[Senate Hearing 117-219]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                      S. Hrg. 117-219

                     BLACK SEA SECURITY: REVIVING 
                     U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE REGION

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
                     REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           OCTOBER 27, 2021

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
  
                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Damian Murphy, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        




                   SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND        
                 REGIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION        

            JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
                                     TODD YOUNG, Indiana

                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Shaheen, Hon. Jeanne, U.S. Senator From New Hampshire............     1

Johnson, Hon. Ron, U.S. Senator From Wisconsin...................     3

    Prepared Statement...........................................     3

Townsend, Jim, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American 
  Security, Washington, DC.......................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Polyakova, Dr. Alina, President and CEO, Center for European 
  Policy and Analysis, Washington, DC............................    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    12

Brzezinski, Ian, Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC.    24
    Prepared Statement...........................................    25

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Written Statements From Embassies Representing Black Sea 
  Countries, Outlining Initiatives and Recommendations for 
  Enhancing U.S. Policy, Entered Into the Record by Senator 
  Jeanne Shaheen.................................................    56

                                 (iii)

  

 
                      BLACK SEA SECURITY: REVIVING 
                     U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE REGION

                              ----------                              


                     WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2021

                           U.S. Senate,    
        Subcommittee on Europe and Regional
                              Security Cooperation,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in 
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne 
Shaheen, chairwoman of the subcommittee presiding.
    Present: Senators Shaheen [presiding], Murphy, Van Hollen, 
Johnson, Romney, and Barrasso.

           OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, 
                U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

    Senator Shaheen. Good afternoon. This meeting of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee's European Affairs Subcommittee 
will now come to order, and as I explained to our witnesses, we 
are going to be having two votes in the middle of this hearing.
    We will take turns. We expect the first one to come at 
about 2:45. We will just try and take turns going to vote and, 
hopefully, that way we do not have to stop the hearing.
    Let me begin by saying how much I appreciate working with 
Ranking Member Johnson on this hearing. This is a very 
important topic and very timely, ``Black Sea Security: Reviving 
U.S. Policy Toward the Region,'' and very much appreciate the 
three very expert witnesses we have this afternoon.
    The Black Sea is a hot spot for the competition between 
Russia and the West over expansion of the transatlantic 
community. Six countries--Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, 
Georgia, and Turkey--hold varying sizes of coastline in the 
region, but only one country treats the Black Sea as if it is 
its own sea, and that is Russia.
    This hearing provides us an opportunity to step back and to 
take a more holistic look at the Black Sea region and the 
patterns of encroachment by Russia. We can also investigate how 
the U.S. and NATO can each enhance and strengthen their 
approach to the Black Sea region.
    I am encouraged by recent signaling from the NATO Secretary 
General that NATO will develop an overarching plan for defense 
of the region.
    I am also pleased to see that Secretary of Defense Lloyd 
Austin visited Georgia, Ukraine, and Romania last week. I think 
this is a welcome shift in the approach to counter Russia's 
increased attempts to control the Black Sea.
    Russia has a history of waging war and deploying illegal 
and aggressive tactics to advance its control in the region and 
to prevent NATO from encroaching upon its southern border.
    In 2008, Russia waged war against Georgia and illegally 
seized the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 2014, 
Russia annexed Crimea and fueled a separatist insurgency in the 
Donbas region of Ukraine, which is a conflict that continues to 
claim the innocent lives of Ukrainians every day.
    This annexation also empowered Russia to establish a 
Mediterranean naval task force, significantly enhancing its 
Black Sea fleet. Collectively, these brazen acts made it 
painfully clear that Russia was and is prepared to exert 
economic, military, and political power to thwart NATO 
expansion and expand its control in the Black Sea.
    Russia's malign intentions were on clear display earlier 
this summer when Senators Portman, Murphy, and I visited 
Ukraine and Georgia in June. We went to the border with South 
Ossetia where we witnessed Russia's ongoing borderization and 
hostile actions against Georgia.
    What appeared to be minor territorial aggression from 
Russia, such as continuing to move the fence further away from 
the boundary line with South Ossetia, is part of a larger 
pattern of Russia's bellicose behavior that must continue to be 
condemned, and I very much appreciate the continued work of the 
EU monitoring mission who keep watch over those boundaries.
    The transatlantic alliance that has maintained our world 
order for more than 70 years has played an important role in 
responding to Russia's belligerent behavior. After the illegal 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO successfully shored up 
support for our Eastern European allies.
    Sea Breeze, which is an annual exercise involving 
participation of NATO allies and partners, has also sent an 
important message of solidarity to our Black Sea allies. 
However, the NATO response to the Black Sea demands more 
coordination and political unity like we have seen in the 
Baltic Assurance Initiative where our Baltic allies helped 
their cause by standing united against Russian aggression. The 
inconsistent perspectives for NATO's role among Black Sea 
nations has also exacerbated this disconnect in our approach.
    Although Romania has called for greater NATO presence in 
the region, Turkey has made it clear they do not want an 
increased NATO presence. Again, this hinders a coordinated 
effort.
    While robust transatlantic relations are key to combating 
Russian aggression, the greatest defense against Russia is 
strong democratic institutions in the Black Sea region. 
Countries like Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia must continue to 
rebuff Russia's malign activity by forging ahead on necessary 
democratic reforms to reflect the will of the people and to 
move them closer to the transatlantic community.
    Confirming ambassadors who will be seated in each of these 
countries is another key piece of the puzzle to support 
democracy in the region and to strengthen bilateral ties with 
the West.
    President Biden should swiftly nominate an ambassador to 
Ukraine to reflect the priority and commitment we place on our 
bilateral relationship there, but most critical, partisan 
politics waged by certain members of this committee are 
obstructing the body from fulfilling its obligation to confirm 
experienced qualified diplomats in the most important parts of 
the world, including the Black Sea region, and we have seen 
that with the appointment of Kent Logsdon to Moldova and Julie 
Smith to NATO.
    These are only 2 of 50 nominees that are being held up for 
political purposes. We need a fully operational diplomatic 
corps to ensure our national security structures are staffed 
and supported.
    With that, let me turn to Ranking Member Johnson.

                STATEMENT OF HON. RON JOHNSON, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair. I also want to 
welcome our witnesses. Thank you for your detailed testimonies 
and I am looking forward to hearing your oral testimonies and 
your answers to our questions.
    I also want to thank Madam Chair for holding this hearing. 
I will just ask that my opening statement be entered in the 
record.
    Senator Shaheen. Without objection.
    [The prepared statement of Senator Johnson follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Senator Ron Johnson

    Thank you Senator Shaheen. Today's hearing focuses on the security 
of the Black Sea and nearby states, a region of strategic significance 
to U.S. interests and Europe's peace and stability. Russia's invasion 
and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing 
destabilization of Eastern Ukraine highlight Russia's malign intent and 
the continued necessity of an increasingly robust, coordinated response 
from the United States and our NATO allies. Russia's Black Sea 
aggression has unsettled NATO's Black Sea member states and threatens 
the alliance's southeastern flank. Thus far, the United States and NATO 
have failed to respond adequately to Russia's provocations. Our purpose 
here today is to explore options for remedying this inattention.
    On November 25, 2018, Russian naval forces attacked and seized 
three Ukrainian naval vessels and their crews as they transited the 
Kerch Strait between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In response, I 
joined 66 Senators in sponsoring a resolution calling for the immediate 
release of the Ukrainian ships and crew, and for the U.S. to lead a 
multinational freedom of navigation operation to assert the 
inviolability of internationally recognized borders and safe passage 
through the Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov. I have also joined Senate 
colleagues in calling for robust freedom of navigation operations in 
the Black Sea and a stronger NATO response to Russia's aggression. 
Russia has continued its efforts to turn the Sea of Azov into a Russian 
lake, strangling the Ukrainian ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol in the 
process. Emboldened by NATO's weak response, Russia has expanded its 
horizons and is now pressing Russian claims in the Black Sea itself. 
During the summer, Russia harassed the warships of U.S. allies 
operating in international waters. Putin responds to strength. We need 
to change the current Russian dominated narrative in the Black Sea 
sooner rather than later.
    An effective U.S. strategy in the Black Sea will have to address 
the new reality of Russia's illegal occupation and military build-up in 
Crimea. It will also have to assess Russian intentions, capabilities, 
and priorities and adopt appropriate responses. Energy exploration and 
competing interests of regional allies will also come into play. Russia 
continues to destabilize democracies in an attempt to preserve a buffer 
zone and to prevent countries like Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova's 
incorporation into Western institutions. NATO, for its part, has and 
must continue to emphasize that our doors remain open to countries 
wishing to join, and we will help them with the reforms necessary to 
meet the requirements of membership. Let me be clear, Russia's 
insecurities do not give it a veto over the security arrangements or 
future of its neighbors. We must work with our NATO partners to address 
Russian aggression with strength and resolve and to ensure that the 
cost of continuing its malign activities is higher than it can afford. 
A comprehensive integrated strategy backed by significant U.S. 
political will is required.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about the 
elements of such a strategy.

    Senator Johnson. An awful lot will be repetitive of what 
you just said, which I think should send a very strong signal. 
I think maybe that is the most important part of this hearing 
is the signal it sends to the region how strong the bipartisan 
support is for this region and for these nations that are 
really trying to struggle under the constant assault, both 
physical as well as just mental disinformation assault, from 
Russia.
    I hope people in the region understand that. I think it is 
a good sign. I hate to bring up kind of the 800-pound gorilla 
in the room, though, because as I read the testimonies, as I 
listened to Senator Shaheen's opening statement, I think an 
awful lot of what is going to be suggested here is going to be 
talking about American leadership.
    Of course, you can only lead if you are strong, and right 
now in the first 10 months of this Administration strength is 
not exactly what has been projected. I do not think I have to 
go into detail, but not to steal the thunder from Mr. 
Townsend's opening statement, his final line is it does not 
have to be the U.S. that shoulders the burden alone, but it 
does fall to the U.S. to lead the way, and I think that is 
crucially true. In order to lead, we must be strong. We need to 
project strength and, unfortunately, that does not appear to be 
the path that this nation is on right now.
    Anyway, appreciate the hearing. I think the strong 
bipartisan support is probably a wonderful outcome for it. 
Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Senator Johnson. We 
will submit your opening statement for the record.
    I will also point out that I have received written 
statements from a number of embassies representing Black Sea 
countries, which outline their respective initiatives in the 
region and include recommendations for enhancing U.S. policy.
    Without objection, I will submit these also for the record.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Shaheen. As I said earlier, we have three real 
experts on the Black Sea region who are here to share their 
thoughts with us today.
    Let me begin by thanking our first witness, Jim Townsend. 
He is currently the Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Transatlantic 
Security Program at the Center for A New American Security.
    After 8 years as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
European and NATO Policy in the Obama administration, Jim 
Townsend completed more than two decades of work on European 
and NATO policies in the Pentagon at NATO and at the Atlantic 
Council.
    Our second witness is Dr. Alina Polyakova. She is President 
and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis. She is a 
recognized expert on transatlantic relations with over a decade 
of deep expertise on European politics, Russian foreign policy, 
and digital technologies.
    Our final witness this afternoon is Ian Brzezinski. He 
currently serves as a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council 
supporting its Brent Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security 
and its Europe Center.
    He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Europe and NATO policy from 2001 to 2005 during which his 
responsibilities, like Mr. Townsend's, included NATO expansion, 
Alliance force planning, and transformation, and NATO 
operations in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq.
    We have much more extensive biographies on each of our 
witnesses that are available for members of the committee.
    With those introductions, let me ask each of our witnesses 
if they could try and keep their opening remarks to 5 minutes. 
We will submit the full testimony for the record and we will 
ask you to go in the order in which I introduced you.
    Mr. Townsend, you will be first. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF JIM TOWNSEND, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A 
             NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Townsend. Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, and 
members of the Subcommittee on Europe, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Black Sea 
security.
    The U.S. faces a threat from Russia along the frontier, 
beginning in Alaska and ending in southern Europe at the Black 
Sea, the anchor of NATO's southern flank. Along this line, 
almost daily Russian forces test the defenses of NATO allies 
and partners. Russia also employs gray area tactics such as 
cyber-attacks, disinformation, or aggressive military exercises 
to bully or intimidate these nations.
    For the Russians, a critical part of this frontier is the 
Black Sea region, not just because it is home to Russia's Black 
Sea fleet and an important trade route for Russian exports, 
but, more importantly, as a defensive buffer and bastion that 
protects Russia from threats emanating from the south and from 
which Russia can project power outwards into the Mediterranean 
and the region surrounding the Black Sea.
    The restoration of Russian military capability in the Black 
Sea is well documented since the invasion of Georgia in 2008. 
Russian-occupied Crimea now encompasses significant ground 
forces, combat aircraft, and new naval vessels, all protected 
by advanced sensors and missile systems.
    Included in this Russian modernization are six new Kilo-
class submarines equipped with Kalibr-class cruise missiles 
which can strike deep into Europe. This geopolitical balance in 
the Black Sea was not always this way.
    In 2007, the Black Sea was ringed by nations who were 
either NATO allies or partners on the road to membership. 
Today, that political geography has changed dramatically, with 
Russian forces partially occupying the two NATO partners, 
Ukraine and Georgia, to keep them out of the Alliance, and a 
NATO ally, Turkey, whose bilateral relationship is stronger 
with NATO's adversary Russia than with most NATO allies.
    This geostrategic shift has not been lost on the U.S. or 
NATO, but actions taken to strengthen deterrence in the region 
has been slow and comprised of half measures.
    Unlike in the Baltics, no NATO battle groups have been 
deployed to the region or NATO command structure put in place 
to rebuild deterrence. Instead, NATO provided a Tailored 
Forward Presence based on Romanian efforts to establish a 
headquarters unit and a multinational brigade that could be 
offered to NATO in the event conflict erupted.
    The U.S. has been more proactive, periodically sending 
guided missile cruisers into the Black Sea, rotating forces and 
air assets into Romania, and investing millions to improve 
training areas and air bases in Romania and Bulgaria.
    As Secretary of Defense Austin's recent trip to the region 
demonstrates, the Biden administration recognizes its 
importance. However, what long-term priority will be given U.S. 
force presence in the Black Sea region is still unclear.
    Unlike the Nordic Baltic region, the complex politics and 
history of the Black Sea region make it difficult to develop 
either a regional or a NATO approach to strengthen deterrence.
    NATO initiatives to establish a presence in the Black Sea 
usually run afoul of Turkey, which considers itself the 
guardian of the Black Sea. To minimize ally presence in its 
backyard, Turkey blocks NATO Black Sea initiatives by 
reassuring allies that the Turkish navy has the Black Sea well 
in hand and that NATO should avoid initiatives that unsettle 
the Russians in the Black Sea.
    Such a seemingly low priority given the Black Sea has 
likely not escaped the attention of Moscow. It has not escaped 
the attention of Beijing either, where the Chinese are taking 
advantage of the underdeveloped areas of southern Europe to 
build infrastructure, ports, and railroads with strings 
attached.
    It would be dangerous to continue giving the growing 
Russian dominance in the Black Sea region a low priority. The 
longer we in NATO wait before we make a serious investment in 
Black Sea deterrence, both militarily and economically, the 
harder it will be to do so as conflict nears or impossible to 
do so as conflict erupts.
    To counter and deter Russian activity in the Black Sea 
region, the U.S. and its allies at NATO need to develop a 
strategy that encompasses not just military actions but 
economic, political, and developmental assistance to address 
the underdeveloped areas in the region.
    What I provide below are six suggestions for the military 
component of such a strategy.
    Number one, keep a focus on Europe and the threat from 
Russia even as we turn to the Indo-Pacific. As the 
Administration drafts its Global Posture Review, U.S. military 
posture in Europe should reflect a high priority to strengthen 
deterrence in the Black Sea region.
    Number two, rebalance NATO force structure in Europe. NATO 
command and force structure needs to be rebalanced with a focus 
on NATO's southern flank. The rebalancing should include NATO 
making the Black Sea regional plan a high priority for 
accelerated completion as well as upgrading its Tailored 
Forward Presence with a NATO battle group. Additionally, the 
Romanian-run Headquarters Multinational Corps South-East should 
become a standing NATO regional command.
    Number three, increase presence of NATO and U.S. forces in 
the Black Sea region. The rhythm and number of NATO and allied 
deployments and exercises can still be increased so that there 
is almost a permanent presence of NATO forces in the region 
with allied navies taking part in rotations to the Black Sea to 
provide a constant naval presence.
    Number four, improve maritime domain awareness and 
intelligence collection and analysis in the Black Sea region. 
Romania could host a Black Sea Intelligence Fusion Center to 
develop a common operating picture of Russian activity in the 
Black Sea, analyzing intelligence collected from periodic 
rotations to Romania of NATO, partner, or allied assets such as 
drones or P-8 maritime patrol aircraft.
    Number five, repair relations with Turkey. The United 
States and Turkey need to repair their formerly close 
relationship. To do this, we must help the Turks find a way out 
of the corner they have painted themselves into by buying the 
S-400 and being expelled from the F-35 program.
    We must also find a way to meet the Turks halfway in their 
tech transfer desires in a Patriot air defense system purchase.
    Finally, we should accelerate the time when we can wind 
down honorably the U.S. military relationship with the Syrian 
Kurds in the fight with ISIS.
    Finally, last point, security assistance. Romania, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia can take on an even greater role 
in Black Sea security if provided a tailored, targeted, multi-
year security assistance funding package that helps them 
acquire capabilities such as reconnaissance drones, anti-
submarine warfare platforms, mining, and anti-ship missile 
systems.
    These are six suggestions to improve NATO deterrence in the 
Black Sea region, but what is especially important is the 
development of a strategy that can weave military and economic 
and financial initiatives together to reduce the vulnerability 
of this region to intimidation and exploitation.
    It is not too late to develop such an integrated strategy 
and to bring allies, partners, NATO, and the European Union 
along to help implement it, but such a strategy will not work 
without U.S. leadership.
    It does not have to be the United States that shoulders 
this burden alone, but it does fall to the U.S. to lead the 
way.
    Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]

