[Senate Hearing 117-254]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-254
UPDATE ON U.S. RUSSIA POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 7, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-353 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 30
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator James Risch............................................ 32
Letter From Senator Risch and Senator Portman to President Biden,
Dated December 3, 2021, Urging the President To Show Support
for Ukraine, To Warn President Putin, and To Reject
Unreasonable Kremlin Demands................................... 37
(iii)
UPDATE ON U.S.-RUSSIA POLICY
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen,
Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Young, Barrasso, and
Cruz.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Secretary Nuland, thank you for coming before the committee
today and coming not just once, but twice this week to testify
before this committee. We appreciate the time that you and
Assistant Secretary Holmgren gave us last night in a classified
setting.
As we meet here today, Russia is engaged in one of the most
significant troop buildups that we have seen along Ukraine's
border. To anyone paying attention, this looks like more than
posturing, more than attention seeking. The Kremlin's actions
clearly pose a real threat of war.
I want to be crystal clear to those listening to this
hearing in Moscow, Kyiv, and other capitals around the world. A
Russian invasion will trigger devastating economic sanctions
the likes of which we have never seen before.
I proposed a suite of options last month in an amendment to
the NDAA. The Russian banking sector would be wiped out.
Sovereign debt would be blocked. Russia would be removed from
the SWIFT payment system. Sectoral sanctions would cripple the
Russian economy.
Putin, himself, as well as his inner circle would lose
access to bank accounts in the West. Russia would, effectively,
be cut off and isolated from the international economic system.
Let me be clear. These are not run of the mill sanctions.
What is being discussed is at the maximum end of the spectrum,
or, as I have called it, the mother of all sanctions, and I
hope that we can come together in a bipartisan way to find a
legislative path forward soon so that we can achieve that.
If Putin invades Ukraine, the implications will not only be
devastating for the Russian economy, but also for the Russian
people. The Ukrainian military forces of 2021 are not the
Ukrainian military forces of 2014.
They are well equipped, thanks to the United States and our
allies. They are well trained. They have years of combat
experience, and, most importantly, they have every incentive to
fight.
Now Russia clearly has conventional advantages, but is the
Kremlin really ready to face a bloody, persistent, and drawn-
out insurgency? How many body bags is Putin willing to accept?
In New Jersey, we have a large Ukrainian diaspora. I know
Ukrainians well. I know their fighting spirit. Is Russia ready
for Ukrainians from every walk of life, from boys and men and
grandmothers, to rise up and undermine and destroy a Putin-
installed puppet government?
Do Russian families really want to sacrifice their sons and
daughters to the ego of a dictator in the Kremlin? Is the
Kremlin truly prepared for a 1980s Afghanistan all over again?
In short, the Kremlin may want to reconsider.
Putin clearly wants to reconstitute the Soviet Union, amass
power, and expand Russia's borders, but you know what? It turns
out that Ukraine gets a vote and the Ukrainian people clearly
want to be part of the West. They do not want to be subservient
to Moscow. They want a better future for their children. Given
Ukraine's resolve, Putin may want to reconsider. There are off-
ramps available if he chooses to follow them.
Finally, Putin is clearly underestimating our allies. This
is not a question of the United States versus Russia. Our
European allies and partners share our alarm. They are willing
to act and, if pushed, they will stand in solidarity with
Ukraine and against Kremlin aggression. Given Europe's resolve,
Putin may want to reconsider.
This is a critical time. There still may be a window to
deter the Kremlin from deciding to invade, but we must be clear
and united about what awaits Russia if it chooses that unwise
path.
I look forward to hearing about the Administration's
diplomatic efforts, including a readout of this morning's call
with Putin by President Biden. I look forward to hearing how we
are supporting Ukraine's military. I look forward to hearing
how we are leading a sanctions effort with allies.
Let us not mince words. This is not a time for half
measures. If Putin does decide to act, if he invades Ukraine,
the response will be swift and will be unequivocal. Putin does
not get to redraw the map of Europe. Europeans should be
thinking about that.
He does not get to bully the people of an independent
nation into submission. He may dictate the course of events
inside of Russia, but he does not get to dictate the course of
events in Ukraine. Ukrainians will not stand for it and neither
should we.
Finally, this critical moment calls for unity of purpose,
unity with our partners in Kyiv, unity with our allies,
especially those who value democracy and the rule of law, and
unity amongst ourselves in this body.
As we have during past instances of peril, the Senate must
be united in sending a clear and strong message that
unwarranted aggression will not stand. I urge our members to
come together in that unity of purpose in the days to come.
With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Risch, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. That was
an extensive opening statement and I would like to join in the
chairman's remarks.
This is a clearly, clearly bipartisan matter, and rather
than going over it again, I will simply say that those who are
listening, both our allies and those in Moscow, listen
carefully to what has been said here.
I join in those remarks. My sentiment is the same as the
chairman's. I think that I can tell you that the sentiment in
the United States Senate is very much as described by the
chairman.
We have not had a readout yet on what the phone call was
like this morning. I do not know whether you are ready to do
that here yet or not. Whatever happens, I hope you will
communicate back to the Administration, although I suspect it
will be there before you get back, of the resolve that this
body has to move forward if, indeed, such an act by Russia
occurs.
With that, I will yield back. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, we will turn to Secretary Nuland. Thank you,
again, for coming before the committee. You have heard some of
my framing questions at the beginning. We look forward to your
testimony and then to the dialogue that will ensue.
We recognize you at this time.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Risch, members of the committee, for the opportunity to
appear before you today and for the time that we were able to
spend in classified session yesterday to discuss our shared
concern--what I hear is a bipartisan concern--about the buildup
of Russian forces on Ukraine's border and in occupied Crimea.
First, let me review what we are seeing. Over the past 6
weeks, Russia has stepped up planning for potential further
military action in Ukraine, positioning close to 100,000 troops
around Ukraine's eastern and northern borders and from the
south via the Crimean Peninsula.
Russian plans and positioning of assets also include the
means to destabilize Ukraine from within and an aggressive
information operation in an attempt to undermine Ukrainian
stability and social cohesion and to pin the blame for any
potential escalation on Kyiv and on NATO nations, including the
United States.
Russia's military and intelligence services are continuing
to develop the capability to act decisively in Ukraine when
ordered to do so, potentially, in early 2022. The intended
force, if fully mobilized, would be twice the size of what we
saw last spring, including approximately a hundred battalion
tactical groups, or nearly all of Russia's ready ground forces
based west of the Urals.
We do not know whether President Putin has made a decision
to attack Ukraine or to overthrow its government, but we do
know he is building the capacity to do so.
Much of this comes right out of Putin's 2014 playbook, but
this time it is much larger and on a much more lethal scale.
Despite our uncertainty about exact intentions and timing, we
must prepare with our allies and partners for all
contingencies, even as we push Putin to reverse course.
Now to what we are doing. First, we are engaging Russia at
all levels to urge Moscow to pull back and to settle any
concerns with Ukraine or with the transatlantic community
through diplomacy.
As you know, the President sent CIA Director Burns to
Moscow in early November, Secretary Blinken engaged with
Foreign Minister Lavrov last Thursday, National Security
Adviser Sullivan and I and all of us have been active with our
Russian counterparts, and President Biden gave that message
directly to President Putin in a more than 2-hour phone call
this morning.
We are also warning, and the President warned President
Putin today, of severe costs and consequences, including
deploying far harsher economic measures than we have used
before if Russia chooses the path of confrontation and military
action.
Second, we are engaging intensively with Ukrainian
President Zelensky and his government to strengthen their
defenses, support their preparedness, and help them fight
disinformation, while also urging, as you did, Mr. Chairman,
national unity and vigilance in the face of Russian efforts to
divide or provoke them.
Since 2014, the United States has provided Ukraine with
$2.4 billion in security assistance, including $450 million
this year alone. We are committed to Ukraine's sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and independence, and that is
unwavering.
Third, during Secretary Blinken's meetings at NATO and the
OSCE last week and in countless bilateral meetings at all
levels, including the President's engagements directly with key
Europeans, we are working with allies and partners to send a
united message: Russia must deescalate, it must pull back its
forces, and return to negotiations.
If Russia attacks Ukraine, we will be united in imposing
severe consequences on Moscow for its actions, including high-
impact economic measures that we have refrained from using in
the past, and at NATO, we are working closely with allies to
prepare to reinforce NATO's defenses on its eastern flank as
that is needed.
None of us seeks confrontation or crisis. Certainly, the
Russian people do not need it as they come out of a difficult
COVID period. Diplomacy remains the best route to settle the
conflict in Donbas and address any other problems or
grievances.
The Minsk Agreements offer the best basis for negotiations
and the U.S. is prepared to support a revived effort if the
parties welcome that.
More broadly, President Biden continues to believe that a
more stable and predictable U.S.-Russia relationship is in both
countries' interests. We will continue to have very deep
disagreements with the Kremlin on human rights, on Mr.
Navalny's treatment, on press and NGO freedom, on Belarus, on
cyber threats, on election interference, on detained American
citizens, and on embassy staffing and many other things.
President Biden has, including today, and will continue to
raise these issues with President Putin.
Yet, as we all know, when the United States and Russia can
work together, as we are doing now on Iran and in the nascent
strategic stability talks, we offer both our citizens and
people everywhere the prospect of a better future, but what we
could and should do together will be put at risk if President
Putin chooses more aggression against Ukraine.
Senators, while I have you captive, I want to thank this
committee for moving so many of our State nominees out of
committee in recent weeks and even getting some of them
confirmed.
I met with Ambassador Flake this morning, one of your
previous colleagues and now one of our colleagues, for example,
but with 85 nominees pending consideration before the Senate,
American diplomacy remains at quarter power at main State and
around the world.
At this time of myriad security challenges, including the
one we are talking about today, every empty slot around the
world diminishes our global influence and creates space for our
adversaries to fill.
As Christmas and New Year's approach, the Senate could give
American diplomacy no greater gift than to get our folks
confirmed and off to work.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victoria Nuland
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss our
shared concern about the build-up of Russian forces on Ukraine's
borders and in occupied Crimea.
First, let me review what we are seeing: Over the past 6 weeks,
Russia has stepped up planning for potential further military action in
Ukraine, positioning close to 100 thousand troops around Ukraine's
Eastern, and Northern borders as well as from the South via the Crimean
Peninsula. Russia's plans and positioning of assets also include the
means to destabilize Ukraine from within, and aggressive information
operations in an attempt to undermine Ukrainian stability and social
cohesion, and to pin blame for any potential escalation on Kyiv and
NATO nations.
Russia's military and intelligence services are continuing to
develop the capability to act decisively in Ukraine when ordered to do
so, potentially in early 2022. The intended force, if fully mobilized,
would be twice the size of what we saw last spring, including
approximately 100 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), or nearly all of
Russia's ready ground forces based West of the Urals.
We don't know whether Russian President Putin has made a decision
to attack Ukraine or overthrow its government, but we do know he is
building the capacity to do so. Much of this comes right out of Putin's
2014 playbook, but this time, it is on a much larger and more lethal
scale. So despite our uncertainty about exact intentions and timing, we
must prepare for all contingencies, even as we push Russia to reverse
course.
Now to what we are doing: First, we are engaging Russia at all
levels to urge Moscow to pull back, and settle any concerns with
Ukraine or with the Trans-Atlantic community through diplomacy. The
President sent CIA Director Burns to Moscow with that message in early
November; Secretary Blinken engaged FM Lavrov last Thursday; NSA
Sullivan and I have been active with Russian counterparts, and [today]
President Biden gave that message directly to President Putin.
