[Senate Hearing 117-238]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-238

               U.S. POLICY ON DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 
                               AND THE CARIBBEAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             NOVEMBER 30, 2021

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
47-326 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        


                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Robinson, Hon. Todd, Assistant Secretary of State for 
  International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. 
  Department of State, Washington, DC............................     4
    Prepared Statement...........................................     6

Nichols, Hon. Brian A., Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
  Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC...     9
    Prepared Statement...........................................    11

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols and Mr. Todd Robinson to 
  Questions Submitted by Senator Jim Risch.......................    44

Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions Submitted by Senator 
  Marco Rubio....................................................    49

Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Marco Rubio............................................    50

                                 (iii)

 
                  U.S. POLICY ON DEMOCRACY IN LATIN 
                       AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

                              ----------                              


                                      TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, 
Rubio, Johnson, Portman, Young, Cruz, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing on U.S. Policy and Democracy in 
Latin America and the Caribbean will come to order.
    In March, this committee hosted Organization of American 
States Secretary General Luis Almagro to review the state of 
democracy in the region. We heard concerns about the uptick in 
fraudulent elections, shrinking space for civil society and 
independent media, efforts to politicize judicial institutions, 
and the loss of hope in a region plagued by insecurity and 
kleptocracy.
    While the Inter-American Democratic Charter marked its 20th 
anniversary in September, the harsh reality is that we are 
witnessing a fraying of democratic consensus in the Americas.
    Given Secretary General Almagro's diagnosis, it is critical 
that the Biden administration continue efforts to restore the 
defense of democracy as a central pillar of U.S. foreign 
policy.
    In his June memorandum, the President made it clear that 
combating kleptocracy is a U.S. national security priority, and 
American diplomats are again using the language of human 
rights.
    After 4 years of the Trump administration failing to stand 
up for our fundamental values, we have acutely felt the effects 
and these initial steps are welcome, but we must do more 
because the truth is that since March the situation in the 
hemisphere has become even more challenging.
    In Cuba, the Diaz-Canel regime attacked, detained, and 
disappeared its citizens for demanding fundamental freedoms 
during unprecedented countrywide protests in July. The regime 
paired physical assaults with internet shutdowns and decrees 
criminalizing free expression on social media. Terrified of the 
Cuban people's desire for change, it militarized the entire 
island to prevent protests in November.
    While I welcome the Administration's four rounds of 
targeted sanctions, we must move more aggressively to hold 
security forces accountable and we must launch a strategic 
effort to demilitarize the Cuban economy in parallel with our 
support for the Cuban people.
    In Nicaragua, the Ortega regime's relentless campaign to 
jail and persecute political opponents, civil society, and 
independent media resulted in the recent sham elections.
    This month, Congress passed my bipartisan RENACER Act, 
ushering in a new era of international accountability. I am 
pleased that the Biden administration is already implementing 
the RENACER Act with new targeted sanctions and a blanket visa 
ban on Nicaraguan officials complicit in the dismantling of 
democracy, the toughest measures Ortega has ever faced.
    In Haiti, following President Moise's assassination, gangs 
now control large parts of the country and kidnap and terrorize 
civilians, including American missionaries and children.
    I look forward to hearing how the Administration is working 
to restore security, facilitate dialogue between civil society 
and political actors, and help chart a Haitian-led path to new 
elections to overcome this chaos.
    Since March, the Maduro regime has continued its campaign 
of torture, disappearances, arbitrary jailings, and 
manipulation of essential supplies in order to subjugate the 
Venezuelan people.
    It has walked away from negotiations with the National 
Unity Platform, talks that could help address urgent 
humanitarian needs and set the country on a path towards 
recovery.
    Instead, the regime prioritized holding deeply flawed 
elections that no credible democratic actor has called free and 
fair.
    We have observed the surgical deconstruction of El 
Salvador's justice system as President Bukele appears intent on 
taking the training wheels off his autocratic project.
    In Brazil, President Bolsonaro is plagiarizing the Trumpian 
playbook by invoking the specter of political violence and 
fraud in advance of next year's elections.
    It is no wonder, given the state of democracy in the 
Americas that irregular population movements are at an all-time 
high.
    Our hemisphere is at a critical inflection point. We must 
help democracies deliver, especially as they recover from the 
economic and social impact of the pandemic. We must continue 
supporting civil society efforts to reverse democratic 
backsliding. We must help pro-democracy movements harness the 
power of technology to confront dictatorships.
    The upcoming Summit for Democracy presents an opportunity 
to coalesce around a global strategy to confront repressive 
regimes and strengthen democracies. It is my sincere hope that 
it produces tangible outcomes.
    As we said in March, the cost of inaction is too great and 
it is increasing exponentially. When democracies in the 
Americas fail to provide for their people, those looking for a 
better life will come knocking at the door, and if we do not 
increase our engagement in the hemisphere, others from further 
away--China, Russia--will be only too happy to gain a stronger 
foothold to exploit tensions and divisions.
    I look forward to discussing these and other issues as it 
relates to the hemisphere to this hearing, and now I will turn 
to the ranking member for his remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The United States has had an enduring interest in a stable 
and prosperous Western Hemisphere and the democratic order is 
the best guarantor of those things.
    The people of Latin America and the Caribbean have made 
great strides toward democratic governance over the last 
several decades. However, it is disheartening to see how 
quickly that progress can be lost.
    Nicaragua joins Cuba on a seemingly bottomless descent into 
authoritarianism. Within less than a generation, Hugo Chavez 
and Nicolas Maduro have turned Venezuela into a failed state.
    Last year, candidate Biden promised to use smart sanctions 
and greater multilateral pressure on the Maduro regime. Ten 
months in, President Biden has not imposed a single sanction on 
the regime or any of its cronies, and the European Union is not 
any closer to matching the economic and diplomatic pressure 
brought forth by the United States and Canada.
    Equally concerning is the negative effect of malign state 
actors such as China and Russia. China's predatory economic 
practices are a formidable threat to the sovereignty of 
countries in the Western Hemisphere.
    The adoption of technologies developed and controlled by 
firms vulnerable to Chinese Communist Party pressure undermines 
privacy and human rights. Russian disinformation campaigns 
exacerbated the protests that rocked democratic countries in 
South America in 2019, including Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador.
    Putin openly endorses increasingly authoritarian rulers 
with the goal of destabilizing the region and threatening 
insecurity, and Russia has exported repressive laws and 
practices to its allies in Latin America that allows 
authoritarian leaders to suppress independent media, civil 
society, and political opposition.
    Lastly, criminal and foreign terrorist organizations are 
malign threats to the safety of both our communities here at 
home and democracies in the region. The Administration's plan 
to remove the FARC from the foreign terrorists list undermines 
U.S. national security and democratic stability in Colombia.
    As this administration plans for its upcoming Summit for 
Democracy next month, I am glad to see numerous countries from 
the region invited. I hope this summit is more than just a 
ceremony of words and hollow promises, and instead will produce 
real results to improve democracy and rule of law across the 
region.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about all of 
these important issues.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. We will start with our panel.
    We are pleased to have Assistant Secretary of State for the 
Western Hemisphere Brian Nichols, who previously has served as 
ambassador in various locations, including in Peru, was the 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and also was the Deputy 
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombia. So he is very 
well familiar with the hemisphere.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us.
    We also have the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Todd 
Robinson, who previously has served in a variety of positions--
the Senior Advisor for Central America and the Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, was previously the charge 
d'affaires in Venezuela. So both of our witnesses have 
significant deep experience in the hemisphere, which we 
appreciate, to draw from.
    We will start off with Secretary Robinson. We would ask you 
to have your testimony be summarized in about 5 minutes or so. 
Your full statements will be entered into the record, without 
objection.
    Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF THE HON. TODD ROBINSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, 
            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Robinson. Good morning, Chairman Menendez, Ranking 
Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you 
for calling this hearing and bringing attention to the issue of 
erosion of democracy in Latin America.
    I am pleased to be here today with my friend and colleague, 
Assistant Secretary Nichols, with whom I am working closely to 
address the challenges raised by the issue.
    Democratic institutions that effectively and adequately 
meet their citizens' needs are critical building blocks in this 
region. Supporting democratic norms and transparent 
institutions is something we should all support.
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I was expelled from Venezuela 
in 2018 for speaking out against the Maduro regime's 
illegitimate elections and corrupt governance.
    Before that, in 2015, I saw firsthand as Guatemalan 
citizens demanded the investigation and prosecution of corrupt 
officials, including their president. I am no stranger to the 
threats facing democracy in this region.
    I am clear eyed about the challenges, but I am also 
confident that working with our colleagues across the 
department and the interagency, my team in the Bureau of 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, INL, is 
well positioned to address them.
    Throughout the Western Hemisphere, endemic corruption 
drives authoritarianism, irregular migration, crime, and 
violence. Corrupt government actors and other elites are 
incentivized to allow drug trafficking and other organized 
criminal groups to operate, driving instability and 
contributing to undemocratic practices.
    The Biden-Harris administration is moving to protect and 
reinvigorate democracy both at home and abroad, and INL is 
working to build capacity to fight the cycle of corruption and 
our efforts span the region.
    In Colombia, INL-supported prosecutors and police are 
helping root out corruption and enable greater transparency. In 
Mexico, our partnership helped strengthen the capacity of 
security and justice institutions to reduce opportunities for 
corruption, prosecute offenders, and promote a culture of 
accountability.
    However, we must recognize some governments lack the 
ability or, frankly, the political will to tackle corruption. 
Indeed, many of these governments and their elites are 
benefiting from it. Our strong preference is to work with 
governments, but, ultimately, we cannot want this more than 
them.
    As Secretary Blinken testified in June, if governments are 
unable or unwilling to do what is necessary, we will increase 
our work with civil society, local communities, and 
international organizations and trusted partners in the private 
sector, particularly if they are willing to fight corruption 
rather than seeking to benefit from it.
    We strongly support efforts by watchdog groups and 
investigative media outlets to expose the corruption, advocate 
for justice and democratic institutions, and support anti-
corruption reforms in their countries. No one understands the 
corrosive nature of corruption better than those whose 
livelihoods suffer because of it.
    In Venezuela, the cycle of violence, crime, and corruption 
has eroded the democratic process, the economy, and the 
security situation. In response, the department to date has 
issued 13 transnational organized crime and narcotics rewards 
offers for information leading to the arrest and conviction of 
Maduro and his cronies.
    We have also designated three individuals under Section 
7031(c) of the Department of State Foreign Operations and 
Related Appropriations Act who abuse their public position in 
the region by accepting bribes and kickbacks and 
misappropriating public funds for their own self-enrichment.
    We have also taken similar actions in Central America in 
places like Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, 
and we will continue to do so.
    In Haiti, weak institutions and pervasive corruption 
contribute to the proliferation of gang violence, including 
kidnappings for ransom. Gangs control nearly half of Port-au-
Prince and key transportation infrastructure.
    When I was in Haiti 2 weeks ago, I met with the Prime 
Minister, the Acting Minister of Justice, the new Director 
General of Police, and our international partners to emphasize 
our concern for the security situation and discuss INL's 
planned support to help the Haitian National Police establish a 
tactical anti-gang unit.
    I stressed the need to ensure officer accountability within 
the HNP, respect for human rights, and transparency, 
particularly for the HNP anti-gang unit, and INL will continue 
to support longer-term community prevention efforts and 
institutional capacity building of the HNP, including through 
additional embedded advisors, vehicles, and protective 
equipment for HNP units countering gangs, and supporting 
election security.
    Mr. Chairman, I will end my testimony reiterating an 
important point. The political will of partners is absolutely 
critical. Even the best resourced intervention cannot succeed 
if our partners are not equally or more committed to the 
challenge.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Todd D. Robinson

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished Members of 
the Committee; thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today. The threats to democracy across the Western Hemisphere are 
growing and have a significant impact on the United States' national 
security and economic prosperity. The Bureau I have led since 
September, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), is aligned to work with our 
Department and interagency colleagues to address these threats. 
Bolstering the rule of law, uprooting corruption, reducing the levels 
of violent crime, and deterring the production and trafficking of 
illicit drugs are ways in which INL is actively working to shore up 
democracy and ensuring it delivers for the people it represents. We 
place a significant focus on combating the corruption that permeates 
all levels of society in Latin America, with the goal of creating a 
more secure, democratic, and prosperous Western Hemisphere.
    INL's focus on the illicit drug trade responds to transnational 
criminal organizations that destabilize the region and contribute to 
democratic backsliding through their entrenched corruption networks. 
The scale of illicit drug profits is estimated to reach hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually. While corruption takes many forms and 
stems from many sources, financial profits on this scale give 
transnational criminal organizations an almost unlimited capacity to 
harm government institutions.
        corruption: a key contributor to democratic backsliding
    Endemic corruption erodes trust in institutions and democracy, and 
enables authoritarianism, crime, and violence throughout the Western 
Hemisphere. Corrupt government actors are incentivized to allow drug 
trafficking and other organized criminal groups to operate within their 
jurisdictions. Drug trafficking and organized crime undermine the 
democratic process, national security, the rule of law, and licit 
economies. It is not surprising to witness democratic backsliding in 
the region, as this cycle of corruption thrives in areas where 
democratic institutions once thrived. President Biden has prioritized 
the need to protect and reinvigorate democracy both at home and abroad. 
INL works with countries to build their capacity to fight cycles of 
corruption. However, we recognize some governments lack the capacity, 
and in some cases, the political will to tackle the problem. Corruption 
has enabled the emergence of autocratic leaders in this hemisphere.
    As Secretary Blinken has testified here before you, the key is for 
governments to do the right thing: address the concerns of their 
people, strengthen the rule of law, and protect democratic institutions 
and the human rights for all their citizens, as called for in the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter.
    Corruption also hobbles effective governance; erodes respect for 
human rights; distorts markets and equitable access to services; 
undercuts development efforts; contributes to national fragility, 
extremism, and irregular migration; endangers the physical safety of 
citizens; and provides authoritarian leaders a means to undermine 
democracies worldwide. When leaders steal from their nations' citizens 
or elites flout the rule of law, economic growth slows, inequality 
widens, and trust in government plummets.
    Our strong preference is to work with governments, but to make real 
inroads, we cannot want this more than they do. As Secretary Blinken 
testified in June, if governments are unable or unwilling to do what is 
necessary to be an appropriate partner for the United States and for 
our taxpayer dollars, we will work with NGOs and civil society, 
communities and international organizations, the private sector where 
appropriate, and other implementing partners. There are ways to 
effectively deliver assistance and support that do not require working 
with a central government to make meaningful improvements in 
governance. We will work with these non-governmental partners, as we do 
currently, to affect change where possible.
            using foreign assistance to address corruption 
                  and promote democratic institutions
    In Central America, INL support for anticorruption and rule of law 
programming remains a priority under the Root Causes Strategy. The 
United States encourages justice sector authorities in northern Central 
America to recognize the deficit in citizens' trust in institutions to 
deliver trustworthy anticorruption investigations and prosecutions, and 
ensure credible, independent judicial investigations into corruption-
related crimes. We continue to support civil society and watchdog 
groups to expose corruption, advocate for justice, and support 
anticorruption reforms in their countries, as no one understands the 
corrosive nature of corruption better than those whose livelihoods 
suffer because of it. We stand ready and willing to work with those 
partners in the region who have demonstrated a good faith commitment to 
combating corruption.
    In Nicaragua, under the authoritarian regime of Daniel Ortega, 
government attacks on the free press are a daily occurrence (we have 
also seen this increasingly in El Salvador and Guatemala). INL helps 
independent media and journalists carry out data driven investigations 
into issues of crime, corruption, and transparency. The reporting 
conducted by INL partners exposes the regime's corruption and human 
rights abuses and informs Nicaraguans of ways the ruling party 
manipulates them. INL also engages with civil society organizations in 
Nicaragua to strengthen the rule of law, keep youth out of gangs and 
address gender-based violence.
    The cycle of crime and corruption has eroded the democratic 
process, the economy, and the security of Venezuela. To increase 
international attention, cooperation, and action to combat crime and 
corruption emanating from Venezuela, INL brings together justice sector 
and policy officials from partner countries to drive substantive 
conversations and information exchanges on Venezuela-based or linked 
criminal organizations; illegal drug and gold trafficking; and 
kleptocracy and financial crimes. These exchanges not only serve to 
increase countries' understanding of criminal trends coming from 
Venezuela, but--as this effort continues to develop--we hope it will 
result in increased action to hold the Maduro regime and criminal 
actors operating in Venezuelan territory accountable for their crimes.
    In Haiti, weak institutions and pervasive corruption contribute to 
proliferation of gang violence, including kidnappings for ransom and 
control of critical, public infrastructure. Gang violence has become 
the primary concern in Haiti and continues to grow as Haitian gangs 
expand their influence and geographic presence, including control of 
nearly 50 percent of metropolitan Port-au-Prince and expanding into 
less urban areas. We are seeing increasingly aggressive tactics, 
including the recent kidnapping of American citizens, outmaneuvering of 
Haitian National Police (HNP), and disruption or control of transport 
routes leading to fuel scarcity throughout the country. When I visited 
Haiti 2 weeks ago, I met with the prime minister, the Acting Minister 
of Justice, the new Director General of the HNP, and members of the 
international community to emphasize our concern for the immediate 
security situation and to emphasize the need to ensure HNP officer 
accountability, respect for human rights, and transparency, especially 
of the new HNP anti-gang unit, and we will do more. Following the July 
presidential assassination and August earthquake, INL bolstered support 
for training, equipping, and vetting the anti-gang unit. INL is also in 
the process of providing additional embedded advisors, vehicles, and 
protective equipment for HNP units countering gangs and supporting 
election security. INL will continue efforts to support longer-term 
community prevention efforts and institutional capacity building of the 
HNP.
       supporting key regional partners in the western hemisphere
    In environments where we can effectively partner with central 
governments, INL develops the professional capacity of police, 
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials to help create strong, 
transparent democratic institutions. In coordination with the 
Department of Justice, we mentor law enforcement and justice 
counterparts throughout the region, including Colombia, Central 
America, and Mexico. Our work includes a focus on providing training to 
judicial actors, improving compliance with international standards, and 
promoting accountability throughout the justice system.
    In Colombia, INL provides significant support in coordination with 
our DOJ partners to mentor elite cadres of specialized Colombian 
prosecutors. These prosecutors are responsible for prosecuting 
Colombia's most high-profile cases, many of which involve public 
corruption. In Peru, INL provided training to all justices on the 
National Anticorruption Court who then utilized this knowledge to train 
other judges in regional anticorruption courts throughout Peru. INL 
also supported Peru's judiciary in obtaining International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO) anti-bribery management system certification 
for Peru's Supreme Criminal Court in 2021 and the judiciary is planning 
to expand the anti-bribery ISO certification into 11 Superior Courts in 
2022. Moving forward and with INL's support, Peru's Attorney General's 
office intends to implement the ISO anti-bribery standards in several 
key units, including the newly created Integrity Office. Supporting 
efforts to improve judicial compliance with international standards is 
an important way to increase citizen's trust and create an effective 
judicial check and balance on other government branches.
    In areas like northern Central America, where the rule of law is 
under constant threat, INL intends to target assistance to willing 
partners and trusted institutions. We are working within the region to 
help build partnerships to successful security programs in other 
Central American countries. For example, the Government of Costa Rica 
is working closely with INL to implement aspects of the ``Sembremos 
Seguridad'' community policing projects in northern Central America to 
increase security and confidence in the police in those communities. In 
Honduras, INL is providing standardized training in basic and advanced 
prosecutorial skills to approximately 1,000 prosecutors (nearly all 
prosecutors in Honduras), as well as courses on handling corruption 
cases for specialized prosecutors. In Panama, a new INL-supported Anti-
Money Laundering and Anticorruption Taskforce brings all Panamanian 
agencies involved in money laundering, terrorism financing, 
transnational economic crimes, and corruption together in one building 
to work with U.S. law enforcement agencies to conduct complex 
investigations with the goal of successfully prosecuting cases to 
reduce money laundering and corruption.
    Our partnership with Mexico helps strengthen the capacity of 
security and justice institutions to reduce opportunities for 
corruption, prosecute offenders, and promote a culture of 
accountability. Our work complements robust interagency programs, 
including those of USAID. Our collaboration with Mexico to transition 
to a more open and transparent accusatorial judicial system is a 
centerpiece of these efforts. INL support helped Mexico to achieve 
international accreditation of Mexican security and justice 
institutions to increase transparency. Such efforts are essential for 
reducing crime, improving responses to crime, improving criminal 
justice processes, and protecting human rights. Going forward under the 
U.S.-Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and 
Safe Communities, the United States will deepen its partnership with 
Mexico to counter corruption through support for the investigation and 
prosecution of corrupt officials and the seizure and forfeiture of 
their illicit assets. We will also work to expand capacity to increase 
the investigation and prosecution of organized criminal groups. The 
success of these measures reduces opportunities for drug trafficking 
organizations to leverage corruption to advance and protect their 
operations.
                            deterrence tools
    To complement and reinforce our diplomacy and assistance, INL also 
works with interagency counterparts to employ targeted sanctions and 
deterrence tools to combat high-level corruption and support the work 
of law enforcement. INL manages two rewards programs targeting high-
level drug traffickers and other transnational criminal leaders, which 
have helped our law enforcement partners bring more than 75 
international major violators to justice. INL also manages two 
anticorruption visa restriction authorities, and, in close cooperation 
with the Department of the Treasury, supports implementation of the 
corruption prong of the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. INL also 
coordinates with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, and other relevant bureaus to implement Section 353 
of the Northern Triangle Enhancement Act (also known as ``the Engel 
List'') and INA 212(a)(3)(C) policies related to corruption and the 
rule of law.
    The public designation of corrupt actors under Section 7031(c) of 
the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Appropriations 
Act, 2021, the Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list, and 
the Global Magnitsky Act has significantly reinforced our broader 
anticorruption agenda, including through increased media, civil 
society, and general public attention. We have also seen these 
designations spur governments to remove designees from office or to 
open law enforcement investigations and to build momentum to adopt 
anticorruption reforms. INL has greatly expanded the use of these tools 
since 2019, completing two and a half times more visa restrictions 
cases and seven times more reward cases than in the previous 2 years. 
These tools complement our diplomatic and foreign assistance efforts, 
including those under the Root Causes Strategy, to prevent and combat 
corruption.
    These tools allow us to elevate attention on corrupt officials and 
practices, even in countries where we don't have programming. For 
example, the Department has issued 13 Transnational Organized Crime and 
Narcotics rewards offers for information leading to the arrest or 
conviction of Maduro and his cronies as well as designating three 
individuals under Section 7031(c) who abused their public position in 
the Maduro regime by accepting bribes and kickbacks and 
misappropriating public funds for their own self-enrichment.
                        multilateral engagement
    In addition to our assistance programs and deterrence tools, INL is 
supporting the Department's efforts in the multilateral space. The 
upcoming Summit for Democracy will reinforce the importance of 
democratic values and reassert America's role as the leader of 
democratic nations. Acknowledging the threat corruption poses to 
democracy, the Summit will serve as a platform to discuss and 
coordinate with partners from a diverse group of democracies around the 
world opportunities to reduce its corrosive effects. In particular, the 
Summit will be an opportunity to advance U.S. anticorruption 
priorities, including: shutting down safe havens for corrupt actors and 
their ill-gotten gains; increasing our partners' capacity to prevent 
and combat corruption and hold corrupt actors accountable; leveraging 
innovation in the fight against corruption; and improving our ability 
to respond decisively to opportunities and threats to partner 
governments facing corruption related challenges. We will encourage 
partners to announce commitments to combat kleptocracy and foreign 
bribery, improve beneficial ownership and real estate transparency, and 
promote the role of civil society, independent media and journalists, 
and the private sector in anticorruption efforts. We will hold 
ourselves to the same standard and expect to announce commitments and 
deliverables at the Summit, including to fight corruption at home.
    We hope the Summit will be a useful opportunity to advance the core 
tenets of democracy and demonstrate to democracies and non-democracies 
alike that democratic governance can and will deliver for the region. 
In a promising signal of democracy's potential in the region, the 
Western Hemisphere constitutes the second-largest delegation of invited 
countries at the Summit. Similarly, we will reinforce these and other 
democratic themes at the Summit of the Americas next year. Committing 
to democracy in these summits will solidify and confirm our approach to 
defending and supporting democratic governance throughout the region.
                               conclusion
    Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, my testimony has focused on the 
work of INL, but let me end by reiterating an important point: 
political will from our partners to confront corruption and 
transnational crime in our hemisphere is absolutely critical. Even the 
best resourced and planned U.S. foreign policy intervention cannot 
succeed if our partners are not equally or more committed to addressing 
these challenges. Governments must own their efforts to enact reforms 
and disrupt criminal networks and the corruption they engender.
    Our assistance programs can nudge countries in the right direction. 
But long-term progress to close pathways for corruption and push the 
illicit drug trade to the margins must come from our partners. To 
mobilize political will for further reforms, the United States must 
continue to engage civil society and public audiences. Partner 
governments that are accountable to their citizens and value 
contributions from civil society have much greater resiliency against 
corruption, drug trafficking, and other criminal threats. No country is 
immune to these challenges, and we share them ourselves. The United 
States must achieve further success here at home to reduce our own 
vulnerabilities, such as reducing demand for illicit drugs. By holding 
ourselves and our partners accountable, and recognizing that these are 
shared challenges, we give greater strength to our public messaging and 
increase our appeal as a partner.

