[Senate Hearing 117-271]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-271
SUDAN'S IMPERILED TRANSITION: U.S. POLICY
IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 25TH COUP
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 1, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-713 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Coleman, Hon. Isobel, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Phee, Hon. Mary Catherine, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...... 9
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Ero, Dr. Comfort, President and CEO, International Crisis Group,
Nairobi, Kenya................................................. 34
Prepared Statement........................................... 36
Tucker, Joseph, Senior Expert for the Greater Horn of Africa,
United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC............... 39
Prepared Statement........................................... 41
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Amnesty International USA Statement, Dated January 24, 2022...... 52
Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 56
Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 56
Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions Submitted by Senator Jim
Risch.......................................................... 57
Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions Submitted by
Senator Jim Risch.............................................. 58
Responses of Dr. Comfort Ero to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jim Risch...................................................... 61
Responses of Joseph Tucker to Questions Submitted by Senator Jim
Risch.......................................................... 62
(iii)
SUDAN'S IMPERILED TRANSITION: U.S. POLICY
IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 25TH COUP
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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young,
Rounds, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Let me thank our witnesses for joining us today to discuss
the crisis in Sudan.
East Africa stands at a precipice. Three years ago, fragile
transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan were once cause for cautious
optimism. Today, conflict in Ethiopia, including the deadly
siege of Tigray and the October 25 coup d'etat in Sudan, are
cause for alarm.
In April 2019, the Sudanese people peacefully and
tenaciously ousted indicted war criminal Omar al-Bashir,
Sudan's brutal dictator for 30 years. Despite a violent
response from his security services through 5 months of
sustained widespread protests, the people of Sudan succeeded in
their demands for a transition to democracy.
Though the process was rocky, civilians were able to reach
agreement with military actors on a transitional constitutional
document, which provided timelines for full return to civilian
rule.
Al-Bashir's fall and subsequent progress on the transition
paved the way for me and other members of this body to take
legal action leading to the removal of Sudan from the state
sponsor of terrorism list and to support an overall thaw of
relations between the United States and Sudan.
The military's brazen October coup has put that progress in
jeopardy. The coup was the culmination of weeks of tensions
between civilian and military members of Sudan's transitional
government.
The military's arrests and detention of Prime Minister
Hamdok and other civilian officials and the killing of dozens
of protesters advocating for a return to civilian rule have
made it clear that military actors have little interest in
ceding power and no fear of consequences for their actions.
The United States, regional actors, and the international
community must respond swiftly and decisively to help the
Sudanese people put their country back on a democratic
trajectory.
While the United Nations Integrated Transitional Assistance
Mission in Sudan has indicated it will facilitate Sudanese-led
talks among local stakeholders, it has no means to enforce
participation or to hold participants accountable for following
through on commitments.
Despite having publicly committed to dialogue to resolve
the current crisis, the Sudanese military continues to kill,
torture, abuse, and detain protesters and civil society actors.
Nearly 80 civilians have been killed by security forces
since the coup, including a 27-year-old man just this past
weekend. While a dialogue is necessary, there must also be
consequences for those responsible for human rights abuses and
for those at the highest levels who have engineered the coup.
In that vein, I support the Biden administration's decision
to suspend $700 million in aid immediately following the coup.
I also welcome the decision by the World Bank to suspend its
own planned assistance.
However, these actions alone have proven insufficient to
end the violence and force the generals to the negotiating
table.
I am pleased that the Administration has taken a number of
steps to increase its engagement on the crisis in Sudan,
including selecting David Satterfield to succeed Ambassador
Feltman as Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and dispatching
a seasoned ambassador to serve as charge d'affaires at Embassy
Khartoum until an ambassador is confirmed, and I am pleased
that the White House has finally nominated an ambassador to
Sudan.
Given the current situation, I hope that my colleagues will
join me in working to ensure that we move the nomination as
expeditiously as possible.
In the days to come, Congress will act as well. Ranking
Member Risch and I are collaborating on legislation that
establishes conditions that must be met prior to restarting
assistance; that directs the Administration to rethink its
assistance strategy; and, which sets up a regime of targeted
sanctions for those who undertook the coup and continue to
undermine the transition to democracy and abuse human rights,
thus far a critical missing element in the Administration
response.
I hope during the course of their testimony, witnesses will
discuss the following: What are the prospects for a return to
civilian rule? What role are the African Union, Arab Gulf
states, and other regional actors playing with regard to
supporting a return to dialogue and pressing military leaders
to agree to yield power? What consequences were you referring
to in your tweet from a week ago, Assistant Secretary Phee, and
when does the Administration plan to impose them?
We have vital strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and
the Red Sea corridor that will be difficult, if not impossible,
to meet should Sudan's transition fail. We simply cannot take
that risk.
Let me turn to the ranking member for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a tough
one.
The 2019 revolution in Sudan marked a pivotal moment for a
country at the crossroads of the Sahel, East, Central, and the
Horn regions of Africa. The end of the violent Bashir regime
was driven by millions of Sudanese through nationwide mass
demonstrations demanding change, and change did occur for a
little while.
Even though the military-led Sovereign Council had ultimate
authority over the Sudanese state, the establishment of a
civilian-led transitional government under the leadership of
Prime Minister Hamdok was a significant step toward achieving a
new democratic Sudan.
This government was by no means perfect. The civilian
groups that influenced the revolution made missteps along the
way, while old and new anti-democratic forces worked furiously
to infiltrate and undermine the work of the transitional
government. The Hamdok Government also faced a severe economic
crisis and deeply complicated political challenges.
In the weeks before the Sudan's October 25 coup, I, along
with other members of this committee, warned Sudan's military
not to intervene in the efforts by Prime Minister Hamdok and
his cabinet.
However, the leaders of the Sovereign Council, Generals
Burhan and Hemeti, did not resist and removed the civilian
government by force.
While the Administration has not wanted to characterize
what happened on October 25 as a coup, that is, indeed, what it
was. Foreign policy leaders released a bipartisan bicameral
statement calling what happened a coup, demanded that Sudan's
junta restore its civilian leadership, and vowed to take action
if they did not.
We followed that statement with a concurrent resolution in
both chambers, further outlining our concerns. The well-
documented violence against civilians before and following the
October 25 coup proves that Sudan's military junta is brutal,
cannot be trusted, and is incapable of leading Sudan's
democratic transition.
While we may need to engage Generals Burhan and Hemeti to
find a path toward restoring civilian control, we must put them
on notice. The United States must take action to hold the junta
and other spoilers of Sudan's transition accountable.
That is why my staff is working closely with the chairman's
office on comprehensive legislation to address this issue of
accountability, but, more importantly, to reshape our
assistance and policy approach towards Sudan.
The United States must continue to support the Sudanese
people and Sudan's pro-democracy forces. All totaled, the
financial commitments made by Congress to support Sudan's
civilian-led democratic transition exceed $1 billion.
Congress also worked to help reshape the bilateral
relationship by supporting debt relief, working with the State
Department to meet conditions for removing Sudan's state
sponsor of terrorism designation, and restoring its sovereign
immunity.
I am concerned, however, about how the United States
positioned itself before and following the October 25 coup.
Looking forward, the United States must have a clear vision
for what we would like to see in Sudan. We must be prudent with
our tax dollars and with clear-eyed determination, decide
whether we should commit all this funding to Sudan while coup
leaders remain in control of the government.
The Biden administration must also act urgently to help
stem the tide of military coups occurring across Africa, not
just in the Sudan. If democracy is, indeed, a priority for this
Administration, it must view these coups as a trend that
imperils the future of democracy in Africa and worldwide.
Finally, I have consistently called for the appointment of
an experienced U.S. Ambassador to Sudan since Secretary Pompeo
agreed to exchange ambassadors with Sudan in December of 2019.
I am pleased the Administration is moving an experienced
diplomat, like Lucy Tamlyn, to Khartoum as charge d'affaires,
but the 2 years we spent without a full time ambassador in
Sudan reflects a broader problem we must address: the low
priority the State Department faces in filling positions at all
levels for posts in Africa. I say that with full understanding
how difficult these posts are.
In the days leading up to this hearing, the Biden
administration signaled to this committee its intent to put
forward a nominee. Intent is good. Action is better. We are
still waiting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Let me turn to our witnesses.
With us this morning on behalf of the Administration is
Ambassador Isobel Coleman, Deputy Administrator for policy and
programming at the U.S. Agency for International Development,
where she is responsible for program and policy oversight,
including the agency's regional and pillar bureaus.
As Deputy Administrator, she guides USAID's crisis response
liaison work in countering the influence of China and Russia
and is responsible for overseeing agency efforts to prevent
famine and future pandemics, strengthen education, health,
democracy, and economic growth, and improve responses to
climate change.
Ambassador Coleman is a foreign policy and global
development expert with more than 25 years of experience
working in government, the private sector, and nonprofits. From
2014 to 2017, she was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
for management, reform, and special political affairs. During
that time, she represented the United States in the U.N.
Security Council on Africa and peacekeeping issues and on
issues related to the budget.
Joining her on this panel is Ambassador Molly Phee,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at the
Department of State. Ambassador Phee is a career member of the
Senior Foreign Service, but most recently served as the Deputy
Special Representative for Afghanistan reconciliation.
Ambassador Phee was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from
2015 to 2017. She also served as Deputy Chief of Mission of the
U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and as Chief of Staff in
the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan.
Additionally, Ambassador Phee has served as the Acting
Secretary for International Organization Affairs as well as the
Deputy Security Council Coordinator at the U.S. mission to the
U.N., handling U.N. engagement in Africa and Middle East for
both portfolios.
This is a very well-versed panel, particularly as it
relates to this issue. This is also the first time each of our
witnesses has testified before this committee in their current
roles for which they have been confirmed to, so congratulations
to both of you. Welcome to both of you. Thank you for your
service.
With that, we ask you to summarize your statement in 5
minutes. Your full statement will be included in the record,
without objection.
Let me turn to Ambassador Coleman first.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ISOBEL COLEMAN, DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Coleman. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify today on USAID's assistance to the people of
Sudan and our response to the devastating setback to Sudan's
democratic transition since October 25 when the military
detained civilian leaders, disrupted communication networks,
and began killing protesters in the streets.
Congressional interest in Sudan and support for the people
of Sudan have been essential over the years. USAID greatly
appreciates the additional $700 million in funding Congress
appropriated last year for Sudan.
Despite our collective efforts to help Sudan solidify the
democratic transition, recent events serve as a reminder that
progress toward democracy can be fragile. I thank the committee
for its attention to Sudan today.
For decades, we have witnessed the appalling violence and
human rights abuses as well as violations of international
humanitarian law committed by Sudanese security forces against
civilians. This includes the massacre of at least 127 peaceful
democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019.
Following Sudan's inspiring citizen-led revolution in 2019,
USAID reimagined and expanded its support, becoming the largest
donor supporting Sudan's democratic transition, including
assistance to then Prime Minister Hamdok's office and key
ministries to help them deliver on the goals of the revolution.
USAID partnered with the government to mitigate the sharp
effects of difficult yet necessary economic reforms on Sudanese
families to begin to right the ship after years of economic
neglect and mismanagement.
Our assistance to the civilian side of the transitional
government complemented our long-standing support for Sudanese
civil society and peacebuilding efforts, particularly in
marginalized and conflict-affected communities. These programs
operated alongside USAID's lifesaving humanitarian assistance.
After the military takeover on October 25, the United
States announced a pause on new obligations from the $700
million appropriation while we evaluated next steps in our
assistance for Sudan.
Following a review of our programs, that pause remained in
force for assistance to Sudan's government. Meanwhile, we have
expanded activities that support the Sudanese people in their
democratic aspirations.
Our current approach links the resumption of any assistance
to the government to the restoration of the civilian-led
transition. We have coordinated this effort with like-minded
international partners.
In light of the dynamic political environment, we are
revising the original plan for the $700 million and we look
forward to continued engagement with Congress to find the best
way forward.
We are now focused on ramping up support for Sudan's
democratic transition in three primary ways: first,
strengthening civilian political leadership; second, promoting
respect for human rights including freedom of expression and
right of peaceful assembly; and third, supporting the Sudanese
people's demand for an end to their military's long-standing
domination of politics and the economy.
Our goal remains to help the people of Sudan in their
pursuit of a civilian-led democratic government that is
responsive to its people. Our programs support civil society to
organize around, advocate for, and engage in transition
discussions and peace negotiations.
We support our partners in building the capacity of youth,
women, and marginalized citizens to lead whether in political
parties, civil society organizations, or in their communities.
We support civil society in conducting peacebuilding
activities, including ongoing national efforts to reach a
political agreement to the current crisis and engagement with
political consultations facilitated by UNITAMS.
USAID also supports journalists and independent media to
accurately and professionally report on transition, peace, and
political issues.
Amid the recent political turmoil, humanitarian needs
continue to rise. The U.N. estimates that nearly one-third of
Sudan's population will need humanitarian assistance in 2022.
This includes approximately 10 million people facing life-
threatening levels of acute food insecurity.
USAID has long been the largest humanitarian donor to the
people of Sudan. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to date, we have
contributed nearly $430 million in funding to provide for the
basic needs of refugees, internally-displaced persons, host
community members, and others in need.
This year, we will work to mitigate the suffering of
vulnerable populations and prioritize life-saving assistance in
Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. We will continue to meet
the immense needs of the Sudanese people as we urge other
donors to join us in these efforts as well.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Coleman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Isobel Coleman
Good morning Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to
testify today on USAID's assistance to the people of Sudan, and our
response to the devastating setback to Sudan's democratic transition
since October 25, when the military detained civilian leaders,
disrupted communications networks, and began killing protesters in the
streets--returning to the contemptible practices of failed past
Sudanese regimes. The military takeover also negatively affects Sudan's
long-term development prospects as well as prospects for sustainable
peace. Congressional interest in Sudan and support for the people of
Sudan have been essential over the years. USAID greatly appreciates the
additional $700 million in funding Congress appropriated last year to
further our goals in Sudan. Despite our collective efforts to help
Sudan solidify the democratic transition, recent events serve as a
reminder that progress toward democracy can be fragile. I thank the
Committee for its attention to developments in Sudan today.
The people of Sudan have demanded, and continue to demand, an end
to military rule. Thousands of brave citizens are risking their lives
on an almost daily basis to end the corrupt military rule that has
threatened and oppressed many of them for their entire lives.
For decades, we have witnessed the appalling violence and human
rights violations and abuses, as well as violations of international
humanitarian law, committed by Sudanese security forces against
Sudanese civilians. This includes genocide in Darfur, the
indiscriminate bombing of civilian settlements, the targeted bombing of
clearly marked hospitals, and security force attacks on medical
facilities, staff, and patients. It also includes the massacre of at
least 127 peaceful democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019.
We recognize and deeply appreciate the concern of your committee
members--and Congress as a whole--regarding the brutality and terror
the Sudanese people are facing, and how, in spite of these major
setbacks, we can best continue to support the people of Sudan to
fulfill their aspirations for freedom, peace, and justice.
Following Sudan's inspiring citizen-led revolution in 2019, USAID
reimagined and expanded its support, becoming the largest donor
supporting Sudan's democratic transition, including assistance to then-
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok's office and key ministries to help them
deliver on the goals of the revolution. USAID partnered with the
government to mitigate the sharp effects of difficult, yet necessary,
economic reforms on Sudanese families to begin to right the ship after
years of economic neglect and mismanagement. Our assistance to the
civilian side of the transitional government complemented our
longstanding support for Sudanese civil society and peacebuilding
efforts, particularly in long-marginalized and conflict-affected
communities. These programs operated alongside USAID's life-saving
humanitarian assistance.
After the military takeover on October 25, the United States
announced a pause on new obligations from the $700 million
appropriation while we evaluated next steps in our assistance for
Sudan. Following a review of our programs, that pause remains in place
for assistance to Sudan's government. Meanwhile, we have continued and
expanded activities that support the Sudanese people in their
democratic aspirations. Our current approach links the resumption of
any assistance to Sudan's government to the restoration of the
civilian-led transition. We have coordinated this effort with like-
minded international partners. In light of the dynamic political
environment, we are revising the original plan for the $700 million,
and we look forward to continued engagement with Congress to find the
best way forward.
We are now focused on ramping up support for Sudan's democratic
transition in three primary areas:
1. Strengthening civilian political leadership;
2. Promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of
expression and the right of peaceful assembly; and
3. Supporting the Sudanese people's demand for an end to their
military's longstanding domination of politics and the economy,
including with efforts to explore anti-corruption and
transparency mechanisms, support for transitional justice and
human rights, and exploring opportunities to support security
sector reform.
Our goal remains to help the people of Sudan in their pursuit of a
civilian-led, democratic government that is responsive to its people.
USAID has supported this type of work in Sudan for many years
through programs that promote democracy, empower civil society, and
protect human rights.
Our programs support civil society to organize around, advocate
for, and engage in transition discussions and peace negotiations. We
support our partners in building the capacity of youth, women, and
marginalized citizens to lead, whether in political parties--including
organizing new parties--civil society organizations, or in their
communities. We support civil society in monitoring political
processes, identifying conflict hotspots, and conducting peacebuilding
activities--including ongoing national efforts to reach a political
agreement to the current crisis, and engagement with political
consultations facilitated by the United Nations Integrated Transition
Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). USAID also supports journalists
and independent media to accurately and professionally report on
transition, peace, and political issues.
humanitarian response
Amid the recent political turmoil, humanitarian needs in Sudan
continue to rise. The United Nations estimates that approximately 14.3
million people in Sudan, or nearly one-third of the population, will
need humanitarian assistance in 2022, a 7 percent increase from last
year. This includes approximately 9.8 million people facing life-
threatening levels of acute food insecurity.
In Sudan's greater Darfur region, escalating violence due to
resource competition, unresolved political grievances, and the full
withdrawal of United Nations--African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur
(UNAMID) peacekeepers contributed to the displacement of thousands of
people, exacerbated risks to women and children, and impeded aid relief
groups from reaching the communities in greatest need of assistance.
This also shines a renewed spotlight on the need to protect civilians
in Darfur and on the shortcomings of an imperfect peace agreement.
Meanwhile, intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states
continue to increase displacement and disrupt emergency programming,
further exacerbating humanitarian needs. There are more than 3 million
people displaced within the country as of August due to violence,
protracted economic crisis, and severe flooding. An additional 1.1
million refugees and asylum seekers sought shelter in Sudan as of
November due to ongoing insecurity in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and other
neighboring countries.
USAID has long been the largest humanitarian donor to the people of
Sudan. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to date, we have contributed
nearly $429 million in funding to provide for the basic needs of
refugees, internally displaced persons, host community members, and
others in need. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
USAID partner Save the Children Federation is providing infection
prevention and control supplies to medical workers at the Khartoum
Isolation Center, helping to meet heightened health needs during the
pandemic and reducing the risk of health care workers contracting the
disease while attending to COVID-19 patients.
USAID also supports humanitarian coordination and logistics
activities, which help extend the reach and efficiency of emergency
response programming. Following the 6-week blocking of Port Sudan and
the Khartoum-Red Sea Port Sudan highway by the Beja Supreme Council,
which contributed to a significant backlog in the delivery of relief
commodities, USAID and our partners have actively engaged in
contingency planning to minimize the humanitarian impact of any future
disruptions in access to the port.
In 2022, we will continue to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable
populations and prioritize life-saving assistance in Darfur, South
Kordofan, and Blue Nile, particularly conflict-affected and newly
accessible zones in Jebel Marra. We will continue to meet the immense
needs of the Sudanese people, as we continue to urge other donors to
join us in these efforts as well.
conclusion
Finally, let me say that we appreciate our collaboration with
Congress to jointly determine the best uses of our foreign assistance
resources to help the people of Sudan fulfill their aspirations for
freedom, peace, and justice.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Phee.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY CATHERINE PHEE, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished
members of the committee, let me also thank you for your long-
standing interest in and support for a democratic Sudan. We
share your alarm about the deteriorating situation and the risk
of regression.
As you have noted, since the fall of the Bashir
dictatorship in 2019, the United States and our international
partners have robustly endeavored to support the Sudanese
people and have worked closely with this committee and Congress
on their behalf.