                Prepared Statement of James J. Townsend

    Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the 
Subcommittee on Europe, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 
you today to discuss Black Sea Security: Reviving U.S. policy toward 
the region.
    The U.S. faces a threat from Russia along a frontier, beginning in 
Alaska and ending in Southern Europe at the Black Sea--the anchor of 
NATO's southern flank. Along this line, almost daily Russian forces 
test the defenses of NATO Allies and Partners. Russia also employs 
hybrid, or ``grey area'' tactics such as cyber-attacks, disinformation 
or aggressive military exercises to bully or intimidate these nations. 
Just last week Russian combat aircraft were intercepted close to the 
Alaskan border probing our defenses.
    For the Russians, a critical part of this frontier is the Black Sea 
region; not just because it is home to Russia's Black Sea fleet and an 
important trade route for Russian exports, but more importantly as a 
defensive buffer and bastion that protects Russia from threats 
emanating from the south and from which Russia can project power 
outwards into the Mediterranean and the region surrounding the Black 
Sea.
    The restoration of Russian military capability in the Black Sea is 
well documented since the invasion of Georgia in 2008. Russian-occupied 
Crimea now encompasses significant ground forces, combat aircraft, and 
new naval vessels, all protected by advanced sensors and missile 
systems. Included in this Russian modernization are six new KILO-class 
submarines equipped with Kalibr-class cruise missiles which can strike 
deep into Europe. This deep strike capability was famously demonstrated 
in 2015 when Russian Kalibr cruise missiles were fired 900 miles over 
Iran and Iraq and into Syria from Russian ships in the Caspian Sea. 
From this protected bastion, the Russians have been able to reestablish 
its naval presence in the Mediterranean which is felt as far away as 
Libya.
    This geopolitical balance in the Black Sea wasn't always this way. 
In 2007, the Black Sea was ringed by nations who were either NATO 
Allies or Partners on the road to membership. Today, that political 
geography has changed dramatically with Russian forces partially 
occupying the two NATO Partners, Ukraine and Georgia, to keep them out 
of the Alliance, and a NATO ally, Turkey, whose bilateral relationship 
is stronger with NATO's adversary Russia than with most NATO Allies.
    This geostrategic shift has not been lost on the U.S. or NATO, but 
action taken to strengthen deterrence in the region has been slow and 
composed of half-measures. Unlike in the Baltics immediately after the 
invasion of Ukraine, no NATO battlegroups have been deployed to the 
region or NATO command structure put in place to rebuild deterrence. 
Instead, NATO provided a ``tailored forward presence'' based on 
Romanian efforts to establish a Headquarters unit and a multinational 
brigade that could be offered to NATO in the event conflict erupted.
    The U.S. was more proactive, periodically sending guided missile 
cruisers into the Black Sea to establish presence. The U.S. also began 
to conduct air and ground exercises with regional allies, rotate forces 
and air assets into Romania and invested millions to improve training 
areas in Romania and Bulgaria and upgrade Romanian air bases, 
especially the large Mihail Koganlniceanu (MK) airbase used as a hub 
for U.S. force deployments. As Secretary of Defense Austin's recent 
trip to the region demonstrates, the Biden administration recognizes 
its importance; however, what long term priority the Administration 
will give U.S. force presence in the Black Sea region is still unclear.
    Unlike the Nordic/Baltic region, the complex politics and history 
of the Black Sea region make it difficult to develop either a regional 
or a NATO approach to strengthen deterrence. NATO initiatives to 
establish a presence in the Black Sea usually run afoul of Turkey, 
which considers itself the guardian of the Black Sea. To minimize 
Allied presence in its backyard, Turkey blocks NATO Black Sea 
initiatives by reassuring Allies that the Turkish Navy has the Black 
Sea well in hand. Recently, the Turks have cited not wanting to 
unsettle the Russians as their reason for blocking NATO efforts. 
Romania presents a bright spot by taking responsibility for its own 
defense, dramatically increasing defense spending to purchase the 
Patriot missile system, the HIMARS artillery system and F-16s. 
Bulgaria, too, is slowly rebuilding its military capability but is 
hampered by a history of low defense spending and political unease with 
appearing anti-Russian.
    NATO Allies individually are helping to strengthen NATO presence in 
the Black Sea. Along with the U.S. Navy, the UK, the Dutch and France 
periodically send warships to ``show the flag,'' most famously the HMS 
Defender and the Dutch ship Evertsen which were the subject of 
harassment by Russian air and naval units. Just last week, two B-1 
bombers were intercepted over the Black Sea by Russian combat aircraft 
as Secretary of Defense Austin was visiting the region.
    Given the threat posed by this growing Russian buildup, the NATO 
and U.S. responses have been comparatively light when compared to the 
response in the Baltic Sea which included NATO battlegroup deployments 
along with major air and sea exercises. Such a seemingly lower priority 
given the Black Sea has likely not escaped the attention of Moscow.
    It has not escaped the attention of Beijing either. While much of 
my testimony today has focused on the Russian military buildup, China 
has entered the region as well, not as a military power but as a 
financial and economic one, taking advantage of the underdeveloped 
areas of Southern Europe to build infrastructure, ports and railroads 
with strings attached. China's Belt and Road Initiative has permeated 
the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions, from Turkey and 
Greece, into Italy, Egypt and the Balkans, where Chinese trade and 
financial deals have bought them political leverage influencing 
decisions even in the EU.
    It would be dangerous to continue giving the growing Russian 
dominance in the Black Sea region a low priority. This Russian 
perception emboldened Russian naval forces to act with impunity in 2018 
when they fired on and captured Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of 
Azov without fear of retribution, confident that Russia had a free hand 
in the Black Sea. The longer we and NATO wait before we make a serious 
investment in Black Sea deterrence, both militarily and economically, 
the harder it will be to do so as conflict nears . . . or impossible to 
do so as conflict erupts.
    To counter and deter Russian activity in the Black Sea region the 
U.S. and its Allies at NATO need to develop a strategy that encompasses 
not just military actions but economic, political, and developmental 
assistance, such as the infrastructure-focused ``Three Seas 
Initiative,'' to reduce the areas of economic and developmental 
weakness in the region that Putin and Chinese President Xi exploit. 
What I provide below are six suggestions for the military component of 
such a strategy:

   Keep a focus on Europe and the threat from Russia even as we 
        turn to the Indo-Pacific:

        As pressing as the challenge is in the Indo-Pacific, the 
            U.S. should not lose focus on the Russia threat in Europe. 
            As the Administration drafts its Global Posture Review, 
            U.S. military posture in Europe should reflect a high 
            priority to strengthening deterrence in the Black Sea 
            region.

   Rebalance NATO force posture in Europe

        Since 2014, NATO command and force structure has focused 
            on the Northern flank; this now needs to be rebalanced with 
            a focus on strengthening NATO's southern flank. The 
            rebalancing should include NATO making the Black Sea 
            regional plan a high priority for accelerated completion as 
            well as upgrading its ``Tailored Forward Presence'' in 
            Romania by replacing the Romanian multinational brigade 
            with a NATO Battlegroup. Additionally, the Romanian-run 
            Headquarters Multinational Corps South-East should become a 
            standing NATO regional command to lead the expansion of 
            NATO activities in the region to help strengthen its 
            southern flank.

   Increased presence of NATO and U.S. forces in the Black Sea 
        region

        While NATO and the U.S. and its Allies have recently 
            increased deployments to the Black Sea region, the rhythm 
            and number of NATO and Allied deployments and exercises can 
            still be increased so that there is almost a permanent 
            presence of NATO forces in the region. The sophistication 
            of NATO and U.S.-led exercises can be increased as well, 
            particularly scaling up the annual SEA BREEZE exercise to a 
            larger and more complex one like the Russian Kavkaz 
            exercise. All Allies with navies, including the Standing 
            NATO Maritime Groups, should rotate deployments to the 
            Black Sea to provide a constant naval presence, thereby 
            demonstrating NATO unity while also sharing the burden of 
            the deployments.

   Improve maritime domain awareness and intelligence 
        collection and analysis in the Black Sea region

        NATO still has an incomplete picture of Russian military 
            activity in the region. Romania could host a Black Sea 
            intelligence fusion center to develop a common operating 
            picture of Russian activity in the Black Sea, analyzing 
            intelligence collected from NATO, Partner or Allied assets 
            such as drones or P-8s periodically deployed to Romania, so 
            that NATO better understands Russian operations.

   Repair Relations with Turkey

        As difficult and frustrating as current relations are with 
            President Erdogan, the U.S. and Turkey need to repair their 
            formerly close relationship. This will take time, but 
            Turkey is the key to control of the Black Sea; Turkey's 
            return to the Western fold would be a blow to Putin. To do 
            this, we must help the Turks find a way out of the corner 
            they've painted themselves in by buying the S-400 and being 
            expelled from the F-35 program. We must also find a way to 
            meet the Turks halfway in their tech transfers desires as 
            part of their potential purchase of the Patriot air defense 
            system. Finally, we should accelerate the time when we can 
            wind down honorably the U.S. military relationship with the 
            Syrian Kurds (the YPG) in the fight against ISIS. The U.S. 
            training and equipping of the Syrian Kurds is the biggest 
            obstacle in repairing relations with Turkey.

   Security Assistance

        Romania and to a lesser extent Bulgaria are the core of 
            NATO's deterrent force posture in the Black Sea. Partners 
            Georgia and Ukraine, even while partially occupied by 
            Russian forces, can still play an important role in Black 
            Sea security. However, despite improvements in defense 
            spending, these four Black Sea nations need financial 
            assistance to acquire assets that could greatly improve 
            their ability to strengthen deterrence. The Administration 
            should consider sending to the Congress a tailored, 
            targeted, multi-year security assistance funding package 
            that helps these four Black Sea Allies and Partners to 
            acquire capabilities such as reconnaissance drones, ASW 
            platforms, mining and anti-ship missile systems that will 
            significantly increase their ability to complicate Russian 
            Black Sea fleet operations.

    I have provided six suggestions to improve NATO deterrence in the 
Black Sea region. But what is especially important is the development 
of a strategy that involves our European allies and the EU that can 
weave military and economic/financial initiatives together to help this 
region develop and overcome political and economic weaknesses that 
Russia and China exploit. It is not too late to develop such an 
integrated strategy and bring Allies, Partners, NATO and the EU along 
to help implement it. But such a strategy will not work without U.S. 
leadership. It does not have to be the U.S. that shoulders this burden 
alone, but it does fall to the U.S. to lead the way.
    I look forward to your questions.

    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Townsend.
    Dr. Polyakova.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALINA POLYAKOVA, PRESIDENT AND CEO, CENTER FOR 
          EUROPEAN POLICY AND ANALYSIS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Dr. Polyakova. Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor and 
privilege to address you today on this critical issue for 
United States national security. Thank you for inviting me to 
speak.
    Since our founding, CEPA, the organization I head, has 
worked to raise awareness on the strategic importance of the 
Black Sea region for the United States and our allies, but with 
the caveat that the views I discuss here today do not represent 
those of the organization, which takes no institutional 
position.
    The Black Sea region is strategically critical to broader 
transatlantic stability. It is where Russia, Europe, the Middle 
East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus come together, and it is 
also the locus of the Kremlin's tests against Alliance 
credibility and resolve, which have escalated over the last two 
decades in the conventional and nonconventional domain.
    Russia sees the Black Sea region as a core area where it 
can achieve its foreign policy objectives, the first one being 
a desire to undermine NATO by pressuring Ukraine, Georgia, and 
Moldova at the same time, countries that Russia sees as its 
sphere of influence and where it has incited so-called frozen 
conflicts, or gray zones.
    Crimea, which Russia seized illegally in 2014, is key for 
these efforts. Today, the Russian efforts to militarize Crimea 
have turned the peninsula into an unsinkable aircraft carrier, 
allowing the Kremlin to build capabilities and project power 
far, far beyond the Black Sea region.
    Russia also retains leverage over Ukraine by blocking 
access to key ports and undermining the freedom of navigation. 
It is important to note that just this week some 20 warships 
and auxiliary Russian vessels were involved in the latest 
Russian exercises to intimidate NATO partners and allies.
    The Black Sea is, of course, a testing ground for Russia's 
full spectrum warfare, most notably in the cyber and 
information domain, and we have to understand that Russia's 
military aggression always occurs in concert with asymmetric 
tactics.
    Disinformation in particular accompanies Russian military 
aggression, as we just saw this summer with the incident with 
HMS Defender. Such campaigns produce a fog of war environment 
where the risk of direct conflict is increasingly likely, and 
we are ill prepared to deal with this kind of hybrid warfare.
    It must be said that while Russia has established itself as 
the dominant power in the region, the Kremlin's capabilities 
are limited and we still have time and must turn back the tide 
with strategic U.S. leadership and commitment to ensure that 
the Black Sea does not become a permanent security black hole.
    We must respond to Russian hybrid threats while 
simultaneously building long-term stability and security in the 
region. To do so, I elaborate quite a few recommendations in my 
written testimony. I will highlight just three buckets here.
    First, such a strategy for U.S. leadership in the Black Sea 
must see resilience both in terms of economic and democratic 
resilience, and invest with a long view towards the region.
    What we can do in that regard is support independent media, 
investigative journalist groups, and media literacy education 
across the entire Black Sea region. These kinds of groups, the 
independent media sphere in particular, is the best bulwark to 
protect against Russian disinformation.
    To that end, with our limited resources--and we have to 
admit that we have a bandwidth issue in the United States and a 
priority issue--but we can get the most bang out of our buck if 
we prioritize Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, the non-NATO, non-
EU member states that require the most support and have the 
fewest access to those resources.
    We must encourage economic investment as a tool for broader 
regional cooperation and cohesion by, first, delivering on the 
U.S. commitment to the Three Seas Initiative, which was 
proposed under the last Administration--the $1 billion 
commitment--and we must provide alternatives to Chinese 
investment, which is actively playing a role to undermine 
regional cohesion, and particularly in the telecom and broader 
IT infrastructure. For that, the 2021 Transatlantic 
Telecommunications Security Act is key.
    Number two, we have to work with regional allies to 
establish a dialogue around a shared understanding of Black Sea 
security. The 6+1 Dialogue, including Bulgaria, Georgia, and 
Moldova, has to be a part of it as well. Romania, Turkey, and 
Ukraine and the United States can align on a shared vision for 
the region and engage Turkey.
    While Turkey has been a very challenging ally, in the Black 
Sea is an area where Turkey is at odds with Russia and we 
should use that to continue to engage Turkey and move beyond 
our quarrels over S-400 and F-35.
    Lastly, we have to emphasize a strategy that includes 
responding to nonconventional threats in the cyber and 
information domains. In this regard, we should consider opening 
an operational hub in the region.
    Romania is the most natural partner and ally for this to 
coordinate NATO and EU efforts in the hybrid domain, 
particularly in cyber operations and Russian disinformation 
efforts. Undoubtedly, limited U.S. resources and bandwidth will 
mean a greater role for U.S. allies in the region, particularly 
NATO and the European Union.
    The U.S. will have to do more with less, but the Black Sea 
is where relatively limited resources can make a profound 
difference for long-term allied resilience and U.S. global 
leadership.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Polyakova follows:]

               Prepared Statement of Dr. Alina Polyakova

    Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, Distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee: It is an honor and privilege to address you today 
on this critical issue for United States national security. Thank you 
for inviting me to speak.
    I am the President and CEO of the Center for European Policy 
Analysis (CEPA), a nonprofit, nonpartisan, independent foreign policy 
think-tank focused on the transatlantic alliance. My views are my own 
and do not represent those of the organization, which takes no 
institutional position. Since our founding, CEPA has worked to raise 
awareness on the strategic importance of the Black Sea region for the 
United States and our allies. My views as presented here are informed 
by my CEPA colleagues and experts, most notably Lieutenant General 
(retired) Ben Hodges, Admiral (retired) James Foggo, Lauren Speranza, 
and Carsten Schmiedl, who provided invaluable feedback and have written 
extensively on these issues.
         why the black sea region matters to the united states
    ``Security and stability of the Black Sea are in the U.S. national 
interest and are critical to the security of NATO's Eastern Flank . . . 
Russia's destabilizing activities in and around the Black Sea reflect 
its ambitions to regain a dominant position in the region and to 
prevent the realization of a Europe that is whole, free, and at 
peace.''--U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin \1\
    As Secretary of Defense Austin said on his recent trip to Romania, 
Georgia, and Ukraine, stability in the Black Sea region (BSR) is in the 
national security interest of the United States. The U.S. cannot afford 
to neglect key regional security environments in Europe, such as the 
BSR, even as it pivots to the Indo-Pacific. The transatlantic alliance 
remains a bedrock of U.S. global leadership--a Europe that is whole, 
free, and at peace is an asset to the United States. But the European 
continent is still riddled with contested security zones and is where 
the transatlantic alliance is continuously tested. The BSR is vital to 
U.S. strategic interests of deterring Russian aggression against 
allies, ensuring European stability, and protecting freedom of 
navigation. Insufficient resources and attention have undermined the 
U.S. and allies' ability to effectively pursue these objectives at the 
same time as Russia has stepped up its aggression and China is 
increasing its foothold in the region.
    The BSR is where Russia, Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans, and 
the Caucasus come together--and where the forces of democracy to the 
west, Russian military aggression to the north, Chinese economic 
influence to the east, and instability in the Middle East to the south 
converge. The U.S.-friendly countries of the BSR (Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Moldova, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine) also present a complex alliance 
structure with both NATO and European Union members and partners and a 
shared border--by way of the Black Sea--with Russia, the main 
competitive rival and military aggressor in the region.
    The BSR is the locus of the Kremlin's tests against alliance 
credibility and resolve, which have escalated over the last two decades 
in the conventional and nonconventional domain: from the invasion of 
Georgia in 2008, to the 2014 illegal and illegitimate annexation of 
Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, to cyber attacks and 
information influence operations. Russian acts of aggression occur 
regularly in the land, maritime, and so-called hybrid domains. To do 
so, the Kremlin has militarized Ukraine's Crimea, which is now a 
massive Russian military outpost that serves as an anchor for Moscow's 
aggression against Ukraine by land and sea, intimidation of NATO 
allies, and testing ground of U.S. commitment.
    The Kremlin has de facto pulled a new Iron Curtain over Europe in 
the Black Sea. And it benefits from the complexity of alliances that 
has created a web of interconnected interests across states and 
institutions but without a single entity developing or taking ownership 
of a comprehensive regional strategy.
    The Secretary of Defense's visit earlier this month to the region 
is a welcome and positive sign that the BSR is gaining significance for 
the United States. While timely and important, the visit should not 
stand alone as the sum of U.S. engagement. Rather, the Biden 
administration and the U.S. Congress should use the visit as an 
opportunity to build momentum across the alliance for a comprehensive 
regional strategy. An effective strategy for regional security in the 
Black Sea should:

   View regional security through a broader lens of resilience, 
        which goes beyond the military domain to encompass economic and 
        democratic resilience;

   Emphasize and craft responses to nonconventional threats in 
        the cyber and information domains, which are a core part of 
        Russian influence operations in the region;

   Work with key regional allies to establish a cross-cutting 
        regional dialogue around a shared understanding of Black Sea 
        security.