We are also warning of severe costs and consequences, including
deploying far harsher economic measures than we have used before, if
Russia chooses the path of confrontation and military action.
Second, we are engaging intensively with President Zelenskyy and
the Ukrainian Government to strengthen their defenses, support their
preparedness, and help them fight disinformation, while also urging
national unity and vigilance in the face of Russian efforts to divide
or provoke them. Since 2014, we have provided Ukraine with $2.4 billion
in security assistance, including $450 million this year alone. The
United States' commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial
integrity and independence is unwavering.
Third, during Secretary Blinken's meetings at NATO and the OSCE
last week and in countless bilateral meetings at all levels, we are
working with Allies and partners to send a united message: Russia must
deescalate, pull back its forces and return to negotiations. But if
Russia attacks Ukraine, we will be united in imposing severe
consequences on Moscow for its actions, including high-impact economic
measures we have refrained from using in the past. At NATO, we are
working closely with Allies to be prepared to reinforce defenses on the
eastern flank, as needed.
None of us seeks a confrontation or a crisis. Diplomacy remains the
best route to settle the conflict in the Donbas and address other
grievances. The Minsk agreements offer the best basis for negotiations,
and the U.S. is prepared to support a revived effort if the parties
welcome that.
More broadly, President Biden continues to believe that a more
stable and predictable U.S.-Russia relationship is in both our
interests. We will continue to have deep disagreements with the Kremlin
on human rights, Mr. Navalnyy's treatment, press and NGO freedom,
Belarus, cyber threats, election interference, detaining American
citizens, embassy staffing and many other things. President Biden has
and will continue to raise all these issues with President Putin.
And yet, when the United States and Russia work together, as we do
now on Iran and in the nascent strategic stability talks, we offer our
citizens and people everywhere the prospect of a safer future. But what
we could and should do together will be put at risk if President Putin
chooses more aggression against Ukraine.
While I have you captive, I want to thank this committee for moving
so many of our State Department nominees out of committee in recent
weeks, and even getting a few confirmed. But with 85 nominees pending
consideration before the Senate, American diplomacy remains at quarter
power at Main State and around the world. At this time of myriad
security challenges, every empty slot diminishes our global influence
and creates space for our adversaries to fill. As Christmas and the New
Year approach, the Senate could give American diplomacy no greater gift
than to get our folks confirmed and off to work. Thank you.
I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We will start a series
of 5-minute rounds. I will recognize myself.
First of all, with reference to the President's call with
President Putin today, would you characterize President Biden's
messages to President Putin as clear and unequivocal, of
delineating the consequences of any such invasion, including
sanctions such as that I have mentioned and others that we
mentioned yesterday in a classified setting?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. The President could
not have been clearer.
The Chairman. All right. In that respect, have we also
shared that this is not just a question of the United States
engaging in these very significant sanction activities, but an
increasing multilateral reality for President Putin if he makes
the mistake of invading Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely. We have said it ourselves, but the
Europeans and other allies are increasingly saying it as well.
You might have seen a press conference today that Commission
Chairwoman von der Leyen gave in Brussels in which she made
absolutely clear that the EU would also join in very
consequential economic measures of the kind that they have not
employed before.
The Chairman. Much has been said about the Nord Stream 2,
somehow that it would be the be all and end all of not having
this present set of circumstances. I do not believe that for a
moment because there is far more engagement here than that.
Are the Germans ready to take significant actions with us
if, in fact, Russia invades Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. I believe they are, and today is the first day
of the new German Government, as you know, but we have already
begun intensive consultations with them.
The Chairman. Do we have a calculus as to how much pain
Putin is willing to subject himself to in order to invade
Ukraine? Meaning, how many lives as Russia's sons are in the
mix in terms of, particularly, a long-term insurgency that
would exist by the Ukrainian people rising up?
Ms. Nuland. Chairman, I thought you sent President Putin a
very powerful message yourself this morning, that the
Ukrainians are a tough nation. They will not stand by should
President Putin order his forces into Ukraine or otherwise try
to destabilize their democracy in profound ways.
I think the Russians will have a very big fight on their
hands, that there will be severe casualties for them, and,
frankly, it is hard to comprehend why, at a time when Russia
itself has one of the highest rates of COVID around the world
and the Russian people are suffering in other ways, Putin would
want to spend the money in the Russian treasury, hundreds of
millions of rubles, on a war nobody needs with Ukraine rather
than on building back better inside Russia, which is what his
people are asking for.
The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that because of the
mounting Russian troops, which I understand is close to 170,000
or so, amassed along Ukraine's various borders, that, in fact,
it has caused the Ukrainians to have to mobilize in a way that
they might not have before?
Ms. Nuland. That is right. With, as I said, close to
100,000 troops now and many, many more planned, the Ukrainians
are having to think differently about their own security and,
in fact, some of the defensive lethal support that the U.S. has
given Ukraine over the years they have had in storage
containers and I think we will now see them have to put that
stuff out and be thinking very hard about their own civil
defense.
The Chairman. Finally, if, hopefully, President Putin takes
a different course and does not invade Ukraine that does not
mean that Ukraine's stability is reasserted because there are
other ways to try to destabilize the Ukrainian Government.
Are we working with the President of Ukraine to try to firm
up their stability institutionally as well as against cyber and
other efforts to undermine the Government of Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. We are, Mr. Chairman. As I said in my opening,
there are also significant Russian efforts to destabilize
Ukraine from within and to pose catastrophic risks for the
Zelensky Government.
We have been very clear in sharing our concerns and
intelligence that we have with the Ukrainians and in supporting
efforts that they are making not only in the cyber realm, but
in the civil defense realm to protect their institutions and
their critical infrastructure.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Are you able to
give us a readout on this call this morning?
Ms. Nuland. Ranking Member Risch, just to say that the
White House is doing a public readout simultaneously with this
hearing. I will let them take the lead there, and the President
is also having a consultation with major European allies this
afternoon. I think there will be a further readout thereafter.
Just to say that my understanding is that the call went
some 2 and a quarter hours or longer with consecutive
translation that the President was able to in a very, very
fulsome way express our concerns, express the consequences of
any further Russian aggression, but also to make clear to
President Putin that if there are questions that he has or
grievances that he has that could be worked through with
diplomacy, either vis-a-vis Ukraine or vis-a-vis the U.S. or
vis-a-vis NATO that we are open to having these conversations
and that aggression is the wrong way to go.
Senator Risch. You have heard the comments that have been
made by the chairman and myself over the last couple of days.
Do you think that the President was that strong when he
communicated to Putin where the U.S. is on this issue?
Ms. Nuland. I am confident that he was.
Senator Risch. Do you think Putin understood?
Ms. Nuland. I try very hard not to get inside the mind of
President Putin. I will leave that for others.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much. We will look forward to
getting the readout from the White House. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Madame Secretary, first of all,
thank you very much for your service. I appreciated the
opportunity in the closed session, and let me follow up a
little bit on our concerns.
First of all, I agree completely with the chair in regards
to the maximum pressure being exhibited at this stage and that
we need to show unity and make it clear that there would be a
heavy price to pay if Russia, indeed, does further incursions
into Ukraine.
I want to get to an issue that should concern all of us.
Crimea was taken over by Russia in 2014. We imposed sanctions,
Europe imposed sanctions, and the status is still a Russian
occupation of Crimea.
Yes, we have to be prepared to take action against Russia
if they incur further into Ukraine, but we need to have a
strategy that goes beyond just the initial response on our
activities that makes it increasingly more difficult for Russia
to continue this behavior over--if it extends for any length of
time.
I guess my first question to you is do we have
conversations with our allies that we have to be prepared for
any contingency, including the possibility that our initial
response if Russia invades Ukraine may require us to escalate
and make it even more challenging for Russia to continue this
behavior?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely, Senator Cardin. We are talking
about day one measures, day five measures, day 10 measures, et
cetera, but it is also important, I think, for President Putin
to understand, as the President conveyed to him today, that
this will be different than it was in 2014 if he goes in. You
will recall then that our sanctions escalated somewhat
gradually as he did not stop moving.
This time, the intent is to make clear that the initial
sanctions in response to any further aggressive moves in
Ukraine will be extremely significant and isolating for Russia
and for Russian business and for the Russian people.
Senator Cardin. Russia has substantial energy resources.
Are we considering how to handle the energy sector in the event
of Russia's incursion? We already talked a little bit about
Nord Stream 2, but if we could talk about the way that they
have weaponized energy in the past, yet, it is a resource that
Mr. Putin might believe he will still be able to utilize even
with sanctions from the West. How do we handle the energy
sector?
Ms. Nuland. This is part of what we are discussing with our
allies and partners as we build the sanctions packages that we
need to understand the exposure of allies and partners, but
also the risks to Mr. Putin and to his government.
As you know, energy is the cash cow that enables these
kinds of military deployments. Putin needs the energy to flow
as much as the consumers need it, but, more broadly, we have
been counseling Europe for almost a decade now to reduce its
dependence on Russian energy, including our opposition to Nord
Stream 2 and our opposition to Nord Stream 1 and our opposition
to TurkStream and TurkStream 2, and to come to find alternative
sources of hydrocarbons, but also to continue their efforts to
go green and end their dependencies.
Senator Cardin. How are our discussions going with the
Ukrainian Government in regards to the contingency of a Russian
incursion as to what type of assistance they will need from the
United States?
Ms. Nuland. Conversations are ongoing at every level. We
had Secretary Blinken talk to President Zelensky yesterday.
President Biden will speak to him either later today or
tomorrow.
We have had the defense minister, the foreign minister, the
national security adviser in Washington. Secretary Blinken also
sat with the foreign minister a week ago in--on the margins of
the OSCE meeting in Stockholm and we have a very robust team in
the embassy and our advisor is in Kyiv now.
I would ask our DoD colleagues to talk to you about the
conversations that they are having with counterparts in Ukraine
as well, which are also pretty fulsome.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I understand we are joined by
Senator Young by WebEx.
Senator Young. Yes, thank you.
Ambassador Nuland, on December 1, Secretary Blinken
promised serious consequences for any Russian aggression while
you said the U.S. would impose high-impact economic sanctions.
These are sort of vague terms and they do not provide enough
substance to serve as an effective deterrence one might think.
Can you provide any more specifics about what measures are
being considered by the Administration to counter Russian
aggression?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Young, I, again, want to thank the
committee for the opportunity to speak in classified session
yesterday where I was quite clear and specific about the
various measures that we are working on internally and that we
are working on with our allies and partners.
I would say that the President was equally precise in his
conversation with President Putin. It did not come as a
surprise to President Putin because he was very aware of the
conversation which we are having with our allies, which is part
of the strategy, obviously.
Suffice to say that the impact would be extremely profound.
I do not think it serves the policymaking process to go any
further than that in this setting. I know you will understand.
Senator Young. I do. I do understand. Russia is already
subject, Ambassador, to extensive sanctions so why have these
sanctions not served as an effective deterrent thus far?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think you and I have had this
conversation before. I, personally, believe that the sanctions
that we imposed in a steadily increasing fashion in 2014 and in
2015 in response to Russia's incursions--first in Crimea, and
then in Donbas--did have the effect of stopping the Russian
forces and President Putin from going further, particularly
when we got to the sectoral sanctions in 2015.