    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Secretary Nichols.

STATEMENT OF THE HON. BRIAN A. NICHOLS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
STATE FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
                         WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify regarding our efforts to promote 
inclusive democracy in the Americas.
    Two decades ago, we and our Western Hemisphere partners 
committed to promote and defend democracy across the region 
through the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
    Following that historic commitment, the region's 
democracies enjoyed a period of relative prosperity, security, 
and stability.
    Unfortunately, too many ordinary citizens in the region's 
democracies saw their governments failing to meet their 
aspirations for a better future. Street protests broke out in 
several countries in 2019 as citizens expressed anger and 
frustration with political and economic elites. The COVID-19 
pandemic has highlighted and exacerbated the region's 
underlying governance challenges.
    As Secretary Blinken said in his October 20 remarks in 
Ecuador, we find ourselves in a moment of democratic reckoning 
and the question for all of us who believe in democracy and 
believe its survival is vital to our shared future is what can 
we do to make democracies deliver on the issues that matter 
most to people.
    Our defining mission in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere 
Affairs is answering that question and doing all we can to 
deliver the benefits of democracy to the nations of the 
Americas.
    We know elements of the answer already. To strengthen 
democracy, we must use every diplomatic, economic, and moral 
tool available to combat corruption, enhance civilian security, 
improve government service delivery, and address the economic 
and social challenges facing the region's citizens.
    We work across all these fronts daily with partners across 
the globe. We hold corrupt actors accountable including through 
visa restrictions, economic sanctions, and naming more than 60 
individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the 
Section 353 Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors List.
    We will expand on our commitment to fight corruption as 
host of the Ninth Summit of the Americas next year. To 
strengthen civilian security, the United States invests 
billions of dollars globally to reduce violence and combat 
transnational criminal organizations.
    We laid the groundwork for more comprehensive approaches to 
security at the October 8 High-Level Security Dialogue with 
Mexico and the October 21 High-Level Dialogue with Colombia. We 
will adopt similar approaches with other partners.
    We must also address the economic and social challenges 
facing our citizens as together we recover from the pandemic. 
In partnership with COVAX and bilaterally, we have donated more 
than 54 million doses to 30 countries in the hemisphere.
    The United States has invested more than $10 billion in 
Latin America and the Caribbean through the Development Finance 
Corporation to help the region restart its economy. The 
President's Build Back Better World Initiative will frame our 
efforts, moving forward.
    We must work tirelessly to support democracy where 
undemocratic regimes prevail. We support the Unity Platform in 
Venezuela and their demand for human rights and democracy. 
Nicolas Maduro should release wrongfully-detained U.S. 
nationals immediately so that they can return to their 
families.
    In Nicaragua, following the sham November 7 elections, the 
Administration sanctioned 40 individuals and 9 entities under 
our Nicaragua-specific four Global Magnitsky programs.
    We imposed visa restrictions on 169 people linked to the 
Ortega-Murillo Government. We announced a presidential 
proclamation on Nicaragua suspending the entry of individuals 
complicit in undermining democracy. We welcome the strong 
bipartisan RENACER legislation and look forward to working 
closely with you to implement it.
    Our Cuba policy focuses on support for the Cuban people and 
accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in human 
rights abuses. Working with the international community, we 
condemn the violence and repression perpetrated by the Cuban 
regime.
    Since July, the Treasury Department has imposed four rounds 
of targeted financial sanctions against Cuban officials and 
entities within the Cuban military and security services, 
imposing tangible consequences against repressors and promoting 
accountability for the human rights abuses.
    The Administration also supports efforts to counter 
internet censorship. We will continue to work with the private 
sector and other stakeholders to identify viable options to 
ensure greater internet access for the Cuban people.
    We see these and other challenges confronting the region, 
but we stand by our conviction that democracy remains the best 
form of government to address them.
    The President will host the Summit for Democracy on 
December 9 and 10, where we will take on bold new commitments 
to fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism, and 
promote respect for human rights both at home and abroad, and I 
am honored to partner with INL and my friend, Todd Robinson, 
its Assistant Secretary, in that effort.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Mr. Brian A. Nichols

