[Senate Hearing 117-164]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-164

                     EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL 
                            FROM AFGHANISTAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE
                               
                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 14, 2021

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]   

                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
46-923 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022                     
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------  

                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Jessica Lewis, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     4

Blinken, Hon. Antony J., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of 
  State, Washington, DC..........................................     8
    Prepared Statement...........................................    13

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement, Dated 
  September 9, 2021..............................................    70

Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter, Dated September 2, 2021.    77

Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women 
  Leaders and Human Rights Defenders.............................    82

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    83

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................    94

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................   125

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen............................   127

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine.................................   130

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey..........................   130

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Cory Booker...............................   132

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................   133

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson...............................   139

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney...............................   145

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Rob Portman...............................   149

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Todd Young................................   151

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator John Barrasso.............................   152

Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
  Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz..................................   159

                                 (iii)
 

 
                    EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL 
                            FROM AFGHANISTAN

                              ----------                              


                                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert 
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, 
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van 
Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Barrasso, 
Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee will come to order.
    Secretary Blinken, thank you for joining us today.
    Last week, the New York Times reported on a local Afghan 
reporter who goes by the name of Nemat. He was covering a 
demonstration by several women protesting against the Taliban. 
He was arrested. His camera was confiscated.
    Nemat said, ``I told them I was a journalist and showed 
them my ID card, but they accused me of organizing the 
protests. They took me into a room, tied my hands with a scarf, 
and started beating me with a cable.''
    The horror he experienced is hard to fathom. He described a 
demonstrator covered in blood after being severely beaten and 
saw Taliban militants abusing prisoners. One of Nemat's 
colleagues said, ``They were mocking us and saying, `You want 
freedom? What freedom?'''
    This is not the Taliban of 2001. This happened last week. 
Amid the extensive oversight work planned in Afghanistan, we 
must not lose sight of people like Nemat and the courageous 
women who continue to protest in the streets, calling for 
freedom in the face of violence and threats. The repression of 
the Afghan people is happening in real time, and the world must 
bear witness and hold the Taliban accountable.
    Let me turn to the focus of today's hearing. Mr. Secretary, 
the execution of the U.S. withdrawal was clearly and fatally 
flawed. This committee expects to receive a full explanation of 
the Administration's decisions on Afghanistan since coming into 
office last January. There has to be accountability.
    We will have other hearings to develop a set of lessons 
learned over the course of the war, to understand the many 
mistakes made over the course of 20 years. The diversion of 
attention and resources when the Bush administration decided to 
invade Iraq despite its irrelevance to the 9/11 attacks, the 
double-dealing by Pakistan in providing a safe haven to the 
Taliban, and the list goes on.
    We need to understand why successive administrations made 
so many of the same mistakes repeatedly. Perhaps most urgently, 
we need to understand why the Afghan Government and military 
collapsed so precipitously. This rapid collapse laid bare a 
fundamental fact, that successive administrations lied to the 
Congress over the years about the durability of the Afghan 
military and governing institutions, and we need to understand 
why.
    The chaos of last August is due in large part to the 
February 2020 surrender deal negotiated by President Trump, a 
deal that was clearly built on a set of lies. A deal that led 
to the release of 5,000 hardened Taliban fighters, boosting the 
militant group on the battlefield this summer.
    We know now that the Taliban had no intention of pursuing a 
political path and peace deal with the Afghan Government. It 
had no intention of pursuing a democratic path. It had no 
intention of breaking ties with Al Qaeda and it clearly had no 
intention of allowing women to have their rightful seat at the 
table and to participate fully in society.
    To demand the Taliban abide by its commitments now and 
expect a different result I think is somewhat absurd. The 
Taliban rules Afghanistan, so we will have to deal with it in 
some form, but let us not kid ourselves. There is no such thing 
as a reformed Taliban. This group is woefully stuck in the 14th 
century with no will to come out. Their concept of political 
representation and legitimacy is based squarely on the use of 
violent force and intimidation.
    The Administration says that we should judge the Taliban by 
their actions, and I agree. Their actions since taking over 
Afghanistan have been pretty horrifying. Beating women 
activists, murdering ethnic and religious minorities such as 
the Hazara, separating classrooms by gender, shutting down 
local media, refusal to break with Al Qaeda, appointing the 
head of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by our 
Government from the Haqqani Network to lead the Ministry of 
Interior, and the list goes on.
    With this in mind, the United States and the United Nations 
should maintain existing sanctions on the Taliban. The U.S. 
should reimpose those sanctions that were waived during the 
negotiations process, and the U.S. should consider new measures 
to impose higher costs on the group and its leaders while 
ensuring that lifesaving humanitarian aid is able to assist 
those most vulnerable to hunger, disease, and disaster.
    Nor should any country be in a rush to unilaterally 
recognize this regime. At a minimum, the following criteria 
must be met before recognition is even considered. Absolute 
repudiation by the Taliban of all cross-border terrorism, 
including Al Qaeda and associated groups. Equality of rights 
for girls and women. Protection of minority, ethnic, and 
religious groups. Commitment to democratic elections and ending 
all narcotics-related activity.
    So, yes, the Taliban now run Afghanistan, but that does not 
mean we ever accept their behavior. I supported the decision to 
eventually withdraw our military from Afghanistan. I have long 
maintained, however, that how the United States left mattered. 
Doing the right thing in the wrong way can end up being the 
wrong thing. To get this right, the Biden administration needed 
to answer two fundamental questions. First, would the 
withdrawal leave a durable political arrangement in its wake? 
Second, would the U.S. and our allies maintain an ability to 
collect intelligence, conduct counterterrorism operations in a 
region still rife with groups, including ISIS-K, seeking to do 
us harm?
    I believe the U.S. clearly fell short on the first measure, 
and time will tell on the second. The prospects do not look 
promising. So let me start with some framing questions about 
the Biden administration's Afghanistan decision-making.
    First, upon coming into office, how did the Biden 
administration assess the impact on the ground of President 
Trump's flawed deal with the Taliban? Did the Administration 
attempt to negotiate better terms with the Taliban upon coming 
into office?
    Second, did the President's April withdrawal announcement 
set in motion any explicit contingency planning in the event 
that the Taliban rapidly took over the country? What was the 
plan to evacuate all Americans? What was the plan to evacuate 
SIVs, P1s, P2s, and other at-risk groups? What was the plan to 
evacuate staff and those affiliated with Radio Free Europe, 
Radio Liberty, Voice of America, the National Endowment for 
Democracy, and other U.S.-funded organizations?
    President Trump, with Stephen Miller, intentionally blocked 
SIVs from being processed, which I think is a barbaric and 
cruel decision which likely resulted in death for some U.S. 
partners. How did the Biden administration specifically 
accelerate processing SIVs upon coming into office?
    Third, what was the plan to avoid or deal with a refugee 
and humanitarian crisis? I expect you will address some of 
these issues in your opening remarks.
    Let me applaud the efforts of the personnel on the ground 
from the Departments of State and Defense who worked under 
horrific circumstances. Their actions in evacuating over 
120,000 individuals were nothing short of heroic, and these 
personnel deserve answers. The American public deserves 
answers. The Afghan people certainly deserve answers.
    So let me close with three points. First, while 
communication from the Administration has been frequent 
throughout this crisis, information from State, the Pentagon, 
and the White House has often been vague or contradictory. This 
was obviously a fluid and difficult situation. Frustration 
among many Members was high, and this has to improve.
    To put this in context, Member frustration came on top of 
years of stonewalling by the Trump administration and its 
refusal to engage the Senate on the Taliban negotiations. This 
is one of the examples of why I have been trying to pursue on 
the CASE Act to understand what the written agreements are, 
that come between an Administration and others. Maybe if we had 
seen all of the elements of it, we would have been poised in a 
better position.
    Second, I am very disappointed that Secretary Austin 
declined our request to testify today. A full accounting of the 
U.S. response to this crisis is not complete without the 
Pentagon, especially when it comes to understanding the 
complete collapse of the U.S.-trained and funded Afghan 
military.
    His decision not to appear before the committee will affect 
my personal judgment on Department of Defense nominees. I 
expect the Secretary will avail himself to the committee in the 
near future, and if he does not, I may consider the use of 
committee subpoena power to compel him and others over the 
course of these last 20 years to testify.
    Third, I implore the Administration to remain focused on 
Afghanistan. It is critically important that the world bear 
witness and take action when possible in response to Taliban 
abuses. Your visit, Mr. Secretary, to Qatar and Germany sent 
the right message, and I strongly urge sustained attention to 
Afghanistan in the months and years to come.
    I also urge the Administration to strengthen its resolve 
and efforts to secure the relocation of our civil society 
partners now at grave risk who were left behind in Afghanistan. 
They include heroic individuals working for organizations on 
the frontlines of U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy and 
human rights, including the rights of Afghan women and girls.
    Finally, I know that Senator Young is not with us today. He 
is home in Indiana attending the funeral of Marine Corporal 
Humberto Sanchez. Corporal Sanchez was among those killed in 
the horrendous terror attack on August 26 at the Kabul airport.
    I would like to suggest that we have a moment of silence 
and pay our respects to all those brave American service 
members who were killed or injured on that day and that we also 
honor the thousands of American service members, Afghan 
soldiers, and civilians who were casualties of this 20-year 
war. Please join me in a moment of silence.
    [Moment of silence.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member, 
Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Blinken, good morning, and welcome back to our 
committee. You are doing the right thing testifying here today, 
and I thank you.
    However, like the chairman, I am disappointed that some of 
your colleagues have declined to testify, particularly 
Secretary Austin. There are questions that we really need to 
have answered, and it is disheartening that they declined to 
testify. The debacle in Afghanistan is an interagency failure, 
and the fact that you are the only one stepping up is 
disheartening.
    I agree with the chairman that the withdrawal was a dismal 
failure. One of the things we need to get to the bottom to is, 
who is responsible for this? Who made the decisions? There is 
real questions right now as to who is making the decisions.
    We know for a fact that the President of the United States 
is somewhat disadvantaged here in that someone is calling the 
shots. He cannot even speak without someone in the White House 
censoring it or signing off on it. As recently as yesterday, in 
mid-sentence he was cut off by someone in the White House who 
makes the decision that the President of the United States is 
not speaking correctly.
    So I would like to know who this person is. This is a 
puppeteer act, if you would, and we need to know who is in 
charge and who is making these decisions. The only way we are 
going to get that is when we have people like you come in and 
answer questions. When we get to questions, I am going to have 
more questions for you in that regard.
    While I supported a responsible end to the war in 
Afghanistan, no American thinks we should have left this way. 
America cannot end wars simply by walking away. It is naive to 
assume our enemies will lay down their arms, leave us alone, 
and suddenly enshrine human rights if we go home. Indeed, there 
is a fierce battle of ideas and ambitions on the world stage, 
and the U.S. cannot remain neutral.
    However, President Biden presented the American people with 
a false choice in Afghanistan, and the rushed and embarrassing 
retreat is a stain on America's credibility that will have 
implications for years to come. There were other options that 
could have protected our national security interests, allowed 
for a more measured reduction in force, and preserved American 
credibility.
    I feel this Administration is trying to blame the prior 
Administration. Contrary to some that have said that the prior 
Administration started this, is responsible, that is simply not 
true. The prior Administration, when they took steps toward 
withdrawing from Afghanistan, entered into an agreement that 
had very, very specific conditions. I was privy to those. So I 
have personal knowledge of this.
    The February 2020 agreement was contingent, contingent upon 
the Taliban reducing violence, meeting counterterrorism 
commitments, and engaging in substantive talks with the Afghan 
Government. These were all very important, and most 
importantly, most importantly, it was telegraphed to the 
Taliban that failure to meet their commitments would be met 
with grave, grave circumstances for them. The Taliban failed to 
meet any of these commitments, and yet, yet this Administration 
turned the country over to them.
    President Biden chose to withdraw from Afghanistan without 
conditions and without prudent planning and obviously without, 
most important, telegraphing to the Taliban that they would 
enforce the conditions that the Taliban had agreed to. It did 
not happen. It was a strategic unforced error, and he did this 
against the advice of the commanders on the ground.
    One of the most embarrassing things I thought was the 
strike that was made--and obviously, we cannot talk about what 
we know from an intelligence standpoint--but the kinetic strike 
that was made after the Taliban entered the country. This de 
minimis strike had dire consequences for civilians, but not for 
the Taliban.
    These are facts. The President's withdrawal led to a 
Taliban offensive to topple the democratically elected 
government, slammed the door on any chance for a final peace 
agreement, reversed the hard-earned rights of Afghan women and 
minorities, and will result in a safe haven for terrorists, 
many of whom wish to attack the United States.
    The Biden administration left Afghanistan in total disarray 
and single-handedly created a humanitarian crisis with 
thousands of refugees and internally displaced Afghans in need 
of immediate emergency assistance.
    Secretary Blinken, you characterized the evacuation as an 
extraordinary effort. You have touted over 124,000 evacuees. 
However, we abandoned the people we prioritized for departure. 
The Department's efforts were plagued by lack of basic 
planning, a failure to identify Americans, a failure to 
energize the SIV process months in advance, ignoring repeated 
congressional offers to help, and a failure to recognize the 
Taliban for what it is, a terrorist organization.
    The numbers are telling. You evacuated 6,040 Americans and 
say only a couple of hundred remain. Your own department told 
this committee in July that there were 10,000 to 15,000 
Americans in Afghanistan. There is a huge difference between 
6,000 and 15,000. What happened to these other Americans?
    The situation with the Special Immigrant Visa evacuations 
is even more disturbing. Not counting the SIVs that arrived 
before Kabul's fall, you evacuated 705 of roughly 20,000 
principal SIV applicants. What happened to these people?
    This committee reached out to the Department in April, May, 
and June to help expedite SIV processing. We asked what 
additional authorities or resources you needed. For months, we 
received contradictory responses or no responses at all.
    I will take a minute here to defend the State Department. 
One of the biggest problems to helping process SIVs was the 
enormous failure of the Department of Defense to provide the 
records needed to validate the Afghans who bravely helped our 
forces. The fact that DoD did not keep accurate records is 
irresponsible and a slap in the face to those who fought 
alongside of us. Obviously, we want to talk to Secretary Austin 
about this.
    Despite the enormous efforts of our troops and diplomats on 
the ground, the preventable tragedy that unfolded at the 
airport in Kabul was a disaster of leadership and of the 
Administration's own making. Not only were you unable to ensure 
that Americans had access to the airport, many were turned away 
repeatedly after braving Taliban checkpoints. Americans outside 
of Kabul had absolutely no chance of evacuation.
    Green card holders and SIVs should have been prioritized 
for access to the airport as well, but there was no mechanism 
to get inside. It was an informal network of Americans that 
helped get Americans and Afghans around the bureaucratic wall 
the Administration set up at the airport. It should not have 
come to that.
    The Administration patting itself on the back for this 
evacuation is like an arsonist taking credit for saving people 
from the burning building he just set on fire. We know the U.S. 
military and our diplomats can do so much more than they did, 
if only their political bosses had gotten out of the way.
    Now we have an untold number of Americans, U.S. 
contractors, and SIVs still in Afghanistan. Despite repeated 
assurances that you will get them out, you have been unable to 
do so. Planes are stranded in Northern Afghanistan. Our Voice 
of America employees and female Afghan students on scholarships 
have been abandoned, and our SIV applicants are in hiding as 
Taliban death squads hunt them down.
    You said you would have mechanisms for continued 
evacuations after 31 August. Where is your plan? I have not 
seen it. I don't know that I have even talked to anyone who has 
seen it.
    What I have seen is a rebuke from our European allies. They 
begged us for help, but where we were not helping our own 
citizens, how could we help them? Instead, we had to rely on 
the generosity of partners like Qatar.
    What we have all heard and read is that the United States 
is no longer a reliable ally. And frankly, the way this 
evacuation was conducted, I cannot blame them. For years, 
despite strains in our relations with Europe and other allies, 
everyone knew the United States was the competent and capable 
partner. They trusted us to be the steady hand at the wheel 
that could navigate out of any difficult situation.
    That confidence has been shattered. Now across the globe, 
allies doubt our resolve, and our competitors like China and 
Russia see weakness and think they can exploit this situation. 
The Biden administration alone is responsible for this debacle 
and its consequences.
    Going forward, the challenges become even harder to 
resolve. U.S. actions must rebuild our credibility and re-
establish deterrence. The U.S. will need more proactive 
policies on counterterrorism and security around the globe to 
discourage our competitors.
    Over the weekend, we marked the 20th anniversary of 
September 11, but we have yet to receive details about how the 
Administration's so-called ``over the horizon'' 
counterterrorism plan will succeed. The Taliban's takeover 
destroyed the basis of that strategy, and despite repeated 
requests from the Hill, we have yet to receive a single piece 
of information about the Administration's revised 
counterterrorism plan.
    Meanwhile, the Taliban continues its relationship with Al 
Qaeda, and the new interior minister has a $10 million U.S. 
bounty on his head for killing Americans. Any hope that the 
Taliban will protect American security is a fatally flawed 
assumption. You must redouble efforts with Afghanistan's 
neighbors to reach CT agreements and preserve disappearing 
intelligence networks.
    Additionally, any country that offered support to the 
Taliban in their recent offensive should risk a strategic 
downgrade in their relationship with the United States. We also 
must understand Pakistan's role in this entire matter, as the 
chairman has alluded to. This is a difficult, but important 
situation.
    I also remain concerned that the Administration is rushing 
to normalize ties with the Taliban Government. This must not 
occur without extensive congressional consultations. Your 
notification that you intended to restart foreign assistance is 
deeply, deeply concerning. I suspect there are other members of 
this committee that are going to speak to that. That is going 
to be a heavy lift for you.
    On the security front, the United States spent over $80 
billion on Afghan security forces. Many of these funds bypassed 
the oversight of the State Department and this committee. We 
now see the consequences of a Department of Defense that 
operates security cooperation on its own. The Taliban is now 
one of the best-armed terrorist organizations on the planet.
    We have sent repeated requests for the Administration's 
plan to address the captured equipment. We have yet to receive 
any response. As Secretary, I would hope you would demand that 
all DoD assistance programs once again require State Department 
concurrence.
    In closing, I would like to speak directly to our 
diplomats, our men and women in uniform, our Gold Star 
families, our humanitarian workers, and our veterans. On behalf 
of the American people, I would like to say thank you. The 
ineptitude of this Administration does not tarnish your 
service. What you did mattered.
    You served nobly. You stood on the wall and prevented a 
terrorist attack against the United States for over 20 years at 
enormous cost to you and your families. America will always be 
indebted to you.
    Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    Mr. Secretary. The Secretary has agreed to stay with us so 
each member has an opportunity to ask their questions. As such 
and because of the nature of the subject matter, I have agreed 
that the Secretary has an extended opening statement.
    With that, Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF HON. ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 
Ranking Member Risch, thank you very much. To all members, I 
appreciate the opportunity to be with all of you today to 
discuss our policy on Afghanistan, including where we are, how 
we got here, and where we are going in the weeks and months 
ahead.
    For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided 
funding for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my own time 
as a staff member here in this room for then-Senator Biden just 
how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I said when I was 
nominated, I believe strongly in Congress' traditional role as 
a partner in foreign policymaking. I am committed to working 
with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the 
interests of the American people.
    On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor nearly 3,000 
men, women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded 
of why we went to Afghanistan in the first place, to bring 
justice to those who attacked us and to ensure it would never 
happen again. We achieved those objectives a long time ago. 
Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's capabilities 
were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan and 
conduct external operations.
    After 20 years, 2,461 American lives lost, 20,000 injuries, 
$2 trillion spent, it was time to end America's longest war.
    When President Biden took office in January, he inherited 
an agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban 
to remove all remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan by May 1 
of this year. As part of that agreement, previous 
Administration pressed the Afghan Government to release 5,000 
Taliban prisoners, including some top war commanders. 
Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
    In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and 
partner forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's 
major cities, but the Taliban continued its relentless march on 
remote outposts, checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well 
as some of the major roads connecting the cities. By January of 
2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position since 
9/11, and we had the smallest number of U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan since 2001.
    As a result, upon taking office, President Biden 
immediately faced the choice between ending the war or 
escalating it. Had he not followed through on his predecessor's 
commitment, attacks on our forces and those of our allies would 
have resumed, and the Taliban's nationwide assault on 
Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would 
have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into 
Afghanistan to defend ourselves and to prevent a Taliban 
takeover, taking casualties and with, at best, the prospect of 
restoring a stalemate and remaining stuck in Afghanistan under 
fire indefinitely.
    There is no evidence that staying longer would have made 
the Afghan security forces or the Afghan Government any more 
resilient or self-sustaining. If 20 years, hundreds of billions 
of dollars in support, equipment, training did not suffice, why 
would another year, another 5, another 10?
    Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors 
like China and Russia or adversaries like Iran and North Korea 
would have liked more than for the United States to re-up a 20-
year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for another 
decade.
    In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant 
contact with our allies and partners to hear their views and 
factor them into our thinking. When the President announced the 
withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. We 
all set to work together on the drawdown.
    Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of 
Americans in Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to 
leave the country. In total, between March and August, we sent 
19 specific messages with that warning, as well as offers of 
help, including financial assistance to pay for plane tickets.
    Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began, 
there were still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost 
all of whom were evacuated by August 31. Many were dual 
citizens living in Afghanistan for years, decades, or 
generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the place that 
they know as home is a wrenching decision.
    In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering 
nonessential personnel to depart. We also used this time to 
significantly speed up the processing of Special Immigrant 
Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took office, we 
inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a statutory 
framework enacted by Congress involving multiple agencies and a 
backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.
    There had not been a single SIV applicant interview in 
Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020. The program was 
basically in a stall. Within 2 weeks of taking office, we 
restarted the SIV interview process in Kabul. On February 4, 
one of the first executive orders issued by President Biden 
directed us to immediately review the SIV program to identify 
causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV applications 
more quickly.
    This spring, I directed significant additional resources to 
the program, expanding the team of people in Washington 
processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling the number of 
SIV adjudicators in Kabul in our embassy there. Even as many 
embassy personnel began to return, under ordered departure, we 
sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV 
applications.
    As a result of these and other steps, including working 
with Congress, especially this committee--Senator Shaheen and 
others--by May, we had reduced the average processing time for 
Special Immigrant Visas by more than 1 year. Even amid a COVID 
surge in Kabul, we continued to issue visas. We went from 
issuing about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to 
more than 1,000 per week in August when our evacuation and 
relocation effort began.
    That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of 
the Afghan security forces and government. Throughout the year, 
we were constantly assessing their staying power and 
considering multiple scenarios. Even the most pessimistic 
assessments did not predict that the government forces in Kabul 
would collapse while U.S. forces remained.
    They were focused on what would happen after the United 
States withdrew, from September onward. As General Milley, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, ``Nothing I or 
anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this 
government in 11 days.'' Nonetheless, we planned and exercised 
a wide range of contingencies.
    Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our 
embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within 
48 hours. And the military, placed on standby by President 
Biden, was able to secure the airport and start the evacuation 
within 72 hours. Yes, that evacuation was an extraordinary 
effort, under the most difficult conditions imaginable, by our 
diplomats, by our military, by our intelligence professionals.
    They worked around the clock to get American citizens, 
Afghans who helped us, citizens of our allies and partners, and 
at-risk Afghans on planes out of the country, off to the United 
States or to transit locations that our diplomats had arranged 
or negotiated in multiple countries. Our consular team worked 
24/7 to reach out to Americans who could still be in country, 
making 55,000 phone calls, sending 33,000 emails by August 31, 
and they are still at it.
    In the midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed 
13 service members who were working the gates at HKIA, wounded 
20 others, killed and wounded scores of Afghans. Our service 
members gave their lives so that others can continue to live 
theirs. In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in 
history, with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
    On August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan 
officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began. I want to 
acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have helped 
with the relocation effort, some serving as transit hubs, some 
welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time. As the 9/
11 report suggested, it is essential that we accelerate the 
appointment process for national security officials since a 
catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice.
    Today, there are nearly 80 State Department nominees 
pending before the Senate. Nearly two dozen have already been 
voted out of this committee on a strong bipartisan basis and 
simply await a vote in the Senate. For our national security, I 
respectfully urge the Senate and this committee to move as 
swiftly as possible to consider and confirm all pending 
nominees and to address what is a significant disruption in our 
national security policymaking.
    Now let me briefly outline what the State Department has 
done in the last couple of weeks and where we are going in the 
weeks ahead. First, as you know, we moved our diplomatic 
operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs 
team is hard at work. Many of our key partners have done the 
same thing. They have joined us there in Doha.
    Second, we have continued our relentless efforts to help 
any remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of 
allied and partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose. 
Last week, on Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with 
U.S. citizens and others onboard departed Kabul and landed in 
Doha. On Friday, a second flight carrying U.S. citizens and 
others departed Afghanistan.
    These flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the 
United States, Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport and 
intense diplomacy to start the flights. In addition to those 
flights, half a dozen American citizens, a dozen permanent 
residents of the United States, have also left Afghanistan via 
overland routes with our assistance.
    We are in constant contact with American citizens still in 
Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been 
assigned a case management team to offer specific guidance and 
instructions. Some declined to be on the first flights on 
Thursday and Friday for reasons including needing more time to 
make arrangements, wanting to remain with extended family for 
now, or medical issues that precluded traveling last week.
    We will continue to help Americans and Afghans to whom we 
have a special commitment depart Afghanistan if they choose, 
just as we have done in other countries where we have evacuated 
our embassy and hundreds or even thousands of Americans 
remained behind--for example, in Libya, Syria, Venezuela, 
Yemen, Somalia. There is no deadline to this effort.
    Third, we are focused on counterterrorism. Taliban has 
committed to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as 
a base for external operations that could threaten the United 
States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will 
hold them accountable for that. That does not mean that we will 
rely on them. We will maintain a vigilant effort to monitor 
threats, robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to 
neutralize those threats, if necessary, and as we do in places 
around the world where we do not have military forces on the 
ground.
    Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with allies and 
partners. We initiated a statement joined by more than 100 
countries and a United Nations Security Council resolution 
setting out the international community's expectations of a 
Taliban-led government. We expect the Taliban to ensure freedom 
of travel; to make good on its counterterrorism commitments; to 
uphold the basic rights of the Afghan people, including women, 
girls, and minorities; to name a broadly representative 
permanent government; to forswear reprisals. The legitimacy and 
support that it seeks from the international community will 
depend entirely on its conduct.
    We have organized contact groups of key countries to ensure 
that the international community continues to speak and act 
together on Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence. 
Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus 
NATO, the EU, the United Nations, to align our efforts.
    Fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the 
Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not 
flow through the government, but rather through independent 
organizations like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
    Yesterday, we announced the United States has provided 
nearly $64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people 
of Afghanistan to meet critical health and nutrition needs, to 
address the protection concerns of women and children and 
minorities, to help more children, including girls, go back to 
school. This additional funding means the United States has 
provided nearly $330 million in assistance to the Afghan people 
this fiscal year.
    In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans 
that we evacuated are being processed before moving on to their 
next destinations. Here at home, I spent time at the Dulles 
Expo Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed 
after arriving in the United States. It is remarkable to see 
what our diplomats, our military, employees from many civilian 
agencies across the U.S. Government have been able to achieve 
in a very short time.
    They have met an enormous human need. They have coordinated 
food, water, sanitation for thousands of people. They are 
arranging medical care, including the delivery of babies. They 
are reuniting families that were separated, caring for 
unaccompanied minors. It is an extraordinary interagency 
effort, a powerful testament to the skill, the dedication, the 
humanity of our people.
    I think we can all be deeply proud of what they are doing, 
and as we have done throughout our history, Americans are now 
welcoming families from Afghanistan into our communities, 
helping them resettle as they start new lives. That is 
something to be proud of as well.
    With that, I thank the members of this committee and look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken

    I welcome this opportunity to discuss our policy on Afghanistan--
including where we are, how we got here, and where we're going in the 
weeks and months ahead.
    For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided funding 
for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my time as a staff member 
for then-Senator Biden just how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I 
said when I was nominated, I believe strongly in Congress's traditional 
role as a partner in foreign policy making and am committed to working 
with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the 
interests of the American people.
    On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor the nearly 3,000 men, 
women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded why we went 
to Afghanistan in the first place: to bring justice to those who 
attacked us and ensure it would never happen again. We achieved those 
objectives long ago. Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's 
capabilities were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan 
and conduct external operations. After 20 years, 2,461 American lives 
lost, 20,000 injuries, and $2 trillion spent, it was time to end 
America's longest war.
    When President Biden took office in January, he inherited an 
agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban to remove 
all remaining U.S. troops by May 1 of this year. As part of that 
agreement, the previous Administration pressed the Afghan Government to 
release 5,000 Taliban prisoners--including some top war commanders. 
Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
    In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and partner 
forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's major cities. But 
the Taliban continued its relentless march on remote outposts, 
checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well as the major roads 
connecting the cities.
    By January 2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position 
since 9/11--and we had the smallest number of troops on the ground 
since 2001.
    As a result, upon taking office, President Biden immediately faced 
the choice between ending the war or escalating it. Had he not followed 
through on his predecessor's commitment, attacks on our forces and 
those of our allies would have resumed and the Taliban's nationwide 
assault on Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would 
have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into Afghanistan 
to defend ourselves and prevent a Taliban takeover, taking casualties--
and with at best the prospect of restoring a stalemate and remaining 
stuck in Afghanistan, under fire, indefinitely.
    There's no evidence that staying longer would have made the Afghan 
security forces or the Afghan Government any more resilient or self-
sustaining. If 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in support, 
equipment, and training did not suffice, why would another year, or 5, 
or 10, make a difference?
    Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors like China 
and Russia--or adversaries like Iran and North Korea--would have liked 
more than for the United States to re-up a 20-year war and remain 
bogged down in Afghanistan for another decade.
    In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant contact 
with our Allies and partners to hear their views and factor them into 
our thinking. When the President announced the withdrawal, NATO 
immediately and unanimously embraced it. We all set to work--together--
on the drawdown.
    Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of Americans in 
Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to leave the country. In 
total, between March and August, we sent 19 specific messages with that 
warning--and with offers of help, including financial assistance to pay 
for plane tickets.
    Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began, there were 
still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were 
evacuated by August 31. Many were dual citizens living in Afghanistan 
for years, decades, generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the 
place they know as home is a wrenching decision.
    In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering non-essential 
personnel to depart.
    We also used this time to significantly speed up the processing of 
Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took 
office, we inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a 
statutory framework enacted by Congress and involving multiple 
government agencies--and a backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants. 
There had not been a single interview of an SIV applicant in Kabul in 9 
months, going back to March of 2020. The program was basically in a 
dead stall.
    Within 2 weeks of taking office, we restarted the SIV interview 
process in Kabul. On February 4, one of the first executive orders 
issued by President Biden directed us to immediately review the SIV 
program to identify causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV 
applications more quickly.
    This spring, I directed significant additional resources to the 
program, expanding the team of people in Washington processing 
applications from 10 to 50 and doubling the number of SIV adjudicators 
at our embassy in Kabul. Even as many embassy personnel returned to the 
United States, we sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV 
applications.
    As a result of these and other steps, including working with 
Congress, by May we had reduced the average processing time for Special 
Immigrant Visas by more than a year. Even amid a COVID surge at Embassy 
Kabul in June, we continued to issue visas. And we went from issuing 
about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to more than 1,000 
per week in August--when our evacuation and relocation operation began.
    That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of the Afghan 
security forces and Government. Throughout the year, we were constantly 
assessing their staying power and considering multiple scenarios. Even 
the most pessimistic assessments did not predict that government forces 
in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained. They were focused 
on what would happen after the United States withdrew, from September 
onward. As General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
has said, ``Nothing I or anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this 
army and this Government in 11 days.''
    Nonetheless, we planned and exercised a wide range of 
contingencies. Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our 
embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within 48 
hours. And the military--placed on stand-by by the President--was able 
to secure the airport and start the evacuation within 72 hours.
    The evacuation was an extraordinary effort--under the most 
difficult conditions imaginable--by our diplomats, military, and 
intelligence professionals. They worked around the clock to get 
American citizens, Afghans who helped us, citizens of our Allies and 
partners, and at-risk Afghans on planes, out of the country, and off to 
the United States or transit locations that our diplomats arranged in 
multiple countries. Our consular team worked 24-7 to reach out to 
Americans who could still be in the country, making 55,000 phone calls 
and sending 33,000 emails by August 31--and they're still at it. In the 
midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed 13 service members 
working the gates at HKIA, wounded 20 others, and killed and wounded 
scores of Afghans.
    In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in history, 
with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
    And on August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan 
officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began.
    I want to acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have 
helped with the relocation effort--some serving as transit hubs, some 
welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time.
    And as the 9/11 report suggested, it is essential that we 
accelerate the process for national security appointments since a 
catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice. Yet today, 
there are nearly 80 State Department nominees pending before the 
Senate. Nearly 20 have already been voted out of the Committee on a 
strong bipartisan basis and simply await a vote in the Senate. 
Yesterday's voice vote to confirm three of them was greatly, greatly 
appreciated, and was a demonstration of how quickly the Senate can move 
when the need is great and the bipartisan will is there. For our 
national security, I respectfully urge the Senate and this Committee to 
move swiftly to consider and confirm all pending nominees and to 
address what is a significant disruption in our national security 
policymaking.
    Let me briefly outline what the State Department has done in the 
past 2 weeks.
    First, we moved our diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where 
our new Afghan affairs team is hard at work. Many of our key partners 
have joined us there.
    Second, we're continuing our relentless efforts to help any 
remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of Allied and 
partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose.
    On Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with U.S. citizens and 
others onboard departed Kabul and landed in Doha. On Friday, a second 
flight carrying U.S. citizens and others departed Afghanistan. These 
flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the United States, 
Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport, and intense diplomacy to start 
the flights.
    In addition to those flights, 6 American citizens and 11 permanent 
residents of the United States have also left Afghanistan via an 
overland route, with our help.
    We are in constant contact with American citizens still in 
Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been assigned 
a case management team to offer specific guidance and instructions. 
Some declined to be on the first flights on Thursday and Friday for 
reasons including needing more time to make arrangements, wanting to 
remain with extended family for now, or medical issues that preclude 
traveling now.
    We will continue to help Americans--and Afghans to whom we have a 
special commitment--depart Afghanistan if they choose, just as we've 
done in other countries where we've evacuated our embassy and hundreds 
or even thousands of Americans remained behind--for example, in Libya, 
Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia. There is no deadline to this 
mission.
    Third, we're focused on counterterrorism.
    The Taliban has committed to prevent terrorist groups from using 
Afghanistan as a base for external operations that could threaten the 
United States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will 
hold them accountable to that. That does not mean we will rely on them. 
We will remain vigilant in monitoring threats, and we'll maintain 
robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize those 
threats if necessary--as we do in places around the world where we do 
not have military forces on the ground.
    Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with Allies and 
partners.
    We initiated a statement joined by more than 100 countries and a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution setting out the 
international community's expectations of a Taliban-led government. We 
expect the Taliban to ensure freedom of travel; make good on its 
counter-terrorism commitments; uphold the basic rights of the Afghan 
people, including women, girls, and minorities; name a broadly 
representative permanent government; and forswear reprisals. The 
legitimacy and support it seeks from the international community will 
depend on its conduct.
    We've organized contact groups of key countries to ensure the 
international community continues to speak with one voice on 
Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence.
    Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus NATO, 
the EU, and the U.N., to align our efforts.
    And fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the 
Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not flow 
through the government, but rather through independent organizations 
like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
    Yesterday, we announced that the United States is providing nearly 
$64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people of 
Afghanistan, to meet critical health and nutrition needs, address the 
protection concerns of women, children, and minorities, to help more 
children--including girls--go back to school. This additional funding 
means the United States has provided nearly $330 million in assistance 
to the Afghan people this fiscal year.
    In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans that we 
evacuated are being processed before moving on to their next 
destinations. Here at home, I spent some time at the Dulles Expo 
Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed after 
arriving in the United States. It's remarkable to see what our 
diplomats, military, and employees from other civilian agencies across 
the U.S. Government have been able to achieve in a very short time.
    They've met an enormous human need. They're coordinating food, 
water, and sanitation for thousands of people. They're arranging 
medical care, including the delivery of several babies. They're 
reuniting families who were separated and caring for unaccompanied 
minors. It's an extraordinary interagency effort--and a powerful 
testament to the skill, compassion, and dedication of our people.
    We can all be deeply proud of what they're doing. And as we've done 
throughout our history, Americans are now welcoming families from 
Afghanistan into our communities and helping them resettle as they 
start their new lives. That's something to be proud of, too.
    With that, I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    Let me first begin by asking unanimous consent to enter 
into the hearing record a letter by the U.S.-Afghan Women's 
Council calling on the Biden administration to take immediate 
action at the United Nations to protect Afghan civilians, 
particularly women and girls.
    Without objection, it is so ordered.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Let us start a series of 7-minute rounds. I 
am going to hold the time tight so that every member can get 
their opportunity, and I will start off by making sure that I 
do not exceed my 7 minutes.
    So prior to the final flight out, we heard from both 
American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the 
airport they were either not being allowed through the gates, 
being sent back home, or simply abandoned. While we understand 
and appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is 
confounding that such a chaotic process arose to begin with.
    So when did the Administration begin to plan for a worst-
case scenario contingency?
    Secretary Blinken. In the spring and summer.
    The Chairman. In the spring and summer of this year?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. Multiple interagency meetings, 
exercises, looking at the different contingencies.
    The Chairman. So what was the specific planning put into 
the likely scenario that American citizens were going to have 
to evacuate under hostile conditions?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, planning went to a number of 
things, including the ability to move our embassy quickly, as 
we did in 48 hours, including the effort to make sure that we 
could control the airport, bring flights in and evacuate people 
out.
    One of the things that happened, as you know, Mr. Chairman, 
is that the situation outside the airport became incredibly 
chaotic, with thousands of people massing at the airport, 
massing at the gates of the airport, and that created, among 
other things, a very, very challenging situation.
    The Chairman. Should we not have started earlier so there 
would not have been a bigger surge on the SIV issue? I 
recognize, and I think it is only fair to put in context, that 
your own testimony suggested that there was a 17,000 SIV 
backlog. Nine months had passed by without a single interview. 
So, obviously, you inherited a significant backlog. How many 
SIVs were awarded during the Trump administration?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not have the numbers in front of 
me, but I think over the course of the Administration, there 
must have been several thousand issued.
    The Chairman. Okay. So the question is then should we not 
have surged more significantly? I know you said you put up to 
50 individuals, but knowing that you were preparing for a 
contingency of the worst-case scenario, should not back in 
March there have been a more significant surge to process SIVs 
and determine the entire universe of who needed to be taken 
out?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, I believe we did surge those 
resources. As I said, we quadrupled the number of people in 
Washington doing processing of SIVs, and this is at a critical 
stage in the processing, as I think many members know. The most 
important stage in many ways is the so-called Chief of Mission 
approval. That is the stage at which SIV applicants are 
actually deemed eligible under the criteria established by 
Congress for the program.
    By the way, those who apply, those who actually get Chief 
of Mission approval, the washout rate is about 40 percent 
historically. That is because it turns out that many people who 
apply do not qualify under the criteria set by Congress, or 
they are unable to get the documentation--I think this was 
alluded to prove that they had worked faithfully and loyally 
for the United States.
    There are some situations where people were committing 
fraud in order to get into the program, maybe for 
understandable reasons, but the point is we have a very lengthy 
process, 14 steps, multiple agencies involved. We worked to try 
to streamline that. I think there is more work that we would 
like to do going forward to do that, but the bottom line is we 
did significantly surge our resources to that, particularly to 
the Chief of Mission approval process, quadrupling them.
    Ultimately, we went from 10 to 50 to now, I believe, 61 or 
62 working on that stage of things. We doubled the resources we 
had in Kabul, all in an effort to expedite. We did. We went 
from 100 visas a week to 1,000 visas a week. What was not 
anticipated was the collapse in 11 days of the Afghan 
Government and the Afghan military.
    The Chairman. Let me ask you this. There have been numerous 
press reports over the past week about a new or refined process 
for the State Department to lead efforts in coordination with 
the Department of Defense to work with outside groups to 
evacuate American citizens and Afghan allies left behind in 
Afghanistan. Can you tell us exactly what these new U.S. 
Government-led efforts are? How coordination with outside 
groups and individuals is being handled? By who? What is the 
nature of the State-DoD cooperation? Give us a sense of that.
    Secretary Blinken. Sure. We have within the Department, led 
by our former Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass, who went 
back to Kabul to the airport to help lead the evacuation 
efforts, he is leading an effort to manage, coordinate, all of 
the ongoing efforts to bring people who wish to leave 
Afghanistan out. That includes, among other things, a 
coordination with the many outside groups, as well as Members 
of Congress, who are working themselves heroically to help in 
this effort.
    I met, myself, with about 75 veteran's organizations a 
couple of weeks ago, given the extraordinary efforts that 
veterans, either individually or as groups, are doing to help. 
We want to make sure that we are as coordinated as we possibly 
can be on these efforts to make sure that we know who is doing 
what, what assistance we can provide, and to make sure that we 
are working together going forward.
    We have many other people working on this task force. Some 
dedicated to American citizens, others focused on SIVs and 
other Afghans at risk. Others focused on coordinating with 
different groups, including Members of Congress.
    The Chairman. Let me give you, in my final minute, I would 
like to give you an opportunity to set the record straight on 
one point. Several commentators have suggested that had the 
Department moved forward with the Crisis Contingency and 
Response Bureau proposed by the Trump administration as it was 
walking out the door, it would have been able to respond better 
to the Afghan situation.
    It is my understanding that that bureau had not been stood 
up yet when you decided to curtail the proposal nor, as 
proposed, did it actually add any additional resources or 
capabilities to those that State already had. It was a 
bureaucratic movement not creating or getting rid of actual 
capabilities, just a new organizational chart. In that 
bureaucratic result, potentially creating damage to the 
Department's operations, not solving them. Is that a fair 
statement?
    Secretary Blinken. That is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Okay. If it is not the CCR, then what is the 
answer?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, here again, to your point, with 
regard to the CCR, whether it became a bureau or not, there was 
no change in the assets that we already had at hand to work on 
these efforts. The focus of this group, either in its existing 
organizational structure or had it become a bureau, which, 
among other things, it did not because there were congressional 
holds across the aisle on this effort.
    The previous Administration, nonetheless, went through and 
tried to move it forward. We decided that we needed to review 
it. We did the review. As you described very--very accurately, 
we found that this would add no assets to what we already had 
at hand. It would simply create a different bureaucratic 
structure.
    Having said that, again, this is something designed 
primarily for individual extractions, medical emergencies. 
These men and women who are part of our operational medical 
unit are remarkable and do incredible work, but not the kind of 
work that would have been applicable to the large evacuation 
that we had to conduct in Afghanistan.
    Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, I can tell you, I have listened to you and a 
handful of other people try to put the best face on this 
possible. I can tell you that the temperature of the American 
people is not there with you and that I am not talking from a 
partisan basis. This goes both ways.
    There is not enough lipstick in the world to put on this 
pig to make it look any different than what it actually is. The 
American people want to know who is responsible for this. So 
let us start with this. Who is responsible? Who made the 
decisions on this? Was it the President of the United States?
    Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President makes the 
decisions. That is correct.
    Senator Risch. Did he in this case?
    Secretary Blinken. As in every case, ultimately, decisions 
that can only be decided by the President are decided by the 
President.
    Senator Risch. Well----
    Secretary Blinken. Now, of course, to be specific, Senator, 
there are hundreds, thousands of decisions every single day 
that go into a situation as complex as this one. The big 
strategic decisions, those are decided by the President. The 
tactical operational decisions are made by different agencies, 
agency heads, and agency officials.
    Senator Risch. Well, I am more interested in the top 
decision-making. Look, we have all seen this. We saw it as 
recently as yesterday. Somebody in the White House has 
authority to press the button and stop the President, cut off 
the President's speaking ability and sound. Who is that person?
    Secretary Blinken. I think anyone who knows the President, 
including members of this committee, knows that he speaks very 
clearly and very deliberately for himself. No one else does.
    Senator Risch. Well, are you saying that there is no one in 
the White House that can cut him off? Because yesterday that 
happened, and it has happened a number of times before that. It 
has been widely reported that somebody has the ability to push 
the button and cut off his sound and stop him from speaking. 
Who is that person?
    Secretary Blinken. There is no such person. Again, the 
President speaks for himself, makes all of the strategic 
decisions informed by the best advice that he can get from the 
people around him.
    Senator Risch. So are you unaware that this is actually 
happening? Because it happened yesterday at the Interagency 
Fire Center. It was widely reported. The media has reported on 
it, and it is not the first time it has happened. It has 
happened several times.
    Are you telling this committee that this does not happen? 
That there is no one in the White House who pushes the button 
and cuts him off in mid-sentence?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Risch. So this did not happen yesterday nor on the 
other occasions where the media showed the American people that 
his sentence was cut off in mid-sentence?
    Secretary Blinken. No.
    Senator Risch. Are you saying that did not happen?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I really do not know what you 
are referring to. All I can tell you is having worked with the 
President for now 20 years, both here on this committee and in 
over the last 9 months at the White House, the President very 
much speaks for himself.
    Senator Risch. Well, let us take a different attack. He 
does speak for himself, but what happens when somebody does not 
want him speaking? You are telling us you do not know anything 
about this that somebody cuts him off in mid-sentence? Is that 
what you are trying to tell this committee? Because everybody 
here has seen it.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am telling you based on my 
own experience with the President over the last 20 years, 
anyone who tried to stop him from saying what he wanted to say, 
speaking his mind, would probably not be long for their job.
    Senator Risch. Let us turn to the dissent cable that you 
received in July. Are you willing to give a copy of this 
dissent cable that you got from two dozen diplomats regarding 
the imminent catastrophic collapse in Afghanistan, are you 
willing to give a copy of that to this committee?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, this dissent channel is 
something that I place tremendous value and importance on. It 
is a way for people in the State Department to speak the truth, 
as they see it, to power. These cables, I have read every 
single one of them, of the dissent channel cables that we have 
gotten during this Administration. I have responded to every 
single one. I factored what I read and heard into my thinking 
and into my actions.
    The legitimacy of the channel, the ability for people to be 
able to, with confidence, share their thoughts, share their 
views, even when they run counter to what their seniors have 
said or the policies being prescribed, it is vitally important 
that we protect that channel, protect its integrity. It is 
designed by its very regulations only to be shared with senior 
officials in the Department.
    What I do not want to see is some kind of chilling effect 
going forward that says to those who would think of writing a 
cable in the future that, oh, this will, get out widely, be 
distributed in ways that would have that chilling effect.
    Senator Risch. Do you admit that you received a dissent 
cable in July signed by two dozens diplomats that warned about 
the imminent catastrophic collapse that was coming in 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I certainly received this cable 
in mid-July. I read it. I responded to it. I factored its 
contents into my thinking.
    What the cable said broadly was two things. It did not 
suggest that the government and security forces were going to 
collapse prior to our departure. It did express real concerns 
about the durability of that government force after our 
departure, and it focused on the efforts that we were making, 
particularly on the SIV front, to try to expedite moving them 
out.
    In fact, a number of the recommendations, the very good 
recommendations it made were already entrained. Others were 
not, but one of the ones that was entrained was the 
establishment of Operation Allies Refuge. We received the cable 
on July 13. That operation was actually put into force on July 
14. It had already been planned for some time, and this was an 
effort to expedite the identification and relocation of SIVs, 
actually putting them on planes, which, as you know, is not 
part of the program. Actually relocating them and working to 
establish transit sites so that we could put them there while 
we finished processing them.
    Senator Risch. Well, you see that is the problem with us 
not having access to that cable. You are telling us that, but 
we have been told by others that it was significantly different 
than what you are saying. Also we really would like to see the 
response to that because I think history is going to be 
interested in that particular cable and your response to it.
    I will save my next question for the next round. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin, I have asked 
Senator Cardin to, in addition to his questions, preside for a 
few minutes since I have a hearing that I have to just go to.
    Thank you.
    Senator Cardin [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Blinken, thank you so much for being with us 
today. Thank you during the Afghan evacuations for almost the 
daily briefings you had for all members of the United States 
Senate and keeping us totally informed as to the events 
unfolding.
    Now I contrast that to what happened during the Trump 
years, where we were not kept informed at all about the 
negotiations between the Trump administration and the Taliban, 
that we had no briefings or information at all in regards to 
the summit meetings between the United States and North Korea, 
or the United States and Russia. Where our committee could not 
conduct the oversight that is so important, as you have pointed 
out, working with the executive branch in a check and balance 
for the unity of our country.
    So I thank you very much for the way that you have kept us 
engaged and informed as decisions have been made.
    As you pointed out, the Biden administration was dealt a 
very difficult hand on the withdrawal from Afghanistan. We all 
recognize we needed to withdraw. The options were extremely 
limited.
    The mistakes made by previous administrations, we have 
talked about it. I think we need to understand that many of us 
did not support the 2002 campaign to go into Iraq. One of those 
reasons was that we wanted to complete the mission in 
Afghanistan when we had a chance to do it when the Taliban was 
diminished after our military came in, after the attack on our 
country.
    Instead, we went into Iraq, which was not engaged in the 9/
11 activities, and we never finished Afghanistan, a mistake 
made by the Bush administration.
    Now we have already talked about the Trump administration 
and setting a deadline and releasing prisoners and moving 
forward with the reduction of troops when there was really very 
little options that the Administration had. It does not negate 
the information that was made available to you about the 
strength of the Afghan security forces and the Ghani 
administration's will to stick with it in Afghanistan.
    I think many of us are interested in knowing how 
intelligence got that so wrong, and the contingency plans are 
ones that we really do want to review because it seems to us 
there had to be better ways to secure passage into the airport 
than what ultimately happened. Considering the hand that you 
were dealt, considering the crisis that developed, evacuating 
124,000 was a miraculous task. So we congratulate all that were 
involved in the evacuation of so many people under such a short 
period of time under such difficult circumstances.
    I want to get to where we are today. During this process, 
the State Department was very open to all Members of Congress--
Democrats, Republicans--as we filtered information in to you 
about vulnerable people in an effort to get them out of 
Afghanistan. Today, our offices are still being deluged by 
requests to help people that are in Afghanistan. NGOs are 
working very aggressively.
    Can you share with us the process that you are using in 
order to filter information about Americans that are still in 
Afghanistan who want to leave, those that apply for SIV status, 
and those Afghans that are at risk? How do we transmit that 
information, and what process is in place so that we can try to 
get these people out of Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you, Senator.
    As I noted, we have established a task force focused 
entirely on relocation to help those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, whether there be any remaining American citizens, 
whether it is SIV applicants, whether it is Afghans at-risk, 
whether it is the nationals of our partner countries, get out. 
That involves a number of things.
    It involves, for the American citizens, case management 
teams. Five hundred individuals whose task is to be in constant 
contact with any remaining American citizens who wish to leave, 
and that is what they are doing.
    It also includes, together with our Legislative Affairs 
Office, being in constant contact with you, as well as with 
outside groups who have identified and are trying to help 
people who seek to leave. This here is the sum total of cases 
brought to us by members of this committee, just this 
committee, that all of you or many of you have been working, 
and we are deeply grateful for those efforts, for this 
information. It ensures that when you send us the information, 
we put it into our database if it is not already there. We make 
sure that we are able to track it. We make sure we are able to 
coordinate with you.
    I recognize that especially in the early going, during the 
evacuation itself, some of the feedback was lacking. We were 
trying to do all of this in real time, making sure that we took 
in the information that you were providing and acting on it. In 
some cases, we did not get back to people to say here is what 
we have done, and we have been working to make sure that we get 
back to everyone. I think we have 26,000 inquiries from 
Congress. We have responded to 21,000 or 22,000 of them.
    Senator Cardin. So we still have the categories of 
reporters that work for us that are still in Afghanistan. We 
have women that were officials in Afghanistan that are at risk. 
We have NGOs that worked with us in Afghanistan, their 
employees that are at risk.
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Cardin. So you are saying we still have an 
opportunity to work with you to get that information to the 
sources that you are using to try to arrange for their exit 
from Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, absolutely. We very much invite 
that, and we want to make sure that we have as best possible a 
unified, coordinated list so that we know what everyone is 
working on, and we can track and we can help. Or we can take on 
depending on the----
    Senator Cardin. Can I get your best guess on the numbers? 
At one point when we first started, we thought there might be 
somewhere around a little less than 100,000 of U.S. citizens, 
SIVs, and Afghans at-risk that wanted to leave. Obviously, that 
number was low. We have already evacuated over 124,000.
    Do we know how many U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan that 
want to exit today? How many are in SIV status that want to 
exit? How many Afghans at-risk we want to help?
    Secretary Blinken. On the American citizens who wish to 
leave, the number is about 100, and it is very hard to give a 
real-time number at any given moment because it is very fluid, 
by which I mean this. Some people--and we are in direct contact 
with this group.
    Some, for very understandable reasons, are changing their 
mind from day-to-day about whether or not they want to leave. 
Others continue, even now, to raise their hands and say I am an 
American citizen in Afghanistan, someone who had not identified 
themselves before. Again, I think, as all of you know very, 
very well, we do not require, as a country, our citizens to 
register or identify themselves to our embassies in any country 
in the world when they travel there or if they reside there.
    Senator Cardin. Do you have the numbers for SIV and for----
    Secretary Blinken. So the SIV numbers, that we are 
tabulating right now because we are trying to account for 
everyone who has come in. Some people remain in transit 
countries. Other people are now in the United States.
    We are putting all of those numbers together to determine--
but the overwhelming majority of Afghans who have come out of 
Afghanistan, thanks to our evacuation efforts, are in one way 
or another Afghans at-risk. Some will be SIV applicants. Others 
will be P1 or P2 applicants. Others will be in none of those 
categories, but Afghans at-risk. We are breaking down all of 
those numbers, and we should have a breakdown for you in the 
next couple of weeks.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to seeing that.
    Senator Rubio.
    Senator Rubio. Thank you.
    Mr. Secretary, in your statement, I think that the most 
troubling thing is the following quote from you. ``Even the 
most pessimistic assessment did not predict the government 
forces in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained.'' I 
back that up by saying you also cite General Milley, who said 
there was no indication that there would be a rapid collapse of 
the Afghan army and government.
    For much of last year, I was the acting chairman of 
intelligence. I am now the vice chairman of intelligence. I 
have been tracking this very, very closely. Just going back to 
the beginning of this year, obviously, I cannot quote the 
titles of the pieces, but let me suffice it to say that there 
are numerous pieces that would be categorized as, ``It is going 
to hit the fan.''
    Let us just for a moment put that aside, okay? Because I 
think any analysis of those pieces would have led anyone to 
that conclusion. Putting that aside for a moment, we had every 
reason to believe and to plan for the rapid collapse of the 
Afghan military and the Afghan Government.
    At the beginning of 2020, by all admissions, we had already 
really bad status quo in Afghanistan. Okay, we had a small 
footprint, but we had a strong commitment to air support, and 
that sustained the Afghan security force's ability to resist 
the Taliban. The security forces of Afghanistan were suffering 
10,000 casualties a year. The Taliban was suffering casualties, 
too, but they enjoyed safe haven in Pakistan. They were able to 
go there to rest, to refit, to train, to recruit.
    So, in summary, even before the withdrawal, we had a 
terrible status quo. The security forces, a small number of 
U.S. forces continued to die. We had U.S. losses as well. I 
want to mention that, but the Afghan Government was still 
fractious and corrupt, and the Taliban had an unchallenged safe 
haven in Pakistan.
    Or put another way, and paraphrasing your own words from 
your opening statement, if after 20 years and hundreds of 
billions of dollars in support, equipment, and training, there 
is not enough for the Afghan Government or the Afghan security 
forces to become more resilient or self-sustaining, what did we 
think was going to happen as that support began to be removed?
    What did we think was going to happen when that terrible 
status quo was changed? It does not take some exquisite piece 
of intelligence or some brilliant analysis to conclude that if 
you radically change an already bad status quo, by removing 
U.S. and NATO forces, by ending enablers and air support, the 
status quo was going to collapse in favor of the Taliban.
    This is not an argument in favor of staying. I think that 
ship has sailed, okay? Because I know a lot of time has been 
spent on justifying the withdrawal. We are not debating the 
withdrawal. What I am arguing is we had a terrible status quo 
as is. By your own admission, the Afghan Government, even after 
billions of dollars and 20 years, was not self-sustaining, was 
not resilient. We should have known that as we began to draw 
down support we were going to see the potential for a collapse, 
and that is what all these pieces pointed to as well.
    So it is concerning that no one saw all of this and 
concluded that there was no evidence or no reason to believe 
that there could be a rapid collapse. More to that point, we 
began to see clear signs weeks ago that this is where it was 
headed. Without air strikes, the Taliban now began to mass and 
maneuver, going from intimidating these small Afghan outposts 
to actually getting them into quitting. We were seeing Afghan 
outposts begin to quit.
    The Taliban could now--they went from surrounding these 
small provincial capitals to surrounding major cities, with 
5,000 to 8,000 Taliban fighters. This is weeks before. By the 
way, this is at the same time as, I believe, on July 8 
President Biden was still giving this naive optimistic 
prediction about the fighting capabilities of the Afghan forces 
and so forth.
    We could see them meticulously focused on the north. You 
could see that they were methodically and carefully splintering 
the sporadic remains of any sort of resistance. Weeks before 
the fall of Kabul, you could see the Taliban was on the verge, 
was headed towards doing something they had not done before. 
They were going to isolate Kabul from the north, cutting off 
all their supply routes.
    So we knew weeks before that we were headed for a Taliban 
control of the north, all the traditional routes of Taliban 
encroachment on Kabul were nearly sealed, the south and the 
east. Kabul faced the prospect of no fuel. The Afghan 
Government faced the prospect of being unable to mount any 
viable opposition and sustained defense. What did we think was 
going to happen? All of those things were in place at the time.
    I think the most concerning part of it is that if we did 
not have an analysis that looked at all this, this was not a 
failure of intelligence. This was a failure of policy and 
planning. We had the wrong people analyzing this. Someone did 
not see this. Either someone did not see this or someone did 
not want to see this because we had established this, we wanted 
to be out by September 11 so that we could have some ceremony 
arguing that we got and pulled out of Afghanistan on the 
anniversary of 9/11.
    The fact of the matter is where it leaves us now, on top of 
all the other things that have been mentioned here, from a 
geopolitical perspective, is not a good place. I think China 
and Russia and Iran, they look at this botched withdrawal, and 
what they see is incompetence that they think they might be 
able to exploit, may lead to miscalculation.
    I think the Europeans, our allies, who had very little say, 
if any, or control certainly over the timing and the execution 
of all this, they are now, number one, have to be wondering 
about our reliability, the credibility of our defense 
agreements with them. They also have to be really, really upset 
at the prospects of a massive refugee crisis landing right on 
their borders here very soon.
    India, and I know that there was an announcement today 
there will be a meeting of the Quad fairly soon, which is a 
good development, except that in the Pacific region, if you are 
India, you are looking at this and saying if the United States 
allowed Pakistan to unravel their standing--the Pakistani role 
in all this, and I think multiple administrations are guilty of 
ignoring it. The Pakistani role in enabling the Taliban is 
ultimately a victory for those pro-Taliban hardliners in the 
Pakistani Government. They have to be looking at this and 
saying if the United States could have a third-rate power like 
Pakistan unravel its aims, what chance do they have of 
confronting China?
    So I think this leaves us in a terrible situation. I go 
back to the initial point. I do not know how it is possible if, 
in fact, the people in charge of our foreign policy did not see 
all of these factors and conclude that there was a very real 
possibility of a very rapid collapse, then we have got the 
wrong people making military and diplomacy decisions in our 
government.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to respond briefly 
in the time that we have. As you know from your own expertise 
and leadership on these matters, there are constant assessments 
being done. In this particular case, assessments being done of 
the resilience of Afghan security forces, of the Afghan 