I would say that when we began to see this latest buildup
and when we began to make clear that we would take economic
measures that are far more severe than those we have used
before, I think it did come as somewhat of a surprise to
President Putin and the group around him. So they are having to
factor that in.
In every sanctions conversation, you apply them. They have
some effect. They have to be updated, because countries find a
way to navigate, as you know.
Senator Young. We have also discussed, Ambassador, that
sanctions tend to be more effective in a multilateral sort of
capacity. Are you able to share with me and those who are
watching or listening how you assess our NATO partners would
respond to a Russian invasion of Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, we are having a very robust
conversation with our NATO allies, with our allies and partners
in the European Union, obviously, with Ukraine.
I think the statement, as I said earlier, by the chairman
of the EU Commission, von der Leyen, this morning about the
EU's strength of conviction with regard to the potential need
to deploy more and far harsher sanctions this morning speaks to
the unity that we are building, as did the very strong
statements that we had from NATO when the Secretary was there
last week. Again, the President is continuing that diplomacy
today, as we all are, at every level.
Senator Young. Ambassador, President Putin and Foreign
Minister Lavrov have repeatedly indicated that they seek to
deny any potential path to NATO membership for Ukraine and
other Eastern European countries. Does the Administration view
this demand is a valid issue for negotiation?
Ms. Nuland. No, we do not, and President Biden made that
point crystal clear to President Putin today that the issue of
who joins NATO is an issue for NATO to decide. It is an issue
for applicant countries to decide, that no other outside power
will or may have a veto or a vote in those decisions.
Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador. I have no further
questions.
Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen is recognized.
Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Nuland, thank you for being
here today and for the briefing that you gave us yesterday. I
think it is very clear, listening to the members of this
committee, that there is strong bipartisan concern about what
Russia might be thinking about with respect to Ukraine and
support on this committee and in the Senate for Ukraine and for
doing everything we can to ensure that they remain a sovereign
nation.
Senator Portman and I offered an amendment to this year's
NDAA in that vein to increase military assistance and raise the
amount of assistance that could go to lethal weapons.
Are there other things that you think we could be doing in
this Congress that would further show support for Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator. I think the Congress and
the American people in a bipartisan fashion have been
enormously generous, as I mentioned in my opening--$450 million
in lethal defensive support heretofore.
I think we need to continue to look at other things that
the Ukrainians need in terms of cyber resilience, in terms of
communications capability, in terms of educating the next
generation, all these kinds of things.
We will not be shy about coming to you as we need support
and the bipartisan spirit here is really gratifying.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Last week, Senator Johnson and
I met with a number of members of parliament from Estonia, and
one of the things that they talked about was the importance of
European unity with respect to Ukraine.
They were also quite anxious that we reconsider whether or
not to station more troops in the Baltic nations, something
that I have also heard from Poland and some of the other
Eastern European countries.
Can you tell us if that is on the table for consideration
as we are thinking about how to respond to what Putin is doing?
Ms. Nuland. Yes, Senator. At the NATO ministerial last
week, there was a commitment among allies that we needed more
advice and more options from our NATO military authorities with
regard to the consequences of any move by Russia deeper into
Ukraine, and what that would mean for the eastern edge of the
Alliance and what it would mean about our need to be more
forward deployed in the East. Again, I think that was also a
subject of conversation in this morning's phone call.
Senator Shaheen. Belarus, now that it seems to be totally
within Russia's control, also presents another front for the
potential for Russia to invade Ukraine. Can you speak to
whether we view what is happening in Belarus in that way?
I know the Ukrainians view it that way because we heard
that when we were in Halifax for the International Security
Forum and met with some Ukrainian officials.
Ms. Nuland. As you know, Senator, the situation in Belarus
is just tragic and really concerning in many, many ways, which
is why the Administration, along with the European Union in a
multilateral way, increased sanctions just last week, including
blocking the sale to us or to Europe of one of the great
sources of Lukashenko's money, potash, et cetera, and
sanctioned some dozens more Belarusians responsible for the
violence and intimidation there and, particularly, now for the
weaponization of migrants pushing--accepting them from third
countries and then pushing them against the EU's border in a
very cynical and dangerous way.
I think you are talking about the potential, as Lukashenko
becomes more and more dependent on the Kremlin and gives up
more and more of Belarus' sovereignty, something that he told
his people he would never do, that Russia could actually use
Belarusian territory to march on Ukraine and/or mask its forces
as Belarusian forces. Those are both things that we are
watching and it was particularly concerning to see President
Lukashenko make a change in his own posture with regard to
Crimea. He had long declined to recognize Russia's claim on
Crimea, but he changed tack a week ago, which is concerning.
Senator Shaheen. Very much. I am out of time, but I just
wanted to raise an issue you brought up in your opening remarks
with respect to the effort to confirm our ambassadors and State
Department officials and the effect it is having currently of
hamstringing our foreign policy efforts around the world.
I know this committee has worked very hard in a bipartisan
way to try and move those appointments, but they are being held
up on the floor by a small group of Republican colleagues, who
have other issues, who do not want us to move forward.
I hope that you will share with everybody on this committee
and those holding up those appointments what that means to our
diplomacy and our foreign policy when we cannot get our people
in place to protect American interests.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you for that, Senator, and thank you for
how stalwart you have been on this subject.
As I said in my opening, we are on the field at quarter
power as our adversaries and as the autocrats are on the field
at full power and, frankly, on the march. We need all of our
assistant secretaries confirmed in the department.
We still have, I think, less than 10 confirmed and we need
all of our ambassadors out in the field. As good as our charges
are, it is not the same as having been the President's choice
and to have the advice and consent in a bipartisan way of this
Senate.
So 85 of our best, political and career, awaiting floor
action, and think about the message that that sends to Russia
and China. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Under Secretary Nuland, welcome. I, certainly, appreciate
you spending some time with us last night in the secured
briefing and I think it is important that you are here today.
I want to associate myself with remarks of the chairman and
the ranking member. I think if there is one thing that Vladimir
Putin ought to understand is how unified we are. I mean, there
are many things that divide us politically in this country, but
when it comes to pushing back on Russian aggression, supporting
countries like Ukraine that are trying to develop their
freedom, free themselves from the legacy of corruption from
their former involvement with the Soviet Union, we are very
strongly united.
Often within this discussion, you were talking about an
unprecedented level of sanctions. I think it would be important
for the public, for the Senate, for Congress, but for Vladimir
Putin to really understand in somewhat granular detail what we
are talking about, what we would impose on them and how harmful
it would be to Russia and, unfortunately, to Russian people.
Vladimir Putin ought to be concerned about the Russian
population more concerned than we are. We cannot allow this.
Can you really describe the types of sanctions that you are
contemplating and pushing with our European allies?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, thanks for that statement of unity and
for your strong statement here today.
As we discussed last night in some detail, what we are
talking about would amount to, essentially, isolating Russia
completely from the global financial system with all of the
fallout that that would entail for Russian business, for the
Russian people, for their ability to work and travel and trade,
and we are looking at the full suite of options.
I think in the context of the diplomacy that we are doing
and the work that we are doing internally, I was gratified to
have a chance to go through some of those specific measures in
the classified session yesterday.
Going beyond that in this open session, I think, does not
help us get from here to there, but everything is on the table,
I would say, if that is helpful.
Senator Johnson. One thing that I believe, certainly, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee is pretty unified on--it may
not be unanimous--was our support for sanctions against the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I think many of us were very
disappointed that those sanctions were not fully implemented
and the construction continued.
I cannot think of a more powerful way to punish Russian
aggression than by rolling back what progress has been made
and, if at all possible, prevent the Nord Stream 2 from ever
being completed.
Is that something that is being discussed with allies? Is
that something that is being contemplated?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely. As you recall from the July U.S.-
German statement, that was very much in that statement, that
any moves of Russian aggression against Ukraine would have a
direct impact on the pipeline, and that is our expectation and
the conversation that we are having.
Senator Johnson. Again, direct impact is one thing, but I
am literally talking about rolling back the pipeline. Loosely,
define that, but I mean taking action that will prevent it from
ever becoming operational.
Ms. Nuland. I think if President Putin moves on Ukraine,
our expectation is that the pipeline will be suspended.
Senator Johnson. I certainly hope the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee would take up legislation to go beyond just
suspending it, but from ending it permanently. Anyway, thank
you, Under Secretary Nuland.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and thank you, Under Secretary Nuland, for speaking with
us today and for briefing the committee in classified session
and for all the ways that you have been responsive and engaged
as these important developments have unfolded.
Like, I believe, all of my colleagues, I am greatly
concerned about developments along the Russia-Ukraine border
and the very real threat that Putin poses to security stability
throughout Europe.
In addition to serving on this committee, I chair the
Appropriations Subcommittee that funds the State Department and
USAID. What tools and funding within the FY22 State and Foreign
Operations bill do you think would be most effective in
deterring Russian aggression and in supporting our partners in
Ukraine, yes, but also in other places throughout Eastern
Europe and Georgia and elsewhere?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I would like to come back to you with
specifics, if I may, because I think we have not yet gone
through chapter and verse if Putin does not heed the concerns
and the warnings of what we will need to strengthen NATO, to
strengthen partners who live on the edges of Ukraine, and to
beef up our diplomatic presence as necessary.
I would like to come back to you, but one thing I will say
is that I think we can, and I know this is close to your heart
as well, need to do better in our Global Engagement Center and
in the way we speak to audiences around the world and,
particularly, on these kinds of subjects.
Senator Coons. Thank you, and I look forward to working
with you on finding ways we can strengthen our investments.
This week is the Summit for Democracy, which I expect will kick
off a year of action. I have introduced a bipartisan bill today
with Senator Graham that would strengthen our investment.
In particular, I think it is important that we invest in
anti-corruption activists and pro-democracy reformers and in
folks who are in countries under real pressure--Ukraine,
Belarus, Georgia, many others--that we find ways to shield them
from authoritarian surveillance and from the digital tools of
repression.
A lot of us have been struck at the strength and the speed
and the breadth of Putin's military preparations. Could Russia
have any alternative goals in the region other than invading
Ukraine?
What other goals might they be pursuing and how can we
ensure that our statements of determination in partnership with
the President to impose sanctions, to rally our European
allies, and to stand up to Putin's aggression--which of those
actions might be most successful in thwarting any other
objectives that Putin might have through this military buildup?
Ms. Nuland. I think the concern is that President Putin's
public lamentations and private lamentations about the demise
of the Soviet Union have gotten noisier and stronger over the
years, and just in the last year, in the last 6 months, he has
increased his public comments to the effect that the sovereign
nation of Ukraine is actually a part of Russia, belongs to
Russia, et cetera.
The concern is that he is actually, as a legacy project,
seeking to reconstitute the Soviet Union and then would his
appetite be fulfilled with that eating or would he seek to go
further.
I think this is why the unity here in the Senate, unity in
the House, unity within the United States, unity in Ukraine,
unity with our NATO allies and partners, and the significant
consequences that we are talking about are so important and
making clear that we are absolutely ready there.
I also think it is important to talk to the Russian people,
as I have said to you before and have said to this committee.
Nobody wants or needs war at this moment, least of all the
people of Russia, who deserve better schools, better hospitals,
better infrastructure, better health care, and that is where
the wealth of that great country ought to be going, not on
sending their boys to freeze on the Ukrainian front. Thanks.
Senator Coons. I agree, and I just want to close by
emphasizing the simple forceful clarity with which you just
testified before this committee that the United States'
commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
independence is unwavering.
