[Senate Hearing 117-238]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-238
U.S. POLICY ON DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 30, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-326 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Robinson, Hon. Todd, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Nichols, Hon. Brian A., Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC... 9
Prepared Statement........................................... 11
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols and Mr. Todd Robinson to
Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Risch....................... 44
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 49
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by
Senator Marco Rubio............................................ 50
(iii)
U.S. POLICY ON DEMOCRACY IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch,
Rubio, Johnson, Portman, Young, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing on U.S. Policy and Democracy in
Latin America and the Caribbean will come to order.
In March, this committee hosted Organization of American
States Secretary General Luis Almagro to review the state of
democracy in the region. We heard concerns about the uptick in
fraudulent elections, shrinking space for civil society and
independent media, efforts to politicize judicial institutions,
and the loss of hope in a region plagued by insecurity and
kleptocracy.
While the Inter-American Democratic Charter marked its 20th
anniversary in September, the harsh reality is that we are
witnessing a fraying of democratic consensus in the Americas.
Given Secretary General Almagro's diagnosis, it is critical
that the Biden administration continue efforts to restore the
defense of democracy as a central pillar of U.S. foreign
policy.
In his June memorandum, the President made it clear that
combating kleptocracy is a U.S. national security priority, and
American diplomats are again using the language of human
rights.
After 4 years of the Trump administration failing to stand
up for our fundamental values, we have acutely felt the effects
and these initial steps are welcome, but we must do more
because the truth is that since March the situation in the
hemisphere has become even more challenging.
In Cuba, the Diaz-Canel regime attacked, detained, and
disappeared its citizens for demanding fundamental freedoms
during unprecedented countrywide protests in July. The regime
paired physical assaults with internet shutdowns and decrees
criminalizing free expression on social media. Terrified of the
Cuban people's desire for change, it militarized the entire
island to prevent protests in November.
While I welcome the Administration's four rounds of
targeted sanctions, we must move more aggressively to hold
security forces accountable and we must launch a strategic
effort to demilitarize the Cuban economy in parallel with our
support for the Cuban people.
In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime's relentless campaign to
jail and persecute political opponents, civil society, and
independent media resulted in the recent sham elections.
This month, Congress passed my bipartisan RENACER Act,
ushering in a new era of international accountability. I am
pleased that the Biden administration is already implementing
the RENACER Act with new targeted sanctions and a blanket visa
ban on Nicaraguan officials complicit in the dismantling of
democracy, the toughest measures Ortega has ever faced.
In Haiti, following President Moise's assassination, gangs
now control large parts of the country and kidnap and terrorize
civilians, including American missionaries and children.
I look forward to hearing how the Administration is working
to restore security, facilitate dialogue between civil society
and political actors, and help chart a Haitian-led path to new
elections to overcome this chaos.
Since March, the Maduro regime has continued its campaign
of torture, disappearances, arbitrary jailings, and
manipulation of essential supplies in order to subjugate the
Venezuelan people.
It has walked away from negotiations with the National
Unity Platform, talks that could help address urgent
humanitarian needs and set the country on a path towards
recovery.
Instead, the regime prioritized holding deeply flawed
elections that no credible democratic actor has called free and
fair.
We have observed the surgical deconstruction of El
Salvador's justice system as President Bukele appears intent on
taking the training wheels off his autocratic project.
In Brazil, President Bolsonaro is plagiarizing the Trumpian
playbook by invoking the specter of political violence and
fraud in advance of next year's elections.
It is no wonder, given the state of democracy in the
Americas that irregular population movements are at an all-time
high.
Our hemisphere is at a critical inflection point. We must
help democracies deliver, especially as they recover from the
economic and social impact of the pandemic. We must continue
supporting civil society efforts to reverse democratic
backsliding. We must help pro-democracy movements harness the
power of technology to confront dictatorships.
The upcoming Summit for Democracy presents an opportunity
to coalesce around a global strategy to confront repressive
regimes and strengthen democracies. It is my sincere hope that
it produces tangible outcomes.
As we said in March, the cost of inaction is too great and
it is increasing exponentially. When democracies in the
Americas fail to provide for their people, those looking for a
better life will come knocking at the door, and if we do not
increase our engagement in the hemisphere, others from further
away--China, Russia--will be only too happy to gain a stronger
foothold to exploit tensions and divisions.
I look forward to discussing these and other issues as it
relates to the hemisphere to this hearing, and now I will turn
to the ranking member for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The United States has had an enduring interest in a stable
and prosperous Western Hemisphere and the democratic order is
the best guarantor of those things.
The people of Latin America and the Caribbean have made
great strides toward democratic governance over the last
several decades. However, it is disheartening to see how
quickly that progress can be lost.
Nicaragua joins Cuba on a seemingly bottomless descent into
authoritarianism. Within less than a generation, Hugo Chavez
and Nicolas Maduro have turned Venezuela into a failed state.
Last year, candidate Biden promised to use smart sanctions
and greater multilateral pressure on the Maduro regime. Ten
months in, President Biden has not imposed a single sanction on
the regime or any of its cronies, and the European Union is not
any closer to matching the economic and diplomatic pressure
brought forth by the United States and Canada.
Equally concerning is the negative effect of malign state
actors such as China and Russia. China's predatory economic
practices are a formidable threat to the sovereignty of
countries in the Western Hemisphere.
The adoption of technologies developed and controlled by
firms vulnerable to Chinese Communist Party pressure undermines
privacy and human rights. Russian disinformation campaigns
exacerbated the protests that rocked democratic countries in
South America in 2019, including Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador.
Putin openly endorses increasingly authoritarian rulers
with the goal of destabilizing the region and threatening
insecurity, and Russia has exported repressive laws and
practices to its allies in Latin America that allows
authoritarian leaders to suppress independent media, civil
society, and political opposition.
Lastly, criminal and foreign terrorist organizations are
malign threats to the safety of both our communities here at
home and democracies in the region. The Administration's plan
to remove the FARC from the foreign terrorists list undermines
U.S. national security and democratic stability in Colombia.
As this administration plans for its upcoming Summit for
Democracy next month, I am glad to see numerous countries from
the region invited. I hope this summit is more than just a
ceremony of words and hollow promises, and instead will produce
real results to improve democracy and rule of law across the
region.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about all of
these important issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. We will start with our panel.
We are pleased to have Assistant Secretary of State for the
Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, who previously has served as
ambassador in various locations, including in Peru, was the
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and also was the Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia. So he is very
well familiar with the hemisphere.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us.
We also have the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Todd
Robinson, who previously has served in a variety of positions--
the Senior Advisor for Central America and the Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs, was previously the charge
d'affaires in Venezuela. So both of our witnesses have
significant deep experience in the hemisphere, which we
appreciate, to draw from.
We will start off with Secretary Robinson. We would ask you
to have your testimony be summarized in about 5 minutes or so.
Your full statements will be entered into the record, without
objection.
Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. TODD ROBINSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Robinson. Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for calling this hearing and bringing attention to the issue of
erosion of democracy in Latin America.
I am pleased to be here today with my friend and colleague,
Assistant Secretary Nichols, with whom I am working closely to
address the challenges raised by the issue.
Democratic institutions that effectively and adequately
meet their citizens' needs are critical building blocks in this
region. Supporting democratic norms and transparent
institutions is something we should all support.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I was expelled from Venezuela
in 2018 for speaking out against the Maduro regime's
illegitimate elections and corrupt governance.
Before that, in 2015, I saw firsthand as Guatemalan
citizens demanded the investigation and prosecution of corrupt
officials, including their president. I am no stranger to the
threats facing democracy in this region.
I am clear eyed about the challenges, but I am also
confident that working with our colleagues across the
department and the interagency, my team in the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, is
well positioned to address them.
Throughout the Western Hemisphere, endemic corruption
drives authoritarianism, irregular migration, crime, and
violence. Corrupt government actors and other elites are
incentivized to allow drug trafficking and other organized
criminal groups to operate, driving instability and
contributing to undemocratic practices.
The Biden-Harris administration is moving to protect and
reinvigorate democracy both at home and abroad, and INL is
working to build capacity to fight the cycle of corruption and
our efforts span the region.
In Colombia, INL-supported prosecutors and police are
helping root out corruption and enable greater transparency. In
Mexico, our partnership helped strengthen the capacity of
security and justice institutions to reduce opportunities for
corruption, prosecute offenders, and promote a culture of
accountability.
However, we must recognize some governments lack the
ability or, frankly, the political will to tackle corruption.
Indeed, many of these governments and their elites are
benefiting from it. Our strong preference is to work with
governments, but, ultimately, we cannot want this more than
them.
As Secretary Blinken testified in June, if governments are
unable or unwilling to do what is necessary, we will increase
our work with civil society, local communities, and
international organizations and trusted partners in the private
sector, particularly if they are willing to fight corruption
rather than seeking to benefit from it.
We strongly support efforts by watchdog groups and
investigative media outlets to expose the corruption, advocate
for justice and democratic institutions, and support anti-
corruption reforms in their countries. No one understands the
corrosive nature of corruption better than those whose
livelihoods suffer because of it.
In Venezuela, the cycle of violence, crime, and corruption
has eroded the democratic process, the economy, and the
security situation. In response, the department to date has
issued 13 transnational organized crime and narcotics rewards
offers for information leading to the arrest and conviction of
Maduro and his cronies.
We have also designated three individuals under Section
7031(c) of the Department of State Foreign Operations and
Related Appropriations Act who abuse their public position in
the region by accepting bribes and kickbacks and
misappropriating public funds for their own self-enrichment.
We have also taken similar actions in Central America in
places like Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,
and we will continue to do so.
In Haiti, weak institutions and pervasive corruption
contribute to the proliferation of gang violence, including
kidnappings for ransom. Gangs control nearly half of Port-au-
Prince and key transportation infrastructure.
When I was in Haiti 2 weeks ago, I met with the Prime
Minister, the Acting Minister of Justice, the new Director
General of Police, and our international partners to emphasize
our concern for the security situation and discuss INL's
planned support to help the Haitian National Police establish a
tactical anti-gang unit.
I stressed the need to ensure officer accountability within
the HNP, respect for human rights, and transparency,
particularly for the HNP anti-gang unit, and INL will continue
to support longer-term community prevention efforts and
institutional capacity building of the HNP, including through
additional embedded advisors, vehicles, and protective
equipment for HNP units countering gangs, and supporting
election security.
Mr. Chairman, I will end my testimony reiterating an
important point. The political will of partners is absolutely
critical. Even the best resourced intervention cannot succeed
if our partners are not equally or more committed to the
challenge.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd D. Robinson
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of
the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. The threats to democracy across the Western Hemisphere are
growing and have a significant impact on the United States' national
security and economic prosperity. The Bureau I have led since
September, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), is aligned to work with our
Department and interagency colleagues to address these threats.
Bolstering the rule of law, uprooting corruption, reducing the levels
of violent crime, and deterring the production and trafficking of
illicit drugs are ways in which INL is actively working to shore up
democracy and ensuring it delivers for the people it represents. We
place a significant focus on combating the corruption that permeates
all levels of society in Latin America, with the goal of creating a
more secure, democratic, and prosperous Western Hemisphere.
INL's focus on the illicit drug trade responds to transnational
criminal organizations that destabilize the region and contribute to
democratic backsliding through their entrenched corruption networks.
The scale of illicit drug profits is estimated to reach hundreds of
billions of dollars annually. While corruption takes many forms and
stems from many sources, financial profits on this scale give
transnational criminal organizations an almost unlimited capacity to
harm government institutions.
corruption: a key contributor to democratic backsliding
Endemic corruption erodes trust in institutions and democracy, and
enables authoritarianism, crime, and violence throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Corrupt government actors are incentivized to allow drug
trafficking and other organized criminal groups to operate within their
jurisdictions. Drug trafficking and organized crime undermine the
democratic process, national security, the rule of law, and licit
economies. It is not surprising to witness democratic backsliding in
the region, as this cycle of corruption thrives in areas where
democratic institutions once thrived. President Biden has prioritized
the need to protect and reinvigorate democracy both at home and abroad.
INL works with countries to build their capacity to fight cycles of
corruption. However, we recognize some governments lack the capacity,
and in some cases, the political will to tackle the problem. Corruption
has enabled the emergence of autocratic leaders in this hemisphere.
As Secretary Blinken has testified here before you, the key is for
governments to do the right thing: address the concerns of their
people, strengthen the rule of law, and protect democratic institutions
and the human rights for all their citizens, as called for in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Corruption also hobbles effective governance; erodes respect for
human rights; distorts markets and equitable access to services;
undercuts development efforts; contributes to national fragility,
extremism, and irregular migration; endangers the physical safety of
citizens; and provides authoritarian leaders a means to undermine
democracies worldwide. When leaders steal from their nations' citizens
or elites flout the rule of law, economic growth slows, inequality
widens, and trust in government plummets.
Our strong preference is to work with governments, but to make real
inroads, we cannot want this more than they do. As Secretary Blinken
testified in June, if governments are unable or unwilling to do what is
necessary to be an appropriate partner for the United States and for
our taxpayer dollars, we will work with NGOs and civil society,
communities and international organizations, the private sector where
appropriate, and other implementing partners. There are ways to
effectively deliver assistance and support that do not require working
with a central government to make meaningful improvements in
governance. We will work with these non-governmental partners, as we do
currently, to affect change where possible.
using foreign assistance to address corruption
and promote democratic institutions
In Central America, INL support for anticorruption and rule of law
programming remains a priority under the Root Causes Strategy. The
United States encourages justice sector authorities in northern Central
America to recognize the deficit in citizens' trust in institutions to
deliver trustworthy anticorruption investigations and prosecutions, and
ensure credible, independent judicial investigations into corruption-
related crimes. We continue to support civil society and watchdog
groups to expose corruption, advocate for justice, and support
anticorruption reforms in their countries, as no one understands the
corrosive nature of corruption better than those whose livelihoods
suffer because of it. We stand ready and willing to work with those
partners in the region who have demonstrated a good faith commitment to
combating corruption.
In Nicaragua, under the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega,
government attacks on the free press are a daily occurrence (we have
also seen this increasingly in El Salvador and Guatemala). INL helps
independent media and journalists carry out data driven investigations
into issues of crime, corruption, and transparency. The reporting
conducted by INL partners exposes the regime's corruption and human
rights abuses and informs Nicaraguans of ways the ruling party
manipulates them. INL also engages with civil society organizations in
Nicaragua to strengthen the rule of law, keep youth out of gangs and
address gender-based violence.
The cycle of crime and corruption has eroded the democratic
process, the economy, and the security of Venezuela. To increase
international attention, cooperation, and action to combat crime and
corruption emanating from Venezuela, INL brings together justice sector
and policy officials from partner countries to drive substantive
conversations and information exchanges on Venezuela-based or linked
criminal organizations; illegal drug and gold trafficking; and
kleptocracy and financial crimes. These exchanges not only serve to
increase countries' understanding of criminal trends coming from
Venezuela, but--as this effort continues to develop--we hope it will
result in increased action to hold the Maduro regime and criminal
actors operating in Venezuelan territory accountable for their crimes.
In Haiti, weak institutions and pervasive corruption contribute to
proliferation of gang violence, including kidnappings for ransom and
control of critical, public infrastructure. Gang violence has become
the primary concern in Haiti and continues to grow as Haitian gangs
expand their influence and geographic presence, including control of
nearly 50 percent of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and expanding into
less urban areas. We are seeing increasingly aggressive tactics,
including the recent kidnapping of American citizens, outmaneuvering of
Haitian National Police (HNP), and disruption or control of transport
routes leading to fuel scarcity throughout the country. When I visited
Haiti 2 weeks ago, I met with the prime minister, the Acting Minister
of Justice, the new Director General of the HNP, and members of the
international community to emphasize our concern for the immediate
security situation and to emphasize the need to ensure HNP officer
accountability, respect for human rights, and transparency, especially
of the new HNP anti-gang unit, and we will do more. Following the July
presidential assassination and August earthquake, INL bolstered support
for training, equipping, and vetting the anti-gang unit. INL is also in
the process of providing additional embedded advisors, vehicles, and
protective equipment for HNP units countering gangs and supporting
election security. INL will continue efforts to support longer-term
community prevention efforts and institutional capacity building of the
HNP.
supporting key regional partners in the western hemisphere
In environments where we can effectively partner with central
governments, INL develops the professional capacity of police,
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials to help create strong,
transparent democratic institutions. In coordination with the
Department of Justice, we mentor law enforcement and justice
counterparts throughout the region, including Colombia, Central
America, and Mexico. Our work includes a focus on providing training to
judicial actors, improving compliance with international standards, and
promoting accountability throughout the justice system.
In Colombia, INL provides significant support in coordination with
our DOJ partners to mentor elite cadres of specialized Colombian
prosecutors. These prosecutors are responsible for prosecuting
Colombia's most high-profile cases, many of which involve public
corruption. In Peru, INL provided training to all justices on the
National Anticorruption Court who then utilized this knowledge to train
other judges in regional anticorruption courts throughout Peru. INL
also supported Peru's judiciary in obtaining International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) anti-bribery management system certification
for Peru's Supreme Criminal Court in 2021 and the judiciary is planning
to expand the anti-bribery ISO certification into 11 Superior Courts in
2022. Moving forward and with INL's support, Peru's Attorney General's
office intends to implement the ISO anti-bribery standards in several
key units, including the newly created Integrity Office. Supporting
efforts to improve judicial compliance with international standards is
an important way to increase citizen's trust and create an effective
judicial check and balance on other government branches.