Government, and different scenarios established, from worst 
case to best case to everything in between.
    Ultimately, the preponderance of the intelligence and 
assessments land someplace, and there are always going to be 
voices, and critically important that we listen to all of them, 
who may be talking about exclusively the worst case, some best 
case, some in-between. Here is what I can say in this setting, 
and we can take this up as well in other settings.
    Back in February, the overall assessment of the community 
was that after a complete U.S. military withdrawal, that could 
potentially in the worst-case scenario lead to the Taliban 
capturing Kabul within a year or two. So that is back in 
February, and that was more or less where things stood in the 
winter and into the spring.
    You are exactly right that the situation was deteriorating 
as the Taliban continued to make progress on the ground 
throughout the summer. In July, the IC indicated that it was 
more likely than not that the Taliban would take over by the 
end of the year, the end of this year. That said, we, the 
intelligence community, did not say that the country-wide 
collapse of all meaningful resistance would be likely to occur 
in a matter of days.
    You referenced Chairman Milley, as I did earlier. Nothing 
that he saw, that I saw, that we saw, suggested that this 
government and the security force would collapse in a matter of 
11 days.
    You are right that I think we need to look back at all of 
this because, to your point, we collectively over 20 years 
invested extraordinary amounts in those security forces and in 
that government. Hundreds of billions of dollars, equipment, 
training, advice, support. Based on that, as well as based on 
what we were looking at real time, again, we did not see this 
collapse in a matter of 11 days.
    It is important that we go back and look at all of this.
    Senator Cardin. The time has expired.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Secretary Blinken, for appearing before the committee today.
    I appreciate and share the frustration of my colleagues 
over the challenges with the evacuation, over the situation of 
Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and the Taliban's treatment 
of women and girls and other minorities. I also agree with your 
assessment and that that has been given by several others that 
where we were when we got to that evacuation was because of the 
failure of both Democratic and Republican administrations.
    I want to know where that outrage was when year after year 
for 10 years, starting with Senator McCain, I and others in the 
Senate tried to get more Special Immigrant Visa applicants 
through the process so that they could leave Afghanistan, leave 
the threat, and come to the United States. There were a few 
Republicans in the Senate who blocked us year after year from 
getting more SIV applicants to the United States.
    I want to know where that outrage was during the 
negotiations by the Trump administration and former Secretary 
Pompeo, when they were giving away the rights of women and 
girls and when Secretary Pompeo came before this committee and 
blew off questions about what they were doing to pressure the 
Taliban to have women at the negotiating table for that peace 
treaty.
    So I think there is a lot of regret and a lot of 
recriminations to go around, and the important thing for us to 
do now is to figure out how we can work together to address 
those people who still need to be evacuated from Afghanistan 
and also to ensure that we can do everything possible with the 
international community to help protect the human rights of the 
women and girls who remain in the country and those minorities.
    So, Mr. Secretary, that is where I am going to put my 
effort. I do think we need an accounting. That is important for 
history and for us going forward, but let us stop with the 
hypocrisy about who is to blame. There are a lot of people to 
blame, and we all share in it.
    Now, Mr. Secretary, as you know, I was one of those who was 
opposed to our withdrawing from Afghanistan. I am not going to 
revisit that, but a lot of my concerns were around the rights 
of women and girls if Afghanistan fell into the hands of the 
Taliban.
    So I want to ask you now, and you have been very specific 
on briefing calls that you share the concern, and I recognize 
that you believe it is a priority for this Administration to do 
what you can to protect the rights of women and girls. So can 
you talk specifically about what steps the Department is taking 
to provide for the safety of women and girls and how we are 
trying to rally the international community behind that effort?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    Let me just start by thanking you personally for your 
leadership for a long time now on these issues, both on the 
SIVs and the work that we have actually been able to do to try 
to improve the program, but more work needs to be done, as 
well, of course, as on women and girls. From advancing women, 
peace, and security and that agenda to ensuring that there is 
an equal playing field for women and girls, you have made a 
huge difference.
    I have to say over the last 20 years, we have made a 
difference, collectively, in Afghanistan. Possibly the biggest 
difference we made was for women and girls. Access to 
education, access to healthcare, access to work and 
opportunity. All of that was as a result of many of the efforts 
that we made and that this Congress made and supported, 
including with very, very significant assistance.
    This is hard. I was in Kabul after the President announced 
his decision. I met with women leaders from the then-
parliament, NGOs, a lawyer, human rights defenders, listened 
and heard from them about their concerns about the future. Just 
the past couple of weeks when I was out in Doha and then in 
Ramstein, I talked to young women and girls who we had 
evacuated and heard from them, both their gratitude for having 
been evacuated, but also their deep concerns, more than deep 
concerns about the future for the women and girls who remain in 
Afghanistan.
    So, with that bearing in mind, we have done a few things, 
and this is where we really want to work closely with you and 
with every member. One, we have worked to rally the 
international community to set very clear expectations of the 
Taliban going forward, to include the expectation that it will 
uphold the basic rights of women and girls, as well as 
minorities.
    That is visible in the statement that more than 100 
countries have signed at our initiative. It is also in a U.N. 
Security Council resolution that we initiated and got passed. I 
know people say, oh, it is a statement or a Security Council 
resolution, it does not matter. Well, in the case of the 
Security Council resolution, just to cite one example, there 
are significant sanctions from the United Nations on the 
Taliban. There are travel restrictions on the Taliban. The idea 
that if the Taliban is in violation of the Security Council 
resolution that we established, it will get any relief just on 
that alone, the U.N. sanctions or travel restrictions, I think 
that is pretty clear that that will not happen. That is just 
one point of leverage.
    We have been working to make sure that the international 
community speaks with one voice and acts together, including on 
this. That is one.
    Second, we want to make sure that assistance continues to 
flow. Humanitarian assistance, including assistance that is 
directed at the special needs of women and girls. We are doing 
that consistent with our sanctions, and we are able to do that 
by working through NGOs and the U.N. agencies.
    Now I do not want to sugarcoat this because we know that 
while the Taliban seeks and will probably support and protect 
basic humanitarian assistance through these agencies like for 
food and medicine, it may be a different story when it comes to 
things that are directed specifically at women and girls. So we 
are going to be very focused on that and trying to make sure 
that that assistance can go through, that it is monitored 
effectively, including by the agencies doing it. I had spent 
some time talking with the head of the United Nations effort on 
this in terms of having a clear monitoring mechanisms for this 
and to carry that forward.
    Next, we will soon appoint, at my direction, a senior 
official responsible for focusing and marshaling all of our 
efforts on support for women, girls, and minorities in 
Afghanistan. I think it is very important that we have a focal 
point in the U.S. Government at the State Department whose 
responsibility is to carry forward this agenda, working closely 
with you in the weeks and months ahead.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of 
time, but can you share with us who that official is as soon as 
they are appointed?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, of course.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Johnson.
    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, if I were just to read your testimony, not 
having watched any news, I would literally think this was a 
smashing success, but I do read the news, as most Americans do, 
and we realize this was a complete debacle. I think what 
concerns me the most among many things is that detachment from 
reality. It is the same denial of reality, for example, on the 
border. A self-inflicted wound. A crisis created by President 
Biden's policies that have completely thrown open our borders, 
and yet the Administration denies that we have a problem at the 
border.
    I have got a number of questions. First of all, 
approximately, what is the dollar value of the equipment that 
has been left behind that now the Taliban controls? What is the 
dollar value of that?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I believe the equipment 
provided over the last 20--well, little less than 20 years, 15 
years, is about $80 billion. Of that equipment that remains, as 
you know, it was given--some of it was handed over to the 
Afghan security forces----
    Senator Johnson. I understand.
    Secretary Blinken. --and of course, some of that is now in 
the hands of the Taliban.
    Senator Johnson. So I was also struck by your comment that 
in your testimony that even the most pessimistic assessment did 
not predict the government would collapse as quickly as it did. 
You just in your testimony said that the realistic predictions 
before the complete withdrawal was that it was going to 
collapse by the end of this year.
    So the Administration continued with their plans of 
withdrawal, of evacuation, of surrender, knowing the Taliban 
would be in control of $80 billion worth of sophisticated 
equipment at the end of that. Correct? I mean, did that ever--
--
    Secretary Blinken. That----
    Senator Johnson. Did that discussion ever come up in terms 
of maybe that would not be a good idea, leaving all that 
equipment behind as we bug out of Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. That assessment came in July. Much of 
the equipment--and again, I will defer to my colleagues at the 
Pentagon, who are more expert in this than I am. Much of that 
equipment was made inoperable. Other pieces of equipment will 
become inoperable because there is no ability on the part of 
the Taliban to maintain it. None of it, to the best of my 
knowledge, poses a strategic threat to us or to any of 
Afghanistan's neighbors. What we are looking at are----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. So we have an oversight letter. We 
would like response on that.
    Let us just quick talk about the decision to close down 
Bagram. I mean, again, the President says this was unanimously 
decided by the military. Is it not true that the President 
decided what the troop level would be, a very minimal troop 
level? The President decided that we would keep the embassy 
open, and it had to be protected. He forced the military's 
hands, right?
    In the end, it was his decision. It was not the military's 
decision to close Bagram.
    Secretary Blinken. The President makes the strategic 
decisions. When it comes to the actual drawdown, the 
retrograde, to use the technical language, those were decisions 
made by his military commanders. He sought their best advice, 
and that is what was carried out, including the timing of the 
decision to leave----
    Senator Johnson. Okay. Another troubling piece of your 
testimony. You said when the President announced the 
withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. Josep 
Borrell, the Foreign Affairs Chief for the European Union, his 
statement on the surrender is that it is ``a catastrophe for 
the Afghan people, for Western values and credibility, and for 
the developing of international relations.''
    The Wall Street Journal summarizes it quite nicely in their 
piece, just the title, ``How Biden Broke NATO: The Chaotic 
Afghan Withdrawal Has Shocked and Angered U.S. Allies.'' Again, 
that is detachment from reality that our NATO allies are 
onboard with this thing. They are not.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator----
    Senator Johnson. That is not what we are hearing.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I went to NATO well before the 
President's decision, along with Secretary of Defense Austin, 
and spent the day with all of our NATO allies listening to 
them, their views, their prescriptions, their ideas for what we 
should do moving forward in Afghanistan. I shared some of our 
initial thinking at that point.
    We factored in everything we heard from our allies into our 
own decision-making process. When the President made----
    Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for----
    Secretary Blinken. When the President made the----
    Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for every 
contingency. Okay, I got it.
    Secretary Blinken. If I could continue?
    Senator Johnson. Now, listen, it is bureaucratic-speak. I 
have some questions. So, again, my concern is detachment from 
reality. As we surrendered, as we are evacuating, as we are 
bugging out, we are hearing all these soothing comments from 
the Administration. This is almost like a well-oiled machine 
here. We have got flights just leaving and 124,000 people being 
evacuated.
    We heard something completely different. So tell me what is 
wrong about what I had heard. First of all, prior to the 
Taliban providing perimeter security, there was no security, 
and basically, tens of thousands of the Afghanis flooded into 
the Kabul airport. Correct?
    Secretary Blinken. There was perimeter security around the 
airport established by our----
    Senator Johnson. You had--we literally had tens of 
thousands of people.
    Secretary Blinken. We did not----
    Senator Johnson. We did not know who these people were. It 
was not like people we invited in that were Special Immigrant 
Visa holders. Correct?
    Secretary Blinken. We controlled the airport. We did not 
control the city. We controlled the airport. Sorry for speaking 
over you.
    Senator Johnson. Again, so we had tens of thousands of 
people in Kabul airport. The reports we were getting on the 
ground is many had no form of ID whatsoever. When I went to 
Fort McCoy, I asked the commanding general--again, all the--
every contingency planned for. I asked the commanding general, 
when did you first find out that your mission would be as an 
intake facility for the Afghanistan refugees? He said 10 days 
ago.
    I asked the commanding general. I asked the representative 
for the Department of State, as well as from Department of 
Homeland Security. Do we know that every refugee that you have 
received so far--and there was only 1,000 at that point in 
time--but do we know that they at least have some form of ID? 
We did not.
    We are hearing all these assurances that we are getting 
biometrically screened, a 14-step plan. I asked the head of 
Northern Command, he was at Fort McCoy, describe those steps to 
me, and what are we screening them against? I mean, are ISIS 
terrorists? Are Al Qaeda terrorists? Have we biometrically 
screened them in the past that we can compare them to a 
database?
    What is that 14-step process in detail? Not just 14 steps. 
Tell me, describe to us in detail how are we keeping this 
nation safe from such a chaotic situation.
    Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, the 14-step process refers 
specifically to the Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and 
there is a lengthy process----
    Senator Johnson. So how about for the other 124,000 people?
    Secretary Blinken. So, yes. So to come to your point, 
Senator, a couple of things. We arranged, as you know, transit 
countries so that any Afghan coming out of Afghanistan would 
initially go to a transit country where we could initiate the 
screening, the vetting, and the background checks. We surged 
Customs and Border Protection officials to those transit 
points, as well, of course, as other security law enforcement 
agencies to do these checks with biometric, biographic, other 
information that we have.
    Then as people are cleared in these transit points, they 
then come into the United States, but they are not being 
resettled immediately. They are going, once they land at Dulles 
or in Philadelphia, they are then being sent to military bases, 
where the checks continue and are completed.
    Senator Johnson. Again, what checks? We need specifically 
what the checks are going to be.
    The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired. I am 
sure you can follow up for the rest of your questions.
    Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, for this hearing. Thank you, Secretary Blinken, for your 
service and your testimony today.
    We have, I am sure, lots of opportunities to look backwards 
at the 20 years of our engagement in Afghanistan and at 
decisions. I had hoped this committee would rise above the 
temptations of partisan politics and use this hearing to 
consider the urgent questions still before us, and I hope we 
will get a few minutes to focus on this, Mr. Secretary.
    How do we get the remaining American citizens, legal 
permanent residents, and those Afghans who served alongside us 
or worked with and for us and who are most at risk out of 
Afghanistan? How do we make sure Afghanistan does not become a 
safe haven for terrorists again and deal with the Taliban? What 
leverage do we have in doing so and to also make sure 
humanitarian aid gets into Afghanistan? Most urgently, how do 
we support and resettle those Afghan refugees whom we have 
evacuated to third countries and that much smaller population 
that has reached the United States?
    So let me just start with my thanks to the State 
Department, to the employees in Kabul and Qatar, and the DC-
based task force that has worked with the evacuation 
repatriation of Americans and Afghans, and to the many 
Delawareans and Americans whom I have heard from. Former 
military folks who served in Afghanistan, former diplomats, and 
development professionals eager to help.
    I look forward to continuing to coordinate with you and 
with the agencies of our Government, advocacy groups, and other 
partners on resettlement efforts. I am glad that the former 
Governor of Delaware, Jack Markell, has been asked to step 
forward and help coordinate this resettlement effort.
    I was encouraged today to see Welcome.US launch, a broad, 
multi-faith, bipartisan national organization, co-chaired by 
three former Presidents--Bush, Obama, and Clinton--and dozens 
and dozens of faith groups and nonprofits to welcome Afghans to 
the United States.
    So let me just start with a question about visa status. 
Senator Sullivan and I wrote a bipartisan letter in mid-August, 
urging expanded eligibility for the SIV program. I am 
interested in how you are working to expand eligibility under 
the existing visa programs to include family members and to 
support those the U.S. Government supported and worked 
alongside, but who were not direct employees?
    I want to start, if I could, Mr. Secretary, by asking you 
just ``yes'' or ``no'' questions about three groups that other 
Senators have mentioned.
    Secretary Blinken. Sure.
    Senator Coons. There is about 550 employees and family 
members from Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio 
Liberty, who were not evacuated. Is the Department prioritizing 
their evacuation?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Coons. The Department committed to evacuating our 
partners from NED, the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI, 
IRI. Are those also being prioritized?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, they are.
    Senator Coons. Our partners from the American University of 
Afghanistan as well?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Coons. So if you would take the 4 minutes we have 
got left and explore with me how do we ensure safe passage 
across land borders, whether into Tajikistan or Pakistan, safe 
and regular flights out of Afghanistan, whether from Mazar-i-
Sharif or Kabul? How do we get documents into the hands of 
those who do not have identity documents, either because they 
were destroyed in our embassy or they destroyed them themselves 
out of fear of the Taliban? How do we make sure that we are 
providing the financial support needed for the whole group of 
refugees who, after thorough vetting, ultimately reached the 
United States?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. Those 
are all very important questions, and let me try to respond 
briefly to them, and we can take on the details after this 
session if need be.
    First, we needed and we have established a clear 
expectation from the Taliban about allowing people to continue 
to leave the country, to include American citizens, green card 
holders, Afghans who are properly documented with a visa, 
including specifically those who worked in some capacity for 
the United States.
    Not only do we have that understanding in public statements 
by the Taliban, of course, it is built into everything we have 
done with a large coalition of countries in terms of setting an 
expectation and making very clear that the failure to fulfill 
that expectation will have significant consequences, which we 
can get into.
    Second, very important to actually make sure that there are 
ways to travel freely from the country. We made an intensive 
effort before we left to understand and share with Qatar and 
Turkey, the countries that stepped up to do this, what was 
necessary to make sure that the airport in Kabul could continue 
to function. Ultimately not--to have charter flights and then 
commercial flights going in under international civil aviation 
organization standards.
    We did intensive work. We brought the American contractors 
back in the midst of the evacuation who had been running the 
airport to work that, and we handed off a very detailed plan, 
which is now being implemented.
    Third, the land crossings. We have worked with Pakistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on this to make sure that as we 
moved people out of Afghanistan, they would facilitate their 
crossing into their countries. We would have consular officials 
surged in the necessary places to handle people coming out in 
that fashion.
    Now, to your very important point about documentation--and 
this is something that maybe we can take offline--we are 
working on a mechanism and a means by which--and there are 
multiple ways of doing this, to make sure that people who do 
not have the necessary document, for example, a visa, from us, 
a physical visa, to get that to them. I prefer to go into more 
detail on that in another setting.
    Senator Coons. Understood. If I might, just as a closing 
question, you were asked at the outset sort of what are the 
factors we weigh as we decide the future of our relationship 
with the Taliban? We are in this difficult situation. Many 
recognize the Taliban is a terrorist organization that has done 
horrific things within Afghanistan in the past, yet we need to 
have some working relationship with them to secure the safe 
passage out of thousands of people who we still care deeply 
about.
    A number of American citizens with Delaware ties who I have 
been in contact with did not leave because their families were 
still in Afghanistan, and there are clear measures that they 
should be expected to meet that you laid out in your opening 
statement. What do you think will be the most important aspects 
of our leverage to ensure the Taliban perform in ways that we 
would accept, and what do you think will be the turning point 
at which we will make decisions with our allies to take sharper 
and harsher measures against the Taliban?
    Secretary Blinken. So, simply put, the nature of the 
relationship that the Taliban would have with us or most other 
countries around the world will depend entirely on its conduct 
and actions, specifically with regard to freedom of travel as 
well as to making good on its counterterrorism commitments, 
upholding basic rights of the Afghan people, not engaging in 
reprisals, et cetera. These are the things that not only we, 
but countries around the world are looking at.
    There is, I think, significant leverage that we and other 
countries hold when it comes to things that the Taliban says it 
wants but will not get if it does not act in a way that meets 
these expectations. For example, we talked a little bit before 
about the existing U.N. sanctions on the Taliban--these are 
significant--as well as travel restrictions.
    There is now a new Security Council resolution that we 
initiated setting out the expectations for what the Taliban has 
do to. If it is in violation of that resolution, it is hard to 
see any of these U.N. sanctions being lifted, travel 
restrictions being lifted, and indeed, additional sanctions 
could well be imposed.
    Similarly, the foreign reserves of Afghanistan are almost 
exclusively in banks here in the United States, including the 
Federal Reserve. Other banks, about $9 billion. All of that has 
been frozen. There are significant resources as well that are 
in the international financial institutions that Afghanistan 
normally would have access to. Those, too, have been frozen.
    Over the last 20 years or so, the international community 
has provided about 75 percent of the Afghan Government's annual 
operating budget. That, too, has been frozen.
    So among many things that the Taliban says it seeks, both 
basic legitimacy and basic support, the United States, the 
international community has a hand on a lot of that, much of 
that, most of that. So we will have to see going forward what 
conclusions the Taliban draws from that and what its conduct 
will be matching these basic expectations that we have set.
    Thank you.
    Senator Coons. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for taking time to answer our questions today.
    I would like to associate myself with the comments that 
Senator Rubio made about planning for a potential immediate 
collapse of the Afghan Government and security forces. It 
seemed that as the Taliban was running the table throughout 
Afghanistan that the prospect of them continuing to run the 
table by coming into Kabul was a significant probability that 
should have been planned for.
    In your view, Mr. Secretary, has the Taliban abandoned 
their sympathy and collaboration with groups like Al Qaeda and 
the Haqqani Network? Do they continue to have the same aim, and 
are they of like spirit? Or has that relationship been severed?
    Secretary Blinken. The relationship has not been severed, 
and it is a very open question as to whether their views and 
the relationship has changed in any kind of definitive way. I 
think it is fair to say two things.
    One, whatever the Taliban's views on Al Qaeda, they do know 
that the last time they harbored Al Qaeda and it engaged in an 
outwardly directed attack, an attack on our homeland, certain 
things followed, which I believe it would have an interest in 
not seeing repeated. So whatever their views on Al Qaeda, there 
is a strong disincentive built-in to allow it to engage in 
outwardly directed attacks, which the assessment of the 
intelligence community is they are not currently capable of 
doing.
    ISIS-K, the other main group, is a different thing, as you 
know, because the Taliban and ISIS-K are sworn enemies. In 
fact, over the last 5 or 6 years since the emergence of ISIS-K, 
the fight has actually been between the Taliban and ISIS-K, 
with the Taliban taking most of the territory that ISIS-K 
sought to hold onto in Afghanistan. The question there, I 
think, is less whether they have the will to deal with ISIS-K 
and more whether they have the capacity.
    Senator Romney. Given that response, I know that previously 
the position of the Administration and the State Department was 
that the 2001 AUMF no longer played a role of significance. 
Given the developments in Afghanistan and the Taliban's ongoing 
collaboration with and sympathy with Al Qaeda and the Haqqani 
Network and like-minded groups, is it not appropriate for the 
State Department to revisit your recommendation that we abandon 
the 2001 AUMF?
    Secretary Blinken. I think, Senator, we need to look to 
make sure that we have all the authorities that we would need 
for any potential contingency, including the re-emergence as a 
threat of Al Qaeda or the further emergence of ISIS-K as an 
outwardly directed threat. If we do not have those authorities, 
we should get them. Whether that means relooking at those 
authorizations or writing new ones, which I think would be the 
most appropriate thing to do, if necessary, we need to look at 
that.
    Senator Romney. I appreciate your willingness to change 
your point of view in part because of the conditions that have 
developed in the most recent weeks. Nothing wrong with 
conditions leading to a change in perspective.
    I, for one, thought some years ago that we should withdraw 
from Afghanistan. The conditions that I saw in the ensuing 
years convinced me that I was wrong, and I, like Senator 
Shaheen, was one of those that felt that President Trump was 
wrong to enter into an agreement to withdraw. I thought 
President Biden was wrong to enter into an agreement--or to 
continue with that agreement to withdraw. Of course, I was 
appalled by the disastrous withdrawal process itself.
    For us today, however, I guess I would like to focus more 
on the moral stain of leaving people behind and understand what 
we can do to make sure that we are not leaving people behind. I 
understand we are down to a small number of Americans. It is 
hard to know exactly how many are left behind.
    In terms of legal permanent residents, is your priority 
just as high to get them out as it is to get out citizens? Or 
is there a different level of commitment for a legal permanent 
resident's return to the United States relative to a citizen?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, our number-one priority is 
American citizens, and that has, I think, long been the case. 
In this situation in Afghanistan, in this emergency evacuation 
in Afghanistan, we did everything we could as well to make sure 
that legal permanent residents, green card holders would also 
identify themselves to us. Like with American citizens, we do 
not know at any given time how many there are in any given 
country around the world, and to make available resources to 
help them.
    Our number-one priority is any remaining American citizens 
who wish to leave.
    Senator Romney. I did not realize there is a secondary 
level of priority then for a legal permanent resident. If that 
is the case, how many of them approximately? So we do not know 
the exact number, but how many legal permanent residents are we 
convinced are still in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. We do not have an exact number, but it 
is in the thousands.
    Senator Romney. A round number? Pardon?
    Secretary Blinken. In the thousands.
    Senator Romney. In the thousands. Likewise, in terms of SIV 
holders or SIV applicants, or people who worked with us that 
have been our partners through the years, how many of them 
approximately are still in Afghanistan that want to come to the 
United States?
    Secretary Blinken. So this is what we are doing an 
accounting of right now based on two things, based on the 
pipeline of applicants as it existed before the evacuation and 
then looking at those who we were able to evacuate. We do not 
have those numbers yet because as we have moved to evacuate 
people, a number of them are still at transit points around the 
world. Others that----
    Senator Romney. But it would be tens of thousands?
    Secretary Blinken. So, realistically, two things. One, we 
talked about this a little bit earlier. Of the applicants in 
the program, and as I said, we inherited about 18,000. About 
half of those, and this remains more or less the case now, are 
at a point where it is before the Chief of Mission has given 
his or her approval that they are, in fact, eligible for the 
program.
    Senator Romney. I understand.
    Secretary Blinken. So we focused on the----
    Senator Romney. I was looking for a number, and I guess the 
question I was leading to was this, which is given the fact 
that the SIV process was so slow and not undertaken during the 
Trump years in a significant way, you sped it up. That is 
great. Although you knew that there was no way you were going 
to get all these people out in time----
    Secretary Blinken. Let me put a finer point on it.
    Senator Romney. --given the rapid collapse of the Afghan 
security forces. You said, yesterday, that you inherited a 
date, but in fact, you did not inherit the date. The date was 
May 1, and you pushed it to August 31. Why did you not push it 
much later so that we would have been able to process the SIV 
applicants, as well as those who had worked with us that had 
not yet applied?
    I do not understand why a date was actually not inherited, 
and a date was not selected that would be sufficient to 
actually remove people from the nation in a way that would be 
in keeping with our moral commitment to honor our citizens, our 
green card holders, as well as those who have worked us over 
the years.
    Secretary Blinken. Two things, if I may? First, we took 
some risks in terms of what the Taliban would do or not do 
after May 1 in pushing beyond May 1. We, of course, worked this 
very hard because----
    Senator Romney. It is a risk with other people we took.
    Secretary Blinken. It is a risk----
    Senator Romney. The risk was on people we care for.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, just to be clear, if I could? The 
military told us that in order to do its retrograde, its 
drawdown from Afghanistan in a safe and orderly way, it needed 
3 to 4 months. That is why we pushed to move beyond May 1 and 
to get to the end of August, early September.
    Second, to your point, which is an important one and a good 
one, our expectation was that beyond August 31, beyond the 
military drawdown, the government, the security forces were 
going to remain in control of Kabul, of the major cities. Our 
embassy was fully planned to remain up and running. We were 
leaving about 600 military behind to make sure that we could 
secure the embassy so that it could continue to operate.
    We had robust programming planned, to include continuing to 
bring out anyone who wished to leave on notably SIVs. So that 
was very much the plan and the expectation.
    What we did not anticipate was that 11-day collapse of the 
government and security forces. That is what changed 
everything.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Murphy.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for spending so much time with us.
    I think what links our failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is 
that they are both fundamentally failures of hubris, believing 
that we can control things and influence events on the other 
side of the world that are beyond our control or influence. 
America can be a force for good in the world, but there is a 
limit to what we can achieve, and so there has been decades-
long magical thinking with respect to what is in our control 
and what is outside of our control.
    As it turns out, it was not within our control to be able 
to stand up an American-style democracy, an American-looking 
military in Afghanistan that was going to be able to protect 
the country from the Taliban, but we spent 20 years trying to 
achieve it.
    So, Mr. Secretary, you covered some of this in your opening 
remarks, but I wanted to ask you a series of questions to try 
to level set for the committee the situation you inherited, 
right? What was in your control, what was outside of your 
control? Then to look at the events of the last 30 to 40 days 
with that same lens. What was in your control, what was outside 
of your control?
    I think these are ``yes'' or ``no'' answers. Some of it you 
covered in your testimony, but I think it is important to get 
it on the record.
    So, Mr. Secretary, if President Biden had chosen to breach 
the agreement that President Trump had signed with the Taliban, 
would the Taliban have restarted attacks against U.S. troops 
and bases?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Murphy. As you said in your opening testimony, by 
the time the Administration took office, the Taliban was on the 
outskirts of several provincial capitals. If President Biden 
had chosen to breach the agreement between President Trump and 
the Taliban, would the Taliban have begun offensives on these 
urban centers?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Murphy. So if the Taliban had begun a siege on 
these cities and resumed attacks on U.S. troops, would 2,500 
troops have been enough to keep the country from falling to the 
Taliban?
    Secretary Blinken. No.
    Senator Murphy. Would double that number have been enough? 
Do we know how big our force would have had to have gotten?
    Secretary Blinken. I think it was the assessment of our 
military leaders not to put a number on it, but significant 
additional U.S. forces would have been required, both to 
protect ourselves and to prevent the onslaught from the Taliban 
against the provincial capitals and ultimately against Kabul.
    Senator Murphy. So it was not a decision between leaving 
and the status quo? This was a decision between a significant 
commitment of new U.S. resources to the fight or the 
continuation of a withdrawal plan?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Murphy. Okay. Let us talk about the last month. So 
once the Afghan Government and military disintegrate all at 
once, it seems to me it was pretty predictable and 
understandable that there would be panic on the ground amongst 
the Afghan people. So could it be expected that a few thousand 
U.S. troops and diplomats on the ground at the time would have 
been able to prevent this panic?
    Secretary Blinken. No.
    Senator Murphy. Much has been made about these dramatic, 
heartbreaking scenes at the airport. Were 2,500 or 5,000 troops 
enough to stop the Afghan people from rushing to the airport? 
It created this security nightmare for you, but was there any 
way for the limited number of personnel that were there to 
prevent individuals from rushing to the airport?
    Secretary Blinken. No. They could control the airport, as 
we did. They could establish a basic immediate perimeter around 
the airport, as we did, but they could not control what 
happened beyond that perimeter.
    Senator Murphy. So let us talk about that perimeter. Others 
say, well we should have controlled a bigger perimeter. We 
should have taken back over parts of Kabul to secure the 
passage of Americans and Afghans to the airport. I mean, let us 
say you had quadrupled the number of troops you had there. Let 
us say you had 10,000 troops there.
    Without the Afghan military or a functioning government, 
would that have been enough to retake Kabul, to be able to 
secure the passage of everyone to the airport?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not want to profess to be a 
military expert. So I would really defer to my colleagues at 
the Pentagon on that, but I can say that I think--safely say 
that it would have taken a substantial number of forces to try 
to retake the city or establish a much broader perimeter. Of 
course, if that was ultimately opposed by the Taliban, in a 
sense it would have defeated the purpose because anyone outside 
that perimeter would not have been allowed to get through it to 
come to the airport, among other things.
    Senator Murphy. Right. So once the Afghan military 
collapses, it disintegrates, we do not have enough troops to 
retake Kabul. We are in the position of having to rely on the 
Taliban, or at least communicate with the Taliban, to make sure 
that we get individuals to the airport?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Murphy. Okay. I just think this is important to put 
on the record in a clear and concise way because we have to 
have a reckoning in this country about what we can accomplish 
and what we cannot accomplish. It is extraordinary that this 
Administration got 130,000 people out of Afghanistan, given 
those circumstances, given the situation that they inherited, 
that you inherited in January of this year.
    My worry, Mr. Chairman, is that the malady that we suffered 
for the last 20 years, this idea that it was just a bad plan, 
that it was the failure of execution as to why we could not 
succeed in Iraq or Afghanistan, is plaguing us again today. 
That right now we are having a conversation as if we just had a 
better plan, if we just executed better, we could have avoided 
these scenes at the airport. We could have guaranteed the easy 
and safe passage of everyone into that facility.
    It is heartbreaking what happened. It was impossible for 
Americans to watch, but if we just simply leave today believing 
that if we had planned better, if we had better execution, we 
could have avoided this panic and confusion, I think we are 
just inviting another Iraq, another Afghanistan in the future.
    Finally, Mr. Secretary, just quickly expand on your point 
about the message that it sends to China, this idea that the 
Chinese would love it if we stayed another 10 or 20 years, and 
why this is not a sign of weakness and, in fact, this is an 
ability for you and the national security infrastructure to be 
able to reorient resources toward fights that we actually can 
win?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, I think, Senator, you have put it 
very well. In my assessment and the assessment of many others, 
as I said, there is nothing that strategic competitors like 
China, like Russia, or adversaries like Iran and North Korea, 
would like better than for us to have re-upped the war, doubled 
down on it, and remained bogged down in Afghanistan for another 
year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, with all of that dedication 
of resources, all of that energy and focus on that, as opposed 
to the challenges that we have to face today.
    I might add, this committee has done, I think, a very good 
job on trying to refocus us on, notably the competition from 
China. So I think that would have been--doubling down on this 
war after 20 years, after nearly $2 trillion, after 2,461 
American lives lost, 20,000 injuries, and not to preserve the 
status quo that existed before May 1, that would have been one 
thing. To be in the situation where the war with us was 
restarted, the Taliban attacking our forces, attacking our 
partners and allies, going on an offensive across the country 
to retake the cities, that would have required a doubling down 
on the war.
    The bottom line is this. We were right to end the war. We 
were right not to send a third generation of Americans to 
Afghanistan to fight and die there. I believe we were right in 
the extraordinary efforts that were made to make sure we could 
bring out as many people as possible. Now we have an obligation 
to make sure that we continue to do that and, of course, to 
guard against the re-emergence of any threats coming from 
Afghanistan.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Portman.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 
fact you are having this critical hearing today.
    I must say I am going to change what I was going to talk 
about based on the last interaction. Thank you for being here. 
I wish General Austin were here because Secretary Austin could 
answer many of the questions that just been posed.
    I have a lot of respect for my colleague, Senator Murphy, 
as he knows, but this was not a choice between either a 
dangerous escalation of the war, which has just been laid out, 
or a precipitous, chaotic withdrawal that embarrassed us around 
the globe. To say that it was not a sign of weakness the way we 
left, I mean, I do not know who you are talking to. If you are 
talking to our allies in NATO, they will say it was a sign of 
weakness.
    If you are talking honestly to our adversaries, they will 
certainly say it is a sign of weakness, as will terrorist 
groups around the world. So I hope the lesson we learn here is 