I recently led a bipartisan delegation that went to meet
with leaders of the EU, of the UK, and of the new German
Government. It is my hope that they will be as unwavering and
clear and forceful in their actions as that statement and that
all of us on this committee will join in supporting your work
and the President's work and that we will work with one voice
to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate, Under Secretary Nuland, your work and your
testimony today and yesterday, and the work that you do for our
country. I wish to associate myself also with the comments of
the chairman and the ranking member.
We are united in our commitment to a free and sovereign
nation in Ukraine. I want to associate myself with the comments
of Senator Portman last night as he spoke about the resilience
and strength and character of the people of Ukraine and his
conviction that were they to ever be invaded by a foreign foe
like Russia that they would stand aggressively and defend
themselves, and if, perchance, they were unsuccessful in,
ultimately, having victory that there would be insurgency that
would continue that would make sure that anyone who invaded
them suffered a very high price for having done so.
I would like to associate myself with the comments of
Senator Cruz as well, who indicated that the decision by this
administration and prior administrations to allow the
completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline contributed to
Russia's feeling that they could amass troops on the border
and, potentially, use their threat to obtain something that
they deeply desire.
I am one of those that looks at Russia and, I guess, I will
associate myself with Senator Barrasso's comments, that he was
quoting, I think, Senator McCain, saying that Russia is a
mafia-run gas station parading as a country.
Russia has real problems. Their population is declining.
Their industrial base is weak, but they have extraordinary
natural resources. As I look at Russia, I am concerned that
their ambition does not stop with Ukraine, but that their--
Putin's ambition, personally, is much broader and that what
happens in Ukraine is an appetizer for a growing appetite on
his part.
I would like to get your perspectives on what you believe
or what the Administration believes Putin's ambition is, where
he intends to lead his troops and his nation over the coming
years, and whether his efforts in Ukraine are the beginning or
the end of his sense of legacy.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator, for all those opening
comments.
I will just say, again, here that I work very hard not to
live inside the brain of President Putin so I am not going to
speculate what his end state would be.
I would simply say that one should have considerable
concern when you look at the public statements that he has been
making with increasing frequency, including over the last 6
months, to the effect that Russia and Ukraine are one nation,
et cetera, and not respecting their sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and his laments about the death of the Soviet Union.
I have had the pleasure and the honor to know so many
Russians over so many decades ever since I was a student and I
was there not too long ago, and it is my firm belief that the
citizens of Russia do not want a war with Ukraine.
They do not want body bags coming home. They want better
health care, better schools, better roads, and better
broadband. They want to live better, and President Putin could
so much more worthwhile serve his own people at this moment
when we are all having to build back better.
I hope that he thinks about what he owes his own people
before seeking to acquire more territory.
Senator Romney. I share your desire not to live within
President Putin's brain. At the same time, there are elements
that we, obviously, look at and try and draw inferences from.
One relates to something that is not connected to Ukraine,
but that is his commitment to his nuclear arsenal. I think
there were many of us that were hoping that as our arsenals,
respectively, got older and would be retired, potentially, that
we could reduce our nuclear investment and could shrink our
nuclear armament.
Obviously, China's joining the nuclear race would have
changed that to a certain degree, but Russia took a different
course. Putin decided to invest massively--not so-called build
back better, but to completely modernize his nuclear arsenal.
What is the status of that at this stage and how does that
compare to our own?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator.
We will get you a fulsome briefing, but simply to say that
the New START treaty that was negotiated some 10 years ago and
which was extended by the Administration caps the long-range
nuclear arsenal.
You are right that President Putin continues to augment
intermediate-range forces and short-range nuclear forces as
well as build new exquisite weapons like his hypersonics, which
are outside of any arms control regime, and to try to compete
in building up their long-range conventional forces as well,
which is why President Biden at the Geneva Summit in June
pressed President Putin, and Putin did agree to get back into
strategic stability talks bilaterally, and we have had two
rounds of those.
I would say we are still at the nascent stage to try to get
back into arms control to try to reduce the threat from these
weapons and try to deal with asymmetries and concerns.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When my great grandfather came to this country he would
have been considered a Polish immigrant because that is the
country from which he came, but he did not consider himself
Polish. He wrote on his immigration card that the country he
came from was Ukraine. That was curious because that country
did not exist at the time, but he had a sense of where he was
from. He had a sense of the country that he believes should
exist.
The story of Ukrainian nationalism has been a confusing
one, an elusive one, a land that has been occupied over and
over by contesting armies, but something different has happened
in that country since what has been referred to as the
Revolution of Dignity. I got the chance to be there on Maidan
during the midst of that revolution with you and Senator
McCain.
As to the question of how easy an invasion will be, as to
the question of what a counterinsurgency may look like, as
Senator Romney posits, there is inside it a question of what
Ukrainian patriotism and nationalism looks like today compared
to, say, what it felt like and looked like in 1941.
Putin is making a bet here that an invasion of Ukraine
today may look like it did 60 years ago. That is probably not
the case. They have not only gotten a taste of independence
since their break from the Soviet Union, but in the last 10
years they have got a sense of what real self-determination
looks like, and this forging of identity that has happened in
the last 8 years, I think, is relevant to this question of what
this invasion might look like and feel like for an invading
army.
Just a minute or two on what you have seen with respect to
the development of Ukraine's sense of self since the events of
2013.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator, and I agree with you.
From the Revolution of Dignity, which really was about
Ukrainians all across the country--not just in Kyiv, but also
in Ukraine's east--saying that they wanted the right to have a
closer relationship with Europe, to live more as Europeans
live.
Through the 10--almost 10 years that have--well, 8 years
that have passed since, I think Ukraine has really come back to
its sense of independence and sovereignty and a path that very
much they would like to look more like Paris and Berlin than
like what they see in Sverdlovsk and Ekaterinburg at the moment
today, and that has to do with individuals being able to live
better and work better and have a cleaner, more open choice in
the way they forge their lives.
I think it is also true that the state of Ukrainian
nationalism has always been fierce, going back to 1917 or
wherever you want to start counting, and to bet against
Ukrainian patriotism is very, very dangerous, as a lot of
Russians have found already.
Unfortunately, there are many, many reasons why none of us
should want a war. It will be extremely bloody and difficult
for Ukraine, but it will also be extremely bloody and difficult
for Russia, and many of them will not go home as they came.
Senator Murphy. Second--very well said--second, on this
question of Russia being a very complicated and advanced gas
station, gas stations cannot stay in business unless they have
customers and Russia has all sorts of customers in and around
its periphery. Many customers that see Russia as an adversary
are still doing a tremendous amount of business.
We passed legislation out of this committee several years
ago, signed by President Trump at the time that would allow for
the U.S. Development Finance Corporation to do additional deals
with countries that want to make themselves energy independent,
and we allowed that to happen not just in the developing world,
but in other nations as well.
The Three Seas Initiative is a really important initiative
linking the--essentially, the ring of countries that are either
former republics or satellite states of the Soviet Union
together. They are begging for U.S. participation in their
projects necessary to make them more energy independent of
Russia.
Is this not an opportunity for the United States to step up
and take some of these customers away from Russia's gas
station?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely, as we have been doing with our
support for more LNG terminals around Europe for many years, as
we are doing now in our support for green alternatives not just
in the United States, but in Europe as well, and many, many
U.S. companies are involved with that, but that particular belt
of Three Seas countries is absolutely crucial, as you said.
Senator Murphy. I would just note, Mr. Chairman, I do not
think we need to persuade Secretary Nuland, but right now there
are no plans in the Administration to put DFC dollars behind
Three Seas, something that this committee, I think, in a
bipartisan way could work on moving forward.
The Chairman. Thank you. I appreciate this.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Nuland, I agree with all of the
assessments that have been made about Vladimir Putin that he
seeks to establish great power parity with the United States
and, therefore, tries to show force and power around the world.
I also think he is driven, to some extent, maybe a great
extent, by the ego and the drive to bring Ukraine into at least
the Russian sphere of influence if not into the Russian
Federation as--and cement his legacy as the uniter of a greater
Russia.
I think there is a third factor here that I am curious
whether you agree with and that is that he also thinks that the
West--and I, by no means, am a fan of Vladimir Putin and I am
confident that they are not fans of mine--but their thinking,
as irrational as we may think it is, that we want to turn
Ukraine--the West in general, the U.S. in specific--into a base
of operation to threaten their security and/or to undermine
their internal cohesion and the like and, therefore, he is
using this as an opportunity to try to impose neutrality--at a
minimum, impose neutrality on Ukraine.
If that is, in fact, at least a primary motivator in the
short term of this threat of military action, then I would
imagine that he has already been publicly messaging what his
asks are.
The first is that we would pull back NATO forces from
anywhere near their western border, the second is to completely
rule out the admission probably not just of Ukraine, but
Georgia as a member of NATO, and the third is to stop arming
Ukraine.
Are those three conditions that he has publicly messaged
already, would the United States agree to any of those three?
Ms. Nuland. All of those would be unacceptable.
Senator Rubio. Let me ask you about another trend that I
think is disturbing as you sort of follow it. On the one hand,
we see a growing amount of what appears to be, including here
in our own--I have seen some here domestically, too, but this
messaging that Zelensky is a U.S. and Western puppet, he is
ineffective, he is corrupt, and that he is not acting in the
best interest of the Ukrainian people. So that disinformation
can be anything.
One of the things we are seeing in real time is what hybrid
warfare looks like to prepare the groundwork at the same time,
sadly, as we see a confederation of oligarchs, opposition
politicians, former government officials, all with their own
agendas, looking to undermine Zelensky at the same time as some
of this is happening, I imagine, some of them, perhaps, in
coordination with the Kremlin, others just doing it because
they want to be president instead.
What options do we have on both fronts to deal with this
sort of disinformation hybrid warfare campaign that they are
undertaking to prepare the ground for all of it and, in
particular, on addressing these oligarchs, former officials and
others who clearly understand that what they are doing would
aid Russian efforts and Putin's efforts, and nonetheless
continue because of--some because of personal ambition, others,
I imagine, because of financial gain, to move along this track?
What options do we have on those two things?
Ms. Nuland. Among the many counsels that we are giving to
Ukrainians and that President Zelensky is also now giving to
his country is that at this moment of challenge for Ukraine,
unity among patriots, unity among Ukrainians who believe in the
sovereignty and territorial independence of their country, is
absolutely essential and that none of them should fall into
these traps that the Kremlin is setting to divide them or pit
them against each other.
You know that democracy is a relatively new sport in
Ukraine. They occasionally play it rough, as others do, but now
is absolutely a moment for unity. Particularly with regard to
disinformation efforts, efforts to blame the other guy for what
you yourself are doing, we have encouraged the Ukrainians to
apply that best adage, which is that sunlight is the best
disinfectant and to be very vigilant about exposing Russian
disinformation activities and payments and little gray men and
little green men who are trying to infect politics, and that is
something that they must do in this moment.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Madam Secretary, for your service.
I want to begin by associating myself with the comments the
chairman made at the outset, which is, number one, that
Vladimir Putin should understand that there is going to be a
strong unified severe response should he decide to invade
Ukraine.
I am a big believer that sanctions are actually more useful
and effective when you lay them out in advance and say to a
foreign leader, these are the consequences if you take these
actions, rather than trying to reverse action after the fact
through sanctions. That is why last session Senator Rubio and I
introduced the DETER Act because we thought it was important to
make it clear what would happen if there was interference in
U.S. elections, going forward, with a very strict set of
sanctions.
