[Senate Hearing 117-270]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-270
THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-712 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific
Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC... 9
Prepared Statement........................................... 10
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 39
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 41
Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 42
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator
Edward J. Markey............................................... 43
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator
Ted Cruz....................................................... 44
Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted
Cruz........................................................... 44
(iii)
THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Young,
Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order. Let me thank Ambassador
Kritenbrink and Dr. Ratner for joining the committee today.
This hearing on the future of U.S. policy and strategy with
Taiwan may well prove to be one of the more consequential
hearings that this committee holds this year, and that is for
one clear reason--Beijing's increasingly aggressive rhetoric
and action.
Its threats and coercion underscore that the Taiwan Strait
remains one of the most dangerous divides in the world today
and one of the handful of places in the world where
miscalculation could lead to a war with potentially
catastrophic global consequences.
Xi Jinping has orchestrated Beijing's hyper-nationalist
aggression for his own domestic ends as he imposes his
authoritarian neo-Maoist vision on the Chinese people.
His relentless incursion into Taiwan's air defense
identification zone this year are a significant threat to the
people of Taiwan and the entire international community.
It may be that with Beijing's cynical manipulation of its
hosting of the Olympic Games that we will have a period of
``calm'' over the next few months, but there should be no
question about Xi's mindset.
So we may have a crucial window of opportunity for the
United States and our partners to reinvigorate our strategy for
the challenges ahead, but let us be clear. The starting point
for U.S. policy is a recognition that Taiwan's flourishing
democracy and free market economy is one of the world's real
success stories.
It should be a point of great pride, something to be
cherished, for all people on both sides of the Strait. We,
certainly, cherish it here on both sides of the aisle.
Let us also be clear, the U.S. commitment to the people of
Taiwan and our obligation to safeguard Taiwan's space to make
its own determinations about its own future without threat of
coercion or use of force must be unequivocal.
There should be no doubt or ambiguity about the nature,
depth, and strength of that commitment or of our endurance as
an Indo-Pacific power or of our determination as a people and
as a nation to stand with those, like Taiwan, who share our
interests and our values.
Beijing should have no doubt or question that any cross-
Strait military or kinetic contingency directly affects the
United States and our interests and values, directly affects
our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six
Assurances, and there should be no doubt, question, or
misunderstanding that we will respond appropriately.
As Beijing also seeks to reset baselines through coercive
measures in the ``gray zone'' it should also understand that we
remain committed to the essential constituent elements of
deterrence across the Strait as well.
Likewise, the United States must stand prepared and ready
to assist Taiwan as it seeks to build its own security
capabilities and to deter potential PRC military pressure.
While I do not expect Dr. Ratner to get into sensitive
specifics in an open setting, I am interested in hearing about
how the Department of Defense is thinking about priorities in
this area.
I know the ranking member has a narrow bill that he has
introduced on security assistance to Taiwan and, as he knows, I
am working on a larger bipartisan package into which we hope to
incorporate his bill, and I hope to work with him and other
colleagues on it during the course of the balance of this year
and to next.
Beyond military and security matters, trade and economic
ties also lie at the heart of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. I
am interested to hear the outcomes of the most recent round of
the Prosperity and Partnership Dialogue with Taiwan through the
State Department, as well as other initiatives to deepen
bilateral trade and commercial ties and to enmesh Taiwan in
regional economic architecture, especially given Taiwan's
centrality to secure semiconductor supply chains.
Building closer and more enduring economic ties between
Taiwan and the world is also crucial to assure that Taiwan and
others have the wherewithal to withstand Beijing's efforts at
economic coercion.
As I know Ambassador Kritenbrink is aware, I have been
deeply concerned about the pressure Beijing has been bringing
to bear on Lithuania for its willingness to stand by Taiwan,
for example, and I am interested in your thoughts on what else
the United States can do to support Lithuania and others who
stand with Taiwan.
Lastly, let me flag that I am interested in the
Administration's thinking about how to open and expand Taiwan's
diplomatic space, be it how we engage with Taiwan here in
Washington and how we work with our partners to assure Taiwan's
meaningful participation in appropriate international
organizations like the World Health Assembly, or consistent
with the bill I just introduced, the Inter-American Development
Bank.
So we have a very rich and full agenda today. With that,
let me turn to the ranking member, Senator Risch, for his
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Tensions, as we all know, are high in the Taiwan Strait and
we all know why. China is taking increasingly aggressive
actions to pressure Taiwan to unify. We are seeing more and
more disinformation, political attacks, economic coercion, and
military downright belligerence.
I am glad this committee is holding this hearing at this
critical time on Taiwan. As we increase the time, energy, and
resources devoted to supporting this Indo-Pacific democracy, we
need to be able to tell the American people why it is so
important.
We also need more extensive discussions with civilian and
military leaders, including in a classified setting, to
properly engage on the issues at hand. I hope we can work
together to hold classified briefings on Taiwan early after the
first of the year.
A unilateral change in the status quo regarding Taiwan
would not only threaten the security and liberty of 23 million
Taiwanese, but also significantly damage vital U.S. interests
and alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
We would lose a model democracy at a time of creeping
authoritarianism. It would give China a platform in the First
Island Chain to dominate the Western Pacific and threaten,
indeed, U.S. homeland. The consequences for Japan's security
and, therefore, the U.S.-Japan alliance are hard to overstate.
Semiconductor supply chains would fall into China's hands,
and it would embolden China in other territorial disputes,
including with India and in the South China Sea. Many U.S.
allies and partners fear Taiwan would just be China's first
step, and China's aggressive actions give us no reason to
believe otherwise.
To deter the Chinese Communist Party from coercing Taiwan,
the United States must be laser-focused on concrete actions
that put Taiwan in the best possible position to defend against
the Chinese military.
Last month, I introduced, as the chairman indicated, the
Taiwan Deterrence Act with several colleagues. The bill
authorizes $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan
every year through 2032.
Such a program would accelerate Taiwan's acquisition of
asymmetric capabilities and incentivize closer U.S.-Taiwan
joint defense coordination. I look forward to working with the
chairman as he puts his bill forward and melding the two bills
together.
This is not, I am sure the chairman would agree, a partisan
matter. This is a matter that is important to all American
people.
I applaud President Tsai's commitment to important defense
reforms, defensive reforms that we have been urging, including
recent purchases of key capabilities and the planned
establishment of an agency for civilian resilience.
More needs to be done to ensure the Taiwanese military
fully implements her reform-minded vision. Close coordination
with our executive and legislative branches is essential. The
U.S. Government should prioritize getting the right
capabilities to Taiwan quickly and enhancing other important
forms of defense engagement.
If there is a problem, the executive branch should tell
Congress and we all need to fix it. We should be delivering the
same messages on reform to our friends in Taiwan.
What we do in the next 2 years is of great importance, but
what we say also matters. I am deeply concerned by confused and
varying statements on our Taiwan policy from high members in
the current Administration, including the President.
This confusion demonstrates weakness, and weakness always
invites more aggression. Our Taiwan policy has remained
consistent, regardless of the false claims by Chinese leaders.
U.S. policy towards Taiwan has always called for robust support
for its defense. This is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act.
There has been much talk recently about U.S. policy
regarding Taiwan, and I would urge anyone, whether they are
friends or enemies, to read the Taiwan Relations Act. This is
United States law. This is not a suggestion. It is not a
thought. It is law that was put in place on January 1, 1979,
and it is called the Taiwan Relations Act. It sets forth the
policy of the United States regarding Taiwan. It is binding. It
is the law. It is not a suggestion. It is a commitment to
ourselves, it is a commitment to our allies, it is a commitment
to Taiwan, and it is a commitment to the world.
I will quote very, very briefly from the Act. In Section
2(b)(5) it says that it is the policy of the United States to
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and it is the
policy of the United States, in (6), to maintain the capacity
of the United States to resist any resort to force or other
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the
social economic system of the people on Taiwan.
Section 3 goes on to say--that is, 3(a)--in furtherance of
the policy set forth in Section 2 of this act, the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
This is the law of America. It is the law that has been in
place since January 1, 1979. So any debate that is going on
right now needs to start with this law. This is where we begin.
In 1982, President Reagan wrote that the linkage between
U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan and whether China pursues a
peaceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait is a permanent
imperative of U.S. foreign policy.
Today, China sends large numbers of military aircraft into
the Taiwan Strait for what they call rehearsals for future
operations. It threatens to take all necessary means to unify
with Taiwan and uses its economic might to punish countries
that engage with Taiwan.
These are not tenets of a peaceful resolution, which is
what is called for in the United States policy. These actions,
coupled with China's massive military buildup, create a very
different geopolitical environment. The United States must
continue executing our long-standing Taiwan policy in a manner
that matches today's geopolitical realities.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch, for those remarks,
and we are very much in sync here.
Let us turn to Ambassador Kritenbrink first and then Dr.
Ratner. We will have your full statements included for the
record, without objection. We would ask you to summarize them
in about 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee could
engage in a conversation with you.
Let us start off with Ambassador Kritenbrink.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
speak with you today about our growing partnership with Taiwan.
As you know, Taiwan is a leading democracy, a technological
powerhouse, and a force for good. Our shared values, commercial
and economic links, as well as people-to-people ties form the
bedrock of our friendship and serve as the impetus for our
expanding engagement with Taiwan. This sentiment, shared across
multiple administrations from both parties, is the lodestar in
managing our critically important unofficial relationship with
Taiwan.
Our One China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances has
promoted peace and prosperity in the region for more than 40
years.
Our policy also maximizes our ability to broaden and deepen
U.S.-Taiwan cooperation and best ensures the future of Taiwan
is determined by its people, peacefully and free of PRC
coercion.
Through the American Institute in Taiwan, our cooperation
with Taiwan has increased in recent years. Taiwan has become an
important U.S. partner in trade and investment, health,
semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment
screening, science and technology, education, and democratic
governance.
Under this Administration, we have advanced these
cooperative efforts in a number of ways, including convening
the second annual U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership
Dialogue, to build secure and resilient supply chains and
counter economic coercion, and inviting Taiwan to share its
expertise to combat disinformation and/or authoritarianism at
the Summit for Democracy.
We have also expanded the global cooperation and training
framework in which we, Japan, and now Australia work together
to showcase Taiwan's expertise around the world.
Our relationship with Taiwan brings tremendous benefits to
the American people. As just one example, cutting-edge
semiconductors from Taiwan are key components for many of our
most important industries.
Taiwan companies, most notably TSMC, are now investing
billions of dollars in the United States to create high-paying
jobs and help ensure our semiconductor supply chains are
resilient.
The United States is firmly committed to peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific region, where we have an enduring
national interest. We continue to oppose unilateral changes to
the status quo and we call for cross-Strait issues to be
resolved in a peaceful manner consistent with the wishes and
best interests of the people on Taiwan.
It is for this reason that we view that PRC's growing
military, diplomatic, and economic coercion toward Taiwan with
serious concern. These actions are destabilizing to the region
and risk a miscalculation that could harm the global economy.
In response, the United States has and will continue to
make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services
necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The United States has notified Congress of more than $32
billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but we should be
clear that arms sales alone are not enough.
We also are encouraging Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric
capabilities that complicate PRC planning, and to implement
defense reforms that will strengthen the resilience of Taiwan
society against PRC coercion.
The PRC also continues to execute campaigns to sway
Taiwan's few remaining diplomatic partners into breaking
official ties, to bully countries such as Lithuania when they
seek to deepen engagement with Taiwan, and to block Taiwan's
meaningful participation in international organizations.
These campaigns are part of a broader PRC effort to
diminish Taiwan's international space, which ultimately robs
all of us of the many benefits derived from Taiwan's expertise.
We continue to work with like-minded countries to ensure
Taiwan is acknowledged as a respected and constructive
democratic actor in global affairs. Maintaining Taiwan's
international space is fundamental to preserving the cross-
Strait status quo and denying the PRC the political conditions
it views as conducive for coerced unification.
To that end, it is critical that we have our Senate-
confirmed ambassadors in country to help shore up our alliances
and push back against malign influence.
Our nominees to some of the most important countries in the
region, including Japan, Vietnam, and China itself are awaiting
confirmation in the Senate after being voice voted out of this
committee with broad bipartisan support. I respectfully ask the
committee's help in confirming them as quickly as possible.
The United States continues to raise the importance of
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait with our allies and
partners. We have publicly and privately urged the PRC to abide
by its commitment to peacefully resolve cross-Strait issues and
to engage Taiwan in a meaningful dialogue to deescalate
tensions.
As a result of the PRC's actions, the global community has
become more vocal in supporting Taiwan. Several countries'
parliamentarians have visited Taiwan or passed measures of
support.
Many U.S. allies and partners have also publicly raised
their concerns about maintaining peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait. Congress has played a critical role in
championing continued U.S. and international support for
Taiwan, for which we are very grateful.
In summary, our relationship with Taiwan is truly rock
solid. Taiwan time and again has proven to be a valuable
partner. Only by continuing all our efforts to work with
Taiwan--to work with and support Taiwan can we ultimately
preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific that
undergirds a strong global economy and our national interest.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kritenbrink follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel J. Kritenbrink
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today
about our partnership with Taiwan, including our expanding security
cooperation, and our efforts to coordinate with like-minded countries
to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan is a leading democracy, a technological powerhouse, and a
force for good. Our shared values, commercial and economic links, as
well as people-to-people ties form the bedrock of our friendship and
serve as the impetus for our expanding engagement with Taiwan. This
sentiment is the lodestar in managing our critically important
unofficial relationship with Taiwan.
