[Senate Hearing 117-270]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-270

                   THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            DECEMBER 8, 2021

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-712 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
  Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Ratner, Hon. Ely, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific 
  Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC...     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    10

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Robert Menendez................................................    39

Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    41

Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    42

Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Edward J. Markey...............................................    43

Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Ted Cruz.......................................................    44

Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions Submitted by Senator Ted 
  Cruz...........................................................    44

                                 (iii)



 
                  THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Young, 
Cruz, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order. Let me thank Ambassador 
Kritenbrink and Dr. Ratner for joining the committee today.
    This hearing on the future of U.S. policy and strategy with 
Taiwan may well prove to be one of the more consequential 
hearings that this committee holds this year, and that is for 
one clear reason--Beijing's increasingly aggressive rhetoric 
and action.
    Its threats and coercion underscore that the Taiwan Strait 
remains one of the most dangerous divides in the world today 
and one of the handful of places in the world where 
miscalculation could lead to a war with potentially 
catastrophic global consequences.
    Xi Jinping has orchestrated Beijing's hyper-nationalist 
aggression for his own domestic ends as he imposes his 
authoritarian neo-Maoist vision on the Chinese people.
    His relentless incursion into Taiwan's air defense 
identification zone this year are a significant threat to the 
people of Taiwan and the entire international community.
    It may be that with Beijing's cynical manipulation of its 
hosting of the Olympic Games that we will have a period of 
``calm'' over the next few months, but there should be no 
question about Xi's mindset.
    So we may have a crucial window of opportunity for the 
United States and our partners to reinvigorate our strategy for 
the challenges ahead, but let us be clear. The starting point 
for U.S. policy is a recognition that Taiwan's flourishing 
democracy and free market economy is one of the world's real 
success stories.
    It should be a point of great pride, something to be 
cherished, for all people on both sides of the Strait. We, 
certainly, cherish it here on both sides of the aisle.
    Let us also be clear, the U.S. commitment to the people of 
Taiwan and our obligation to safeguard Taiwan's space to make 
its own determinations about its own future without threat of 
coercion or use of force must be unequivocal.
    There should be no doubt or ambiguity about the nature, 
depth, and strength of that commitment or of our endurance as 
an Indo-Pacific power or of our determination as a people and 
as a nation to stand with those, like Taiwan, who share our 
interests and our values.
    Beijing should have no doubt or question that any cross-
Strait military or kinetic contingency directly affects the 
United States and our interests and values, directly affects 
our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six 
Assurances, and there should be no doubt, question, or 
misunderstanding that we will respond appropriately.
    As Beijing also seeks to reset baselines through coercive 
measures in the ``gray zone'' it should also understand that we 
remain committed to the essential constituent elements of 
deterrence across the Strait as well.
    Likewise, the United States must stand prepared and ready 
to assist Taiwan as it seeks to build its own security 
capabilities and to deter potential PRC military pressure.
    While I do not expect Dr. Ratner to get into sensitive 
specifics in an open setting, I am interested in hearing about 
how the Department of Defense is thinking about priorities in 
this area.
    I know the ranking member has a narrow bill that he has 
introduced on security assistance to Taiwan and, as he knows, I 
am working on a larger bipartisan package into which we hope to 
incorporate his bill, and I hope to work with him and other 
colleagues on it during the course of the balance of this year 
and to next.
    Beyond military and security matters, trade and economic 
ties also lie at the heart of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. I 
am interested to hear the outcomes of the most recent round of 
the Prosperity and Partnership Dialogue with Taiwan through the 
State Department, as well as other initiatives to deepen 
bilateral trade and commercial ties and to enmesh Taiwan in 
regional economic architecture, especially given Taiwan's 
centrality to secure semiconductor supply chains.
    Building closer and more enduring economic ties between 
Taiwan and the world is also crucial to assure that Taiwan and 
others have the wherewithal to withstand Beijing's efforts at 
economic coercion.
    As I know Ambassador Kritenbrink is aware, I have been 
deeply concerned about the pressure Beijing has been bringing 
to bear on Lithuania for its willingness to stand by Taiwan, 
for example, and I am interested in your thoughts on what else 
the United States can do to support Lithuania and others who 
stand with Taiwan.
    Lastly, let me flag that I am interested in the 
Administration's thinking about how to open and expand Taiwan's 
diplomatic space, be it how we engage with Taiwan here in 
Washington and how we work with our partners to assure Taiwan's 
meaningful participation in appropriate international 
organizations like the World Health Assembly, or consistent 
with the bill I just introduced, the Inter-American Development 
Bank.
    So we have a very rich and full agenda today. With that, 
let me turn to the ranking member, Senator Risch, for his 
remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Tensions, as we all know, are high in the Taiwan Strait and 
we all know why. China is taking increasingly aggressive 
actions to pressure Taiwan to unify. We are seeing more and 
more disinformation, political attacks, economic coercion, and 
military downright belligerence.
    I am glad this committee is holding this hearing at this 
critical time on Taiwan. As we increase the time, energy, and 
resources devoted to supporting this Indo-Pacific democracy, we 
need to be able to tell the American people why it is so 
important.
    We also need more extensive discussions with civilian and 
military leaders, including in a classified setting, to 
properly engage on the issues at hand. I hope we can work 
together to hold classified briefings on Taiwan early after the 
first of the year.
    A unilateral change in the status quo regarding Taiwan 
would not only threaten the security and liberty of 23 million 
Taiwanese, but also significantly damage vital U.S. interests 
and alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
    We would lose a model democracy at a time of creeping 
authoritarianism. It would give China a platform in the First 
Island Chain to dominate the Western Pacific and threaten, 
indeed, U.S. homeland. The consequences for Japan's security 
and, therefore, the U.S.-Japan alliance are hard to overstate.
    Semiconductor supply chains would fall into China's hands, 
and it would embolden China in other territorial disputes, 
including with India and in the South China Sea. Many U.S. 
allies and partners fear Taiwan would just be China's first 
step, and China's aggressive actions give us no reason to 
believe otherwise.
    To deter the Chinese Communist Party from coercing Taiwan, 
the United States must be laser-focused on concrete actions 
that put Taiwan in the best possible position to defend against 
the Chinese military.
    Last month, I introduced, as the chairman indicated, the 
Taiwan Deterrence Act with several colleagues. The bill 
authorizes $2 billion in foreign military financing for Taiwan 
every year through 2032.
    Such a program would accelerate Taiwan's acquisition of 
asymmetric capabilities and incentivize closer U.S.-Taiwan 
joint defense coordination. I look forward to working with the 
chairman as he puts his bill forward and melding the two bills 
together.
    This is not, I am sure the chairman would agree, a partisan 
matter. This is a matter that is important to all American 
people.
    I applaud President Tsai's commitment to important defense 
reforms, defensive reforms that we have been urging, including 
recent purchases of key capabilities and the planned 
establishment of an agency for civilian resilience.
    More needs to be done to ensure the Taiwanese military 
fully implements her reform-minded vision. Close coordination 
with our executive and legislative branches is essential. The 
U.S. Government should prioritize getting the right 
capabilities to Taiwan quickly and enhancing other important 
forms of defense engagement.
    If there is a problem, the executive branch should tell 
Congress and we all need to fix it. We should be delivering the 
same messages on reform to our friends in Taiwan.
    What we do in the next 2 years is of great importance, but 
what we say also matters. I am deeply concerned by confused and 
varying statements on our Taiwan policy from high members in 
the current Administration, including the President.
    This confusion demonstrates weakness, and weakness always 
invites more aggression. Our Taiwan policy has remained 
consistent, regardless of the false claims by Chinese leaders. 
U.S. policy towards Taiwan has always called for robust support 
for its defense. This is enshrined in the Taiwan Relations Act.
    There has been much talk recently about U.S. policy 
regarding Taiwan, and I would urge anyone, whether they are 
friends or enemies, to read the Taiwan Relations Act. This is 
United States law. This is not a suggestion. It is not a 
thought. It is law that was put in place on January 1, 1979, 
and it is called the Taiwan Relations Act. It sets forth the 
policy of the United States regarding Taiwan. It is binding. It 
is the law. It is not a suggestion. It is a commitment to 
ourselves, it is a commitment to our allies, it is a commitment 
to Taiwan, and it is a commitment to the world.
    I will quote very, very briefly from the Act. In Section 
2(b)(5) it says that it is the policy of the United States to 
provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and it is the 
policy of the United States, in (6), to maintain the capacity 
of the United States to resist any resort to force or other 
forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the 
social economic system of the people on Taiwan.
    Section 3 goes on to say--that is, 3(a)--in furtherance of 
the policy set forth in Section 2 of this act, the United 
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and 
defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
    This is the law of America. It is the law that has been in 
place since January 1, 1979. So any debate that is going on 
right now needs to start with this law. This is where we begin.
    In 1982, President Reagan wrote that the linkage between 
U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan and whether China pursues a 
peaceful resolution across the Taiwan Strait is a permanent 
imperative of U.S. foreign policy.
    Today, China sends large numbers of military aircraft into 
the Taiwan Strait for what they call rehearsals for future 
operations. It threatens to take all necessary means to unify 
with Taiwan and uses its economic might to punish countries 
that engage with Taiwan.
    These are not tenets of a peaceful resolution, which is 
what is called for in the United States policy. These actions, 
coupled with China's massive military buildup, create a very 
different geopolitical environment. The United States must 
continue executing our long-standing Taiwan policy in a manner 
that matches today's geopolitical realities.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch, for those remarks, 
and we are very much in sync here.
    Let us turn to Ambassador Kritenbrink first and then Dr. 
Ratner. We will have your full statements included for the 
record, without objection. We would ask you to summarize them 
in about 5 minutes or so so that members of the committee could 
engage in a conversation with you.
    Let us start off with Ambassador Kritenbrink.

 STATEMENT OF THE HON. DANIEL KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                     STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished 
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
speak with you today about our growing partnership with Taiwan.
    As you know, Taiwan is a leading democracy, a technological 
powerhouse, and a force for good. Our shared values, commercial 
and economic links, as well as people-to-people ties form the 
bedrock of our friendship and serve as the impetus for our 
expanding engagement with Taiwan. This sentiment, shared across 
multiple administrations from both parties, is the lodestar in 
managing our critically important unofficial relationship with 
Taiwan.
    Our One China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances has 
promoted peace and prosperity in the region for more than 40 
years.
    Our policy also maximizes our ability to broaden and deepen 
U.S.-Taiwan cooperation and best ensures the future of Taiwan 
is determined by its people, peacefully and free of PRC 
coercion.
    Through the American Institute in Taiwan, our cooperation 
with Taiwan has increased in recent years. Taiwan has become an 
important U.S. partner in trade and investment, health, 
semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment 
screening, science and technology, education, and democratic 
governance.
    Under this Administration, we have advanced these 
cooperative efforts in a number of ways, including convening 
the second annual U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership 
Dialogue, to build secure and resilient supply chains and 
counter economic coercion, and inviting Taiwan to share its 
expertise to combat disinformation and/or authoritarianism at 
the Summit for Democracy.
    We have also expanded the global cooperation and training 
framework in which we, Japan, and now Australia work together 
to showcase Taiwan's expertise around the world.
    Our relationship with Taiwan brings tremendous benefits to 
the American people. As just one example, cutting-edge 
semiconductors from Taiwan are key components for many of our 
most important industries.
    Taiwan companies, most notably TSMC, are now investing 
billions of dollars in the United States to create high-paying 
jobs and help ensure our semiconductor supply chains are 
resilient.
    The United States is firmly committed to peace and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific region, where we have an enduring 
national interest. We continue to oppose unilateral changes to 
the status quo and we call for cross-Strait issues to be 
resolved in a peaceful manner consistent with the wishes and 
best interests of the people on Taiwan.
    It is for this reason that we view that PRC's growing 
military, diplomatic, and economic coercion toward Taiwan with 
serious concern. These actions are destabilizing to the region 
and risk a miscalculation that could harm the global economy.
    In response, the United States has and will continue to 
make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services 
necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability 
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
    The United States has notified Congress of more than $32 
billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but we should be 
clear that arms sales alone are not enough.
    We also are encouraging Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric 
capabilities that complicate PRC planning, and to implement 
defense reforms that will strengthen the resilience of Taiwan 
society against PRC coercion.
    The PRC also continues to execute campaigns to sway 
Taiwan's few remaining diplomatic partners into breaking 
official ties, to bully countries such as Lithuania when they 
seek to deepen engagement with Taiwan, and to block Taiwan's 
meaningful participation in international organizations.
    These campaigns are part of a broader PRC effort to 
diminish Taiwan's international space, which ultimately robs 
all of us of the many benefits derived from Taiwan's expertise.
    We continue to work with like-minded countries to ensure 
Taiwan is acknowledged as a respected and constructive 
democratic actor in global affairs. Maintaining Taiwan's 
international space is fundamental to preserving the cross-
Strait status quo and denying the PRC the political conditions 
it views as conducive for coerced unification.
    To that end, it is critical that we have our Senate-
confirmed ambassadors in country to help shore up our alliances 
and push back against malign influence.
    Our nominees to some of the most important countries in the 
region, including Japan, Vietnam, and China itself are awaiting 
confirmation in the Senate after being voice voted out of this 
committee with broad bipartisan support. I respectfully ask the 
committee's help in confirming them as quickly as possible.
    The United States continues to raise the importance of 
peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait with our allies and 
partners. We have publicly and privately urged the PRC to abide 
by its commitment to peacefully resolve cross-Strait issues and 
to engage Taiwan in a meaningful dialogue to deescalate 
tensions.
    As a result of the PRC's actions, the global community has 
become more vocal in supporting Taiwan. Several countries' 
parliamentarians have visited Taiwan or passed measures of 
support.
    Many U.S. allies and partners have also publicly raised 
their concerns about maintaining peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. Congress has played a critical role in 
championing continued U.S. and international support for 
Taiwan, for which we are very grateful.
    In summary, our relationship with Taiwan is truly rock 
solid. Taiwan time and again has proven to be a valuable 
partner. Only by continuing all our efforts to work with 
Taiwan--to work with and support Taiwan can we ultimately 
preserve peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific that 
undergirds a strong global economy and our national interest.
    Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ambassador Kritenbrink follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Daniel J. Kritenbrink

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today 
about our partnership with Taiwan, including our expanding security 
cooperation, and our efforts to coordinate with like-minded countries 
to preserve peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
    Taiwan is a leading democracy, a technological powerhouse, and a 
force for good. Our shared values, commercial and economic links, as 
well as people-to-people ties form the bedrock of our friendship and 
serve as the impetus for our expanding engagement with Taiwan. This 
sentiment is the lodestar in managing our critically important 
unofficial relationship with Taiwan.
    Our one China policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the 
Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has promoted peace and 
prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple 
administrations from both parties. Our policy also maximizes our 
ability to broaden and deepen U.S.-Taiwan cooperation, and best ensures 
the future of Taiwan is determined by its people, peacefully and free 
of PRC coercion.
    Through the American Institute in Taiwan, our cooperation with 
Taiwan has increased in recent years, including in several new areas. 
Taiwan has become an important U.S. partner in trade and investment, 
health, semiconductor and other critical supply chains, investment 
screening, science and technology, education, and democratic 
governance. Under this Administration, we have advanced these 
cooperative efforts in a number of ways, including:

   Resuming Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) 
        talks to further interlink our economies;

   Inviting Taiwan to share its expertise at the Global COVID-
        19 Summit;

   Holding the U.S.-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic 
        Governance in the Indo-Pacific to advance human rights in a 
        region under pressure from authoritarian regimes;

   Convening the second annual U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity 
        Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) to build secure and resilient 
        supply chains between our economies, counter economic coercion, 
        and pave the way for deeper cooperation on next generation 
        technologies and scientific endeavors; and

   Inviting Taiwan to share its expertise on using digital 
        tools to combat disinformation and authoritarianism at the 
        Summit for Democracy.