not that this was the right way to leave. I hope the lesson we 
learn here is that there was a better way to leave. If the 
decision was made to pull out, it should not have been a 
precipitous, chaotic, and unfortunately deadly departure.
    This afternoon, I will be speaking on the floor about Max 
Soviak. He is a Navy corpsman who was one of the 13 American 
soldiers, sailors, and Marines who were killed on the wall, 
trying to help others escape from the tyranny of the Taliban. 
He should never have been put in that position. It was an 
impossible position for our troops, for your diplomats, and the 
impossibility that they faced was due to our policy decisions.
    There was an alternative. Bagram Air Base, I mean it was 
shut down in the middle of the night with no notice to anybody. 
It was a surprise. I have talked to people who know a lot more 
about the military side of this than I do who tell me that, 
yes, the Afghan troops were a disappointment, but that is 
partly because they were used to having Americans provide that 
close air support. If they had had that, they could have pushed 
back against the Taliban.
    I think we will hear that from your military. I think if 
General Austin were here, we would hear this.
    We just left, like just pulled out all the military 
underpinnings. So without the cover, literally, of close air 
support and other military support, yes, it became extremely 
dangerous and chaotic. We left a lot of people behind.
    Senator Romney has asked you to give him some numbers, and 
you said you are still working on that. Here are the numbers 
that I have, the best that I have. As the ranking member on the 
Homeland Security Committee, we pushed and pushed and pushed. 
Eighteen thousand applicants for SIV. We got 705 out.
    You said earlier the overwhelming number of people who were 
at risk got out. I do not think that is true.
    Secretary Blinken. If I could, sir, just to----
    Senator Portman. No, let me just finish giving you the 
numbers that I have. We think about 30,000 at-risk Afghans were 
evacuated out of an estimated 60,000. That is the best numbers 
we can come up with because we cannot get good numbers from the 
Administration. That is the best estimate.
    So that is true that we left people behind who had stood 
with us and helped us. Obviously, American citizens were left 
behind. Green card holders were left behind. Thousands of 
people who stood with us and helped us. Then let us ask about 
who came.
    Earlier, there was discussion about what kind of vetting 
has taken place. The best numbers we have is that about three-
quarters of the people who were evacuated were not green card 
holders, were not American citizens, were not SIV applicants, 
were not P1 or P2 visa holders. So about three-quarters of 
these individuals may not have qualified in this sense.
    Now you say that they are being vetted. Good. They should 
be, and you know, nobody knows because we cannot get good 
information from the Department of Homeland Security, from the 
State Department, and others. From the start, many of us have 
said what we do there needs to be based on conditions on the 
ground.
    Quite frankly, the President's decision was not based on 
conditions on the ground. That is why it was a disastrous 
withdrawal. That is why it put so many people at risk. It 
should have been an orderly withdrawal under the cover of 
superior U.S. and NATO military force. We did have 2,500 troops 
there, but we had 7,500 NATO troops with us, too.
    Again, many of their commanders were shocked at what 
happened because they were surprised because there was not good 
coordination. There was a lack of coordination with the people 
who had stuck with us. I talked about Bagram. There was also a 
lack of integrated interagency planning. Of course, we have 
seen this in terms of how the chaotic withdrawal occurred.
    These were preventable problems, and they put our military 
and your diplomats in this impossible situation. They did the 
best they could, and I commend them for that. In an impossible 
situation, it is amazing what they were able to perform. It was 
so rushed and so chaotic that, again, we did not get the right 
people out. Many who did get out seemed not to fall into any of 
the categories that we are concerned about.
    So now what do we do? Let us look forward, as was suggested 
by Senator Coons, and I agree with that. You said that you do 
not believe that it will be a platform for terrorism going 
forward, that the current government, the Taliban Government 
has said that they will fight back against terrorists.
    Do you believe that the Haqqani Network and particularly 
the new Secretary of the Interior who is a wanted terrorist, 
based on your Administration's assessment, do you believe that 
that is indication that they are going to fight back against 
terrorists?
    Secretary Blinken. The question, Senator, from our 
perspective and our partners' perspective is whether the 
Taliban will make good on commitments to ensure that 
Afghanistan is not used as a place for outwardly directed 
terrorist attacks. They have made commitments, but we are not 
relying on those commitments. We are going to make sure that we 
have in place the ability to detect any re-emergence of that 
threat and to be able to do something about it if it does re-
emerge, something that we can talk about in more detail in 
another setting.
    Senator Portman. Is the Haqqani Network considered a 
terrorist group?
    Secretary Blinken. It is.
    Senator Portman. Is it true that the interior minister is a 
leader of the Haqqani Network?
    Secretary Blinken. That is accurate.
    Senator Portman. I just think, sadly, we have shaken the 
foundations of a lot of our alliances, and we have work to do. 
I think we have demonstrated weakness and made the world more 
dangerous as a result.
    Let me ask you about one specific question. Well, I guess 
my time has expired.
    The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
    Senator Portman. I will follow up with regard to some of 
the international financing questions in a letter we sent to 
Secretary Yellen from Senator Rubio and myself regarding 
foreign assets.
    Secretary Blinken. Good. Thank you for that.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Merkley.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Mr. Secretary.
    I want to turn to the humanitarian situation in 
Afghanistan. The World Food Program observed that half the 
children under 5 are acutely malnourished in the country, that 
14 million individuals in Afghanistan are on the brink of 
starvation, that 31 of 34 provinces are at risk of losing their 
health services entirely, and that only 1 percent of the 
country is vaccinated. This is a fairly accurate description of 
the challenge for both food and for healthcare?
    Secretary Blinken. It is. The humanitarian situation is 
dire.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you. The U.S. just participated in 
an international conference in which $1.1 billion was pledged 
in humanitarian relief from a variety of nations, including an 
additional commitment by the United States.
    NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, that often are 
essential for providing aid, are very concerned about a legal 
pathway to do so because in 2002, the Taliban was listed as a 
specially designated global terrorist organization under the 
International Economic Emergency Powers Act, and it does not 
have a humanitarian exception.
    Previously, where we faced this situation in Yemen, the 
Treasury Department stepped in to create a legal pathway. A 
number of Senators have written to Secretary Yellen and with 
copies to you and to Samantha Powers saying let us use that 
same pathway here in which the Office of Foreign Asset Controls 
issues a general license, creating kind of legal insulation 
providing humanitarian assistance. Are you engaged in a 
conversation about how to create a legal pathway to provide 
humanitarian assistance?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, we are. We have issued one initial 
license, as you know. The Treasury issued about 10 days ago. We 
are looking at what other authorities might be needed to make 
sure that humanitarian assistance can flow as best possible in 
Afghanistan.
    Senator Merkley. Great. Thank you. That is absolutely 
essential, and I think we have a significant responsibility. We 
have the chaos of war in combination with the pandemic and 
general disruption in the country, and it is a moral 
responsibility to provide assistance.
    I am going to ask to enter into the record the letter from 
September 2 that the Senators and Members of House sent to the 
Administration.
    The Chairman. Without objection.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    So as provincial capitals started to fall, and we had 9 
provincial capitals fall in 6 days, there was a lot of 
discussion about whether the Government of Afghanistan would 
direct a reconsolidation of forces to essentially consolidate 
protection of the territories still held, which was shrinking. 
Did the Government of Afghanistan take key strategic military 
decisions to consolidate its forces?
    Secretary Blinken. It did not, and this was a source of 
tremendous frustration across the Administration from the 
President on down. As the summer went on and we saw the Taliban 
moving across the country, we repeatedly pressed the Afghan 
Government to do just what you described, which is to 
consolidate its forces and to defend what was essential to 
defend and what could be defended. Not to extend itself across 
the entire country, which it did not have the full capacity to 
do.
    Unfortunately, that consolidation and the plan that we 
urged on them for how to effectively defend the major cities 
never took shape.
    Senator Merkley. What was the response of the government or 
from President Ashraf Ghani about why they chose not to 
consolidate their forces to protect the areas they controlled?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, at different moments, there were 
different responses. At some point, I think initially the 
response was, oh, we cannot be seen to be giving up on any part 
of the country. Never mind that over the last 5 or 6 years, the 
part of the country by population controlled by the Government 
of Afghanistan, if you go back to 2014, 2015, went from about 
60 percent to, at the end of last year, about 48 percent.
    So this was happening, to some extent, outside the cities, 
of course, relentlessly. Slowly, but relentlessly. Then, as we 
pressed and pressed and pressed on them, the response was, yes, 
we will do it, but they did not.
    Senator Merkley. Well, we have seen over a number of years 
we had the challenge of the elections that were considered 
illegitimate by a portion of the country. We had Abdullah 
Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani kind of facing off against each other 
and creating paralysis, great difficulty appointing key 
ministers to key positions.
    As we analyze and try to understand the rapid collapse, was 
there essentially a failure to create an effective decision-
making capability within the Afghanistan Government?
    Secretary Blinken. I think there are a number of factors, 
and this is something that I hope we all look at, going back 
really over the last 20 years at various key points. Certainly, 
there was a lack of unity in the government. It was comprised 
of different groups, different factions. Despite, again, very 
significant efforts to get them to act in a unified way, they 
could not or would not.
    Second, I think in terms of their effectiveness, there are 
obvious serious concerns that manifested themselves. Third, one 
of the endemic problems that we have had over the last 20 years 
that we have not been able to effectively address is pervasive 
corruption. That has so many consequences.
    One of the consequences, though, is that if you are being 
asked to fight and put your life on the line for a government, 
for an institution that is corrupt, that is a pretty hard 
decision to make. So I think, as we saw with many Afghan forces 
and soldiers fighting very, very bravely and giving their 
lives. Institutionally, the military collapsed in totally 
unanticipated ways in the course of 11 days.
    I think as we go back and look, one of the things we have 
to look at is the impact that this pervasive corruption had in 
terms of giving the institution the will to fight for the 
country.
    Senator Merkley. Absolutely. In those final days as the 
provincial capitals were falling, President Ghani refused to 
acknowledge that there were falling capitals. It was almost 
like a world in which he was disengaged. Then the finance 
minister resigned and said he was leaving the country for 
family reasons, but it was taken as a symbol of the government 
on the verge of collapse. Then, shortly thereafter, President 
Ghani fled himself. I think it was Sunday, August 15.
    Did we have forewarning of this beginning of the cabinet to 
essentially flee the country, and how did we respond to that?
    Secretary Blinken. We did not. On Saturday, as it happens, 
I spoke to President Ghani. We were working on a plan to have a 
transfer of power to a Taliban-led, but more broadly 
representative government to include many of the different 
actors in Afghanistan, working on that in Doha.
    I was calling President Ghani to make sure that he would 
support that. That was critical. He told me he would, but he 
said if the Taliban would not go ahead with it, he would--and I 
am paraphrasing here--fight to the death. That was Saturday. He 
left Afghanistan the next day on Sunday.
    Senator Merkley. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you. For the awareness of Senators, 
there is a vote going on. There is a subsequent vote going on 
as well. It is my intention to try to continue through the 
process, but I just wanted to make members aware.
    Senator Paul.
    Senator Paul. I have advocated for an end to the Afghan war 
for over a decade. I am glad it is finally over, but never in 
my worst nightmares could I have imagined that an 
Administration would leave and leave $80 billion worth of 
weaponry to the Taliban, dozens of planes and helicopters, 
thousands of armored carriers, hundreds of thousands of 
automatic weapons. Worst of all, 13 of our brave young men and 
women.
    Never in my worst nightmares did anyone conceive of such a 
colossal incompetence. Abandoning Bagram Air Force Base will be 
remembered as one of the worst military decisions in our 
history.
    Holding no one accountable, having everyone circle the 
wagons and say, hey, we all agreed abandoning Bagram Air Force 
Base was a great idea, this is going to be remembered by the 
people. Holding no one accountable for letting the base go, it 
will be remembered.
    To add insult to injury, this week you have now released 
$64 million in aid to Afghanistan. Do we not have some 
prohibition against giving aid and comfort to the enemy?
    Now the argument from the Biden administration is, oh, we 
are giving it to charities, and it is for the good of the 
people, for poor people and for women. Well, the Taliban has a 
history of taking this. Throughout their governance, they would 
take the money. This was a big complaint we had when they were 
in power the last time.
    They now have $80 billion worth of weapons, 350,000 
automatic weapons. Are we really naive enough to believe that 
we are just going to keep sending charity to Afghanistan and 
they are not going to interrupt it? I think that is a foolish 
notion.
    The $64 million, though, is the tip of the iceberg. There 
is still about $10 billion out there that was designated for 
the Afghan Government. Can you pledge today without 
equivocation that the Biden administration will not release any 
of this money to the Taliban?
    Secretary Blinken. Absent the Taliban making good on the 
commitments and expectations of the international community 
that I have outlined previously, that is correct.
    Senator Paul. Maybe we could deduct a few for the weapons 
they took?
    Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, on the weapons, again I 
will defer to my colleagues at the Pentagon who are more expert 
in this. You are right that about $80 billion worth of weaponry 
has been provided over the course of the last 15 or 16 years. 
Much of that, the significant weaponry--planes, helicopters--is 
actually inoperable, will soon become inoperable because it 
cannot be maintained.
    In terms of the strategic threat that that weaponry poses, 
it does not to us or to Afghanistan----
    Senator Paul. You cannot say you are not going to give them 
the money. If they behave, you are going to give them the 
money. Why do we not subtract the $80 billion from the $10 
billion you are going to give them? Then they are minus 70 
still.
    I mean, really, the fact that you are entertaining good 
behavior that they will get more money I think is a big mistake 
and a naive notion that we are going to somehow change this 
Stone Age philosophy by giving them more of our money. We have 
sunk trillions of dollars over there. This is our chance to 
have a peace dividend. Let us quit sending good money after 
bad.
    The guy the Biden administration droned, was he an aid 
worker or an ISIS-K operative?
    Secretary Blinken. The Administration is, of course, 
reviewing that strike, and I am sure that a full assessment 
will be forthcoming.
    Senator Paul. So you do not know if it was an aid worker or 
an ISIS-K operative?
    Secretary Blinken. I cannot speak to that, and I cannot 
speak to that in this setting, in any event.
    Senator Paul. So you do not know or will not tell us?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not know because we are reviewing 
it.
    Senator Paul. Well, see, you would think you would kind of 
know before you off somebody with a Predator drone whether he 
is an aid worker or he is an ISIS-K. See, the thing is, this is 
not just you. It has been going on for Administration after 
Administration.
    The Obama administration droned hundreds and hundreds of 
people, and the thing is, is there is blowback to that. I mean, 
I do not know if it is true. I see these pictures of these 
beautiful children that were killed in the attack. If that is 
true and not propaganda, if that is true, guess what? Maybe you 
have created hundreds or thousands of new potential terrorists 
from bombing the wrong people.
    So you have got to know who you--we cannot sort of have an 
investigation after we kill people. We have an investigation 
before we kill people.
    We have got plenty of bombs. We can bomb almost anything we 
want from anywhere in the world. Maybe we should have bombed 
the helicopters and the planes that we left behind. I mean, 
even though you said you did not know any of this and was all 
surprised, once they took all of our stuff, we should have said 
you have got 20 minutes to get out of it because we are going 
to blow it all up.
    Then you would have sent a message of strength. Instead, we 
bombed somebody who we are not sure whether it was an aid 
worker or an ISIS-K operative. See, that is not sending a 
signal of strength, and in the end, there will be more blowback 
from it. If you killed an aid worker on accident, I mean, do 
you think we are better off because of that?
    You really could have acted in a position of strength, but 
you could have made the basic, fundamental decision that really 
ruined the whole thing for you was a military decision to 
abandon Bagram Air Force Base before you left, before the 
Americans were out.
    Anybody can argue, and you may have a point, that it 
happened more quickly than we thought it was going to happen. 
Okay, that is an honest mistake. Still a huge mistake. When 
people make judgment mistakes in the military, they ought to be 
relieved of their post.
    Leaving Bagram Air Force Base I think is an unforgivable 
sort of mistake. It is going to be remembered in history. But 
if you do nothing about it, you leave all these people in place 
and say, oh, well, we all agreed. It is like then maybe 
everybody needs to go.
    I mean, but really it was a terrible mistake, but releasing 
money to the Taliban will add insult to injury. It will be 
terrible for the memory of the 13 soldiers who died in the end, 
who were the final soldiers to die in this war, if you end up 
giving money to the people that had been ruining the Middle 
East and Afghanistan for decades.
    I hope you will not release the money, and I think it would 
be a big mistake.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Schatz is 
with us virtually?
    Senator Schatz. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Before Senator Schatz begins, I am going to 
ask Senator Kaine to preside so I can vote and come back.
    Thank you.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Secretary Blinken, thank you for appearing before the 
committee. I want to sort of zoom out a little bit. The defense 
establishment, political appointees, so-called think tank 
experts, defense contractors are complaining loudly about 
tactics because it is their strategy that failed. They are 
complaining about how America's longest war ended because they 
did not want it to ever end, and they are mad because they 
think we should be an occupying force indefinitely, and they 
know that position is untenable so they dive into tactics.
    They want to talk about holding onto Bagram for longer or 
sending forces into Kabul. They will not acknowledge the 
fundamental mistake was that we invaded a country in Central 
Asia without a good understanding of its people, its history, 
or of its culture.
    After 20 years, trillions of dollars spent, and training of 
hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces, the Afghan 
Government reinstalled was no more capable of being a referee 
in a civil war than before we invaded. That is not the fault of 
our service members or diplomats. It is the fault of 
policymakers who set unrealistic goals.
    So the basic question I have for you, Mr. Secretary, is: 
What are the lessons of the last 20 years of war?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, Senator, I think you actually 
summed it up extremely well, and I would say two things, just 
to put a fine point on it.
    We went to Afghanistan for one reason, and that was to deal 
with the people who attacked us on 9/11, to bring them to 
justice, and to the best of our ability make sure that that 
would not happen again from Afghanistan. We largely succeeded 
in that effort a long time ago with Bin Laden being killed in 
2011 and Al Qaeda, in terms of its capacity to conduct attacks 
on the homeland from Afghanistan, vastly degraded to the point 
where it is currently assessed that it does not have that 
capacity.
    Somewhere along the way, with the best of intentions, we 
also sought to remake the country and, in effect, to use 
military force to remake another society. I think to your point 
and the point that Senator Murphy and others have made, 
whatever our intentions, that is probably something that is 
beyond our capacity. The net of that is that we were there for 
20 years. We lost 2,461 Americans, 20,000 were injured. About 
$2 trillion were spent in direct and indirect costs. That is 
the equivalent of about $300 million every single day for 20 
years on average.
    To those who say, well, yes, but you arrived in a place 
where the expenditures in terms of people and resources were 
sustainable. Well, that is simply not the reality that we faced 
because, as we have discussed, given the deadline established 
for the removal of U.S. forces by the previous Administration, 
the choice we had was either to go through with that and 
withdraw our forces or to re-up the war, to escalate, to send 
in more forces, more loss of life, more loss of resources 
indefinitely.
    To what end? To what result? In terms of having something 
sustainable in a government or in security forces that could 
protect the country and uphold basic rights. So I think those 
lessons are important. They are profound, and I hope that all 
of us together will reflect on those and other lessons that we 
have learned, both in what we have done tactically, including 
in this Administration, as well as what we have done 
strategically across many administrations over 20 years.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
    I am worried about reports that we are seeing about acts of 
violence against journalists, women, and girls and the Taliban 
targeting minority groups like the Hazara people, groups who 
have a brutal history of committing violence against them are 
probably going to get worse.
    So what are we doing to ensure physical access for the NGOs 
that service these constituencies?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
    These reports, which I have also seen, whether in media 
reporting, in videos and other reports, are deeply, deeply 
disturbing. I think whether it is us or whether it is many 
other countries around the world that we have been working to 
organize and to focus, this, of course, violates the basic 
expectations that we have of a Taliban-led government in terms 
of its need to not abuse these rights, but to uphold them.
    So we are working to make sure that we are all both 
speaking with one voice and acting together when it comes to 
using the influence and leverage we have with the Taliban to 
insist that it meet these expectations. Second, when it comes 
to humanitarian assistance and other kinds of support, besides 
providing that support to NGOs, to the United Nations and its 
agencies, we are doing whatever we can to help ensure that 
those agencies and those NGOs are able to operate, pressing 
directly and indirectly on the Taliban-led government to ensure 
their ability to do that and their protection.
    This is very much a moving picture and something we are 
very focused on right now and in the days and weeks ahead.
    Senator Schatz. One final question. I understand this is 
not the main thing. I understand there are people who remain in 
mortal danger, but from your standpoint, the Department of 
State, you have got to be a little worried about morale for 
those people who have dedicated the better part of 20 years to 
this effort.
    So what can we do, not what can we say, but what can we do 
on behalf of the Foreign Service, especially at a time when we 
need to building back our diplomatic corps?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you for raising that, 
Senator, because it is--you are exactly right, and it is very, 
very important to me, and it is very, very important 
institutionally.
    I spent time with all of our returning diplomats from 
Afghanistan, either personally or virtually depending on where 
they were, and spent a lot of time listening to them, hearing 
them, and trying to address the concerns that they have. To 
your point, we have so many people who have invested their 
work, their careers, their lives in Afghanistan, developed 
relationships, a deep love for the country, and this is very 
challenging, painful for many of them.
    Of course, those who participated in the evacuation itself 
who were literally at the gates at the Kabul airport side-by-
side with these extraordinary men and women in uniform, doing 
that work, including the 13 who lost their lives who were 
killed in the terrorist attack. I had officers who were 
literally serving next to them up to a couple of hours before 
that attack, knew them by first name.
    So the impacts, both over 20 years and more immediately, 
with our people who were there literally pulling people in to 
safety, helping to talk people in, to walk people in, officers 
around the Department who stood up and volunteered to help in 
some way. Many of them who ran into HKIA, to the airport, to 
help get people out.
    So we are spending time talking to them, listening to them, 
and also providing them the support that some of them may need, 
including emotional support----
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, if I can ask you 
to sum up, we are over time, and there are still eight Senators 
who want to ask questions.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Kaine. Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Secretary, President Biden has described the evacuation 
from Afghanistan as an extraordinary success. His words, 
``extraordinary success.'' This has to be the lie of the 21st 
century.
    It is dishonest, and if he believes it, it is delusional. 
America can no longer ever say we leave no American behind 
because Joe Biden did, and by your own testimony and your words 
this morning, there are still about 100 Americans trapped 
behind enemy lines.
    We have heard a lot about the 13 U.S. service members who 
died a couple of weeks ago. One was Rylee McCollum of Jackson 
Hole, Wyoming. He was 20 years old, signed up for the Marines 
on his 18th birthday.
    His wife Gigi, expecting a baby. The baby was delivered 
just yesterday, a baby girl. I stood with Rylee's family and 
his then-pregnant wife on Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as 
his remains were brought back in a flag-draped coffin from 
Afghanistan. Never made it back home alive, as a result of this 
Administration's failures. People in Wyoming view this as 
having lost one of their sons, one of their children, and it is 
a devastating loss. They really do believe it is the 
Administration who should hold the blame for what has occurred.
    This withdrawal, and you have heard it from other Senators 
on both sides of the aisle, has been an epic failure. No 
planning, no strategy. It was cobbled together at the last 
minute, disorganized. It did not have to be this way.
    I am thinking back to your confirmation hearing. I raised a 
number of questions and concerns about your record on foreign 
policy failures in Syria, in Libya, in Iran. I said these 
botched decisions have serious consequences. I said I believe 
they embolden terrorist organizations around the globe.
    I said your decisions in the past have put lives of men and 
women who serve our nation at risk because of these failures, 
and I said I think it would be a grave mistake to confirm a 
Secretary of State who has a demonstrated track record of 
repeatedly making the wrong decisions when it comes to American 
foreign policy and national security. The actions I have seen 
from you over the last 7 months have proven my assessment to be 
correct.
    The Biden administration's missteps are numerous. Failed to 
start evacuation operations until the fall of Kabul in August, 
despite announcing the withdrawal in April. Failed to heed the 
warnings of a collapse of the Afghan Government and security 
forces in spite of warnings. Failed to prepare for a rapid 
Taliban takeover. Failed to adapt the politically motivated 
deadline for withdrawal to the situation taking place on the 
ground because you were so focused on the calendar on the wall.
    Failed to keep Bagram Air Force Base, a place I visited 
about eight or nine times. The U.S. military base with two 
runways that could be used to help evacuate civilians. We just 
heard failure to prevent a vast arsenal of weapons from getting 
into the hands of the Taliban.
    I mean, it seems the most egregious, though, that I hear 
about in Wyoming and people all across the country are most 
offended by is abandoning American citizens, as well as 
abandoning our allies in Afghanistan. Senator Portman went over 
the numbers. The Washington Post called it a ``moral 
disaster.'' I think it is a moral disgrace.
    You nearly dislocated your shoulder, though, patting 
yourself on the back for the great job you have done. I mean, 
just yesterday you stated, ``We did the right thing by our 
citizens in working feverishly to get every one of them out.''
    You did not get every one of them out. You have admitted 
again and again we are talking about over 100 Americans. The 
top priority must always be getting all Americans home safely. 
Now with no U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, the Americans that 
President Biden left behind, instead of going on national TV 
and saying we will not take the troops out until every American 
is out, their options for escaping are dwindling.
    So I am trying to put this all together to say how did we 
end up here? In April, the President made the decision to 
announce everyone would be out by August 31. May 8, there was a 
rehearsal of concept, which is a dress rehearsal for 
withdrawal.
    I know that the National Security Council was there. The 
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, they were all there. My 
understanding is that you did not attend. Is that true?
    Secretary Blinken. My Deputy responsible for the operation 
was there.
    Senator Barrasso. I know where you were. I think you should 
have been here instead. I understand in late June the State 
Department was getting nervous because the military drawdown 
was moving on schedule, but not the civilian drawdown. You were 
running behind.
    I understand State Department was talking to the Defense 
Department to slow down the pace of military withdrawal, 
calling actually for ``tapping the brakes'' on military 
withdrawal. Is that not true?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not going to get into any 
internal deliberations or discussions that we had. We worked on 
this together every step of the way.
    Senator Barrasso. In July, you got more warnings at the 
State Department things were getting bad. When did the State 
Department formally make the request to the Department of 
Defense for military-assisted evacuation, the noncombatant 
evacuation operation? Because that is a Secretary or Ambassador 
job.
    Secretary Blinken. The NEO was being planned, if necessary, 
throughout the spring and summer. We revised the plans on a 
number of occasions, and ultimately, when the government and 
security forces unexpectedly collapsed in the 11 days, the NEO 
went into effect.
    Senator Barrasso. So middle of August?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Barrasso. Why did you wait so long?
    Secretary Blinken. Because we had a government and security 
forces in place that, by every estimate, would be able to 
protect the city, protect Kabul, protect the other provincial 
capitals certainly through the year.
    Senator Barrasso. So yesterday, you testified that the 
Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization. I want to 
be very clear on this because that is what you said yesterday. 
``The Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization.''
    Does this Administration believe the Taliban is a terrorist 
organization?
    Secretary Blinken. It is designated under one of the 
designations, and any engagement that we have will be purely 
for the purposes of advancing our interests.
    Senator Barrasso. Under one of the designations?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, a specially designated terrorist--
--
    Senator Barrasso. When does this Administration plan to 
list the Taliban as a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist 
organization?
    Secretary Blinken. A specially designated terrorist 
organization, that is correct.
    Senator Barrasso. You testified this morning about the SIV 
washout rate. I think you said about 40 percent that they do 
not qualify----
    Secretary Blinken. Before the Chief of Mission approval, 
that is correct.
    Senator Barrasso. So what percentage of the Afghan 
population that left Afghanistan as part of our U.S. evacuation 
efforts, what percentage of those were vetted before they 
actually got on the airplanes?
    Secretary Blinken. Before they got on the airplanes----
    Senator Barrasso. Yes.
    Secretary Blinken. --to leave Kabul? Certainly not--most of 
them were not. That is exactly why we established transit 
points in countries through negotiations with those countries 
to make sure that before anyone came to the United States, they 
would be vetted by the different law enforcement and security 
agencies. So we established agreements with well more than a 
dozen countries.
    Senator Barrasso. So who were you letting on the planes? 
Anybody that showed up?
    Secretary Blinken. Well, initially, as you know, there were 
people who managed to flood the airport. We had to do an 
immediate assessment of those. We had to make sure we could 
clear people out of the airport so that the flights could come 
in, go out.
    No one came to the United States without being checked 
somewhere else first to make sure that they do not pose a 
security threat.
    Senator Barrasso. My time has expired. Thank you very much, 
Mr. Chairman.
    I would just have to say I spent time overseas last week 
talking to our NATO allies at a security conference, as well as 
with NATO individuals. I will tell you, our enemies are 
emboldened, and our allies are enraged.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Booker.
    Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here, 
and thank you for allotting so much time and taking every 
single question posed to you.
    I want to first maybe just pick up with what my friend and 
colleague asked. Could you characterize the Americans that are 
still there? I know there are a lot of them that did not 
necessarily want to come back. There is a whole array of 
different reasons. Could you give us a better understanding of 
those that have remained and what their circumstances are?
    Secretary Blinken. Certainly. Senator, as we have noted, 
starting back in March, we issued 19 separate messages to any 
American citizen who was registered with the embassy, urging 
them to leave Afghanistan. To avail themselves of commercial 
flights that were running, offering assistance if they needed 
it, because we knew it was a very volatile security 
environment.
    Especially when we went, started the ordered departure of 
our embassy on April 27, it is also very incumbent upon us to 
make sure that we are making clear to any American citizens 
that they should take the opportunity to leave.
    By the time of the evacuation, despite these 19 separate 
messages, there were still somewhere around 5,000 or 6,000 
American citizens left in Afghanistan. As we have noted 
earlier, we never know, whether it is Afghanistan or any other 
country around the world, at any given moment how many American 
citizens are there because they are not--no one is required, 
when you travel abroad, when you reside abroad, you are not 
required to register with the embassy or with anyone else.
    Many people do. Many do not. We made a massive effort to 
try to determine how many people were there. To get to your 
point, the reason that despite all of these warnings, despite 
the environment people remained is because for virtually all of 
them Afghanistan was their home. They have lived there for 
years, for decades, for generations.
    Their extended family was there, and it is the most 
wrenching of all decisions to have to decide whether or not to 
leave the place you have come to know as home.
    Senator Booker. I wanted to ask that because I wanted to 
give more texture to this complex situation. This is not that 
there were people there--there were many people that fall into 
the category of not being abandoned by our country but have 
made the conscious choice to stay in country. Correct?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Booker. I have only been here 8 years, but I will 
say to you and your staff, you have been the most responsive 
State Department team that my office has dealt with. We have 
brought many, as you know, people to your attention, both 
American citizens and Afghanis, who wanted to get out, have 
worked with us to many different degrees of success. I am 
grateful for that.
    I have now witnessed with my senior Senator, we went to our 
joint base and saw the facilities being done for those who have 
met extreme vetting and have made it to the United States. What 
is going on with the 13,000 expected in New Jersey and the 
65,000 to 70,000 is America at its best. I meant, for military 
personnel and State Department talking to me about this being 
some of the proudest work they have ever done, and I think 
Americans should be aware of that and what is going on. We are 
a great nation, and this is a reflection of those words on the 
Statue of Liberty.
    I want to pick up, though, on the situation as it is. I 
think it was Senator Merkley who brought up the concerns about 
humanitarian interests, humanitarian crisis that is really 
boiling over there. I want to just get you to reiterate that 
you issued one license, but we really need more. Correct?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes, I understand that, and that is 
exactly what we are looking at. We want to make sure that all 
the authorities exist to provide that humanitarian assistance, 
including by not just our own NGOs, but others as well.
    Senator Booker. It is a strategic situation. We know we 
control significant resources the Afghan Government has been 
relying on to run basic services. This is a strategic leverage 
that we have over the Taliban to continue to try to pressure 
them into honoring human rights, honoring the rights of women, 
countering some of the terrorist concerns that we have, and it 
is very important.
    However, given what we understand, without those resources 
there are going to be continued humanitarian suffering. As the 
New York Times reported, the World Food Program is estimating 
about 40 percent of Afghans' crops are going to be lost. There 
is going to be tremendous hunger as the price of wheat is 
expected to go up 25 percent.
    The World Food Program's own food stock is expected to run 
out by September. So this is tremendous suffering that will 
come. It is going to be exacerbated by climate change. We can 
literally see issues of starvation hitting the general 
population.
    I guess, if you can give me specifically what assurances 
has the Biden administration been able to secure from the 
Taliban as it is to humanitarian access, and how is the State 
Department working with international partners? Because it is 
not just our responsibility to coordinate and provide near-term 
and long-term assistance for those Afghans who have ended up in 
locations without the proper support mechanisms.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. First, you are exactly right I 
think to draw a distinction between basic humanitarian 
assistance to respond to what is a crisis among so many Afghan 
people. By the U.N.'s estimates, well over 50 percent are in 
need of humanitarian assistance. We have had a drought. We have 
had horrific economic conditions. We have had COVID, everything 
piling on to one of the poorest countries on Earth to begin 
with.
    So when it comes to food, when it comes to medicine, when 
it comes to the basics, we, the international community, 
irrespective of anything else, ought to be able to provide 
that, provided that we can do it knowing that the assistance is 
going to get to the people who need it and not diverted or used 
in any other way.
    We have longstanding mechanisms and arrangements in place, 
including with leading NGOs, including with the U.N. agencies 
to do just that, as well as very clear monitoring mechanisms to 
make sure even in an environment that we do not control, that 
assistance gets to the people who need it. I spent time with 
the head of the U.N. agency responsible for that to make sure 
that that is what is happening.
    We are coordinating with dozens of countries on this. The 
U.N. is playing a lead role. They just had a donor's conference 
to make sure that everyone else is feeding into this as well.
    Senator Booker. I just want to end by saying thank you to 
many of the State Department personnel still in that region as 
well as here in the United States that are working through this 
crisis.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Senator Rounds I understand is with us 
virtually.
    Senator Rounds. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.
    Secretary Blinken, thank you for your willingness to appear 
before the committee and to answer questions on the Afghanistan 
withdrawal. I understand you have been there for almost 3 hours 
now. I appreciate your persistence in this.
    Mr. Secretary, my staff has been working very closely with 
yours on the issue of Afghan Special Immigration applications, 
or SIVs, some of which have been initiated for over 3 years. As 
you are aware, I sent a letter to you last week that outlines 
my concerns, and I spoke to Deputy Secretary McKeon 3 weeks 
ago.
    Due to the preparation for the hearing, I received updates 
on three of the five SIV cases my staff has been working for 
months on. I sincerely appreciate the efforts of your staff to 
get me this information, which I provided last night to the 
South Dakota veterans who requested my help. For that, I want 
to thank you.
    I would, however, like you to be aware of my concern 
pertaining to a key reason that has hamstrung my efforts to 
assist SIV applicants. This is the Department's position stated 
to my staff on multiple occasions that it is precluded by law 