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding our efforts to 
promote inclusive democracy in the Americas.
                      ensuring democracy delivers
    Two decades ago, together with our Western Hemisphere partners, we 
committed to promote and defend democracy across the region through the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter. Following that historic commitment, 
the region's democracies enjoyed a period of relative prosperity, 
security, and stability. Latin America's middle class grew, and poverty 
fell by half. Living standards and access to education rose. Maternal 
and infant mortality declined.
    Nevertheless, too many ordinary citizens in the region's 
democracies saw their governments failing to meet their expectations 
and aspirations for a better future. Corruption remained rampant. 
Economies grew but so did inequality. Crime and insecurity took too 
many lives and stymied the region's development. Surveys this year 
showed citizens' satisfaction with democracy at near historic lows. 
Street protests broke out in several countries as citizens expressed 
anger and frustration with political and economic elites. The COVID-19 
pandemic highlighted and exacerbated the region's underlying governance 
challenges and inequities.
    As the Secretary said in his October 20 remarks in Ecuador, ``We 
find ourselves in a moment of democratic reckoning. And the question 
for all of us who believe in democracy--and believe its survival is 
vital to our shared future--is what can we do to make democracies 
deliver on the issues that matter most to people.'' Our defining 
mission in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs is answering that 
question.
    We know elements of the answer already. To strengthen democracy, we 
must work closely with those in the region committed to using the tools 
of government to transparently address the needs of their societies and 
equally committed to handing over power at the end of their term in 
office. We must use every diplomatic and economic tool available to 
combat corruption, enhance civilian security, improve government 
service delivery, and address the economic and social challenges facing 
the region's citizens. In short, we must close the gap between 
democracy's promise and its reality. We work across all these fronts 
daily.
    Public frustration with corruption represents one of the greatest 
threats to confidence in political systems across the region. That is 
why President Biden's designation of fighting corruption as a core U.S. 
national security interest resonated in many countries in the Americas. 
We use the tools Congress gave us to show our commitment is not just 
rhetorical. We hold corrupt individuals and groups accountable, 
including through visa restrictions, economic sanctions, and adding 
more than 60 individuals in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to the 
Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors list mandated under Section 353 of the 
United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act. We will uphold 
and expand upon our commitment to fight corruption as host of the Ninth 
Summit of the Americas next year.
    To strengthen civilian security, the United States invests billions 
of dollars globally to reduce violence and combat transnational 
criminal organizations. However, we must do even more to address the 
root causes of insecurity in our hemisphere. Under the Administration's 
Root Causes Strategy, we work with local communities to reduce the 
violence and insecurity in northern Central America which drives so 
many Central Americans out of their homes. We laid the groundwork for 
more comprehensive approaches to security at the October 8 High-Level 
Security Dialogue (HLSD) with Mexico and October 21 High-Level Dialogue 
with Colombia and will adopt similar approaches with other partners.
    We must also address the economic and social challenges facing our 
citizens as together we recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. In 
partnership with COVAX and bilaterally, we donated more than 54 million 
vaccine doses to 30 countries in the Western Hemisphere. At this 
month's North American Summit, President Biden and his counterparts 
from Mexico and Canada pledged to develop a trilateral North American 
Partnership for Racial Equity and Inclusion. The United States invested 
more than $10 billion in Latin America and the Caribbean through the 
Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to grow economies, create jobs, 
and help the region restart its economy. As part of the President's 
Build Back Better World Initiative, we sent a delegation to Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Panama in September to work with our partners to narrow 
the gaps in physical, digital, and human resources infrastructure 
exacerbated by the pandemic. The B3W Initiative will frame our efforts 
in the Hemisphere moving forward.
                   preventing democratic backsliding
    Twenty years after the approval of the Inter American Democratic 
Charter, we recognize that governance conditions in some countries 
either have not progressed or are moving in the wrong direction.
    Haiti struggles with grave humanitarian and security challenges and 
political turmoil, compounded by the July 7 assassination of President 
Jovenel Moise and the August 14 earthquake. NSC Senior Director Juan 
Gonzalez, Under Secretary for Civilian Security Uzra Zeya, Assistant 
Secretary Todd Robinson, and I all made trips to Haiti in October and 
November to underscore the Administration's commitment to the Haitian 
people.
    In our meetings with the diaspora, civil society, political actors, 
and Prime Minister Ariel Henry, we expressed concern about insecurity 
and pledged our support for the Haitian people to find their own 
solutions and chart a broad and inclusive path out of the current 
political uncertainty. Haitian stakeholders insisted the current 
insecurity would not allow for free and fair elections this year. I 
agree.
    The Haitian people will determine a timeline for their elections. 
We will work now to support conditions for free and fair elections when 
they happen, including by helping the Haitian National Police (HNP) 
restore security and address gang violence. The October kidnapping of 
16 American and one Canadian missionary underscores the grave lack of 
security in Haiti.
    We witnessed a serious erosion of democratic norms in Central 
America in the last decade. In El Salvador, the Bukele administration 
took taken a series of concerning steps that weakened respect for 
democratic principles and institutions. The proposed Foreign Agent Law, 
which would impose unnecessary controls on civil society activities 
protected under the Democratic Charter, emerged in the context of other 
actions that seem aimed at concentrating power in the hands of the 
executive and intimidating critics of the Bukele administration. These 
include sending armed soldiers into the Legislative Assembly; 
improperly replacing Supreme Court judges with loyalists who decreed--
against the country's own constitutional provisions--that a president 
can run for re-election; cutting off access to public information; 
turning a blind eye to corruption within the current administration; 
and denigrating civil society, independent media, and U.S. assistance 
as ``the opposition.'' While we remain committed to helping the 
Salvadoran people achieve security and prosperity, we will continue to 
work with Congress and international partners to urge the Bukele 
administration to change course and recommit to human rights and 
democratic norms.
    In Honduras, violence marred the runup to Sunday's national 
elections with more than 30 tragic deaths associated with the election 
cycle. Thankfully, election day itself was largely peaceful, with a 
turnout that reflected the democratic spirit of the Honduran people. I 
visited Honduras last week to underscore the importance of a peaceful, 
transparent, free and fair election to the candidates and Honduran 
stakeholders in the government, civil society, and the private sector. 
DRL and USAID supported messaging campaigns and worked with their 
contacts to encourage non-violence and respect for the electoral 
process. INL provided training on the role of police in elections to 
more than 5,000 officers and distributed more than 20,000 pamphlets on 
best practices for use of force. USAID also supported electoral 
authorities to strengthen their efforts to promote fair and transparent 
elections, including establishing internal biosafety protocols for 
electoral personnel before and on election day.
    In Guatemala, the Attorney General used her office to obstruct 
investigations into high-level wrongdoing and instead persecuted those 
seeking to strengthen accountability for corruption and human rights 
violations, including by dismissing the Public Ministry's leading anti-
corruption prosecutor on July 23. This is especially unfortunate in 
view of the excellent cooperation we enjoy with Guatemala on law 
enforcement matters, including record-level extraditions and 
cooperation on drug interdictions. Good cooperation in some areas, 
however, does not mean we can ignore actions that undermine the rule of 
law. We designated the Attorney General and her deputy under Section 
353 which suspended most avenues of cooperation with the Public 
Ministry until the selection of a new Attorney General in May 2022. We 
urge the government of Guatemala to pursue a fair and transparent 
process to nominate qualified and independent candidates as the next 
Attorney General.
      supporting democratic transitions in non-democratic regimes
    We must work tirelessly to support democracy where undemocratic 
regimes prevail. We support the Unity Platform of Venezuelan democracy 
defenders in their demand for human rights and democracy in their 
country. On the margins of the 51st OAS General Assembly on November 
10-12, we joined 12 other countries calling for the return of democracy 
in Venezuela and for attention to its humanitarian crisis. Nicolas 
Maduro should release wrongfully detained U.S. nationals immediately so 
they can return to their families in the United States.
    In Nicaragua, the Ortega-Murillo regime launched an unprecedented 
crackdown against opposition leaders and independent journalists. 
Following the sham November 7 elections, Ortega and Murillo no longer 
have a democratic mandate. On November 12 at the OAS General Assembly, 
25 countries voted to condemn the Nicaraguan elections and demand the 
release of political prisoners and a return to democracy. Nicaragua 
alone voted against the resolution, demonstrating its isolation in the 
region. The Administration sanctioned a total of 40 individuals and 
nine entities under our Nicaragua-specific or Global Magnitsky 
sanctions programs, with the largest tranche announced on November 15 
following the sham elections. We imposed visa restrictions on 169 
individuals linked to the Ortega-Murillo government and their immediate 
family members and on November 16 announced a Presidential Proclamation 
on Nicaragua suspending the entry of individuals complicit in 
undermining democracy. We welcome concrete actions taken by our 
partners, including Canada's and the UK's announcement of additional 
Nicaragua sanctions on November 15, and the EU's August 2 decision to 
apply sanctions on eight individuals, including Vice President Murillo. 
We welcome the strong bipartisan RENACER legislation and look forward 
to working closely with you to implement it.
    Our Cuba policy focuses on support for the wellbeing of the Cuban 
people and accountability for Cuban Government officials involved in 
human rights abuses. Working with the international community, we 
condemn the violence and repression perpetrated by the Cuban regime 
upon the Cuban people for demanding their fundamental freedoms. Time 
and again the Cuban Government rejected the Cuban people's attempt to 
initiate a discussion, choosing instead to respond with repression, 
sending security forces and government-backed mobs to bully those who 
seek democracy. On November 15, the regime again blocked the voices of 
the Cuban people rather than listen, forgoing opportunities for 
dialogue and positive change for the future of Cuba. Since July, the 
Treasury Department imposed four rounds of targeted financial sanctions 
against Cuban officials and entities within the Cuban military and 
security services in connection with violence, repression, and human 
rights violations against peaceful protestors.
    Through these Global Magnitsky sanctions, the Biden-Harris 
administration imposes tangible consequences against repressors and to 
promote accountability for their human rights abuses.
    We also seek ways to meaningfully support the Cuban people. The 
Administration also supports efforts to counter Internet censorship, 
restrictions on content access, and shutdowns. We will continue to work 
with the private sector and other stakeholders to identify viable 
options to ensure greater internet access for the Cuban people.
                         democracy can deliver
    We see these and other challenges confronting the region, but we 
stand by our conviction that democracy remains the best form of 
government to address them. As the Secretary said in Quito, ``there's 
no threat we face that better democracy cannot fix--no challenge where 
a closed system would do better for people than an open one.''
    We look forward to working with our partners to ensure that 
democracy delivers equally throughout the hemisphere. On December 9-10, 
the President will host the Summit for Democracy, which serves as an 
opportunity for governments, civil society, and private sector 
stakeholders to promote these ideals and hold ourselves accountable to 
the commitments we have made. We will also take on new commitments to 
address and fight corruption, defend against authoritarianism, promote 
respect for human rights both at home and abroad, and advance an 
economic recovery in the hemisphere that creates the conditions for 
equitable growth, benefitting historically marginalized populations. 
Twenty-six countries from our region will attend the Summit to work 
together toward strengthening democracy in our hemisphere.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to 
your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you both for your testimonies. We will 
start a series of 5-minute rounds.
    Secretary Nichols, let us talk about some of these things 
specifically. The Cuban military has long claimed that it draws 
its power from the people. Yet, Diaz-Canel, like the Castros 
before him, is using the military to perpetrate the Communist 
Party's stranglehold on the Cuban people and stifle democratic 
openings.
    The regime militarizes the island to shut down peaceful 
protests and continues expanding the military's control of the 
Cuban economy, fueling the rise of a new generation of military 
oligarchs in the process.
    The Biden administration rightly designated Defense 
Minister Lopez Miera under Global Magnitsky sanctions, but it 
has become clear that the problem is bigger than one general.
    Let me ask you, do we agree that the Cuban military has an 
expansive control of the economy, which stifles out, for 
example, independent entrepreneurs trying to get a foothold in 
the country's economy?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The role of the Cuban 
military--MINFAR, GAESA--in dominating the economy and 
controlling the largest businesses and placing itself in a 
position to suck up resources that go into different parts of 
the country is of great concern.
    The military's role in repressing citizens who seek only to 
exercise their fundamental rights of free speech, assembly, has 
been documented for decades, and everything that we can do to 
prevent that conduct, I think, will be important.
    The Chairman. We agree what the role they are playing is a 
rather nefarious role, but what steps will the Biden 
administration take to increase accountability for the 
military's role in repression and to facilitate the 
demilitarization of the Cuban economy?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Administration continues to look at specific 
individuals to sanction under the full range of our 
authorities. We look to block resources from moving into 
military-controlled organizations and companies, and we will 
continue to prevent military individuals from traveling and we 
will work with allies and partners around the world to 
highlight the abuses that the Cuban military perpetrates on its 
populace.
    The Chairman. There is a lot more that can be done and 
there is a lot more sanctioning that should take place so that 
people understand that they do not get away with impunity.
    One of the things we should be looking at is revoking the 
visas of a variety of Cuban military and Cuban officials' 
families that have visas to come to the United States. Sends a 
very clear message that we will not tolerate and give them the 
benefit of doing what everyday Cubans cannot do, and I really 
would urge the Administration to look at that. We have been 
talking for some time about how do we facilitate freedom of 
expression inside of Cuba, particularly through the use of the 
internet, and you refer to it in your testimony.
    I understand we have been using and seen an exponential use 
of some tools that the Department and USAGM have been working 
on. I will not get into the specifics because we do not want to 
give the regime greater information about them for 
circumvention.
    Why is it that we have not been able to find the pathway to 
greater widespread internet use inside of Cuba? What are the 
obstacles that we are facing in that regard?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    There are a number of challenges with regard to internet in 
Cuba. The first is the amount of bandwidth that goes into the 
country, which is quite limited. If there were greater 
bandwidth overall there would be greater ability to access the 
internet at higher speeds.
    The regime uses a number of technologies and techniques to 
block internet access to individuals, to small groups of 
people, to specific geographic locations, and actually does not 
typically shut down the entire internet to the island. 
Defeating those techniques and technologies is an important 
focus of our efforts, and I am happy to go into greater detail 
with you and your colleagues in a restricted setting.
    The Chairman. All right, but there has been suggestion that 
if we did satellite, if we tethered balloons, if we did a 
variety of other things, that we could more successfully get 
access to the internet for the Cuban people.
    We have researched those and the challenge is bandwidth on 
the island. Is that what you are saying?
    Mr. Nichols. That is one of the challenges, but projecting 
a wireless signal into the island either from a balloon or an 
aircraft or from a static location when the Cuban authorities 
would be actively trying to jam that signal presents a 
significant technological challenge and, again, I am happy to 
go into greater detail on that.
    The Chairman. Let me close on Venezuela. I think the 
Administration has rightfully claimed the recent elections as a 
sham election. I believe other countries have also joined in 
calling it such.
    I am really concerned about the purposes of EU Commissioner 
Borrell's intentions. A leaked EU memo shows that he ignored 
recommendations from his own staff not to send an observation 
mission to Venezuela, and if we want a credible alternative to 
the Borrell report about all the flaws and manipulations of 
elections in Venezuela, it has to be prepared by a credible 
organization.
    Can you confirm for us today that the United States does, 
indeed, support a negotiated solution as codified in the VERDAD 
Act and make equally clear that any recalibration of U.S. 
sanctions will be tied to concrete results at the negotiating 
table?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and in fact, I will be 
meeting with members of the Unitary Platform this afternoon.
    The Chairman. Now Interim President Guaido and the National 
Unity Platform have shown their willingness to participate in 
negotiations to restore democracy and the rule of law in 
Venezuela.
    However, in a sign of bad faith, Maduro suspended the talks 
in October because he is upset about someone who was 
apprehended by the U.S. Justice Department who may spill the 
goods on him.
    It shows where we are at with Maduro. I hope the world 
recognizes that. My understanding is that interim President 
Guaido has been invited to the Summit of Democracies. Is that 
true?
    Mr. Nichols. That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and he will 
have a speaking role at that event.
    The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
    Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wonder if both of you could speak to the fact that in the 
last presidential campaign then candidate Biden had promised 
sanctions on Maduro and the regime and nothing has happened in 
these 10 months. Can you explain that?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch.
    We continue to support a negotiated process in Venezuela. 
When we have the information regarding actions of certain 
individuals, we take action to use all of the authorities that 
we have been given.
    We believe that the crucial elements in the way forward is 
the negotiation process and, hopefully, the Maduro regime will 
return to the table promptly.
    Senator Risch. What information are you looking for? Every 
time we talk to the Administration about this they say, oh, 
well, we are working on it. We are looking for information. 
What information are you looking for and on what individuals?
