks. I believe UNFICYP continues to play an important role in 
preventing a resurgence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot communities, supervising ceasefire lines, maintaining a 
buffer zone, and supporting the Secretary-General's Good Offices.

    Question. Do you believe reaching a political settlement is 
possible?

    Answer. Yes. But ultimately, the responsibility for finding a 
solution lies first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves.

    Question. Turkish President Erdogan's recent behavior regarding 
Varosha is unacceptable and a flagrant disregard of current 
international norms and two U.N. Resolutions. If confirmed, what 
actions would you take to address this issue and growing, illegal 
Turkish activity in northern Cyprus?

    Answer. The announcement by Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and 
Turkish President Erdogan on July 20 regarding the transfer of parts of 
Varosha to Turkish Cypriot control was clearly inconsistent with U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789, provocative, unacceptable, 
and incompatible with their past commitments to engage constructively 
in settlement talks. If confirmed, I will work to urge Turkish Cypriots 
and Turkey to reverse their decision announced on July 20 and all steps 
taken since October 2020, and work with the international community to 
give a strong response to this action. I will also underscore the need 
to avoid provocative unilateral actions that increase tensions on the 
island and hinder efforts to resume Cyprus settlement talks in line 
with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

    Question. Do you see President Erdogan's calls for ``a two-state 
solution'' in Cyprus as feasible?

    Answer. A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the 
island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation is the only path to lasting 
peace and stability. This is the only framework with broad 
international community support and approved by the U.N. Security 
Council.

    Question. Maintaining recent stability in Kosovo remains a 
priority, but some Security Council members (including the United 
States) have indicated a desire to downsize the mission. If confirmed, 
would you support a strategic review of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)?

    Answer. Although the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has operated in 
Kosovo since its independence in 2008, it has long since fulfilled its 
original purpose. U.N. engagement with Kosovo in a more appropriate 
form that acknowledges and strengthens Kosovo's sovereignty could 
provide an important support for continued development of democratic 
institutions. If confirmed, I would continue to urge that the U.N. 
Security Council consider better ways of helping Kosovo to realize its 
full potential, which a strategic review could identify. It should be 
noted that Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, 
unhelpfully insists on UNMIK remaining in its current incarnation. I 
would also caution that change to the NATO security presence should be 
conditions-based.

    Question. Since the August 9th presidential election, Belarusians 
have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to contest the 
official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander Lukashenka 
another term. The Government has responded to these peaceful protests 
with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances, arrests, 
torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists. Since the 
protests began, the United States has increased its support of civil 
society in Belarus. What more can the United States-through USAID and 
along with our European allies-do to assist Belarusian advocates of 
democracy?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work energetically with 
partners and Allies to keep pressure on the Lukashenka regime to end 
repression, release all political prisoners and begin an inclusive 
dialogue with the opposition (including the Coordination Council led by 
Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya) that leads to free and fair elections under 
international observation. Specifically, I plan to continue efforts to 
coordinate and strengthen economic sanctions, provide assistance and 
support for civil society- including those working to support human 
rights, free press, democracy, and Belarus' independence- and keep 
pressure on the regime through all bilateral and multilateral 
diplomatic channels.

    Question. The International Monetary Fund is in the process of 
sending around $1 billion to Belarus as part of its program to use 
Special Drawing Rights to help the world's poorer countries emerge from 
the coronavirus pandemic. In Belarus, this money will go right into 
Lukashenka's pocket and will help keep him in power.

   What can or should the United States do to make sure that these 
        monies are not given to Mr. Lukashenka?

    Answer. It is my understanding that the United States retains the 
right to refuse to purchase Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) from any 
country that we choose, including those under U.S. sanction regimes. We 
are working with Treasury to develop a strategy to engage our like-
minded allies to do the same. However, these countries will not 
automatically be able to exchange their SDRs- which are reserve assets- 
for hard currencies. Belarus would need to find a willing country to 
provide them with hard currency in exchange for their SDRs. If 
confirmed, I will continue working with our partners at the Department 
of Treasury to increase transparency around SDR exchanges.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working to keep these 
funds out of Lukashenka's hands?

    Answer. Yes, I commit to using all tools at my disposal to prevent 
the Belarusian authorities from exchanging their SDRs for hard 
currency.

    Question. How important is it that the United States and its 
European allies take steps to make our own systems less friendly to 
kleptocracy and less penetrable by dirty money?

    Answer. The United States will continue to work with European 
partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and 
return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in 
corruption; combat money-laundering; stem foreign bribery; and empower 
and protect civil society and independent media. The United States 
supports the work at the OSCE and Council of Europe to help 
participating states implement more effective and transparent 
anticorruption policies and mechanisms and ensure countries are 
following through on their international anticorruption commitments. If 
confirmed, I will also support the work of countering corruption in our 
own system and continued use of sanctions related to the Global 
Magnitsky Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by 
President Biden on June 8, 2021, and others.

    Question. Will the administration make a concerted push on anti-
corruption in the EU and its periphery with the dual purpose of 
benefitting European citizens and making it more difficult for malign 
actors like Russia and China to gain a foothold?

    Answer. The United States remains committed to combatting 
corruption not only in Europe, but across the globe. Fighting 
corruption benefits citizens while also making it more difficult for 
malign actors to exert their influence. If confirmed, I will continue 
to work with governments across Europe and Eurasia to strengthen anti-
corruption efforts, and encourage these countries to work to fulfill 
their obligations under the U.N. Convention against Corruption, and to 
implement the recommendations of regional organizations, such as the 
OSCE and the Council of Europe, to combat corruption. I will also 
support the continued use of sanctions related to the Global Magnitsky 
Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by President 
Biden on June 8, 2021, and others to combat corruption in the region.

    Question. The United States and France share several overlapping 
priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa and work together on many fronts, 
including fighting the terror threat in the Sahel. However, American 
and French interests in the region do not always align, including with 
regard to the ongoing conflict in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon.

   If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to ensure 
        that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the 
        Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various 
        points of leverage and capability the United States and France 
        each bring to the table?

    Answer. France has significant ties in the Sahel and West and 
Central Africa, and is a steadfast partner in the fight against 
terrorism. Our shared priorities include security, governance, economic 
development, and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I 
will continue our deep cooperation in Africa with France. I will engage 
the French on our priorities in West and Central Africa, encouraging 
them to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural 
influence toward long-term stability in these regions. I will work 
within our interagency to support French efforts when mutually 
beneficial.

    Question. How can the United States better coordinate with France 
to holistically address security threats and improve diplomatic 
engagements in the Sahel and West and Central Africa from a holistic 
perspective?

    Answer. Both France and the United States share security, 
governance, economic development, and recovery from the COVID-19 
pandemic as priorities in the Sahel and West and Central Africa. These 
priorities cannot be achieved independent of one another. If confirmed, 
I will work strategically and tactically with the French to ensure that 
our efforts are mutually supportive and reinforcing. I will encourage 
the French to use their strong political, economic, security, and 
cultural influence to promote the political, security, and democratic 
reforms that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions, 
and work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned 
with ours.

    Question. How can the United States better coordinate and 
collaborate with the European Union, as well as individual European 
Governments such as the U.K., to enhance policy consistency and advance 
mutually-beneficial opportunities for trade, investment, development, 
and security cooperation with the African Union, regional bodies, 
African Governments, and private sector partners?

    Answer. The EU and European Governments are crucial partners of the 
United States to advance prosperity and security in Africa. On June 12, 
President Biden and G7 leaders agreed to launch a global infrastructure 
initiative called Build Back Better World that will mobilize private 
sector capital in four areas of focus--climate, health and health 
security, digital technology and gender equity and equality. The scope 
of this initiative will include Africa, as well as Latin America, the 
Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. The June 15 U.S.-EU Summit Joint 
Statement confirmed that the United States and the EU are committed to 
peace and sustainable development in Africa, and plan to provide 
support for a sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic. U.S.-EU 
cooperation resulted in the U.N. Human Rights Council's July 13 
decision to adopt an EU-led and U.S.-cosponsored resolution on the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia, and to defeat hostile amendments. If 
confirmed, I will work collaboratively with our European partners to 
continue our cooperation.

    Question. Russian malign activity in Africa is increasingly a 
growing concern, particularly given credible reports of elections 
interference across the continent and deployment of Russian 
mercenaries, including through the Wagner Group in Northern Mozambique 
and through nontransparent transfers of weapons and training via 
Russian security sector support to the Touadera administration in the 
Central African Republic (CAR). From your perspective, how can the 
Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs coordinate 
to more effectively counter the malign activities and influence of 
Russia in Africa generally and, more specifically, of Yevgeny Prigozhin 
and affiliated mining and security companies (like the Wagner Group) in 
Africa?

    Answer. Russian harmful activity in Africa is a matter of grave and 
growing concern. The use of proxies like Prigozhin's enterprise in the 
Central African Republic and elsewhere is a particular threat to 
stability, good governance, and human rights on the continent. I know 
the Bureaus of European and Eurasian and African Affairs are already 
working in close coordination on this issue, something I would seek to 
continue and build upon if confirmed. I would also prioritize 
collaboration with our European Allies and partners on this issue, as 
they too are invested in the future of the African continent, directly 
and via various U.N. programs. The UK and EU have already designated 
Prigozhin for sanctions, a clear signal that they also take this threat 
seriously.

    Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters housed at various 
detention facilities around the world. This includes at least 2,000 
foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist fighters.'' Many of these 
FTFs are housed at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, like al 
Hol in northeastern Syria. The al-Hol IDP camp has become fertile 
ground for ISIS recruitment of vulnerable populations, posing a serious 
risk to global security. Despite this risk, countries with foreign 
terrorist fighters have failed to make any progress to date towards 
repatriating their nationals.

   Can you commit to using all tools at your disposal to press the 
        Europe and Eurasia region to repatriate nationals from camps 
        for ISIS fighters and affiliates in northeast Syria?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I intend to encourage countries to 
repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, including foreign 
terrorist fighters and associated family members, and to prosecute 
them, as appropriate. As I understand it, the Department holds that 
repatriation--followed by appropriate prosecution in domestic courts of 
law--is the best way to keep these fighters off the battlefield and 
hold them accountable for their crimes. If confirmed, I will also 
support repatriation of associated family members as a means to 
rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals into their local communities, 
as appropriate.

    Question. How do you plan to engage with EUR countries to advance 
repatriation efforts, which remains a critical to ensure the enduring 
defeat of ISIS?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue our consistent 
diplomatic outreach to European and Eurasian countries urging them to 
repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria. I will collaborate 
with the interagency in their work to support countries' efforts to 
repatriate their nationals with logistical and planning assistance for 
repatriations, including the use of U.S. Government assets to transport 
foreign fighters and associated family members out of the region.

    Question. United Nations humanitarian assistance program in Syria 
relies on the border crossings from Turkey to deliver aid to millions 
of Syrians. Although Russia held off from vetoing the renewal of the 
last remaining border crossing, it will need to be renewed in December. 
In the event all border crossings between Turkey and Syria close, what 
alternatives do we have to get aid to the Syrian people? How could we 
pressure the Assad regime and Russia to provide aid in our stead?

    Answer. The United States led a successful diplomatic campaign to 
overcome Russian opposition and renew the U.N. Security Council's 
mandate authorizing cross-border humanitarian assistance from Turkey 
into Syria. I continue to believe that cross-line assistance alone 
cannot meet existing humanitarian needs, which is why extending the 
cross-border mandate at Bab al-Hawa for another year was so important. 
If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Bureau of Near 
Eastern Affairs to move forward on a political solution in line with 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and continued engagement between 
the United States, Russia, Turkey, and other key players in Syria.

    Question. In your assessment, what are the top five most pressing 
challenges the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to both the 
United States and Europe?