    As Taiwan's response to the pandemic has shown, it is also a 
willing partner with significant expertise to help solve global 
challenges. The United States, Japan, and now Australia, have worked 
together to showcase Taiwan's ability to help the world through the 
Global Cooperation and Training Framework, or GCTF. The GCTF provides 
training and technical assistance to third-country participants, which 
builds support for Taiwan around the world by demonstrating the value 
of its participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, 
the GCTF has provided training to more than 3,000 participants in 
dozens of workshops ranging from building media literacy to empowering 
women entrepreneurs. This year, we have started a ``franchise program'' 
that enables U.S. embassies to work with Taiwan representative offices 
and likeminded partners to hold GCTF events on pressing regional 
problems. I am particularly grateful for congressional support for 
GCTF, which will significantly enhance the program's reach.
    Our relationship with Taiwan brings tremendous benefits to the 
American people. As just one example, cutting-edge semiconductors from 
Taiwan are key components for many of our most important industries. 
Taiwan companies, most notably TSMC, are now investing billions of 
dollars in the United States to create high-paying jobs and help ensure 
our semiconductor supply chains are resilient. And we still remember 
with great gratitude Taiwan's donation of millions of articles of PPE 
at the start of the pandemic last year. As part of our partnership on 
health, the United States has provided Taiwan with 4 million doses of 
Moderna vaccine.
    The United States is firmly committed to peace and stability in the 
Indo-Pacific region, where we have long had an enduring national 
interest. We continue to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo 
and call for cross-Strait issues to be resolved in a peaceful manner 
that is consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on 
Taiwan. It is for this reason that we view the PRC's growing coercive 
and provocative behavior toward Taiwan with serious concern.
    Since the 2016 election of Taiwan's President Tsai Ing-wen, the PRC 
has used military, diplomatic, and economic coercion to undermine the 
status quo in the Taiwan Strait. These actions are destabilizing to the 
region and risk a miscalculation that could harm the global economy.
    In response to the growing PRC military threat, the United States 
has and will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles 
and services necessary to enable it to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. The 
United States has notified Congress of more than $32 billion worth of 
arms to Taiwan since 2009, but we should be clear that arms sales alone 
cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. As my Department of 
Defense colleague will note, we also are encouraging Taiwan to 
prioritize asymmetric capabilities that complicate PRC planning and to 
implement necessary defense reforms that will strengthen the resilience 
of Taiwan's society against PRC coercion.
    In addition to increased PLA military activity near Taiwan, the PRC 
continues to execute campaigns to sway Taiwan's few remaining 
diplomatic partners into breaking official ties; to bully countries, 
such as Lithuania, when they seek to deepen engagement with Taiwan; and 
to block Taiwan's participation in international organizations. These 
campaigns seek to coercively influence how countries decide the 
contours of their policy with respect to cross-Strait issues. It is 
also part of a longer PRC campaign to diminish Taiwan's international 
space, which ultimately robs the global community of the many benefits 
derived from Taiwan's expertise in solving shared challenges.
    To preserve Taiwan's ``international space,'' we continue to work 
with likeminded countries to ensure that Taiwan is acknowledged as a 
respected and constructive democratic actor in international affairs. 
Maintaining Taiwan's international space is fundamental to preserving 
the cross-Strait status quo and denying the PRC the political 
conditions it views as being conducive for coerced unification on 
Beijing's terms.
    To that end, it is critical that we have our Senate-confirmed 
Ambassadors in the region, to help shore up our alliances and push back 
against malign influence. Unfortunately, our nominees to some of the 
most important countries in the region, including Japan, Vietnam, and 
China itself, are awaiting confirmation in the Senate after being 
voice-voted out of this Committee with broad bipartisan support. I 
respectfully ask for your help in confirming them as quickly as 
possible.
    Through our diplomatic channels, the United States continues to 
raise the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait with 
our allies and partners, and to express our strong concerns to the PRC 
regarding its actions and behavior toward Taiwan. We have publicly and 
privately urged the PRC to abide by its commitment to peacefully 
resolve cross-Strait issues and to engage Taiwan in a meaningful 
dialogue to deescalate tensions.
    As a result of the PRC's actions, the global community has become 
more vocal regarding its concerns over the Taiwan Strait and its 
support for Taiwan's international space. Several countries' 
parliamentarians have visited Taiwan or passed measures expressing 
support for Taiwan. Many U.S. allies and partners also have publicly 
raised their concerns about maintaining peace and stability in the 
Taiwan Strait. Congress has played a critical role in championing 
continued U.S. and international support for Taiwan, for which we are 
grateful. This support is important in demonstrating to the PRC that 
Taiwan is not merely a so-called ``internal affair,'' but rather a 
matter of great consequence and importance to the global community and 
economy.
    In summary, our relationship with Taiwan is truly ``rock solid.'' 
Taiwan time and again has proven to be a valuable partner. The United 
States will continue to support Taiwan publicly. We will continue to 
work with Taiwan on initiatives that demonstrate the value it brings to 
the international community. And we will continue to encourage like-
minded countries' engagement with and public demonstrations of support 
for Taiwan. Only then can we ultimately preserve the peace and 
stability in the Indo-Pacific that undergirds a strong global economy 
and our national interest.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner.

   STATEMENT OF THE HON. ELY RATNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
 DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                    DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Ratner. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to be here today to describe how the Department of 
Defense is supporting Taiwan's ability to defend its vibrant 
prosperous democracy.
    I would like to begin with an overview of why Taiwan's 
security is so important to the United States. As you know, 
Taiwan is located at a critical node within the First Island 
Chain, anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners that is 
critical to the region's security and critical to the defense 
of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.
    Geographically, Taiwan is also situated alongside major 
trade lanes that provide sea lines of communication for much of 
the world's commerce and energy shipping. It is in part for 
these strategic reasons that this administration, like those 
before it, has affirmed our commitment to our One China policy 
as guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint U.S.-PRC 
communiques, and the Six Assurances.
    Taiwan is also integral, as you know, to the regional and 
global economy. Its free market economy embraces innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and private sector-led growth, which has 
helped Taiwan become a valuable economic and trade partner for 
the United States.
    Moreover, Taiwan is a beacon of democratic values and 
ideals. In stark contrast to deepening authoritarianism and 
oppression in the PRC, Taiwan has proven the possibilities of 
an alternative path to that of the Chinese Communist Party.
    Unfortunately, although the PRC publicly advocates for 
peaceful unification with Taiwan, leaders in Beijing have never 
renounced the use of military aggression. In fact, the PLA is 
likely preparing for a contingency to unify Taiwan with the PRC 
by force while simultaneously attempting to deter, delay, or 
deny third-party intervention on Taiwan's behalf.
    The PRC threat to Taiwan, however, is not limited to 
invasion or blockade. The PLA is conducting a broader coercive 
campaign in the air and maritime domains around Taiwan. These 
operations are destabilizing, intentionally provocative, and 
increase the likelihood of miscalculation.
    Nevertheless, although the PLA's actions are real and 
dangerous and PLA modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC 
can still be deterred through a combination of Taiwan's own 
defenses, its partnership with the United States, and growing 
support from like-minded democracies.
    Through smart investments in key reforms, Taiwan can send a 
clear signal that its society and armed forces are committed 
and prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering 
Taiwan's self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential 
feature of deterrence.
    We, therefore, appreciate that President Tsai has 
prioritized the development of asymmetric capabilities for 
Taiwan's self-defense that are credible, resilient, mobile, 
distributed, and cost effective.
    Asymmetric capabilities, however, are only one part of the 
deterrence equation. Taiwan must complement investments in 
these critical capabilities with equal focus on enhancing 
resilience, supporting civil-military integration, and building 
a strategy that includes defense in-depth.
    Now, in addition to the provision of defense arms and 
services to Taiwan, the department remains committed to 
maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist the 
resort to force or other forms of coercion that may jeopardize 
the security of the people on Taiwan.
    Let me be clear that this is an absolute priority. The PRC 
is the Department of Defense's pacing challenge and a Taiwan 
contingency is the pacing scenario. We are modernizing our 
capabilities, updating U.S. force posture, and developing new 
operational concepts accordingly.
    I should also underscore that the department's efforts to 
deter PRC aggression and enhance Taiwan's defenses will not be 
in isolation. Countries throughout the Indo-Pacific and beyond 
recognize that PRC aggression against Taiwan would have serious 
consequences for their own interests and are increasingly 
voicing concerns about PRC coercion and potential aggression 
against Taiwan.
    As evidenced by a number of recent multilateral operations 
and exercises, the Department is focused on enhancing our 
regional cooperation as a means of bolstering deterrence.
    Finally, I would like to close by thanking all of you for 
your strong bipartisan support for Taiwan. It is my firm belief 
that this bipartisanship is one of our most powerful assets in 
the defense of Taiwan and should be nurtured and treated as 
such.
    In that context, the Department's partnership and 
bipartisan collaboration with Congress are critical to ensuring 
that we continue to meet our commitments under the Taiwan 
Relations Act.
    Thank you for your time and attention today, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Ratner follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Dr. Ely Ratner