    Undoubtedly, limited U.S. resources and bandwidth will mean a 
greater role for U.S. allies in the region, particularly NATO and the 
EU. The U.S. will also have to do more with less, but recent history 
has shown that when the U.S. disengages, its adversaries step in to 
fill the power vacuums that are left behind. In the BSR, Russia has 
already established itself as the dominant power, but the Kremlin's 
capabilities are limited. Strategic U.S. leadership and commitment is 
instrumental to ensuring that the Black Sea does not become a permanent 
security black hole. There is no substitute for U.S. strategic presence 
in the Black Sea, operating in consort with Black Sea allies and 
partners.
         understanding regional security in terms of resilience
    Stability in the BSR will not be achieved through military means 
alone. Therefore, U.S. engagement in the region should occur through a 
broader lens of security as resilience rooted in three domains: 
military, economic, and democratic. U.S. strategy should seek to 
balance across these domains based on available resources and 
priorities. A longer-term lens and strategy is particularly important 
as military signals--such as the U.S. decision to send the USS Fort 
McHenry in response to Russian aggression in the Sea of Azov--tend to 
be ephemeral if they are not backed by a broader holistic approach.
The Challenge of Complex Alliances
    The BSR is shaped by a complex regional security environment 
comprised of a mix of NATO partners and allies. The BSR's NATO allies 
and partners unite around a common border with Russia, by way of the 
Black Sea itself, as well as the broadly shared view that Russia 
presents the most immediate and greatest regional threat. But, partly 
due to varying relationships with NATO and the EU, each regional 
partner has a unique view of the region as well as wide-ranging 
capabilities.
    In terms of NATO, Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey are members, 
Georgia and Ukraine retain Enhanced Opportunity Partner (EOP) status in 
the alliance, while Moldova is constitutionally neutral with respect to 
NATO and the CTSO. In terms of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria are 
members, Moldova is part of its European Neighborhood Policy, Turkey is 
a candidate country, Georgia is preparing its application for 
membership by 2024, and Ukraine is a priority partner through the 
Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Area (DCFTA).
    Romania views the Black Sea as a strategic priority and is the 
alliance's regional center of gravity owing to its proximity to other 
allies, significant capability modernization efforts, and mobility 
infrastructure. It sets an example for alliance commitment on burden-
sharing, exceeding 2 percent of GDP on defense spending and over 20 
percent of that amount on defense modernization. As well as 
contributing forces to Afghanistan, Romania hosts around 1,000 U.S. 
rotational forces at Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base, is at the 
terminus of the Danube, and has a key regional port at Constanta.\2\ It 
has also undertaken several notable efforts to enhance regional 
resilience, including the new European Cybersecurity Competence Centre 
and the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience. Diplomatically, Romania's 
good relationship with Turkey is an asset for cooperation in the 
region.
    Bulgaria, the only other member besides Romania of both the EU and 
NATO as well as the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), has demonstrated 
commitment to enhancing capabilities and improving regional security 
through alliance exercises and multinational military cooperation. It 
has benefitted from an increasingly close security relationship with 
the U.S., led by the U.S.-Bulgarian Defense Cooperation Agreement, 
which has provided more than $160 million in security assistance over 
the last 5 years.\3\ However, Bulgaria needs more urgency to modernize 
outdated conventional capabilities, many of which are obsolete and 
vestiges of the Soviet era. A positive sign is Bulgaria's adoption of 
Program 2032, which outlines a capability development strategy and 
indicates that Bulgaria will reach 2 percent spending of GDP on defense 
by 2024.\4\ Bulgaria also developed a National Cyber Security Strategy 
in 2020 but needs a more comprehensive effort to enhance national and 
regional resilience against broader hybrid threats, perhaps by building 
on Romania's efforts.
    Georgia maintains close relations with the alliance and is one of 
its closest partners. The alliance assists in modernizing Georgia's 
capabilities through the Joint Training and Evaluation Center and the 
Substantial NATO-Georgia Package. Georgia's participation in 
multinational exercises has increased. Tbilisi will also benefit from a 
new security pact with the U.S. following Secretary Austin's visit to 
the BSR.\5\
    Ukraine faces the most urgent and direct threat in the region with 
the ongoing war that has witnessed over 14,000 casualties, more than 
1.5 million displaced persons,\6\ the loss of over 75 percent of 
Ukraine's naval capabilities, access to naval ports, and associated 
freedom of navigation, and the loss of Ukrainian territory. For 
Ukraine, building cooperation with thetransatlantic alliance, 
particularly in the maritime domain, is critical to Ukraine's ability 
to defend itself against further Russian aggression and ensure economic 
stability.
    While constitutionally neutral, Moldova is key to regional security 
dynamics. In Transnistria, Russia has backed around 1,500 separatist 
forces, as well as 500 so-called Russian peacekeepers, and conducts 
regular military exercises.\7\ Long viewed as aligned more with Russia 
than the West, there are signs--particularly after the election of pro-
EU candidate Maia Sandu--that Moldova is shifting more towards the 
alliance. Moldova continues to cooperate with the alliance to modernize 
its defense and security structures and institutions and is a 
contributor to the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo, while NATO 
supported the establishment of a Cyber Incident Response Capability for 
the Moldovan Armed Forces in January 2021.\8\
    Turkey is NATO's military heavyweight in the region and holds 
sovereignty over the Bosporus Straits. But it can be a challenging and 
demanding Ally: Ankara's purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense 
systems has been a sore spot in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, leading 
to the U.S. blocking the sale of F-35s to Turkey. At the end of the 
day, NATO needs Turkey and Turkey needs NATO, especially in the BSR. 
Moving past the S-400 debate and the cancelled F-35 deal with Turkey to 
build greater Alliance solidarity, while not abandoning the ``carrot 
and stick'' approach, will be key for broader regional stability.
    Unlike other areas where Turkey and Russia see eye-to-eye, the BSR 
is an area of discord for the two. Turkey disapproves of the Russian 
occupation of Crimea, which has a Muslim Tatar minority population with 
ties to the Tatars in Turkey. Ankara sees Crimea as an unwelcome 
expansion of Russia's footprint in the region. But Ankara is reluctant 
to challenge Moscow or disrupt the regional status quo as it has a long 
history of losing wars provoked by Russia.\9\ Thus, Turkey plays a 
delicate balance with Russia--seeing other BSR countries as allies in 
helping it balance against Moscow. Indeed, the Kremlin holds leverage 
over and applies pressure to Turkey through its positions in Syria, 
where it can provoke a refugee influx to Turkey.\10\ Russia also wields 
economic leverage over Turkey through the tourist industry (Russian 
tourists make up the largest tourist group to Turkey, accounting for 20 
percent of foreign visitors in April 2021 and 6 million tourists the 
year before the pandemic \11\) and imports (Russia is Turkey's 10th 
largest export market with main products being citrus, vehicle parts, 
and pitted fruits \12\).
    The complexity of alliances, divergent views of the region, and 
varying capabilities produce a challenge for regional cohesion. From a 
U.S. perspective, working to ensure a shared vision of regional 
security among BSR partners that focuses on a complementary division of 
labor across key domains would bring greater cohesion to the region. 
Spreading liability and responsibility between BSR states would also 
undermine Russia's points of leverage in each, making the region more 
resilient to Russia's ``divide and conquer'' approach to foreign 
policy.
Economic Investment is Investment in Security
    The BSR has tremendous economic potential as the crossroads linking 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the connector of its littoral 
countries to the rest of the global economy, and with an emerging but 
latent supply of energy reserves which could shape current and future 
energy markets. However, owing to spillover effects from regional 
geopolitical competition and rivalry, as well as the relatively low 
level of foreign economic investment, much of this economic potential 
is unrealized.
    Many of the regional formats designed to promote growth--including 
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Black Sea Trade and 
Development Bank (BSTDB), Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUAM), 
and the Danube River Commission--have hitherto been unsuccessful.\13\ 
BSEC is particularly problematic as Russia is a member of the 
organization.
    The region includes some success stories but also some of the 
poorest countries in Europe, which is reflected in several economic 
indicators. In a ranking of 206 countries by GDP, Turkey was ranked 17, 
Romania was 45, Ukraine was 54, Bulgaria was 73, Georgia was 119, and 
Moldova was 138.\14\ In terms of GDP per capita, Romania was 51, 
Bulgaria was 57, Turkey was 62, Moldova was 91, Georgia was 96, and 
Ukraine was 105.\15\ While real GDP growth is showing positive signs so 
far in 2021,\16\ the countries of the region are among those at highest 
risk of a long and complicated recovery from the economic impact of 
Covid-19.\17\
    In addition to economic challenges, energy is a key issue for 
regional resilience. Here, Russia also wields significant influence and 
leverage. The Kremlin-backed Nord Stream 2 pipeline is not just a 
Ukraine-Germany-U.S. issue, but a regional one indicative of broader 
dynamics of European energy price volatility, dependence on Russian 
supply, and regulatory resilience. The Kremlin has attempted to 
blackmail German and EU officials to grant final regulatory approvals 
to finish the pipeline, which threaten Europe's regulatory 
integrity.\18\ With the U.S. and Germany reaching a deal earlier this 
year to allow the completion of Nord Stream 2, these regional dynamics 
will only continue. Russia's annexation of Crimea also provided the 
Kremlin an opportunity to illegally and illegitimately seize gas 
reserves off the Crimean coast which are potentially worth trillions of 
dollars.\19\
    The Kremlin weaponizes BSR energy supplies to strangle Ukraine, to 
prevent east-west energy corridors which could weaken its grip on 
regional oil and gas exports, and to undermine the West more broadly. 
On October 22, 2021, Moldova's parliament declared an energy state-of-
emergency after Moldova failed to reach a new contract with the 
Kremlin-backed Gazprom, which raised prices from $550 per cubic meter 
to $790.\20\ The U.S. change in policy from the hardline approach of 
the Trump administration to the more complacent and diplomatic approach 
of the Biden term has sowed confusion among BSR allies, who are looking 
for policy consistency from the U.S.
    But across the BSR, untapped energy sources could eventually reduce 
the Kremlin's leverage. Offshore gas reserves are currently being 
explored in the BSR, including a gas field discovered last year by 
Turkey.\21\ The littoral Ukrainian shelf could have as much as two 
trillion cubic meters of gas under the Black Sea, Romania between 150-
200 bcm of offshore reserves, and Bulgaria's Khan Asparuh as much as 
100 bcm.\22\ In Georgia, the Namakhvani hydropower plant could reduce 
energy dependence on Russia if social and environmental concerns are 
resolved.\23\ In this light, discussions on the Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
(TCP), which has been dormant for years but could tap gas reserves in 
Turkmenistan for eventual delivery through Turkey to the EU, should be 
revived. The BSR countries also have a common interest and shared 
potential for adopting cleaner energy. This includes hydrogen and 
renewable forms of power generation; the BSR has some of the highest 
potential in Europe for offshore wind, and the region's abundant 
natural gas supply could enable significant hydrogen production 
capacity.\24\
    Greater U.S. investment is needed to develop an integrated energy 
strategy with the necessary technical expertise and financial resources 
to help BSR allies take advantage of these energy reserves. The added 
benefit of increasing the economic value of the region is that its 
military significance also increases, encouraging the West to better 
protect its investments by committing more resources and by making the 
BSR more central in the minds of strategic planners.
Democratic Governance--The Long-Term Path for Regional Security
    Good governance is the key to long-term regional stability and 
security. Black Sea states as a whole must do more to improve the 
resilience of institutions. Unstable democratic institutions and 
processes within BSR countries expose the region to the Kremlin's 
influence operations in the information and cyber domains. Stronger and 
more transparent institutions, particularly rule of law, also reduce 
uncertainty for foreign investors by producing an appealing business 
environment. Every Black Sea state can and should do more on democratic 
reforms, anti-corruption, and judicial independence.
    Several indexes suggest that resilience in the BSR mirrors the 
military domain in its multiplicity and complexity. According to 
Transparency International's 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, which 
ranks countries according to perceived corruption in the public sector, 
Georgia is ranked 45 in the world, Romania and Bulgaria are 69, Turkey 
is 86, Moldova is 115, and Ukraine is 117.\25\ The World Bank's 2021 
Ease of Doing Business Index, an indicator of economic growth 
potential, ranks Georgia 7 in the world, Turkey at 33, Moldova at 48, 
Romania at 55, Bulgaria at 61, and Ukraine at 64.\26\ The 2021 World 
Press Freedom Index, which is an indicator of media independence, ranks 
Romania at 48, Georgia at 60, Moldova at 89, Ukraine at 97, Bulgaria at 
112, and Turkey at 153 out of 180 countries.\27\ The figures contrast 
higher rankings, on average, for the other members of the transatlantic 
alliance, suggesting lower broader resilience in the BSR.
    An independent and vibrant civil society sphere, including an 
independent media, is core to increasing societal resilience. An 
independent media sphere is still the best bulwark against 
disinformation. Civil society watchdog groups also hold governments 
accountable for incursions on judicial independence and corrupt 
practices. In Ukraine, the United States and international institutions 
have made financial loans conditional on progress on reforms. This 
model has put pressure on the Ukrainian Government to deliver on the 
reform agenda regardless of which political leader is in power.
    Within the region, several countries have taken steps to enhance 
resilience in the cyber domain. Bucharest was selected by EU members as 
the location for a new European Cybersecurity Competence Centre to 
improve the coordination of cybersecurity research and innovation.\28\ 
Romania also hosts the Euro-Atlantic Centre for Resilience. Bulgaria 
developed a National Cyber Security Strategy in 2020 and updated its 
National Security Strategy in 2018 to include hybrid threats. NATO and 
Georgia intend to strengthen cooperation around improving resilience in 
military exercising, while the NATO-Ukraine Platform on Countering 
Hybrid Warfare has seen increased cooperation recently on responding to 
hybrid threats.\29\
    The West and the U.S. are generally viewed positively in the BSR. 
Support is particularly high in Romania, where 81 percent of the 
population supports strong ties with Western political and military 
alliances as well as the U.S.\30\ In Ukraine, support for joining NATO 
reached 53 percent in 2019, the highest level since 2014.\31\ In 
Georgia, support has continued to increase for both NATO (82 percent) 
and the EU (74 percent).\32\ Moldova has positive views of relations 
with Russia as well as the West, although Russia is viewed 
simultaneously as its most important economic partner--tied with the EU 
for the most important political partner--and also as the greatest 
threat. But the next generation of Moldovans overwhelmingly (64 
percent) appears to prefer economic convergence with the West over 
Russia.\33\ Bulgaria remains somewhat of an exception with roughly half 
or fewer of the population having a positive view of NATO.\34\ Bulgaria 
is also one of the only countries in Europe which disagreed that Covid-
19 showed a need for closer European cooperation.\35\
    In addition, ensuring that Euro-Atlantic integration is a reachable 
goal for the non-EU, non-NATO BSR countries is key to long-term 
regional stability and security. EU membership and the reforms that the 
accession process requires have also engendered incredible economic 
growth in Central Eastern Europe as well as in Romania and Bulgaria. EU 
integration should be a top priority for the non-EU BSR countries.
                 russia's view of the black sea region
    The Kremlin views the BSR as squarely within its perceived sphere 
of influence. Although Russia is a country in economic and demographic 
decline, it is nonetheless a military power with a proven ability and 
determination to undermine U.S. and more broadly Western interests. It 
is of course the main military aggressor in the region and fears 
growing Western and particularly Turkish influence turning the BSR into 
a ``NATO lake.'' Using conventional capability buildup as well as a new 
generation of so-called hybrid means--which it refines in the BSR 
before weaponizing them against the broader West, including the U.S.--
to asymmetrically challenge the West where it is weaker, the Kremlin is 
attempting to draw an ``Iron Curtain'' across the BSR to exert 
influence and enable it to operate with impunity.
    From the Kremlin's perspective, the BSR is part of a coherent 
western flank. It perceives NATO's more siloed approach to its eastern 
flank, where some regions are prioritized over others, as creating 
weaker defense and deterrence in regions such as the BSR that it can 
exploit.\36\ Increasingly, Russia is signaling its lack of desire for 
dialogue and cooperation with NATO as evidenced by Russia's recent 
recall of its diplomats from the NATO Mission in Brussels and closure 
of the NATO information bureau in Moscow.
    The Kremlin has demonstrated continued willingness to use force in 
the BSR, particularly against non-NATO members, in an attempt to keep 
sovereign states in its perceived sphere of influence. The region's 
``grey zones'' or so-called frozen conflicts, which are not actually 
frozen, are where the Kremlin turns up the heat on a regular basis to 
intimidate Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. They are also subject to a 
slow creep of Russian aggression. Since 1992, the Kremlin has backed 
and regularly exercises with separatists in Moldova's Transnistria 
region. Russia has occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia since invading 
Georgia in 2008 and continues to shift the physical borders of those 
regions to slowly annex more and more territory from Georgia.\37\ The 
Kremlin illegally and illegitimately annexed Crimea and invaded eastern 
Ukraine in 2014, where it continues to wage a low-intensity war. 
Earlier this year, the mobilization of substantial Russian capabilities 
along the border with Ukraine and in Crimea caused U.S. European 
Command to raise its awareness level to ``potential imminent crisis.'' 
\38\ These examples demonstrate that the threat environment continues 
to evolve.




    From the conventional military perspective, Russia uses the BSR to 
build capabilities and then project power into the Caucasus, the 
Balkans, the Middle East, and beyond--in particular, growing maritime 
capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean and into Syria and Libya. 
Russia's Black Sea Fleet retains numerical control in the BSR, and 
despite Turkey's sovereignty over Turkish Straits, the Kremlin is 
becoming increasingly bold with reports of repeated violations of the 
Montreux Convention by a Kilo-class submarine transiting to the Eastern 
Mediterranean.\39\
    Russia also blockaded the Sea of Azov, seized three Ukrainian 
vessels,\40\ reportedly falsified the location of two NATO warships 
near Odesa to a more provocative position off the coast of 
Sevastopol,\41\ and announced that it is closing the Kerch Straits, 
which divides the Black Sea from the Sea of Azov, to vessels from 
Ukraine and other countries until at least the end of October this 
year.\42\ This is part of Moscow's strategy to use the Black Sea to 
squeeze Ukraine economically by blocking access to key ports, such as 
Sevastopol, and by harassing ships.
    Since 2014, the Kremlin has increasingly turned the peninsula into 
an ``unsinkable aircraft carrier'' by upgrading the peninsula's 
military infrastructure. This includes emplacing the Murmansk-BN long-
range communications jamming system, anti-drone warfare capabilities, 
electronic warfare (EW), the Yakhroma early-warning missile-defense 
radar, and S-400 ground-based air defense complexes.\43\ As of April 
2021, Russia had moved between 15,000-25,000 troops to Crimea for a 
total of 31,500 soldiers and greater force posture along the 
internationally recognized border with Ukraine \44\ as well as some 680 
armored vehicles, 170 artillery pieces, 100 fighter planes, and 40 
tanks.\45\ Russia's militarization of Crimea also includes enhancing 
mobility and integration with Russia by constructing the Kerch Bridge 
and opening a railway station \46\ and even promoting militarism among 
the Crimean youth.\47\
    The Kremlin's military provocations occur in concert with 
asymmetric tactics. In June 2021, two NATO warships operating legally 
in the Black Sea, the United Kingdom's HMS Defender and the Dutch HNLMS 
Evertsen, were harassed by Russian patrol boats or overflown by Russian 
fighter jets on two separate occasions.\48\ The Kremlin used this 
apparent military confrontation as an opportunity to promote broader 
false narratives and disinformation throughout the region, including 
the narrative that the HMS Defender incident was a ``provocation'' that 
would elicit a ``tough response.'' The Russian Ministry of Defense also 
showed falsified video footage in order to claim that the vessel had 
been ``chased out of Crimean waters'' by Russian forces.\49\ The HMS 
Defender incident demonstrates the need to respond to the Kremlin's 
full-spectrum threats in an equally holistic manner.
    The Kremlin's hybrid tactics also include information operations 
and cyberattacks to project power, influence public opinions, and 
undermine democratic institutions. Ukraine has been the primary target 
and victim of Russia's full spectrum of warfare tactics. It has been 
called ``Putin's petri dish'' \50\ for the almost daily and high-
profile cyberattacks waged against it, including the NotPetya malware 
attack in 2017 and two separate occasions where Russian cyber saboteurs 
turned off the electricity in Ukraine to hundreds of thousands of 
people.\51\ Cyberattacks have also occurred elsewhere in the BSR, 
including a GRU-backed takedown of more than 2,000 websites in 
Georgia.\52\ Russian information operations in Bulgaria have targeted 
leftwing political pages and nationalistic accounts advancing pro-
Russian versions of Bulgarian history. In Romania, disinformation 
narratives are less pervasive and have mainly been distributed by 
overtly pro-Russian websites.\53\ Russia's hybrid tactics also include 
more overt forms of influence: in March 2021, six Bulgarians, five of 
whom were senior or former defense officials, were arrested on 
suspicion of spying for Russia.\54\
    China has also increased its influence in the BSR although its 
involvement has remained limited to investments in ports and 
infrastructure.\55\ Through the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing 
has attempted to secure new markets for its exports and invest in new 
infrastructure projects, with a closer economic relationship in 
particular with Georgia and the early stages of closer Turkish-Chinese 
cooperation on port development.\56\ Sino-Russian cooperation in the 
region has been limited, with no joint military exercises and both 
countries avoiding mention of the region in joint communications.\57\ 
The BSR's EU members should work collectively to ensure that Chinese 
investments do not undermine regional cohesion or unfairly advantage or 
disadvantage any single member. The West more broadly should build on 
the 3SI to incentivize greater investment in the region and spur 
economic development; offering alternatives is the key to countering 
Chinese economic influence, which should be a global effort and not 
relegating to the Indo-Pacific region exclusively.
                          the west's response
    The West views the BSR as part of the broader eastern flank, but 
since Crimea, has prioritized bolstering defense and deterrence in the 
Baltic Sea region rather than the BSR. The 2014 Wales Summit 
Communique, issued 7 months after the invasion of Crimea, aimed to 
support regional allies and partners rather than develop a 
comprehensive regional strategy: NATO would ``support, as appropriate, 
regional efforts by the Black Sea littoral states aimed at ensuring 
security and stability. We will also strengthen our dialogue and 
cooperation with Georgia and Ukraine in this regard.'' \58\ In 2016, 
the alliance established enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia but settled for tailored Forward 
Presence (tFP) in the Black Sea region, a smaller and less capable 
force.\59\ But as of the 2021 Brussels Summit, even tFP had not been 
fully implemented: alliance leaders noted NATO's contributions in the 
land, sea, and air domains and recommitted NATO to tFP's full 
implementation.\60\ NATO members have also enhanced cooperation with 
Ukraine, providing guidance as it rebuilt its maritime capabilities 
following Russia's seizure of Sevastopol and 75 percent of Ukraine's 
fleet.\61\ These are positive developments, but in sum, suggest that 
the West's military commitment and capabilities are not commensurate 
with the threat environment and that a cohesive regional approach does 
not yet exist.
    Meanwhile, exercises in the BSR have continued--and in some cases, 
also increased. Sea Breeze, an annual maritime exercise co-hosted by 
the U.S. and Ukraine, was the largest in its 20-year history in 2021 
with 30 participating countries, more than 5,000 sailors, soldiers, and 
airmen, over 40 aircraft, and 32 ships.\62\ The U.S.-led annual 
Defender 2021 exercise tested military mobility to the BSR this year. 
Situational awareness and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) are improving as a result of recent NATO air-
maritime exercises.\63\ The West can create a more robust exercise 
regime that includes partners and allies by increasing the scale of Sea 
Breeze to match Defender and by integrating it with Georgia's Noble 
Partner and Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria's Saber Junction exercises. 
Regular exercises could also be supplemented with direct strategic 
responses to Russian actions in the region. Having a regular presence 
in the BSR would enable faster response times while developing a 
toolkit of symmetric actions.
    The West's response to non-conventional threats in the BSR has also 
seen some progress. When the Kremlin used falsified maritime 
positioning to claim that the HMS Defender and HNLMS Evertsen provoked 
Russia's response,\64\ Western governments publicly refuted the claim 
with evidence from live broadcast webcams. NATO officers should also be 
commended for acting in accordance with internationally recognized 
boundaries. There is growing evidence that NATO is also taking hybrid 
threats more seriously,\65\ including with the development of NATO's 
counter-hybrid support teams, but these need to be enhanced, and 
addressing hybrid threats also needs to be integrated into a 
comprehensive regional strategy.
                    what the united states should do
Work With BSR Countries To Establish a Shared Understanding of Regional 

        Security.
   Establish a 6+1 dialogue on Black Sea security. Stand up a 
        dialogue with BSR allies--Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, 
        Turkey, Ukraine--together with the U.S. to align on a shared 
        vision for the region. The dialogues should:

        Occur at the working level with counterparts from the 
            Department of Defense, Department of State, and relevant 
            agencies such as CISA, and have high level buy-in. The U.S. 
            DoD, building on Secretary Austin's visit to the region, 
            should lead the dialogues at the Deputy Secretary level.