    Answer. The most pressing challenge posed by the PRC is its attempt 
to undermine the rules-based international order, including the multi-
lateral U.N. system. If confirmed, I will stand up for democracy, human 
rights, and human dignity in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. I will 
work to support Taiwan, a leading democracy and essential partner, in 
keeping with U.S. commitments. I will make it a priority to support 
efforts to ensure supply chains for critical supplies are secure and 
free of forced labor. I will work with Allies and partners to defend 
access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation under 
international law. And finally, if confirmed, I will work with Congress 
and Allies to confront Beijing's coercive economic practices, unfair 
and illegal trade practices, and cyber theft.

    Question. What are the areas that the United States and EU have the 
most opportunity to work together on mutual challenges posed by the 
PRC, and which areas still require regulatory reform (either U.S. or 
EU) to better facilitate cooperation?

    Answer. The United States and EU intend to closely consult and 
cooperate on the challenges posed by China, including through the U.S.-
EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. It 
is important that the United States and EU work together to confront 
Beijing on the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang and human rights abuses in 
Tibet and Hong Kong, protect freedom of navigation in the East and 
South China Seas, and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. 
If confirmed, I will work with the EU to promote an open, free, secure, 
and reliable digital space and, along with likeminded partners around 
the world, work to ensure the rules governing tomorrow's technology are 
based in democratic values.

    Question. How do you view Europe's attempts at strategic autonomy, 
and what challenges does it pose to U.S. cooperation with Europe on 
issues related to the PRC?

    Answer. We welcome efforts of our Allies and partners to strengthen 
their capacity and capabilities, but it is important that these efforts 
be compatible with our alliances and contribute to Transatlantic 
security. Together, the United States and its Allies and partners set 
the global rules of the road, and we must continue to do so. If 
confirmed, I will seek to resolve difficult issues with our European 
Allies and partners while safeguarding U.S. interests and ensuring a 
level playing field for U.S. companies. As Secretary Blinken has noted, 
the United States will be much more effective in engaging the PRC when 
we do so with our Allies and partners.

    Question. The United Kingdom has previously joined U.S. freedom of 
navigation operations in the South China Sea, and France recently 
announced it would set up a coast guard network with the Pacific Island 
nations to deter predatory and coercive behavior. What other 
opportunities are there for the European countries to increase their 
presence in the Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. The Biden administration supports robust engagement by 
European counterparts in the Indo-Pacific. Some European countries, 
including Germany and the Netherlands, have published Indo-Pacific 
strategies, and EU member states have tasked the European Commission 
and European External Action Service to release an Indo-Pacific 
strategy by September. The United States supports the UK's ``Indo-
Pacific Tilt'' to the region and its ongoing deployment of the UK-led 
Aircraft Carrier Strike Group 21 which plans to transit through the 
South China Sea. If confirmed, I plan to support ongoing efforts by the 
EU and European counterparts to direct more diplomatic, military, 
economic, and other resources to the region.

    Question. In my China-Europe report published last fall, I discuss 
the importance of overcoming barriers to U.S.-Europe technology 
cooperation to counter Chinese technology supremacy, including working 
through competing regulatory approaches on joint-R&D, data transfer, 
and privacy shields. What steps do the U.S. and Europe each need to 
take with respect to technology regulations, and what do you see as the 
hardest obstacles to overcome in this area?

    Answer. President Biden and his EU counterparts established the 
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council as a forum to demonstrate to the 
world how democratic approaches to trade, technology, and innovation 
can improve the lives of our citizens and counter authoritarian 
influence in the digital realm. Discussions on an enhanced Privacy 
Shield framework also underscore our shared commitment to privacy, data 
protection, and the rule of law; our mutual recognition of the 
importance of transatlantic data flows to our respective citizens, 
economies, and societies; and our common interest in aligning against 
the growing government surveillance ambitions of authoritarian states. 
If confirmed, I will work to deepen cooperation in these important 
areas.

    Question. The latest EU strategy on China mentions ``the importance 
of peace and stability across the Taiwan strait.'' What should the EU 
do to better support Taiwan in light of an increasingly aggressive PRC?

    Answer. Taiwan is a leading democracy, a critical U.S. security and 
economic partner, and a key U.S. partner in addressing shared global 
challenges. The United States continues to encourage European allies 
and partners to engage and publicly support Taiwan. The U.S. commitment 
to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and 
stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific. If 
confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts to support 
Taiwan and encourage our European Allies and partners to do the same.

    Question. My China-Europe report, published last fall, covers the 
growing presence of PRC companies in building undersea cables. The 
previous administration focused on this issue through its Clean Cable 
initiative, and by providing financing for specific cable projects in 
the Indo-Pacific. A PRC company--Huawei Marine (now called HMN 
Technologies)--is currently constructing an undersea cable that 
terminates in Marseilles, France. Please describe your understanding of 
PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications and 
risks for U.S. and allied interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this 
area of technology if you are confirmed?

    Answer. As with 5G networks, the Biden administration views the 
security of commercial undersea communications cables as a high 
priority. The secure development and deployment of undersea cables and 
related infrastructure in both developed and developing economies is of 
critical concern to the United States. Countries and citizens need to 
be able to trust that such equipment will not introduce risks that 
threaten national security, personal privacy, or human rights. If 
confirmed, I look forward to engaging on this topic with our European 
allies and partners to promote open, interoperable, reliable, and 
secure information and communications technology infrastructure.



                               __________


     Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
            Dr.Karen Donfried by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Support for Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights: 
Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance, which begins 
with fighting corruption and must continue to be a priority of U.S. 
policy.

   What more can we do to further these efforts with our European 
        partners, especially on the battle against corruption?

    Answer. The United States will continue to work with European 
partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and 
return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in 
corruption; combat money-laundering; and stem foreign bribery. If 
confirmed, I will support the OSCE's work to help participating States 
create robust anti-money laundering regimes, a solid ethics 
infrastructure, and sound financial and resource management.

    Question. How can we better work within the OSCE to address these 
issues?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would also encourage the OSCE to take a 
cross-dimensional approach to anticorruption that focuses on building 
the capacity of law enforcement, strengthening legal frameworks, and 
defending members of civil society and the media which expose 
corruption.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Somalia: As you are aware, the Trump administration ended 
our troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has 
dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.

   If confirmed, what actions will you take to support a sustainable 
        political transition in Somalia?

    Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting Somali efforts 
to complete a timely, peaceful, and transparent electoral process, 
which is vital for the advancement of political reconciliation and 
governance, security, and economic reforms. I am prepared to engage 
with Somali leaders to ensure they follow through with their 
commitments with respect to the electoral and government formation 
processes. I also will coordinate closely with other international 
partners to ensure consistent policies and messages, and to discourage 
efforts that could exacerbate political tensions or disrupt a political 
transition.

    Question. In what specific areas should the United States focus 
security assistance in Somalia going forward? Are there lessons learned 
from long running security assistance programs that you believe could 
be better applied?

    Answer. The United States supports efforts to advance peace and 
security in Somalia with a wide range of activities. If confirmed, I am 
committed to reviewing State Department-administered security 
assistance programs in Somalia to ensure they are effectively and 
efficiently advancing our policy goals. If confirmed, I will prioritize 
close coordination with regional and international partners in the 
security sector, accountability of U.S. security assistance, and 
mentorship and training of partnered forces.
    Lessons learned applicable to Somalia include biometric enrollment 
of Somalia National Army (SNA) forces receiving U.S. support, sustained 
mentorship and training of SNA and African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) forces and the introduction of clear accountability procedures 
for U.S. assistance when transferred to partners. With regard to 
lessons learned on mentoring, U.S. security assistance monitoring has 
identified that the SNA-Danab program improved by recruiting for clan 
appropriate battalions, increasing the recruitment of women, and 
ensuring the Federal Government of Somalia and its Member States agree 
to both support SNA-Danab. Over time, the results have demonstrated 
increased unit cohesion and pride, successful joint operations with the 
AU Mission in Somalia Forces, and lower instances of desertion.

Somalia
    Question. As you are aware, the Trump administration ended our 
troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has 
dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.

   If confirmed, how will you work to better manage the sometimes of 
        unhelpful engagement of outside actors in Somalia, including 
        neighboring states and countries from the Middle East like 
        Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar? If confirmed, how do you plan to 
        engage the Bureau of Near East Affairs on issues relate to the 
        Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Corridor?

    Answer. The United States has close and constructive relations with 
many of the external actors engaged in Somalia, including the Gulf 
states, Turkey, and some of Somalia's neighbors. If confirmed, I would 
collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to employ U.S. 
influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to engage 
strategically to promote long-term security and stability in Somalia 
specifically and the Horn of Africa more broadly.

Nigeria
    Question. Poor governance and leadership have prevented Nigeria 
from reaching its full potential. Endemic corruption remains a 
challenge. There is little accountability for extrajudicial killings by 
security forces. ISIS West Africa Province remains a potent force in 
the northeast, and, intercommunal violence and banditry plague various 
parts of the country.

   If confirmed, how will you engage with the Nigerian Government on 
        these challenges?

    Answer. The United States has a strong and enduring relationship 
with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy and economy.? Nigeria's 
stability and economic growth can advance our mutual prosperity as well 
as that of West Africa and the broader continent. If confirmed, I will 
continue to raise the profile of our engagement with Nigerian leaders 
to advance our national security priorities and strengthen our 
collaboration to address security, economic, and governance challenges. 
Working with other State Department bureaus and U.S. Government 
agencies, I will support our investments in training Nigerian security 
forces to build their effectiveness in fighting common threats and 
serving the Nigerian people, increase accountability for military or 
police personnel who commit human rights violations and abuses, and 
strengthen security forces coordination. Working across the U.S. 
interagency and in partnership with Nigeria's new Ambassador to the 
United States as well as civil society stakeholders and the Nigerian 
diaspora, I will undertake a holistic approach to our bilateral 
relationship that emphasizes shared values and candid dialogue. Through 
the annual Bi-National Commission and in other bilateral and 
multilateral meetings and fora, I will engage actively with Nigerian 
leaders within and beyond government to champion the strengthening of 
democratic institutions, diversification of its economy, and pursuit of 
important reforms.

    Question. Do you commit to working with the committee to develop a 
coherent framework in which to provide security assistance before 
moving forward with additional arms sales and security assistance 
programs in Nigeria?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to actively reinforce the importance of 
civilian protection, and respect for human rights in all elements of 
our security assistance to Nigeria. I will urge the Nigerian Government 
to hold security force elements accountable for human rights abuses and 
violations. To help Nigeria reduce the risk of civilian harm, I will 
support a combination of legal training and advising to provide 
stronger underpinnings for the Nigerian military and police to address 
systematic human rights concerns, develop a professional process for 
military justice and police accountability, and develop more 
disciplined security forces.
    Arms sales and security assistance programs in Nigeria help bring 
about incremental institutional reform. I will seek to combine military 
and law enforcement capability sales with comprehensive training and 
maintenance programs. Our goal, which the Nigerian Government supports, 
is greater professionalism of Nigerian security services. Recent 
improvements demonstrate that Nigeria is a willing security partner, 
making needed investments and security sector institutional reforms 
that will bring lasting results in combatting a variety of security 
challenges.

    Question. If confirmed, what new, innovative approaches will you 
recommend that administration take to mitigate conflict, stop human 
rights abuses, counterbalance Russian influence, and help the people of 
CAR achieve a stable democracy?

    Answer. The United States supports CAR's efforts to develop strong 
institutions and strengthen the rule of law through capacity building 
and technical assistance. If confirmed, I will work to increase 
coordination within the Department of State, across the U.S. 
Government, and with likeminded partners such as the European Union and 
France to ensure our efforts are aligned and mutually supportive to 
strengthen the CAR Government's ability to mitigate conflict, stop 
human rights abuses and violations, hold those responsible for such 
actions accountable, and help the country achieve a stable democracy 
that does not require the support of dubious external actors. 
Specifically, to counterbalance Russia's influence, I will pursue 
opportunities to stand up to negative Russian behavior.