from providing updates or noting any potential defects in 
applications.
    Mr. Secretary, if true, this would prevent Members of 
Congress from executing oversight and constituent service 
responsibilities, specifically when they are advocating in 
support of an applicant. It would also, incidentally, violate 
the Department's own foreign affairs manual.
    Will you commit to me today that you will review the 
Department's procedures and fix this unacceptable procedure?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to review that. Let 
me say, first, thank you. Thank you for the work that you and 
your team and staff have done to help folks in need and to make 
sure that we had the information that we needed to try to be 
helpful and to get people out. I am really grateful for that 
and grateful for the work that we have been able to do 
together.
    We will certainly review all of these procedures. There are 
requirements either built into the law, privacy concerns, et 
cetera, that may have to be addressed, but we should look at 
everything.
    Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think this is 
important enough to where we will follow up, and hopefully, 
within a time certain, we will be able to come up with what 
changes need to be made, either statutorily or within the rules 
process, to clarify this because this should not be that hard 
to be able to stay in contact and to make those communications 
back and forth between your Department and Members of the 
United States Senate.
    Our adversaries, Mr. Secretary, are celebrating the 
departure of U.S. troops, and they most certainly are 
celebrating the creation of a power vacuum. Most certainly, 
they are also prepared to take this opportunity and use it to 
their advantage. China has announced last week that it will 
send $31 million worth of aid to Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan. There have also been reports that they are looking 
at Bagram Air Base for their own use.
    The Russian embassy in Afghanistan has remained open, and 
the Ambassador met with Taliban leadership after the takeover. 
Pakistan is considering the Taliban Government as a partner to 
counter India, and the Iranian President openly called this an 
American military defeat and is considering working with the 
Taliban.
    Did the Administration consider all of these foreign policy 
implications before such an abrupt withdrawal? If they did, 
does the Department have a strategy to counter our adversaries' 
malign influence in the region?
    Secretary Blinken. We certainly did. We factored everything 
into the decisions we made, including the impact that it might 
have on the neighboring countries, regional countries, and 
others with various interests in Afghanistan.
    A number of the countries that you cited have a whole 
series of different interests in Afghanistan, to include making 
sure that it is not a place for terrorism directed against 
them, to ensure that it is not a source of drugs flowing out 
into their countries, to make sure that it is not a source of 
potential refugees flowing out into the countries as well. So 
all of those things are in play, and countries are looking to 
take steps that they need to take to protect some of their 
basic interests.
    At the same time, we have established across more than 100 
countries and in the U.N. through a Security Council resolution 
basic expectations of the Taliban-led government. If those 
expectations are not met, and other countries are aiding and 
abetting so that the Taliban is able to not fulfill those 
expectations, there will be consequences for that, too.
    Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, if I could, what I am 
really curious about is do you have a strategy that you 
established? Did you have enough time before this withdrawal to 
actually establish a strategy, knowing that there would be a 
void in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. The work that we have done to bring 
together across dozens of countries, very active contact 
groups, looking as we work together across these countries with 
NATO, the EU, as well as the U.N., we have a collective 
strategy on the way forward, and we are working that as we 
speak.
    Senator Rounds. Does our country, do we have a strategy 
that if this has been laid out and based upon the need to move 
out as quickly as we did, did you have time to actually 
establish a strategy to take care of what will be this power 
void? I understand that you have been there now for almost 3 
hours, but simply to say that you are working on it with our 
other countries seems to me, looks to me like we need our own 
strategy here, and it does not sound like you are in a position 
to share with us that that strategy actually exists today.
    Secretary Blinken. I am happy, Senator, to follow up with 
you and to share both our thinking and more of our work on 
that. We have organized several dozens countries that are 
collectively working----
    Senator Rounds. Mr. Secretary, and my time is getting----
    Secretary Blinken. --working on and implementing a strategy 
both----
    Senator Rounds. My time is getting short.
    Secretary Blinken. Oh, I am sorry. Go ahead, Senator. Go 
ahead.
    Senator Rounds. What I hope is that if you would, whether 
it be in a classified setting or publicly, if you could share 
with us in the next week to 10 days what that strategy is. If 
it needs to be in a classified setting, I would ask the 
chairman to provide us with the opportunity.
    Most certainly, I think it is important that we have a 
strategy to combat what will be a void in Afghanistan, which is 
a void now and most certainly is something that we should be in 
better position, I believe, than what it sounds like you are 
able to articulate today.
    Mr. Chairman, I would suspect that my time is up at this 
point.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very 
much.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for all of your work 
and all of your colleagues' as well.
    President Biden was right to end the United States' longest 
war. If leaving Afghanistan was ever going to be clean and 
easy, one of the President's three predecessors would have done 
so. If we have learned anything from our 20-year war in 
Afghanistan, it is that it is easier to get into a war than to 
get out of one.
    However, given the amount of second-guessing and arm-chair 
quarterbacking that I have seen over the last month, I fear 
that we have not learned anything. We must re-imagine a 
national security policy that prioritizes diplomacy and stops 
endless, undefined military engagements before they can begin.
    I want to be sure that Americans at home understand the 
position President Biden was placed in. President Trump's deal 
with the Taliban exchanged a halt in Taliban offensives against 
our troops for a commitment that we would leave the country by 
May of this year. President Trump, with the support of his 
national security team and many Republican Members of Congress, 
negotiated this deal without the participation or buy-in of the 
Afghan Government.
    President Biden faced a choice of having to break that 
deal, essentially restarting the war in Afghanistan and risk 
increased attacks against U.S. troops or to get our troops home 
as promised. President Trump, of course, did not leave an 
actual plan to evacuate all of those who should have been taken 
out of Afghanistan, and President Trump's vision without a plan 
is and was a hallucination.
    So that left it then ultimately to the Biden 
administration, which did its best in order to effectuate that 
agreement, which President Trump, in fact, made. President 
Biden ultimately was right to follow through on that commitment 
to end our country's longest war, one that claimed so many 
military lives, so many tens of thousands of Afghan civilian 
lives, and saddled U.S. taxpayers with $2 trillion worth of 
debt over the last two decades.
    The tremendous cost of war hit home in its final chapter, 
as our armed forces and diplomats executed one of the largest 
airlifts in U.S. history. We owe them a debt of gratitude.
    Yesterday, Senator Warren and I both attended the funeral 
service for U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Johanny Rosario-Pichardo 
in Lawrence, Massachusetts. One of 13 American heroes who lost 
her life on August 26 in that suicide bombing, as she was 
guiding Afghan women and girls to safety at the Kabul airport's 
Abbey gate.
    The work of Purple Heart recipient Sergeant Rosario and 
others during Operation Allies Refuge saved thousands of 
innocent lives, and we have to ensure that our own commitment 
to help the Afghan people endures past the takeoff of that last 
U.S. military transport plane 2 weeks ago. We honor her, and we 
honor all of those who gave their lives and sacrificed in 
Afghanistan.
    Every member of this committee I think has to agree that we 
have to ensure that there is humanitarian aid that goes into 
Afghanistan to help those who are in need. We spent $300 
million every single day to conduct the war in Afghanistan, 
roughly equivalent to what we spent this entire year in 
humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.
    Mr. Secretary, I sent a letter with four of my colleagues 
today asking for the Administration to ensure that the money 
previously allocated or requested for Afghan war efforts be 
repurposed to assist Afghans in need. Could you give your view 
as to what should happen with that funding now that the defunct 
Afghan defense and national security forces are not there to 
receive this funding, in terms of ensuring that we avert 
further humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan?
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator, and I got your 
letter. We are looking at all of that.
    We want to make sure in the first instance that we are 
making good on our own contributions to the humanitarian 
assistance that the Afghan people need. We did that again 
yesterday at the pledging conference organized by the United 
Nations. We are going to continue to look at the needs going 
forward and to look at what we can do effectively to make sure 
that assistance is getting to the people who need it, not 
diverted, of course, to the Taliban-led government and making 
sure that agencies, whether the U.N. or NGOs, can operate 
safely and effectively in Afghanistan.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. As the last planes left, many 
international relief organizations stayed behind. We owe it to 
them not to create red tape and free them from the risk of 
sanctions. Are you working with the Treasury Department to 
issue a general license so that these groups' lifesaving work 
can continue?
    Secretary Blinken. We are working on the necessary 
licensing authorities. As you know, we issued one license, the 
Treasury did, a couple of weeks ago. We are looking to see what 
additional authorities may be needed to make sure that 
humanitarian assistance can get in there freely.
    Senator Markey. Thank you. I think that is very important, 
and I think telescoping the timeframe to get that completed is 
very important.
    Just about every major refugee assistance group has called 
for lifting the level to 200,000 people as refugee admissions 
into our country. What is the Administration's view on that 
200,000 person goal in order to ensure that we deal with the 
magnitude of this humanitarian crisis?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, as you know, we have already 
significantly lifted the refugee cap from its historic lows 
that were in place when we took office. Of course, we are 
assessing whether there are going to be additional needs.
    Having said that, the work we are doing now to bring 
Afghans in need were vetted and checked into this country, 
including support we need from Congress on that, will not for 
the most part tap into the refugee cap. There are other means 
and mechanisms by which we are looking to bring people in to 
ensure, with your support, that they are given the assistance 
that they would get were they coming in as refugees, but not 
actually cutting into the existing cap or any future cap.
    Senator Markey. Thank you, and thanks for all your great 
work. I just would hope the 200,000 is the goal. The 
resettlement agencies are pointing toward that number, and I 
think it is a number that we should all strive to meet in order 
to just be sure that these individuals not only survive, but 
thrive in their new environment.
    Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thanks for all your great work.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine, Ranking Member 
Risch, Secretary Blinken.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator.
    Senator Hagerty. Before I start, I would just like to 
acknowledge a young man, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss. Ryan 
is a Tennessean, one of the 13 service members who lost his 
life at the airport in Kabul, trying to rescue and save others. 
My heart goes out to he and his family and the tragic loss 
associated with this evacuation.
    Regarding this evacuation, I agree with Senator Barrasso. 
For President Biden to call this an extraordinary success is 
beyond the pale when we leave Americans, when we leave our 
allies, when we leave those that have helped us behind.
    I have also just been over to visit with our allies in the 
U.K. and in NATO, and their sense of surprise and enragement is 
palpable. We have a very significant failure that is taking 
place here, a failure of global proportion. It has placed our 
allies in the position of questioning America's resolve, of 
questioning our Nation's integrity, and frankly, they put us in 
a situation where they are questioning whether we are a 
reliable partner.
    Our reputation as a nation, I think, has been put at risk 
as a result of the failed evacuation here. Our job now is to 
get to the bottom of this failure as a committee, this failure 
that has left the world a more dangerous place for the United 
States, for our allies, for those that depend on us. It has 
also armed our enemies like never before, and it has emboldened 
our strategic adversaries. There must be accountability.
    Secretary Blinken, my office and other congressional 
offices have heard rumors regarding potential Cabinet 
resignations over the situation in Afghanistan. So I want to 
ask you, have you submitted your resignation regarding this 
issue?
    Secretary Blinken. I have not.
    Senator Hagerty. The lack of accountability here, the lack 
of accountability in this Administration is shocking to me. I 
would like to turn to another question regarding the 
intelligence that we have relied upon.
    In an internal report given to the State Department by 
Embassy Kabul on August 16, there was warning of a breach at 
the Kabul airport, and it said, ``A breach cannot be fully 
prevented at current force levels.''
    Mr. Secretary, did you see that report?
    Secretary Blinken. I am sorry. Can you tell me the date 
again, Senator?
    Senator Hagerty. August 16, a report given to Embassy 
Kabul, an internal report from Embassy Kabul to the State 
Department saying that a breach at the airport cannot be fully 
prevented at current force levels.
    Secretary Blinken. I cannot tell you whether I saw that 
specific report, but that is exactly why the President had on 
standby 6,000 forces to be able to deploy immediately into 
Afghanistan, into the airport in case the airport was in 
jeopardy, and that is exactly what we did.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, the force levels being insufficient 
I think was a significant reason for concern, something that in 
a plan of action I think should have been accounted for 
certainly earlier.
    Going to the NEO plan, I would like to cover that with you 
for a few minutes. The noncombatant evacuation operational plan 
for Afghanistan would be a plan on how we evacuate American 
civilians from a foreign country should a dangerous situation 
arise.
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Hagerty. Prior to turning over the Bagram Air Base 
on July 2, did the NEO plan to evacuate Americans have the 
Bagram Air Base as a critical element of its strategy?
    Secretary Blinken. The critical element for any evacuation 
was actually the airport in Kabul, known as HKIA. Because, as 
you know, Senator, Bagram is about 40 miles from Kabul. To the 
extent that the population that you are seeking to evacuate is 
mostly in Kabul, the airport by far most convenient to them 
would be the airport in Kabul, HKIA.
    Senator Hagerty. A civilian airport in a neighborhood that 
is much more difficult to protect than an airport the size of 
Bagram with two runways and the ability to land and lift off, 
significant airlift capacity. I am frankly quite shocked that 
our NEO plan would have had no inclusion of the Bagram Air 
Base, but if I understand you correctly, it did not include 
Bagram?
    Secretary Blinken. The plan focused on the airport in 
Kabul.
    Senator Hagerty. I wonder how the evacuation plan was 
updated, Mr. Secretary, as things began to change on the 
ground. What was the process that you deployed there?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, through the course of the 
spring and summer, we reviewed all of these plans, different 
contingencies, including the NEO plan. Of course, the element 
that no one anticipated, as we have discussed on numerous 
occasions, was the rapid collapse of the Afghan Government and 
the Afghan security forces in the space of about 11 days.
    Having said that, we had plans in place to do the two 
critical things that we did. We were able to evacuate our 
embassy, all its personnel, destroy sensitive materials, and 
get people to the airport in 48 hours and in many cases much 
less than that.
    Second, as I mentioned, the President ordered that there be 
a standby force in place to make sure that HKIA, the airport in 
Kabul, was secured. Planes could come in, planes could take 
off, and we had a secure facility. We did that in the course of 
about 72 hours.
    Senator Hagerty. Back to the NEO discussion. In an August 
14 briefing, the Pentagon spokesman John Kirby denied that 
there was an NEO operation in Afghanistan at that point. But 2 
days later, on the 16th, he belatedly admitted there was a NEO 
operation going on.
    So I am curious, Mr. Secretary, what date did the 
Administration actually decide to execute the NEO plan, and 
when did they begin to actively evacuate all Americans and 
allies?
    Secretary Blinken. I believe, Senator, it was triggered by 
the collapse of the government and the security forces.
    Senator Hagerty. Who would have made the decision to 
execute the NEO?
    Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President would be asked 
for his decision, approval to do that, based on the 
recommendation of the different Government agencies involved.
    Senator Hagerty. Is that what happened in this case?
    Secretary Blinken. I believe that is right. Yes, sir.
    Senator Hagerty. You know, oversight is not a simple check 
the box exercise. It requires getting to the bottom of what has 
come to be the greatest U.S. foreign policy disaster, at least 
in my lifetime. Mr. Chairman, we need more hearings on this 
Afghanistan withdrawal failure.
    I would also like to say this. Leadership requires owning 
one's mistakes, and leadership requires introspection and a 
commitment to achieve what is right. What we have witnessed 
here has been a failure of leadership. What it is has been a 
press-driven spin cycle. It is one that has deflected blame, 
and it is one that shamed us as a nation. It is time to leave.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, if I could just say briefly in 
response?
    Senator Kaine. Please be brief, if you would.
    Secretary Blinken. Yes. I am responsible for the decisions 
I make. I am responsible for the actions of my Department. I am 
responsible for learning any lessons that flowed from those 
decisions or those actions, and I am also responsible to 
holding myself accountable to you and through you to the 
American people, which is exactly what I am doing here today, 
what I have been doing these past weeks in repeated 
conversations and briefings with Members of Congress, both the 
Senate and the House, and what I will continue to do going 
forward.
    We can all draw our own conclusions from that. I respect 
yours. I may disagree with them, but that is exactly the 
process that I am engaged in and that we are engaged in, and we 
will continue to do that going forward.
    Senator Hagerty. Well, my constituents expect that sort of 
accountability as well, particularly the veterans that serve in 
Tennessee and across the Nation that have reached out to me 
that are absolutely heartbroken about what has gone on. There 
has been loss of life. There has been loss of treasure.
    We have now armed terrorists at a level that I have never 
expected. Our allies are more proximate to this threat than we 
are. They could not have been more frustrated with me when I 
spoke with them. They are concerned that we now have a threat 
level that we have never seen before, and we have got to find 
ways to work together with them to address that.
    I will look to you for accountability on that as well as we 
move forward, Mr. Secretary.
    Senator Kaine. Mr. Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator.
    Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I recognize what a huge 
undertaking it is to airlift every American out of Afghanistan 
and work to get some of our closest Afghan partners out of 
harm's way after 20 years of American presence and troops in 
Afghanistan.
    The United States Government conducted the biggest airlift 
in our history, over 120,000 people. I understand and want to 
thank all the people who were involved in that.
    That said, I really urge you to have the State Department 
surge more people to this process to help the remaining 
Americans out of Afghanistan, to help others, legal permanent 
residents and others. Mr. Secretary, I have with me a list of a 
lot of the constituent cases that are on our office. I am going 
to give it to you and your staff. If I could just get your 
commitment that you will get back to us on these cases?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Because we have had your 
help, we have one case of a 2-year-old American citizen, and we 
have been working with you on that. We also have cases of 15 
legal permanent residents and a number of our close Afghan 
partners. At this point, the system at the State Department and 
DHS is overwhelmed. We are just getting back form responses 
without any feedback as to the state of the case. So I really 
urge you to keep at that.
    I must say I guess I should not be surprised. As Senator 
Shaheen said, the level of hypocrisy in this room and this 
Congress is staggering. You know, we should have more hearings 
on what happened in Afghanistan, starting with the decision to 
divert huge amounts of U.S. troops and resources to Iraq in one 
of the biggest strategic blunders in modern American history, 
where it is a clear matter of record that Iran has been the 
biggest beneficiary of that decision.
    Let us fast forward now to the Trump administration. I did 
not oppose the decision of the Trump administration to open up 
negotiations with the Taliban. Everybody in this room, I 
suspect, recognized there was no military solution to this 
conflict, that there had to be a political solution. So I 
supported opening up that process.
    Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the Trump 
administration asked the Pakistani Government to release three 
top Taliban commanders as part of that process?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. One of them is the person who is now 
number two, Baradar, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. He is the person everybody saw in those 
photos in Kabul, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. Right. There was another senior 
commander released, and they began the discussions in Doha?
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Van Hollen. They did not include the Afghan 
Government, did they?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. Right. They, in fact, essentially 
ordered, pressured the Afghan Government to release 5,000 
Taliban fighters, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. Many of those fighters involved in the 
attack on Kabul today, right?
    Secretary Blinken. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now let us see what the 
negotiation was. Here was the negotiation. I supported the 
beginning of it. The United States will leave by a date 
certain, May of this year, right?
    Secretary Blinken. Correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. You cannot attack American forces, but 
you can attack Afghan forces with impunity, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. That is right. So we pick a date, we 
say to the Taliban you can attack Afghan forces, and then we 
say, okay, now let us negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Is 
that not the way it was set up when you walked in?
    Secretary Blinken. That is essentially correct, yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. There is a saying in Afghanistan that 
foreigners have the watches, we have the time. So the Trump 
administration, through those negotiations, set it up perfectly 
for the Taliban. Green light to attack the Afghan forces. No 
discussion going forward.
    Then is it not true that the former President criticized 
President Biden for not pulling out our forces earlier?
    Secretary Blinken. I believe that is accurate.
    Senator Van Hollen. I think he said we have got to stick to 
our May timetable. So President Trump, ``stick to our May 
timetable,'' and by the way I am handing you negotiation where 
I have already said we are getting out, and I have said go 
ahead and attack the Afghan forces. Now we are going to talk 
about the future.
    So that is the hand you have been dealt. Let me talk to you 
a little bit about the future, and I am glad you brought 
together the ministerial meeting with our NATO partners, with 
surrounding countries. This will never work if the surrounding 
countries do not participate and others in the region. You had 
both Pakistan and India at the table, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now I am very much in the mode, 
and I know you are, too, you watch what they do, not what they 
say, right?
    Secretary Blinken. Exactly.
    Senator Van Hollen. The Taliban clearly have new PR people. 
They also recognize that their actions they have to take in 
order to get any kind of support whatsoever from some of the 
Western countries, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. So I have heard you testify today 
to some of those conditions, free and safe passage for people 
who want to leave, right?
    Secretary Blinken. Right.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Access by international 
humanitarian organizations directly to the Afghan people, not 
through any Taliban, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is Right.
    Senator Van Hollen. Protection of girls, women, and 
minorities.
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Van Hollen. This is going to be one, obviously, we 
have to keep a very close eye on.
    Fourth, you cannot use the territory of Afghanistan as a 
base for future terrorist attacks, whether it is Al Qaeda or 
anybody else, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Van Hollen. A more inclusive government because, 
right now, we have a government comprised of Taliban, including 
two members of the Haqqani Network, one of who is wanted for 
questioning and for violent activities.
    So my question to you is that was a really important first 
step because we want everybody on the same page, meaning our 
close partners and surrounding countries, right?
    Secretary Blinken. That is right.
    Senator Van Hollen. All right. Do you have that buy-in from 
all the partners around the table that we will act in unison?
    Secretary Blinken. We do have that buy-in. We have that 
buy-in not only from the meetings we have. We have that buy-in 
in the statements that many countries have signed onto. We have 
that in a U.N. Security Council resolution that we initiated, 
and critically, we have moving forward established an ongoing 
group of countries and institutions that are going to work 
together to track this, to continue to make sure we are 
speaking with one voice and acting in unison.
    Senator Van Hollen. Got it.
    Secretary Blinken. Now there are countries that may be 
outliers in this effort. Some of them have been referenced to 
include China, to include Russia, to include Pakistan, and that 
is something that we are being very vigilant about as well.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, I know time is up, but I think a 
number of those countries, at least Pakistan, like India, like 
the others, have an interest in preventing chaos and civil war 
in Afghanistan.
    Secretary Blinken. They do.
    Senator Van Hollen. Obviously, we asked them to release 
prisoners that they had locked up, Taliban prisoners. So, 
obviously, we have to keep an eye on the ISI, I get that. Let 
us all work together to achieve the goal of a stable 
Afghanistan that protects the rights of its people.
    Thank you.
    Secretary Blinken. Appreciate that.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
    Secretary Blinken. Senator.
    Senator Cruz. President Biden and the Biden administration 
have presided over the worst foreign policy catastrophe in a 
generation. Americans across the Nation are horrified. Our 
servicemen and women, our active duty military are angry, they 
are disillusioned, and they are frustrated.
    Our enemies across the globe are emboldened, which makes 
the world more dangerous today for America, and our allies are 
dispirited. Ever since the disaster began unfolding in 
Afghanistan, we have seen the Biden administration making 
political excuses. We have seen Democrats on this committee 
explaining at great length how everything that happened in 
Afghanistan is Trump's fault. It is all Trump's fault.
    Mr. Secretary, Joe Biden is the President of the United 
States. Kamala Harris is the Vice President of the United 
States. You are the United States Secretary of State. Just like 
Jimmy Carter owns the disaster of the Iran hostage crisis, you 
own this.
    The Biden administration caused this disaster. It was 
caused by two things. Number one, ideological naivete and 
extremism. Repeatedly, Mr. Secretary, in this hearing and also 
on multiple conference calls over the last month, you keep 
saying things like the steps the Taliban needs to take to be 
welcomed into the community of civilized nations.
    Mr. Secretary, they do not want to be welcomed into the 
community of civilized nations. They are terrorists who want to 
murder us. This Administration does not understand that. Joe 
Biden does not understand that.
    Sadly, that ideological extremism was combined with 
manifest incompetence. There were four decisions this 
Administration made that I think were utterly indefensible. 
Number one, abandoning the Bagram airfield, giving it to the 
Taliban. That is a decision that 100 years from now will be 
studied at war colleges as a colossal strategic mistake, giving 
up two secure airfields, necessitating an evacuation from a 
dense urban environment, a commercial airport, which led 
tragically to the suicide bombings and murders that killed 13 
American servicemen and women.
    Had we been evacuating from Bagram with a secure perimeter, 
the odds are quite high that attack either would not have 
happened or if it had happened, it would have been far less 
severe in its consequences.
    Secondly, the Biden administration giving the Taliban a 
list of Americans and of Afghans we wanted out. Third, the 
decision to leave Americans behind. Hundreds of Americans, 
perhaps more, perhaps thousands; thousands of green card 
holders; tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted the U.S. 
military, the Biden administration abandoned them and left them 
behind.
    Fourth, leaving billions of dollars of American military 
equipment that the Taliban will now use to threaten our lives. 
Earlier in this hearing, you said about that equipment, ``None 
of it poses a strategic threat to us or their neighbors.'' That 
does not pass the laugh test. When you are looking at the 
Taliban potentially having 64,000 machine guns, 33 Black Hawk 
helicopters, 16,000 night vision goggles, we will see American 
blood spilled because of these colossal mistakes.
    Now abandoning Bagram was not your call. It was the 
Pentagon's and the White House's ultimately. I want to ask you 
flat out, did the State Department give the Taliban a list or 
multiple lists of Americans and/or Afghans that we wanted out?
    Secretary Blinken. Those reports and the idea that we would 
do anything to endanger our citizens or anyone else at a time 
when we were trying to save their lives is flat-out wrong. Let 
me----
    Senator Cruz. So I would just like a ``yes'' or ``no,'' did 
you give them a list?
    Secretary Blinken. Let me be very clear, Senator, if I may, 
please? Thank you.
    In limited instances where we were seeking to get a bus or 
a group of people through a checkpoint, we gave a manifest to 
the people at the checkpoint to demonstrate that those people 
were expected to----
    Senator Cruz. Roughly how many names were on the list you 
gave?
    Secretary Blinken. Does not matter because they all----
    Senator Cruz. Dozens, hundreds, thousands, give us some 
order of magnitude.
    Secretary Blinken. This happened in a handful of situations 
where to get through----
    Senator Cruz. Dozens? So is it your testimony it was not 
hundreds? I want to understand. Did you give them thousands of 
names?
    Secretary Blinken. No, we did not.
    Senator Cruz. Okay. Hundreds?
    Secretary Blinken. I am not going to put a number on it, 
but it was--again----
    Senator Cruz. Why not? This is a hearing to discover. How 
many names and how many of those individuals you gave the 
Taliban the name to have been targeted for torture or murder?
    Secretary Blinken. Senator, by definition, these were in 
limited instances with a bus or a group of people to get them 
through a checkpoint. They got through the checkpoint.
    Senator Cruz. So not only did you fail to evacuate 
Americans and green card holders who were there, but you also 
brought in tens of thousands of Afghans who had wholly 
inadequate vetting, bringing many of them to the United States. 
One of the things that has done is that has brought in a 
humanitarian crisis to America.
    Child marriage and domestic abuse tragically are widespread 
in Afghanistan. According to the World Health Organization, 
more than half of the women in Afghanistan are married as child 
brides, and 90 percent of women are subject to domestic abuse, 
90 percent.
    On August 27, according to public reports, you distributed 
internal documentation highlighting numerous instances at 
intake centers of sexual abuse in which much older, grown 
Afghan males appeared with children, young children, claimed 
they were their brides, claimed they were their wives, and the 
document said the State Department urgently requested guidance. 
That was your word, ``urgently.''
    Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security said that 
it showed the desperation of families that they were willing to 
give little girls to grown men to be subject to sexual abuse 
and child wives. My question is as follows. Did you receive 
that urgent guidance? How many children have been subject to 
sexual abuse? What have you done to rescue young children from 
illegal and abusive relationships after being brought to 
America by the State Department?
    Secretary Blinken. Across the entire Government, everyone 
involved in the evacuation effort, whether it is at a transit 
point in one of the countries that we negotiated with, whether 
it is here in the United States at Dulles or Philadelphia or 
the military bases, we have all of our officers at extreme 
vigilance to look for and to deal with any cases or concerns 
that arise----
    Senator Cruz. Did you receive the urgent guidance, and how 
many child brides have you seen?
    Secretary Blinken. I do not know the specific guidance you 
are referring to. I am happy to look at it.
    Senator Cruz. So was there not urgency to discover if 
children are being abused?
    Secretary Blinken. Absolutely. Absolutely.
    The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
    Secretary Blinken. We could detect and deal with many 
cases, and there have been, to my knowledge, a limited number 
of cases where we have separated people because we were 
concerned that they were----
    Senator Cruz. How many?
    Secretary Blinken. Cases I am aware of? A handful.
    [Gavel sounding.]
    The Chairman. Senator Kaine, you have the last word today.
    Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 
Risch.
    Secretary Blinken, thank you for the time that you have 
spent with us today. It is an important hearing, and there will 
be many more. I am going to a second one in the Armed Services 
Committee in about 2 hours, and I expect over the course of the 
next weeks, there will be many. I am just going to really speak 
from the heart to kind of set out what I am thinking at a very 
important moment, a complicated moment.
    I am the father of a Marine. I come from a state that is 
very, very heavily affected by the wars of the last 20 years. 
It was one of the States that was attacked on 9/11. In the 
weeks of August and early September, this is basically what I 
have done. I have watched Afghanistan on television. I have 
talked to active duty and veterans. I have talked to you and 
other colleagues.
    I have visited the Pentagon for the Pentagon employees' 
commemoration of the 9/11 attack. I went to Arlington on 9/11 
to go to the fire station where the relief effort was 
spearheaded. I have also gone to Fort Lee, as you have, to see 
the incredible work that is being done to help Afghans who have 
stood with us integrate into American life.
    I have been to the Dulles Expo Center to see these families 
that have traveled halfway around the world, still traumatized, 
but looking forward to a chapter where they can be free. I have 
a lot of emotions. So let me just tell you what they are. They 
are sadness, and they are anger, and they are pride, and they 
are relief.
    Sadness. I am saddened by the unnecessary deaths of the 
3,000 or so who were killed on 9/11. I am saddened by the 
deaths of more than 7,000 U.S. troops. I am saddened by the 
deaths of more than 8,000 American contractors. I doubt there 
has been a war in the history of the United States where more 
contractors died than troops, but this global war on terror is 
one such war.
    I am saddened at the deaths of 400,000 innocent civilians 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. I am saddened at those who are 
now going to have to live under Taliban rule. I am particularly 
saddened for the families of the 13 troops who were killed. To 
lose a child in any circumstance is horrible, and war is 
horrible. In the last days of a war, in the last days of a war 
that has been declared over and is winding down, I do not know 
how that wound could ever heal for a parent. Yet, those 13 died 
to save the lives of about 120,000 people who will have the 
chance to live in a freer and better society because of their 
heroism.
    I am angry. I am angry at the terrorist impulse. I was 
angry about it on 9/11/01, the urge to destroy with the planes 
flying into buildings and killing people indiscriminately--
young, old, American, and other nationalities, Muslim, 
Christian, Jewish, no religion. That indiscriminate urge to 
destroy, to blow up a demolition vest at the Kabul airport and 
kill 13 American troops and hundreds of your own countrymen and 
women. For what? That angers me.
    I am angered that after 20 years of American investment in 
an Afghan security force dramatically larger than the Taliban, 
dramatically better equipped than the Taliban, that security 
force just melted away and failed. The one thing I would be a 
little bit critical of you and the Administration is the same 
point that Senator Romney was making earlier and Senator Rubio. 
The notion that General Milley said that nothing I or anyone 
else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this government 
in 11 days, I just do not think that is true.
    I know it was not the consensus opinion, and I know it was 
not the most likely possibility, but the possibility of a 
collapse was not zero percent, and it was not 1 percent. It 
probably was not 10 percent. It was probably, based on what we 
have been hearing in this committee and others have, too, that 
was always a fairly--it was a possibility that had to be 
grappled with.
    I guess one of the questions that I will get into over 
coming weeks is if the Administration really said nobody could 
see this coming, then that probably suggests that the 
contingency planning for something that was a real possibility 
was not all that it should have been.
    My anger at the collapse of the security force, we have got 
to get into it, and we have to decide did we train them wrong? 
Did our equipping them lead to corruption? Were they good 
fighters that lacked confidence in their own military and 
civilian leadership? Did we want things for Afghans that the 
Afghan leadership did not want for themselves?
    We had good intentions about what we might have wanted in 
Afghanistan, but let us face it. We cannot get 30 percent of 
Americans to get a vaccine. We cannot get 30 percent of 
Americans to acknowledge the results of a presidential 
election. Do we really think that we can determine what the 
culture of another country should be?
    I am proud. I am proud of those who served in so many 
different ways, from first responders who ran into the 
buildings on 9/11, to this generation of Americans, many of 
whom did not come from military families necessarily, but who 
volunteered to serve.
    Not just serve once or twice, but this is the only 
generation, I believe, of the American military that has seen 
five, six, seven, eight, nine deployments again and again and 
again. Injured, wounded, carrying some invisible scars that 
will affect the rest of their life. I am proud of their 
service.
    I am proud of the country and my Virginians for what they 
are doing in welcoming Afghans here. The outreach from 
Virginians to my office, from our Vietnamese community, we want 
to help Afghans settle. From churches, where do we donate? How 
do we give to resettlement agencies?
    When I visited Fort Lee and Dulles, to hear the Afghans 
express their appreciation to the United States and, even in 
the midst of their trauma and their anxiety about the next 
chapter, to be excited about the opportunity to live in a place 
not under Taliban rule and have an opportunity for better lives 
for their children, I am proud that even amidst all of the 
challenge that is the way they look at us.
    I am proud of the military who are there who say I have 
been deployed five times. This mission is the most important 
mission I will ever undertake.
    The last thing--and Mr. Chair, if you might indulge me 
because I may go another 30 seconds past--I am relieved. No one 
has said this yet. I am relieved that a child born at Inova 
Fairfax today is not born into a nation at war. Some will 
challenge my characterization because the world is a dangerous 
place, and American troops are deployed all over the world. 
There is risks, and there is threats, but we have been a nation 
at permanent war for 20 years.
    We were never supposed to be that nation, never. Never. We 
were never supposed to be that nation. I heard a college 
student at George Washington say recently, ``I know nothing of 
war''--because with an all-volunteer army, she does not have 
to--``but all I know is war.'' ``All I know is war.''
    President Biden had the courage to say this Nation is not a 
nation that should be permanently at war. It is going to take a 
while for people to wrap their head around the notion that 
though there are serious threats for us everywhere, we are not 
a nation now that is at war, ground wars in the Middle East. It 
is going to take people a while to get used to it.
    Some people will resist it. Some people will want to say, 
no, we have got to be on the front edge of our feet and be on 
permanent war footing at all moments for now into infinity. I 
am relieved. I am relieved that for the first time in 20 years, 
children being born in this country today are not being born 
into a nation at war.
    I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Let me move and place into today's 
hearing record a statement on Afghanistan from recently exiled 
Afghan women leaders and human rights defenders that urges the 
United States to continue to support women's groups across 
Afghanistan as central drivers of change.

