[Senate Hearing 117-271]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 117-271

               SUDAN'S IMPERILED TRANSITION: U.S. POLICY 
                  IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 25TH COUP

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                           FEBRUARY 1, 2022

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                              __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-713 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
  
                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)       


                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Coleman, Hon. Isobel, Deputy Administrator, U.S. Agency for 
  International Development, Washington, DC......................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Phee, Hon. Mary Catherine, Assistant Secretary of State for 
  African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC......     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

Ero, Dr. Comfort, President and CEO, International Crisis Group, 
  Nairobi, Kenya.................................................    34
    Prepared Statement...........................................    36

Tucker, Joseph, Senior Expert for the Greater Horn of Africa, 
  United States Institute of Peace, Washington, DC...............    39
    Prepared Statement...........................................    41

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Amnesty International USA Statement, Dated January 24, 2022......    52

Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    56

Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    56

Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions Submitted by Senator Jim 
  Risch..........................................................    57

Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Jim Risch..............................................    58

Responses of Dr. Comfort Ero to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Jim Risch......................................................    61

Responses of Joseph Tucker to Questions Submitted by Senator Jim 
  Risch..........................................................    62

                                 (iii)



 
         SUDAN'S IMPERILED TRANSITION: U.S. POLICY 
          IN THE WAKE OF THE OCTOBER 25TH COUP

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young, 
Rounds, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Let me thank our witnesses for joining us today to discuss 
the crisis in Sudan.
    East Africa stands at a precipice. Three years ago, fragile 
transitions in Ethiopia and Sudan were once cause for cautious 
optimism. Today, conflict in Ethiopia, including the deadly 
siege of Tigray and the October 25 coup d'etat in Sudan, are 
cause for alarm.
    In April 2019, the Sudanese people peacefully and 
tenaciously ousted indicted war criminal Omar al-Bashir, 
Sudan's brutal dictator for 30 years. Despite a violent 
response from his security services through 5 months of 
sustained widespread protests, the people of Sudan succeeded in 
their demands for a transition to democracy.
    Though the process was rocky, civilians were able to reach 
agreement with military actors on a transitional constitutional 
document, which provided timelines for full return to civilian 
rule.
    Al-Bashir's fall and subsequent progress on the transition 
paved the way for me and other members of this body to take 
legal action leading to the removal of Sudan from the state 
sponsor of terrorism list and to support an overall thaw of 
relations between the United States and Sudan.
    The military's brazen October coup has put that progress in 
jeopardy. The coup was the culmination of weeks of tensions 
between civilian and military members of Sudan's transitional 
government.
    The military's arrests and detention of Prime Minister 
Hamdok and other civilian officials and the killing of dozens 
of protesters advocating for a return to civilian rule have 
made it clear that military actors have little interest in 
ceding power and no fear of consequences for their actions.
    The United States, regional actors, and the international 
community must respond swiftly and decisively to help the 
Sudanese people put their country back on a democratic 
trajectory.
    While the United Nations Integrated Transitional Assistance 
Mission in Sudan has indicated it will facilitate Sudanese-led 
talks among local stakeholders, it has no means to enforce 
participation or to hold participants accountable for following 
through on commitments.
    Despite having publicly committed to dialogue to resolve 
the current crisis, the Sudanese military continues to kill, 
torture, abuse, and detain protesters and civil society actors.
    Nearly 80 civilians have been killed by security forces 
since the coup, including a 27-year-old man just this past 
weekend. While a dialogue is necessary, there must also be 
consequences for those responsible for human rights abuses and 
for those at the highest levels who have engineered the coup.
    In that vein, I support the Biden administration's decision 
to suspend $700 million in aid immediately following the coup. 
I also welcome the decision by the World Bank to suspend its 
own planned assistance.
    However, these actions alone have proven insufficient to 
end the violence and force the generals to the negotiating 
table.
    I am pleased that the Administration has taken a number of 
steps to increase its engagement on the crisis in Sudan, 
including selecting David Satterfield to succeed Ambassador 
Feltman as Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and dispatching 
a seasoned ambassador to serve as charge d'affaires at Embassy 
Khartoum until an ambassador is confirmed, and I am pleased 
that the White House has finally nominated an ambassador to 
Sudan.
    Given the current situation, I hope that my colleagues will 
join me in working to ensure that we move the nomination as 
expeditiously as possible.
    In the days to come, Congress will act as well. Ranking 
Member Risch and I are collaborating on legislation that 
establishes conditions that must be met prior to restarting 
assistance; that directs the Administration to rethink its 
assistance strategy; and, which sets up a regime of targeted 
sanctions for those who undertook the coup and continue to 
undermine the transition to democracy and abuse human rights, 
thus far a critical missing element in the Administration 
response.
    I hope during the course of their testimony, witnesses will 
discuss the following: What are the prospects for a return to 
civilian rule? What role are the African Union, Arab Gulf 
states, and other regional actors playing with regard to 
supporting a return to dialogue and pressing military leaders 
to agree to yield power? What consequences were you referring 
to in your tweet from a week ago, Assistant Secretary Phee, and 
when does the Administration plan to impose them?
    We have vital strategic interests in the Horn of Africa and 
the Red Sea corridor that will be difficult, if not impossible, 
to meet should Sudan's transition fail. We simply cannot take 
that risk.
    Let me turn to the ranking member for his opening 
statement.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a tough 
one.
    The 2019 revolution in Sudan marked a pivotal moment for a 
country at the crossroads of the Sahel, East, Central, and the 
Horn regions of Africa. The end of the violent Bashir regime 
was driven by millions of Sudanese through nationwide mass 
demonstrations demanding change, and change did occur for a 
little while.
    Even though the military-led Sovereign Council had ultimate 
authority over the Sudanese state, the establishment of a 
civilian-led transitional government under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Hamdok was a significant step toward achieving a 
new democratic Sudan.
    This government was by no means perfect. The civilian 
groups that influenced the revolution made missteps along the 
way, while old and new anti-democratic forces worked furiously 
to infiltrate and undermine the work of the transitional 
government. The Hamdok Government also faced a severe economic 
crisis and deeply complicated political challenges.
    In the weeks before the Sudan's October 25 coup, I, along 
with other members of this committee, warned Sudan's military 
not to intervene in the efforts by Prime Minister Hamdok and 
his cabinet.
    However, the leaders of the Sovereign Council, Generals 
Burhan and Hemeti, did not resist and removed the civilian 
government by force.
    While the Administration has not wanted to characterize 
what happened on October 25 as a coup, that is, indeed, what it 
was. Foreign policy leaders released a bipartisan bicameral 
statement calling what happened a coup, demanded that Sudan's 
junta restore its civilian leadership, and vowed to take action 
if they did not.
    We followed that statement with a concurrent resolution in 
both chambers, further outlining our concerns. The well-
documented violence against civilians before and following the 
October 25 coup proves that Sudan's military junta is brutal, 
cannot be trusted, and is incapable of leading Sudan's 
democratic transition.
    While we may need to engage Generals Burhan and Hemeti to 
find a path toward restoring civilian control, we must put them 
on notice. The United States must take action to hold the junta 
and other spoilers of Sudan's transition accountable.
    That is why my staff is working closely with the chairman's 
office on comprehensive legislation to address this issue of 
accountability, but, more importantly, to reshape our 
assistance and policy approach towards Sudan.
    The United States must continue to support the Sudanese 
people and Sudan's pro-democracy forces. All totaled, the 
financial commitments made by Congress to support Sudan's 
civilian-led democratic transition exceed $1 billion.
    Congress also worked to help reshape the bilateral 
relationship by supporting debt relief, working with the State 
Department to meet conditions for removing Sudan's state 
sponsor of terrorism designation, and restoring its sovereign 
immunity.
    I am concerned, however, about how the United States 
positioned itself before and following the October 25 coup.
    Looking forward, the United States must have a clear vision 
for what we would like to see in Sudan. We must be prudent with 
our tax dollars and with clear-eyed determination, decide 
whether we should commit all this funding to Sudan while coup 
leaders remain in control of the government.
    The Biden administration must also act urgently to help 
stem the tide of military coups occurring across Africa, not 
just in the Sudan. If democracy is, indeed, a priority for this 
Administration, it must view these coups as a trend that 
imperils the future of democracy in Africa and worldwide.
    Finally, I have consistently called for the appointment of 
an experienced U.S. Ambassador to Sudan since Secretary Pompeo 
agreed to exchange ambassadors with Sudan in December of 2019.
    I am pleased the Administration is moving an experienced 
diplomat, like Lucy Tamlyn, to Khartoum as charge d'affaires, 
but the 2 years we spent without a full time ambassador in 
Sudan reflects a broader problem we must address: the low 
priority the State Department faces in filling positions at all 
levels for posts in Africa. I say that with full understanding 
how difficult these posts are.
    In the days leading up to this hearing, the Biden 
administration signaled to this committee its intent to put 
forward a nominee. Intent is good. Action is better. We are 
still waiting.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Let me turn to our witnesses.
    With us this morning on behalf of the Administration is 
Ambassador Isobel Coleman, Deputy Administrator for policy and 
programming at the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
where she is responsible for program and policy oversight, 
including the agency's regional and pillar bureaus.
    As Deputy Administrator, she guides USAID's crisis response 
liaison work in countering the influence of China and Russia 
and is responsible for overseeing agency efforts to prevent 
famine and future pandemics, strengthen education, health, 
democracy, and economic growth, and improve responses to 
climate change.
    Ambassador Coleman is a foreign policy and global 
development expert with more than 25 years of experience 
working in government, the private sector, and nonprofits. From 
2014 to 2017, she was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations 
for management, reform, and special political affairs. During 
that time, she represented the United States in the U.N. 
Security Council on Africa and peacekeeping issues and on 
issues related to the budget.
    Joining her on this panel is Ambassador Molly Phee, 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs at the 
Department of State. Ambassador Phee is a career member of the 
Senior Foreign Service, but most recently served as the Deputy 
Special Representative for Afghanistan reconciliation.
    Ambassador Phee was U.S. Ambassador to South Sudan from 
2015 to 2017. She also served as Deputy Chief of Mission of the 
U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and as Chief of Staff in 
the Office of the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan. 
Additionally, Ambassador Phee has served as the Acting 
Secretary for International Organization Affairs as well as the 
Deputy Security Council Coordinator at the U.S. mission to the 
U.N., handling U.N. engagement in Africa and Middle East for 
both portfolios.
    This is a very well-versed panel, particularly as it 
relates to this issue. This is also the first time each of our 
witnesses has testified before this committee in their current 
roles for which they have been confirmed to, so congratulations 
to both of you. Welcome to both of you. Thank you for your 
service.
    With that, we ask you to summarize your statement in 5 
minutes. Your full statement will be included in the record, 
without objection.
    Let me turn to Ambassador Coleman first.

       STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ISOBEL COLEMAN, DEPUTY 
   ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Coleman. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify today on USAID's assistance to the people of 
Sudan and our response to the devastating setback to Sudan's 
democratic transition since October 25 when the military 
detained civilian leaders, disrupted communication networks, 
and began killing protesters in the streets.
    Congressional interest in Sudan and support for the people 
of Sudan have been essential over the years. USAID greatly 
appreciates the additional $700 million in funding Congress 
appropriated last year for Sudan.
    Despite our collective efforts to help Sudan solidify the 
democratic transition, recent events serve as a reminder that 
progress toward democracy can be fragile. I thank the committee 
for its attention to Sudan today.
    For decades, we have witnessed the appalling violence and 
human rights abuses as well as violations of international 
humanitarian law committed by Sudanese security forces against 
civilians. This includes the massacre of at least 127 peaceful 
democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019.
    Following Sudan's inspiring citizen-led revolution in 2019, 
USAID reimagined and expanded its support, becoming the largest 
donor supporting Sudan's democratic transition, including 
assistance to then Prime Minister Hamdok's office and key 
ministries to help them deliver on the goals of the revolution.
    USAID partnered with the government to mitigate the sharp 
effects of difficult yet necessary economic reforms on Sudanese 
families to begin to right the ship after years of economic 
neglect and mismanagement.
    Our assistance to the civilian side of the transitional 
government complemented our long-standing support for Sudanese 
civil society and peacebuilding efforts, particularly in 
marginalized and conflict-affected communities. These programs 
operated alongside USAID's lifesaving humanitarian assistance.
    After the military takeover on October 25, the United 
States announced a pause on new obligations from the $700 
million appropriation while we evaluated next steps in our 
assistance for Sudan.
    Following a review of our programs, that pause remained in 
force for assistance to Sudan's government. Meanwhile, we have 
expanded activities that support the Sudanese people in their 
democratic aspirations.
    Our current approach links the resumption of any assistance 
to the government to the restoration of the civilian-led 
transition. We have coordinated this effort with like-minded 
international partners.
    In light of the dynamic political environment, we are 
revising the original plan for the $700 million and we look 
forward to continued engagement with Congress to find the best 
way forward.
    We are now focused on ramping up support for Sudan's 
democratic transition in three primary ways: first, 
strengthening civilian political leadership; second, promoting 
respect for human rights including freedom of expression and 
right of peaceful assembly; and third, supporting the Sudanese 
people's demand for an end to their military's long-standing 
domination of politics and the economy.
    Our goal remains to help the people of Sudan in their 
pursuit of a civilian-led democratic government that is 
responsive to its people. Our programs support civil society to 
organize around, advocate for, and engage in transition 
discussions and peace negotiations.
    We support our partners in building the capacity of youth, 
women, and marginalized citizens to lead whether in political 
parties, civil society organizations, or in their communities.
    We support civil society in conducting peacebuilding 
activities, including ongoing national efforts to reach a 
political agreement to the current crisis and engagement with 
political consultations facilitated by UNITAMS.
    USAID also supports journalists and independent media to 
accurately and professionally report on transition, peace, and 
political issues.
    Amid the recent political turmoil, humanitarian needs 
continue to rise. The U.N. estimates that nearly one-third of 
Sudan's population will need humanitarian assistance in 2022. 
This includes approximately 10 million people facing life-
threatening levels of acute food insecurity.
    USAID has long been the largest humanitarian donor to the 
people of Sudan. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to date, we have 
contributed nearly $430 million in funding to provide for the 
basic needs of refugees, internally-displaced persons, host 
community members, and others in need.
    This year, we will work to mitigate the suffering of 
vulnerable populations and prioritize life-saving assistance in 
Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. We will continue to meet 
the immense needs of the Sudanese people as we urge other 
donors to join us in these efforts as well.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Coleman follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Isobel Coleman

    Good morning Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to 
testify today on USAID's assistance to the people of Sudan, and our 
response to the devastating setback to Sudan's democratic transition 
since October 25, when the military detained civilian leaders, 
disrupted communications networks, and began killing protesters in the 
streets--returning to the contemptible practices of failed past 
Sudanese regimes. The military takeover also negatively affects Sudan's 
long-term development prospects as well as prospects for sustainable 
peace. Congressional interest in Sudan and support for the people of 
Sudan have been essential over the years. USAID greatly appreciates the 
additional $700 million in funding Congress appropriated last year to 
further our goals in Sudan. Despite our collective efforts to help 
Sudan solidify the democratic transition, recent events serve as a 
reminder that progress toward democracy can be fragile. I thank the 
Committee for its attention to developments in Sudan today.
    The people of Sudan have demanded, and continue to demand, an end 
to military rule. Thousands of brave citizens are risking their lives 
on an almost daily basis to end the corrupt military rule that has 
threatened and oppressed many of them for their entire lives.
    For decades, we have witnessed the appalling violence and human 
rights violations and abuses, as well as violations of international 
humanitarian law, committed by Sudanese security forces against 
Sudanese civilians. This includes genocide in Darfur, the 
indiscriminate bombing of civilian settlements, the targeted bombing of 
clearly marked hospitals, and security force attacks on medical 
facilities, staff, and patients. It also includes the massacre of at 
least 127 peaceful democracy activists in Khartoum on June 3, 2019.
    We recognize and deeply appreciate the concern of your committee 
members--and Congress as a whole--regarding the brutality and terror 
the Sudanese people are facing, and how, in spite of these major 
setbacks, we can best continue to support the people of Sudan to 
fulfill their aspirations for freedom, peace, and justice.
    Following Sudan's inspiring citizen-led revolution in 2019, USAID 
reimagined and expanded its support, becoming the largest donor 
supporting Sudan's democratic transition, including assistance to then-
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok's office and key ministries to help them 
deliver on the goals of the revolution. USAID partnered with the 
government to mitigate the sharp effects of difficult, yet necessary, 
economic reforms on Sudanese families to begin to right the ship after 
years of economic neglect and mismanagement. Our assistance to the 
civilian side of the transitional government complemented our 
longstanding support for Sudanese civil society and peacebuilding 
efforts, particularly in long-marginalized and conflict-affected 
communities. These programs operated alongside USAID's life-saving 
humanitarian assistance.
    After the military takeover on October 25, the United States 
announced a pause on new obligations from the $700 million 
appropriation while we evaluated next steps in our assistance for 
Sudan. Following a review of our programs, that pause remains in place 
for assistance to Sudan's government. Meanwhile, we have continued and 
expanded activities that support the Sudanese people in their 
democratic aspirations. Our current approach links the resumption of 
any assistance to Sudan's government to the restoration of the 
civilian-led transition. We have coordinated this effort with like-
minded international partners. In light of the dynamic political 
environment, we are revising the original plan for the $700 million, 
and we look forward to continued engagement with Congress to find the 
best way forward.
    We are now focused on ramping up support for Sudan's democratic 
transition in three primary areas:

  1.  Strengthening civilian political leadership;

  2.  Promoting respect for human rights, including freedom of 
        expression and the right of peaceful assembly; and

  3.  Supporting the Sudanese people's demand for an end to their 
        military's longstanding domination of politics and the economy, 
        including with efforts to explore anti-corruption and 
        transparency mechanisms, support for transitional justice and 
        human rights, and exploring opportunities to support security 
        sector reform.