    Question. As the U.S. engages to strengthen accountability, 
security, and inclusiveness, will you commit to supporting processes 
and institutions, rather than a specific individual or leader?

    Answer. Yes. Across administrations, the United States has worked 
to advance democracy and human rights in the DRC, prevent conflict, and 
promote economic development. If confirmed, I will work with the DRC 
Government and our civil society partners, as well as our partners in 
the region and at the United Nations, to promote political, economic, 
and security reforms.
    The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an 
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, 
I will urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for 
reforms. I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of 
undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary 
for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the 
Independent National Electoral Commission. I will also work with our 
partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the 
country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt 
actors with all tools at our disposal.

    Question. What actions should the administration be taking right 
now to help support a credible presidential election in 2023, and what 
specific steps do you plan to take if confirmed to support credible 
elections?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early 
imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical 
preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including 
reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be 
credible, those elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently 
and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. 
I will also continue to work with this committee on issues related to 
the 2023 elections. Appreciating your longstanding interest in this 
issue, I will work with you to ensure we take your views on board in 
advance, and that we have the appropriate resources in place to help 
our Congolese partners with this important task.

Zimbabwe
    Question. U.S. policy regarding Zimbabwe has been largely 
consistent across recent administrations, including the rigorous 
implementation of ZDERA and other sanctions. Yet the Zimbabwean 
Government of today is no less authoritarian and corrupt than it was 
under former president Robert Mugabe.

   If confirmed, how will you approach U.S.-Zimbabwe relations?

    Answer. I share the committee's deep concern over the Government of 
Zimbabwe's authoritarian and corrupt practices, including the targeting 
of opposition political figures, journalists, and members of civil 
society through harassment, arrests, and detentions. I appreciate the 
willingness of this committee to publicly call out repression by the 
Zimbabwe Government. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S. 
Embassy in Harare issue condemnations when appropriate and publicly 
voice our support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak 
out against government corruption and abuses.
    The United States supports democratic governance programs that 
improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and 
enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the 
Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted 
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who 
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes.
    But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will 
work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and 
likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the situation in 
Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the 
Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human 
rights. If confirmed, I will also work with our interagency partners to 
mobilize our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those 
individuals who are currently active in corruption and human rights 
abuses.

    Question. Is it time to rethink our Zimbabwe policy, in your view?

    Answer. We should continually examine our policy towards Zimbabwe 
to ensure that it is timely and effective. The United States currently 
employs a blend of programs and strategies in Zimbabwe to strengthen 
democratic institutions, promote equitable economic growth, boost 
public health, and improve food security for the benefit of the 
Zimbabwean people. If confirmed, I will review these programs and 
strategies.
    If confirmed, I will be guided by the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act in our efforts to press the Government of 
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, basic freedoms, and human 
rights, and to support those citizens who seek to build an open and 
accountable system. I also will work with this committee, likeminded 
partners, and subject matter experts within civil society to examine 
ways to ensure that our policy towards Zimbabwe is relevant and 
effective.

    Question. What new measures should the U.S. pursue in advancing 
democracy and human rights in Uganda?

    Answer. This year's flawed elections in Uganda underscored the 
continuing deterioration of both Uganda's democracy and respect and 
support for human rights and freedoms. Helping the Ugandan people 
reverse this trend will take new ideas and increased engagement with 
Ugandan leaders and the country's beleaguered civil society. If 
confirmed, I will assess what more the United States can do to promote 
democracy, human rights, and accountability in Uganda and seek to 
develop options for advancing these goals and objectives.

    Question. Given democratic and human rights deficits in Uganda, 
what will you recommend if confirmed, relative to continued cooperation 
with the Museveni regime on regional security matters?

    Answer. Uganda plays an important role in supporting regional 
security and counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and elsewhere in the 
region. During deployments, Ugandan units have been among the most 
capable and professional in regional missions. The conduct of specific 
Ugandan troops at home, however, is of concern. If confirmed, I will 
ensure that U.S. policy in Uganda appropriately reflects the centrality 
of democracy and respect for human rights called for by President 
Biden. In addition to working with the African Union (AU), the United 
Nations (U.N.), and the Government of Uganda to ensure that personnel 
are properly vetted, follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect 
human rights, I support working with the AU and the U.N. to identify 
potential new troop contributors that would reduce AMISOM's reliance on 
forces that may be implicated in human rights abuses. There is also a 
need to engage the AU and the U.N. in a timely and credible process to 
identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be implicated 
in human rights abuses.

    Question. How serious is the new leadership in Tanzania about 
pursuing genuine political reform?

    Answer. President Hassan has taken some encouraging steps in the 
early days of her administration. These include significant revisions 
to Tanzania's approach on COVID-19, reengagement with the international 
community, and overtures to the business community suggesting greater 
openness to foreign investment. Her initial outreach to opposition 
political parties and civil society organizations was welcome but needs 
to be accompanied by significant democratic and human rights reforms. 
The arrest of leading opposition politicians on July 20 was gravely 
concerning. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. engagement in Tanzania 
to encourage rule of law, good governance, political pluralism, and 
people's freedom to exercise their rights without fear of harassment.

    Question. What steps will you take if confirmed to incentivize the 
new Tanzanian leadership to repair the damage of the Magufuli era, both 
in terms of political reform at home, and Tanzania-U.S. bilateral 
relations?

    Answer. The new Tanzanian leadership has been much more receptive 
to engagement with both Embassy Dar es Salaam and senior Department of 
State officials. Such engagement has already contributed to the Hassan 
administration's increasingly positive steps with regard to its COVID-
19 policy. If confirmed, I would work with Embassy leadership to 
continue to highlight to the Tanzanian Government the additional, 
potential benefits of closer cooperation with the United States, 
including renewed support for the country's development and economic 
recovery efforts. At the same time, I would underscore the democratic 
and economic reforms that would be required on the part of the 
Tanzanian Government in order to attain such support and repair in full 
the Tanzania-U.S. bilateral relationship.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, what specific actions will you take to meet the 
administration's stated goal of prioritizing Africa?

    Answer. If confirmed, I intend to engage respectfully with African 
partners to meet global challenges--including security, global health, 
climate change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. You would 
see greater attention to our relationships with African states and 
publics, with regional institutions like the African Union, and with 
the African bloc in international organizations.
    If confirmed, I look forward to participating in an interagency 
policy process as the Biden-Harris administration develops a fresh U.S. 
strategy for Africa that enumerates our national interests in Africa 
and develops operational actions to advance them, guided by the 
priorities of this committee. Responding to President Biden's 
direction, I would highlight the role of democracy and human rights and 
add a new emphasis on anti-corruption. Without good governance, African 
states will not be well-positioned to expand peace and security and 
manage the threats posed by terrorism and migration. I will ensure that 
we work with our African partners to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change. I will support programs that promote two-way trade and 
investment to create opportunities for African youth that benefit 
workers there and here. In line with this committee's direction, I will 
work to advance an affirmative agenda rooted in our values and our 
longstanding investments in development, security and people to prevail 
in the strategic competition with China. In this effort, we will seek 
to expand our partnership with Europe and other likeminded nations to 
reinforce our collective impact.
    I will also capitalize on our soft power--engaging with youth, 
encouraging education opportunities, and engaging the diaspora. 
Finally, I will join the U.S. Government campaign to help Africa 
mitigate the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Question. What changes in U.S. posture toward Africa are needed to 
demonstrate to our African partners that ``Africa is a priority''?

    Answer. We need to expand the quantity and quality of our 
engagement across the Continent. As Secretary Blinken noted in his 
January 19 testimony before this committee, senior-level engagement on 
a consistent basis will be one important way to demonstrate our 
commitment. Showing up and showing respect is important. Consistent 
with our values, we must champion leaders seeking positive change and 
hold others to account. This approach means reinvigorating our focus on 
human rights, transparency and accountability, and the fight against 
corruption which are essential for stability and economic growth. 
Expanding trade and investment, tackling climate change, and responding 
to COVID-19 are all shared priorities between the United States and 
African nations. If confirmed, I will support diplomacy that translates 
this rhetoric into action.

    Question. What specific policies and strategies will you pursue to 
ensure that you and the Bureau of African Affairs are meeting what 
you've indicated as ``President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity 
and quality of our engagement with African Governments, institutions . 
. . [and] African publics''? What changes, if any, are needed within 
the Bureau of African Affairs to ensure they are best prepared to carry 
out this vision?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 hearing before 
this committee, the United States has engaged African countries as 
partners in pursuing our shared interests and values--including 
security, global health, climate change, freedom and democracy, and 
shared prosperity. Expanded senior-level engagement on a consistent 
basis will be one important way to demonstrate our commitment. If 
confirmed, I will actively support engagement through senior-level 
visits to Africa, increased consultations with the African Union and 
African regional organizations, initiatives and economic opportunities 
to harness the innovation and energy of Africa's youth, university 
partnerships and training opportunities, and active engagement with the 
African diaspora here in the United States, to name a few. If 
confirmed, I will closely review the Africa Bureau's organization, 
management, staffing, and budget to align our resources to support 
execution of this vision.

    Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that 
ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by qualified, 
experience nominees in a timely manner?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Secretary 
Blinken to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.

    Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that 
first-time career ambassadorial nominees will not be the first choice 
when identifying nominees for high-profile and strategic U.S. missions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa?

    Answer. The Department of State has a robust process for choosing 
Chiefs of Mission. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the 
Secretary and other Department leadership to ensure that we identify 
highly qualified individuals for every one of these positions in the 
Bureau of African Affairs.

    Question. Under your leadership as Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure 
that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and 
consistently staffed?

    Answer. I recognize that the Africa Bureau is chronically 
understaffed, both in numbers of assigned positions and vacancies in 
those positions. If confirmed, I will personally prioritize personnel 
and allocate additional resources to support that effort. I am 
committed to an inclusive workplace and will build on the Bureau's 
progress to date in implementing management reforms designed to support 
diversity in recruitment, hiring, and retention.
    Other actions I intend to pursue include reviewing staffing levels 
across the continent with the goal of aligning staffing to our most 
pressing national interests; exploring options for enhancing incentives 
for service at hardship posts; and attending to morale and 
reinvigorating the sense of public service that attracts professionals 
devoted to making a difference for the United States in Africa.

    Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, how will you ensure that the Bureau of African Affairs has the 
requisite capacity, including sufficient number of trained contract 
officers and staff, to ensure that it can implement, monitor, and 
conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will start by reviewing existing capacity 
within the Bureau of African Affairs in order to identify any necessary 
increases in resources necessary to appropriately implement, monitor, 
and conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs. I will 
work with the leadership of the Department of State to secure required 
support. I also commit to working with the committee toward our shared 
goal of improving the effectiveness, transparency, and oversight of 
TSCTP.
    The Africa Bureau has already made a number of changes to respond 
to the OIG's recommendations. These include, but are not limited to, 
establishing a TSCTP secretariat to facilitate coordination and 
implementing best practices around procurement, management, and 
oversight of AF-funded TSCTP programs. If confirmed, I will review the 
TSCTP and consult with the committee to ensure we have the appropriate 
resources, authorities, flexibility, and management controls in place 
to meet shared objectives for this important program.

    Question. How can the Department of State, in coordination with 
other relevant departments and agencies, support our African partners 
to manage the activities and impacts better of armed groups on 
populations, economies and governance?