[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found 
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section 
at the end of this hearing.]

    The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony. 
You have been here over 3 and a half hours. I think every 
member of the committee was present and had an opportunity to 
ask questions, and you give substantive answers.
    I will just close by saying while the focus today has been 
the present Administration's decisions, this is going back 20 
years. As someone who sat here as a staff director of this 
committee, as someone who was at the NSC at one time, as 
someone who was an Assistant Deputy Secretary and now the 
Secretary, I think you might join me in saying that over the 
last 20 years at different times, Congress has been misled.
    Assessments were definitely overly rosy, to say the best. 
If we are not to repeat the past, we need to learn from it, and 
that is what the committee's ultimate pursuit will be.
    The record of this hearing will remain open until the close 
of business on Thursday. With the thanks and respect of the 
committee for your participation, this hearing is adjourned.
    Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


         U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement, 
                        Dated September 9, 2021






















                                 ______
                                 

               Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter, 
                        Dated September 2, 2021
















                                 ______
                                 

Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women Leaders and 
                         Human Rights Defenders

Secretary Blinken and Members of Congress:

    With the fall of the Afghan Government, it has been a blow to many 
of our achievements of the last 20 years that have been gained with 
your government's support. In the last few weeks since being overtaken 
by the Taliban, it is evident that the peace process has been a fallacy 
that had no guarantee of securing what the United States and people of 
Afghanistan invested in over the last two decades.
    Many of us women activists have been working for an inclusive and 
just peace for years. We repeatedly warned the United States Government 
and the international community that if the withdrawal was not managed 
responsibly, and if the peace process was not Afghan-centric, it would 
be a disastrous failure.
    We were incredibly disappointed with the peace process that your 
government facilitated, especially when the talks in Istanbul were 
supposed to happen but then the announcement of the non-conditional 
troop withdrawal effectively ended them before they could begin. We do 
understand the United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan as its 
longest war, however a few months more where your troops were not 
involved in combat would have at least helped with reaching an 
acceptable political settlement that would have allowed some level of 
inclusivity.
    Today the Taliban Government is run by unqualified fighters and by 
Pakistani proxy. Women are nowhere in the new structure of government 
and women's activities and freedoms are being limited in health and 
education in 7 out of 34 provinces. The media is strictly under 
scrutiny and minorities have been marginalized in the disorganized new 
government structure. Protests have been met with brutality, with women 
protestors arrested and tortured badly. Many people were massacred in 
Panjsheer, and elsewhere in Afghanistan.
    Some of us have made it to the United States through the parole 
process and with the support of U.S. women's rights groups and 
political leaders. This journey started under extremely difficult 
conditions, and we still don't know when it will end. We women leaders 
and activists have been mixed with U.S. trained Afghan troops and other 
groups. The entire evacuation process was gravely mismanaged for women. 
Even those who had U.S. visas were denied safe entry into the airport 
as timely information was not communicated with relevant troops 
managing the airport gates. Worst of all, not all of our friends made 
it out with us. At the airport gates we faced gun fire from both 
Taliban and U.S. troops, tear gas, and a suicide bomb attack. Many 
people died trying to escape a regime that they don't believe in.
    The Taliban has proven to be an extreme regime lacking law and 
order, essentially being run by several groups of outlaws. They are now 
targeting activists, former government employees, and women Members of 
Parliament, and entering their homes, taking their cars, and collecting 
any means of security that they possessed in the past. Even NGO offices 
run by women have been shut down and their valuables, such as cars, 
have been taken from them.
    While we are disheartened by the way things evolved on the ground, 
the United States still has an opportunity to support the Afghan 
people. We women leaders of Afghanistan call on the U.S. Government to 
provide a humanitarian response to the double catastrophe of the 
Taliban regime and the drought and famine that are causing suffering 
across the country. Beyond humanitarian assistance, we call on the U.S. 
to support women's groups across Afghanistan as the real drivers of 
change. Women should be given any and all political support to help 
ensure their safety as they continue their life saving work on behalf 
of thousands of women across the country.
    We also call on the United States to include a more responsible 
team in the peace process and help end the current catastrophe before 
it engulfs everyone in the country and region. Particular pressure 
should be maintained and increased on Pakistan for supporting the 
Taliban and offering safe haven to ISIS.
    Today Al-Qaida, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist 
groups are in Afghanistan enjoying safe sanctuary. This is a threat to 
the U.S. and the world that needs to be contained through a revised 
strategy in Afghanistan and the region. Just like all other strategies, 
women should be at the center if there is to be a guarantee for a safe 
and balanced Afghanistan. As we have been saying all along, our rights 
are not separate from peace and security, but are necessary for peace 
and security to be achieved.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. In August, my staff reached out to the State Department 
regarding the family of Sharif Azizi who interpreted for U.S. forces in 
Afghanistan and resides in the United States as an SIV. We have 
received credible reports the Taliban are actively hunting for members 
of his family, who remain unable to leave Afghanistan. On August 29, a 
rocket hit about 300 yards away from where they were hiding. The family 
is now trying to cross into Pakistan. We've asked your office to get 
him an expedited travel document so he can travel to Pakistan and 
escort his family from the border to U.S. Embassy Islamabad. I have one 
simple ask: can you please work with me to get this individual an 
expedited travel document ASAP and ensure that State is prepared to 
process the family's application, if they can safely cross the border?

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if 
and when they choose to do so. We are continuing to process Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process, 
including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates 
around the world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it 
is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a 
third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we are 
developing processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver 
these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan.

    Question. The Taliban continue to imprison Mark Frerichs, (Free-
ricks) an American contractor. He should have been on that plane to 
Qatar last week along with other Americans inside the country. What 
steps are you taking to secure his release?

    Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran 
Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to 
hold an American hostage. We continue to raise the need for Mark's 
immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible 
opportunity. The Taliban must immediately release him. We have been 
clear that any legitimacy and any support will have to be earned. We 
have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar, Pakistan, and 
others while we continue to press the Taliban to release Mark.

    Question. We have received credible reports that there were 1,200 
students, faculty and staff from the American University of Afghanistan 
mobilized and ready to depart well before the August 31 deadline--all 
with the proper paperwork. The Taliban gave assurances that they would 
let the convoy through the airport but reversed themselves on August 
27, apparently citing a decision from Washington that AUAF evacuees 
were no longer a priority. Nearly half of the 1,000 students are women, 
and about 200 Afghan women were handpicked by the State Department and 
given full-ride scholarships. Now the campus is under the control of 
the Haqqanis. What are your plans to ensure continued support for this 
university--one of the few investments we have left--and can you 
confirm you will help these vulnerable young people, who are desperate 
to evacuate, leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. The United States will continue to support equal access to 
education in Afghanistan, and we are exploring options regarding our 
support for the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) and its 
students under current circumstances. We are aware that AUAF is also 
exploring options, including the possibility of remote learning. We 
would refer you to AUAF leadership for details. The Department 
continues to explore options for those students who wish to depart 
Afghanistan, and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of 
commercial flights out of Kabul International Airport.

    Question. It is my understanding that a number of Afghan passports 
and documents associated with visa applications were destroyed by 
embassy staff when the embassy closed down, resulting in a number of 
Afghans now lacking the documents that they would need in order to meet 
Taliban document demands in order to be able to leave the country. 
While I understand the security concerns in not wanting to leave those 
materials behind, this again strikes me as indicative of the lack of 
planning and preparation made for the collapse of Afghanistan and our 
hasty exit. I also understand we don't even know the number, let alone 
the identities, of Afghans who we've stranded in this way. Can you 
explain to us what happened with this incident, why, and where it 
leaves our Afghan partners?

    Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency 
drawdown to mitigate risk by reducing the amount of sensitive material 
remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown was conducted in accordance 
with this procedure. For Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) recipients 
traveling to the United States under U.S. Government care, we 
collaborated with the Department of Homeland Security to provide 
electronic proof of recent visa issuance. While we are currently unable 
to provide consular services for visa applicants in Afghanistan, we 
will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the 
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and 
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear.
    We are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to 
deliver consular services for Afghans. In tandem with our allies and 
partners, we continue to press the Taliban to live up to their public 
commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.

    Question. Prior to the final flight out, we heard from both 
American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the airport but 
were either not being allowed through the gates, being sent back home, 
or simply abandoned with no guidance. While we understand and 
appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is confounding 
that such a chaotic process arose to begin with. It speaks to the 
failure to plan and resource to get this withdrawal right. Or it speaks 
to a failure of implementation. Why was the Administration unable to 
implement clear and concise plans to wind down our presence in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel 
is a top priority for the Department. A major component of executing 
contingency plans is adjusting to the situation on the ground as the 
operating environment warrants. The U.S. embassy was able to safely 
relocate personnel to the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul 
International Airport (KIA) on August 15 and 16, 2021. The security 
situation was dynamic and required the U.S. military to send additional 
troops to secure the perimeter of KIA. The embassy released 15 consular 
messages to the public between August 15 and August 31, 2021, to 
provide the latest information to U.S. citizens on the evacuation 
operations. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and 
partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from 
Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a 
pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats. I defer 
to the Department of Defense on any questions related to the withdrawal 
of U.S. military personnel.

    Question. Precisely when did the Administration begin to plan for a 
worst case scenario contingency?

    Answer. The Department of State engaged in contingency planning for 
a range of scenarios starting in January 2019. The planning scenarios 
were based on a range of potential security conditions on the ground 
and a declining level of mission functions. The scenarios assumed 
reduced embassy footprints while maintaining core mission functions 
under various scenarios. Planning continued following the change in 
administration in January 2021.

    Question. Why didn't we have the security, personnel for 
processing, and airlift capabilities in place for what was a very 
predictable set of circumstances?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy was able to safely relocate personnel to 
the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul International Airport 
(KIA) August 15-16, 2021. The security situation was dynamic and 
required the U.S. military to send additional troops to secure the 
perimeter of KIA and the Department to send in additional logistics and 
consular personnel. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and 
partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from 
Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a 
pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats.

    Question. What was the specific planning put into the likely 
scenario that American citizens were going to have to evacuate under 
hostile conditions?

    Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens, U.S. Government 
personnel, and their dependents is the highest Department priority. All 
embassies and consulates around the world prepare detailed Emergency 
Action Plans that include sections related to Department of Defense 
support to assist with crises abroad. U.S. Embassy Kabul completed an 
annual Crisis Management Exercise in December 2020 to prepare for a 
potential large-scale evacuation. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various 
Department offices participated with interagency partners in evacuation 
planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of 2021. Planning 
efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S. Embassy Kabul 
worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure close 
coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan, and 
with CENTCOM.

    Question. In your remarks on August 30, you said the United States 
will continue to work with Afghans at risk who want to leave. How do 
you define an ``Afghan at risk'' and how many Afghans in that category 
remain in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the 
international community to explore all options to support members of 
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--
women, children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ 
community, members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk 
populations. We are continuing to examine all available avenues for 
protection for this population. We recognize that it is currently 
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a 
third country or find a way to enter a third country, and like many 
refugees, they may face significant challenges fleeing to safety. We 
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border 
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need.

    Question. What role did individual vulnerability based on religion, 
ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.--factors beyond U.S. affiliation or 
NGO affiliation--play in prioritizing evacuations? If at all, when in 
the planning process did this consideration arise? How many resources 
did the Department devote to this line of effort?

    Answer. The Department of State's priority is supporting departures 
of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents and their immediate 
families. The Department of State is also committed to providing 
assistance to Special Immigrant Visa applicants and vulnerable Afghans, 
including refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans, 
victims of conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with 
disabilities, members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and 
other at-risk populations. The Department of State established a team, 
led by the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate 
across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency 
partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to 
leave Afghanistan.

    Question. Of those identified by the State Department as ``most 
vulnerable'' Afghans, including activists, journalists, and human 
rights defenders, how many were evacuated by the U.S. or with U.S. 
facilitation? How many of these were implementers of USG democracy and 
human rights programs? What is your plan to assist them?

    Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the 
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable 
populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women, 
children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community, 
members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk populations. 
We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for 
this population.

    Question. How and when did you brief NGOs regarding requirements 
for facilitating charters how did you share the information those NGOs 
needed to facilitate safe passage of their employees through Kabul and 
into the airport? During the approximately 2 weeks of evacuation 
operations following the fall of Kabul, how did you prioritize private 
charter requests and the entry of their manifested passengers to the 
Kabul airport? What efforts did your Department take to facilitate 
access to the airport for those assigned seats on charter aircraft that 
had been given landing clearance?

    Answer. During the operations in August led by the Department of 
Defense (DoD), the Department of State had a dedicated team liaising 
across State and with DoD to coordinate information and communications 
with private charter operators. Guidance provided by the DoD was 
communicated as inquiries were received by the Department of State, and 
planning and arrangements were further facilitated by the assigned case 
manager for each private charter inquiry that was received. Airport 
access for those manifested for private charter flights was coordinated 
with security at the airport in Kabul, and the Department of State case 
managers worked with private charter operators to facilitate this 
access as conditions allowed.

    Question. To what do you attribute claims that your Department gave 
no clear guidance to anybody other than those with U.S. visas or 
passports to enter the airport?

    Answer. The Department of State provided regular notifications and 
security alerts on our public website prior to the suspension of 
operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 31, 
2021. These notifications are available for review here: https://
af.usembassy.gov/news-events/.

    Question. How is the Administration coordinating with the NGO 
coalition and private entities still conducting time-sensitive private 
evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan? In particular, how is the 
Administration supporting efforts to facilitate civilian evacuation 
flights, including with regard to landing rights at destination 
locations and travel to and capacity at lily-pad location?

    Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for 
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State 
Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the 
flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating 
requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately 
organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger 
manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these 
flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially 
eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States.
    The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator 
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies 
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others. 
The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate 
the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. 
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and 
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

    Question. I applaud the Administration's decision to appoint 
Governor Markell and Mr. Robert Fenton as senior officials responsible 
for addressing the resettlement of Afghans in the United States. Who is 
the corresponding lead official at the Department of State responsible 
for addressing the evacuation of and support to those Afghans at risk 
who remain left behind in Afghanistan or are now in third countries? 
What planning has been done to help all of these people who remain left 
behind?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency 
partners and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for 
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. The United States will work vigorously with the international 
community to explore all options to support vulnerable populations in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. More than 3,200 Afghans are part of the United Nations' 
presence in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were left behind during the 
evacuation and remain trapped there. The Taliban have been very clear 
about how they view any Afghan who has worked with the international 
community, and as such these women and men--and their families--face 
much the same threat as those who worked with the United States. While 
the U.N.'s humanitarian presence in Afghanistan is critical, a great 
many of these Afghans are not directly involved in humanitarian aid 
delivery or other urgent life-saving work. Certainly the international 
community shares a profound responsibility for their safety. What is 
being done to help get them and their families to safety? Which 
countries are offering them visas? What options are available to 
provide them safe passage out of Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department of State is working with U.N. leadership to 
consolidate lists of Afghan national staff who are known to a U.S. 
Government agency and are at risk and have referred them to the 
Priority 1 (P-1) refugee program for access to the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP). Individuals referred to the USRAP can begin 
processing their case once in a third country where refugee processing 
is possible. We consider the U.N.'s work in Afghanistan more critical 
than ever, particularly for its human rights reporting, humanitarian 
assistance coordination, and other key roles crucial for peace and 
stability in Afghanistan. The United States is carefully tracking 
allegations of violence or intimidation against U.N. staff and are 
engaging with U.N. leadership to improve security provisions for those 
at risk. We have also emphasized and have called on the Taliban 
leadership to ensure that Taliban members at all levels comply with 
obligations under international humanitarian law and take every action 
to respect the independence and neutrality of the U.N. system and all 
its staff operating in Afghanistan.

    Question. How many locally employed staff remain to be evacuated?

    Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were 
unable or chose not to travel by August 30, 2021, of which 7 have 
requested assistance departing Afghanistan.

    Question. Embassy Kabul drew down during the pandemic and consular 
activity dramatically decreased. There was a particular decrease in the 
processing of non-immigrant visas. Did the Department shift resources 
to SIV and other Afghanistan-related immigration cases? If so, how? Why 
did the Department not waive in person interviews for processing given 
the pandemic?

    Answer. Due to the pandemic, U.S. Embassy Kabul adjusted its 
consular operations to conform with prioritization guidelines issued by 
the Department of State. The prioritization plan focuses on the 
provision of services to U.S. citizens, and then, as feasible, visa 
processing including immigrant visa processing.
    The Department temporarily extended the validity of certain 
immigrant visa applications, thus reducing repeat in-person 
appearances, for individuals who had been interviewed and signed their 
immigrant visa applications under oath before a consular officer, but 
whose visa applications have not been approved within 1 year of the 
oath. U.S. law requires immigrant visa applicants to appear personally 
before a consular officer to take an oath and execute their visa 
application biometrically, in addition to submitting to the collection 
of biometric information for security vetting.

    Question. How many SIV applicants and their families were killed 
while waiting for their cases to be approved?

    Answer. The Department of State expresses its sincere condolences 
for the loss of life of any Afghan at risk, including Special Immigrant 
Visa (SIV) applicants and their family members. However, the Department 
does not have information on the numbers of SIV applicants and family 
members who may have died.

    Question. Why were SIV approvals not significantly ramped up 
following the Biden's April withdrawal announcement? Why didn't the 
Administration start in April to evacuate SIVs to Guam or third 
countries and then start the lengthy visa approval process?

    Answer. Efforts to decrease processing time include quintupling 
(since May 2021) the staff who process Chief of Mission (COM) approval 
applications, doubling the number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul, 
waiving the requirement for a medical examination for Special Immigrant 
Visa (SIV) applicants in Afghanistan, and issuing foil-less visas to 
applicants who have completed consular interviews and administrative 
processing. These efforts led to a significant increase in COM 
approvals and visa issuances since the resumption of visa interviews in 
February 2021. In the third quarter of FY 2021 (April 1 to June 30), 
the Department issued SIVs to 615 Afghan principal applicants and 1,975 
derivative family members. This is approximately three times the number 
of visas issued in previous quarters.
    On July 19, the Department of State activated the Afghanistan 
Coordination Task Force. The task force consists of experts from the 
Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Health and Human 
Services. From July 30 through August 15, 2021, 10 flights arrived at 
Dulles under Operation Allies Refuge carrying a total of 1,962 SIV 
applicants and family members.
    We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV 
applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa 
interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting 
continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of 
Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S. 
Government, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no 
expiration date.

    Question. What were the average processing days for SIVs in May 
2021? How did that compare to January 2021?

    Answer. In January 2021, average processing time was 996 days while 
in June 2021, it had decreased to 665 days. Since February 2021, there 
has been a whole-of-government effort to decrease the processing time 
for SIVs at every step of the process. These numbers do not tell the 
whole story, as our reporting calculates only the cases completed in a 
given quarter. Therefore, completing long outstanding cases in a 
particular quarter results in higher average processing times.

    Question. What has been done to assist Afghans who had been 
approved for visas-including non-SIV immigrant visas-but could not 
obtain them because of the precipitous collapse of the Government? Can 
they have their visas issued by U.S. Embassies in another country?

    Answer. Consular staff at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide 
have assisted with adjudication of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
applications; Consulate General Guangzhou has processed visa 
applications since late August for 1,398 Afghan individuals who 
completed consular interviews and administrative processing. We are 
continuing to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV 
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and 
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. We 
know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa 
to a third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we 
are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver 
these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are 
also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public 
commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We 
are doing this ourselves in our direct and pragmatic communications to 
the Taliban on this national security concern and national priority. 
We're also doing this in tandem with our allies and partners around the 
world. Immigrant visa applicants may request to have their cases 
transferred to another immigrant visa processing post for interview and 
processing. Several posts, including Islamabad, Ankara, Frankfurt, New 
Delhi, and Warsaw, have issued Afghan SIVs since the suspension of 
operations in Kabul.

    Question. What has the Department of State communicated to U.S. 
embassies and consulates around the world about providing consular 
services to Afghan P2 applicants? What are the Administration's plans 
to process Afghans in third countries? If they must complete processing 
in a third country, how will the Administration ensure that they have 
access to basic services while awaiting processing?

    Answer. For P1 and P2-referred individuals who are in a third 
country and have contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-
funded Resettlement Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based 
on the individual's location. The Administration has sought to increase 
the capacity of these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases 
as part of an overall larger U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). 
Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work regionally and can process 
cases in some countries even if there is not a physical RSC presence, 
though it might take some time for a team to deploy to a particular 
location for processing. While we are working expeditiously, there is 
no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that 
the Department expects to process in the next year, and there is no 
limit to the number of referrals the Department will accept. In 
general, it takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee 
resettlement case from start to finish including pre-screening, the 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous 
security vetting.

    Question. Thousands of our Afghan partners either do not have 
passports or have had their passports taken or destroyed due to recent 
events. The Taliban and bordering countries are reportedly blocking 
travel without these documents. What is the Administration doing to 
ensure that Afghans who do not have passports, but who are eligible as 
an SIV, P-1, P-2, or P-3 designation, or through humanitarian parole, 
have access to safe pathways out of the country?

    Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for 
Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way 
to enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant 
challenges fleeing to safety. Many refugees worldwide do not have 
passports, and passports are generally not required to register with 
UNHCR or for referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. We 
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border 
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their 
respective obligations related to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, 
and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

    Question. Secretary Blinken has repeatedly said that the Taliban 
must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid 
travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who 
worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas. 
Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or 
verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special 
Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?

    Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department 
or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. As operations 
at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible and 
referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of 
Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We 
recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a 
visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country, and 
like many refugees, may face significant challenges fleeing to safety. 
We strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border 
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Afghans in need.

    Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban 
about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental 
task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S. 
and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents. 
We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment.

    Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be 
located outside the U.S. for their applications to begin processing. 
However, many eligible applicants were brought to the U.S. directly, by 
the U.S. Government, in recognition of the dangerous situation they 
faced in Afghanistan. As a result, they are not able to have their P-2 
applications processed. This unnecessary bureaucratic obstacle will 
limit them to applying for asylum in the U.S., which was not 
specifically designed for their situations and can quickly become 
overburdened. These journalists have past and current employers willing 
to sponsor their P-2 applications. Will the Administration modify the 
P-2 program to allow for processing while in the U.S.?

    Answer. The Department continues to evaluate all options related to 
the protection of Afghan nationals at risk, particularly those 
affiliated with the United States.
    On September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, which allows for relocated 
Afghan nationals to receive domestic refugee benefits in the United 
States and contains a provision requiring United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications 
filed by certain Afghan nationals described in the Act.

    Question. The U.S. announced that a number of countries have 
pledged to accept and have taken in at-risk Afghans. How are you 
working with these governments to relocate Afghans who are still in 
need of evacuation? And how are you working with these governments to 
help those who managed to flee but have limited legal status in their 
current countries of relocation?

    Answer. The United States is working vigorously with the 
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable 
populations in Afghanistan. We strongly encourage countries in the 
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and 
coordinate with international organizations and other humanitarian 
partners to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also 
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations to not 
return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and 
to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

    Question. The U.S. itself accepted many at-risk Afghans at its 
military base in Doha. How long will those individuals be allowed to 
stay in Doha? What is the State Department doing to process or refer 
those individuals to third countries? Do you have a process in place?

    Answer. The Government of Qatar agreed to allow thousands of 
Afghans at risk to transit through Qatar as part of Operation Allies 
Refuge. The majority of them are already in the United States and are 
being processed for parole at domestic bases. Remaining Afghans are 
housed at Qatar-based U.S. facilities while they are being vetted and 
prepared for onward travel to the United States. The U.S. Government 
and the Government of Qatar are discussing arrangements to use a 
facility to transit smaller numbers of Afghans-at-risk over the coming 
months.

    Question. Do you support the application of the Priority 2 
designation for Afghan religious minorities, namely Sikhs, Hindus, 
Christians, and Jews?

    Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection 
of the rights of all Afghans. The United States will work vigorously 
with the international community and civil society partners to explore 
all options to ensure that vulnerable individuals, including members of 
Afghan religious minority groups, have equal access to protection, 
including refugee resettlement in the United States and other 
countries.
    By law, religion is one of the five grounds of persecution that is 
part of establishing refugee status in the United States together with 
race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and 
political opinion. Many of the most vulnerable refugee applicants have 
suffered religious persecution. Increasing the resettlement ceiling to 
125,000 in FY 2022 increases the ability of the United States to 
resettle those facing persecution based on religion, including members 
of Afghan religious minority groups.

    Question. How should Afghans fleeing Taliban persecution but still 
stuck in Afghanistan apply for humanitarian parole? Does the Department 
expect them to simply use the global process via Form I-131?

    Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
is the agency that adjudicates Form I-131 and grants parole. Afghans-
at-risk within Afghanistan may file a request for humanitarian parole 
or have someone file on their behalf. However, because the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul has suspended operations and consular services are not 
available in Afghanistan, Afghans-at-risk may need to travel to a third 
country for processing before USCIS approves their humanitarian parole. 
I defer to USCIS for further information on the parole process for 
Afghans-at-risk.

    Question. What is the current status of airports in Kabul and 
Mazar-i-Sharif? Is the Administration working to coordinate evacuations 
from these airports with evacuees, outside groups, and/or third 
countries? If so, for what categories of at-risk Afghans?

    Answer. Taliban leaders currently have control over the airports in 
Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Commercial airlines have been operating some 
relief and charter flights via the airport in Kabul. I defer to the 
airlines for details of their operations.
    We recognize the need for international flights to resume regular 
operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the Qatari 
and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also safely 
and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that there is an urgent 
need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. I defer to them for details 
of their presence and support in Afghanistan going forward.
    We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any issues and 
to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people with valid 
travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this 
point to the Taliban.

    Question. Media reports state Turkish private security companies 
are guarding HKIA. Can you confirm if those reports are true? How many 
Turkish private security personnel are at HKIA?

    Answer. There have been some private charter flights operated by 
commercial carriers via the airport in Kabul. We refer you to the 
airlines for details of their operations, including how visual flight 
rules currently in effect at all Afghan airports limit their ability to 
operate flights into and out of Afghanistan. We recognize the need for 
international flights to resume regular operations and urge the Taliban 
to work expeditiously with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure 
this is done quickly, but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey 
share our view that there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and 
safe travel. I defer to them for details of their presence and support 
in Afghanistan going forward.

    Question. Throughout August, press freedom organizations including 
the Committee to Protect Journalists regularly shared with various 
State Department staff lists of at-risk journalists who needed 
evacuation from the country including their biographical and contact 
information. Three questions: How many of these individuals were 
contacted by the State Department? Was this list ever shared with other 
governments who offered to help? How many of these individuals were 
evacuated by the U.S.?

    Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental 
task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across 
agencies, as we have done, but we also appreciate the desire of NGOs 
and private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for 
coordination there.
    The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator 
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies 
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others. 
The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate 
freedom of movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including 
U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, 
and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on 
supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their immediate 
families. We are not in a position to detail our involvement with any 
specific groups at this time.

    Question. On August 31, the U.S. left behind thousands of Afghan 
journalists who risked their lives to help cover the war and inform the 
public over the last 20 years. Because of their work and public 
profile, these journalists are now at heightened risk of Taliban 
violence. What is the State Department doing to negotiate a path for 
these vulnerable Afghans seeking to leave Afghanistan? Are you pursuing 
a diplomatic solution brokered by the U.S. to ensure the protection of 
these individuals in the country and allow for a pathway for them to 
leave safely?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to examine all available 
avenues to provide protection for vulnerable Afghans, including 
refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans, victims of 
conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities, 
members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and other at-risk 
populations. The Department of State has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency 
partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to 
leave Afghanistan.

    Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists 
and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?

    Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2 
referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) from U.S. 
Government employers and qualifying media and non-governmental 
organizations. A P-2 referral is separate from the visa process. After 
USRAP has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-
based non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media 
organization, and the individual has relocated to a country where 
refugee processing can occur, the referred individual may contact PRM 
to begin processing their case. Individuals should follow the 
guidelines on wrapsnet.org to contact PRM. At that point, PRM will 
assign the case to a PRM-funded overseas Resettlement Support Center 
for processing. Please note a P-2 referral enables applicants to access 
the USRAP and is not a visa category.

    Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into 
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while 
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could 
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

    Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow 
procedures to register for international protection and assistance with 
the government of the country they are in. They may also register and 
seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
We are working with international humanitarian partners and other 
governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns are 
able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program processing.

    Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are 
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them 
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to 
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

    Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those 
that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge 
states to uphold their respective obligations related to Afghan 
refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.

    Question. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Journalists and Staff: 
Media reports have indicated that as many as 550 congressionally funded 
journalists and their families working for Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty and Voice of America remain in Afghanistan after the U.S. 
withdrawal. The reports indicate that in the final days of the 
evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed staff 
of Embassy Kabul. Is that correct?

    Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were 
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the 
August operations, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of 
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as 
translators and interpreters for our Government, and other at-risk 
Afghans. Since August 31, we have worked closely with the U.S. Agency 
for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-affiliated employees and 
family members. We remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM, 
RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues 
will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top 
priorities.

    Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed 
staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?

    Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were 
unable or unwilling to travel on August 30, 2021, of which seven have 
requested assistance to depart Afghanistan.

    Question. What steps are being taken to evacuate these journalists?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with DoD and 
other partners to facilitate onward travel for those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents 
(LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The 
initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs 
and their immediate families. We are not in a position to detail our 
involvement with any specific groups at this time.