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for the opportunity today to describe how the 
Department of Defense is supporting Taiwan's ability to defend its 
vibrant, prosperous democracy.
    I'd like to begin with an overview of why Taiwan's security is so 
important to the United States. As you know, Taiwan is located at a 
critical node within the first island chain, anchoring a network of 
U.S. allies and partners--stretching from the Japanese archipelago down 
to the Philippines and into the South China Sea--that is critical to 
the region's security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. 
interests in the Indo-Pacific. Geographically, Taiwan is also situated 
alongside major trade lanes that provide sea lines of communication for 
much of the world's commerce and energy shipping. It is in part for 
these strategic reasons that this Administration, like those before it, 
has affirmed our commitment to our one-China policy, as guided by the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint U.S.-PRC Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances.
    Taiwan is also integral to the regional and global economy. Its 
free-market economy embraces innovation, entrepreneurship, and private-
sector led growth, which has helped Taiwan become a valuable economic 
and trade partner for the United States. Indeed, our economy--like many 
others around the world--has come to count on Taiwan as a critical 
supplier of high-technology, including semiconductors.
    Moreover, Taiwan is a beacon of democratic values and ideals. In 
stark contrast to deepening authoritarianism and oppression in the PRC, 
Taiwan has proven the possibilities of an alternative path to that of 
the Chinese Communist Party.
              the people's republic of china (prc) threat
    Unfortunately, although the PRC publicly advocates for peaceful 
unification with Taiwan, leaders in Beijing have never renounced the 
use of military aggression.
    In fact, the PLA is likely preparing for a contingency to unify 
Taiwan with the PRC by force, while simultaneously attempting to deter, 
delay, or deny third-party intervention on Taiwan's behalf.
    The PRC's options for military campaigns against Taiwan are 
bolstered by the PLA's rapidly advancing capabilities, including the 
sophistication of its surface ships and submarines, advances in combat 
aircraft and air defenses, the increased quantity and quality of 
ballistic and cruise missiles, and the development of tools for cyber 
and information warfare.
    The PRC threat to Taiwan, however, is not limited to invasion or 
blockade. The PLA is conducting a broader coercive campaign in the air 
and maritime domains around Taiwan. These operations are destabilizing, 
intentionally provocative, and increase the likelihood of 
miscalculation. They put the prosperity and security of the region at 
risk, and are part of a pattern of PRC military coercion and aggression 
against other U.S. allies and partners in the region, including India, 
Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
                       dod priorities for taiwan
    Although the PLA's actions are real and dangerous, and PLA 
modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC can still be deterred 
through a combination of Taiwan's own defenses, its partnership with 
the United States, and growing support from like-minded democracies. 
Through smart investments and key reform efforts, Taiwan can send a 
clear signal that its society and armed forces are committed and 
prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering Taiwan's self-
defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence.
    We therefore appreciate that President Tsai has prioritized the 
development of asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan's self-defense that 
are credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In 
short, these are affordable investments in lethal capabilities tailored 
to counter the military threat from the PRC. These capabilities are 
aimed to strengthen multi-domain deterrence and ensure that an invasion 
or attack could neither succeed rapidly nor occur without substantial 
costs. DoD is taking an increasingly proactive approach to supporting 
these efforts as we continue upholding our commitment under the Taiwan 
Relations Act to make available to Taiwan relevant defense articles and 
services.
    Asymmetric capabilities, however, are only one part of the 
deterrence equation. Taiwan must complement investments in these 
critical capabilities with equal focus on enhancing resilience, 
supporting civil-military integration, and building a strategy that 
includes defense-in-depth. In this regard, President Tsai's 
determination to reform Taiwan's reserve forces and integrate civilian 
and military agencies under the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency is 
critical to enhancing Taiwan's overall preparedness--and in doing so 
will further strengthen deterrence. DoD will continue to work with 
relevant U.S. departments and agencies to support Taiwan's efforts in 
this regard.
                         dod's focus on taiwan
    In addition to the provision of defensive arms and services to 
Taiwan, the Department remains committed to maintaining the capacity of 
the United States to resist the resort to force or other forms of 
coercion that may jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan. Let 
me be clear that this is an absolute priority: The PRC is the 
Department's pacing challenge and a Taiwan contingency is the pacing 
scenario. We are modernizing our capabilities, updating U.S. force 
posture, and developing new operational concepts accordingly.
    I should also underscore that the Department's efforts to deter PRC 
aggression and enhance Taiwan's defenses will not be in isolation. 
Countries throughout the Indo Pacific and beyond recognize that PRC 
aggression against Taiwan would have serious consequences for their 
interests, and are increasingly voicing concerns about PRC coercion and 
potential aggression against Taiwan. As evidenced by a number of recent 
multilateral operations and exercises, the Department is focused on 
enhancing our regional cooperation as a means of bolstering deterrence.
    Finally, I'd like to close by thanking all of you for your strong, 
bipartisan support for Taiwan. It is my firm belief that this 
bipartisanship is one of our most powerful assets in the defense of 
Taiwan, and should be nurtured and treated as such. In that context, 
the Department's partnership and bipartisan collaboration with Congress 
are critical to ensuring that we continue to meet our commitments under 
the Taiwan Relations Act. Please be assured that the Department of 
Defense understands the growing threat from the PRC and its military, 
and we are committed, in line with our longstanding policy, to ensure 
Taiwan's ability to deter and defend its successful and prosperous 
democracy.
    Thank you for your time and attention, and I look forward to your 
questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you both very much. We will start a 
series of rounds of 5-minute questions and I will recognize 
myself.
    Given the increased muscle flexing and threatening rhetoric 
from Beijing, some policymakers and analysts have called for an 
end to the policy of strategic ambiguity with regards to 
Taiwan.
    What is your views on the advantages and disadvantages of 
maintaining strategic ambiguity? Is it time for additional 
clarity or a new framework for managing the cross-Strait 
relations?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, if it is okay I would 
like to reply first.
    The Chairman. Sure.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I would say, first of 
all, I fully agree that the coercive and bullying behavior that 
we have seen from the People's Republic of China directed at 
Taiwan is concerning. It is destabilizing and it risks 
undermining peace and stability in the region.
    Mr. Chairman, we continue to believe that our One China 
policy and the framework provided by the Taiwan Relations Act 
provides us with all the tools that we need to counter that 
threat and to continue to maintain peace and stability across 
the Strait.
    The Chairman. Do you think China is undoubtedly convinced 
that we will be as vigorous in our support of Taiwan and in 
defense of it as we assert here?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I think that is our 
goal and it is an urgent one. We think that contributing to 
that stability and providing that deterrence that we believe 
provides that stability is a here and now problem, and we are 
committed to that on an urgent basis, on a daily basis.
    My view, Mr. Chairman, is that our policy over the last 
four decades--as you noted, a bipartisan policy with leadership 
from both the executive and congressional branches--I think, 
has succeeded and has allowed Taiwan to proper.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that and I am in strong support 
of that and of the view that not only as it relates to Taiwan, 
but in anything that we can do as it relates to foreign policy 
the strength of bipartisanship is an incredibly important 
message globally----
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. --and to the country.
    My question really revolves around, okay, that has been the 
reality of how we have approached the cross-Straits 
relationship, but we have not had the hyper nationalism of Xi 
Jinping. We have not had the type of rather overt threats that 
have taken place.
    Is the Defense Department of the same view as the 
Department of State?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I know there has been a very robust 
public discussion of this issue and I have deep respect for 
folks on both sides of this debate.
    In addition to agreeing with everything that Ambassador 
Kritenbrink said, my personal view is that a change in U.S. 
declaratory policy would not meaningfully strengthen 
deterrence, and I would be happy to say more about that in a 
classified setting.
    The Chairman. All right. We will leave it at that then.
    What is your assessment? I am concerned that in recent 
years the PLA military operations near Taiwan have become more 
sophisticated and more frequent, including recent incursion 
into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and, frankly, I 
am concerned that these incursions would circumnavigate the 
island and demonstrate Beijing's ability to execute a blockade 
of Taiwan.
    What is your assessment of the current cross-Strait 
military balance? Are you concerned that the PRC can take 
unilateral military action against Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am concerned about China's military 
modernization. The Defense Department recently provided an 
extremely detailed report on China--the annual China Military 
Power Report--and clearly, they are engaging in increased 
coercion and aggressive behaviors, not only toward Taiwan, but 
around the region. This has effects in terms of tempting 
miscalculation and crisis. It has effect on Taiwan's readiness.
    I think our job at the Department of Defense is to 
strengthen deterrence and to ensure that we are taking actions 
such that Beijing understands that it would not be able to 
achieve its military objectives and, certainly, not without 
facing substantial risks and costs, and we are doing that by 
supporting Taiwan's defenses and reforms, by bolstering our own 
deterrence, and by working on this issue with the broader 
international community.
    The Chairman. Ambassador, what would trigger such a step by 
Beijing?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I am reluctant to 
speculate what might be in President Xi Jinping's mind on any 
given day, but I would just say that we feel the urgent need 
every day to take a broad range of steps that we have tried to 
outline in our opening statements to deter such a step and to 
provide that stability.
    If I could add one point to my colleague, Assistant 
Secretary Ratner's, comment, we do believe that to contribute 
to that stability we have to do more than just focus on 
military deterrence. It is vitally important, we believe, to 
continue to bolster and expand Taiwan's international space and 
also to deepen our engagement with Taiwan and to help enable 
Taiwan to resist economic coercion. We also think those are 
important parts.
    The Chairman. In that regard--then we will close on this 
for myself. I have a lot more, but I will stop here. In that 
regard, if we want to expand Taiwan's diplomatic space when we 
succeed at it--because there are many countries that have 
succumbed to China's closing the doors on Taiwan even though 
they had official recognition and relationships with Taiwan--we 
have seen Taiwan's diplomatic channels close due to Chinese 
pressure in multiple capitals.
    Indeed, since 2016, eight former Taiwan diplomatic partners 
have switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC, and even now 
we are watching as Beijing places significant economic pressure 
on a country like Lithuania for authorizing the opening of a 
Taiwanese representative office.
    How is the Administration supporting our democratic 
partners in countering undue Chinese influence and helping 
Taiwan to establish and maintain formal relationships?
    If we cannot help Lithuania, who is being threatened in 
economic terms, supply chains and whatnot, which I view as a 
test for the West, then if we fail that test then, ultimately, 
we will face the consequences of it when others say it is not 
worth to stand up to China--the U.S. will not be there for us.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, I would say 
that when we focus on trying to expand and strengthen Taiwan's 
diplomatic space we work with a range of partners to 
demonstrate what Taiwan has to offer to the international 
community and what the benefits of engaging with Taiwan are.
    You mentioned both diplomatic partners and then countries 
like Lithuania, who have simply tried to expand their 
engagement with a Taiwan representative office.
    In the case of Lithuania, Mr. Chairman, we took a number of 
steps to assist our Lithuanian partners. We engaged at both the 
Secretary and Deputy Secretary level to express our support for 
Lithuania and to hear their concerns.
    We engaged in a dialogue that was hosted by the White House 
that I participated in with the Lithuanian foreign minister. 
That same day, Lithuania and Ex-Im Bank announced an MOU that 
involved $600 million of credits to assist Lithuania and we 
also dispatched a private sector commercial delegation to 
Lithuania to try to assist them as well in finding other 
markets, other supply chains.
    That is one example, Mr. Chairman, in which we have taken 
very seriously the need to assist our partners in resisting 
Chinese economic coercion in the context of engagement with 
Taiwan.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Maybe just one last comment, Mr. 
Chairman.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have expanded 
the Global Cooperation and Training Framework as well, which is 
another way in which we help partners around the world engage 
with Taiwan and learn about the capabilities that Taiwan can 
offer, and we are grateful to Congress for the support of that 
program.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thanks for those comments about Lithuania. 
That is not getting nearly enough ink around the world. We all 
want to counter this Chinese influence, and when they do it 
malignly like they did in Lithuania it is important that we do 
counter that.
    The list you just ticked off is an important list, but the 
world should take note that we are engaged in that sort of 
thing and will help when it is appropriate.
    Most of the areas I want to cover are in the intelligence 
lane so I am going to be brief here, but tell me your thoughts 
on the fact, and I--everybody talks about this and that is what 
China did to Hong Kong and, really, the repercussions were de 
minimis for China.
    Certainly, in China, one would think they are tempted to 
look at that and say, hey, this was so easy. The next one is 
not going to be any tougher.
    Do they have a sense in China, do you think, that we, the 
West, particularly America, view the Taiwanese situation 
entirely different than the Hong Kong situation? Either one of 
you can start. I would like to hear both your views on that.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
    Obviously, as the Administration has stated clearly, what 
happened in Hong Kong--and the previous administration as 
well--what happened in Hong Kong was completely unacceptable, 
but, Mr. Ranking Member, it would be a grave mistake if China 
were to conclude from that that somehow it gave them an 
opportunity to take coercive action vis-a-vis Taiwan, and I 
know that Secretary Blinken has been quoted extensively, 
including this past week, in stating what a serious mistake it 
would be if China were to undertake such a path.
    We believe, Mr. Ranking Member, that our job every day is 
to make sure that we provide a level of deterrence and 
stability across the Strait so that China is not tempted to 
take that step.
    Senator Risch. I do not think that that proposition about 
how we view this can be understated. We need to underscore that 
and underscore it strongly.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, to the specific question of our 
understanding of Beijing's perception and whether they think we 
view the Hong Kong problem differently than Taiwan, I think the 
answer to that is categorically yes.
    As you mentioned, these relate to intelligence matters and 
I would be eager to discuss that with you in a classified 
setting. The only thing I would add to what Ambassador 
Kritenbrink said is the Taiwanese themselves took very careful 
notice of what happened in Hong Kong and it, certainly, in 
their view, reinforced the unacceptability of some kind of one-
country, two-systems bargain, given what they saw what happened 
to Hong Kong.
    Thank you.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Cardin [presiding]. Well, let me thank both of you 
for your service. Let me continue this discussion as much as we 
can discuss in an open setting.
    Can you just assess for us how much mainland China is doing 
within Taiwan itself? It seems like there is shifting politics 
within Taiwan in regards to the attitude of its relations with 
mainland China.
    Can you just share with us how active the PRC is in regards 
to politics within Taiwan?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for 
your remarks and for your question.
    In terms of a detailed response, perhaps that would be 
better in another session, but I think that I could say here in 
great confidence and safely that, certainly, the PRC's attempts 
to intimidate and coerce and influence friends on Taiwan does 
involve activities inside Taiwan as well, which is deeply 
concerning.
    I would pick up on your final comment in that I think 
attitudes in Taiwan have shifted over time. I have some 
skepticism about the effectiveness of China's actions. In fact, 
I think the more that the PRC tries to squeeze, the more it 
simply pushes Taiwan and the Taiwanese people away.
    Senator Cardin. So let me talk about the U.S. engagement in 
the Asian Pacific area. With the withdrawal from TPP we know 
that created a vacuum. We have the issues of so many countries 
in that region concerned about the free commerce on the China 
Seas and what PRC has done in that regard.
    Our ability to have influence in regards to Taiwan is very 
much related to how America is perceived as interested in Asian 
Pacific area. So can you just coordinate for us how your 
strategies in that region are being arranged in order to deal 
with PRC's increasing activities in the China Seas as well as 
its compromising of Taiwan's security?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Senator. Our goal is to 
demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America's 
commitment to the Indo-Pacific region and to our many allies 
and partners in that region.
    We have demonstrated that the Indo-Pacific region is vital 
to our future security and prosperity and we try to demonstrate 
that through our actions every day. As you know----
    Senator Cardin. Can you be more specific about that?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator, as you know, for example, the first two world 
leaders hosted by President Biden at the White House were the 
Japanese Prime Minister and the South Korean President. The 
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense's first trips 
to the region were to Japan and Korea.
    Just this morning, we announced that Secretary Blinken will 
travel to Southeast Asia next week to visit Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand to, again, demonstrate the strength of 
our commitment to our partners and allies in ASEAN.
    In addition, of course, to that diplomatic engagement, 
Senator, we are carrying out a very aggressive policy vis-a-vis 
the maritime domains in the South China Sea and the East China 
Sea to both diplomatically garner support for pushing back 
against Chinese illegal behavior and bullying and to strengthen 
support for the international rule of law.
    Secondly, we are providing hundreds of millions of dollars' 
worth of maritime assistance to partners in the region to 
increase their domain awareness and their ability to defend 
their own interests, which we think contributes to stability in 
the region.
    Then, finally, of course--and I will turn to Assistant 
Secretary Ratner--we are developing and exercising our own 
capabilities on a regular basis in both the South and East 
China Seas and elsewhere in the region, all, again, designed to 
contribute to stability and demonstrate the strength of our 
commitment.
    Finally, Senator, you mentioned our economic engagement as 
well. The President announced recently last month--at the end 
of October, rather--at the East Asia Summit his desire to 
launch a new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, and that will, 
certainly, be a focus of our engagement in the weeks and months 
ahead.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I will only say Secretary Austin has 
said repeatedly that allies and partners are, perhaps, our 
biggest strategic advantage in our military competition with 
China.
    They have capabilities they can bring to bear on their own 