    Answer. Tailored U.S. diplomatic, development, and human rights-
sensitive security assistance can play a critical role to support peace 
and security. While security cooperation is necessary, it is not 
sufficient to address the drivers of violence and extremism. 
Sustainable gains--whether governance, security, or economic--require a 
holistic approach across our government and in coordination with 
African and other partners.
    If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Department of 
Defense, USAID, other U.S. Government agencies, and our allies and 
partners to support African efforts to reduce the activities of armed 
groups and support policies and programs that build democratic 
governance structures that respect human rights and deliver liberty and 
prosperity.

    Question. How can the Department of State better address the cross-
border movement of armed groups, including through the development and 
execution of regional approaches?

    Answer. Armed groups and illicit traffickers exploit weak border 
controls and inadequate surveillance but also often benefit from 
assistance or indifference from border communities that often are 
underserved by governance, administration, security, and economic 
opportunities offered by regional and national governments. Addressing 
cross-border movement of armed groups requires holistic approaches and 
regional cooperation and information-sharing. Working with partners to 
build professional, capable, and accountable security and intelligence 
services to monitor and secure often vast and porous borders must 
complement rather than replace efforts to provide stability and 
economic opportunities to vulnerable communities along borders. The 
Department of State and our embassies across Africa are committed to 
leverage our influence and diplomatic engagements to promote cross-
border collaboration, exercises, information sharing, and coordination 
among security sector and civilian entities from neighboring and 
regional states to develop improved cross-border protocols, 
relationships, and operational effectiveness. Programmatically, the 
Africa Bureau is reinvigorating the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa 
Counterterrorism (PREACT) in part to strategically identify resources 
and expertise to address these issues and support regional and sub-
regional efforts in West and East Africa to increase border management 
and security.

    Question. What are your views on the role trade and investment 
could and should play in building stronger ties between the United 
States and the African continent? How should U.S.-Africa trade and 
investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter 
China in Africa?

    Answer. We need to do more to boost trade and investment. We want 
to be partners in creating responsible and sustainable trade and 
investment that secures good livelihoods for both Africans and 
Americans. If confirmed, I will advocate for U.S. companies that 
provide the world class products, technology, and services that 
Africans seek to grow their economies. I commit to working with 
interagency partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government 
to support this effort and meet the challenges posed by China. The 
positive economic contributions to Africa that U.S. companies bring--
robust training, capital, and high labor and environmental standards--
are our best way to compete with strategic competitors such as China.

    Question. How can the U.S. Government better promote African 
countries as destinations for U.S. private sector foreign investment? 
How can the U.S. improve access for African firms seeking to do 
business here? How can we best engage the U.S. African diaspora?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 testimony to 
this committee, the United States, using our economic diplomacy and the 
tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and Treasury, will work with the U.S. 
private sector, African Governments, and international financial 
institutions to increase trade and investment in Africa and promote 
U.S. business. If confirmed, I will ensure our Embassy Deal Teams in 
Africa prioritize trade and investment opportunities, as well as 
business climate reforms that can provide a strong foundation for 
economic growth more generally. I will make full use of all U.S. 
Government tools, including through Prosper Africa, to bring 
opportunities to the attention of the private sector.
    If confirmed, I will make full use of USAID's programs to help 
African firms utilize the preferential access provided by the Africa 
Growth and Opportunity Act. Likewise, I want to ensure we are making 
full use of the SelectUSA program at the Department of Commerce to 
promote the United States as an investment destination for African 
investors. I agree that we need to work robustly to tap the dynamic 
African diaspora in the United States as a partner in promoting greater 
two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa. If 
confirmed, I will promote active outreach to diaspora organizations as 
a vital piece of our engagement.

    Question. How can the U.S. Government most effectively support 
efforts to improve the enabling environment for competitive foreign 
investment by U.S. firms in Africa? What types of partnerships work 
best, and how can the U.S. best incentivize reforms and other actions 
necessary to foster economic opportunity and expand two-way trade and 
investment with the African continent?

    Answer. The Prosper Africa initiative can play an important role in 
ensuring effective coordination of U.S. Government assistance to 
improve investment and business climates toward the overall goal of 
expanding trade and investment. U.S. Government programming needs to be 
targeted at areas where there is strong host country will to reform. I 
believe there is potential to do more in partnership with our private 
sector, particularly in the technology area, to incentivize governments 
to implement needed reforms, given our firms generally have a clear 
sense of what needs to be done. Successful partnerships require clear 
goals and expectations.
    I noted in my testimony the importance of greater efforts on 
governance, human rights, and anti-corruption. I see these areas as 
vital components of work to build sound, prosperous economies, and to 
attract needed investment. If confirmed, I will also support our soft 
power efforts-engaging with youth and encouraging educational 
opportunities, that amplify our good governance messaging.

    Question. Do you agree that countries like Zimbabwe, South Sudan, 
and Somalia are unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper 
Africa?

    Answer. I agree that Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Somalia are 
currently unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper Africa. I 
also believe we should support U.S. businesses and investors across 
Africa wherever possible when they see opportunities for increased 
trade and investment.

    Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa 
be a priority?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, I will prioritize reinforcing democratic institutions 
and norms in Africa.

    Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that messaging 
from the Bureau of African Affairs and its embassies and leadership 
consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values and interests, including 
the need to respect democratic institutions and norms, advance human 
and political rights, and enhance citizen responsive governance?

    Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary I commit to 
ensuring that messaging from the Bureau of African Affairs and its 
embassies and leadership consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values 
and interests.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to 
ensure that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the 
Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various points of 
leverage and capability the United States and France each bring to the 
table?

    Answer. Given its colonial history, France has significant ties in 
the Sahel and West and Central Africa and concerns about the direct 
threats posed to Europe from migration and terrorism. Our shared 
priorities include promoting improved security, governance, economic 
development, and recovery from COVID-19. France has been a steadfast 
partner in the fight against Islamic State-Western Sahara (IS-WS) and 
Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQIM). If confirmed, in line with President 
Biden's direction to revitalize partnerships with key allies, I will 
act to sustain and build on the historic strong coordination between 
the United States and France, aligning our respective comparative 
advantages to holistically address the security and governance 
challenges across the region.

    Question. How can the U.S. better coordinate with France in Africa 
to holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic 
engagements, particularly in the Sahel and West and Central Africa, 
from a holistic perspective?

    Answer. Both France and the United States share security, 
governance, and economic development as priorities in the Sahel and 
West and Central Africa. These priorities cannot be achieved 
independent of one another. If confirmed, I will encourage the French 
to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural 
influence toward African political, security, and democratic reforms 
that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions, and 
work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned 
with ours. The United States and France regularly coordinate on issues 
of mutual concern and, if confirmed, I commit to working with France 
and our other allies and partners in Europe, including the EU, to 
holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic 
engagement across the continent. Specifically, I see continued areas 
for improved coordination with our French partners in the Sahel and 
towards resolving the crisis Cameroon. As your report on U.S- European 
cooperation noted, the significant demographic and economic shifts 
underway across the African continent requires a strong transatlantic 
alliance, in coordination with our African partners, to collaborate on 
countering malign influence, and promoting the growth of healthier, 
more stable, democratic societies that share our values and interests.

    Question. Political and ethnic tensions and violence in Burundi 
have contributed to instability, human rights abuses, and humanitarian 
crises in central Africa's Great Lakes region for decades. On June 9, 
2020, the Government of Burundi announced that sitting President Pierre 
Nkurunziza (age 55) died suddenly of ``cardiac arrest,'' two and a half 
months before he was expected to step down following general elections 
on May 20, 2020. Nkurunziza's elected successor, CNDD-FDD party head 
Evariste Ndayishimiye, was inaugurated in late August, after the 
constitutional court upheld his victory with 68% of the vote in the May 
2020 elections.

   How optimistic are you about deepening ties with the new Burundian 
        administration under President Ndayishimiye?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the approach of 
President Ndayishimiye's administration and will review Burundi's 
progress.

    Question. Do you feel that upgrading Burundi's ranking in the State 
Department's 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report from Tier 3 to Tier 2 
Watch List was warranted based on an objective assessment of progress 
made in Burundi on TIP issues?

    Answer. I understand that Burundi's 2021 Trafficking in Persons 
ranking as Tier 2 Watch List is based on the Burundian Government's 
overall increasing effort to counter trafficking in persons. This 
effort included increasing investigations and prosecutions of suspected 
trafficking offenses, convicting traffickers, and referring victims to 
assistance. The Government also developed and implemented the country's 
first-ever national data collection system on law enforcement's efforts 
to combat human trafficking and trained officials on its use. If 
confirmed, I will commit to working with Burundi to ensure it continues 
to prioritize countering trafficking in persons.

    Question. What additional tools does the United States have at its 
disposal to encourage a peaceful and enduring resolution to the 
Anglophone conflict in Cameroon?

    Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the 
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain 
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, 
undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone 
regions of Cameroon. Secretary Blinken's decision to restrict the visas 
of individuals responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is a 
concrete example of options the Department of State can exercise to 
push for peace and dialogue. If confirmed, my focus would be to 
continue urging all parties to end violence and to engage in an 
inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make clear U.S. 
support for the Swiss Government's effort to advance mediation between 
the Government and separatist armed group leaders and encourage the 
Government to take concrete steps to move this effort forward. I will 
also review the different tools we have to hold human rights violators 
accountable, including sanctions, and continue the practice of 
reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis. I will continue 
to pursue engagement with France, other likeminded partners, and U.N. 
Security Council member states to find ways to promote a peaceful 
resolution of the ongoing violence.

    Question. How can the United States more effectively encourage 
France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the 
Government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the conflict?

    Answer. The United States and France share an interest in stability 
and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa and meet regularly to discuss how 
to advance those priorities, including the critical effort to press the 
parties in Cameroon to pursue an inclusive and constructive path toward 
peace and stability. Secretary Blinken regularly consults with his 
counterpart French Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian. If confirmed, I 
will support ongoing U.S. engagement with France, a key partner in 
Cameroon, as well as with the UK, the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany 
and other allies, to align our efforts in support of dialogue to 
resolve the Anglophone conflict.

    Question. How is the Department mobilizing other partners to assist 
Cameroon to find peace and justice, and how do you plan to lead such an 
effort once in-country?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages allies and U.N. 
Security Council member states at the highest level regarding the need 
to resolve the Anglophone conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to 
strongly engage with France, which is key in this process, the UK, the 
EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and other key allies both bilaterally 
and in multilateral fora to find ways to work together to achieve 
tangible progress towards peace.
    If confirmed, I will also make clear U.S. support for the Swiss 
Government's efforts to advance mediation between the Government and 
separatist armed group leaders and encourage the Government to take 
concrete steps to move this effort forward. The Department of State can 
support the likeminded countries' effort to support the Swiss Process 
through coordinated actions and messaging. The process of working with 
our allies and NGO partners is a regular on-going effort, which I will 
continue with focus and vigor.

    Question. What is your perspective on the performance of the 
Tshisekedi administration to date?

    Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of 
building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi 
took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the 
freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily 
detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-
level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that 
merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility.
    The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an 
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, 
I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the 
legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and 
fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be 
inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in 
accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders 
to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining 
sector and security apparatus.

    Question. Is it your assessment that the Tshisekedi administration 
is in a position to continue to advance reforms, including in the areas 
of anti-corruption and in the security and mining sectors?

    Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's and the 
Government's goal of building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since 
President Tshisekedi took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has 
contributed to the freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or 
arbitrarily detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the 
highest-level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps 
that merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility. The recent 
inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter 
in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will work with our 
partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the 
country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt 
actors with all tools at our disposal. I will also urge DRC leaders to 
heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining sector 
and security apparatus.
    The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to 
stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence, 
including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and 
human rights abuses and violations to account. If confirmed, I will 
urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with the U.N. 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in support of 
the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians, reduce 
intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.