This was always an ambitious undertaking. After 30 years of
an Islamist military dictatorship and recurring internal
conflict, the Sudanese are coping with a burdensome legacy,
including the generational damage to the country's historically
marginalized areas such as Darfur. Even as we welcome the
transitional government's progress in political and economic
reform, we were acutely aware of the immense structural issues
facing the transition.
Yet, on the other side of the ledger, we have all been
inspired by the remarkable and resilient civilian resistance
movement, which resulted, as you have noted, in the
constitutional declaration and the Juba Peace Agreement. These
two documents offer the promise of transition to democracy and
peace for Sudan.
On October 25, as we all know, Sudan's Security Services
upended the civilian-military partnership when they betrayed
the transition and the Sudanese people by overthrowing the
Prime Minister and Cabinet.
The subsequent November 21 political agreement that
restored Prime Minister Hamdok to office failed because it did
not include key civilian stakeholders and did not end military
violence against civilian protesters.
Hamdok's decision on January 2 to resign further shocked
the Sudanese political system. Given the unacceptable actions
of Sudan's Security Services, the Sudanese people are now
intent on restoring civilian leadership of the country's
democratic transition through a reform of the Constitutional
Declaration and the Juba Peace Agreement.
They demand a new relationship between the military and
civilians, one that redefines and right-sizes the role of the
military from partner in a transitional government to
participant in the transitional process.
The United States fully supports the civilians in realizing
this ambition and is taking concrete action to reinforce their
efforts. Sudanese stakeholders tell us they welcome
international support to help them find common ground.
With the announcement on January 8 that UNITAMS would
facilitate a Sudanese-led political process, the international
community began actively working with Sudanese civilian
stakeholders to build consensus around a common vision for
reform of the Constitutional Declaration in order to refashion
the path of the civilian transition and implementation of the
Juba Peace Agreement.
With the Security Council mandate to use its good offices
in support of the transition, UNITAMS will be in front, but not
alone. The United States, in concert with the Friends of Sudan,
has pledged our full support, recognizing the uphill work
ahead.
Successful and durable democratic transitions require
broad-based agreement among multiple stakeholders in the
capital and across this diverse country. It will require the
contributions of many to meet this sizeable challenge.
We are prepared not only to provide programmatic and
financial support, but also to work closely with UNITAMS
leadership and key international partners, especially the
African Union, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia to shape
this process to ensure it delivers timely concrete results.
In my two visits to Sudan, including most recently with
Ambassador Satterfield, I heard a strong desire to find a way
forward. On behalf of the United States, I have made clear
publicly and privately that violence against peaceful
protesters perpetrated by Security Services since October 25
must end. So, too, must the detentions of civil society
activists, the use of sexual violence, closure of media
outlets, attacks on medical facilities, and communication
blackouts.
We have already worked intensively with our partners in the
international community to impose significant costs on Sudan's
military regime for its actions on October 25. The pause of
bilateral and multilateral assistance to the government,
estimated to reach more than $4 billion U.S. dollars, and of
debt relief, estimated at $19 billion U.S. dollars, has left
the country's finances in a precarious state.
We have been clear that restoration of international
financial assistance is predicated on ending the violence and
restoring the democratic transition.
I have also made clear that we are prepared to apply
additional costs should the violence continue and the
transition remains stalled.
We are now reviewing the full range of traditional and
nontraditional tools at our disposal to further reduce the
funds available to Sudan's military regime, to isolate its
military-controlled companies, and to increase the reputational
risk for any who choose to continue to engage in business as
usual with Sudanese Security Services and their economic
enterprises.
Three decades of military rule under Bashir failed to bring
stability or prosperity to Sudan. Sudanese history undeniably
demonstrates that only a democratic state can produce a
sustainable peace.
It is time for Sudan's military leaders to recognize this
reality. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mary Catherine Phee
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, allow me to begin by thanking the
committee for your longstanding interest in and support for a
successful transition from authoritarian to civilian rule in Sudan. We
share your alarm about the increasingly volatile situation and the risk
of regression. Since the fall of the Bashir dictatorship in 2019, the
United States and our international partners have robustly endeavored
to support the Sudanese people in their extraordinary efforts to build
a democracy. We have worked closely with this Committee and Congress to
advance this shared priority.
This was always an ambitious undertaking. After 30 years of an
Islamist, military dictatorship and recurring internal conflicts, the
Sudanese are coping with a legacy marked by a military-dominated
economy now in danger of collapse, a denuded civil service as a result
of repeated political purges, a fractured political system following
calculated military intervention to break and divide, and the
generational damage to the country's historically marginalized areas
such as Darfur which left hundreds of thousands dead, millions
displaced, and the nation divided in two. Even as we welcomed the
transitional government's progress in repealing repressive legislation
that restricted human rights, opening space for civil society and
political activism, ending decades-long government support for
terrorist organizations, and embarking on free-market economic reforms,
we were acutely aware of the immense structural issues facing the
transition, aggravated by internal power struggles and external
spoilers.
We were also inspired by the remarkable and resilient civilian
resistance movement, which achieved the historic overthrow of Bashir
and drove the security forces to agree in 2019 to a civilian-military
transitional partnership and path to elections known as the
Constitutional Declaration. Sudanese stakeholders also reached a
landmark transitional power-sharing arrangement for the historically
marginalized regions known as the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. These two
documents offered the promise of finally achieving democracy and thus
peace for Sudan. We were proud to work with Congress and our
international partners to leverage our diplomacy and our assistance to
support this transition, which holds so much promise for the people of
Sudan, the region, and the continent.
On October 25, as we all know, Sudan's security services upended
the civilian-military partnership when they betrayed the transition and
the Sudanese people by seizing power directly--overthrowing the Prime
Minister and cabinet and damaging the trust of the Sudanese people in
the promise of the transition and the goodwill of the international
community. The subsequent November 21 Political Agreement that restored
Prime Minister Hamdok to office failed because it did not include key
civilian stakeholders and did not definitively end military repression
of and violence against civilian protests. Prime Minister Hamdok's
decision on January 2 to resign shocked the Sudanese political system
and led prompted civilian and military stakeholders to reach out to the
international community for help in rescuing the transition.
Given the repeated troubling actions of Sudan's security services,
the Sudanese people have concluded that it is no longer realistic to
look at Sudan's transition as a partnership with the military. They are
now intent on restoring civilian leadership of the country's democratic
transition through reform of the Constitutional Declaration and the
Juba Peace Agreement to ensure that these guiding documents reflect the
needs of the present moment. To do so, Sudanese stakeholders demand a
new relationship between the military and civilians, one that redefines
and right sizes the role of the military from partner in a transitional
government to participant in the transitional process. For our part, we
have made clear we support the civilians in realizing this ambition and
will act to facilitate that change.
Sudanese stakeholders across the military and political spectrum
tell us they seek a way back to a transition but would welcome
international support to help them find common ground. With the
announcement on January 8 that the UN Integrated Transition Assistance
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) would facilitate a Sudanese-led political
process, the international community began actively working with
Sudanese civilian stakeholders to build consensus around a common
vision for reform of the Constitutional Declaration to refashion the
path of the civilian transition, carve-out an appropriate participatory
role for the security services, stand up a Legislative Council, and
establish the necessary groundwork to advance elections, economic
reforms, accountability, and implementation of the Juba Peace
Agreement.
With a Security Council mandate to use its good offices in support
of the transition, UNITAMS will be in front but not alone. The United
States--in concert with the Friends of Sudan (Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia,
France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom, the United States, the African Union, the European Union, the
League of Arab States, and the United Nations)--has pledged our full
support to the UNITAMS-facilitated process. We have done so with full
recognition of the uphill work facing the Sudanese and their regional
and international partners. Successful democratic transitions require
broad-based agreement among multiple stakeholders in the capital and
across the country. It will require the contributions of many to meet
this sizeable challenge. We are prepared not only to provide diplomatic
and financial support to this effort but also to work closely with
UNITAMS leadership and key international partners--especially the
African Union, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia--to shape this
process to ensure that it is time-bound and delivers concrete results.
In my two visits to Sudan, civilian and military stakeholders
expressed a strong desire to find a way out of the quagmire that has
bedeviled the country since the October 25 military takeover. While
they have pledged their support to the UNITAMS-facilitated political
process, such pledges must be met by action, particularly on the part
of the security services. On behalf of the United States, I have made
clear that the ongoing reprehensible pattern of violence against
peaceful protestors in which security services have engaged since
October 25 must end. So too must the use of detentions of civil society
activists, closure of media outlets, attacks on medical facilities, and
communications blackouts. These actions perpetuate a cycle of violence
that hardens positions and makes agreement on a political way forward
all the more difficult.
We have already worked with our partners in the international
community to impose significant costs on Sudan's military regime for
its actions on October 25. The pause of bilateral and multilateral
assistance to the government and of debt relief has left the country's
finances in a precarious state, unable to meet its current financial
obligations. We have been clear that the only path to restoration of
international financial assistance is predicated on ending the violence
and restoring the democratic transition.
At the same time, as I have made clear to military leaders, we in
concert with our partners are prepared to apply additional costs should
the current pattern of violence continue. We are now reviewing the full
range of traditional and non-traditional tools at our disposal to
further reduce the funds available to Sudan's military regime, to
isolate its military-controlled companies, and to increase the
reputational risk for any who choose to continue to engage in
``business-as-usual'' with Sudanese security services and their
economic enterprises. Using such leverage smartly will enable us to
press for behavior change on the part of security sector leaders, and
could contribute to a reset of the military-civilian balance of power
in Sudan, a prerequisite for the long-term success of its democracy.
We applaud Sudanese from all walks of life who continue to take to
the streets at great personal risk to demand civilian rule and
democracy. Since 2018, they have been the vanguard and the heroes of
Sudan's revolution. As the UNITAMS-facilitated dialogue progresses, we
will provide concrete support to enable the Sudanese people and civil
society organizations to channel their determination to refashion a new
civilian-led path to democracy that includes political and economic
reforms essential to achieving the Revolution's goals of freedom,
peace, and justice.
Three decades of military rule under Bashir failed to bring
stability or prosperity to Sudan. The Sudanese people have made clear
through 4 years of sustained activism and protest that they will not
allow their demands for civilian rule and democracy to be ignored, set
aside, or coopted. Sudanese history undeniably demonstrates that only a
democratic state can produce a sustainable peace. It is past time for
Sudan's military leaders to recognize this reality, cease the use of
violence, and participate constructively in a civilian-led transition
to democracy. The United States and the international community share
the aspirations of the Sudanese people to restore and advance their
transition and we will continue to work with our regional and
international partners towards that goal. We will continue to seek your
help and engagement to help the Sudanese people realize the full
potential of their brave and historic revolution.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, and thank you both.
We will start a series of 5 minutes of questions, and the
chair will recognize himself.
The October 25 coup, and it was a coup and should be
treated as such by the Administration, was a blatant power grab
by the military after months of mounting tensions between the
military and civilian elements of the Sovereign Council.
The root cause of the tensions appears to be the reluctance
of the military to cede power to civilian authorities. Even now
the bloody crackdown on civilians continues and the fatality
count is rising.
The Administration has taken some actions--suspending most
assistance, dispatching high-level diplomatic missions to the
region, meetings with local and regional stakeholders, and
public statements--but security forces continue to attack
civilians, arrest civil society actors, and engage in sexual
violence with impunity.
Ambassador Phee, why has the Administration failed to
impose personal targeted sanctions on those responsible for
impeding Sudan's democratic process and perpetrating human
rights abuses?
Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, as I outlined, we worked closely
with our partners in the international community to impose
extraordinary economic pressure on the government. The combined
efforts have had a devastating fiscal impact and have made very
clear that Sudan cannot move forward with international
assistance if the security forces do not change their behavior.
I have also made those points clear in my engagement, as
has Ambassador Feltman and Ambassador Satterfield in their
roles as Special Envoy. We are also engaging, as you know,
regional and international partners to pass the same messages.
So----
The Chairman. My question is we have not, to my knowledge,
imposed personal targeted sanctions on those responsible. For
example, the Sudanese security forces reportedly have vast
business interests, controlling an estimated 250-plus companies
in various sectors from mining to agriculture.
Why has not the Administration considered sanctioning any
of these companies or the security force members who own them?
It would seem to me that this would be a priority since they
are the ones who seem to be the intransigent entity here in
terms of allowing Sudan to move forward.
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We agree exactly that those are sectors where we should
explore imposing pressure and we are actively looking at how to
do that. You know our traditional existing regimes were not
specifically designed for this moment.
We are looking at how we might develop a new regime in
which we would work with you and I was gratified to hear about
the legislation you are considering, and we are looking also at
nontraditional ways to get at these financial sources of power
for the security forces.
The Chairman. I would think that you have authorities
already under a variety of existing laws, but you have failed--
not you personally, but, of course, the Administration--has
failed to take use of any of them.
If that is the case and you feel that you do not have them
then, please, by all means, let the committee know what is it
that you are missing, because we would be very desirous of
giving you the wherewithal.
You and Special Envoy Satterfield recently returned--you
referred to it--from a trip to Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and
Ethiopia. Is there progress on persuading the Sudanese military
to end its practice of using lethal force, arbitrary arrests,
and sexual violence against civil society activists and pro-
democracy protesters?
Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, I think it is too soon to tell.
Certainly, the protests are going to continue. This is an
immutable fact. We made that clear to the Sudanese Security
Force leaders and to their partners in the Arab region that
they need to change this behavior.
They need to cease using lethal force against protesters.
They need to provide accountability for the conduct of security
forces.
The Sovereign Council, which, as you know, is currently
governing Sudan, has established a committee to look into the
violence on January 17. These are nascent and inadequate steps,
but we are mobilizing our pressure. We also stopped in Addis
and spoke to the African Union about its engagement.
The IGAD envoy is currently in Khartoum. We are
coordinating with other like-minded partners to try and pass
that message. This meeting today is a helpful sign to all these
leaders that they need to change their behavior if they want
Sudan to succeed.
The Chairman. I hope it would not be necessary to have a
hearing in order to move them on the issue.
Let me turn to Ambassador Coleman. First of all, we would
like to be consulted on your plans before they are finalized.
As you referenced, the $700 million package will be
readjusted to meet the new realities of Sudan's political and
economic crisis. I would like to have some insights as to what
you are thinking there.
Finally, how is USAID working to address the needs in
Darfur in the wake of the coup? We should not lose sight of the
continued violence and displacement in Darfur as we are dealing
with this larger problem. These voices have been marginalized
for far too long.
Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, we absolutely will consult with you before we finalize
our plan's $700 million appropriation.
As I noted in my opening statement, immediately after the
events of October 25 we paused all of our funding and did a
review and made a determination not to move forward with any
funding that works directly with the government.
We have instead reprogrammed some of that money and
directed it to activities that support civil society in a
couple of different areas, in particular, on strengthening
civil society and civilian political engagement as partners in
the peace process, helping them advocate, providing civic
education and training, even transporting local groups to
Khartoum so that they can engage in dialogue with UNITAMS and
with other groups connecting them for the ability to come up
with a more unified vision of civilian demands, going forward,
for this transition.
We are also spending money on human rights work to bolster
collection of information around human rights abuses,
independent media that are able to both bring in different
voices into the media space and work on anti-corruption
measures with transparency in their reporting.
With respect to Darfur, yes, sir, there is just remarkable
needs still in Darfur across several of those states--Darfur,
Blue Nile, South and West Kordofan. There is almost 3 million
internally-displaced people and we are working with our
partners there to provide basic needs and humanitarian
assistance, also trying to help with some health needs there
and livelihoods in the agricultural space as so many of the
people do depend on subsistence farming with a specific focus
on women and also addressing some of the gender-based violence
that has happened there, providing support for survivors of
gender-based violence--that, too.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, bless you for what you do. I mean, this is a
heavy lift.
When you listen to the list of problems with the human
rights abuses and shootings and murders and everything else, it
is easy--it is really easy to get discouraged, particularly,
when we have done--we have done some pretty heavy lifting,
particularly financially, to try to lift this thing, and it
just goes unrewarded.
It is difficult and, look, there is all kinds of problems
on the continent, and they seem like they keep getting worse
and I--as I have looked at it, I do not think this one is the
worst, but probably got to be pretty close to it.
In recent months, there has been a half a dozen coups, as
you know, on the continent. One country had two coups. As I was
sitting here, I was just handed a note that in Guinea-Bissau,
they have--gunfire has just broken out near the presidential
palace where a cabinet meeting is being held, so probably got
another one going on there.
Give us some hope here. I heard the antiseptic recitation
of what you have told them and how you insist on this and that,
but give us some hope that we can look forward to seeing things
improve because it just--to see the backward sliding as bad as
it has been and particularly with everybody trying to help, it
is really disheartening.
Ms. Phee, why do you not start and see--give me something
to feel good about.
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Ranking Member, and, first, let me let
me say I think everyone shares the disappointment and
frustration in the current state of events, but I do have hope.
I have had the opportunity in my brief time in this new
assignment to travel to Khartoum twice and you know I have been
in a lot of difficult places in the world.
The Sudanese people are amazing. They are committed, they
are creative, they have a vision for what they want, and they
are not going to let that vision go, and I have not seen that
kind of strength and cohesion in other difficult environments
in which I have worked.
Also, the security forces in Sudan are difficult, but they
are not monolithic. Some of them, I think, truly would like to
affect a transition. They do not know how to do it. They are
falling back on their old playbook.
I think there is really an opportunity for diplomacy here.
I am excited by so many players in the region, in the
international community, who want to support the Sudanese, who
have their own agency and their own vision for their country.
I believe that that is the strength that we have not seen
in other environments, that this is not only in the capital,
but it is in the many different diverse areas of Sudan.
I think we need to continue to support them. It is not,
frankly, a surprise that this transition is difficult. I think
we need to have an approach that can absorb shocks that will be
inevitable, continue to put the pressure on, and continue to
provide the kind of technical assistance that the Deputy
Administrator referred to. That is how I look at it right now,
Senator.
Senator Risch. Thanks so much for that. I hope that is a
realistic appraisal of the conditions there on the ground. I
can understand how a population has the commitments,
enthusiasm, and optimism that you have described.
If they do not have the guns and the other side has got the
guns, it is--that is difficult. Also, the issue of the armed
forces, where they are not monolithic, that sword cuts both
ways because if they are not monolithic, they do not have a
strong leader that can actually talk everybody into laying down
their guns and doing things peacefully.
That sort of cuts both ways. I hope you are right.
Ms. Coleman, do you want to take a shot at this?
Ms. Coleman. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
I think I would just underscore what Assistant Secretary
Phee has noted, which is the incredible resiliency of the
Sudanese people and the vibrancy of this movement.
Despite the Security Forces turning their guns on all of
these people too often over the last 2 years, they continue to
come out into the streets. They continue to mobilize and
protest peacefully, and we have seen just a remarkable
determination not to give up.
People taking such courageous acts, speaking out, and
starting new media. There is a woman who was a spokesperson in
the Prime Minister's office who USAID supported with
communications while the civilian leader was in his role.
After Prime Minister Hamdok left, she left, too, and now
she has started her own media company, continuing to put out
messaging about peaceful transition, democracy, human rights.
These are people who were putting themselves and their
families on the line to fight for something, and I think it is
just a reflection of the resiliency of a people who lived for
decades under an authoritarian government.
Most people in the country grew up knowing nothing else,
and here they are with a chance at a better life for
themselves, for their children, one based on rule of law and
democracy and human rights, and they just will not give up. I
think that is the message that the security forces are slowly
coming to realize is the reality of this situation.
Senator Risch. I guess time will tell. My time is up, but
before I do that, could you give us an update on getting an
ambassador to the country?
We are all anxious to see that. I know that has got to be a
difficult post to take on, but we need to see an ambassador. I
know they have said intent to appoint, but where are we?
Ms. Phee. Senator, the process is being pushed as quickly
as it can be by the State Department and we will work in
partnership with the Senate to, hopefully, achieve a full
nomination and confirmation as soon as possible, and I am very
proud and I am glad you welcomed the role of Ambassador Lucy
Tamlyn.