    Our goal remains to help the people of Sudan in their pursuit of a 
civilian-led, democratic government that is responsive to its people.
    USAID has supported this type of work in Sudan for many years 
through programs that promote democracy, empower civil society, and 
protect human rights.
    Our programs support civil society to organize around, advocate 
for, and engage in transition discussions and peace negotiations. We 
support our partners in building the capacity of youth, women, and 
marginalized citizens to lead, whether in political parties--including 
organizing new parties--civil society organizations, or in their 
communities. We support civil society in monitoring political 
processes, identifying conflict hotspots, and conducting peacebuilding 
activities--including ongoing national efforts to reach a political 
agreement to the current crisis, and engagement with political 
consultations facilitated by the United Nations Integrated Transition 
Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS). USAID also supports journalists 
and independent media to accurately and professionally report on 
transition, peace, and political issues.
                         humanitarian response
    Amid the recent political turmoil, humanitarian needs in Sudan 
continue to rise. The United Nations estimates that approximately 14.3 
million people in Sudan, or nearly one-third of the population, will 
need humanitarian assistance in 2022, a 7 percent increase from last 
year. This includes approximately 9.8 million people facing life-
threatening levels of acute food insecurity.
    In Sudan's greater Darfur region, escalating violence due to 
resource competition, unresolved political grievances, and the full 
withdrawal of United Nations--African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) peacekeepers contributed to the displacement of thousands of 
people, exacerbated risks to women and children, and impeded aid relief 
groups from reaching the communities in greatest need of assistance. 
This also shines a renewed spotlight on the need to protect civilians 
in Darfur and on the shortcomings of an imperfect peace agreement. 
Meanwhile, intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states 
continue to increase displacement and disrupt emergency programming, 
further exacerbating humanitarian needs. There are more than 3 million 
people displaced within the country as of August due to violence, 
protracted economic crisis, and severe flooding. An additional 1.1 
million refugees and asylum seekers sought shelter in Sudan as of 
November due to ongoing insecurity in Ethiopia, South Sudan, and other 
neighboring countries.
    USAID has long been the largest humanitarian donor to the people of 
Sudan. In fiscal years 2021 and 2022 to date, we have contributed 
nearly $429 million in funding to provide for the basic needs of 
refugees, internally displaced persons, host community members, and 
others in need. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
USAID partner Save the Children Federation is providing infection 
prevention and control supplies to medical workers at the Khartoum 
Isolation Center, helping to meet heightened health needs during the 
pandemic and reducing the risk of health care workers contracting the 
disease while attending to COVID-19 patients.
    USAID also supports humanitarian coordination and logistics 
activities, which help extend the reach and efficiency of emergency 
response programming. Following the 6-week blocking of Port Sudan and 
the Khartoum-Red Sea Port Sudan highway by the Beja Supreme Council, 
which contributed to a significant backlog in the delivery of relief 
commodities, USAID and our partners have actively engaged in 
contingency planning to minimize the humanitarian impact of any future 
disruptions in access to the port.
    In 2022, we will continue to mitigate the suffering of vulnerable 
populations and prioritize life-saving assistance in Darfur, South 
Kordofan, and Blue Nile, particularly conflict-affected and newly 
accessible zones in Jebel Marra. We will continue to meet the immense 
needs of the Sudanese people, as we continue to urge other donors to 
join us in these efforts as well.
                               conclusion
    Finally, let me say that we appreciate our collaboration with 
Congress to jointly determine the best uses of our foreign assistance 
resources to help the people of Sudan fulfill their aspirations for 
freedom, peace, and justice.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward 
to answering your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ambassador Phee.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY CATHERINE PHEE, ASSISTANT 
  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                     STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished 
members of the committee, let me also thank you for your long-
standing interest in and support for a democratic Sudan. We 
share your alarm about the deteriorating situation and the risk 
of regression.
    As you have noted, since the fall of the Bashir 
dictatorship in 2019, the United States and our international 
partners have robustly endeavored to support the Sudanese 
people and have worked closely with this committee and Congress 
on their behalf.
    This was always an ambitious undertaking. After 30 years of 
an Islamist military dictatorship and recurring internal 
conflict, the Sudanese are coping with a burdensome legacy, 
including the generational damage to the country's historically 
marginalized areas such as Darfur. Even as we welcome the 
transitional government's progress in political and economic 
reform, we were acutely aware of the immense structural issues 
facing the transition.
    Yet, on the other side of the ledger, we have all been 
inspired by the remarkable and resilient civilian resistance 
movement, which resulted, as you have noted, in the 
constitutional declaration and the Juba Peace Agreement. These 
two documents offer the promise of transition to democracy and 
peace for Sudan.
    On October 25, as we all know, Sudan's Security Services 
upended the civilian-military partnership when they betrayed 
the transition and the Sudanese people by overthrowing the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet.
    The subsequent November 21 political agreement that 
restored Prime Minister Hamdok to office failed because it did 
not include key civilian stakeholders and did not end military 
violence against civilian protesters.
    Hamdok's decision on January 2 to resign further shocked 
the Sudanese political system. Given the unacceptable actions 
of Sudan's Security Services, the Sudanese people are now 
intent on restoring civilian leadership of the country's 
democratic transition through a reform of the Constitutional 
Declaration and the Juba Peace Agreement.
    They demand a new relationship between the military and 
civilians, one that redefines and right-sizes the role of the 
military from partner in a transitional government to 
participant in the transitional process.
    The United States fully supports the civilians in realizing 
this ambition and is taking concrete action to reinforce their 
efforts. Sudanese stakeholders tell us they welcome 
international support to help them find common ground.
    With the announcement on January 8 that UNITAMS would 
facilitate a Sudanese-led political process, the international 
community began actively working with Sudanese civilian 
stakeholders to build consensus around a common vision for 
reform of the Constitutional Declaration in order to refashion 
the path of the civilian transition and implementation of the 
Juba Peace Agreement.
    With the Security Council mandate to use its good offices 
in support of the transition, UNITAMS will be in front, but not 
alone. The United States, in concert with the Friends of Sudan, 
has pledged our full support, recognizing the uphill work 
ahead.
    Successful and durable democratic transitions require 
broad-based agreement among multiple stakeholders in the 
capital and across this diverse country. It will require the 
contributions of many to meet this sizeable challenge.
    We are prepared not only to provide programmatic and 
financial support, but also to work closely with UNITAMS 
leadership and key international partners, especially the 
African Union, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia to shape 
this process to ensure it delivers timely concrete results.
    In my two visits to Sudan, including most recently with 
Ambassador Satterfield, I heard a strong desire to find a way 
forward. On behalf of the United States, I have made clear 
publicly and privately that violence against peaceful 
protesters perpetrated by Security Services since October 25 
must end. So, too, must the detentions of civil society 
activists, the use of sexual violence, closure of media 
outlets, attacks on medical facilities, and communication 
blackouts.
    We have already worked intensively with our partners in the 
international community to impose significant costs on Sudan's 
military regime for its actions on October 25. The pause of 
bilateral and multilateral assistance to the government, 
estimated to reach more than $4 billion U.S. dollars, and of 
debt relief, estimated at $19 billion U.S. dollars, has left 
the country's finances in a precarious state.
    We have been clear that restoration of international 
financial assistance is predicated on ending the violence and 
restoring the democratic transition.
    I have also made clear that we are prepared to apply 
additional costs should the violence continue and the 
transition remains stalled.
    We are now reviewing the full range of traditional and 
nontraditional tools at our disposal to further reduce the 
funds available to Sudan's military regime, to isolate its 
military-controlled companies, and to increase the reputational 
risk for any who choose to continue to engage in business as 
usual with Sudanese Security Services and their economic 
enterprises.
    Three decades of military rule under Bashir failed to bring 
stability or prosperity to Sudan. Sudanese history undeniably 
demonstrates that only a democratic state can produce a 
sustainable peace.
    It is time for Sudan's military leaders to recognize this 
reality. Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Phee follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mary Catherine Phee

    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, allow me to begin by thanking the 
committee for your longstanding interest in and support for a 
successful transition from authoritarian to civilian rule in Sudan. We 
share your alarm about the increasingly volatile situation and the risk 
of regression. Since the fall of the Bashir dictatorship in 2019, the 
United States and our international partners have robustly endeavored 
to support the Sudanese people in their extraordinary efforts to build 
a democracy. We have worked closely with this Committee and Congress to 
advance this shared priority.
    This was always an ambitious undertaking. After 30 years of an 
Islamist, military dictatorship and recurring internal conflicts, the 
Sudanese are coping with a legacy marked by a military-dominated 
economy now in danger of collapse, a denuded civil service as a result 
of repeated political purges, a fractured political system following 
calculated military intervention to break and divide, and the 
generational damage to the country's historically marginalized areas 
such as Darfur which left hundreds of thousands dead, millions 
displaced, and the nation divided in two. Even as we welcomed the 
transitional government's progress in repealing repressive legislation 
that restricted human rights, opening space for civil society and 
political activism, ending decades-long government support for 
terrorist organizations, and embarking on free-market economic reforms, 
we were acutely aware of the immense structural issues facing the 
transition, aggravated by internal power struggles and external 
spoilers.
    We were also inspired by the remarkable and resilient civilian 
resistance movement, which achieved the historic overthrow of Bashir 
and drove the security forces to agree in 2019 to a civilian-military 
transitional partnership and path to elections known as the 
Constitutional Declaration. Sudanese stakeholders also reached a 
landmark transitional power-sharing arrangement for the historically 
marginalized regions known as the 2020 Juba Peace Agreement. These two 
documents offered the promise of finally achieving democracy and thus 
peace for Sudan. We were proud to work with Congress and our 
international partners to leverage our diplomacy and our assistance to 
support this transition, which holds so much promise for the people of 
Sudan, the region, and the continent.
    On October 25, as we all know, Sudan's security services upended 
the civilian-military partnership when they betrayed the transition and 
the Sudanese people by seizing power directly--overthrowing the Prime 
Minister and cabinet and damaging the trust of the Sudanese people in 
the promise of the transition and the goodwill of the international 
community. The subsequent November 21 Political Agreement that restored 
Prime Minister Hamdok to office failed because it did not include key 
civilian stakeholders and did not definitively end military repression 
of and violence against civilian protests. Prime Minister Hamdok's 
decision on January 2 to resign shocked the Sudanese political system 
and led prompted civilian and military stakeholders to reach out to the 
international community for help in rescuing the transition.
    Given the repeated troubling actions of Sudan's security services, 
the Sudanese people have concluded that it is no longer realistic to 
look at Sudan's transition as a partnership with the military. They are 
now intent on restoring civilian leadership of the country's democratic 
transition through reform of the Constitutional Declaration and the 
Juba Peace Agreement to ensure that these guiding documents reflect the 
needs of the present moment. To do so, Sudanese stakeholders demand a 
new relationship between the military and civilians, one that redefines 
and right sizes the role of the military from partner in a transitional 
government to participant in the transitional process. For our part, we 
have made clear we support the civilians in realizing this ambition and 
will act to facilitate that change.
    Sudanese stakeholders across the military and political spectrum 
tell us they seek a way back to a transition but would welcome 
international support to help them find common ground. With the 
announcement on January 8 that the UN Integrated Transition Assistance 
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) would facilitate a Sudanese-led political 
process, the international community began actively working with 
Sudanese civilian stakeholders to build consensus around a common 
vision for reform of the Constitutional Declaration to refashion the 
path of the civilian transition, carve-out an appropriate participatory 
role for the security services, stand up a Legislative Council, and 
establish the necessary groundwork to advance elections, economic 
reforms, accountability, and implementation of the Juba Peace 
Agreement.
    With a Security Council mandate to use its good offices in support 
of the transition, UNITAMS will be in front but not alone. The United 
States--in concert with the Friends of Sudan (Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, United Arab Emirates, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, the African Union, the European Union, the 
League of Arab States, and the United Nations)--has pledged our full 
support to the UNITAMS-facilitated process. We have done so with full 
recognition of the uphill work facing the Sudanese and their regional 
and international partners. Successful democratic transitions require 
broad-based agreement among multiple stakeholders in the capital and 
across the country. It will require the contributions of many to meet 
this sizeable challenge. We are prepared not only to provide diplomatic 
and financial support to this effort but also to work closely with 
UNITAMS leadership and key international partners--especially the 
African Union, the European Union, and Saudi Arabia--to shape this 
process to ensure that it is time-bound and delivers concrete results.
    In my two visits to Sudan, civilian and military stakeholders 
expressed a strong desire to find a way out of the quagmire that has 
bedeviled the country since the October 25 military takeover. While 
they have pledged their support to the UNITAMS-facilitated political 
process, such pledges must be met by action, particularly on the part 
of the security services. On behalf of the United States, I have made 
clear that the ongoing reprehensible pattern of violence against 
peaceful protestors in which security services have engaged since 
October 25 must end. So too must the use of detentions of civil society 
activists, closure of media outlets, attacks on medical facilities, and 
communications blackouts. These actions perpetuate a cycle of violence 
that hardens positions and makes agreement on a political way forward 
all the more difficult.
    We have already worked with our partners in the international 
community to impose significant costs on Sudan's military regime for 
its actions on October 25. The pause of bilateral and multilateral 
assistance to the government and of debt relief has left the country's 
finances in a precarious state, unable to meet its current financial 
obligations. We have been clear that the only path to restoration of 
international financial assistance is predicated on ending the violence 
and restoring the democratic transition.
    At the same time, as I have made clear to military leaders, we in 
concert with our partners are prepared to apply additional costs should 
the current pattern of violence continue. We are now reviewing the full 
range of traditional and non-traditional tools at our disposal to 
further reduce the funds available to Sudan's military regime, to 
isolate its military-controlled companies, and to increase the 
reputational risk for any who choose to continue to engage in 
``business-as-usual'' with Sudanese security services and their 
economic enterprises. Using such leverage smartly will enable us to 
press for behavior change on the part of security sector leaders, and 
could contribute to a reset of the military-civilian balance of power 
in Sudan, a prerequisite for the long-term success of its democracy.
    We applaud Sudanese from all walks of life who continue to take to 
the streets at great personal risk to demand civilian rule and 
democracy. Since 2018, they have been the vanguard and the heroes of 
Sudan's revolution. As the UNITAMS-facilitated dialogue progresses, we 
will provide concrete support to enable the Sudanese people and civil 
society organizations to channel their determination to refashion a new 
civilian-led path to democracy that includes political and economic 
reforms essential to achieving the Revolution's goals of freedom, 
peace, and justice.
    Three decades of military rule under Bashir failed to bring 
stability or prosperity to Sudan. The Sudanese people have made clear 
through 4 years of sustained activism and protest that they will not 
allow their demands for civilian rule and democracy to be ignored, set 
aside, or coopted. Sudanese history undeniably demonstrates that only a 
democratic state can produce a sustainable peace. It is past time for 
Sudan's military leaders to recognize this reality, cease the use of 
violence, and participate constructively in a civilian-led transition 
to democracy. The United States and the international community share 
the aspirations of the Sudanese people to restore and advance their 
transition and we will continue to work with our regional and 
international partners towards that goal. We will continue to seek your 
help and engagement to help the Sudanese people realize the full 
potential of their brave and historic revolution.
    Thank you very much.