    Question. In your view, how can the United States continue to 
support democratic reforms in the DRC, including by enhancing prospects 
for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2023?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early 
imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical 
preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including 
reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be 
credible, the 2023 elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently 
and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. 
Knowing of your longstanding interest in this issue, I will work with 
you to ensure we take your views on board in advance, and that we have 
the appropriate resources in place to help our Congolese partners with 
this important task.

    Question. If confirmed, how will you work with Congress and USAID 
to ensure the $700 million is programmed efficiently and effectively to 
support Sudan's ongoing transition?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will stress the importance of timely 
consultations with Congress by the Africa Bureau and our USAID 
colleagues on the utilization and effective programming of these 
appropriated funds. I will also ensure we consult closely with Sudan's 
civilian led transitional government to ensure these new resources will 
assist the Government to meet the urgent needs of the Sudanese people 
at this moment in the transition, and to support efforts related to 
human rights and accountability, conflict mitigation, and democracy and 
governance, especially in support of marginalized communities long shut 
out from having a voice in determining Sudan's future.

    Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work with Congress to 
ensure the $700 million is programmed appropriately?

    Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress 
on the programming of these funds, working closely with USAID to ensure 
that funds are used appropriately and effectively in support of Sudan's 
transition.

    Question. Given that the United States is a significant stakeholder 
in ensuring that South Sudan achieves sustainable peace and 
development, what diplomatic investments would you make as Secretary of 
State bilaterally, regionally, and with multi-lateral institutions?

    Answer. Expedited progress on the integration of security forces, 
anti-corruption, transitional justice, and a permanent constitutional 
process leading to post-transitional elections is key to achieving 
sustainable peace and development in South Sudan. If confirmed, I will 
make clear to South Sudan's leaders our serious concerns about delays 
in implementation of commitments in these areas and look for 
opportunities to increase pressure on those officials responsible for 
such delays. I would also invigorate the use of all available 
diplomatic and development tools to provide support to South Sudanese 
civil society and non-governmental organizations seeking positive 
change. Additionally, I would consult with regional and international 
partners to review critically and comprehensively our current approach 
towards South Sudan. I intend to collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to 
the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has the necessary resources and mandate 
to support accelerated implementation of South Sudan's peace process. 
Finally, I would continue to prioritize diplomatic efforts to press 
South Sudan's leaders to do more to facilitate the unhindered delivery 
of humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan, to ensure the 
safety of humanitarian workers in the country, and to hold accountable 
those responsible for growing violence against humanitarian 
organizations.

    Question. What is your perspective on the ongoing U.S. assistance 
review, announced in 2018, for South Sudan? If confirmed, how would you 
support a timely conclusion to the assistance review and enable action 
on its findings?

    Answer. I understand the Biden-Harris administration continues to 
evaluate the findings of the assistance review in South Sudan conducted 
under the last administration to ensure that programs are being 
implemented efficiently and are consistent with our objectives. If 
confirmed, I would work to continue this process and ensure that 
programs are strategic, effective and have adequate oversight. The 
United States Government continues to work to maximize the impact of 
our humanitarian assistance in South Sudan and mitigate risks of 
diversion or obstruction of aid or perpetuation of kleptocratic 
governance.

    Question. How would you take a fresh look at U.S. policy in the 
Horn of Africa as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs?

    Answer. A stable and prosperous Horn of Africa is critical to U.S. 
economic and security interests. The external actors who are most 
engaged in the Horn are U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf. If 
confirmed, I will collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 
to employ U.S. influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to 
engage strategically to foster peace and security in the Horn--a shared 
goal. I will also consult with the Special Envoy for the Horn of 
Africa, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, to review our policy, especially our 
engagement with regional and international partners, to hone a coherent 
and integrated U.S. approach.

    Question. There is broad consensus that U.S. policy toward Somalia 
needs reconsideration. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward 
Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity 
over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a 
more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?

    Answer. The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which 
includes Somaliland. The United States has maintained a positive 
relationship with the authorities in Hargeisa and has encouraged the 
Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland to cooperate on issues of 
mutual interest and to engage in constructive dialogue on questions 
related to Somaliland's status. If confirmed, I am committed to 
reviewing U.S. engagement with Somaliland to ensure it effectively 
advances U.S. interests, including with respect to our relationship 
with Mogadishu.

    Question. From your perspective, what tools (including those 
currently underutilized) does the United States have at its disposal 
that are underutilized to encourage democratic and economic reforms in 
Zimbabwe?

    Answer. I share the committee's deep concern over the human rights 
abuses, economic mismanagement, and kleptocratic behavior that we 
continue to see in Zimbabwe. I appreciate this committee's condemnation 
of the Government of Zimbabwe's abuse of human rights and repression of 
its people. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S. Embassy in 
Harare regularly issue similar condemnations and publicly voice our 
support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak out 
against government corruption and abuses.
    The United States supports democratic governance programs that 
improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and 
enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the 
Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted 
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who 
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes.
    But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will 
work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and 
likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the situation in 
Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the 
Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human 
rights. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners to use 
our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those individuals 
who are currently active in corruption and human rights abuses.

    Question. An area of considerable debate has been the value of 
reincorporating political party programming into the portfolio of U.S. 
democracy assistance to Zimbabwe. Do you commit to reviewing the 
Department of State's posture on political party support in Zimbabwe?

    Answer. Since the 2018 election, the Government of Zimbabwe has 
systematically weakened the opposition through manipulated court 
rulings, harassment and incarceration of key figures, and thinly veiled 
actions to install pliant political figures in parliament.
    If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the Department of State's 
posture on political party support in Zimbabwe.

    Question. What is your assessment of the appropriateness of Nigeria 
for this designation?

    Answer. The Department is reviewing this designation as part of the 
annual process. That process is underway, and the Department will 
consider all available information. I take this issue very seriously 
and do not wish to prejudge the process or the Secretary's decision.

    Question. What is your assessment of the drivers of conflict in 
Nigeria? How do the drivers of conflict in Nigeria differ across 
geographical regions?

    Answer. Nigeria faces growing insecurity on multiple fronts, 
including kidnapping and banditry in the North West, insurgency from 
the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Haram in the North 
East, communal violence including herder-farmer conflict in various 
regions, attacks by Biafran separatists in the South East, and piracy 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The drivers of conflict are numerous and 
overlapping, and also vary across regions. Experts have cited the 
proliferation of small arms, increasing competition over land and water 
resources, lack of accountability and access to justice, as well as 
politics, ethnicity, and religion among contributing factors. 
Ineffective state security responses, poor governance and service 
delivery, endemic corruption, and lack of economic opportunity also 
create conditions that are ripe for conflict.
    The United States is partnering with Nigeria to build more 
effective and accountable security forces to better respond to the 
country's security challenges and protect civilians. The U.S. 
Government also helps Nigerians prevent and mitigate conflict through 
our diplomacy, police and justice reform programs, peacebuilding 
programs, early warning and early response programs, dialogue efforts, 
and development programs.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
       to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. How can the United States support a peaceful resolution 
of Cameroon's Anglophone conflict?

    Answer. I share your concerns about the ongoing violence in 
Cameroon and the conflict in the Anglophone region. If confirmed, my 
focus would be to continue urging all parties to end violence and to 
engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make 
clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to advance 
mediation between the Government and separatist armed group leaders and 
encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move this effort 
forward. I will also review the different tools we have to hold human 
rights violators accountable, including sanctions. I will continue to 
pursue engagement with France, key allies, and U.N. Security Council 
member states, to find ways to promote a peaceful resolution of the 
ongoing violence.

    Question. How can the United States balance support for the 
counterterrorism campaign in the north with efforts to promote a 
peaceful resolution of the Anglophone conflict?

    Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional 
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, 
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and 
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of 
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining 
stability in the region is even more important. Since 2018, the 
Department has significantly reduced security assistance because the 
Government of Cameroon had not taken appropriate action to investigate 
credible allegations of gross violations of human rights by its 
security forces and hold the perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I 
commit to continuing the practice of reviewing security assistance on a 
case-by-case basis to ensure the assistance the United States provides 
aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect for human 
rights. I will also ensure the Department vets potential recipients of 
security assistance, consistent with the Leahy laws, and does not 
provide assistance to Cameroonian security force units where there is 
credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of 
human rights.

    Question. Would you advocate the use of sanctions on Cameroonian 
officials and others responsible for hindering a resolution of the 
Anglophone conflict?

    Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the 
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain 
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, 
undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone 
regions of Cameroon. I understand the Department of State continues to 
work on expanding visa restrictions on individuals on both sides of the 
conflict. Secretary Blinken's decision to implement a visa restrictions 
policy on some of those responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon 
is the first of many possible approaches the Department of State can 
take to push for peace and dialogue. It has encouraged both the UK and 
the EU to look at utilizing their new sanctions laws. It is yet another 
sign of the commitment to back up words with actions. If confirmed, I 
will consider all the tools at our disposal aimed at promoting a 
peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence which has resulted in much 
suffering and threatens to become even more critical day by day.

    Question. According to the U.N., nearly 5.2 million of the Tigray 
region's 5.7 million people are in need of emergency food assistance, 
and more than 2 million have been displaced by violence. U.N. 
humanitarian agencies have scaled up to meet the needs of civilians in 
Tigray, distributing food aid to more than 1.4 million people and 
working to reach people with shelter, clean water, hygiene supplies, 
and other critical relief items and services. The U.N. is also working 
to identify and provide support to survivors of gender-based violence, 
which has been widespread during the conflict. Unfortunately, the U.N. 
and its partners are only able to help a fraction of the people in need 
because parties to the conflict-largely the Ethiopian and Eritrean 
militaries-continue to block humanitarian access to large parts of the 
region.

   How is the administration working to address this issue?

    Answer. Intensified conflict in western Tigray and the expansion of 
conflict into the neighboring Afar region has effectively blocked 
overland access for humanitarian supplies. In light of these recent 
developments, the Biden-Harris administration has prioritized the 
establishment of direct talks between the Ethiopian Government and the 
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) with the aim of achieving a 
negotiated ceasefire. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey 
Feltman is working in close coordination with international partners to 
create the necessary conditions for such talks to occur. Ending 
hostilities is an essential component of ensuring that sufficient 
humanitarian supplies can reach the Tigray region. In addition, the 
Biden-Harris administration has taken a number of steps to press all 
parties to provide unhindered humanitarian access. On May 23, we put in 
place a visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act for any current or former Ethiopian or 
Eritrean Government officials, members of the security forces, or other 
individuals-to include Amhara regional and irregular forces and members 
of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-responsible for, or 
complicit in undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray. This 
includes those who have conducted wrongful violence or other abuses 
against people in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as those who 
have hindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in the region. 
If confirmed, I would carefully review the option of implementing 
additional sanctions against those who are preventing access to 
humanitarian assistance. It will also be important to continue to 
encourage our likeminded partners to support such targeted sanctions.

    Question. What leverage or pressure points do we have with the 
Ethiopian Government that can be brought to bear to ensure that the 
U.N. and other humanitarian actors are able to access vulnerable 
communities?

    Answer. Sustained diplomatic engagement with all parties to the 
conflict is essential to press for unhindered humanitarian access. If 
confirmed, I would work closely with our Ambassador, Special Envoy 
Feltman, and international partners to continue to make clear to the 
Ethiopian Government its responsibility in this regard and the impact 
of interference with humanitarian assistance on our bilateral 
relationship. The Biden-Harris administration has already ended most 
non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance programming 
to Ethiopia. The Department of State has established a visa restriction 
policy including on those who have hindered humanitarian access to 
those in the Tigray region. If confirmed, I would carefully review the 
option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are 
preventing access to humanitarian assistance.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Cory A. Booker

    Question. What next-level plans and programs does the United States 
Government have prepared to increase pressure on those who are 
responsible for perpetuating violence and instability in the region?