She is a terrific seasoned diplomat and she will be very
important at this critical moment to support the Sudanese
people as they put this transition back on track.
Senator Risch. Have you got some experienced people over
there you got on the list that are willing to do this? It seems
to me that is going to be the toughest thing, once you get
that. Making a choice should not be that hard, but it seems it
could move faster than what it is.
Ms. Phee. I agree with you, sir. People are our policy, and
we are doing our very best to get our best out there.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Cardin is
with us virtually.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank
both of our witnesses for their extraordinary service. It is,
certainly, a difficult circumstance in Sudan. I understand
that. We are with the Sudanese people.
Clearly, we must make it clear that a military coup and the
military that is now controlling the country, and we have to be
with the Sudanese people, not just by our words, but by our
deeds.
As I listened to your testimony about what we are doing in
consultation with other partners in the region and trying to
work out some type of a reconciliation here, it seems to me we
need to do more than that.
I heard you, Secretary Phee, talk about human rights
violations and holding those responsible for these human rights
violations accountable. I have heard that before.
Unfortunately, as you go to some form of a reconciliation or
some form of a process forward, it seems like holding those who
violated human rights is always the last thing and very seldom
really accomplished.
What confidence can you give us that the Biden
administration will insist as part of the process, that those
who have violated the human rights of the Sudanese people, in
fact, will be held accountable in this process?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, in addition to the programming that the
Deputy Administrator referred to, I want you to just call to
your attention that we have from the Bureau of Democracy and
Human Rights a 3-year dedicated program to help the Sudanese
document human rights violations. That program is underway to
support them in what they demand.
Again, going back to the strength of the civilian
stakeholder movement, they want accountability and this is a
key topic of discussion among the stakeholders who are now
reviewing and desirous of changing the Constitutional
Declaration.
All the Sudanese that I have had a chance to meet have made
very clear that they understand addressing accountability is
important both to pull the military forward on the transition
and to heal the country and allow it to remain a durable and
stable democracy.
That is their commitment and we will back up their
commitment, but I wanted you to be aware of the specific
programmatic efforts we are undertaking.
We also have the authority that Congress has given us
through GLOMAG. That is a possibility we can immediately use,
in addition to exploration of the other options I discussed
earlier. Thank you, sir.
Senator Cardin. I hope you will use the tools that we
provided and I hope you will take advantage of Chairman
Menendez's offer. If you need additional tools in the toolkit
to deal with these issues, please let us know.
I have another concern and that is you talk about working
with our regional partners. At times, I find in regards to
their policies in Sudan, we are not always aligned completely
as to what we are trying to accomplish. I have confidence in
the Biden administration in supporting the Sudanese people over
the military control.
I am not certain about other regional partners in that
region as to what they will do, ultimately, in regards to the
power structure within Sudan as well as a holding those
responsible for human rights violations accountable in the
final resolutions here.
What can you tell me about how we are working with our
traditional partners in the region to make sure we are all on
the same path for an outcome in Sudan that is in the best
interests of the Sudanese people?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. You are quite right to
highlight the importance of engaging with these partners who
have extensive ties, including personal, political, and
economic, with Sudan.
That is why it is so important for us to talk to them and
discuss our view, which is that there is a false choice if they
think supporting the security forces at the expense of the
civilians will bring stability to Sudan, which is what they
claim they seek.
That is really the basis of our dialogue that we just
deeply contest that assumption that support to the security
forces exclusively will result in stability in Sudan.
In the meeting that Special Envoy Satterfield and I
attended in Riyadh as part of the Friends of Sudan, which
included Gulf Arab states, we also had an opportunity to meet
the Saudi foreign minister while we were there.
That final statement condemned the use of violence against
protesters and committed all the members of the Friends of
Sudan to not restoring or expanding financial assistance or
economic assistance until the violence ended and the transition
was back on track.
Those are some examples of how we are engaging and what we
are saying.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate those responses. I think we
need to follow this carefully because I have seen this in the
past. We see statements that are made, but they are not carried
out by specific actions. I hope that you will continue to make
a priority a resolution in the interests of the people of Sudan
as well as holding accountable those responsible for these
human rights violations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me just begin by saying thank you to both of you
for your interest and your agreement to participate in this
meeting, but also your interest overall in the situation at
hand in Sudan.
I would like to read just what I believe is a fair analysis
and I would like to get your thoughts about where we sit right
now after looking at the last 3 years.
As I understand it, in April of 2019, nationwide protests
spurred the ouster of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir after
three decades in power. To defuse the crisis at that time,
mediators brokered a deal in which the coup leaders and
civilians would share power during a 3-year transition period,
leading to elections and full civilian rule.
The transitional government that was subsequently formed
was broadly welcomed by the international community and began
reforms, pursued peace talks with rebel groups, and sought to
end the country's international isolation.
The Government's reforms helped to secure funding from
international donors, including the United States, and support
for multilateral debt relief. U.S.-Sudan relations improved
dramatically, and in late 2020 Sudan agreed to normalize ties
with Israel.
In mid-September 2021, the transitional government
announced that a coup attempt purportedly by loyalists of the
former regime had been thwarted. General Burhan became
increasingly critical of civilian leaders, including Prime
Minister Hamdok, and that was after this had occurred.
In the aftermath, he accused politicians of alienating the
armed forces and of neglecting their governing responsibilities
while fighting over positions. As Burhan pressed for Hamdok to
replace his cabinet, pro-democracy forces responded on October
21, organizing a mass protest against the prospect of a
military takeover.
Overnight, on October 25, security forces detained Hamdok,
several ministers and other officials and took control of state
media. In November, Burhan reconstituted the Sovereign Council,
replacing civilian members of the government with his own
appointees.
On November 21, at which point at least 40 protesters had
been killed, Hamdok signed a political agreement with Burhan in
what he said was an effort to avert more bloodshed and protect
economic gains.
The deal restored the Prime Minister to his position, but
with the stipulation that a new cabinet of technocrats rather
than politicians be formed. On January 3, the Prime Minister
resigned, condemning the continued violence against protesters
and acknowledging that his efforts to find consensus among
Sudanese stakeholders had failed. Hamdok's resignation leaves
the military in charge.
On October 25, the Biden administration announced that it
was pausing almost all assistance under the 2021 Economic
Support Fund appropriation of approximately $700 million in
security assistance and other forms of assistance to the
Sudanese Government.
Humanitarian assistance, as I understand it, is not
affected by the decision. U.S. officials say assistance to the
government will not resume until there is an end to the
violence and a restoration of civilian-led government that
reflects the will of the people of Sudan.
Is my statement fairly accurate?
[Ms. Phee nods.]
Senator Rounds. Based upon that, it would appear that over
the last 3 years, number one, we looked at a proposal that
would have been a 3-year transition period. We are closing in
on that now.
During that time period, it would appear that all parties
there seem to have an interest in moving forward and, yet,
internal strife appears to be the challenge.
Is that a fair statement within the political realm of
Sudan?
[Ms. Phee nods.]
Senator Rounds. Based on that, are we choosing sides in
this particular case? How do we work with both sides to try to
find an end game?
Ms. Phee. Senator, it seems to me that the way the Sudanese
have characterized their current challenge is a model that we
should follow.
As you described, there was an agreement that the civilians
and the military would move forward as partners in this
transition process. That broke down because of the military's
conduct.
The military, obviously, cannot be wished out of the
political and economic system they have dominated for 30 years.
The way the Sudanese are now formulating the approach is
that they recognize the military must be a participant in the
process in which all stakeholders need to redefine the role of
the military.
Every country needs a military to defend the borders, to
defend the nation, to defend the sovereignty. The problem in
Sudan has been the military's overreach.
Senator Rounds. Do we have access and do we have ongoing
communication with both sides in this particular case?
Ms. Phee. Yes.
Senator Rounds. Would you consider the communications good
communications, open communications?
Ms. Phee. Yes, I would. In fact, I have traveled twice and
spoken to leaders of the security forces and I have also spoken
to them on the phone, and our embassy regularly engages. I
would characterize our engagement across the board with all
Sudanese as constructive.
Senator Rounds. Okay. One last very quick question. What is
the Administration considering with respect to the $700 million
in paused assistance to Sudan?
We have come close to it, but we have not answered the
question yet.
Ms. Coleman. Thank you. In consultation with Congress so
far and with the interagency, we have already looked to
program, roughly, $100 million of that money with a focus on
civil society.
Working not directly with the government, but with civil
society groups outside the government, private organizations
both in the center of the country in Khartoum, but also in
regional and local areas, helping them with training and
education on civics to better strengthen and prepare them for
this eventual transition.
As we have noted, this has been three decades of
authoritarian rule that has left civil society, really, not in
any shape to be as active and a participant as it needs to be
in this process.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today.
As we talk about the 2019 revolution, it is known in many
quarters as the women's revolution because about 90 percent of
demonstrators were women who participated in that and had for
many years played a prominent role in advocating against
Bashir's brutal regime.
Unfortunately, as is often the case, women were sidelined
from peace talks and they had to demand representation and
inclusion in a transitional government.
Deputy Administrator Coleman, you talked about what we are
doing to strengthen civilian leadership and capacity building
among women.
Can you speak to some of the particulars and highlight what
we are doing to address the women, peace, and security
requirements that say that women should be included in peace
processes in areas like Sudan, which are trying to resolve
conflict?
Ms. Coleman. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
You are absolutely right. This is in no small part a
women's revolution, and if you look at the television that
carries coverage of street demonstrations still in Sudan today
you see women out front and center, risking life and limb to
continue carrying the flame for a better life for themselves
and their children.
We are working with women's groups across much of the
country as we have been for many, many years. We have
relationships in many of the states where we have been working
in a humanitarian context, where we have developed good
relationships with civil society organizations on the ground
that have been partners in our humanitarian efforts, and some
of those groups are part of our women, peace, and security
efforts, too.
They have strong views on what should be happening. Their
voices have not been heard, have not been included. We are, as
I noted, providing them with advocacy training, even with
transportation money to help them get to Khartoum to engage in
a broader discussion on peacebuilding, making sure that they
are connected with the UNITAMS-facilitated efforts, providing
them with both funding and training on media.
I mentioned the woman who has started her own media
business. We are also funding a women's talk show in Sudan. You
can think of it sort of Sudanese women meet ``The View.''
It is women from different ethnicities, different
demographic groups, young, old, across the country, sharing
ideas on what the future of the country might look like for
them. It is bringing lots of different viewpoints together.
Senator Shaheen. How, specifically, are we going to
continue to promote the inclusion of women in the next stage of
negotiations?
I appreciate all of those civil society-building efforts,
but if we are talking about the negotiating table, are we
demanding that in terms of our participation that women be
included in that?
Either one of you can respond to that. Assistant Secretary
Phee?
Ms. Coleman. I will turn to Assistant Secretary Phee, but I
will just say, absolutely, because they are such an important
voice and presence. They themselves demand a seat at the table
and we will ensure that they are there.
Ms. Phee. Good morning, Senator. Yes, absolutely. We have
discussed this directly with the Special Representative of the
Secretary General who leads the UNITAMS effort and he fully
supports the goal of having women and has been meeting with
women's groups and including them in the process that he is
undertaking right now. Absolutely, that is a commitment on our
side and on the side of the international community.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear
that and hope that will continue.
Just to switch gears a little bit, and I only have a few
seconds left, but Russia, obviously, has refused to condemn the
coup leaders. They have stuck to their playbook of blaming the
West for the instability. What does Russia want to get out of
Sudan?
Ms. Phee. Senator, some of the details of our assessment
there might be better handled in a different setting, but it is
known that the Russians are interested in the Port of Sudan,
and I think, generally, we can see by Russian conduct globally
that they are interested in exploiting insecurity for tactical
gain and financial gain.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Hopefully, we will have the
opportunity in a classified setting to address that question in
further detail.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Phee, I would like to start with you,
if I might, and talk a bit about the Abraham Accords and the
relationship to the Sudan.
I think, as you know, the U.S. significantly advanced
efforts to normalize relations between Arab nations and Israel
with respect to the Abraham Accords. In fact, four Arab nations
signed up including Sudan, who joined in January of 2021.
My sense is that the Abraham Accords present a great
opportunity for these normalized relations and my understanding
is that Israel has been reaching out to Sudan in the wake of
the coup to a number of stakeholders there to try to assist.
My question to you is does the Biden administration support
Israel's attempt to reach out to work with Sudanese
stakeholders, particularly in light of the normalization with
the Abraham Accords?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Special
Envoy Satterfield will be in Israel tomorrow to discuss
Israel's concerns and interests in the region, including in
Sudan.
We agree with you. It was a great prospect to apply the
Abraham Accords to Sudan, but the normalization efforts that
were underway were part of a negotiation with the civilian-led
government.
Now that that government is no longer in place, we do not
feel it is appropriate to push for it at this time, but that is
something we are keeping a close eye on for an opportunity to
resume.
It would be helpful if Israel would use its influence to
encourage the transition to go forward so then we can move
forward on other important objectives like the Abraham Accords.
Senator Hagerty. I would encourage you to look for those
opportunities, despite the fact that the original negotiating
counterparts may have changed. I think Israel has the desire to
work there and I think we should be doing everything that we
can to support it.
A question to both the Assistant Secretary Phee and Deputy
Administrator Coleman. I would like to talk about the Economic
Support Fund that was allocated.
Under the previous Administration, $700 million in foreign
assistance was made available to Sudan for fiscal year 2021.
After the coup that took place in 2021, the Biden
administration has to my understanding halted those funds.
What is the plan, moving forward, with respect to those
funds? How much has been spent so far, how much remains, and
what would the plan be, moving forward?
Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Senator.
Of the $700 million, we have looked to program $108 million
of that over the course of the coming year, much of it towards
promoting and enhancing and strengthening civil society, but
also in standing up more agricultural livelihoods work outside
of the government.
All of that money is being spent outside the government.
None of it is being spent with the government. We paused all of
our programming and took a look and decided that there were a
certain set of activities that we could continue outside the
government.
Going forward, we are now in a process of looking at the
remainder of that money and determining what we can use
efficiently, effectively, and productively in Sudan, both to
help the people of Sudan to strengthen their prospects and to
be a net positive in this transitional process, but not working
with the government. That is off the table.
Senator Hagerty. If I understand correctly then, $108
million of the $700 million has been programmed so you have a
rather large balance left that you can continue to work with
there. I appreciate your businesslike approach, as we have
discussed in the past, and taking this in a stepwise fashion
and making certain we get the most effective usage of those
funds.
Assistant Secretary Phee, can I come back to you now again
to talk about Russia's efforts to strengthen their geopolitical
foothold in Sudan?
As you know, Sudan is a very strategically well-located
place when you think about their access to the Red Sea and
Russia's desire to continue to build their relationship.
They have got a strong economic relationship, diplomatic
relationship, military relationship with Sudan. In November of
this past year, 2021, General Burhan recommitted Sudan to the
naval base deal that they struck with Russia to build a base
there in Port Sudan right there on the Red Sea.
As the current crisis in Ukraine continues to unfold, I
think it is very important for us to work with our friends and
allies to push back on Russia's influence, and I know that the
previous Administration had worked hard to discourage Sudan
from engaging with Russia in this matter. Where do you see our
posture unfolding here with respect to this?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, for raising that important
issue. The leaders of Sudan's security forces have a choice.
They can be the leaders who help Sudan complete this historic
transition or they can be the leaders that fail.
We want a Sudan that has a partnership with the United
States and with our like-minded partners in the world, and not
with Russia.
Russia is the old Sudan, and our efforts are designed to
help Sudan, first, for its own sake, reach democracy and
prosperity, and secondly, take up its rightful role on the
continent and in the international community and that includes
working with partners like us. That is undergirding our
approach to this problem.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate a very keen eye toward this.
We know China's presence in Djibouti. We understand Russia's
presence here. I think the strategic value of Africa is very
clear and a very concentrated focus on our part to do just as
you say will be necessary, going forward.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both
of you for your service and testimony.
Last May, Senator Coons and I visited Sudan to tell both
government leaders as well as activists that the United States
stood with them in the transition toward democracy.
We met with General Burhan, who looked us in the eye and
said he supported that transition toward democracy. Clearly, he
broke his word. More importantly, he broke his word to the
people of Sudan.
Another person we met with was the Minister of Justice
Abdelbari, who was a bright light in the transition, a strong
supporter of democracy, rule of law.
As you know, he has resigned and what he said about what
happened in October is, ``What is happening now in Sudan is a
military coup.'' Unequivocal.
I do think the United States has to say that out loud, too,
and I agree with my colleagues who say that we need to do more
to target individuals who have been responsible with sanctions
and other tools at our disposal.
Much has been said about the $700 million in AID funding. I
understand your answers with that. Clearly, we had to put that
on hold.
Of course, the big money is in the debt relief for Sudan,
and after Bashir was ousted and we had the peaceful revolution,
international financial institutions, right--the IMF, the World
Bank--agreed to provide Sudan with debt relief.
There is $76 billion indebtedness by Sudan, and the IMF and
the World Bank have put some of the tranches of relief on hold,
right now holding up $650 million in anticipated funding and a
$2.5 billion 39-month IMF loan program that was approved in
June of 2021 and a $2 billion World Bank grant program are at
risk.
The United States, obviously, plays a very important role
in both those international financial institutions. Are we
using our leadership there to make it clear that we will not
support additional debt relief to Sudan until Sudan moves
forward again toward democracy and meets those conditions?
Assistant Secretary Phee, why do not we----
Ms. Phee. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Absolutely. In fact, we were leaders in early reaching out
to the World Bank and to the IMF to arrange this pause in
assistance and, as you have noted, the figures you have
provided. I have slightly different figures that were provided
to me.
What matters is that they are big and they are having an
enormous impact, and that is what we wanted to do. We wanted to
make clear that the United States and the international
community would not have a normal relationship with Sudan if
the transition was abandoned. So, absolutely, that is our
posture and policy in the international financial institutions.
Senator Van Hollen. Good. I mean, you would agree that is
where our main leverage is at this point, right?
Ms. Phee. Absolutely. The scope is very significant, and
there is an argument that the military have their own sources
of income and that they are not directly affected, but if the
economy collapses because of this major shock due to the
withholding of this large-scale amount of assistance, it will
engulf their commercial interests as well.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it. Just another question,
Assistant Secretary Phee.
With respect to the opposition, we have a very broad-based
civilian opposition and many, of course, are still protesting
in the streets. They have been subject to beatings and violence
and killings.
As we support the UNITAMS process, which I understand we
do, correct? Are you going to make sure that all the voices of
the opposition are included in that process, including those
who do not want to have any dialogue right now with the
military government, which is understandable? How are you going
to make sure that those voices--the opposition--are included in
whatever process UNITAMS moves forward with?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. We are in the happy position
of dealing with Sudanese civilian stakeholders and voices that
will demand to be part of defining the future of the country.
My understanding from the Special Representative of the
Secretary General is that all groups that are committed to this
change have agreed to sit and consult with him and talk to him.
Some of them have not wanted to make it public, but
everyone is looking for how to build a collective path,
collective pressure, and identify a common vision and common
ground.
I think unanimity is probably not feasible. Probably not
feasible in any political system, but, certainly, not there,
but, definitely, when I have had the chance to speak to
Sudanese people, women, youth activists, and the resistance
committees, families of those who have been martyred, they are
all--they all share a lot of concerns and interests and plans
for the future, and I think there is a real possibility to knit
that all together.
That is why we are trying to play a supporting role to
UNITAMS and to work with other critical regional actors such as
the African Union, which, as you will recall, played an
important role in 2019 to help broker the Constitutional
Declaration.
We are committed to making sure those voices, and we are
using the programmatic resources that the Deputy Administrator
has described, to help build the capacity so that they can
engage effectively in that transition discussion.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch. Chairman Menendez, thank you for convening this hearing
and for ensuring that Sudan remains high on this committee's
agenda at this critical time.
To see a full committee hearing on the ongoing crisis in
Sudan with robust participation from Democrats and Republicans
is genuinely encouraging.
Assistant Secretary Phee, it is great to see you again.
Thank you for your service and your focus on this critical
issue, and Deputy Administrator Coleman, good to see you as
well.