In areas like northern Central America, where the rule of law is
under constant threat, INL intends to target assistance to willing
partners and trusted institutions. We are working within the region to
help build partnerships to successful security programs in other
Central American countries. For example, the Government of Costa Rica
is working closely with INL to implement aspects of the ``Sembremos
Seguridad'' community policing projects in northern Central America to
increase security and confidence in the police in those communities. In
Honduras, INL is providing standardized training in basic and advanced
prosecutorial skills to approximately 1,000 prosecutors (nearly all
prosecutors in Honduras), as well as courses on handling corruption
cases for specialized prosecutors. In Panama, a new INL-supported Anti-
Money Laundering and Anticorruption Taskforce brings all Panamanian
agencies involved in money laundering, terrorism financing,
transnational economic crimes, and corruption together in one building
to work with U.S. law enforcement agencies to conduct complex
investigations with the goal of successfully prosecuting cases to
reduce money laundering and corruption.
Our partnership with Mexico helps strengthen the capacity of
security and justice institutions to reduce opportunities for
corruption, prosecute offenders, and promote a culture of
accountability. Our work complements robust interagency programs,
including those of USAID. Our collaboration with Mexico to transition
to a more open and transparent accusatorial judicial system is a
centerpiece of these efforts. INL support helped Mexico to achieve
international accreditation of Mexican security and justice
institutions to increase transparency. Such efforts are essential for
reducing crime, improving responses to crime, improving criminal
justice processes, and protecting human rights. Going forward under the
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and
Safe Communities, the United States will deepen its partnership with
Mexico to counter corruption through support for the investigation and
prosecution of corrupt officials and the seizure and forfeiture of
their illicit assets. We will also work to expand capacity to increase
the investigation and prosecution of organized criminal groups. The
success of these measures reduces opportunities for drug trafficking
organizations to leverage corruption to advance and protect their
operations.
deterrence tools
To complement and reinforce our diplomacy and assistance, INL also
works with interagency counterparts to employ targeted sanctions and
deterrence tools to combat high-level corruption and support the work
of law enforcement. INL manages two rewards programs targeting high-
level drug traffickers and other transnational criminal leaders, which
have helped our law enforcement partners bring more than 75
international major violators to justice. INL also manages two
anticorruption visa restriction authorities, and, in close cooperation
with the Department of the Treasury, supports implementation of the
corruption prong of the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. INL also
coordinates with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, and other relevant bureaus to implement Section 353
of the Northern Triangle Enhancement Act (also known as ``the Engel
List'') and INA 212(a)(3)(C) policies related to corruption and the
rule of law.
The public designation of corrupt actors under Section 7031(c) of
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations
Act, 2021, the Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list, and
the Global Magnitsky Act has significantly reinforced our broader
anticorruption agenda, including through increased media, civil
society, and general public attention. We have also seen these
designations spur governments to remove designees from office or to
open law enforcement investigations and to build momentum to adopt
anticorruption reforms. INL has greatly expanded the use of these tools
since 2019, completing two and a half times more visa restrictions
cases and seven times more reward cases than in the previous 2 years.
These tools complement our diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts,
including those under the Root Causes Strategy, to prevent and combat
corruption.
These tools allow us to elevate attention on corrupt officials and
practices, even in countries where we don't have programming. For
example, the Department has issued 13 Transnational Organized Crime and
Narcotics rewards offers for information leading to the arrest or
conviction of Maduro and his cronies as well as designating three
individuals under Section 7031(c) who abused their public position in
the Maduro regime by accepting bribes and kickbacks and
misappropriating public funds for their own self-enrichment.
multilateral engagement
In addition to our assistance programs and deterrence tools, INL is
supporting the Department's efforts in the multilateral space. The
upcoming Summit for Democracy will reinforce the importance of
democratic values and reassert America's role as the leader of
democratic nations. Acknowledging the threat corruption poses to
democracy, the Summit will serve as a platform to discuss and
coordinate with partners from a diverse group of democracies around the
world opportunities to reduce its corrosive effects. In particular, the
Summit will be an opportunity to advance U.S. anticorruption
priorities, including: shutting down safe havens for corrupt actors and
their ill-gotten gains; increasing our partners' capacity to prevent
and combat corruption and hold corrupt actors accountable; leveraging
innovation in the fight against corruption; and improving our ability
to respond decisively to opportunities and threats to partner
governments facing corruption related challenges. We will encourage
partners to announce commitments to combat kleptocracy and foreign
bribery, improve beneficial ownership and real estate transparency, and
promote the role of civil society, independent media and journalists,
and the private sector in anticorruption efforts. We will hold
ourselves to the same standard and expect to announce commitments and
deliverables at the Summit, including to fight corruption at home.
We hope the Summit will be a useful opportunity to advance the core
tenets of democracy and demonstrate to democracies and non-democracies
alike that democratic governance can and will deliver for the region.
In a promising signal of democracy's potential in the region, the
Western Hemisphere constitutes the second-largest delegation of invited
countries at the Summit. Similarly, we will reinforce these and other
democratic themes at the Summit of the Americas next year. Committing
to democracy in these summits will solidify and confirm our approach to
defending and supporting democratic governance throughout the region.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, my testimony has focused on the
work of INL, but let me end by reiterating an important point:
political will from our partners to confront corruption and
transnational crime in our hemisphere is absolutely critical. Even the
best resourced and planned U.S. foreign policy intervention cannot
succeed if our partners are not equally or more committed to addressing
these challenges. Governments must own their efforts to enact reforms
and disrupt criminal networks and the corruption they engender.
Our assistance programs can nudge countries in the right direction.
But long-term progress to close pathways for corruption and push the
illicit drug trade to the margins must come from our partners. To
mobilize political will for further reforms, the United States must
continue to engage civil society and public audiences. Partner
governments that are accountable to their citizens and value
contributions from civil society have much greater resiliency against
corruption, drug trafficking, and other criminal threats. No country is
immune to these challenges, and we share them ourselves. The United
States must achieve further success here at home to reduce our own
vulnerabilities, such as reducing demand for illicit drugs. By holding
ourselves and our partners accountable, and recognizing that these are
shared challenges, we give greater strength to our public messaging and
increase our appeal as a partner.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Nichols.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRIAN A. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify regarding our efforts to promote
inclusive democracy in the Americas.
Two decades ago, we and our Western Hemisphere partners
committed to promote and defend democracy across the region
through the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
Following that historic commitment, the region's
democracies enjoyed a period of relative prosperity, security,
and stability.
Unfortunately, too many ordinary citizens in the region's
democracies saw their governments failing to meet their
aspirations for a better future. Street protests broke out in
several countries in 2019 as citizens expressed anger and
frustration with political and economic elites. The COVID-19
pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated the region's
underlying governance challenges.
As Secretary Blinken said in his October 20 remarks in
Ecuador, we find ourselves in a moment of democratic reckoning
and the question for all of us who believe in democracy and
believe its survival is vital to our shared future is what can
we do to make democracies deliver on the issues that matter
most to people.
Our defining mission in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs is answering that question and doing all we can to
deliver the benefits of democracy to the nations of the
Americas.
We know elements of the answer already. To strengthen
democracy, we must use every diplomatic, economic, and moral
tool available to combat corruption, enhance civilian security,
improve government service delivery, and address the economic
and social challenges facing the region's citizens.
We work across all these fronts daily with partners across
the globe. We hold corrupt actors accountable including through
visa restrictions, economic sanctions, and naming more than 60
individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the
Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors List.
We will expand on our commitment to fight corruption as
host of the Ninth Summit of the Americas next year. To
strengthen civilian security, the United States invests
billions of dollars globally to reduce violence and combat
transnational criminal organizations.
We laid the groundwork for more comprehensive approaches to
security at the October 8 High-Level Security Dialogue with
Mexico and the October 21 High-Level Dialogue with Colombia. We
will adopt similar approaches with other partners.
We must also address the economic and social challenges
facing our citizens as together we recover from the pandemic.
In partnership with COVAX and bilaterally, we have donated more
than 54 million doses to 30 countries in the hemisphere.
The United States has invested more than $10 billion in
Latin America and the Caribbean through the Development Finance
Corporation to help the region restart its economy. The
President's Build Back Better World Initiative will frame our
efforts, moving forward.
We must work tirelessly to support democracy where
undemocratic regimes prevail. We support the Unity Platform in
Venezuela and their demand for human rights and democracy.
Nicolas Maduro should release wrongfully-detained U.S.
nationals immediately so that they can return to their
families.
In Nicaragua, following the sham November 7 elections, the
Administration sanctioned 40 individuals and 9 entities under
our Nicaragua-specific four Global Magnitsky programs.
We imposed visa restrictions on 169 people linked to the
Ortega-Murillo Government. We announced a presidential
proclamation on Nicaragua suspending the entry of individuals
complicit in undermining democracy. We welcome the strong
bipartisan RENACER legislation and look forward to working
closely with you to implement it.
Our Cuba policy focuses on support for the Cuban people and
accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in human
rights abuses. Working with the international community, we
condemn the violence and repression perpetrated by the Cuban
regime.
Since July, the Treasury Department has imposed four rounds
of targeted financial sanctions against Cuban officials and
entities within the Cuban military and security services,
imposing tangible consequences against repressors and promoting
accountability for the human rights abuses.
The Administration also supports efforts to counter
internet censorship. We will continue to work with the private
sector and other stakeholders to identify viable options to
ensure greater internet access for the Cuban people.
We see these and other challenges confronting the region,
but we stand by our conviction that democracy remains the best
form of government to address them.
The President will host the Summit for Democracy on
December 9 and 10, where we will take on bold new commitments
to fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism, and
promote respect for human rights both at home and abroad, and I
am honored to partner with INL and my friend, Todd Robinson,
its Assistant Secretary, in that effort.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our efforts to
promote inclusive democracy in the Americas.
ensuring democracy delivers
Two decades ago, together with our Western Hemisphere partners, we
committed to promote and defend democracy across the region through the
Inter-American Democratic Charter. Following that historic commitment,
the region's democracies enjoyed a period of relative prosperity,
security, and stability. Latin America's middle class grew, and poverty
fell by half. Living standards and access to education rose. Maternal
and infant mortality declined.
Nevertheless, too many ordinary citizens in the region's
democracies saw their governments failing to meet their expectations
and aspirations for a better future. Corruption remained rampant.
Economies grew but so did inequality. Crime and insecurity took too
many lives and stymied the region's development. Surveys this year
showed citizens' satisfaction with democracy at near historic lows.
Street protests broke out in several countries as citizens expressed
anger and frustration with political and economic elites. The COVID-19
pandemic highlighted and exacerbated the region's underlying governance
challenges and inequities.
As the Secretary said in his October 20 remarks in Ecuador, ``We
find ourselves in a moment of democratic reckoning. And the question
for all of us who believe in democracy--and believe its survival is
vital to our shared future--is what can we do to make democracies
deliver on the issues that matter most to people.'' Our defining
mission in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is answering that
question.
We know elements of the answer already. To strengthen democracy, we
must work closely with those in the region committed to using the tools
of government to transparently address the needs of their societies and
equally committed to handing over power at the end of their term in
office. We must use every diplomatic and economic tool available to
combat corruption, enhance civilian security, improve government
service delivery, and address the economic and social challenges facing
the region's citizens. In short, we must close the gap between
democracy's promise and its reality. We work across all these fronts
daily.
Public frustration with corruption represents one of the greatest
threats to confidence in political systems across the region. That is
why President Biden's designation of fighting corruption as a core U.S.
national security interest resonated in many countries in the Americas.
We use the tools Congress gave us to show our commitment is not just
rhetorical. We hold corrupt individuals and groups accountable,
including through visa restrictions, economic sanctions, and adding
more than 60 individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the
Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list mandated under Section 353 of the
United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act. We will uphold
and expand upon our commitment to fight corruption as host of the Ninth
Summit of the Americas next year.
To strengthen civilian security, the United States invests billions
of dollars globally to reduce violence and combat transnational
criminal organizations. However, we must do even more to address the
root causes of insecurity in our hemisphere. Under the Administration's
Root Causes Strategy, we work with local communities to reduce the
violence and insecurity in northern Central America which drives so
many Central Americans out of their homes. We laid the groundwork for
more comprehensive approaches to security at the October 8 High-Level
Security Dialogue (HLSD) with Mexico and October 21 High-Level Dialogue
with Colombia and will adopt similar approaches with other partners.
We must also address the economic and social challenges facing our
citizens as together we recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. In
partnership with COVAX and bilaterally, we donated more than 54 million
vaccine doses to 30 countries in the Western Hemisphere. At this
month's North American Summit, President Biden and his counterparts
from Mexico and Canada pledged to develop a trilateral North American
Partnership for Racial Equity and Inclusion. The United States invested
more than $10 billion in Latin America and the Caribbean through the
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to grow economies, create jobs,
and help the region restart its economy. As part of the President's
Build Back Better World Initiative, we sent a delegation to Colombia,
Ecuador, and Panama in September to work with our partners to narrow
the gaps in physical, digital, and human resources infrastructure
exacerbated by the pandemic. The B3W Initiative will frame our efforts
in the Hemisphere moving forward.
preventing democratic backsliding
Twenty years after the approval of the Inter American Democratic
Charter, we recognize that governance conditions in some countries
either have not progressed or are moving in the wrong direction.
Haiti struggles with grave humanitarian and security challenges and
political turmoil, compounded by the July 7 assassination of President
Jovenel Moise and the August 14 earthquake. NSC Senior Director Juan
Gonzalez, Under Secretary for Civilian Security Uzra Zeya, Assistant
Secretary Todd Robinson, and I all made trips to Haiti in October and
November to underscore the Administration's commitment to the Haitian
people.
In our meetings with the diaspora, civil society, political actors,
and Prime Minister Ariel Henry, we expressed concern about insecurity
and pledged our support for the Haitian people to find their own
solutions and chart a broad and inclusive path out of the current
political uncertainty. Haitian stakeholders insisted the current
insecurity would not allow for free and fair elections this year. I
agree.
The Haitian people will determine a timeline for their elections.
We will work now to support conditions for free and fair elections when
they happen, including by helping the Haitian National Police (HNP)
restore security and address gang violence. The October kidnapping of
16 American and one Canadian missionary underscores the grave lack of
security in Haiti.
We witnessed a serious erosion of democratic norms in Central
America in the last decade. In El Salvador, the Bukele administration
took taken a series of concerning steps that weakened respect for
democratic principles and institutions. The proposed Foreign Agent Law,
which would impose unnecessary controls on civil society activities
protected under the Democratic Charter, emerged in the context of other
actions that seem aimed at concentrating power in the hands of the
executive and intimidating critics of the Bukele administration. These
include sending armed soldiers into the Legislative Assembly;
improperly replacing Supreme Court judges with loyalists who decreed--
against the country's own constitutional provisions--that a president
can run for re-election; cutting off access to public information;
turning a blind eye to corruption within the current administration;
and denigrating civil society, independent media, and U.S. assistance
as ``the opposition.'' While we remain committed to helping the
Salvadoran people achieve security and prosperity, we will continue to
work with Congress and international partners to urge the Bukele
administration to change course and recommit to human rights and
democratic norms.
In Honduras, violence marred the runup to Sunday's national
elections with more than 30 tragic deaths associated with the election
cycle. Thankfully, election day itself was largely peaceful, with a
turnout that reflected the democratic spirit of the Honduran people. I
visited Honduras last week to underscore the importance of a peaceful,
transparent, free and fair election to the candidates and Honduran
stakeholders in the government, civil society, and the private sector.
DRL and USAID supported messaging campaigns and worked with their
contacts to encourage non-violence and respect for the electoral
process. INL provided training on the role of police in elections to
more than 5,000 officers and distributed more than 20,000 pamphlets on
best practices for use of force. USAID also supported electoral
authorities to strengthen their efforts to promote fair and transparent
elections, including establishing internal biosafety protocols for
electoral personnel before and on election day.
In Guatemala, the Attorney General used her office to obstruct
investigations into high-level wrongdoing and instead persecuted those
seeking to strengthen accountability for corruption and human rights
violations, including by dismissing the Public Ministry's leading anti-
corruption prosecutor on July 23. This is especially unfortunate in
view of the excellent cooperation we enjoy with Guatemala on law
enforcement matters, including record-level extraditions and
cooperation on drug interdictions. Good cooperation in some areas,
however, does not mean we can ignore actions that undermine the rule of
law. We designated the Attorney General and her deputy under Section
353 which suspended most avenues of cooperation with the Public
Ministry until the selection of a new Attorney General in May 2022. We
urge the government of Guatemala to pursue a fair and transparent
process to nominate qualified and independent candidates as the next
Attorney General.
supporting democratic transitions in non-democratic regimes
We must work tirelessly to support democracy where undemocratic
regimes prevail. We support the Unity Platform of Venezuelan democracy
defenders in their demand for human rights and democracy in their
country. On the margins of the 51st OAS General Assembly on November
10-12, we joined 12 other countries calling for the return of democracy
in Venezuela and for attention to its humanitarian crisis. Nicolas
Maduro should release wrongfully detained U.S. nationals immediately so
they can return to their families in the United States.
In Nicaragua, the Ortega-Murillo regime launched an unprecedented
crackdown against opposition leaders and independent journalists.