Our one China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the
Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has promoted peace and
prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple
administrations from both parties. Our policy also maximizes our
ability to broaden and deepen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation, and best ensures
the future of Taiwan is determined by its people, peacefully and free
of PRC coercion.
Through the American Institute in Taiwan, our cooperation with
Taiwan has increased in recent years, including in several new areas.
Taiwan has become an important U.S. partner in trade and investment,
health, semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment
screening, science and technology, education, and democratic
governance. Under this Administration, we have advanced these
cooperative efforts in a number of ways, including:
Resuming Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
talks to further interlink our economies;
Inviting Taiwan to share its expertise at the Global COVID-
19 Summit;
Holding the U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic
Governance in the Indo-Pacific to advance human rights in a
region under pressure from authoritarian regimes;
Convening the second annual U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity
Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) to build secure and resilient
supply chains between our economies, counter economic coercion,
and pave the way for deeper cooperation on next generation
technologies and scientific endeavors; and
Inviting Taiwan to share its expertise on using digital
tools to combat disinformation and authoritarianism at the
Summit for Democracy.
As Taiwan's response to the pandemic has shown, it is also a
willing partner with significant expertise to help solve global
challenges. The United States, Japan, and now Australia, have worked
together to showcase Taiwan's ability to help the world through the
Global Cooperation and Training Framework, or GCTF. The GCTF provides
training and technical assistance to third-country participants, which
builds support for Taiwan around the world by demonstrating the value
of its participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015,
the GCTF has provided training to more than 3,000 participants in
dozens of workshops ranging from building media literacy to empowering
women entrepreneurs. This year, we have started a ``franchise program''
that enables U.S. embassies to work with Taiwan representative offices
and likeminded partners to hold GCTF events on pressing regional
problems. I am particularly grateful for congressional support for
GCTF, which will significantly enhance the program's reach.
Our relationship with Taiwan brings tremendous benefits to the
American people. As just one example, cutting-edge semiconductors from
Taiwan are key components for many of our most important industries.
Taiwan companies, most notably TSMC, are now investing billions of
dollars in the United States to create high-paying jobs and help ensure
our semiconductor supply chains are resilient. And we still remember
with great gratitude Taiwan's donation of millions of articles of PPE
at the start of the pandemic last year. As part of our partnership on
health, the United States has provided Taiwan with 4 million doses of
Moderna vaccine.
The United States is firmly committed to peace and stability in the
Indo-Pacific region, where we have long had an enduring national
interest. We continue to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo
and call for cross-Strait issues to be resolved in a peaceful manner
that is consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on
Taiwan. It is for this reason that we view the PRC's growing coercive
and provocative behavior toward Taiwan with serious concern.
Since the 2016 election of Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, the PRC
has used military, diplomatic, and economic coercion to undermine the
status quo in the Taiwan Strait. These actions are destabilizing to the
region and risk a miscalculation that could harm the global economy.
In response to the growing PRC military threat, the United States
has and will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles
and services necessary to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. The
United States has notified Congress of more than $32 billion worth of
arms to Taiwan since 2009, but we should be clear that arms sales alone
cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. As my Department of
Defense colleague will note, we also are encouraging Taiwan to
prioritize asymmetric capabilities that complicate PRC planning and to
implement necessary defense reforms that will strengthen the resilience
of Taiwan's society against PRC coercion.
In addition to increased PLA military activity near Taiwan, the PRC
continues to execute campaigns to sway Taiwan's few remaining
diplomatic partners into breaking official ties; to bully countries,
such as Lithuania, when they seek to deepen engagement with Taiwan; and
to block Taiwan's participation in international organizations. These
campaigns seek to coercively influence how countries decide the
contours of their policy with respect to cross-Strait issues. It is
also part of a longer PRC campaign to diminish Taiwan's international
space, which ultimately robs the global community of the many benefits
derived from Taiwan's expertise in solving shared challenges.
To preserve Taiwan's ``international space,'' we continue to work
with likeminded countries to ensure that Taiwan is acknowledged as a
respected and constructive democratic actor in international affairs.
Maintaining Taiwan's international space is fundamental to preserving
the cross-Strait status quo and denying the PRC the political
conditions it views as being conducive for coerced unification on
Beijing's terms.
To that end, it is critical that we have our Senate-confirmed
Ambassadors in the region, to help shore up our alliances and push back
against malign influence. Unfortunately, our nominees to some of the
most important countries in the region, including Japan, Vietnam, and
China itself, are awaiting confirmation in the Senate after being
voice-voted out of this Committee with broad bipartisan support. I
respectfully ask for your help in confirming them as quickly as
possible.
Through our diplomatic channels, the United States continues to
raise the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait with
our allies and partners, and to express our strong concerns to the PRC
regarding its actions and behavior toward Taiwan. We have publicly and
privately urged the PRC to abide by its commitment to peacefully
resolve cross-Strait issues and to engage Taiwan in a meaningful
dialogue to deescalate tensions.
As a result of the PRC's actions, the global community has become
more vocal regarding its concerns over the Taiwan Strait and its
support for Taiwan's international space. Several countries'
parliamentarians have visited Taiwan or passed measures expressing
support for Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners also have publicly
raised their concerns about maintaining peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait. Congress has played a critical role in championing
continued U.S. and international support for Taiwan, for which we are
grateful. This support is important in demonstrating to the PRC that
Taiwan is not merely a so-called ``internal affair,'' but rather a
matter of great consequence and importance to the global community and
economy.
In summary, our relationship with Taiwan is truly ``rock solid.''
Taiwan time and again has proven to be a valuable partner. The United
States will continue to support Taiwan publicly. We will continue to
work with Taiwan on initiatives that demonstrate the value it brings to
the international community. And we will continue to encourage like-
minded countries' engagement with and public demonstrations of support
for Taiwan. Only then can we ultimately preserve the peace and
stability in the Indo-Pacific that undergirds a strong global economy
and our national interest.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Ratner.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Ratner. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to describe how the Department of
Defense is supporting Taiwan's ability to defend its vibrant
prosperous democracy.
I would like to begin with an overview of why Taiwan's
security is so important to the United States. As you know,
Taiwan is located at a critical node within the First Island
Chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners that is
critical to the region's security and critical to the defense
of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.
Geographically, Taiwan is also situated alongside major
trade lanes that provide sea lines of communication for much of
the world's commerce and energy shipping. It is in part for
these strategic reasons that this administration, like those
before it, has affirmed our commitment to our One China policy
as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint U.S.-PRC
communiques, and the Six Assurances.
Taiwan is also integral, as you know, to the regional and
global economy. Its free market economy embraces innovation,
entrepreneurship, and private sector-led growth, which has
helped Taiwan become a valuable economic and trade partner for
the United States.
Moreover, Taiwan is a beacon of democratic values and
ideals. In stark contrast to deepening authoritarianism and
oppression in the PRC, Taiwan has proven the possibilities of
an alternative path to that of the Chinese Communist Party.
Unfortunately, although the PRC publicly advocates for
peaceful unification with Taiwan, leaders in Beijing have never
renounced the use of military aggression. In fact, the PLA is
likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC
by force while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or
deny third-party intervention on Taiwan's behalf.
The PRC threat to Taiwan, however, is not limited to
invasion or blockade. The PLA is conducting a broader coercive
campaign in the air and maritime domains around Taiwan. These
operations are destabilizing, intentionally provocative, and
increase the likelihood of miscalculation.
Nevertheless, although the PLA's actions are real and
dangerous and PLA modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC
can still be deterred through a combination of Taiwan's own
defenses, its partnership with the United States, and growing
support from like-minded democracies.
Through smart investments in key reforms, Taiwan can send a
clear signal that its society and armed forces are committed
and prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering
Taiwan's self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential
feature of deterrence.
We, therefore, appreciate that President Tsai has
prioritized the development of asymmetric capabilities for
Taiwan's self-defense that are credible, resilient, mobile,
distributed, and cost effective.
Asymmetric capabilities, however, are only one part of the
deterrence equation. Taiwan must complement investments in
these critical capabilities with equal focus on enhancing
resilience, supporting civil-military integration, and building
a strategy that includes defense in-depth.
Now, in addition to the provision of defense arms and
services to Taiwan, the department remains committed to
maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist the
resort to force or other forms of coercion that may jeopardize
the security of the people on Taiwan.
Let me be clear that this is an absolute priority. The PRC
is the Department of Defense's pacing challenge and a Taiwan
contingency is the pacing scenario. We are modernizing our
capabilities, updating U.S. force posture, and developing new
operational concepts accordingly.
I should also underscore that the department's efforts to
deter PRC aggression and enhance Taiwan's defenses will not be
in isolation. Countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond
recognize that PRC aggression against Taiwan would have serious
consequences for their own interests and are increasingly
voicing concerns about PRC coercion and potential aggression
against Taiwan.
As evidenced by a number of recent multilateral operations
and exercises, the Department is focused on enhancing our
regional cooperation as a means of bolstering deterrence.
Finally, I would like to close by thanking all of you for
your strong bipartisan support for Taiwan. It is my firm belief
that this bipartisanship is one of our most powerful assets in
the defense of Taiwan and should be nurtured and treated as
such.
In that context, the Department's partnership and
bipartisan collaboration with Congress are critical to ensuring
that we continue to meet our commitments under the Taiwan
Relations Act.
Thank you for your time and attention today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ely Ratner
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity today to describe how the
Department of Defense is supporting Taiwan's ability to defend its
vibrant, prosperous democracy.
I'd like to begin with an overview of why Taiwan's security is so
important to the United States. As you know, Taiwan is located at a
critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of
U.S. allies and partners--stretching from the Japanese archipelago down
to the Philippines and into the South China Sea--that is critical to
the region's security and critical to the defense of vital U.S.
interests in the Indo-Pacific. Geographically, Taiwan is also situated
alongside major trade lanes that provide sea lines of communication for
much of the world's commerce and energy shipping. It is in part for
these strategic reasons that this Administration, like those before it,
has affirmed our commitment to our one-China policy, as guided by the
Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint U.S.-PRC Communiques, and the Six
Assurances.
Taiwan is also integral to the regional and global economy. Its
free-market economy embraces innovation, entrepreneurship, and private-
sector led growth, which has helped Taiwan become a valuable economic
and trade partner for the United States. Indeed, our economy--like many
others around the world--has come to count on Taiwan as a critical
supplier of high-technology, including semiconductors.
Moreover, Taiwan is a beacon of democratic values and ideals. In
stark contrast to deepening authoritarianism and oppression in the PRC,
Taiwan has proven the possibilities of an alternative path to that of
the Chinese Communist Party.
the people's republic of china (prc) threat
Unfortunately, although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful
unification with Taiwan, leaders in Beijing have never renounced the
use of military aggression.
In fact, the PLA is likely preparing for a contingency to unify
Taiwan with the PRC by force, while simultaneously attempting to deter,
delay, or deny third-party intervention on Taiwan's behalf.
The PRC's options for military campaigns against Taiwan are
bolstered by the PLA's rapidly advancing capabilities, including the
sophistication of its surface ships and submarines, advances in combat
aircraft and air defenses, the increased quantity and quality of
ballistic and cruise missiles, and the development of tools for cyber
and information warfare.
The PRC threat to Taiwan, however, is not limited to invasion or
blockade. The PLA is conducting a broader coercive campaign in the air
and maritime domains around Taiwan. These operations are destabilizing,
intentionally provocative, and increase the likelihood of
miscalculation. They put the prosperity and security of the region at
risk, and are part of a pattern of PRC military coercion and aggression
against other U.S. allies and partners in the region, including India,
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
dod priorities for taiwan
Although the PLA's actions are real and dangerous, and PLA
modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC can still be deterred
through a combination of Taiwan's own defenses, its partnership with
the United States, and growing support from like-minded democracies.
Through smart investments and key reform efforts, Taiwan can send a
clear signal that its society and armed forces are committed and
prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering Taiwan's self-
defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence.
We therefore appreciate that President Tsai has prioritized the
development of asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan's self-defense that
are credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In
short, these are affordable investments in lethal capabilities tailored
to counter the military threat from the PRC. These capabilities are
aimed to strengthen multi-domain deterrence and ensure that an invasion
or attack could neither succeed rapidly nor occur without substantial
costs. DoD is taking an increasingly proactive approach to supporting
these efforts as we continue upholding our commitment under the Taiwan
Relations Act to make available to Taiwan relevant defense articles and
services.
Asymmetric capabilities, however, are only one part of the
deterrence equation. Taiwan must complement investments in these
critical capabilities with equal focus on enhancing resilience,
supporting civil-military integration, and building a strategy that
includes defense-in-depth. In this regard, President Tsai's
determination to reform Taiwan's reserve forces and integrate civilian
and military agencies under the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency is
critical to enhancing Taiwan's overall preparedness--and in doing so
will further strengthen deterrence. DoD will continue to work with
relevant U.S. departments and agencies to support Taiwan's efforts in
this regard.
dod's focus on taiwan
In addition to the provision of defensive arms and services to
Taiwan, the Department remains committed to maintaining the capacity of
the United States to resist the resort to force or other forms of
coercion that may jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan. Let
me be clear that this is an absolute priority: The PRC is the
Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing
scenario. We are modernizing our capabilities, updating U.S. force
posture, and developing new operational concepts accordingly.
I should also underscore that the Department's efforts to deter PRC
aggression and enhance Taiwan's defenses will not be in isolation.
Countries throughout the Indo Pacific and beyond recognize that PRC
aggression against Taiwan would have serious consequences for their
interests, and are increasingly voicing concerns about PRC coercion and
potential aggression against Taiwan. As evidenced by a number of recent
multilateral operations and exercises, the Department is focused on
enhancing our regional cooperation as a means of bolstering deterrence.