I have worked hard over recent years to support Sudan's
peaceful revolution, the inspiring civilian-led nationwide
uprising that, as one of the most successful grassroots pro-
democracy movements in recent years, actually overthrew a
brutal dictator who had repressed the people of Sudan for
decades and committed genocide.
We have worked hard on the appropriation of over a billion
dollars in both economic aid and, as my friend and colleague,
Senator Van Hollen, was just referencing, important debt relief
to help support a transition to civilian government.
We have made a significant down payment on a democratic
future for Sudan, but I am gravely concerned that this
transition is badly off track, and without active diplomatic
engagement and some strong and decisive action by the United
States this transition may, effectively, be dead.
To live up to the commitments that we have made to the
Sudanese people to support their aspirations, we have to take a
greater leadership role and I am grateful for the steps you
have been taking, Madam Assistant Secretary.
As a number of my colleagues have asked, a lack of
accountability for atrocities committed in Darfur and
throughout Sudan, the killing of protesters in recent years and
the recent coup, all of this has established a pattern of
impunity for military leaders who kill and harm unarmed
civilians and peaceful protesters.
We have seen that continued in recent weeks as the military
has systematically arrested and even assassinated some of the
most effective community organizers and obstructed injured
protesters from getting needed medical care.
I have introduced the Sudan Democracy Act to sanction those
involved in these activities and others who undermine democracy
and human rights and the networks that sustain them, and the
Administration has publicly stated it will hold military
authorities responsible.
What does this mean in practice? How will the U.S. hold
them accountable and what does your previous comment that the
security forces are not monolithic mean for a path forward
where we could somehow secure a transition to a wholly civilian
government?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, first of all, for your
engagement and involvement in this important issue and for your
assessment of the challenges that we face.
I do believe, as I said to the chairman, that this hearing
is a terrific way to reinforce the Administration's diplomacy
and signal to all the parties of Sudan that we are with the
civilians, we are with this transition, and it needs to move
forward if they want to have any kind of partnership with us.
So that has been, basically, the bottom line. How we
implement it? We have talked, Senator Coons, about using
authorities that exist. We have talked about developing new
authorities and we have talked--we are looking very hard right
now at nontraditional methods of pressure, particularly in
terms of, for example, the illicit gold mining that takes place
and we are also looking at the many enterprises that are owned
by security forces.
There is a lot of active effort underway to augment the
already significant pressure that we have discussed, from the
suspension of both debt relief and bilateral and multilateral
assistance.
Senator Coons. As the chairman mentioned, if you need
additional authorities, please do communicate that to this
committee. I am concerned the military will simply organize
elections that are sham elections in 2023 that they will use to
legitimize their rule next year.
How are we working with our regional partners, our allies,
and relevant Sudanese stakeholders to prevent that outcome,
which thousands and thousands of civilians have taken to the
streets to prevent and that they have consistently spoken out
against and rejected?
Ms. Phee. That is a valid concern. However, the military
leaders have claimed that they want international support for
those elections. We want to be in a position to provide that
support and, of course, that would be geared towards credible
and transparent elections.
Also the Sudanese people, as we have seen, I am confident
would not participate in any sort of Potemkin type election.
We talked earlier, Senator Coons, and I think it is worth
emphasizing about the importance of making clear, particularly
to our Arab partners and Israel, who engage in Sudan, that the
prospect of security from a military-led government is not a
true reality. That cannot work. Sudan's history shows that.
The fact that the security forces are split is not
necessarily a positive situation, but it does mean that they,
like the civilians, because there are fractures and fissures,
may be unwilling collectively to do a severe repression and a
severe crackdown.
That is what we have been trying to say to them. Do not go
that path. Do not be the leaders that lost Sudan. Be the
leaders that effected this transition. It is a tricky balance,
frankly.
Senator Coons. There is a number of us who look forward to
working with you on that. I have just submitted a nomination
for the Nobel Peace Prize for Sudan's resistance committees and
the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors. I hope you will work to
make sure that they are part of the center of any political
process.
I look forward, Deputy Administrator Coleman, to hearing an
update about how the Administration is planning to leverage the
$700 million in frozen funds and I hope that we will consult in
advance as you craft the broader framework for the U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit later this year.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, and thank you, Senator Coons, for
your work on the Sudan.
I recall when we were in the midst of trying to decide on
the pathway forward on recognition and the question of those
who had been hurt--Americans and others who had been hurt in
the past, and we were in quite an engagement in that process
and we thought there were better days ahead.
So we remain desirous of that, but really cautious here as
we move forward. Thank you for your leadership in this regard.
Senator Booker is with us virtually.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
I have really appreciated the conversation and the range of
urgent issues that my colleagues have brought up, from the
critical necessity to have women leaders at the table all the
way to concerns about the Abraham Accords and how we can
continue to see some stability and progress.
I want to focus my concerns and questions, really, on just
one area. There is a real crisis in the Horn on everything from
the violence as well as just the severe lack of medical care
that is going on there.
One thing I do have even a more particular concern with is
just the severe state of food insecurity within not just Sudan,
but a number of the countries in the region--South Sudan,
Ethiopia. They are all facing what is this terrific, imminent
prospect of extreme famine-like conditions.
Famine is not just for the sort of moral urgency of human
life, but it also has a multiplier effect in the destabilizing
effects it can have when it comes to the security situation of
these nations and how it could spill over and be destabilizing
to other nations, especially if more refugee crises are
triggered.
This is a region of great importance, obviously, to the
United States, the whole Horn. It is critical to our security
interests, our dealing with counterterrorism, with Al-Shabaab,
its proximity to crucial international shipping lanes through
the Red Sea and, obviously, key military facilities there.
I just want to ask, and anyone on the panel could take this
for me, what is the Administration doing specifically to help
the millions of people who are facing starvation in Sudan and,
frankly, facing it throughout the Horn of Africa?
Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Senator Booker. That is such a
critical and important issue and one that we are dealing with
every single day.
As you note, the Horn of Africa is experiencing tremendous
instability and food security, and this is a consequence not
only of conflict, but also of drought and other natural
disasters, including locusts. I mean, it is under enormous
stress across the whole region.
Right now there are more than a million people in need of
food security--food assistance, because they face very
significant food insecurity in that--in Sudan.
There are also, of course, refugees who have left South
Sudan for Sudan and are now heading back to South Sudan. You
have got the compounding effect of people moving from one
insecure environment to another and the challenges that puts on
the whole system.
We are working with our partners on the ground, namely, the
World Food Programme, to meet the food needs of the people. We
are working on some basic health and livelihoods work and
addressing the most severe needs of malnutrition.
As you have noted, these are integrated problems that
humanitarian assistance only addresses at the surface, and
underneath we need to really get at the root causes and that, I
think, has been the basis of this conversation, trying to put
the country on a better path and play its important stabilizing
role in the region that it should be playing. Thank you.
Senator Booker. If I could just drill a little bit deeper
down because I have been in touch with the U.N. World Food
Programme. They have issued an emergency funding request.
They were short to meet the global need from Afghanistan to
the Horn of Africa, billions of dollars, and they are saying
quite plainly in order to prevent tens of millions of people,
including millions of children in countries around the globe
and, particularly, in the Horn from starving to death in just
the coming months, we need this emergency supplemental funding,
and something that is--it seems to be you are alluding to is,
that this kind of mass starvation would make all of the
situations regarding the politics far more complex as well as
we are seeing, again, in that region of Africa the continued
destabilization being caused by these challenges that are
faced, as you said, from climate change issues to COVID-related
issues to the military destabilization.
I guess just my point and question is do you agree that
providing this funding, filling this funding gap with the World
Food Programme, should be a top priority if we really are
serious about meeting the political instability of Sudan as
well as other areas in the Horn?
Ms. Coleman. Yes. Yes, thank you, Senator Booker.
I mean, I spend my day looking across the world and I see
crisis in Afghanistan. I see food crisis in the Horn of Africa
and in West Africa, the Sahel.
I see enormous needs in South America with migrants and
refugees flowing across the region, and the World Food
Programme is providing--and UNHCR--resources across the board
and they are stretched. They are stretched very, very thin.
I would, of course, be an advocate for more humanitarian
assistance, given all of these simultaneous crises that we are
facing and the integrated nature of many of these crises,
particularly in the Horn.
Thank you.
Senator Booker. I am grateful to hear you saying that. You
could look at Burkina Faso. It is one of our globe's poorest
nations, its political instability right now and the extreme
poverty there.
These issues are very much interrelated. I am grateful for
Senator Menendez's and Senator Coons' leadership in trying to
help us to meet this massive gap. It is, clearly, proven that
dollars invested in the World Food Programme, helping people
where they are--to feed them where they are--actually save
multiples of the resources necessary if those famines end up
triggering a crisis in migration and more.
This is a wise investment of money for political stability,
for national security, not to mention the humanitarian--the
real human crisis of millions of children that will die if the
U.S. fails to act.
I appreciate your testimony, and I thank you, Chairman, for
the time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, and either one
of you can address this.
While this meeting was going on, we were served with a
congressional notification by the State Department regarding an
expenditure of $10.5 million dollars for something I do not
understand.
It talks about Economic Support Funds, and the bureau that
is going to do it is Democracy Rights and Labor, and it refers
to expenditures supporting the civilian-led transitional
government, which I understand does not exist anymore.
I assume one of you know something about this. I thought we
suspended--I think all of us agreed that we ought to be
suspending, and now we get served with this notice that there
is going to be an expenditure. What can you tell us about that?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. I do not have the notice in
front of me, and we all agree that we do not want to be
providing any financial support to the government, but we are
providing support to civil society and others, and I am aware
of a very important grant undertaken by the Bureau of Democracy
and Human Rights to support accountability--justice and
accountability--and to provide assistance to Sudanese human
rights activists who are trying to document atrocities.
That is the immediate program that I am aware of, but I
would assume if it is a different program it would similarly be
designed to complement the programs that the Deputy
Administrator has discussed to help strengthen the capacity of
Sudanese civilians to tackle the problems in their country and
the money would not be going to the government.
Senator Risch. You had made reference to this woman who had
started the--a media company over there. Would it be going in
that direction, perhaps?
Ms. Coleman. That was a USAID-funded program. The DRL-CN
you are referring to is a State Department program, so I think
it would be different, but along the same types of lines with a
focus on human rights is my guess.
Senator Risch. We are going to need some more clarification
on this, Mr. Chairman. This is pretty vague, and with
everything we have heard today I am really, really reluctant to
talk about spending more money there until we have a really
clear direction where we are going.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Understood. Madam Secretary, if you would go
back to the Department and tell them that we both need--I have
not seen the CN so we both need clarification because there is
a hesitancy on spending here unless we know, clearly, purpose
and recipient, at the end of the day, and, obviously, a pathway
forward.
To the extent the Department has a good argument to make
for whatever this is, we will look forward to hearing it.
Senator Risch, are you okay?
The Chairman. Okay. I understand that Senator Romney is now
with us, virtually.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you can
hear me.
The Chairman. We can.
Senator Romney. Good. Thank you.
Excuse me if I am going to ask a question here which has
been asked already, but I was at another hearing and just was
able to join this more recently.
I am interested in getting a sense of why it is we are
seeing so many coups, if you will. This is not the--obviously,
the one and only.
There seems to be a crescendo in the number of places where
military action is replacing democratically-elected leaders.
That is, obviously, something which is very much not in the
interests of the people of those nations nor is it in the
interest of global peace.
One question is, to either of the panelists, are Russia or
China playing a role either in encouraging these actions or are
they playing a role in sustaining the military juntas or
leaders after a coup occurs?
What role are they playing with regards to these increasing
number of coups that we are seeing, if any?
Ms. Phee. Senator, thank you for flagging this troubling
issue, which concerns us all. It is clear that Russia is
playing a negative role, particularly in the Sahel, but also in
Sudan. They are exploiting fissures and tensions and
insecurities for their own political and economic advantage.
I think this issue could be helpfully discussed in another
setting, but I do want to flag that they are a player of
concern for us.
I also wanted to, more broadly, address your question. I
think we are seeing, in some cases, the economic impact of the
COVID pandemic, which has really disrupted economic growth in
countries that are already struggling and some of the poorest
countries in the world, and we are also seeing fatigue by
publics from poor governance, including corruption as well as
insecurity.
Those are some of the factors that we are looking at as we
try and assess the changing landscape in Africa and make sure
we respond appropriately.
Senator Romney. I am wondering as well whether in Africa,
but also in other parts of the world where we are seeing
actions of this nature, whether we are able to provide to the
newly-formed democratic governments, in some cases governments
that have been there for a long period of time, some assessment
of the risk of a coup occurring and some actions to take to
make it less likely that something of that nature will occur.
Because, of course, we always have sanctions when bad
things happen, clearly, everybody would tell us that writing
checks to these governments would help them out, but that is
not something we can do indefinitely.
So I wonder, do we have an effective strategy to make it
less likely that Russia or others that are playing a malevolent
role would be less effective?
Do we have a strategy to encourage and strengthen nations
such that they can withstand the inevitable draw of
authoritarianism when a newly-elected government is put in
place?
Again, for you, Assistant Secretary, or your colleague.
Ms. Phee. Senator, you all helped us out by giving us the
Global Fragility Act, and the Administration is working
carefully and quickly to try and mobilize those resources and
to try and adopt that new format and new approach precisely to
get at what you are discussing.
I am hopeful that you will see real action on the ground to
implement the goals and ambitions laid out in the Global
Fragility Act, which were designed precisely to address the
concerns you have outlined.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I return the time to you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. One last set of
questions here.
The Sudan Tribune reported today that the Executive
Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development was
in Khartoum, ``to discuss with the Sudanese stakeholders the
mediation they plan to launch to end the crisis.''
Up until now, UNITAMS has the mandate from the U.N. to
provide support to Sudan during its political transition to
democratic rule. It was the only forum for dialogue to end the
current crisis.
Madam Secretary, is the report on IGAD's involvement
accurate and how might the efforts by IGAD complicate UNITAMS'
facilitated process?
Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that is sloppy drafting. My understanding that the
Secretary General with whom we have a good and constructive
working relationship was there to see how IGAD could support
the UNITAMS effort and that IGAD, as you know, is nested under
the AU, nested under the U.N., so how all three bodies could
help with this transition process. I think that is a
mischaracterization in the press reports----
The Chairman. Okay. Then this is IGAD actually helping
UNITAMS. All right.
Let me ask you this. What leverage do we and other actors
have in the region to press the Sudanese military to
participate in good faith, from the Administration's
perspective?
Ms. Phee. I think, as we have discussed, we have mobilized
enormous economic pressure and made clear our position and the
position of like-minded friends in the international community,
and I know that these--that the sort of phenomenal impact,
which the World Bank discussed when we were in Riyadh at the
Friends of Sudan meeting, where they compared the economic
shock to the system as analogous to the political shock by the
events on October 25 that that economic pressure is getting the
attention of security leaders.
The discussion we have had here today, the public
statements made by members of Congress, are also getting the
attention of security leaders.
Thirdly, I believe our diplomacy, particularly our
engagement of traditional partners of the Sudanese security
forces, is also getting their attention.
The Chairman. I often find that when we talk about economic
shock those who are empowered--in this case by force--often do
not end up feeling that part of the shock.
The people do, but they do not, and the question is how do
we make them feel that reality as well? Because I find that
coups, military juntas, dictators, do not really care about how
much their people are hurt.
Finally, if Sudan's transition to democracy fails--and we
are all here to try to ensure it does not fail--but if it does,
what are the implications for the U.S. strategic interests in
the Horn of Africa? Which countries stand to win if the
transition fails?
Ms. Phee. My own view is that nobody wins, neither the
Sudanese, nor their neighbors, nor the region, nor the
continent, and there may be some governments--we have discussed
Russia here today--who get tactical gains or wins if there is a
collapse of the Sudanese state, but the humanitarian
consequences would be overwhelming and it would contribute
mightily to destabilization in Northern Africa, in Eastern
Africa, and probably spreading south.
All of our efforts are focused on preventing that outcome
because of the negative consequences.
The Chairman. Yes. I think there may have been some
countries who were happy to see the coup take place, and the
question is if they were happy to see the coup take place then
what are the consequences if, in fact, the nation fails, at the
end of the day.
To those who were happy to see the coup take place, they
must have made calculations as to what they think is the
benefit of that, and it would seem to me that we should be
focusing on some of those countries to give them a clear
message that, in fact, their calculation is wrong.
With that, the committee thanks this panel. This panel is
excused. We appreciate your insights, and we will call up our
second panel. Thank you very much.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. I am going to introduce our second panel. My
understanding is that there is a vote going on and so we will
avail ourselves of what would be a natural break to try to vote
and come back.
Before introducing our witnesses for the second panel, I
ask unanimous consent to enter into the record written
testimony from Amnesty International.
Without objection, so ordered.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Let me welcome the members of our next panel.
Joining us via teleconference from Brussels is Dr. Comfort
Ero, president and CEO of the International Crisis Group. She
joined the organization as West Africa project director in 2001
and rose to become the Africa program director and then in
January of 2021, interim vice president.
Dr. Ero was appointed Crisis Group's president in December
of 2021. She has spent her career working in conflict-affected
countries and related policy.
In between her two tenures at the Crisis Group, she served
as deputy director of the Africa program for the International
Center for Transitional Justice and prior to that political
affairs officer and policy adviser to the Special
Representative of the Secretary General as part of the U.N.
Mission in Liberia.
She has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, the
University of London, is also the chair of the board of the
Rift Valley Institute, sits on the editorial board of various
journals, including International Peacekeeping, and we welcome
her remotely.
Also with us on the second panel is Joseph Tucker, senior
expert for the Greater Horn of Africa, the United States
Institute of Peace. Mr. Tucker is a senior expert from the
Greater Horn of Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace where he
focuses primarily on Sudan and South Sudan.
Prior to joining the institute, he worked at USAID for 4
and a half years, most recently a senior advisor for Democracy,
Conflict, and Governance in the Office of South Sudan and South
Sudan programs.
In 2013, Mr. Tucker worked in Juba, South Sudan, for
Deloitte Consulting as a policy and research advisor to the
Minister of Cabinet Affairs in the government of South Sudan.
From 2009 to 2013, he served in the Office of the U.S.
Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan at the Department of
State, including as negotiations team leader. He was a member
of the U.S. Government's observation team for Sudan's 2010
national elections and 2011 South Sudan Referendum. He has
traveled widely in both countries in the region.
Thank you both to our witnesses, and Dr. Ero,
congratulations on your recent promotion.
We are going to take a brief recess. There is a vote going
on. We will return immediately after that vote and we will
begin the testimony.
With that, the hearing is in recess.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. This hearing on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order with the thanks to our witnesses
for their forbearance as we had a vote.
Let me start with Dr. Ero and then we will move to Mr.
Tucker.
Dr. Ero.
STATEMENT OF DR. COMFORT ERO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERNATIONAL
CRISIS GROUP, NAIROBI, KENYA
Dr. Ero. Good morning, Chair Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. My name is
Comfort Ero and I am the president and CEO of the International
Crisis Group.
Previously, I served as the organization's Africa program
director and I have spent my professional and academic life
focusing on peace and security issues in Africa.
The International Crisis Group is a global organization
committed to the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of
deadly violent conflict. We cover over 50 conflict countries
around the world and our presence in Sudan dates back more than
20 years.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you
about the deteriorating situation in Sudan today and how the
United States and others can help support the country.
Sudan is at a dangerous crossroads. Once again, the
military has turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese
people and violently seized power. The coup on October 25
brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that,
since 2019, has been charged with steering Sudan towards
elections and for civilian rule.
It was a major reversal in a transition that brought hope
to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The transition
that was interrupted in October followed 30 years of rule by
the notorious strongman, Omar al-Bashir.
Following Bashir's ouster and under heavy pressure, the
military agreed to an August 17 Constitutional Declaration
under which the country would be governed by a hybrid civilian-
military coalition for 39 months leading up to elections.
In defiance of the United States and others who warned them
against doing so, the generals seized power and ousted the
civilians. In the meantime, the Sudanese across the country
have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the
military's power grab.