    Answer. In addition to the visa restriction policy under Section 
212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act announced by 
Secretary Blinken on May 23 with regard to the issuance of visas for 
any current or former Ethiopian or Eritrean Government officials, 
members of the security forces, or other individuals-to include Amhara 
regional and irregular forces and members of the Tigray People's 
Liberation Front (TPLF)-responsible for, or complicit in, undermining 
resolution of the crisis in Tigray, the Biden-Harris administration has 
ended most non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance 
programming to Ethiopia. If confirmed, I would carefully review the 
option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are 
undermining resolution of the conflict, who are engaging in human 
rights abuses, violations, or atrocities, or who are preventing access 
to humanitarian assistance. These could include Global Magnitsky 
designations under E.O. 13818 and a new Executive Order (E.O.) 
establishing a Tigray-specific sanctions regime. It will also be 
important to continue to encourage our likeminded partners to support 
such targeted sanctions. The goal of these measures is to increase 
pressure on all the parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate 
negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights abuses and 
violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray region.

    Question. What measures does the State Department intend to take to 
hold Prime Minister Abiy accountable for ignoring, misleading, and 
deflecting the international community while civilians were facing 
grave human rights abuses?

    Answer. In concert with international partners, the Biden-Harris 
administration has consistently called out human rights abuses 
committed by all parties to the conflict, including the Ethiopian 
Government, and stressed the need for accountability. Because of 
concern about human rights violations, abuses, and atrocities, the 
Biden-Harris administration has suspended most non-humanitarian U.S. 
development and security assistance to Ethiopia and established a visa 
restriction policy. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the feasibility 
of additional measures, such as imposition of targeted Global Magnitsky 
sanctions and a new Executive Order establishing a Tigray-specific 
sanctions regime. At the United Nations, the United States played a 
leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security Council on 
July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press for 
additional action by the Security Council. The United States also 
worked with partners on the U.N. Human Rights Council to successfully 
arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution 
that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights 
Commission, and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes. 
Additionally, the Department of State is exploring support for 
additional documentation and associated accountability and transitional 
justice options that could be used to address atrocities and other 
abuses that have been and continue to be committed by parties to the 
conflict in Tigray. If confirmed, I am committed to employing U.S. 
leverage and influence to hold all parties to the conflict to account.

    Question. What are our like-minded partners in Europe and elsewhere 
doing to help address these concerns?

    Answer. I understand that the Department of State is working in 
close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded partners to 
increase pressure on all parties to the conflict to agree to an 
immediate negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights 
abuses and violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray 
region.
    The Department of State is also collaborating with international 
partners in an effort to open communication among the parties to the 
conflict with the goal of achieving an immediate negotiated ceasefire. 
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and other State 
Department officials coordinate closely with an Ethiopia contact group 
of like-minded international partners. Special Envoy Feltman is 
actively engaging with influential counties such as the UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Kenya, and Sudan. At the United Nations, the United States 
played a leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security 
Council on July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press 
for additional action by the Security Council. The United States also 
worked with partners on the U.N. Human Rights Council to successfully 
arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution 
that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission 
and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes. If confirmed, I 
commit to sustaining these intensive efforts to work with like-minded 
partners.

    Question. What is the Biden administration's policy position on 
Somalia? What role should the United States play in helping to address 
armed conflict, terrorism, and political crisis in the country? What 
changes, if any, would you seek to State Department-administered 
security assistance programs in Somalia?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration supports efforts to advance 
peace and security in Somalia by countering the threat from al Shabaab 
and ISIS-Somalia operating in the country. This effort addresses the 
drivers of instability by promoting democratic governance and market-
oriented economic reforms that are necessary for lasting stability. It 
is imperative that the United States continue to coordinate closely 
with the Somalis and international partners, such as the United 
Nations, the African Union, Somalia's neighbors, the European Union, 
the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Gulf states, to tackle the country's 
considerable security and political challenges. If confirmed, I am 
committed to reviewing State Department-administered security 
assistance in Somalia to ensure these programs are effectively and 
efficiently advancing our policy goals.

    Question. Two of the largest troop contributing countries to 
AMISOM, Ethiopia and Uganda, are credibly accused of committing serious 
human rights violations at home. Has the time come to seek a new 
configuration and/or new partners for AMISOM?

    Answer. Somalia continues to require regional and international 
support to mitigate the threats from al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia and 
address the drivers of instability. While AMISOM has played an 
important role during the past 10 years in liberating territory from 
al-Shabaab and stabilizing parts of Somalia, reconfiguring the mission 
(1) to better respond to the terrorist threats and (2) to transfer 
increasing security responsibility to Somalia's security forces must be 
a priority during upcoming negotiations for a new mandate in 2022. I 
agree that troubling new developments in the region should also be 
considered in upcoming negotiations. If confirmed, I commit to working 
with the African Union, the United Nations, and individual AMISOM troop 
contributing countries to ensure that personnel are properly vetted, 
follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect human rights. There is 
a need to engage the AU and the U.N. in a timely and credible process 
to identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be 
implicated in human rights abuses.

    Question. Would we not be better off with partners that will not 
use the threat of pulling their troops from AMISOM as leverage for 
getting the United States and others to refrain from taking a hard 
stance on corruption and human rights abuses in their home countries?

    Answer. AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) participate in 
the mission because it serves their interests to mitigate the threat 
from al-Shabaab to their own countries. I am not aware of a serious 
threat to withdraw troops from Somalia, despite occasional resistance 
to U.S. efforts to combat corruption and human rights abuses in TCC 
capitals.

Ethiopia/Sudan Border Dispute
    Question. A long simmering border dispute between Sudan and 
Ethiopia in the al-Fashaga region of Sudan appears on the brink of 
turning hot. The United Arab Emirates had, for a time, taken the lead 
on mediating this dispute, but their role is no longer clear.

   Who is currently leading the mediation effort in this long-running 
        dispute?

    Answer. I share your concern about the risk of escalating tension 
between Sudan and Ethiopia generated by a military buildup and recent 
violence along the border of Ethiopia and Sudan in the al-Fashaga area. 
My understanding is that the UAE initiative is currently inactive. If 
confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy for the Horn of 
Africa Ambassador Feltman and U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa and 
Khartoum to encourage both governments to engage in constructive 
dialogue to deescalate tensions as part of a U.S. Horn strategy to 
address the interlinked political, security, and humanitarian crises in 
the region. I will also engage international and regional partners, 
including the UAE, to explore ways to persuade the two parties to agree 
to a mutually acceptable resolution.

    Question. What is the Department doing to alleviate the pressure on 
this potential hot spot?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to engage the two parties 
to press for a de-escalation of tensions and to call for no further 
violence. If confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy for 
the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and the U.S. embassies in Addis 
Ababa and Khartoum to press the two parties to find a mutually 
acceptable resolution in coordination with international and regional 
partners.

    Question. How confident are you in President Tshisekedi's 
commitment to advance reforms in the mining sector, state security 
apparatus, and election process?

    Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of 
building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi 
took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the 
freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily 
detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-
level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that 
merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility.
    The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an 
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, 
I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the 
legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and 
fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National 
Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be 
inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in 
accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders 
to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining 
sector and security apparatus.

    Question. The DRC holds over 51 percent of the global cobalt 
reserves and produces nearly 70 percent of the total cobalt feedstock 
globally. Underpinned by huge demand for from the battery sector, 
competition for control over global cobalt feedstock supply chains has 
intensified in recent years. What is the Department of State doing to 
support more responsible trade missions and U.S. commercial delegations 
to the DRC and to assist the DRC's efforts to improve the transparency 
of its minerals trade, including strong support for implementation of 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), beneficial 
ownership transparency, and the formalization of the artisanal mining 
sector?

    Answer. The United States is working with the DRC Government to 
bolster economic opportunities for all Congolese, including by 
establishing conditions that attract American companies to the DRC, 
expand trade, advance gender equality and women's entrepreneurship, and 
encourage business climate reforms to promote inclusive development. 
The reinstatement of the DRC's AGOA eligibility on January 1, 2021, 
affirmed the Tshisekedi Government's positive progress on reform, and 
bolstered our effort to expand U.S.-DRC commercial ties to benefit 
workers in both countries.
    The United States supports responsible minerals sourcing and 
trading and works closely with the private sector to support conflict-
free minerals supply chains, emphasizing compliance with section 1502 
of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. The Public-Private Alliance for Responsible 
Minerals (PPA), forged by the Department of State, USAID, and the 
Department of Labor and inclusive of U.S. companies and civil society 
organizations, seeks to improve due diligence and develop the 
governance systems needed for ethical supply chains of critical 
minerals in the DRC and Great Lakes region. PPA programming also aims 
to increase transparency and monitoring of child labor in artisanal 
mining in the DRC's cobalt supply chain while building government 
capacity to do the same.
    The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the 
EITI since its founding in 2003. In addition to providing financial 
support, as well as capacity building to improve EITI's financial 
management and operational effectiveness, the Department of State 
serves on the EITI International Board. In a related initiative, the 
Department of State is supporting improvements to the governance of the 
DRC's mining royalties with a Fiscal Transparent Innovation Fund grant 
to the Carter Center.
    Finally, the Critical Minerals Security Initiative provides the 
Department of State with a new tool to engage U.S. companies operating 
in the critical materials and minerals supply chain in countries such 
as the DRC. If confirmed, I commit to supporting and expanding these 
efforts to promote responsible minerals sourcing and trade.

    Question. What are the prospects for regional military operations 
and the imposition of martial law in eastern DRC to address the 
security and humanitarian crisis in the region?

    Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about continued 
violence, humanitarian crises, and allegations of human rights abuses 
and violations in eastern DRC. The expanding role of ISIS-DRC and other 
armed groups in conducting horrific acts against civilians is of 
particular concern. To tackle these challenges, the United States has 
called for an end to the violence, justice and accountability for those 
responsible, the professionalization of state security services, and 
inclusion of local communities and the U.N. Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in peace and reconciliation efforts.
    The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to 
stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence, 
including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and 
human rights abuses and violations to account. We have reiterated this 
message since the Government imposed a ``state of siege'' in two 
provinces in eastern DRC most affected by the conflict. If confirmed, I 
will urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with MONUSCO in 
support of the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians, 
reduce intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.
    We welcome President Tshisekedi's diplomatic outreach to the DRC's 
neighbors. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic solutions and cross-
border cooperation. As appropriate, I will share the U.S. view that any 
potential regional military cooperation must be conducted in a 
transparent manner in coordination with the DRC Government and MONUSCO.

    Question. What changes, if any, would you seek to the U.N. 
peacekeeping operation in DRC, MONUSCO?

    Answer. The U.N. plays a critical role in the stabilization of the 
DRC, particularly in eastern DRC, where armed group violence remains 
widespread. The MONUSCO mandate, last renewed in December 2020, 
prioritizes tasks to protect civilians, support stabilization efforts, 
and strengthen state institutions. MONUSCO has transitioned out of the 
Kasai provinces due to favorable gains in security and is scheduled to 
transition out of Tanganyika province by mid-2022 as part of a 
responsible, conditions-based transition to allow for more resources to 
focus on North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces.
    The Department of State continues to promote reforms to support the 
offensive operations mandate of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), 
including through the addition of new units and improved operational 
capabilities. If confirmed, I will collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to 
the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield to encourage MONUSCO to 
improve its ability to protect civilians, conduct effective quick-
reaction operations, and build state capacity in support of sustainable 
peace in this restive region.

    Question. What is the Department doing in response to the 
Government of Nigeria's growing levels of intolerance for universal 
human rights and freedoms?