    The Chairman. Thank you, and thank you both.
    We will start a series of 5 minutes of questions, and the 
chair will recognize himself.
    The October 25 coup, and it was a coup and should be 
treated as such by the Administration, was a blatant power grab 
by the military after months of mounting tensions between the 
military and civilian elements of the Sovereign Council.
    The root cause of the tensions appears to be the reluctance 
of the military to cede power to civilian authorities. Even now 
the bloody crackdown on civilians continues and the fatality 
count is rising.
    The Administration has taken some actions--suspending most 
assistance, dispatching high-level diplomatic missions to the 
region, meetings with local and regional stakeholders, and 
public statements--but security forces continue to attack 
civilians, arrest civil society actors, and engage in sexual 
violence with impunity.
    Ambassador Phee, why has the Administration failed to 
impose personal targeted sanctions on those responsible for 
impeding Sudan's democratic process and perpetrating human 
rights abuses?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, as I outlined, we worked closely 
with our partners in the international community to impose 
extraordinary economic pressure on the government. The combined 
efforts have had a devastating fiscal impact and have made very 
clear that Sudan cannot move forward with international 
assistance if the security forces do not change their behavior.
    I have also made those points clear in my engagement, as 
has Ambassador Feltman and Ambassador Satterfield in their 
roles as Special Envoy. We are also engaging, as you know, 
regional and international partners to pass the same messages. 
So----
    The Chairman. My question is we have not, to my knowledge, 
imposed personal targeted sanctions on those responsible. For 
example, the Sudanese security forces reportedly have vast 
business interests, controlling an estimated 250-plus companies 
in various sectors from mining to agriculture.
    Why has not the Administration considered sanctioning any 
of these companies or the security force members who own them? 
It would seem to me that this would be a priority since they 
are the ones who seem to be the intransigent entity here in 
terms of allowing Sudan to move forward.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    We agree exactly that those are sectors where we should 
explore imposing pressure and we are actively looking at how to 
do that. You know our traditional existing regimes were not 
specifically designed for this moment.
    We are looking at how we might develop a new regime in 
which we would work with you and I was gratified to hear about 
the legislation you are considering, and we are looking also at 
nontraditional ways to get at these financial sources of power 
for the security forces.
    The Chairman. I would think that you have authorities 
already under a variety of existing laws, but you have failed--
not you personally, but, of course, the Administration--has 
failed to take use of any of them.
    If that is the case and you feel that you do not have them 
then, please, by all means, let the committee know what is it 
that you are missing, because we would be very desirous of 
giving you the wherewithal.
    You and Special Envoy Satterfield recently returned--you 
referred to it--from a trip to Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Ethiopia. Is there progress on persuading the Sudanese military 
to end its practice of using lethal force, arbitrary arrests, 
and sexual violence against civil society activists and pro-
democracy protesters?
    Ms. Phee. Mr. Chairman, I think it is too soon to tell. 
Certainly, the protests are going to continue. This is an 
immutable fact. We made that clear to the Sudanese Security 
Force leaders and to their partners in the Arab region that 
they need to change this behavior.
    They need to cease using lethal force against protesters. 
They need to provide accountability for the conduct of security 
forces.
    The Sovereign Council, which, as you know, is currently 
governing Sudan, has established a committee to look into the 
violence on January 17. These are nascent and inadequate steps, 
but we are mobilizing our pressure. We also stopped in Addis 
and spoke to the African Union about its engagement.
    The IGAD envoy is currently in Khartoum. We are 
coordinating with other like-minded partners to try and pass 
that message. This meeting today is a helpful sign to all these 
leaders that they need to change their behavior if they want 
Sudan to succeed.
    The Chairman. I hope it would not be necessary to have a 
hearing in order to move them on the issue.
    Let me turn to Ambassador Coleman. First of all, we would 
like to be consulted on your plans before they are finalized.
    As you referenced, the $700 million package will be 
readjusted to meet the new realities of Sudan's political and 
economic crisis. I would like to have some insights as to what 
you are thinking there.
    Finally, how is USAID working to address the needs in 
Darfur in the wake of the coup? We should not lose sight of the 
continued violence and displacement in Darfur as we are dealing 
with this larger problem. These voices have been marginalized 
for far too long.
    Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Yes, we absolutely will consult with you before we finalize 
our plan's $700 million appropriation.
    As I noted in my opening statement, immediately after the 
events of October 25 we paused all of our funding and did a 
review and made a determination not to move forward with any 
funding that works directly with the government.
    We have instead reprogrammed some of that money and 
directed it to activities that support civil society in a 
couple of different areas, in particular, on strengthening 
civil society and civilian political engagement as partners in 
the peace process, helping them advocate, providing civic 
education and training, even transporting local groups to 
Khartoum so that they can engage in dialogue with UNITAMS and 
with other groups connecting them for the ability to come up 
with a more unified vision of civilian demands, going forward, 
for this transition.
    We are also spending money on human rights work to bolster 
collection of information around human rights abuses, 
independent media that are able to both bring in different 
voices into the media space and work on anti-corruption 
measures with transparency in their reporting.
    With respect to Darfur, yes, sir, there is just remarkable 
needs still in Darfur across several of those states--Darfur, 
Blue Nile, South and West Kordofan. There is almost 3 million 
internally-displaced people and we are working with our 
partners there to provide basic needs and humanitarian 
assistance, also trying to help with some health needs there 
and livelihoods in the agricultural space as so many of the 
people do depend on subsistence farming with a specific focus 
on women and also addressing some of the gender-based violence 
that has happened there, providing support for survivors of 
gender-based violence--that, too.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First of all, bless you for what you do. I mean, this is a 
heavy lift.
    When you listen to the list of problems with the human 
rights abuses and shootings and murders and everything else, it 
is easy--it is really easy to get discouraged, particularly, 
when we have done--we have done some pretty heavy lifting, 
particularly financially, to try to lift this thing, and it 
just goes unrewarded.
    It is difficult and, look, there is all kinds of problems 
on the continent, and they seem like they keep getting worse 
and I--as I have looked at it, I do not think this one is the 
worst, but probably got to be pretty close to it.
    In recent months, there has been a half a dozen coups, as 
you know, on the continent. One country had two coups. As I was 
sitting here, I was just handed a note that in Guinea-Bissau, 
they have--gunfire has just broken out near the presidential 
palace where a cabinet meeting is being held, so probably got 
another one going on there.
    Give us some hope here. I heard the antiseptic recitation 
of what you have told them and how you insist on this and that, 
but give us some hope that we can look forward to seeing things 
improve because it just--to see the backward sliding as bad as 
it has been and particularly with everybody trying to help, it 
is really disheartening.
    Ms. Phee, why do you not start and see--give me something 
to feel good about.
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Ranking Member, and, first, let me let 
me say I think everyone shares the disappointment and 
frustration in the current state of events, but I do have hope. 
I have had the opportunity in my brief time in this new 
assignment to travel to Khartoum twice and you know I have been 
in a lot of difficult places in the world.
    The Sudanese people are amazing. They are committed, they 
are creative, they have a vision for what they want, and they 
are not going to let that vision go, and I have not seen that 
kind of strength and cohesion in other difficult environments 
in which I have worked.
    Also, the security forces in Sudan are difficult, but they 
are not monolithic. Some of them, I think, truly would like to 
affect a transition. They do not know how to do it. They are 
falling back on their old playbook.
    I think there is really an opportunity for diplomacy here. 
I am excited by so many players in the region, in the 
international community, who want to support the Sudanese, who 
have their own agency and their own vision for their country.
    I believe that that is the strength that we have not seen 
in other environments, that this is not only in the capital, 
but it is in the many different diverse areas of Sudan.
    I think we need to continue to support them. It is not, 
frankly, a surprise that this transition is difficult. I think 
we need to have an approach that can absorb shocks that will be 
inevitable, continue to put the pressure on, and continue to 
provide the kind of technical assistance that the Deputy 
Administrator referred to. That is how I look at it right now, 
Senator.
    Senator Risch. Thanks so much for that. I hope that is a 
realistic appraisal of the conditions there on the ground. I 
can understand how a population has the commitments, 
enthusiasm, and optimism that you have described.
    If they do not have the guns and the other side has got the 
guns, it is--that is difficult. Also, the issue of the armed 
forces, where they are not monolithic, that sword cuts both 
ways because if they are not monolithic, they do not have a 
strong leader that can actually talk everybody into laying down 
their guns and doing things peacefully.
    That sort of cuts both ways. I hope you are right.
    Ms. Coleman, do you want to take a shot at this?
    Ms. Coleman. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    I think I would just underscore what Assistant Secretary 
Phee has noted, which is the incredible resiliency of the 
Sudanese people and the vibrancy of this movement.
    Despite the Security Forces turning their guns on all of 
these people too often over the last 2 years, they continue to 
come out into the streets. They continue to mobilize and 
protest peacefully, and we have seen just a remarkable 
determination not to give up.
    People taking such courageous acts, speaking out, and 
starting new media. There is a woman who was a spokesperson in 
the Prime Minister's office who USAID supported with 
communications while the civilian leader was in his role.
    After Prime Minister Hamdok left, she left, too, and now 
she has started her own media company, continuing to put out 
messaging about peaceful transition, democracy, human rights.
    These are people who were putting themselves and their 
families on the line to fight for something, and I think it is 
just a reflection of the resiliency of a people who lived for 
decades under an authoritarian government.
    Most people in the country grew up knowing nothing else, 
and here they are with a chance at a better life for 
themselves, for their children, one based on rule of law and 
democracy and human rights, and they just will not give up. I 
think that is the message that the security forces are slowly 
coming to realize is the reality of this situation.
    Senator Risch. I guess time will tell. My time is up, but 
before I do that, could you give us an update on getting an 
ambassador to the country?
    We are all anxious to see that. I know that has got to be a 
difficult post to take on, but we need to see an ambassador. I 
know they have said intent to appoint, but where are we?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, the process is being pushed as quickly 
as it can be by the State Department and we will work in 
partnership with the Senate to, hopefully, achieve a full 
nomination and confirmation as soon as possible, and I am very 
proud and I am glad you welcomed the role of Ambassador Lucy 
Tamlyn.
    She is a terrific seasoned diplomat and she will be very 
important at this critical moment to support the Sudanese 
people as they put this transition back on track.
    Senator Risch. Have you got some experienced people over 
there you got on the list that are willing to do this? It seems 
to me that is going to be the toughest thing, once you get 
that. Making a choice should not be that hard, but it seems it 
could move faster than what it is.
    Ms. Phee. I agree with you, sir. People are our policy, and 
we are doing our very best to get our best out there.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Cardin is 
with us virtually.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me thank 
both of our witnesses for their extraordinary service. It is, 
certainly, a difficult circumstance in Sudan. I understand 
that. We are with the Sudanese people.
    Clearly, we must make it clear that a military coup and the 
military that is now controlling the country, and we have to be 
with the Sudanese people, not just by our words, but by our 
deeds.
    As I listened to your testimony about what we are doing in 
consultation with other partners in the region and trying to 
work out some type of a reconciliation here, it seems to me we 
need to do more than that.
    I heard you, Secretary Phee, talk about human rights 
violations and holding those responsible for these human rights 
violations accountable. I have heard that before. 
Unfortunately, as you go to some form of a reconciliation or 
some form of a process forward, it seems like holding those who 
violated human rights is always the last thing and very seldom 
really accomplished.
    What confidence can you give us that the Biden 
administration will insist as part of the process, that those 
who have violated the human rights of the Sudanese people, in 
fact, will be held accountable in this process?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator.
    First of all, in addition to the programming that the 
Deputy Administrator referred to, I want you to just call to 
your attention that we have from the Bureau of Democracy and 
Human Rights a 3-year dedicated program to help the Sudanese 
document human rights violations. That program is underway to 
support them in what they demand.
    Again, going back to the strength of the civilian 
stakeholder movement, they want accountability and this is a 
key topic of discussion among the stakeholders who are now 
reviewing and desirous of changing the Constitutional 
Declaration.
    All the Sudanese that I have had a chance to meet have made 
very clear that they understand addressing accountability is 
important both to pull the military forward on the transition 
and to heal the country and allow it to remain a durable and 
stable democracy.
    That is their commitment and we will back up their 
commitment, but I wanted you to be aware of the specific 
programmatic efforts we are undertaking.
    We also have the authority that Congress has given us 
through GLOMAG. That is a possibility we can immediately use, 
in addition to exploration of the other options I discussed 
earlier. Thank you, sir.
    Senator Cardin. I hope you will use the tools that we 
provided and I hope you will take advantage of Chairman 
Menendez's offer. If you need additional tools in the toolkit 
to deal with these issues, please let us know.
    I have another concern and that is you talk about working 
with our regional partners. At times, I find in regards to 
their policies in Sudan, we are not always aligned completely 
as to what we are trying to accomplish. I have confidence in 
the Biden administration in supporting the Sudanese people over 
the military control.
    I am not certain about other regional partners in that 
region as to what they will do, ultimately, in regards to the 
power structure within Sudan as well as a holding those 
responsible for human rights violations accountable in the 
final resolutions here.
    What can you tell me about how we are working with our 
traditional partners in the region to make sure we are all on 
the same path for an outcome in Sudan that is in the best 
interests of the Sudanese people?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. You are quite right to 
highlight the importance of engaging with these partners who 
have extensive ties, including personal, political, and 
economic, with Sudan.
    That is why it is so important for us to talk to them and 
discuss our view, which is that there is a false choice if they 
think supporting the security forces at the expense of the 
civilians will bring stability to Sudan, which is what they 
claim they seek.
    That is really the basis of our dialogue that we just 
deeply contest that assumption that support to the security 
forces exclusively will result in stability in Sudan.
    In the meeting that Special Envoy Satterfield and I 
attended in Riyadh as part of the Friends of Sudan, which 
included Gulf Arab states, we also had an opportunity to meet 
the Saudi foreign minister while we were there.
    That final statement condemned the use of violence against 
protesters and committed all the members of the Friends of 
Sudan to not restoring or expanding financial assistance or 
economic assistance until the violence ended and the transition 
was back on track.
    Those are some examples of how we are engaging and what we 
are saying.
    Senator Cardin. I appreciate those responses. I think we 
need to follow this carefully because I have seen this in the 
past. We see statements that are made, but they are not carried 
out by specific actions. I hope that you will continue to make 
a priority a resolution in the interests of the people of Sudan 
as well as holding accountable those responsible for these 
human rights violations.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Rounds.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    First, let me just begin by saying thank you to both of you 
for your interest and your agreement to participate in this 
meeting, but also your interest overall in the situation at 
hand in Sudan.
    I would like to read just what I believe is a fair analysis 
and I would like to get your thoughts about where we sit right 
now after looking at the last 3 years.
    As I understand it, in April of 2019, nationwide protests 
spurred the ouster of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir after 
three decades in power. To defuse the crisis at that time, 
mediators brokered a deal in which the coup leaders and 
civilians would share power during a 3-year transition period, 
leading to elections and full civilian rule.
    The transitional government that was subsequently formed 
was broadly welcomed by the international community and began 
reforms, pursued peace talks with rebel groups, and sought to 
end the country's international isolation.
    The Government's reforms helped to secure funding from 
international donors, including the United States, and support 
for multilateral debt relief. U.S.-Sudan relations improved 
dramatically, and in late 2020 Sudan agreed to normalize ties 
with Israel.
    In mid-September 2021, the transitional government 
announced that a coup attempt purportedly by loyalists of the 
former regime had been thwarted. General Burhan became 
increasingly critical of civilian leaders, including Prime 
Minister Hamdok, and that was after this had occurred.
    In the aftermath, he accused politicians of alienating the 
armed forces and of neglecting their governing responsibilities 
while fighting over positions. As Burhan pressed for Hamdok to 
replace his cabinet, pro-democracy forces responded on October 
21, organizing a mass protest against the prospect of a 
military takeover.
    Overnight, on October 25, security forces detained Hamdok, 
several ministers and other officials and took control of state 
media. In November, Burhan reconstituted the Sovereign Council, 
replacing civilian members of the government with his own 
appointees.
    On November 21, at which point at least 40 protesters had 
been killed, Hamdok signed a political agreement with Burhan in 
what he said was an effort to avert more bloodshed and protect 
economic gains.
    The deal restored the Prime Minister to his position, but 
with the stipulation that a new cabinet of technocrats rather 
than politicians be formed. On January 3, the Prime Minister 
resigned, condemning the continued violence against protesters 
and acknowledging that his efforts to find consensus among 
Sudanese stakeholders had failed. Hamdok's resignation leaves 
the military in charge.
    On October 25, the Biden administration announced that it 
was pausing almost all assistance under the 2021 Economic 
Support Fund appropriation of approximately $700 million in 
security assistance and other forms of assistance to the 
Sudanese Government.
    Humanitarian assistance, as I understand it, is not 
affected by the decision. U.S. officials say assistance to the 
government will not resume until there is an end to the 
violence and a restoration of civilian-led government that 
reflects the will of the people of Sudan.
    Is my statement fairly accurate?
    [Ms. Phee nods.]
    Senator Rounds. Based upon that, it would appear that over 
the last 3 years, number one, we looked at a proposal that 
would have been a 3-year transition period. We are closing in 
on that now.
    During that time period, it would appear that all parties 
there seem to have an interest in moving forward and, yet, 
internal strife appears to be the challenge.
    Is that a fair statement within the political realm of 
Sudan?
    [Ms. Phee nods.]
    Senator Rounds. Based on that, are we choosing sides in 
this particular case? How do we work with both sides to try to 
find an end game?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, it seems to me that the way the Sudanese 
have characterized their current challenge is a model that we 
should follow.
    As you described, there was an agreement that the civilians 
and the military would move forward as partners in this 
transition process. That broke down because of the military's 
conduct.
    The military, obviously, cannot be wished out of the 
political and economic system they have dominated for 30 years.
    The way the Sudanese are now formulating the approach is 
that they recognize the military must be a participant in the 
process in which all stakeholders need to redefine the role of 
the military.
    Every country needs a military to defend the borders, to 
defend the nation, to defend the sovereignty. The problem in 
Sudan has been the military's overreach.
    Senator Rounds. Do we have access and do we have ongoing 
communication with both sides in this particular case?
    Ms. Phee. Yes.
    Senator Rounds. Would you consider the communications good 
communications, open communications?
    Ms. Phee. Yes, I would. In fact, I have traveled twice and 
spoken to leaders of the security forces and I have also spoken 
to them on the phone, and our embassy regularly engages. I 
would characterize our engagement across the board with all 
Sudanese as constructive.
    Senator Rounds. Okay. One last very quick question. What is 
the Administration considering with respect to the $700 million 
in paused assistance to Sudan?
    We have come close to it, but we have not answered the 
question yet.
    Ms. Coleman. Thank you. In consultation with Congress so 
far and with the interagency, we have already looked to 
program, roughly, $100 million of that money with a focus on 
civil society.
    Working not directly with the government, but with civil 
society groups outside the government, private organizations 
both in the center of the country in Khartoum, but also in 
regional and local areas, helping them with training and 
education on civics to better strengthen and prepare them for 
this eventual transition.
    As we have noted, this has been three decades of 
authoritarian rule that has left civil society, really, not in 
any shape to be as active and a participant as it needs to be 
in this process.
    Senator Rounds. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you, 
Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
both for being here today.
    As we talk about the 2019 revolution, it is known in many 
quarters as the women's revolution because about 90 percent of 
demonstrators were women who participated in that and had for 
many years played a prominent role in advocating against 
Bashir's brutal regime.
    Unfortunately, as is often the case, women were sidelined 
from peace talks and they had to demand representation and 
inclusion in a transitional government.
    Deputy Administrator Coleman, you talked about what we are 
doing to strengthen civilian leadership and capacity building 
among women.
    Can you speak to some of the particulars and highlight what 
we are doing to address the women, peace, and security 
requirements that say that women should be included in peace 
processes in areas like Sudan, which are trying to resolve 
conflict?
    Ms. Coleman. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    You are absolutely right. This is in no small part a 
women's revolution, and if you look at the television that 
carries coverage of street demonstrations still in Sudan today 
you see women out front and center, risking life and limb to 
continue carrying the flame for a better life for themselves 
and their children.
    We are working with women's groups across much of the 
country as we have been for many, many years. We have 
relationships in many of the states where we have been working 
in a humanitarian context, where we have developed good 
relationships with civil society organizations on the ground 
that have been partners in our humanitarian efforts, and some 
of those groups are part of our women, peace, and security 
efforts, too.
    They have strong views on what should be happening. Their 
voices have not been heard, have not been included. We are, as 
I noted, providing them with advocacy training, even with 
transportation money to help them get to Khartoum to engage in 
a broader discussion on peacebuilding, making sure that they 
are connected with the UNITAMS-facilitated efforts, providing 
them with both funding and training on media.
    I mentioned the woman who has started her own media 
business. We are also funding a women's talk show in Sudan. You 
can think of it sort of Sudanese women meet ``The View.''
    It is women from different ethnicities, different 
demographic groups, young, old, across the country, sharing 
ideas on what the future of the country might look like for 
them. It is bringing lots of different viewpoints together.
    Senator Shaheen. How, specifically, are we going to 
continue to promote the inclusion of women in the next stage of 
negotiations?
    I appreciate all of those civil society-building efforts, 
but if we are talking about the negotiating table, are we 
demanding that in terms of our participation that women be 
included in that?
    Either one of you can respond to that. Assistant Secretary 
Phee?
    Ms. Coleman. I will turn to Assistant Secretary Phee, but I 
will just say, absolutely, because they are such an important 
voice and presence. They themselves demand a seat at the table 
and we will ensure that they are there.
    Ms. Phee. Good morning, Senator. Yes, absolutely. We have 
discussed this directly with the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General who leads the UNITAMS effort and he fully 
supports the goal of having women and has been meeting with 
women's groups and including them in the process that he is 
undertaking right now. Absolutely, that is a commitment on our 
side and on the side of the international community.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear 
that and hope that will continue.
    Just to switch gears a little bit, and I only have a few 
seconds left, but Russia, obviously, has refused to condemn the 
coup leaders. They have stuck to their playbook of blaming the 
West for the instability. What does Russia want to get out of 
Sudan?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, some of the details of our assessment 
there might be better handled in a different setting, but it is 
known that the Russians are interested in the Port of Sudan, 
and I think, generally, we can see by Russian conduct globally 
that they are interested in exploiting insecurity for tactical 
gain and financial gain.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Hopefully, we will have the 
opportunity in a classified setting to address that question in 
further detail.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, I would like to start with you, 
if I might, and talk a bit about the Abraham Accords and the 
relationship to the Sudan.
    I think, as you know, the U.S. significantly advanced 
efforts to normalize relations between Arab nations and Israel 
with respect to the Abraham Accords. In fact, four Arab nations 
signed up including Sudan, who joined in January of 2021.
    My sense is that the Abraham Accords present a great 
opportunity for these normalized relations and my understanding 
is that Israel has been reaching out to Sudan in the wake of 
the coup to a number of stakeholders there to try to assist.
    My question to you is does the Biden administration support 
Israel's attempt to reach out to work with Sudanese 
stakeholders, particularly in light of the normalization with 
the Abraham Accords?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Special 
Envoy Satterfield will be in Israel tomorrow to discuss 
Israel's concerns and interests in the region, including in 
Sudan.
    We agree with you. It was a great prospect to apply the 
Abraham Accords to Sudan, but the normalization efforts that 
were underway were part of a negotiation with the civilian-led 
government.
    Now that that government is no longer in place, we do not 
feel it is appropriate to push for it at this time, but that is 
something we are keeping a close eye on for an opportunity to 
resume.
    It would be helpful if Israel would use its influence to 
encourage the transition to go forward so then we can move 
forward on other important objectives like the Abraham Accords.
    Senator Hagerty. I would encourage you to look for those 
opportunities, despite the fact that the original negotiating 
counterparts may have changed. I think Israel has the desire to 
work there and I think we should be doing everything that we 
can to support it.
    A question to both the Assistant Secretary Phee and Deputy 
Administrator Coleman. I would like to talk about the Economic 
Support Fund that was allocated.
    Under the previous Administration, $700 million in foreign 
assistance was made available to Sudan for fiscal year 2021. 
After the coup that took place in 2021, the Biden 
administration has to my understanding halted those funds.
    What is the plan, moving forward, with respect to those 
funds? How much has been spent so far, how much remains, and 
what would the plan be, moving forward?
    Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Senator.
    Of the $700 million, we have looked to program $108 million 
of that over the course of the coming year, much of it towards 
promoting and enhancing and strengthening civil society, but 
also in standing up more agricultural livelihoods work outside 
of the government.
    All of that money is being spent outside the government. 
None of it is being spent with the government. We paused all of 
our programming and took a look and decided that there were a 
certain set of activities that we could continue outside the 
government.
    Going forward, we are now in a process of looking at the 
remainder of that money and determining what we can use 
efficiently, effectively, and productively in Sudan, both to 
help the people of Sudan to strengthen their prospects and to 
be a net positive in this transitional process, but not working 
with the government. That is off the table.
    Senator Hagerty. If I understand correctly then, $108 
million of the $700 million has been programmed so you have a 
rather large balance left that you can continue to work with 
there. I appreciate your businesslike approach, as we have 
discussed in the past, and taking this in a stepwise fashion 
and making certain we get the most effective usage of those 
funds.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, can I come back to you now again 
to talk about Russia's efforts to strengthen their geopolitical 
foothold in Sudan?
    As you know, Sudan is a very strategically well-located 
place when you think about their access to the Red Sea and 
Russia's desire to continue to build their relationship.
    They have got a strong economic relationship, diplomatic 
relationship, military relationship with Sudan. In November of 
this past year, 2021, General Burhan recommitted Sudan to the 
naval base deal that they struck with Russia to build a base 
there in Port Sudan right there on the Red Sea.
    As the current crisis in Ukraine continues to unfold, I 
think it is very important for us to work with our friends and 
allies to push back on Russia's influence, and I know that the 
previous Administration had worked hard to discourage Sudan 
from engaging with Russia in this matter. Where do you see our 
posture unfolding here with respect to this?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, for raising that important 
issue. The leaders of Sudan's security forces have a choice. 
They can be the leaders who help Sudan complete this historic 
transition or they can be the leaders that fail.
    We want a Sudan that has a partnership with the United 
States and with our like-minded partners in the world, and not 
with Russia.
    Russia is the old Sudan, and our efforts are designed to 
help Sudan, first, for its own sake, reach democracy and 
prosperity, and secondly, take up its rightful role on the 
continent and in the international community and that includes 
working with partners like us. That is undergirding our 
approach to this problem.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate a very keen eye toward this. 
We know China's presence in Djibouti. We understand Russia's 
presence here. I think the strategic value of Africa is very 
clear and a very concentrated focus on our part to do just as 
you say will be necessary, going forward.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both 
of you for your service and testimony.
    Last May, Senator Coons and I visited Sudan to tell both 
government leaders as well as activists that the United States 
stood with them in the transition toward democracy.
    We met with General Burhan, who looked us in the eye and 
said he supported that transition toward democracy. Clearly, he 
broke his word. More importantly, he broke his word to the 
people of Sudan.
    Another person we met with was the Minister of Justice 
Abdelbari, who was a bright light in the transition, a strong 
supporter of democracy, rule of law.
    As you know, he has resigned and what he said about what 
happened in October is, ``What is happening now in Sudan is a 
military coup.'' Unequivocal.
    I do think the United States has to say that out loud, too, 
and I agree with my colleagues who say that we need to do more 
to target individuals who have been responsible with sanctions 
and other tools at our disposal.
    Much has been said about the $700 million in AID funding. I 
understand your answers with that. Clearly, we had to put that 
on hold.
    Of course, the big money is in the debt relief for Sudan, 
and after Bashir was ousted and we had the peaceful revolution, 
international financial institutions, right--the IMF, the World 
Bank--agreed to provide Sudan with debt relief.
    There is $76 billion indebtedness by Sudan, and the IMF and 
the World Bank have put some of the tranches of relief on hold, 
right now holding up $650 million in anticipated funding and a 
$2.5 billion 39-month IMF loan program that was approved in 
June of 2021 and a $2 billion World Bank grant program are at 
risk.
    The United States, obviously, plays a very important role 
in both those international financial institutions. Are we 
using our leadership there to make it clear that we will not 
support additional debt relief to Sudan until Sudan moves 
forward again toward democracy and meets those conditions?
    Assistant Secretary Phee, why do not we----
    Ms. Phee. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
    Absolutely. In fact, we were leaders in early reaching out 
to the World Bank and to the IMF to arrange this pause in 
assistance and, as you have noted, the figures you have 
provided. I have slightly different figures that were provided 
to me.
    What matters is that they are big and they are having an 
enormous impact, and that is what we wanted to do. We wanted to 
make clear that the United States and the international 
community would not have a normal relationship with Sudan if 
the transition was abandoned. So, absolutely, that is our 
posture and policy in the international financial institutions.
    Senator Van Hollen. Good. I mean, you would agree that is 
where our main leverage is at this point, right?
    Ms. Phee. Absolutely. The scope is very significant, and 
there is an argument that the military have their own sources 
of income and that they are not directly affected, but if the 
economy collapses because of this major shock due to the 
withholding of this large-scale amount of assistance, it will 
engulf their commercial interests as well.
    Senator Van Hollen. Got it. Just another question, 
Assistant Secretary Phee.
    With respect to the opposition, we have a very broad-based 
civilian opposition and many, of course, are still protesting 
in the streets. They have been subject to beatings and violence 
and killings.
    As we support the UNITAMS process, which I understand we 
do, correct? Are you going to make sure that all the voices of 
the opposition are included in that process, including those 
who do not want to have any dialogue right now with the 
military government, which is understandable? How are you going 
to make sure that those voices--the opposition--are included in 
whatever process UNITAMS moves forward with?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. We are in the happy position 
of dealing with Sudanese civilian stakeholders and voices that 
will demand to be part of defining the future of the country. 
My understanding from the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General is that all groups that are committed to this 
change have agreed to sit and consult with him and talk to him.
    Some of them have not wanted to make it public, but 
everyone is looking for how to build a collective path, 
collective pressure, and identify a common vision and common 
ground.
    I think unanimity is probably not feasible. Probably not 
feasible in any political system, but, certainly, not there, 
but, definitely, when I have had the chance to speak to 
Sudanese people, women, youth activists, and the resistance 
committees, families of those who have been martyred, they are 
all--they all share a lot of concerns and interests and plans 
for the future, and I think there is a real possibility to knit 
that all together.
    That is why we are trying to play a supporting role to 
UNITAMS and to work with other critical regional actors such as 
the African Union, which, as you will recall, played an 
important role in 2019 to help broker the Constitutional 
Declaration.
    We are committed to making sure those voices, and we are 
using the programmatic resources that the Deputy Administrator 
has described, to help build the capacity so that they can 
engage effectively in that transition discussion.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch. Chairman Menendez, thank you for convening this hearing 
and for ensuring that Sudan remains high on this committee's 
agenda at this critical time.
    To see a full committee hearing on the ongoing crisis in 
Sudan with robust participation from Democrats and Republicans 
is genuinely encouraging.
    Assistant Secretary Phee, it is great to see you again. 
Thank you for your service and your focus on this critical 
issue, and Deputy Administrator Coleman, good to see you as 
well.
    I have worked hard over recent years to support Sudan's 
peaceful revolution, the inspiring civilian-led nationwide 
uprising that, as one of the most successful grassroots pro-
democracy movements in recent years, actually overthrew a 
brutal dictator who had repressed the people of Sudan for 
decades and committed genocide.
    We have worked hard on the appropriation of over a billion 
dollars in both economic aid and, as my friend and colleague, 
Senator Van Hollen, was just referencing, important debt relief 
to help support a transition to civilian government.
    We have made a significant down payment on a democratic 
future for Sudan, but I am gravely concerned that this 
transition is badly off track, and without active diplomatic 
engagement and some strong and decisive action by the United 
States this transition may, effectively, be dead.
    To live up to the commitments that we have made to the 
Sudanese people to support their aspirations, we have to take a 
greater leadership role and I am grateful for the steps you 
have been taking, Madam Assistant Secretary.
    As a number of my colleagues have asked, a lack of 
accountability for atrocities committed in Darfur and 
throughout Sudan, the killing of protesters in recent years and 
the recent coup, all of this has established a pattern of 
impunity for military leaders who kill and harm unarmed 
civilians and peaceful protesters.
    We have seen that continued in recent weeks as the military 
has systematically arrested and even assassinated some of the 
most effective community organizers and obstructed injured 
protesters from getting needed medical care.
    I have introduced the Sudan Democracy Act to sanction those 
involved in these activities and others who undermine democracy 
and human rights and the networks that sustain them, and the 
Administration has publicly stated it will hold military 
authorities responsible.
    What does this mean in practice? How will the U.S. hold 
them accountable and what does your previous comment that the 
security forces are not monolithic mean for a path forward 
where we could somehow secure a transition to a wholly civilian 
government?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator, first of all, for your 
engagement and involvement in this important issue and for your 
assessment of the challenges that we face.
    I do believe, as I said to the chairman, that this hearing 
is a terrific way to reinforce the Administration's diplomacy 
and signal to all the parties of Sudan that we are with the 
civilians, we are with this transition, and it needs to move 
forward if they want to have any kind of partnership with us.
    So that has been, basically, the bottom line. How we 
implement it? We have talked, Senator Coons, about using 
authorities that exist. We have talked about developing new 
authorities and we have talked--we are looking very hard right 
now at nontraditional methods of pressure, particularly in 
terms of, for example, the illicit gold mining that takes place 
and we are also looking at the many enterprises that are owned 
by security forces.
    There is a lot of active effort underway to augment the 
already significant pressure that we have discussed, from the 
suspension of both debt relief and bilateral and multilateral 
assistance.
    Senator Coons. As the chairman mentioned, if you need 
additional authorities, please do communicate that to this 
committee. I am concerned the military will simply organize 
elections that are sham elections in 2023 that they will use to 
legitimize their rule next year.
    How are we working with our regional partners, our allies, 
and relevant Sudanese stakeholders to prevent that outcome, 
which thousands and thousands of civilians have taken to the 
streets to prevent and that they have consistently spoken out 
against and rejected?
    Ms. Phee. That is a valid concern. However, the military 
leaders have claimed that they want international support for 
those elections. We want to be in a position to provide that 
support and, of course, that would be geared towards credible 
and transparent elections.
    Also the Sudanese people, as we have seen, I am confident 
would not participate in any sort of Potemkin type election.
    We talked earlier, Senator Coons, and I think it is worth 
emphasizing about the importance of making clear, particularly 
to our Arab partners and Israel, who engage in Sudan, that the 
prospect of security from a military-led government is not a 
true reality. That cannot work. Sudan's history shows that.
    The fact that the security forces are split is not 
necessarily a positive situation, but it does mean that they, 
like the civilians, because there are fractures and fissures, 
may be unwilling collectively to do a severe repression and a 
severe crackdown.
    That is what we have been trying to say to them. Do not go 
that path. Do not be the leaders that lost Sudan. Be the 
leaders that effected this transition. It is a tricky balance, 
frankly.
    Senator Coons. There is a number of us who look forward to 
working with you on that. I have just submitted a nomination 
for the Nobel Peace Prize for Sudan's resistance committees and 
the Central Committee of Sudan Doctors. I hope you will work to 
make sure that they are part of the center of any political 
process.
    I look forward, Deputy Administrator Coleman, to hearing an 
update about how the Administration is planning to leverage the 
$700 million in frozen funds and I hope that we will consult in 
advance as you craft the broader framework for the U.S.-Africa 
Leaders Summit later this year.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, and thank you, Senator Coons, for 
your work on the Sudan.
    I recall when we were in the midst of trying to decide on 
the pathway forward on recognition and the question of those 
who had been hurt--Americans and others who had been hurt in 
the past, and we were in quite an engagement in that process 
and we thought there were better days ahead.
    So we remain desirous of that, but really cautious here as 
we move forward. Thank you for your leadership in this regard.
    Senator Booker is with us virtually.
    Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
    I have really appreciated the conversation and the range of 
urgent issues that my colleagues have brought up, from the 
critical necessity to have women leaders at the table all the 
way to concerns about the Abraham Accords and how we can 
continue to see some stability and progress.
    I want to focus my concerns and questions, really, on just 
one area. There is a real crisis in the Horn on everything from 
the violence as well as just the severe lack of medical care 
that is going on there.
    One thing I do have even a more particular concern with is 
just the severe state of food insecurity within not just Sudan, 
but a number of the countries in the region--South Sudan, 
Ethiopia. They are all facing what is this terrific, imminent 
prospect of extreme famine-like conditions.
    Famine is not just for the sort of moral urgency of human 
life, but it also has a multiplier effect in the destabilizing 
effects it can have when it comes to the security situation of 
these nations and how it could spill over and be destabilizing 
to other nations, especially if more refugee crises are 
triggered.
    This is a region of great importance, obviously, to the 
United States, the whole Horn. It is critical to our security 
interests, our dealing with counterterrorism, with Al-Shabaab, 
its proximity to crucial international shipping lanes through 
the Red Sea and, obviously, key military facilities there.
    I just want to ask, and anyone on the panel could take this 
for me, what is the Administration doing specifically to help 
the millions of people who are facing starvation in Sudan and, 
frankly, facing it throughout the Horn of Africa?
    Ms. Coleman. Thank you, Senator Booker. That is such a 
critical and important issue and one that we are dealing with 
every single day.
    As you note, the Horn of Africa is experiencing tremendous 
instability and food security, and this is a consequence not 
only of conflict, but also of drought and other natural 
disasters, including locusts. I mean, it is under enormous 
stress across the whole region.
    Right now there are more than a million people in need of 
food security--food assistance, because they face very 
significant food insecurity in that--in Sudan.
    There are also, of course, refugees who have left South 
Sudan for Sudan and are now heading back to South Sudan. You 
have got the compounding effect of people moving from one 
insecure environment to another and the challenges that puts on 
the whole system.
    We are working with our partners on the ground, namely, the 
World Food Programme, to meet the food needs of the people. We 
are working on some basic health and livelihoods work and 
addressing the most severe needs of malnutrition.
    As you have noted, these are integrated problems that 
humanitarian assistance only addresses at the surface, and 
underneath we need to really get at the root causes and that, I 
think, has been the basis of this conversation, trying to put 
the country on a better path and play its important stabilizing 
role in the region that it should be playing. Thank you.
    Senator Booker. If I could just drill a little bit deeper 
down because I have been in touch with the U.N. World Food 
Programme. They have issued an emergency funding request.
    They were short to meet the global need from Afghanistan to 
the Horn of Africa, billions of dollars, and they are saying 
quite plainly in order to prevent tens of millions of people, 
including millions of children in countries around the globe 
and, particularly, in the Horn from starving to death in just 
the coming months, we need this emergency supplemental funding, 
and something that is--it seems to be you are alluding to is, 
that this kind of mass starvation would make all of the 
situations regarding the politics far more complex as well as 
we are seeing, again, in that region of Africa the continued 
destabilization being caused by these challenges that are 
faced, as you said, from climate change issues to COVID-related 
issues to the military destabilization.
    I guess just my point and question is do you agree that 
providing this funding, filling this funding gap with the World 
Food Programme, should be a top priority if we really are 
serious about meeting the political instability of Sudan as 
well as other areas in the Horn?
    Ms. Coleman. Yes. Yes, thank you, Senator Booker.
    I mean, I spend my day looking across the world and I see 
crisis in Afghanistan. I see food crisis in the Horn of Africa 
and in West Africa, the Sahel.
    I see enormous needs in South America with migrants and 
refugees flowing across the region, and the World Food 
Programme is providing--and UNHCR--resources across the board 
and they are stretched. They are stretched very, very thin.
    I would, of course, be an advocate for more humanitarian 
assistance, given all of these simultaneous crises that we are 
facing and the integrated nature of many of these crises, 
particularly in the Horn.
    Thank you.
    Senator Booker. I am grateful to hear you saying that. You 
could look at Burkina Faso. It is one of our globe's poorest 
nations, its political instability right now and the extreme 
poverty there.
    These issues are very much interrelated. I am grateful for 
Senator Menendez's and Senator Coons' leadership in trying to 
help us to meet this massive gap. It is, clearly, proven that 
dollars invested in the World Food Programme, helping people 
where they are--to feed them where they are--actually save 
multiples of the resources necessary if those famines end up 
triggering a crisis in migration and more.
    This is a wise investment of money for political stability, 
for national security, not to mention the humanitarian--the 
real human crisis of millions of children that will die if the 
U.S. fails to act.
    I appreciate your testimony, and I thank you, Chairman, for 
the time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman, and either one 
of you can address this.
    While this meeting was going on, we were served with a 
congressional notification by the State Department regarding an 
expenditure of $10.5 million dollars for something I do not 
understand.
    It talks about Economic Support Funds, and the bureau that 
is going to do it is Democracy Rights and Labor, and it refers 
to expenditures supporting the civilian-led transitional 
government, which I understand does not exist anymore.
    I assume one of you know something about this. I thought we 
suspended--I think all of us agreed that we ought to be 
suspending, and now we get served with this notice that there 
is going to be an expenditure. What can you tell us about that?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Senator. I do not have the notice in 
front of me, and we all agree that we do not want to be 
providing any financial support to the government, but we are 
providing support to civil society and others, and I am aware 
of a very important grant undertaken by the Bureau of Democracy 
and Human Rights to support accountability--justice and 
accountability--and to provide assistance to Sudanese human 
rights activists who are trying to document atrocities.
    That is the immediate program that I am aware of, but I 
would assume if it is a different program it would similarly be 
designed to complement the programs that the Deputy 
Administrator has discussed to help strengthen the capacity of 
Sudanese civilians to tackle the problems in their country and 
the money would not be going to the government.
    Senator Risch. You had made reference to this woman who had 
started the--a media company over there. Would it be going in 
that direction, perhaps?
    Ms. Coleman. That was a USAID-funded program. The DRL-CN 
you are referring to is a State Department program, so I think 
it would be different, but along the same types of lines with a 
focus on human rights is my guess.
    Senator Risch. We are going to need some more clarification 
on this, Mr. Chairman. This is pretty vague, and with 
everything we have heard today I am really, really reluctant to 
talk about spending more money there until we have a really 
clear direction where we are going.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Understood. Madam Secretary, if you would go 
back to the Department and tell them that we both need--I have 
not seen the CN so we both need clarification because there is 
a hesitancy on spending here unless we know, clearly, purpose 
and recipient, at the end of the day, and, obviously, a pathway 
forward.
    To the extent the Department has a good argument to make 
for whatever this is, we will look forward to hearing it.
    Senator Risch, are you okay?
    The Chairman. Okay. I understand that Senator Romney is now 
with us, virtually.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you can 
hear me.
    The Chairman. We can.
    Senator Romney. Good. Thank you.
    Excuse me if I am going to ask a question here which has 
been asked already, but I was at another hearing and just was 
able to join this more recently.
    I am interested in getting a sense of why it is we are 
seeing so many coups, if you will. This is not the--obviously, 
the one and only.
    There seems to be a crescendo in the number of places where 
military action is replacing democratically-elected leaders. 
That is, obviously, something which is very much not in the 
interests of the people of those nations nor is it in the 
interest of global peace.
    One question is, to either of the panelists, are Russia or 
China playing a role either in encouraging these actions or are 
they playing a role in sustaining the military juntas or 
leaders after a coup occurs?
    What role are they playing with regards to these increasing 
number of coups that we are seeing, if any?
    Ms. Phee. Senator, thank you for flagging this troubling 
issue, which concerns us all. It is clear that Russia is 
playing a negative role, particularly in the Sahel, but also in 
Sudan. They are exploiting fissures and tensions and 
insecurities for their own political and economic advantage.
    I think this issue could be helpfully discussed in another 
setting, but I do want to flag that they are a player of 
concern for us.
    I also wanted to, more broadly, address your question. I 
think we are seeing, in some cases, the economic impact of the 
COVID pandemic, which has really disrupted economic growth in 
countries that are already struggling and some of the poorest 
countries in the world, and we are also seeing fatigue by 
publics from poor governance, including corruption as well as 
insecurity.
    Those are some of the factors that we are looking at as we 
try and assess the changing landscape in Africa and make sure 
we respond appropriately.
    Senator Romney. I am wondering as well whether in Africa, 
but also in other parts of the world where we are seeing 
actions of this nature, whether we are able to provide to the 
newly-formed democratic governments, in some cases governments 
that have been there for a long period of time, some assessment 
of the risk of a coup occurring and some actions to take to 
make it less likely that something of that nature will occur.
    Because, of course, we always have sanctions when bad 
things happen, clearly, everybody would tell us that writing 
checks to these governments would help them out, but that is 
not something we can do indefinitely.
    So I wonder, do we have an effective strategy to make it 
less likely that Russia or others that are playing a malevolent 
role would be less effective?
    Do we have a strategy to encourage and strengthen nations 
such that they can withstand the inevitable draw of 
authoritarianism when a newly-elected government is put in 
place?
    Again, for you, Assistant Secretary, or your colleague.
    Ms. Phee. Senator, you all helped us out by giving us the 
Global Fragility Act, and the Administration is working 
carefully and quickly to try and mobilize those resources and 
to try and adopt that new format and new approach precisely to 
get at what you are discussing.
    I am hopeful that you will see real action on the ground to 
implement the goals and ambitions laid out in the Global 
Fragility Act, which were designed precisely to address the 
concerns you have outlined.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I return the time to you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. One last set of 
questions here.
    The Sudan Tribune reported today that the Executive 
Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development was 
in Khartoum, ``to discuss with the Sudanese stakeholders the 
mediation they plan to launch to end the crisis.''
    Up until now, UNITAMS has the mandate from the U.N. to 
provide support to Sudan during its political transition to 
democratic rule. It was the only forum for dialogue to end the 
current crisis.
    Madam Secretary, is the report on IGAD's involvement 
accurate and how might the efforts by IGAD complicate UNITAMS' 
facilitated process?
    Ms. Phee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I think that is sloppy drafting. My understanding that the 
Secretary General with whom we have a good and constructive 
working relationship was there to see how IGAD could support 
the UNITAMS effort and that IGAD, as you know, is nested under 
the AU, nested under the U.N., so how all three bodies could 
help with this transition process. I think that is a 
mischaracterization in the press reports----
    The Chairman. Okay. Then this is IGAD actually helping 
UNITAMS. All right.
    Let me ask you this. What leverage do we and other actors 
have in the region to press the Sudanese military to 
participate in good faith, from the Administration's 
perspective?
    Ms. Phee. I think, as we have discussed, we have mobilized 
enormous economic pressure and made clear our position and the 
position of like-minded friends in the international community, 
and I know that these--that the sort of phenomenal impact, 
which the World Bank discussed when we were in Riyadh at the 
Friends of Sudan meeting, where they compared the economic 
shock to the system as analogous to the political shock by the 
events on October 25 that that economic pressure is getting the 
attention of security leaders.
    The discussion we have had here today, the public 
statements made by members of Congress, are also getting the 
attention of security leaders.
    Thirdly, I believe our diplomacy, particularly our 
engagement of traditional partners of the Sudanese security 
forces, is also getting their attention.
    The Chairman. I often find that when we talk about economic 
shock those who are empowered--in this case by force--often do 
not end up feeling that part of the shock.
    The people do, but they do not, and the question is how do 
we make them feel that reality as well? Because I find that 
coups, military juntas, dictators, do not really care about how 
much their people are hurt.
    Finally, if Sudan's transition to democracy fails--and we 
are all here to try to ensure it does not fail--but if it does, 
what are the implications for the U.S. strategic interests in 
the Horn of Africa? Which countries stand to win if the 
transition fails?
    Ms. Phee. My own view is that nobody wins, neither the 
Sudanese, nor their neighbors, nor the region, nor the 
continent, and there may be some governments--we have discussed 
Russia here today--who get tactical gains or wins if there is a 
collapse of the Sudanese state, but the humanitarian 
consequences would be overwhelming and it would contribute 
mightily to destabilization in Northern Africa, in Eastern 
Africa, and probably spreading south.
    All of our efforts are focused on preventing that outcome 
because of the negative consequences.
    The Chairman. Yes. I think there may have been some 
countries who were happy to see the coup take place, and the 
question is if they were happy to see the coup take place then 
what are the consequences if, in fact, the nation fails, at the 
end of the day.
    To those who were happy to see the coup take place, they 
must have made calculations as to what they think is the 
benefit of that, and it would seem to me that we should be 
focusing on some of those countries to give them a clear 
message that, in fact, their calculation is wrong.
    With that, the committee thanks this panel. This panel is 
excused. We appreciate your insights, and we will call up our 
second panel. Thank you very much.
    [Pause.]
    The Chairman. I am going to introduce our second panel. My 
understanding is that there is a vote going on and so we will 
avail ourselves of what would be a natural break to try to vote 
and come back.
    Before introducing our witnesses for the second panel, I 
ask unanimous consent to enter into the record written 
testimony from Amnesty International.
    Without objection, so ordered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Let me welcome the members of our next panel.
    Joining us via teleconference from Brussels is Dr. Comfort 
Ero, president and CEO of the International Crisis Group. She 
joined the organization as West Africa project director in 2001 
and rose to become the Africa program director and then in 
January of 2021, interim vice president.
    Dr. Ero was appointed Crisis Group's president in December 
of 2021. She has spent her career working in conflict-affected 
countries and related policy.
    In between her two tenures at the Crisis Group, she served 
as deputy director of the Africa program for the International 
Center for Transitional Justice and prior to that political 
affairs officer and policy adviser to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General as part of the U.N. 
Mission in Liberia.
    She has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics, the 
University of London, is also the chair of the board of the 
Rift Valley Institute, sits on the editorial board of various 
journals, including International Peacekeeping, and we welcome 
her remotely.
    Also with us on the second panel is Joseph Tucker, senior 
expert for the Greater Horn of Africa, the United States 
Institute of Peace. Mr. Tucker is a senior expert from the 
Greater Horn of Africa at the U.S. Institute of Peace where he 
focuses primarily on Sudan and South Sudan.
    Prior to joining the institute, he worked at USAID for 4 
and a half years, most recently a senior advisor for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Governance in the Office of South Sudan and South 
Sudan programs.
    In 2013, Mr. Tucker worked in Juba, South Sudan, for 
Deloitte Consulting as a policy and research advisor to the 
Minister of Cabinet Affairs in the government of South Sudan.
    From 2009 to 2013, he served in the Office of the U.S. 
Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan at the Department of 
State, including as negotiations team leader. He was a member 
of the U.S. Government's observation team for Sudan's 2010 
national elections and 2011 South Sudan Referendum. He has 
traveled widely in both countries in the region.
    Thank you both to our witnesses, and Dr. Ero, 
congratulations on your recent promotion.
    We are going to take a brief recess. There is a vote going 
on. We will return immediately after that vote and we will 
begin the testimony.
    With that, the hearing is in recess.
    [Recess.]
    The Chairman. This hearing on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order with the thanks to our witnesses 
for their forbearance as we had a vote.
    Let me start with Dr. Ero and then we will move to Mr. 
Tucker.
    Dr. Ero.