In response, the security forces have repeatedly fired into
the crowds, killing dozens. However, there is evidence to
suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated their
position.
Since the coup, Sudan's mobilized youthful population have
again shown its strength and courage by mobilizing millions of
Sudanese to take to the streets and to send a clear signal to
the generals.
Getting the transition back on track would serve both the
people of Sudan's democratic aspirations and the interests of
the United States and other regional and international actors
in the strategically important Horn of Africa.
As one of Sudan's most important external partners, the
United States is well positioned to support efforts to reverse
the military's power grab and set Sudan back on its
transitional path.
The United States should press the generals to immediately
halt their repeated use of violence against protesters and
coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to account.
With its partners, the United States should make clear that
the generals will face consequences, including assets freeze
and travel ban if they continue to kill unarmed demonstrators
or obstruct progress towards elections, more broadly.
The United States has already signaled its backing for
efforts to stimulate negotiations among the generals and
civilian groups. The United States should warn the generals
against taking precipitous measures that could derail these
potential talks, including refraining from unilaterally
appointing a new prime minister.
It should further insist that these talks are maximally
inclusive. The 2019 power-sharing agreement should be the
blueprint for a compromise that could restore civilian-military
governance and lead to elections.
In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, the
United States suspended $700 million in assistance to Sudan.
This was the right step. The United States should make clear
that this support will not resume unless the generals accept a
return towards elections.
The United States should also advance efforts to repurpose
some of its support to civil society and also work with
partners, including the United Nations, to offer direct
assistance to Sudan's long-suffering people.
Many on the Sudanese streets perceive some external actors,
namely, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia as
tacitly backing military rule.
Special Envoy Satterfield should be well positioned to
engage these actors and urge them to constructively use their
privileged relationships with Sudan's generals to push for a
return to civilian-led transitional process.
With the welcome appointment of a new ambassador to
Khartoum, the United States could play a key role in marshaling
a coalition of actors within and outside Sudan that can steer
the country back to a path to elections.
The military's power grab has derailed a transition that
was an inspiration well beyond Sudan and could still be an
inspiration. The world and the United States should stand with
the people of Sudan to ensure a more accountable government.
I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to
testify before the Senate. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ero follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Comfort Ero
Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and
distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Dr. Comfort Ero, and
I am the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group.
Previously I served as the organization's Africa program director and I
have spent my professional and academic career focusing on peace and
security issues in Africa. International Crisis Group is a global
organisation committed to the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of
deadly conflict. We cover over 50 conflict situations around the world
and our presence in Sudan dates back more than two decades.\1\
I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the
deteriorating situation in Sudan today. The country is at a dangerous
crossroads. Not for the first time in its history, the military has
turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese people for more just and
representative rule by violently seizing power. The coup on October 25
brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that since 2019
has been charged with steering Sudan toward elections and full civilian
rule.\2\ It was a major reversal in a transition that had brought hope
to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. I will share with you my
analysis of the current situation in Sudan and recommendations for
steps the United States might take to help guide it back on the path
towards greater democracy and stability.
background
By way of background, the transition that was interrupted on
October 25 followed 30 years of rule by the notorious strongman Omar
al-Bashir.
After coming to office in a coup in June 1989, Bashir
maintained his hold on power by repressing political
opposition, fighting costly counter-insurgencies in the
country's peripheries and underwriting his factious security
sector with patronage-driven expenditure that ate up, by some
estimates, 70 per cent of the national budget.\3\
The patronage system that Bashir built eventually bankrupted
the country and contributed to the strongman's ouster. A small
cabal of favoured cronies including Bashir's Islamist allies
from the National Congress Party, senior military officers
(many of them drawn from the tiny riverine elite that has
dominated Sudan's military and politics for decades) and newly
minted allies such as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces
(RSF), which was blamed for some of the worst violence in the
western region of Darfur, benefited substantially from Sudan's
rigged, lopsided economy.\4\ These same actors continue to try
to preserve their privileges atop Sudan's political, economic
and security establishment.
Popular frustration over political repression, rising prices
and a sclerotic economy that could not absorb Sudan's ranks of
unemployed youths helped trigger the protests that eventually
drove Bashir from power. The uprising began in the south-
eastern towns of Damazin and Sennar, where crowds took to the
streets on 13 December 2018 in response to a tripling of bread
prices. By the time the protests reached Atbara, the historic
bastion of unionism in Sudan, demonstrators were demanding
regime change. Against long odds and despite heavy repression,
the protesters eventually overwhelmed the security forces, who
staged a palace coup against Bashir on 11 April 2019.
The military tried to maintain the upper hand but was forced
under pressure both from the protest movement and external
actors to compromise and accept to share power with civilians.
International revulsion over a 3 June 2019 massacre of
protesters encamped outside the military headquarters was
particularly important in forcing the generals to cede to the
will of the Sudanese people.\5\ Under the terms of a 17 August
Constitutional Declaration, the country would be governed by a
hybrid civilian-military coalition for 39 months leading up to
elections.
The task before that coalition was enormous. The new cabinet
headed by the technocrat and diplomat Abdalla Hamdok was
charged with breathing new life into Sudan's anaemic economy,
reforming political institutions to lay the ground for
elections and delivering justice to the many Sudanese victims
of atrocities during Bashir's rule--and in the weeks following
his fall. Despite the formidable obstacles the authorities
faced, that coalition represented the country's best hope for
emerging into a stable, prosperous, and democratic future and
was a source of hope for those supporting democratic renewal in
other countries in the region.
Always reluctant participants in the alliance, the generals
barely disguised their opposition to the Hamdok
administration's reforms and were particularly opposed to
efforts to deliver justice and to reshape the country's
economy. In defiance of the United States Government and others
who warned them against doing so, they seized power and ousted
the civilians.
the october 25 coup and its aftermath
Today, unfortunately, the picture looks grim. The military
violently applied the brakes on the transition in the early hours of
October 25 when they placed Hamdok under house arrest, rounded up
numerous other civilian officials in the administration, declared a
state of emergency and dissolved key institutions including the
cabinet. Since then, Sudan's military chief General Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan has taken a series of steps to reverse the reforms the civilian-
led administration had rolled out including by disbanding a committee
charged with reclaiming public assets, by packing the Sovereign
Council, which serves as the country's executive, with his allies and
by appointing Bashir-era figures into key posts including in the
judiciary and security forces.\6\ The military attempted some window
dressing when it reinstated Hamdok on 21 November, a move Sudanese
protesters rightly dismissed as an effort to legitimise their power
grab. Some efforts to stimulate talks among Sudanese actors to find a
way out of the crisis continue although the prospects of a resolution
appear dim.
Overall, the country has been on a downhill trajectory since the
coup. On 2 January, Hamdok resigned in frustration after failing to
persuade the generals to stick by their commitments under the August
2019 constitutional charter, and in particular to give him a free hand
to appoint a new cabinet. In the meantime, the public's frustration has
been growing. For the past few weeks, Sudanese people across the
country have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the
military's power grab. The general's response to the protests has come
right out of the Bashir playbook. The security forces have repeatedly
fired into crowds, killing dozens, according to human rights groups and
the UN.\7\ A late December decree by military chief Abdel-Fattah al-
Burhan gave the police effective immunity for their actions. Still, the
Sudanese people continue to risk their lives by staging protests, work
boycotts and other strike actions.
While it is not yet clear who will come out on top in this contest
between the security forces and the street, there is evidence to
suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated the strength of
their hand. This is a different Sudan from the one in which the army
captured control of the state at least five times in the past,
including in 1989 when Bashir took office.\8\ Sudan has one of the
youngest populations in the world.\9\ Six in ten Sudanese are aged
between 15 and 30--and the current generation rejects the notion that
the country should go back to being governed by an unaccountable, out
of touch elite.\10\ This mobilised, youthful population showed its
power at the end of 2018 when it rose up in protest at Bashir's
repressive, kleptocratic rule. The protest movement captured the
imagination of pro-democracy campaigners well beyond Sudan with its
diversity, with the prominent role that women played--sometimes
outnumbering men in demonstrations--with its tenacity, and ultimately
with its success. Against what many viewed as tall odds, it brought a
halt to Bashir's rule. Since the coup, this movement has again shown
its strength by mobilising millions of Sudanese to take to the streets
and send a clear signal to the generals that they will not, as past
generations of officers did, get away with imposing their will on the
Sudanese people.\11\
Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of
Sudan's democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States
and other regional and international actors in the strategically
important Horn of Africa--where Sudan sits between major regional
powers Ethiopia and Egypt and shares a border with seven countries,
several in the throes of conflict themselves. Support for Sudan's
transition would comport with the U.S. Government's stated commitment
to champion democratic values and to ``demonstrate that democracies can
deliver by improving the lives of their own people.'' \12\ It would
also be the surest pathway to medium and long term stability in the
country.
recommendations
The United States is one of Sudan's most important external
partners. It provides about half a billion dollars in assistance
annually and was a champion of efforts to reconnect Sudan's economy
with international financial institutions. Given these ties and the
United States Government's relations with all the main regional actors,
the U.S. is well positioned to support efforts to reverse the
military's power grab and set Sudan back on a path toward elections and
representative government. Specifically, it could:
Press the generals to immediately halt violence against
protesters and coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to
account: As outlined, Sudan's security forces have responded to
peaceful protests by indiscriminately shooting into crowds and
sometimes reportedly even pursuing fleeing and wounded
demonstrators into hospitals.\13\ This pattern of behaviour, on
top of its grave human cost, threatens to poison relations
between the parties and render a resolution even further beyond
reach. In coordination with partners including the African
Union (AU) and the European Union, the United States should
make clear that the generals will face consequences including
asset freezes and travel bans if they continue to kill unarmed
demonstrators. The White House should simultaneously convene an
interagency process to design a targeted sanctions programs
aimed at key figures in the military and outline that it is
willing to deploy these against individuals that continue to
sanction the killing of protesters or obstruct progress toward
elections more broadly.
Support Sudanese-led efforts to rerail the transition: The
United States has already signalled its backing for efforts to
stimulate negotiations among the generals and civilian groups
including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the
coalition that spearheaded the protest movement and
neighbourhood resistance committees, which play an integral
role in the day-to-day organisation of protests and have proved
a particularly effective channel of resistance to the military
coup. The United States should warn the generals against taking
precipitous measures that could derail these potential talks,
including refraining from unilaterally appointing a new prime
minister. It should further insist that these talks are
maximally inclusive and in particular that they should take on
board the views of the resistance committees. The 2019 power-
sharing agreement should be the blueprint for a compromise that
could restore civilian-military governance and lead to
elections.
Withhold financial assistance until the military reverses
its coup: In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover,
the United states suspended $700 million in assistance to
Sudan. This was the right step given the generals' brazen
decision to terminate the power-sharing agreement. The United
States should make clear to the generals that this support will
not resume unless they accept to return to the path toward
elections laid out in the 2019 power-sharing agreement. In the
meantime, the United States should advance with efforts to
repurpose some of its support to civil society groups and also
to work with partners including the UN to offer direct
assistance to Sudan's longsuffering people.
Urge all regional actors to back a return to a civilian-led
dispensation: Many on the Sudanese street perceive some
external actors, namely Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia, as tacitly backing military rule.\14\ Such
perceptions will ultimately be damaging to those countries'
standing in Sudan if it is able to reinvigorate its
transitional process. But it is still possible for these key
regional actors to play an important role in helping Sudan
return to a civilian-led transitional process, thereby
protecting their relations with the Sudanese people. Given his
strong background in regional diplomacy, Special Envoy
Satterfield should be well-positioned to engage these actors
and urge them to use their privileged relations with Sudan's
generals to convey to them that the power-sharing agreement
they torpedoed remains Sudan's best and perhaps only chance for
stability, a goal they all profess to share. With the welcome
appointment of a new ambassador to Khartoum, the United States
could play a key role in marshalling a coalition of actors
within and outside Sudan that can help steer the country back
toward the path to elections.
Sudan is at a historic hinge-point. The military's power grab has
derailed a transition that was an inspiration well beyond Sudan, and
still could be, if the generals step back and allow Sudan's civilians
to steer the country to elections. With a piling set of challenges--not
least an economy in deep distress, resurging violence in Darfur and
elsewhere, and a tottering peace deal with armed groups--the generals
can hardly afford to stonewall the Sudanese people's demands for
change. The world--and the United States--should stand with Sudan's
people in their quest for a more democratic and accountable government,
an outcome that represents the country's best hope for achieving long-
run political, social and economic stability.
----------------
Notes
\1\ Crisis Group Africa Report N+281, Safeguarding Sudan's
Revolution, 21 October 2019; Jonas Horner, After the Coup, Restoring
Sudan's Transition, Crisis Group Q&A, 5 November 2021; Crisis Group
Africa Briefing N+168, The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement
Sudan's New Peace Agreement, 23 February 2021.
\2\ Crisis Group Africa Report N+281, Safeguarding Sudan's
Revolution, op.cit.; Jonas Horner, After the Coup, Restoring Sudan's
Transition, op.cit.
\3\ Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who
was mandated to lead the civilian-military transition in August 2019,
listed as an ambition driving down military expenditure to 20 per cent
of the national budget. He said in some years, that budget line had
stood at 80 per cent. ``Sudan PM seeks to end the country's pariah
status,'' ap, August 25 2019.
\4\ ``Who are Sudan's RSF and their Commander Hemeti?'' Al Jazeera,
6 June 2019.
\5\ ``Sudan commemorates the June 3 Massacre,'' Dabanga Sudan, 3
June 2021.
\6\ Crisis Group EU Watch List, 27 January 2022
\7\ ``Bachelet condemns killings of peaceful protesters in Sudan,''
UN, 18 November 2021.
\8\ ``A history of Sudan coups,'' Statista, 25 October 2021
\9\ ``After the Uprising: Including Sudanese Youth'', Chr.
Michelsen Institute, 2020
\10\ Crisis Group Horn Podcast, Sudan's Political Impasse, 26
January 2022.
\11\ ``Deaths Reported in Sudan as `March of Millions' Demands
Restoration of Civilian Rule,'' Voice of America, 30 October 2021
\12\ ``President Biden to Convene Leaders' Summit for Democracy,''
White House, 11 August 2021
\13\ ``Sudanese security forces `hunt down' injured protesters in
hospital,'' France 24, 25 January 2022
\14\ Crisis Group Horn Podcast, Sudan's Political Impasse, 26
January 2022.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Tucker.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH TUCKER, SENIOR EXPERT FOR THE GREATER HORN
OF AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Tucker. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you
for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Sudan.
I am a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace,
although the views expressed here are my own. Sudan is complex,
but this should not mask simple truths.
There was a coup in October 2021. The political transition,
hard won through nonviolent struggle, was fundamentally
disrupted. Its political settlement based on a civilian-
military partnership was broken.
As Sudanese and the international community plot a way
forward, it is critical to examine lessons from the
transitional period.
My written testimony outlines lessons based on analysis of
stakeholders and key thematic areas of the transition. Given
the importance of political pathways to address the current
situation, I will focus, first, on lessons to inform them and
any potential U.S. or U.N. assistance to them.
Many political processes lack clarity on a preferred end
state. This is not the case in Sudan. Civilian groups appear to
agree that a fully democratic state is needed with security
forces absent from non-security arenas. The U.S. should embrace
this end state.
However, it is the process to get there that needs a clear
strategy, bolstered by coordinated international engagement.
Many agree that political processes should be Sudanese-led.
There are Sudanese processes that are well constructed and are
likely to result in a sustainable agreement and there are
Sudanese processes that are not. Sudanese recognize this and
are wary of blanket international acceptance of any Sudanese-
led process.
Any process can be made more inclusive, especially by
involving women, youth, and other civic actors, but if
inclusivity is symbolic and a process is not grounded in the
views of civilians, the bitterness it creates can cripple
support for outcomes.
Lastly, it is imperative that violence against civilians
stops, for it will prevent a political solution. The
international community must take measures beyond words to halt
it.
However, the international reactions to violence must not
put undue pressure on civilians who overly compromise for the
sake of a quick, perhaps, false peace. Creating safe spaces for
citizens to refine positions and engage political parties and
leadership on their views is urgently needed and the U.S. can
help with this.
I will now offer some thoughts on the suspension of
assistance, aligning diplomacy and assistance, the security
sector, and sanctions.
As others noted, much U.S. assistance to Sudan's government
was halted after the coup. A scenario for resumption is when
violence against civilians is stopped and there is an
enforceable decision and progress on a fully civilian
government with benchmarks set by civilians themselves.
It may be tempting to restart assistance at the first sign
of improvement, but care should be taken to ensure that this is
not premature. Having to suspend assistance again or withstand
a period where assistance remains, but the situation worsens
can dent the credibility of the U.S. approach.
The suspension provides the U.S. a rare opportunity to
interrogate the aims of assistance and refine a strategy. This
strategy should be organized around facilitating, supporting,
and consolidating a genuine transition.
Key to this is better aligning U.S. political efforts with
development assistance. There are times when diplomacy can
smartly reinforce assistance, particularly for democracy, human
rights, conflict mitigation efforts, and vice versa.
Lastly, a U.S. all-of-government-integrated Sudan democracy
strategy is needed. I offer concrete suggestions for this in my
written testimony and how it can be tied to existing
legislation and this Administration's democracy agenda.
It is right for the U.S. to engage citizen security sector
actors, but this should be grounded in a view of a civilian
government and state. The U.S. can also analyze lessons from
its engagement with the previous National Congress Party
regime, particularly on how it did or did not utilize
incentives and disincentives.
It is understandable that some call for sanctions because
they are a powerful tool to translate condemnation into action.
They must be applied smartly and be part of a clear strategy.
The argument that sanctions negatively impact dialogue
through hardening positions or stoke violence needs to be
groundtruthed. The argument is often made based on assumptions
instead of objective analysis.
In conclusion, the U.S. and international community can and
should avoid a neutral stance on Sudan. There was a coup, and
it is not possible to return to the pre-coup dispensation.
A new constitutional order is needed, and Sudan will not be
stable until there is a civilian government and the proper role
of the security sector is firmly decided and implemented.
The onus is on Sudanese to achieve their goals, but the
U.S. has a duty to nurture civilian-led nonviolent democratic
change at a time when it is, surely, in short global supply.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Tucker
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
on the situation in Sudan after the October 2021 coup. Events on the
ground in Sudan continue to evolve and provide challenges to U.S. and
international engagement, yet there are opportunities to improve the
situation.
I am a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, although the
views expressed here are my own. The U.S. Institute of Peace was
established by Congress over 35 years ago as an independent,
nonpartisan national institute to prevent and resolve violent conflicts
abroad, in accordance with U.S. national interests and values.
introduction
Sudan's citizens affirmed and secured their right to define the
nature of the state and their relationship to it through the 2019
revolution. Given the complexities of Sudan's politics, economy, and
society, this is difficult. But the transitional period provided for
this, subject to the willingness of leaders within the civilian-
military partnership to uphold commitments to a different vision for
Sudan. There will be many debates about if that partnership was
possible from the start. What is clear is that the contested nature of
the transition and certain individuals within it overpowered those
working toward the revolution's aims of freedom, peace, and justice.
The coup broke the already fragile transition and its
constitutional foundation. Sudan is now witnessing an unprecedented
political and economic crisis and may be reverting to its pre-
revolution state. Violence against citizens continues to increase,
including in areas outside of Khartoum, especially in Darfur. As
Sudanese, the region, and international community try to plot a way
forward, it is critical to examine lessons from the transitional period
so they can inform policymaking and assistance.
This testimony outlines some lessons learned from the start of the
transition to the present. The lessons cover topics on various
stakeholders and key thematic areas of the transition. This is followed
by views on the current political situation, and possible U.S. and
international diplomatic and assistance tools to support democratic
stakeholders and pursue a true civilian transition.
Resistance Committees & Protest Groups
As happened in the lead-up to and during the 2019 revolution, the
post-coup situation has again thrust Resistance Committees (RCs) and
protest groups into the limelight as they face violence during
protests. Some of them note that this is a continuation of the
revolution after an aborted attempt at transition. It frames their
current ``no negotiation, no partnership, no compromise'' posture.