Following the sham November 7 elections, Ortega and Murillo no longer
have a democratic mandate. On November 12 at the OAS General Assembly,
25 countries voted to condemn the Nicaraguan elections and demand the
release of political prisoners and a return to democracy. Nicaragua
alone voted against the resolution, demonstrating its isolation in the
region. The Administration sanctioned a total of 40 individuals and
nine entities under our Nicaragua-specific or Global Magnitsky
sanctions programs, with the largest tranche announced on November 15
following the sham elections. We imposed visa restrictions on 169
individuals linked to the Ortega-Murillo government and their immediate
family members and on November 16 announced a Presidential Proclamation
on Nicaragua suspending the entry of individuals complicit in
undermining democracy. We welcome concrete actions taken by our
partners, including Canada's and the UK's announcement of additional
Nicaragua sanctions on November 15, and the EU's August 2 decision to
apply sanctions on eight individuals, including Vice President Murillo.
We welcome the strong bipartisan RENACER legislation and look forward
to working closely with you to implement it.
Our Cuba policy focuses on support for the wellbeing of the Cuban
people and accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in
human rights abuses. Working with the international community, we
condemn the violence and repression perpetrated by the Cuban regime
upon the Cuban people for demanding their fundamental freedoms. Time
and again the Cuban Government rejected the Cuban people's attempt to
initiate a discussion, choosing instead to respond with repression,
sending security forces and government-backed mobs to bully those who
seek democracy. On November 15, the regime again blocked the voices of
the Cuban people rather than listen, forgoing opportunities for
dialogue and positive change for the future of Cuba. Since July, the
Treasury Department imposed four rounds of targeted financial sanctions
against Cuban officials and entities within the Cuban military and
security services in connection with violence, repression, and human
rights violations against peaceful protestors.
Through these Global Magnitsky sanctions, the Biden-Harris
administration imposes tangible consequences against repressors and to
promote accountability for their human rights abuses.
We also seek ways to meaningfully support the Cuban people. The
Administration also supports efforts to counter Internet censorship,
restrictions on content access, and shutdowns. We will continue to work
with the private sector and other stakeholders to identify viable
options to ensure greater internet access for the Cuban people.
democracy can deliver
We see these and other challenges confronting the region, but we
stand by our conviction that democracy remains the best form of
government to address them. As the Secretary said in Quito, ``there's
no threat we face that better democracy cannot fix--no challenge where
a closed system would do better for people than an open one.''
We look forward to working with our partners to ensure that
democracy delivers equally throughout the hemisphere. On December 9-10,
the President will host the Summit for Democracy, which serves as an
opportunity for governments, civil society, and private sector
stakeholders to promote these ideals and hold ourselves accountable to
the commitments we have made. We will also take on new commitments to
address and fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism, promote
respect for human rights both at home and abroad, and advance an
economic recovery in the hemisphere that creates the conditions for
equitable growth, benefitting historically marginalized populations.
Twenty-six countries from our region will attend the Summit to work
together toward strengthening democracy in our hemisphere.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimonies. We will
start a series of 5-minute rounds.
Secretary Nichols, let us talk about some of these things
specifically. The Cuban military has long claimed that it draws
its power from the people. Yet, Diaz-Canel, like the Castros
before him, is using the military to perpetrate the Communist
Party's stranglehold on the Cuban people and stifle democratic
openings.
The regime militarizes the island to shut down peaceful
protests and continues expanding the military's control of the
Cuban economy, fueling the rise of a new generation of military
oligarchs in the process.
The Biden administration rightly designated Defense
Minister Lopez Miera under Global Magnitsky sanctions, but it
has become clear that the problem is bigger than one general.
Let me ask you, do we agree that the Cuban military has an
expansive control of the economy, which stifles out, for
example, independent entrepreneurs trying to get a foothold in
the country's economy?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The role of the Cuban
military--MINFAR, GAESA--in dominating the economy and
controlling the largest businesses and placing itself in a
position to suck up resources that go into different parts of
the country is of great concern.
The military's role in repressing citizens who seek only to
exercise their fundamental rights of free speech, assembly, has
been documented for decades, and everything that we can do to
prevent that conduct, I think, will be important.
The Chairman. We agree what the role they are playing is a
rather nefarious role, but what steps will the Biden
administration take to increase accountability for the
military's role in repression and to facilitate the
demilitarization of the Cuban economy?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Administration continues to look at specific
individuals to sanction under the full range of our
authorities. We look to block resources from moving into
military-controlled organizations and companies, and we will
continue to prevent military individuals from traveling and we
will work with allies and partners around the world to
highlight the abuses that the Cuban military perpetrates on its
populace.
The Chairman. There is a lot more that can be done and
there is a lot more sanctioning that should take place so that
people understand that they do not get away with impunity.
One of the things we should be looking at is revoking the
visas of a variety of Cuban military and Cuban officials'
families that have visas to come to the United States. Sends a
very clear message that we will not tolerate and give them the
benefit of doing what everyday Cubans cannot do, and I really
would urge the Administration to look at that. We have been
talking for some time about how do we facilitate freedom of
expression inside of Cuba, particularly through the use of the
internet, and you refer to it in your testimony.
I understand we have been using and seen an exponential use
of some tools that the Department and USAGM have been working
on. I will not get into the specifics because we do not want to
give the regime greater information about them for
circumvention.
Why is it that we have not been able to find the pathway to
greater widespread internet use inside of Cuba? What are the
obstacles that we are facing in that regard?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There are a number of challenges with regard to internet in
Cuba. The first is the amount of bandwidth that goes into the
country, which is quite limited. If there were greater
bandwidth overall there would be greater ability to access the
internet at higher speeds.
The regime uses a number of technologies and techniques to
block internet access to individuals, to small groups of
people, to specific geographic locations, and actually does not
typically shut down the entire internet to the island.
Defeating those techniques and technologies is an important
focus of our efforts, and I am happy to go into greater detail
with you and your colleagues in a restricted setting.
The Chairman. All right, but there has been suggestion that
if we did satellite, if we tethered balloons, if we did a
variety of other things, that we could more successfully get
access to the internet for the Cuban people.
We have researched those and the challenge is bandwidth on
the island. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Nichols. That is one of the challenges, but projecting
a wireless signal into the island either from a balloon or an
aircraft or from a static location when the Cuban authorities
would be actively trying to jam that signal presents a
significant technological challenge and, again, I am happy to
go into greater detail on that.
The Chairman. Let me close on Venezuela. I think the
Administration has rightfully claimed the recent elections as a
sham election. I believe other countries have also joined in
calling it such.
I am really concerned about the purposes of EU Commissioner
Borrell's intentions. A leaked EU memo shows that he ignored
recommendations from his own staff not to send an observation
mission to Venezuela, and if we want a credible alternative to
the Borrell report about all the flaws and manipulations of
elections in Venezuela, it has to be prepared by a credible
organization.
Can you confirm for us today that the United States does,
indeed, support a negotiated solution as codified in the VERDAD
Act and make equally clear that any recalibration of U.S.
sanctions will be tied to concrete results at the negotiating
table?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and in fact, I will be
meeting with members of the Unitary Platform this afternoon.
The Chairman. Now Interim President Guaido and the National
Unity Platform have shown their willingness to participate in
negotiations to restore democracy and the rule of law in
Venezuela.
However, in a sign of bad faith, Maduro suspended the talks
in October because he is upset about someone who was
apprehended by the U.S. Justice Department who may spill the
goods on him.
It shows where we are at with Maduro. I hope the world
recognizes that. My understanding is that interim President
Guaido has been invited to the Summit of Democracies. Is that
true?
Mr. Nichols. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and he will
have a speaking role at that event.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wonder if both of you could speak to the fact that in the
last presidential campaign then candidate Biden had promised
sanctions on Maduro and the regime and nothing has happened in
these 10 months. Can you explain that?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch.
We continue to support a negotiated process in Venezuela.
When we have the information regarding actions of certain
individuals, we take action to use all of the authorities that
we have been given.
We believe that the crucial elements in the way forward is
the negotiation process and, hopefully, the Maduro regime will
return to the table promptly.
Senator Risch. What information are you looking for? Every
time we talk to the Administration about this they say, oh,
well, we are working on it. We are looking for information.
What information are you looking for and on what individuals?
Mr. Nichols. It is our goal to collect comprehensive and
detailed information on the actions of government actors that
violates U.S. law or international norms and that will
withstand judicial scrutiny.
Senator Risch. What information are you looking for?
Mr. Nichols. Participation in human rights violations----
Senator Risch. You do not have any information on that?
Mr. Nichols. --and acts of corruption. Those are the types
of areas where we seek information.
Senator Risch. Do you plan on doing any sanctions at all in
the near future?
Mr. Nichols. The Administration has aggressively used the
sanctions authorities available and I expect that we will
continue to do so.
Senator Risch. Do you want to comment on this?
Mr. Robinson. I would just add that I do not think the
previous administration or the current administration are
holding back on using sanctions, certainly, not against members
of the Maduro regime, and we intend to continue to do that.
Senator Risch. Were either one of you consulted on removing
FARC from the list, the terrorist list?
Mr. Nichols. Yes. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
was consulted and played a role in the listing of the FARC-EP
and the Segunda Marquetalia and the delisting of the FARC,
which demobilized in 2016.
Senator Risch. Did you recommend that that delisting take
place?
Mr. Nichols. The delisting recognizes the reality on the
ground that the original FARC, if you will, which targeted me
when I served in Colombia so I have no love for them, but they
have participated in the peace process since 2016.
They have demobilized their structures, while the FARC-EP
and the Segunda Marquetalia have carried out continued
terrorist activities, attacked individuals, carried out
bombings, participated in drug trafficking, and we want to
focus on those who are currently carrying out those illicit
activities.
Senator Risch. Do you have anything to add to that?
Mr. Robinson. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement was also consulted and we came to the same
conclusion.
Senator Risch. My time is almost up. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and let me thank both of our witnesses for their
service to our country and our hemisphere.
Our hemisphere has always bragged about having democratic
states and, yet, in recent decades we have seen a decline of
democracy, a decline of countries where they have free and fair
elections so that people can have self-determination of their
leaders.
We see a growth of systemic corruption, as you have all
pointed out, which denies the people of that country effective
democratic governance. It really is a critical moment, and I
was listening to your response and I understand that you are
collecting information.
I know that you are using the different legislative
authorities that you have to identify actors for sanctions and
to use country activities to express our concerns about the
decline of democracy.
I just want to be clear. The chairman questioned about
Cuba, questioned about many other countries. To me, the
sanction that has gotten the most international attention is
the Magnitsky sanction.
Other countries around the world have adopted similar
regimes that we have to identify individuals for visa bans and
for denial of the use of our banking system, which is really
critical for those that participate in corruption.
They like to travel and they like to hide their money in
states that have no rule of law, and if we can deny them that
opportunity it really affects their ability to carry out their
corrupt regimes.
I think we have got to be very clear about our commitment
to use these sanctions, and I must tell you I have not seen a
robust use of the Magnitsky sanctions in our hemisphere.
I have seen some, but I have not seen a robust use. That
statute, really, anticipates a collaborative effort between
Congress and the Administration on working together to identify
and impose sanctions against those that are committing these
types of activities.
President Biden has been very clear to identify corruption
as the fuel to undemocratic regimes. Can we be more open and
robust so that it is a very clear message to those that are
participating in corruption that they are going to be
identified by the United States?
If we do not have U.S. leadership there is not going to be
leadership in our hemisphere. We have got to take the lead.
I understand there is a due process. I understand you have
got to collect information, but we also have to be very clear
about our willingness to identify those corrupt actors and
impose tough sanctions against them individually so that they
cannot benefit from their corruption.
Why are not we being more aggressive in this area?
Mr. Robinson. Senator, thank you for that very important
question, and from our standpoint, I think, again, the
Administration has not been leaning back on this. I think they
have been leaning forward, but I think we have to recognize
that sanctions are part of a kit that we can use to not just go
after those who are committing corrupt acts, but we have to
look at other tools that we can use: support for democratic
institutions, making sure that we are----
Senator Cardin. I agree with you. I agree with you that we
need to have the programs in place to support democracy and
democratic institutions and I strongly support those
partnerships through the State Department. I agree with you.
It has got to be a carrot-stick. Do you how many Magnitsky
sanctions have been imposed in our hemisphere in the last 12
months?
Mr. Robinson. I do not know off the top of my head. No.
Mr. Nichols. I think we are over 40, I think.
Senator Cardin. How many are now under consideration?
Mr. Nichols. I cannot tell you how many are currently under
consideration, but we look to aggressively deploy them across
all of the areas where we see problems, and as you alluded to,
Senator, a key part of that is bringing along international
partners so when we are able to enlist the European Union or
Canada or the UK to also apply sanctions, to secure supportive
resolutions in multilateral organizations, that all increases
the pressure on the authoritarian and criminal regimes in our
hemisphere.
Senator Cardin. I would just conclude on this, and I would
ask for a commitment that you work with our staffs, with us as
this committee, on the list that you are working on and the
countries in which you are working on because it is our
impression that we could be more direct and visible on the use
of these sanctions to make it clear that America's leadership
is there.
I understand we want to work with other countries, but it
is critical that the United States takes the lead, and I would
just ask for your commitment that you would work with us and
our staffs as we identify countries and individuals that we
believe need to be considered for these types of sanctions.
Mr. Nichols. Absolutely, Senator.
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Secretary Nichols, I think you would agree
that supporting democracy begins by supporting the existing
democracies, to do nothing that undermines their strength or
legitimacy. You would agree with that?
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
Senator Rubio. Okay. You would also agree, I believe, that
Colombia is one of the strongest, most stable democracies and
one of our best partners and allies in the region. That is a
correct statement?
Mr. Nichols. Absolutely.
Senator Rubio. Did we consult with them before we delisted
the FARC?
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
Senator Rubio. What was their take on it?
Mr. Nichols. This has been part of the implementation of
the 2016 agreement between the Government and the FARC--the
peace accord--and from Colombia's standpoint the key element is
for us to be able to deliver assistance in areas where the FARC
has demobilized. That is the----
Senator Rubio. Were they in favor or against the delisting?
Mr. Nichols. I do not want to characterize their position.
They were, certainly, in favor of us providing assistance for
those who have demobilized and are participating in the peace
process. They are also in favor of us listing FARC-EP and the
Segunda Marquetalia.
Senator Rubio. Okay. So in terms of providing assistance to
those who have demobilized and become politically engaged, is
it not true that they wanted that assistance to be channeled
through the Colombian Government?
Mr. Nichols. We have a robust partnership with Colombia on
these issues and we work hand-in-hand with them. It is a great
partnership.
Senator Rubio. I understand, but is it not true that what
they wanted was not just to delist it. They did not want a
delisting. What they wanted was to the extent that you are
going to provide assistance to these people who have abandoned
the guerrilla fight, laid down their weapons, become
politically engaged, we want you to run that assistance through
the democratically-elected government of Colombia, not
unilaterally.
Mr. Nichols. Certainly, they and many governments with whom
we partner have an interest in us providing direct budgetary
support, but I think it is important for us to be able to
implement the programs that the Congress authorizes, that USAID
and other implementing agencies like INL be able to directly
carry out the programming.
Senator Rubio. Even if the carrying it out directly goes
against the wishes of the democratically-elected partner of
that home country?
Mr. Nichols. Everything we do with our partners in Colombia
is negotiated and agreed with the Government of Colombia.
Senator Rubio. So you are saying they agreed to this? They
agreed to this agreement? This is what they wanted to see
happen, a hundred percent?
Mr. Nichols. They have signed an agreement on assistance
programs, whether it is with USAID or with INL.
Senator Rubio. No. No. Did they agree with the delisting
and the direct delivery of aid to former FARC or FARC elements?
Mr. Nichols. I did not personally participate in that
conversation. I do not want----
Senator Rubio. Who did? Is this a NSC process? Was the NSC
lead on this?
Mr. Nichols. Sir, our ambassador in Bogota was crucial in
this process and, again, I do not want to give the impression
that there is any daylight between the Government of Colombia
and the United States. They are superb partners.
Senator Rubio. Okay. I think we will hear from them on it.
I can tell you I know what their opinion on it is. They were
not in favor of the delisting and they wanted to the extent aid
to be provided to these people that it be provided through them
and not directly.
Let me ask this--talk about the reality on the ground.
After this so-called peace process, there used to be--right,
there is this FARC. The people who laid down their arms and
became politically engaged have done so through a political
party called Comunes, correct?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Senator.
Senator Rubio. That group is not sanctioned. They are not
on any list of foreign terrorist organizations, right? They are
not--okay. Then the group that did not lay down their arms have
gone on to become these dissident groups--FARC dissident, FARC-
D, and others, correct?
Mr. Nichols. Correct.
Senator Rubio. Okay. We sanctioned the group that became
the dissidents. We have added them to the list, and the people
that are in the political party are no longer sanctioned
because they are no longer part of FARC. They are now part of
the political process.
Who exactly are we delisting? What was the purpose of doing
this? If the argument is that the peace process has dismantled
the FARC and now people that were in the FARC are either, A,
dissidents who are covered under the new listing, or B, members
of a political party who are not part of any sanction list, why
did we do this?
Who is not getting money as a result of this? Who is not a
dissident group, who is not part of Comunes, and needs money
from the United States that used to be or is a part of FARC?
Mr. Nichols. In order to carry out the development
programming with former members of the FARC, from a legal
standpoint delisting them was required.
Senator Rubio. Would it not have been easier to just say if
you abandon the FARC and now join Comunes you are no longer
considered a former--would that not have been easier to do and
more straightforward and less confusing than delisting an
entire group?
Because a new group could start up tomorrow and say, we are
the FARC, right? The dissident group could rename themselves
and, theoretically, not be covered by this.