Unfortunately, the previous administration opposed that
approach, but I am pleased to see that the Biden administration
is taking that approach with respect to what is happening in
Ukraine, and, obviously, those are far more useful if we do so
on a unified basis with our allies, as you have indicated.
The other thing that we need to, I think, underscore, and I
know it has been discussed at this hearing, is the
determination of the people of Ukraine because there was a time
a long time ago where Putin was not viewed in Ukraine as a
threatening individual compared to where it is today. I think
he should be disabused of any illusions that he is going to be
greeted in Ukraine as some kind of liberator of people who
support him.
Can you talk a little bit about the Ukrainian people's
sentiment for Putin? We have polling data. We also know that
after Putin's action to annex Crimea--that sort of sent a
shockwave through much of Ukraine.
If he thinks he is going to just sort of have a little bit
of a fight and no resistance, I think it is important that he
be disabused of that fact. Can you speak to that?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator, and I should have said this in
response to Senator Murphy as well. Ukraine and Russia,
obviously, their peoples have lived side by side forever and
there is a lot of intermarriage and there is a lot of trade
back and forth in the old days, and before the invasion of
Crimea and of Donbas, I think 60, 70 percent of Ukrainians had
a favorable view of Russia.
Today, after not only those invasions and biting off pieces
of Ukraine, but also all of the stresses and tensions that have
ensued otherwise, I think the support--friendly feeling towards
Russia is not--among Ukrainians is at an all-time high, about
12 percent, something like that.
This is what Putin's own policies have wrought and he needs
to understand that, and I just hope that his advisers are
telling him the truth about how Ukrainians already feel, let
alone how they will feel if they are aggressed.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. I think it is important to
underscore that because you never know what his advisers are
saying, but it is pretty clear that the Ukrainian people have a
good sense of what Putin's mindset is because their views of
Russia changed after his actions against Crimea and the actions
in eastern Ukraine.
I think that it would be a very bloody fight. Lots of
people would be killed and injured, and I think it is really
important that the international community and the United
States do as what--as we are doing today, which is letting
people know that there will be a very strong severe reaction. I
appreciate the President's message in the phone call today.
You may have covered this, but what is your sense about
whether our allies--our European allies and others--are willing
to support us in not just sanctions against individuals, we are
talking about sectoral sanctions, right, against the financial
industry, banking industry, other areas, the kind of things
that Senator Rubio and I laid out in the DETER Act? How do you
assess their support for that?
Ms. Nuland. Again, we have been working with our allies
intensively since the President was at the G-20 meetings in
Rome and our sense is that their appreciation for the dangers
we may confront and, therefore, their appreciation that the
deterrent that we put up needs to be real and needs to be
unified is growing by the day, as evidenced by the very strong
statement we had from the head of the European Commission just
today in speaking to her ambassadorial core, and I think you
will hear more of that, going forward.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We live in dangerous times, do we not? This is a deadly
serious moment in the history of Ukraine and in the history of
the region. I thank you, Ambassador Nuland, for your time and
effort and spending some time with us last night as well.
I know that President Biden spoke with President Putin on
this subject today and I look forward to getting the readout
from that. I know we all do.
Senator Risch and I sent a letter last week to the
President urging him to show absolute support for Ukraine and
to let President Putin know in no uncertain terms that there
would be serious consequences and also to reject the
unreasonable Kremlin demands.
I would like that letter, without objection, to be included
in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Portman. I visited the Maidan in 2014. The tires
were still smoldering and that Revolution of Dignity changed
everything. Ukraine decided to turn to us and to the West and
to freedom and democracy, and it was a momentous decision. They
chose to stand with us and now it is our turn to stand with
them.
We have done that over the years. I mean, if you look at
what happened with regard to the Ukraine Security Assistance
Initiative, which I co-authored, over the past 6 years the
United States has transferred defense articles, conducted
training with the Ukrainian military. We have been very
engaged.
I would ask you, Ambassador, this week we have the NDAA
likely to be voted on and likely it will include an increase in
that lethal defensive funding. What defensive weapons has
Ukraine asked for and what is the State Department willing to
provide them under an expedited process?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, we had a chance to talk about this at
some length in the classified session last night, and I
appreciate the time and the detail that we were able to go into
there.
I think, given the fact that the threat is now coming not
simply from the East, but from three sides of Ukraine, what
they are seeking is, largely, more of the defensive lethal
equipment that we have already given them, these same kinds of
things that you actually do not deploy in an offensive way, but
that are essential for defenses----
Senator Portman. Anti-aircraft, anti-tank weaponry?
Ms. Nuland. Exactly.
Senator Portman. Let me ask you this. If there is an
invasion, I believe that Russia will not face anything like the
same Ukrainian resistance it did in 2014. With all due respect,
at that time the Ukrainian military had not been modernized.
They were disorganized. They were a new country, in essence.
The Ukrainian military has now made significant strides in
professionalism and enacted important defense reforms, and,
again, the United States and our NATO allies have been very
involved in that.
What domestic factors is President Putin considering when
weighing the option to invade Ukraine? Does he have sufficient
domestic support, despite that all calculations indicate that
Russia is going to experience high casualties? Has he factored
in the cost of additional sanctions, including severe
sanctions, such as denial of access to the SWIFT banking
mechanism?
Ms. Nuland. I think it is important that not just President
Putin, as he got the message very clearly from President Biden
today, but that the Russian people also appreciate the kind of
things that are being contemplated and the kind of risk that
their president is, potentially, taking them into, including
for their sons and daughters who serve.
I would just add to your list with regard to the capability
of the Ukrainian forces and, obviously, Russia is so much
bigger and their force is so much bigger, but Ukraine is better
trained now.
In addition to that, many, many Ukrainians have served and
are now returned to civilian life, some of them with that
training as well. That is something to factor in.
I have not seen any Russian polling, but what I have seen
is the Kremlin spreading huge amounts of disinformation,
including inside Russia, to try to make the case that Russia is
under threat from Ukraine, and nothing could be further from
the truth. There is no threat to Russia from Ukraine.
He is trying to prepare the ground in his own body politic,
but, again, he might do better to listen to the needs that they
have as they try to come out of COVID, which have much more to
do with their daily lives and their roads and schools and
hospitals and health care.
Senator Portman. I agree with that and I think it would be
a grave mistake if Putin were to decide to invade again, and I
think this time he would meet a very different and more capable
resistance.
My hope is that in the next several days we will be able to
continue to send those strong messages through a vote on the
National Defense Authorization bill, but also in other ways to
let Russia know in no uncertain terms of the severe sanctions
that would accompany any kind of invasion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair. An important hearing.
Thank you, Secretary Nuland.
I have a question and a concern. My question follows up at
the very end of your dialogue with Senator Johnson. You said
your belief would be that if Russia further invaded the country
of Ukraine that the Nord Stream pipeline would be suspended,
and I want to pick up on that.
The pipeline has been the subject of much controversy here.
No one is pro-pipeline in the sense of making Russia happy, but
we have allies that are important to us who are pro-pipeline,
and the Administration and the past administration have tried
to balance that.
Do you think our European allies, including those who have
been more in the pro-pipeline camp, would find a Russian
invasion of Ukraine so troubling that they would be willing to
work together with us to either stop the pipeline from being
certified--it is in a certification process--or stop the
operation of the pipeline?
In other words, would an invasion of Ukraine tip the
balance so that our allies would join together with us to make
sure that the Nord Stream pipeline was truly suspended, as you
indicated?
Ms. Nuland. I believe that it absolutely would, Senator. As
you know, this is gratuitous anyway. They do not need any
additional energy from Russia.
Senator Kaine. The German Government is brand new so we are
working with them on this issue, but, again, without putting
too many words in their mouth because they are new, while the
Government in the past has been somewhat pro-pipeline, your
view of the new government is they would view a Russian
invasion of Ukraine as sufficiently dire that that would cause
them to maybe reassess the plusses and minuses of the Nord
Stream pipeline from their standpoint?
Ms. Nuland. The President is having his first opportunity
today--perhaps, even as we speak--to speak with Olaf Scholz now
that he is chancellor, as Chancellor Scholz, so we will have a
better sense of that.
I would say that we have already been speaking to him in
his role as finance minister, and I have no doubt that he
understands the seriousness of the situation that we are
facing.
Senator Kaine. Now I want to raise a concern that I have
and I am--I want you to tell me whether my concern is a fair
one, but I am going to be particularly happy if you actually
tell me that I do not need to be concerned about this. I have a
concern, but maybe I need not to have a concern.
We have talked about the crushing sanctions that could fall
upon Russia should they push west in a military invasion of
Ukraine and we have talked about the kinds of sanctions that we
might contemplate together with our allies.
My concern is this. If the United States and the West's
response to a military invasion is sanctions, but no military
response--obviously, we are providing military aid to Ukraine
and we have been generous in that way--but if we are not
willing to help a Ukrainian military that is 50,000 people
matched up against Russia, I would think that China would
conclude, boy, the West sure is not going to come to the aid of
Taiwan if we were to do something on Taiwan, because China
would conclude, we are much more militarily powerful than
Russia is, and the status questions about Taiwan and
sovereignty are a little bit murkier than those about Ukraine.
There is no NATO in the Indo-Pacific. We have allies in the
Indo-Pacific, but we do not have a NATO with a charter with a
self-defense article.
I think China would determine if the West's response to a
military invasion went as far as sanctions, but no further that
the United States and other nations would be extremely unlikely
to use military force to counter a military invasion of Taiwan,
and I think Taiwan would likely conclude the same thing.
I am very concerned about that and I wonder, is that a fair
concern that I have about how the Chinese and the Taiwanese
would view the West's unwillingness to provide more significant
military support to stop an invasion by Russia? Is my concern a
fair one or is my concern overwrought?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, in this setting, I would simply say
that this is a moment of testing, and I believe that both
autocrats around the world and our friends around the world
will watch extremely carefully what we do and it will have
implications for generations.
Senator Kaine. Those implications could go far beyond
Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. They could go well beyond Europe, yes.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, over the years I have traveled to Ukraine
numerous times. Eight members of the Senate--a number of
members of this very committee--were in Ukraine when Russia
invaded Ukraine and annexed Crimea in 2014.
On another trip, traveled with Senator McCain and Senator
Cotton. We went to eastern Ukraine, met with courageous men and
women fighting for their country's freedom and their future--I
mentioned this to you last night--because every day they battle
along the frontlines against separatist forces and more than
14,000 Ukrainians have already died in fighting on that eastern
region.
I know firsthand that the heart and the courage and
determination of these freedom fighters, and Ukrainian armed
forces fight bravely. They fight fiercely. They do not back
down. Ukrainians are absolutely willing to die for their
homeland.
If Vladimir Putin thinks that he invades and it is going to
be easy, it is not. I will tell you, I believe much Russian
blood will be spilled and there will be Russians going home in
body bags if he invades this country.
The United States and our allies, I believe, must do more
to deter Russia by increasing the costs of aggression, and I am
always looking for ways to do that. I think we need enduring
strategic response from the U.S., from Europe, and from NATO.
I am looking in terms of how we can respond to put Putin's
bold and dangerous behavior away because the repercussions go
far beyond Ukraine and we need to make sure we do not fail this
test.
When I talked to President Zelensky in September of this
year, he said they needed anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft
missiles, better radar, and that is in that location.
I am going to ask you what you believe President Putin's
ultimate objective is and how we need to stay ahead of his
efforts.