STATEMENT OF DR. COMFORT ERO, PRESIDENT AND CEO, INTERNATIONAL 
                  CRISIS GROUP, NAIROBI, KENYA

    Dr. Ero. Good morning, Chair Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. My name is 
Comfort Ero and I am the president and CEO of the International 
Crisis Group.
    Previously, I served as the organization's Africa program 
director and I have spent my professional and academic life 
focusing on peace and security issues in Africa.
    The International Crisis Group is a global organization 
committed to the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of 
deadly violent conflict. We cover over 50 conflict countries 
around the world and our presence in Sudan dates back more than 
20 years.
    I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you 
about the deteriorating situation in Sudan today and how the 
United States and others can help support the country.
    Sudan is at a dangerous crossroads. Once again, the 
military has turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese 
people and violently seized power. The coup on October 25 
brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that, 
since 2019, has been charged with steering Sudan towards 
elections and for civilian rule.
    It was a major reversal in a transition that brought hope 
to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. The transition 
that was interrupted in October followed 30 years of rule by 
the notorious strongman, Omar al-Bashir.
    Following Bashir's ouster and under heavy pressure, the 
military agreed to an August 17 Constitutional Declaration 
under which the country would be governed by a hybrid civilian-
military coalition for 39 months leading up to elections.
    In defiance of the United States and others who warned them 
against doing so, the generals seized power and ousted the 
civilians. In the meantime, the Sudanese across the country 
have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the 
military's power grab.
    In response, the security forces have repeatedly fired into 
the crowds, killing dozens. However, there is evidence to 
suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated their 
position.
    Since the coup, Sudan's mobilized youthful population have 
again shown its strength and courage by mobilizing millions of 
Sudanese to take to the streets and to send a clear signal to 
the generals.
    Getting the transition back on track would serve both the 
people of Sudan's democratic aspirations and the interests of 
the United States and other regional and international actors 
in the strategically important Horn of Africa.
    As one of Sudan's most important external partners, the 
United States is well positioned to support efforts to reverse 
the military's power grab and set Sudan back on its 
transitional path.
    The United States should press the generals to immediately 
halt their repeated use of violence against protesters and 
coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to account.
    With its partners, the United States should make clear that 
the generals will face consequences, including assets freeze 
and travel ban if they continue to kill unarmed demonstrators 
or obstruct progress towards elections, more broadly.
    The United States has already signaled its backing for 
efforts to stimulate negotiations among the generals and 
civilian groups. The United States should warn the generals 
against taking precipitous measures that could derail these 
potential talks, including refraining from unilaterally 
appointing a new prime minister.
    It should further insist that these talks are maximally 
inclusive. The 2019 power-sharing agreement should be the 
blueprint for a compromise that could restore civilian-military 
governance and lead to elections.
    In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, the 
United States suspended $700 million in assistance to Sudan. 
This was the right step. The United States should make clear 
that this support will not resume unless the generals accept a 
return towards elections.
    The United States should also advance efforts to repurpose 
some of its support to civil society and also work with 
partners, including the United Nations, to offer direct 
assistance to Sudan's long-suffering people.
    Many on the Sudanese streets perceive some external actors, 
namely, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia as 
tacitly backing military rule.
    Special Envoy Satterfield should be well positioned to 
engage these actors and urge them to constructively use their 
privileged relationships with Sudan's generals to push for a 
return to civilian-led transitional process.
    With the welcome appointment of a new ambassador to 
Khartoum, the United States could play a key role in marshaling 
a coalition of actors within and outside Sudan that can steer 
the country back to a path to elections.
    The military's power grab has derailed a transition that 
was an inspiration well beyond Sudan and could still be an 
inspiration. The world and the United States should stand with 
the people of Sudan to ensure a more accountable government.
    I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to 
testify before the Senate. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Ero follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Dr. Comfort Ero

    Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and 
distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Dr. Comfort Ero, and 
I am the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. 
Previously I served as the organization's Africa program director and I 
have spent my professional and academic career focusing on peace and 
security issues in Africa. International Crisis Group is a global 
organisation committed to the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of 
deadly conflict. We cover over 50 conflict situations around the world 
and our presence in Sudan dates back more than two decades.\1\
    I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the 
deteriorating situation in Sudan today. The country is at a dangerous 
crossroads. Not for the first time in its history, the military has 
turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese people for more just and 
representative rule by violently seizing power. The coup on October 25 
brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that since 2019 
has been charged with steering Sudan toward elections and full civilian 
rule.\2\ It was a major reversal in a transition that had brought hope 
to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. I will share with you my 
analysis of the current situation in Sudan and recommendations for 
steps the United States might take to help guide it back on the path 
towards greater democracy and stability.
                               background
    By way of background, the transition that was interrupted on 
October 25 followed 30 years of rule by the notorious strongman Omar 
al-Bashir.

   After coming to office in a coup in June 1989, Bashir 
        maintained his hold on power by repressing political 
        opposition, fighting costly counter-insurgencies in the 
        country's peripheries and underwriting his factious security 
        sector with patronage-driven expenditure that ate up, by some 
        estimates, 70 per cent of the national budget.\3\

   The patronage system that Bashir built eventually bankrupted 
        the country and contributed to the strongman's ouster. A small 
        cabal of favoured cronies including Bashir's Islamist allies 
        from the National Congress Party, senior military officers 
        (many of them drawn from the tiny riverine elite that has 
        dominated Sudan's military and politics for decades) and newly 
        minted allies such as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces 
        (RSF), which was blamed for some of the worst violence in the 
        western region of Darfur, benefited substantially from Sudan's 
        rigged, lopsided economy.\4\ These same actors continue to try 
        to preserve their privileges atop Sudan's political, economic 
        and security establishment.

   Popular frustration over political repression, rising prices 
        and a sclerotic economy that could not absorb Sudan's ranks of 
        unemployed youths helped trigger the protests that eventually 
        drove Bashir from power. The uprising began in the south-
        eastern towns of Damazin and Sennar, where crowds took to the 
        streets on 13 December 2018 in response to a tripling of bread 
        prices. By the time the protests reached Atbara, the historic 
        bastion of unionism in Sudan, demonstrators were demanding 
        regime change. Against long odds and despite heavy repression, 
        the protesters eventually overwhelmed the security forces, who 
        staged a palace coup against Bashir on 11 April 2019.

   The military tried to maintain the upper hand but was forced 
        under pressure both from the protest movement and external 
        actors to compromise and accept to share power with civilians. 
        International revulsion over a 3 June 2019 massacre of 
        protesters encamped outside the military headquarters was 
        particularly important in forcing the generals to cede to the 
        will of the Sudanese people.\5\ Under the terms of a 17 August 
        Constitutional Declaration, the country would be governed by a 
        hybrid civilian-military coalition for 39 months leading up to 
        elections.

   The task before that coalition was enormous. The new cabinet 
        headed by the technocrat and diplomat Abdalla Hamdok was 
        charged with breathing new life into Sudan's anaemic economy, 
        reforming political institutions to lay the ground for 
        elections and delivering justice to the many Sudanese victims 
        of atrocities during Bashir's rule--and in the weeks following 
        his fall. Despite the formidable obstacles the authorities 
        faced, that coalition represented the country's best hope for 
        emerging into a stable, prosperous, and democratic future and 
        was a source of hope for those supporting democratic renewal in 
        other countries in the region.

   Always reluctant participants in the alliance, the generals 
        barely disguised their opposition to the Hamdok 
        administration's reforms and were particularly opposed to 
        efforts to deliver justice and to reshape the country's 
        economy. In defiance of the United States Government and others 
        who warned them against doing so, they seized power and ousted 
        the civilians.
                 the october 25 coup and its aftermath
    Today, unfortunately, the picture looks grim. The military 
violently applied the brakes on the transition in the early hours of 
October 25 when they placed Hamdok under house arrest, rounded up 
numerous other civilian officials in the administration, declared a 
state of emergency and dissolved key institutions including the 
cabinet. Since then, Sudan's military chief General Abdel Fattah al-
Burhan has taken a series of steps to reverse the reforms the civilian-
led administration had rolled out including by disbanding a committee 
charged with reclaiming public assets, by packing the Sovereign 
Council, which serves as the country's executive, with his allies and 
by appointing Bashir-era figures into key posts including in the 
judiciary and security forces.\6\ The military attempted some window 
dressing when it reinstated Hamdok on 21 November, a move Sudanese 
protesters rightly dismissed as an effort to legitimise their power 
grab. Some efforts to stimulate talks among Sudanese actors to find a 
way out of the crisis continue although the prospects of a resolution 
appear dim.
    Overall, the country has been on a downhill trajectory since the 
coup. On 2 January, Hamdok resigned in frustration after failing to 
persuade the generals to stick by their commitments under the August 
2019 constitutional charter, and in particular to give him a free hand 
to appoint a new cabinet. In the meantime, the public's frustration has 
been growing. For the past few weeks, Sudanese people across the 
country have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the 
military's power grab. The general's response to the protests has come 
right out of the Bashir playbook. The security forces have repeatedly 
fired into crowds, killing dozens, according to human rights groups and 
the UN.\7\ A late December decree by military chief Abdel-Fattah al-
Burhan gave the police effective immunity for their actions. Still, the 
Sudanese people continue to risk their lives by staging protests, work 
boycotts and other strike actions.
    While it is not yet clear who will come out on top in this contest 
between the security forces and the street, there is evidence to 
suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated the strength of 
their hand. This is a different Sudan from the one in which the army 
captured control of the state at least five times in the past, 
including in 1989 when Bashir took office.\8\ Sudan has one of the 
youngest populations in the world.\9\ Six in ten Sudanese are aged 
between 15 and 30--and the current generation rejects the notion that 
the country should go back to being governed by an unaccountable, out 
of touch elite.\10\ This mobilised, youthful population showed its 
power at the end of 2018 when it rose up in protest at Bashir's 
repressive, kleptocratic rule. The protest movement captured the 
imagination of pro-democracy campaigners well beyond Sudan with its 
diversity, with the prominent role that women played--sometimes 
outnumbering men in demonstrations--with its tenacity, and ultimately 
with its success. Against what many viewed as tall odds, it brought a 
halt to Bashir's rule. Since the coup, this movement has again shown 
its strength by mobilising millions of Sudanese to take to the streets 
and send a clear signal to the generals that they will not, as past 
generations of officers did, get away with imposing their will on the 
Sudanese people.\11\
    Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of 
Sudan's democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States 
and other regional and international actors in the strategically 
important Horn of Africa--where Sudan sits between major regional 
powers Ethiopia and Egypt and shares a border with seven countries, 
several in the throes of conflict themselves. Support for Sudan's 
transition would comport with the U.S. Government's stated commitment 
to champion democratic values and to ``demonstrate that democracies can 
deliver by improving the lives of their own people.'' \12\ It would 
also be the surest pathway to medium and long term stability in the 
country.
                            recommendations
    The United States is one of Sudan's most important external 
partners. It provides about half a billion dollars in assistance 
annually and was a champion of efforts to reconnect Sudan's economy 
with international financial institutions. Given these ties and the 
United States Government's relations with all the main regional actors, 
the U.S. is well positioned to support efforts to reverse the 
military's power grab and set Sudan back on a path toward elections and 
representative government. Specifically, it could:

   Press the generals to immediately halt violence against 
        protesters and coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to 
        account: As outlined, Sudan's security forces have responded to 
        peaceful protests by indiscriminately shooting into crowds and 
        sometimes reportedly even pursuing fleeing and wounded 
        demonstrators into hospitals.\13\ This pattern of behaviour, on 
        top of its grave human cost, threatens to poison relations 
        between the parties and render a resolution even further beyond 
        reach. In coordination with partners including the African 
        Union (AU) and the European Union, the United States should 
        make clear that the generals will face consequences including 
        asset freezes and travel bans if they continue to kill unarmed 
        demonstrators. The White House should simultaneously convene an 
        interagency process to design a targeted sanctions programs 
        aimed at key figures in the military and outline that it is 
        willing to deploy these against individuals that continue to 
        sanction the killing of protesters or obstruct progress toward 
        elections more broadly.

   Support Sudanese-led efforts to rerail the transition: The 
        United States has already signalled its backing for efforts to 
        stimulate negotiations among the generals and civilian groups 
        including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the 
        coalition that spearheaded the protest movement and 
        neighbourhood resistance committees, which play an integral 
        role in the day-to-day organisation of protests and have proved 
        a particularly effective channel of resistance to the military 
        coup. The United States should warn the generals against taking 
        precipitous measures that could derail these potential talks, 
        including refraining from unilaterally appointing a new prime 
        minister. It should further insist that these talks are 
        maximally inclusive and in particular that they should take on 
        board the views of the resistance committees. The 2019 power-
        sharing agreement should be the blueprint for a compromise that 
        could restore civilian-military governance and lead to 
        elections.

   Withhold financial assistance until the military reverses 
        its coup: In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, 
        the United states suspended $700 million in assistance to 
        Sudan. This was the right step given the generals' brazen 
        decision to terminate the power-sharing agreement. The United 
        States should make clear to the generals that this support will 
        not resume unless they accept to return to the path toward 
        elections laid out in the 2019 power-sharing agreement. In the 
        meantime, the United States should advance with efforts to 
        repurpose some of its support to civil society groups and also 
        to work with partners including the UN to offer direct 
        assistance to Sudan's longsuffering people.

   Urge all regional actors to back a return to a civilian-led 
        dispensation: Many on the Sudanese street perceive some 
        external actors, namely Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and 
        Saudi Arabia, as tacitly backing military rule.\14\ Such 
        perceptions will ultimately be damaging to those countries' 
        standing in Sudan if it is able to reinvigorate its 
        transitional process. But it is still possible for these key 
        regional actors to play an important role in helping Sudan 
        return to a civilian-led transitional process, thereby 
        protecting their relations with the Sudanese people. Given his 
        strong background in regional diplomacy, Special Envoy 
        Satterfield should be well-positioned to engage these actors 
        and urge them to use their privileged relations with Sudan's 
        generals to convey to them that the power-sharing agreement 
        they torpedoed remains Sudan's best and perhaps only chance for 
        stability, a goal they all profess to share. With the welcome 
        appointment of a new ambassador to Khartoum, the United States 
        could play a key role in marshalling a coalition of actors 
        within and outside Sudan that can help steer the country back 
        toward the path to elections.

    Sudan is at a historic hinge-point. The military's power grab has 
derailed a transition that was an inspiration well beyond Sudan, and 
still could be, if the generals step back and allow Sudan's civilians 
to steer the country to elections. With a piling set of challenges--not 
least an economy in deep distress, resurging violence in Darfur and 
elsewhere, and a tottering peace deal with armed groups--the generals 
can hardly afford to stonewall the Sudanese people's demands for 
change. The world--and the United States--should stand with Sudan's 
people in their quest for a more democratic and accountable government, 
an outcome that represents the country's best hope for achieving long-
run political, social and economic stability.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ Crisis Group Africa Report N+281, Safeguarding Sudan's 
Revolution, 21 October 2019; Jonas Horner, After the Coup, Restoring 
Sudan's Transition, Crisis Group Q&A, 5 November 2021; Crisis Group 
Africa Briefing N+168, The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement 
Sudan's New Peace Agreement, 23 February 2021.
    \2\ Crisis Group Africa Report N+281, Safeguarding Sudan's 
Revolution, op.cit.; Jonas Horner, After the Coup, Restoring Sudan's 
Transition, op.cit.
    \3\ Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who 
was mandated to lead the civilian-military transition in August 2019, 
listed as an ambition driving down military expenditure to 20 per cent 
of the national budget. He said in some years, that budget line had 
stood at 80 per cent. ``Sudan PM seeks to end the country's pariah 
status,'' ap, August 25 2019.
    \4\ ``Who are Sudan's RSF and their Commander Hemeti?'' Al Jazeera, 
6 June 2019.
    \5\ ``Sudan commemorates the June 3 Massacre,'' Dabanga Sudan, 3 
June 2021.
    \6\ Crisis Group EU Watch List, 27 January 2022
    \7\ ``Bachelet condemns killings of peaceful protesters in Sudan,'' 
UN, 18 November 2021.
    \8\ ``A history of Sudan coups,'' Statista, 25 October 2021
    \9\ ``After the Uprising: Including Sudanese Youth'', Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, 2020
    \10\ Crisis Group Horn Podcast, Sudan's Political Impasse, 26 
January 2022.
    \11\ ``Deaths Reported in Sudan as `March of Millions' Demands 
Restoration of Civilian Rule,'' Voice of America, 30 October 2021
    \12\ ``President Biden to Convene Leaders' Summit for Democracy,'' 
White House, 11 August 2021
    \13\ ``Sudanese security forces `hunt down' injured protesters in 
hospital,'' France 24, 25 January 2022
    \14\ Crisis Group Horn Podcast, Sudan's Political Impasse, 26 
January 2022.

    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Tucker.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH TUCKER, SENIOR EXPERT FOR THE GREATER HORN 
  OF AFRICA, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Tucker. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and 
members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you 
for the opportunity to testify on the situation in Sudan.
    I am a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, 
although the views expressed here are my own. Sudan is complex, 
but this should not mask simple truths.
    There was a coup in October 2021. The political transition, 
hard won through nonviolent struggle, was fundamentally 
disrupted. Its political settlement based on a civilian-
military partnership was broken.
    As Sudanese and the international community plot a way 
forward, it is critical to examine lessons from the 
transitional period.
    My written testimony outlines lessons based on analysis of 
stakeholders and key thematic areas of the transition. Given 
the importance of political pathways to address the current 
situation, I will focus, first, on lessons to inform them and 
any potential U.S. or U.N. assistance to them.
    Many political processes lack clarity on a preferred end 
state. This is not the case in Sudan. Civilian groups appear to 
agree that a fully democratic state is needed with security 
forces absent from non-security arenas. The U.S. should embrace 
this end state.
    However, it is the process to get there that needs a clear 
strategy, bolstered by coordinated international engagement.
    Many agree that political processes should be Sudanese-led. 
There are Sudanese processes that are well constructed and are 
likely to result in a sustainable agreement and there are 
Sudanese processes that are not. Sudanese recognize this and 
are wary of blanket international acceptance of any Sudanese-
led process.
    Any process can be made more inclusive, especially by 
involving women, youth, and other civic actors, but if 
inclusivity is symbolic and a process is not grounded in the 
views of civilians, the bitterness it creates can cripple 
support for outcomes.
    Lastly, it is imperative that violence against civilians 
stops, for it will prevent a political solution. The 
international community must take measures beyond words to halt 
it.
    However, the international reactions to violence must not 
put undue pressure on civilians who overly compromise for the 
sake of a quick, perhaps, false peace. Creating safe spaces for 
citizens to refine positions and engage political parties and 
leadership on their views is urgently needed and the U.S. can 
help with this.
    I will now offer some thoughts on the suspension of 
assistance, aligning diplomacy and assistance, the security 
sector, and sanctions.
    As others noted, much U.S. assistance to Sudan's government 
was halted after the coup. A scenario for resumption is when 
violence against civilians is stopped and there is an 
enforceable decision and progress on a fully civilian 
government with benchmarks set by civilians themselves.
    It may be tempting to restart assistance at the first sign 
of improvement, but care should be taken to ensure that this is 
not premature. Having to suspend assistance again or withstand 
a period where assistance remains, but the situation worsens 
can dent the credibility of the U.S. approach.
    The suspension provides the U.S. a rare opportunity to 
interrogate the aims of assistance and refine a strategy. This 
strategy should be organized around facilitating, supporting, 
and consolidating a genuine transition.
    Key to this is better aligning U.S. political efforts with 
development assistance. There are times when diplomacy can 
smartly reinforce assistance, particularly for democracy, human 
rights, conflict mitigation efforts, and vice versa.
    Lastly, a U.S. all-of-government-integrated Sudan democracy 
strategy is needed. I offer concrete suggestions for this in my 
written testimony and how it can be tied to existing 
legislation and this Administration's democracy agenda.
    It is right for the U.S. to engage citizen security sector 
actors, but this should be grounded in a view of a civilian 
government and state. The U.S. can also analyze lessons from 
its engagement with the previous National Congress Party 
regime, particularly on how it did or did not utilize 
incentives and disincentives.
    It is understandable that some call for sanctions because 
they are a powerful tool to translate condemnation into action. 
They must be applied smartly and be part of a clear strategy.
    The argument that sanctions negatively impact dialogue 
through hardening positions or stoke violence needs to be 
groundtruthed. The argument is often made based on assumptions 
instead of objective analysis.
    In conclusion, the U.S. and international community can and 
should avoid a neutral stance on Sudan. There was a coup, and 
it is not possible to return to the pre-coup dispensation.
    A new constitutional order is needed, and Sudan will not be 
stable until there is a civilian government and the proper role 
of the security sector is firmly decided and implemented.
    The onus is on Sudanese to achieve their goals, but the 
U.S. has a duty to nurture civilian-led nonviolent democratic 
change at a time when it is, surely, in short global supply.
    Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Tucker follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Joseph Tucker