Mr. Nichols. The nomenclature is covered in the way that we
address this. We named specific leaders of these FARC-EP and
Segunda Marquetalia, their structures, sub-fronts,
organizations, and alternate names. So----
Senator Rubio. We could have done the same by just naming
the political party as opposed to creating all this anxiety
and, frankly, going against the wishes of our democratically-
elected allies in Colombia.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you both for your work and for coming before the committee
today.
I think it is safe to say that President Trump's policy
towards Venezuela was a failure. The Administration,
essentially, decided to push all of our chips to the center of
the table on the first hand, recognizing Guaido ahead of many
of our allies in the region and assuming that that would lead
to the immediate collapse of Maduro's regime.
That is not what happened and there was no plan B, so we
were stuck for the next 3 years. You have a lot of work to do
to put together a policy that actually effectuates American
aims in the region.
On the question of sanctions, I just want to probe this
with you a little bit more, Secretary Nichols, because there
is, certainly, a case to be made that our sanctions can be
effective, that they can weaken Maduro, and that they can
punish bad actors.
There is, of course, a flip side. There is a humanitarian
crisis in Venezuela today. There is a report from a few years
ago suggesting that our sanctions have dramatically reduced
caloric intake, increased disease and mortality, and had a
number of other really serious and potentially catastrophic
effects on the Venezuelan people.
It also has the potential, our sanctions do, to provide
fuel behind the anti-Americanism that is essential for Maduro
to hang on to power. I have supported these sanctions because
there is no shortage of individuals in Venezuela who deserve
them.
At the same time, there are humanitarian consequences and
there, frankly, is not a lot of evidence over the course of the
last 4 to 5 years that those sanctions are actually weakening
the Maduro regime.
So let me ask you about how you view both the upside and
the downside of our existing sanctions policy and the prospect
of additional sanctions.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The sanctions are an important tool in our quiver, and as
Assistant Secretary Robinson said, it is also important to have
other tools that we can use to both induce positive behavior
and to dissuade people from taking improper actions.
We need to work to balance and leverage all of those tools
to the greatest extent possible. I think the suffering of the
Venezuelan people owes much more to the horrible policies of
Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, which destroyed the economy,
the healthcare sector, food production, retail sector, and some
6 million Venezuelans have voted with their feet to leave that
country.
I think those are sort of the root causes of the suffering
in Venezuela, but I also believe firmly that a negotiated
process between the Unitary Platform and the Maduro regime is
the best way forward, a process led by Venezuelans themselves,
and we should be flexible and creative in supporting that
process.
Senator Murphy. I agree the primary and proximate cause is
the unconscionable immoral leadership of the Maduro regime, but
our sanctions can be contributory and they can provide a
diversion for Maduro so as to blame the economic suffering in
the nation on us rather than have it land on his shoulders, and
I just hope that that is a consideration that we weigh.
I wanted to ask, Mr. Robinson, one question of you with
respect to gun violence and small arms proliferation in Mexico.
Despite increased troop deployments by the Mexican Government
to try to help address the violence in that country, homicides
have continued to rise.
The statistics suggest that over 70 percent of the guns
that are recovered at Mexican crime scenes originated in the
United States, and earlier this year the Mexican Government
went so far as to file a lawsuit accusing American gun
manufacturers of helping to fuel the rise in violence by
knowingly flooding Mexico with firearms that are designed to
end up in the hands of the cartels.
What is the Administration doing to try to cut down on the
flow of illegal arms and the arms trade into Mexico?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That question came up
earlier this year during the High-Level Security Dialogue,
which I participated in, in Mexico, and we have committed to
working--we, my interagency partners at DEA and FBI and ATF,
have committed to working more closely with Mexican officials
on the illegal arms trade and the flows of arms and money,
frankly, from the United States to Mexico.
Senator Murphy. I look forward to working with you on that
as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just say to
both of you thank you for your service and appreciate your
comments today.
Secretary Nichols, you and I have had some good
conversations regarding the kidnappings in Haiti and I want to
dig a little deeper into that today and find out where we are.
I do appreciate your personal involvement in this.
For those who do not follow this closely, there is an Ohio-
based group in my home state of Ohio called Christian Aid
Ministries that had 17 people kidnapped in Haiti. It happened 6
weeks ago and, typically, as I understand it, these kidnappings
result in some resolution prior to that time. So I am very
concerned about it. Two hostages have been released. I guess
that is encouraging, but of the remaining hostages, the 15,
there are children as well, one very young child.
Again, I appreciate our conversations about it. This
committee has expressed its concern on this. We actually passed
an amendment last month requiring the State Department to work
better on an interagency basis to coordinate efforts on
kidnappings in Haiti and to address the broader issue of
violence.
This criminal gang, the 400 Mawozo gang, is responsible. I
have also spoken to the FBI director about this and made sure
that we are doing everything we can from the law enforcement
point of view to resolve this issue.
Can you give me the status today of what is being done by
the State Department and by the U.S. Government to rescue these
missionaries?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The issue of kidnapping for ransom in Haiti is a grave one.
I believe 41 U.S. persons--U.S. citizens and legal permanent
residents--have been kidnapped for ransom in Haiti in 2021.
The embassy country team, including U.S. law enforcement
agencies, are cooperating with Haitian police authorities to
support a resolution of this case. It is one of deep concern.
We saw the release of two U.S. citizens who had been
kidnapped in connection with that case and we hope that there
will be a rapid resolution and favorable resolution for the
remainder of those who have been kidnapped.
Senator Portman. Secretary Nichols, are you staying
personally involved in this?
Mr. Nichols. I am personally involved in it and I am in
contact with our embassy in Port-au-Prince on the situation
every day.
Senator Portman. I appreciate that, and if there is
anything you think we should be doing we are not doing I would
ask you to let me know and we will continue to help however we
can in terms of expressing our deep concern, but we have to
rely on people on the ground doing the right thing and making
sure this is a priority. I thank you for that.
Let me change to another topic, which is the drug issue. We
have a crisis right now, and a couple charts here have arrived
just in time that I took to the floor of the Senate last night.
I recently was on a congressional delegation with Senator
Kaine, who is here with us today, and we went to various
countries in the region, including Ecuador, Colombia,
Guatemala, and Mexico and met with the President of Mexico and,
of course, raised this issue. I think it should be the top
issue in our bilateral relationship with Mexico today.
Senator Murphy just mentioned the gun issue, totally
related to this issue. These transnational criminal
organizations are selling drugs into the United States, making
a tremendous profit and, yes, cash and drugs, cash and guns,
are coming back into Mexico and that means it is an issue for
both Mexico and for us in a very significant way.
Here is the crisis and it is pretty extraordinary. We have
got 100,000 people who died in America of drug overdoses during
the most recent 12-month period for which we have data, which
would be April to April.
It is probably worse than that now. That is a record. That
is more people than die from gunshot wounds and traffic
accidents combined.
[Chart is shown.]
Here is what is happening. The blue line is the number of
overdose deaths related to fentanyl, which is a synthetic
opioid produced primarily now in Mexico. You can see we have
gone--from 2015 the blue line keeps going up to 2020. In 2020,
well over half of the overdose deaths in this country were from
one drug and that is fentanyl. Also, crystal meth plays a role
here, cocaine plays a role, other drugs that originate in
Mexico as well, but this fentanyl issue is just overwhelming.
Let us look at this next chart. You can see what is
happening right now. On the U.S. border, we were told that last
month there was a 42 percent increase in 1 month of fentanyl
seizures, and what the Border Patrol agents will tell you
privately is that they are not catching the vast majority of
it.
Here it is, seeing it from 2016 up to 2021 you can see the
increase in fentanyl seizures. We have a huge crisis. This is a
killer drug and it is not slowing down. People have supply
chain issues in this country right now. The transnational
criminal organizations do not have a supply chain issue. They
are figuring out a way to do it.
What specific steps, Mr. Nichols, have you asked the
Government of Mexico to take under the Bicentennial Framework
for Security to stop the flow of fentanyl and other illicit
drugs into the United States?
Mr. Nichols. If I could, I would like to ask my colleague,
Todd Robinson----
Senator Portman. I am going to ask him a question in a
minute, too.
Mr. Nichols. Okay. So----
Senator Portman. If I have time, which I do not.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Nichols. Yes. Together we met with Mexican authorities
and stressed the importance of coordinated intelligence-driven
operations to take down drug trafficking networks, move away
from the going after the capo-led approach to one that takes
down entire networks. Better intelligence sharing, better
cooperation between Mexican authorities and U.S. law
enforcement.
We have already seen progress in that area in terms of
closer cooperation, better access for our law enforcement
officials. As you know, fentanyl is smaller in size, cheaper to
produce, and easier to smuggle. It is a very tough nut to
crack.
Todd and I worked together on this issue when we were both
in INL and we continue to work shoulder-to-shoulder with our
Mexican colleagues to try and defeat this problem.
Senator Portman. My time has expired. I appreciate the
indulgence, and Secretary Robinson, I will follow up with you
on what INL specifically is doing and whether it is a high
enough priority.
Secretary Nichols, again, thanks for your personal
involvement on the kidnapping issue. Sorry to take so much
time.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair, and to our witnesses
thank you so much for your service. I want to talk about two
things, Colombia and the Northern Triangle.
I agree with Senator Rubio's position that the first thing
we should do is make sure we have strong relations with our
allies and shore up democracies, and Colombia has been a great
ally.
Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not have a problem with
the Biden administration's delisting of FARC. Today is the
fifth anniversary of the peace deal that was done between the
Santos administration and FARC, and I would hope that virtually
everybody on the committee would view that as an historic
achievement. President Santos won the Nobel Peace Prize for it.
I think the U.S. deserves some significant credit for it.
We were involved in those negotiations. I think the delisting
at the--essentially, at the 5-year anniversary of the peace
deal was the right decision.
The Colombian architect of the peace negotiation, Sergio
Jaramillo, said, ``For the Biden administration, this is a low
cost thing to do. It sends the signal to the FARC it has been 5
years, you have done your bit, behaved properly, and we are
delisting you.''
The U.S. envoy who was involved in the peace negotiation,
who is one of our finest diplomats, Bernard Aronson, said, ``If
groups that were once violent revolutionary groups are never
allowed to get off the list that is one less incentive for them
to make peace. You undermine incentives for other groups to
renounce terrorism and renounce violent struggle.''
I think the decision to remove the FARC after 5 years of
participating in a new life and a new chapter in Colombian
life, but designated groups like the FARC-EP, like Segunda
Marquetalia, and as far as I know, ELN is still on the
terrorist list, correct?
Mr. Nichols. Correct.
Senator Kaine. So there is three Colombian groups who are
carrying out terrorist activities that are on the list. I think
it is the right thing to do and I just wanted to start there.
Let me go to the Northern Triangle. Honduras, Guatemala, El
Salvador--I note that none of them have been invited to
participate in the Summit for Democracy next week.
Nicaragua has not been invited. Haiti has not been invited.
Bolivia has not been invited. Venezuela has not been invited.
Cuba has not been invited. None of the Northern Triangle
nations.
We have invested billions and billions of dollars in this
region and, yet, none of the Northern Triangle nations have
been invited to participate.
I will just say, parenthetically, with this summit coming
up next week, I am a little bit surprised that no one I know in
the Senate has received any outreach about what we think are
topics that should be brought up in the summit, and to be on
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to have surveyed my
colleagues here and on the Intel Committee and on the Armed
Services Committee and said, has anyone reached out to you
about the Summit for Democracy, and so far everyone has told me
no, I am a little surprised at that.
There is going to be a Summit for the Americas next summer,
August of 2022. The U.S. is hosting for the first time in 25
years. I would hope that those preparing for that summit might
decide that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had some
expertise and might want to reach out and get our ideas about
it.
Back to the Northern Triangle. The elections in Nicaragua
were a sham. Senator Rubio and I wrote a letter to you all, and
I know Senator Merkley had one, too, about concerns about
elections in Honduras.
If I read the OAS reports, it looks like thus far maybe
things are exceeding our expectations there. The count is not
yet done so we could not celebrate prematurely.
El Salvador has backslid after the first election of a
president who was not part of the FMLN or was not part of the
right-wing death squad groups from the past, promised that
there might be a new chapter in Salvadoran life.
The President of El Salvador is behaving like an
authoritarian. Even maybe our best partner in the region,
Guatemala, has backslid even since Senator Portman and I were
there in July in terms of sacking anti-corruption prosecutors,
and I gather that is the reason that they have not been invited
to participate.
This is a hugely important region to us. Much of the
immigration crisis at the border is being driven by instability
in the Northern Triangle. Much of the drug trade that ravages
our communities is being driven by instability in the Northern
Triangle.
Talk to us a little bit about this particular part of the
Americas and what the Biden administration hopes to accomplish
there.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a critical
part of the region for us.
I was in Honduras last week. I met with the leading
presidential candidates. In every meeting, I urged the
importance of a peaceful, free, fair, transparent electoral
process. Talked to the press about that. As you note, it
appears at this juncture we have achieved that, or let me
rephrase that, that the Honduran people have achieved that with
the support of the international community.
The region is one that has seen drops in incomes over the
past decade, problems due to climate change, challenges due to
the gang-related violence and, above all, intense acute
corruption from key leaders in the Northern Triangle.
We are working to address all of those issues and I think
we have made progress in that, but we still have a long way to
go and we are dealing with entrenched elites, political and
economic elites, who do not see reform as their friend and we
need to push both using carrots and sticks to encourage change.
I am hopeful that in Honduras we are going to see the kinds
of change that we have been asking. The leading candidate at
this moment has stated her commitment to attack corruption, to
deal with the causes and drivers of migration, and to promote
jobs and better incomes in her country. We look forward to
working with her in that regard.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. My time is up, but I appreciate
the answer. I will yield it back to the chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I understand
that now we have Senator Young on WebEx.
Senator Young. Yes, Chairwoman. Thank you so much and,
welcome, Ambassador Nichols.
Ambassador Nichols, previous administrations have rightly
noted that the Caribbean is, effectively, a third border with
the United States. I think--at the time I served in the Marine
Corps back in the 1990s as a member of a joint task force and I
was operating on the southern border, working in collaboration
with some other countries to deal with issues like illegal
migration and drug trafficking, and, of course, at the same
time, we were promoting strong trading relationships with
countries in the Caribbean.
We are seeing a growing decline in democracy and governance
in that region. We have seen instability in Haiti lead to
migration and persons descending on our own borders and fleeing
chaos.
We have seen authoritarian governments throughout the area,
Cuba in particular, that has continued its subversive
activities. Then migration has destabilized many countries as
populations have fled economic stagnation and uncertainty.
So, Mr. Ambassador, I just want to know how does the
Administration view the Caribbean? Do you see it as a sort of
sea-based third border with the United States?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I would just note that
the Caribbean is a crucial partner for us in a crucial region,
one where we need to stay engaged.
The Bahamas is only 41 miles away from the United States,
and when we look throughout the Caribbean region we see
countries that want opportunities, want to partner with us,
face substantial challenges, and our engagement, our support,
those things are going to be crucial for them to resist the
pressures that they are under, both economic and political.
Senator Young. To what extent does ongoing drug trafficking
in the Caribbean and the Northern Triangle countries undermine
our democracy promotion programs?
Mr. Nichols. It is a major challenge. I do not know if my
colleague, Ambassador Robinson, wants to add to that.
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely. We know that drug traffickers use
the same routes that they are moving people, that they are
moving guns, that they are moving money, they move drugs, and
so we see it as a significant challenge for us and a threat to
our national security.
We have, fortunately, a very good relationship with the
governments in the Caribbean and work very closely with them on
training and equipment to help them help us target those routes
and to try to keep the drugs from reaching our shores.
Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Nichols, I know some of my colleagues have asked
questions pertaining to China and how they are seeking to
undermine democracy in Latin America. This was covered
extensively by this year's report from the U.S.-China Economic
and Security Review Commission.
Do you believe the U.S. has the capability to counter
China's efforts to undermine democracy in Latin America? If
not, what else do we need so that we might counter China's
efforts--what we feel is appropriate?
Mr. Nichols. I think we do have that capability, Senator,
but we need to use all the tools available to us. I think the
Development Finance Corporation is an important tool that gives
us the ability to support private sector-led growth in the
region.
The COVAX consortium and our efforts to supply COVID
vaccines to countries in the region is vital. Our presence in
the region is crucial in my travels and meetings with over 20
foreign ministers and governments since I have taken on my
duties.
Senator Young. Mr. Ambassador--I just regret my time is
very limited here--does the Administration have a strategic
policy laid out for countering China in the region? You have
just gone through a list. Is there actually a written strategy?
Mr. Nichols. We are working both within the State
Department and the interagency to sharpen our strategy for the
region and it is an ongoing process within the department.
Deputy Secretary Sherman is leading that effort.
Senator Young. Will that be a written work product which
you can share to me and other members of the committee?
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
Senator Young. Okay. We will follow up and receive a time
frame for that, unless you want to volunteer it to me.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
both for being here today and for your ongoing good work.
Ambassador Robinson, I would like to begin with you because
New Hampshire, like Ohio, has a very difficult problem with
substance misuse, and as I hear from law enforcement and our
DEA agents, the majority of those drugs are coming across our
southern border from Mexico.
So I wonder, just to follow up on Senator Portman's
question, what specifically are we doing with Mexico to try and
address this problem? Because whatever we have been doing has
not been working.
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, and I agree with you.
There is nothing more heartbreaking than what drugs like
fentanyl is doing to our communities across the United States.