Ms. Nuland. Again, I work hard to stay out of the inside of
President Putin's brain. That said, he has been pretty clear
about his regret at the fall of the Soviet Union and his regret
that Ukraine and Russia are no longer one country and about his
skepticism with regard to Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and independence, and I think that is what is
motivating here is that he may be trying to leave as his legacy
the reconstitution of something that was rejected by the people
of the lands that he is moving on.
Senator Barrasso. You have been an observer for a long
time. I remember discussing with you Bob Strauss' book, that
while he was there as the ambassador, who was--for President
Reagan that you were there as a young staff member in Moscow at
the U.S. Embassy in Russia.
You have been studying this a long time. You know how Putin
uses energy as a weapon. I think earlier today you said energy
is the cash cow that funds these military deployments, and with
high oil prices now $80 a barrel, if not going higher--I think
his budget is based on $40 from what I have been following over
the years in my time in the Senate--that is putting a lot of
money and giving him firepower that he might not have had in
previous times.
I want to ask about how the way he uses energy as a
geopolitical weapon because in July, President Biden and German
Chancellor--then Chancellor Merkel agreed to re-impose
sanctions if President Putin used gas as a geopolitical weapon.
Since then, the world has watched Russia use natural gas to
coerce and to manipulate countries all around Europe, severely
limited the flow of gas through Ukraine, no longer delivers gas
to Hungary through Ukraine due to a side agreement where they
can bypass it.
Moldova has declared a state of emergency due to Russia
threatening to cut off gas and they only avoided a crisis by
agreeing to a longer-term contract. As physical construction on
Nord Stream 2 nears completion, Putin reduced gas production
and deliveries to dramatically increase prices. The spot prices
soared. Where do you see the Biden-Merkel promised sanctions
against Putin for using gas as a weapon?
Ms. Nuland. I think you are referring to the July agreement
between the U.S. and Germany, which sought to address the
stress on Ukraine that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was putting
into effect.
So that agreement speaks to a number of things, first of
all, helping Ukrainians themselves wean themselves off of
dependence on Russian energy and make a green transition, but
also a commitment that if Ukraine faced aggression and pressure
of a significant kind from Russia in the energy field that it
would have a direct impact on Nord Stream 2.
I think reiterating that commitment and hearing the new
German Government reiterate those commitments will be very
important and that is something that we are seeking in this
context.
Senator Barrasso. Just finally, I mean, I just have
concerns if we do not abide by a Biden-Merkel agreement we send
to Putin--it shows that we do not keep our word. Then it you
makes you wonder what threats of additional sanctions we will
have on Putin in that situation.
Ms. Nuland. I agree with you.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Thank you for being here and for your great work, and many
of my colleagues are focusing upon Nord Stream 2 and its
geopolitical implications. I want to discuss our own complicity
in contributing to the financial engine powering Putin's
destabilizing behavior, our addiction to Russian oil in the
United States.
According to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
roughly, 80 percent of Russian oil and gas revenues come from
oil while only 20 percent come from natural gas. The United
States imported more than 800,000 barrels of Russian oil a day,
on average, in June of 2021 and the price of that oil is
skyrocketing.
Russia is now the United States' number two supplier of
crude oil and petroleum products in 2021. We only import more
oil and petroleum products from Canada. Most years anywhere
from one-third to more than one-half of Russian federal revenue
is the direct result of their fossil fuel exports and profits
and the roughly 800,000 barrels of oil per day that Americans
import contribute to an estimated $20 billion annually in
American dollars going directly into the pockets of Russian
petrol oligarchs.
Oil profits also fuel corrupt actions and human rights
violations by Putin and his cronies' actions, which have been
detailed over years by investigative journalists and activists,
including Alexei Navalny, who Putin is trying to brutally
silence.
Yet, we just continue to feed their revenues year to year
by allowing their oil to flood our markets and that oil is
coming directly from Siberia to the United States of America
and, ultimately, into the pockets of Putin and his cronies.
Do the U.S. dollars that we spend on Russian oil contribute
to Russia's ability to engage in abuses at home and malign
activities throughout the region?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, thank you for all that. I think you
know that the United States does not and our suppliers do not
buy--we are not engaged in contracts with countries. We buy oil
on the open market, and there are certain kinds of heavy and
dirty oil that we need in certain parts of the U.S. that Russia
is a major supplier of.
I think your question is well put. Whether in the context
of where we know this revenue goes, those independent free
market purchasers of that particular source might want to, how
shall we say, purvey their oil with a conscience.
Senator Markey. Yes. Again, my concern is that while we
talk about natural gas going into Europe, we actually import at
least as much oil from Russia as well, and those revenues are
going into the very same oligarchs' pockets and, ultimately, to
Putin.
My concern here is that we understand this and that we
start to think about how we can use those oil imports that go
to the United States as a weapon back at Russia as well, as we
are talking about sanctions, as we are talking about putting
strong restrictions upon them.
All of that oil that is coming into our country is
something that, I am sure, causes real bemusement to Putin,
knowing that, and I think the Germans are aware of it as well,
that as we--we are trying to preach temperance from a barstool
and we ourselves have to square up our own domestic oil policy
since so much of the revenues that Putin gets comes from
American consumers at the pump.
When the construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
continues, it did so during the Trump administration including
even after sanctions were imposed by the United States. Is that
correct?
Ms. Nuland. The vast majority of this pipeline--90 percent
of it--was constructed during the period of the Trump
administration and no sanctions were imposed until 2 or 3 days
before President Biden took office.
There were many opportunities for the Trump administration
to take action, which it did not take, against Nord Stream 2.
Senator Markey. Right. I think it is important, again, that
when Joe Biden became president the pipeline was over 90
percent complete already.
Ms. Nuland. That is right.
Senator Markey. Yes. From my perspective, I just think it
is very important for us to understand what the Trump
administration was doing during those 4 years and that we just
not ignore the whole history that got us to this point.
Thank you so much. Thanks for your great service. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, we are here in a circumstance that
neither you nor I wanted to be here. Sadly, when you predicted
to this committee, what I predicted to this committee, and,
indeed, what members on both sides of the aisles knew might
happen appears to be happening.
We have some 100,000 Russian troops massed on the border of
Ukraine, and according to declassified documents from the Biden
administration the odds are significant that we will see a
military invasion of Ukraine by Russia in the next 90 days.
This was entirely preventable. This disaster is the direct
consequence of political decisions made by Joe Biden. One
decision, in particular, caused this disaster and it was the
decision to throw away our national security victory on Nord
Stream 2 and instead to hand Vladimir Putin a multi-billion-
dollar generational gift.
Just a moment ago with Senator Markey you were asked what
are the democratic talking points which are, number one, the
vast majority of the pipeline was completed under Donald Trump.
Yes, that happens to be true. It was completed before the
sanctions legislation passed. I authored the sanctions
legislation along with Senator Shaheen on this committee.
Sanctions legislation passed in December of 2019. December of
2019, over 90 percent of the pipeline was completed.
What happened? Putin stopped building the pipeline the day
President Trump signed that bill into law. Not the next day,
not the next week, that day. The sanctions worked exactly as
designed, and for over a year nothing happened. The pipeline
was a hunk of metal at the bottom of the ocean. So an over 90
percent complete pipeline is a zero percent complete pipeline
until you connect it and turn it on.
When did Putin begin constructing the pipeline? Joe Biden
was sworn in as president on January 20, 2021. Four days later,
January 24, 2021, is when Putin began building the pipeline
again.
We had succeeded with a bipartisan victory stopping this
pipeline until Joe Biden and Kamala Harris came into office and
gave away our leverage and surrendered.
Why does that matter? Vladimir Putin did not wake up
yesterday and decide he wanted to invade Ukraine. He has wanted
to do that for a long time and, indeed, he has. In 2014, he
invaded Ukraine, he invaded Crimea, but he stopped. He did not
go all the way to Kyiv and one of the major reasons why is
because of the Ukrainian energy infrastructure, that he could
not risk damaging or destroying the ability to get Russian gas
to Europe.
Nord Stream 2 was launched shortly after that initial
Crimea invasion because if Putin can get an alternative means
of getting gas to Europe he can send the tanks into Kyiv
without fear of damaging his ability to get to market.
This summer, when Joe Biden gave away a massive bipartisan
foreign policy victory, our allies, Ukraine and Poland, put out
a formal statement on July 21 saying the Biden administration's
surrender to Putin ``has created a political, military, and
energy threat for Ukraine and Central Europe.'' They were
right. We are seeing this threat today.
Here is the good news. The Administration in which you
serve--and I will note, you argued to do the right thing. You
were overruled by your political superiors in the White House,
but the Biden administration can still do the right thing.
Secretary Nuland, is it true or false that if President
Biden decided to he could sanction Nord Stream 2 AG today?
Ms. Nuland. The waiver is currently in place. It could be
lifted, yes.
Senator Cruz. He could sanction then today. Let me ask you
a question. If the Biden administration imposed sanctions on
Nord Stream 2 AG, if it halted the certification of the
pipeline so that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline did not go online,
would that make invasion of Ukraine more likely or less likely?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, it is the German Government that has
paused the certification of the pipeline itself right now. That
certification is not going forward. You know that we believe
this pipeline is a bad deal for Europe and a bad pipeline.
I do not believe that anything we would have done with
regard to Nord Stream 2 would have changed Putin's calculus
with regard to the buildup we have around Ukraine today. I
believe he has an ambition to have and to hold Ukraine----
Senator Cruz. Let me ask it another way. If Nord Stream 2
goes online and is operational, does that make an invasion of
Ukraine more likely or less likely?
Ms. Nuland. Nord Stream 2 is not currently on track to
become operational and it will be--it will----
Senator Cruz. If it does. I am asking a hypothetical. If
Nord Stream 2 goes online. I do not think it is coincidental
that the predicted date for an invasion is almost exactly when
certification is predicted to be over. I do not think that is
accidental.
My question is this. If Nord Stream 2 goes online, does
that make invasion of Ukraine more likely or less likely?
Ms. Nuland. I believe that President Putin will make his
decisions with regard to Ukraine regardless of what happens to
Nord Stream 2. I believe he has an aspiration to have control
of Ukraine.
Senator Cruz. He did not do that until the Biden
administration waived sanctions. From 2014 until today, he has
not done that and it was exactly what Ukraine and Poland warned
us, that when this President surrendered to Putin it would
create a security crisis in Ukraine. That is what it has done.
The Chairman. I think we have had all of our colleagues who
were present or desires on WebEx to ask questions.
Can I ask you one last set of questions? Is Nord Stream 2
the reason that Putin is supposedly complaining about expansion
of NATO?
Ms. Nuland. I am sorry, Chairman. One more time.
The Chairman. Is Nord Stream 2 the reason that Putin is
complaining about expansion of NATO?
Ms. Nuland. No.
The Chairman. Is Nord Stream 2 the reason that Putin
complains about supposedly defending Russian speakers in
Ukraine?
Ms. Nuland. No.
The Chairman. Is Nord Stream 2 the reason that Putin
alleges that Ukraine is not actually an independent country?
Ms. Nuland. No.
The Chairman. I could go down a list. Is Nord Stream 2 the
reason that Putin says that Ukraine is actually the provoker in
this set of circumstances?
Ms. Nuland. No, and, Chairman, if I may, I would just like
to put one more fact in the record, which is that between
December of 2019 when the PEESA legislation was passed and
January 19 of 2021 there was only one sanction applied under
it. Since January of 2021, the Biden-Harris administration has
sanctioned 17 vessels and 8 people under the PEESA legislation
in an effort to raise the costs for Nord Stream 2.