    Mr. Nichols. It is our goal to collect comprehensive and 
detailed information on the actions of government actors that 
violates U.S. law or international norms and that will 
withstand judicial scrutiny.
    Senator Risch. What information are you looking for?
    Mr. Nichols. Participation in human rights violations----
    Senator Risch. You do not have any information on that?
    Mr. Nichols. --and acts of corruption. Those are the types 
of areas where we seek information.
    Senator Risch. Do you plan on doing any sanctions at all in 
the near future?
    Mr. Nichols. The Administration has aggressively used the 
sanctions authorities available and I expect that we will 
continue to do so.
    Senator Risch. Do you want to comment on this?
    Mr. Robinson. I would just add that I do not think the 
previous administration or the current administration are 
holding back on using sanctions, certainly, not against members 
of the Maduro regime, and we intend to continue to do that.
    Senator Risch. Were either one of you consulted on removing 
FARC from the list, the terrorist list?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes. The Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 
was consulted and played a role in the listing of the FARC-EP 
and the Segunda Marquetalia and the delisting of the FARC, 
which demobilized in 2016.
    Senator Risch. Did you recommend that that delisting take 
place?
    Mr. Nichols. The delisting recognizes the reality on the 
ground that the original FARC, if you will, which targeted me 
when I served in Colombia so I have no love for them, but they 
have participated in the peace process since 2016.
    They have demobilized their structures, while the FARC-EP 
and the Segunda Marquetalia have carried out continued 
terrorist activities, attacked individuals, carried out 
bombings, participated in drug trafficking, and we want to 
focus on those who are currently carrying out those illicit 
activities.
    Senator Risch. Do you have anything to add to that?
    Mr. Robinson. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement was also consulted and we came to the same 
conclusion.
    Senator Risch. My time is almost up. I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 
hearing and let me thank both of our witnesses for their 
service to our country and our hemisphere.
    Our hemisphere has always bragged about having democratic 
states and, yet, in recent decades we have seen a decline of 
democracy, a decline of countries where they have free and fair 
elections so that people can have self-determination of their 
leaders.
    We see a growth of systemic corruption, as you have all 
pointed out, which denies the people of that country effective 
democratic governance. It really is a critical moment, and I 
was listening to your response and I understand that you are 
collecting information.
    I know that you are using the different legislative 
authorities that you have to identify actors for sanctions and 
to use country activities to express our concerns about the 
decline of democracy.
    I just want to be clear. The chairman questioned about 
Cuba, questioned about many other countries. To me, the 
sanction that has gotten the most international attention is 
the Magnitsky sanction.
    Other countries around the world have adopted similar 
regimes that we have to identify individuals for visa bans and 
for denial of the use of our banking system, which is really 
critical for those that participate in corruption.
    They like to travel and they like to hide their money in 
states that have no rule of law, and if we can deny them that 
opportunity it really affects their ability to carry out their 
corrupt regimes.
    I think we have got to be very clear about our commitment 
to use these sanctions, and I must tell you I have not seen a 
robust use of the Magnitsky sanctions in our hemisphere.
    I have seen some, but I have not seen a robust use. That 
statute, really, anticipates a collaborative effort between 
Congress and the Administration on working together to identify 
and impose sanctions against those that are committing these 
types of activities.
    President Biden has been very clear to identify corruption 
as the fuel to undemocratic regimes. Can we be more open and 
robust so that it is a very clear message to those that are 
participating in corruption that they are going to be 
identified by the United States?
    If we do not have U.S. leadership there is not going to be 
leadership in our hemisphere. We have got to take the lead.
    I understand there is a due process. I understand you have 
got to collect information, but we also have to be very clear 
about our willingness to identify those corrupt actors and 
impose tough sanctions against them individually so that they 
cannot benefit from their corruption.
    Why are not we being more aggressive in this area?
    Mr. Robinson. Senator, thank you for that very important 
question, and from our standpoint, I think, again, the 
Administration has not been leaning back on this. I think they 
have been leaning forward, but I think we have to recognize 
that sanctions are part of a kit that we can use to not just go 
after those who are committing corrupt acts, but we have to 
look at other tools that we can use: support for democratic 
institutions, making sure that we are----
    Senator Cardin. I agree with you. I agree with you that we 
need to have the programs in place to support democracy and 
democratic institutions and I strongly support those 
partnerships through the State Department. I agree with you.
    It has got to be a carrot-stick. Do you how many Magnitsky 
sanctions have been imposed in our hemisphere in the last 12 
months?
    Mr. Robinson. I do not know off the top of my head. No.
    Mr. Nichols. I think we are over 40, I think.
    Senator Cardin. How many are now under consideration?
    Mr. Nichols. I cannot tell you how many are currently under 
consideration, but we look to aggressively deploy them across 
all of the areas where we see problems, and as you alluded to, 
Senator, a key part of that is bringing along international 
partners so when we are able to enlist the European Union or 
Canada or the UK to also apply sanctions, to secure supportive 
resolutions in multilateral organizations, that all increases 
the pressure on the authoritarian and criminal regimes in our 
hemisphere.
    Senator Cardin. I would just conclude on this, and I would 
ask for a commitment that you work with our staffs, with us as 
this committee, on the list that you are working on and the 
countries in which you are working on because it is our 
impression that we could be more direct and visible on the use 
of these sanctions to make it clear that America's leadership 
is there.
    I understand we want to work with other countries, but it 
is critical that the United States takes the lead, and I would 
just ask for your commitment that you would work with us and 
our staffs as we identify countries and individuals that we 
believe need to be considered for these types of sanctions.
    Mr. Nichols. Absolutely, Senator.
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Secretary Nichols, I think you would agree 
that supporting democracy begins by supporting the existing 
democracies, to do nothing that undermines their strength or 
legitimacy. You would agree with that?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. You would also agree, I believe, that 
Colombia is one of the strongest, most stable democracies and 
one of our best partners and allies in the region. That is a 
correct statement?
    Mr. Nichols. Absolutely.
    Senator Rubio. Did we consult with them before we delisted 
the FARC?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    Senator Rubio. What was their take on it?
    Mr. Nichols. This has been part of the implementation of 
the 2016 agreement between the Government and the FARC--the 
peace accord--and from Colombia's standpoint the key element is 
for us to be able to deliver assistance in areas where the FARC 
has demobilized. That is the----
    Senator Rubio. Were they in favor or against the delisting?
    Mr. Nichols. I do not want to characterize their position. 
They were, certainly, in favor of us providing assistance for 
those who have demobilized and are participating in the peace 
process. They are also in favor of us listing FARC-EP and the 
Segunda Marquetalia.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. So in terms of providing assistance to 
those who have demobilized and become politically engaged, is 
it not true that they wanted that assistance to be channeled 
through the Colombian Government?
    Mr. Nichols. We have a robust partnership with Colombia on 
these issues and we work hand-in-hand with them. It is a great 
partnership.
    Senator Rubio. I understand, but is it not true that what 
they wanted was not just to delist it. They did not want a 
delisting. What they wanted was to the extent that you are 
going to provide assistance to these people who have abandoned 
the guerrilla fight, laid down their weapons, become 
politically engaged, we want you to run that assistance through 
the democratically-elected government of Colombia, not 
unilaterally.
    Mr. Nichols. Certainly, they and many governments with whom 
we partner have an interest in us providing direct budgetary 
support, but I think it is important for us to be able to 
implement the programs that the Congress authorizes, that USAID 
and other implementing agencies like INL be able to directly 
carry out the programming.
    Senator Rubio. Even if the carrying it out directly goes 
against the wishes of the democratically-elected partner of 
that home country?
    Mr. Nichols. Everything we do with our partners in Colombia 
is negotiated and agreed with the Government of Colombia.
    Senator Rubio. So you are saying they agreed to this? They 
agreed to this agreement? This is what they wanted to see 
happen, a hundred percent?
    Mr. Nichols. They have signed an agreement on assistance 
programs, whether it is with USAID or with INL.
    Senator Rubio. No. No. Did they agree with the delisting 
and the direct delivery of aid to former FARC or FARC elements?
    Mr. Nichols. I did not personally participate in that 
conversation. I do not want----
    Senator Rubio. Who did? Is this a NSC process? Was the NSC 
lead on this?
    Mr. Nichols. Sir, our ambassador in Bogota was crucial in 
this process and, again, I do not want to give the impression 
that there is any daylight between the Government of Colombia 
and the United States. They are superb partners.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. I think we will hear from them on it. 
I can tell you I know what their opinion on it is. They were 
not in favor of the delisting and they wanted to the extent aid 
to be provided to these people that it be provided through them 
and not directly.
    Let me ask this--talk about the reality on the ground. 
After this so-called peace process, there used to be--right, 
there is this FARC. The people who laid down their arms and 
became politically engaged have done so through a political 
party called Comunes, correct?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes, Senator.
    Senator Rubio. That group is not sanctioned. They are not 
on any list of foreign terrorist organizations, right? They are 
not--okay. Then the group that did not lay down their arms have 
gone on to become these dissident groups--FARC dissident, FARC-
D, and others, correct?
    Mr. Nichols. Correct.
    Senator Rubio. Okay. We sanctioned the group that became 
the dissidents. We have added them to the list, and the people 
that are in the political party are no longer sanctioned 
because they are no longer part of FARC. They are now part of 
the political process.
    Who exactly are we delisting? What was the purpose of doing 
this? If the argument is that the peace process has dismantled 
the FARC and now people that were in the FARC are either, A, 
dissidents who are covered under the new listing, or B, members 
of a political party who are not part of any sanction list, why 
did we do this?
    Who is not getting money as a result of this? Who is not a 
dissident group, who is not part of Comunes, and needs money 
from the United States that used to be or is a part of FARC?
    Mr. Nichols. In order to carry out the development 
programming with former members of the FARC, from a legal 
standpoint delisting them was required.
    Senator Rubio. Would it not have been easier to just say if 
you abandon the FARC and now join Comunes you are no longer 
considered a former--would that not have been easier to do and 
more straightforward and less confusing than delisting an 
entire group?
    Because a new group could start up tomorrow and say, we are 
the FARC, right? The dissident group could rename themselves 
and, theoretically, not be covered by this.
    Mr. Nichols. The nomenclature is covered in the way that we 
address this. We named specific leaders of these FARC-EP and 
Segunda Marquetalia, their structures, sub-fronts, 
organizations, and alternate names. So----
    Senator Rubio. We could have done the same by just naming 
the political party as opposed to creating all this anxiety 
and, frankly, going against the wishes of our democratically-
elected allies in Colombia.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you both for your work and for coming before the committee 
today.
    I think it is safe to say that President Trump's policy 
towards Venezuela was a failure. The Administration, 
essentially, decided to push all of our chips to the center of 
the table on the first hand, recognizing Guaido ahead of many 
of our allies in the region and assuming that that would lead 
to the immediate collapse of Maduro's regime.
    That is not what happened and there was no plan B, so we 
were stuck for the next 3 years. You have a lot of work to do 
to put together a policy that actually effectuates American 
aims in the region.
    On the question of sanctions, I just want to probe this 
with you a little bit more, Secretary Nichols, because there 
is, certainly, a case to be made that our sanctions can be 
effective, that they can weaken Maduro, and that they can 
punish bad actors.
    There is, of course, a flip side. There is a humanitarian 
crisis in Venezuela today. There is a report from a few years 
ago suggesting that our sanctions have dramatically reduced 
caloric intake, increased disease and mortality, and had a 
number of other really serious and potentially catastrophic 
effects on the Venezuelan people.
    It also has the potential, our sanctions do, to provide 
fuel behind the anti-Americanism that is essential for Maduro 
to hang on to power. I have supported these sanctions because 
there is no shortage of individuals in Venezuela who deserve 
them.
    At the same time, there are humanitarian consequences and 
there, frankly, is not a lot of evidence over the course of the 
last 4 to 5 years that those sanctions are actually weakening 
the Maduro regime.
    So let me ask you about how you view both the upside and 
the downside of our existing sanctions policy and the prospect 
of additional sanctions.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The sanctions are an important tool in our quiver, and as 
Assistant Secretary Robinson said, it is also important to have 
other tools that we can use to both induce positive behavior 
and to dissuade people from taking improper actions.
    We need to work to balance and leverage all of those tools 
to the greatest extent possible. I think the suffering of the 
Venezuelan people owes much more to the horrible policies of 
Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro, which destroyed the economy, 
the healthcare sector, food production, retail sector, and some 
6 million Venezuelans have voted with their feet to leave that 
country.
    I think those are sort of the root causes of the suffering 
in Venezuela, but I also believe firmly that a negotiated 
process between the Unitary Platform and the Maduro regime is 
the best way forward, a process led by Venezuelans themselves, 
and we should be flexible and creative in supporting that 
process.
    Senator Murphy. I agree the primary and proximate cause is 
the unconscionable immoral leadership of the Maduro regime, but 
our sanctions can be contributory and they can provide a 
diversion for Maduro so as to blame the economic suffering in 
the nation on us rather than have it land on his shoulders, and 
I just hope that that is a consideration that we weigh.
    I wanted to ask, Mr. Robinson, one question of you with 
respect to gun violence and small arms proliferation in Mexico. 
Despite increased troop deployments by the Mexican Government 
to try to help address the violence in that country, homicides 
have continued to rise.
    The statistics suggest that over 70 percent of the guns 
that are recovered at Mexican crime scenes originated in the 
United States, and earlier this year the Mexican Government 
went so far as to file a lawsuit accusing American gun 
manufacturers of helping to fuel the rise in violence by 
knowingly flooding Mexico with firearms that are designed to 
end up in the hands of the cartels.
    What is the Administration doing to try to cut down on the 
flow of illegal arms and the arms trade into Mexico?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That question came up 
earlier this year during the High-Level Security Dialogue, 
which I participated in, in Mexico, and we have committed to 
working--we, my interagency partners at DEA and FBI and ATF, 
have committed to working more closely with Mexican officials 
on the illegal arms trade and the flows of arms and money, 
frankly, from the United States to Mexico.
    Senator Murphy. I look forward to working with you on that 
as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
    Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Madam Chair. Let me just say to 
both of you thank you for your service and appreciate your 
comments today.
    Secretary Nichols, you and I have had some good 
conversations regarding the kidnappings in Haiti and I want to 
dig a little deeper into that today and find out where we are. 
I do appreciate your personal involvement in this.
    For those who do not follow this closely, there is an Ohio-
based group in my home state of Ohio called Christian Aid 
Ministries that had 17 people kidnapped in Haiti. It happened 6 
weeks ago and, typically, as I understand it, these kidnappings 
result in some resolution prior to that time. So I am very 
concerned about it. Two hostages have been released. I guess 
that is encouraging, but of the remaining hostages, the 15, 
there are children as well, one very young child.
    Again, I appreciate our conversations about it. This 
committee has expressed its concern on this. We actually passed 
an amendment last month requiring the State Department to work 
better on an interagency basis to coordinate efforts on 
kidnappings in Haiti and to address the broader issue of 
violence.
    This criminal gang, the 400 Mawozo gang, is responsible. I 
have also spoken to the FBI director about this and made sure 
that we are doing everything we can from the law enforcement 
point of view to resolve this issue.
    Can you give me the status today of what is being done by 
the State Department and by the U.S. Government to rescue these 
missionaries?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The issue of kidnapping for ransom in Haiti is a grave one. 
I believe 41 U.S. persons--U.S. citizens and legal permanent 
residents--have been kidnapped for ransom in Haiti in 2021.
    The embassy country team, including U.S. law enforcement 
agencies, are cooperating with Haitian police authorities to 
support a resolution of this case. It is one of deep concern.
    We saw the release of two U.S. citizens who had been 
kidnapped in connection with that case and we hope that there 
will be a rapid resolution and favorable resolution for the 
remainder of those who have been kidnapped.
    Senator Portman. Secretary Nichols, are you staying 
personally involved in this?
    Mr. Nichols. I am personally involved in it and I am in 
contact with our embassy in Port-au-Prince on the situation 
every day.
    Senator Portman. I appreciate that, and if there is 
anything you think we should be doing we are not doing I would 
ask you to let me know and we will continue to help however we 
can in terms of expressing our deep concern, but we have to 
rely on people on the ground doing the right thing and making 
sure this is a priority. I thank you for that.
    Let me change to another topic, which is the drug issue. We 
have a crisis right now, and a couple charts here have arrived 
just in time that I took to the floor of the Senate last night.
    I recently was on a congressional delegation with Senator 
Kaine, who is here with us today, and we went to various 
countries in the region, including Ecuador, Colombia, 
Guatemala, and Mexico and met with the President of Mexico and, 
of course, raised this issue. I think it should be the top 
issue in our bilateral relationship with Mexico today.
    Senator Murphy just mentioned the gun issue, totally 
related to this issue. These transnational criminal 
organizations are selling drugs into the United States, making 
a tremendous profit and, yes, cash and drugs, cash and guns, 
are coming back into Mexico and that means it is an issue for 
both Mexico and for us in a very significant way.
    Here is the crisis and it is pretty extraordinary. We have 
got 100,000 people who died in America of drug overdoses during 
the most recent 12-month period for which we have data, which 
would be April to April.
    It is probably worse than that now. That is a record. That 
is more people than die from gunshot wounds and traffic 
accidents combined.