I was just in Mexico, along with my colleague, Brian, for
negotiations at the High-Level Security Dialogue. We work very
closely with the Government of Mexico. They have agreed with us
on a number--on an accord that lists a number of things that we
are going to do, including greater cooperation on intel
exchange, working more closely within the interagency, with our
partners in the interagency, the FBI, DEA. They have just
agreed to more visas for DEA agents in Mexico.
I think one of aspects that we miss that is not as public
is the great work we do--we, INL, and the interagency--with the
state and local Mexican--state and local governments in Mexico.
They clamor for greater opportunities to cooperate and
collaborate with us on security issues, on equipment, on
training. We are trying to keep up with the demand.
The only--the last thing I would say is we have some work
to do at home on this issue as well. If we cannot get a handle
on the demand side for these drugs----
Senator Shaheen. Clearly. I, certainly--you do not have to
argue that with me. I would, certainly, agree with that, and we
are working hard in New Hampshire and I know in other states to
try and address that. Thank you very much.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, as a region, Latin America has
among the highest rates of violence against women and girls in
the world. This has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic
and, of course, it has been exacerbated in Venezuela where we
have seen women and girls flee that country and be subject to
sexual assault and other means of gender-based violence.
Can you talk about what the Administration's policy is to
help support Venezuelan women and girls?
Mr. Nichols. Our goal is to combat sexual and gender-based
violence throughout the hemisphere, but migrants and,
particularly, Venezuelan migrants are exceptionally vulnerable
to gender-based violence.
We work to provide training to first responders. We partner
with international organizations like the International
Organization for Migration and the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees to provide support to combat gender-based violence.
We fund shelters along the migrant route as well as in a
variety of countries in the hemisphere. We work with gender
champions, and when I was ambassador to Peru I was very honored
to work with Arlette Contreras, who won our International Woman
of Courage Award while I was there.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Obviously, we have more work to
do, but can you speak to the challenges that we face because we
do not have ambassadors in a number of Latin American countries
and what that means for our ability to enact foreign policy
that is in the best interests of American citizens?
Mr. Nichols. An ambassador is crucial. They are the
President's personal representative. They can deliver tough
messages that no one else can.
They are our highest ranking officers who have a level of
understanding and discernment that informs Washington
policymaking and their presence also signifies the importance
of the relationship. While not having an ambassador should not
be seen as a slight, that is often how it is perceived.
Senator Shaheen. Something that we, certainly, need to do
everything we can to move forward in Congress. I would just
like to point out I had a recent case in my office where a New
Hampshire citizen's daughter was in the hospital.
She was having real issues with the hospital, and after
they got a call from the embassy, the attitude in the hospital
and the treatment of that family changed dramatically.
It is that kind of difference that our embassies and our
ambassadors make in countries not only in Latin America, but
around the world. Hopefully, we can get these people confirmed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Assistant Secretary Nichols, it is good to see you again.
During your nomination hearing in May, you committed to
working with me and this committee to curb illegal immigration
and to address the root causes of this ongoing border crisis.
I want to first ask you just a couple of basic questions.
Yes or no answers will be fine. First, do you agree that to
solve the border crisis the United States needs policies and
diplomatic agreements to discourage illegal immigration?
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
Senator Hagerty. My second question, do you agree that
making it easier to cross the border and remain in the United
States tends to encourage people to come here illegally, all
else being equal?
Mr. Nichols. We should encourage orderly legal migration--
--
Senator Hagerty. I agree with you.
Mr. Nichols. --while combating irregular migration.
Senator Hagerty. I agree with you on that.
In May of 2021, I traveled to Guatemala and Mexico to meet
with government officials about long-term strategies to address
the border crisis. These officials told me that the key root
cause of the crisis is that the Biden administration is sending
a message that if you cross the border right now you will be
allowed to stay in the United States.
This message is being sent because the Biden administration
canceled common sense policies like the migrant protection
protocols, the remain in Mexico policy, policies and diplomatic
agreements with Mexico that were hard negotiated by the
previous administration.
These policies require that persons crossing the border
from Mexico and seeking asylum in the United States, rather,
should remain in Mexico and not be released into the United
States while their asylum claims are being adjudicated. This
policy made sense to me and, I think, to many others.
We should not allow people who do not have valid asylum
claims to enter the United States for any period of time, and
if a migrant knows that simply by crossing the border he or she
can achieve indefinite release into the United States, often
for years before their asylum claim is heard or permanently if
they simply decide not to show up, then that is an enormous
incentive to cross the border right now.
Yet, despite court orders to the contrary, the Biden
administration is still trying to terminate these policies and
these diplomatic agreements that were so hard fought.
So, Ambassador Nichols, why, in the face of record illegal
immigration, is the Biden administration terminating policies
and diplomatic agreements that would otherwise serve to reduce
migrants' incentive to illegally cross the border?
Mr. Nichols. The migrant protection protocols is subject to
ongoing litigation. The Administration is committed to
following the law and court orders. I cannot get into this in
greater detail due to that ongoing litigation.
I will note that our cooperation with Mexico on the full
range of migration issues is excellent. The first trip that I
took was to Haiti and, among other things, I talked to the
Prime Minister about migration issues.
I accompanied Secretary Blinken to Colombia where we had a
regional migration conference to address illegal irregular
migration to deal with issues related to the root causes, to
promote regular migration, to attack trafficking networks, and
we are committed to following up and pushing on these issues
every day.
Senator Hagerty. I have got it. I appreciate the meetings
and the conferences, but I will note this. The Biden
administration is actually trying to undo these diplomatic
agreements that were put in place and were working.
I think it is very simple. Obey the law. That is what the
Fifth Circuit has suggested. That is the proper answer here.
Ambassador Robinson, I would like to turn to you, if I
might. The fentanyl problem that is plaguing the United States
is getting worse. We have talked about this--Senator Shaheen,
Senator Portman.
In Tennessee, overdose rates for individuals who are aged
25 to 34 have skyrocketed from 4.8 per 100,000 in 2015 to 37.6
per 100,000 in 2019, and every time I am home, I hear from
local sheriffs that it has gotten much worse this year.
Memphis' Commercial Appeal, our large newspaper in our
state, a few days ago interviewed Tennessee's former opioid
czar and he said, ``I cannot remember the last time I have
looked at a drug screening of a new patient coming off the
street that did not have fentanyl in it.''
Mexico is the major transit and production point for
fentanyl, the fentanyl that is coming from China before it
enters the United States.
While direct shipments of finished fentanyl from China to
the U.S. have declined after the Trump administration's
crackdown, the amount of fentanyl shipped from Mexico has
increased dramatically, and I have been told that more than 90
percent of that fentanyl crossing the border or at least the
chemicals that are used to make it--the precursors--comes from
China. I mean, these drugs are killing Americans.
Assistant Secretary Robinson, what percentage of fentanyl
coming across our border ultimately originates in China,
including the precursor chemicals?
Mr. Robinson. I would say a great percentage. I do not have
a specific number, but I would say a great percentage comes
from China.
Senator Hagerty. I will ask both Ambassador Nichols and
Ambassador Robinson if you would commit to putting together an
estimate for me and for this committee how much of this
fentanyl coming from China--what percentage of it is coming
from China, whether it is precursor or actual fentanyl, coming
across the border into America annually and how much of it
specifically can be traced to China.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your testimony and for your service.
Secretary Robinson, a question with respect to Haiti. I
understand you had a trip there recently and, as you know, it
is a desperate situation.
As I understand it, right now gangs control about half of
Port-au-Prince, hijacking fuel, kidnapping people for ransom.
Senator Portman mentioned the 17 U.S. and Canadian missionaries
that were abducted, 15 who are still being held.
What is your proposal as to what the United States can and
should be doing right now with respect to the situation in
Haiti?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Very,
very important.
As you noted, I was there 2 weeks ago, I think. I had an
opportunity to meet with the prime minister, Prime Minister
Henry, the acting Minister of Justice, and the new Director
General of the Police.
We have also sent advisors down to assess the situation and
look at mid- to long-term actions we can take in terms of
advising on setting up a new SWAT unit that will directly go
after gang leaders for prosecution either in Haiti or in the
United States.
It is, as you know, much more complicated than that. There
are political parties, there are political and economic elites
that support these gangs. We know this.
We are trying to track the money and we are going to use
every punitive measure we have to go after the elites that are
supporting these gangs and to go after the money of these
gangs.
Senator Van Hollen. That raises a question. As you point
out, a lot of the elites are supporting the gangs. Is there a
risk of a coup, essentially, led by the gangs with the support
of the elites and what measures are we taking to try to prevent
that?
Mr. Robinson. I do not know if there is a risk of--what I
should say is there are many risks in Haiti today. After the
assassination of the president, certainly, anything is
possible.
We believe that if we continue to work with the current
government officials, certainly, the current--the new director
general of the police, if we can train them, if we can equip
them, if we can give them the foundation they need to go after
these gangs we will lessen many of those risks.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that.
Secretary Nichols, there was an alarming poll in The
Economist by a reputable polling organization that showed a big
drop in the percentage of Latin Americans who believe democracy
is important to their future. It said 49 percent, so just less
than half of the population.
You see a number of trends in the region where people are
sort of cracking down or preventing independent judiciary and a
number of other concerning developments. In the case of Brazil,
you have the current president, who has, essentially, stated
that he will either be killed or he will win in the next
election, and there has been concern expressed about whether or
not the elections next year will be free and fair and
accurately counted.
Can you talk a little bit about your assessment of the
situation in Brazil?
Mr. Nichols. Brazil is an important partner. It is a
country with whom we have robust dialogue and exchange.
National Security Adviser Sullivan has been there. Their
national security adviser has visited us.
We will have a number of high-level visits and engagements
early in the New Year, Omicron variant permitting, and one of
the topics that we discussed is democracy in the hemisphere and
the importance of jointly working to continue to build
democracy in our hemisphere.
We stress that we have seen challenges in our own nation,
as you well know, Senator, and they need to take steps to
ensure that their institutions can meet any tests that are put
before them.
Senator Van Hollen. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to the elections next year, do you expect them
to be conducted in a free and fair manner or do you have
concerns as of the present moment?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that they will be conducted in a
free and fair manner and I believe that Brazil's institutions
will meet the test. Every nation--and, again, we have seen this
in our own country--every nation has to strengthen its
institutions because they are not only weakened by cynicism and
corruption on the inside, in many cases, but they are also
being attacked from outside our hemisphere very actively and we
need to be cognizant of that.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Appreciate it. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome.
Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Nichols, I would like to start with Mexico. I am
increasingly concerned that the Mexican Government is engaged
in a systematic campaign to undermine American companies and
especially American energy companies that have invested in our
shared prosperity and in the future of the Mexican people and
economy.
Over the past 5 months, Mexican regulators have shut down
three privately-owned fuel storage terminals. Among those, they
shut down a fuel terminal in Tuxpan which is run by an American
company based in Texas and which transports fuel on ships owned
by American companies.
This is a pattern of sustained discrimination against
American companies and I worry that the Mexican Government's
ultimate aim is to roll back the country's historic 2013 energy
sector liberalization reforms in favor of Mexico's mismanaged
and failing state-owned energy companies.
The only way the Mexican Government is going to slow and
reverse their campaign is if the United States Government
conveys clearly and candidly that their efforts pose a serious
threat to our relationship and to our shared economic
interests.
I hope that the Biden administration is willing to do that
and I want to ask you some questions about that specifically.
What leverage do you believe the United States Government
has and what leverage should we use to secure a course
correction in Mexico's behavior?
Mr. Nichols. We have an incredibly complex and rich
relationship with Mexico. We have a structure for that
relationship under the USMCA and the integration of our energy
markets in North America and our supply chains in North America
is critical.
We are Mexico's largest trading partner, and thousands and
thousands of Americans and Mexicans cross the border every day
as part of that relationship.
Senator Cruz. How concerned are you about the Mexican
Government's behavior and, in particular, their targeting of
American companies?
Mr. Nichols. I do not believe that the Mexican Government
is targeting American companies. I think the other point that
you made about consolidating the energy sector in public hands
rather than private hands is more the issue because they are
not----
Senator Cruz. So you believe they are targeting just all
private energy companies, Mexican and American?
Mr. Nichols. Yes. Yes.
Senator Cruz. Is that a good thing for America? Is that a
good thing for Mexico?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that we need to talk in a
comprehensive way with our Mexican partners about the
importance of energy security and how the private sector is
vital to maintaining energy security for the Americas.
Senator Cruz. Let me try again, Mr. Nichols.
In your judgment, would Mexico destroying the private
energy sector in Mexico and nationalizing or throwing out
American companies and moving everything to the corrupt and
failing state-owned energy companies, would that be a good
thing for Mexico and would that be a good thing for America?
Mr. Nichols. It is important that we talk to Mexico about a
future of reliable energy, a future where our energy markets
can remain integrated, where the private sector plays a leading
role, particularly in working together to achieve a role----
Senator Cruz. I have to say, Mr. Nichols, that your answer
is discouraging because if you are not willing to tell me
candidly that Mexico nationalizing energy and targeting
American companies is a bad thing, then I have even less
confidence that you are willing to convey that to Mexico.
Let me shift to another country, Colombia. This morning,
the Biden administration removed the FARC--the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia--from the list of foreign terrorist
organizations.
The FARC is an organization of Marxist-Leninist narco
terrorists. For decades, they have killed, they have kidnapped,
they have extorted Colombians. They have murdered and seized
American citizens. They continue to pose an acute threat to
Colombian security and to American interests across the region.
This is, sadly, a part of a pattern of Biden foreign policy
when it comes to dealing with terrorists and it is a pattern of
appeasement and weakness towards terrorists.
It is a pattern we have seen with the Taliban and the
absolute disaster in Afghanistan. It is a pattern we have seen
with the Houthis in Yemen where, again, the Biden
administration lifted sanctions on them, and it is a pattern
that has led to disaster.
Given that appeasement did not work with the Houthis in
Yemen, given that it did not work with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, why does the Administration believe that weakness
and appeasement and delisting the FARC as terrorists will
produce anything but terrible results in Colombia? What makes
you think weakness towards these terrorists is going to be
successful?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
The Administration is focused on the current terror threat.
We designated the FARC-EP and the Segunda Marquetalia, the two
active elements that are carrying out terrorist attacks.
We continue to have a $10 million reward for alias Ivan
Marquez, the head of the Segunda Marquetalia. We are focusing
on supporting the peace process 5 years in and those elements
of the prior FARC.
Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question because my time has
expired. If and when the FARC responds to being delisted with
more violence and more terrorism, will you commit to coming
before this committee and admitting that it was a mistake to
pretend they were not terrorists and it was a mistake for
President Biden to delist them today?
Mr. Nichols. I am always available to appear before this
committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador
Nichols, thank you for your service.
I particularly want to focus on Honduras. We have the early
returns favoring the Libre Party and the woman who ran against
corruption. Many people see this as a referendum on corruption
in Honduras, but there is a lot of concern that yesterday the
counting was suspended for 10 hours and that the counting is
not disclosed for the National Assembly, their congress. We
know this is a nation that has had military coups in the past,
including Ms. Castro's husband, who was ousted by a coup in
2009.
There is an opportunity here, an incredible opportunity,
that the United States has to seize it with both hands and to
send a powerful message that no military coup will be tolerated
because one could happen a week from now.
The power elites are deeply entrenched. The corruption
extends to the mayors, the legislators, the police, the
military, all the way down. No one should underestimate how
difficult it is when this type of corruption permeates every
level of authority in the country right down to gangs that
control the street vendors.
It is a possibility, but a challenging moment, and I would
just like to hear what measures the State Department is taking
to make sure: A, there is not a military coup; second, that the
counting is completed in an honest fashion; third, that there
is not shenanigans that occur with the National Assembly trying
to undermine her ability to get anything done.
I must say I am impressed that she campaigned on restoring
the international corruption investigators, MACCIH, which was
the team that started to finally tackle corruption at its
highest levels in Honduras and that the previous president and
his allies shut down.
She is promising to bring them back. She is promising to
address inequality that is at the foundation of the deep
desperation of millions of Hondurans and that helps drive
migration, and when President Biden's team talks about root
causes, therefore, she is talking about root causes.
So what are we going to do to make the most of this rare
moment of a promising opportunity?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
This time last week I was in Honduras. I met with Xiomara
Castro and Tito Asfura, had meetings with the Foreign Minister,
the Public Security Minister, Defense Minister, Chief of
Defense. I talked about the importance of free, fair,
transparent elections, and the importance of a peaceful process
where everyone respects the outcome.
I met with the National Electoral Council, talked about
their vital role in ensuring a free, fair, transparent, and
peaceful process.
Following my meetings with them, both of the leading
candidates put out statements reiterating their commitment to
respect the results and encouraging their supporters to remain
patient and peaceful throughout that process.
We have embassy observers on the ground in Honduras who
also partnered with the Organization of American States and
there was an EU electoral observation mission. Through USAID we
supported the civil society broad umbrella effort to observe
the elections.
There are observers who are with the Electoral Council
taking a look at the actual vote-counting process. There were,
as I think you noted, some technical issues in the vote count
process, but there are international observers at every stage
looking at how that is working. The----
Senator Merkley. Let me cut to the chase here because those
conversations were fine and good. I am glad you sent those
messages.
Are we conveying that there will be significant powerful
consequences if there is a military coup or if the voting count
is suspended or corrupted in some form here at the last moment,
to try to give a new assembly and a new president a real chance
to enact reforms? If so, what is that message we are sending,
if you are free to share?