    Answer. President Biden has charged us with restoring democracy and 
human rights to the forefront of U.S. diplomacy. Advocacy for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms is foundational to our relationship 
with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy. The United States is engaging 
Nigeria's Government at the highest levels to urge Nigerian leaders to 
uphold their country's constitution and our shared democratic 
principles. The Department of State spoke clearly when Nigeria recently 
suspended Twitter operations. If confirmed, I commit to engaging 
directly about these foundational rights.
    The Department of State also supports programs to strengthen the 
capacity of government institutions and civil society to promote 
respect for human rights. Of note, the Department of State supported 
the demands of Nigerian civil society who successfully pressed for the 
establishment of judicial panels of inquiry in 28 Nigerian states to 
examine allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Nigeria's 
now-defunct Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and the Nigerian Police 
Force.

    Question. What efforts does the Department have underway and in the 
planning process to assist journalists and protesters in Nigeria to 
exercise their rights to freedom of association and freedom of 
expression?

    Answer. The Department of State is committed to partnering with 
Nigerian journalists and civil society activists who, despite facing 
many hardships and risks, are highly active and well-established, and 
in many respects serve as a model for the continent. The Department of 
State employs a range of foreign policy tools to promote media freedom, 
including public messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and 
foreign assistance programming. In addition to multi-donor-funded 
initiatives like the Lifeline Fund for Embattled CSOs, the Department 
of State has established emergency mechanisms to respond to specific 
needs of journalists in crisis. If confirmed, I will prioritize support 
for and engagement with journalists and civil society.

    Question. What impacts have reported abuses by Nigerian security 
forces had on U.S.-Nigeria military relations?

    Answer. Nigeria faces multiple drivers of instability: a terrorist 
threat from ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram, entrenched insurgencies, 
banditry, pastoralist/farmer conflict, ethnic divisions, piracy in the 
Gulf of Guinea, a rising separatist movement in the South, and 
widespread criminality. In contending with these challenges, Nigerian 
security forces have committed incidents of human rights violations and 
abuses. In response, the U.S. Government has limited--in line with our 
laws and policies--the provision of certain military training and 
capabilities that could otherwise be useful to Nigeria in combatting 
these security challenges. To address the parallel priorities of 
security and human rights, the Biden-Harris administration is committed 
to engaging with the Nigerian Government and security services to 
support the institutional reforms and improved professionalism that 
will promote conduct that respects human rights. In seeking U.S. 
military sales that include mandatory training and maintenance 
programs, the Nigerian Government has shown a commitment to the 
investments and security sector institutional reforms that will enable 
the expansion of U.S.-Nigeria military relations and the improvement of 
Nigerian security capabilities.
    If confirmed, I will work with the Nigerian Government to actively 
promote the professionalization of their security forces to reinforce 
the importance of civilian protection and respect for human rights. I 
will urge the Nigerian Government to hold security force elements 
accountable for human rights abuses and violations.

    Question. To what extent does China's engagement in Africa threaten 
U.S. interests? How should the United States respond?

    Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, there are adversarial, 
competitive, and cooperative aspects of our relationship with China, 
and this dynamic applies to our respective partnerships in Africa. Our 
best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy agenda that 
enlists African partners in building free market democracies that offer 
liberty and prosperity and realize the continent's full potential.
    Africans and Americans alike support democracy, the rule of law, 
open competition, and human rights. This robust foundation will help us 
achieve a mutually beneficial relationship.
    If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and interagency 
partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government to boost 
socially responsible and climate-friendly trade and investment that 
secures good livelihoods for both African and American workers. 
Following the President's lead, I will liaise with the EU, the G-7 and 
other likeminded partners to engage African partners in the struggle to 
uphold the international rules-based order, in line with the guidelines 
in the Strategic Competition Act.

    Question. Are there any areas where cooperation with China might 
advance U.S. goals?

    Answer. Where cooperation might advance U.S. goals, such as efforts 
to promote peace and stability, we will consider collaboration. If 
confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure American values 
and interests prevail.

    Question. What is the administration's approach to supporting 
COVID-19 responses in Africa?

    Answer. Recognizing the devastating human loss and the debilitating 
second-order economic impacts of COVID-19, the Biden-Harris 
administration has committed to providing and supporting the rollout of 
COVID-19 vaccines across Africa. This commitment includes activities 
that will support public health and case management interventions to 
stop transmissions and mitigate the impacts of the pandemic across 
Africa. In May, President Biden committed to sharing 80 million COVID-
19 doses from the U.S. supply with the world. In total 25 million of 
these doses are being shared with Africa and distribution has been 
coordinated closely with the African Union and COVAX. Of this 
allotment, more than one million doses have thus far been donated to 
Africa, with Djibouti being the first African country to receive 
vaccine doses on July 17. The President subsequently committed the 
United States to provide 500 million doses of Pfizer vaccine to Gavi 
for distribution via COVAX to 92 low- and lower-middle-income economies 
as defined by Gavi's COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), and to the 
African Union. Almost half of the COVAX AMC countries are in Africa.
    The Biden-Harris administration is also supporting the expansion of 
vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The U.S. International 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with international partners, 
announced on June 30 a financing package for Aspen, Africa's largest 
manufacturer of pharmaceuticals located in South Africa, to increase 
production capacity for COVID-19 vaccines, and on July 9 U.S. announced 
its commitment to support Fondation Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) to 
boost vaccine production in Senegal.
    Finally, since the start of the pandemic, the Department of State 
and U.S. Agency for International Development have provided roughly 
$541 million in health, humanitarian, and economic support assistance 
to more than 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden-Harris 
administration will also provide additional foreign assistance under 
the American Rescue Plan Act to Sub-Saharan Africa to support COVID-19 
vaccine preparedness and delivery activities to ensure `shots in the 
arms' of African people. In addition, this funding will support public 
health efforts, strengthen case management, and interventions to stop 
and help mitigate the pandemic's effects on economic growth, food 
security, education, democracy, and women and girls.

    Question. The Biden administration just announced that it was 
sending 25 million vaccines to three African countries--Burkina Faso, 
Djibouti, and Ethiopia. In your view, what are the key challenges to 
more effective vaccine distribution?

    Answer. Over the last two decades, the U.S. Government invested 
roughly $100 billion in Africa's public health infrastructure. The 
result is strong systems that allowed partner countries to prepare for 
and respond rapidly to COVID-19. Rapid and equitable distribution of 
novel COVID-19 vaccines, however, is a complex operational challenge 
with legal, regulatory, logistics and cold chain considerations. Thanks 
to Congressionally-appropriated funding from the American Rescue Plan 
Act, the U.S. Government is supporting vaccine preparedness in Sub-
Saharan Africa, working with international partners and COVAX to 
provide technical assistance, logistics support, build cold chain 
capacity, and enhance vaccine absorptive capacity. To date, U.S.-
supplied vaccines have been successfully donated to four African 
countries, and COVAX has delivered vaccines to over 40 sub-Saharan 
African countries. As in the United States, vaccine hesitancy in Africa 
remains a concern. To respond, the United States partners every day 
with national and local African health ministries and services, as well 
as international and NGO partners, in support of messaging campaigns to 
address vaccine hesitancy in African populations as well as to confront 
COVID-19 vaccine mis- and disinformation.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
          to Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky by Senator Robert Menendez

Stabilization Priorities:
    Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when 
assessing whether the United States should engage more closely in 
conflict-affected countries and regions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue CSO's efforts to incorporate 
data, evidence, and quantitative and qualitative methods into policy-
making and prioritization when assessing whether the United States 
should engage more closely in conflict-affected countries and regions. 
CSO's analytical tools, such as the Instability Monitoring and Analysis 
Platform (IMAP), provide global data analytics on state fragility, 
instability, and conflict. CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate 
change, the COVID-19 pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses, 
and democratic backsliding to understand how these factors impact 
conflict risk and how targeted interventions might mitigate these 
trends.

    Question. With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or 
regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of 
occurring where you believe the United States should consider 
dedicating more resources and attention?

    Answer. Several countries, such as those laid out in this year's 
report to Congress pursuant to the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities 
Prevention Act of 2018, including Ethiopia and Burma, warrant increased 
attention and action, and it will be critical to monitor and address 
the broader, regional impact of the situations in these countries.

CSO Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting Stability
    Question. In addition to the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency 
for International Development, and other federal agencies, the State 
Department's regional bureaus, Office of Foreign Assistance, and Chiefs 
of Mission are responsible for elements of the U.S. Government's 
efforts to prevent conflict and promote stability abroad.

   With this in mind, if confirmed, in what areas do you anticipate 
        directing the CSO Bureau to play a leading role in these 
        efforts, including through the work of CSO stabilization 
        advisors in the field?

    Answer. If confirmed, and in support of the Under Secretary for 
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, I will direct CSO to 
continue its leading role in coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts 
to implement the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 
2018, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, and Global Fragility Act 
(2019) while integrating and advancing the Women, Peace, and Security 
Act (2017) as a cross-cutting priority. CSO informs key U.S. 
strategies, policies, and programs on conflict prevention and 
stabilization by combining quantitative data analytics with the 
qualitative expertise of its stabilization advisors, particularly in 
peace process support, security sector stabilization, and strategic 
prevention. Deployed CSO stabilization advisors provide technical 
conflict and stabilization expertise to DOD Geographic Combatant 
Commands and to U.S. embassies in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle 
East, and the Western Hemisphere.

    Question. Similarly, where is the Bureau better positioned to play 
a complementary role in efforts led by other agencies and State 
Department bureaus?

    Answer. Given its unique conflict expertise and advanced analytics 
tools, CSO complements other U.S. Government efforts to prevent 
conflict and promote stability by deploying Stabilization Advisors, 
harnessing data analytics, and leading, informing, and implementing 
policy and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. If 
confirmed, I will continue CSO's close coordination with other State 
Department bureaus and other agencies, including the J Family Bureaus, 
the Office of Foreign Assistance, USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention 
and Stabilization (CPS), the Department of Defense Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Treasury.
    Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Many analysts have expressed 
concern regarding the potential impacts of COVID-19 on fragile states.

    Question. How would you prioritize addressing COVID-19-related 
challenges in the context of the many risk factors capable of 
exacerbating violence and instability in fragile states?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure CSO continues to consider the 
impact of COVID-19 as a risk factor for instability and the interacting 
effects of COVID-19 and other drivers of conflict. CSO is currently 
monitoring the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on countries 
experiencing fragility, including through disruptions to remittances 
and tourism revenues and the general capacity of states' ability to 
deliver medical and other services to their citizens. CSO is also 
monitoring state repression through exploiting lockdowns, delays in 
elections, and other warning signs of democratic backsliding. I will 
ensure this work continues, and I will work across the department and 
interagency to investigate how targeted outreach and programming may 
mitigate COVID-19-related challenges.
    Leveraging CSO Data Analytics: Former CSO officials have identified 
a need to ensure that CSO data analytics tools are utilized by other 
State Department officials and bureaus in policy and programming 
decisions.

    Question. Please share your understanding of how the State 
Department is currently leveraging CSO's analytics tools, such as its 
Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform? If confirmed, how, if at 
all, would you work to ensure these tools are used more widely?

    Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that CSO's analytics 
capabilities and tools continue to be incorporated into all aspects of 
CSO's work, including support for the Global Fragility Act (GFA), the 
Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, and the 
Women, Peace, and Security Act. Since October 2019, CSO's analytics 
products have been requested and utilized by more than 50 State 
Department bureaus and embassies. CSO's Instability Monitoring and 
Analysis Platform (IMAP) provides all State Department employees and 
select interagency partners with global data analytics on state 
fragility, instability, and conflict, supporting the administration's 
policy to make evidence-based decisions guided by the best available 
data. I am eager to work with Congress to ensure that robust analytics 
continue to play a key role in CSO's work and to expanding 
opportunities for analytics to improve policies and programs at all 
levels.

CSO's Role in Atrocity Prevention
    Question. What is CSO's role in interagency efforts related to 
atrocity prevention? And, what are the specific activities CSO has 
engaged in related to atrocity prevention?