and with us, they support our force posture in forward 
deployments in the region, and they exercise and operate with 
us to ensure a free and open region.
    I will say, for my part, I have been in this role since the 
summer, and right down the line from the Republic of Korea, 
where we were last week, to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
Australia, Vietnam, India, in every one of these instances 
there is incredible positive momentum in those defense 
partnerships, and in most instances those relationships are 
stronger than they have ever been.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    Senator Romney is recognized.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I do not know that we have laid out a comprehensive 
strategy for supporting the people of Taiwan and the capacity 
of the people to determine their own destiny, but if I were to 
jot down several of the elements that I think would be part of 
that, I am afraid that on almost all of them we are failing, 
not succeeding, and I say that a bit to get your response.
    One of the ones that we are succeeding on is the attitude 
of the people of Taiwan themselves. That is not due to anything 
we have done, I do not imagine, but instead due to the fact 
that the Chinese have been brutal against the Uighurs and 
against the people of Hong Kong and, of course, the people of 
Tibet, and that has concentrated the thinking of the people of 
Taiwan. So we have been successful there.
    Other elements, it strikes me, that we are not being 
successful. So one element of our strategy would surely be to 
make sure that world opinion is watching this and is concerned 
about what China is doing and wants to see Taiwan have its 
capacity for self-rule. Yet, as has already been mentioned, we 
are seeing greater and greater diplomatic isolation of Taiwan 
by nations around the world.
    A second element or a third element would be the--if you 
will, the military porcupining, if you will, the capacity of 
Taiwan to make decisions to make itself a very difficult target 
and to make sure that Chinese aggressors would recognize that 
the cost of invasion would be a severe, indeed.
    On that one, I know this is not a classified session so we 
cannot go into that in-depth, but I do not come away thinking 
that that has become as--much stronger as we would have liked 
it to become.
    The next would be communication of severe economic 
consequence were there to be an incursion against Taiwan, and 
while we talk about that, I do not know that we have 
communicated to the Chinese or collaborated with our friends 
around the world a decision of just what we would do to inform 
China in advance of what we, the collective nations of the 
world, would do were they to take aggressive action against 
Taiwan.
    The final element of our strategy might be our commitment 
to the region and communicating our commitment to the region, 
and the decision made by the prior administration and not yet 
reversed by this one to back out of the TPP does not 
communicate commitment to the region.
    There are some things we do that, obviously, are able to so 
commit, but that decision was not. There was a discussion made 
that we do not like multilateral trade agreements. We like 
bilateral agreements, but we did not enter into bilateral 
agreements. So we are just sort of--we disappeared. There would 
be opportunities, for instance, with the ASEAN nations to enter 
into a digital trade agreement and to begin the process again, 
but I am concerned that--if I were China looking at this, I 
would say this is getting easier, not harder.
    Am I misreading that? I do not mean to be blaming just this 
administration. I am looking back over the last several years 
of American policy, but it strikes me that on almost every 
dimension of an effective strategy we are not winning. We are 
losing.
    Ambassador, please.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for 
your comments and your question.
    Senator, none of us underestimate the scope of the 
challenge, but I would argue that there are also reasons for 
optimism. In terms of world opinion and the interest of our 
partners around the world, I think it is quite significant that 
for the first time in many instances or the first time in a 
long time many of our allies and partners have spoken up 
together with us in joint statements and in other venues to 
express publicly their concern for the situation in Taiwan and 
the national interest that they see in peace and stability 
across the Taiwan Strait, and I am thinking about the 
statements made publicly by Japanese leaders, our South Korean 
allies, by the G-7, just last week by the Secretary General of 
the EU External Action Service and the like.
    I think there are an increasing number of partners and 
allies around the world who recognize the importance of peace 
and stability across the Strait and they are publicly stating 
that fact.
    In terms of our military deterrence strategy, I will let 
Assistant Secretary Ratner reply to that in more detail, but 
what you have outlined, Senator, precisely is our strategy, 
assisting Taiwan to develop an asymmetric defense and that is 
what we are focused on every day.
    Certainly, the economic consequences of any conflict across 
the Strait would be severe and I think that we are making that 
clear, and it is up to us every day to, I think, demonstrate 
that, and as Secretary Blinken has said recently, this would be 
a serious mistake if China were to ever take that step, with 
very serious consequences.
    In terms of our commitment to the region, Senator, I would 
say it is what animates our actions every day. I know from my 
most recent travels to the region over the last month and the 
engagement of our leadership from the President, the Secretary 
of State, the Secretary of Defense on down, we demonstrate on a 
daily basis our ironclad commitment to the security of our 
treaty allies, our strong commitment to peace and security and 
prosperity across the Indo-Pacific region, and that is what 
animates our actions every day.
    Let me stop there, sir.
    Senator Romney. Dr. Ratner. Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator Romney, thank you.
    I would offer a more optimistic view of, at least, the 
trajectory of where we are headed on some of the issues that 
you raised. I share your concerns about the military challenge.
    China's military modernization is, certainly, stressing 
stability across the Strait, but we have seen--particularly, 
under the leadership of President Tsai, we have seen Taiwan 
taking incredibly important steps on trying to modernize and 
reform its own military.
    We have seen them increasing their defense budget. We have 
seen them increasingly focused on asymmetric capabilities and 
the kinds of capabilities that we think will strengthen 
deterrence, and we have seen them starting to walk down the 
road of making some fairly significant reforms, reserve 
reforms, and in other areas that are going to enable them to 
defend themselves.
    At the same time, at the Department of Defense we are 
increasingly focused on this challenge. Secretary Austin has 
articulated China as the top pacing challenge and we are in the 
process of updating capabilities, expediting experimentation 
and prototyping, developing new operational concepts and 
updating our posture in the region to be better prepared to 
deter aggression in this area.
    As it relates to allies and partners, I think we are seeing 
increasing concern and increasing action including on the 
security side. We had our very first ever combined, meaning 
with another country, Taiwan Strait transit within the last 
couple months. That was with Canada.
    We have held major military exercises with partners from 
inside and outside of the region including multi-carrier 
operations with aircraft carriers from the U.K., large-deck 
amphibs from Japan, a number of countries participating. We 
have seen countries in the region starting to do their own 
Taiwan Strait transits.
    So I think we are seeing countries stepping up their 
military presence in the region and their willingness to 
support deterrence in a way that we have not before.
    Collectively, I agree with you. It is an enormous 
challenge, but I think the urgency is there and we have got the 
right formula and we are moving as fast as we can.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen is recognized.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for being here.
    Just to follow up on your comments about our allies and 
what they are doing because we know that our messages are going 
to be much more effective when they are delivered with our 
allies, I noticed that the European Parliament sent its first 
official parliamentary delegation to Taiwan last month and it 
adopted a nonbinding resolution to deepen ties with Taiwan.
    Can you discuss to what extent the Administration is 
engaging with our European allies around issues and working to 
align our policy toward Taiwan?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for 
the question. Yes, I would say that if I were to summarize in 
one line our approach to the Indo-Pacific it would be allies, 
partners, and friends, and our efforts are focused not just on 
our partners within the region, but without as well as, those 
outside of the region who also see the Indo-Pacific as being 
vital to their future and the EU is very important in that 
regard.
    Just 3 weeks ago, I held 2 days of consultations with my EU 
counterpart on these very issues, both focused on our 
engagement across the Indo-Pacific and, specifically, vis-a-vis 
China, and that included a discussion of Taiwan.
    Just last week, as I mentioned, the EU Secretary General of 
the EU External Action Service was in Washington for 
consultations with Deputy Secretary Sherman, and I think, as 
you may have seen from the public readout, there was a very 
robust discussion of all of these issues.
    The word that I would use to describe our consultations is 
convergence. If you look at what the EU has done, what our 
friends in Japan have done, what ASEAN itself has done, we have 
all talked about the principles that ought to define behavior 
in the Indo-Pacific and the principles that are most important 
for supporting peace and stability, and we all share those 
principles.
    Our focus now, whether it is with the EU or many other 
allies and partners across the region, is what is the concrete 
action that we can take together. That was, certainly, the 
nature of our discussion with the EU and it is with the rest of 
our partners as well.
    Senator Shaheen. I assume these discussions would be even 
more effective if we had ambassadors to the EU and to China to 
engage in these conversations. Can you speak to the impact that 
it is having not having our diplomats in those critical 
positions?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I am honored, of 
course, to be in this chair and I am grateful to the members of 
this committee and in the larger Senate for their support 
regarding my confirmation, but we are truly hamstrung in the 
region when we do not have our fully-confirmed capable 
ambassadors on the ground. No doubt in every capital we have 
very capable representatives, whether they are ambassadors or 
our talented charges d'affaires.
    There is simply no substitute for a fully-confirmed U.S. 
Ambassador in terms of their capabilities, the legitimacy they 
have within that country, and their ability to fully operate 
and to have influence.
    So yes, ma'am, respectfully, as I mentioned in my opening 
statement, we would be grateful for the Senate taking quick 
action to confirm as many of our ambassadors as possible. I do 
believe it represents a real vulnerability for us in the field, 
including in East Asia and Pacific region, for which I am 
responsible.
    Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Risch, I think it is 
particularly concerning that these positions are being held up 
by members of this committee, who ought to understand better 
than most people in the Senate just why it is so important to 
have our diplomats in position when we are trying to engage in 
our foreign policy.
    I would add, by the way, that it also is hamstringing 
Americans' interests in China, for example, where we have a 
number of Americans who are being held hostage by the 
government of China and we have no one in the position of 
Ambassador to advocate on behalf of those people.
    Again, I think we should note that this is an area that is 
affecting our national security because our colleagues on the 
other side of the aisle--and it is not all of them--I know 
Senator Risch has been very active in trying to move these 
nominations--but we have got a couple of people who are holding 
things up in a way that is having a real impact on our ability 
to conduct American foreign policy.
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. I 
agree with you. This is becoming, increasingly, a critical 
issue. It would be great if we had an ambassador in China right 
now, both on Taiwan and as we try to get China to join us 
against the challenges of Iran and others.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to 
thank both the chairman and the ranking member for your holding 
this meeting. We wrote and asked for this, and I so appreciate 
your accommodation of this and I appreciate our witnesses here 
today to provide insight on a very challenging area.
    I would like to start with you, Assistant Secretary Ratner, 
if I might. I want to focus on the importance of Taiwan to the 
broader security of the Indo-Pacific region.
    Earlier this year, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi stated 
that the peace and stability of Taiwan are directly connected 
to Japan. Building on that statement, just last month, former 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, and I quote, ``A Taiwan 
emergency is a Japanese emergency and, therefore, an emergency 
for the U.S.-Japan alliance.''
    As former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, I understand the 
strategic importance of Taiwan to the U.S.-Japan alliance, but 
I also believe an emergency in the U.S.-Japan alliance will 
also represent an emergency for our alliances both in Korea and 
in Australia. Protecting Taiwan is key to protecting the entire 
U.S. Alliance Network within the Indo-Pacific.
    First, I would just like to start with yes or no questions, 
Secretary Ratner. Is the security of Taiwan important to the 
security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would say it is essential.
    Senator Hagerty. I agree. Then I just would like to then 
ask you how Taiwan impacts our defense posture in the Indo-
Pacific and our ability to work with, to protect and defend 
Japan, Korea, and Australia.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would describe our partnership with 
Taiwan as an anchor to our network of allies and partners in 
the region.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
    I will come to my good friend, Ambassador Kritenbrink.
    China is engaged in a deeply destabilizing nuclear arms 
race right now. It is currently building underground silos for 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is improving its 
nuclear triad of land-based, of sea-based, of air-based 
weapons, and it is testing nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons.
    General Mark Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, described China's recent hypersonic missile test as a 
Sputnik moment.
    General John Hyten, who, until recently, served as Vice 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, described these nuclear-capable 
hypersonics as likely a first-use weapon or a first-strike 
weapon.
    Our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are 
increasingly alarmed about China's laser focus and emphasis on 
their strategic capabilities. The United States needs to 
maintain a credible extended deterrence commitment to our 
allies in the Indo-Pacific.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink, do you agree with the premise that 
the United States should do all it can to maintain credible 
deterrence?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator Hagerty, thank you very 
much for the question. Absolutely. I believe it is a vital 
American national interest to demonstrate the credibility and 
the sanctity of our security treaty commitments to our allies 
in the region using all of our capabilities.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
    In November, Japan's chief cabinet secretary publicly 
stated that adopting a no-first-use policy in terms of using 
nuclear weapons would, and I quote, ``make it difficult to 
ensure Japan's national security.''
    I would come to both of you now and ask if you agree that 
the United States should seriously take into consideration the 
views of Japan as well as our other allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific with respect to U.S. declaratory policy.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, what I would say I would 
simply reiterate my comment from a moment ago that it is a 
vital American national interest to demonstrate the credibility 
of our security treaty commitments involving all of our 
capabilities, including our extended deterrence capabilities.
    Senator Hagerty. Secretary Ratner.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, as you know, the Department is 
currently conducting its Nuclear Posture Review. In the context 
of that process, we have been engaging deeply and repeatedly 
with allies around the world, including our allies in the Indo-
Pacific, and we have heard their concerns and, certainly, 
Secretary Austin has spoken repeatedly about the importance of 
our extended deterrence commitments.
    Senator Hagerty. Secretary Ratner, thank you for the 
comment and I would just encourage you, as I hear from our 
allies in the region as well, they have very strong views on 
this. Their proximity makes those views very relevant, and 
thank you for taking those views into account.
    Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Booker, who is with us virtually.
    Senator Booker. First, I just want to echo the concerns 
that were expressed by both the chairman and, obviously, by 
Senator Shaheen about our lack of full diplomatic corps in a 
time that we are seeing on multiple continents that we are--
have flashpoints and crisis points, and the urgency of 
diplomacy.
    I want to add to that that there are still a number of 
positions at the State Department that are unfilled that are 
necessary for national security, and, perhaps, to the Secretary 
of State, that is true, right? These are important positions 
when it comes to U.S. national security and should not be held 
up with the urgencies that we have. Would you agree?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, yes, sir. I do believe it 
is a major hindrance to the conduct of our foreign policy not 
to have our full team on the field and, again, I would express 
my thanks to the Senate for their support in my nomination and 
others.
    I would respectfully ask that we please move as quickly as 
possible on the many remaining nominations both for ambassadors 
in the field and our many positions unfilled here domestically.
    Senator Booker. I am grateful. I am grateful for that.
    I know this has been covered a little bit, but I would like 
to just ask you again. You know, China had made a lot of 
statements about pursuing a peaceful rise and it just does 
not--and they were not really seeking confrontation.
    Clearly, we have seen that change, and the aggressive 
actions taken in Taiwanese airspace, international waterways, 
and more is indicative of a change in posture.
    I am wondering, this rhetoric, how much is it really--and 
these actions, is it, in your opinion, not only belying their 
claims, but, really, reflecting a real intention? Or is this, 
in some ways, just to satisfy internal Chinese politics and 
sort of the wolf warrior constituency and others? Do you really 
think that they are looking to, potentially, engage in more 
overt conflict of a military nature?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for--
--
    Senator Booker. That is for either of them. Yes.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for 
the question.
    Our focus here today is, of course, on Taiwan and the 
situation across the Strait, but we are deeply concerned about 
a range of destabilizing and aggressive and coercive actions 
that we have seen the People's Republic of China carry out 
across the region and, in some instances, around the world, 
whether it is in the maritime domain, whether it is this 
situation on the Paracels, or the border with India, whether it 
is economic coercion that it has carried out regarding a range 
of countries around the world, or its increasingly aggressive 
and coercive activities in the South and East China Seas. We 
are laser-focused on the threat posed by those aggressive and 
coercive actions and that is what animates much of our policy.
    I would just say, Senator, I think you noted at the top of 
your comments, whatever PRC rhetoric may say, I think we have 
to focus on China's actions and base our policies there, and 
that is why we are focused, Senator, so intently on supporting 
and maintaining the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific 
region that we believe is under threat from the PRC and that 
order, we believe, is so vital to our future, security, and 
prosperity and that of our allies.
    Therefore, our intention is to work closely with our many 
like-minded partners around the region to support that order, 
which is, as I said, under threat.
    Senator Booker. I am sorry, was there another comment?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. No, sir.
    Senator Booker. I am concerned about, in my visits to 
Africa, the incredible influence that the Chinese have there 
and their erosion of diplomatic relations between African 
nations and Taiwan.
    They have been incredibly successful. I think it is 
Eswatini and Somaliland that are the last two that have 
maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and I think this 
is indicative of a larger picture of Chinese influence in--on 
the continent and, in many ways, undermining our position and 
our interests there as well.
    I am wondering what can the U.S. Government do to help 