    [Chart is shown.]

    Here is what is happening. The blue line is the number of 
overdose deaths related to fentanyl, which is a synthetic 
opioid produced primarily now in Mexico. You can see we have 
gone--from 2015 the blue line keeps going up to 2020. In 2020, 
well over half of the overdose deaths in this country were from 
one drug and that is fentanyl. Also, crystal meth plays a role 
here, cocaine plays a role, other drugs that originate in 
Mexico as well, but this fentanyl issue is just overwhelming.
    Let us look at this next chart. You can see what is 
happening right now. On the U.S. border, we were told that last 
month there was a 42 percent increase in 1 month of fentanyl 
seizures, and what the Border Patrol agents will tell you 
privately is that they are not catching the vast majority of 
it.
    Here it is, seeing it from 2016 up to 2021 you can see the 
increase in fentanyl seizures. We have a huge crisis. This is a 
killer drug and it is not slowing down. People have supply 
chain issues in this country right now. The transnational 
criminal organizations do not have a supply chain issue. They 
are figuring out a way to do it.
    What specific steps, Mr. Nichols, have you asked the 
Government of Mexico to take under the Bicentennial Framework 
for Security to stop the flow of fentanyl and other illicit 
drugs into the United States?
    Mr. Nichols. If I could, I would like to ask my colleague, 
Todd Robinson----
    Senator Portman. I am going to ask him a question in a 
minute, too.
    Mr. Nichols. Okay. So----
    Senator Portman. If I have time, which I do not.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Nichols. Yes. Together we met with Mexican authorities 
and stressed the importance of coordinated intelligence-driven 
operations to take down drug trafficking networks, move away 
from the going after the capo-led approach to one that takes 
down entire networks. Better intelligence sharing, better 
cooperation between Mexican authorities and U.S. law 
enforcement.
    We have already seen progress in that area in terms of 
closer cooperation, better access for our law enforcement 
officials. As you know, fentanyl is smaller in size, cheaper to 
produce, and easier to smuggle. It is a very tough nut to 
crack.
    Todd and I worked together on this issue when we were both 
in INL and we continue to work shoulder-to-shoulder with our 
Mexican colleagues to try and defeat this problem.
    Senator Portman. My time has expired. I appreciate the 
indulgence, and Secretary Robinson, I will follow up with you 
on what INL specifically is doing and whether it is a high 
enough priority.
    Secretary Nichols, again, thanks for your personal 
involvement on the kidnapping issue. Sorry to take so much 
time.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Portman.
    Senator Kaine.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair, and to our witnesses 
thank you so much for your service. I want to talk about two 
things, Colombia and the Northern Triangle.
    I agree with Senator Rubio's position that the first thing 
we should do is make sure we have strong relations with our 
allies and shore up democracies, and Colombia has been a great 
ally.
    Unlike some of my colleagues, I do not have a problem with 
the Biden administration's delisting of FARC. Today is the 
fifth anniversary of the peace deal that was done between the 
Santos administration and FARC, and I would hope that virtually 
everybody on the committee would view that as an historic 
achievement. President Santos won the Nobel Peace Prize for it.
    I think the U.S. deserves some significant credit for it. 
We were involved in those negotiations. I think the delisting 
at the--essentially, at the 5-year anniversary of the peace 
deal was the right decision.
    The Colombian architect of the peace negotiation, Sergio 
Jaramillo, said, ``For the Biden administration, this is a low 
cost thing to do. It sends the signal to the FARC it has been 5 
years, you have done your bit, behaved properly, and we are 
delisting you.''
    The U.S. envoy who was involved in the peace negotiation, 
who is one of our finest diplomats, Bernard Aronson, said, ``If 
groups that were once violent revolutionary groups are never 
allowed to get off the list that is one less incentive for them 
to make peace. You undermine incentives for other groups to 
renounce terrorism and renounce violent struggle.''
    I think the decision to remove the FARC after 5 years of 
participating in a new life and a new chapter in Colombian 
life, but designated groups like the FARC-EP, like Segunda 
Marquetalia, and as far as I know, ELN is still on the 
terrorist list, correct?
    Mr. Nichols. Correct.
    Senator Kaine. So there is three Colombian groups who are 
carrying out terrorist activities that are on the list. I think 
it is the right thing to do and I just wanted to start there.
    Let me go to the Northern Triangle. Honduras, Guatemala, El 
Salvador--I note that none of them have been invited to 
participate in the Summit for Democracy next week.
    Nicaragua has not been invited. Haiti has not been invited. 
Bolivia has not been invited. Venezuela has not been invited. 
Cuba has not been invited. None of the Northern Triangle 
nations.
    We have invested billions and billions of dollars in this 
region and, yet, none of the Northern Triangle nations have 
been invited to participate.
    I will just say, parenthetically, with this summit coming 
up next week, I am a little bit surprised that no one I know in 
the Senate has received any outreach about what we think are 
topics that should be brought up in the summit, and to be on 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to have surveyed my 
colleagues here and on the Intel Committee and on the Armed 
Services Committee and said, has anyone reached out to you 
about the Summit for Democracy, and so far everyone has told me 
no, I am a little surprised at that.
    There is going to be a Summit for the Americas next summer, 
August of 2022. The U.S. is hosting for the first time in 25 
years. I would hope that those preparing for that summit might 
decide that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had some 
expertise and might want to reach out and get our ideas about 
it.
    Back to the Northern Triangle. The elections in Nicaragua 
were a sham. Senator Rubio and I wrote a letter to you all, and 
I know Senator Merkley had one, too, about concerns about 
elections in Honduras.
    If I read the OAS reports, it looks like thus far maybe 
things are exceeding our expectations there. The count is not 
yet done so we could not celebrate prematurely.
    El Salvador has backslid after the first election of a 
president who was not part of the FMLN or was not part of the 
right-wing death squad groups from the past, promised that 
there might be a new chapter in Salvadoran life.
    The President of El Salvador is behaving like an 
authoritarian. Even maybe our best partner in the region, 
Guatemala, has backslid even since Senator Portman and I were 
there in July in terms of sacking anti-corruption prosecutors, 
and I gather that is the reason that they have not been invited 
to participate.
    This is a hugely important region to us. Much of the 
immigration crisis at the border is being driven by instability 
in the Northern Triangle. Much of the drug trade that ravages 
our communities is being driven by instability in the Northern 
Triangle.
    Talk to us a little bit about this particular part of the 
Americas and what the Biden administration hopes to accomplish 
there.
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator. It is a critical 
part of the region for us.
    I was in Honduras last week. I met with the leading 
presidential candidates. In every meeting, I urged the 
importance of a peaceful, free, fair, transparent electoral 
process. Talked to the press about that. As you note, it 
appears at this juncture we have achieved that, or let me 
rephrase that, that the Honduran people have achieved that with 
the support of the international community.
    The region is one that has seen drops in incomes over the 
past decade, problems due to climate change, challenges due to 
the gang-related violence and, above all, intense acute 
corruption from key leaders in the Northern Triangle.
    We are working to address all of those issues and I think 
we have made progress in that, but we still have a long way to 
go and we are dealing with entrenched elites, political and 
economic elites, who do not see reform as their friend and we 
need to push both using carrots and sticks to encourage change.
    I am hopeful that in Honduras we are going to see the kinds 
of change that we have been asking. The leading candidate at 
this moment has stated her commitment to attack corruption, to 
deal with the causes and drivers of migration, and to promote 
jobs and better incomes in her country. We look forward to 
working with her in that regard.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you. My time is up, but I appreciate 
the answer. I will yield it back to the chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Kaine. I understand 
that now we have Senator Young on WebEx.
    Senator Young. Yes, Chairwoman. Thank you so much and, 
welcome, Ambassador Nichols.
    Ambassador Nichols, previous administrations have rightly 
noted that the Caribbean is, effectively, a third border with 
the United States. I think--at the time I served in the Marine 
Corps back in the 1990s as a member of a joint task force and I 
was operating on the southern border, working in collaboration 
with some other countries to deal with issues like illegal 
migration and drug trafficking, and, of course, at the same 
time, we were promoting strong trading relationships with 
countries in the Caribbean.
    We are seeing a growing decline in democracy and governance 
in that region. We have seen instability in Haiti lead to 
migration and persons descending on our own borders and fleeing 
chaos.
    We have seen authoritarian governments throughout the area, 
Cuba in particular, that has continued its subversive 
activities. Then migration has destabilized many countries as 
populations have fled economic stagnation and uncertainty.
    So, Mr. Ambassador, I just want to know how does the 
Administration view the Caribbean? Do you see it as a sort of 
sea-based third border with the United States?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I would just note that 
the Caribbean is a crucial partner for us in a crucial region, 
one where we need to stay engaged.
    The Bahamas is only 41 miles away from the United States, 
and when we look throughout the Caribbean region we see 
countries that want opportunities, want to partner with us, 
face substantial challenges, and our engagement, our support, 
those things are going to be crucial for them to resist the 
pressures that they are under, both economic and political.
    Senator Young. To what extent does ongoing drug trafficking 
in the Caribbean and the Northern Triangle countries undermine 
our democracy promotion programs?
    Mr. Nichols. It is a major challenge. I do not know if my 
colleague, Ambassador Robinson, wants to add to that.
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely. We know that drug traffickers use 
the same routes that they are moving people, that they are 
moving guns, that they are moving money, they move drugs, and 
so we see it as a significant challenge for us and a threat to 
our national security.
    We have, fortunately, a very good relationship with the 
governments in the Caribbean and work very closely with them on 
training and equipment to help them help us target those routes 
and to try to keep the drugs from reaching our shores.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Ambassador Nichols, I know some of my colleagues have asked 
questions pertaining to China and how they are seeking to 
undermine democracy in Latin America. This was covered 
extensively by this year's report from the U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission.
    Do you believe the U.S. has the capability to counter 
China's efforts to undermine democracy in Latin America? If 
not, what else do we need so that we might counter China's 
efforts--what we feel is appropriate?
    Mr. Nichols. I think we do have that capability, Senator, 
but we need to use all the tools available to us. I think the 
Development Finance Corporation is an important tool that gives 
us the ability to support private sector-led growth in the 
region.
    The COVAX consortium and our efforts to supply COVID 
vaccines to countries in the region is vital. Our presence in 
the region is crucial in my travels and meetings with over 20 
foreign ministers and governments since I have taken on my 
duties.
    Senator Young. Mr. Ambassador--I just regret my time is 
very limited here--does the Administration have a strategic 
policy laid out for countering China in the region? You have 
just gone through a list. Is there actually a written strategy?
    Mr. Nichols. We are working both within the State 
Department and the interagency to sharpen our strategy for the 
region and it is an ongoing process within the department. 
Deputy Secretary Sherman is leading that effort.
    Senator Young. Will that be a written work product which 
you can share to me and other members of the committee?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    Senator Young. Okay. We will follow up and receive a time 
frame for that, unless you want to volunteer it to me.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 
both for being here today and for your ongoing good work.
    Ambassador Robinson, I would like to begin with you because 
New Hampshire, like Ohio, has a very difficult problem with 
substance misuse, and as I hear from law enforcement and our 
DEA agents, the majority of those drugs are coming across our 
southern border from Mexico.
    So I wonder, just to follow up on Senator Portman's 
question, what specifically are we doing with Mexico to try and 
address this problem? Because whatever we have been doing has 
not been working.
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, and I agree with you. 
There is nothing more heartbreaking than what drugs like 
fentanyl is doing to our communities across the United States.
    I was just in Mexico, along with my colleague, Brian, for 
negotiations at the High-Level Security Dialogue. We work very 
closely with the Government of Mexico. They have agreed with us 
on a number--on an accord that lists a number of things that we 
are going to do, including greater cooperation on intel 
exchange, working more closely within the interagency, with our 
partners in the interagency, the FBI, DEA. They have just 
agreed to more visas for DEA agents in Mexico.
    I think one of aspects that we miss that is not as public 
is the great work we do--we, INL, and the interagency--with the 
state and local Mexican--state and local governments in Mexico.
    They clamor for greater opportunities to cooperate and 
collaborate with us on security issues, on equipment, on 
training. We are trying to keep up with the demand.
    The only--the last thing I would say is we have some work 
to do at home on this issue as well. If we cannot get a handle 
on the demand side for these drugs----
    Senator Shaheen. Clearly. I, certainly--you do not have to 
argue that with me. I would, certainly, agree with that, and we 
are working hard in New Hampshire and I know in other states to 
try and address that. Thank you very much.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, as a region, Latin America has 
among the highest rates of violence against women and girls in 
the world. This has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic 
and, of course, it has been exacerbated in Venezuela where we 
have seen women and girls flee that country and be subject to 
sexual assault and other means of gender-based violence.
    Can you talk about what the Administration's policy is to 
help support Venezuelan women and girls?
    Mr. Nichols. Our goal is to combat sexual and gender-based 
violence throughout the hemisphere, but migrants and, 
particularly, Venezuelan migrants are exceptionally vulnerable 
to gender-based violence.
    We work to provide training to first responders. We partner 
with international organizations like the International 
Organization for Migration and the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees to provide support to combat gender-based violence.
    We fund shelters along the migrant route as well as in a 
variety of countries in the hemisphere. We work with gender 
champions, and when I was ambassador to Peru I was very honored 
to work with Arlette Contreras, who won our International Woman 
of Courage Award while I was there.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Obviously, we have more work to 
do, but can you speak to the challenges that we face because we 
do not have ambassadors in a number of Latin American countries 
and what that means for our ability to enact foreign policy 
that is in the best interests of American citizens?
    Mr. Nichols. An ambassador is crucial. They are the 
President's personal representative. They can deliver tough 
messages that no one else can.
    They are our highest ranking officers who have a level of 
understanding and discernment that informs Washington 
policymaking and their presence also signifies the importance 
of the relationship. While not having an ambassador should not 
be seen as a slight, that is often how it is perceived.
    Senator Shaheen. Something that we, certainly, need to do 
everything we can to move forward in Congress. I would just 
like to point out I had a recent case in my office where a New 
Hampshire citizen's daughter was in the hospital.
    She was having real issues with the hospital, and after 
they got a call from the embassy, the attitude in the hospital 
and the treatment of that family changed dramatically.
    It is that kind of difference that our embassies and our 
ambassadors make in countries not only in Latin America, but 
around the world. Hopefully, we can get these people confirmed.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Assistant Secretary Nichols, it is good to see you again.
    During your nomination hearing in May, you committed to 
working with me and this committee to curb illegal immigration 
and to address the root causes of this ongoing border crisis.
    I want to first ask you just a couple of basic questions. 
Yes or no answers will be fine. First, do you agree that to 
solve the border crisis the United States needs policies and 
diplomatic agreements to discourage illegal immigration?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    Senator Hagerty. My second question, do you agree that 
making it easier to cross the border and remain in the United 
States tends to encourage people to come here illegally, all 
else being equal?
    Mr. Nichols. We should encourage orderly legal migration--
--
    Senator Hagerty. I agree with you.
    Mr. Nichols. --while combating irregular migration.
    Senator Hagerty. I agree with you on that.
    In May of 2021, I traveled to Guatemala and Mexico to meet 
with government officials about long-term strategies to address 
the border crisis. These officials told me that the key root 
cause of the crisis is that the Biden administration is sending 
a message that if you cross the border right now you will be 
allowed to stay in the United States.
    This message is being sent because the Biden administration 
canceled common sense policies like the migrant protection 
protocols, the remain in Mexico policy, policies and diplomatic 
agreements with Mexico that were hard negotiated by the 
previous administration.
    These policies require that persons crossing the border 
from Mexico and seeking asylum in the United States, rather, 
should remain in Mexico and not be released into the United 
States while their asylum claims are being adjudicated. This 
policy made sense to me and, I think, to many others.
    We should not allow people who do not have valid asylum 
claims to enter the United States for any period of time, and 
if a migrant knows that simply by crossing the border he or she 
can achieve indefinite release into the United States, often 
for years before their asylum claim is heard or permanently if 
they simply decide not to show up, then that is an enormous 
incentive to cross the border right now.
    Yet, despite court orders to the contrary, the Biden 
administration is still trying to terminate these policies and 
these diplomatic agreements that were so hard fought.
    So, Ambassador Nichols, why, in the face of record illegal 
immigration, is the Biden administration terminating policies 
and diplomatic agreements that would otherwise serve to reduce 
migrants' incentive to illegally cross the border?
    Mr. Nichols. The migrant protection protocols is subject to 
ongoing litigation. The Administration is committed to 
following the law and court orders. I cannot get into this in 
greater detail due to that ongoing litigation.
    I will note that our cooperation with Mexico on the full 
range of migration issues is excellent. The first trip that I 
took was to Haiti and, among other things, I talked to the 
Prime Minister about migration issues.
    I accompanied Secretary Blinken to Colombia where we had a 
regional migration conference to address illegal irregular 
migration to deal with issues related to the root causes, to 
promote regular migration, to attack trafficking networks, and 
we are committed to following up and pushing on these issues 
every day.
    Senator Hagerty. I have got it. I appreciate the meetings 
and the conferences, but I will note this. The Biden 
administration is actually trying to undo these diplomatic 
agreements that were put in place and were working.
    I think it is very simple. Obey the law. That is what the 
Fifth Circuit has suggested. That is the proper answer here.
    Ambassador Robinson, I would like to turn to you, if I 
might. The fentanyl problem that is plaguing the United States 
is getting worse. We have talked about this--Senator Shaheen, 
Senator Portman.
    In Tennessee, overdose rates for individuals who are aged 
25 to 34 have skyrocketed from 4.8 per 100,000 in 2015 to 37.6 
per 100,000 in 2019, and every time I am home, I hear from 
local sheriffs that it has gotten much worse this year.
    Memphis' Commercial Appeal, our large newspaper in our 
state, a few days ago interviewed Tennessee's former opioid 
czar and he said, ``I cannot remember the last time I have 
looked at a drug screening of a new patient coming off the 
street that did not have fentanyl in it.''
    Mexico is the major transit and production point for 
fentanyl, the fentanyl that is coming from China before it 
enters the United States.
    While direct shipments of finished fentanyl from China to 
the U.S. have declined after the Trump administration's 
crackdown, the amount of fentanyl shipped from Mexico has 
increased dramatically, and I have been told that more than 90 
percent of that fentanyl crossing the border or at least the 
chemicals that are used to make it--the precursors--comes from 
China. I mean, these drugs are killing Americans.
    Assistant Secretary Robinson, what percentage of fentanyl 
coming across our border ultimately originates in China, 
including the precursor chemicals?
    Mr. Robinson. I would say a great percentage. I do not have 
a specific number, but I would say a great percentage comes 
from China.
    Senator Hagerty. I will ask both Ambassador Nichols and 
Ambassador Robinson if you would commit to putting together an 
estimate for me and for this committee how much of this 
fentanyl coming from China--what percentage of it is coming 
from China, whether it is precursor or actual fentanyl, coming 
across the border into America annually and how much of it 
specifically can be traced to China.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both 
for your testimony and for your service.
    Secretary Robinson, a question with respect to Haiti. I 
understand you had a trip there recently and, as you know, it 
is a desperate situation.
    As I understand it, right now gangs control about half of 
Port-au-Prince, hijacking fuel, kidnapping people for ransom. 
Senator Portman mentioned the 17 U.S. and Canadian missionaries 
that were abducted, 15 who are still being held.
    What is your proposal as to what the United States can and 
should be doing right now with respect to the situation in 
Haiti?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Very, 
very important.
    As you noted, I was there 2 weeks ago, I think. I had an 
opportunity to meet with the prime minister, Prime Minister 
Henry, the acting Minister of Justice, and the new Director 
General of the Police.
    We have also sent advisors down to assess the situation and 
look at mid- to long-term actions we can take in terms of 
advising on setting up a new SWAT unit that will directly go 
after gang leaders for prosecution either in Haiti or in the 
United States.
    It is, as you know, much more complicated than that. There 
are political parties, there are political and economic elites 
that support these gangs. We know this.
    We are trying to track the money and we are going to use 
every punitive measure we have to go after the elites that are 
supporting these gangs and to go after the money of these 
gangs.
    Senator Van Hollen. That raises a question. As you point 
out, a lot of the elites are supporting the gangs. Is there a 
risk of a coup, essentially, led by the gangs with the support 
of the elites and what measures are we taking to try to prevent 
that?
    Mr. Robinson. I do not know if there is a risk of--what I 
should say is there are many risks in Haiti today. After the 
assassination of the president, certainly, anything is 
possible.
    We believe that if we continue to work with the current 
government officials, certainly, the current--the new director 
general of the police, if we can train them, if we can equip 
them, if we can give them the foundation they need to go after 
these gangs we will lessen many of those risks.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that.
    Secretary Nichols, there was an alarming poll in The 
Economist by a reputable polling organization that showed a big 
drop in the percentage of Latin Americans who believe democracy 
is important to their future. It said 49 percent, so just less 
than half of the population.
    You see a number of trends in the region where people are 
sort of cracking down or preventing independent judiciary and a 
number of other concerning developments. In the case of Brazil, 
you have the current president, who has, essentially, stated 
that he will either be killed or he will win in the next 
election, and there has been concern expressed about whether or 
not the elections next year will be free and fair and 
accurately counted.
    Can you talk a little bit about your assessment of the 
situation in Brazil?
    Mr. Nichols. Brazil is an important partner. It is a 
country with whom we have robust dialogue and exchange. 
National Security Adviser Sullivan has been there. Their 
national security adviser has visited us.
    We will have a number of high-level visits and engagements 
early in the New Year, Omicron variant permitting, and one of 
the topics that we discussed is democracy in the hemisphere and 
the importance of jointly working to continue to build 
democracy in our hemisphere.
    We stress that we have seen challenges in our own nation, 
as you well know, Senator, and they need to take steps to 
ensure that their institutions can meet any tests that are put 
before them.
    Senator Van Hollen. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
    With respect to the elections next year, do you expect them 
to be conducted in a free and fair manner or do you have 
concerns as of the present moment?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe that they will be conducted in a 
free and fair manner and I believe that Brazil's institutions 
will meet the test. Every nation--and, again, we have seen this 
in our own country--every nation has to strengthen its 
institutions because they are not only weakened by cynicism and 
corruption on the inside, in many cases, but they are also 
being attacked from outside our hemisphere very actively and we 
need to be cognizant of that.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Appreciate it. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, welcome. 
Thank you for your testimony.
    Mr. Nichols, I would like to start with Mexico. I am 
increasingly concerned that the Mexican Government is engaged 
in a systematic campaign to undermine American companies and 
especially American energy companies that have invested in our 
shared prosperity and in the future of the Mexican people and 
economy.
    Over the past 5 months, Mexican regulators have shut down 
three privately-owned fuel storage terminals. Among those, they 
shut down a fuel terminal in Tuxpan which is run by an American 
company based in Texas and which transports fuel on ships owned 
by American companies.
    This is a pattern of sustained discrimination against 
American companies and I worry that the Mexican Government's 
ultimate aim is to roll back the country's historic 2013 energy 
sector liberalization reforms in favor of Mexico's mismanaged 
and failing state-owned energy companies.
    The only way the Mexican Government is going to slow and 
reverse their campaign is if the United States Government 
conveys clearly and candidly that their efforts pose a serious 
threat to our relationship and to our shared economic 
interests.
    I hope that the Biden administration is willing to do that 
and I want to ask you some questions about that specifically.
    What leverage do you believe the United States Government 
has and what leverage should we use to secure a course 
correction in Mexico's behavior?
    Mr. Nichols. We have an incredibly complex and rich 
relationship with Mexico. We have a structure for that 
relationship under the USMCA and the integration of our energy 
markets in North America and our supply chains in North America 
is critical.
    We are Mexico's largest trading partner, and thousands and 
thousands of Americans and Mexicans cross the border every day 
as part of that relationship.
    Senator Cruz. How concerned are you about the Mexican 
Government's behavior and, in particular, their targeting of 
American companies?
    Mr. Nichols. I do not believe that the Mexican Government 
is targeting American companies. I think the other point that 
you made about consolidating the energy sector in public hands 
rather than private hands is more the issue because they are 
not----
    Senator Cruz. So you believe they are targeting just all 
private energy companies, Mexican and American?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes. Yes.
    Senator Cruz. Is that a good thing for America? Is that a 
good thing for Mexico?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe that we need to talk in a 
comprehensive way with our Mexican partners about the 
importance of energy security and how the private sector is 
vital to maintaining energy security for the Americas.
    Senator Cruz. Let me try again, Mr. Nichols.