        Aim to establish a complementary division of labor based 
            on an assessment of capabilities and resources that 
            distributes responsibility and liability across BSR states.

        Rotate the hosting country for a high-level meeting 
            annually between counterparts at the Deputy Minister/Deputy 
            Secretary level, with the first meeting hosted by the 
            United States.

        Reengage Turkey to ensure Ankara's perspective is included 
            in negotiations and to that end consider Turkey to host the 
            second annual meeting following the United States.

   Establish an operational hub in the region. The United 
        States should continue to see Turkey as the key NATO ally while 
        also developing an operational hub to further build up military 
        and nonconventional capabilities in the region. The operational 
        hub should:

        Focus on conventional and nonconventional capabilities 
            working with NATO and the EU to align in priorities.

        Not be a solely bilateral effort between the U.S. and the 
            hub host nation but rather serve as the regional 
            coordination point for all BSR allies. The hub should 
            become the location of a joint, multinational headquarters 
            responsible for coordinating all BSR military activity, 
            enhanced intelligence sharing and cyber capabilities, and a 
            common operating picture for the region.

        Focus on developing and expanding response to 
            nonconventional threats in the cyber and information 
            domains. This should include better intelligence-sharing 
            among allies and partners around Russian and Chinese hybrid 
            activities, joint efforts to improve attribution, and 
            longer-term analyses of broader Kremlin influence campaigns 
            in the BSR.

        Be established in a NATO, EU, 3SI member state to increase 
            cooperation across these institutions and initiatives. As 
            such, Romania would be the natural partner to host the hub.

             Romania already hosts around 1,000 rotational 
            U.S. troops at MK Air Base.

             Romania has good diplomatic relations with 
            Turkey, which, with appropriate engagement, would likely 
            welcome Romania's greater involvement while allowing Ankara 
            to continue to balance against Russian incursions in the 
            BSR (i.e. Romania could engage in ways that Turkey may be 
            reluctant to do).

             Romania's recently established Euro-Atlantic 
            Centre for Resilience, a public institution under its 
            Ministry of Foreign Affairs, also offers an opportunity for 
            the U.S. to promote whole-of-government and whole-of- 
            society approaches to enhance resilience across the BSR.

             The U.S. should work with Romania on improving 
            capabilities to enhance regional deterrence. The most cost-
            effective means to achieve this objective is through long-
            range (600 mile) missiles, and the most effective means is 
            through manned or unmanned survivable missiles carrying 
            submarines to challenge the Black Sea Fleet, which are 
            permissible for Romania to acquire under the Montreux 
            Convention. The U.S. and Romania can also consider building 
            or buying small, diesel-electric missiles carrying 
            submarines to give NATO a new and effective deterrent tool.

   Engage the EU, NATO and capable non-BSR allies, such as the 
        United Kingdom, to align strategic priorities and enhance 
        capabilities by:

        Actively engaging to align strategic priorities with the 
            EU's Strategic Compass and NATO's Strategic Concept, which 
            are currently in early drafting stages.

        Leading the development of a Graduated Response Plan for 
            the BSR, similar to what has already been created for the 
            Baltic Sea region, as well as a comprehensive maritime 
            strategy which has been slow to materialize but would 
            enable commanders across domains to better anticipate force 
            requirements to counter Russian aggression in support of 
            NATO's Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-
            Atlantic Area (DDA).
Actively Encourage Economic Investment in the Region as a Tool for 
        Broader Regional Cooperation and Cohesion

   Deliver on the U.S. commitment to the Three Seas Initiative 
        (3SI). Consistency and reliability of U.S. policy is key for 
        regional allies. In 2020, the U.S. pledged 1 billion dollars of 
        financing to support 3SI primarily through the International 
        Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The U.S. should deliver 
        on this promise. Failure to make good on this commitment will 
        sew additional seeds of uncertainty on America's commitment to 
        the region.

   Provide alternatives to Chinese investment, particularly in 
        infrastructure. The U.S. Congress should work to pass the 2021 
        Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act (TTSA), which 
        aims to provide resources to Central East European countries, 
        including several BSR states, to build out telecom 
        infrastructure that is not dependent on Chinese technologies.

   Open DFC funding to the BSR states. The United States 
        already possesses a key mechanism to increase economic 
        investment in the BSR--the DFC. Stability in the BSR depends on 
        economic cohesion and growth and the DFC is the appropriate 
        entity to channel U.S. support.
Invest in Long-Term Democratic Resilience in the BSR Region
   Support independent media, investigative journalist groups, 
        and media literacy education. Across the BSR, civil society is 
        under development. An independent media and a well-educated 
        population that is able to detect Russian propaganda are the 
        best bulwarks for building societal resilience. The U.S. could 
        also build on media support programs and expand programs and 
        agencies to support a sustained, top-level commitment to back 
        free media, including mobilizing individual agencies already 
        active in support of Russian-language free media.\66\

   Prioritize Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. When it comes to 
        prioritizing resources, the U.S. can have the greatest impact 
        in the non-EU, non-NATO states of the BSR. Ukraine, Moldova, 
        and Georgia are the primary targets of Russia aggression. As 
        non-EU and non-NATO states, the three countries are most 
        vulnerable to cyber and information influence operations, and 
        as was the case with the 2017 NotPetya attack, the Kremlin's 
        operations against these countries tend to affect the broader 
        region.

        Do more outside of discussions on the NATO Membership 
            Action Plan (MAP). The MoU on Georgia Defense and 
            Deterrence Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI), signed during 
            Secretary Austin's visit to Tbilisi, is an important step 
            in increasing U.S. presence in Georgia. In Ukraine, joint 
            exercises such as Rapid Trident and Sea Breeze are key for 
            continued demonstration of U.S. support.

             Establish joint EU-NATO Centers of Excellence to 
            focus on hybrid threats across the region to serve as an 
            early warning system for identifying, attributing, and 
            responding to cyber and information threats.

             Continue U.S. support for Ukraine and establish 
            BSR support through the National Defense Authorization Act 
            (NDAA). The U.S. can demonstrate commitment to enhancing 
            regional capabilities by expanding on the NDAA's security 
            assistance earmarked for Ukraine and designating funds for 
            BSR capability development in the next budget year.

        Encourage private-public partnerships to establish a 
            ``tech innovation belt.'' Despite lagging economic 
            performance, the three countries boast a well-educated 
            population, particularly in the tech and IT sectors. Rather 
            than perpetuating the narratives of grey zones, the U.S. 
            should encourage U.S. venture capital firms to see the 
            region as a tech innovation belt, where relatively small 
            investments in R&D could yield high results.

        Work with the EU to broaden and deepen EU cooperation and 
            eventual integration. EU membership has proven to be the 
            most effective tool for economic and institutional reform. 
            The U.S., as part of a broader strategic partnership with 
            the EU, should elevate the strategic importance of eventual 
            EU integration for Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, while 
            encouraging deeper economic ties.

----------------
Notes

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Romanian Ministry of Defense Post-Bilat Joint Press Event,'' U.S. 
Department of Defense, October 20, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/
Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2816800/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-
austin-iiis-remarks-at-romanian-ministry-of-defens/.
    \2\ ``Defense Secretary Holds Talks in Romania,'' U.S. Department 
of Defense, October 20, 2021, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/2816855/defense-secretary-holds-talks-in-
romania/.
    \3\ ``U.S. Security Cooperation with Bulgaria: Fact Sheet,'' U.S. 
Department of State, February 23, 2021, https://www.state.gov/u-s-
security-cooperation-with-bulgaria/.
    \4\ Dimirinka Metodieva, ``Modernization of the Bulgarian Military: 
Recent Developments and New Opportunities,'' CEE Legal Matters, 
September 6, 2021, https://ceelegalmatters.com/bulgaria/17781-
modernization-of-the-bulgarian-military-recent-developments-and-new-
opportunities.
    \5\ Karoun Demirjian, ``U.S. extends security pact with Georgia as 
Russia tensions flare,'' The Washington Post, October 18, 2021, https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/lloyd-austin-georgia-russia-
urkraine-nato/2021/10/18/9b5846de-3014-11ec-9241-
aad8e48f01ff_story.html.
    \6\ ``Donbas war took 14,000 lives and forced relocation of 1,5 
million people--Ukraine's MFA,'' 112 Ukraine, December 17, 2019, 
https://112.international/conflict-in-eastern-ukraine/donbas-war-
claimed-14000-lives-and-forced-relocation-of-15-million-people-
ukraines-mfa-46613.html.
    \7\ Madalin Necsutu, ``Russian Exercises in Breakaway Transnistria 
Leave Moldova Unfazed,'' Balkan Insight, April 8, 2021, https://
balkaninsight.com/2021/04/08/russian-exercises-in-breakaway-
transnistria-leave-moldova-unfazed/.
    \8\ ``Cyber Incident Response Capability established in the 
Republic of Moldova with NATO support,'' NATO, January 21, 2021, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180758.htm.
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For Now,'' The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 4, 
2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/new-erdogan-
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June 2021, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/rus/partner/
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black-sea-or-a-black-hole/.
    \14\ ``Gross domestic product 2020,'' World Bank, 2021, https://
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data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.
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new-european-cybersecurity-competence-centre-to-be-located-in-
bucharest-romania/.
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by-many-across-10-member-states/.
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youth-of-the-crimea/.
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`provocation' will elicit a `tough response,''' Sky News, July 4, 2021, 
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elicit-a-tough-response-12348602.
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the Cyber Age (New York: Crown, 2018).
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and Rufin Zamfir, ``Influence of Pro-Kremlin Public Pages in Bulgaria's 
and Romania's Facebook Ecosystem,'' GLOBSEC/Center for the Study of 
Democracy/Global Focus, May 13, 2021, https://csd.bg/publications/
publication/influence-of-pro-kremlin-public-pages-in-bulgarias-and-
romanias-facebook-ecosystem/.
    \54\ Mihail Naydenov, ``Bulgaria in the Black Sea: Defending 
against Russian hybrid warfare,'' Middle East Institute, April 19, 
2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/bulgaria-black-sea-defending-
against-russian-hybrid-warfare.
    \55\ Deborah Sanders, ``Can China Promote Stability in the Black 
Sea Region?'' Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 
3, 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/
14683857.2021.1935771.
    \56\ Gonul Tol et al, ``A Sea Change? China's Role in the Black 
Sea,'' Frontier Europe Initiative, November 2020, https://mei.edu/
sites/default/files/2020-11/A%20Sea%20Change%3F-
China%27s%20Role%20in%20the%20Black%20Sea.pdf.
    \57\ ``China in the Broader Black Sea Region,'' GLOBSEC/Wilfried 
Martens Center for European Studies/The Black Sea Trust for Regional 
Cooperation, March 2021, https://www.martenscentre.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/China-in-the-Broader-Black-Sea-Region.pdf.
    \58\ ``Wales Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Wales,'' NATO, September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.
    \59\ ``Warsaw Summit Communique: Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Warsaw,'' NATO, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm.
    \60\ Brussels Summit Communique: Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels,'' NATO, July 14, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/
natolive/news_185000.htm?selectedLocale=en.
    \61\ Megan Eckstein, ``After 2014 decimation, Ukrainian Navy 
rebuilds to fend off Russia,'' DefenseNews, August 9, 2021, https://
www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/08/09/after-2014-decimation-ukrainian-
navy-rebuilds-to-fend-off-russia/.
    \62\ Edward Lundquist, ``Exercise Sea Breeze 2021 Comes to a Close 
in Black Sea,'' Sea Power Magazine, July 13, 2021, https://
seapowermagazine.org/exercise-sea-breeze-2021-comes-to-a-close-in-
black-sea/.
    \63\ https://ac.nato.int/archive/2021/airmaritime-cooperation-
enhances-shared-situational-awareness-in-the-black-sea
    \64\ H I Sutton, ``Positions of Two NATO Ships Were Falsified Near 
Russian Black Sea Naval Base,'' USNI News, June 21, 2021, https://
news.usni.org/2021/06/21/positions-of-two-nato-ships-were-falsified-
near-russian-black-sea-naval-base.
    \65\ ``NATO's approach to countering disinformation: a focus on 
COVID-19,'' NATO, June 17, 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
177273.htm.
    \66\ Alina Polyakova and Daniel Fried, ``Democratic Offense Against 
Disinformation,'' Center for European Policy Analysis/Atlantic Council, 
December 2, 2020, https://cepa.org/democratic-offense-against-
disinformation/.

    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Brzezinski.

          STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, SENIOR FELLOW, 
                ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Brzezinski. Thank you, Chairman Shaheen. Can you hear 
me?
    Thank you. Can you hear me now? Fantastic.
    Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, distinguished 
members of the committee, thank you for conducting this hearing 
on how to promote peace and stability in the Black Sea region.
    For more than a decade and a half, this region has been the 
zone of Europe's most intense confrontation and violent 
conflict. It has become the soft underbelly of European 
security.
    We have witnessed, as my colleagues listed, Russia's 
invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, its occupation of their 
territories and that of Moldova, its use of Crimea as a hub for 
an anti-access area denial zone spanning across the Black Sea, 
its massing of military forces in the region, including last 
spring, and its harassment of allied aircraft and ships in the 
Black Sea.
    The Black Sea has been transformed into a Russian military 
lake that President Putin uses to further his disruptive and 
expansionist objectives in the region and beyond.
    Moscow exercises the full spectrum of hybrid warfare across 
the region, including trade and energy embargoes, cyber-
attacks, information warfare, and even sabotage and 
assassination.
    In the absence of a more comprehensive and more assertive 
strategy, this region will likely experience further Russian 
aggression, including an increased risk of military conflict.
    Allow me to highlight four priorities essential to an 
effective Black Sea strategy.
    First, it must strengthen military deterrence and defense 
in the region. Last week's NATO defense ministerial underscored 
the need for our allies to address long-standing capability 
shortfalls, particularly in the air and missile defense realm, 
long range fires, reconnaissance platforms, all of which are 
needed in the Black Sea region.
    The Alliance, including the United States, must do more to 
help Georgia and Ukraine strengthen the lethality of their 
armed forces, but the Alliance must also increase its footprint 
in the region. NATO should create a joint training and 
evaluation center in Ukraine just as it has done to support 
Georgia.
    NATO's Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region 
consists of only a headquarters element in Romania. It should 
be reinforced with stationed, land, coastal, and naval combat 
elements, something more akin to what NATO has deployed to the 
Baltic Sea region.
    I agree with my colleagues that a NATO Intelligence Fusion 
Center should be established in Romania or Bulgaria to enhance 
the Alliance's situational awareness across the entire Black 
Sea region, across all the challenges it faces. This reinforced 
NATO presence should be complemented by the deployment of a 
U.S. brigade combat team to the region.
    Let me also emphasize an effective deterrence strategy also 
requires a clear path for Georgia and Ukraine to NATO 
membership. NATO enlargement is one of the great success 
stories of post-Cold War Europe.
    Where NATO membership has been granted, peace and security 
has been strengthened. That success is in stark contrast to the 
Alliance's hesitancy regarding Ukraine and Georgia's request 
for NATO membership. Two invasions testify to this.
    Responding affirmatively and unequivocally to the 
transatlantic aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine is essential 
to enduring peace and stability in the Black Sea region.
    A second priority of Black Sea strategy is countering the 
dissemination of false and intentionally divisive information. 
Washington essentially disarmed itself in 1999 when it closed 
the doors of the United States Information Agency, USIA. That 
multi-billion-dollar department was our frontline force in the 
realm of information warfare.
    Congress should reestablish a modernized version of USIA so 
we can return to the offense in this dynamic and fast-paced 
dimension of international affairs. Strengthening regional 
economic prosperity and resilience should be a third priority 
of a Black Sea strategy.
    Toward this end, the United States should robustly support 
the Three Seas Initiative. This is a Central European launched 
and led effort to leverage the power of private capital to 
develop cross-border infrastructure in the region spanning 
between the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic Seas. It is all about 
marshalling infrastructural connectivity to generate economic 
growth, strengthen economic resilience, and complete the vision 
of undivided Europe.
    With bipartisan support, the United States announced it 
would invest up to $1 billion into Three Seas energy projects, 
including a $300 million equity investment into the Three Seas 
Initiative Investment Fund. That really injected real momentum 
into the initiative.
    However, a year later, these promises remain unfulfilled 
and risk becoming a drag on the initiative, especially in the 
capital markets it seeks to engage.
    Allow me to urge Congress to use its authorities to direct 
the United States Government to execute its pledge to make an 
equity investment into the Three Seas fund.
    Let me also urge Congress to pass the Transatlantic 
Telecommunications Security Act. TTSA would complement U.S. 
Government authorities to invest in energy infrastructure in 
Central Europe with similar authority to assist this region to 
develop secure telecommunication networks.
    Finally, and just briefly, a Black Sea strategy should also 
seek engagement with Russia where constructive cooperation is 
possible, and a logical place to start is arms control and 
confidence-building measures to enhance military stability.
    Madame Chairman, much is at stake in the Black Sea region. 
This includes the security of some of our closest allies and 
partners as well as the future of the international rules-based 
order, which today in the Black Sea region is under sustained 
attack.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Ian Brzezinski