reverse the erosion and encourage countries to support, really, 
our democratic principles, ideals, as well as be supportive of 
a larger effort to contain China's influence?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you.
    Whether it is in the context of trying to shore up 
international support for Taiwan or Taiwan's international 
space, or ensuring that countries and regions around the world, 
including Africa, are not subject to Chinese coercion, I think 
this, again, has to be and is a central focus of our policy and 
our efforts, and our intent is, one, to remind countries of 
some of the risks, for example, of taking on certain Chinese 
investments or incurring certain debts vis-a-vis the PRC and 
what those implications for a country's sovereignty may be down 
the line.
    Secondly, we need to demonstrate the benefits of partnering 
with the United States and other like-minded partners, and 
thirdly, we need to continue to highlight the importance of a 
rules-based order and the values that we all hold dear, and 
that is what we are doing and that is what we intend to 
continue to do.
    Certainly, the scope of the challenge is growing, Senator. 
I agree.
    Senator Booker. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I just 
want to reaffirm I have been pleased to hear a bipartisan 
commitment to our relationships with Taiwan. I feel very 
strongly with that.
    I think what is happening there and the fear and insecurity 
they are creating in the country is unacceptable to such a 
strong partner of the United States, and I know, on behalf of a 
lot of Taiwanese Americans, that a strong American posture in 
support of that democracy is something that we all should be 
doing everything we can to support.
    So thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both 
of you for your testimony. Thank you for your service.
    I have been trying to keep track of the testimony in the 
hearing as it has gone on, but I apologize if I ask questions 
that have already been covered.
    We know from what has been said and following developments 
in the area that we see real Chinese aggressive moves. We saw 
the military moves up against toward Taiwanese airspace. We 
have seen other actions taken.
    Obviously, the United States also has sort of held its 
position in the region. What are we doing now? What is in place 
now to avoid miscalculations that could lead to unintended 
escalation and conflict?
    If you could each talk from the vantage views of your 
perspectives of your departments.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you for your comment 
and for your questions as well.
    I would say, from our position, in order to prevent the 
miscalculation and the risk of that that you have outlined, we 
are doing a number of things.
    First of all, we are taking a range of actions to 
demonstrate the strength of our--the strength of our commitment 
to the region and the strength of our deterrent capabilities 
and those of our allies and partners and friends. We are trying 
to strengthen countries' abilities to resist Chinese coercion 
in all its forms.
    I think those actions are the most important steps that we 
can take, and the main focus for this Administration and me in 
my job is how can we best support our allies, partners, and 
friends across the region to support that rules-based order 
that is under pressure from the People's Republic of China.
    Secondly, Senator, there is an element involved in our 
diplomacy directly with the People's Republic of China as well. 
As you have seen, President Biden recently engaged in a virtual 
meeting with President Xi Jinping.
    One of the main objectives of that meeting was to make sure 
as our competition becomes increasingly intense, we also engage 
in intense diplomacy at the most senior levels to reduce the 
risk of miscalculation that could veer into an unintended 
conflict.
    I do think that that is an important element of what we do. 
We do need to continue to signal at senior levels to the PRC 
leadership the depth of our concerns and a desire to avoid 
miscalculation.
    Again, Senator, I would say the most important part of what 
we are doing, I would argue, across the region is to work with 
our allies and partners to shore up the regional order.
    Senator Van Hollen. I agree with the overall strategy that 
the President has put forward, but I do want to push a little 
bit more maybe on the defense side as well as to what 
operationally is in place to make sure lines of communication 
are open in order to avoid miscalculation?
    Dr. Ratner. Between the United States and the PRC 
specifically, Senator?
    Senator Van Hollen. Yes.
    Dr. Ratner. Yes. So I would echo Ambassador Kritenbrink's 
comments that, clearly, one of the key priorities for the 
Administration, and the President has said this clearly, is to 
try to develop guardrails on the relationship, and there is 
going to be follow-up to the President's meeting to try to do 
that in practice.
    From the perspective of the Defense Department, we have 
been working to renew military-to-military relations with the 
PLA over the course of the last year with a very laser-focus on 
questions of crisis communications and crisis management.
    We have had interactions within the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense and interactions with INDOPACOM and some of their 
PLA counterparts. We are in the process of renewing those 
efforts.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, obviously, and I 
know the chairman and others have mentioned that if we had an 
ambassador in place, those kind of communications could be even 
more effective and more clear. I think it is hurting our 
national security every day that the--Ambassador Nick Burns' 
nomination is being held up.
    My last question is this. Look, China has long taken the 
position that eventually they want what they claim will be the 
peaceful reunification of China. Obviously, their actions have 
been anything, but peaceful.
    Do you note a real change in the position taken and the 
tone taken by President Xi in his comments on Taiwan compared 
to many of his predecessors?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you.
    I do not know that the tone or the rhetoric has been 
dramatically different from Beijing. There is still 
occasionally a reiteration of a stated desire to resolve the 
situation, in their view, peacefully, and yet, China has never 
ruled out the use of force and that continues to this day.
    I think the dramatic change that we have seen in recent 
months and years has been in Chinese actions and behavior, 
including its coercive and bullying behavior vis-a-vis Taiwan 
and that is our primary concern, and that is what is driving 
primarily our response rather than a focus on rhetoric, 
Senator.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Young is with us virtually.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome before 
the committee, gentleman.
    Recent press reports have highlighted concerning 
developments with Taiwan's domestic defense strategy and 
capability. Reserve forces are in need of reform and there are 
questions around Taiwan's recent shift in favor of 
counterstrike weapons rather than adopting a porcupine strategy 
of strategic denial capabilities.
    Beyond weapons sales, gentlemen, what is the Administration 
doing to support Taiwan's domestic military readiness?
    Dr. Ratner. Thank you, Senator Young. It is a hugely 
important question and we have to always remember that Taiwan's 
ability to defend itself is more than just its arms purchases 
and that as a government we ought to be taking a--widening our 
aperture as much as we can and its reserve reforms are an 
important element of that insofar as Taiwan's shift to an all-
volunteer force and the subsequent decrease of its active force 
strength has led to the need to ensure that its reserve forces 
are prepared to assume increasingly difficult missions.
    The good news is that President Tsai and Minister of 
Defense Chiu have begun walking down this path. As you know, 
they have approved changes to reservists' training 
requirements, increasing the number of days required for 
reservists, and they have also been creating requirements for 
more realistic combat training.
    In addition to that, as was mentioned earlier in the 
hearing, Taiwan is slated at the beginning of next year to 
establish an all-out defense mobilization agency--an ADMA--
which is geared to combine mobilization and reserve functions 
in one agency to better align training exercises and force 
development requirements.
    We think they are making real tangible progress on this. 
Some of it is very much initial, and we are going to do 
everything we can to support these efforts.
    Senator Young. Dr. Ratner--okay, so that was my question. 
Were there things that you think we should be doing, perhaps, 
this committee can be helpful with as it pertains to supporting 
Taiwan and its efforts to reform its reserve forces?
    Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator. I would be happy to 
explain that in some detail in a closed session. What I will 
say is that we are taking a more proactive approach to 
supporting Taiwan in some of these reforms, working with them 
on some of their defense concepts doctrine, supporting them in 
some of their----
    Senator Young. Why do we not just take it to a classified 
setting, Doctor? I will pick up on that thread with you at a 
later date. Thank you.
    Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to do that, Senator.
    Senator Young. So are the--what capabilities are most 
needed for asymmetric defense? Because my sense is the legacy 
systems and weapons that Taiwan has relied on in the past are 
not sufficient, are not adequate, for a robust defense of the 
island right now.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, that is right. That is precisely the 
argument that the Administration has been making and the Trump 
administration was making as well.
    Again, we support President Tsai's commitment to achieve 
greater balance of asymmetric capabilities. To your question 
specifically, these include coastal defense cruise missiles, 
short- and medium-range air defenses, defensive naval mines, 
enabling C4ISR and other capabilities, but those would be at 
the top of our priorities.
    Senator Young. Okay. Lastly, and in what time period do you 
see the greatest risks for conflict between CCP and, perhaps, 
Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, my answer to that is that the China 
challenge is a today problem, a tomorrow problem, a 2027 
problem, a 2030 problem, a 2040 problem and beyond. I do not 
think there is a date we ought to pick on the calendar, and we 
got to make sure that we are sustaining deterrence from today 
and maintaining it, going forward.
    Senator Young. It is a today problem. That is all I need to 
hear. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez and Ranking 
Member Risch, for this hearing and thank you, Ambassador 
Kritenbrink, Dr. Ratner, for your testimony and your public 
service.
    You mentioned in your testimony, Dr. Ratner, the 
significance of bipartisanship and it being a key part of our 
relationship and our defense of Taiwan and that it should be 
nurtured.
    I will just mention at the outset that I think 
bipartisanship in this hearing and in the actions of members of 
this committee and in partnership with the Administration has 
been a long and a critical part of our work together.
    I have visited Taiwan twice in recent years, coordinating 
with the Trump administration and the Biden administration 
before doing so, and I went on a bipartisan trip just a few 
months ago to deliver vaccines.
    I think it is striking how the status quo and the support 
of both Republican and Democratic administrations, including 
through defensive arms sales, has served its successful and 
free market democracy.
    Dr. Ratner, what is the most critical investment that we in 
Congress could make to help both ensure and strengthen 
deterrence and U.S. military readiness in the Indo-Pacific, 
most important investment in Taiwan both in terms of arms 
sales, but moving forward some of the strategic and military 
reforms that previous members have discussed, but also, most 
important investment in terms of the Indo-Pacific region in 
strengthening our partnership with our allies?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I think the answer I would give to 
that is rather--and if the question is around U.S. capability 
or investment in terms of strengthening Taiwan's capabilities?
    Senator Coons. Both.
    Dr. Ratner. I think the list that I just provided to 
Senator Young would be at the top of our prioritization list in 
terms of the types of capabilities that are mobile and 
resilient and cost-effective for Taiwan, including coastal 
defense, cruise missiles, and defensive naval mines and 
others--I think we have articulated those--as well as the 
reserve reforms and civil-military integration efforts that 
Taiwan is undergoing. We support----
    Senator Coons. Doctor, there continues to be some ongoing 
tension within Taiwan military planning between those who want 
to invest in expensive, but, perhaps, less critical 
capabilities and those who agree with the vision that you just 
laid out. How do we help move forward Taiwan's defense reforms?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, this is a question we often get. I 
would say I am encouraged by the direction that President Tsai 
and Taiwan's minister of national defense are heading in terms 
of its capability development, its reserve reforms, other 
defense reforms.
    As in any bureaucracy, there are going to be competing 
priorities. There are going to be service rivalries, especially 
in a resource-constrained environment. I think what we need to 
do is speak with one voice as an administration, as a Congress, 
as a government, and work with allies and partners in the 
region as well on this issue.
    Senator Coons. How much harm would a year-long CR where we 
do no more appropriation, no more policy through appropriation 
as well--how much harm would that do possibly to our Indo-
Pacific strategy?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, leaders at the Defense Department have 
been clear from the Secretary on down about concerns about a CR 
and the need for stability in our budgeting cycles.
    Senator Coons. Thank you.
    Ambassador, I would like to see us work in close 
coordination with our European allies and partners to 
strengthen our trade investment relationships.
    Taiwan is one of the world's most significant sources of 
advanced semiconductor chips. We currently have just come 
through some real supply chain disruptions and significant 
shortages.
    What do you think we could do to develop the standards for 
the 21st century for the digital economy in partnership with 
Taiwan, including them in the world community of open societies 
that is, in part, convening through the Summit for Democracy 
this week, and what do you think we could do to better engage 
our European allies in that work in strengthening both economic 
ties and, potentially, security ties with Taiwan?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for 
your question.
    On the issue of Taiwan's role in the global economy and the 
importance of resilient and diverse supply chains, I think that 
is absolutely critical for Taiwan. It is absolutely critical 
for the global economy and for our prosperity as well.
    We have engaged in a range of fora and via a range of 
dialogues with our Taiwan partners on those very issues, 
including assisting Taiwan in making sure that its supply 
chains are more diverse and secure and that Taiwan carries out 
the export control and other screening policies designed to 
protect its most important technologies and trade secrets as 
well.
    Our European partners are absolutely critical in this 
effort as well, given their, obviously, central role in the 
economy and these same supply chains, and this has been, in 
fact, an area of discussion between the EU and the United 
States, including in the recent engagements with the EU that I 
mentioned earlier, both at my level and at the deputy secretary 
level.
    Senator, I could not agree more with the importance of the 
issue, the importance of Taiwan's role in these supply chains 
and in the global economy and in the importance of the EU's 
role in achieving our goals.
    Senator Coons. Thank you both.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the 
witnesses.
    Over the last year, the world has gotten much more 
dangerous and, unfortunately, that danger is a direct 
consequence of a series of foreign policy failures by the 
Biden-Harris administration. We have seen President Biden's 
weakness over and over again translating into making America 
less safe.
    In Afghanistan, we saw an absolute catastrophe with Biden's 
surrender to the Taliban, abandoning Americans behind enemy 
lines, and the chaos that resulted. When that occurred, every 
enemy of America looked to Washington and took measure of the 
man in the Oval Office, and whether it was Russia or Iran or 
North Korea or China, they all determined that the President 
was too weak to be a serious threat to them and, unfortunately, 
as a consequence, each of them has gotten substantially more 
bellicose, substantially more aggressive.
    As we sit here today, over a hundred thousand Russian 
troops are massed on the border of Ukraine preparing to invade 
Ukraine because Joe Biden surrendered to Vladimir Putin on the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline and paved the way for Putin to take a 
major step towards his long-term goal of rebuilding the Soviet 
Union and, once again, posing a massive threat to the safety 
and security of Americans.
    In China, the weakness of the Biden administration, from 
abandoning Afghanistan, from surrendering to Putin, has been 
noticed and the Afghanistan disaster, I believe, made it 
substantially more likely that China will launch an amphibious 
military assault against Taiwan sometime between now and the 
end of 2024 because for the same reason that Putin is preparing 
to launch an invasion of Ukraine our enemies have determined 
this President is too weak to stand up to them.
    That has been complicated even further by the Biden 
administration's incoherence and undermining of Taiwan, which, 
unfortunately, serves as an encouragement to the Chinese 
Communist government to engage in military hostilities directed 
at Taiwan.
    Every few weeks we see another example of bumbling and 
incompetence from this Administration when it comes to Taiwan. 
Over the summer, for instance, the White House's official 
Twitter account first posted and then deleted a tweet about 
vaccination donations in Taiwan because the tweet included a 
flag of Taiwan.
    Our Taiwanese allies were forced to publicly ask the White 
House not to cause unnecessary speculation or misunderstanding 
from all walks of life due to the removal of the related tweet.
    The Biden White House publicly retreated from Taiwan to 
avoid angering the communist overlords in China. More broadly, 
the Biden administration has imposed a policy forbidding our 
Taiwanese allies from displaying symbols of their sovereignty, 
whether flags or medals or uniforms, on U.S. soil. It is the 
policy that goes back to 2015 when the Obama administration 
capitulated to the Chinese Communist Party demands to restrict 
Taiwanese activities.
    I fought for the Trump administration to change this 
policy. It took 4 years to get it done, but, ultimately, they 
did. They changed the policy to allow our Taiwanese allies to 
display their flags on military uniforms.
    The Biden administration reversed that policy and it did so 
knowing it was over the objection of Republicans and Democrats 
in the Senate on this committee.
    I introduced legislation in this committee to restore the 
policy allowing Taiwan to display its symbols of sovereignty. 
It passed overwhelmingly in this committee with bipartisan 
support, it passed the Senate overwhelmingly with bipartisan 
support, and yet the Biden administration is defying the United 
States Senate and continues to impose this policy undermining 
our ally, Taiwan.
    I have even heard recently from officers at several bases 
that DoD is asking for stricter enforcement of the ban after a 
Taiwanese graduate of the Air Force Academy wore the Taiwanese 
flag at a graduation ceremony.
    Meanwhile, we hear from Biden administration officials that 
they have actually loosened contact guidance for Taiwan.
    Dr. Ratner, what is the Biden administration's actual 
policy regarding the ability of our Taiwanese allies to display 
their national symbols of sovereignty and has that policy been 
memorialized in a written memo that is being distributed within 
the Administration?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am going to defer to my State 
Department colleague, who has oversight of that particular 
piece. What I will say is I am not familiar with the case that 
you raised vis-a-vis DoD and I will look into that. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz. Your office has not circulated any guidance 
within DoD?
    Dr. Ratner. State Department determines contact guidance 
for the Department--for the U.S. Government as a whole.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. Then same question.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, first, I would say that 
everything that animates our approach to the Indo-Pacific is 
designed to demonstrate the credibility of our commitment to 
the region and to our allies, and no one should doubt the 
strength of that commitment and the capabilities that America 
brings to bear.
    Under this administration and since I have had the honor of 
having this job, America has revitalized its engagement with 
allies and partners across the region in a way that improves 
our national security and our prosperity that counters the 
aggressive and coercive actions by the PRC that----
    Senator Cruz. I just asked what the policy was on Taiwan.
    The Chairman. I am sorry. I am sorry.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator, and then on second 
part----
    The Chairman. The time of the Senator----
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. If I can respond, Senator.
    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes. I am sorry, sir.