    In your judgment, would Mexico destroying the private 
energy sector in Mexico and nationalizing or throwing out 
American companies and moving everything to the corrupt and 
failing state-owned energy companies, would that be a good 
thing for Mexico and would that be a good thing for America?
    Mr. Nichols. It is important that we talk to Mexico about a 
future of reliable energy, a future where our energy markets 
can remain integrated, where the private sector plays a leading 
role, particularly in working together to achieve a role----
    Senator Cruz. I have to say, Mr. Nichols, that your answer 
is discouraging because if you are not willing to tell me 
candidly that Mexico nationalizing energy and targeting 
American companies is a bad thing, then I have even less 
confidence that you are willing to convey that to Mexico.
    Let me shift to another country, Colombia. This morning, 
the Biden administration removed the FARC--the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia--from the list of foreign terrorist 
organizations.
    The FARC is an organization of Marxist-Leninist narco 
terrorists. For decades, they have killed, they have kidnapped, 
they have extorted Colombians. They have murdered and seized 
American citizens. They continue to pose an acute threat to 
Colombian security and to American interests across the region.
    This is, sadly, a part of a pattern of Biden foreign policy 
when it comes to dealing with terrorists and it is a pattern of 
appeasement and weakness towards terrorists.
    It is a pattern we have seen with the Taliban and the 
absolute disaster in Afghanistan. It is a pattern we have seen 
with the Houthis in Yemen where, again, the Biden 
administration lifted sanctions on them, and it is a pattern 
that has led to disaster.
    Given that appeasement did not work with the Houthis in 
Yemen, given that it did not work with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, why does the Administration believe that weakness 
and appeasement and delisting the FARC as terrorists will 
produce anything but terrible results in Colombia? What makes 
you think weakness towards these terrorists is going to be 
successful?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    The Administration is focused on the current terror threat. 
We designated the FARC-EP and the Segunda Marquetalia, the two 
active elements that are carrying out terrorist attacks.
    We continue to have a $10 million reward for alias Ivan 
Marquez, the head of the Segunda Marquetalia. We are focusing 
on supporting the peace process 5 years in and those elements 
of the prior FARC.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question because my time has 
expired. If and when the FARC responds to being delisted with 
more violence and more terrorism, will you commit to coming 
before this committee and admitting that it was a mistake to 
pretend they were not terrorists and it was a mistake for 
President Biden to delist them today?
    Mr. Nichols. I am always available to appear before this 
committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ambassador 
Nichols, thank you for your service.
    I particularly want to focus on Honduras. We have the early 
returns favoring the Libre Party and the woman who ran against 
corruption. Many people see this as a referendum on corruption 
in Honduras, but there is a lot of concern that yesterday the 
counting was suspended for 10 hours and that the counting is 
not disclosed for the National Assembly, their congress. We 
know this is a nation that has had military coups in the past, 
including Ms. Castro's husband, who was ousted by a coup in 
2009.
    There is an opportunity here, an incredible opportunity, 
that the United States has to seize it with both hands and to 
send a powerful message that no military coup will be tolerated 
because one could happen a week from now.
    The power elites are deeply entrenched. The corruption 
extends to the mayors, the legislators, the police, the 
military, all the way down. No one should underestimate how 
difficult it is when this type of corruption permeates every 
level of authority in the country right down to gangs that 
control the street vendors.
    It is a possibility, but a challenging moment, and I would 
just like to hear what measures the State Department is taking 
to make sure: A, there is not a military coup; second, that the 
counting is completed in an honest fashion; third, that there 
is not shenanigans that occur with the National Assembly trying 
to undermine her ability to get anything done.
    I must say I am impressed that she campaigned on restoring 
the international corruption investigators, MACCIH, which was 
the team that started to finally tackle corruption at its 
highest levels in Honduras and that the previous president and 
his allies shut down.
    She is promising to bring them back. She is promising to 
address inequality that is at the foundation of the deep 
desperation of millions of Hondurans and that helps drive 
migration, and when President Biden's team talks about root 
causes, therefore, she is talking about root causes.
    So what are we going to do to make the most of this rare 
moment of a promising opportunity?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    This time last week I was in Honduras. I met with Xiomara 
Castro and Tito Asfura, had meetings with the Foreign Minister, 
the Public Security Minister, Defense Minister, Chief of 
Defense. I talked about the importance of free, fair, 
transparent elections, and the importance of a peaceful process 
where everyone respects the outcome.
    I met with the National Electoral Council, talked about 
their vital role in ensuring a free, fair, transparent, and 
peaceful process.
    Following my meetings with them, both of the leading 
candidates put out statements reiterating their commitment to 
respect the results and encouraging their supporters to remain 
patient and peaceful throughout that process.
    We have embassy observers on the ground in Honduras who 
also partnered with the Organization of American States and 
there was an EU electoral observation mission. Through USAID we 
supported the civil society broad umbrella effort to observe 
the elections.
    There are observers who are with the Electoral Council 
taking a look at the actual vote-counting process. There were, 
as I think you noted, some technical issues in the vote count 
process, but there are international observers at every stage 
looking at how that is working. The----
    Senator Merkley. Let me cut to the chase here because those 
conversations were fine and good. I am glad you sent those 
messages.
    Are we conveying that there will be significant powerful 
consequences if there is a military coup or if the voting count 
is suspended or corrupted in some form here at the last moment, 
to try to give a new assembly and a new president a real chance 
to enact reforms? If so, what is that message we are sending, 
if you are free to share?
    Mr. Nichols. Again, in my conversations with the leading 
officials, including the Defense Minister, the Foreign 
Minister, the Chief of Defense and the Minister of Public 
Security, they reiterated to me their commitment to free, fair 
elections and respecting the result.
    If there were some violation of that commitment that would 
be unacceptable, and we have the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, we have the Organization of American States, and we 
have ample confidence that all parties are going to respect 
this outcome.
    Senator Merkley. Okay. My time is up. I will just conclude 
by noting that people always give assurances until the moment a 
military coup starts or the counting is suspended and not 
resumed.
    I am specifically encouraging that we send a very strong 
message that there will be concrete consequences should this 
fail to happen, which is different than a positive--just a 
positive encouragement, because we have seen this go off the 
rails many times before and we should be absolutely there 
accelerating the return of the international investigators that 
she has called for as soon as she is in office.
    I hope the National Assembly will be one that she can work 
with. If not, none of her reforms will be able to move through.
    It is extraordinarily frustrating to see how the corruption 
has infiltrated throughout every level, again, clear down to 
the street level, and how difficult it is to reform, and all of 
our root causes strategy will not work when a society operates 
on that complete 100 percent corruption from top to bottom.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Booker is with us virtually.
    Senator Booker. Thank you, Chairman Menendez. I appreciate 
both Mr. Nichols and Mr. Robinson being here. I want to jump 
right in.
    I know this issue was discussed a little bit earlier, but I 
would like to get back to it. Reports really suggest that both 
China and Russia are engaging in an active propaganda and 
disinformation campaign in Latin America, as they are doing in 
other parts of the world, obviously, but China and Russia have 
really sought to undermine the democratic values and damage the 
overall reputation of the United States.
    So I am wondering what is the State Department's Global 
Engagement Center doing to counter the Chinese and Russian 
government's disinformation in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and what more could the GEC do in the future?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    Our focus is ensuring that, one, we identify where the 
negative messaging trolls are coming from, that we work with 
friendly governments to alert them to what the realities are, 
that we actively message the reality of the situations that we 
are facing, that we have very direct and comprehensive 
conversations with governments in the region as well as civil 
society and publics about the realities of what the presence of 
PRC, Russia, others, in the region, and we need to also offer a 
positive alternative.
    Whether it is 5G technology or whether it is support for 
infrastructure projects, we are actively working to make sure 
that countries know that there are alternatives available to 
them and that we will work with them to put together a package 
that works for their nation.
    Senator Booker. Mr. Nichols, could you just be a little 
more specific about the tactics of the GEC? What are some of 
the specific activities they are doing and what more would you 
like to see them do?
    Mr. Nichols. The Global Engagement Center both measures 
public opinion and social media trends throughout the world. 
They actively work to counter false messages from our strategic 
competitors and they prepare media products or talking points 
that our embassies and consulates around the hemisphere can use 
to combat disinformation.
    I think they do a great job. Obviously, it is a huge task. 
The resources that they have to bring to bear to this limit 
somewhat the ability to accomplish those goals, but I think 
they are doing vital, vital work.
    Senator Booker. Just jumping really quick to Haiti--and I 
heard at least one of my colleagues bring up the severe issues 
that are going on there--we are in a state of extreme crisis 
and the democracy there is really faltering as violence is sort 
of almost at pandemic levels throughout the country, not to 
mention the challenges with the natural disasters that they--
that we have seen there.
    I just want to know maybe overall, what is your sense of 
hope in Haiti and how effective is the U.S. strategy there in 
countering some of these both natural disasters as well as the 
faltering of the democracy and the endemic violence?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    The situation in Haiti is a critical challenge for our 
hemisphere. Haiti faces collapsed government institutions, deep 
political polarization, criminal and gang violence, lack of 
economic progress.
    We are working together with our partners around the world 
to try and support the Haitian people at this crucial moment 
and to promote a Haitian-led solution to those challenges.
    That promotion means our advocacy and encouragement on the 
ground, the leadership of our charge, Ken Merton. That involves 
interaction at high levels whether it be Secretary Blinken or 
other senior officials in Washington and collaboration with 
international partners like Canada, France, Brazil, to support 
Haiti.
    Senator Booker. Then, lastly--I have a few seconds left--I 
continue to be dissatisfied with the level of diversity at the 
State Department, and I know there are a lot of good efforts 
going on to try to get more diverse and inclusive members--
employees at the State Department and I, myself, have worked 
with other senators to try to do things from sponsoring paid 
internship programs and other fellowship programs.
    I am curious if you have any advice for me who just--
especially as I travel the globe and visit with our State 
Department employees, I am surprised at the lack of diversity. 
I wonder if you have any advice to me about what more we could 
be doing to promote diversity within the State Department.
    Mr. Nichols. I think recruiting is the first crucial step. 
I think the Fellowship Programs Rangel and Pickering are 
vitally important. I think retention is crucial and in our 
bureau we have several parallel programs to support retention 
of a diverse workforce.
    We have a Senior Foreign Service officer who actually led 
the department's recruitment efforts, Marianne Scott, who leads 
our diversity, equity, and inclusion efforts from the front 
office and works not only to support that in Washington, but 
also in all of our embassies and consulates around the world.
    I think if you talk about the importance of diversity and 
inclusion, when you visit our embassies and with foreign 
partners, I think that definitely helps and I hope that you 
will support our recruiting efforts in universities and 
colleges around America.
    Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Nichols.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to you, 
Ambassador Nichols, just want to talk about--in following up on 
Senator Booker's questioning on Haiti, just want to make sure 
that the actions which we are taking in Haiti are not 
solidifying opportunists over the interests of the Haitian 
people.
    I saw where you met with representatives of the Montana 
Group made up of Haitian citizens and civil society leaders in 
late September. What were your takeaways from that meeting in 
terms of how the United States should move forward with an 
inclusive Haitian-led focused policy?
    Mr. Nichols. My number-one takeaways are--number one was 
the importance of security. We need better security be able to 
get to free and fair elections in Haiti, and we are a long way 
away from that. The role of civil society in its broadest 
construct--private sector, nongovernmental organizations--is 
vital, and bringing together a broad set of actors to agree on 
a way forward without an artificially imposed time line from 
the international community is also vital. Those would be my 
main takeaways, sir.
    Senator Markey. Okay. I just urge you to continue to reach 
out to those civil society leaders in Haiti because, 
ultimately, they have the vision which is going to be necessary 
to just change this underlying historical dynamic which exists 
there.
    Thank you for your good work, but let us just continue to 
focus on that community of leaders who are risking their lives 
every day to try to provide the long-term vision for what has 
to happen there.
    Mr. Nichols. Absolutely.
    Senator Markey. On the subject of--yes, sir?
    Mr. Nichols. Just absolutely, Senator.
    Senator Markey. Yes, thank you. On the subject of climate 
change, the science is clear on the fact that climate change is 
an underlying driver of widespread humanitarian crisis and 
displacement throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.
    Therefore, I reintroduced legislation this year that aims 
to create a U.S. resettlement pathway for climate-displaced 
persons, given the United States bears an outsized 
responsibility for fueling global warming. Still, the majority 
of the CO2 is red, white, and blue after 200 years of leading 
the Industrial Revolution.
    I was glad to hear that in response to my persistent calls 
for action on this topic there is now a National Security 
Council Interagency Working Group aimed at finding solutions to 
issues of climate migration.
    Do either of you have anything more you can share on the 
progress of this Interagency Working Group and what potential 
solutions might be offered?
    Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
    I have not participated directly in that specific 
conversation, but I can tell you that climate change and its 
effects on the countries in our hemisphere is a central concern 
that I have.
    I had the pleasure of participating with Vice President 
Harris in her meeting with Prime Minister Mia Mottley of 
Barbados and that was a key topic in that conversation.
    We are integrating climate issues into all of our 
diplomatic engagement throughout the hemisphere and we are 
actively focused on mitigation measures for those states most 
at risk as well as adaptation, particularly in the energy 
sector.
    Senator Markey. I would urge you to continue to stay very 
engaged on this very important issue. We have to tackle the 
issues of climate resiliency and solutions for climate-
displaced persons, which is just going to increase as each year 
goes by, and if we are doing that we are actually working on 
one of the underlying drivers of mass migration coming out of 
Latin America, coming out of the Caribbean.
    I just urge you to continue to elevate it as an issue, to 
drive it at the National Security Council as an issue that has 
to be addressed and factored into all of the resultant issues 
that are a consequence of our long-term ignoring of the climate 
crisis.
    Mr. Nichols. Absolutely, Senator.
    Mr. Robinson. Senator, I would just add, it is even broader 
than that. The environmental degradation from narcotics 
trafficking throughout the region is also a major problem and 
we are both working very closely with our partners in the 
region.
    We have seen the effects of illegal mining. We have seen 
the effects of runoff from waste from drug trafficking or drug 
production areas in Mexico and in Colombia, and we are working 
to raise that as well.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you both for your great 
work. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Let me have some final closing questions. Let me start off 
with Haiti. A lot has been discussed here, but here is the one 
thing I do not understand.
    Haiti, obviously, is a challenge, number one, because of 
the suffering of the Haitian people by both natural and manmade 
disasters. It is destabilizing to its neighbor that it shares 
the island of Hispaniola with, the Dominican Republic.
    One is facing the challenges that the Haitian citizens are 
facing. Fleeing the island is, clearly, may be a desirable 
alternative. That means migration to--in the hemisphere and to 
the United States.
    These are real tangible challenges we are facing right now. 
I have heard your answers about our overall goal of a Haitian-
led democratic process. I share that, but when Doctors Without 
Borders are closing up because they cannot get fuel to operate 
their circumstances, when I am getting calls from orphanages 
that American sponsors who wants to close up the orphanages and 
bring the children to the United States because they cannot 
secure them, when people are sequestered and kidnapped, it 
seems to me that none of that can happen in terms of our 
aspirations for Haiti unless there is security.
    What is our initiative to try to create some semblance of 
security so that all these other things can happen?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That is a great question.
    As I mentioned before, it is a complicated issue. We, INL, 
are working very closely with the Haitian National Police, the 
new Director General. We are going to send in advisors.
    When I was there 2 weeks ago, I arrived with--they had 
asked for greater ability to get police around the city. I 
showed up with 19 new vehicles, 200 new protective vests for 
the police. We are--the 19 was the first installment of a total 
of 60 that we are going to deliver to the Haitian National 
Police.
    We are going to get advisors down there to work with the 
new SWAT team to start taking back the areas that have been 
taken from ordinary Haitians, but it is going to be a process 
and it is going to take some time.
    The Chairman. First of all, is the Haitian National Police 
actually an institution capable of delivering the type of 
security that Haitians deserve?
    Mr. Robinson. We believe it is. It is an institution that 
we have worked with in the past. There was a small brief moment 
where Haitians actually acknowledged that the Haitian National 
Police have gotten better and was more professional.
    Our goal--our long-term goal is to try to bring it back to 
that----
    The Chairman. How much time before we get security on the 
ground?
    Mr. Robinson. I cannot say exactly, but we are working as 
fast as we can.
    The Chairman. Months? Years?
    Mr. Robinson. I would hope we could do it in less than 
months, but we are working as fast as we can.
    The Chairman. Here is the problem. I do not understand why 
there is a reticence to, for example, seek U.N. action to try 
to create stability because nothing else--when the gangs 
control the ports and everything you try to get to the Haitian 
people are stopped at the ports because the gangs control it, 
something is wrong.
    How do you do all the things we want to do to help the 
Haitian people if, at the end of the day, you cannot get 
through the gangs?
    Mr. Robinson. We are absolutely going to need--as you 
rightly point out, we are absolutely going to need the help of 
international organizations. We were a little bit stymied in 
this just recently when we tried to extend the mandate of the 
current group of police advisors.
    We wanted to get them extended for a year, but we were 
blocked by Russia and China and they were only able to be 
extended for 9 months. It is going to take a collective effort.
    The Chairman. Why do you think Russia and China sought 
this? Because they want total unrest in the hemisphere. Their 
whole purpose in this hemisphere is creating instability, is to 
move people to a point of saying democracy does not work. Let 
me try something else, authoritarianism.
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. They systematically work at it. At some 
point, we have to think about how we circumvent that. Let me 
turn to something else.
    Secretary Nichols, in the Trafficking in Persons Report 
that the State Department put out, Cuban doctors were listed as 
among a group of people who were trafficked. Is that correct?
    Mr. Nichols. That is correct.
    The Chairman. When an entity like PAHO, the Pan American 
Health Organization, uses Cuban doctors in a way that allows 
them to be trafficked, should not we be doing something to 
change that at PAHO?
    Mr. Nichols. We have had strong conversations with the 
leadership of PAHO about the unacceptable nature of that 
relationship. We have talked about the importance of better 
governance and oversight within that organization and that in 
order for us to work with PAHO we need to be assured that 
something like that can never be repeated.
    The Chairman. They are continued, though. For example, 
right now, Cuban doctors are being used inside of Mexico in a 
way in which they are being trafficked. I understand that 
trafficking in persons by a country, ultimately, is a violation 
of the USMCA.
    Mr. Nichols. We talk to all countries about the reality of 
the Cuban medical missions program and that it is a massive 
trafficking risk, and we encourage countries to avoid it. It is 
an abuse of the Cuban people and it is a misguided attempt to 
provide health care in the country.
    The Chairman. When a country engages in it knowing that, 
then there has to be some type of consequence. I mean, for 
those who might be viewing and do not understand what we are 
talking about, Cuba sends doctors to different countries in the 
world.
    They, ultimately--those countries pay the Cuban Government 
for the service of those doctors. Those doctors get a fraction 
of their wages and their passports are taken away so they 
cannot leave.
    That is human trafficking and it is being done right here 
in our hemisphere with international organizations like PAHO 
and done with countries who, supposedly, we have a relationship 
with like Mexico, and there has to be consequences to it or 
else we are complicit in the trafficking.
    Let me ask you, with reference to Nicaragua and El 
Salvador, Secretary Nichols, we can agree that in the case of 
Nicaragua, we have a new dictatorship arising and in the case 
of El Salvador, we have dramatic backsliding in democracy. Is 
that a fair statement?
    Mr. Nichols. Yes.
    The Chairman. Both of them are part of DR-CAFTA. Should we 
be considering suspending them as a action that is a strong 
action to be taken so that we can, hopefully, turn the tide?
    Mr. Nichols. I think we should be thinking about all the 
tools that we have available to us. There is an urgency to 
demonstrate to countries in the region that actions have 
consequences.
    The ability of countries to flaunt their own constitutions, 
their own laws, to abuse their own citizens, is a huge problem 
when we should use every tool available to----
    The Chairman. I think that whatever the tools--one of the 
strongest tools you can do is take away trade preferences. When 
we entered DR-CAFTA, it was not with countries that were moving 
in the opposite direction from democracy. They were moving 
towards democracy.
    They were moving towards a respect for human rights. They 
were moving towards a respect for the rule of law. They should 
not be able to benefit from trade preferences when they go in 
the opposite direction. That is a strong action the 
Administration can take and I recommend it to them.
    Let me ask Secretary Robinson, while the United States has 
traditionally stood with principled activists and public 
officials that seek to reverse democratic backsliding, combat 
kleptocracy, and uphold the rule of law, those courageous 
individuals often face significant threats as a result of their 
work.
    Far too often these individuals are forced to flee their 
countries when the situation becomes untenable or when they 
finish their term in office.
    I know you are familiar with these dynamics. What more does 
the United States need to do to support those individuals who 
stand against efforts to undermine democratic governance?
    How can we address the challenge, for example, in Central 
American countries where the problem is particularly acute?
    Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. That is a really 
important question.
    I would say we need to look at a basket of ways that we can 
support and defend democracy in Central America and, frankly, 
throughout the region. We need to continue to use all of our 
sanctions authorities and vigorously use our sanctions 
authorities.
    We need to continue to work with those governments to shore 
up their democratic institutions, independent attorneys-
general, judiciaries, the courts, prosecutors. We need to 
continue to work very closely with these with these 
organizations.
    We need to find more flexible and creative ways to support 
civil society and independent media in country so that they do 
not--it is not easy to make them flee when they stand up and do 
the right thing for democracy, for investigating corrupt acts, 
and I look forward to working with you all on finding these 
flexible and creative ways to do that.
    I would say the last thing we need to do is we need to be 
more vigorous on protecting and offering a safe haven for those 
who do have to flee. It is a cumbersome process now. It is very 
hard.
    There are four courageous people, at least four courageous 
people, from Guatemala that are being hosted here. There are 
probably others from the region. It was hard to get them here 
and, again, I look forward to working with you all to figure 
out better ways, more efficient ways, that we can offer some 
semblance of safety.
    The Chairman. We, certainly, want to work with you on that 
and other issues. Let me just say, though, when the corruption 
fighter has to leave the country there is one less person to 
try to create change.
    Mr. Robinson. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. So at the end of the day, we have to find 
ways to strengthen their hand, to create international 
spotlights on what they are doing, to make it more difficult 
for regimes to threaten them and, ultimately, cause them to 
leave because for them, for the regime, that is, ultimately, a 
success story, right? This person leaves. Now there is one less 
person to try to create change in the country.
    Mr. Robinson. Senator, I would also add that we saw the 
model that worked. I cannot remember who mentioned it, but I 
think it was Senator Merkley mentioned MACCIH in Honduras.
    We had international organizations in some of these 
countries that were working and the reason they are not there 
now is because they touched people in those countries in power 
who had never been touched before, and I think if we can look 
at that again we might have some more success.
    The Chairman. Finally, Secretary Nichols, where did the 
idea for delisting of the FARC come from?
    Mr. Nichols. It has been something under discussion since 
at least the previous administration. It was always 
contemplated as part of the peace accord. You may recall that 
when the Uribe administration reached an agreement with the AUC 
paramilitaries, that organization was also delisted.
    The Chairman. More recently, where--who drove the question 
of delisting the FARC?
    Mr. Nichols. It is----
    The Chairman. Was it NSC? Was it State Department? Who was 
it?
    Mr. Nichols. I believe that this was--when I arrived in the 
position that was already well advanced. So I cannot say who 
the specific driver was. It was always a component of our 
support for the peace process and updating the threats that we 
face.
    The Chairman. My understanding is that what you are doing 
is sanctioning those who have not put their arms down and 
delisting those that have and are following a peaceful path to 
integration in their society.
    This is an example of when I have pressed the question both 
in nominations and with the Administration about consultation 
versus notification, and in this particular case my 
notification was to The Wall Street Journal.
    That is not what I consider consultation, and the lack of 
getting that type of consultation creates problems. I hope we 
do not relive it again.
    This hearing record will remain open to the close of 
business tomorrow. Members who have questions will submit it by 
then and we would like your answers to be expeditious and as 
full as possible.
    With that, and the thanks to the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


 Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols and Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Jim Risch

    Question. Can you explain why the Administration has not issued a 
single sanction since it came to office?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has maintained a robust 
sanctions policy against the Maduro regime and has lifted no previously 
imposed sanctions. Those existing U.S. sanctions deny Maduro revenue 
streams that finance repression and line the pockets of regime 
officials; protect the U.S. financial system from exposure to corrupt 
and illicit financial flows; and promote accountability for those who 
undermine democracy, abuse human rights, or engage in corruption. We 
continuously assess how best to align our sanctions approaches with our 
policy goals and calibrate our sanctions policy to account for the 
political and economic context of developments on the ground.
    Sanctions comprise just one part of our strategy. We also work with 
Venezuelan and international partners, using available diplomatic and 
economic tools, to support the Venezuelan people in their peaceful 
pursuit of democracy and freedom in Venezuela. So long as the Maduro 
regime and its enablers repress the Venezuelan people and divert 
revenue from Venezuela's resources to support repression and corrupt 
practices, we will work with our international partners to keep up the 
pressure.

    Question. Does the Administration have a strict deadline for its 
support of the ongoing negotiations between some Venezuelan political 
parties and the Maduro regime?

    Answer. We support the Venezuelan-led, comprehensive negotiations 
as a means to restore to Venezuelans the democracy that they deserve 
and to alleviate the suffering caused by the regime-created crisis in 
Venezuela. A peaceful restoration of democracy, an end to human rights 
abuses, and a solution to Venezuela's dire humanitarian crisis are long 
overdue and should remain at the forefront of the Venezuelan-led 
negotiation process, without externally imposed deadlines.
    By suspending participation in the process, the regime has once 
again placed its own interests above those of Venezuelans. Alongside 
our partners and allies, we will continue calling on, and pressuring, 
Maduro to return to the negotiation table in Mexico City.

    Question. In your opinion, are the members of the Maduro regime 
honest brokers to be trusted to cede power given current circumstances?

    Answer. No. That's why the United States and others in the 
international community need to keep pressure on Maduro and his regime 
and help promote transparent, verifiable, and holistic changes under 
which Venezuelans themselves can establish the conditions required for 
free and fair elections, the best framework for a political resolution 
to the crisis.
    We stand with all Venezuelans striving to build a better future for 
their country. The Maduro regime has engaged in a broad range of 
authoritarian tactics, including arresting and harassing political and 
civil society actors without justification; trying to criminalize 
opposition voices; committing numerous human rights abuses; 
manipulating voter registration rolls and the candidacies of opponents 
from across the political spectrum; and engaging in persistent media 
censorship. It lacks confidence in its own ability to face the 
Venezuelan people in elections free of such manipulation and its 
actions make clear to the world that its determination to cling to 
power takes precedence have persistently shown the world their 
nefarious intent and priorities far outweigh that over their own 
Venezuelan citizens.
    Maduro needs to return to the Mexico negotiations as a necessary 
step towards improving the situation in Venezuela.

    Question. What incentive does Maduro have in participating in the 
negotiation process?

    Answer. Meaningful progress in negotiations would serve the 
interests of the Venezuelan people and lead the United States to review 
our sanctions policies. Venezuelans themselves must lead the 
negotiations between the Venezuelan democratic opposition and the 
Maduro regime. Maduro regime policies have caused Venezuela's economic 
struggles. The regime, through its own actions, has forfeited the trust 
of the Venezuelan people, Venezuela's private sector, and the 
international community, causing more than 6 million Venezuelans to 
vote with their feet and leave the country. To restore legitimacy and 
to end the economic crisis, Maduro and his cronies must negotiate with 
other Venezuelans and to return to a free and open democratic system.

    Question. What signal does the U.S. supporting an electoral 
observation mission to Venezuela send to the Maduro regime which has 
sought to legitimize a completely fraudulent process?

    Answer. The November elections did not meet even basic 
international standards. Fearful of the voice and vote of Venezuelans, 
the regime grossly skewed the process to predetermine the result long 
before any Venezuelan voter cast a ballot. Unjustified arrests and 
harassment of political and civil society actors, criminalization of 
opposition party activities, bans on candidates, manipulation of voter 
registration, media censorship, and other authoritarian tactics ensured 
the elections would not reflect the will of the Venezuelan people.
    We noted the participation of international observers and experts, 
including from the European Union and the Carter Center. We continue 
urging them to call out regime abuses during this process.

    Question. Does the Administration plan to recognize Juan Guaido as 
the Interim-President after January 2022?

    Answer. The United States continues to recognize the authority of 
the democratically elected 2015 National Assembly as the last remaining 
democratic institution and of Juan Guaido as the interim President of 
Venezuela.

    Question. In your view, why did U.S. policy and foreign assistance 
efforts fail to achieve electoral reforms in Nicaragua ahead of the 
November 2021 elections?

    Answer. For years, the Ortega-Murillo regime has chipped away at 
Nicaragua's democratic institutions and consolidated all state powers 
in its hands with impunity. The victory in a sham election on November 
7 stemmed from their full control of all branches of government, 
carefully built over decades, and their desire to hold on to power at 
all costs. The Ortega-Murillo regime implemented the Russian model of 
repressing civil society and political opponents, including through the 
adoption of six laws between late October 2020 and early February 2021 
used to limit free speech, detain individuals for up to 90 days without 
charges, extend criminal sentences, blunt the assistance and influence 
of the international community through onerous registration and 
extensive reporting requirements, and exclude prominent opposition 
leaders from the electoral process. In addition, Russian Government 
forces have provided training and materials to the Ortega-Murillo 
regime to aid its campaign of repression. Ortega and Murillo's 
consolidation of power and efforts to steer Nicaragua down an 
autocratic path did not happen overnight, and U.S. and international 
efforts to return Nicaragua to a democratic path will not achieve 
results overnight. We will demonstrate resolve and work multilaterally 
with like-minded partners to defend democracy and human rights in 
Nicaragua. We will press for the immediate and unconditional release of 
political prisoners and continue to work with our partners and the 
Nicaraguan people over the medium term to restore the democracy they 
deserve.

    Question. Why has U.S. policy and foreign assistance efforts failed 
to meaningfully improve the capacity of recipients to effectively 
challenge the Ortega regime during the election?

    Answer. Through the Department of State and USAID, we support 
Nicaraguan civil society organizations, independent media, and human 
rights defenders as they strive to restore democracy, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights. Specifically, our assistance supports 
Nicaraguans in their efforts to restore democratic norms and practices, 
supports a free and independent press, and promotes the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. Despite increasing harassment and 
intimidation by the Ortega-Murillo government, we maintain the ability 
to assist these Nicaraguan partners to expose the government's 
brutality and defiance of international law, as well as provide 
Nicaraguans with factual information in contrast to government 
propaganda. We also facilitate dialogue and consensus-building among 
opposition leaders in exile and the diaspora. The decision to imprison 
prominent potential presidential candidates and ban any genuine 
opposition parties from participating in the November elections 
demonstrates that the regime did assess the opposition's ability to 
pose an effective challenge to them as credible if elections were free 
and fair. We will continue to support Nicaraguan civil society in its 
efforts to restore democracy and will help the Nicaraguan exile 
community remain engaged with the population in Nicaragua and make its 
international advocacy more effective.
                            colombia / farc
    Question. How clear is the demarcation line between the FARC and 
the residual organized armed groups that sprung up after the 2016 deal 
between President Santos and the FARC?

    Answer. New terrorist groups have emerged since the 2016 Peace 
Accord, including Segunda Marquetalia and Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia--People's Army (FARC-EP), and the Department of State 
announced the designation of boto hog these groups as foreign terrorist 
organizations pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
(SDGT) entities under E.O. 13224, as amended, and the designations of 
the respective leaders of those organizations, Luciano Marin Arango, 
Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, Henry Castellanos Garzon, Nestor 
Gregorio Vera Fernandez, Miguel Santanilla Botache, and Euclides Espana 
Caicedo, as SDGTs under E.O. 13224, as amended. The Department did so 
based on reliable information that these groups have conducted attacks 
or otherwise engaged in terrorism or terrorist activity.
    In accordance with the terms of the 2016 Peace Accord with the 
Colombian government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
formally dissolved and disarmed, and the group no longer exists as a 
unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or 
has the capability or intent to do so. No reliable information 
indicates that the FARC has conducted attacks or otherwise engaged in 
terrorism or terrorist activity since the Peace Accord. We regularly 
evaluate whether former members of the FARC, or other individuals, 
conduct attacks or otherwise engage in terrorism or terrorist activity.

    Question. The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute monitoring 
the 2016 FARC deal has consistently reported progress in its 
implementation, even during the height of the pandemic last year.
    What specific lines of effort will be advanced by revoking FARC's 
terrorist designation?

    Answer. The decision to revoke the designation does not change the 
posture with regards to any charges or potential charges in the United 
States against former leaders of the FARC, nor does it remove the stain 
of the decision by Colombia's Special Jurisdiction of Peace, which 
characterized their actions as crimes against humanity. Revocation of 
the FARC's FTO designation does not impact prior law enforcement 
actions related to the FARC's past terrorist activities and does not 
allow any former FARC members admissibility into the United States.
    As a practical matter, the decision will allow USAID and other 
elements of the U.S. Embassy to evaluate whether and if so how to work 
with the Colombian government on peace accord implementation in areas 
of the country in which demobilized members of the former FARC reside, 
without violating U.S. law.

    Question. The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute monitoring 
the 2016 FARC deal has consistently reported progress in its 
implementation, even during the height of the pandemic last year.
    Did the Colombian Government request to revoke the FARC's terrorist 
designation?

    Answer. The Department consulted the Government of Colombia when 
gathering facts as we conducted the legally mandated five-year review 
of the FARC's designation. In January 2020, when Colombia adopted the 
U.S. sanctions list, it specifically excluded the FARC from its own 
list. That same month, Colombia officially requested the United States 
designate FARC dissidents as FTOs. We also pre-notified the Colombian 
Government in advance of the public announcement.

    Question. It has been estimated that the FARC had reportedly had 
only delivered $12.9 million in local currency, dollars, and gold of 
the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020 for 
reparations to their victims.
    What is the FARC doing with the funds it has failed to surrender?

    Answer. We commend the progress of the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace to identify, and hold responsible, former members of the FARC who 
orchestrated hostage taking and child recruitment, and some commanders 
of the Army who ordered, tolerated, or covered up, extrajudicial 
killings.
    We refer you to the Government of Colombia for specific questions 
on reparations to victims.

    Question. It has been estimated that the FARC had reportedly had 
only delivered $12.9 million in local currency, dollars, and gold of 
the $291 million it pledged to surrender by the end of 2020 for 
reparations to their victims.
    What kind of risks would this amount of unaccounted for money pose 
for political stability in Colombia?

    Answer. We commend the progress of the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace to identify, and hold responsible, former members of the FARC who 
orchestrated hostage taking and child recruitment, and some commanders 
of the army who ordered, tolerated, or covered up, extrajudicial 
killings.
    We refer you to the Government of Colombia for specific questions 
on reparations to victims.

    Question. Honduran President-elect Xiomara Castro has indicated she 
would seek to establish formal ties with the People's Republic of 
China, thus altering its long-standing view towards Taiwan.
    Do you agree that Chinese influence in the region is destabilizing?

    Answer. Problematic PRC actions represent a serious challenge to 
U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security ties and opaque 
infrastructure investments that undermine transparency and sovereignty. 
We will continue to inform countries in the region about problematic 
PRC influence and coercive actions. We raise concerns about PRC 
infrastructure projects with inadequate labor and environmental 
standards, for example, which undermine workers' rights under domestic 
law and international labor standards and undermine environmental 
protections. The projects also operate under a general lack of 
transparency and disregard for the rule of law; carry opaque and often 
unsustainable loan terms; and foster public corruption in borrowing 
countries. In addition, we will continue to highlight the risk of using 
PRC's untrusted providers, as PRC law compels Chinese firms to provide 
its intelligence and security services with on-demand access to data, 
facilities, and telecommunications equipment and infrastructure. This 
knowledge allows local populations to better discern the sources of 
disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access to critical 
infrastructure and sensitive sectors.

    Question. What will the Administration's efforts to counter this 
malign influence as well as encourage the new Honduran Government to 
maintain its current diplomatic relations with Taiwan?

    Answer. The U.S. Government--through our sustained commitment to 
the Western Hemisphere--bolsters the region's coalition of resilient 
democracies that champion our shared values. We work closely with our 
allies and partners to lend expertise and resources toward the region's 
pandemic recovery, including support for greater vaccine availability, 
high-standard infrastructure investment, and transparent economic 
development. I have stressed the value of their relationship with 
Taiwan with Honduran officials and President-elect Castro. Taiwan 
remains an essential democratic partner in a region where most 
countries share our values. We will continue U.S. efforts to support 
Taiwan's diplomatic and unofficial relationships across the Western 
Hemisphere region, including in Honduras. Together we can support good 
governance, transparent investments, and economic growth together with 
likeminded countries.

    Question. The Administration is exploring options to financially 
compensate migrants separated at the border while illegally entering 
our country. In your opinion, what are the chances some of those funds 
are channeled as payments to criminal organizations involved in human 
smuggling and trafficking?

    Answer. The Department of State participates in the President's 
Interagency Task Force on the Reunification of Families as part of the 
Biden-Harris Administration's efforts to reunify families separated 
under the prior Administration's immigration policies. The Department 
of Justice leads settlement negotiations on behalf of the U.S. 
Government and we ask that you direct any questions related to the 
litigation to the Department of Justice. As part of the U.S. 
Government's reunification program, the Administration is looking for 
funding to provide services and support to the children and their 
families once reunited in the United States. Relevant U.S. Government 
agencies would oversee the Administration of these services.

    Question. With illegal migration through the southwest U.S. border 
at a 21-year high, what actions will the Administration take to 
incentivize the governments of Mexico and northern Central America to 
uphold their domestic and international obligations regarding refugee 
and asylum seekers?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to advance the 
Administration's Collaborative Migration Management Strategy and Root 
Causes Strategy to address irregular migration in the region. The 
Administration works with regional partner countries to expand pathways 
for safe, legal, and humane migration to the United States and other 
third countries, including labor opportunities, access to regional 
asylum programs, refugee resettlement, and family reunification.
    Through international organization partners, the Department of 
State is supporting the Government of Mexico and Central American 
governments to strengthen asylum systems and build institutional 
responses for forced internal displacement where relevant. In October 
2021, Secretary Blinken joined leaders from other regional governments 
to underscore the importance of responsibility sharing across the 
Western Hemisphere; not only to provide access to protection for those 
in need, but to manage unprecedented mixed migration flows humanely and 
effectively, including through responsible removal operations and visa 
regimes. U.S. Government funding is supporting Mexico to strengthen the 
capacity of its asylum system, including helping its refugee agency 
COMAR to nearly triple its annual asylum claim processing capacity 
since 2017.

    Question. As INL continues its efforts to support longer-term 
community prevention efforts and institutional capacity building of the 
Haitian National Police, what will be the metrics used to evaluate the 
success of U.S. foreign assistance to the HNP?

    Answer. INL is measuring the success of U.S. assistance to the HNP 
using several key metrics across efforts in community policing and 
institutional capacity building. Across a 2-year period, these metrics 
and other output and outcome-level measures will offer INL quantitative 
data on whether its assistance to the HNP is achieving its goals in 
providing security to Haitian citizens and preventing gangs from 
spreading their influence. In terms of community policing, INL is 
evaluating the success of its assistance to the HNP through the 
reduction of gang influence in the community and the public perception 
of the HNP as a service provider and reliable force to protect Haitian 
citizens. Essential metrics to measure this impact include the 
percentage decrease in homicides, kidnappings, and robberies in key 
neighborhoods and the percentage increase of individuals that see the 
HNP as a service provider in lieu of gangs.
    In terms of institutional capacity building, INL continues to 
support the HNP in its efforts to become a professional and accountable 
institution capable of managing Haiti's internal security and 
dismantling gangs across the country. As INL is still developing its 
increased assistance to the HNP's gang reduction efforts, metrics are 
still being finalized but will focus on measuring the inability of 
gangs to threaten Haitian lives and destabilize Haiti, the HNP 
achieving a sufficient force strength and being properly resourced, and 
the sufficiency of Haiti's prison infrastructure to detain convicted 
prisoners securely and humanely. Specific metrics will include, for 
example, the total number of arrested gang members and successful anti-
gang operations conducted by the HNP, the establishment of a consistent 
HNP recruitment schedule to increase the force, a transparent budget 
that ensures proper resourcing of HNP units, and on corrections the 
percentage reductions in both pre-trial detainees and overcrowding 
across Haiti's corrections system.
                                 ______
                                 

              Responses of Mr. Todd Robinson to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. How are you and the Administration prioritizing U.S. 
bilateral relations with our Caribbean allies/partners?

    Answer. Under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the 
Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) works with 13 countries and regional security 
institutions to build Caribbean capacity to confront illicit 
trafficking and transnational organized crime, increase citizen 
security, and hold criminals accountable. Key bilateral engagements in 
the Dominican Republic include INL's work to stand up and continue to 
support a 911 system as well as capacity building support for 
specialized counternarcotics units. In The Bahamas, INL is working to 
build the Royal Bahamas Police Force's law enforcement and 
counternarcotics maritime capabilities to support Operation Bahamas, 
Turks and Caicos, a decades-old trilateral counternarcotics operation 
between the United States, The Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos. In 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, program efforts focus on combating 
gang violence and associated criminality.
    INL's regional programming yields bilateral results as well. 
Through INL's financial crimes project, six Caribbean countries have 
adopted model legislation to enable the recovery of criminal proceeds, 
and enabled partner nations to advance civil forfeiture actions 
totaling more than $2.9 million in cash and more than $62 million in 
pending property seizing orders since 2015. CBSI countries directly 
benefit from the use of CBSI-Connect, an online law enforcement 
learning management platform that has proved a crucial connectivity 
tool throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, and INL's investments in the 
Regional Security System's Air Wing, Digital Forensic Lab, and police 
training academy.

    Question. Since your appointment, how have you personally taken a 
role in enhancing law enforcement cooperation with the other nations of 
the Caribbean?