Finally, I'd like to close by thanking all of you for your strong,
bipartisan support for Taiwan. It is my firm belief that this
bipartisanship is one of our most powerful assets in the defense of
Taiwan, and should be nurtured and treated as such. In that context,
the Department's partnership and bipartisan collaboration with Congress
are critical to ensuring that we continue to meet our commitments under
the Taiwan Relations Act. Please be assured that the Department of
Defense understands the growing threat from the PRC and its military,
and we are committed, in line with our longstanding policy, to ensure
Taiwan's ability to deter and defend its successful and prosperous
democracy.
Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you both very much. We will start a
series of rounds of 5-minute questions and I will recognize
myself.
Given the increased muscle flexing and threatening rhetoric
from Beijing, some policymakers and analysts have called for an
end to the policy of strategic ambiguity with regards to
Taiwan.
What is your views on the advantages and disadvantages of
maintaining strategic ambiguity? Is it time for additional
clarity or a new framework for managing the cross-Strait
relations?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, if it is okay I would
like to reply first.
The Chairman. Sure.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I would say, first of
all, I fully agree that the coercive and bullying behavior that
we have seen from the People's Republic of China directed at
Taiwan is concerning. It is destabilizing and it risks
undermining peace and stability in the region.
Mr. Chairman, we continue to believe that our One China
policy and the framework provided by the Taiwan Relations Act
provides us with all the tools that we need to counter that
threat and to continue to maintain peace and stability across
the Strait.
The Chairman. Do you think China is undoubtedly convinced
that we will be as vigorous in our support of Taiwan and in
defense of it as we assert here?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I think that is our
goal and it is an urgent one. We think that contributing to
that stability and providing that deterrence that we believe
provides that stability is a here and now problem, and we are
committed to that on an urgent basis, on a daily basis.
My view, Mr. Chairman, is that our policy over the last
four decades--as you noted, a bipartisan policy with leadership
from both the executive and congressional branches--I think,
has succeeded and has allowed Taiwan to proper.
The Chairman. I appreciate that and I am in strong support
of that and of the view that not only as it relates to Taiwan,
but in anything that we can do as it relates to foreign policy
the strength of bipartisanship is an incredibly important
message globally----
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. --and to the country.
My question really revolves around, okay, that has been the
reality of how we have approached the cross-Straits
relationship, but we have not had the hyper nationalism of Xi
Jinping. We have not had the type of rather overt threats that
have taken place.
Is the Defense Department of the same view as the
Department of State?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I know there has been a very robust
public discussion of this issue and I have deep respect for
folks on both sides of this debate.
In addition to agreeing with everything that Ambassador
Kritenbrink said, my personal view is that a change in U.S.
declaratory policy would not meaningfully strengthen
deterrence, and I would be happy to say more about that in a
classified setting.
The Chairman. All right. We will leave it at that then.
What is your assessment? I am concerned that in recent
years the PLA military operations near Taiwan have become more
sophisticated and more frequent, including recent incursion
into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and, frankly, I
am concerned that these incursions would circumnavigate the
island and demonstrate Beijing's ability to execute a blockade
of Taiwan.
What is your assessment of the current cross-Strait
military balance? Are you concerned that the PRC can take
unilateral military action against Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am concerned about China's military
modernization. The Defense Department recently provided an
extremely detailed report on China--the annual China Military
Power Report--and clearly, they are engaging in increased
coercion and aggressive behaviors, not only toward Taiwan, but
around the region. This has effects in terms of tempting
miscalculation and crisis. It has effect on Taiwan's readiness.
I think our job at the Department of Defense is to
strengthen deterrence and to ensure that we are taking actions
such that Beijing understands that it would not be able to
achieve its military objectives and, certainly, not without
facing substantial risks and costs, and we are doing that by
supporting Taiwan's defenses and reforms, by bolstering our own
deterrence, and by working on this issue with the broader
international community.
The Chairman. Ambassador, what would trigger such a step by
Beijing?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I am reluctant to
speculate what might be in President Xi Jinping's mind on any
given day, but I would just say that we feel the urgent need
every day to take a broad range of steps that we have tried to
outline in our opening statements to deter such a step and to
provide that stability.
If I could add one point to my colleague, Assistant
Secretary Ratner's, comment, we do believe that to contribute
to that stability we have to do more than just focus on
military deterrence. It is vitally important, we believe, to
continue to bolster and expand Taiwan's international space and
also to deepen our engagement with Taiwan and to help enable
Taiwan to resist economic coercion. We also think those are
important parts.
The Chairman. In that regard--then we will close on this
for myself. I have a lot more, but I will stop here. In that
regard, if we want to expand Taiwan's diplomatic space when we
succeed at it--because there are many countries that have
succumbed to China's closing the doors on Taiwan even though
they had official recognition and relationships with Taiwan--we
have seen Taiwan's diplomatic channels close due to Chinese
pressure in multiple capitals.
Indeed, since 2016, eight former Taiwan diplomatic partners
have switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and even now
we are watching as Beijing places significant economic pressure
on a country like Lithuania for authorizing the opening of a
Taiwanese representative office.
How is the Administration supporting our democratic
partners in countering undue Chinese influence and helping
Taiwan to establish and maintain formal relationships?
If we cannot help Lithuania, who is being threatened in
economic terms, supply chains and whatnot, which I view as a
test for the West, then if we fail that test then, ultimately,
we will face the consequences of it when others say it is not
worth to stand up to China--the U.S. will not be there for us.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I would say
that when we focus on trying to expand and strengthen Taiwan's
diplomatic space we work with a range of partners to
demonstrate what Taiwan has to offer to the international
community and what the benefits of engaging with Taiwan are.
You mentioned both diplomatic partners and then countries
like Lithuania, who have simply tried to expand their
engagement with a Taiwan representative office.
In the case of Lithuania, Mr. Chairman, we took a number of
steps to assist our Lithuanian partners. We engaged at both the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary level to express our support for
Lithuania and to hear their concerns.
We engaged in a dialogue that was hosted by the White House
that I participated in with the Lithuanian foreign minister.
That same day, Lithuania and Ex-Im Bank announced an MOU that
involved $600 million of credits to assist Lithuania and we
also dispatched a private sector commercial delegation to
Lithuania to try to assist them as well in finding other
markets, other supply chains.
That is one example, Mr. Chairman, in which we have taken
very seriously the need to assist our partners in resisting
Chinese economic coercion in the context of engagement with
Taiwan.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Maybe just one last comment, Mr.
Chairman.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have expanded
the Global Cooperation and Training Framework as well, which is
another way in which we help partners around the world engage
with Taiwan and learn about the capabilities that Taiwan can
offer, and we are grateful to Congress for the support of that
program.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thanks for those comments about Lithuania.
That is not getting nearly enough ink around the world. We all
want to counter this Chinese influence, and when they do it
malignly like they did in Lithuania it is important that we do
counter that.
The list you just ticked off is an important list, but the
world should take note that we are engaged in that sort of
thing and will help when it is appropriate.
Most of the areas I want to cover are in the intelligence
lane so I am going to be brief here, but tell me your thoughts
on the fact, and I--everybody talks about this and that is what
China did to Hong Kong and, really, the repercussions were de
minimis for China.
Certainly, in China, one would think they are tempted to
look at that and say, hey, this was so easy. The next one is
not going to be any tougher.
Do they have a sense in China, do you think, that we, the
West, particularly America, view the Taiwanese situation
entirely different than the Hong Kong situation? Either one of
you can start. I would like to hear both your views on that.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
Obviously, as the Administration has stated clearly, what
happened in Hong Kong--and the previous administration as
well--what happened in Hong Kong was completely unacceptable,
but, Mr. Ranking Member, it would be a grave mistake if China
were to conclude from that that somehow it gave them an
opportunity to take coercive action vis-a-vis Taiwan, and I
know that Secretary Blinken has been quoted extensively,
including this past week, in stating what a serious mistake it
would be if China were to undertake such a path.
We believe, Mr. Ranking Member, that our job every day is
to make sure that we provide a level of deterrence and
stability across the Strait so that China is not tempted to
take that step.
Senator Risch. I do not think that that proposition about
how we view this can be understated. We need to underscore that
and underscore it strongly.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, to the specific question of our
understanding of Beijing's perception and whether they think we
view the Hong Kong problem differently than Taiwan, I think the
answer to that is categorically yes.
As you mentioned, these relate to intelligence matters and
I would be eager to discuss that with you in a classified
setting. The only thing I would add to what Ambassador
Kritenbrink said is the Taiwanese themselves took very careful
notice of what happened in Hong Kong and it, certainly, in
their view, reinforced the unacceptability of some kind of one-
country, two-systems bargain, given what they saw what happened
to Hong Kong.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Well, let me thank both of you
for your service. Let me continue this discussion as much as we
can discuss in an open setting.
Can you just assess for us how much mainland China is doing
within Taiwan itself? It seems like there is shifting politics
within Taiwan in regards to the attitude of its relations with
mainland China.
Can you just share with us how active the PRC is in regards
to politics within Taiwan?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for
your remarks and for your question.
In terms of a detailed response, perhaps that would be
better in another session, but I think that I could say here in
great confidence and safely that, certainly, the PRC's attempts
to intimidate and coerce and influence friends on Taiwan does
involve activities inside Taiwan as well, which is deeply
concerning.
I would pick up on your final comment in that I think
attitudes in Taiwan have shifted over time. I have some
skepticism about the effectiveness of China's actions. In fact,
I think the more that the PRC tries to squeeze, the more it
simply pushes Taiwan and the Taiwanese people away.
Senator Cardin. So let me talk about the U.S. engagement in
the Asian Pacific area. With the withdrawal from TPP we know
that created a vacuum. We have the issues of so many countries
in that region concerned about the free commerce on the China
Seas and what PRC has done in that regard.
Our ability to have influence in regards to Taiwan is very
much related to how America is perceived as interested in Asian
Pacific area. So can you just coordinate for us how your
strategies in that region are being arranged in order to deal
with PRC's increasing activities in the China Seas as well as
its compromising of Taiwan's security?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Senator. Our goal is to
demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America's
commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and to our many allies
and partners in that region.
We have demonstrated that the Indo-Pacific region is vital
to our future security and prosperity and we try to demonstrate
that through our actions every day. As you know----
Senator Cardin. Can you be more specific about that?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Senator, as you know, for example, the first two world
leaders hosted by President Biden at the White House were the
Japanese Prime Minister and the South Korean President. The
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense's first trips
to the region were to Japan and Korea.
Just this morning, we announced that Secretary Blinken will
travel to Southeast Asia next week to visit Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Thailand to, again, demonstrate the strength of
our commitment to our partners and allies in ASEAN.
In addition, of course, to that diplomatic engagement,
Senator, we are carrying out a very aggressive policy vis-a-vis
the maritime domains in the South China Sea and the East China
Sea to both diplomatically garner support for pushing back
against Chinese illegal behavior and bullying and to strengthen
support for the international rule of law.
Secondly, we are providing hundreds of millions of dollars'
worth of maritime assistance to partners in the region to
increase their domain awareness and their ability to defend
their own interests, which we think contributes to stability in
the region.
Then, finally, of course--and I will turn to Assistant
Secretary Ratner--we are developing and exercising our own
capabilities on a regular basis in both the South and East
China Seas and elsewhere in the region, all, again, designed to
contribute to stability and demonstrate the strength of our
commitment.
Finally, Senator, you mentioned our economic engagement as
well. The President announced recently last month--at the end
of October, rather--at the East Asia Summit his desire to
launch a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and that will,
certainly, be a focus of our engagement in the weeks and months
ahead.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I will only say Secretary Austin has
said repeatedly that allies and partners are, perhaps, our
biggest strategic advantage in our military competition with
China.
They have capabilities they can bring to bear on their own
and with us, they support our force posture in forward
deployments in the region, and they exercise and operate with
us to ensure a free and open region.
I will say, for my part, I have been in this role since the
summer, and right down the line from the Republic of Korea,
where we were last week, to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Australia, Vietnam, India, in every one of these instances
there is incredible positive momentum in those defense
partnerships, and in most instances those relationships are
stronger than they have ever been.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Romney is recognized.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do not know that we have laid out a comprehensive
strategy for supporting the people of Taiwan and the capacity
of the people to determine their own destiny, but if I were to
jot down several of the elements that I think would be part of
that, I am afraid that on almost all of them we are failing,
not succeeding, and I say that a bit to get your response.
One of the ones that we are succeeding on is the attitude
of the people of Taiwan themselves. That is not due to anything
we have done, I do not imagine, but instead due to the fact
that the Chinese have been brutal against the Uighurs and
against the people of Hong Kong and, of course, the people of
Tibet, and that has concentrated the thinking of the people of
Taiwan. So we have been successful there.
Other elements, it strikes me, that we are not being
successful. So one element of our strategy would surely be to
make sure that world opinion is watching this and is concerned
about what China is doing and wants to see Taiwan have its
capacity for self-rule. Yet, as has already been mentioned, we
are seeing greater and greater diplomatic isolation of Taiwan
by nations around the world.
A second element or a third element would be the--if you
will, the military porcupining, if you will, the capacity of
Taiwan to make decisions to make itself a very difficult target
and to make sure that Chinese aggressors would recognize that
the cost of invasion would be a severe, indeed.
On that one, I know this is not a classified session so we
cannot go into that in-depth, but I do not come away thinking
that that has become as--much stronger as we would have liked
it to become.