Diplomats have recently met with RC and protest representatives in
Sudan and learned more about how they are adapting structures to the
current situation. They are also hearing about positions being
developed organically on local consensus-building, social justice,
community representation, and resource mobilization.
This attention is a welcome shift from 2019 when it seemed that the
diffuse nature of protests, coupled with the horizontal organization of
RCs, led international actors to face difficulty with--or indifference
to--engaging with them. Attention moved to the operation of government
and challenges, such as economic reform and international relations. A
key lesson is that the motivations and strategies of all elements of
the revolution matter, not just organized political and civic forces.
The RCs can be studied and engaged more closely. There is much to learn
about their evolution during the previous National Congress Party (NCP)
regime through to their role in 2018-19 protests, their engagement with
the Sudan Professionals Association and the Forces for Freedom and
Change (FFC), and how they undertook advocacy during the attempted
transition. Charting this evolution will provide clarity to their
current positions and analyzing the nonviolent nature of the protests
can provide lessons for situations elsewhere.
There is a narrative that some RCs oppose political parties or wish
to replace them. However, there is another one that suggests they
realize political party participation in elections and governance is
needed. Within that, there is a desire for politicians to carry forward
their positions, outlined in section seven below, that are informed by
the previous 2 years and to be held accountable through fair elections.
Lastly, while protests in urban centers are important, so too are those
citizens who share similar aspirations, but who are further removed
among nomadic, internally displaced, rural, and agrarian communities.
Security Sector
International actors should reassess their understanding of Sudan's
security sector, including the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF). Since the security sector is not one bloc and
there are differences within SAF circles, their internal opinions on
transitions and coups are important. At the beginning of the
transition, an international fear was that the paramilitary RSF would
seek to dominate security and economic power. While this fear may have
been warranted, it detracted from attempts to understand dynamics
within the SAF and between the SAF and RSF.
The removal of the National Intelligence and Security Service
(NISS) leadership and supposed reduction of its operational capacity
after the revolution led many to assume it was rightsized. This should
have been groundtruthed, as it now appears that after the coup the NISS
heir, the General Intelligence Service, reverted to its predecessor's
pre-revolution state. There were also accusations that former regime
elements remained prominent in the security sector, but this never
seemed adequately explored by international actors and could have shed
light on security sector commitments, power dynamics, and the
resurgence of certain elements after the coup.
Given the security sector's prominent role in the economy and
politics, a key need of the transition was to undertake security sector
reform (SSR). Along with what SSR traditionally entails--such as
integration of paramilitary forces into the regular army--thought was
given by some international actors and Sudanese stakeholders on how to
develop a national security vision that prioritized citizen security
over regime security. This was grounded in the reality that security
actors have a role to play in the country and have insights that are
relevant to discussions about security priorities, risks, and threats.
However, the distinction between these two was not sufficiently
stressed by some international actors that focused primarily on the
tactical aspects of SSR. SSR was rightly seen as necessary, but without
also prioritizing dialogue about security sector priorities and
civilian-led security sector governance.
While protestors and RCs are diametrically opposed to the SAF and
some other security sector actors, attempts to learn how the wider
Sudanese public views them is important since it is possible that there
are divergent views in more rural areas beyond Khartoum. Lastly,
observing international engagement with the security sector, especially
by Russia, Egypt, and the Gulf states, can also help extrapolate how
such countries view the transition. Key questions should have been
asked, such as did the security sector assume that its regional allies
would provide them with more overt support than they did, especially
after the coup.
Political Parties & Civilian Groups
Political parties and organized civilian groups are a necessary
part of any resumed transition, and their ability to work with each
other and effectively represent citizen stances on a new, more
sustainable, and truly civilian transition will build a healthier
political environment. Understanding the motives, strategies, and
personalities among them can help comprehend how they, and the wider
public, perceive their role.
Far from being one unified bloc, the civilians that composed half
of the transition are diverse in political ideology and approaches.
Assumptions about their unity on issues beyond the desire for a
civilian-led government should be groundtruthed. Political and civic
leaders as individuals are important, but more significant is the
environment in which they operate and, if provided the opportunity,
govern. Focusing on the former without attention to the latter can
create a distorted, underdeveloped political system.
The umbrella created by the FFC, a loose grouping of political
parties, unions, civic bodies, and rebel movements, arose during the
revolution and negotiated the Constitutional Declaration that ushered
in the hybrid government. Tensions within and between FFC groups
widened during the transition, whether the result of genuine
differences, personal animosity, or interference by security sector or
other actors in Sudan. This chipped away at trust, splitting some
groups, causing some withdrawals from the FFC, and limiting the ability
to present actionable views on a way forward. By the time of the coup,
continued disagreements and interference from some armed movements and
security actors created discernible factions. However divided they may
have been, this was no excuse for a coup and saying that it needed to
happen to get the transition back on track is disingenuous.
In the post-coup environment, the role of the FFC, its factions,
and other civilian groups in proposing a political roadmap and engaging
with actors such as the United Nations Interim Transition Assistance
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) is contested. The gulf between political
groups and the protest movement is wide and there is mistrust--or
misunderstanding--on both sides. International engagement with such
political groups can help advocate for and possibly facilitate
understanding through diplomacy and assistance.
The Juba Peace Agreement
A key goal of the transition was to reach peace agreements with
armed movements in Sudan's peripheries. Given the historic U.S. and
international role in peace processes in Sudan--and what is now in
South Sudan--this theme is particularly relevant. The Juba Peace
Agreement (JPA) was brokered by South Sudan and signed by the
transitional government with some armed groups and political movements
in October 2020. Two main groups from Southern Kordofan and Darfur
remained outside the agreement. The negotiations process was convoluted
and expanded to include separate deals with areas such as Eastern
Sudan. While civilians were initially involved in discussions, security
elites took the lead. This created a bond between some JPA signatories
and security components of the transition that was solidified by their
entry into government in February 2021. The continued presence of some
JPA representatives in the post-coup government is testament to this
relationship and its complicated power dynamics.
Many observers criticize international involvement in Sudanese and
South Sudanese peace processes going back to the 1990s since they
produced power-sharing deals that seemed to reward rebellion. Positions
were doled out, resources divided, and ineffectual committees formed.
Citizens barely benefited. The JPA replicated a similar process that
bred similar implementation problems that plagued previous peace deals.
Taking a fresh look at peace processes and agreements can find ways to
avoid reinforcing zero-sum, militarized politics. While peace
agreements and deals between elites are needed, their shape and impact
need to account for citizen needs and long-term socio-economic
benefits, not just short-term elite gains.
Assumptions about the nature of rebel movements and their relative
legitimacy and representativeness also need to be interrogated, with
evaluation of the credibility of such groups accounting for their
commitments to democracy, especially when in government. Agreements can
provide for detailed, enforceable political deals that do not simply
provide a screen for signatories to make untransparent decisions and
trade power. Lastly, a comprehensive peace arrangement may be more
beneficial than the JPA's peace by pieces approach. That process may be
more effective if run by civilians, with security sector involvement on
security arrangements.
Economic Issues
The transition inherited an economic crisis based on crushing
international debt, decreasing revenues, chronic budget deficits,
corruption, and decreased oil revenue after South Sudan's 2011
secession. Citizens coped with rising urban and rural food insecurity
amidst government attempts to undertake sweeping economic reforms. Such
efforts were also impacted by the rise of COVID-19. At the beginning of
the transition Sudan's economy was effectively blocked from the
international financial system. The process to reverse this was well
underway before the coup due to international engagement, particularly
the U.S. Government's removal of Sudan from its list of state sponsors
of terrorism after Sudan paid compensation to victims of terrorism.
Subsequent arrears clearance with international financial institutions
and reaching the Highly Indebted Poor Countries decision point in June
2021 continued forward movement. The coup stalled progress since it
halted international financial institution support and other key
assistance, and jeopardized debt relief.
A more technical discussion of economic issues is beyond the scope
of this testimony. A main lesson is that while economic reforms are
critical to a transition, equally important are their political
implications. For example, the scope and timing of subsidy removals
that can drive popular discontent if mishandled. The international
community may have realized the need for a social safety net and
economic dividends, but plans were too often divorced from inescapable
political linkages. Tied to this is the importance of efforts to
address Sudan's gray economy, corruption, and undue influence of the
security actors and previous regime on many sectors. Looking at
challenges faced by the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-corruption, and
Funds Recovery Committee tasked with seizing assets of the previous
regime is critical, as is its treatment after the coup, including
reversal of some of its decisions.
Sudan may have moved toward reintegration into the international
financial and development community, but it was unable to sufficiently
bring local political actors into this orbit or show more tangible
dividends to citizens. The precarious post-coup economic situation
provides impetus for international stakeholders to observe how it
impacts protests, political discussions and power dynamics, and
responses from the post-coup government. This could create a more
nuanced political economy analysis--for example on the controversial
gold sector--to help inform U.S. and international policies on Sudan.
Transitional Justice
The need for transitional justice and accountability, and an
overhauled judicial sector to advance this, is critical to any
transition in Sudan. For those who suffered abuses under the previous
regime--and from the 2019 revolution until now--justice is often the
most salient issue. They must be involved and support outcomes. The
previous transitional government was unable to advance the issue.
International theory varies on issues such as the extent and timing
of justice, as well as strategies such as amnesty. Like many things, it
is foremost up to the people of Sudan to determine these issues. There
are relevant comparative examples from the region, though they often
cripple efforts at justice mechanisms during negotiations and
implementation of agreements. Though it may sometimes be appropriate to
delink negotiations on transitional justice from wider talks, this
often results in implementation being watered down or postponed, or
formation of toothless committees. Sudanese can discuss concrete
options for sequencing and leveraging justice issues and determining
the level(s) of accountability.
Political Pathways Forward
There are over 10 civilian groups at both national and local levels
advocating positions on the way forward. They range from political
parties to community organizations and the families of those killed
during protests. They seem to agree on the need for: a fully civilian
democratic government; removal of the security sector from politics and
the economy; accountability related to the June 2019 Khartoum massacre
and those killed since the coup; JPA and peace process reviews;
creation of the transitional legislative council; and a unified
national army and reformed civilian-led security sector. They disagree
on whether to reject all dialogue with security actors. Some are
suggesting that security sector involvement in government be limited to
a civilian-led security and defense council to advise on security
matters. Some are in favor of engaging with the UNITAMS consultations
while others are opposed.
It is remarkable that these groups can prepare positions through
consensus-building and dialogue while many are peacefully confronting
state-sponsored violence. This violence is unacceptable, and the
international community must take measures beyond words to halt it.
Continued violence will likely prevent a viable, inclusive political
process and solution. However, continued violence and international
reactions to this should not put undue pressure on civilians to overly
compromise for the sake of a quick, halfhearted peace. Focusing on
simultaneously creating a safe space for them to refine positions and
encourage political actors to embrace them is needed. Similarly,
premature calls for national dialogue that is not inclusive and/or
ignores the need for a level playing field are unhelpful. If not
carefully planned and executed, a contested dialogue process could
reinforce power inequalities and harden positions.
Many political processes begin with a defined process, topics for
negotiation, and identifiable stances. But they often lack clarity on
what an end state may be. The current case of Sudan appears to be the
opposite; civilian groups seem to agree that a fully democratic end
state is needed with security forces taking up their proper role and
devoid of involvement in non-security arenas. A comprehensive peace is
also critical. The U.S. and international community should embrace this
end state. However, it is the process to that end state that needs a
clear strategy, bolstered by coordinated international engagement. The
inclusion of women in such a process is paramount. They have often
borne the brunt of repressive regimes. For example, surviving the use
of rape as a weapon of war from the beginning of the Darfur conflict
until now. Their inclusion in political and peace discussions, and
security sector reform and accountability, is critical.
It is important for political processes to be Sudanese-led.
However, there are ones that are well-constructed, align with the
revolution's vision, and likely to result in a sustainable agreement.
And those that are not. Sudanese recognize this and are wary of blanket
acceptance sometimes employed by the international community.
Additionally, intervention by regional states, some of which may be
seen by Sudanese as unhelpful, needs to be accounted for in political
solutions. It is tempting to use previous models for political
discussions and negotiations. This post-coup situation is a rare
opportunity to test new ways and avoid overlaying Sudan's evolving
dynamics onto stale frameworks. Many Sudanese see beyond the end of a
transition to future events that can strengthen a democratic outcome.
This requires medium- and long-term international strategies that
extend beyond the horizon of any renewed transition.
The UNITAMS initiative has received much attention because it is
the first structured political consultation process. In its public
statements UNITAMS was careful to note that it has not embarked on a
formal mediation effort but is beginning with consultations to feed
into a possible process that could be facilitated by the UN and/or
other partners. Any process can be made more inclusive, especially by
including women, youth, and other civic actors. But if inclusivity is
symbolic or disingenuous, the bitterness it creates among those groups
can cripple support for outcomes.
International discussions underway to identify eminent
international personalities that can assist with UNITAMS' work are
important. Something akin to the Intergovernmental Authority on
Development Partners Forum may also be helpful. There is precedent, for
example during the 2010-12 African Union High-level Implementation
Panel talks between Sudan and South Sudan, for broad collaboration
between the UN, AU, and international champions. If this is replicated
in Sudan, its impact can be magnified if it stretches from UN
headquarters in New York where the Security Council's P5 and A3 can be
invoked, to regional capitals and AU headquarters. Technical experts in
fields such as constitutional design and security issues can be on
standby, and secretariat services organized. Genuine partnerships among
those with the mandate and stake in the future of the country are
required for success. Absent such collaboration, energy and political
coherence will be wasted and parties are likely to ``forum shop'' at
the expense of forging a timely, equitable deal.
United States Assistance & Diplomacy
The U.S. Government, in particular the Department of State and
USAID, has decades of experience amidst the complexities of Sudan's
politics, economy, and humanitarian situation. Never has the U.S.
Government had access to so much information to help understand the
current situation. This is key to advancing policy objectives and
assisting in Sudan's democratic transformation.
After the coup, the U.S. suspended portions of a $700 million
assistance appropriation related to direct government support, along
with similar support provided by other U.S.-funded programs.
Fortunately, civil society support, democracy, human rights, and
governance (DRG) programs, and conflict mitigation assistance was
expanded. It may be tempting to restart assistance at first sign of
improvement or if it appears it can fix an emergency, but care should
be taken to ensure that a restart is not premature. Having to suspend
assistance again, or weather a period where it is clear that the
situation has not effectively changed, can dent credibility of the U.S.
approach. A scenario for the suspension's lifting is when violence
against civilians has ceased and there is tangible, irreversible
progress toward a civilian government.
While it may seem counterintuitive, the suspension provides a rare
opportunity to return to first principles and assess the aims of
assistance. The collapse of the transition and upending of the
constitutional order is a shift that requires serious reconsideration.
During this time, however, close attention on the nationwide economic,
livelihoods, and food security situation is needed to ensure that
appropriate help is applied. In most cases, humanitarian crises are
best solved through negotiated solutions to political and conflict
issues. This can unlock assistance for community resilience and
economic growth programs, such as small and medium agricultural
enterprises, and supporting Sudanese organizations working on
environmental issues.
The U.S. could better align its diplomatic and political efforts
with development assistance. There are times when diplomacy can provide
tangible support for assistance objectives, particularly for DRG and
conflict mitigation ones. However, they can be inadvertently undermined
through the course of diplomacy, especially during key political
milestones, negotiations, or conflict. An example is the April 2010
Sudan national elections. While the U.S. supported electoral management
bodies and citizen-led monitoring to advance elections, some diplomatic
messages did not address contested processes and outcomes amidst the
focus on moving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement closer to other
milestones. An overriding consideration for bridging the gap between
diplomacy and assistance is that the latter is unlikely to completely
resolve complex problems, but it can help support outcomes and
consolidate gains.
All assistance, especially to the DRG sector, is most effective
when grounded in a ``do no harm'' principle and adaptable to situations
on the ground. Sudan's citizens can best express ways to achieve this,
more so now due to closing space. Proposed assistance should undertake
the necessary groundwork with possible beneficiaries to build trust and
overcome any misunderstandings. For example, if assistance to RCs is
requested, it should be based on careful, transparent discussions to
ensure buy-in and that resources are going where RCs think they are
most needed. Assistance to RCs could include continued development of
strategies for nonviolent action, ensuring that mobilization is
sustained while aiming to stop civilian deaths, and support for new
political mechanisms arising from RCs and other civic groups. It is
possible that some groups will not want U.S. and international
assistance for valid reasons. Lastly, it is possible that some groups
may benefit more from political and non-monetary support or feel that
financial support will not be effective without political support.
Coordination between assistance and diplomacy is critical in such
cases.
A U.S. all-of-government DRG strategy for Sudan to help restore,
support, and consolidate a genuine transition is needed. It could be
conceptualized, implemented, and monitored by a joint USAID/Department
of State/National Security Council task force with senior-level
leadership. It could also link diplomatic and political efforts with
assistance programs and be informed by rolling assessments of political
economy and conflict situations. Areas for mutually reinforcing
international partnerships could be explored. A task force could be
staffed with experts in digital communications, independent media,
civil society protection, women's political engagement, and political
party and legislative development, among others. Many relevant program
areas can be found in the 2020 Sudan Democratic Transition,
Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act. A Sudan DRG strategy could
be viewed in the context of the Biden administration's democracy agenda
and be a case study for turning democracy promotion ideals into
actionable policy placed at the heart of bilateral relations.
Diplomatic and assistance strategies are important, but individuals
do the hard work of implementation. Some embassies and assistance
missions in Khartoum were not backfilled after some billets were
transferred to South Sudan in 2011. While assistance opportunities may
have been limited in post-secession Sudan, there has not been adequate
staffing up since the 2019 revolution. Additionally, there are good
examples of Washington, DC-based U.S. Government surge support for
Sudan. For example, the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan in
2010 had over 20 staff, including some detailed from the Departments of
Defense and Treasury, and Schedule B and contractor hires for
negotiations support, programming assistance, security sector advising,
public affairs outreach, and other specialties. Retired ambassadors
were brought back to focus on political issues and the Darfur conflict.
More personnel could be devoted to messaging and public affairs
outreach, both in person in Sudan and on social media. For many
protestors and RCs, the idea that the U.S. can on the one hand publicly
say they support the people of Sudan in their struggle for democracy,
and on the other hand support dialogue with security actors, is not
valid. The U.S. can help publicly bridge this gap and explain why it
believes these things can happen simultaneously.
It is right for the U.S. and others to diplomatically engage
security actors in Sudan, but it should be grounded in a firm view of a
truly civilian government end state grounded in comprehensive peace. As
the U.S. engages with security actors that are using some tactics
reminiscent of the pre-revolution era, it can analyze lessons from its
engagement with the NCP regime, particularly on how it did or did not
utilize concrete incentives and disincentives.
It is understandable that some call for targeted sanctions because
they are a powerful tool to translate statements condemning violence
against citizens into action. They must be applied smartly and be part
of a clear, detailed strategy grounded in political realities.
Sanctions are not a substitute for a strategy. The argument that
sanctions may in theory negatively impact prospects for dialogue
through hardening positions or stoking violence needs to be
groundtruthed. The argument is often made based on assumptions instead
of objective analysis. Assumptions that sanctions on lower-level
officials will provide necessary warning to senior leaders and change
their behavior should also be checked.
conclusion
The 2019 revolution was informed by decades of repression and
struggle, and what came after did not arise from a clean slate. Many
Sudanese rightly have a long view of history and link their
generation's struggles to prior ones. In the British colonial era
library at the University of Khartoum there is a small shrine to Ahmed
al Qurashi, a 20-year-old student whose killing galvanized popular
protests that brought down a military government in October 1964.
Today, the photos of many 2019 revolution victims are alongside his.
More have probably been added since October 2021.
Complex social and demographic changes got underway due to the
relative opening of civic space after the revolution. It will be
difficult to definitively close that space without resistance from
citizens, as is currently happening on the streets of Sudan. The
complexity of Sudan's politics has also increased during this historic
time. While contrasting views abound, a plurality of views is normal in
deeply divided societies like Sudan, and it is possible to encourage
civil debate and consensus. This can lay a strong foundation for a
vibrant democracy that Sudanese have struggled to achieve and that the
U.S. values in its own society.