The Chairman. Our colleague suggested that Putin stopped at
Crimea because he did not want to ruin the Ukrainian energy
infrastructure, but is it not true that had he marched forward
at that time he would have had probably the control of Ukraine,
probably bloody even then, in the different circumstances than
far more capable--a far more capable Ukrainian military now and
still Ukrainian nationalism--but, nonetheless, that he could
have marched forward and actually he would have controlled the
Ukrainian energy infrastructure? Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Nuland. In fact, you could argue that in the Donbas he
did take control of some 40 percent of Ukraine's coal reserves,
which were a major energy input.
The Chairman. The fact of the matter is, as much as one
would want to suggest that the question of sanctioning Nord
Stream 2 was the alpha, the omega, the reason why Putin is
acting today, Putin is acting today because he wants to
reconstitute the Russia he knew, the one he laments
consistently about that should be reconstituted, and that is
his whole goal, regardless of what happened about Nord Stream
or not.
Ms. Nuland. Frankly, Chairman, if we did not have the
working relationship that we have with the German Government
now, we would not be in a position to build the sanctions
package that we are working on.
The Chairman. I hope the one thing that anyone in the world
who is watching this hearing today takes away is that even on
some of the most contentious issues of the day, on this one
there is overwhelming broad bipartisan support for Ukraine.
There is overwhelming bipartisan support for its territorial
integrity. There is overwhelming bipartisan support for swift
and robust action.
After conversations with some of the members of the
committee, I look to galvanize that in some tangible way
legislatively as we wait for the days ahead as to what may or
may not happen.
With the thanks of the committee for your appearance both
here today and yesterday in a classified session, the record
for this hearing will remain open until the close of business
on Wednesday, December 8. I ask questions for the record be
submitted no later than that time.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:24 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Given the Kremlin's prior use of cyberattacks as a
weapon, it seems we can expect it to use cyber operations alongside
conventional forces in a potential invasion of Ukraine. What is the
United States doing--and what more can be done--to deter Kremlin cyber
aggression toward Ukraine, particularly with regard to critical
infrastructure?
Answer. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that remains a major
threat against the military, diplomatic, commercial, and critical
infrastructure networks of the United States and its NATO Allies and
partners. With respect to Ukraine, we are working to strengthen
Ukraine's ability to harden its critical infrastructure through a
whole-of-government approach that leverages the full range of U.S.
Government capabilities--diplomatic, economic, law enforcement,
intelligence, and military. We will continue to work closely with
Ukraine and all our international partners to combat any potential
Russian malicious cyber activities and hold Russian cyber actors
accountable.
Question. What steps are we taking to help Ukraine bolster its
cyber defenses?
Answer. We remain committed to providing support to the Government
of Ukraine to assist in its efforts to mitigate and respond to cyber
threats. Since 2017, the Department of State has allocated more than
$40 million in cybersecurity assistance for Ukraine, including $5
million in new cyber assistance for nine ongoing assistance projects
that focus on a whole-of-government approach to cybersecurity. These
projects include bolstering cyber defenses of critical infrastructure
sectors such as energy and financial services. In addition, we engage
in capacity building work with Ukraine's National Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT-UA) that improves Ukraine's ability to protect its
own networks and respond to cyber threats.
Question. I remain very concerned about the well-being of
wrongfully imprisoned Americans Paul Whelan and Trevor Reed. Have we
made any progress on these cases?
Answer. I, along with other senior U.S. officials, including the
President, continue to press the Government of Russia to release Paul
Whelan and Trevor Reed. The Department is prepared to provide a secure
briefing to members on these cases.
Question. Has the Russian Government made clear any conditions
under which it would release them?
Answer. The Department of State is prepared to provide a secure
briefing to members on these cases.
Question. Russia continues to undermine the security and stability
of the global internet with its lawless and irresponsible behavior in
cyberspace. I understand that the Administration is currently engaging
diplomatically with Russia on a variety of cyber issues. In the
meantime, however, the United States and our partners and allies are
facing an ongoing flood of Russia cyberattacks, from state actors like
the SVR and from cybercriminals operating with the Kremlin's blessing.
What is the status of the Administration's negotiations with the
Kremlin on cyber issues and what results have those negotiations
produced to date? Have any deadlines for negotiations been set and what
outcomes are you hoping to achieve?
Answer. We are going to keep using the power and capacity of the
U.S. Government to disrupt these criminals, their financial enablers,
and their infrastructure. These efforts include White House-Kremlin
experts group meetings seeking action against Russian ransomware
criminals in their territory. We have shared information with Russia
regarding criminal ransomware activity conducted from its territory,
but have not yet seen Russia take action against these ransomware
criminals. We were very clear with Russia: we are taking steps to
protect the American people, hold ransomware actors accountable, and
stand with our NATO Allies.
Question. To what extent has Russia cooperated with U.S. efforts to
investigate and remediate ransomware attacks linked to Russian actors,
such as the Colonial Pipeline and Kaseya incidents?
Answer. We have engaged Russia regarding ransomware actors
emanating from its territory. A part of these efforts is the ongoing
White House-Kremlin experts group meetings to seek Russian action
against cyber criminals in its territory. We have seen reports that
some criminal groups have shut down or reduced their activity. We have
not seen additional attacks of the size and consequence of earlier in
2021, yet ransomware remains at unacceptable levels. We are going to
keep bringing the power and capacity of the U.S. Government to bear to
disrupt these criminals, their financial enablers, and their
infrastructure.
Question. How can the Department more effectively mobilize U.S.
allies and partners against Russia's reckless behavior in cyberspace?
Answer. Responsible states must stand together to impose
consequences on bad actors. That is why we are strengthening our
alliances and partnerships to collectively respond to malicious cyber
activity. The Department of State led the development of a strategy
that enables the U.S. Government respond more nimbly when cyber
incidents occur. We also expanded our ability to work with
international partners to attribute and respond to cyber incidents
together, as shown by our response to the SolarWinds intrusion when 22
non-EU countries, NATO, and the EU issued statements of support
following our attribution of this campaign to the Russian foreign
intelligence service (SVR).
Question. The Wagner Group has expanded its activities into sub-
Saharan Africa. In the Central African Republic (CAR), it has been
accused of human rights violations and harassment of U.N. peacekeepers,
aid workers, journalists, and other civilians. It is reportedly
negotiating a potential contract with the Government of Mali and made
an unsuccessful foray into the conflict in Mozambique. To what extent
does Wagner coordinate its activities in Africa with the Russian
Government? Are Wagner's activities in Africa meant to advance specific
goals of the Russian Government, and, if so, what are those goals?
Answer. The Russian-backed Wagner Group exploits insecurity in
Africa as a catalyst to expand its destabilizing presence on the
continent, threatening stability, good governance, and respect for
human rights in the process. Wagner Group is often misleadingly
referred to as a Russian private military company, but it is supported/
backed by and used by the Russian Government as a low-cost, low-risk
instrument to advance its goals. Given the Wagner Group's record
elsewhere in Africa, any role for Russian mercenaries in Mali risks
exacerbating an already fragile and unstable situation and will
negatively affect future efforts by the United States and our allies to
partner with the transition government.
Question. What specific steps has the Administration taken in
response to Wagner's activities in CAR and Mali, and what is the
Administration doing to prevent Wagner's expansion into Mali and other
countries in the region?
Answer. The United States has condemned and sanctioned Wagner Group
and related personnel and entities, and we coordinate with governments
around the world to maximize the impact of our sanctions. We continue
to support U.N. and other investigations into allegations of wrongdoing
and invest in governance and security institutions that make countries
less vulnerable and better able to counter these actions. We support
the work of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which
plays an integral role in protecting civilians, supporting security
sector reform, promoting respect for human rights, and reporting on
abuses. We are also working within the Department and across the
interagency to counter disinformation linked to Russian oligarch
Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the leader and financier of the Wagner Group. We
have been clear on our position publicly and with partners in the
region--Wagner is a threat to security wherever it deploys, and it is
important for the Malian public to know the negative consequences to
Mali's security and scarce resources of bringing Wagner forces into the
country.
Question. What steps has the Administration taken to work with
partners and allies to counteract Wagner's presence and to convince
other governments not to welcome or contract Wagner forces in their
countries?
Answer. We have coordinated and engaged extensively with west
African and European partners to amplify our concerns that countries
that partner with Yevgeniy Prigozhin and Wagner become weaker, poorer,
and less secure. Most recently, the European Union matched existing
U.S. sanctions against Wagner, a move we applauded publicly. In Central
African Republic (CAR), we continue to call for Wagner's departure and
we support the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission's (MINUSCA) vital work to reinforce CAR's peace process,
provide stability, and report on abuses. We are working with allies and
partners to encourage the restoration of safety and security for the
Malian people and a successful transition towards legitimate,
constitutional rule in Mali.
______
Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator James Risch
Question. I am concerned that the Administration will engage in
legal agreements with the Russian Government to avert military action
against Ukraine. President Putin has stated that NATO's presence in
Ukraine and advancement in Eastern Europe is a ``red-line'' for Russia,
and I am concerned the United States and NATO could make legally
binding concessions in exchange for a treaty or lesser agreement that
include an unreliable commitment from Russia to not further invade
Ukraine or violate its sovereignty. Can you please tell me if the
Administration is prepared to join the Normandy format?
Answer. Yes, if invited.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to encourage Ukraine to accept and implement Russia's interpretation of
the Minsk Accords?
Answer. Our support for Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity is unwavering, and we have not and will not push
Ukraine to make concessions that could compromise these fundamental
principles. We support a diplomatic, peaceful resolution to the
conflict in the Donbas that fully restores Ukrainian control over its
internationally recognized borders.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to agree to end NATO expansion in Eastern Europe?
Answer. No, the Administration is not prepared to do so.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to agree to end NATO aspirations for Ukraine, including reducing its
role as an enhanced opportunities partner or eliminating its
opportunity to pursue a membership action plan or full NATO membership?
Answer. No, the Administration is not prepared to do so.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to halt the increase of military cooperation with NATO allies in
Eastern Europe?
Answer. No, the Administration is not prepared halt cooperation.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to reduce military cooperation with NATO allies in Eastern Europe?
Answer. The Administration does not plan to reduce military
cooperation with NATO Allies in Eastern Europe. We stand with all our
NATO Allies, including those in Eastern Europe, and remain committed to
our treaty obligations.
Question. Can you please tell me if the Administration is prepared
to reduce or halt bilateral security cooperation with Ukraine,
including the reduction of lethal and non-lethal support, training, and
intelligence sharing?
Answer. We have no plans to reduce or halt bilateral security
cooperation with Ukraine. In his call with President Zelenskyy on
September 1, President Biden reaffirmed the U.S. Government's
unwavering commitment to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. The President announced $60 million in military equipment,
including lethal defensive weapons, under Presidential Drawdown
Authority, that has been delivered. Also, we have and will continue to
deliver additional defensive military equipment to Ukraine. We have
committed $452 million in military assistance to Ukraine for fiscal
year 2021, including using the Presidential Drawdown Authority.
Additional deliveries of equipment, services, and supplies are planned
through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), Foreign
Military Financing, and other programs in fiscal year 2022. We will
continue to support Ukraine's capacity for self-defense through a
variety of means, including foreign assistance appropriated by
Congress.