    Chairman Shaheen, Ranking Member Johnson, distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for conducting this hearing to highlight the 
significance of the Black Sea region and the need for a more effective 
United States strategy to promote peace and stability in this important 
and dynamic part of Europe.
    For more than a decade and a half, the Black Sea region has been 
the zone of Europe's most intense confrontation and violent conflict. 
This unfortunate reality has been driven by Moscow's revanchist 
ambitions, which it has advanced by applying the full spectrum of 
Russian power, including brute military force.
    This was underscored this last Spring when Russian President Putin 
massed military forces along Ukraine's eastern frontiers and in 
occupied Ukrainian territories, including Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea. 
That offensive posture remains in place today and poses a real threat 
to Ukraine and the security Black Sea region.
    Russia's military build-up, its occupation of Georgian and 
Ukrainian territories, and other provocative uses of armed force and 
hybrid warfare has transformed the Black Sea into a Russian military 
lake that President Putin uses to further his disruptive and 
expansionist objectives in the region and beyond.
    This aggression underscores how the Black Sea region has become the 
soft underbelly of transatlantic security. Nonetheless, this part of 
Europe has not received the same degree of priority and focus as its 
northern counterpart, the Baltic Sea region. In the absence of a 
comprehensive and more assertive strategy on the part of the United 
States and its Allies and Partners in NATO and the European Union, the 
Black Sea region will likely experience a further intensification of 
Russian aggression. That will not only jeopardize the safety and 
sovereignty of the region's democracies but will also increase risk of 
military conflict, including that with dangerous escalatory dynamics.
          the black sea: a region of geopolitical significance
    The Black Sea is a region of geopolitical significance and has been 
a long-standing zone of contest among great powers. As a crossroads 
linking Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, it features strategic lines 
of communication. The Black Sea is traversed each day by hundreds of 
ships transporting goods and people from its shores and beyond. The sea 
hosts numerous telecommunications lines and energy pipelines, including 
those that bring Caspian oil and gas to Europe. This important role as 
a trade route and the fact that the Black Sea coast features some of 
Europe's fastest growing economies has also made this region a focus of 
China. Beijing has attempted to established footholds in the region via 
investments through its Belt and Road Initiative and 17+1 format for 
regional engagement.
    The Black Sea is also a major export route for Russia's oil and 
gas. As the home of Russia's only warm water ports, it serves as 
Moscow's most important access route to the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Middle East. It serves as an important element of Russia's main 
logistics route supporting military and paramilitary operations in 
Syria, Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa.
    The six countries that surround the Black Sea include three NATO 
allies--Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, two NATO Partners--Ukraine and 
Georgia, and Russia. Turkey and Romania host two critical elements of 
NATO's deployed missile defense system that protects both Europe and 
the United States: an advanced X-band Radar in Kurecik in southeastern 
Turkey and an Aegis- Ashore facility in Deveselu, Romania which can 
detect, track, and engage ballistic missiles in flight launched from 
the Middle East.
    The commitment of these NATO Allies and Partners to the Alliance' 
missions should not be underestimated. It is notable that at one time 
Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria accounted for one third 
of the military forces deployed to Afghanistan under NATO's RESOLUTE 
SUPPORT mission.\1\
    The Black Sea's geopolitical significance includes Russia's 
presence but also the influence the region has on Russia's potential to 
evolve into a democratic, law-abiding power. Former professor and U.S. 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (my father) asserted that 
if Russia is allowed to subordinate Ukraine, Russia will never be able 
to cease being an empire, and an empire, by definition, cannot be a 
true democracy. The same logic applies to Russia's relations with the 
rest of Black Sea region. A stable, peaceful Black Sea region featuring 
democratic and secure sovereign states is essential to the prospects of 
a post-imperial Russia.
                  a zone of confrontation and conflict
    Over the last decade and half, peace and stability have not defined 
the Black Sea region. Instead, it has been the objective of a sustained 
effort by Russian President Putin to reestablish Moscow's dominion over 
states what were once subordinated to the Soviet Union. Toward this 
end, Putin has exercised the full spectrum of aggression.
    Brute military force was used to invade Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine 
in 2014. The Russian military continues to illegally occupy territories 
of Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has 
killed well over 13,000 Ukrainian citizens and soldiers \2\ and 
displaced over 1.5 million persons.\3\ This continues to be a hot war 
with more and more Ukrainian lives being lost.
    The countries of the Black Sea region have also experienced the 
direct and indirect impact of Russian trade and energy embargoes. 
Today, all of Europe is enduring a dramatic escalation of gas prices 
due to Russia's refusal to sell its gas in response to increased 
European demand. This apparently intentional decision is intended to 
force the European Union to lift restrictions on the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline and pressure European nations back into long term contracts 
with Gazprom.
    Russia's aggression in the Black Sea region also includes political 
subversion, cyber-attacks, sabotage, and assassination--tools it has 
exercised across nearly all of Europe. Moscow has repeatedly 
assassinated critics in Ukraine.\4\ Today, Bulgaria is investigating 
four explosions at arms depots between 2011 and 2020 that were holding 
munitions intended for Georgia and Ukraine.\5\
    Russia's assertiveness has also been directed against NATO forces 
operating the Baltic Sea. U.S., Dutch, and British naval and air 
forces, among others, have been subject to harassment by Russian armed 
forces while operating in international waters or that of Ukraine.\6\
    Moscow's military build-up and assertiveness have transformed the 
Black Sea into a lake dominated by the Russian military. Over the 
course of its occupation of Crimea, Moscow has packed some 28,000 
troops on to the peninsula. It has deployed sophisticated radars, over 
100 combat aircraft--including strategic bombers, S-400 air defense 
systems, coastal defense batteries armed with sophisticated anti-ship 
missiles, and Kalibr cruise missiles.\7\ Russia has even deployed to 
the peninsula Iskander tactical ballistic missiles, which can be armed 
with nuclear warheads.
    Crimea extends deep into the Black Sea making it a strategic pivot 
point within the region. Russia's military deployments on the peninsula 
have transformed Crimea into the hub of an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/
AD) bubble that spans across much of the Black Sea and its coastlines. 
This provides a Russia a significant means for area surveillance, puts 
at risk aircraft and vessels operating in and over the surrounding sea, 
and threatens the populations and territories of NATO allies and 
partners.
    These actions by Russia not only violate the sovereignty of Black 
Sea states, they constitute a direct attack to the rules based 
international order that has been the basis of peace, freedom, and 
prosperity over the last seven decades in Europe and around the world.
           key elements of a comprehensive black sea strategy
    Last week, in the run-up to the October 21, 2021 meeting of NATO 
Defense Ministers, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited 
Georgia, Ukraine and Romania. The message of U.S. commitment and 
support he brought to these nations is much needed. And, hopefully, the 
visit is part of the Biden administration's development of a U.S. 
strategy to bring greater peace and stability to the Black Sea region.
    To be fully effective, a Black Sea security strategy will have to 
be comprehensive, leveraging the West's diplomatic, military, 
intelligence, cyber, information, economic and other capacities that 
span the breadth of geopolitical competition today. It must marshal the 
full spectrum of efforts necessary to strengthen deterrence and defense 
in the region, reinforce the economic and political resilience of our 
Allies and Partners there, and mobilize the capacities and commitment 
of Allies and Partners from beyond the region as well as key 
multilateral institutions, including NATO, the European Union, and the 
OSCE.
    The following addresses elements that should stand among the top 
objectives of such a Black Sea security strategy:
Strengthen Deterrence and Defense
    A key priority must be to strengthen the capacity of NATO to deter 
and defend against aggression in this region. Toward this end, the 
United States and NATO should aim to do the following:

    Enhance Regional Situational Awareness: The United States and the 
NATO Alliance have been surprised twice by significant Russian 
offensive actions: the 2008 invasion of Georgia; and, the 2014 invasion 
of Ukraine. Better fidelity is needed about the region's economic, 
political, and military developments--to accelerate what LTG Ben Hodges 
(U.S.A.-ret.) calls the West's ``speed of recognition'' in the Black 
Sea region. Russia's recent massing of its military forces in and 
around Ukraine increased the urgency of this requirement. The Alliance 
should establish a Black Sea Intelligence Fusion center akin to the 
NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples which focuses on threats 
and developments in the Middle East and Africa. An intelligence fusion 
center, based in Romania or Bulgaria, should focus on the full spectrum 
of threats confronting the Black Sea region, with an initial focus on 
Russian aggression.\8\

    Strengthen Allied and Partner Military Capabilities: NATO continues 
to be hampered by military capability shortfalls of its member states, 
particularly in the realms of air and missile defense, long range fires 
and intelligence platforms. Russia's offensive build-up in the Black 
Sea makes these capability gaps more ominous. Romania's acquisition of 
HIMARs long-range artillery and the PATRIOT air and missile defense 
system bring needed capabilities to the region. Nonetheless, these 
systems need to be complemented by and integrated with similar 
acquisitions by other European NATO allies.
    A second capacity-building priority should be to expand efforts to 
strengthen the armed forces of Georgia and Ukraine. Congress is to be 
commended for directing more resources to meet this requirement, but 
both nations still need additional lethal defense systems crucial to 
deterring further Russian military aggression, including anti-armor 
weapons, air defense systems, anti-ship missiles and unmanned aerial 
reconnaissance drones. Greater consideration is needed on how to assist 
their navies--as well as those of Bulgaria and Romania--to offset the 
significant naval advantage Russia now exercises in the Black Sea.

    Develop a More Robust Persistent Military Presence: NATO's Tailored 
Forward Presence (TFP) in the Black Sea region should be upgraded to an 
Enhanced Forward Presence, featuring land, coastal and naval elements. 
TFP's land element, a multinational brigade headquarters, should be 
expanded to include the deployment of NATO battalions to Romania and 
Bulgaria--as is the case in the Baltic states. These need to be 
reinforced by the deployment of Allied air and missile defense systems 
and anti-ship batteries to Romania and Bulgaria and by further 
increases in the deployment of Allied air and naval forces to the Black 
Sea region.
    This expanded NATO presence should be complemented by the 
deployment on a rotational or permanent basis of U.S. brigade combat 
team (BCT) to Bulgaria and/or Romania, (a decision that would return 
the number of U.S. BCTs to Europe to levels prior to President's 
Obama's mistaken reduction of U.S. forces deployed to Europe.)
    NATO's presence in Georgia and Ukraine should be increased through 
additional deployments of Allied air and ground units for exercises and 
training. The Alliance's Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC) in 
Georgia should be mirrored in Ukraine to both further assist the 
development of Ukraine's armed forces and to demonstrate Allied 
commitment to Ukraine's security.

    Launch a Major NATO Exercise in the Black Sea Region: Over the last 
several years, the United States has increased the tempo of military 
exercises across Europe. USAEUR is to be commended for launching its 
DEFENDER exercises designed to deploy a division size equivalent of 
force from the U.S. to Europe. DEFENDER 2022 spanned the Balkans and 
Black Sea region with distributed exercises that tested the operational 
and logistical capacities of NATO forces.
    With that said, it is time for NATO to increase the magnitude of 
its exercises in the Black Sea region. NATO's largest exercise series, 
TRIDENT JUNCTURE was hosted by Portugal and Spain in 2015 and by Norway 
in 2018. In the latter, the Alliance deployed 50,000 military personnel 
along with 250 aircraft and 65 ships. The next Iteration of TRIDENT 
JUNCTURE or a land-centric version of it should take place in an area 
of immediate concern, such as the Black Sea region.

    Place Georgia and Ukraine on a Clear Path to NATO Membership: NATO 
enlargement has been one of the great success stories of post-Cold War 
Europe. The extension of Alliance membership to the democracies of 
Central Europe expanded and reinforced the zone of peace and security 
in Europe and strengthened the Alliance's military capability. The 
newest members of the Alliance have been among Europe's most stalwart 
Transatlanticists and most willing to contribute to U.S.-led 
operations, including those beyond Europe.
    That success is in stark contrast to the Alliance's hesitancy to 
grant the requests of Ukraine and Georgia for membership--even as these 
countries have courageously contributed to NATO operations around the 
world. That hesitancy has relegated Georgia and Ukraine to a 
destabilizing grey zone of insecurity in Europe's strategic landscape.
    While Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are clearly frontline states 
facing military, economic, informational, and other forms of pressure 
from Russia, their security and the stability of the Baltic region is 
stronger than that of the Black Sea region. The Russian invasions of 
Georgia and Ukraine testify to this in stark terms. The failure of NATO 
to integrate these two nations as full members has only encouraged 
President Putin to act on his desire to resubordinate them under 
Moscow's control.
    NATO's reluctance to fully embrace the transatlantic aspirations of 
Ukraine and Georgia has transformed the Alliance's Open-Door policy 
into a destabilizing bromide. An effective Black Sea strategy has to 
provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear and unambiguous path to NATO 
membership.
Counter Hybrid-Warfare--The Information Domain
    An increasingly assertive element of Putin's campaign of disruption 
against the West has been its dissemination abroad of false and 
divisive information. His objective--and that of other adversaries 
distorting the truth--is to manipulate public perceptions to foment 
political tension, if not social and political unrest. Nowhere has this 
been more intense than in the Black Sea region. While the West has 
become more aware and better equipped to expose and counter 
disinformation efforts, the transatlantic community remains very much 
on the defensive.
    The United States essentially unilaterally disarmed itself in the 
information realm in 1999 when Washington shut down the United States 
Information Agency. This multi-billion-dollar agency and its staff of 
over 10,000 professionals was dedicated to the mission of public 
diplomacy. It was established ``to understand, inform, and influence 
foreign publics in the promotion of the national interest'' and to 
``streamline the U.S. Government's overseas information programs and 
make them more effective.'' USIA was our frontline sentinel on the 
information front during the Cold War and a critical element in our 
victory in that era. After USIA closed its doors, its founding purpose 
has only become more important and more complex as evidenced by current 
events.
    Congress should consider recreating a modernized version of USIA so 
that the United States can return to the offense in this increasingly 
dynamic and fast paced dimension of international affairs. Succeeding 
in this realm is critical to reinforcing the resilience of our 
alliances and partnerships, including those in the Black Sea region. It 
can and should play an important role in our efforts to shape the 
internal political dynamics of our adversaries--leveraging the power of 
public engagement, democratic principles, and truth to undercut the 
authority of authoritarian regimes and to give hope, motivation and 
support to those yearning and struggling for freedom.
Strengthen Regional Economic Resilience--The Three Seas Initiative
    A key element of hybrid warfare is the exercise of economic power, 
and as previously noted the last two decades are replete with examples 
of Russian energy and trade embargoes and other forms of economic 
leverage used to weaken or destabilize U.S. allies and partners, 
including those in the Black Sea region.
    An effective Black Sea security strategy must include initiatives 
to strengthen the economic resilience of this region, including those 
that will further integrate the region's economies with that of Western 
Europe.
    The EU member states of Central Europe, including Romania and 
Bulgaria, fully recognize this requirement and toward that end launched 
the Three Seas Initiative, an effort to accelerate the development of 
cross border energy, transport, and digital infrastructure in the 
region between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas.
    This Central European launched and led initiative is all about: 
leveraging the power of infrastructure to promote economic growth; 
strengthening the region's economic resilience--including its energy 
security through diversification of energy supplies; and, completing 
the vision of undivided Europe through the infrastructural integration 
of the Three Seas nations, their Central and Eastern European 
neighbors, and Western Europe.
    The institutional core of the Three Seas is the Three Seas 
Initiative Investment Fund, a new, innovative public-private 
partnership launched to leverage the power of the market to catalyze 
regional infrastructure development. Three Seas states have invested 
their own finances into this commercially managed fund--whose 
investments are driven by the commercial goal of securing the highest 
rate of return.
    By adhering to purely market principles and by being free from 
political interference, this fund serves as a spotlight on the economic 
opportunity present across the region. It serves as a beacon to the 
trillion dollars of foreign direct investment (FDI) circulating the 
globe seeking the long term, profitable returns offered by 
infrastructure.
    (I believe this ground-breaking fund creates a model for 
infrastructure development that can and should be applied to other 
regions around the world.)
    The Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations each robustly endorsed 
the Three Seas Initiative as has the United States Congress--including 
members of this Senate Committee. In February 2020, the United States 
Government announced that it would invest up to $1 Billion in Three 
Seas energy projects.
    In October of that year at the Three Seas Summit in Tallinn, 
Estonia, the USG announced it use $300 million of that billion to make 
an equity investment in the Three Seas fund. These announcements, which 
triggered bipartisan endorsements from Capitol Hill, not surprisingly, 
generated significant additional momentum to the Three Seas Initiative.
    However, the time is long overdue for the USG to deliver on its 
commitments. They remain unfulfilled a year after the Tallinn Summit 
and consequently are at risk of becoming a drag on the initiative, one 
that raises questions in capital market as to why the U.S. is not 
executing its promised investments.
    The Three Seas is an initiative that merits and needs additional 
Congressional leadership.
    First, allow me to urge the U.S. Congress to use its authorities to 
direct the United States Government to execute its pledge to make an 
equity investment into the Three Seas Fund.
    The execution of that investment commitment would eliminate any 
doubt of U.S. commitment to the Three Seas. It would encourage other 
democratic states, such as Germany, France, and the UK, to mirror that 
investment. Above all, it would significantly boost the Initiative's 
ability to attract and leverage the power of private capital to drive 
forward infrastructure development across Central and Eastern Europe--
thereby increasing the region's prosperity and strengthening its 
security.
    Second, Congress should expand the authorities of the USG to invest 
in the Three Seas. In 2019, Congress provided the United States 
Government the ability to invest in Three Seas energy projects through 
the enactment of the European Energy Security and Diversification Act--
legislation that was introduced by members of this committee to provide 
for the first time the ability for the USG to help finance strategic 
energy projects in Europe.
    Congress should complement that important legislation with a 
digital counterpart, the Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act, 
which has been introduced to provide similar authorities to the USG to 
invest and catalyze the development of modern secure telecommunications 
infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea 
region.
    Secure and robust telecommunications networks are a significant a 
driver of economic growth and are essential to economic resilience. The 
United States has a significant security and economic interest in 
having our allies and partners in the Black Sea region linked into 
trusted telecommunications networks.
    Finally, an effective Black Sea security strategy must feature 
efforts not only to deter Russian aggression but also to engage Russia 
where constructive cooperation is possible. One area of need and mutual 
benefit to pursue is arms control and confidence building measures that 
would enhance the military stability not just in the Black Sea but also 
across the entirety of NATO's geographic engagement with Russia.

    To be effective, a U.S. strategy to enhance Black Sea security must 
be comprehensive, integrating the full spectrum of geopolitical 
competition that defines today's world--including, among others, their 
military, informational, economic and diplomatic dimensions. It will 
have greatest prospects of success when it is able to marshal the 
engagement of European allies and partners from beyond the Black Sea, 
as well as NATO and the European Union.
    Requirements for success include: deeper awareness of the region's 
dynamics and developments; political initiative and commitment; 
skillful diplomacy--not just among allies and partners, but also toward 
Russia; and, real economic and military investment.
    Much is at stake in the Black Sea region: the security of Allies 
and Partners whose soldiers have stood shoulder to shoulder with U.S. 
soldiers around the world; how the region will shape Russia's prospects 
for a post-imperial transformation; and, the future of the 
international rules based order--which today in the Black Sea region is 
under sustained attack.

----------------
Notes

    \1\ Coffey, Luke. ``The Black Sea should be a US and NATO 
Priority.'' Middle East Institute. 6 February 2020. https://
www.mei.edu/publications/black-sea-should-be-us-and-nato-priority
    \2\ ``Death Toll Up to 13,000 in Ukraine Conflict, Says UN Rights 
Office,'' Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 February 2019. https://
www.rferl.org/a/death-toll-up-to-13-000-in-ukraine-conflict-says-un-
rights-office/29791647.html
    \3\ Global Conflict Tracker, Council on Foreign Relations, Updated 
22 October 2021. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/
conflict-ukraine
    \4\ Schwirtz, Michael, ``Russia Ordered a Killing That Made No 
Sense Then the Assassin Started Talking,'' The New York Times, 31 March 
2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/world/europe/russian-
assassinations-putin-ukraine.html
    \5\ ``How GRU Sabotage and Assassination Operations in Czechia and 
Bulgaria Sought to Undermine Ukraine,'' Bellingcat. 26 April 2021. 
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2021/04/26/how-gru-
sabotage-and-assassination-operations-in-czechia-and-bulgaria-sought-
to-undermine-ukraine/ and Dzhambazova, Boryana and Schwirtz, Michael 
``Russian Spy Unit Investigated for Links to Bulgarian Explosions'' The 
New York Times, 31 March 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/31/
world/europe/russian-assassinations-putin-ukraine.html
    \6\ Amiel, Sandrine, ``What is behind recent confrontations between 
Russia and the West in the Black Sea?'' Euronews, 7 July 2021. https://
www.euronews.com/2021/07/07/what-is-behind-recent-confrontations-
between-russia-and-the-west-in-the-black-sea
    \7\ For an excellent overview of the naval balance of power in the 
Black Sea has shifted to Russia's favor, see Petersen, Michael, ``The 
Naval Power Shift in the Black Sea,'' War on the Rocks, 9 January 2019. 
https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/the-naval-power-shift-in-the-black-
sea/
    \8\ Such a center could build upon or complement Bulgaria's 
Maritime Coordination Center in Varna and Romania's Euro-Atlantic 
Center for Resilience, both of which are linked to the Alliance.