The U.S. and international community can, and should, avoid a
neutral stance on what has happened in Sudan. There was a military coup
and the government's constitutional bond with its citizens was severed.
It is not possible to return to the pre-coup dispensation. A new
constitutional order is needed. There will be no stability in Sudan
until there is a genuine civilian government and the role of the
security sector is firmly decided and implemented. That stability must
extend to Sudan's peripheries such as Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue
Nile, Eastern Sudan, and the Far North. For now, instability there is
tied to national-level politics, exacerbating local issues during a
time of economic and humanitarian crisis. The onus is on Sudanese to
achieve their democratic goals, but the U.S. and international
community have an explicit role to play in the interest of regional and
international stability. More importantly, there is a duty to nurture
citizen-led, non-violent democratic change at a time when this is in
short global supply.
The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and
not the United States Institute of Peace.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. Let me
start off.
Dr. Ero, can Sudan's transition be salvaged? What do we
need, from your perspective, to put things back on track?
Dr. Ero. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez.
Yes, it can be salvaged, and the people of Sudan themselves
have articulated clearly the steps that need to be taken to
ensure that.
I think key will be keeping your consistent line that you
started to articulate here today about supporting the efforts
to getting Sudan back on track, including supporting the
transition, making sure that the military do pull back from
their--from their entrenched position of derailing the process,
making sure that they step back from the current course that
they are taking.
The Sudanese military power has held power in the past, as
you know, for 52 of Sudan's 65 years of independence. It is not
surprising that they have taken a very hard-line entrenched
position as well.
Working with the Sudanese people, making sure you have a
very firm line also on dealing with the consequences and making
it clear to the military that there are consequences for their
own intervention into the civil political life has to be a very
firm line.
Getting coordinated a response from your international
allies, the African Union, particularly, the region, making
sure there is a clear understanding of what stability means for
the country, making it very clear to everybody that there is no
place in Sudan for military rule in the country, and making
sure also that the region is aligned in understanding that, I
think, is going to be key to getting Sudan back on track and
getting the transition back towards the path that was started
in 2019 and then getting it towards a transition.
We do need coordinated and concerted action both within the
United States, between the United States and its international
actors, and particularly in the region to get the country back
on track.
The Chairman. In that coordination that you refer to, what
steps would you like the U.S. and like-minded countries to take
to increase pressure on the Sudanese military leader to yield
power to a civilian government?
Dr. Ero. I think some of your opening statements, Senator
Menendez, started to articulate that. I think you also began to
articulate that there will be clear consequences for the
security forces as well.
I think that is an important message. The military seeks
legitimacy. It seeks engagement with international actors. It
also recognizes that it cannot govern without the support of
civilians as well.
That already gives you an entry point as well, and I think
then being consistent in terms of the pressure that is to be
applied to the country. There is a very narrow window now to
begin to ensure that the military understands the nature of the
pressure that can be applied.
For example, the step that you have taken already at the
level of the United States has triggered already an
understanding that the military has heavily miscalculated in
its own actions as well.
I think the weak link right now is between the
international actors and the wider regional community, and you
have already pointed out in your previous session that a lot of
work has been taken to work with the Gulf countries and Egypt,
and making sure that they stay in the room and be coordinated
in their steps, I think, is going to be the key to getting
Sudan stabilized.
The Chairman. There will be no legitimacy for the military
unless they move towards--back towards a transition to a
civilian government and there will be no assistance, from my
perspective, at least not in any way that would be helpful to
them unless we have a change.
Mr. Tucker, what type of programmatic activities would be
the most impactful when it comes to supporting the democratic
aspirations of the Sudanese people at this time?
Mr. Tucker. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
I think we need to take a quick look that assistance to
civil society, to political parties, legislative development--
the suite of things that we all know well that is encompassed
by democracy, human rights, and governance support--is
desperately needed.
I want to underline here that I have seen in my career,
both at the State Department and USAID, that sometimes support
to civil society and other critical governance actors is not
necessarily supported in real time substantively by our
diplomacy and international diplomacy.
What I mean by that is at times when diplomatic and
political solutions might not be evident or are very difficult,
it is easy to say we should do assistance to civil society, to
civilian actors.
I, certainly, do not want to downplay support to those
critical actors. They are critical to the way forward.
I think we need the development of a detailed strategy on
how diplomacy and assistance can better work together on these
things.
I have to say here that that requires an enormous amount of
technical expertise and staff across the board at State and
USAID, and that is possible, but it is difficult, both in
Khartoum and here in Washington, DC.
The Chairman. Let me ask you, in this regard what
benchmarks then should we expect to be met before the U.S.
resumes assistance? Why are those benchmarks important?
Mr. Tucker. They are important, frankly, because they are
very difficult to determine. It is easy to say we need progress
toward a civilian-led government.
I think that some people in the international community got
hung up on the idea of a civilian-led government. I think that
the government that happened during the transition was actually
led by the military.
I think what people on the streets and resistance
committees are looking for is genuine, full, unimpeded
executive power held by the prime minister and the cabinet by
civilians. So, perhaps, that assistance should start before you
get that fully civilian government.
I think there needs to be really enforceable directives and
progress toward that fully civilian government end state that
are enforceable and benchmarks set by civilians themselves and
that are agreed to by what now is a very broad group of
civilian actors.
The Chairman. Dr. Ero, when it comes to returning Sudan to
a path that would lead to democracy, who are the potential
spoilers, including foreign countries?
Dr. Ero. Senator, every spoiler is also part of the
solution is the way I would like to characterize it that way
and, of course, at the top of the podium is the military.
Whether we like it or not, we have to find a way in which
to engage with the military, but it should not be engagement
that sets aside--as you rightly pointed out, that sets aside
the demands that the civilians have articulated for a number of
years as well. The military and the civilian leadership as
well, is crucial to that.
I do not want to use the terminology spoiler. As I said,
every spoiler is crucial to getting us to where we need to be.
The other--there are other important players, armed groups as
well, that are crucial to knitting back a very complex and
complicated country as well.
There are a number of regional countries that have tacitly
sort of given a nod to the coup who articulate or claim to
express their desire to see stability in Sudan, and we have got
to make sure that we all have a clear understanding of what
stability for Sudan means today and there is only one stability
for Sudan, which is to get it back on that transitional
roadmap, to get it back to that inspirational revolution that
we started to see back in 2019 and to make sure that that path
towards democratization that was embedded in the peace
agreement in 2019 is articulated as well.
Again, Senator, I understand the way in which you want to
characterize it, but there are--those who we consider spoilers
are also crucial to getting us back or to getting Sudan back on
the right track as well.
The Chairman. I appreciate your diplomatic response to
that. The reality is, is that we would hope spoilers would be
empowerers and not spoilers, and they would be part of the
solution.
Some of them have played the role of spoiler already to
this point. We have to think about--at some point, I am into
naming and shaming in the hopes that we will get people to
recategorize and rethink their positions as to what is in their
best interests, but I understand your view that a spoiler can
be actually a facilitator. It all depends which road they
decide to take.
Finally, let me ask you both: what can we, the United
States and the international community, do to ensure that the
U.N.-mediated talks are inclusive, especially of historically
marginalized communities, and not limited primarily to elites?
Mr. Tucker.
Mr. Tucker. Yes, thank you. That is an excellent question.
I think, first, I would say in speaking to many people on
the ground in Khartoum in the past week that are involved in
some of the discussions among resistance committees, civilian
groups and political groups on political consensus and
political positions, everyone has said that the nature of these
groups are important.
Sometimes they are horizontal and diffuse, and there needs
to be time for them to develop their positions and, perhaps,
equally importantly, to engage with political parties on how
they can support these positions and how they can bring them
forward in inevitable negotiations in which, perhaps, political
individuals will take the lead.
As I mentioned in my testimony, there is urgency. There
definitely is, but they cannot be rushed to submit positions
that, perhaps, fracture them and their loose coalitions. I
have, frankly, seen that happen before in South Sudan and in
Sudan, and that is unfortunate.
I think there is precedent for strong, robust international
engagement on these issues. In my experience with the African
Union and the U.N. in Sudan and South Sudan, it is best when
there are links between U.N. operations and the Security
Council, the P5 and the A3 in New York, connected directly to
the region, to AU headquarters and IGAD, so you can invoke that
high-level senior diplomatic engagement that has to be
connected to what the SRSG is doing on the ground in Khartoum.
So what I am getting at here is it cannot just be one
individual with technical support in the capital. They need to
be able to invoke that higher authority. When and as needed
discussions underway on international eminent personalities are
important, but we desperately need more direct engagement and
signaling from the U.N. in New York and African Union
headquarters that, first and foremost, is coordinated and not
at cross purposes with what civilians are looking at right now.
The Chairman. Dr. Ero, any thoughts on this?
Dr. Ero. Yes. I completely agree with what my colleague at
USIP has said and I think it is worth acknowledging in front of
your committee that the initiative by the United Nations has
not been without problems as well.
It has come under fairly substantial criticisms from some
in the protest movements who feel, at one level, that that
process has been rushed. They also feel that there was not a
sufficiently consultative approach taken towards talks as well.
Some do feel that the international--Sudan's international
partners and including the U.S., I have to add, rushed to
embrace the U.N.-led talks without strongly demanding that they
should be better coordinated with all of Sudan's actors to give
it the best chance of success.
I think it is worth adding here that the resistance
committees--Sudanese resistance committees are currently
coordinating their own efforts to come up with an agreed
position on a way forward for the country. It is a laudable
effort and it will ultimately form a key part of any future
talks that we want to see in the country.
I would say that in the meantime the U.N. should continue
its attempt to bring various parties to the table, but it
should pay special attention to two conditions that we believe,
at the International Crisis Group, are important.
First, that those talks should be Sudanese led and that
they should be, as I said in my oral statement, maximally
inclusive, and that especially they must include prominent
voices from Sudanese neighborhood resistance committees. This
is what we see as vital if those talks are going to succeed.
The Chairman. Very well. Thank you both for your insights.
It has been very instructive and helpful, and we look forward
to continuing to engage with both of you as we move forward.
Seeing no other member before the committee seeking
recognition, this record will stay open until the close of
business tomorrow.
With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Amnesty International USA Statement, Dated January 24, 2022
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. It is critically important that we not lose sight of the
continued violence and displacement in Darfur, where people's voices
have been marginalized for far too long. It is not clear to me that
those who purport to represent the people of Darfur in Khartoum have
any interest in accurately reflecting the interests of those who are
still suffering violence and displacement on the ground. How is USAID
working to address needs in Darfur in the wake of the coup? How can the
USG ensure that grassroots voices in Darfur are represented in
political negotiations?
Answer. USAID's humanitarian assistance has continued since October
25 for people in need in Sudan, including in Darfur. The United States
is the single largest humanitarian donor in Sudan, and USAID provided
more than $382 million in Fiscal Year 2021 alone and nearly $45 million
to date in Fiscal Year 2022. The United States is committed to
supporting the Sudanese people as they confront ongoing challenges
related to insecurity, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters.
In Darfur, USAID works with partners to provide multi-sectoral
humanitarian assistance, including agriculture, food, health,
nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance. For example,
in December, a USAID non-governmental organization (NGO) partner
provided health consultations to more than 35,000 people, including
approximately 10,000 children aged 5 years and younger. The NGO also
supported the vaccination of nearly 3,300 children against diseases
such as measles, meningitis, polio, and tuberculosis. North Darfur,
West Darfur and other areas of Sudan are facing acute food insecurity
due to above-average food prices and reduced purchasing power--driven
by conflict, displacement, and economic disruptions related to
political instability. In response, USAID is providing life-saving food
assistance to people in need through NGO and United Nations (UN)
partners, primarily through cash transfers for food and cereals, pulses
including split peas and lentils, and vegetable oil sourced locally,
regionally, and from the United States.
USAID humanitarian assistance in Sudan also supports activities
that seek to address gender-based violence (GBV) and address the
negative consequences of conflict on women and children. This includes
GBV response services in Darfur, child protection networks, and
psychosocial services for survivors of domestic violence, child
marriage, and female genital mutilation.
USAID, in coordination with the Department of State, is providing
complementary support to the UN Integrated Transition Assistance
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in order to incorporate grassroots voices in
political discussions--for those in Darfur and other regions outside
Khartoum as well. Bringing together voices from across the country is
essential not only to find a way out of the current political impasse,
but also to enhance participation and accountability more broadly.
USAID is supporting grassroots organizations to engage in consultations
with UNITAMS and other platforms that focus on consensus building.
______
Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What specific legal authorities are currently in place
that could be used to impose sanctions, including personal targeted
sanctions on Sudan in the wake of the coup?
Answer. UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) established a
sanctions regime that includes a territorial arms embargo on Darfur and
prescribes an asset freeze and travel ban for those who are designated
for impeding the peace process or otherwise constituting a threat to
stability in Darfur and the region. President Bush in 2006 authorized
domestic sanctions in connection with the conflict in Darfur, including
for those undermining peace and security in Darfur. E.O. 13818 (Global
Magnitsky) authorizes sanctions in connection with serious human rights
abuse or corruption. While not specific to Sudan, it could be used on
Sudanese actors.
Question. On January 24, you tweeted that military actors
responsible for violence against protestors would face consequences.
What ``consequences'' were you referring to in your tweet and what will
trigger them?
Answer. The consequences I referred to in my tweet match those I
detailed in my official testimony for this hearing. After the military
overthrew the government on October 25, we moved swiftly to pause much
of our $700m in assistance and rallied our international partners to
pause billions in debt relief and assistance. Losing access to that
assistance and debt relief has dealt a major blow to the military
government's budget and demonstrated that they cannot receive
international aid while simultaneously undermining Sudan's stability.
While we are redirecting our assistance to best support the Sudanese
people, we will not allow it to directly or indirectly benefit the
military government until they restore civilian rule and cease
violations of human rights. We are now considering the full range of
traditional and non-traditional tools at our disposal to impose costs
on military actors who commit acts of violence against demonstrators
and undermine the democratic transition. This includes exploring new
authorities specific to Sudan's democratic transition. We will assess
how and when to apply those consequences based on available evidence
and the evolving situation on the ground in Sudan.
Question. How is the State Department working to address needs in
Darfur in the wake of the coup? How can the USG ensure that grassroots
voices in Darfur are represented in political negotiations?
Answer. It's clear that instability in Khartoum is benefiting armed
opportunists in Darfur, resulting in increased intercommunal violence
in the region over the last year. We are exploring how to expand our
ongoing support, including from the $700 million emergency
appropriation designated for Sudan, to further support peace in Darfur.
We are supporting the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in
Sudan's (UNITAMS) consultations with Sudanese actors, which include
many Darfuri groups, including internally displaced persons and other
Darfuri stakeholders, and Juba Peace Agreement signatories, by using
our offices to urge our Darfuri contacts to engage meaningfully with
UNITAMS and other Sudanese political and civil society actors. The U.S.
Government is also supporting and trying to expand UN and NGO efforts
to deploy more observers to Darfur to deter violence and human rights
abuses.
Question. What are we doing with regards to putting in place
mechanisms that protect civilians in Darfur?
Answer. Because delays in implementation of the Juba Peace
Agreement have had a negative effect on the security situation in
Darfur, I have urged General Burhan, General Hemedti, armed opposition
leaders, and others not to neglect this process. We are encouraged by
UNITAMS' work with the permanent ceasefire committee and urge the JPA
signatories to expedite implementation of other security arrangement
provisions, in particular the establishment of the Darfur Security
Forces mandated to protect civilians. Ultimately, the best protection
for civilians in Darfur is a democratic Sudanese Government that is
inclusive, responsive to the needs of its people, and protective of
their human rights. To that end, our support of the UNITAMS
facilitation of a Sudanese led political agreement will be most
impactful in ensuring long term protection for civilians in Darfur.
______
Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. Following the October 25 coup, what action did USAID take
to pause and/or redirect U.S. assistance to Sudan?
Answer. Following the October 25, 2021, military takeover, USAID
immediately paused all non-humanitarian assistance to the Government of
Sudan and all activities funded by the FY 2021 Title IX Economic
Support Fund (ESF) appropriation, which included USAID's Office of
Transition Initiative (OTI) work with the transitional government.
While assistance to the Government of Sudan remains paused, programs
that help the people of Sudan and their democratic aspirations,
including ongoing activities with civil society and independent media,
monitoring and documenting human rights abuses, peacebuilding
activities in conflict-affected areas, and health programs, resumed
following a short review. OTI has refocused its efforts on working with
civil society and on activities that bolster independent media. USAID
will look for clear progress towards resuming a transition to a more
democratic, civilian-led government before re-engaging with the
Government of Sudan.
Question. What, if any, action should Congress take to augment or
terminate assistance previously appropriated for Sudan, including the
$700 million in Economic Support Funds appropriated in the FY21 omnibus
spending bill?
Answer. USAID is currently engaging in an interagency process to
revise the spend plan for the $700 million in FY 2021 Title IX Economic
Support Funds in light of the military takeover on October 25, 2021. We
are working with our colleagues at the Department of State and National
Security Council to put together a proposed spend plan that is
responsive to the needs of the Sudanese people, in line with absorptive
capacity and does not reward the military regime. We look forward to
consulting with the Committee on the proposed plan shortly.
Question. Does the USAID Mission in Khartoum have sufficient
capacity, levels of staffing, and variety of implementers to be able to
obligate fully the levels of assistance appropriated by Congress to
support Sudan's transition?
Answer. The USAID Mission constantly reviews its staffing pattern
with the Bureau for Africa to provide adequate coverage and United
States Direct Hire (USDH) oversight. These reviews have led USAID to
identify the need for additional staff, and three USDH positions were
added in Sudan in FY 2021. Two USDH positions are currently in
recruitment, and three additional USDH positions will be requested in a
forthcoming Congressional Notification. The Mission is able to use
contractors and temporary duty support for immediate needs while longer
term staffing needs are fulfilled.
USAID is currently consulting with interagency partners on a
revised plan for the funding appropriated by Congress to support
Sudan's transition. We look forward to engaging this committee on
future planning.
USAID works closely with the interagency in Sudan to ensure any
work conducted by different U.S. Government agencies with the same
implementing partner is complementary and not duplicative.
Question. Does USAID have a strategy for democracy, rights, and
governance (DRG) programming for Sudan to help restore, support and
consolidate the country's transition?
Answer. Yes. USAID has several programs that focus on developing a
rights-based, participatory approach and an enabling environment where
democracy, human rights, and governance can flourish and meet the
aspirations of Sudanese citizens. As the transition has evolved, our
programs have adapted to meet new realities on the ground. Our strategy
includes expansion of existing democracy, rights, and governance (DRG)
programming as well as the development of new, timely programs that
will work holistically toward the restoration, consolidation, and--most
importantly--success of Sudan's transition.
Core to our strategy is bolstering the pro-democracy movement, with
a special focus on supporting youth and women as active participants
and leaders in their country's future, promoting access to information,
and engaging leaders who embody and actively promote democratic values.
Additionally, we aim to build the capacity and resilience of
institutions that are critical for democracy to be successful, such as
a diverse civil society, independent media, and inclusive political
parties. Equally as important to our strategy and as part of a broader
effort to advance peace and reconciliation, we are working to
strengthen accountability for human rights abuses through monitoring,
documentation, and advocacy. We are engaging with diverse local
organizations, which are often nascent and located outside of Khartoum,
to build a strong local oversight capacity. This includes monitoring
and observing the transition process and relevant political processes
so that local, trusted organizations can contribute to, report on, and
analyze the transition's progress and alert the Sudanese public to
areas that need additional oversight or advocacy for reform. As part of
these programs, civil society will monitor conflict in their
communities and work on local solutions to mitigate violence. A
diversity of citizen voices will continue to be essential to the
success of the transition and will need to be incorporated into every
aspect of our DRG strategy.
______
Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. Considering lessons learned from the start of Sudan's
transition to the October 25 coup, how will the United States deal with
issues of accountability and justice, particularly for prominent
members of the military junta currently running Sudan?