The next would be communication of severe economic
consequence were there to be an incursion against Taiwan, and
while we talk about that, I do not know that we have
communicated to the Chinese or collaborated with our friends
around the world a decision of just what we would do to inform
China in advance of what we, the collective nations of the
world, would do were they to take aggressive action against
Taiwan.
The final element of our strategy might be our commitment
to the region and communicating our commitment to the region,
and the decision made by the prior administration and not yet
reversed by this one to back out of the TPP does not
communicate commitment to the region.
There are some things we do that, obviously, are able to so
commit, but that decision was not. There was a discussion made
that we do not like multilateral trade agreements. We like
bilateral agreements, but we did not enter into bilateral
agreements. So we are just sort of--we disappeared. There would
be opportunities, for instance, with the ASEAN nations to enter
into a digital trade agreement and to begin the process again,
but I am concerned that--if I were China looking at this, I
would say this is getting easier, not harder.
Am I misreading that? I do not mean to be blaming just this
administration. I am looking back over the last several years
of American policy, but it strikes me that on almost every
dimension of an effective strategy we are not winning. We are
losing.
Ambassador, please.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for
your comments and your question.
Senator, none of us underestimate the scope of the
challenge, but I would argue that there are also reasons for
optimism. In terms of world opinion and the interest of our
partners around the world, I think it is quite significant that
for the first time in many instances or the first time in a
long time many of our allies and partners have spoken up
together with us in joint statements and in other venues to
express publicly their concern for the situation in Taiwan and
the national interest that they see in peace and stability
across the Taiwan Strait, and I am thinking about the
statements made publicly by Japanese leaders, our South Korean
allies, by the G-7, just last week by the Secretary General of
the EU External Action Service and the like.
I think there are an increasing number of partners and
allies around the world who recognize the importance of peace
and stability across the Strait and they are publicly stating
that fact.
In terms of our military deterrence strategy, I will let
Assistant Secretary Ratner reply to that in more detail, but
what you have outlined, Senator, precisely is our strategy,
assisting Taiwan to develop an asymmetric defense and that is
what we are focused on every day.
Certainly, the economic consequences of any conflict across
the Strait would be severe and I think that we are making that
clear, and it is up to us every day to, I think, demonstrate
that, and as Secretary Blinken has said recently, this would be
a serious mistake if China were to ever take that step, with
very serious consequences.
In terms of our commitment to the region, Senator, I would
say it is what animates our actions every day. I know from my
most recent travels to the region over the last month and the
engagement of our leadership from the President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense on down, we demonstrate on a
daily basis our ironclad commitment to the security of our
treaty allies, our strong commitment to peace and security and
prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region, and that is what
animates our actions every day.
Let me stop there, sir.
Senator Romney. Dr. Ratner. Thank you.
Dr. Ratner. Senator Romney, thank you.
I would offer a more optimistic view of, at least, the
trajectory of where we are headed on some of the issues that
you raised. I share your concerns about the military challenge.
China's military modernization is, certainly, stressing
stability across the Strait, but we have seen--particularly,
under the leadership of President Tsai, we have seen Taiwan
taking incredibly important steps on trying to modernize and
reform its own military.
We have seen them increasing their defense budget. We have
seen them increasingly focused on asymmetric capabilities and
the kinds of capabilities that we think will strengthen
deterrence, and we have seen them starting to walk down the
road of making some fairly significant reforms, reserve
reforms, and in other areas that are going to enable them to
defend themselves.
At the same time, at the Department of Defense we are
increasingly focused on this challenge. Secretary Austin has
articulated China as the top pacing challenge and we are in the
process of updating capabilities, expediting experimentation
and prototyping, developing new operational concepts and
updating our posture in the region to be better prepared to
deter aggression in this area.
As it relates to allies and partners, I think we are seeing
increasing concern and increasing action including on the
security side. We had our very first ever combined, meaning
with another country, Taiwan Strait transit within the last
couple months. That was with Canada.
We have held major military exercises with partners from
inside and outside of the region including multi-carrier
operations with aircraft carriers from the U.K., large-deck
amphibs from Japan, a number of countries participating. We
have seen countries in the region starting to do their own
Taiwan Strait transits.
So I think we are seeing countries stepping up their
military presence in the region and their willingness to
support deterrence in a way that we have not before.
Collectively, I agree with you. It is an enormous
challenge, but I think the urgency is there and we have got the
right formula and we are moving as fast as we can.
Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen is recognized.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here.
Just to follow up on your comments about our allies and
what they are doing because we know that our messages are going
to be much more effective when they are delivered with our
allies, I noticed that the European Parliament sent its first
official parliamentary delegation to Taiwan last month and it
adopted a nonbinding resolution to deepen ties with Taiwan.
Can you discuss to what extent the Administration is
engaging with our European allies around issues and working to
align our policy toward Taiwan?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for
the question. Yes, I would say that if I were to summarize in
one line our approach to the Indo-Pacific it would be allies,
partners, and friends, and our efforts are focused not just on
our partners within the region, but without as well as, those
outside of the region who also see the Indo-Pacific as being
vital to their future and the EU is very important in that
regard.
Just 3 weeks ago, I held 2 days of consultations with my EU
counterpart on these very issues, both focused on our
engagement across the Indo-Pacific and, specifically, vis-a-vis
China, and that included a discussion of Taiwan.
Just last week, as I mentioned, the EU Secretary General of
the EU External Action Service was in Washington for
consultations with Deputy Secretary Sherman, and I think, as
you may have seen from the public readout, there was a very
robust discussion of all of these issues.
The word that I would use to describe our consultations is
convergence. If you look at what the EU has done, what our
friends in Japan have done, what ASEAN itself has done, we have
all talked about the principles that ought to define behavior
in the Indo-Pacific and the principles that are most important
for supporting peace and stability, and we all share those
principles.
Our focus now, whether it is with the EU or many other
allies and partners across the region, is what is the concrete
action that we can take together. That was, certainly, the
nature of our discussion with the EU and it is with the rest of
our partners as well.
Senator Shaheen. I assume these discussions would be even
more effective if we had ambassadors to the EU and to China to
engage in these conversations. Can you speak to the impact that
it is having not having our diplomats in those critical
positions?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I am honored, of
course, to be in this chair and I am grateful to the members of
this committee and in the larger Senate for their support
regarding my confirmation, but we are truly hamstrung in the
region when we do not have our fully-confirmed capable
ambassadors on the ground. No doubt in every capital we have
very capable representatives, whether they are ambassadors or
our talented charges d'affaires.
There is simply no substitute for a fully-confirmed U.S.
Ambassador in terms of their capabilities, the legitimacy they
have within that country, and their ability to fully operate
and to have influence.
So yes, ma'am, respectfully, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, we would be grateful for the Senate taking quick
action to confirm as many of our ambassadors as possible. I do
believe it represents a real vulnerability for us in the field,
including in East Asia and Pacific region, for which I am
responsible.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Risch, I think it is
particularly concerning that these positions are being held up
by members of this committee, who ought to understand better
than most people in the Senate just why it is so important to
have our diplomats in position when we are trying to engage in
our foreign policy.
I would add, by the way, that it also is hamstringing
Americans' interests in China, for example, where we have a
number of Americans who are being held hostage by the
government of China and we have no one in the position of
Ambassador to advocate on behalf of those people.
Again, I think we should note that this is an area that is
affecting our national security because our colleagues on the
other side of the aisle--and it is not all of them--I know
Senator Risch has been very active in trying to move these
nominations--but we have got a couple of people who are holding
things up in a way that is having a real impact on our ability
to conduct American foreign policy.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I
agree with you. This is becoming, increasingly, a critical
issue. It would be great if we had an ambassador in China right
now, both on Taiwan and as we try to get China to join us
against the challenges of Iran and others.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank both the chairman and the ranking member for your holding
this meeting. We wrote and asked for this, and I so appreciate
your accommodation of this and I appreciate our witnesses here
today to provide insight on a very challenging area.
I would like to start with you, Assistant Secretary Ratner,
if I might. I want to focus on the importance of Taiwan to the
broader security of the Indo-Pacific region.
Earlier this year, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi stated
that the peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected
to Japan. Building on that statement, just last month, former
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, and I quote, ``A Taiwan
emergency is a Japanese emergency and, therefore, an emergency
for the U.S.-Japan alliance.''
As former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, I understand the
strategic importance of Taiwan to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but
I also believe an emergency in the U.S.-Japan alliance will
also represent an emergency for our alliances both in Korea and
in Australia. Protecting Taiwan is key to protecting the entire
U.S. Alliance Network within the Indo-Pacific.
First, I would just like to start with yes or no questions,
Secretary Ratner. Is the security of Taiwan important to the
security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would say it is essential.
Senator Hagerty. I agree. Then I just would like to then
ask you how Taiwan impacts our defense posture in the Indo-
Pacific and our ability to work with, to protect and defend
Japan, Korea, and Australia.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would describe our partnership with
Taiwan as an anchor to our network of allies and partners in
the region.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
I will come to my good friend, Ambassador Kritenbrink.
China is engaged in a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms
race right now. It is currently building underground silos for
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is improving its
nuclear triad of land-based, of sea-based, of air-based
weapons, and it is testing nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons.
General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, described China's recent hypersonic missile test as a
Sputnik moment.
General John Hyten, who, until recently, served as Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described these nuclear-capable
hypersonics as likely a first-use weapon or a first-strike
weapon.
Our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are
increasingly alarmed about China's laser focus and emphasis on
their strategic capabilities. The United States needs to
maintain a credible extended deterrence commitment to our
allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Ambassador Kritenbrink, do you agree with the premise that
the United States should do all it can to maintain credible
deterrence?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator Hagerty, thank you very
much for the question. Absolutely. I believe it is a vital
American national interest to demonstrate the credibility and
the sanctity of our security treaty commitments to our allies
in the region using all of our capabilities.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
In November, Japan's chief cabinet secretary publicly
stated that adopting a no-first-use policy in terms of using
nuclear weapons would, and I quote, ``make it difficult to
ensure Japan's national security.''
I would come to both of you now and ask if you agree that
the United States should seriously take into consideration the
views of Japan as well as our other allies and partners in the
Indo-Pacific with respect to U.S. declaratory policy.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, what I would say I would
simply reiterate my comment from a moment ago that it is a
vital American national interest to demonstrate the credibility
of our security treaty commitments involving all of our
capabilities, including our extended deterrence capabilities.
Senator Hagerty. Secretary Ratner.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, as you know, the Department is
currently conducting its Nuclear Posture Review. In the context
of that process, we have been engaging deeply and repeatedly
with allies around the world, including our allies in the Indo-
Pacific, and we have heard their concerns and, certainly,
Secretary Austin has spoken repeatedly about the importance of
our extended deterrence commitments.
Senator Hagerty. Secretary Ratner, thank you for the
comment and I would just encourage you, as I hear from our
allies in the region as well, they have very strong views on
this. Their proximity makes those views very relevant, and
thank you for taking those views into account.
Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker, who is with us virtually.
Senator Booker. First, I just want to echo the concerns
that were expressed by both the chairman and, obviously, by
Senator Shaheen about our lack of full diplomatic corps in a
time that we are seeing on multiple continents that we are--
have flashpoints and crisis points, and the urgency of
diplomacy.
I want to add to that that there are still a number of
positions at the State Department that are unfilled that are
necessary for national security, and, perhaps, to the Secretary
of State, that is true, right? These are important positions
when it comes to U.S. national security and should not be held
up with the urgencies that we have. Would you agree?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, yes, sir. I do believe it
is a major hindrance to the conduct of our foreign policy not
to have our full team on the field and, again, I would express
my thanks to the Senate for their support in my nomination and
others.
I would respectfully ask that we please move as quickly as
possible on the many remaining nominations both for ambassadors
in the field and our many positions unfilled here domestically.
Senator Booker. I am grateful. I am grateful for that.
I know this has been covered a little bit, but I would like
to just ask you again. You know, China had made a lot of
statements about pursuing a peaceful rise and it just does
not--and they were not really seeking confrontation.
Clearly, we have seen that change, and the aggressive
actions taken in Taiwanese airspace, international waterways,
and more is indicative of a change in posture.
I am wondering, this rhetoric, how much is it really--and
these actions, is it, in your opinion, not only belying their
claims, but, really, reflecting a real intention? Or is this,
in some ways, just to satisfy internal Chinese politics and
sort of the wolf warrior constituency and others? Do you really
think that they are looking to, potentially, engage in more
overt conflict of a military nature?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for--
--
Senator Booker. That is for either of them. Yes.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for
the question.
Our focus here today is, of course, on Taiwan and the
situation across the Strait, but we are deeply concerned about
a range of destabilizing and aggressive and coercive actions
that we have seen the People's Republic of China carry out
across the region and, in some instances, around the world,
whether it is in the maritime domain, whether it is this
situation on the Paracels, or the border with India, whether it
is economic coercion that it has carried out regarding a range
of countries around the world, or its increasingly aggressive
and coercive activities in the South and East China Seas. We
are laser-focused on the threat posed by those aggressive and
coercive actions and that is what animates much of our policy.
I would just say, Senator, I think you noted at the top of
your comments, whatever PRC rhetoric may say, I think we have
to focus on China's actions and base our policies there, and
that is why we are focused, Senator, so intently on supporting
and maintaining the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific
region that we believe is under threat from the PRC and that
order, we believe, is so vital to our future, security, and
prosperity and that of our allies.
Therefore, our intention is to work closely with our many
like-minded partners around the region to support that order,
which is, as I said, under threat.
Senator Booker. I am sorry, was there another comment?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. No, sir.