    Answer. Since I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary on September 
30, I have advanced U.S. priorities through several key Caribbean 
security partners. I met with the Executive Director of the Eastern 
Caribbean's Regional Security System (RSS), a key partner in combating 
maritime crime and narcotics trafficking in the region, to discuss ways 
to deepen and broaden our relationship. I also attended the change of 
command ceremony at SOUTHCOM in late October where I met with security 
officials from several key Caribbean partner countries. In the coming 
months, I intend to visit Caribbean partners and expand our diplomatic 
engagement in the region by participating in the tenth annual 
Caribbean-U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue, scheduled to take place 
in early 2022 under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative.

    Question. What update can you share with regards to the progress of 
the investigation?

    Answer. The United States supports a thorough, independent 
investigation into President Moise's assassination consistent with both 
Haitian law and international rule of law standards. We want to see 
those who planned, funded, and carried out the assassination of former 
President Moise held accountable. We refer you to the Government of 
Haiti on the progress of its ongoing investigation into President 
Moise's assassination. We would also refer you to the FBI for 
additional questions.

    Question. How else is the United States assisting Haitian law 
enforcement deal with gangs and rampant crime?

    Answer. The Department of State, through INL, supports the 
development of the Haitian National Police (HNP) into a professional 
and accountable institution capable of managing Haiti's internal 
security. In addition to its steady-state support of the HNP's capacity 
building, INL recently reallocated an additional $15 million to 
increase the HNP's community policing efforts, to establish an anti-
gang task force, and to support the overcrowded and underfunded Haitian 
corrections system. INL priorities with this additional funding include 
adding five new contract subject matter expert advisors embedded in the 
HNP to combat gang influence and build HNP capacity in the near term; 
supporting the creation of a highly vetted anti-gang unit, based on the 
results of an INL-led security needs assessment for the HNP; 
sustainably reducing gang influence over the long term through a 
holistic, community-oriented interventions by the HNP; and procuring 
new vehicles and additional protective equipment for HNP specialized 
units. INL has already delivered 19 of 60 new unarmored vehicles to the 
HNP and expects to further support Haitian law enforcement needs for 
specialized units as anti-gang operations ramp up. INL will continue to 
provide ongoing support to build the HNP into an accountable and 
professional organization and to improve prisons through infrastructure 
improvement, addressing overcrowding, and Prisons Administration 
Directorate's (DAP) medical and management through training, advising, 
and provision of supplies and equipment.

    Question. How does the Administration view Cuba's complicity in 
drug trafficking through Venezuela?

    Answer. We have serious differences with Cuba on a range of issues, 
including Venezuela. Cuba continues to support the Maduro regime and 
seeks to undermine regional stability. INL closely monitors 
transnational criminal organizations and trafficking trends in the 
region, including Cuba, and works to counter criminality emanating from 
Venezuela. While much of the cocaine trafficked through Venezuela moves 
through the broader Caribbean region regional traffickers typically 
avoid Cuba due to counternarcotics efforts by the Cuban Government.

    Question. What actions, if any, is the Administration taking to 
counter this threat?

    Answer. Individuals within the Maduro regime increasingly depend on 
narcotrafficking revenue, among other illicit revenue streams, to 
maintain their grip on power. We are committed to stemming the 
transshipment of drugs through Venezuela, combating the endemic 
corruption of regime officials, and impeding the money laundering and 
criminal networks related to the illegal trade of commodities. Since 
January 2019, the United States has worked with the Interim Government 
of Venezuela to increase the interdiction of Venezuelan-flagged vessels 
beyond the territorial sea of any State suspected of illicit narcotics 
trafficking. In April 2021, the Department of State successfully 
negotiated an arrangement with the Venezuelan Interim Government to 
facilitate expedited U.S. law enforcement boardings of these suspect 
vessels. As of December 8, 2021, this partnership has resulted in the 
interdiction of 64 vessels and transfer of 159 suspects to authorities 
ashore for U.S. prosecution.
    We also continue countering threats in coordination with 
international narcotics trafficking and money laundering charges by the 
Department of Justice against Venezuelan targets through our Narcotics 
and Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Programs. We are working with 
our partners to increase the identification and interdiction of 
criminal activity emanating from Venezuela, primarily: violent non-
state armed groups, illegal drug and gold trafficking, and money 
laundering.
                                 ______
                                 

            Responses of Mr. Brian A. Nichols to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. What is the State Department doing to provide assistance 
to political prisoners in Cuba facing critical and life-threatening 
conditions?

    Answer. Advancing democracy and human rights remains at the core of 
our policy efforts toward Cuba. The Department of State has strongly 
condemned the Cuban government's treatment of political prisoners, to 
include repression and unjust detention of peaceful protesters, human 
rights activists, and journalists. We have placed new sanctions and 
visa restrictions on Cuban security force officials responsible for 
repression and human rights violations. Through democracy assistance 
programs managed by the State Department and USAID, the U.S. Government 
supports pro-democracy voices and individuals persecuted by the Cuban 
regime. These funds provide humanitarian assistance to human rights 
defenders and political prisoners on-island and raises awareness of the 
plight of Cuban political prisoners in international fora.

    Question. How is the State Department working with allies in Europe 
and the Western Hemisphere to increase pressure on the Cuban regime?

    Answer. The Administration actively engages with multinational 
organizations and our international partners to collectively condemn 
the violence and repression upon the Cuban people for demanding 
freedom. The State Department has reached out to governments and 
multinational organizations around the world to build support for the 
Cuban people. Many countries have asked to coordinate with the 
Administration to press for respect for human rights on the island. We 
have held conversations with leaders who have differing views and 
refocused the world's attention where it belongs: on the Cuban 
government's repression and on support for the human rights enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

    Question. Another result of the historic protests in Cuba this year 
is that they shone a light on the regime's rampant use of internet 
circumvention tools in order to both control Cubans' access to 
information from the outside world and curtail their ability to share 
widely news within the island. I understand that the United States has 
provided assistance mostly in the form of virtual private networks, 
which can overcome Cuba's nascent censorship regime. I am intensely 
concerned that this assistance does nothing to counter the regime's 
ability to shutdown internet service altogether for different regions 
of the country.
    What can you tell me of the Department's efforts to ensure 
unfettered access to the internet for the Cuban people?

    Answer. Through the Global Internet Freedom appropriations earmark, 
the U.S. government obligates over $70 million annually to promote 
Internet freedom globally, including in Cuba. Assistance supports the 
development, global deployment, and operation of the latest secure and 
reliable technical solutions to counter Internet censorship, content 
blocking, and shutdowns. The Administration remains open to other 
scenarios for expanding information flow for the Cuban people, 
recognizing that no easy fixes exist to nation-level connectivity 
limitations of the kind we see in Cuba. However, in all potential 
scenarios, the security and anonymity of activists using these 
solutions on the island remains a paramount consideration.

    Question. On November 18, President Joe Biden met with Mexican 
President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) during the ``Three 
Amigos'' summit of the North American states. That summit occurred at a 
time of disturbing actions and comments made by the Mexican president 
towards the dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, as 
the people of those countries suffer from repression, poverty, and 
societal breakdown.
    Did President Biden reaffirm the United States' long-standing 
commitment to supporting freedom and democracy in the hemisphere? 
Specifically, did he make clear that AMLO's indulgence of left-wing 
dictatorships' repressing of their peoples is incompatible with a 
strong U.S.-Mexico partnership and violates Mexico's obligations to 
support and defend democracy under the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter

    Answer. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
integral to a healthy democracy, and support for democratic values was 
a key theme throughout the North American Leaders' Summit. During the 
Summit, the Leaders affirmed their support to press for full and 
meaningful participation in our democracies and economies for all. 
President Biden and the other leaders reaffirmed our collective 
commitment to protect human rights, especially for members of the most 
vulnerable and historically marginalized communities. The United 
States, Mexico, and Canada also expressed a determination to reinforce 
democracy at home and inspire democratic development around the world.

    Question. In your recent testimony before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, you were asked about the presence of Cuban doctors in 
Mexico in the context of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada agreement (USMCA).
    Has the Administration made a determination whether the presence of 
those doctors is a violation of the forced labor provisions of USMCA?

    Answer. The Department recognized some of the Cuban medical 
professionals that assisted Mexico may have been forced to work by the 
Government of Cuba in its 2021 Trafficking in Persons report. The TIP 
Report also called upon the Government of Mexico to develop and 
implement standardized procedures for frontline officials to 
proactively identify victims among Cuban medical professionals and 
refer those individuals to organizations or officials providing 
services to trafficking victims. USTR, as the lead agency for USMCA 
compliance on this issue under the Labor Section , is examining this 
question and has access to reporting from State to inform its 
determination. For questions on USMCA compliance and timing for a 
determination, I refer you to USTR.

    Question. Earlier this month, Secretary of State Antony Blinken 
appointed new officials to oversee the ongoing investigations into the 
health attacks against U.S. diplomatic personnel serving overseas. The 
resulting health damage has been named, ``Havana syndrome,'' due to the 
fact that the first wave of attacks occurred in Cuba. However, 
Secretary Blinken, in a carefully worded statement, refused to use the 
word ``attack'' to describe what occurred.
    What is the Administration's position on these ongoing incidents? 
Do you believe they are attacks specifically targeting U.S. officials?

    Answer. There is nothing we take more seriously than the health and 
security of U.S. Government personnel and their family members. The 
interagency community is actively examining a range of hypotheses but 
has made no determination about the cause of these incidents and/or 
whether they can be attributed to a foreign actor. AHIs are a top 
priority for Secretary Blinken, who set clear goals for the Health 
Incident Response Task Force to strengthen the Department's 
communication with our workforce, provide care for affected employees 
and family members, and deal more effectively with these events in the 
future as we continue to work closely with the interagency to find the 
cause of these AHIs.

    Question. Were U.S. officials, some of whom have been medically 
diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, just random victims?

    Answer. The Department's investigation surrounding these incidents 
is a fact-based mission. The interagency community is actively 
examining a range of hypotheses but has made no determination about the 
cause of these incidents. What is certain, however, is that the 
experiences and symptoms of our affected employees are real.

    Question. Some open-source reporting speculates that some form of a 
new weapon developed by Russia or perhaps China was being tested on 
unsuspecting American personnel.
    As you know, nothing happens in Cuba without the regime's 
knowledge. When it comes to the attacks to our U.S. personnel in Cuba, 
does the Department believe that another government could really plan 
and carry out actions like this in Havana, Cuba, with the Cuban regime 
having absolutely no knowledge of them?

    Answer. The Department is doing everything within its power and in 
partnership with the interagency to identify the cause of AHIs. The 
interagency community is actively examining a range of hypotheses but 
has made no determination about the cause of the AHIs or whether they 
can be attributed to a foreign actor.

    Question. What steps will the State Department take to further hold 
the regime accountable for the breakdown in Nicaraguan democracy?

    Answer. The Department, along with the U.N. Human Rights Council, 
Organization of American States, European Union, and many countries in 
the region, has spoken out clearly in defense of democracy and human 
rights in Nicaragua, and will continue to do so. We will continue to 
work in close consultation with a broad coalition of OAS member states 
to urge the Ortega-Murillo regime to change course, immediately and 
unconditionally release all political prisoners, and take concrete 
action to restore democracy. As mandated by the OAS General Assembly, 
OAS members states conducted a collective assessment of the situation 
in Nicaragua on November 30 and will pave a path forward for Nicaragua 
to take action to put it back on a course to democracy. We will 
continue to work in coordination with our international allies and 
partners, like Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, to 
take concrete actions to respond to the Ortega-Murillo government's 
attacks on civil liberties. We will leverage new tools such as the 
Presidential Proclamation on Nicaragua, which President Biden signed on 
November 16, and the Corrupt and Undemocratic Actors List, which the 
RENACER Act expanded to include Nicaragua, to impose visa restrictions 
on those individuals determined, among other things, to have knowingly 
engaged in actions that undermine democratic processes or institutions 
in Nicaragua. We will continue to use diplomatic, economic, and other 
tools at our disposal to promote accountability for those who support 
the Ortega-Murillo regime's human rights abuses and attacks on 
Nicaraguan democracy, and to support those committed to restoring 
democratic governance in Nicaragua.

    Question. I understand that last week the Nicaraguan regime 
formally announced its intention to withdraw from the Organization of 
American States (OAS). Given this, does the State Department plan to 
invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to start the 
process of suspending Nicaragua's membership?

    Answer. The Department noted Nicaragua's November 18 decision to 
begin the formal process of withdrawal from the OAS, which takes 2 
years to go into effect. The OAS is the most important multilateral 
organization in the Western Hemisphere and has a long history of 
supporting the democratic advancement of all nations in the Americas. 
The Ortega-Murillo regime's stated intention to withdraw Nicaragua from 
the OAS is yet another sign of their lack of respect for democratic 
ideals and for the interests of the Nicaraguan people. The OAS and its 
member states must stay engaged, stand up for the rights of the 
Nicaraguan people, and continue to press for the Ortega-Murillo regime 
to fulfill its commitments to its people under the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter. As mandated by the OAS General Assembly, OAS member 
states conducted a collective assessment of the situation in Nicaragua 
on November 30 and will continue to take action to put it back on a 
path to democracy.

    Question. A provision in the RENACER Act calls for the executive 
branch to review Nicaragua's continued participation in the Central 
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Has the Administration begun to 
implement this section of RENACER?

    Answer. The Department welcomes the broad, bipartisan nature of the 
U.S. desire to support the Nicaraguan people in their striving for 
democracy. The RENACER Act delivers a strong message and new tools to 
address the corrupt and authoritarian Ortega-Murillo regime and its 
subversion of the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people. The 
terms of the CAFTA-DR do not provide for a party's expulsion. In light 
of the dramatic deterioration of respect for democratic principles in 
Nicaragua, however, the United States has taken a number of actions, 
including withholding support for Nicaragua's participation in trade 
capacity-building and technical assistance initiatives and working to 
redirect capacity-building to benefit the people of Nicaragua rather 
than the government. We continue to review the Nicaraguan Government's 
participation in any U.S.-supported CAFTA-DR programs, including trade 
capacity-building activities under the CAFTA-DR, with a view toward 
promoting good governance and transparency.

    Question. Last week, we witnessed elections in Honduras, the 
results of which we're still awaiting. Several other critical American 
allies and partners will hold elections in the coming year, from the 
run-off elections for Chile's President next month, to elections in 
Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica. In the last few years, democracy 
organizations have noticed an uptick in activity by purveyors of 
Kremlin and CCP disinformation. I am very concerned that disinformation 
can distort people's perceptions of candidates in these elections. Such 
disinformation can lead to Latin American heads more concerned about 
lining their pockets with rubles and yuan than they are about building 
prosperous societies for their people.
    What actions can Congress take to build resilience in Latin America 
and the Caribbean to the effects of disinformation?

    Answer. With the FY 2022 request, the Department can strengthen the 
capacity of civil society and government communicators to address 
foreign disinformation and propaganda. As this phenomenon becomes more 
widespread and actors utilize sophisticated tactics, we look to 
Congress to fully support the Administration's FY 2022 request to 
provide Public Diplomacy the funding needed to bolster its outreach and 
capacity-building initiatives, including through the International 
Visitor Leadership Program, which enable key stakeholders to address 
such activities and strengthen an open information environment.

    Question. I would welcome your thoughts on how to effectively 
tailor U.S. policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean to counter 
malign Chinese influence in this region. As you've noted, the Chinese 
Government is taking advantage of the pandemic that it unleashed on the 
world to increase its influence in the region.
    In your view, how can we best frustrate their efforts?

    Answer. The U.S. Government, through our sustained commitment to 
the Western Hemisphere, bolsters the region's coalition of resilient 
democracies that champion our shared values. We work to promote trade, 
people-to-people ties, exchange programs, environmental cooperation, 
improved health outcomes, climate mitigation and adaptation and 
technical cooperation, inter alia. As of November 15, we provided more 
than 50 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines to 30 countries in the 
region. We work closely with our allies and partners to lend expertise 
and resources toward the region's pandemic recovery, including support 
for greater vaccine availability, high-standard infrastructure 
investment, and transparent economic development. We use our range of 
tools--from diplomatic engagement to technical exchanges, public 
diplomacy to targeted foreign assistance, and partnership with the 
private sector to civil society cooperation--to pursue deeper regional 
democracy, prosperity, security, and provide alternatives to PRC 
engagement.

    Question. In which areas do you see opportunities for America to 
act?

    Answer. We remain committed to working with our allies and partners 
to combat COVID-19 and the climate crisis; to face down foreign 
election interference and corruption; to strengthen our defenses in 
cyber space; and to produce and secure the technologies of the future. 
We will support our allies and partners who speak up against adverse 
actions, including the use of economic coercion. The United States 
remains committed to working with our partners on investment and 
procurement issues, including to build an enabling environment for 
private sector investment in infrastructure that reflects transparency, 
competitiveness, and international best practices. We will work with 
countries in the region to develop investment screening mechanisms that 
can protect these countries and the world from national security and 
data privacy risks that come with investment in critical infrastructure 
and sensitive sectors by untrusted vendors. These joint efforts remain 
crucial to the hemisphere's recovery from the pandemic.

    Question. Which aspects of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) 
malign influence should we highlight in our public diplomacy to Latin 
American and Caribbean audiences in order to generate public pressure 
on local officials to shun PRC economic exploitation that comes under 
the guise of cooperation and aid?

    Answer. We will continue to inform countries in the region about 
problematic PRC influence and coercive actions in the region. We raise 
concerns about PRC infrastructure projects with inadequate labor and 
environmental standards, for example, which undermine workers' rights 
under domestic law and international labor standards and undermine 
environmental protections. The projects also operate under a general 
lack of transparency and disregard for the rule of law; carry opaque 
and often unsustainable loan terms; and foster public corruption in 
borrowing countries. In addition, we will continue to highlight the 
risk of using PRC's untrusted providers, as PRC law compels Chinese 
firms to provide its intelligence and security services with on-demand 
access to data, facilities, and telecommunications equipment and 
infrastructure. This knowledge allows local populations to better 
discern the sources of disinformation and PRC attempts to gain access 
to critical infrastructure and sensitive sectors.
    We also cooperate to provide a positive, transparent alternative to 
PRC investment offers. The U.S. International Development Finance 
Corporation (DFC) has approved investments tackling key development 
challenges including food security, logistics gaps, climate change, 
gender equity, and advancing the President's Build Back Better World 
(B3W) Initiative. The agency has more than $10 billion invested across 
Latin America and the Caribbean in key sectors. We also continue to 
invest in people-to-people relationships, with programs in education, 
entrepreneurship, English language, and exchanges. Expanding access to 
educational opportunities and English learning and promoting 
entrepreneurship not only increases incomes throughout the region but 
also promotes more inclusive economic growth, ensuring more 
opportunities for people. Expanding these opportunities supports 
democratic institutions, rule of law, free press, and social inclusion.

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