Answer. Justice and accountability for human rights abuses and
related crimes, past and ongoing, are key to a stable and lasting peace
in Sudan and will be an important component of the UN Integrated
Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) process. We intend to
provide assistance to support and promote accountability and
transitional justice efforts as determined by the Sudanese people and
consistent with Sudan's international and domestic legal obligations
and commitments, including with respect to the International Criminal
Court.
Question. Should individuals responsible for genocide in Darfur,
killing protesters, and the overthrow of a civilian-led transitional
government continue to be treated as legitimate partners moving
forward?
Answer. As I noted in my testimony, Sudan's military leaders broke
their commitment to ``partnership'' when they overthrew the civilian-
led transitional government and violated the Constitutional Declaration
last October. Sudan's security forces now hold the political and
economic levers of power, but it is clear the Sudanese people consider
the current arrangement to be unacceptable and are committed to
establishing a democracy. While no longer a partner in the transition
to democracy, the military is a participant in the process, but they
must not dictate its terms or its outcome.
Question. If yes to question 2, what considerations must be taken
as to the appropriate balance between the need for justice and
accountability, and the interest of returning Sudan to peaceful
civilian leadership?
Answer. There cannot be a stable and lasting peace in Sudan if the
root causes of violence are not addressed, including longstanding
impunity for serious abuses. The UNITAMS process offers an opportunity
for the Sudanese to discuss how to seek accountability for the crimes
of the past and lay the groundwork for a future where the rights of all
persons in Sudan are respected. We are prepared to support future
civilian leadership in efforts aimed at accountability and transitional
justice.
Question. If no to question 2, how will the U.S. manage to elevate
legitimate representatives of the Sudanese people?
Answer. It is not up to us to elevate or choose representatives for
Sudan. We have made clear to all of our interlocutors that the United
States supports the desire of the Sudanese people for a civilian-led
government and democratic elections in Sudan. Through our current
programs, efforts to support UNITAMS, and in planning future
assistance, we have focused on providing funding, training, and support
to civil society organizations and other stakeholders to lift the
voices of the Sudanese people in order to rebalance power in their
favor.
Question. How will the United States participate in future
conversations about debt relief for Sudan?
Answer. We, and our partners in the Paris Club and Friends of
Sudan, have made clear to the military that their actions have
imperiled debt relief in Sudan, which is currently paused due to the
overthrow of the government by the military on October 25. We will
continue to reassess the situation as it develops to determine if and
when we might be in a position to proceed with concluding a bilateral
debt agreement.
Question. In the case that a civilian-led transition and
discussions with the international financial institutions get back on
track, what minimum benchmarks will need to be met for the United
States to rejoin discussion about bilateral and multilateral debt
relief for Sudan?
Answer. The resumption of broader assistance depends on Sudan
meeting democratic transition benchmarks, including establishing a
civilian cabinet that is credible in the eyes of the Sudanese people;
lifting the state of emergency; ending security force violence against
protestors; making progress toward establishing legislative and
judicial institutions, electoral infrastructure, and transitional
justice mechanisms; and implementing security sector reforms.
Question. Will a complete hand over of power to civilian
authorities be a requirement for the U.S. to rejoin discussion about
bilateral and multilateral debt relief for Sudan?
Answer. Civilian leadership is the most basic prerequisite for
renewed U.S. support for debt relief. Sudan made commitments to
economic reform prior to the military takeover. Every day that passes
with military control further damages Sudan's economy. We will look to
civilian leadership meeting the aforementioned benchmarks before we
will consider U.S. support for proceeding with debt relief.
Question. For the United States, what does the meaningful
participation of women in political dialogue and transition processes
look like?
Answer. Women have risked their lives to realize the dream of a
democratic Sudan. Without the leadership and bravery of Sudanese women,
the Sudanese revolution would likely not have enjoyed success. Women
have been at the forefront of democratization efforts in Sudan and have
provided a significant portion of the movement's leadership. We are
committed to supporting UNITAMS in ensuring the meaningful
participation of women in the political process and transition. To
date, UNITAMS has met with an estimated 75 different women's groups, as
well as female delegates representing civil society groups and
political parties. Women's participation in these consultations means
that women can voice their concerns, participate as equals, and
maintain their important role in leading the transition to democracy.
Gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence and
sexual violence used as a means of repressing protestors, is
unacceptable, and perpetrators must be held accountable.
Question. How will the United States work with the international
community and Sudanese partners to ensure that women are not simply at
the table, but are critical voices leading discussions on a way forward
for Sudan that reflects the will of the Sudanese people?
Answer. We have ongoing programming that focuses on empowering and
enabling women to take a leading and meaningful role in the political
process in Sudan. We will continue to mainstream women's leadership in
future programming, and we prioritize the engagement of women leaders
and groups in our diplomatic engagement. We have also encouraged
engagement and outreach by UNITAMS with women leaders and groups.
Question. Looking forward, and considering lessons learned from the
last 10 years, how will the United States engage on the Abyei issue?
Answer. We will continue to support the important mission of the
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and use our offices to
encourage the governments of South Sudan and Sudan to engage in good
faith to resolve the status of Abyei. While Sudan faces many
challenges, we will continue to work with relevant parties to ensure
Abyei remains an area of focus for both governments. Abyei's disputed
status has had a negative effect on the people residing and transiting
the area. We will also endeavor to ensure that the United Nations has
the appropriate support, financing, and staffing to be able to
effectively conduct its mission in Abyei.
Question. How will various potential outcomes of the situation in
Khartoum affect future efforts related to Abyei?
Answer. For progress to be made regarding Abyei, Sudan needs an
involved civilian government, willing to meaningfully engage with those
residing in--or who regularly transit--Abyei. Other critical
stakeholders include the government of South Sudan and the UN Interim
Security Force, who must participate in negotiations to resolve
pressing issues related to security as well as the ultimate status of
Abyei.
Question. How is the U.S. Government's public affairs and media
outreach strategy adapting to the current situation in Sudan?
Answer. Our public diplomacy and media outreach strategy seeks to
speak to the people on their terms--and to listen. That includes press
releases, tweets, Facebook posts, public engagements, and interviews
with domestic and international media.
Question. How does the State Department plan to balance its public
and private messaging and the diversity of audiences both inside and
outside of Sudan?
Answer. We strive to have a consistent message both publicly and
privately. That message has been for our unwavering support for the
democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people; civilian-led government
and democratic elections in Sudan; an end to the violence against, and
detentions of, protesters; and lifting the state of emergency. We are
working to ensure the diverse audiences paying attention to Sudan have
an accurate view of U.S. policy and engagements.
Question. Does the State Department have a strategy for democracy,
rights, and governance (DRG) programming for Sudan to help restore,
support and consolidate the country's transition?
Answer. Our current strategy for DRG programming consists of
providing financial support and training for civil society groups in
Sudan with a focus on empowerment for women and youth groups. Looking
ahead, we are exploring how to best target assistance that both
complements UNITAMS' facilitation efforts and lays the groundwork for a
more inclusive social contract in a democratic Sudan.
Question. Can you provide us with the Department's plans regarding
the Paul Rusesabagina case and engagement with the Rwandan Government
given that efforts toward quiet diplomacy do not seem to be working?
Answer. The Department is engaging the Government of Rwanda with
senior officials in Kigali, and senior officials of the Department
raise Mr. Rusesabagina's case at every appropriate opportunity. We are
constantly re-assessing our strategy and evaluating all possible
options to seek Mr. Rusesabagina's release.
Question. Will, and if so when, the United States shift its
approach to a more public and confrontational approach toward the
President Kagame and his government on the Paul Rusesabagina case?
Answer. We have not yet determined whether or when we will shift
away from the current strategy. We are constantly re-assessing our
strategy and evaluating all possible options to seek Mr. Rusesabagina's
release.
Question. Please provide an update on staffing at Embassy Khartoum.
Answer. CDA, a.i. Brian Shukan departed post on January 24. John
Godfrey was nominated as the next Ambassador to Sudan on January 26.
Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn arrived on February 3 from her previous posting
in Bangui, to serve as CDA, a.i. until another CDA, a.i. is appointed
or an ambassador arrives. The 03-Public Diplomacy Officer and the 02-
Medical Provider positions are vacant, and no offers for those
positions were accepted. Several positions have been assigned, but will
be vacant until the officers arrive later in 2022 and in the first half
of 2023, including a Consular position, a Public Diplomacy position, a
Political/Economic position, and an Assistant Regional Security Officer
Investigator position. All other positions are encumbered.
Question. Does the State Department have plans to add staff to
Embassy Khartoum over the next year?
Answer. Embassy Khartoum, in partnership with AF/EX and the Desk,
were reviewing staffing needs in anticipation of increased host nation
engagement after Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism
was rescinded and continued its transition to democracy. The October 25
actions have delayed that planning while Post and Washington assess
what future engagement may be and the resources required to support
that engagement. The Department is exploring sending additional staff
to embassy Khartoum to support UNITAMS' facilitation effort.
Question. What particular challenges does the State Department face
regarding staffing at Embassy Khartoum?
Answer. Embassy Khartoum remains a partially-accompanied post with
only those family members 18 and over allowed. With most staff serving
tours separated from their families and with few international flight
options, limited paved roads outside the capital, and the inability to
travel outside Khartoum State without host government permission,
assignments to Khartoum are very isolating. Despite offering incentives
such as 20 percent hardship, 25 percent danger pay, and four R&Rs in a
2-year tour, it is difficult to fully staff the Embassy. Post is
actively looking for ways to improve the quality of life of staff and
bidding prospects. For instance, changes to Post's security posture
since November 2020 have allowed employees to ship or purchase
personally owned vehicles.
Question. Would you characterize the staffing challenges at Embassy
Khartoum as similar to those experienced across the Africa Bureau?
Answer. Many staffing challenges are similar to those experienced
across the Africa Bureau. Embassy Khartoum has the added challenge of
being a partially-accompanied post for those 18 and older due to
security considerations.
______
Responses of Dr. Comfort Ero to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. In your view, is the United States adequately engaging
foreign partners who are both helpful and unhelpful to Sudan's
transition to civilian rule?
Answer. The United States enjoys ties with key actors in the Horn
of Africa and among the Gulf states that have a stake in Sudan's
stability. Once in office, the new U.S. ambassador to Sudan should work
in concert with the U.S. Horn envoy to continue to press Gulf powers
and Egypt to offer their support for a transition to democratic rule,
which represents the best chance for long-run stability in Sudan.
Question. What could the United States do differently to improve
our engagement with foreign partners regarding Sudan's transition to
civilian rule?
Answer. The United States should press for greater coordination
among the multiple actors that have a stake in what happens next in
Sudan. The U.S. Horn envoy is well positioned to marshal key players--
including the UN SRSG, the African Union envoy, the EU Horn envoy, Gulf
powers and others--to come up with a shared position on the best way to
stimulate dialogue--and support Sudanese-led efforts to re-rail the
transition.
Question. Are there relevant lessons for the current situation from
U.S. engagement with the previous regime of Omar al-Bashir, given that
the current military government appears to be emulating some of its
tactics?
Answer. It's worth noting that elements of the security forces and
associated elites benefited from Sudan's rigged economy even in the
face of the broad sanctions that were applied for decades. Any new
sanctions regime should therefore ideally be targeted at individuals
that are standing in the way of a successful transition. These
restrictions should be coordinated among the AU, the U.S., the EU and,
critically, Gulf countries where many Sudanese elites store their
funds. These individually targeted sanctions including travel bans and
asset freezes are more likely to be effective than broader sanctions
that exert pain on ordinary civilians.
______
Responses of Joseph Tucker to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. In your opinion, what would be the most constructive use
of the substantial levels of available U.S. assistance to Sudan under
current conditions?
Answer. Increased support to civil society organizations and
civilian and political stakeholders and processes as noted by both
witnesses on the U.S. Government panel is an important use of funding
under current conditions. Support to such citizen actors in Sudan could
include programs both in Khartoum and locations outside that focus on
increasing political participation and citizen monitoring of and
involvement in political processes. These processes include events such
as creation of the transitional legislative council, monitoring of key
events before and during any renewed transition, and, when appropriate,
participation in electoral events. Additionally, during the pre-October
2021 period, training, and capacity building to bolster effective
civilian participation in government was underway. While it is unlikely
that such assistance can be provided to civilians in the current
iteration of government, thoughts can be given to how to train
civilians during this volatile period that could be part of a renewed
transition if and when direct assistance is resumed. Civilians working
in economic, service delivery, banking, financial, taxation,
agricultural, legislative, and justice sectors of government will be
especially critical to a renewed transition and beyond.
Past assistance efforts in Sudan (and South Sudan) suggest that
program flexibility and responsiveness is key in scenarios where there
is a positive political trajectory and progress toward key goals, but
also one where the opposite happens, and space continues to close as is
currently happening. The 2005-11 Comprehensive Peace Agreement period
saw much U.S. assistance going to this type of work, but the lack of a
pivot within Sudan after South Sudan's secession and increasingly
closed space meant that most gains were lost. Increased programming in
this sector should ensure that there are adequate expert technical
staff at both headquarters and in the field to ensure appropriate and
impactful decisions. Local Sudanese staff at the U.S. Embassy in
Khartoum and USAID/Sudan mission should be central to such efforts
given their long-term work on such issues that extends well beyond the
average tour length of foreign service officers. Staff to focus on
increased international donor coordination across this sector should
also be available. Equally important is that support to civil society
and frontline citizen stakeholders be adequately bolstered by
coordinated U.S. diplomacy and political engagement as noted in my
written testimony.
The continued deterioration of Sudan's economy is a major threat to
the country's stability and is unlikely to reverse in the short-term.
Planning across assistance sectors--and collaboration between
humanitarian and development strategies--to bolster programs that may
directly or indirectly increase the economic stability of citizens
without direct support to the government is urgently needed. The
participation of many security sector actors in Sudan's economy makes
this tricky since assistance should not benefit such actors, and many
are involved in Sudan's commodity sector, including wheat, fuel, and
other trades. To offset this, Sudanese and expatriate experts in small-
scale agriculture, livelihoods assistance in conflict settings, and
access to local and national markets can work to prepare comprehensive
plans for agriculture and emergency livelihoods sectors, if this has
not happened already.
The U.S. should not shy away from using assistance to prepare
comprehensive, multisector plans for areas outside of the capital, such
as Darfur, Eastern Sudan, the Far North, and the Two Areas. Such plans
can be flexible and responsive, allowing for programming in scenarios
where situations are improved, stagnant, or volatile. Commissioning
analyses, research, and technical recommendation reports using internal
U.S. Government experts or external ones to assist in such efforts is
key. Resources spent on such products should not be dismissed because
they may be seen as spending funds on internal matters rather than
direct support to beneficiaries. On the contrary, these products are
key to creating informed, responsible, and proactive programs to
accurately assist such beneficiaries. As the economic and humanitarian
situation continues to degenerate, authorities in Khartoum are neither
equipped nor willing to focus on areas beyond the capital. Part of
assistance currently under discussion can look at programming on food
security and livelihoods issues that may be beyond the reach of current
humanitarian assistance. In some settings, livelihoods work can
incorporate programming on intra and intercommunity engagement,
conflict management, and resilience strengthening. This has been done
to good effect in South Sudan at local levels and such cross-sectoral
collaboration in Sudan should be explored.
Question. Is there any scenario in which the types and levels of
U.S. assistance to Sudan provided prior to the October 25 coup should
be reinstated?
Answer. For the purposes of answering this question I will de-link
the type/level of U.S. assistance from a possible scenario for
reinstatement of assistance. Some thoughts on the former are provided
above.
In my oral testimony I commented on the complex issue of
reinstatement of assistance to the government in Sudan, noting that ``a
scenario for resumption is when violence against civilians has stopped,
and there is enforceable decision and progress on a fully civilian
government, with benchmarks set by civilians''. For the first part, I
mean a scenario where civilians are allowed to gather peacefully
without use of violence by security forces in the capital and other
areas, particularly in Darfur. This is a hard benchmark to meet because
in most peace processes in Sudan (and South Sudan) there is a certain
level of violence during most stages of negotiations and agreement
implementation. Determining what a sufficient end to violence looks
like will be key to this. It is not possible to do this in the current
context of increasing violence against civilians across Sudan, and
patterns of security sector violence and possible restraint must be
monitored closely.
For the second part, a primary issue is the difference between what
one defines as a ``civilian-led'' government versus a ``fully
civilian'' government. The former could imply that civilians head some
major institutions, but the security sector is involved in government
beyond the security arena. This looks more like the pre-coup hybrid
military-civilian transitional government. The latter implies that
civilians are in full control of executive authority and the security
sector is limited to the security arena, which is governed by civilian
oversight.
The scenario I referred to is possibly one where negotiations have
reached a stage where parties agree that a wholly civilian-led
executive authority is an end state and international guarantors of
that process are committed to ensuring this based on benchmarks and
metrics that civilian negotiators agree to. This is complex because the
timing for such a civilian-led executive authority is complicated and
could mean it happens before the end of a transition period, in the
middle, or at the end. Given how fluid the situation is, it is
impossible to forecast this at present, but U.S. policy makers and
assistance officials need to observe this closely going forward.
Providing direct or indirect assistance--and diplomatic support to--a
Sudanese-led monitoring body that can track the situation could be
central to helping U.S. and international policy makers determine
benchmarks and conditions that can lead to informed, timely decisions
on if and when assistance can be resumed.
Question. In your written testimony, you noted that premature
reinstatement of assistance to Sudan may harm U.S. credibility. You
highlighted the ending of violence against civilians and ``tangible,
irreversible progress'' toward a civilian government as the primary
metrics for restarting aid. It seems to me that neither condition has
been met, and won't be in the near-term. Is it possible for Sudan to
achieve even these basic metrics?
Answer. As noted above, arriving at such benchmarks in the current
situation will be difficult, and determining how situations are
shifting will require close U.S. observation and analysis. The ability
of the U.S. and likeminded international stakeholders to conceptualize,
agree on, and drive toward an end state based on such conditions and
beyond a merely civilian-led government is a first step. Nuanced and
increased engagement with the United Nations Transitional Assistance
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and international stakeholders working on
political processes will be instrumental in reaching such an end state
as well. This reinforces the idea that as assistance decision-makers
look at scenarios where assistance to the government can be resumed or
phased in, they will need to closely engage with their diplomatic and
political counterparts to ensure that they are aware of such thinking,
and that plans for resumed assistance can help support political
outcomes, and vice versa.
Question. How should the U.S. Government be engaging security
sector actors given the current situation?
The U.S. Government should be directly engaging security sector
actors to obtain further information about their stances on the current
situation and possible political ways forward. However, the U.S. should
improve public messaging about why such engagement is needed and how it
can help lead to a restored transition and fully civilian outcome.
Without this, many Sudanese protestors, Resistance Committees, and
political leaders may think that such engagement is indicative of a
U.S. bias favoring a return to the pre-coup hybrid government that many
are expressly against. Part of this engagement should be geared toward
helping the U.S. better understand internal dynamics within the
security sector for the reasons noted in my written testimony. This
engagement should also be used to help inform Troika and other like-
minded international stakeholders such as UNITAMS that may have a
different set of relationships than the U.S. does.
A worrisome post-coup development is the return of the General
Intelligence Service (GIS) to tactics used by its predecessor, the
National Intelligence & Security Service (NISS), before the 2019
revolution. After the coup the GIS was given increased authorities that
had originally been taken away after the revolution. It is openly
utilizing them to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and harass protestors and
activists throughout the country.\1\ The U.S. was well versed in
engaging the pre-revolution Sudan Government on NISS issues, and it
should return to this posture with the GIS if it has not done so
already.
An equal priority for engagement with the security sector is to
affirm the need for the development of a national security vision
grounded in the original aims of the transition--including civilian
oversight of the security sector--and in recognition of the fact that
the security sector has a legitimate role to play in Sudan and can help
prioritize genuine risks and threats to the country. This should happen
in order for future security sector reform initiatives to fully take
root. Given the current situation, U.S. engagement should reiterate
this need and a desire to assist if appropriate, but note that with the
current trajectory, the security sector is squandering an opportunity
to unlock positive U.S. and international involvement on this issue.
----------------
Note
\1\ See https://sudantribune.com/article253483/ & https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60245133
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