Senator Booker. I am concerned about, in my visits to
Africa, the incredible influence that the Chinese have there
and their erosion of diplomatic relations between African
nations and Taiwan.
They have been incredibly successful. I think it is
Eswatini and Somaliland that are the last two that have
maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and I think this
is indicative of a larger picture of Chinese influence in--on
the continent and, in many ways, undermining our position and
our interests there as well.
I am wondering what can the U.S. Government do to help
reverse the erosion and encourage countries to support, really,
our democratic principles, ideals, as well as be supportive of
a larger effort to contain China's influence?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you.
Whether it is in the context of trying to shore up
international support for Taiwan or Taiwan's international
space, or ensuring that countries and regions around the world,
including Africa, are not subject to Chinese coercion, I think
this, again, has to be and is a central focus of our policy and
our efforts, and our intent is, one, to remind countries of
some of the risks, for example, of taking on certain Chinese
investments or incurring certain debts vis-a-vis the PRC and
what those implications for a country's sovereignty may be down
the line.
Secondly, we need to demonstrate the benefits of partnering
with the United States and other like-minded partners, and
thirdly, we need to continue to highlight the importance of a
rules-based order and the values that we all hold dear, and
that is what we are doing and that is what we intend to
continue to do.
Certainly, the scope of the challenge is growing, Senator.
I agree.
Senator Booker. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I just
want to reaffirm I have been pleased to hear a bipartisan
commitment to our relationships with Taiwan. I feel very
strongly with that.
I think what is happening there and the fear and insecurity
they are creating in the country is unacceptable to such a
strong partner of the United States, and I know, on behalf of a
lot of Taiwanese Americans, that a strong American posture in
support of that democracy is something that we all should be
doing everything we can to support.
So thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both
of you for your testimony. Thank you for your service.
I have been trying to keep track of the testimony in the
hearing as it has gone on, but I apologize if I ask questions
that have already been covered.
We know from what has been said and following developments
in the area that we see real Chinese aggressive moves. We saw
the military moves up against toward Taiwanese airspace. We
have seen other actions taken.
Obviously, the United States also has sort of held its
position in the region. What are we doing now? What is in place
now to avoid miscalculations that could lead to unintended
escalation and conflict?
If you could each talk from the vantage views of your
perspectives of your departments.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you for your comment
and for your questions as well.
I would say, from our position, in order to prevent the
miscalculation and the risk of that that you have outlined, we
are doing a number of things.
First of all, we are taking a range of actions to
demonstrate the strength of our--the strength of our commitment
to the region and the strength of our deterrent capabilities
and those of our allies and partners and friends. We are trying
to strengthen countries' abilities to resist Chinese coercion
in all its forms.
I think those actions are the most important steps that we
can take, and the main focus for this Administration and me in
my job is how can we best support our allies, partners, and
friends across the region to support that rules-based order
that is under pressure from the People's Republic of China.
Secondly, Senator, there is an element involved in our
diplomacy directly with the People's Republic of China as well.
As you have seen, President Biden recently engaged in a virtual
meeting with President Xi Jinping.
One of the main objectives of that meeting was to make sure
as our competition becomes increasingly intense, we also engage
in intense diplomacy at the most senior levels to reduce the
risk of miscalculation that could veer into an unintended
conflict.
I do think that that is an important element of what we do.
We do need to continue to signal at senior levels to the PRC
leadership the depth of our concerns and a desire to avoid
miscalculation.
Again, Senator, I would say the most important part of what
we are doing, I would argue, across the region is to work with
our allies and partners to shore up the regional order.
Senator Van Hollen. I agree with the overall strategy that
the President has put forward, but I do want to push a little
bit more maybe on the defense side as well as to what
operationally is in place to make sure lines of communication
are open in order to avoid miscalculation?
Dr. Ratner. Between the United States and the PRC
specifically, Senator?
Senator Van Hollen. Yes.
Dr. Ratner. Yes. So I would echo Ambassador Kritenbrink's
comments that, clearly, one of the key priorities for the
Administration, and the President has said this clearly, is to
try to develop guardrails on the relationship, and there is
going to be follow-up to the President's meeting to try to do
that in practice.
From the perspective of the Defense Department, we have
been working to renew military-to-military relations with the
PLA over the course of the last year with a very laser-focus on
questions of crisis communications and crisis management.
We have had interactions within the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and interactions with INDOPACOM and some of their
PLA counterparts. We are in the process of renewing those
efforts.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, obviously, and I
know the chairman and others have mentioned that if we had an
ambassador in place, those kind of communications could be even
more effective and more clear. I think it is hurting our
national security every day that the--Ambassador Nick Burns'
nomination is being held up.
My last question is this. Look, China has long taken the
position that eventually they want what they claim will be the
peaceful reunification of China. Obviously, their actions have
been anything, but peaceful.
Do you note a real change in the position taken and the
tone taken by President Xi in his comments on Taiwan compared
to many of his predecessors?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you.
I do not know that the tone or the rhetoric has been
dramatically different from Beijing. There is still
occasionally a reiteration of a stated desire to resolve the
situation, in their view, peacefully, and yet, China has never
ruled out the use of force and that continues to this day.
I think the dramatic change that we have seen in recent
months and years has been in Chinese actions and behavior,
including its coercive and bullying behavior vis-a-vis Taiwan
and that is our primary concern, and that is what is driving
primarily our response rather than a focus on rhetoric,
Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young is with us virtually.
Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome before
the committee, gentleman.
Recent press reports have highlighted concerning
developments with Taiwan's domestic defense strategy and
capability. Reserve forces are in need of reform and there are
questions around Taiwan's recent shift in favor of
counterstrike weapons rather than adopting a porcupine strategy
of strategic denial capabilities.
Beyond weapons sales, gentlemen, what is the Administration
doing to support Taiwan's domestic military readiness?
Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Senator Young. It is a hugely
important question and we have to always remember that Taiwan's
ability to defend itself is more than just its arms purchases
and that as a government we ought to be taking a--widening our
aperture as much as we can and its reserve reforms are an
important element of that insofar as Taiwan's shift to an all-
volunteer force and the subsequent decrease of its active force
strength has led to the need to ensure that its reserve forces
are prepared to assume increasingly difficult missions.
The good news is that President Tsai and Minister of
Defense Chiu have begun walking down this path. As you know,
they have approved changes to reservists' training
requirements, increasing the number of days required for
reservists, and they have also been creating requirements for
more realistic combat training.
In addition to that, as was mentioned earlier in the
hearing, Taiwan is slated at the beginning of next year to
establish an all-out defense mobilization agency--an ADMA--
which is geared to combine mobilization and reserve functions
in one agency to better align training exercises and force
development requirements.
We think they are making real tangible progress on this.
Some of it is very much initial, and we are going to do
everything we can to support these efforts.
Senator Young. Dr. Ratner--okay, so that was my question.
Were there things that you think we should be doing, perhaps,
this committee can be helpful with as it pertains to supporting
Taiwan and its efforts to reform its reserve forces?
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator. I would be happy to
explain that in some detail in a closed session. What I will
say is that we are taking a more proactive approach to
supporting Taiwan in some of these reforms, working with them
on some of their defense concepts doctrine, supporting them in
some of their----
Senator Young. Why do we not just take it to a classified
setting, Doctor? I will pick up on that thread with you at a
later date. Thank you.
Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
Senator Young. So are the--what capabilities are most
needed for asymmetric defense? Because my sense is the legacy
systems and weapons that Taiwan has relied on in the past are
not sufficient, are not adequate, for a robust defense of the
island right now.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, that is right. That is precisely the
argument that the Administration has been making and the Trump
administration was making as well.
Again, we support President Tsai's commitment to achieve
greater balance of asymmetric capabilities. To your question
specifically, these include coastal defense cruise missiles,
short- and medium-range air defenses, defensive naval mines,
enabling C4ISR and other capabilities, but those would be at
the top of our priorities.
Senator Young. Okay. Lastly, and in what time period do you
see the greatest risks for conflict between CCP and, perhaps,
Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, my answer to that is that the China
challenge is a today problem, a tomorrow problem, a 2027
problem, a 2030 problem, a 2040 problem and beyond. I do not
think there is a date we ought to pick on the calendar, and we
got to make sure that we are sustaining deterrence from today
and maintaining it, going forward.
Senator Young. It is a today problem. That is all I need to
hear. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking
Member Risch, for this hearing and thank you, Ambassador
Kritenbrink, Dr. Ratner, for your testimony and your public
service.
You mentioned in your testimony, Dr. Ratner, the
significance of bipartisanship and it being a key part of our
relationship and our defense of Taiwan and that it should be
nurtured.
I will just mention at the outset that I think
bipartisanship in this hearing and in the actions of members of
this committee and in partnership with the Administration has
been a long and a critical part of our work together.
I have visited Taiwan twice in recent years, coordinating
with the Trump administration and the Biden administration
before doing so, and I went on a bipartisan trip just a few
months ago to deliver vaccines.
I think it is striking how the status quo and the support
of both Republican and Democratic administrations, including
through defensive arms sales, has served its successful and
free market democracy.
Dr. Ratner, what is the most critical investment that we in
Congress could make to help both ensure and strengthen
deterrence and U.S. military readiness in the Indo-Pacific,
most important investment in Taiwan both in terms of arms
sales, but moving forward some of the strategic and military
reforms that previous members have discussed, but also, most
important investment in terms of the Indo-Pacific region in
strengthening our partnership with our allies?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I think the answer I would give to
that is rather--and if the question is around U.S. capability
or investment in terms of strengthening Taiwan's capabilities?
Senator Coons. Both.
Dr. Ratner. I think the list that I just provided to
Senator Young would be at the top of our prioritization list in
terms of the types of capabilities that are mobile and
resilient and cost-effective for Taiwan, including coastal
defense, cruise missiles, and defensive naval mines and
others--I think we have articulated those--as well as the
reserve reforms and civil-military integration efforts that
Taiwan is undergoing. We support----
Senator Coons. Doctor, there continues to be some ongoing
tension within Taiwan military planning between those who want
to invest in expensive, but, perhaps, less critical
capabilities and those who agree with the vision that you just
laid out. How do we help move forward Taiwan's defense reforms?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, this is a question we often get. I
would say I am encouraged by the direction that President Tsai
and Taiwan's minister of national defense are heading in terms
of its capability development, its reserve reforms, other
defense reforms.
As in any bureaucracy, there are going to be competing
priorities. There are going to be service rivalries, especially
in a resource-constrained environment. I think what we need to
do is speak with one voice as an administration, as a Congress,
as a government, and work with allies and partners in the
region as well on this issue.
Senator Coons. How much harm would a year-long CR where we
do no more appropriation, no more policy through appropriation
as well--how much harm would that do possibly to our Indo-
Pacific strategy?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, leaders at the Defense Department have
been clear from the Secretary on down about concerns about a CR
and the need for stability in our budgeting cycles.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Ambassador, I would like to see us work in close
coordination with our European allies and partners to
strengthen our trade investment relationships.
Taiwan is one of the world's most significant sources of
advanced semiconductor chips. We currently have just come
through some real supply chain disruptions and significant
shortages.
What do you think we could do to develop the standards for
the 21st century for the digital economy in partnership with
Taiwan, including them in the world community of open societies
that is, in part, convening through the Summit for Democracy
this week, and what do you think we could do to better engage
our European allies in that work in strengthening both economic
ties and, potentially, security ties with Taiwan?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for
your question.
On the issue of Taiwan's role in the global economy and the
importance of resilient and diverse supply chains, I think that
is absolutely critical for Taiwan. It is absolutely critical
for the global economy and for our prosperity as well.
We have engaged in a range of fora and via a range of
dialogues with our Taiwan partners on those very issues,
including assisting Taiwan in making sure that its supply
chains are more diverse and secure and that Taiwan carries out
the export control and other screening policies designed to
protect its most important technologies and trade secrets as
well.
Our European partners are absolutely critical in this
effort as well, given their, obviously, central role in the
economy and these same supply chains, and this has been, in
fact, an area of discussion between the EU and the United
States, including in the recent engagements with the EU that I
mentioned earlier, both at my level and at the deputy secretary
level.
Senator, I could not agree more with the importance of the
issue, the importance of Taiwan's role in these supply chains
and in the global economy and in the importance of the EU's
role in achieving our goals.
Senator Coons. Thank you both.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the
witnesses.
Over the last year, the world has gotten much more
dangerous and, unfortunately, that danger is a direct
consequence of a series of foreign policy failures by the
Biden-Harris administration. We have seen President Biden's
weakness over and over again translating into making America
less safe.
In Afghanistan, we saw an absolute catastrophe with Biden's
surrender to the Taliban, abandoning Americans behind enemy
lines, and the chaos that resulted. When that occurred, every
enemy of America looked to Washington and took measure of the
man in the Oval Office, and whether it was Russia or Iran or
North Korea or China, they all determined that the President
was too weak to be a serious threat to them and, unfortunately,
as a consequence, each of them has gotten substantially more
bellicose, substantially more aggressive.
As we sit here today, over a hundred thousand Russian
troops are massed on the border of Ukraine preparing to invade
Ukraine because Joe Biden surrendered to Vladimir Putin on the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline and paved the way for Putin to take a
major step towards his long-term goal of rebuilding the Soviet
Union and, once again, posing a massive threat to the safety
and security of Americans.
In China, the weakness of the Biden administration, from
abandoning Afghanistan, from surrendering to Putin, has been
noticed and the Afghanistan disaster, I believe, made it
substantially more likely that China will launch an amphibious
military assault against Taiwan sometime between now and the
end of 2024 because for the same reason that Putin is preparing
to launch an invasion of Ukraine our enemies have determined
this President is too weak to stand up to them.