    The Chairman. I am sorry, but the time of the Senator is 
well past expired. There have been members who have been 
waiting here. The Senator used----
    Senator Cruz. He has not answered the question at all.
    The Chairman. The Senator used 5 minutes to make a 
statement before he ever got to a question. I cannot allow all 
members to do that or we will be here forever. I am happy for 
it be included to the record.
    Senator Cruz. You are not going to allow him to answer the 
question?
    The Chairman. No. You can speak for 5 minutes if you choose 
to, but then you cannot speak for 5 minutes and then think you 
can ask a series of questions. It is unfair to----
    Senator Cruz. I asked one question. I asked one question 
that he has refused to answer.
    The Chairman. No, this is your third. This is your third.
    Senator Cruz. I asked one question.
    The Chairman. It is unfair to the other members who have 
been waiting here.
    Senator Cruz. I asked one question. The DoD witness said he 
could not answer. The State Department----
    The Chairman. The Secretary will answer it for the record.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Cruz. Let the record reflect that the chair is 
protecting the Biden administration from admitting their 
policies' undermining of Taiwan.
    The Chairman. Let the record reflect that when the Senator 
from Texas turns his back to the chair and thinks that he can 
run out the clock and then begin to ask questions, that dog 
will not hunt here.
    Senator Cruz. I actually just look at the person to whom I 
am speaking.
    The Chairman. That dog will not----
    Senator Cruz. I look at the witnesses when I am asking them 
questions----
    The Chairman. You see the clock----
    Senator Cruz. --and I am looking at you now when you are 
trying to prevent the witness from answering the question.
    The Chairman. I know you enjoy this because you put it up 
on your YouTube channel. You cannot run the clock in statement, 
which you are free to do, and then ask questions.
    Senator Cruz. Look, your exchange has taken longer than it 
would take for them to answer the question.
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine is recognized.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I have one item I would like to ask each of you about. I do 
believe the Biden administration is earnestly trying to rebuild 
and shore up alliances around the world and that is a positive 
thing.
    I think with respect to this particular region, the 
elevation of importance of the Quad is an important component. 
I think U.S. support for vaccine delivery in Taiwan has been 
very positive as well as vaccine delivery around the world.
    We are the most generous donor of vaccines. That is a good 
thing. I think the announcement of a more potent Indo-Pacific 
partnership between the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom 
is positive, but now my critique and my question. I have yet to 
get an answer from the Administration about why that particular 
partnership--U.S., Australia, U.K.--blindsided France or at 
least was perceived to have been blindsiding France.
    Since France is an ally and France is an Indo-Pacific 
nation, it would seem like we would want to include France in 
our efforts in the Indo-Pacific, that that would be a real 
positive, and instead, the U.S.-Australia-U.K. partnership 
around submarines was perceived to be blindsiding France and 
left France out of something that, I think, it would be in our 
interest and other nations in the region for France to be 
included.
    So I want to ask each of you from the DoD perspective and 
from the State perspective were you individually involved in 
crafting this U.S.-U.K.-Australia partnership around submarines 
and, if so, why was not France included?
    If I could start with you, Dr. Ratner, from the Defense 
side.
    Dr. Ratner. Sure, Senator. The answer to your last question 
is yes, I was involved in the latter stage of the negotiations. 
They had been underway for several months by the time I was 
confirmed, but I did participate in the final development of 
the MOUs and some of the other elements of the AUKUS agreement.
    I guess what I would say there is it is a particular 
agreement around three sets of countries which have--and is 
very particular to the strategic context and as well as our 
existent bilateral cooperation with each.
    As it relates to the question of France, one of the reasons 
why the negotiations were so secret is because of the 
sensitivity of the subject, and I guess I will leave it to the 
Australians to explain their own engagement with the French on 
the question of their own submarine deal.
    Senator Kaine. You would agree with me, would you not, that 
France is an Indo-Pacific country?
    Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator, and we are actively----
    Senator Kaine. France is a great military ally of the 
United States?
    Dr. Ratner. They are, and I have met with----
    Senator Kaine. If we want to be, you know, engaged with 
allies in the Indo-Pacific in a way that will support other 
allies like Taiwan and, potentially, be a bit of a deterrent to 
China, the involvement of France in those efforts would be a 
positive, correct?
    Dr. Ratner. It is a positive. It is existent. We engage 
with them on defense issues in the Indo-Pacific and we look 
forward to doing even more of that into the future. They are a 
resident power in the Indo-Pacific. They have got their own 
relationship----
    Senator Kaine. I gather from your answer that you were 
involved in negotiations between three nations, France was not 
part of those negotiations, and the U.S. expectation was that 
Australia would somehow give notice to France about what was 
going on at the appropriate time?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, my own conception of the AUKUS 
agreement is that it is complementary to what is a very diverse 
set of security relationships and arrangements in the Indo-
Pacific and globally.
    So we have AUKUS. We have the Quad, as you mentioned. We 
have a number of trilateral arrangements with the Japanese and 
the Koreans, with the Australians and the Japanese. We, of 
course, have our approach to ASEAN and these are meant to be 
complementary. None is meant to be exclusive of the other.
    Senator Kaine. Let me ask you, Mr. Ambassador. Were you 
involved from the State Department side in discussions about 
the AUKUS framework or agreement and why was France blindsided 
and should we not be including France in the Indo-Pacific 
Alliance efforts?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
    All of that happened, Senator, before I was confirmed and 
sworn in, but I would say that, as you outlined, I think the 
progress made by the Quad and the announcement of the AUKUS 
agreement, I think these are very significant strategic moves 
that contribute to peace and stability across the region.
    I think that the President has stated publicly that the 
rollout in particular could have been handled better and I 
think you have seen the Administration take a number of steps 
even since I have been in this position to engage intensively 
with our French allies and our EU partners to recognize their 
critical role in the region.
    We recognize it, we value it, and we are in touch on a 
regular basis how to advance our shared interests.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. I have exceeded my time. Thank 
you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Ratner, then Vice President Joe Biden said in January 
of 2017, ``Given our nonnuclear capabilities and the nature of 
today's threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in 
which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States 
would be necessary or make sense.''
    Do you agree with the President in the context of the East 
Asia and Pacific region that you oversee that his statement as 
Vice President is accurate?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, what I would say is the Nuclear 
Posture Review and these types of questions are currently under 
review at the Department and likely to be completed early next 
year in terms of the role of nuclear weapons and U.S. nuclear 
doctrine.
    Senator Markey. I hope that your Department's Nuclear 
Posture Review will be drawing inspiration from the President's 
own views, namely, that we do not need to be the first country 
to escalate a nonnuclear conflict into a nuclear conflict, and 
if a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, as 
President Biden reiterated in Geneva this summer, surely, we 
should have no issue stating that the sole purpose of nuclear 
weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the United States 
and its allies, but that we would never be the first country to 
use nuclear weapons in a nonnuclear war setting.
    The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently called China's 
test of an orbital hypersonic missile as a Sputnik moment, 
suggesting that there is a technological gap with respect to 
China that the United States needs to fill.
    Dr. Ratner, is it true the United States exceeds the next 
11 countries combined in defense spending, one of which is 
China?
    Dr. Ratner. I do not have the data at my fingertips, sir, 
but, certainly, Senator, the United States has the largest 
defense budget in the world.
    Senator Markey. I will confirm for you that, yes, our 
budget is larger than the next 11 combined, including China, 
just so that we do not get back to 1960s missile gap. We are 
looking over our shoulders at number two, three, and four.
    Dr. Ratner, Department of Defense witnesses have testified 
that China's development of nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles 
is meant to counter U.S. missile defenses, but does our 
regional or homeland-based missile defense architecture pose a 
threat to China's strategic deterrent, be it from a traditional 
Chinese ICBM or a hypersonic glide vehicle?
    Dr. Ratner. Sorry, Senator. Could you repeat the question? 
Is our missile----
    Senator Markey. Does our regional or homeland-based missile 
defense architecture pose a threat to China's strategic 
deterrent, be it from a traditional Chinese ICBM or a 
hypersonic glide vehicle?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, the purpose of our missile defense is 
to enhance stability and deter aggression. It does not pose a 
threat to China, no.
    Senator Markey. It does not pose a threat? Thank you. That 
is the answer. It does not pose a threat.
    Is it not true that U.S. ICBMs that we have right now are 
actually faster than the hypersonic glide vehicles that the 
United States, Russia, and China are all rushing to develop?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I would be happy to discuss that in a 
classified setting.
    Senator Markey. I appreciate that. The Union of Concerned 
Scientists says that our ICBMs are 20 times the speed of 
sound--I just think it is important to get that out there--and 
I do not think there is any evidence thus far that the Chinese 
hypersonic weapons are going to be able to exceed what we can 
do in our country.
    I always hate it when they make out the Chinese or the 
Russians to be 10 feet tall and we are midgets. It is just the 
opposite, and I just think we have to keep that out there.
    Is it true that even if China were to have 1,000 
deliverable warheads by 2030 it would still be one-fourth of 
what is already in our active nuclear weapons inventory of 
3,750? Is that correct?
    Dr. Ratner. That is correct, though, of course, we deploy 
lower numbers than that, Senator.
    Senator Markey. We have the capacity right now in our 
active nuclear weapons inventory to counter the 300 that they 
have right now or the 1,000 that they might have by the year 
2030? Is that correct?
    Dr. Ratner. That is correct, Senator, though there are 
still reasons to be concerned about China's nuclear buildup 
despite the United States having a larger overall size.
    Senator Markey. I appreciate that perspective. I just want 
to say, though, that the Pentagon should not be hyping the 
threat from hypersonics or goading us into an arms race.
    We should absolutely engage with China on talks to reduce 
nuclear risks. We should be prepared to acknowledge mutual 
vulnerability with China as we did with the former Soviet 
Union.
    We just should not be trying, which I really feel the arms 
manufacturers are trying to do and many in the Pentagon, to 
just create artificial fear in the United States. It is not a 
Sputnik moment. One hundred percent it is not a Sputnik moment 
and the Pentagon should not be saying it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
    Notwithstanding the row here with Senator Cruz, there is a 
lot of us that do have an interest in that question that he 
asked and you indicated they would answer it for the record, 
and I guess I would be interested in hearing that answer.
    The Chairman. If you want to use your time now, Senator 
Risch, I am happy to have the secretary answer you. I am not 
afraid of the answer nor am I hiding, Senator.
    Senator Risch. Yes. This--yes. No, I get that. Mr. 
Secretary, I just appreciate you never got to the answer to the 
question. You talked about all the good stuff we were doing and 
we appreciate that. We really do, but we have all heard 
anecdotal stories about suppression of the Taiwanese flag and 
what have you. Is there an official policy on this? Do we have 
anything in writing on this?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very 
much for the question and I am happy to answer it to the best 
of my ability.
    Senator Risch. Please.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. I would state, first, we have 
tremendous respect for our Taiwan partners. We treat them with 
great respect and dignity in every interaction.
    However, over the last four decades, it has been United 
States policy to not allow Taiwan partners to display symbols 
of sovereignty on U.S. facilities. That includes flags. That 
includes military uniforms. That has been long-standing 
American policy for the last 40 years and it remains as such.
    Senator Risch. Is there a written policy in that regard?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Senator, there is a written policy 
regarding our contact guidelines and the guidance that we give 
and the encouragement that we give to U.S. Government officials 
to meet with Taiwan partners in a way that is fully in 
accordance with our unofficial, but vitally important 
relationship with Taiwan. I do not know if the contact 
guidelines covers the uniform or flag issue, but I would be 
happy to research that immediately----
    Senator Risch. If you could check that, that is fine.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. --and get back to you, but what I 
can state with confidence is that the policy on symbols of 
sovereignty has been long-standing over these many decades.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that, and like I said, we hear 
anecdotal stories that are unique to a particular situation. It 
can be--awkward would be a good word. Whatever you can provide 
in that regard, I think, a lot of us would be interested in it.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Dr. Ratner. Mr. Chairman, if I could just clarify for the 
record. I said earlier in response to Senator Cruz that the 
Defense Department does not issue its own guidance. The Defense 
Department does issue guidance. That guidance requires 
adherence to the State Department guidance. Just to clarify the 
record there.
    The Chairman. All right. Let me ask some final set of 
questions. I want to just to follow this up fully. At the end 
of the Trump administration, Secretary Pompeo rescinded 
previous Department guidance on executive branch contacts with 
Taiwan.
    This past April, the State Department issued new guidance 
that allows working-level meetings with Taiwan counterparts in 
federal buildings. Is that the case, Mr. Secretary?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is the 
case.
    The Chairman. Okay. Which is different than the question of 
symbols, but meetings are taking place in federal--with 
Taiwanese counterparts in federal buildings.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. It was reported earlier this year that the 
U.S. was ``seriously considering changing the name of the 
Taiwan office from the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Office to 
the Taiwan Representative Office to elevate our treatment of 
Taiwan consistent, however, with the One China policy and the 
Taiwan Relations Act.'' Has Taipei made an official request for 
the United States to consider changing the name of TECRO?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is 
that we are continuing to assess a request to that effect.
    The Chairman. So they have made a request?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. That is my understanding, but I 
will confirm that and get back to you.
    The Chairman. Would you confirm that for the record? Also 
if, in fact, they have made a request, I would like to know the 
status of the Administration's consideration of TECRO's name 
change.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. They have also asked or engaged in 
conversations that I have had on two things that they are very 
interested in pursuing. One is forward deployment of our 
Customs personnel, as we do in other countries, so that those 
who are transiting from Taiwan to the United States could go 
through that forward deployment. Are you cognizant of that?
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I am not tracking 
that issue, but I would be happy to check into it and get back 
to you.
    The Chairman. If you would. I would like to know that.
    Dr. Ratner, I understand that one of their other issues is 
surplus defense equipment. Are you aware of that?
    Dr. Ratner. Yes, Senator.
    The Chairman. Are we engaged with them in that?
    Dr. Ratner. I would be happy to discuss that in a 
classified setting, Senator.
    The Chairman. Okay. I would like to--I am going to follow 
up on that.
    Then, finally, let me ask you--you touched upon this a 
little bit, but I want to get a sense of what is the view of 
the Biden administration in prioritizing, providing Taiwan with 
asymmetric weapons for the island's force modernization and how 
do you, meaning the Department, define asymmetric? Thirdly, is 
that definition shared with Taipei, including Taiwan's military 
leadership?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, we view Taiwan's development of 
asymmetric capabilities as an absolute priority not only for 
Taiwan, but a priority for the United States.
    We have defined those capabilities as--in my both written 
and oral statement as capabilities that are credible, 
resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost effective.
    By and large, there is consensus between the United States 
and Taiwan on the definition of asymmetric defense capabilities 
and strategies, and the Department of Defense and the U.S. 
Government as a whole is taking a proactive approach to try to 
support Taiwan's development of these. Again, I would be happy 
to get into details in a closed session.
    The Chairman. I would like to know that, including are we 
prioritizing providing Taiwan with those asymmetric weapons as 
defined by your testimony.
    Dr. Ratner. Absolutely, Senator. Without question.
    The Chairman. Okay. Then what operational concept is most 
appropriate to follow for an overall defense concept when we 
are talking about Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, as I mentioned earlier, in addition to 
just the provision of arms there is a wide range of reforms and 
capabilities that are going to be important to Taiwan's defense 
and we are engaged across the board, including on issues of 
concept development and analysis, doctrine, and otherwise.
    Again, not--happy to get involved in specific questions 
related to concept development, but we would be looking at 
operational concepts that are taking advantage not only just of 
Taiwan's geography, but also its technology, its economic 
strength, and some of its capabilities' strengths, and also 
helping it develop the role of its reserves, as we discussed 
earlier, greater civil-military integration and what we 
describe as defense in-depth as well--concepts that build upon 
all of those efforts, not just the provision of arms.
    The Chairman. Finally, is the Administration presently 
delaying any DSP-5 license for arms sales to Taiwan?
    Dr. Ratner. I believe that would be a question for 
Ambassador Kritenbrink.
    The Chairman. I am sorry.
    Ambassador.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I would be happy--I 
do not know, but I would be happy to check into that and get 
back to you.
    The Chairman. All right. Well, let me help your situational 
awareness.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. I am aware of at least one DSP case that has 
been sitting at State after clearing DoD for 5-plus months. It, 
basically, covers upgrades for Taiwan's M-60 tanks, which is 
not a cutting-edge ask, but as we seek to normalize arms sales 
and avoid returning to a packaged approach, it makes no sense 
that we would be sitting on it at this point, after DoD's 
clearance and 5 months to make a consideration.
    So I would like to hear back from the Department on that.
    Ambassador Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Dr. Ratner, I am going to be asking my staff 
to set up a classified briefing with you and whoever else you 
want to bring from the Department to answer some of the 
questions we have not been able to pursue in a public hearing, 
which I understand, but I want to hear the answers to.
    Dr. Ratner. Senator, I am keen to do that. I think we have 
got a great story to tell. I would look forward to that.
    The Chairman. We are always listening, ready to listen to 
great stories, especially when it comes to Taiwan. So we are 
happy to hear it.
    No other members seeking recognition, the record for this 
hearing will remain open until the close of business on 
Thursday, December 9. Please ensure that questions for the 
record are submitted no later than Thursday. We, certainly, ask 
you to answer them expeditiously.
    With the thanks of the committee for your service and your 
testimony here today, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


             Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

                             supply chains
    Taiwan is the world's leading producer of semiconductors, including 
cutting-edge computer chips essential for mobile devices, artificial 
intelligence, and many other strategic technologies. Having so much of 
the world's supply of this critical resource concentrated in one-place 
raises obvious concerns--especially when Taiwan sits a short distance 
from mainland China.
    Question. What steps is the Biden administration taking to 
collaborate with Taiwan to address current market shortages and to 
bolster supply chain security in the future?

    Answer. The semiconductor shortages caused by the COVID-19 pandemic 
have highlighted the critical functions these chips play in our society 
and put a spotlight on Taiwan as a leader in global semiconductor 
supply chains.
    Supply chains were a focus of the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity 
Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) held on November 22. We discussed the 
importance of coordinating between the United States and Taiwan 
(through AIT and TECRO), as well as with industry, to build a more 
resilient semiconductor supply chain.
    TSMC's planned $12 billion investment in Arizona is just one 
example of the great potential and opportunity that comes with 
increased high-tech cooperation between our two economies.

    Question. How might the semiconductor issue affect Beijing's 
thinking around unification?

    Answer. We are closely tracking Beijing efforts to undermine 
Taiwan's semiconductor industry, including through talent poaching and 
intellectual property theft. Taiwan's semiconductor industry is highly 
valued and is on the cutting edge globally. The Biden-Harris 
administration continues to emphasize our economic relationship with 
Taiwan, focusing on making critical supply chains, such as those for 
semiconductors, secure and resilient. This was a primary topic during 
the November 22 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue.

    Question. We've seen consistent Chinese efforts to compete with or 
subvert Taiwan's semiconductor industry--for example, by recruiting 
Taiwanese engineers and executives to state-backed chipmakers in China. 
Are these efforts succeeding? How should the United States respond?

    Answer. We are closely tracking Beijing efforts to undermine 
Taiwan's semiconductor industry, including through talent poaching and 
intellectual property theft. We are actively working to mitigate the 
PRC threat to Taiwan's semiconductor industry through our work under 
the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue and by working 
to strengthen Taiwan's existing export controls to prevent advanced 
semiconductor technology from going to the PRC for military purposes.
                      taiwan/u.s. pork referendum
    As you know, the Taiwanese people will be going to the polls to 
vote on a referendum on December 18. Among the questions on the ballot 
will be whether or not Taiwan will lift the restrictions on the 
importation of U.S. pork imports.

    Question. Secretary Kritenbrink, as we contemplate deepening 
economic and trade ties, what are the broader foreign policy 
implications of a negative vote on U.S. pork imports on the referendum?

    Answer. Taiwan is our ninth largest trading partner in goods in 
2020 with two-way trade totaling $90.6 billion. U.S. exports of 
agricultural products to Taiwan totaled $3.3 billion in 2020, making 
Taiwan our eighth largest agricultural export market.
    We note that the December 18 referendum on imports of pork 
containing ractopamine did not pass. Regardless, we will continue to 
engage on agricultural trade issues through mechanisms such as USTR's 
agricultural working group under the Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement talks through AIT and TECRO, which was restarted during the 
Biden-Harris administration.

    Question. What are the stakes for the referendum on our bilateral 
relationship?

    Answer. Our partnership with Taiwan is diverse, robust, and 
multifaceted, and goes beyond this one issue. We note that the December 
18 referendum on imports of pork containing ractopamine did not pass. 
We have consistently messaged that U.S. pork is safe to consume, and we 
will continue to engage on agricultural trade issues through mechanisms 
such as the USTR's agricultural working group under the Trade and 
Investment Framework Agreement talks through AIT and TECRO, which was 
restarted during the Biden-Harris administration.
                            cyber operations
    Taiwan is on the frontlines of Chinese cyberattacks and digital 
disinformation campaigns. Taiwanese authorities have linked Chinese 
hackers to cyberattacks on government agencies, universities, and major 
companies, including Taiwan's strategically critical semiconductor 
industry.

    Question. What can the United States do to help strengthen Taiwan 
against this digital coercion? And what can the United States learn 
from Taiwan's strategy in order to strengthen our own defenses against 
Chinese cyber aggression?

    Answer. We have discussed with Taiwan our shared experience with 
PRC malicious cyber activity and are working together to strengthen 
both sides' cyber resilience and capacity. The recent Economic 
Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) with Taiwan, held under the 
auspices of AIT and TECRO and led by Under Secretary for Economic 
Growth, Energy, and the Environment, Jose Fernandez, focused on 
exchanging views and ideas for how we can work together to build more 
resilient supply chains, including for semiconductors, combat economic 
coercion, and strengthen the digital economy and 5G network security.
                       international institutions
    Global health, international aviation security, and transnational 
crime are all matters of global importance requiring cooperation from 
stakeholders from all around the world. Indeed, Congress has passed 
legislation requiring the State Department to support Taiwan's 
meaningful participation in international organizations such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL).

    Question. What is the Biden administration's strategy for 
supporting Taiwan's participation in international institutions and 
within the international community?

    Answer. We support Taiwan's membership in international 
organizations where statehood is not a requirement, and meaningful 
participation when it is. We continue to show the world that engagement 
with Taiwan brings substantive benefits, and we encourage more 
countries to deepen their engagement with Taiwan, which is a leading 
democracy, a vibrant economic partner, and a technology powerhouse. 
Through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, we are able to 
show concretely Taiwan's ability and willingness to address global 
challenges.

    Question. What steps will the United States take to bolster 
Secretary Blinken's October statement calling on all UN members to 
support Taiwan's robust and meaningful participation in the UN system?

    Answer. Increasing Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN 
system and in other international and regional organizations is an 
important priority, as the Secretary made clear in his October 26 
statement on this subject.
    The East Asian and Pacific Affairs and International Organizations 
Bureaus also lead semiannual talks with Taiwan on international 
organizations, which was held most recently on October 22 under the 
auspices of the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Relations Office.
    These discussions focus on supporting Taiwan's ability to 
participate meaningfully at the UN and contribute its valuable 
expertise to address global challenges, including global public health, 
the environment and climate change, development assistance, technical 
standards, and economic cooperation.
    We also continue to engage likeminded partners on how to protect 
and expand Taiwan's meaningful participation in the UN and other 
international organizations.
                      president tsai and elections
    I don't mean to suggest that President Tsai, whom I have great 
regard for, should be considered a lame-duck just yet . . .

    Question. However, what is the United States doing to prepare for 
post-Tsai relations with Taiwan?

    Answer. Our rock-solid commitment to and partnership with Taiwan 
will continue, as it has for 40 years, irrespective of the political 
party or leadership.
                            taiwan democracy
    In November, the PRC placed top Taiwan officials on a blacklist and 
barred institutions affiliated with these individuals from cooperating 
with PRC entities, as well as punishing firms that make financial 
donations to Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party.

    Question. What is your assessment of the implications of this 
decision? How can the United States continue to support Taiwan's 
democracy and resist this type of economic coercion from Beijing?

    Answer. As we have seen in the recent case of PRC coercion against 
Lithuania, the United States has a range of actions that we can take. 
We can coordinate with the U.S. interagency to help those facing PRC 
coercion access USG programs and financial resources, including working 
with our commercial service to help diversify supply chains and 
identify U.S. substitutes for inputs the PRC may cut off. During the 
November 22 U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, 
conducted through AIT and TECRO, we also discussed with Taiwan ways to 
make our economies more resilient to economic coercion as well as how 
to ensure our supply chains are secure and resilient.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. Strategic ambiguity is a longstanding informal tactic, 
but it is not enshrined in any formal U.S. policy document, and is 
arguably at odds with the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the legal 
foundation of Taiwan policy since 1979. While the TRA did not fully 
commit the United States to Taiwan's defense, it also did not strike a 
tone of neutrality either. Congress embedded a strong presumption of 
intervention throughout the TRA. It described aggression against Taiwan 
as a ``grave concern'' to the United States. Subsequent decades of 
steady U.S. support for Taiwan have further solidified the widespread 
perception in capitals around the world that we are Taiwan's protector.
    Do you believe that the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act and 
the decades-long political, military and economic support the U.S. has 
provided to Taiwan imply that the United States should come to Taiwan's 
defense in the event of a PRC invasion?

    Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances has fostered 
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple 
administrations.
    We seek to minimize miscalculations on both sides of the Taiwan 
Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and deepen the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship, and best ensure the future of Taiwan is determined 
peacefully and in accordance with the wishes and best interests of the 
people in Taiwan.
    We will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles 
and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our 
``one China'' policy.