Question. Would the Administration characterize granting such
concessions with the goal of averting Russian military threats on
Ukraine as appeasement? If not, please explain why.
Answer. We have no such plans. Our support for Ukraine is
unwavering, and we have not and will not push Ukraine to make
concessions that could compromise these fundamental principles.
Question. In the event an agreement with Russia is made to resolve
the current crisis, what are the minimum legally binding commitments
that Russia would have to make in order to ensure Ukraine will maintain
political and territorial sovereignty?
Answer. We do not believe Russia would adhere to any legally
binding agreement guaranteeing Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial
integrity. President Putin and other Russian officials have been clear
that their goal is the complete subordination of Ukraine as a vassal
state and the end of the free and democratic Ukrainian nation. To
resolve the current crisis, Russia must move its troops away from
Ukraine's borders; take steps to fulfill its commitments under the
Minsk agreements, including the withdrawal of its troops from the
Donbas; and allow the full restoration of Ukrainian control over its
internationally recognized borders and territorial waters.
Question. What are the ideal commitments Russia would make?
Answer. In the current context, Russia must pull back the military
forces it has massed in Crimea and around Ukraine's eastern and
northern border, cease its public threats and intimidation, and engage
sincerely and constructively in diplomatic discussions with the United
States, NATO Allies, and European partners about its security concerns.
More generally, Russia should cease its ongoing aggression against
Ukraine and Georgia, withdraw its military forces from countries where
they are present without host country consent, and abide by its
international commitments, including the core elements of the Helsinki
Final Act and NATO-Russia Founding Act.
Question. What measures must be included to verify that Russia
would abide by such an agreement, as it has failed to uphold previous
agreements, including the 1994 Budapest Memorandum?
Answer. The United States is willing to discuss measures to address
Russia's security concerns, but any discussion must be based on
reciprocity, address our concerns about Russia's own actions, and be
fully coordinated with our NATO Allies and European partners. Moscow
must also take steps to deescalate the unprovoked crisis that it has
created in and near Ukraine by pulling back the military forces it has
massed on Ukraine's borders and ceasing its public threats and
intimidation. Russia's actions over the quarter century after the
signing of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances demonstrate a
pattern of violations of its international commitments, which is
precisely why the United States must maintain our defense and
deterrence posture, sanctions on Russia, and security assistance to
Ukraine.
Question. Do you commit to including Ukrainian political and
military leadership in all discussions or agreements with the Russian
Federation that will affect Ukraine's political, economic, and
territorial sovereignty?
Answer. Yes. President Biden has made clear that the United States,
its Allies, and its partners are committed to the principle of no
decisions or discussions ``about Ukraine, without Ukraine.''
Question. Why has the Administration not yet used its authorities
and resources to expedite new security assistance to Ukraine?
Answer. The Department remains deeply concerned by the reports of a
significant Russian military build-up along Russia's border with
Ukraine. Since the beginning of the armed conflict in 2014, we have
provided more than $2.7 billion in security assistance to the Ukrainian
Government. In CY 2021 alone, we provided approximately $650 million in
security assistance to Ukraine. We are committed to Ukraine's
sovereignty and security and are in the process of assessing the best
ways to employ our legal authorities and resources moving forward.
Question. Do you commit to providing the committee with a full
readout and/or transcript of the call between President Biden and Mr.
Putin on December 7, 2021?
Answer. I commit to work with the committee to provide, through
briefings or other interactions, pertinent information on this topic,
though the Department of State does not control the specific records/
information referenced.
Question. Do you commit to providing the committee with a full
readout and/or transcript of the call between President Biden and
President Zelenskyy on December 9, 2021?
Answer. I commit to work with the committee to provide, through
briefings or other interactions, pertinent information on this topic,
though the Department of State does not control the specific records/
information referenced.
Question. Will you provide this committee with a full readout and/
or transcript of the call between President Biden and NATO allies (the
UK, France, Germany, and Italy) on December 7, 2021?
Answer. I commit to work with the committee to provide it, through
briefings or other interactions, the information it needs on this
topic, though the Department of State does not control of the specific
records/information referenced.
Question. The President has said that he is ``putting together what
I believe to be the most comprehensive and meaningful set of
initiatives'' to help deter Russia from invading Ukraine. Will you
provide a specific list of the action items included in this
initiative?
Answer. I outlined certain elements during my classified briefing
on December 6. As our package is refined, we will continue to consult
with Congress in appropriate settings.
Question. Do they include more measures than sanctions?
Answer. Yes. We are also considering export controls and measures
to strengthen NATO.
Question. Has the President authorized the transfer of new security
assistance, using FY22 presidential drawdown authority funding?
Answer. We are currently considering a full range of options to
determine how we can best assist Kyiv in the face of the threat.
Question. Will the Administration provide more lethal aid to
Ukraine?
Answer. Historically, U.S. security assistance to Ukraine has
included the provision of both non-lethal and lethal defense articles.
In authorizing additional assistance, the Administration would look at
what is required to enhance Ukraine's readiness and defensive
capabilities. This could include lethal aid.
Question. In the July 21, 2021, joint statement, the United States
and Germany stated, ``this commitment is designed to ensure that Russia
will not misuse any pipeline, including Nord Stream 2, to achieve
aggressive political ends by using energy as a weapon.'' What is the
Administration's definition of the ``use of energy as a weapon?'' How
would the Administration define whether or not Nord Stream 2 is
involved in ``the use of energy as a weapon''?
Answer. The Administration remains very concerned about the
weaponization of energy by Russia. The July 21 joint statement sent a
clear message that both the United States and Germany will not tolerate
Russia using energy as a geopolitical weapon or escalating its
aggression against Ukraine. The Administration remains committed to
working with U.S. allies and partners to impose significant costs on
Russia if it engages in these kinds of malign activities.
Question. What is the German Government's definition of the ``use
of energy as a weapon''? How would the German Government define whether
or not Nord Stream 2 is being involved in ``the use of energy as a
weapon?''
Answer. As detailed in July 21 U.S.-Germany joint statement, should
Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon, Germany has committed to
``take action at the national level and press for effective measures at
the European level, including sanctions, to limit Russian export
capabilities to Europe in the energy sector, including gas, and/or in
other economically relevant sectors. This commitment is designed to
ensure that Russia will not misuse any pipeline, including Nord Stream
2, to achieve aggressive political ends by using energy as a weapon.''
We remain engaged with German counterparts on implementing the package
of measures detailed in the joint statement, including Russian actions
that would trigger responses.
Question. Have the United States and Germany come to an agreement
on the definition of ``use of energy as a weapon,'' and agreed to take
specific actions in the event Russia uses Nord Stream 2 to weaponize
energy against Ukraine?
Answer. The United States and Germany remain committed to
implementing the package of measures detailed in our July 21 joint
statement. We continue to work with our German counterparts on
appropriate actions and responses to Russian pressure on Ukraine.
Question. If Russia uses Nord Stream 2 to weaponize energy against
Ukraine, is the Administration willing to further impose sanctions and
lift current waivers on the pipeline and related entities with the goal
of the complete prevention of Nord Stream 2's operation?
Answer. The Administration remains committed to implementing the
Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, and
continues to examine entities potentially engaged in sanctionable
behavior. Any national interest waiver issued by the Secretary of State
can be rescinded if the Secretary determines it is no longer in the
national interests of the United States.
Question. Does the Administration believe that Russia and GazProm's
recent political coercion of Moldova over proving gas constitutes the
``use of energy as a weapon''?
Answer. The Administration remains very concerned about
weaponization of energy by Russia. We took careful note of Russia's
behavior toward Moldova during its recent contract negotiations and
will continue to consult closely with the Moldovan Government.
Question. What is the delivery time for new security assistance?
Answer. We would work closely with our Department of Defense
colleagues to expedite any proposed shipments to get it to Ukraine
within weeks, no months. We would also continue to consult and update
Congress throughout the process.
Question. What capabilities are most needed by Ukraine now, before
Russia invades?
Answer. While I will not go into specifics, I can affirm that we
continue to work closely with Ukraine to evaluate the specific
requirements of the Ukrainian armed forces. The United States remains
committed to providing Ukraine with the capabilities it needs to defend
its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The United
States has provided more than $2.5 billion in military assistance to
Ukraine since 2014, including $452 million in military assistance
committed for fiscal year 2021.
Question. What is the Administration doing now to help the
Ukrainian people be prepared to resist occupation by Russian forces?
What capabilities do the Ukrainian people need to resist occupation?
Answer. The Administration is engaged in a range of deterrence,
civil defense, and humanitarian programs to support the Ukrainian
people, both against Russia's ongoing aggression and in the event of a
further invasion. We are actively working to bolster the ability of the
Ukrainian Government to defend its territorial integrity and
sovereignty, to increase civilian defense preparedness, and to secure
critical infrastructure against potential sabotage and hybrid attacks.
We continue to stress the importance of Ukrainian national unity and
that the Ukrainian people have a right to a free and democratic future.
They have shown they will fight for that right, and our support for
them and for Ukraine is unwavering.
Question. What role are U.S. special operations forces playing
right now to help prepare the Ukrainian people to resist occupation?
Answer. U.S. Special Operations Command Europe maintains routine
contact and has long assisted in the development of Ukrainian special
operations forces through regular training and validation exercises.
This includes assisting Ukrainian special operations forces with
developing the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to support the
Ukrainian military's mission of defending Ukraine's sovereignty. I
refer you to the Department of Defense for more detail.
Question. Has there been a policy decision to deny Ukraine air
defense capabilities? If not, what are the obstacles to transferring
air defense assets to Ukraine in the immediate future?
Answer. No. The Department of State is examining all options in
support of Ukraine's self-defense needs. The U.S. Government has
already provided more than $2.5 billion in security assistance to
Ukraine since 2014.
Question. What did President Biden mean when he referred to ``the
Eastern Front''?
Answer. I would need to see the context of the President's remarks.
He could have been referring to the eastern edge of NATO territory--
Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. Or, he
might have been referring to Ukraine's East--usually meaning territory
east of the Dnieper River, including Donbas.
Question. What did President Biden mean when he referred to ``major
NATO allies'', and to which countries was he referring? Are there non-
major NATO allies?
Answer. A basic principle of the NATO Alliance is that all 30
members have equal rights and responsibilities, as reflected in the
NATO Treaty.
Question. Do we understand correctly that, even as allies
increasingly question the Biden administration's commitment to allied
security in the face of Russian threats, Biden administration officials
are currently touring allied capitals in an attempt to overcome strong
allied opposition to a new ``sole purpose,'' or other similarly-phrased
nuclear declaratory policy? If this is correct, please describe these
engagements, their objectives, reactions from allies, and implications
for the confidence of allies in U.S. security guarantees.
Answer. That is not a correct assessment of the Administration's
interactions with allies on nuclear policy. The Department of Defense,
in coordination with the Department of State, has been conducting
allied consultations in an iterative manner to ensure that allied and
partner views are incorporated throughout the nuclear posture review
(NPR). All Allied viewpoints and concerns will inform the
Administration's decision making. President Biden has called our
extended deterrence guarantees a ``sacred obligation'' and repeatedly
has stressed that our commitments to our treaty allies are ironclad. I
fully expect that the final NPR will ensure that the United States will
have the capabilities needed to deter aggression, assure allies, and
respond if deterrence fails.
______
Letter From Senator Risch and Senator Portman to President Biden, Dated
December 3, 2021, Urging the President To Show Support for Ukraine, To
Warn President Putin, and To Reject Unreasonable Kremlin Demands
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