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
on the situation in Sudan after the October 2021 coup. Events on the 
ground in Sudan continue to evolve and provide challenges to U.S. and 
international engagement, yet there are opportunities to improve the 
situation.
    I am a senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, although the 
views expressed here are my own. The U.S. Institute of Peace was 
established by Congress over 35 years ago as an independent, 
nonpartisan national institute to prevent and resolve violent conflicts 
abroad, in accordance with U.S. national interests and values.
                              introduction
    Sudan's citizens affirmed and secured their right to define the 
nature of the state and their relationship to it through the 2019 
revolution. Given the complexities of Sudan's politics, economy, and 
society, this is difficult. But the transitional period provided for 
this, subject to the willingness of leaders within the civilian-
military partnership to uphold commitments to a different vision for 
Sudan. There will be many debates about if that partnership was 
possible from the start. What is clear is that the contested nature of 
the transition and certain individuals within it overpowered those 
working toward the revolution's aims of freedom, peace, and justice.
    The coup broke the already fragile transition and its 
constitutional foundation. Sudan is now witnessing an unprecedented 
political and economic crisis and may be reverting to its pre-
revolution state. Violence against citizens continues to increase, 
including in areas outside of Khartoum, especially in Darfur. As 
Sudanese, the region, and international community try to plot a way 
forward, it is critical to examine lessons from the transitional period 
so they can inform policymaking and assistance.
    This testimony outlines some lessons learned from the start of the 
transition to the present. The lessons cover topics on various 
stakeholders and key thematic areas of the transition. This is followed 
by views on the current political situation, and possible U.S. and 
international diplomatic and assistance tools to support democratic 
stakeholders and pursue a true civilian transition.
Resistance Committees & Protest Groups
    As happened in the lead-up to and during the 2019 revolution, the 
post-coup situation has again thrust Resistance Committees (RCs) and 
protest groups into the limelight as they face violence during 
protests. Some of them note that this is a continuation of the 
revolution after an aborted attempt at transition. It frames their 
current ``no negotiation, no partnership, no compromise'' posture. 
Diplomats have recently met with RC and protest representatives in 
Sudan and learned more about how they are adapting structures to the 
current situation. They are also hearing about positions being 
developed organically on local consensus-building, social justice, 
community representation, and resource mobilization.
    This attention is a welcome shift from 2019 when it seemed that the 
diffuse nature of protests, coupled with the horizontal organization of 
RCs, led international actors to face difficulty with--or indifference 
to--engaging with them. Attention moved to the operation of government 
and challenges, such as economic reform and international relations. A 
key lesson is that the motivations and strategies of all elements of 
the revolution matter, not just organized political and civic forces. 
The RCs can be studied and engaged more closely. There is much to learn 
about their evolution during the previous National Congress Party (NCP) 
regime through to their role in 2018-19 protests, their engagement with 
the Sudan Professionals Association and the Forces for Freedom and 
Change (FFC), and how they undertook advocacy during the attempted 
transition. Charting this evolution will provide clarity to their 
current positions and analyzing the nonviolent nature of the protests 
can provide lessons for situations elsewhere.
    There is a narrative that some RCs oppose political parties or wish 
to replace them. However, there is another one that suggests they 
realize political party participation in elections and governance is 
needed. Within that, there is a desire for politicians to carry forward 
their positions, outlined in section seven below, that are informed by 
the previous 2 years and to be held accountable through fair elections. 
Lastly, while protests in urban centers are important, so too are those 
citizens who share similar aspirations, but who are further removed 
among nomadic, internally displaced, rural, and agrarian communities.
Security Sector
    International actors should reassess their understanding of Sudan's 
security sector, including the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid 
Support Forces (RSF). Since the security sector is not one bloc and 
there are differences within SAF circles, their internal opinions on 
transitions and coups are important. At the beginning of the 
transition, an international fear was that the paramilitary RSF would 
seek to dominate security and economic power. While this fear may have 
been warranted, it detracted from attempts to understand dynamics 
within the SAF and between the SAF and RSF.
    The removal of the National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS) leadership and supposed reduction of its operational capacity 
after the revolution led many to assume it was rightsized. This should 
have been groundtruthed, as it now appears that after the coup the NISS 
heir, the General Intelligence Service, reverted to its predecessor's 
pre-revolution state. There were also accusations that former regime 
elements remained prominent in the security sector, but this never 
seemed adequately explored by international actors and could have shed 
light on security sector commitments, power dynamics, and the 
resurgence of certain elements after the coup.
    Given the security sector's prominent role in the economy and 
politics, a key need of the transition was to undertake security sector 
reform (SSR). Along with what SSR traditionally entails--such as 
integration of paramilitary forces into the regular army--thought was 
given by some international actors and Sudanese stakeholders on how to 
develop a national security vision that prioritized citizen security 
over regime security. This was grounded in the reality that security 
actors have a role to play in the country and have insights that are 
relevant to discussions about security priorities, risks, and threats. 
However, the distinction between these two was not sufficiently 
stressed by some international actors that focused primarily on the 
tactical aspects of SSR. SSR was rightly seen as necessary, but without 
also prioritizing dialogue about security sector priorities and 
civilian-led security sector governance.
    While protestors and RCs are diametrically opposed to the SAF and 
some other security sector actors, attempts to learn how the wider 
Sudanese public views them is important since it is possible that there 
are divergent views in more rural areas beyond Khartoum. Lastly, 
observing international engagement with the security sector, especially 
by Russia, Egypt, and the Gulf states, can also help extrapolate how 
such countries view the transition. Key questions should have been 
asked, such as did the security sector assume that its regional allies 
would provide them with more overt support than they did, especially 
after the coup.
Political Parties & Civilian Groups
    Political parties and organized civilian groups are a necessary 
part of any resumed transition, and their ability to work with each 
other and effectively represent citizen stances on a new, more 
sustainable, and truly civilian transition will build a healthier 
political environment. Understanding the motives, strategies, and 
personalities among them can help comprehend how they, and the wider 
public, perceive their role.
    Far from being one unified bloc, the civilians that composed half 
of the transition are diverse in political ideology and approaches. 
Assumptions about their unity on issues beyond the desire for a 
civilian-led government should be groundtruthed. Political and civic 
leaders as individuals are important, but more significant is the 
environment in which they operate and, if provided the opportunity, 
govern. Focusing on the former without attention to the latter can 
create a distorted, underdeveloped political system.
    The umbrella created by the FFC, a loose grouping of political 
parties, unions, civic bodies, and rebel movements, arose during the 
revolution and negotiated the Constitutional Declaration that ushered 
in the hybrid government. Tensions within and between FFC groups 
widened during the transition, whether the result of genuine 
differences, personal animosity, or interference by security sector or 
other actors in Sudan. This chipped away at trust, splitting some 
groups, causing some withdrawals from the FFC, and limiting the ability 
to present actionable views on a way forward. By the time of the coup, 
continued disagreements and interference from some armed movements and 
security actors created discernible factions. However divided they may 
have been, this was no excuse for a coup and saying that it needed to 
happen to get the transition back on track is disingenuous.
    In the post-coup environment, the role of the FFC, its factions, 
and other civilian groups in proposing a political roadmap and engaging 
with actors such as the United Nations Interim Transition Assistance 
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) is contested. The gulf between political 
groups and the protest movement is wide and there is mistrust--or 
misunderstanding--on both sides. International engagement with such 
political groups can help advocate for and possibly facilitate 
understanding through diplomacy and assistance.
The Juba Peace Agreement
    A key goal of the transition was to reach peace agreements with 
armed movements in Sudan's peripheries. Given the historic U.S. and 
international role in peace processes in Sudan--and what is now in 
South Sudan--this theme is particularly relevant. The Juba Peace 
Agreement (JPA) was brokered by South Sudan and signed by the 
transitional government with some armed groups and political movements 
in October 2020. Two main groups from Southern Kordofan and Darfur 
remained outside the agreement. The negotiations process was convoluted 
and expanded to include separate deals with areas such as Eastern 
Sudan. While civilians were initially involved in discussions, security 
elites took the lead. This created a bond between some JPA signatories 
and security components of the transition that was solidified by their 
entry into government in February 2021. The continued presence of some 
JPA representatives in the post-coup government is testament to this 
relationship and its complicated power dynamics.
    Many observers criticize international involvement in Sudanese and 
South Sudanese peace processes going back to the 1990s since they 
produced power-sharing deals that seemed to reward rebellion. Positions 
were doled out, resources divided, and ineffectual committees formed. 
Citizens barely benefited. The JPA replicated a similar process that 
bred similar implementation problems that plagued previous peace deals. 
Taking a fresh look at peace processes and agreements can find ways to 
avoid reinforcing zero-sum, militarized politics. While peace 
agreements and deals between elites are needed, their shape and impact 
need to account for citizen needs and long-term socio-economic 
benefits, not just short-term elite gains.
    Assumptions about the nature of rebel movements and their relative 
legitimacy and representativeness also need to be interrogated, with 
evaluation of the credibility of such groups accounting for their 
commitments to democracy, especially when in government. Agreements can 
provide for detailed, enforceable political deals that do not simply 
provide a screen for signatories to make untransparent decisions and 
trade power. Lastly, a comprehensive peace arrangement may be more 
beneficial than the JPA's peace by pieces approach. That process may be 
more effective if run by civilians, with security sector involvement on 
security arrangements.
Economic Issues
    The transition inherited an economic crisis based on crushing 
international debt, decreasing revenues, chronic budget deficits, 
corruption, and decreased oil revenue after South Sudan's 2011 
secession. Citizens coped with rising urban and rural food insecurity 
amidst government attempts to undertake sweeping economic reforms. Such 
efforts were also impacted by the rise of COVID-19. At the beginning of 
the transition Sudan's economy was effectively blocked from the 
international financial system. The process to reverse this was well 
underway before the coup due to international engagement, particularly 
the U.S. Government's removal of Sudan from its list of state sponsors 
of terrorism after Sudan paid compensation to victims of terrorism. 
Subsequent arrears clearance with international financial institutions 
and reaching the Highly Indebted Poor Countries decision point in June 
2021 continued forward movement. The coup stalled progress since it 
halted international financial institution support and other key 
assistance, and jeopardized debt relief.
    A more technical discussion of economic issues is beyond the scope 
of this testimony. A main lesson is that while economic reforms are 
critical to a transition, equally important are their political 
implications. For example, the scope and timing of subsidy removals 
that can drive popular discontent if mishandled. The international 
community may have realized the need for a social safety net and 
economic dividends, but plans were too often divorced from inescapable 
political linkages. Tied to this is the importance of efforts to 
address Sudan's gray economy, corruption, and undue influence of the 
security actors and previous regime on many sectors. Looking at 
challenges faced by the Empowerment Elimination, Anti-corruption, and 
Funds Recovery Committee tasked with seizing assets of the previous 
regime is critical, as is its treatment after the coup, including 
reversal of some of its decisions.
    Sudan may have moved toward reintegration into the international 
financial and development community, but it was unable to sufficiently 
bring local political actors into this orbit or show more tangible 
dividends to citizens. The precarious post-coup economic situation 
provides impetus for international stakeholders to observe how it 
impacts protests, political discussions and power dynamics, and 
responses from the post-coup government. This could create a more 
nuanced political economy analysis--for example on the controversial 
gold sector--to help inform U.S. and international policies on Sudan.
Transitional Justice
    The need for transitional justice and accountability, and an 
overhauled judicial sector to advance this, is critical to any 
transition in Sudan. For those who suffered abuses under the previous 
regime--and from the 2019 revolution until now--justice is often the 
most salient issue. They must be involved and support outcomes. The 
previous transitional government was unable to advance the issue.
    International theory varies on issues such as the extent and timing 
of justice, as well as strategies such as amnesty. Like many things, it 
is foremost up to the people of Sudan to determine these issues. There 
are relevant comparative examples from the region, though they often 
cripple efforts at justice mechanisms during negotiations and 
implementation of agreements. Though it may sometimes be appropriate to 
delink negotiations on transitional justice from wider talks, this 
often results in implementation being watered down or postponed, or 
formation of toothless committees. Sudanese can discuss concrete 
options for sequencing and leveraging justice issues and determining 
the level(s) of accountability.
Political Pathways Forward
    There are over 10 civilian groups at both national and local levels 
advocating positions on the way forward. They range from political 
parties to community organizations and the families of those killed 
during protests. They seem to agree on the need for: a fully civilian 
democratic government; removal of the security sector from politics and 
the economy; accountability related to the June 2019 Khartoum massacre 
and those killed since the coup; JPA and peace process reviews; 
creation of the transitional legislative council; and a unified 
national army and reformed civilian-led security sector. They disagree 
on whether to reject all dialogue with security actors. Some are 
suggesting that security sector involvement in government be limited to 
a civilian-led security and defense council to advise on security 
matters. Some are in favor of engaging with the UNITAMS consultations 
while others are opposed.
    It is remarkable that these groups can prepare positions through 
consensus-building and dialogue while many are peacefully confronting 
state-sponsored violence. This violence is unacceptable, and the 
international community must take measures beyond words to halt it. 
Continued violence will likely prevent a viable, inclusive political 
process and solution. However, continued violence and international 
reactions to this should not put undue pressure on civilians to overly 
compromise for the sake of a quick, halfhearted peace. Focusing on 
simultaneously creating a safe space for them to refine positions and 
encourage political actors to embrace them is needed. Similarly, 
premature calls for national dialogue that is not inclusive and/or 
ignores the need for a level playing field are unhelpful. If not 
carefully planned and executed, a contested dialogue process could 
reinforce power inequalities and harden positions.
    Many political processes begin with a defined process, topics for 
negotiation, and identifiable stances. But they often lack clarity on 
what an end state may be. The current case of Sudan appears to be the 
opposite; civilian groups seem to agree that a fully democratic end 
state is needed with security forces taking up their proper role and 
devoid of involvement in non-security arenas. A comprehensive peace is 
also critical. The U.S. and international community should embrace this 
end state. However, it is the process to that end state that needs a 
clear strategy, bolstered by coordinated international engagement. The 
inclusion of women in such a process is paramount. They have often 
borne the brunt of repressive regimes. For example, surviving the use 
of rape as a weapon of war from the beginning of the Darfur conflict 
until now. Their inclusion in political and peace discussions, and 
security sector reform and accountability, is critical.
    It is important for political processes to be Sudanese-led. 
However, there are ones that are well-constructed, align with the 
revolution's vision, and likely to result in a sustainable agreement. 
And those that are not. Sudanese recognize this and are wary of blanket 
acceptance sometimes employed by the international community. 
Additionally, intervention by regional states, some of which may be 
seen by Sudanese as unhelpful, needs to be accounted for in political 
solutions. It is tempting to use previous models for political 
discussions and negotiations. This post-coup situation is a rare 
opportunity to test new ways and avoid overlaying Sudan's evolving 
dynamics onto stale frameworks. Many Sudanese see beyond the end of a 
transition to future events that can strengthen a democratic outcome. 
This requires medium- and long-term international strategies that 
extend beyond the horizon of any renewed transition.
    The UNITAMS initiative has received much attention because it is 
the first structured political consultation process. In its public 
statements UNITAMS was careful to note that it has not embarked on a 
formal mediation effort but is beginning with consultations to feed 
into a possible process that could be facilitated by the UN and/or 
other partners. Any process can be made more inclusive, especially by 
including women, youth, and other civic actors. But if inclusivity is 
symbolic or disingenuous, the bitterness it creates among those groups 
can cripple support for outcomes.
    International discussions underway to identify eminent 
international personalities that can assist with UNITAMS' work are 
important. Something akin to the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development Partners Forum may also be helpful. There is precedent, for 
example during the 2010-12 African Union High-level Implementation 
Panel talks between Sudan and South Sudan, for broad collaboration 
between the UN, AU, and international champions. If this is replicated 
in Sudan, its impact can be magnified if it stretches from UN 
headquarters in New York where the Security Council's P5 and A3 can be 
invoked, to regional capitals and AU headquarters. Technical experts in 
fields such as constitutional design and security issues can be on 
standby, and secretariat services organized. Genuine partnerships among 
those with the mandate and stake in the future of the country are 
required for success. Absent such collaboration, energy and political 
coherence will be wasted and parties are likely to ``forum shop'' at 
the expense of forging a timely, equitable deal.
United States Assistance & Diplomacy
    The U.S. Government, in particular the Department of State and 
USAID, has decades of experience amidst the complexities of Sudan's 
politics, economy, and humanitarian situation. Never has the U.S. 
Government had access to so much information to help understand the 
current situation. This is key to advancing policy objectives and 
assisting in Sudan's democratic transformation.
    After the coup, the U.S. suspended portions of a $700 million 
assistance appropriation related to direct government support, along 
with similar support provided by other U.S.-funded programs. 
Fortunately, civil society support, democracy, human rights, and 
governance (DRG) programs, and conflict mitigation assistance was 
expanded. It may be tempting to restart assistance at first sign of 
improvement or if it appears it can fix an emergency, but care should 
be taken to ensure that a restart is not premature. Having to suspend 
assistance again, or weather a period where it is clear that the 
situation has not effectively changed, can dent credibility of the U.S. 
approach. A scenario for the suspension's lifting is when violence 
against civilians has ceased and there is tangible, irreversible 
progress toward a civilian government.
    While it may seem counterintuitive, the suspension provides a rare 
opportunity to return to first principles and assess the aims of 
assistance. The collapse of the transition and upending of the 
constitutional order is a shift that requires serious reconsideration. 
During this time, however, close attention on the nationwide economic, 
livelihoods, and food security situation is needed to ensure that 
appropriate help is applied. In most cases, humanitarian crises are 
best solved through negotiated solutions to political and conflict 
issues. This can unlock assistance for community resilience and 
economic growth programs, such as small and medium agricultural 
enterprises, and supporting Sudanese organizations working on 
environmental issues.
    The U.S. could better align its diplomatic and political efforts 
with development assistance. There are times when diplomacy can provide 
tangible support for assistance objectives, particularly for DRG and 
conflict mitigation ones. However, they can be inadvertently undermined 
through the course of diplomacy, especially during key political 
milestones, negotiations, or conflict. An example is the April 2010 
Sudan national elections. While the U.S. supported electoral management 
bodies and citizen-led monitoring to advance elections, some diplomatic 
messages did not address contested processes and outcomes amidst the 
focus on moving the Comprehensive Peace Agreement closer to other 
milestones. An overriding consideration for bridging the gap between 
diplomacy and assistance is that the latter is unlikely to completely 
resolve complex problems, but it can help support outcomes and 
consolidate gains.
    All assistance, especially to the DRG sector, is most effective 
when grounded in a ``do no harm'' principle and adaptable to situations 
on the ground. Sudan's citizens can best express ways to achieve this, 
more so now due to closing space. Proposed assistance should undertake 
the necessary groundwork with possible beneficiaries to build trust and 
overcome any misunderstandings. For example, if assistance to RCs is 
requested, it should be based on careful, transparent discussions to 
ensure buy-in and that resources are going where RCs think they are 
most needed. Assistance to RCs could include continued development of 
strategies for nonviolent action, ensuring that mobilization is 
sustained while aiming to stop civilian deaths, and support for new 
political mechanisms arising from RCs and other civic groups. It is 
possible that some groups will not want U.S. and international 
assistance for valid reasons. Lastly, it is possible that some groups 
may benefit more from political and non-monetary support or feel that 
financial support will not be effective without political support. 
Coordination between assistance and diplomacy is critical in such 
cases.
    A U.S. all-of-government DRG strategy for Sudan to help restore, 
support, and consolidate a genuine transition is needed. It could be 
conceptualized, implemented, and monitored by a joint USAID/Department 
of State/National Security Council task force with senior-level 
leadership. It could also link diplomatic and political efforts with 
assistance programs and be informed by rolling assessments of political 
economy and conflict situations. Areas for mutually reinforcing 
international partnerships could be explored. A task force could be 
staffed with experts in digital communications, independent media, 
civil society protection, women's political engagement, and political 
party and legislative development, among others. Many relevant program 
areas can be found in the 2020 Sudan Democratic Transition, 
Accountability, and Fiscal Transparency Act. A Sudan DRG strategy could 
be viewed in the context of the Biden administration's democracy agenda 
and be a case study for turning democracy promotion ideals into 
actionable policy placed at the heart of bilateral relations.
    Diplomatic and assistance strategies are important, but individuals 
do the hard work of implementation. Some embassies and assistance 
missions in Khartoum were not backfilled after some billets were 
transferred to South Sudan in 2011. While assistance opportunities may 
have been limited in post-secession Sudan, there has not been adequate 
staffing up since the 2019 revolution. Additionally, there are good 
examples of Washington, DC-based U.S. Government surge support for 
Sudan. For example, the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan in 
2010 had over 20 staff, including some detailed from the Departments of 
Defense and Treasury, and Schedule B and contractor hires for 
negotiations support, programming assistance, security sector advising, 
public affairs outreach, and other specialties. Retired ambassadors 
were brought back to focus on political issues and the Darfur conflict.
    More personnel could be devoted to messaging and public affairs 
outreach, both in person in Sudan and on social media. For many 
protestors and RCs, the idea that the U.S. can on the one hand publicly 
say they support the people of Sudan in their struggle for democracy, 
and on the other hand support dialogue with security actors, is not 
valid. The U.S. can help publicly bridge this gap and explain why it 
believes these things can happen simultaneously.
    It is right for the U.S. and others to diplomatically engage 
security actors in Sudan, but it should be grounded in a firm view of a 
truly civilian government end state grounded in comprehensive peace. As 
the U.S. engages with security actors that are using some tactics 
reminiscent of the pre-revolution era, it can analyze lessons from its 
engagement with the NCP regime, particularly on how it did or did not 
utilize concrete incentives and disincentives.
    It is understandable that some call for targeted sanctions because 
they are a powerful tool to translate statements condemning violence 
against citizens into action. They must be applied smartly and be part 
of a clear, detailed strategy grounded in political realities. 
Sanctions are not a substitute for a strategy. The argument that 
sanctions may in theory negatively impact prospects for dialogue 
through hardening positions or stoking violence needs to be 
groundtruthed. The argument is often made based on assumptions instead 
of objective analysis. Assumptions that sanctions on lower-level 
officials will provide necessary warning to senior leaders and change 
their behavior should also be checked.
                               conclusion
    The 2019 revolution was informed by decades of repression and 
struggle, and what came after did not arise from a clean slate. Many 
Sudanese rightly have a long view of history and link their 
generation's struggles to prior ones. In the British colonial era 
library at the University of Khartoum there is a small shrine to Ahmed 
al Qurashi, a 20-year-old student whose killing galvanized popular 
protests that brought down a military government in October 1964. 
Today, the photos of many 2019 revolution victims are alongside his. 
More have probably been added since October 2021.
    Complex social and demographic changes got underway due to the 
relative opening of civic space after the revolution. It will be 
difficult to definitively close that space without resistance from 
citizens, as is currently happening on the streets of Sudan. The 
complexity of Sudan's politics has also increased during this historic 
time. While contrasting views abound, a plurality of views is normal in 
deeply divided societies like Sudan, and it is possible to encourage 
civil debate and consensus. This can lay a strong foundation for a 
vibrant democracy that Sudanese have struggled to achieve and that the 
U.S. values in its own society.
    The U.S. and international community can, and should, avoid a 
neutral stance on what has happened in Sudan. There was a military coup 
and the government's constitutional bond with its citizens was severed. 
It is not possible to return to the pre-coup dispensation. A new 
constitutional order is needed. There will be no stability in Sudan 
until there is a genuine civilian government and the role of the 
security sector is firmly decided and implemented. That stability must 
extend to Sudan's peripheries such as Darfur, Southern Kordofan, Blue 
Nile, Eastern Sudan, and the Far North. For now, instability there is 
tied to national-level politics, exacerbating local issues during a 
time of economic and humanitarian crisis. The onus is on Sudanese to 
achieve their democratic goals, but the U.S. and international 
community have an explicit role to play in the interest of regional and 
international stability. More importantly, there is a duty to nurture 
citizen-led, non-violent democratic change at a time when this is in 
short global supply.
    The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and 
not the United States Institute of Peace.