    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much to each of you. I 
think Senator Johnson will go vote and when he returns, I will 
then go vote.
    Let me begin with a question to each of you, actually, 
because I was interested that none of you really talked very 
much about the differences between the Black Sea countries 
themselves over how they view their future.
    How much of the challenges that we are facing now is a 
function of lack of unity among those Black Sea countries? 
Obviously, Turkey is one exception because you mentioned 
Turkey. How much is it a failing policy among NATO and Western 
allies? Based on that, do we think Russia is succeeding in the 
Black Sea region?
    I guess I would ask each of you if you would respond to 
that.
    Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator.
    I think that is a great place to start our discussion, and 
I will say that it is probably all the above in terms of what 
you said.
    Each of those nations that are around the Black Sea--their 
culture, their history, their traditions--shape their relations 
with one another, and as we have tried to put together a 
regional approach to dealing with Russia we run into those 
relationships.
    Historically, Bulgaria and Turkey have had trouble with one 
another. Politically, in Sofia, in Bulgaria, the Government has 
traditionally leaned towards their old relationship with 
Russia, particularly in the intelligence communities.
    So it is a bit more of a tender feeling towards Moscow than 
you would find next door in Romania. Romania, instead has been 
one of the first of all the partners when it was a member of 
PFP and then, as an ally, they were always the first in line to 
take on NATO initiatives or take on NATO missions.
    You have the opposite there. Of course, Georgia and 
Ukraine, I think my colleagues laid out very well the problems 
that they have now being partially occupied by the Russians and 
not knowing what their future looks like, whether it is with 
the European Union or with NATO.
    NATO has had trouble dealing with this. They are used to 
dealing with Western Europe, with the older allies, or with the 
Nordic nations where there is more of a collective view on what 
needs to be done in terms of Europe.
    It is easier to work in those regions than in the Black Sea 
region where you are running into these historic problems, and 
just trying to get Bulgaria and Romania to work together on a 
specific initiative such as a naval group, I found that to be 
very difficult to do because of the different politics.
    It is a hard task, because it is as hard as it is I think 
NATO and maybe the U.S. shies away a bit from it because it is 
just very difficult to pull off.
    Senator Shaheen. Dr. Polyakova, do you want to add to that?
    Dr. Polyakova. Yes. Is mic on? Okay, there we go.
    I agree with everything that Jim just laid out but I would 
add to that the reality--I will take a step back. There is a 
huge complexity of alliances in the region. There is no 
question about that. We know some of the problems involved with 
different perspectives on the Black Sea, but all the countries 
to a certain extent are united in their fear of Russian 
militarization of the region and that includes Turkey and that 
includes the rest of the allies as well.
    I think this is where U.S. leadership really matters. 
Before we start to think about specific projects or work we 
want to do across the region, we need to establish a shared 
vision for what security actually means and an understanding of 
a division of labor that will spread both responsibility, 
whether it comes to countering information operations or being 
the military heavyweight in the region, which, of course, is 
Turkey, and spreads liability across the region.
    I think this is something Turkey might actually welcome 
because they are often the target of Russian aggression when 
the relationship between Erdogan and Putin is not going so 
well.
    I think there are many opportunities for us to undermine 
what Russia sees as its main advantage, which is a divided 
region, but it is divided because there has not been a single 
leading voice to try to bring everyone to the same table and I 
think this is exactly where the United States has to start.
    Senator Shaheen. Mr. Brzezinski, do you agree with that?
    Mr. Brzezinski. I think my colleagues are spot on. The only 
thing I would add is that there is actually more of an 
opportunity now to drive forward a coordinated regional 
response to the challenges of the Black Sea and that is because 
Russian aggression in Ukraine and the continued use of force 
there, including, in the sea of Kerch and the Black Sea, 
Russia's mobilization of a significant amount of offensive 
capability in the region, has helped to unify Allied 
perspectives in the Black Sea.
    I see this in Bulgaria and Romania. There is greater 
consistency in the view of Russia and the challenge it poses to 
Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine. When you have that 
kind of consensus in five of the six countries there, it makes 
it a little bit easier to work with Turkey and to bring Turkey 
on board a more common approach by the region.
    When you have that, you can be more effective in bringing 
our West European allies and partners into that game.
    I recognize the historic difficulties. They are real. They 
still persist today, but the opportunity for an effective 
strategy, I think, now is before us and all it needs is some 
strong American leadership.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mr. Brzezinski, you indicated that you thought there should 
be a path to NATO membership, potentially, for Ukraine, 
Georgia. There have been some that have argued that putting 
such a path in place would give Russia the excuse they want to 
incur even more aggressively militarily in their territory.
    Is that something that you or Mr. Townsend or others are 
concerned about, that somehow this kind of discussion gives 
Russia the excuse they want to take further military action?
    Mr. Brzezinski. I think it is, Senator Romney. I think it 
is a concern we should watch, but it is a manageable concern, 
because if you look at the balance of power between the West 
and Russia, it is overwhelming in the West's favor, and if the 
West can be put on a track, a determined track, to bring these 
two countries aboard as they wish, back it with the political, 
military, and economic muscle that comes--that NATO brings to 
the table, I think we are in a position to drive forward that 
integration while at the same time deterring Russian 
aggression.
    The problem is in the past is that we have communicated a 
hesitant approach, a divided approach. I am not saying that 
such an approach has to yield membership immediately. It is 
going to require a real committed diplomatic effort on the part 
of the United States to bring our West--particularly, some of 
our West European allies on board and that will not happen 
without American leadership, but the capacity is there for this 
to actually occur and to complete the vision of an undivided 
Europe.
    Senator Romney. Dr. Polyakova or Mr. Townsend, do you 
agree?
    Dr. Polyakova. I agree with everything Ian just said. I 
would also add that we cannot forget the EU integration piece 
of this. EU integration and accession for Central Eastern 
Europe has been the core driver of reforms in the judicial 
sector, in the civil society sector, and in defense sector in 
all of these countries.
    It is one reason why countries like Ukraine, Moldova, and 
Georgia have these so-called frozen conflicts or gray zones on 
their borders because Russia wants to prevent them from joining 
the EU as well as NATO. It is not just about NATO.
    To your direct question, I find that we spend a lot of time 
worrying about what the Kremlin might do, and we do not spend 
enough time thinking about what we should do. I think it is 
high time that we take an approach and a strategic view of the 
region, first, that will serve our national security interests, 
that will serve the broader regional national security 
interest, rather than thinking about what might the Russians do 
to react.
    I think it is a manageable problem on the Russia side, as 
Ian correctly said, but I think this is where we need to just 
switch how we are thinking about the problem.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Townsend.
    Mr. Townsend. I would agree with my colleagues as well and, 
Senator, I would also agree with you too in terms of how 
delicate and difficult this can be and has been with Russia, 
but because of that, we allow those fears to hobble our 
approach in the region. We allow our fears to dictate what we 
do, as my colleagues have pointed out, and I think a path to 
membership can be managed in such a way that it does not set 
off an immediate conflict with Russia.
    I think such a path includes just beginning with the 
Membership Action Plan, which begins to put these two 
candidates into a process where we begin to look at their 
capabilities. It is not that we have not done this already, but 
it is part of this path that Ian talked about and I think that 
would be a logical first step.
    It should not be something that would light a fuse. It is 
something that we can manage and I think we need to seriously 
consider beginning with a Membership Action Plan.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. Very difficult question, I 
think, for any of us to respond to, but that is trying to 
understand what is going on or what was going on in Turkey's 
mind, how it was that they decided to go ahead and buy the S-
400, what their plans are as it relates to their relationship 
with Russia and with NATO.
    Did they underestimate the response that would come from 
NATO, the fact that we have withdrawn production elements from 
the F-35 as a result of their decision? Did they just 
miscalculate or do they have a different objective in mind that 
we have not fully understood?
    This is sort of for any one of you to respond to, but I 
must admit that I find Turkey's actions to be hard to 
understand and explain.
    Mr. Brzezinski. Senator Romney, if I could just add another 
point on NATO enlargement. If you look at the history of the 
debate on extension of NATO membership to the Baltics, the same 
arguments were made that are made today about the risk of 
Russia launching a military response to a Membership Action 
Plan for Ukraine. We have been through that debate before.
    Regarding Turkey, which is a much more complex question, 
when ask myself why is Erdogan doing this--and I emphasize the 
word President Erdogan. It is really not Turkey. It is one 
individual. From his point of view--and I am not justifying 
it--his relationship with the United States has not been ideal.
    From his point of view, he has had to endure the 
consequences of the U.S. invasion in Iraq, and instability--and 
the consequences and instability of that region--the refugees 
that were driven in his country by that, by U.S.' Syria policy. 
He associates a nearly successful assassination attempt against 
him, to Turkish officers that were trained in the United 
States.
    There are many reasons, from his perspective, that 
relationship with the United States has not been ideal. I am 
not justifying his perspective. You are asking why is he doing 
what he is doing.
    These and other events broke his trust with the United 
States and pushed him onto a vector where he is trying to find 
this middle way between East and West, between the great 
powers, between Europe and the Middle East, between Russia and 
the United States.
    That is why he continues to sustain NATO's role in--
Turkey's role in NATO, serving as the host for NATO 
headquarters, contributing to NATO missions, but at the same 
time is dangerously flirting with Putin as a means that keep 
his independence and perhaps a check on the West, which he no 
longer trusts as much.
    It is a dangerous flirtation, and this S-400 is extremely 
significant because he is, basically, not just buying a system 
but he is integrating into the core of the armed forces--the 
Turkish armed forces--Russian intelligence, and that is going 
to take him a long time--it is going to take Turkey a long time 
to shake out.
    That is not a very clear answer to your question, but this 
is an individual leader who has had personal challenges with 
the West, trying to find a middle way. Unfortunately, he has 
turned to an authoritarian bent and is flirting with dangerous 
adversaries of ours. My sense is it will take a generation for 
us to get beyond this. We will not be able to normalize our 
relationship with Turkey until we enter the post-Erdogan era.
    Senator Romney. Thank you. I have taken more than my 
allotted time, but if the chairman would allow the other 
members to comment if they would like we would appreciate that.
    Dr. Polyakova. Thank you. If it is okay to say a couple of 
words, I think this is the key question for understanding U.S. 
engagement in the broader region. Turkey is, of course, the key 
military power that is a NATO ally besides Russia, and in many 
ways Russia and Turkey split the region as a sort of 
condominium of--in the military domain.
    I think the Turkey-Russia relationship is primarily about 
Erdogan and Putin. There is a deep personal relationship there, 
maybe even a friendship--certainly, they project it that way 
and they present it that way--and I do not think that is a 
relationship between these two men that we are ever going to 
break.
    I think that being said, Russia has a huge amount of 
leverage over Turkey. Russia's positions in Syria could turn up 
another refugee wave, a migrant wave, into Turkey. They are 
absolutely terrified of that.
    Russia consistently uses tourism. Russian tourists make up 
the largest part of the foreign tourist industry in Turkey, and 
we have seen elements and time and again where the Turks, or I 
should say, Erdogan does something and then all of a sudden, 
Russian tourists cannot go to Turkey anymore. This really hurts 
and it hurts Erdogan domestically, and I think at the end of 
the day, this is about domestic politics.
    So I think there is a desire from Erdogan to constantly 
balance against Putin by using the West and aggravating the 
West by pursuing these kinds of somewhat nonsensical 
engagements and purchases of these kinds of military 
capabilities.
    I think we should watch very, very closely whether the 
Turks will actually use the S-400s. I think they are going to 
remain unused and relatively dormant to preserve the NATO 
relationship and to not ruin even further the relationship with 
the United States, but I think Russia has a huge amount of 
leverage over Turkey and that personal relationship with 
Erdogan and Putin is not going to go anywhere while Erdogan or 
Putin are both in power.
    Mr. Townsend. Senator, I would only add that I worked 
deeply with Turkey over the past 10 years or so, and the 
conclusion I drew with the S-400s is that it really began with 
the bargaining over the sale of a Patriot missile system to 
Turkey.
    That has been in the works for years. It began to frustrate 
Erdogan greatly that he was not getting from the United States 
the price and the technology transfer that he wanted, and he 
began to throw something new into what has been a routine, 
although long-standing negotiation over the sale. He threw into 
that the point that he has options.
    He wanted the United States to know that he has got other 
options besides the Patriot system. The first example of that 
was he was going to buy a Chinese system, and for about a year 
there was this talk coming out of Ankara that there was going 
to be a Chinese system.
    Then he said, well, I am still not happy with where the 
United States is. I am not going to buy China. I am going to go 
talk to the Russians. This time, he took it further. Because 
the DoD was not moving on the various elements that he was 
unhappy with the Patriot, he went ahead and bought the S-400 
system and by doing that he bought into this relationship with 
Putin.
    It is not a relationship that is based on love or 
friendship or interest. It is really based on these two 
autocrats using one another to take forward--whether it is 
regional or vis-a-vis the United States to take forward their 
own agendas working with one another on this.
    If you see where the Russians and the Turks are in Libya in 
terms of the problems there or in Azerbaijan or in other 
regional issues in the area, usually the Russians are on one 
side and the Turks are on the other side.
    This relationship is one based primarily on those two 
personalities and how they use one another to signal or to try 
to get leverage over the United States, particularly. So we 
have just got to break that vortex because at the end of the 
day we need to return to that close relationship with Turkey.
    We do need them and they need us as well. They do not need 
Russia to be their friend. It is the United States, and the 
bulk of the civil service and the diplomatic service and the 
military, those left after the purges, I think they know that, 
but they are keeping their heads down and we will have to wait 
the departure of Erdogan, I think, before we can get a 
semblance of normalcy between the United States and Turkey.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I think that is you, Chris.
    Senator Murphy. I think it is Senator Johnson. You want me 
to go?
    Thank you, Senator Johnson. Thank you all for being here. 
You all have done so much to help this committee and, in 
particular, this subcommittee over the course of the last 
decade. Grateful to have you both before us. I am going to try 
to fit in a question for each of you.
    Mr. Townsend, I wanted to talk to you about Russia's end 
goals. One of them is to try to create fissures inside the EU, 
but another is to try to create fissures between the EU, 
Europe, and the United States.
    I think we have to have our eyes wide open as to the ways 
in which they use both their official means of communication, 
but also their surrogates and their propaganda channels, both 
inside Europe and inside the United States, to try to break us 
from each other. I think about what is happening in Romania and 
Bulgaria today, as an example.
    Can you just give us an example or two of the ways in which 
Russia is trying to split the United States from Europe and 
make sure that this committee is going into some of these 
questions about the future of U.S.-European cooperation fully 
cognizant of what Russia's motives are here?
    Mr. Townsend. I think one of the top priorities for Moscow 
as they look at trying to drive a wedge is to portray to the 
Allies, particularly Central and Eastern European allies, that 
the United States cannot be trusted, that at the end of the 
day, they will take problems such as Nord Stream 2 or Kabul, 
just those two, or our politics over the past number of years 
and they turn that around and they portray that in Europe and 
they portray that to those nations that are afraid that the 
United States that they thought they knew in terms of being a 
trusted ally that would be there when it counts, to cast doubts 
on that, to tell the Central and East Europeans that, look, you 
put so much faith in United States. Look what they have done in 
Kabul. You cannot trust the Americans.
    Or they might go to the French and say, you cannot trust 
the Americans and NATO. The EU and the Europeans should 
establish their own military capability. They should go off on 
their own. NATO's time is in the past. NATO's great champion, 
the United States, is no longer interested in Europe. France, 
you should pull together a coalition of European members and 
set up a European army and you should--it is this kind of thing 
more than anything else that gets the press in Europe or gets 
the think tanks in Europe or those that shape opinion, 
politicians, to begin to feel that they need to hedge against 
the United States, that they do not know where the United 
States is going. Therefore, we need to be doing things as 
Europeans to look out for that time when the United States 
might be distracted and doing things in the Pacific instead.
    That is one of the major tools that they use to drive that 
wedge is to insert into the European mind that the United 
States is not what it used to be. The United States cannot be 
trusted to come. There has got to be other alternatives, and 
we, Russia, have some great ideas to have a Europe without the 
United States that would be better than a Europe with the 
United States.
    Senator Murphy. We need to be positioned in order to 
counteract that narrative and that is why it is so egregious 
that we do not have ambassadors and that we have had a log jam 
here in Congress trying to get our diplomatic team deployed to 
Europe.
    For instance, right now, one of the leaders who is being 
held up in the Senate is the Assistant Secretary for Europe, 
the person who would coordinate pushback on this narrative, but 
another way that we can pushback on this narrative is by 
funding independent objective media sources.
    Ms. Polyakova, you have done a lot of work on this topic. 
You talk about it in your written testimony. The idea that we 
are spending the same amount of money on our entire anti-
propaganda budget housed at the Global Engagement Center as we 
do on one single littoral combat ship seems to be a gross 
misallocation of resources today.
    Can you talk a little bit about whether we are allocating 
enough resources in and around the Black Sea region, in 
particular, to try to combat against Russian narratives in ways 
that we support objective media sources, fact checkers, 
throughout the region?
    Dr. Polyakova. Thank you, Senator, and I know you are very 
familiar with the region and have visited the region quite 
often so you know some of these issues quite well. Thank you 
for your question.
    Just a couple of thoughts there. The answer to your 
question as to whether we are spending enough resources 
commensurate with the level of the threat, I think the answer 
is very clear, no, and that has been the case for, 
unfortunately, a very long time.
    I think we need to not think about counter disinformation 
or counter propaganda efforts separate from supporting 
independent media. These are one and the same, and we have to 
understand that this is a long-term game.
    We, obviously, have issues around disinformation in our own 
country. We know this is not easy, but certainly, the countries 
of the Black Sea, most notably Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, 
have been battling this for a long time. I think, 
unfortunately, what I have seen in the last couple of months--
and I was in Ukraine just in September--is what Jim just 
outlined about Russian messaging about the lack of U.S. 
reliability, the lack of U.S. leadership, the lack of U.S. just 
care and involvement in the region, and the lack of our 
capability to act has been very effective.
    These are the pictures from Afghanistan, the chaos that 
ensued as part of the withdrawal, was all over Russian media. 
Again, this was propaganda, but these were real photos.
    I want to be clear about how well the Russians are using 
U.S. foreign policy to drive our Central and East European 
allies away from United States as well as to help mobilize 
these conversations around strategic autonomy, which are very, 
very dangerous, in my view, because it serves the Russian 
interests and the Chinese interests.
    To be clear, I think the Global Engagement Center is a good 
initiative, but it seems like we have done that and then we 
thought, that is it. We are done. We solved the problem; and 
we, certainly, have not. If anything it has gotten far, far 
worse and we need to do a great deal more to invest in the 
region and to really rethink how we do democracy support, 
independent media support.
    I think our system--it is a different hearing, I think--but 
our system is--it feels very broken right now in terms of how 
we invest in some of these independent efforts in the media 
sphere in these countries.
    Senator Murphy. I thank you for that. I am over my time. I 
will submit an additional question to the record for you.

[Editor's note.--Senator Murphy chose not to submit the 
question for the record.]