Mr. Nichols. Again, in my conversations with the leading
officials, including the Defense Minister, the Foreign
Minister, the Chief of Defense and the Minister of Public
Security, they reiterated to me their commitment to free, fair
elections and respecting the result.
If there were some violation of that commitment that would
be unacceptable, and we have the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, we have the Organization of American States, and we
have ample confidence that all parties are going to respect
this outcome.
Senator Merkley. Okay. My time is up. I will just conclude
by noting that people always give assurances until the moment a
military coup starts or the counting is suspended and not
resumed.
I am specifically encouraging that we send a very strong
message that there will be concrete consequences should this
fail to happen, which is different than a positive--just a
positive encouragement, because we have seen this go off the
rails many times before and we should be absolutely there
accelerating the return of the international investigators that
she has called for as soon as she is in office.
I hope the National Assembly will be one that she can work
with. If not, none of her reforms will be able to move through.
It is extraordinarily frustrating to see how the corruption
has infiltrated throughout every level, again, clear down to
the street level, and how difficult it is to reform, and all of
our root causes strategy will not work when a society operates
on that complete 100 percent corruption from top to bottom.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker is with us virtually.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. I appreciate
both Mr. Nichols and Mr. Robinson being here. I want to jump
right in.
I know this issue was discussed a little bit earlier, but I
would like to get back to it. Reports really suggest that both
China and Russia are engaging in an active propaganda and
disinformation campaign in Latin America, as they are doing in
other parts of the world, obviously, but China and Russia have
really sought to undermine the democratic values and damage the
overall reputation of the United States.
So I am wondering what is the State Department's Global
Engagement Center doing to counter the Chinese and Russian
government's disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean,
and what more could the GEC do in the future?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
Our focus is ensuring that, one, we identify where the
negative messaging trolls are coming from, that we work with
friendly governments to alert them to what the realities are,
that we actively message the reality of the situations that we
are facing, that we have very direct and comprehensive
conversations with governments in the region as well as civil
society and publics about the realities of what the presence of
PRC, Russia, others, in the region, and we need to also offer a
positive alternative.
Whether it is 5G technology or whether it is support for
infrastructure projects, we are actively working to make sure
that countries know that there are alternatives available to
them and that we will work with them to put together a package
that works for their nation.
Senator Booker. Mr. Nichols, could you just be a little
more specific about the tactics of the GEC? What are some of
the specific activities they are doing and what more would you
like to see them do?
Mr. Nichols. The Global Engagement Center both measures
public opinion and social media trends throughout the world.
They actively work to counter false messages from our strategic
competitors and they prepare media products or talking points
that our embassies and consulates around the hemisphere can use
to combat disinformation.
I think they do a great job. Obviously, it is a huge task.
The resources that they have to bring to bear to this limit
somewhat the ability to accomplish those goals, but I think
they are doing vital, vital work.
Senator Booker. Just jumping really quick to Haiti--and I
heard at least one of my colleagues bring up the severe issues
that are going on there--we are in a state of extreme crisis
and the democracy there is really faltering as violence is sort
of almost at pandemic levels throughout the country, not to
mention the challenges with the natural disasters that they--
that we have seen there.
I just want to know maybe overall, what is your sense of
hope in Haiti and how effective is the U.S. strategy there in
countering some of these both natural disasters as well as the
faltering of the democracy and the endemic violence?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you for that question, Senator.
The situation in Haiti is a critical challenge for our
hemisphere. Haiti faces collapsed government institutions, deep
political polarization, criminal and gang violence, lack of
economic progress.
We are working together with our partners around the world
to try and support the Haitian people at this crucial moment
and to promote a Haitian-led solution to those challenges.
That promotion means our advocacy and encouragement on the
ground, the leadership of our charge, Ken Merton. That involves
interaction at high levels whether it be Secretary Blinken or
other senior officials in Washington and collaboration with
international partners like Canada, France, Brazil, to support
Haiti.
Senator Booker. Then, lastly--I have a few seconds left--I
continue to be dissatisfied with the level of diversity at the
State Department, and I know there are a lot of good efforts
going on to try to get more diverse and inclusive members--
employees at the State Department and I, myself, have worked
with other senators to try to do things from sponsoring paid
internship programs and other fellowship programs.
I am curious if you have any advice for me who just--
especially as I travel the globe and visit with our State
Department employees, I am surprised at the lack of diversity.
I wonder if you have any advice to me about what more we could
be doing to promote diversity within the State Department.
Mr. Nichols. I think recruiting is the first crucial step.
I think the Fellowship Programs Rangel and Pickering are
vitally important. I think retention is crucial and in our
bureau we have several parallel programs to support retention
of a diverse workforce.
We have a Senior Foreign Service officer who actually led
the department's recruitment efforts, Marianne Scott, who leads
our diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts from the front
office and works not only to support that in Washington, but
also in all of our embassies and consulates around the world.
I think if you talk about the importance of diversity and
inclusion, when you visit our embassies and with foreign
partners, I think that definitely helps and I hope that you
will support our recruiting efforts in universities and
colleges around America.
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to you,
Ambassador Nichols, just want to talk about--in following up on
Senator Booker's questioning on Haiti, just want to make sure
that the actions which we are taking in Haiti are not
solidifying opportunists over the interests of the Haitian
people.
I saw where you met with representatives of the Montana
Group made up of Haitian citizens and civil society leaders in
late September. What were your takeaways from that meeting in
terms of how the United States should move forward with an
inclusive Haitian-led focused policy?
Mr. Nichols. My number-one takeaways are--number one was
the importance of security. We need better security be able to
get to free and fair elections in Haiti, and we are a long way
away from that. The role of civil society in its broadest
construct--private sector, nongovernmental organizations--is
vital, and bringing together a broad set of actors to agree on
a way forward without an artificially imposed time line from
the international community is also vital. Those would be my
main takeaways, sir.
Senator Markey. Okay. I just urge you to continue to reach
out to those civil society leaders in Haiti because,
ultimately, they have the vision which is going to be necessary
to just change this underlying historical dynamic which exists
there.
Thank you for your good work, but let us just continue to
focus on that community of leaders who are risking their lives
every day to try to provide the long-term vision for what has
to happen there.
Mr. Nichols. Absolutely.
Senator Markey. On the subject of--yes, sir?
Mr. Nichols. Just absolutely, Senator.
Senator Markey. Yes, thank you. On the subject of climate
change, the science is clear on the fact that climate change is
an underlying driver of widespread humanitarian crisis and
displacement throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
Therefore, I reintroduced legislation this year that aims
to create a U.S. resettlement pathway for climate-displaced
persons, given the United States bears an outsized
responsibility for fueling global warming. Still, the majority
of the CO2 is red, white, and blue after 200 years of leading
the Industrial Revolution.
I was glad to hear that in response to my persistent calls
for action on this topic there is now a National Security
Council Interagency Working Group aimed at finding solutions to
issues of climate migration.
Do either of you have anything more you can share on the
progress of this Interagency Working Group and what potential
solutions might be offered?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
I have not participated directly in that specific
conversation, but I can tell you that climate change and its
effects on the countries in our hemisphere is a central concern
that I have.
I had the pleasure of participating with Vice President
Harris in her meeting with Prime Minister Mia Mottley of
Barbados and that was a key topic in that conversation.
We are integrating climate issues into all of our
diplomatic engagement throughout the hemisphere and we are
actively focused on mitigation measures for those states most
at risk as well as adaptation, particularly in the energy
sector.
Senator Markey. I would urge you to continue to stay very
engaged on this very important issue. We have to tackle the
issues of climate resiliency and solutions for climate-
displaced persons, which is just going to increase as each year
goes by, and if we are doing that we are actually working on
one of the underlying drivers of mass migration coming out of
Latin America, coming out of the Caribbean.
I just urge you to continue to elevate it as an issue, to
drive it at the National Security Council as an issue that has
to be addressed and factored into all of the resultant issues
that are a consequence of our long-term ignoring of the climate
crisis.
Mr. Nichols. Absolutely, Senator.
Mr. Robinson. Senator, I would just add, it is even broader
than that. The environmental degradation from narcotics
trafficking throughout the region is also a major problem and
we are both working very closely with our partners in the
region.
We have seen the effects of illegal mining. We have seen
the effects of runoff from waste from drug trafficking or drug
production areas in Mexico and in Colombia, and we are working
to raise that as well.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you both for your great
work. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me have some final closing questions. Let me start off
with Haiti. A lot has been discussed here, but here is the one
thing I do not understand.
Haiti, obviously, is a challenge, number one, because of
the suffering of the Haitian people by both natural and manmade
disasters. It is destabilizing to its neighbor that it shares
the island of Hispaniola with, the Dominican Republic.
One is facing the challenges that the Haitian citizens are
facing. Fleeing the island is, clearly, may be a desirable
alternative. That means migration to--in the hemisphere and to
the United States.
These are real tangible challenges we are facing right now.
I have heard your answers about our overall goal of a Haitian-
led democratic process. I share that, but when Doctors Without
Borders are closing up because they cannot get fuel to operate
their circumstances, when I am getting calls from orphanages
that American sponsors who wants to close up the orphanages and
bring the children to the United States because they cannot
secure them, when people are sequestered and kidnapped, it
seems to me that none of that can happen in terms of our
aspirations for Haiti unless there is security.
What is our initiative to try to create some semblance of
security so that all these other things can happen?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That is a great question.
As I mentioned before, it is a complicated issue. We, INL,
are working very closely with the Haitian National Police, the
new Director General. We are going to send in advisors.
When I was there 2 weeks ago, I arrived with--they had
asked for greater ability to get police around the city. I
showed up with 19 new vehicles, 200 new protective vests for
the police. We are--the 19 was the first installment of a total
of 60 that we are going to deliver to the Haitian National
Police.
We are going to get advisors down there to work with the
new SWAT team to start taking back the areas that have been
taken from ordinary Haitians, but it is going to be a process
and it is going to take some time.
The Chairman. First of all, is the Haitian National Police
actually an institution capable of delivering the type of
security that Haitians deserve?
Mr. Robinson. We believe it is. It is an institution that
we have worked with in the past. There was a small brief moment
where Haitians actually acknowledged that the Haitian National
Police have gotten better and was more professional.
Our goal--our long-term goal is to try to bring it back to
that----
The Chairman. How much time before we get security on the
ground?
Mr. Robinson. I cannot say exactly, but we are working as
fast as we can.
The Chairman. Months? Years?
Mr. Robinson. I would hope we could do it in less than
months, but we are working as fast as we can.
The Chairman. Here is the problem. I do not understand why
there is a reticence to, for example, seek U.N. action to try
to create stability because nothing else--when the gangs
control the ports and everything you try to get to the Haitian
people are stopped at the ports because the gangs control it,
something is wrong.
How do you do all the things we want to do to help the
Haitian people if, at the end of the day, you cannot get
through the gangs?
Mr. Robinson. We are absolutely going to need--as you
rightly point out, we are absolutely going to need the help of
international organizations. We were a little bit stymied in
this just recently when we tried to extend the mandate of the
current group of police advisors.
We wanted to get them extended for a year, but we were
blocked by Russia and China and they were only able to be
extended for 9 months. It is going to take a collective effort.
The Chairman. Why do you think Russia and China sought
this? Because they want total unrest in the hemisphere. Their
whole purpose in this hemisphere is creating instability, is to
move people to a point of saying democracy does not work. Let
me try something else, authoritarianism.
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
The Chairman. They systematically work at it. At some
point, we have to think about how we circumvent that. Let me
turn to something else.
Secretary Nichols, in the Trafficking in Persons Report
that the State Department put out, Cuban doctors were listed as
among a group of people who were trafficked. Is that correct?
Mr. Nichols. That is correct.
The Chairman. When an entity like PAHO, the Pan American
Health Organization, uses Cuban doctors in a way that allows
them to be trafficked, should not we be doing something to
change that at PAHO?
Mr. Nichols. We have had strong conversations with the
leadership of PAHO about the unacceptable nature of that
relationship. We have talked about the importance of better
governance and oversight within that organization and that in
order for us to work with PAHO we need to be assured that
something like that can never be repeated.
The Chairman. They are continued, though. For example,
right now, Cuban doctors are being used inside of Mexico in a
way in which they are being trafficked. I understand that
trafficking in persons by a country, ultimately, is a violation
of the USMCA.
Mr. Nichols. We talk to all countries about the reality of
the Cuban medical missions program and that it is a massive
trafficking risk, and we encourage countries to avoid it. It is
an abuse of the Cuban people and it is a misguided attempt to
provide health care in the country.
The Chairman. When a country engages in it knowing that,
then there has to be some type of consequence. I mean, for
those who might be viewing and do not understand what we are
talking about, Cuba sends doctors to different countries in the
world.
They, ultimately--those countries pay the Cuban Government
for the service of those doctors. Those doctors get a fraction
of their wages and their passports are taken away so they
cannot leave.
That is human trafficking and it is being done right here
in our hemisphere with international organizations like PAHO
and done with countries who, supposedly, we have a relationship
with like Mexico, and there has to be consequences to it or
else we are complicit in the trafficking.
Let me ask you, with reference to Nicaragua and El
Salvador, Secretary Nichols, we can agree that in the case of
Nicaragua, we have a new dictatorship arising and in the case
of El Salvador, we have dramatic backsliding in democracy. Is
that a fair statement?
Mr. Nichols. Yes.
The Chairman. Both of them are part of DR-CAFTA. Should we
be considering suspending them as a action that is a strong
action to be taken so that we can, hopefully, turn the tide?
Mr. Nichols. I think we should be thinking about all the
tools that we have available to us. There is an urgency to
demonstrate to countries in the region that actions have
consequences.
The ability of countries to flaunt their own constitutions,
their own laws, to abuse their own citizens, is a huge problem
when we should use every tool available to----
The Chairman. I think that whatever the tools--one of the
strongest tools you can do is take away trade preferences. When
we entered DR-CAFTA, it was not with countries that were moving
in the opposite direction from democracy. They were moving
towards democracy.
They were moving towards a respect for human rights. They
were moving towards a respect for the rule of law. They should
not be able to benefit from trade preferences when they go in
the opposite direction. That is a strong action the
Administration can take and I recommend it to them.
Let me ask Secretary Robinson, while the United States has
traditionally stood with principled activists and public
officials that seek to reverse democratic backsliding, combat
kleptocracy, and uphold the rule of law, those courageous
individuals often face significant threats as a result of their
work.
Far too often these individuals are forced to flee their
countries when the situation becomes untenable or when they
finish their term in office.
I know you are familiar with these dynamics. What more does
the United States need to do to support those individuals who
stand against efforts to undermine democratic governance?
How can we address the challenge, for example, in Central
American countries where the problem is particularly acute?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That is a really
important question.
I would say we need to look at a basket of ways that we can
support and defend democracy in Central America and, frankly,
throughout the region. We need to continue to use all of our
sanctions authorities and vigorously use our sanctions
authorities.
We need to continue to work with those governments to shore
up their democratic institutions, independent attorneys-
general, judiciaries, the courts, prosecutors. We need to
continue to work very closely with these with these
organizations.
We need to find more flexible and creative ways to support
civil society and independent media in country so that they do
not--it is not easy to make them flee when they stand up and do
the right thing for democracy, for investigating corrupt acts,
and I look forward to working with you all on finding these
flexible and creative ways to do that.
I would say the last thing we need to do is we need to be
more vigorous on protecting and offering a safe haven for those
who do have to flee. It is a cumbersome process now. It is very
hard.
There are four courageous people, at least four courageous
people, from Guatemala that are being hosted here. There are
probably others from the region. It was hard to get them here
and, again, I look forward to working with you all to figure
out better ways, more efficient ways, that we can offer some
semblance of safety.
The Chairman. We, certainly, want to work with you on that
and other issues. Let me just say, though, when the corruption
fighter has to leave the country there is one less person to
try to create change.
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
The Chairman. So at the end of the day, we have to find
ways to strengthen their hand, to create international
spotlights on what they are doing, to make it more difficult
for regimes to threaten them and, ultimately, cause them to
leave because for them, for the regime, that is, ultimately, a
success story, right? This person leaves. Now there is one less
person to try to create change in the country.
Mr. Robinson. Senator, I would also add that we saw the
model that worked. I cannot remember who mentioned it, but I
think it was Senator Merkley mentioned MACCIH in Honduras.
We had international organizations in some of these
countries that were working and the reason they are not there
now is because they touched people in those countries in power
who had never been touched before, and I think if we can look
at that again we might have some more success.
The Chairman. Finally, Secretary Nichols, where did the
idea for delisting of the FARC come from?
Mr. Nichols. It has been something under discussion since
at least the previous administration. It was always
contemplated as part of the peace accord. You may recall that
when the Uribe administration reached an agreement with the AUC
paramilitaries, that organization was also delisted.
The Chairman. More recently, where--who drove the question
of delisting the FARC?
Mr. Nichols. It is----
The Chairman. Was it NSC? Was it State Department? Who was
it?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that this was--when I arrived in the
position that was already well advanced. So I cannot say who
the specific driver was. It was always a component of our
support for the peace process and updating the threats that we
face.
The Chairman. My understanding is that what you are doing
is sanctioning those who have not put their arms down and
delisting those that have and are following a peaceful path to
integration in their society.
This is an example of when I have pressed the question both
in nominations and with the Administration about consultation
versus notification, and in this particular case my
notification was to The Wall Street Journal.
That is not what I consider consultation, and the lack of
getting that type of consultation creates problems. I hope we
do not relive it again.
This hearing record will remain open to the close of
business tomorrow. Members who have questions will submit it by
then and we would like your answers to be expeditious and as
full as possible.