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimony. Let me 
start off.
    Dr. Ero, can Sudan's transition be salvaged? What do we 
need, from your perspective, to put things back on track?
    Dr. Ero. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez.
    Yes, it can be salvaged, and the people of Sudan themselves 
have articulated clearly the steps that need to be taken to 
ensure that.
    I think key will be keeping your consistent line that you 
started to articulate here today about supporting the efforts 
to getting Sudan back on track, including supporting the 
transition, making sure that the military do pull back from 
their--from their entrenched position of derailing the process, 
making sure that they step back from the current course that 
they are taking.
    The Sudanese military power has held power in the past, as 
you know, for 52 of Sudan's 65 years of independence. It is not 
surprising that they have taken a very hard-line entrenched 
position as well.
    Working with the Sudanese people, making sure you have a 
very firm line also on dealing with the consequences and making 
it clear to the military that there are consequences for their 
own intervention into the civil political life has to be a very 
firm line.
    Getting coordinated a response from your international 
allies, the African Union, particularly, the region, making 
sure there is a clear understanding of what stability means for 
the country, making it very clear to everybody that there is no 
place in Sudan for military rule in the country, and making 
sure also that the region is aligned in understanding that, I 
think, is going to be key to getting Sudan back on track and 
getting the transition back towards the path that was started 
in 2019 and then getting it towards a transition.
    We do need coordinated and concerted action both within the 
United States, between the United States and its international 
actors, and particularly in the region to get the country back 
on track.
    The Chairman. In that coordination that you refer to, what 
steps would you like the U.S. and like-minded countries to take 
to increase pressure on the Sudanese military leader to yield 
power to a civilian government?
    Dr. Ero. I think some of your opening statements, Senator 
Menendez, started to articulate that. I think you also began to 
articulate that there will be clear consequences for the 
security forces as well.
    I think that is an important message. The military seeks 
legitimacy. It seeks engagement with international actors. It 
also recognizes that it cannot govern without the support of 
civilians as well.
    That already gives you an entry point as well, and I think 
then being consistent in terms of the pressure that is to be 
applied to the country. There is a very narrow window now to 
begin to ensure that the military understands the nature of the 
pressure that can be applied.
    For example, the step that you have taken already at the 
level of the United States has triggered already an 
understanding that the military has heavily miscalculated in 
its own actions as well.
    I think the weak link right now is between the 
international actors and the wider regional community, and you 
have already pointed out in your previous session that a lot of 
work has been taken to work with the Gulf countries and Egypt, 
and making sure that they stay in the room and be coordinated 
in their steps, I think, is going to be the key to getting 
Sudan stabilized.
    The Chairman. There will be no legitimacy for the military 
unless they move towards--back towards a transition to a 
civilian government and there will be no assistance, from my 
perspective, at least not in any way that would be helpful to 
them unless we have a change.
    Mr. Tucker, what type of programmatic activities would be 
the most impactful when it comes to supporting the democratic 
aspirations of the Sudanese people at this time?
    Mr. Tucker. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
    I think we need to take a quick look that assistance to 
civil society, to political parties, legislative development--
the suite of things that we all know well that is encompassed 
by democracy, human rights, and governance support--is 
desperately needed.
    I want to underline here that I have seen in my career, 
both at the State Department and USAID, that sometimes support 
to civil society and other critical governance actors is not 
necessarily supported in real time substantively by our 
diplomacy and international diplomacy.
    What I mean by that is at times when diplomatic and 
political solutions might not be evident or are very difficult, 
it is easy to say we should do assistance to civil society, to 
civilian actors.
    I, certainly, do not want to downplay support to those 
critical actors. They are critical to the way forward.
    I think we need the development of a detailed strategy on 
how diplomacy and assistance can better work together on these 
things.
    I have to say here that that requires an enormous amount of 
technical expertise and staff across the board at State and 
USAID, and that is possible, but it is difficult, both in 
Khartoum and here in Washington, DC.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you, in this regard what 
benchmarks then should we expect to be met before the U.S. 
resumes assistance? Why are those benchmarks important?
    Mr. Tucker. They are important, frankly, because they are 
very difficult to determine. It is easy to say we need progress 
toward a civilian-led government.
    I think that some people in the international community got 
hung up on the idea of a civilian-led government. I think that 
the government that happened during the transition was actually 
led by the military.
    I think what people on the streets and resistance 
committees are looking for is genuine, full, unimpeded 
executive power held by the prime minister and the cabinet by 
civilians. So, perhaps, that assistance should start before you 
get that fully civilian government.
    I think there needs to be really enforceable directives and 
progress toward that fully civilian government end state that 
are enforceable and benchmarks set by civilians themselves and 
that are agreed to by what now is a very broad group of 
civilian actors.
    The Chairman. Dr. Ero, when it comes to returning Sudan to 
a path that would lead to democracy, who are the potential 
spoilers, including foreign countries?
    Dr. Ero. Senator, every spoiler is also part of the 
solution is the way I would like to characterize it that way 
and, of course, at the top of the podium is the military.
    Whether we like it or not, we have to find a way in which 
to engage with the military, but it should not be engagement 
that sets aside--as you rightly pointed out, that sets aside 
the demands that the civilians have articulated for a number of 
years as well. The military and the civilian leadership as 
well, is crucial to that.
    I do not want to use the terminology spoiler. As I said, 
every spoiler is crucial to getting us to where we need to be. 
The other--there are other important players, armed groups as 
well, that are crucial to knitting back a very complex and 
complicated country as well.
    There are a number of regional countries that have tacitly 
sort of given a nod to the coup who articulate or claim to 
express their desire to see stability in Sudan, and we have got 
to make sure that we all have a clear understanding of what 
stability for Sudan means today and there is only one stability 
for Sudan, which is to get it back on that transitional 
roadmap, to get it back to that inspirational revolution that 
we started to see back in 2019 and to make sure that that path 
towards democratization that was embedded in the peace 
agreement in 2019 is articulated as well.
    Again, Senator, I understand the way in which you want to 
characterize it, but there are--those who we consider spoilers 
are also crucial to getting us back or to getting Sudan back on 
the right track as well.
    The Chairman. I appreciate your diplomatic response to 
that. The reality is, is that we would hope spoilers would be 
empowerers and not spoilers, and they would be part of the 
solution.
    Some of them have played the role of spoiler already to 
this point. We have to think about--at some point, I am into 
naming and shaming in the hopes that we will get people to 
recategorize and rethink their positions as to what is in their 
best interests, but I understand your view that a spoiler can 
be actually a facilitator. It all depends which road they 
decide to take.
    Finally, let me ask you both: what can we, the United 
States and the international community, do to ensure that the 
U.N.-mediated talks are inclusive, especially of historically 
marginalized communities, and not limited primarily to elites?
    Mr. Tucker.
    Mr. Tucker. Yes, thank you. That is an excellent question.
    I think, first, I would say in speaking to many people on 
the ground in Khartoum in the past week that are involved in 
some of the discussions among resistance committees, civilian 
groups and political groups on political consensus and 
political positions, everyone has said that the nature of these 
groups are important.
    Sometimes they are horizontal and diffuse, and there needs 
to be time for them to develop their positions and, perhaps, 
equally importantly, to engage with political parties on how 
they can support these positions and how they can bring them 
forward in inevitable negotiations in which, perhaps, political 
individuals will take the lead.
    As I mentioned in my testimony, there is urgency. There 
definitely is, but they cannot be rushed to submit positions 
that, perhaps, fracture them and their loose coalitions. I 
have, frankly, seen that happen before in South Sudan and in 
Sudan, and that is unfortunate.
    I think there is precedent for strong, robust international 
engagement on these issues. In my experience with the African 
Union and the U.N. in Sudan and South Sudan, it is best when 
there are links between U.N. operations and the Security 
Council, the P5 and the A3 in New York, connected directly to 
the region, to AU headquarters and IGAD, so you can invoke that 
high-level senior diplomatic engagement that has to be 
connected to what the SRSG is doing on the ground in Khartoum.
    So what I am getting at here is it cannot just be one 
individual with technical support in the capital. They need to 
be able to invoke that higher authority. When and as needed 
discussions underway on international eminent personalities are 
important, but we desperately need more direct engagement and 
signaling from the U.N. in New York and African Union 
headquarters that, first and foremost, is coordinated and not 
at cross purposes with what civilians are looking at right now.
    The Chairman. Dr. Ero, any thoughts on this?
    Dr. Ero. Yes. I completely agree with what my colleague at 
USIP has said and I think it is worth acknowledging in front of 
your committee that the initiative by the United Nations has 
not been without problems as well.
    It has come under fairly substantial criticisms from some 
in the protest movements who feel, at one level, that that 
process has been rushed. They also feel that there was not a 
sufficiently consultative approach taken towards talks as well.
    Some do feel that the international--Sudan's international 
partners and including the U.S., I have to add, rushed to 
embrace the U.N.-led talks without strongly demanding that they 
should be better coordinated with all of Sudan's actors to give 
it the best chance of success.
    I think it is worth adding here that the resistance 
committees--Sudanese resistance committees are currently 
coordinating their own efforts to come up with an agreed 
position on a way forward for the country. It is a laudable 
effort and it will ultimately form a key part of any future 
talks that we want to see in the country.
    I would say that in the meantime the U.N. should continue 
its attempt to bring various parties to the table, but it 
should pay special attention to two conditions that we believe, 
at the International Crisis Group, are important.
    First, that those talks should be Sudanese led and that 
they should be, as I said in my oral statement, maximally 
inclusive, and that especially they must include prominent 
voices from Sudanese neighborhood resistance committees. This 
is what we see as vital if those talks are going to succeed.
    The Chairman. Very well. Thank you both for your insights. 
It has been very instructive and helpful, and we look forward 
to continuing to engage with both of you as we move forward.
    Seeing no other member before the committee seeking 
recognition, this record will stay open until the close of 
business tomorrow.
    With the thanks of the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


      Amnesty International USA Statement, Dated January 24, 2022
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. It is critically important that we not lose sight of the 
continued violence and displacement in Darfur, where people's voices 
have been marginalized for far too long. It is not clear to me that 
those who purport to represent the people of Darfur in Khartoum have 
any interest in accurately reflecting the interests of those who are 
still suffering violence and displacement on the ground. How is USAID 
working to address needs in Darfur in the wake of the coup? How can the 
USG ensure that grassroots voices in Darfur are represented in 
political negotiations?

    Answer. USAID's humanitarian assistance has continued since October 
25 for people in need in Sudan, including in Darfur. The United States 
is the single largest humanitarian donor in Sudan, and USAID provided 
more than $382 million in Fiscal Year 2021 alone and nearly $45 million 
to date in Fiscal Year 2022. The United States is committed to 
supporting the Sudanese people as they confront ongoing challenges 
related to insecurity, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters.
    In Darfur, USAID works with partners to provide multi-sectoral 
humanitarian assistance, including agriculture, food, health, 
nutrition, and water, sanitation, and hygiene assistance. For example, 
in December, a USAID non-governmental organization (NGO) partner 
provided health consultations to more than 35,000 people, including 
approximately 10,000 children aged 5 years and younger. The NGO also 
supported the vaccination of nearly 3,300 children against diseases 
such as measles, meningitis, polio, and tuberculosis. North Darfur, 
West Darfur and other areas of Sudan are facing acute food insecurity 
due to above-average food prices and reduced purchasing power--driven 
by conflict, displacement, and economic disruptions related to 
political instability. In response, USAID is providing life-saving food 
assistance to people in need through NGO and United Nations (UN) 
partners, primarily through cash transfers for food and cereals, pulses 
including split peas and lentils, and vegetable oil sourced locally, 
regionally, and from the United States.
    USAID humanitarian assistance in Sudan also supports activities 
that seek to address gender-based violence (GBV) and address the 
negative consequences of conflict on women and children. This includes 
GBV response services in Darfur, child protection networks, and 
psychosocial services for survivors of domestic violence, child 
marriage, and female genital mutilation.
    USAID, in coordination with the Department of State, is providing 
complementary support to the UN Integrated Transition Assistance 
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) in order to incorporate grassroots voices in 
political discussions--for those in Darfur and other regions outside 
Khartoum as well. Bringing together voices from across the country is 
essential not only to find a way out of the current political impasse, 
but also to enhance participation and accountability more broadly. 
USAID is supporting grassroots organizations to engage in consultations 
with UNITAMS and other platforms that focus on consensus building.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. What specific legal authorities are currently in place 
that could be used to impose sanctions, including personal targeted 
sanctions on Sudan in the wake of the coup?

    Answer. UN Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005) established a 
sanctions regime that includes a territorial arms embargo on Darfur and 
prescribes an asset freeze and travel ban for those who are designated 
for impeding the peace process or otherwise constituting a threat to 
stability in Darfur and the region. President Bush in 2006 authorized 
domestic sanctions in connection with the conflict in Darfur, including 
for those undermining peace and security in Darfur. E.O. 13818 (Global 
Magnitsky) authorizes sanctions in connection with serious human rights 
abuse or corruption. While not specific to Sudan, it could be used on 
Sudanese actors.

    Question. On January 24, you tweeted that military actors 
responsible for violence against protestors would face consequences. 
What ``consequences'' were you referring to in your tweet and what will 
trigger them?

    Answer. The consequences I referred to in my tweet match those I 
detailed in my official testimony for this hearing. After the military 
overthrew the government on October 25, we moved swiftly to pause much 
of our $700m in assistance and rallied our international partners to 
pause billions in debt relief and assistance. Losing access to that 
assistance and debt relief has dealt a major blow to the military 
government's budget and demonstrated that they cannot receive 
international aid while simultaneously undermining Sudan's stability. 
While we are redirecting our assistance to best support the Sudanese 
people, we will not allow it to directly or indirectly benefit the 
military government until they restore civilian rule and cease 
violations of human rights. We are now considering the full range of 
traditional and non-traditional tools at our disposal to impose costs 
on military actors who commit acts of violence against demonstrators 
and undermine the democratic transition. This includes exploring new 
authorities specific to Sudan's democratic transition. We will assess 
how and when to apply those consequences based on available evidence 
and the evolving situation on the ground in Sudan.

    Question. How is the State Department working to address needs in 
Darfur in the wake of the coup? How can the USG ensure that grassroots 
voices in Darfur are represented in political negotiations?

    Answer. It's clear that instability in Khartoum is benefiting armed 
opportunists in Darfur, resulting in increased intercommunal violence 
in the region over the last year. We are exploring how to expand our 
ongoing support, including from the $700 million emergency 
appropriation designated for Sudan, to further support peace in Darfur. 
We are supporting the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in 
Sudan's (UNITAMS) consultations with Sudanese actors, which include 
many Darfuri groups, including internally displaced persons and other 
Darfuri stakeholders, and Juba Peace Agreement signatories, by using 
our offices to urge our Darfuri contacts to engage meaningfully with 
UNITAMS and other Sudanese political and civil society actors. The U.S. 
Government is also supporting and trying to expand UN and NGO efforts 
to deploy more observers to Darfur to deter violence and human rights 
abuses.

    Question. What are we doing with regards to putting in place 
mechanisms that protect civilians in Darfur?

    Answer. Because delays in implementation of the Juba Peace 
Agreement have had a negative effect on the security situation in 
Darfur, I have urged General Burhan, General Hemedti, armed opposition 
leaders, and others not to neglect this process. We are encouraged by 
UNITAMS' work with the permanent ceasefire committee and urge the JPA 
signatories to expedite implementation of other security arrangement 
provisions, in particular the establishment of the Darfur Security 
Forces mandated to protect civilians. Ultimately, the best protection 
for civilians in Darfur is a democratic Sudanese Government that is 
inclusive, responsive to the needs of its people, and protective of 
their human rights. To that end, our support of the UNITAMS 
facilitation of a Sudanese led political agreement will be most 
impactful in ensuring long term protection for civilians in Darfur.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Isobel Coleman to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. Following the October 25 coup, what action did USAID take 
to pause and/or redirect U.S. assistance to Sudan?

    Answer. Following the October 25, 2021, military takeover, USAID 
immediately paused all non-humanitarian assistance to the Government of 
Sudan and all activities funded by the FY 2021 Title IX Economic 
Support Fund (ESF) appropriation, which included USAID's Office of 
Transition Initiative (OTI) work with the transitional government. 
While assistance to the Government of Sudan remains paused, programs 
that help the people of Sudan and their democratic aspirations, 
including ongoing activities with civil society and independent media, 
monitoring and documenting human rights abuses, peacebuilding 
activities in conflict-affected areas, and health programs, resumed 
following a short review. OTI has refocused its efforts on working with 
civil society and on activities that bolster independent media. USAID 
will look for clear progress towards resuming a transition to a more 
democratic, civilian-led government before re-engaging with the 
Government of Sudan.

    Question. What, if any, action should Congress take to augment or 
terminate assistance previously appropriated for Sudan, including the 
$700 million in Economic Support Funds appropriated in the FY21 omnibus 
spending bill?

    Answer. USAID is currently engaging in an interagency process to 
revise the spend plan for the $700 million in FY 2021 Title IX Economic 
Support Funds in light of the military takeover on October 25, 2021. We 
are working with our colleagues at the Department of State and National 
Security Council to put together a proposed spend plan that is 
responsive to the needs of the Sudanese people, in line with absorptive 
capacity and does not reward the military regime. We look forward to 
consulting with the Committee on the proposed plan shortly.

    Question. Does the USAID Mission in Khartoum have sufficient 
capacity, levels of staffing, and variety of implementers to be able to 
obligate fully the levels of assistance appropriated by Congress to 
support Sudan's transition?

    Answer. The USAID Mission constantly reviews its staffing pattern 
with the Bureau for Africa to provide adequate coverage and United 
States Direct Hire (USDH) oversight. These reviews have led USAID to 
identify the need for additional staff, and three USDH positions were 
added in Sudan in FY 2021. Two USDH positions are currently in 
recruitment, and three additional USDH positions will be requested in a 
forthcoming Congressional Notification. The Mission is able to use 
contractors and temporary duty support for immediate needs while longer 
term staffing needs are fulfilled.
    USAID is currently consulting with interagency partners on a 
revised plan for the funding appropriated by Congress to support 
Sudan's transition. We look forward to engaging this committee on 
future planning.
    USAID works closely with the interagency in Sudan to ensure any 
work conducted by different U.S. Government agencies with the same 
implementing partner is complementary and not duplicative.

    Question. Does USAID have a strategy for democracy, rights, and 
governance (DRG) programming for Sudan to help restore, support and 
consolidate the country's transition?

    Answer. Yes. USAID has several programs that focus on developing a 
rights-based, participatory approach and an enabling environment where 
democracy, human rights, and governance can flourish and meet the 
aspirations of Sudanese citizens. As the transition has evolved, our 
programs have adapted to meet new realities on the ground. Our strategy 
includes expansion of existing democracy, rights, and governance (DRG) 
programming as well as the development of new, timely programs that 
will work holistically toward the restoration, consolidation, and--most 
importantly--success of Sudan's transition.
    Core to our strategy is bolstering the pro-democracy movement, with 
a special focus on supporting youth and women as active participants 
and leaders in their country's future, promoting access to information, 
and engaging leaders who embody and actively promote democratic values. 
Additionally, we aim to build the capacity and resilience of 
institutions that are critical for democracy to be successful, such as 
a diverse civil society, independent media, and inclusive political 
parties. Equally as important to our strategy and as part of a broader 
effort to advance peace and reconciliation, we are working to 
strengthen accountability for human rights abuses through monitoring, 
documentation, and advocacy. We are engaging with diverse local 
organizations, which are often nascent and located outside of Khartoum, 
to build a strong local oversight capacity. This includes monitoring 
and observing the transition process and relevant political processes 
so that local, trusted organizations can contribute to, report on, and 
analyze the transition's progress and alert the Sudanese public to 
areas that need additional oversight or advocacy for reform. As part of 
these programs, civil society will monitor conflict in their 
communities and work on local solutions to mitigate violence. A 
diversity of citizen voices will continue to be essential to the 
success of the transition and will need to be incorporated into every 
aspect of our DRG strategy.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Mary Catherine Phee to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. Considering lessons learned from the start of Sudan's 
transition to the October 25 coup, how will the United States deal with 
issues of accountability and justice, particularly for prominent 
members of the military junta currently running Sudan?