    Mr. Brzezinski, I want to thank you for your support and 
advocacy for the Three Seas Fund. I know the Administration is 
reviewing its participation in that program. This is one of the 
mechanisms by which we build energy independence throughout the 
region.
    I think it is absolutely critical. I am arguing that the 
Administration double-down on our involvement and I appreciate 
your work on that topic.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
    Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair. There is without a 
doubt that Russia uses its propaganda arm, its media outlets, 
to do as much as possible to destabilize these nations, but as 
Ms. Polyakova just talked about, the reality is something we 
need to deal with as well. I just want to ask all three of you, 
because I am assuming you are talking to players in the region 
all the time, what is the current perception of the U.S.?
    I mean, set Russian propaganda and misinformation aside. 
What is the perception of what the reality is in terms of 
American strength, American commitment?
    I will start with you, Mr. Townsend.
    Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. That is an excellent 
question. We do talk to them all the time. It is constant. I 
feel like I am back in my old job in the Pentagon, we see them 
so often.
    I would say that they are nervous about where we are going 
in terms of a nation. They watch our politics as well. They 
read the Washington Post. So there is an unease there where 
they do not quite know where we are going.
    They like the tone of the Biden administration. They like a 
lot of the rhetoric coming out of the Biden administration. 
From what I hear, they are waiting for some of the detail. They 
are waiting for some of the programs, what things will look 
like.
    I think not having ambassadors has had quite an impact. We 
have all been around Washington for many, many years and we 
know the issue, but I think this time it is a bit different. It 
has gone on for so long it is adding to this anxiousness that 
they have, and it is hard for them to--back in their capitals 
to talk about the United States from their embassies here in 
Washington through cables and this type of thing and to give 
their governments a good view of just where the United States 
is right now, where is Washington right now, if there is not an 
ambassador and a country team that can supplement that.
    It is definitely a problem. It is still early days for them 
as they are looking at where the United States is going. 
Finally, just my last point, I think they are also uneasy that 
it has taken so long for them to develop a picture of where the 
Administration is. As the team--the Administration's team is 
still coming into place, the voice that they hear is not as 
unified as they are used to.
    Senator Johnson. I am all for appointing ambassadors. I 
think in your answer you are overlooking what is the impact of 
capitulation on Nord Stream 2? What is the impact of the 
embarrassing, I would argue, dangerous surrender in 
Afghanistan?
    What is the impact of not funding the Defense Department so 
that we maintain a strength where America's percentage of GDP 
spent on defense just continues to decline? What is the impact 
of that?
    I will go to you, Ms. Polyakova.
    Dr. Polyakova. Unfortunately, I think the perception, 
especially in Europe's East, is that our partners and allies 
there can no longer rely on the United States for a consistent 
foreign policy.
    I would say this is not just the last months of this 
Administration. This is a view that has been developing over 
time, and what our allies are looking for is consistency. We 
did, basically, a yo-yo on Nord Stream 2 in this country from 
the last Administration to this one.
    It was very confusing and we are seeing some of the effects 
of that now. Moldova is being held hostage, basically, by the 
Kremlin and so is most of Europe in terms of gas supplies, and 
the Russians have gotten very brazen because they know they can 
just roam now because the deal has been made.
    That is the perception, and I do think that what happened 
with the AUKUS decision and how that was communicated--again, 
this is not about whether this is the right policy or the wrong 
policy. Same with Afghanistan. It is about how it was perceived 
in the region. Again, I think what it is fueling, particularly 
in Western Europe, is a desire to decouple from the United 
States. It is an illusion that Europe can do that, of course, 
but it is fueling that kind of perception. It is fueling that 
debate, as we speak.
    Senator Johnson. Mr. Brzezinski, if you could please answer 
that.
    Mr. Brzezinski. I think the Central Europeans, including 
the region--Central Europeans in the Black Sea region are 
beginning to question their relationship with the United 
States.
    They embraced Biden's election. They liked his outreach to 
Europe, but they, as my colleagues have mentioned, had been a 
little bit stunned by the U.S. decision in Afghanistan, both in 
terms of the rationale for it and the abandonment of America 
commitments it had made and, particularly, commitments to human 
rights, for example, in Afghanistan, commitment to security. 
They were upset over the lack of consultation and the execution 
of that decision. That struck a blow at the confidence in 
United States.
    I think they are concerned, and this is something that I 
hear consistently in discussions with Central European 
colleagues, that there is a focus in Washington on China that 
could be distracting the United States away from the challenges 
posed by Russia.
    That is a criticism directed both at the Administration and 
to Capitol Hill. Nord Stream 2 almost universally across 
Central Europe was a decision that was not well appreciated. 
They thought it was a mistake because it is going to increase, 
particularly, Western Europe's dependence on Russian gas, and 
they are watching very closely how United States is going to 
respond with Germany to the Nord Stream 2.
    Russia is turning off the taps of gas to Europe today, and 
Moldova is in a crisis right now because of that cut off. 
Central Europeans are waiting to see what the United States and 
Germany are going to do to respond to that as was promised 
under the NS 2 agreement between Washington and Berlin.
    They are all watching very closely for the release of 
upcoming policy reviews from the Administration, particularly 
the Global Force Posture Review, the Russia review, and 
probably, of course, also whenever there will be the rollout of 
a Black Sea security strategy. It is not a crisis, but there is 
growing concern.
    Senator Johnson. Again, I am all for getting ambassadors in 
place, but ambassadors will not have enough lipstick to put on 
all those pigs.
    Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I 
thank all of you for your testimony.
    Dr. Polyakova, you say in your written statement that, 
``Black Sea states as a whole must do more to improve 
resilience of institutions, that unstable democratic 
institutions and processes within these states expose the 
region to the Kremlin's influence operations in the 
informational cyber demands, and that every Black Sea state can 
and should do more on democratic reforms, anti-corruption, and 
judicial independence.''
    Can you briefly describe where you think the biggest 
hotspots are in this issue? I agree with your assessment that 
to the extent you have weaker institutions you have countries 
that are more vulnerable to pressure from the Kremlin. Where do 
you see the biggest hotspots to be right now?
    Dr. Polyakova. Thank you for that question, Senator. It is 
such a critical issue for us to be discussing as we think about 
a longer-term strategy, not a short-term strategy. The 
hotspots, to my mind, are exactly in the countries that are not 
part of NATO, that are not part of the EU.
    As I mentioned earlier, EU integration and NATO integration 
have mobilized reforms and have forced countries that would 
have reformed much, much slower, perhaps not at all, to really 
establish proper democratic institutions: a independent 
judiciary, checks and balances, support of independent media, 
and have a proper parliamentary debate and that can curb and 
put a check on executive power.
    In countries like Ukraine, while, certainly, Ukraine in 
terms of reforms has done a great deal, and we have to be very 
patient because these countries are new democracies and 
Ukraine, of course, has only, you could say, broken free of the 
yoke of Russia in just 2014 in terms of the Government being 
not under the thumb of the Kremlin anymore.
    Still, progress has been slow, but I think our strategy to 
tie financial support--not military support, financial support 
and loans through the IMF and other international institutions 
to make that conditional, and very specific reforms in 
judiciary is working. We need to keep up that pressure. We need 
to be very explicit about that conditionality.
    I think Moldova today is a bright spot. I know it is a 
small country and it is hard to focus on small countries, but 
we just had a democratic election there and we have a real 
anti-corruption activist, President Maia Sandu, in charge, and 
we have to support Moldova and make sure it remains a bright 
spot.
    Georgia, unfortunately, I think, has seen some setbacks in 
recent months on democracy. Again, to my mind, we are not in a 
place where we can abandon any ally or any democracy at this 
point. We have to help them succeed. We have to help them 
reform.
    If I had to choose one specific area for all these 
countries it is the judiciary. This is the key. It is also 
often the top line of attack when it comes to anti-democratic 
efforts to undermine independence and undermine proper 
democratic process.
    Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I do want to press 
you a little bit on the statement that it is our non-NATO 
allies that are particularly weak when it comes to these 
institutions.
    I think we see significant erosion of many of these 
democratic institutions and independent judiciary in certain 
NATO countries as well.
    Let me ask you about Turkey. As you know, President Erdogan 
just threatened to declare the U.S. Ambassador and others 
persona non grata because they sent a letter asking for the 
release of Osman Kavala, who is somebody, as you know, that the 
Council of Justice in Europe has found unjustly detained.
    Erdogan is also talking about dismantling one of the 
largest political parties in Turkey, the HDP. I would be 
interested in how you and other panelists sort of judge this 
clear trend in Turkey under President Erdogan away from 
independent democratic institutions, threatening to lock up and 
render illegal these political parties.
    Dr. Polyakova. Thank you, Senator. I can start and then ask 
my colleagues to chime in on this very complex question of 
Turkey, which we knew we would be talking about extensively 
during this hearing.
    You are absolutely right, the democratic recession is not 
just a problem in the Black Sea. We see that in EU member 
states and NATO member states, unfortunately, and we have to 
think about what tools do we have, carrots and sticks, to push 
these countries in the right direction.
    I think this is a huge question for this Administration and 
for the United States, more broadly, but in Turkey 
specifically, certainly, the trends we have seen under 
President Erdogan have been beyond deeply concerning, and it is 
hard to see a reversal in Turkey, certainly, not under Erdogan 
but, hopefully, after Erdogan's time is up, which we do not 
know when that will be.
    I do think that there is, because of the economic 
situation, a growing discontent among the population. There is 
a growing discontent among his supporters, and I think at the 
end of the day a lot of the actions that we see Erdogan take 
including this threat to expel the U.S. Ambassador--the U.S. 
Ambassador and others--are much more about domestic populist 
politics than they are about reality, but I think the reality 
is also that Erdogan does not seem to care as much about the 
international community's response in some of these cases, 
though I will say he did walk back the expulsion threat after 
some international pressure in that regard.
    I think that also tells us that when we work with allies 
and we coordinate our efforts, they work.
    Mr. Townsend. Senator, I stand with my colleague and 
everything that she said, and I would just add that it is going 
to take great patience from the United States so that we do not 
make things worse in terms of picking fights with him or rising 
to the bait, if you will, with Erdogan. He is very good at 
that. He is good at frustrating us and putting us in a position 
where we do not even want to have to deal with him.
    I think that will make things worse. There will come a time 
when he is going to leave the scene. He is vulnerable. I think, 
politically, the next few years will probably show that, and I 
think we need to be patient and keep a strong relationship with 
that civil service, with the diplomatic service, with the 
Turkish military, which used to be, of course, very close to 
the U.S. military.
    As I mentioned earlier, they went through a purge. They are 
going to have to be rebuilt in their own way after Erdogan 
leaves to come back to have that relationship with us the way 
it was in the past.
    I think we have to be patient and not play into his hands, 
and be a constant presence and try to deal with the irritants 
as best we can and wait him out because I do not see us having 
a changed relationship to something that works better for us 
until he leaves the scene.
    We have just got to help that by being patient and keeping 
things intact with that relationship with the broader Turkish 
Government until he leaves.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
    Just to follow up on that a little bit, because I cannot 
remember which one of you said we needed to help President 
Erdogan find an out for his decision to bring in the S-400 and 
to compromise the F-35 program, having talked to a number of 
Turkish officials it is not at all clear to me that they want 
that out.
    So I guess I am a little curious about what you think the 
options might be to engage Turkey in those areas and whether, 
in fact--I mean, the definite sense I had was that they really 
did not think the United States was going to follow through on 
our concerns about their using the S-400 and then withdrawing 
or kicking Turkey out, I guess, is the best way to put it, from 
the F-35 program.
    Given that, it is not clear to me that there is a lot we 
can do in those areas. I do not know who would like to take 
that.
    Mr. Townsend. Senator, I said that in my testimony so I 
guess it is up to me to defend it.
    So much of this problem was based on miscalculation on both 
sides. It was something caught up, again, in the negotiations 
over the Patriot missile system and it just got out of control.
    So the reason I said that we need to help get Erdogan out 
of the corner within which he has painted himself is that he 
went for the S-400 not because he wanted it or the Turkish 
military wanted it.
    It was a message to the United States that, look, I do not 
need the Patriot. I can buy the S-400, too. The Patriot missile 
system is something that, in fact, the military does want and 
so does much of the Turkish Government.
    The Patriot has been what has been deployed for years to 
Turkey when they have come under pressure from Syria or from 
Iraq or other kinds of crises in the Middle East in the past.
    It has been NATO deploying missile defense to Turkey and, 
of course, the U.S. Patriot system. So they want the Patriot 
system. They do want that. They particularly want the F-35.
    The U.S. has had for decades now a very deep relationship 
between Turkish aerospace and the U.S. aerospace and U.S. 
aircraft, particularly the F-16, and I have talked to the 
Turkish military over the past couple of months and they told 
me very quietly they still want to keep going with the American 
platforms because so much of their industry as well as their 
logistics and infrastructure is based around that F-16.
    If the question becomes, well, how can we deal with this S-
400 that you already own and make sure it does not become a 
problem if you are then led into the F-35 program, and I will 
give you a suggestion.
    One was that it almost could be something on the lines of 
taking that S-400 and keeping it in its crates instead of 
deploying it and putting it in a warehouse locked up where it 
has been inspected once a year to make sure that it does not 
come out and there is not Russian technicians. Mr. Brzezinski 
pointed out, it is not integrated into the Turkish air defense 
system, but it is there as a white elephant and that we can be 
assured of that.
    If the Air Force feels confident that, yes, it is not going 
to be a threat to the F-35, then I think we should put them 
back into the F-35 program. They were supposed to make parts 
for the F-35. I think----
    Senator Shaheen. Well, in fact, they did.
    Mr. Townsend. Excuse me?
    Senator Shaheen. In fact, they did make parts for the F-35.
    Mr. Townsend. Yes, absolutely. Absolutely. I think if we 
can come up with a measure to deal with that S-400 and come up 
with a way also to make the Patriot air defense purchased by 
the Turks--if we get halfway to what they want, which is a 
whole another story--they want a lower price, they want to be 
able to manufacture parts of it--and we went into quite a bit 
of negotiations between Raytheon and the Turks on how to do 
that, if we can at least take care of that Patriot purchase, 
neutralize the S-400 and bring them back into the F-35, I think 
that--they are all connected, and if we can come up with a way 
to do that, that will go a long way to bringing at least on the 
military and the civil service side in Ankara get us back into 
a place where we used to be.
    Until we can come up with something like that, we are going 
to be at a standoff.
    Senator Shaheen. I have no doubt about that. What I am 
questioning is Turkey's real interest, either on the part of 
President Erdogan and the people who are in charge, in making 
those changes that they would need to make in order to make 
that happen, and based on conversations that I have had it is 
not clear to me that, in fact, they want to do that.
    I want to move to NATO expansion. Dr. Polyakova, this is 
probably for you. I, certainly, support Georgia and Ukraine's 
aspirations for MAP for NATO. I think it would be very helpful. 
Obviously, they have some reforms that they need to make in 
order to be able to do that, but I worry if we continue to hold 
that out and we are not able to make that happen because, 
obviously, there are a number of NATO countries who seem to 
have reservations about that, that that undermines our efforts 
in both of those countries.
    Can you or any of you talk about what options we might have 
and should we think about a different construct for NATO that 
might provide opportunities for countries like Ukraine and 
Georgia that really want to be members or be on a trajectory 
for membership and yet still have challenges within their own 
countries?
    Dr. Polyakova. Well, thank you so much, Senator. It is an 
important question and I am sure my colleagues will have a lot 
to say about that.
    Like you, I also believe that MAP for Georgia and Ukraine 
is the right path forward. Unfortunately, I think this 
conversation about Ukraine security and also Georgian security 
has become too embroiled and too focused on MAP.
    I think the reality is that, given what you just described 
in terms of some NATO member states not supporting that process 
and the reality that Ukraine and, I think, Ukrainians realize 
that, they are far away from NATO membership, a long ways away 
because of their own reforms in the defense and military sector 
and, of course, questions about Russian occupation of Crimea 
and the continued low conflict--low-level conflict in the 
Donbas.
    That being said, I think there is a lot we can do that is 
below MAP to build a closer partnership with Ukraine and 
Georgia. We are already doing some of that. One idea that I 
elaborate in my written testimony as well is, of course, the 
joint exercises that we have been doing, such as Rapid Trident 
and Sea Breeze, which you also mentioned, are incredibly 
important.
    We should do many more of those. I do not think there is 
any substitute for U.S. operations in concert with our partners 
to demonstrate U.S. support for the Black Sea, but also for 
Ukraine and Georgia and also Moldova, more specifically.
    I think there is an opportunity to focus on establishing 
Centers of Excellence, perhaps EU-NATO joint Centers of 
Excellence--we have a model for that in other countries--in 
Georgia, in Ukraine, as well as focusing on how these countries 
can become sort of a network for responding to Russian hybrid 
threats because they are often the first target of Russian 
cyber-attacks and disinformation attacks and they can serve as 
a sort of early warning system if we have a network in place.
    I think there is a lot more that we can do on the military 
side, certainly, in the NDAA--not cutting that support for 
Ukraine, most notably--that has been so effective and 
continuing our training exercises with both countries, Georgia 
and Ukraine, that we have been doing for years. That has 
professionalized the Ukrainian military in a significant way 
and that has been very obvious in terms of their ability to 
defend themselves as well.
    There is--that is the beginning of a list as to what else 
we can do that will take us a little bit below the discussion 
around MAP.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Did you want to add something, 
Mr. Brzezinski?
    Mr. Brzezinski. Yes, Senator Shaheen.
    When I think about Ukraine and Georgia and MAP and their 
aspirations to become full members of the transatlantic 
community, I just have to come to the conclusion that the 
current approach is not working.
    Russia has invaded Ukraine, continues to occupy Ukrainian 
territory. It has invaded Georgia, continues to occupy Georgian 
territory. You saw firsthand the borderization that is going 
on, which has continued territorial aggression.
    We saw a massive buildup in the Black Sea just this last 
spring, a buildup that has not been withdrawn. That offensive 
posture is still there. Russia is more poised to do more damage 
against those two countries and against the region than before.
    NATO's open-door policy is really--the open-door phrase has 
become a destabilizing bromide. It communicates a lack of 
commitment, a lack of will to really respond affirmatively and 
decisively to the transatlantic aspirations of these countries, 
countries which, by the way, to demonstrate have sent their 
troops into harm's way under the NATO flag.
    We do need to change this approach to membership as soon as 
we can. In addition to putting them on a MAP or another form of 
clear roadmap to membership, we should be upgrading the 
Alliance's engagement with that country.
    We should have a larger institutional presence, perhaps 
kind of a training element like we have in Georgia. We should 
be expanding and increasing the number of exercises we do not 
just with Ukraine, but in Ukraine.
    All of that would complicate Russian planning. We ought to 
be sharing, providing more lethal military assistance to 
Ukraine and Georgia. They need to not only have Javelins but 
the ability to deploy their Javelins to the frontlines, which 
they are not allowed to do today.
    They need to have better counter battery radars against 
Russian artillery. They need better drones to improve their 
situational awareness. They need better air defense systems. 
These are things that would help ensure that Russia does not 
make a move against Ukraine or Georgia as we begin the process 
of integrating them into the Alliance.
    I think it would be very interesting to look at Ukraine 
today, because I was a volunteer in Ukraine in 1993 and it is 
night and day between Ukraine of then and today in terms of 
rule of law, democratic processes, and procedures and 
governance.
    They have come a remarkable way and they have done it in 
the face of Russian aggression, which has been trying to trip 
up their economic reforms, trip up their political reforms from 
the very first day of Ukrainian independence.
    It would be interesting to compare Ukraine today to NATO's 
newest members and their states of reform back in the 2004 
round of NATO enlargement and I would bet you would find 
Ukraine is ahead of a number of those countries who entered in 
2004.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. You make a very 
good point.
    I am going to turn it over to Senator Barrasso. Try and go 
vote again. The train seems to be working so, hopefully, it 
will be quicker. Then turn it over to Senator Johnson.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. As 
you go to vote, I was just thinking about our meeting with Jens 
Stoltenberg not too long ago, just in the last month, about 
NATO showing additional strength and unity, and in my visit to 
Ukraine last month having a chance to visit with President 
Zelensky.
    To your question, Madam Chairman, about the efforts with 
NATO, that was one of the main issues they wanted to talk 
about, the NATO expansion and the ability of Ukraine to find a 
way to enter and show solidarity and union and benefit as well 
as contribute.
    The question--I am going to run through this and let each 
of the three of you respond. When I think about the very 
successful Baltic air policing mission to safeguard the 
integrity of the NATO alliance members' airspace that was 
created by NATO, that mission, I think, could serve as a model 
to efforts to maintain a robust NATO presence in the Black Sea.
    You just mentioned the issues of more involvement in terms 
of not just assistance but actually people. Can I just ask your 
views on NATO establishing, say, a Black Sea maritime patrol 
mission?
    What are some of the challenges and the opportunities of a 
regular and rotational maritime presence by NATO in the Black 
Sea, and do NATO members have the capacity and a commitment to 
create this type of mission? I would just be interested in the 
three of your comments.
    Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. I tried to do that when I 
was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Back in 2016, we 
tried to--and NATO was working on developing a NATO naval 
presence in the Black Sea and it was blocked by Turkey. So that 
is the problem.
    We have to figure out--we still need to do that. How do we 
do this in a way that we will not find ourselves blocked? What 
I suggested in my testimony, and I have heard others talk about 
this as well, is not have it be a NATO mission but have it be a 