With that, and the thanks to the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols and Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jim Risch
Question. Can you explain why the Administration has not issued a
single sanction since it came to office?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has maintained a robust
sanctions policy against the Maduro regime and has lifted no previously
imposed sanctions. Those existing U.S. sanctions deny Maduro revenue
streams that finance repression and line the pockets of regime
officials; protect the U.S. financial system from exposure to corrupt
and illicit financial flows; and promote accountability for those who
undermine democracy, abuse human rights, or engage in corruption. We
continuously assess how best to align our sanctions approaches with our
policy goals and calibrate our sanctions policy to account for the
political and economic context of developments on the ground.
Sanctions comprise just one part of our strategy. We also work with
Venezuelan and international partners, using available diplomatic and
economic tools, to support the Venezuelan people in their peaceful
pursuit of democracy and freedom in Venezuela. So long as the Maduro
regime and its enablers repress the Venezuelan people and divert
revenue from Venezuela's resources to support repression and corrupt
practices, we will work with our international partners to keep up the
pressure.
Question. Does the Administration have a strict deadline for its
support of the ongoing negotiations between some Venezuelan political
parties and the Maduro regime?
Answer. We support the Venezuelan-led, comprehensive negotiations
as a means to restore to Venezuelans the democracy that they deserve
and to alleviate the suffering caused by the regime-created crisis in
Venezuela. A peaceful restoration of democracy, an end to human rights
abuses, and a solution to Venezuela's dire humanitarian crisis are long
overdue and should remain at the forefront of the Venezuelan-led
negotiation process, without externally imposed deadlines.
By suspending participation in the process, the regime has once
again placed its own interests above those of Venezuelans. Alongside
our partners and allies, we will continue calling on, and pressuring,
Maduro to return to the negotiation table in Mexico City.
Question. In your opinion, are the members of the Maduro regime
honest brokers to be trusted to cede power given current circumstances?
Answer. No. That's why the United States and others in the
international community need to keep pressure on Maduro and his regime
and help promote transparent, verifiable, and holistic changes under
which Venezuelans themselves can establish the conditions required for
free and fair elections, the best framework for a political resolution
to the crisis.
We stand with all Venezuelans striving to build a better future for
their country. The Maduro regime has engaged in a broad range of
authoritarian tactics, including arresting and harassing political and
civil society actors without justification; trying to criminalize
opposition voices; committing numerous human rights abuses;
manipulating voter registration rolls and the candidacies of opponents
from across the political spectrum; and engaging in persistent media
censorship. It lacks confidence in its own ability to face the
Venezuelan people in elections free of such manipulation and its
actions make clear to the world that its determination to cling to
power takes precedence have persistently shown the world their
nefarious intent and priorities far outweigh that over their own
Venezuelan citizens.
Maduro needs to return to the Mexico negotiations as a necessary
step towards improving the situation in Venezuela.
Question. What incentive does Maduro have in participating in the
negotiation process?
Answer. Meaningful progress in negotiations would serve the
interests of the Venezuelan people and lead the United States to review
our sanctions policies. Venezuelans themselves must lead the
negotiations between the Venezuelan democratic opposition and the
Maduro regime. Maduro regime policies have caused Venezuela's economic
struggles. The regime, through its own actions, has forfeited the trust
of the Venezuelan people, Venezuela's private sector, and the
international community, causing more than 6 million Venezuelans to
vote with their feet and leave the country. To restore legitimacy and
to end the economic crisis, Maduro and his cronies must negotiate with
other Venezuelans and to return to a free and open democratic system.
Question. What signal does the U.S. supporting an electoral
observation mission to Venezuela send to the Maduro regime which has
sought to legitimize a completely fraudulent process?
Answer. The November elections did not meet even basic
international standards. Fearful of the voice and vote of Venezuelans,
the regime grossly skewed the process to predetermine the result long
before any Venezuelan voter cast a ballot. Unjustified arrests and
harassment of political and civil society actors, criminalization of
opposition party activities, bans on candidates, manipulation of voter
registration, media censorship, and other authoritarian tactics ensured
the elections would not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people.
We noted the participation of international observers and experts,
including from the European Union and the Carter Center. We continue
urging them to call out regime abuses during this process.
Question. Does the Administration plan to recognize Juan Guaido as
the Interim-President after January 2022?
Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining
democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the interim President of
Venezuela.
Question. In your view, why did U.S. policy and foreign assistance
efforts fail to achieve electoral reforms in Nicaragua ahead of the
November 2021 elections?
Answer. For years, the Ortega-Murillo regime has chipped away at
Nicaragua's democratic institutions and consolidated all state powers
in its hands with impunity. The victory in a sham election on November
7 stemmed from their full control of all branches of government,
carefully built over decades, and their desire to hold on to power at
all costs. The Ortega-Murillo regime implemented the Russian model of
repressing civil society and political opponents, including through the
adoption of six laws between late October 2020 and early February 2021
used to limit free speech, detain individuals for up to 90 days without
charges, extend criminal sentences, blunt the assistance and influence
of the international community through onerous registration and
extensive reporting requirements, and exclude prominent opposition
leaders from the electoral process. In addition, Russian Government
forces have provided training and materials to the Ortega-Murillo
regime to aid its campaign of repression. Ortega and Murillo's
consolidation of power and efforts to steer Nicaragua down an
autocratic path did not happen overnight, and U.S. and international
efforts to return Nicaragua to a democratic path will not achieve
results overnight. We will demonstrate resolve and work multilaterally
with like-minded partners to defend democracy and human rights in
Nicaragua. We will press for the immediate and unconditional release of
political prisoners and continue to work with our partners and the
Nicaraguan people over the medium term to restore the democracy they
deserve.
Question. Why has U.S. policy and foreign assistance efforts failed
to meaningfully improve the capacity of recipients to effectively
challenge the Ortega regime during the election?
Answer. Through the Department of State and USAID, we support
Nicaraguan civil society organizations, independent media, and human
rights defenders as they strive to restore democracy, rule of law, and
respect for human rights. Specifically, our assistance supports
Nicaraguans in their efforts to restore democratic norms and practices,
supports a free and independent press, and promotes the rule of law and
respect for human rights. Despite increasing harassment and
intimidation by the Ortega-Murillo government, we maintain the ability
to assist these Nicaraguan partners to expose the government's
brutality and defiance of international law, as well as provide
Nicaraguans with factual information in contrast to government
propaganda. We also facilitate dialogue and consensus-building among
opposition leaders in exile and the diaspora. The decision to imprison
prominent potential presidential candidates and ban any genuine
opposition parties from participating in the November elections
demonstrates that the regime did assess the opposition's ability to
pose an effective challenge to them as credible if elections were free
and fair. We will continue to support Nicaraguan civil society in its
efforts to restore democracy and will help the Nicaraguan exile
community remain engaged with the population in Nicaragua and make its
international advocacy more effective.
colombia / farc
Question. How clear is the demarcation line between the FARC and
the residual organized armed groups that sprung up after the 2016 deal
between President Santos and the FARC?
Answer. New terrorist groups have emerged since the 2016 Peace
Accord, including Segunda Marquetalia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia--People's Army (FARC-EP), and the Department of State
announced the designation of boto hog these groups as foreign terrorist
organizations pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(SDGT) entities under E.O. 13224, as amended, and the designations of
the respective leaders of those organizations, Luciano Marin Arango,
Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, Henry Castellanos Garzon, Nestor
Gregorio Vera Fernandez, Miguel Santanilla Botache, and Euclides Espana
Caicedo, as SDGTs under E.O. 13224, as amended. The Department did so
based on reliable information that these groups have conducted attacks
or otherwise engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity.
In accordance with the terms of the 2016 Peace Accord with the
Colombian government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
formally dissolved and disarmed, and the group no longer exists as a
unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or
has the capability or intent to do so. No reliable information
indicates that the FARC has conducted attacks or otherwise engaged in
terrorism or terrorist activity since the Peace Accord. We regularly
evaluate whether former members of the FARC, or other individuals,
conduct attacks or otherwise engage in terrorism or terrorist activity.
Question. The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute monitoring
the 2016 FARC deal has consistently reported progress in its
implementation, even during the height of the pandemic last year.
What specific lines of effort will be advanced by revoking FARC's
terrorist designation?
Answer. The decision to revoke the designation does not change the
posture with regards to any charges or potential charges in the United
States against former leaders of the FARC, nor does it remove the stain
of the decision by Colombia's Special Jurisdiction of Peace, which
characterized their actions as crimes against humanity. Revocation of
the FARC's FTO designation does not impact prior law enforcement
actions related to the FARC's past terrorist activities and does not
allow any former FARC members admissibility into the United States.
As a practical matter, the decision will allow USAID and other
elements of the U.S. Embassy to evaluate whether and if so how to work
with the Colombian government on peace accord implementation in areas
of the country in which demobilized members of the former FARC reside,
without violating U.S. law.
Question. The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute monitoring
the 2016 FARC deal has consistently reported progress in its
implementation, even during the height of the pandemic last year.
Did the Colombian Government request to revoke the FARC's terrorist
designation?
Answer. The Department consulted the Government of Colombia when
gathering facts as we conducted the legally mandated five-year review
of the FARC's designation. In January 2020, when Colombia adopted the
U.S. sanctions list, it specifically excluded the FARC from its own
list. That same month, Colombia officially requested the United States
designate FARC dissidents as FTOs. We also pre-notified the Colombian
Government in advance of the public announcement.
Question. It has been estimated that the FARC had reportedly had
only delivered $12.9 million in local currency, dollars, and gold of
the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020 for
reparations to their victims.
What is the FARC doing with the funds it has failed to surrender?
Answer. We commend the progress of the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace to identify, and hold responsible, former members of the FARC who
orchestrated hostage taking and child recruitment, and some commanders
of the Army who ordered, tolerated, or covered up, extrajudicial
killings.
We refer you to the Government of Colombia for specific questions
on reparations to victims.
Question. It has been estimated that the FARC had reportedly had
only delivered $12.9 million in local currency, dollars, and gold of
the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020 for
reparations to their victims.
What kind of risks would this amount of unaccounted for money pose
for political stability in Colombia?
Answer. We commend the progress of the Special Jurisdiction for
Peace to identify, and hold responsible, former members of the FARC who
orchestrated hostage taking and child recruitment, and some commanders
of the army who ordered, tolerated, or covered up, extrajudicial
killings.
We refer you to the Government of Colombia for specific questions
on reparations to victims.
Question. Honduran President-elect Xiomara Castro has indicated she
would seek to establish formal ties with the People's Republic of
China, thus altering its long-standing view towards Taiwan.
Do you agree that Chinese influence in the region is destabilizing?
Answer. Problematic PRC actions represent a serious challenge to
U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security ties and opaque
infrastructure investments that undermine transparency and sovereignty.
We will continue to inform countries in the region about problematic
PRC influence and coercive actions. We raise concerns about PRC
infrastructure projects with inadequate labor and environmental
standards, for example, which undermine workers' rights under domestic
law and international labor standards and undermine environmental
protections. The projects also operate under a general lack of
transparency and disregard for the rule of law; carry opaque and often
unsustainable loan terms; and foster public corruption in borrowing
countries. In addition, we will continue to highlight the risk of using
PRC's untrusted providers, as PRC law compels Chinese firms to provide
its intelligence and security services with on-demand access to data,
facilities, and telecommunications equipment and infrastructure. This
knowledge allows local populations to better discern the sources of
disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access to critical
infrastructure and sensitive sectors.
Question. What will the Administration's efforts to counter this
malign influence as well as encourage the new Honduran Government to
maintain its current diplomatic relations with Taiwan?
Answer. The U.S. Government--through our sustained commitment to
the Western Hemisphere--bolsters the region's coalition of resilient
democracies that champion our shared values. We work closely with our
allies and partners to lend expertise and resources toward the region's
pandemic recovery, including support for greater vaccine availability,
high-standard infrastructure investment, and transparent economic
development. I have stressed the value of their relationship with
Taiwan with Honduran officials and President-elect Castro. Taiwan
remains an essential democratic partner in a region where most
countries share our values. We will continue U.S. efforts to support
Taiwan's diplomatic and unofficial relationships across the Western
Hemisphere region, including in Honduras. Together we can support good
governance, transparent investments, and economic growth together with
likeminded countries.
Question. The Administration is exploring options to financially
compensate migrants separated at the border while illegally entering
our country. In your opinion, what are the chances some of those funds
are channeled as payments to criminal organizations involved in human
smuggling and trafficking?
Answer. The Department of State participates in the President's
Interagency Task Force on the Reunification of Families as part of the
Biden-Harris Administration's efforts to reunify families separated
under the prior Administration's immigration policies. The Department
of Justice leads settlement negotiations on behalf of the U.S.
Government and we ask that you direct any questions related to the
litigation to the Department of Justice. As part of the U.S.
Government's reunification program, the Administration is looking for
funding to provide services and support to the children and their
families once reunited in the United States. Relevant U.S. Government
agencies would oversee the Administration of these services.
Question. With illegal migration through the southwest U.S. border
at a 21-year high, what actions will the Administration take to
incentivize the governments of Mexico and northern Central America to
uphold their domestic and international obligations regarding refugee
and asylum seekers?
Answer. The Department of State continues to advance the
Administration's Collaborative Migration Management Strategy and Root
Causes Strategy to address irregular migration in the region. The
Administration works with regional partner countries to expand pathways
for safe, legal, and humane migration to the United States and other
third countries, including labor opportunities, access to regional
asylum programs, refugee resettlement, and family reunification.
Through international organization partners, the Department of
State is supporting the Government of Mexico and Central American
governments to strengthen asylum systems and build institutional
responses for forced internal displacement where relevant. In October
2021, Secretary Blinken joined leaders from other regional governments
to underscore the importance of responsibility sharing across the
Western Hemisphere; not only to provide access to protection for those
in need, but to manage unprecedented mixed migration flows humanely and
effectively, including through responsible removal operations and visa
regimes. U.S. Government funding is supporting Mexico to strengthen the
capacity of its asylum system, including helping its refugee agency
COMAR to nearly triple its annual asylum claim processing capacity
since 2017.
Question. As INL continues its efforts to support longer-term
community prevention efforts and institutional capacity building of the
Haitian National Police, what will be the metrics used to evaluate the
success of U.S. foreign assistance to the HNP?
Answer. INL is measuring the success of U.S. assistance to the HNP
using several key metrics across efforts in community policing and
institutional capacity building. Across a 2-year period, these metrics
and other output and outcome-level measures will offer INL quantitative
data on whether its assistance to the HNP is achieving its goals in
providing security to Haitian citizens and preventing gangs from
spreading their influence. In terms of community policing, INL is
evaluating the success of its assistance to the HNP through the
reduction of gang influence in the community and the public perception
of the HNP as a service provider and reliable force to protect Haitian
citizens. Essential metrics to measure this impact include the
percentage decrease in homicides, kidnappings, and robberies in key
neighborhoods and the percentage increase of individuals that see the
HNP as a service provider in lieu of gangs.
In terms of institutional capacity building, INL continues to
support the HNP in its efforts to become a professional and accountable
institution capable of managing Haiti's internal security and
dismantling gangs across the country. As INL is still developing its
increased assistance to the HNP's gang reduction efforts, metrics are
still being finalized but will focus on measuring the inability of
gangs to threaten Haitian lives and destabilize Haiti, the HNP
achieving a sufficient force strength and being properly resourced, and
the sufficiency of Haiti's prison infrastructure to detain convicted
prisoners securely and humanely. Specific metrics will include, for
example, the total number of arrested gang members and successful anti-
gang operations conducted by the HNP, the establishment of a consistent
HNP recruitment schedule to increase the force, a transparent budget
that ensures proper resourcing of HNP units, and on corrections the
percentage reductions in both pre-trial detainees and overcrowding
across Haiti's corrections system.
______
Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. How are you and the Administration prioritizing U.S.
bilateral relations with our Caribbean allies/partners?
Answer. Under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL) works with 13 countries and regional security
institutions to build Caribbean capacity to confront illicit
trafficking and transnational organized crime, increase citizen
security, and hold criminals accountable. Key bilateral engagements in
the Dominican Republic include INL's work to stand up and continue to
support a 911 system as well as capacity building support for
specialized counternarcotics units. In The Bahamas, INL is working to
build the Royal Bahamas Police Force's law enforcement and
counternarcotics maritime capabilities to support Operation Bahamas,
Turks and Caicos, a decades-old trilateral counternarcotics operation
between the United States, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos. In
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, program efforts focus on combating
gang violence and associated criminality.
INL's regional programming yields bilateral results as well.
Through INL's financial crimes project, six Caribbean countries have
adopted model legislation to enable the recovery of criminal proceeds,
and enabled partner nations to advance civil forfeiture actions
totaling more than $2.9 million in cash and more than $62 million in
pending property seizing orders since 2015. CBSI countries directly
benefit from the use of CBSI-Connect, an online law enforcement
learning management platform that has proved a crucial connectivity
tool throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and INL's investments in the
Regional Security System's Air Wing, Digital Forensic Lab, and police
training academy.
Question. Since your appointment, how have you personally taken a
role in enhancing law enforcement cooperation with the other nations of
the Caribbean?