That has been complicated even further by the Biden
administration's incoherence and undermining of Taiwan, which,
unfortunately, serves as an encouragement to the Chinese
Communist government to engage in military hostilities directed
at Taiwan.
Every few weeks we see another example of bumbling and
incompetence from this Administration when it comes to Taiwan.
Over the summer, for instance, the White House's official
Twitter account first posted and then deleted a tweet about
vaccination donations in Taiwan because the tweet included a
flag of Taiwan.
Our Taiwanese allies were forced to publicly ask the White
House not to cause unnecessary speculation or misunderstanding
from all walks of life due to the removal of the related tweet.
The Biden White House publicly retreated from Taiwan to
avoid angering the communist overlords in China. More broadly,
the Biden administration has imposed a policy forbidding our
Taiwanese allies from displaying symbols of their sovereignty,
whether flags or medals or uniforms, on U.S. soil. It is the
policy that goes back to 2015 when the Obama administration
capitulated to the Chinese Communist Party demands to restrict
Taiwanese activities.
I fought for the Trump administration to change this
policy. It took 4 years to get it done, but, ultimately, they
did. They changed the policy to allow our Taiwanese allies to
display their flags on military uniforms.
The Biden administration reversed that policy and it did so
knowing it was over the objection of Republicans and Democrats
in the Senate on this committee.
I introduced legislation in this committee to restore the
policy allowing Taiwan to display its symbols of sovereignty.
It passed overwhelmingly in this committee with bipartisan
support, it passed the Senate overwhelmingly with bipartisan
support, and yet the Biden administration is defying the United
States Senate and continues to impose this policy undermining
our ally, Taiwan.
I have even heard recently from officers at several bases
that DoD is asking for stricter enforcement of the ban after a
Taiwanese graduate of the Air Force Academy wore the Taiwanese
flag at a graduation ceremony.
Meanwhile, we hear from Biden administration officials that
they have actually loosened contact guidance for Taiwan.
Dr. Ratner, what is the Biden administration's actual
policy regarding the ability of our Taiwanese allies to display
their national symbols of sovereignty and has that policy been
memorialized in a written memo that is being distributed within
the Administration?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am going to defer to my State
Department colleague, who has oversight of that particular
piece. What I will say is I am not familiar with the case that
you raised vis-a-vis DoD and I will look into that. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. Your office has not circulated any guidance
within DoD?
Dr. Ratner. State Department determines contact guidance
for the Department--for the U.S. Government as a whole.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Then same question.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, first, I would say that
everything that animates our approach to the Indo-Pacific is
designed to demonstrate the credibility of our commitment to
the region and to our allies, and no one should doubt the
strength of that commitment and the capabilities that America
brings to bear.
Under this administration and since I have had the honor of
having this job, America has revitalized its engagement with
allies and partners across the region in a way that improves
our national security and our prosperity that counters the
aggressive and coercive actions by the PRC that----
Senator Cruz. I just asked what the policy was on Taiwan.
The Chairman. I am sorry. I am sorry.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator, and then on second
part----
The Chairman. The time of the Senator----
Ambassador Kritenbrink. If I can respond, Senator.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes. I am sorry, sir.
The Chairman. I am sorry, but the time of the Senator is
well past expired. There have been members who have been
waiting here. The Senator used----
Senator Cruz. He has not answered the question at all.
The Chairman. The Senator used 5 minutes to make a
statement before he ever got to a question. I cannot allow all
members to do that or we will be here forever. I am happy for
it be included to the record.
Senator Cruz. You are not going to allow him to answer the
question?
The Chairman. No. You can speak for 5 minutes if you choose
to, but then you cannot speak for 5 minutes and then think you
can ask a series of questions. It is unfair to----
Senator Cruz. I asked one question. I asked one question
that he has refused to answer.
The Chairman. No, this is your third. This is your third.
Senator Cruz. I asked one question.
The Chairman. It is unfair to the other members who have
been waiting here.
Senator Cruz. I asked one question. The DoD witness said he
could not answer. The State Department----
The Chairman. The Secretary will answer it for the record.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Cruz. Let the record reflect that the chair is
protecting the Biden administration from admitting their
policies' undermining of Taiwan.
The Chairman. Let the record reflect that when the Senator
from Texas turns his back to the chair and thinks that he can
run out the clock and then begin to ask questions, that dog
will not hunt here.
Senator Cruz. I actually just look at the person to whom I
am speaking.
The Chairman. That dog will not----
Senator Cruz. I look at the witnesses when I am asking them
questions----
The Chairman. You see the clock----
Senator Cruz. --and I am looking at you now when you are
trying to prevent the witness from answering the question.
The Chairman. I know you enjoy this because you put it up
on your YouTube channel. You cannot run the clock in statement,
which you are free to do, and then ask questions.
Senator Cruz. Look, your exchange has taken longer than it
would take for them to answer the question.
The Chairman. Senator Kaine is recognized.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I have one item I would like to ask each of you about. I do
believe the Biden administration is earnestly trying to rebuild
and shore up alliances around the world and that is a positive
thing.
I think with respect to this particular region, the
elevation of importance of the Quad is an important component.
I think U.S. support for vaccine delivery in Taiwan has been
very positive as well as vaccine delivery around the world.
We are the most generous donor of vaccines. That is a good
thing. I think the announcement of a more potent Indo-Pacific
partnership between the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom
is positive, but now my critique and my question. I have yet to
get an answer from the Administration about why that particular
partnership--U.S., Australia, U.K.--blindsided France or at
least was perceived to have been blindsiding France.
Since France is an ally and France is an Indo-Pacific
nation, it would seem like we would want to include France in
our efforts in the Indo-Pacific, that that would be a real
positive, and instead, the U.S.-Australia-U.K. partnership
around submarines was perceived to be blindsiding France and
left France out of something that, I think, it would be in our
interest and other nations in the region for France to be
included.
So I want to ask each of you from the DoD perspective and
from the State perspective were you individually involved in
crafting this U.S.-U.K.-Australia partnership around submarines
and, if so, why was not France included?
If I could start with you, Dr. Ratner, from the Defense
side.
Dr. Ratner. Sure, Senator. The answer to your last question
is yes, I was involved in the latter stage of the negotiations.
They had been underway for several months by the time I was
confirmed, but I did participate in the final development of
the MOUs and some of the other elements of the AUKUS agreement.
I guess what I would say there is it is a particular
agreement around three sets of countries which have--and is
very particular to the strategic context and as well as our
existent bilateral cooperation with each.
As it relates to the question of France, one of the reasons
why the negotiations were so secret is because of the
sensitivity of the subject, and I guess I will leave it to the
Australians to explain their own engagement with the French on
the question of their own submarine deal.
Senator Kaine. You would agree with me, would you not, that
France is an Indo-Pacific country?
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator, and we are actively----
Senator Kaine. France is a great military ally of the
United States?
Dr. Ratner. They are, and I have met with----
Senator Kaine. If we want to be, you know, engaged with
allies in the Indo-Pacific in a way that will support other
allies like Taiwan and, potentially, be a bit of a deterrent to
China, the involvement of France in those efforts would be a
positive, correct?
Dr. Ratner. It is a positive. It is existent. We engage
with them on defense issues in the Indo-Pacific and we look
forward to doing even more of that into the future. They are a
resident power in the Indo-Pacific. They have got their own
relationship----
Senator Kaine. I gather from your answer that you were
involved in negotiations between three nations, France was not
part of those negotiations, and the U.S. expectation was that
Australia would somehow give notice to France about what was
going on at the appropriate time?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, my own conception of the AUKUS
agreement is that it is complementary to what is a very diverse
set of security relationships and arrangements in the Indo-
Pacific and globally.
So we have AUKUS. We have the Quad, as you mentioned. We
have a number of trilateral arrangements with the Japanese and
the Koreans, with the Australians and the Japanese. We, of
course, have our approach to ASEAN and these are meant to be
complementary. None is meant to be exclusive of the other.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you, Mr. Ambassador. Were you
involved from the State Department side in discussions about
the AUKUS framework or agreement and why was France blindsided
and should we not be including France in the Indo-Pacific
Alliance efforts?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
All of that happened, Senator, before I was confirmed and
sworn in, but I would say that, as you outlined, I think the
progress made by the Quad and the announcement of the AUKUS
agreement, I think these are very significant strategic moves
that contribute to peace and stability across the region.
I think that the President has stated publicly that the
rollout in particular could have been handled better and I
think you have seen the Administration take a number of steps
even since I have been in this position to engage intensively
with our French allies and our EU partners to recognize their
critical role in the region.
We recognize it, we value it, and we are in touch on a
regular basis how to advance our shared interests.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I have exceeded my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Ratner, then Vice President Joe Biden said in January
of 2017, ``Given our nonnuclear capabilities and the nature of
today's threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in
which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States
would be necessary or make sense.''
Do you agree with the President in the context of the East
Asia and Pacific region that you oversee that his statement as
Vice President is accurate?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, what I would say is the Nuclear
Posture Review and these types of questions are currently under
review at the Department and likely to be completed early next
year in terms of the role of nuclear weapons and U.S. nuclear
doctrine.
Senator Markey. I hope that your Department's Nuclear
Posture Review will be drawing inspiration from the President's
own views, namely, that we do not need to be the first country
to escalate a nonnuclear conflict into a nuclear conflict, and
if a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, as
President Biden reiterated in Geneva this summer, surely, we
should have no issue stating that the sole purpose of nuclear
weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States
and its allies, but that we would never be the first country to
use nuclear weapons in a nonnuclear war setting.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently called China's
test of an orbital hypersonic missile as a Sputnik moment,
suggesting that there is a technological gap with respect to
China that the United States needs to fill.
Dr. Ratner, is it true the United States exceeds the next
11 countries combined in defense spending, one of which is
China?
Dr. Ratner. I do not have the data at my fingertips, sir,
but, certainly, Senator, the United States has the largest
defense budget in the world.
Senator Markey. I will confirm for you that, yes, our
budget is larger than the next 11 combined, including China,
just so that we do not get back to 1960s missile gap. We are
looking over our shoulders at number two, three, and four.
Dr. Ratner, Department of Defense witnesses have testified
that China's development of nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles
is meant to counter U.S. missile defenses, but does our
regional or homeland-based missile defense architecture pose a
threat to China's strategic deterrent, be it from a traditional
Chinese ICBM or a hypersonic glide vehicle?
Dr. Ratner. Sorry, Senator. Could you repeat the question?
Is our missile----
Senator Markey. Does our regional or homeland-based missile
defense architecture pose a threat to China's strategic
deterrent, be it from a traditional Chinese ICBM or a
hypersonic glide vehicle?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, the purpose of our missile defense is
to enhance stability and deter aggression. It does not pose a
threat to China, no.
Senator Markey. It does not pose a threat? Thank you. That
is the answer. It does not pose a threat.
Is it not true that U.S. ICBMs that we have right now are
actually faster than the hypersonic glide vehicles that the
United States, Russia, and China are all rushing to develop?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would be happy to discuss that in a
classified setting.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that. The Union of Concerned
Scientists says that our ICBMs are 20 times the speed of
sound--I just think it is important to get that out there--and
I do not think there is any evidence thus far that the Chinese
hypersonic weapons are going to be able to exceed what we can
do in our country.
I always hate it when they make out the Chinese or the
Russians to be 10 feet tall and we are midgets. It is just the
opposite, and I just think we have to keep that out there.
Is it true that even if China were to have 1,000
deliverable warheads by 2030 it would still be one-fourth of
what is already in our active nuclear weapons inventory of
3,750? Is that correct?
Dr. Ratner. That is correct, though, of course, we deploy
lower numbers than that, Senator.
Senator Markey. We have the capacity right now in our
active nuclear weapons inventory to counter the 300 that they
have right now or the 1,000 that they might have by the year
2030? Is that correct?
Dr. Ratner. That is correct, Senator, though there are
still reasons to be concerned about China's nuclear buildup
despite the United States having a larger overall size.
Senator Markey. I appreciate that perspective. I just want
to say, though, that the Pentagon should not be hyping the
threat from hypersonics or goading us into an arms race.
We should absolutely engage with China on talks to reduce
nuclear risks. We should be prepared to acknowledge mutual
vulnerability with China as we did with the former Soviet
Union.
We just should not be trying, which I really feel the arms
manufacturers are trying to do and many in the Pentagon, to
just create artificial fear in the United States. It is not a
Sputnik moment. One hundred percent it is not a Sputnik moment
and the Pentagon should not be saying it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
Notwithstanding the row here with Senator Cruz, there is a
lot of us that do have an interest in that question that he
asked and you indicated they would answer it for the record,
and I guess I would be interested in hearing that answer.
The Chairman. If you want to use your time now, Senator
Risch, I am happy to have the secretary answer you. I am not
afraid of the answer nor am I hiding, Senator.
Senator Risch. Yes. This--yes. No, I get that. Mr.
Secretary, I just appreciate you never got to the answer to the
question. You talked about all the good stuff we were doing and
we appreciate that. We really do, but we have all heard
anecdotal stories about suppression of the Taiwanese flag and
what have you. Is there an official policy on this? Do we have
anything in writing on this?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very
much for the question and I am happy to answer it to the best
of my ability.
Senator Risch. Please.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. I would state, first, we have
tremendous respect for our Taiwan partners. We treat them with
great respect and dignity in every interaction.
However, over the last four decades, it has been United
States policy to not allow Taiwan partners to display symbols
of sovereignty on U.S. facilities. That includes flags. That
includes military uniforms. That has been long-standing
American policy for the last 40 years and it remains as such.