    Answer. CSO supports the National Security Council process to 
coordinate interagency implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Elie Wiesel Act) and serves as the 
Secretariat of the White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. 
In collaboration with other bureaus and agencies, CSO provides atrocity 
risk assessments for countries of concern and develops atrocity risk 
response plans targeted at likely pathways or scenarios to atrocities. 
CSO produces a classified quarterly Early Warning Assessment that 
identifies countries at risk of large-scale and deliberate civilian 
killings, a key indicator of potential atrocity. This assessment is one 
of three primary risk lists the Task Force uses to guide and prioritize 
its efforts. CSO funds a small amount of atrocity prevention 
programming, complementing efforts of other bureaus and agencies. To 
fulfill the Elie Wiesel Act's mandatory training requirements, CSO 
worked closely with stakeholders to develop the Department's first 
virtual atrocity prevention training that has trained over 2,700 
Department personnel since its launch in February, 2020.

Role of Women in Conflict Stabilization
    Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, will you direct the CSO 
Bureau to continue implementing the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and 
Security and elements of the Global Fragility Strategy focused on 
encouraging the meaningful participation of women in processes 
connected to peace and security?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will support CSO's robust Women, Peace, and 
Security (WPS) efforts. CSO works closely with the Secretary's Office 
of Global Women's Issues, among others, to ensure that conflict-
sensitive gender analyses, data on gender-based violence, and 
meaningful consultations with local women and girls will inform the 
development, implementation, and monitoring of GFA implementation 
efforts. CSO developed a new Gender Analysis of Conflict Tool to guide 
more nuanced assessments of how gender norms drive both men and women 
towards violence or peace.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
           to Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky by Senator James E. Risch

Mission and Mandate
    Question. In your view, what is the Bureau for Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations' mandate? Is CSO principally charged with 
policy formulation, program implementation, both, or none of the above?

   If confirmed, how would you work with the relevant regional and 
        functional bureaus within the Department of State and with the 
        relevant regional and functional bureaus at USAID to clarify 
        roles and responsibilities, ensure unity of effort, and reduce 
        duplication and waste?

    Answer. CSO's mandate is to anticipate, prevent, and respond to 
conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. CSO is charged with 
both policy formulation and program implementation. Among CSO's highest 
policy priorities are coordinating interagency implementation of the 
Global Fragility Act (2019), the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, 
and Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018.
    It is my understanding that CSO coordinates closely with other 
bureaus and agencies, and I am committed to ensuring unity of effort 
and preventing duplication, particularly among State, USAID and the 
Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will reinforce current 
coordination efforts to implement policy priorities.

Global Fragility Act
    Question. In your view, what role should CSO play in country 
selection, strategy design, and program implementation under the Global 
Fragility Act?

    Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with my colleagues 
in the White House, across the U.S. interagency in Washington and the 
field, and with multilateral partners and civil society, to ensure full 
implementation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), including country 
selection, strategy design, and program implementation. CSO's expertise 
and coordination role will be critical to innovative implementation of 
the GFA and will advance ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive 
management to inform policy and programming decisions.

    Question. Does CSO have the authority to act as arbiter of disputes 
between the relevant Federal departments and agencies charged with 
implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S. embassies in 
selected partner countries?

    Answer. CSO does not currently have formal authority to act as 
arbiter of disputes among the relevant Federal departments and agencies 
charged with implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S. 
embassies in selected partner countries. If confirmed, I will work 
closely with the White House, across the U.S. interagency including 
embassies and missions in the field, and with multilateral partners and 
civil society to implement fully the Global Fragility Act. I will work 
to enhance CSO's coordinating role and build consensus among all 
involved.

Data, Analytics, and Early Warning
    Question. The White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force 
(the Task Force) was designed to serve as a focal point for the 
relevant Federal departments and agencies, policy makers, and civil 
society working to identify and address the early warning signs of 
atrocities.

   If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that existing and 
        future data analytics and forecasting tools developed and 
        managed by CSO are relevant and readily available for use 
        within the Department, and by overseas missions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO commits and advocates 
for the necessary resources to keep its data analytics tools and 
capabilities freely available to support the Department and its 
overseas missions. My understanding is that all State Department 
employees and select interagency partners are able to freely access 
CSO's Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform (IMAP) which 
includes global data analytics on conflict and instability, forecasting 
tools, and past reports and products. I look forward to engaging with 
you further on evidence-based policy making.

    Question. What is the task force's role in identifying security 
priorities and regional policy?

    Answer. The Atrocity Early Warning Task Force (AEWTF) coordinates a 
whole-of-government approach to strengthen the U.S. Government's 
ability to forecast, prevent, and respond to atrocities. To inform 
security and regional policy development, the Task Force conducts 
global atrocity risk forecasting, using both quantitative and 
qualitative methods, and shares early warning signs with policy 
decision-makers. The Task Force has worked closely with relevant 
regional directorates to conduct atrocity risk assessments and produce 
corresponding atrocity risk response plans for at-risk countries. The 
AEWTF is a functional Interagency Policy Committee, for which close and 
ongoing partnership with regional directorates and policy processes is 
critical. If confirmed, I will support CSO's role in atrocity 
prevention, which President Biden reaffirmed as a core moral obligation 
and national security priority for the United States.

    Question. How does the task force define success?

    Answer. My understanding is that the Atrocity Early Warning Task 
Force defines success as early warning leading to early action. This 
process includes early identification and communication of atrocity 
risk, development of atrocity risk assessments and response plans for 
countries at-risk, and securing long-term attention through integration 
of atrocity prevention in existing regional policy processes.

    Question. What efforts can the task force undertake to amplify 
public messaging on signs of atrocities and/or other conflict 
indicators?

    Answer. Pursuant to recommendations engendered by the Elie Wiesel 
Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, the Atrocity Early 
Warning Task Force has progressed on improving public messaging through 
civil society, Hill, and public engagements. The 2021 congressional 
report - released by Secretary Blinken - sent a clear signal that the 
U.S. Government will publicly call out atrocities that have occurred or 
are ongoing - a strong risk factor for further atrocities. These 
efforts can be useful to shed light on, and raise the costs for, 
perpetrators of potential or ongoing atrocities, but their use must be 
weighed carefully according to context. If confirmed, I will evaluate 
where CSO should recommend the Task Force amplify its public messaging.

    Question. If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations (CSO) remains engaged in the Department's 
efforts to address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan through peace 
process support, atrocity prevention, and stabilization initiatives. 
CSO will continue to provide technical support to the U.S. Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) and others 
involved in the negotiations. CSO will continue to participate in the 
interagency processes to mitigate atrocity risks facing women and 
minorities via planning discussions, recommendations for short- and 
long-term civilian protection, and atrocity risk analysis.

    Question. If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Tigray?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO contributes to 
Department efforts to address the on-going crisis in Tigray by urging 
Ethiopians to come together to confront growing divisions. CSO 
currently supports efforts to promote a negotiated ceasefire and 
inclusive political dialogue to end the conflict in Tigray. CSO stands 
ready to support preparations to assist Ethiopians to advance post-
election dialogue and national reconciliation in Ethiopia.



                               __________


       Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
         to Ms. Anne A, Witkowsky by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

Ethiopia
    Question. As the second most populous country in the African 
continent and given its recent transition toward democracy in 2018 with 
the election of Prime Minister Abiy. With the recent June 21 general 
election and allegations of irregularities in the voting process, 
conflict and violence are expected to increase. The political violence 
has proven to have devastating impacts on the country, from disrupting 
Ethiopia's response to the COVID pandemic to the famine in the Tigray 
region which is reported to have spawned the most severe hunger crisis 
the world has seen in more than a decade. CSO's mission includes both 
conflict-resolution as well as crisis mitigation in regions determined 
to be vital to American interests.

   Does the current conflict in Ethiopia pose a threat to American 
        interests and if so, in what ways?

    Answer. Yes. A secure, stable, peaceful, and developing Horn of 
Africa is critical to U.S. economic and security interests. Conflict 
and instability in Ethiopia adversely affect the entire Horn of Africa 
region. The United States has a strong interest in supporting democracy 
and human rights overseas, and the current conflict undermines these 
efforts. For that reason, the Biden-Harris administration has urged all 
parties to end the hostilities, pursue a negotiated ceasefire and 
inclusive political solution, and hold accountable all those 
responsible for human rights violations and abuses.

    Question. What steps could CSO take to ensure a fair and verifiable 
election to help secure democracy in Ethiopia and prevent further loss 
of life in the region? Is there a role for the bureau in such a 
situation?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO continues to join 
Department leadership in supporting Ethiopians who exercised their 
right to vote on June 21. The Department is calling for the September 6 
elections to be free and fair. The September 6 elections will cover 
several areas that did not participate in the June elections due to 
logistical and security challenges. While elections alone are not a 
sufficient marker of democracy or true political reform, these 
elections are part of a democratic political process that should 
involve dialogue, cooperation, and compromise among all Ethiopians on 
the future of their country.

Burma
    Question. On February 1, 2021, the military of Burma launched a 
military coup d'etat, endangering their nascent democracy by detaining 
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other 
members of parliament. The situation has been further escalated by 
gross human rights violations, including the ongoing ethnic cleansing 
of the Rohingya people. The coup has also sought to create ``media 
blackouts'' in the region, preventing information from leaving and 
entering Burma during a political and public health crisis. Senior 
generals of the Tatmadaw have been sanctioned by the United States 
Government for perpetrating gross human rights violations and are 
subject to ongoing investigations into their conduct by the 
International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

   What steps besides sanctions and investigations could the U.S. 
        Government and its subsidiaries, such as the CSO, be taking to 
        bring about an end to the military coup in Burma, especially 
        considering that, as of today, the coup leaders remain in power 
        and are continuing to persecute the Burmese people and foreign 
        nationals, such as journalists, in what can only be described 
        as authoritarianism in its most severe form?

    Answer. The United States has led the international community's 
immediate and forceful response to the military coup in Burma. The 
United States has galvanized allies and partners to take concrete 
action and urge the regime to end violence, release all those unjustly 
detained, and restore Burma's path to democracy. I understand that such 
efforts include diplomatic outreach to ASEAN members, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and other countries in the region. The 
administration has worked with international partners to deny the 
regime access to hundreds of millions of dollars in resources in 
international financial institutions, and pushed for an arms embargo as 
well as restrictions on exports of dual use technology. The Department 
continues to urge all countries to use all available levers to restrict 
the junta's access to financial institutions. If confirmed, I will work 
diligently to ensure that CSO continues to add value to State 
Department efforts to support the people of Burma.

Stabilization Priorities
    Question. With many countries in conflicts to keep a close eye on 
around the world, it is important to assess how the US will engage in 
specific regions.

   If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when assessing 
        whether the United States should engage more in conflict-
        affected countries and regions?

    Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen CSO's 
analytical capacities to incorporate data, evidence, and quantitative 
and qualitative methods into policy-making and priority setting as the 
Department assesses its engagement in conflict-affected countries and 
regions. CSO's analytical tools provide the State Department and 
interagency partners with a basis for decision making on state 
fragility, instability, and conflict. I understand that among other 
factors, CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate change, the COVID-19 
pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses, and democratic 
backsliding, to understand how these factors impact conflict risk, how 
targeted intervention might mitigate these trends, and what adjustments 
might be recommended for policy focus and attention.

    Question. With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or 
regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of 
occurring where you believe the United States should consider 
dedicating more resources and attention?

    Answer. It will be critical to monitor and address the broader, 
regional impact of the situations in those countries laid out in this 
year's Elie Wiesel Act report to Congress, including Ethiopia and 
Burma. If confirmed I will ensure CSO provides full analysis of 
conflict criteria as the Department determines its engagement in 
countries or regions where conflict is already evident or at risk of 
occurring.



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