    Answer. Justice and accountability for human rights abuses and 
related crimes, past and ongoing, are key to a stable and lasting peace 
in Sudan and will be an important component of the UN Integrated 
Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) process. We intend to 
provide assistance to support and promote accountability and 
transitional justice efforts as determined by the Sudanese people and 
consistent with Sudan's international and domestic legal obligations 
and commitments, including with respect to the International Criminal 
Court.

    Question. Should individuals responsible for genocide in Darfur, 
killing protesters, and the overthrow of a civilian-led transitional 
government continue to be treated as legitimate partners moving 
forward?

    Answer. As I noted in my testimony, Sudan's military leaders broke 
their commitment to ``partnership'' when they overthrew the civilian-
led transitional government and violated the Constitutional Declaration 
last October. Sudan's security forces now hold the political and 
economic levers of power, but it is clear the Sudanese people consider 
the current arrangement to be unacceptable and are committed to 
establishing a democracy. While no longer a partner in the transition 
to democracy, the military is a participant in the process, but they 
must not dictate its terms or its outcome.

    Question. If yes to question 2, what considerations must be taken 
as to the appropriate balance between the need for justice and 
accountability, and the interest of returning Sudan to peaceful 
civilian leadership?

    Answer. There cannot be a stable and lasting peace in Sudan if the 
root causes of violence are not addressed, including longstanding 
impunity for serious abuses. The UNITAMS process offers an opportunity 
for the Sudanese to discuss how to seek accountability for the crimes 
of the past and lay the groundwork for a future where the rights of all 
persons in Sudan are respected. We are prepared to support future 
civilian leadership in efforts aimed at accountability and transitional 
justice.

    Question. If no to question 2, how will the U.S. manage to elevate 
legitimate representatives of the Sudanese people?

    Answer. It is not up to us to elevate or choose representatives for 
Sudan. We have made clear to all of our interlocutors that the United 
States supports the desire of the Sudanese people for a civilian-led 
government and democratic elections in Sudan. Through our current 
programs, efforts to support UNITAMS, and in planning future 
assistance, we have focused on providing funding, training, and support 
to civil society organizations and other stakeholders to lift the 
voices of the Sudanese people in order to rebalance power in their 
favor.

    Question. How will the United States participate in future 
conversations about debt relief for Sudan?

    Answer. We, and our partners in the Paris Club and Friends of 
Sudan, have made clear to the military that their actions have 
imperiled debt relief in Sudan, which is currently paused due to the 
overthrow of the government by the military on October 25. We will 
continue to reassess the situation as it develops to determine if and 
when we might be in a position to proceed with concluding a bilateral 
debt agreement.

    Question. In the case that a civilian-led transition and 
discussions with the international financial institutions get back on 
track, what minimum benchmarks will need to be met for the United 
States to rejoin discussion about bilateral and multilateral debt 
relief for Sudan?

    Answer. The resumption of broader assistance depends on Sudan 
meeting democratic transition benchmarks, including establishing a 
civilian cabinet that is credible in the eyes of the Sudanese people; 
lifting the state of emergency; ending security force violence against 
protestors; making progress toward establishing legislative and 
judicial institutions, electoral infrastructure, and transitional 
justice mechanisms; and implementing security sector reforms.

    Question. Will a complete hand over of power to civilian 
authorities be a requirement for the U.S. to rejoin discussion about 
bilateral and multilateral debt relief for Sudan?

    Answer. Civilian leadership is the most basic prerequisite for 
renewed U.S. support for debt relief. Sudan made commitments to 
economic reform prior to the military takeover. Every day that passes 
with military control further damages Sudan's economy. We will look to 
civilian leadership meeting the aforementioned benchmarks before we 
will consider U.S. support for proceeding with debt relief.

    Question. For the United States, what does the meaningful 
participation of women in political dialogue and transition processes 
look like?

    Answer. Women have risked their lives to realize the dream of a 
democratic Sudan. Without the leadership and bravery of Sudanese women, 
the Sudanese revolution would likely not have enjoyed success. Women 
have been at the forefront of democratization efforts in Sudan and have 
provided a significant portion of the movement's leadership. We are 
committed to supporting UNITAMS in ensuring the meaningful 
participation of women in the political process and transition. To 
date, UNITAMS has met with an estimated 75 different women's groups, as 
well as female delegates representing civil society groups and 
political parties. Women's participation in these consultations means 
that women can voice their concerns, participate as equals, and 
maintain their important role in leading the transition to democracy. 
Gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence and 
sexual violence used as a means of repressing protestors, is 
unacceptable, and perpetrators must be held accountable.

    Question. How will the United States work with the international 
community and Sudanese partners to ensure that women are not simply at 
the table, but are critical voices leading discussions on a way forward 
for Sudan that reflects the will of the Sudanese people?

    Answer. We have ongoing programming that focuses on empowering and 
enabling women to take a leading and meaningful role in the political 
process in Sudan. We will continue to mainstream women's leadership in 
future programming, and we prioritize the engagement of women leaders 
and groups in our diplomatic engagement. We have also encouraged 
engagement and outreach by UNITAMS with women leaders and groups.

    Question. Looking forward, and considering lessons learned from the 
last 10 years, how will the United States engage on the Abyei issue?

    Answer. We will continue to support the important mission of the 
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and use our offices to 
encourage the governments of South Sudan and Sudan to engage in good 
faith to resolve the status of Abyei. While Sudan faces many 
challenges, we will continue to work with relevant parties to ensure 
Abyei remains an area of focus for both governments. Abyei's disputed 
status has had a negative effect on the people residing and transiting 
the area. We will also endeavor to ensure that the United Nations has 
the appropriate support, financing, and staffing to be able to 
effectively conduct its mission in Abyei.

    Question. How will various potential outcomes of the situation in 
Khartoum affect future efforts related to Abyei?

    Answer. For progress to be made regarding Abyei, Sudan needs an 
involved civilian government, willing to meaningfully engage with those 
residing in--or who regularly transit--Abyei. Other critical 
stakeholders include the government of South Sudan and the UN Interim 
Security Force, who must participate in negotiations to resolve 
pressing issues related to security as well as the ultimate status of 
Abyei.

    Question. How is the U.S. Government's public affairs and media 
outreach strategy adapting to the current situation in Sudan?

    Answer. Our public diplomacy and media outreach strategy seeks to 
speak to the people on their terms--and to listen. That includes press 
releases, tweets, Facebook posts, public engagements, and interviews 
with domestic and international media.

    Question. How does the State Department plan to balance its public 
and private messaging and the diversity of audiences both inside and 
outside of Sudan?

    Answer. We strive to have a consistent message both publicly and 
privately. That message has been for our unwavering support for the 
democratic aspirations of the Sudanese people; civilian-led government 
and democratic elections in Sudan; an end to the violence against, and 
detentions of, protesters; and lifting the state of emergency. We are 
working to ensure the diverse audiences paying attention to Sudan have 
an accurate view of U.S. policy and engagements.

    Question. Does the State Department have a strategy for democracy, 
rights, and governance (DRG) programming for Sudan to help restore, 
support and consolidate the country's transition?

    Answer. Our current strategy for DRG programming consists of 
providing financial support and training for civil society groups in 
Sudan with a focus on empowerment for women and youth groups. Looking 
ahead, we are exploring how to best target assistance that both 
complements UNITAMS' facilitation efforts and lays the groundwork for a 
more inclusive social contract in a democratic Sudan.

    Question. Can you provide us with the Department's plans regarding 
the Paul Rusesabagina case and engagement with the Rwandan Government 
given that efforts toward quiet diplomacy do not seem to be working?

    Answer. The Department is engaging the Government of Rwanda with 
senior officials in Kigali, and senior officials of the Department 
raise Mr. Rusesabagina's case at every appropriate opportunity. We are 
constantly re-assessing our strategy and evaluating all possible 
options to seek Mr. Rusesabagina's release.

    Question. Will, and if so when, the United States shift its 
approach to a more public and confrontational approach toward the 
President Kagame and his government on the Paul Rusesabagina case?

    Answer. We have not yet determined whether or when we will shift 
away from the current strategy. We are constantly re-assessing our 
strategy and evaluating all possible options to seek Mr. Rusesabagina's 
release.

    Question. Please provide an update on staffing at Embassy Khartoum.

    Answer. CDA, a.i. Brian Shukan departed post on January 24. John 
Godfrey was nominated as the next Ambassador to Sudan on January 26. 
Ambassador Lucy Tamlyn arrived on February 3 from her previous posting 
in Bangui, to serve as CDA, a.i. until another CDA, a.i. is appointed 
or an ambassador arrives. The 03-Public Diplomacy Officer and the 02-
Medical Provider positions are vacant, and no offers for those 
positions were accepted. Several positions have been assigned, but will 
be vacant until the officers arrive later in 2022 and in the first half 
of 2023, including a Consular position, a Public Diplomacy position, a 
Political/Economic position, and an Assistant Regional Security Officer 
Investigator position. All other positions are encumbered.

    Question. Does the State Department have plans to add staff to 
Embassy Khartoum over the next year?

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum, in partnership with AF/EX and the Desk, 
were reviewing staffing needs in anticipation of increased host nation 
engagement after Sudan's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism 
was rescinded and continued its transition to democracy. The October 25 
actions have delayed that planning while Post and Washington assess 
what future engagement may be and the resources required to support 
that engagement. The Department is exploring sending additional staff 
to embassy Khartoum to support UNITAMS' facilitation effort.

    Question. What particular challenges does the State Department face 
regarding staffing at Embassy Khartoum?

    Answer. Embassy Khartoum remains a partially-accompanied post with 
only those family members 18 and over allowed. With most staff serving 
tours separated from their families and with few international flight 
options, limited paved roads outside the capital, and the inability to 
travel outside Khartoum State without host government permission, 
assignments to Khartoum are very isolating. Despite offering incentives 
such as 20 percent hardship, 25 percent danger pay, and four R&Rs in a 
2-year tour, it is difficult to fully staff the Embassy. Post is 
actively looking for ways to improve the quality of life of staff and 
bidding prospects. For instance, changes to Post's security posture 
since November 2020 have allowed employees to ship or purchase 
personally owned vehicles.

    Question. Would you characterize the staffing challenges at Embassy 
Khartoum as similar to those experienced across the Africa Bureau?

    Answer. Many staffing challenges are similar to those experienced 
across the Africa Bureau. Embassy Khartoum has the added challenge of 
being a partially-accompanied post for those 18 and older due to 
security considerations.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Dr. Comfort Ero to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. In your view, is the United States adequately engaging 
foreign partners who are both helpful and unhelpful to Sudan's 
transition to civilian rule?

    Answer. The United States enjoys ties with key actors in the Horn 
of Africa and among the Gulf states that have a stake in Sudan's 
stability. Once in office, the new U.S. ambassador to Sudan should work 
in concert with the U.S. Horn envoy to continue to press Gulf powers 
and Egypt to offer their support for a transition to democratic rule, 
which represents the best chance for long-run stability in Sudan.

    Question. What could the United States do differently to improve 
our engagement with foreign partners regarding Sudan's transition to 
civilian rule?

    Answer. The United States should press for greater coordination 
among the multiple actors that have a stake in what happens next in 
Sudan. The U.S. Horn envoy is well positioned to marshal key players--
including the UN SRSG, the African Union envoy, the EU Horn envoy, Gulf 
powers and others--to come up with a shared position on the best way to 
stimulate dialogue--and support Sudanese-led efforts to re-rail the 
transition.

    Question. Are there relevant lessons for the current situation from 
U.S. engagement with the previous regime of Omar al-Bashir, given that 
the current military government appears to be emulating some of its 
tactics?

    Answer. It's worth noting that elements of the security forces and 
associated elites benefited from Sudan's rigged economy even in the 
face of the broad sanctions that were applied for decades. Any new 
sanctions regime should therefore ideally be targeted at individuals 
that are standing in the way of a successful transition. These 
restrictions should be coordinated among the AU, the U.S., the EU and, 
critically, Gulf countries where many Sudanese elites store their 
funds. These individually targeted sanctions including travel bans and 
asset freezes are more likely to be effective than broader sanctions 
that exert pain on ordinary civilians.
                                 ______
                                 

                Responses of Joseph Tucker to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. In your opinion, what would be the most constructive use 
of the substantial levels of available U.S. assistance to Sudan under 
current conditions?

    Answer. Increased support to civil society organizations and 
civilian and political stakeholders and processes as noted by both 
witnesses on the U.S. Government panel is an important use of funding 
under current conditions. Support to such citizen actors in Sudan could 
include programs both in Khartoum and locations outside that focus on 
increasing political participation and citizen monitoring of and 
involvement in political processes. These processes include events such 
as creation of the transitional legislative council, monitoring of key 
events before and during any renewed transition, and, when appropriate, 
participation in electoral events. Additionally, during the pre-October 
2021 period, training, and capacity building to bolster effective 
civilian participation in government was underway. While it is unlikely 
that such assistance can be provided to civilians in the current 
iteration of government, thoughts can be given to how to train 
civilians during this volatile period that could be part of a renewed 
transition if and when direct assistance is resumed. Civilians working 
in economic, service delivery, banking, financial, taxation, 
agricultural, legislative, and justice sectors of government will be 
especially critical to a renewed transition and beyond.
    Past assistance efforts in Sudan (and South Sudan) suggest that 
program flexibility and responsiveness is key in scenarios where there 
is a positive political trajectory and progress toward key goals, but 
also one where the opposite happens, and space continues to close as is 
currently happening. The 2005-11 Comprehensive Peace Agreement period 
saw much U.S. assistance going to this type of work, but the lack of a 
pivot within Sudan after South Sudan's secession and increasingly 
closed space meant that most gains were lost. Increased programming in 
this sector should ensure that there are adequate expert technical 
staff at both headquarters and in the field to ensure appropriate and 
impactful decisions. Local Sudanese staff at the U.S. Embassy in 
Khartoum and USAID/Sudan mission should be central to such efforts 
given their long-term work on such issues that extends well beyond the 
average tour length of foreign service officers. Staff to focus on 
increased international donor coordination across this sector should 
also be available. Equally important is that support to civil society 
and frontline citizen stakeholders be adequately bolstered by 
coordinated U.S. diplomacy and political engagement as noted in my 
written testimony.
    The continued deterioration of Sudan's economy is a major threat to 
the country's stability and is unlikely to reverse in the short-term. 
Planning across assistance sectors--and collaboration between 
humanitarian and development strategies--to bolster programs that may 
directly or indirectly increase the economic stability of citizens 
without direct support to the government is urgently needed. The 
participation of many security sector actors in Sudan's economy makes 
this tricky since assistance should not benefit such actors, and many 
are involved in Sudan's commodity sector, including wheat, fuel, and 
other trades. To offset this, Sudanese and expatriate experts in small-
scale agriculture, livelihoods assistance in conflict settings, and 
access to local and national markets can work to prepare comprehensive 
plans for agriculture and emergency livelihoods sectors, if this has 
not happened already.
    The U.S. should not shy away from using assistance to prepare 
comprehensive, multisector plans for areas outside of the capital, such 
as Darfur, Eastern Sudan, the Far North, and the Two Areas. Such plans 
can be flexible and responsive, allowing for programming in scenarios 
where situations are improved, stagnant, or volatile. Commissioning 
analyses, research, and technical recommendation reports using internal 
U.S. Government experts or external ones to assist in such efforts is 
key. Resources spent on such products should not be dismissed because 
they may be seen as spending funds on internal matters rather than 
direct support to beneficiaries. On the contrary, these products are 
key to creating informed, responsible, and proactive programs to 
accurately assist such beneficiaries. As the economic and humanitarian 
situation continues to degenerate, authorities in Khartoum are neither 
equipped nor willing to focus on areas beyond the capital. Part of 
assistance currently under discussion can look at programming on food 
security and livelihoods issues that may be beyond the reach of current 
humanitarian assistance. In some settings, livelihoods work can 
incorporate programming on intra and intercommunity engagement, 
conflict management, and resilience strengthening. This has been done 
to good effect in South Sudan at local levels and such cross-sectoral 
collaboration in Sudan should be explored.

    Question. Is there any scenario in which the types and levels of 
U.S. assistance to Sudan provided prior to the October 25 coup should 
be reinstated?

    Answer. For the purposes of answering this question I will de-link 
the type/level of U.S. assistance from a possible scenario for 
reinstatement of assistance. Some thoughts on the former are provided 
above.
    In my oral testimony I commented on the complex issue of 
reinstatement of assistance to the government in Sudan, noting that ``a 
scenario for resumption is when violence against civilians has stopped, 
and there is enforceable decision and progress on a fully civilian 
government, with benchmarks set by civilians''. For the first part, I 
mean a scenario where civilians are allowed to gather peacefully 
without use of violence by security forces in the capital and other 
areas, particularly in Darfur. This is a hard benchmark to meet because 
in most peace processes in Sudan (and South Sudan) there is a certain 
level of violence during most stages of negotiations and agreement 
implementation. Determining what a sufficient end to violence looks 
like will be key to this. It is not possible to do this in the current 
context of increasing violence against civilians across Sudan, and 
patterns of security sector violence and possible restraint must be 
monitored closely.
    For the second part, a primary issue is the difference between what 
one defines as a ``civilian-led'' government versus a ``fully 
civilian'' government. The former could imply that civilians head some 
major institutions, but the security sector is involved in government 
beyond the security arena. This looks more like the pre-coup hybrid 
military-civilian transitional government. The latter implies that 
civilians are in full control of executive authority and the security 
sector is limited to the security arena, which is governed by civilian 
oversight.
    The scenario I referred to is possibly one where negotiations have 
reached a stage where parties agree that a wholly civilian-led 
executive authority is an end state and international guarantors of 
that process are committed to ensuring this based on benchmarks and 
metrics that civilian negotiators agree to. This is complex because the 
timing for such a civilian-led executive authority is complicated and 
could mean it happens before the end of a transition period, in the 
middle, or at the end. Given how fluid the situation is, it is 
impossible to forecast this at present, but U.S. policy makers and 
assistance officials need to observe this closely going forward. 
Providing direct or indirect assistance--and diplomatic support to--a 
Sudanese-led monitoring body that can track the situation could be 
central to helping U.S. and international policy makers determine 
benchmarks and conditions that can lead to informed, timely decisions 
on if and when assistance can be resumed.

    Question. In your written testimony, you noted that premature 
reinstatement of assistance to Sudan may harm U.S. credibility. You 
highlighted the ending of violence against civilians and ``tangible, 
irreversible progress'' toward a civilian government as the primary 
metrics for restarting aid. It seems to me that neither condition has 
been met, and won't be in the near-term. Is it possible for Sudan to 
achieve even these basic metrics?

    Answer. As noted above, arriving at such benchmarks in the current 
situation will be difficult, and determining how situations are 
shifting will require close U.S. observation and analysis. The ability 
of the U.S. and likeminded international stakeholders to conceptualize, 
agree on, and drive toward an end state based on such conditions and 
beyond a merely civilian-led government is a first step. Nuanced and 
increased engagement with the United Nations Transitional Assistance 
Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and international stakeholders working on 
political processes will be instrumental in reaching such an end state 
as well. This reinforces the idea that as assistance decision-makers 
look at scenarios where assistance to the government can be resumed or 
phased in, they will need to closely engage with their diplomatic and 
political counterparts to ensure that they are aware of such thinking, 
and that plans for resumed assistance can help support political 
outcomes, and vice versa.

    Question. How should the U.S. Government be engaging security 
sector actors given the current situation?
    The U.S. Government should be directly engaging security sector 
actors to obtain further information about their stances on the current 
situation and possible political ways forward. However, the U.S. should 
improve public messaging about why such engagement is needed and how it 
can help lead to a restored transition and fully civilian outcome. 
Without this, many Sudanese protestors, Resistance Committees, and 
political leaders may think that such engagement is indicative of a 
U.S. bias favoring a return to the pre-coup hybrid government that many 
are expressly against. Part of this engagement should be geared toward 
helping the U.S. better understand internal dynamics within the 
security sector for the reasons noted in my written testimony. This 
engagement should also be used to help inform Troika and other like-
minded international stakeholders such as UNITAMS that may have a 
different set of relationships than the U.S. does.
    A worrisome post-coup development is the return of the General 
Intelligence Service (GIS) to tactics used by its predecessor, the 
National Intelligence & Security Service (NISS), before the 2019 
revolution. After the coup the GIS was given increased authorities that 
had originally been taken away after the revolution. It is openly 
utilizing them to arbitrarily arrest, detain, and harass protestors and 
activists throughout the country.\1\ The U.S. was well versed in 
engaging the pre-revolution Sudan Government on NISS issues, and it 
should return to this posture with the GIS if it has not done so 
already.
    An equal priority for engagement with the security sector is to 
affirm the need for the development of a national security vision 
grounded in the original aims of the transition--including civilian 
oversight of the security sector--and in recognition of the fact that 
the security sector has a legitimate role to play in Sudan and can help 
prioritize genuine risks and threats to the country. This should happen 
in order for future security sector reform initiatives to fully take 
root. Given the current situation, U.S. engagement should reiterate 
this need and a desire to assist if appropriate, but note that with the 
current trajectory, the security sector is squandering an opportunity 
to unlock positive U.S. and international involvement on this issue.

----------------
Note

    \1\ See https://sudantribune.com/article253483/ & https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60245133

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