Senator Risch. Is there a written policy in that regard?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, there is a written policy
regarding our contact guidelines and the guidance that we give
and the encouragement that we give to U.S. Government officials
to meet with Taiwan partners in a way that is fully in
accordance with our unofficial, but vitally important
relationship with Taiwan. I do not know if the contact
guidelines covers the uniform or flag issue, but I would be
happy to research that immediately----
Senator Risch. If you could check that, that is fine.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. --and get back to you, but what I
can state with confidence is that the policy on symbols of
sovereignty has been long-standing over these many decades.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that, and like I said, we hear
anecdotal stories that are unique to a particular situation. It
can be--awkward would be a good word. Whatever you can provide
in that regard, I think, a lot of us would be interested in it.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just clarify for the
record. I said earlier in response to Senator Cruz that the
Defense Department does not issue its own guidance. The Defense
Department does issue guidance. That guidance requires
adherence to the State Department guidance. Just to clarify the
record there.
The Chairman. All right. Let me ask some final set of
questions. I want to just to follow this up fully. At the end
of the Trump administration, Secretary Pompeo rescinded
previous Department guidance on executive branch contacts with
Taiwan.
This past April, the State Department issued new guidance
that allows working-level meetings with Taiwan counterparts in
federal buildings. Is that the case, Mr. Secretary?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is the
case.
The Chairman. Okay. Which is different than the question of
symbols, but meetings are taking place in federal--with
Taiwanese counterparts in federal buildings.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. It was reported earlier this year that the
U.S. was ``seriously considering changing the name of the
Taiwan office from the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office to
the Taiwan Representative Office to elevate our treatment of
Taiwan consistent, however, with the One China policy and the
Taiwan Relations Act.'' Has Taipei made an official request for
the United States to consider changing the name of TECRO?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is
that we are continuing to assess a request to that effect.
The Chairman. So they have made a request?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. That is my understanding, but I
will confirm that and get back to you.
The Chairman. Would you confirm that for the record? Also
if, in fact, they have made a request, I would like to know the
status of the Administration's consideration of TECRO's name
change.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. They have also asked or engaged in
conversations that I have had on two things that they are very
interested in pursuing. One is forward deployment of our
Customs personnel, as we do in other countries, so that those
who are transiting from Taiwan to the United States could go
through that forward deployment. Are you cognizant of that?
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I am not tracking
that issue, but I would be happy to check into it and get back
to you.
The Chairman. If you would. I would like to know that.
Dr. Ratner, I understand that one of their other issues is
surplus defense equipment. Are you aware of that?
Dr. Ratner. Yes, Senator.
The Chairman. Are we engaged with them in that?
Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to discuss that in a
classified setting, Senator.
The Chairman. Okay. I would like to--I am going to follow
up on that.
Then, finally, let me ask you--you touched upon this a
little bit, but I want to get a sense of what is the view of
the Biden administration in prioritizing, providing Taiwan with
asymmetric weapons for the island's force modernization and how
do you, meaning the Department, define asymmetric? Thirdly, is
that definition shared with Taipei, including Taiwan's military
leadership?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, we view Taiwan's development of
asymmetric capabilities as an absolute priority not only for
Taiwan, but a priority for the United States.
We have defined those capabilities as--in my both written
and oral statement as capabilities that are credible,
resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost effective.
By and large, there is consensus between the United States
and Taiwan on the definition of asymmetric defense capabilities
and strategies, and the Department of Defense and the U.S.
Government as a whole is taking a proactive approach to try to
support Taiwan's development of these. Again, I would be happy
to get into details in a closed session.
The Chairman. I would like to know that, including are we
prioritizing providing Taiwan with those asymmetric weapons as
defined by your testimony.
Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator. Without question.
The Chairman. Okay. Then what operational concept is most
appropriate to follow for an overall defense concept when we
are talking about Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. Senator, as I mentioned earlier, in addition to
just the provision of arms there is a wide range of reforms and
capabilities that are going to be important to Taiwan's defense
and we are engaged across the board, including on issues of
concept development and analysis, doctrine, and otherwise.
Again, not--happy to get involved in specific questions
related to concept development, but we would be looking at
operational concepts that are taking advantage not only just of
Taiwan's geography, but also its technology, its economic
strength, and some of its capabilities' strengths, and also
helping it develop the role of its reserves, as we discussed
earlier, greater civil-military integration and what we
describe as defense in-depth as well--concepts that build upon
all of those efforts, not just the provision of arms.
The Chairman. Finally, is the Administration presently
delaying any DSP-5 license for arms sales to Taiwan?
Dr. Ratner. I believe that would be a question for
Ambassador Kritenbrink.
The Chairman. I am sorry.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy--I
do not know, but I would be happy to check into that and get
back to you.
The Chairman. All right. Well, let me help your situational
awareness.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I am aware of at least one DSP case that has
been sitting at State after clearing DoD for 5-plus months. It,
basically, covers upgrades for Taiwan's M-60 tanks, which is
not a cutting-edge ask, but as we seek to normalize arms sales
and avoid returning to a packaged approach, it makes no sense
that we would be sitting on it at this point, after DoD's
clearance and 5 months to make a consideration.
So I would like to hear back from the Department on that.
Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Dr. Ratner, I am going to be asking my staff
to set up a classified briefing with you and whoever else you
want to bring from the Department to answer some of the
questions we have not been able to pursue in a public hearing,
which I understand, but I want to hear the answers to.
Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am keen to do that. I think we have
got a great story to tell. I would look forward to that.
The Chairman. We are always listening, ready to listen to
great stories, especially when it comes to Taiwan. So we are
happy to hear it.
No other members seeking recognition, the record for this
hearing will remain open until the close of business on
Thursday, December 9. Please ensure that questions for the
record are submitted no later than Thursday. We, certainly, ask
you to answer them expeditiously.
With the thanks of the committee for your service and your
testimony here today, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
supply chains
Taiwan is the world's leading producer of semiconductors, including
cutting-edge computer chips essential for mobile devices, artificial
intelligence, and many other strategic technologies. Having so much of
the world's supply of this critical resource concentrated in one-place
raises obvious concerns--especially when Taiwan sits a short distance
from mainland China.
Question. What steps is the Biden administration taking to
collaborate with Taiwan to address current market shortages and to
bolster supply chain security in the future?
Answer. The semiconductor shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic
have highlighted the critical functions these chips play in our society
and put a spotlight on Taiwan as a leader in global semiconductor
supply chains.
Supply chains were a focus of the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity
Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) held on November 22. We discussed the
importance of coordinating between the United States and Taiwan
(through AIT and TECRO), as well as with industry, to build a more
resilient semiconductor supply chain.
TSMC's planned $12 billion investment in Arizona is just one
example of the great potential and opportunity that comes with
increased high-tech cooperation between our two economies.
Question. How might the semiconductor issue affect Beijing's
thinking around unification?
Answer. We are closely tracking Beijing efforts to undermine
Taiwan's semiconductor industry, including through talent poaching and
intellectual property theft. Taiwan's semiconductor industry is highly
valued and is on the cutting edge globally. The Biden-Harris
administration continues to emphasize our economic relationship with
Taiwan, focusing on making critical supply chains, such as those for
semiconductors, secure and resilient. This was a primary topic during
the November 22 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue.
Question. We've seen consistent Chinese efforts to compete with or
subvert Taiwan's semiconductor industry--for example, by recruiting
Taiwanese engineers and executives to state-backed chipmakers in China.
Are these efforts succeeding? How should the United States respond?
Answer. We are closely tracking Beijing efforts to undermine
Taiwan's semiconductor industry, including through talent poaching and
intellectual property theft. We are actively working to mitigate the
PRC threat to Taiwan's semiconductor industry through our work under
the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue and by working
to strengthen Taiwan's existing export controls to prevent advanced
semiconductor technology from going to the PRC for military purposes.
taiwan/u.s. pork referendum
As you know, the Taiwanese people will be going to the polls to
vote on a referendum on December 18. Among the questions on the ballot
will be whether or not Taiwan will lift the restrictions on the
importation of U.S. pork imports.
Question. Secretary Kritenbrink, as we contemplate deepening
economic and trade ties, what are the broader foreign policy
implications of a negative vote on U.S. pork imports on the referendum?
Answer. Taiwan is our ninth largest trading partner in goods in
2020 with two-way trade totaling $90.6 billion. U.S. exports of
agricultural products to Taiwan totaled $3.3 billion in 2020, making
Taiwan our eighth largest agricultural export market.
We note that the December 18 referendum on imports of pork
containing ractopamine did not pass. Regardless, we will continue to
engage on agricultural trade issues through mechanisms such as USTR's
agricultural working group under the Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement talks through AIT and TECRO, which was restarted during the
Biden-Harris administration.
Question. What are the stakes for the referendum on our bilateral
relationship?
Answer. Our partnership with Taiwan is diverse, robust, and
multifaceted, and goes beyond this one issue. We note that the December
18 referendum on imports of pork containing ractopamine did not pass.
We have consistently messaged that U.S. pork is safe to consume, and we
will continue to engage on agricultural trade issues through mechanisms
such as the USTR's agricultural working group under the Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement talks through AIT and TECRO, which was
restarted during the Biden-Harris administration.
cyber operations
Taiwan is on the frontlines of Chinese cyberattacks and digital
disinformation campaigns. Taiwanese authorities have linked Chinese
hackers to cyberattacks on government agencies, universities, and major
companies, including Taiwan's strategically critical semiconductor
industry.
Question. What can the United States do to help strengthen Taiwan
against this digital coercion? And what can the United States learn
from Taiwan's strategy in order to strengthen our own defenses against
Chinese cyber aggression?
Answer. We have discussed with Taiwan our shared experience with
PRC malicious cyber activity and are working together to strengthen
both sides' cyber resilience and capacity. The recent Economic
Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) with Taiwan, held under the
auspices of AIT and TECRO and led by Under Secretary for Economic
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Jose Fernandez, focused on
exchanging views and ideas for how we can work together to build more
resilient supply chains, including for semiconductors, combat economic
coercion, and strengthen the digital economy and 5G network security.
international institutions
Global health, international aviation security, and transnational
crime are all matters of global importance requiring cooperation from
stakeholders from all around the world. Indeed, Congress has passed
legislation requiring the State Department to support Taiwan's
meaningful participation in international organizations such as the
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization
(INTERPOL).
Question. What is the Biden administration's strategy for
supporting Taiwan's participation in international institutions and
within the international community?
Answer. We support Taiwan's membership in international
organizations where statehood is not a requirement, and meaningful
participation when it is. We continue to show the world that engagement
with Taiwan brings substantive benefits, and we encourage more
countries to deepen their engagement with Taiwan, which is a leading
democracy, a vibrant economic partner, and a technology powerhouse.
Through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, we are able to
show concretely Taiwan's ability and willingness to address global
challenges.
Question. What steps will the United States take to bolster
Secretary Blinken's October statement calling on all UN members to
support Taiwan's robust and meaningful participation in the UN system?
Answer. Increasing Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN
system and in other international and regional organizations is an
important priority, as the Secretary made clear in his October 26
statement on this subject.
The East Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Organizations
Bureaus also lead semiannual talks with Taiwan on international
organizations, which was held most recently on October 22 under the
auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Relations Office.
These discussions focus on supporting Taiwan's ability to
participate meaningfully at the UN and contribute its valuable
expertise to address global challenges, including global public health,
the environment and climate change, development assistance, technical
standards, and economic cooperation.
We also continue to engage likeminded partners on how to protect
and expand Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN and other
international organizations.
president tsai and elections
I don't mean to suggest that President Tsai, whom I have great
regard for, should be considered a lame-duck just yet . . .
Question. However, what is the United States doing to prepare for
post-Tsai relations with Taiwan?
Answer. Our rock-solid commitment to and partnership with Taiwan
will continue, as it has for 40 years, irrespective of the political
party or leadership.
taiwan democracy
In November, the PRC placed top Taiwan officials on a blacklist and
barred institutions affiliated with these individuals from cooperating
with PRC entities, as well as punishing firms that make financial
donations to Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party.
Question. What is your assessment of the implications of this
decision? How can the United States continue to support Taiwan's
democracy and resist this type of economic coercion from Beijing?
Answer. As we have seen in the recent case of PRC coercion against
Lithuania, the United States has a range of actions that we can take.
We can coordinate with the U.S. interagency to help those facing PRC
coercion access USG programs and financial resources, including working
with our commercial service to help diversify supply chains and
identify U.S. substitutes for inputs the PRC may cut off. During the
November 22 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue,
conducted through AIT and TECRO, we also discussed with Taiwan ways to
make our economies more resilient to economic coercion as well as how
to ensure our supply chains are secure and resilient.
______
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Strategic ambiguity is a longstanding informal tactic,
but it is not enshrined in any formal U.S. policy document, and is
arguably at odds with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the legal
foundation of Taiwan policy since 1979. While the TRA did not fully
commit the United States to Taiwan's defense, it also did not strike a
tone of neutrality either. Congress embedded a strong presumption of
intervention throughout the TRA. It described aggression against Taiwan
as a ``grave concern'' to the United States. Subsequent decades of
steady U.S. support for Taiwan have further solidified the widespread
perception in capitals around the world that we are Taiwan's protector.
Do you believe that the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act and
the decades-long political, military and economic support the U.S. has
provided to Taiwan imply that the United States should come to Taiwan's
defense in the event of a PRC invasion?
Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances has fostered
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple
administrations.
We seek to minimize miscalculations on both sides of the Taiwan
Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and deepen the U.S.-Taiwan
relationship, and best ensure the future of Taiwan is determined
peacefully and in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the
people in Taiwan.