national mission--again, not subject to a NATO vote--where 
allies develop a rotational deployment similar to air policing, 
if you will, where they would go for 2 weeks to patrol the 
Black Sea and then return out to Bosporus and then another one 
goes in. So you have got allies doing this and flying the flag, 
partners, too, and I think that is an important demonstration 
of NATO unity as well.
    While it will not be a NATO initiative, it will be made up 
of NATO nations that are going in there and doing 2-week 
patrols and then coming out, each taking their turn.
    Mr. Brzezinski. If I could answer, Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Yes, please.
    Mr. Brzezinski. When I think of moving forward with our 
NATO presence in that region, I would say, one, let us put an 
intelligence fusion cell there so it could look at the full 
spectrum of challenges--informational, cyber, military, 
economic.
    We have such a cell in Naples today looking at Africa and 
the Middle East. We should have one in the Black Sea. In 
addition to expanding our maritime naval exercises and 
operations in the Black Sea, we have got to really upgrade what 
they call NATO's Tailored Force Presence, which right now is 
just a headquarters element.
    In the Baltic, we have an Enhanced Forward Presence, which 
is four NATO battalions in Poland and three Baltic States. We 
need more than just a headquarters element in the Black Sea 
region.
    We need a headquarters element that has also got actually 
land battalions, combat battalions there, coastal batteries, 
and a more robust naval presence.
    I would reinforce that with a U.S. brigade combat team in 
Romania and Bulgaria. That is the kind of presence that we 
need. If we cannot do that because Turkey blocks us, these are 
initiatives we could do with coalitions of the willing in the 
Alliance, and sometimes that is the thing you do to get the 
Alliance into that gear.
    Senator Barrasso. Dr. Polyakova.
    Dr. Polyakova. Just a small add to my colleagues just to 
second the idea of establishing an operational hub, an 
intelligence cell, whatever we want to call it, to respond to 
full spectrum warfare and to assess full spectrum warfare 
across the Black Sea.
    I think this is exactly something we have to do. We have to 
do it, and I do not think it would take a huge amount of 
resources. As all of us seem to agree, Romania seems to be the 
most natural place to do so, given the level of Romania's 
engagement in the region and its investment.
    Just very quickly on the Tailored Forward Presence, the 
TFP, it is just not enough, at the end of the day, and we have 
to rethink it because it has not even been implemented to--at 
that lower level that is below the Enhanced Forward Presence 
that we have in the broader Central Eastern European region.
    Senator Barrasso. It does seem like most of the activity we 
have is coming out of Sigonella in Sicily to do the 
observational work with the NATO headquarters there as well as 
a U.S. base.
    Dr. Polyakova. I would agree with that.
    Senator Barrasso. Okay. Thank you. Thank you all very much.
    Senator Johnson. Thanks, Senator Barrasso. You kind of 
stole my thunder because I wanted to actually ask about those 
same Baltic state air patrols. I will take it from a slightly 
different position.
    When I first heard of that, and I never got the specific 
figures but it sounded to me like the Baltic States, by and 
large, were paying for it. Maybe it was not a dollar-for-dollar 
type of situation, but to me, that was a complete win-win 
situation. They wanted a U.S. or NATO presence there. 
Obviously, every nation is strapped for financing. Every nation 
is talking about let us do nation building at home.
    Here you had a win-win situation and I would just ask the 
same thing. Why not replicate that? Senator Shaheen and I just 
met with the Romanian Ambassador and in my briefing heard 
something about 1,100 troops kind of on a rotational basis, and 
as every nation in that region just about always asks us, we 
want more U.S. presence.
    Call it a tripwire, but it provides security. It makes a 
lot of sense. From my standpoint, I think it is probably worth 
the U.S. investment just from--again, where we can provide 
stability it is just so much cheaper to keep a nation or a 
region stable as opposed to having to deal with a big mess.
    If that is not possible, what possibilities are there? I 
mean, what other opportunities are there to have these 
countries, whether NATO allies or not, basically, fund the 
presence of whatever military force they can make the 
arrangement for?
    I will start with Mr. Townsend.
    Mr. Townsend. Thank you, Senator. I was very much involved 
in that Baltic and also in the Black Sea arrangement with these 
nations to pick up a lot of the tab in terms of logistics and 
support for U.S. forces when they deploy there.
    I will say that in Romania we are seeing quite a bit of 
investment by the Romanian Government in their MK Base as well 
as some training areas also so that they are building the 
infrastructure, the barracks. They are lengthening runways. 
They are doing things. We are doing the same through the 
European reassurance or European deterrence initiative that we 
early on began to fund some of those upgrades that the 
Romanians are now taking over for us.
    We are doing that, but I think there is more that we can do 
and, particularly, having partners and allies there pick up 
some of those costs. I know in Bulgaria, for instance, there is 
a big exercise area that we built there, Novo Selo, and the 
Bulgarians are paying for a lot of logistics and support for 
that.
    I do believe we can do more. All my colleagues and I have 
talked about ways that we can have NATO put in a command 
structure there and have a headquarters where we can have a 
NATO battle group there or an armored brigade combat team, as 
Ian has pointed out.
    I think we have established the pattern there now and the 
precedent where if we do that, if we do deploy the forces, like 
in the Baltics, the Black Sea nations can pay for the training 
areas, to instrument those, to build barracks, to build those 
logistic structures and then to provide the support for them so 
that as we deploy there a lot of that burden is carried by the 
nation itself.
    The pieces are there already. What we need to do is to 
stitch them together in a bigger way than we have done in the 
past along the way we have talked about this, and then make it 
part of a strategy. I hope that as we do the Global Posture 
Review maybe some of that will be reflected in how the Pentagon 
is looking at increasing force posture there from the United 
States and the role that the nations will play in picking up 
some of the bill.
    Senator Johnson. We put a lot of time and effort into 
cajoling our NATO partners to spend 2 percent, and I think we 
just focus so much on the amount that we do not focus enough on 
how much it is spent.
    To me, and I guess the question is do we have other 
ongoing, or have there been discussions in the past? 
Literally--okay, great. You are putting up facilities, but we 
are still having to pay for the troops.
    I mean, literally, have these nations pay for the full 
deployment as part of their NATO commitment if they are a NATO 
country? If not, just as somebody who wants some security 
assurances?
    I mean, do we have those discussions or is it always if we 
have got troops in this, we are going to pay the full price?
    Mr. Brzezinski.
    Mr. Brzezinski. Senator Johnson, I think it would be hard 
for a country like Estonia to pay the full cost of an allied 
presence in their territory.
    I will say that they really are making an effort to spend 
as much as they can to make their territories as attractive to 
U.S. and allied forces as possible. I mean, I look at 
Lithuania. They are spending a lot of money on creating 
facilities that are, basically, serving as the residences and 
bases for a U.S. deployment there.
    Jim was pointing out that the Romanians are spending about 
a billion dollars to upgrade their MK--their air force base so 
it will be a more attractive and more effective base for U.S. 
and NATO operations.
    I think the folks that really need to be squeezed are, 
really, the West European allies, and I am always struck by the 
fact that United States has what is probably six, seven 
battalion equivalent deployments in Poland and our West 
European allies, really, contributing no more than company 
level detachments to the NATO battalions in the Baltics and 
Poland.
    That is not an appropriate balance of responsibility. I am 
hoping as part of this Global Posture Review, I am hoping as 
part of this Black Sea security strategy that the 
Administration will soon be rolling out, that a big emphasis 
will be putting more pressure on the Germans, on the French, on 
the U.K. and the Norwegians and the Italians to put some of 
their posture out onto NATO's Eastern frontier, which is the 
line of confrontation.
    Senator Johnson. I am not on Armed Services so I really do 
not know, what does it cost to maintain a brigade for a year?
    Mr. Townsend, coming from the Defense Department, do you 
have an estimate of that cost?
    Mr. Townsend. Sir, I do not have that number off the top of 
my head, but I think your point, though, is well taken in terms 
of talking about how this 2 percent is being spent and 
broadening that definition to include paying for a battalion, 
if it comes in, and if they are able to.
    I mean, I think what Ian is saying is important in terms of 
what they are able to do. We have to be more creative in 
finding things that they can do. Some nations might not have 
the ready cash, but they can contribute in kind.
    So when we provide a battalion, we might have to pick up 
the cost of that deployment and the care and feeding of those 
forces, but the host country can pick up the other things--the 
utilities, the transportation. There is other things that they 
can do that are in kind and do not necessarily call for a cash 
layout that a poorer or smaller country might not be able to 
do. It is thinking creatively.
    Senator Johnson. I get a sense that we just do not explore 
those possibilities robustly. Is that an accurate statement?
    Mr. Townsend. I think that is an accurate statement, 
Senator.
    Senator Johnson. Ms. Polyakova, in your testimony, you 
talked about how Turkey and Russia are at odds in terms of the 
Black Sea. Can you give us greater detail on that?
    Dr. Polyakova. Just very briefly, it is certainly a big 
historical issue between Turkey and Russia and it really 
defines the relationship. The Montreux Convention, of course, 
allows Turkey control over the Bosporus Straits, but Turkey 
also has seen Russia's occupation and invasion of Crimea as 
Russian overreach in the region and they constantly see the 
other allies and the other potential partners as a tool for 
balancing against Russia.
    Turkey and Russia are the biggest military powers in the 
Black Sea and both are trying to use the other countries to 
balance against the other. Again, as we know, Turkey also fears 
the leverage and pressure points that Russia wields over it 
when it comes to economic issues and Turkish exports to Russia, 
Russian tourism to Turkey as well, the potential influx of 
migrants from the Syria conflict, which the Russians can 
control.
    Of course, we cannot forget the fact that Crimea had and 
continues to have a Muslim Tatar population that has been 
deeply repressed and there is a Tatar minority in Turkey as 
well, and this has been a huge point of conflict between the 
two countries because of Russia's takeover of Crimea. These are 
some of the issues that we see emerge in the Turkish-Russian 
relationship in the Black Sea.
    Senator Johnson. Why in the world would Turkey block NATO 
maritime patrols in the Black Sea? I mean, are they just being 
surly? Are they just being difficult?
    Dr. Polyakova. I think Jim can probably answer that.
    Mr. Townsend. What has been interesting is that this idea 
in Ankara, and it has been there a long time, which is the 
Black Sea is their preserve and so as allies, the United States 
included, come up with ideas and go to Ankara and say, what we 
would like to do is these three initiatives--it does not even 
have to be a NATO initiative, it could be a coalition--the 
Turks are uncomfortable with having a lot of other nations in 
its backyard in the Black Sea area.
    It is surprising and I--it is a Turkish view out of Ankara 
that this is their sphere of influence, if you will, and they 
would rather----
    Senator Johnson. Let us face it, Russia rules it.
    Mr. Townsend. Russia absolutely does and----
    Senator Johnson. They refuse to allow a counter to Russian 
rule of the Black Sea, basically, saying--pretending they 
control it when Russia really does and they will not cooperate 
with NATO to at least provide a counter to that.
    Mr. Townsend. I think Erdogan sees more payoff by 
cultivating this relationship with Putin than by doing 
something at a lower level concerning the balance of power 
there in the Black Sea.
    Erdogan, in a sense, is riding the tiger. He is making 
these deals with the devil because he sees other things that he 
is getting from this relationship with Putin politically, and 
so he is willing to make these deals in order to curry favor 
even though the cost is his relationships with the United 
States and with NATO.
    Senator Johnson. Most unfortunate.
    Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I know we are coming to 
an end of the hearing, but I wanted to follow up a little bit 
on Senator Johnson's question because I think it was you, Dr. 
Polyakova, who talked about Turkey being at odds with Russia on 
the Black Sea was an opportunity for the U.S., and you may have 
addressed this while I was gone, but what kinds of initiatives 
do you think that lends itself to?
    Dr. Polyakova. Well, I will caveat this to say I am 
definitely not an expert on Turkey, but I think a lot of the 
actions and activities that we are questioning here in the 
United States about S-400 and others and the blocking of the 
NATO initiative in the region, I think that really stems from, 
first and foremost, Erdogan as a person and how he sees his own 
security domestically.
    There is, I think, a perception among those in the elite 
that are close to him and probably there is a perception that 
he holds as well that if there is another democratic uprising, 
if there is another coup attempt, someone has to come to his 
rescue and that is going to be the Kremlin.
    While we do not have any direct evidence for this, there is 
a lot of suspicion and talk that there was sort of a 
gentlemen's agreement made that that would be the case from 
Moscow to support in various ways, whether it be through 
paramilitary groups and other ways, Erdogan if his position is 
ever challenged in his own country.
    Again, I think this is something to be discussed probably 
in a different set of hearings than this one. I think in terms 
of opportunities for the United States. I agree that having a 
greater NATO presence in the Black Sea has always irked Turkey 
and we have not seen them support that. If anything, they have 
blocked it, as Jim has correctly outlined.
    I think we have to start from an understanding of what 
would the Turks accept, and I think at the end of the day, if 
they are engaged in, let us say, a conversation as to what a 
NATO intelligence hub, for example, in Romania would look like, 
what it would do, in some ways it could benefit the Turkish 
interest for not constantly being the target of Russian attack 
when it comes to something Erdogan does the Russians do not 
like.
    It would take some liability off of Erdogan, off of Turkey, 
to be able to disperse the liability across the other states. I 
think we are far away from really knowing and, again, I think 
this is something that we need to think through the Global 
Posture Review or the broader Black Sea strategy what are the 
specific areas, whether they be in the hybrid domain, the 
conventional domain, in the maritime domain, that each partner 
in the region can realistically contribute to broader security 
and have an agreement on that.
    I think we will find that as long as Turkey's interests are 
part of the process that they will be much more likely to be 
able to come to the table there, but, again, it is about 
engagement.
    I think right now, as we have seen from Erdogan at the 
public level there is very little space, but I think there is a 
huge amount of space at the working level.
    Again, I think Jim, who has worked with our Turkish 
colleagues and friends directly, has spoken to that already.
    Mr. Brzezinski. If I could add, I would just say there are 
a lot of things NATO could do in the Black Sea region that 
Turkey is blocking, and my solution to that is, okay, if Turkey 
will block that NATO initiative, why cannot the United States 
pull together a coalition of the willing and do it ``outside of 
NATO?''
    Once that institution is stood up, I can assure you the 
Turks will want to be part of it, and that is when you have a 
discussion with them about transferring it over to a--under a 
NATO flag.
    Sometimes that is the way you have to overcome some of 
these regional differences. They will block you in NATO. Do it 
on your own with a coalition of willing, stand it up, prove its 
value, and next thing you know, you will have a country like 
Turkey knocking on the door and saying, how can I be part of 
it, and that is how all of a sudden it becomes a NATO 
organization or entity.
    Senator Shaheen. My final question is about Moldova.
    Given the election and the potential for Moldova to move 
increasingly towards the West except that Russia's challenging 
their energy supply, what should we be doing to address that? 
Is that something that we should be talking to Europe about 
responding to? Should we be looking at other alternatives?
    Mr. Brzezinski. Senator, if I could suggest, right now is a 
moment where your question is extremely appropriate and timely.
    Moldova is going through an energy crisis right now. It is 
an energy crisis that was fabricated by Putin's intentional 
turn off of the gas spigot, and right now is a time for the 
West to stand up and divert some of its energy supplies to 
Ukraine.
    I am really glad to see that I think the Poles are about to 
sell or have sold a million whatever the metric is, a BTU, 
whatever, of----
    Senator Shaheen. BTUs.
    Mr. Brzezinski. --BTUs. To Moldova to relieve that 
pressure. This is something that we should be swinging in 
behind. We should be encouraging the EU to swing in behind 
because this is a clear example where Putin is using energy as 
a weapon. If we want to kind of lock in Moldova's transatlantic 
turn or shift, this is the time to do it through such action in 
response to this energy aggression by Putin.
    Senator Shaheen. Oh, I could not agree more. It should send 
a real warning signal to Germany on Nord Stream 2 as well.
    Dr. Polyakova. Just to add, if I may, very briefly on that.
    You are absolutely right that we have to work with our 
European allies on the energy crisis in Moldova because it is 
not just about Moldova. It is about the broader energy crisis 
that is looming over Europe and, certainly, the Kremlin is 
driving that in a significant way.
    I was happy to see that there are agreements now being 
reached as Moldova continues to negotiate its gas contract with 
the Russian energy state giant Gazprom for reverse flows 
through other European countries and that is a model, of 
course, that we used in Ukraine to get them off direct imports 
of gas from Russia, but the reality is that I think this is 
something where Europe needs to step up. We cannot, as the 
United States, always step in to solve these regional issues.
    It is a huge problem, and I hope it will be a wakeup call, 
I really do, to the rest of Western Europeans as Russia 
continues to pressure European policymakers to turn on the Nord 
Stream 2 spigot or they are continuing to hold out more gas 
imports to Europe--gas exports to Europe as Europe faces a huge 
energy crisis across the border or across the season during the 
winter.
    I absolutely think this is something that Europe needs to 
lean in on and I think our role as the United States should be 
to make that very clear why this is important and why it should 
be something that the EU takes up and speaks very publicly 
about, going forward.
    Mr. Townsend. What makes this particularly critical now and 
your question timely is that this is the Russians testing us. 
This is the first test of what could happen this winter, and if 
we do not come in hard on this and united, U.S. and Europe, 
including European Union--if we do not do that then we are 
going to see a lot of this in the winter to come. So I hope we 
tackle it that way.
    From what I can tell, the EU is taking this seriously, but 
it is going to call for some very clear-eyed and tough messages 
to Moscow in this very first test, and if we fail this first 
test it is going to be a very cold winter.
    Mr. Brzezinski. If I could add, this is the first test of 
the U.S.-German MOU on Nord Stream 2, and I am watching very 
carefully to see how the United States and Germany are going to 
respond to this crisis in Moldova under this agreement, because 
that agreement specifically said that they would stand up 
together and take action--punitive action--if Russia uses 
energy as a geopolitical weapon. We are seeing that right now 
and I am, unfortunately, not seeing much evidence of that MOU 
being activated.
    Senator Shaheen. Wow. A very important point. Thank you all 
very much. Did you have anything, Senator?
    Senator Johnson. Yes. I would like to follow up on this 
because this is--this has always puzzled me. I have seen the 
pipeline maps. I have not traced them all through to figure out 
exactly what the exact supply situation is.
    I, certainly, understand opening up the Nord Stream 2 makes 
Ukraine and anybody supplied through those Ukrainian pipelines 
vulnerable to Russian extortion, but at the same time, you are 
opening up a new supply line and to a certain extent that 
reduces Russia's ability to--I mean, you got more supply. Okay.
    Can somebody explain to me exactly how they are able to 
extort so many different countries? I mean, is it strictly the 
pipeline through Ukraine and which countries that pipeline is--
I mean, in other words, how did they shut off Moldova? Is that 
pipeline coming through under the Black Sea or what? Did you 
understand the question?
    Mr. Brzezinski. The situation is that the Gazprom's storage 
facility is in Europe, and Central Europe and Western Europe 
have been allowed to go down to levels that are altering now 
the market price for gas, and they have the capacity to fill 
those tanks up and, therefore, also to push the price back 
down.
    They are consciously not doing that, and every analyst I 
read says Russia has the production capacity to do that, which 
leads me and many others to conclude that this is a 
geopolitical move in response to Nord Stream 2 and is an 
attempt to kind of force European--Central European and West 
European gas buyers back into long-term contracts that Russia 
wants and that we have been trying and pushing.
    Senator Johnson. There are other sources of gas and oil. Or 
is Russia that dominant?
    Mr. Brzezinski. They are that dominant because a gas 
pipeline--it is just much easier and can carry that much more 
capacity than LNG tankers that come from United States, from 
Qatar, or Australia for that matter.
    Dr. Polyakova. If I may. We are very far away from being 
able to have, for example, U.S. LNG exports fill a significant 
part of European energy demands. Russia is the main exporter of 
energy to Europe, broadly speaking, still and it dominates the 
market.
    Senator Johnson. Russia always has had that capability. How 
does adding Nord Stream really increase their ability to do 
this?
    Dr. Polyakova. That is the crux of the issue because, of 
course, we are talking about Nord Stream 2 but there is already 
a Nord Stream 1, which Nord Stream 2 just mirrors the path of 
Nord Stream 1.
    Honestly, if we look at every single assessment, the Nord 
Stream 2 project is completely irrelevant economically because 
the most direct route to deliver Russian gas to Europe is 
through Ukraine--the existing pipeline in Ukraine--which can 
deliver as much demand as Europe needs.
    That is why Nord Stream 2 has been this massive 
geopolitical project because it avoids the most direct route so 
it gives Russia capability to not deliver Europe's full energy 
needs in the gas sector without ever passing through Ukraine as 
soon as Nord Stream 2 comes online fully.
    There have been many, many discussions of other potential 
pipeline projects that could diversify reserves that would not 
pass through these countries. There is the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline that would actually develop some of the potential gas 
reserves in Turkmenistan, and deliver it to Turkey and then to 
Europe, but this project has not been off the ground. There is 
a lot of problems with it. These pipelines take a very long 
time to build, and I think, unfortunately, the reality today 
and probably for the foreseeable future is that this is exactly 
what Russia is going to be doing in Europe against Moldova, 
against Ukraine, and every single European country.
    Senator Johnson. Again, I definitely see how Nord Stream 2 
puts at risk Ukraine and anybody serviced through that 
Ukrainian pipeline, but other than that, I do not see how it 
increases their ability.
    I mean, they are kind of slitting their own throat long 
term because the less reliable supplier they are, the more 
people are going to be incentivized to set up those LNG 
pipelines and terminals, that type of thing as well.
    Anyway, it still remains confusing to me. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much, Senator 
Johnson. Thank you to each of our witnesses today.
    Sorry about the votes and the sort of in and out of myself 
and other senators, but, as you all know, I am sure, that is 
the way the Senate operates.
    Thank you all very much for your insights and we look 
forward to seeing the Black Sea strategy from the 
Administration sometime very soon.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 4:28 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    
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              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


  Written Statements From Embassies Representing Black Sea Countries, 
 Outlining Initiatives and Recommendations for Enhancing U.S. Policy, 
           Entered Into the Record by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


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