Answer. Since I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary on September
30, I have advanced U.S. priorities through several key Caribbean
security partners. I met with the Executive Director of the Eastern
Caribbean's Regional Security System (RSS), a key partner in combating
maritime crime and narcotics trafficking in the region, to discuss ways
to deepen and broaden our relationship. I also attended the change of
command ceremony at SOUTHCOM in late October where I met with security
officials from several key Caribbean partner countries. In the coming
months, I intend to visit Caribbean partners and expand our diplomatic
engagement in the region by participating in the tenth annual
Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue, scheduled to take place
in early 2022 under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.
Question. What update can you share with regards to the progress of
the investigation?
Answer. The United States supports a thorough, independent
investigation into President Moise's assassination consistent with both
Haitian law and international rule of law standards. We want to see
those who planned, funded, and carried out the assassination of former
President Moise held accountable. We refer you to the Government of
Haiti on the progress of its ongoing investigation into President
Moise's assassination. We would also refer you to the FBI for
additional questions.
Question. How else is the United States assisting Haitian law
enforcement deal with gangs and rampant crime?
Answer. The Department of State, through INL, supports the
development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) into a professional
and accountable institution capable of managing Haiti's internal
security. In addition to its steady-state support of the HNP's capacity
building, INL recently reallocated an additional $15 million to
increase the HNP's community policing efforts, to establish an anti-
gang task force, and to support the overcrowded and underfunded Haitian
corrections system. INL priorities with this additional funding include
adding five new contract subject matter expert advisors embedded in the
HNP to combat gang influence and build HNP capacity in the near term;
supporting the creation of a highly vetted anti-gang unit, based on the
results of an INL-led security needs assessment for the HNP;
sustainably reducing gang influence over the long term through a
holistic, community-oriented interventions by the HNP; and procuring
new vehicles and additional protective equipment for HNP specialized
units. INL has already delivered 19 of 60 new unarmored vehicles to the
HNP and expects to further support Haitian law enforcement needs for
specialized units as anti-gang operations ramp up. INL will continue to
provide ongoing support to build the HNP into an accountable and
professional organization and to improve prisons through infrastructure
improvement, addressing overcrowding, and Prisons Administration
Directorate's (DAP) medical and management through training, advising,
and provision of supplies and equipment.
Question. How does the Administration view Cuba's complicity in
drug trafficking through Venezuela?
Answer. We have serious differences with Cuba on a range of issues,
including Venezuela. Cuba continues to support the Maduro regime and
seeks to undermine regional stability. INL closely monitors
transnational criminal organizations and trafficking trends in the
region, including Cuba, and works to counter criminality emanating from
Venezuela. While much of the cocaine trafficked through Venezuela moves
through the broader Caribbean region regional traffickers typically
avoid Cuba due to counternarcotics efforts by the Cuban Government.
Question. What actions, if any, is the Administration taking to
counter this threat?
Answer. Individuals within the Maduro regime increasingly depend on
narcotrafficking revenue, among other illicit revenue streams, to
maintain their grip on power. We are committed to stemming the
transshipment of drugs through Venezuela, combating the endemic
corruption of regime officials, and impeding the money laundering and
criminal networks related to the illegal trade of commodities. Since
January 2019, the United States has worked with the Interim Government
of Venezuela to increase the interdiction of Venezuelan-flagged vessels
beyond the territorial sea of any State suspected of illicit narcotics
trafficking. In April 2021, the Department of State successfully
negotiated an arrangement with the Venezuelan Interim Government to
facilitate expedited U.S. law enforcement boardings of these suspect
vessels. As of December 8, 2021, this partnership has resulted in the
interdiction of 64 vessels and transfer of 159 suspects to authorities
ashore for U.S. prosecution.
We also continue countering threats in coordination with
international narcotics trafficking and money laundering charges by the
Department of Justice against Venezuelan targets through our Narcotics
and Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Programs. We are working with
our partners to increase the identification and interdiction of
criminal activity emanating from Venezuela, primarily: violent non-
state armed groups, illegal drug and gold trafficking, and money
laundering.
______
Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. What is the State Department doing to provide assistance
to political prisoners in Cuba facing critical and life-threatening
conditions?
Answer. Advancing democracy and human rights remains at the core of
our policy efforts toward Cuba. The Department of State has strongly
condemned the Cuban government's treatment of political prisoners, to
include repression and unjust detention of peaceful protesters, human
rights activists, and journalists. We have placed new sanctions and
visa restrictions on Cuban security force officials responsible for
repression and human rights violations. Through democracy assistance
programs managed by the State Department and USAID, the U.S. Government
supports pro-democracy voices and individuals persecuted by the Cuban
regime. These funds provide humanitarian assistance to human rights
defenders and political prisoners on-island and raises awareness of the
plight of Cuban political prisoners in international fora.
Question. How is the State Department working with allies in Europe
and the Western Hemisphere to increase pressure on the Cuban regime?
Answer. The Administration actively engages with multinational
organizations and our international partners to collectively condemn
the violence and repression upon the Cuban people for demanding
freedom. The State Department has reached out to governments and
multinational organizations around the world to build support for the
Cuban people. Many countries have asked to coordinate with the
Administration to press for respect for human rights on the island. We
have held conversations with leaders who have differing views and
refocused the world's attention where it belongs: on the Cuban
government's repression and on support for the human rights enshrined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Question. Another result of the historic protests in Cuba this year
is that they shone a light on the regime's rampant use of internet
circumvention tools in order to both control Cubans' access to
information from the outside world and curtail their ability to share
widely news within the island. I understand that the United States has
provided assistance mostly in the form of virtual private networks,
which can overcome Cuba's nascent censorship regime. I am intensely
concerned that this assistance does nothing to counter the regime's
ability to shutdown internet service altogether for different regions
of the country.
What can you tell me of the Department's efforts to ensure
unfettered access to the internet for the Cuban people?
Answer. Through the Global Internet Freedom appropriations earmark,
the U.S. government obligates over $70 million annually to promote
Internet freedom globally, including in Cuba. Assistance supports the
development, global deployment, and operation of the latest secure and
reliable technical solutions to counter Internet censorship, content
blocking, and shutdowns. The Administration remains open to other
scenarios for expanding information flow for the Cuban people,
recognizing that no easy fixes exist to nation-level connectivity
limitations of the kind we see in Cuba. However, in all potential
scenarios, the security and anonymity of activists using these
solutions on the island remains a paramount consideration.
Question. On November 18, President Joe Biden met with Mexican
President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) during the ``Three
Amigos'' summit of the North American states. That summit occurred at a
time of disturbing actions and comments made by the Mexican president
towards the dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, as
the people of those countries suffer from repression, poverty, and
societal breakdown.
Did President Biden reaffirm the United States' long-standing
commitment to supporting freedom and democracy in the hemisphere?
Specifically, did he make clear that AMLO's indulgence of left-wing
dictatorships' repressing of their peoples is incompatible with a
strong U.S.-Mexico partnership and violates Mexico's obligations to
support and defend democracy under the Inter-American Democratic
Charter
Answer. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are
integral to a healthy democracy, and support for democratic values was
a key theme throughout the North American Leaders' Summit. During the
Summit, the Leaders affirmed their support to press for full and
meaningful participation in our democracies and economies for all.
President Biden and the other leaders reaffirmed our collective
commitment to protect human rights, especially for members of the most
vulnerable and historically marginalized communities. The United
States, Mexico, and Canada also expressed a determination to reinforce
democracy at home and inspire democratic development around the world.
Question. In your recent testimony before the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs, you were asked about the presence of Cuban doctors in
Mexico in the context of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement (USMCA).
Has the Administration made a determination whether the presence of
those doctors is a violation of the forced labor provisions of USMCA?
Answer. The Department recognized some of the Cuban medical
professionals that assisted Mexico may have been forced to work by the
Government of Cuba in its 2021 Trafficking in Persons report. The TIP
Report also called upon the Government of Mexico to develop and
implement standardized procedures for frontline officials to
proactively identify victims among Cuban medical professionals and
refer those individuals to organizations or officials providing
services to trafficking victims. USTR, as the lead agency for USMCA
compliance on this issue under the Labor Section , is examining this
question and has access to reporting from State to inform its
determination. For questions on USMCA compliance and timing for a
determination, I refer you to USTR.
Question. Earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken
appointed new officials to oversee the ongoing investigations into the
health attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel serving overseas. The
resulting health damage has been named, ``Havana syndrome,'' due to the
fact that the first wave of attacks occurred in Cuba. However,
Secretary Blinken, in a carefully worded statement, refused to use the
word ``attack'' to describe what occurred.
What is the Administration's position on these ongoing incidents?
Do you believe they are attacks specifically targeting U.S. officials?
Answer. There is nothing we take more seriously than the health and
security of U.S. Government personnel and their family members. The
interagency community is actively examining a range of hypotheses but
has made no determination about the cause of these incidents and/or
whether they can be attributed to a foreign actor. AHIs are a top
priority for Secretary Blinken, who set clear goals for the Health
Incident Response Task Force to strengthen the Department's
communication with our workforce, provide care for affected employees
and family members, and deal more effectively with these events in the
future as we continue to work closely with the interagency to find the
cause of these AHIs.
Question. Were U.S. officials, some of whom have been medically
diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, just random victims?
Answer. The Department's investigation surrounding these incidents
is a fact-based mission. The interagency community is actively
examining a range of hypotheses but has made no determination about the
cause of these incidents. What is certain, however, is that the
experiences and symptoms of our affected employees are real.
Question. Some open-source reporting speculates that some form of a
new weapon developed by Russia or perhaps China was being tested on
unsuspecting American personnel.
As you know, nothing happens in Cuba without the regime's
knowledge. When it comes to the attacks to our U.S. personnel in Cuba,
does the Department believe that another government could really plan
and carry out actions like this in Havana, Cuba, with the Cuban regime
having absolutely no knowledge of them?
Answer. The Department is doing everything within its power and in
partnership with the interagency to identify the cause of AHIs. The
interagency community is actively examining a range of hypotheses but
has made no determination about the cause of the AHIs or whether they
can be attributed to a foreign actor.
Question. What steps will the State Department take to further hold
the regime accountable for the breakdown in Nicaraguan democracy?
Answer. The Department, along with the U.N. Human Rights Council,
Organization of American States, European Union, and many countries in
the region, has spoken out clearly in defense of democracy and human
rights in Nicaragua, and will continue to do so. We will continue to
work in close consultation with a broad coalition of OAS member states
to urge the Ortega-Murillo regime to change course, immediately and
unconditionally release all political prisoners, and take concrete
action to restore democracy. As mandated by the OAS General Assembly,
OAS members states conducted a collective assessment of the situation
in Nicaragua on November 30 and will pave a path forward for Nicaragua
to take action to put it back on a course to democracy. We will
continue to work in coordination with our international allies and
partners, like Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, to
take concrete actions to respond to the Ortega-Murillo government's
attacks on civil liberties. We will leverage new tools such as the
Presidential Proclamation on Nicaragua, which President Biden signed on
November 16, and the Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors List, which the
RENACER Act expanded to include Nicaragua, to impose visa restrictions
on those individuals determined, among other things, to have knowingly
engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions
in Nicaragua. We will continue to use diplomatic, economic, and other
tools at our disposal to promote accountability for those who support
the Ortega-Murillo regime's human rights abuses and attacks on
Nicaraguan democracy, and to support those committed to restoring
democratic governance in Nicaragua.
Question. I understand that last week the Nicaraguan regime
formally announced its intention to withdraw from the Organization of
American States (OAS). Given this, does the State Department plan to
invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to start the
process of suspending Nicaragua's membership?
Answer. The Department noted Nicaragua's November 18 decision to
begin the formal process of withdrawal from the OAS, which takes 2
years to go into effect. The OAS is the most important multilateral
organization in the Western Hemisphere and has a long history of
supporting the democratic advancement of all nations in the Americas.
The Ortega-Murillo regime's stated intention to withdraw Nicaragua from
the OAS is yet another sign of their lack of respect for democratic
ideals and for the interests of the Nicaraguan people. The OAS and its
member states must stay engaged, stand up for the rights of the
Nicaraguan people, and continue to press for the Ortega-Murillo regime
to fulfill its commitments to its people under the Inter-American
Democratic Charter. As mandated by the OAS General Assembly, OAS member
states conducted a collective assessment of the situation in Nicaragua
on November 30 and will continue to take action to put it back on a
path to democracy.
Question. A provision in the RENACER Act calls for the executive
branch to review Nicaragua's continued participation in the Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Has the Administration begun to
implement this section of RENACER?
Answer. The Department welcomes the broad, bipartisan nature of the
U.S. desire to support the Nicaraguan people in their striving for
democracy. The RENACER Act delivers a strong message and new tools to
address the corrupt and authoritarian Ortega-Murillo regime and its
subversion of the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people. The
terms of the CAFTA-DR do not provide for a party's expulsion. In light
of the dramatic deterioration of respect for democratic principles in
Nicaragua, however, the United States has taken a number of actions,
including withholding support for Nicaragua's participation in trade
capacity-building and technical assistance initiatives and working to
redirect capacity-building to benefit the people of Nicaragua rather
than the government. We continue to review the Nicaraguan Government's
participation in any U.S.-supported CAFTA-DR programs, including trade
capacity-building activities under the CAFTA-DR, with a view toward
promoting good governance and transparency.
Question. Last week, we witnessed elections in Honduras, the
results of which we're still awaiting. Several other critical American
allies and partners will hold elections in the coming year, from the
run-off elections for Chile's President next month, to elections in
Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica. In the last few years, democracy
organizations have noticed an uptick in activity by purveyors of
Kremlin and CCP disinformation. I am very concerned that disinformation
can distort people's perceptions of candidates in these elections. Such
disinformation can lead to Latin American heads more concerned about
lining their pockets with rubles and yuan than they are about building
prosperous societies for their people.
What actions can Congress take to build resilience in Latin America
and the Caribbean to the effects of disinformation?
Answer. With the FY 2022 request, the Department can strengthen the
capacity of civil society and government communicators to address
foreign disinformation and propaganda. As this phenomenon becomes more
widespread and actors utilize sophisticated tactics, we look to
Congress to fully support the Administration's FY 2022 request to
provide Public Diplomacy the funding needed to bolster its outreach and
capacity-building initiatives, including through the International
Visitor Leadership Program, which enable key stakeholders to address
such activities and strengthen an open information environment.
Question. I would welcome your thoughts on how to effectively
tailor U.S. policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean to counter
malign Chinese influence in this region. As you've noted, the Chinese
Government is taking advantage of the pandemic that it unleashed on the
world to increase its influence in the region.
In your view, how can we best frustrate their efforts?
Answer. The U.S. Government, through our sustained commitment to
the Western Hemisphere, bolsters the region's coalition of resilient
democracies that champion our shared values. We work to promote trade,
people-to-people ties, exchange programs, environmental cooperation,
improved health outcomes, climate mitigation and adaptation and
technical cooperation, inter alia. As of November 15, we provided more
than 50 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 30 countries in the
region. We work closely with our allies and partners to lend expertise
and resources toward the region's pandemic recovery, including support
for greater vaccine availability, high-standard infrastructure
investment, and transparent economic development. We use our range of
tools--from diplomatic engagement to technical exchanges, public
diplomacy to targeted foreign assistance, and partnership with the
private sector to civil society cooperation--to pursue deeper regional
democracy, prosperity, security, and provide alternatives to PRC
engagement.
Question. In which areas do you see opportunities for America to
act?
Answer. We remain committed to working with our allies and partners
to combat COVID-19 and the climate crisis; to face down foreign
election interference and corruption; to strengthen our defenses in
cyber space; and to produce and secure the technologies of the future.
We will support our allies and partners who speak up against adverse
actions, including the use of economic coercion. The United States
remains committed to working with our partners on investment and
procurement issues, including to build an enabling environment for
private sector investment in infrastructure that reflects transparency,
competitiveness, and international best practices. We will work with
countries in the region to develop investment screening mechanisms that
can protect these countries and the world from national security and
data privacy risks that come with investment in critical infrastructure
and sensitive sectors by untrusted vendors. These joint efforts remain
crucial to the hemisphere's recovery from the pandemic.
Question. Which aspects of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP)
malign influence should we highlight in our public diplomacy to Latin
American and Caribbean audiences in order to generate public pressure
on local officials to shun PRC economic exploitation that comes under
the guise of cooperation and aid?
Answer. We will continue to inform countries in the region about
problematic PRC influence and coercive actions in the region. We raise
concerns about PRC infrastructure projects with inadequate labor and
environmental standards, for example, which undermine workers' rights
under domestic law and international labor standards and undermine
environmental protections. The projects also operate under a general
lack of transparency and disregard for the rule of law; carry opaque
and often unsustainable loan terms; and foster public corruption in
borrowing countries. In addition, we will continue to highlight the
risk of using PRC's untrusted providers, as PRC law compels Chinese
firms to provide its intelligence and security services with on-demand
access to data, facilities, and telecommunications equipment and
infrastructure. This knowledge allows local populations to better
discern the sources of disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access
to critical infrastructure and sensitive sectors.
We also cooperate to provide a positive, transparent alternative to
PRC investment offers. The U.S. International Development Finance
Corporation (DFC) has approved investments tackling key development
challenges including food security, logistics gaps, climate change,
gender equity, and advancing the President's Build Back Better World
(B3W) Initiative. The agency has more than $10 billion invested across
Latin America and the Caribbean in key sectors. We also continue to
invest in people-to-people relationships, with programs in education,
entrepreneurship, English language, and exchanges. Expanding access to
educational opportunities and English learning and promoting
entrepreneurship not only increases incomes throughout the region but
also promotes more inclusive economic growth, ensuring more
opportunities for people. Expanding these opportunities supports
democratic institutions, rule of law, free press, and social inclusion.
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