We will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles
and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our
``one China'' policy.
Question. Given that U.S. law and our decades of support lead many
around the world to already assume we'd come to Taiwan's defense, how
does the United States benefit from maintaining a stance of strategic
ambiguity?
Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has fostered
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple
administrations from both parties.
Question. Do you acknowledge that U.S. inaction in the event of a
PRC military campaign against Taiwan would irreparably damage the
credibility of U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific and beyond?
Answer. We have publicly reaffirmed that the United States' support
for Taiwan is rock-solid. Taiwan knows it has no better friend than the
United States.
Consistent with our assessment of the threat posed by the PRC, we
will continue to provide Taiwan defense articles and services necessary
to deter the PRC's increasingly provocative behavior toward Taiwan,
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.
Question. The TRA made clear that ``the United States' decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.'' This
is an ongoing expectation, and one that the PRC is increasingly
flouting. In past years, when Washington indulged in ambiguity about
its strategic intentions, such a posture had tactical value. It
supported Beijing in its pledge to pursue ``peaceful development'' of
cross-Strait relations, which they said would lead to their eventual
goal of ``peaceful unification.'' Many Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
leaders stressed that ``unification'' could wait for decades if
necessary, and that the political disputes between Beijing and Taipei
should be laid aside in favor of a focus on developing economic and
cultural ties. Since Xi Jinping became the CCP's paramount leader,
belligerent rhetoric and aggressive military maneuvers have become the
norm.
What purpose is served by maintaining strategic ambiguity when
Beijing has changed both its rhetoric toward Taiwan and its conduct in
the Taiwan Strait?
Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has fostered
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple
administrations from both parties. We continue to make adjustments to
our engagement with Taiwan consistent with our ``one China'' policy to
reflect our deepening unofficial relations with Taiwan as well as the
increasing threat from Beijing. We seek to minimize miscalculations on
both sides of the Taiwan Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and
deepen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and best ensure the future of
Taiwan is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best
interests of the people in Taiwan. We will continue to make available
to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable it to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.
Question. Because the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic
relations rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be
determined by peaceful means, do you believe that the U.S. should cut
diplomatic relations with the PRC should the PRC attempt to absorb
Taiwan under threat of force?
Answer. As guided by our ``one China'' policy and the policy
reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act, we continue to consider any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means
to be a threat to the peace and security of the region and of grave
concern to the United States.
______
Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In 2018, a RAND Corporation study drew the following
conclusion: ``Clarity and consistency of deterrent messaging are
essential. Half-hearted commitments risk being misperceived.'' Another
RAND study concluded the same, arguing that ``perceptions [of the
potential aggressor] are the dominant variable in deterrence success or
failure.'' To avoid misperception and miscalculation, the United States
should be as clear as possible about what it seeks to deter--the use of
force by Beijing--as well as what it is prepared to do if deterrence
fails--defend Taiwan.
What kind of strategy has the best odds of deterring
conflict in the Taiwan Strait?
Does ambiguity or clarity better serve the goal of
deterrence?
Answer. Although the PLA's coercive actions are real and dangerous,
and PLA modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC can still be
deterred through a combination of Taiwan's own defenses, its
partnership with the United States, and growing support from like-
minded democracies. Through smart investments and key reform efforts,
Taiwan can send a clear signal that its society and armed forces are
committed and prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering
Taiwan's self-defense provides the best odds of deterring conflict in
the Taiwan Strait.
We therefore appreciate that President Tsai has prioritized the
development of asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan's self-defense that
are credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In
short, these are affordable investments in lethal capabilities tailored
to counter the military threat from the PRC. These capabilities are
aimed to strengthen multi-domain deterrence and ensure that an invasion
or attack could neither succeed rapidly nor occur without substantial
costs. DoD is taking an increasingly proactive approach to supporting
these efforts as we continue upholding our commitment under the Taiwan
Relations Act to make available to Taiwan relevant defense articles and
services.
The debate we're seeing on the merits of strategic ambiguity versus
clarity reflects bipartisan concern of PRC's increasingly assertive
military actions and coercion against Taiwan. Strategically, I believe
the United States has been very clear to both Taiwan and the PRC
regarding our policy, and that policy has endured for 40 years. As I
indicated in my testimony, I do not believe a change in U.S.
declaratory policy would meaningfully strengthen deterrence. I would be
happy to follow up on that point in a classified setting.
Question. It is clear that the United States must do much more to
provide Taiwan with the military platforms and equipment that it needs
to deter conflict in a much more expeditious manner. The Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) process as it pertains to Taiwan is in serious
need of reform.
What is the Biden administration doing to expedite the
internal processing of Taiwan FMS requests?
Once FMS requests have been approved, what more can be done
to ensure that U.S. defense contractors prioritize Taiwan's FMS
orders ahead of countries that do not face as severe of a
security threat?
What is the Biden administration doing to help Taiwan's Air
Force respond to the high frequency of incursions by PLA
fighters into Taiwan's airspace?
Answer. We are working closely with industry and our other security
cooperation partners to find ways of ensuring Taiwan has the
capabilities they need in a timely manner, and are exploring all
options to expedite cases. As you know, this Administration is not
bundling arms transfer requests; we process each request as soon as we
receive it through the foreign military sales and export control
processes. However, the speed of arms sales also depends on Taiwan
moving as quickly as possible to request and confirm transfers and on
U.S. industry to deliver these capabilities.
We have encouraged our industry partners to further support
Taiwan's self-defense through the co-development and co-production of
capabilities that best provide for a credible multi-domain deterrent.
Given Taiwan's focus and need for high-quality, indigenous, asymmetric
weapons systems, it is critical that our respective defense industrial
bases--not just our political and military leadership--are poised to
foster such forms of cooperation. Taiwan is a priority for the United
States and for all the reasons I outlined previously, we are working to
ensure it remains a priority for our industry partners as well.
The PLA's flights into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) are destabilizing and significantly increase the risk of
miscalculation. The flights serve to undermine the Taiwan Air Force's
readiness and Taiwan's broader resilience. It is important to note that
these flights are occurring alongside diplomatic and economic pressure
and targeted socioeconomic coercion. These coercive methods have been
observed most clearly since 2016, when President Tsai came into office.
Furthermore, these flights need to be considered within the greater
context of PRC coercion around the region, including in the East and
South China Seas and against India.
The United States Government has previously issued statements
highlighting the PRC's coercive actions against Taiwan, including PLA
flights into Taiwan's ADIZ. I defer to the Department of State for
further specifics on these statements. In the Department of Defense, we
continue to work closely with Taiwan on its F-16 retrofit and new buy
programs to ensure Taiwan maintains the capacity to respond to these
events.
______
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. You testified to the importance of initiatives of the
U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) in
expanding Taiwan's international partners. If provided additional
resources by Congress, how would the Department expand the scope and
geographical reach of GCTF to showcase Taiwan's expertise in public
health, humanitarian assistance, and the other sectors where it is a
global leader?
Answer. The United States, Japan, and now Australia, have worked
together to showcase Taiwan's ability to help the global community
through the GCTF, consistent with their unofficial relationships. The
GCTF provides training and technical assistance to participants, which
builds support for Taiwan around the world by demonstrating the value
of Taiwan's participation on the global stage. Since its inception in
2015 through the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic
and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, the GCTF has
provided training to more than 3,000 participants in dozens of
workshops ranging from building media literacy to empowering women
entrepreneurs. This year, we have started a ``franchise program'' that
enables U.S. embassies around the world to work with Taiwan
representative offices and likeminded partners to hold GCTF events on
pressing regional problems. I am particularly grateful for
Congressional support for GCTF, which will significantly enhance the
program's reach.
Question. The Innovation and Competition Act (S.1260) includes the
bipartisan and bicameral Taiwan Fellowship Act, which will send up to
10 of our best public servants to Taiwan in a flexible fellowship
lasting of up 2 years. The fellowship, modeled on the Mansfield
Fellowship with Japan, will include intensive study in Mandarin and
assignment in a ministry on Taiwan. Will the President include a
funding request in fiscal year 2023 required to fully implement the
Taiwan Fellowship Program?
Answer. The Administration is committed to supporting Taiwan as it
faces an ongoing PRC pressure campaign to shrink Taiwan's international
space. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on
legislation to deepen our people-to-people ties and enhance our ability
to work with our Taiwan friends. In so doing, we hope to ensure any
proposed legislation that proceeds is framed as permissive authorities
and preserves our shared goals as well as the Department's flexibility.
Question. Would the Department of State actively support Track 1.5
and Track 2 strategic dialogues with China to avoid the inadvertent
escalation between militaries operating in the region? If no decisions
have been made, what are the types of considerations that will inform
whether the Department will actively support such dialogues going
forward?
Answer. The State Department has actively participated in and
funded several unofficial efforts to enhance mutual understanding and
reduce the risks of miscalculation with the PRC in the strategic arena.
Going forward, unofficial and official efforts will continue to pursue
these objectives in parallel. As we work to engage the PRC in
conversations on risk reduction and strategic stability, a key
consideration will be to ensure Beijing engages meaningfully in both
official and unofficial channels.
______
Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Displaying Taiwan's symbols of sovereignty would be an
appropriate reflection of the robust bilateral relationship we maintain
with Taiwan, and would publicly demonstrate U.S. support for Taiwan's
independence and democracy. I sponsored a measure, the Taiwan Symbol of
Sovereignty (Taiwan SOS) Act, which was included in the Senate-passed
U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) with bipartisan support.
While the Biden administration's policy to restrict contact guidelines
for official U.S. engagement with Taiwan remains, it's important for
the Department of State's website to be comprehensive when presenting
facts about Taiwan, in order to ensure U.S. citizens are fully
informed, for their safety and security, especially when it comes to
international travel. A basic measure would be to display the national
flag of Taiwan on the Department's website.
Will the Department of State display Taiwan's flag on the
Department's website?
Answer. We have great respect for our Taiwan friends and treat them
with the dignity they deserve as a strong, democratic partner. However,
in keeping with the unofficial nature of our relationship, we do not
permit displays of Taiwan's flag on the Department's website. This is a
long-standing policy that has been followed by multiple administrations
from both parties in line with our ``one China'' policy as guided by
the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six
Assurances.
______
Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Taiwan Travel--In September, the Foreign Minister of the
Republic of China (Taiwan), Joseph Wu, visited the United States. Due
to a ban on government officials from Taiwan making official visits to
the U.S., Foreign Minister Wu was forced to travel to Annapolis,
Maryland instead of Washington D.C. This ban exists despite dozens of
Senators and Representatives meeting with Foreign Minister Wu
throughout his time in office.
The Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law No. 115-135) encourages visits
and engagement between officials from the United States and Taiwan at
all levels. As both the U.S. and Taiwan have been facing an increase in
political and security challenges from the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), it is critical for Taiwan's Foreign Minister and Defense
Minister to be able to engage directly with their U.S. counterparts.
China's increased military aggression and economic coercion across
the Taiwan Strait and throughout the Indo-Pacific region has raised
concerns of the U.S. and our regional allies and partners. It is
critical that like-minded democracies work together at the ministerial
level to counter China's malign influence. However, Taiwan's Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense are still barred from
visiting Washington, DC to directly engage with their counterparts and
Members of Congress on issues of mutual interests.
Do you believe that allowing the Minister of Defense from Taiwan to
make an official visit to the Pentagon for ministerial level
engagements would be beneficial to increasing coordination on the issue
of security in East Asia?
Answer. In keeping with the unofficial nature of our relationship,
our official contacts are guided by State Department policy consistent
with E.O. 13014 (Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the People on
Taiwan). Consistent with the Taiwan Assurance Act, the Biden
Administration has taken steps to broaden and deepen our unofficial
relationship with Taiwan. I defer to the State Department on the
specifics of these policies.
I agree it is important to maintain a robust engagement with
Taiwan's defense officials, and DoD will continue to advocate for
engagement that advances our national security interests and aligns
with U.S. policy.
Question. Symbols of Sovereignty--This past summer, the official
Twitter account of the White House first posted, and then deleted, a
tweet about vaccination donations to Taiwan, because the tweet included
a flag of Taiwan. Our Taiwanese allies were forced to publicly ask the
White House ``not to cause unnecessary speculation or misunderstanding
from all walks of life due to the removal of the related tweet.''
The Biden administration has a policy of restricting our Taiwanese
allies from displaying symbols of their sovereignty, whether flags or
medals or uniforms on U.S. soil. This is a policy that dates back to
2015, when the Obama administration circulated an internal memorandum
outlining contact guidelines, at the behest of the CCP.
The Biden administration reversed the Trump administration's move
to de-regulate contact with the Taiwanese. In response, this Committee
approved language I authored, which was ultimately included in the
Senate-passed U.S. Innovation Competition Act (USICA), which would
restore the ability of our Taiwanese allies to display their symbols of
sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the Biden administration has continued to restrict
that ability. There are reports from officers at several bases that DoD
is requesting stricter enforcement of the ban after a Taiwanese
graduate of the Air Force Academy wore the Taiwanese flag at a
graduation ceremony.
Mr. Ratner, what is the Biden administration's policy regarding the
ability of our Taiwanese allies to display their national symbols of
sovereignty on U.S. military bases, and are you aware of any efforts to
further address the display of the Taiwanese flag on U.S. military
bases?
Answer. Consistent with E.O. 13014 (Maintaining Unofficial
Relations with the People on Taiwan), the State Department has been
delegated the responsibility for managing our unofficial relations with
Taiwan. In this regard, DoD engagements with Taiwan are wholly
conducted pursuant to State Department guidance.
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