    Question. Given that U.S. law and our decades of support lead many 
around the world to already assume we'd come to Taiwan's defense, how 
does the United States benefit from maintaining a stance of strategic 
ambiguity?

    Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has fostered 
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple 
administrations from both parties.

    Question. Do you acknowledge that U.S. inaction in the event of a 
PRC military campaign against Taiwan would irreparably damage the 
credibility of U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific and beyond?

    Answer. We have publicly reaffirmed that the United States' support 
for Taiwan is rock-solid. Taiwan knows it has no better friend than the 
United States.
    Consistent with our assessment of the threat posed by the PRC, we 
will continue to provide Taiwan defense articles and services necessary 
to deter the PRC's increasingly provocative behavior toward Taiwan, 
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.

    Question. The TRA made clear that ``the United States' decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation 
that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.'' This 
is an ongoing expectation, and one that the PRC is increasingly 
flouting. In past years, when Washington indulged in ambiguity about 
its strategic intentions, such a posture had tactical value. It 
supported Beijing in its pledge to pursue ``peaceful development'' of 
cross-Strait relations, which they said would lead to their eventual 
goal of ``peaceful unification.'' Many Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leaders stressed that ``unification'' could wait for decades if 
necessary, and that the political disputes between Beijing and Taipei 
should be laid aside in favor of a focus on developing economic and 
cultural ties. Since Xi Jinping became the CCP's paramount leader, 
belligerent rhetoric and aggressive military maneuvers have become the 
norm.
    What purpose is served by maintaining strategic ambiguity when 
Beijing has changed both its rhetoric toward Taiwan and its conduct in 
the Taiwan Strait?

    Answer. Our ``one China'' policy, as guided by the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, has fostered 
peace and prosperity in the region for over 40 years across multiple 
administrations from both parties. We continue to make adjustments to 
our engagement with Taiwan consistent with our ``one China'' policy to 
reflect our deepening unofficial relations with Taiwan as well as the 
increasing threat from Beijing. We seek to minimize miscalculations on 
both sides of the Taiwan Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and 
deepen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and best ensure the future of 
Taiwan is determined peacefully in accordance with the wishes and best 
interests of the people in Taiwan. We will continue to make available 
to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable it to 
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the 
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.

    Question. Because the U.S. decision to establish diplomatic 
relations rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be 
determined by peaceful means, do you believe that the U.S. should cut 
diplomatic relations with the PRC should the PRC attempt to absorb 
Taiwan under threat of force?

    Answer. As guided by our ``one China'' policy and the policy 
reflected in the Taiwan Relations Act, we continue to consider any 
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means 
to be a threat to the peace and security of the region and of grave 
concern to the United States.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. In 2018, a RAND Corporation study drew the following 
conclusion: ``Clarity and consistency of deterrent messaging are 
essential. Half-hearted commitments risk being misperceived.'' Another 
RAND study concluded the same, arguing that ``perceptions [of the 
potential aggressor] are the dominant variable in deterrence success or 
failure.'' To avoid misperception and miscalculation, the United States 
should be as clear as possible about what it seeks to deter--the use of 
force by Beijing--as well as what it is prepared to do if deterrence 
fails--defend Taiwan.

   What kind of strategy has the best odds of deterring 
        conflict in the Taiwan Strait?

   Does ambiguity or clarity better serve the goal of 
        deterrence?

    Answer. Although the PLA's coercive actions are real and dangerous, 
and PLA modernization is unlikely to abate, the PRC can still be 
deterred through a combination of Taiwan's own defenses, its 
partnership with the United States, and growing support from like-
minded democracies. Through smart investments and key reform efforts, 
Taiwan can send a clear signal that its society and armed forces are 
committed and prepared to defend Taiwan. Without question, bolstering 
Taiwan's self-defense provides the best odds of deterring conflict in 
the Taiwan Strait.
    We therefore appreciate that President Tsai has prioritized the 
development of asymmetric capabilities for Taiwan's self-defense that 
are credible, resilient, mobile, distributed, and cost-effective. In 
short, these are affordable investments in lethal capabilities tailored 
to counter the military threat from the PRC. These capabilities are 
aimed to strengthen multi-domain deterrence and ensure that an invasion 
or attack could neither succeed rapidly nor occur without substantial 
costs. DoD is taking an increasingly proactive approach to supporting 
these efforts as we continue upholding our commitment under the Taiwan 
Relations Act to make available to Taiwan relevant defense articles and 
services.
    The debate we're seeing on the merits of strategic ambiguity versus 
clarity reflects bipartisan concern of PRC's increasingly assertive 
military actions and coercion against Taiwan. Strategically, I believe 
the United States has been very clear to both Taiwan and the PRC 
regarding our policy, and that policy has endured for 40 years. As I 
indicated in my testimony, I do not believe a change in U.S. 
declaratory policy would meaningfully strengthen deterrence. I would be 
happy to follow up on that point in a classified setting.

    Question. It is clear that the United States must do much more to 
provide Taiwan with the military platforms and equipment that it needs 
to deter conflict in a much more expeditious manner. The Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) process as it pertains to Taiwan is in serious 
need of reform.

   What is the Biden administration doing to expedite the 
        internal processing of Taiwan FMS requests?

   Once FMS requests have been approved, what more can be done 
        to ensure that U.S. defense contractors prioritize Taiwan's FMS 
        orders ahead of countries that do not face as severe of a 
        security threat?

   What is the Biden administration doing to help Taiwan's Air 
        Force respond to the high frequency of incursions by PLA 
        fighters into Taiwan's airspace?

    Answer. We are working closely with industry and our other security 
cooperation partners to find ways of ensuring Taiwan has the 
capabilities they need in a timely manner, and are exploring all 
options to expedite cases. As you know, this Administration is not 
bundling arms transfer requests; we process each request as soon as we 
receive it through the foreign military sales and export control 
processes. However, the speed of arms sales also depends on Taiwan 
moving as quickly as possible to request and confirm transfers and on 
U.S. industry to deliver these capabilities.
    We have encouraged our industry partners to further support 
Taiwan's self-defense through the co-development and co-production of 
capabilities that best provide for a credible multi-domain deterrent. 
Given Taiwan's focus and need for high-quality, indigenous, asymmetric 
weapons systems, it is critical that our respective defense industrial 
bases--not just our political and military leadership--are poised to 
foster such forms of cooperation. Taiwan is a priority for the United 
States and for all the reasons I outlined previously, we are working to 
ensure it remains a priority for our industry partners as well.
    The PLA's flights into Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) are destabilizing and significantly increase the risk of 
miscalculation. The flights serve to undermine the Taiwan Air Force's 
readiness and Taiwan's broader resilience. It is important to note that 
these flights are occurring alongside diplomatic and economic pressure 
and targeted socioeconomic coercion. These coercive methods have been 
observed most clearly since 2016, when President Tsai came into office. 
Furthermore, these flights need to be considered within the greater 
context of PRC coercion around the region, including in the East and 
South China Seas and against India.
    The United States Government has previously issued statements 
highlighting the PRC's coercive actions against Taiwan, including PLA 
flights into Taiwan's ADIZ. I defer to the Department of State for 
further specifics on these statements. In the Department of Defense, we 
continue to work closely with Taiwan on its F-16 retrofit and new buy 
programs to ensure Taiwan maintains the capacity to respond to these 
events.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. You testified to the importance of initiatives of the 
U.S.-Taiwan-Japan Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) in 
expanding Taiwan's international partners. If provided additional 
resources by Congress, how would the Department expand the scope and 
geographical reach of GCTF to showcase Taiwan's expertise in public 
health, humanitarian assistance, and the other sectors where it is a 
global leader?

    Answer. The United States, Japan, and now Australia, have worked 
together to showcase Taiwan's ability to help the global community 
through the GCTF, consistent with their unofficial relationships. The 
GCTF provides training and technical assistance to participants, which 
builds support for Taiwan around the world by demonstrating the value 
of Taiwan's participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 
2015 through the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, the GCTF has 
provided training to more than 3,000 participants in dozens of 
workshops ranging from building media literacy to empowering women 
entrepreneurs. This year, we have started a ``franchise program'' that 
enables U.S. embassies around the world to work with Taiwan 
representative offices and likeminded partners to hold GCTF events on 
pressing regional problems. I am particularly grateful for 
Congressional support for GCTF, which will significantly enhance the 
program's reach.

    Question. The Innovation and Competition Act (S.1260) includes the 
bipartisan and bicameral Taiwan Fellowship Act, which will send up to 
10 of our best public servants to Taiwan in a flexible fellowship 
lasting of up 2 years. The fellowship, modeled on the Mansfield 
Fellowship with Japan, will include intensive study in Mandarin and 
assignment in a ministry on Taiwan. Will the President include a 
funding request in fiscal year 2023 required to fully implement the 
Taiwan Fellowship Program?

    Answer. The Administration is committed to supporting Taiwan as it 
faces an ongoing PRC pressure campaign to shrink Taiwan's international 
space. We look forward to continuing to work with Congress on 
legislation to deepen our people-to-people ties and enhance our ability 
to work with our Taiwan friends. In so doing, we hope to ensure any 
proposed legislation that proceeds is framed as permissive authorities 
and preserves our shared goals as well as the Department's flexibility.

    Question. Would the Department of State actively support Track 1.5 
and Track 2 strategic dialogues with China to avoid the inadvertent 
escalation between militaries operating in the region? If no decisions 
have been made, what are the types of considerations that will inform 
whether the Department will actively support such dialogues going 
forward?

    Answer. The State Department has actively participated in and 
funded several unofficial efforts to enhance mutual understanding and 
reduce the risks of miscalculation with the PRC in the strategic arena. 
Going forward, unofficial and official efforts will continue to pursue 
these objectives in parallel. As we work to engage the PRC in 
conversations on risk reduction and strategic stability, a key 
consideration will be to ensure Beijing engages meaningfully in both 
official and unofficial channels.
                                 ______
                                 

             Responses of Daniel Kritenbrink to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. Displaying Taiwan's symbols of sovereignty would be an 
appropriate reflection of the robust bilateral relationship we maintain 
with Taiwan, and would publicly demonstrate U.S. support for Taiwan's 
independence and democracy. I sponsored a measure, the Taiwan Symbol of 
Sovereignty (Taiwan SOS) Act, which was included in the Senate-passed 
U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) with bipartisan support. 
While the Biden administration's policy to restrict contact guidelines 
for official U.S. engagement with Taiwan remains, it's important for 
the Department of State's website to be comprehensive when presenting 
facts about Taiwan, in order to ensure U.S. citizens are fully 
informed, for their safety and security, especially when it comes to 
international travel. A basic measure would be to display the national 
flag of Taiwan on the Department's website.
    Will the Department of State display Taiwan's flag on the 
Department's website?

    Answer. We have great respect for our Taiwan friends and treat them 
with the dignity they deserve as a strong, democratic partner. However, 
in keeping with the unofficial nature of our relationship, we do not 
permit displays of Taiwan's flag on the Department's website. This is a 
long-standing policy that has been followed by multiple administrations 
from both parties in line with our ``one China'' policy as guided by 
the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six 
Assurances.
                                 ______
                                 

               Responses of Dr. Ely Ratner to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. Taiwan Travel--In September, the Foreign Minister of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan), Joseph Wu, visited the United States. Due 
to a ban on government officials from Taiwan making official visits to 
the U.S., Foreign Minister Wu was forced to travel to Annapolis, 
Maryland instead of Washington D.C. This ban exists despite dozens of 
Senators and Representatives meeting with Foreign Minister Wu 
throughout his time in office.
    The Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law No. 115-135) encourages visits 
and engagement between officials from the United States and Taiwan at 
all levels. As both the U.S. and Taiwan have been facing an increase in 
political and security challenges from the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP), it is critical for Taiwan's Foreign Minister and Defense 
Minister to be able to engage directly with their U.S. counterparts.
    China's increased military aggression and economic coercion across 
the Taiwan Strait and throughout the Indo-Pacific region has raised 
concerns of the U.S. and our regional allies and partners. It is 
critical that like-minded democracies work together at the ministerial 
level to counter China's malign influence. However, Taiwan's Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense are still barred from 
visiting Washington, DC to directly engage with their counterparts and 
Members of Congress on issues of mutual interests.
    Do you believe that allowing the Minister of Defense from Taiwan to 
make an official visit to the Pentagon for ministerial level 
engagements would be beneficial to increasing coordination on the issue 
of security in East Asia?

    Answer. In keeping with the unofficial nature of our relationship, 
our official contacts are guided by State Department policy consistent 
with E.O. 13014 (Maintaining Unofficial Relations with the People on 
Taiwan). Consistent with the Taiwan Assurance Act, the Biden 
Administration has taken steps to broaden and deepen our unofficial 
relationship with Taiwan. I defer to the State Department on the 
specifics of these policies.
    I agree it is important to maintain a robust engagement with 
Taiwan's defense officials, and DoD will continue to advocate for 
engagement that advances our national security interests and aligns 
with U.S. policy.

    Question. Symbols of Sovereignty--This past summer, the official 
Twitter account of the White House first posted, and then deleted, a 
tweet about vaccination donations to Taiwan, because the tweet included 
a flag of Taiwan. Our Taiwanese allies were forced to publicly ask the 
White House ``not to cause unnecessary speculation or misunderstanding 
from all walks of life due to the removal of the related tweet.''
    The Biden administration has a policy of restricting our Taiwanese 
allies from displaying symbols of their sovereignty, whether flags or 
medals or uniforms on U.S. soil. This is a policy that dates back to 
2015, when the Obama administration circulated an internal memorandum 
outlining contact guidelines, at the behest of the CCP.
    The Biden administration reversed the Trump administration's move 
to de-regulate contact with the Taiwanese. In response, this Committee 
approved language I authored, which was ultimately included in the 
Senate-passed U.S. Innovation Competition Act (USICA), which would 
restore the ability of our Taiwanese allies to display their symbols of 
sovereignty.
    Nevertheless, the Biden administration has continued to restrict 
that ability. There are reports from officers at several bases that DoD 
is requesting stricter enforcement of the ban after a Taiwanese 
graduate of the Air Force Academy wore the Taiwanese flag at a 
graduation ceremony.
    Mr. Ratner, what is the Biden administration's policy regarding the 
ability of our Taiwanese allies to display their national symbols of 
sovereignty on U.S. military bases, and are you aware of any efforts to 
further address the display of the Taiwanese flag on U.S. military 
bases?

    Answer. Consistent with E.O. 13014 (Maintaining Unofficial 
Relations with the People on Taiwan), the State Department has been 
delegated the responsibility for managing our unofficial relations with 
Taiwan. In this regard, DoD engagements with Taiwan are wholly 
conducted pursuant to State Department guidance.

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