    Question. Can you commit to us they will be given the opportunity 
to depart Afghanistan and brought to the United States?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the 
interagency and with other partners to facilitate onward travel for 
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. The initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. 
citizens and LPRs and their immediate families. We are not in a 
position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at this 
time.
    Admission into the United States, as well as the granting of 
humanitarian parole or significant public benefit parole, is overseen 
by the Department of Homeland Security.

    Question. We remain concerned about reports that female 
humanitarian workers in Afghanistan are not receiving the same level of 
access and mobility as their male counterparts. Women's full 
participation in humanitarian interventions is critical to identifying 
the priorities and needs of women and girls. Without female staff, 
humanitarians simply cannot deliver programs at scale for women and 
girls, particularly health and protection services for victims of 
violence. How is the United States supporting humanitarians' efforts to 
secure commitments from the Taliban for a principled response, 
including the ability for women to work in the humanitarian response? 
What is the Administration doing to ensure that female humanitarian 
workers have safe, equal, and unrestricted access to perform 
humanitarian work?

    Answer. The United States is working with the international 
community to ensure that the Taliban follow through on their public 
commitments to allow unhindered humanitarian access, including freedom 
of movement for aid workers of all genders in Afghanistan. The Taliban 
has publicly reiterated their desire for humanitarian operations to 
resume, and we will continue to advocate at the highest levels for 
unimpeded humanitarian access and delivery, particularly for female 
staff and beneficiaries. We are coordinating with international 
partners, U.N. agencies, and NGOs on the way forward to deliver 
humanitarian assistance with independence, impartiality, and 
neutrality; this coordination includes ensuring the safety and security 
of female staff, and provision of assistance to all Afghans who need 
it.

    Question. How will the Administration continue to support women's 
rights programs in Afghanistan, particularly programs related to 
gender-based violence, girls' education, and sexual and reproductive 
health? At a time when support for Afghan women's rights organizations 
is most needed, what is the Administration doing to ensure they have 
the funding/resources and other support to continue operating?

    Answer. The United States remains committed to providing 
humanitarian assistance to women and girls in Afghanistan, such as 
child protection, psychosocial support, and sexual and reproductive 
health services. These programs hinge on female aid workers, and we are 
collaborating with fellow donors and the humanitarian response 
community to advocate for safe, unhindered access for all humanitarian 
personnel.
    We will be very focused on monitoring this assistance to ensure it 
is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I noted 
in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a senior 
official who will coordinate the USG's effort to support women in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. We understand that the Department of the Treasury issued 
a Specific License for USAID and the Department of State--and their 
partner organizations--to deliver humanitarian programming in 
Afghanistan on August 25. This unfortunately may not be an adequate 
safeguard for humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan--
including those operating with the funding of other governments as well 
as local organizations. It also does not cover private financial and 
commercial institutions, which we note have scaled back or completely 
curtailed operations in Afghanistan for fear of running afoul of 
sanctions. What further steps--including general licenses--is the 
Administration considering to ensure a sufficient number of 
humanitarian organizations and financial entities are able to operate 
in Afghanistan?

    Answer. On August 25, the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
(``Treasury'') did issue a specific license authorizing transactions 
necessary to provisions by U.S. Government implementers of humanitarian 
assistance in Afghanistan. This allows the U.S. Government and its 
implementing partners to continue to support critical and life-saving 
humanitarian assistance such as the delivery of food, shelter, certain 
health services, and to provide other critical humanitarian assistance 
to the Afghan people. On September 24, Treasury also issued two general 
licenses authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and those 
acting on their behalf to engage in transactions that are ordinarily 
incident and necessary to providing humanitarian assistance and 
engaging in other activities to support the basic needs in Afghanistan 
during this critical time. Treasury also issued answers to frequently 
asked questions providing further clarity on the scope of the general 
licenses and guidance for non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign 
financial institutions, explaining that such persons generally do not 
risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in, or facilitating 
transactions or payments for, activities authorized for U.S. persons 
under these general licenses. The State Department remains committed to 
supporting the people of Afghanistan.

    Question. The U.N. has estimated as many as half a million Afghans 
may flee the country by the end of this year in a worst case scenario. 
Afghanistan's neighbors have expressed varying levels of willingness to 
allow Afghans to cross their borders. Lessons from other mass 
displacements--from Syria, Venezuela and elsewhere--have shown closed 
borders do not stop refugee crises, but instead push people to take 
more dangerous, informal routes that put them at greater risk of human 
trafficking, recruitment by armed groups, and exploitation and abuse, 
particularly for women and girls. What is the U.S. strategy to ensure a 
regional response that welcomes these populations?

    Answer. The United States engages in humanitarian diplomacy with 
the countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to 
advocate for continued humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need, 
including coordination between our partners at UNHCR, other 
international organizations, NGOs, and host governments to monitor and 
respond to refugee outflows in the region. The United States is working 
with its partners to review and strengthen humanitarian preparedness 
and priority interventions in the region in the event of new refugee 
outflows from Afghanistan. We will encourage continued coordination 
between host governments and humanitarian organizations to monitor and 
respond to the protection and assistance needs of displaced Afghans in 
the region.

    Question. Afghanistan's growing humanitarian emergency threatens to 
generate new refugee flows and to foster conditions in which ISIS-K 
could regenerate. Demining groups are some of the very few humanitarian 
organizations continuing to operate in Afghanistan. Given the numerous 
IEDs and explosives remaining from the final phase of fighting, their 
work is needed more than ever. Will you commit to increasing U.S. 
support for this vital work that will create safe conditions for 
refugees to return home and provide employment for young Afghans who 
might otherwise turn to radical movements, such as ISIS-K?

    Answer. We must remain vigilant and monitor threats, especially any 
reemergence of externally directed plotting, and address them swiftly 
when they arise. As President Biden has made clear, the United States 
will maintain robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to 
neutralize any threats, and we will not hesitate to use those 
capabilities if we have to do so. We have made clear our expectation 
that the Afghan people deserve an inclusive government, which is 
essential for stability.

    Question. The withdrawal has already had an extremely negative 
impact on women leaders, parliamentarians, activists, and human rights 
defenders, many of whom have already been targeted and killed. Women 
and girls from all walks of life across the country are facing 
dangerous forms of oppression and roll backs of their rights. However, 
as we have already seen during ongoing protests, most of which have 
been met with brutal violence, they are courageously standing up to the 
Taliban and demanding their rights be protected. How does the U.S. 
Government plan on supporting women in this current situation? Does the 
Administration commit to continued funding for women's groups, 
including those working to promote human rights and protect women and 
girls from gender-based violence? How does the Administration plan to 
continue implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act and Strategy 
in Afghanistan? Does the Administration commit to providing visas for 
high-risk women who are seeking to evacuate the country?

    Answer. The United States is committed to supporting the rights of 
all Afghans, especially women and girls, and the gains they have 
achieved in the past 20 years through our diplomatic engagement and 
humanitarian assistance. Along with the international community, we 
have made it very clear that the legitimacy and support that the 
Taliban seek from the international community will depend on their 
conduct, especially how they treat women and girls.

    Question. What process has the Department put in place for Afghan 
students who have received acceptance from U.S. higher education 
institutions to apply for student visas? What guidance have you 
developed to communicate to these students and the higher education 
institutions issuing acceptances?

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if 
and when they choose to do so. This effort has no expiration date.
    Afghan nonimmigrant visa applicants, including students, may 
request an appointment at any visa processing post. They should request 
an appointment by following the instructions available on each post's 
website. We know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to 
obtain a visa to a third country or to find a way to enter a third 
country, but we are developing processing alternatives so we can 
continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of 
Afghanistan.

    Question. On August 19, Amnesty International reported that Taliban 
fighters murdered nine ethnic Hazara men in Ghazni province between 
July 4 and 6. ``Six of the men were shot and three were tortured to 
death, including one man who was strangled with his own scarf and had 
his arm muscles sliced off,'' Amnesty reported. On September 13, the 
BBC reported that 20 civilians were killed in the Panjshir Valley. How 
do you assess the risk of ethnic cleansing of ethnic and religious 
minorities in Afghanistan? Have you received other reports of attacks 
against ethnic and religious minorities? Is the State Department 
prioritizing prevention of ethnic cleansing in its talks with the 
Taliban?

    Answer. The Department of State is concerned about any credible 
reports of attacks on Afghans because of their ethnic or religious 
background. We continue to hold the Taliban to their public 
commitments, which include ensuring the safety of all Afghans and not 
engaging in retaliatory attacks. We have communicated this concern to 
the Taliban, and we will continue to press them to investigate any 
incidents and to bring perpetrators to justice. We also continue to 
press the Taliban to adhere to their public commitment to form an 
inclusive government, including one that includes representation from 
members of ethnic and religious minority groups.

    Question. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain Major Non-NATO 
Allies even after the Taliban took Kabul with the public cheerleading 
of the Pakistani Government. Do you think both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
should remain Major Non-NATO Allies with all the benefits afforded to 
countries on that list?

    Answer. Events in Afghanistan necessitate reexamination of our 
regional relationships, including with Pakistan. We continue to engage 
closely with Pakistan on U.S. strategic interests in the region, 
including shared counterterrorism concerns, calls for a more inclusive 
Afghan Government, and support for the evacuation of persons of 
interest to the United States. We are currently reviewing Afghanistan's 
Major Non-NATO Allies designation.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The Biden administration has stressed its commitment to 
holding the Taliban to the counter commitments it made under the 
February 29 Agreement. Despite promises to break with al Qaeda, the 
Taliban remains ideologically aligned with the group. According to a 
June 2020 United Nations report, ``The senior leadership of Al-Qaida 
remains present in Afghanistan, as well as hundreds of armed 
operatives, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, and groups of foreign 
terrorist fighters aligned with the Taliban.'' What are your views of 
the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda and impacts on U.S. 
CT interests?

    Answer. On August 31, al-Qa'ida released a public statement 
congratulating the Taliban on their ``victory'' in Afghanistan. The 
Taliban did not issue any public response to the statement, though in a 
September 21 interview Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid repeated a 
longstanding Taliban message that al-Qa'ida does not have a presence in 
Afghanistan. Separately, international media reported that Amin al Haq, 
Osama bin Laden's former security chief, entered Afghanistan and 
transited to Nangarhar on August 30. Speaking to the BBC on September 
29, Mujahid also noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the 
world that there will not be any threat against any country, including 
the United States, from Afghan soil.''
    Such statements, and the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent 
an ISIS-K attack at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, reflect the 
Taliban's aim of demonstrating they are adhering to their 
counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The 
United States continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their 
commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups or individuals 
from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.

    Question. What tools does State have at its disposal to ensure the 
Taliban complies with its CT commitments? How specifically will the 
Department hold the Taliban to account if they fail to fulfill the CT 
pledges?

    Answer. The United States Government continues to call on the 
Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing 
terrorist groups or individuals from training, fundraising, and 
recruiting, and not hosting them. The Taliban are aware that we are 
closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that 
we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S. 
national security concerns.

    Question. How does the new interim government impact your 
assessment of the Taliban's willingness to prevent terrorist 
organizations from freely operating in Afghanistan?

    Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman 
Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the 
world that there will not be any threat against any country including 
the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the 
agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and 
the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at the 
Hamid Karzai International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of 
demonstrating they are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments 
under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The United States Government 
continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which 
include preventing terrorist groups or individuals from training, 
fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.

    Question. The Administration's over-the-horizon counterterrorism 
plan was contingent on a semi-permissive security environment and a 
willing Afghan partner on the ground. The Taliban takeover has 
transitioned Afghanistan to a non-permissive environment without a 
suitable CT partner. What is the status of diplomatic discussions with 
Afghanistan's neighbors to secure access, basing, and overflight 
permissions?

    Answer. The United States has access arrangements necessary for 
ongoing U.S. over-the-horizon operations over Afghanistan. These 
arrangements have allowed the United States to maintain uninterrupted 
counterterrorism operations over Afghanistan. Our ongoing engagement 
seeks to further bolster those capabilities.

    Question. Is Russia involved in these negotiations or are Russian 
bases under consideration?

    Answer. Fighting the scourge of terrorism is a global effort. We 
will continue to engage partners, allies, and key states around the 
world on how best to address it, and in the case of Afghanistan, we 
have long worked closely with the nations of Central Asia. We deal 
directly with our sovereign Central Asian counterparts on these issues. 
Separately, we engage regularly with Russia in order to understand 
Moscow's views as a regional government that is also concerned about 
possible terrorist threats in Afghanistan.

    Question. What do you characterize as the risk to U.S. 
counterterrorism interests through over-the-horizon operations from the 
Gulf that include long travel times, dramatically reduced time on 
station, and inability to observe targets with an ``ISR soak'' to avoid 
civilian casualties?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for questions about 
their operational capacities.

    Question. The governments of Pakistan, China, Iran, India, and the 
Central Asian republics are all concerned, to varying degrees, about 
the possibility of Afghanistan-based terrorist threats. To what extent 
to you view any of these countries as legitimate counterterrorism 
partners?

    Answer. We are open to exploring varying degrees of 
counterterrorism cooperation with a range of countries, as long as the 
activities further U.S. national interests, have sufficient human 
rights protections, and are consistent with applicable law and policy 
guidance.

    Question. In his public comments, President Biden indicated the 
U.S. struck a deal with the Taliban for Kabul evacuations and continued 
evacuations after 31 August. Specifically, what was agreed to between 
the U.S. and the Taliban with respect to the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and vulnerable Afghan allies?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to engage on a practical, 
pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of U.S. national interest, 
including counterterrorism, safe passage, and unhindered humanitarian 
assistance. The Taliban have assured the U.S. Government--and publicly 
declared--that they will not retaliate against individuals associated 
with the United States or the Ghani Government, and that those who wish 
to leave Afghanistan will be able to do so, provided they have valid 
travel documents. U.S. citizens and vulnerable Afghans continue to 
depart Afghanistan, a positive indication that the Taliban are 
delivering on their commitment to freedom of movement. The United 
States will continue to press the Taliban to ensure that all who wish 
to leave Afghanistan are able to and will monitor the Taliban's 
adherence to their commitments closely.

    Question. Section 1217 of the NDAA FY 2021 requires that the 
Administration transmit any agreement or arrangement with the Taliban 
to Congress within 5 days. Why has the State Department not provided 
Congress any such agreement or arrangement as required by law?

    Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any 
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February 
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such 
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and 
is under the purview of the State Department.

    Question. Do you commit to providing Congress any agreement or 
arrangement, and relevant materials, made between the U.S. and the 
Taliban since August 14?

    Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any 
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February 
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such 
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and 
is under the purview of the State Department.

    Question. What is the status of captured equipment to include small 
arms, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery, anti-tank weapons, 
armored vehicles, rotary wing and aircraft? Will we destroy or allow 
them to atrophy over time? What will rise to threshold of destruction?

    Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan 
military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 
(ASFF), a Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10 
authority. DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and 
quantities of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title 
10 authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation 
programs, including determining the disposition of the equipment. We 
defer to DoD to provide this information.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you emphasized that the 
military equipment left behind by the United States would soon be 
inoperable and would not pose challenges to the United States. However, 
there is another significant risk that the Taliban allows adversaries, 
especially China, Russia, and Iran--to examine U.S. military equipment. 
Did the Departments of State and Defense consider this risk, and 
incorporate that into its advice to the President? Do the Departments 
of State and Defense plan to take any action if you become aware of 
reports that sophisticated adversaries gain access to U.S. equipment? 
Are there concerns that foreign actors will provide Taliban training on 
captured equipment?

    Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in 
ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund 
(ASFF) and transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces does not fall into the hands of sophisticated 
adversaries of the United States. The Department defers all questions 
on risk assessments related to this military equipment to the 
Department of Defense.

    Question. What support, if any, did external nations or forces 
provide to the Taliban before and during its summer 2021 offensive?

    Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials continued to support 
Afghan peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in 
negotiations up until August 15. Various senior Pakistan officials also 
made repeated public calls for a political solution to the Afghan 
conflict and expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban 
would lead to a protracted civil war.

    Question. What role did Pakistan play in the Taliban offensive?

    Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister 
Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in 
Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15. 
In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban 
attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by force it would 
lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into Pakistan. 
Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools necessary to 
support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior Pakistani 
officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive political 
settlement and the protection of women's educational rights in 
Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made repeated 
public calls for the international community to directly engage with 
the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic collapse, and 
avert a humanitarian disaster.

    Question. What steps did the State Department take to reduce the 
levels of external support to the Taliban prior to and during the 
offensive that toppled the Afghan Government?

    Answer. Up until August 15, the Department was actively working 
with the Government of Pakistan through a variety of regional 
initiatives in calling for the Taliban to pursue a political solution 
to the Afghan conflict by forming an inclusive government.

    Question. What actions have Russia and China taken since Kabul fell 
to strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties with the Taliban, provide 
support for Taliban efforts to consolidate control over the country, or 
gain access to captured U.S. military equipment, communications gear, 
or any other sensitive technologies left behind?

    Answer. While Russia maintains its Embassy in Kabul, the Taliban is 
still designated a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior Russian 
officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to recognize 
the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties with 
countries that border Afghanistan in recent months more so than with 
the Taliban itself.
    The People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its Embassy in 
Kabul. We continue to engage with countries that border Afghanistan and 
countries in the region, including the PRC, on the importance of the 
international community holding the Taliban accountable for their 
public commitments. The entire international community has a stake in 
ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and 
obligations. The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do, 
and Beijing has to decide where it is in that effort.

    Question. Has the Taliban requested any specific diplomatic, 
financial, military, intelligence, or technical assistance from Russia, 
China, or Pakistan since the fall of the Afghan Government?

    Answer. The Taliban have publicly called for increased economic 
ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including through the 
Belt and Road Initiative. In September 2021, the PRC pledged 
approximately $31 million worth of grant-based aid to Afghanistan, 
including food supplies and coronavirus vaccines. Through active 
regional diplomacy Pakistan has made consistent, public calls for the 
international community to directly engage with the Taliban, including 
by calling for their assets to be unfrozen to avoid economic collapse 
and avert a humanitarian disaster. Further, Pakistan is providing 
limited humanitarian aid to the Taliban and is encouraging other 
countries to pursue similar policies. Russia has also called publicly 
for the unfreezing of Taliban assets.

    Question. Please provide an assessment of the Taliban's compliance 
with the February 29 Agreement prior to April 14, 2021 to include a 
reduction in violence, adherence to counterterror commitments, and 
substantive dialogue with the Afghan Government.

    Answer. Under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, the Taliban committed to 
prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the 
security of the United States and its allies, and to prevent any such 
group from recruiting, training, and fundraising and not to host them. 
We assess that the Taliban has made some progress on these commitments, 
but there is significantly more to do. We continue to press the Taliban 
to fulfill their counterterrorism commitments.
    As part of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban agreed to enter 
into intra-Afghan negotiations on a political roadmap and permanent and 
comprehensive ceasefire. Negotiations began September 12, 2020. The 
Taliban and Ghani Government teams have not met since the Taliban took 
control of Kabul on August 15, 2021.

    Question. Section 1215 of the NDAA FY 2021 restricts funding for 
the Department of Defense for any activity to reduce force levels below 
both 4,000 and 2,000, until DoD submits a report to Congress or the 
President provides a written waiver. During the Afghanistan withdrawal, 
troop levels again exceeded 4,000 on the ground. Why has Congress has 
not received either the required report or written waiver as mandated 
by law?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense.

    Question. President Biden previously said the United States ``will 
not conduct a hasty rush to exit. We'll do it responsibly deliberately 
and safely. And we will do it in full coordination with our allies and 
partners.'' However, scenes from the U.S.-led evacuation effort based 
out of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) suggested anything but 
a responsible, deliberate, and safe exit. Can you elaborate on the 
scale of forward planning?

    Answer. The Department of State engaged in prudent contingency 
planning with interagency partners for a range of scenarios. The 
planning scenarios were based on a range of potential security 
conditions on the ground and a declining level of mission functions. 
The scenarios assumed reductions in embassy staffing while maintaining 
core mission functions under various conditions, up to and including 
suspension of operations and physical closure of the embassy.
    Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the world 
were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the evacuation and relocation operations in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.

    Question. What contingencies were put in place in the wake of 
President Biden's April announcement that the United States would 
withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021?

    Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel 
is my highest priority. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various Department 
offices participated with the interagency in Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operations planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of 
2021. Planning efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S. 
Embassy Kabul worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure 
close coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan, 
and with CENTCOM.

    Question. How many U.S. citizens are currently in Afghanistan? 
Please address how many total U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan, 
independent of how many may have indicated at some point an interest in 
staying in Afghanistan. Of the persons evacuated from Afghanistan in 
August, how many are U.S. citizens? How many are U.S. legal permanent 
residents? How many are SIV applicants?

    Answer. U.S. citizens are not required to register with the 
Department of State or an embassy when they arrive in or depart from a 
country, and as a result we have no means of providing an exact number 
of U.S. citizens currently in Afghanistan. On April 27, the Department 
ordered the departure of U.S. Government employees from U.S. Embassy 
Kabul due to increasing violence and threat reports in Kabul. When we 
expanded our evacuation operations on August 15, 2021, there were an 
estimated 6,000 U.S. citizens in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government 
facilitated the evacuation of approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens from 
Afghanistan through August 31. Between September 1 and November 9, the 
Department has assisted an additional 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs) depart Afghanistan, not including those that 
have departed on private charters or independently crossed a land 
border. We will continue to facilitate this travel. Like U.S. citizens, 
Lawful Permanent Residents are not required to register with the U.S. 
Embassy. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for statistics 
on the number of LPR evacuees admitted into the United States. In 
addition, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for numbers of 
SIV holder evacuees admitted into the United States. We estimate that 
40-50 percent of Afghan parolees may be SIV eligible because they took 
significant risks to support our military and civilian personnel in 
Afghanistan, working for or on behalf of the U.S. Government in 
Afghanistan or our coalition forces, or are a family member of someone 
who did. The Department is currently assessing how many of these Afghan 
evacuees had outstanding SIV applications.

    Question. How many U.S. permanent legal residents are currently in 
Afghanistan? Please address how many total U.S. permanent legal 
residents are in Afghanistan, independent of how many may have 
indicated at some point an interest in staying in Afghanistan.

    Answer. Like U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) do 
not register their location with the Department of State. As a result, 
we are unable to determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any 
other given country. Between September 1 and November 9, the Department 
has assisted 285 LPRs depart Afghanistan, not including those that have 
departed on private charters or independently crossed a land border. We 
will continue to facilitate this travel and will be relentless in 
helping LPRs depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa applicants are currently 
in Afghanistan?

    Answer. We do not have a figure of how many Special Immigrant Visa 
(SIV) applicants are currently in Afghanistan. This number is 
constantly changing since the Afghan SIV program continues to accept 
new applicants. As of October 6, 2021, there were approximately 27,000 
Afghan SIV principal applicants at various stages of the application 
process. At this time, we cannot determine how many are still in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain 
in the pipeline? How many applications did the department process 
between April 2021 and August 2021? Specifically, what steps has the 
Department taken to streamline the process since Biden took office in 
January 2021?

    Answer. As of October 6, 2021, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
pipeline has approximately 27,000 SIV principal applicants. More than 
19,000 are at the initial stage of the process, pending applicant 
action to submit a complete set of documents for consideration of Chief 
of Mission (COM) approval. The Department of State continues to accept 
new SIV applications and add them to the pipeline. From April 1, 2021, 
to August 31, 2021, the Department issued SIVs to 1,812 principal 
applicants (and 5,937 derivative applicants). The Department took 
efforts to decrease processing time to include quintupling (since May 
2021) the staff who assess applications for COM approval, doubling the 
number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul, increasing the staffing at the 
National Visa Center (NVC), initiating Project Rabbit with the 
Department of Defense (where the Department of Defense provides letters 
of recommendation for applicants after reviewing the human resources 
and employment records of Afghan SIV applicants), eliminating the COM 
Committee from the COM approval process, streamlining screening and 
vetting to be more time efficient while remaining secure, and utilizing 
the waiver of the requirement for a medical examination for SIV 
applicants in Afghanistan who completed all other steps for visa 
issuance.

    Question. What is the U.S. plan for evacuating U.S. citizens, legal 
permanent residents, and SIV applicants from Afghanistan?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish 
to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent 
Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The 
initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs 
and their immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing 
departure of Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government, and 
Special Immigrant Visa holders.

    Question. Where will these people go?

    Answer. Evacuees continue to arrive in a variety of destinations. 
While we are currently unable to provide consular services in 
Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by 
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the 
world where applicants are able to appear. Posts which have received 
Afghan SIV applications are prioritizing their processing.
    We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a 
visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country. The 
U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S. 
citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and 
Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while 
encouraging countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan 
to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing processing alternatives so 
that we can continue to deliver these important consular services for 
the people of Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the 
U.S. Government.

    Question. What role has the State Department played in receiving 
Afghan evacuees in Washington, DC and Philadelphia?

    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the designated 
lead federal agency for U.S.-based Afghanistan-related relocation 
operations. Prior to that designation, the Department of State, with 
support from USAID, had opened a temporary transit facility near Dulles 
Airport. DHS assumed overall control of Dulles operations on August 29, 
2021, when it was directed to serve as the lead agency to coordinate 
efforts to resettle Afghans, and the Philadelphia airport opened for 
arrivals as well. Department of State and USAID employees continued to 
support the Dulles operations of DHS in large numbers. Following 
admission of individuals relocated from Afghanistan to the United 
States by Customs and Border Protection at Dulles Airport, these 
employees worked closely with DHS, DoD, and federal health agencies to 
manifest Afghan travelers for flights and buses to their final safe 
haven base around the country for further processing. The Department 
had a small team at the Philadelphia airport to share lessons learned 
from Dulles, provide information to individuals relocated from 
Afghanistan who worked at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, coordinate family 
reunifications, and participate in interagency coordination meetings. 
The Department provided ``wrap-around'' services support at 
Philadelphia airport, specifically interpretation services to 
individuals upon their arrival.

    Question. How much money has the State Department spent on the 
evacuation from Afghanistan, including the housing and transportation 
of evacuees?

    Answer. As of October 13, 2021, the Department has obligated $689.9 
million in support of Operation Allies Welcome and related Afghanistan 
efforts, primarily involving relocation and resettlement of individuals 
at risk as a result of the situation in Afghanistan. Obligations by 
bureau and fund source are shown below. Obligations reported under CGFS 
include EDCS funded activities across multiple State bureaus, which are 
consolidated for reporting purposes under CGFS.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Bureau                       Fund                  Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CGFS                        EDCS                           $92.8 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CA                          CBSP                            $3.8 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRM                         ERMA                          $591.1 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCA                         Diplomatic Programs             $2.2 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (as of 10/13/21)                                    $689.9 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Question. Mr. Secretary, you previously committed to providing 
details on the Department's plans to support the continued evacuation 
of American Citizens, Legal Permanent Residences, Green Card Holders, 
and at-risk Afghans, thousands of whom were left behind after the U.S. 
military withdrawal. These include Afghan journalists, human rights 
defenders, members of parliament, women and girls, aid workers, and 
interpreters, among others. Many of these individuals played key roles 
in supporting the United States mission in Afghanistan and as a result 
of their work and public profile, are now at heightened risk of Taliban 
violence. Since the U.S. finalized its withdrawal from Afghanistan on 
August 31, this committee has received no additional clarity on the 
Department's long-term planning, particularly as relates to at-risk 
Afghans. Those who dedicated themselves to supporting the U.S. and 
promoting democratic ideals, despite the risk, must not now be 
forgotten. Moving forward, how does the State Department plan to assist 
these at-risk Afghans, many of whom are now under increasing threat 
from the Taliban as result of their occupation, identity, or 
connections with the West? What does future evacuation planning look 
like for this class?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, international organizations, and others to facilitate 
the departure of those who still wish to leave. We understand that the 
Taliban have targeted certain populations and professions among Afghan 
civilians in the past and denied access to services for vulnerable 
populations. The United States will work vigorously with the 
international community to explore all options to support members of 
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but not limited to--
women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+ 
individuals, and members of the ethnic and religious minority groups.

    Question. Is the Taliban currently allowing at-risk Afghans to 
leave the country?

    Answer. The departures of the Qatar Airways flights and others are 
a positive step in upholding the commitment to free movement. We 
continue to press the Taliban to see to it that U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, and others with valid travel documents, including 
our Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, are able to 
depart the country, if they so choose.

    Question. If the Taliban requires visas for persons to exit 
Afghanistan and the U.S. no longer has a diplomatic presence inside 
Afghanistan, how will the U.S. get visas to those trying to exit the 
country?

    Answer. We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to 
obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third 
country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe 
passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents 
(LPRs), and Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the region and those that 
border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing 
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these 
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. This effort 
is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.

    Question. How will the State Department facilitate the evacuation 
of eligible Afghans whose passports were destroyed by the U.S. during 
the withdrawal?

    Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency 
drawdown to mitigate risk by minimizing our footprint and reducing the 
amount of sensitive material remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown 
was conducted in accordance with this standard operating procedure.
    We are developing processing alternatives so that we can continue 
to deliver important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. 
This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.

    Question. In cases where safe evacuation isn't an option, what 
steps is the Department of State taking to mitigate the threat the 
Taliban poses to at-risk Afghans? To what extent is the Department 
collaborating with local or international non-government organizations 
in this effort?

    Answer. We are continuing to examine all available avenues to 
provide protection for vulnerable Afghans. Our commitment to providing 
humanitarian assistance directly to the United Nations and NGO partners 
inside Afghanistan also has not changed. The United States is the 
largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and we 
will continue our support for vulnerable populations in Afghanistan and 
in neighboring countries in the region. We strongly encourage countries 
in the region and that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans 
and coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Afghans in need. Our humanitarian assistance for Afghans 
in need allows our partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition, 
protection, shelter, livelihoods opportunities, essential health care, 
water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the humanitarian 
needs generated by conflict, drought, and the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic.

    Question. State Department spokesperson Ned Price recently 
indicated efforts to secure the release of Mark Frerichs ``will not 
stop until Mark comes home.'' What is the status of negotiations with 
the Taliban with respect to American hostage Mark Frerichs? What steps 
has the Department taken to secure his release? What additional avenues 
will the Department pursue to secure his release?

    Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran 
Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to 
hold an American hostage. .We continue to raise the need for Mark's 
immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible 
opportunity. The Taliban-led Government must meet its commitments and 
obligations, which include the immediate release of Mark Frerichs. We 
have been clear that any legitimacy and any recognition will have to be 
earned. We have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar, 
Pakistan, and others while we continue to press the Taliban to release 
Mark.

    Question. Beyond Mark Frerichs, how many Americans citizens are 
currently held hostage by the Taliban, or the Haqqani network?

    Answer. There are three open hostage cases of U.S. citizens in the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition to U.S. citizen and Navy 
veteran Mark Frerichs, there is an open hostage case for Paul Overby, 
who was kidnapped in Khost in May 2014 and Cydney Mizell, who was 
abducted and likely killed in Kandahar in 2008. The Department of State 
has sponsored a Rewards for Justice campaign of up to $5 million for 
information on all three hostage cases. The Taliban, including the 
Haqqani Network, and their Haqqani affiliates, must release Mark 
Frerichs, provide answers and accountability for the other U.S. 
citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent act of hostage taking 
going forward.

    Question. To what extent does the Department feel hostage cases, 
like that of Mark Frerichs, will be used by the Taliban as leverage to 
secure concessions from the United States? How many nationals of NATO 
allies are currently in Afghanistan? How many nationals of other U.S. 
allies and partners are currently in Afghanistan? What is the United 
States doing to help those countries evacuate their nationals?

    Answer. I am concerned with the risk of future hostage-takings. The 
Taliban must release Mark Frerichs, provide answers and accountability 
for the other U.S. citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent 
act of hostage taking going forward. We coordinate regularly with 
partners and NATO Allies on both hostages and wrongfully detained 
citizens. The United States stands ready to assist partners and allies 
with recovery and reintegration.

    Question. The private sector and NGOs took evaluation measures upon 
themselves given the lack of attention by the State Department to allow 
charter flights but are being met with substantive bureaucratic 
obstacles. Can you please elaborate why the U.S. Department of State 
inhibited private entities from allowing chartered flights to evacuate 
at-risk Afghans?

    Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for 
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. There have been significant 
challenges with these flights. Without personnel on the ground to 
ensure the fidelity of the intended manifests, there is no ability to 
determine whether the passengers aboard the plane would be eligible for 
relocation or resettlement in the United States. In several instances 
where private entities have chartered aircraft to transport individuals 
out of Afghanistan, identity checks on arrival at transit destinations 
have revealed that many passengers were not eligible for relocation to 
the United States and, in some cases, that the manifests were not 
accurate, despite the best efforts of the private organizations 
supporting these charters. This puts the individual travelers at risk 
with no plan for relocation to the United States; damages the bilateral 
relationship of the United States with the destination countries; and 
makes it more difficult for the U.S. Government to rely on those 
partner countries to assist in future relocations out of Afghanistan.

    Question. Media reports have indicated that as many as 550 
congressionally funded journalists and their families working for Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) were 
abandoned in Afghanistan after the U.S. military withdrawal. Over 100 
VOA and RFE/RL staff are still in Afghanistan and at great risk of 
reprisal by the Taliban. The reports indicate that in the final days of 
the evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed 
staff of Embassy Kabul, is that correct?

    Answer. Yes, that is correct. VOA and RFE/RL staff were designated 
as Locally Employed Staff during the August evacuation and relocation 
operation. The Department of State is in close and regular 
communication with USAGM regarding VOA and RFE/RL staff who may still 
be in Afghanistan and wish to leave.

    Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed 
staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?

    Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul, 
there were 689 direct-hire local staff employed by the embassy. Sixteen 
of the embassy locally employed staff remained in Kabul. Nine remained 
in Kabul by choice. Seven were unable to travel on August 30 and have 
requested assistance to depart Afghanistan. We will continue our 
efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly travel of those who were 
employed by Embassy Kabul as local staff.

    Question. What steps were taken to prioritize the evacuation of VOA 
and RFE/RL employees and journalists in particular? Moving forward, can 
the Department commit to prioritizing the evacuation of RFE/RL and VOA 
staff who face heightened risk of Taliban violence in light of their 
work for a U.S.-funded press outlet?

    Answer. Yes, we are in regular communication with USAGM about the 
staff of both outlets who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to 
depart. The Department of State has established a team to coordinate 
across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nonprofits, and 
others to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk Afghans to whom 
we have a commitment. This group includes the staff of RFE/RL and VOA.

    Question. To what extent did the Department work with VOA and RFE/
RL partners to support this objective? Were there particular obstacles 
to the Department of State doing so?

    Answer. The State Department and Department of Defense worked 
around the clock to facilitate the departure of VOA and RFE/RL staff 
via both military and charter aircraft. The Department of State was in 
regular communication with USAGM throughout the operation in August and 
continues to maintain these lines of communication about the staff of 
VOA and RFE/RL who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to leave. As 
the situation outside of Kabul International Airport grew increasingly 
dangerous, we advised all local staff to shelter in place while we 
continued to develop departure options. We did not forget about USAGM 
employees and their families, nor will we.

    Question. Are you aware of the fact that a number of these 
journalists have received death threats and inquiries from the Taliban 
about their work in the weeks since the collapse of the government?

    Answer. We have seen the footage of brave Afghan human rights 
defenders making their voices heard and protesting in public spaces. We 
have also seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by journalists in 
Taliban detention as well as the violence against protesters. The 
United States will continue to monitor the human rights situation in 
Afghanistan. The Department will also continue to chronicle human 
rights abuses in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

    Question. What steps does the Department plan on taking to ensure 
their safety in the interim? Specifically, what is the Department doing 
to ensure that they are safe and that the Taliban do not continue to 
harass them and their families?

    Answer. The United States calls for the protection of, and respect 
for, media organizations and journalists to allow accurate reporting, 
which is key to press freedom. Over the last 20 years, Afghanistan's 
media sector has grown exponentially. We are extremely grateful for 
those members of the media who have courageously associated themselves 
with the American press to report on Afghanistan.

    Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be 
located outside Afghanistan for their applications to begin processing. 
However, many eligible applicants weren't safely evacuated from 
Afghanistan before the end of the U.S. NEO on August 31 and are now 
barred from leaving the country by the Taliban. As a result, they are 
not able to have their P-2 applications processed. Will the 
Administration modify the P-2 program to allow for processing while 
inside Afghanistan?

    Answer. This Administration has been clear about its enduring 
commitment to supporting the people of Afghanistan, including those who 
remain in country as well as those who seek to leave. While there are 
no plans for in-country processing or relocation support for 
individuals referred to the Priority 1 or Priority 2 program who remain 
in Afghanistan, the Administration is encouraging countries in the 
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and 
is coordinating with humanitarian international organizations to 
provide assistance to Afghans in need. The United States is also urging 
countries to comply with their respective non-refoulement obligations 
and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that the Taliban 
must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid 
travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who 
worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas. 
Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or 
verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special 
Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?

    Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department 
or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. While we are 
currently unable to provide consular services for immigrant visa 
applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), in Afghanistan, 
we will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV 
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and 
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. As 
operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible 
and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of 
Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We 
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border 
Afghanistan, as well as other countries, to allow entry for Afghans and 
to coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Afghans in need.

    Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban 
about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Taliban have publicly pledged to let people with valid 
travel documents, including U.S. citizens, freely depart Afghanistan. 
We continue to press the Taliban to live up to their commitment of free 
passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing this in 
our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are also 
doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world. 
Freedom of movement is a top national security concern and national 
priority for us.

    Question. Many of these journalists don't have passports. How does 
the United States Government plan to assist those without passports who 
were left behind by the military evacuation?

    Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for 
Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way 
to enter a third country, and like many refugees, they may face 
significant challenges fleeing to safety. We strongly encourage 
countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow 
entry for Afghans and to coordinate with international organizations to 
provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also 
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related 
to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of 
non-refoulement.
    Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department or any 
other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. We are also 
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment 
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing 
this in our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are 
also doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world.

    Question. Other governments like the United Kingdom and Germany 
have provided expedited entry into their country for their government-
funded media. Why have similar arrangements only been made for private 
media outlets, like the New York Times, and not congressionally funded 
ones?

    Answer. Admission to the United States is granted by the Department 
of Homeland Security. We are working closely with our interagency 
colleagues to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of all 
qualified, screened and vetted Afghans referred to the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program through the expedited processing of individuals 
through our transit sites in third countries.

    Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists 
and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?

    Answer. The State Department continues to receive and process P-2 
referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). After USRAP 
has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based 
non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and 
the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can 
occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing 
their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to 
contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded 
overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing. Please note a P-2 
referral enables applicants to access the USRAP and is not a visa 
category.

    Question. We have received reports that the State Department is 
reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system 
due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?

    Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2 
referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of 
Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is 
not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee 
referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for 
resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we 
are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific 
number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process 
in the next year.

    Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into 
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while 
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could 
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

    Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and 
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable 
Afghans, including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee 
resettlement. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, 
Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be 
processed.
    We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans 
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third 
country, and like many refugees, may face significant challenges 
fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the 
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will 
continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and 
those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate 
with international organizations and other humanitarian partners to 
provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also 
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related 
to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of 
non-refoulement.

    Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are 
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them 
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to 
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

    Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those 
that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge 
states to uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan 
refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect 
the principle of non-refoulement.

    Question. Well before the August 31 deadline, 1,200 American 
University of Afghanistan (AUAF) students, staff and faculty were 
mobilized and ready to evacuate with the proper paperwork and 
logistical support. AUAF successfully secured planes to transport the 
students to multiple third-site locations. However, the Biden 
administration reversed its prior authorization granting AUAF access to 
Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) gates, allegedly claiming it 
was no longer a priority. Nearly 200 Afghan women who hoped to evacuate 
with this convoy are part of the Embassy Scholars program. These women 
were hand-picked by the U.S. Embassy to attend AUAF and given full-ride 
scholarships. How do you plan to support the evacuation of AUAF 
students and staff moving forward?

    Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation and relocation flights out 
of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), and at-risk Afghans in Afghanistan remains 
steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and 
at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such as the students, faculty, and staff 
of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States will 
continue to support equal access to education in Afghanistan. The 
Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart, 
and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial 
flights out of the airport in Kabul.

    Question. How is the Taliban treating current or former students of 
the AUAF?

    Answer. The State Department is aware of reports the Taliban have 
mistreated AUAF students, alumni, and staff. We take these reports 
seriously. The Taliban have committed to full access to education, 
general amnesty, and preventing retaliation. The Department continues 
to press the Taliban to fully adhere to these commitments, including 
their commitment not to retaliate. Any report or violations should be 
promptly investigated and those responsible should be held accountable.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, have you determined whether Section 7008 
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which restricts certain 
forms of assistance ``to the government of any country whose duly 
elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree 
or . . . a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive 
role'' applies to the Taliban in Afghanistan?

    Answer. Afghanistan's military forces did not support or 
participate in the Taliban's advance on Kabul, nor did they depose 
President Ghani or other leaders of the Government of Afghanistan.

    Question. The Department and USAID have announced the intent to 
continue ``certain forms of foreign assistance programs that advance 
U.S. national interests'' in Afghanistan. Decisions about which 
programs will continue--and those that will be paused or reprogrammed--
reportedly will be subject to review. Yet, beyond the suggestion that 
humanitarian assistance will be exempted, the Department has provided 
the Committee with virtually zero information about the anticipated 
scope, process, timeline, benchmarks, and indicators of this review. 
What is the full scope of U.S. foreign assistance under review?

    Answer. All humanitarian assistance programming to Afghanistan to 
support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people continues directly 
through the United Nations and NGO partners. State and USAID are 
continuing to review all non-humanitarian assistance programs to 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Who is leading the review?

    Answer. The Office of Foreign Assistance is coordinating the review 
across State and USAID Bureaus for non-humanitarian assistance funds in 
Afghanistan and is working closely with interagency partners.

    Question. Who will be consulted? Will Congress be consulted?

    Answer. In addition to working closely with interagency partners, 
we look forward to working closely with the White House, OMB, and 
Congress as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. When do you anticipate completing the review?

    Answer. We are undertaking the review on an expedited timeline.

    Question. What metrics, benchmarks, and indicators will be used to 
determine whether a program ``advances U.S. national interests''?

    Answer. The review of non-humanitarian assistance is intended to 
ensure programs align with U.S. policy objectives, which include to: 
(i) prevent threats of terrorism against the United States and its 
interests; (ii) ensure the safe passage and freedom of movement of all 
U.S. citizens, Allies, and other individuals at risk from Afghanistan; 
(iii) prevent or mitigate a humanitarian disaster, including the 
humanitarian impacts of an economic collapse; (iv) support U.S. values, 
especially regarding human rights including the rights of women, girls, 
and members of minority groups; and (v) prevent broader regional 
destabilization.

    Question. Is it both feasible and advisable to re-start non-
humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan while we are still 
working to evacuate U.S. citizens and implementing partners?

    Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other 
potential issues to mitigate risks. This review will consider how 
programs may be affected by the new security environment, as it is 
important that we consider how to mitigate the risks to on-the-ground 
implementers and beneficiaries, including to ensure assistance 
resources do not directly benefit the Taliban.

    Question. What mechanisms will be put in place to guard against 
diversion?

    Answer. Bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to 
monitor and evaluate continuing potential non-humanitarian assistance 
programs from outside Afghanistan, including through third parties, 
given that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended. 
State and USAID and our implementers have experience using similar 
mechanisms, such as in Syria, and some bureaus already have years of 
experience in successfully managing programs from outside of 
Afghanistan.
    Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk 
that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This 
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific 
program design to reduce those risks.

    Question. Are you concerned by arguments that the resumption of 
U.S. non-humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan will legitimize the 
Taliban?

    Answer. The President and I have been clear about the U.S. 
commitment to supporting the Afghan people, including women, girls, and 
members of minority groups. Our efforts to continue humanitarian 
assistance to support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people 
demonstrates this commitment.

    Question. Can you confirm that no U.S. foreign assistance, in any 
form, will be programmed with, through, or for the Taliban?

    Answer. No U.S. assistance will be directed to the Taliban. We plan 
to provide assistance all through non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations, or other third parties to directly support 
the Afghan people.

    Question. Former Administrator of USAID Andrew Natsios asserts that 
shipments of U.S. wheat, intended to ameliorate famine conditions in 
certain areas of Afghanistan in 2001, severely undercut the market for 
locally grown wheat on the eve of a bumper harvest (which, ironically, 
can largely be attributed to U.S. foreign assistance to incentivize 
alternative crop production, including through the introduction of 
improved seed varieties). Yet, faced with excess wheat supply and low 
demand (farmers simply could not compete with ``free'' U.S. wheat), 
continued production of wheat became unviable and farmers returned to 
poppy production. According to the Executive Director of the World Food 
Program, today, Afghanistan is once again ``marching toward famine.'' 
How will you ensure that U.S. humanitarian assistance, notably 
assistance delivered through the Food for Peace Program and U.S. 
contributions to WFP, will not result in a similar outcome?

    Answer. USAID and State, through our implementing partners, 
including the World Food Program (WFP), undertake rigorous market 
analyses to ensure humanitarian assistance will not have adverse 
impacts on local producers or markets. In Afghanistan, USAID supports 
WFP to improve food security and nutrition conditions through in-kind 
aid, as well as cash and voucher assistance. WFP conducts frequent 
market and price monitoring to prevent potential disruptions, and 
predominantly uses locally procured wheat flour to support local 
production. WFP has also scaled up its cash transfer options, as cash 
is used where markets are easily accessible, supply routes are 
functioning, food commodities are available, and prices are stable. 
USAID does not currently provide U.S. wheat to Afghanistan but does 
support the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization in providing 
assistance to vulnerable farming households.

    Question. How is the Department working with other donors to ensure 
that humanitarian assistance actually helps ameliorate, rather than 
exacerbate, humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan?

    Answer. U.S. humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan enables our 
partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition, protection, shelter, 
health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the 
needs generated by the complex emergency. U.S. humanitarian assistance 
is provided directly through international organizations and NGOs with 
extensive experience working in challenging environments, and they 
remain committed to delivering needs-based assistance with 
impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Close coordination with 
donor governments and partners is critical during this time, and we 
will continue to work closely with and support our partners to monitor 
and respond to the situation and to encourage other donors to do the 
same.

    Question. What is the status of discussions with the Department of 
Treasury on the issuance of licenses and related guidance for 
humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan, including specific 
guidance relating to access to financial services?

    Answer. As of September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses to 
support the continued flow of humanitarian assistance and other 
activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan, including 
critical food and medicine. OFAC also issued a specific license 
authorizing transactions necessary for U.S. Government implementers of 
humanitarian assistance. These actions authorize the U.S. Government, 
certain international organizations (including the U.N. and its 
specialized agencies such as the World Bank), NGOs, and those acting on 
their behalf, to continue to engage in transactions that are ordinarily 
incident or necessary to the provision of humanitarian assistance and 
other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan. This 
follows past precedent in which the United States has taken steps to 
address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where sanctioned individuals 
and entities are active.

    Question. In the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the 
United States, alongside other international donors announced a 
suspensions in assistance to Afghanistan. Western powers maintain that 
a resumption of aid is contingent upon assurances from the Taliban that 
it will respect human rights, and in particular the rights of women and 
girls. Despite the Taliban's efforts to portray a more liberal face, 
its actions suggest we are headed toward a style of rule similar to 
that which dominated the 1990s, when women were banished from public 
life, media was strictly controlled, and all forms of entertainment 
banned. Already, since taking power, there have been widespread reports 
of Taliban fighters violently assaulting peaceful protestors and 
arbitrarily detaining journalists, in addition to imposing restrictions 
on the rights of Afghan women. Given the Taliban's proven record of 
serious human rights abuses, do you intend to hold the Taliban 
accountable? How?

    Answer. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the 
international community will depend on their adherence to their 
commitments on preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the 
United States from Afghanistan and on protecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allowing freedom of passage for 
American citizens, third country nationals and Afghans with the proper 
documentation that desire to leave, allowing unimpeded humanitarian 
access, and forming an inclusive government. The United States 
maintains a wide range of tools to ensure the Taliban upholds these 
commitments, including diplomatic engagement, economic and financial 
sanctions, and economic assistance.

    Question. Will the Taliban's human rights record be factored into 
any decision to diplomatically recognize a Taliban-led Government?

    Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy, albeit with 
several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on 
recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not 
changed. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan Government 
is one we and the international community can work with. We will 
continue to engage the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan, 
but they have a long path to legitimacy and will be judged by their 
actions, including actions to prevent terrorist groups from posing a 
threat to the United States from Afghanistan, uphold human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allow freedom of passage, allow 
unimpeded humanitarian access, and form an inclusive government.

    Question. What type of relationship do you envision the United 
States having with the Taliban if they continue to perpetrate 
widespread human rights violations? What would this mean for the future 
of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan?

    Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan 
Government is one we and the international community can work with. As 
we have consistently said, we are prepared to engage on a practical, 
pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of core U.S. national 
interests, including safe passage and counterterrorism. The legitimacy 
and recognition that the Taliban seek from the international community 
will depend on their conduct in areas that include, among other things, 
countering threats of terrorism, respecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans and refraining from carrying out 
reprisals. Their actions, not their words, will factor into whether and 
how we decide to provide continued non-humanitarian assistance. The 
United States is committed to providing lifesaving humanitarian 
assistance for Afghans in need.

    Question. In a Question for the Record I submitted to you after 
your confirmation hearing on January 19, 2021, I asked, ``In addition 
to vital counterterrorism interests, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have 
dramatically improved conditions for women, minority and youth. How 
would your State Department safeguard the gains made for Afghan women, 
minority and youth?'' You responded, ``Women, girls, and minority 
groups in Afghanistan have made extraordinary gains over the past 20 
years, and protecting those gains will be a high priority in the Biden-
Harris administration. For a peace agreement between the Afghan 
Government and the Taliban to be durable and just, it must account for 
the rights of women, girls, and minority groups.'' Obviously, that 
``durable and just'' peace agreement never materialized and, 
immediately upon seizing power, the Taliban began rolling-back the 
hard-fought gains of women and girls over the past two decades.

    Answer. We have consistently been clear that the future of 
Afghanistan is for Afghans themselves to decide but that our future 
political relationship will be shaped by their actions, especially with 
respect to the rights of women and girls. As we continue to engage the 
Taliban on issues of vital national interest, we have made clear that 
the international community is watching closely. We continue to press 
the Taliban to respect the rights of all Afghans, including women, 
girls, and members of minority groups.

    Question. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, has said the 
rights of women and girls in Afghanistan will be respected ``in 
accordance with the respect of the principles of Islam'' and ``within 
the margins that we have.'' What does this mean?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions 
with respect to the human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and 
girls. We will monitor closely how any government respects the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms that have been recognized as an 
integral part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the 
last 20 years.

    Question. Have the Taliban's verbal commitments to respect the 
rights of women and girls ``within the margins'' provided the 
Administration with assurances that the Taliban's rule will be 
``durable and just'' in regards to women?

    Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside 
the international community to support the gains that recognized the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women 
and girls. As seen in the joint statement issued by the United States 
and more than 60 other countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in 
August, the international community is deeply worried about Afghan 
women and girls, particularly their rights to education, work, freedom 
of movement, and peaceful assembly. We will continue to press the 
Taliban on the need to respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan 
women and girls in terms of their meaningful participation in political 
processes and public life, as well as access to education, health care, 
and employment.

    Question. How will you protect the gains of the past 20 years as 
``a high priority for the Biden-Harris administration'' under Taliban 
rule?

    Answer. The Taliban can only earn legitimacy gradually through a 
sustained pattern of action that demonstrates a genuine commitment to 
core expectations, such as respect for the human rights of all Afghans, 
including women and girls. We are working with the international 
community to remain unified in holding the Taliban accountable for 
these expectations. In our communications to the Taliban, we have been 
clear that the international community is watching closely, and that 
any future relationship will be shaped by the Taliban's own actions. We 
have stressed that legitimacy cannot be earned quickly or by words 
alone; it must be demonstrated through concrete action.

    Question. Women in Afghanistan made great progress over the last 20 
years, but due to the erratic U.S. military withdrawal and subsequent 
diplomatic evacuation, now face an untenable future. Women will be 
segregated in schools and forced to cease activities they previously 
enjoyed. This is a monstrous step backwards. How do you respond to 
criticism that the United States turned its back on Afghan women and 
children? Did our withdrawal create an environment that will set Afghan 
women back even farther?

    Answer. We stand by our ongoing commitment to supporting the 
aspirations of Afghan women and girls, and we are encouraged that our 
bilateral and multilateral partners stand with us and do the same. We 
will continue to closely monitor how any government in Afghanistan 
respects the human rights and freedoms that have become an integral 
part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the last 20 
years. We remain committed to providing robust humanitarian assistance, 
which provides vulnerable Afghans with critically needed food, health 
care, nutrition, medical supplies, hygiene supplies, and other urgently 
needed relief. It also addresses the protection concerns of women, 
children, and minorities.

    Question. How do you plan to continue to promote women and girls' 
rights in Afghanistan without a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground?

    Answer. We are committed to use every tool at our disposal--through 
our diplomacy and humanitarian efforts--to support, in coordination 
with many other countries, women, girls, and minorities in Afghanistan. 
Embassy Kabul's operations have been transitioned to Doha and, together 
with the Special Representative for Afghanistan, these entities 
communicate to the Taliban on issues of vital national interest. Given 
the important and complex nature of coordinate support for the rights 
of Afghan women and girls, the Secretary will be naming a Senior 
Official for Afghan Women and Girls at the State Department to focus 
entirely on the ongoing effort both from the United States Government 
and in coordination with other countries.

    Question. Throughout the period before final withdrawal, non-
governmental organizations including the Committee to Protect 
Journalists regularly shared with various State Department entities 
lists of at-risk journalists and Afghans who needed evacuation from the 
country including their biographical and contact information. How many 
of these individuals were contacted by the State Department?

    Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental 
task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across 
agencies, as we have done. We also appreciate the desire of NGOs and 
private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for 
coordination there.
    The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator 
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies 
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others. 
The team is working closely across the interagency and with other 
partners to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our 
Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority 
was and is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their 
immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing departure of 
Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government and Special 
Immigrant Visa holders. We are not in a position to detail our 
involvement with any specific groups at this time.

    Question. Was this list ever shared with other governments who 
offered to help?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the 
interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement 
for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, 
Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies and vulnerable 
and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on supporting 
departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs, and their immediate families. We 
are also facilitating the ongoing departure of Afghans who worked with 
and for the U.S. Government, and Special Immigrant Visa holders. We are 
not in a position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at 
this time.

    Question. How many of these individuals were evacuated by the 
United States?

    Answer. During operations in Afghanistan in August 2021, the U.S. 
Government facilitated the departure of 124,000 individuals on U.S. 
military aircraft, foreign military aircraft, and charter aircraft 
organized by private groups. Not all of these travelers went to the 
United States as their final destination.

    Question. Given the Taliban's lack of adherence to fundamental 
human rights, like the freedom of religion, what dangers remain for 
religious minorities, including Christians, Hazara Shia Muslims, 
Hindus, and Sikhs?

    Answer. We have seen reports of harassment and violence targeted 
against members of religious minority groups. As the State Department's 
2020 Religious Freedom Report stated, both the Taliban and ISIS-K, an 
affiliate of ISIS and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, 
targeted and killed members of minority religious communities and 
individuals because of their religious beliefs. We have no reason to 
believe these dangers have decreased; we will judge the Taliban by 
their actions, not their words.

    Question. The United States evacuated Afghan nationals to various 
military bases around the world, including some in the continental 
United States. How long will refugees be housed on U.S. Bases?

    Answer. Individuals relocated from Afghanistan were temporarily 
hosted at military bases outside the United States. Over 50,000 moved 
on to the United States before a measles outbreak required a 
vaccination campaign. Because the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella) 
vaccine requires 21 days post vaccination to become fully effective, 
the Centers for Disease Control ordered a 21-day post vaccination hold 
for all individuals relocated from Afghanistan to U.S. military bases, 
both in the United States and outside the United States. During that 
period, other resettlement processes continued for those already on the 
U.S. safe haven bases. As travelers complete the conditions established 
for their parole, the Department is coordinating with the International 
Organization for Migration, the Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Department of Defense to resettle individuals relocated 
from Afghanistan to their final destinations as quickly as possible 
within limits of local resettlement agency capacities. Those on bases 
overseas are being moved to the United States as soon as possible to 
complete their processing.

    Question. Has the United States entered into any agreements with 
foreign governments to host Afghan nationals?

    Answer. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the 
process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens, 
Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many 
countries have transited Afghans through their territories and many 
other countries made generous offers of support. Many countries have 
committed to permanently resettle Afghans.

    Question. What percentage of those evacuated to the United States 
were admitted on parole alone? To what benefits will humanitarian 
parolees in the United States have access? What about those on U.S. 
bases overseas?

    Answer. The decision on an individual's status in the United 
States, including whether they are paroled into the United States or 
admitted as a U.S. citizen, Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), Special 
Immigrant (SI), or other category, including Afghans who were relocated 
from overseas as a part of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), resides with 
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services and Customs and Border Protection. DHS, working 
with its representatives located at the various military safe havens, 
continues to process information on Afghans at the safe havens and 
ultimately will be in the best position to provide the most accurate 
breakdown of the various categories of individuals relocated to the 
United States as a part of OAW. The individuals at safe havens overseas 
still waiting to travel to the United States are being fully supported, 
including with MMR and varicella vaccines, prior to transport to the 
United States.

    Question. What vetting procedures are in place to move refugees and 
their families expeditiously?

    Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan 
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our 
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and 
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are 
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process 
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism 
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and 
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos, 
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan 
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As 
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a 
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary 
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting 
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety 
and national security.

    Question. What happens to refugees if they fail vetting procedures 
at any step of the process?

    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the 
screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to 
the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.

    Question. What entails ``failing''?

    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the 
screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to 
the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.

    Question. Under what authorities and with what funding are State/
USAID operating the refugee intake centers at the Dulles Expo Center 
and in Philadelphia? What other agencies are contributing funding?

    Answer. The Department of State provided support for individuals 
relocated from Afghanistan at the Dulles Expo Center under section 
2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (MRAA) (22 
U.S.C. 2601(c)(1)), which authorizes the President, when he determines 
it to be important to the national interest, to furnish assistance to 
meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, and establishes the 
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund to carry out 
these purposes. The intake center at Philadelphia is operated by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as lead agency for Operation 
Allies Welcome. State is providing funding for services to individuals 
relocated from Afghanistan at the Philadelphia intake center, including 
interpreters, [certain] medical care, and meals, under section 2(c) of 
the MRAA and Presidential determinations identified above. Other 
agencies supporting this effort including USAID, DoD, DHS, HHS, and 
Peace Corps are also relying on funding and authorities that may be 
available to these agencies for this purpose, including, as necessary, 
the drawdown directed under section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961.

    Question. Why were State and USAID, who do not handle domestic 
immigration or law enforcement, in charge of a domestic intake facility 
for Afghans attempting to immigrate to the United States as refugees or 
visa holders?

    Answer. The August 2021 relocation of individuals from Afghanistan 
required a comprehensive government approach involving a coordinated 
interagency effort. Individuals who arrived at the Dulles Expo Center 
had already been admitted to the United States by Customs and Border 
Protection Officers at Dulles Airport in accordance with U.S. 
immigration laws. Department of State, with support from USAID, with 
local staffing in the area, were able to quickly stand up the Dulles 
Expo center, with 24/7 staffing levels to meet the demands of the 
thousands of Afghans who needed to be onward processed to domestic 
military safe havens for additional resettlement processing.

    Question. When did the Department start keeping track of Afghans 
who left the Dulles facility upon arrival? How many Afghans are 
believed to have left the Dulles facility without authorization? How 
long did it take the Department to clarify the guidance governing 
whether Afghans were free to leave the facility or not?

    Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border 
Protection establishes conditions of parole and I refer you to it for 
full information in this regard.

    Question. Did the Department possess sufficient biometric equipment 
to collect the samples necessary for vetting the Afghans transiting 
through the ports of entry in Dulles and Philadelphia? If not, what 
steps were taken to rectify the situation and ensure sufficient data 
was collected for vetting?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more 
information on biometric data collection required for vetting and 
admittance into the United States.

    Question. Approximately how many of the Afghans processed through 
Dulles/Philadelphia have no identifiable connection to the U.S. 
Government?

    Answer. Many individuals were admitted to the United States under 
humanitarian parole but may have been in the processing stage for a 
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or been employed by the U.S. Government 
but not yet qualified for an SIV. We estimate that 40-50 percent of 
evacuees are potentially eligible to apply for the SIV program. 
Additionally, some individuals may have a U.S. tie as the family member 
of a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident. DHS, as the lead agency 
for Operation Allies Welcome, in coordination with the Department of 
Defense at eight locations throughout the United States, continues to 
document individuals relocated from Afghanistan.

    Question. What documentation providing proof of identity did the 
Department deem was sufficient for Afghan refugees transiting into the 
United States?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more 
information on identity requirements for admittance into the United 
States.

    Question. Without a resumption in international assistance--which 
previously accounted for around 40 percent of GDP--Afghanistan will 
face further economic instability. As long as Afghanistan's economy 
continues to deteriorate, humanitarian needs will remain high and new 
waves of refugees will seek refugee outside the country. How do you 
plan to work with USAID to address these needs, barring a full-scale 
resumption in U.S. assistance? How do you expect third countries to 
respond to fresh waves of Afghan refugees?

    Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to providing humanitarian 
assistance to the Afghan people directly through the United Nations and 
NGO partners. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian 
donor to the Afghan response and provided nearly $330 million in 
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2021. Immediate priorities are 
the safety and security of our partners; ensuring aid is delivered in 
accordance with internationally recognized humanitarian principles; and 
responsibly scaling up humanitarian assistance. State and USAID are 
monitoring the situation very closely, staying in daily contact with 
our partners, and assessing and adjusting to meet these priorities. We 
are also working closely with the international community to respond to 
the humanitarian crisis and worsening economic crisis.

    Question. The hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and its 
failure to provide adequate safeguards for thousands of at risk 
Afghans, has bolstered the position of our adversaries, including Iran. 
With the arrival of fresh waves of Afghan refugees, how do you 
anticipate this will impact Iran's Fatemiyoun Brigade, and specifically 
its ability to undermine U.S. national security interests both in 
Afghanistan and beyond?

    Answer. Iran has for years recruited Afghan Shia militants from 
within Afghanistan and from among Afghan emigres to Iran to fight on 
its behalf in Syria in so-called ``Fatemiyoun Brigades.'' Iran will 
likely continue this practice in an attempt to avoid committing its own 
troops in Syria and potentially engage in similar practices in 
Afghanistan. The Administration will remain vigilant to developments in 
this regard and is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our 
forces, personnel, and vital interests with all appropriate means.
    Regarding the issue of refugees, our priority is the safety and 
welfare of refugees and other individuals at risk as a result of the 
situation in Afghanistan. We are working within the United Nations and 
other international organizations to ensure the safety and welfare of 
refugees and other individuals at risk. We expect all states to uphold 
their obligations under international law, including applicable human 
rights and refugee law obligations, and to respect the principle of 
non-refoulement.

    Question. Please elaborate on the Department's plans for the 
maintaining a diplomatic presence as relates to Afghanistan. Will the 
decision to re-establish a presence in Kabul be contingent upon 
diplomatic recognition of the Taliban?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan suspended operations on 
August 31, 2021. For the time being, the U.S. Government is managing 
our diplomacy with Afghanistan out of Doha, Qatar, to include consular 
affairs, administering humanitarian assistance, and working with 
allies, partners, and regional and international stakeholders. To 
resume operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Department will 
need to complete a deliberative planning process. A decision to resume 
operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul would be made based on an 
assessment of U.S. national security interests and the security 
situation on the ground.

    Question. What, if any, other factors will be considered?

    Answer. Resuming operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul will be subject 
to Congressional notification procedures and Department planning 
processes. The decision-making process will consider a variety of 
factors to include, but not limited to foreign policy priorities; 
representation maintained by other governments in the locality; and 
security requirements and policies necessary to mitigate identified 
threats, including to but not limited to those stemming from terrorism, 
political violence, crime, and Afghanistan's ability to provide 
security in accordance with its international obligations.

    Question. Can you commit to consulting with the Chair and Ranking 
Member before finalizing any decision to establish a U.S. presence in 
Kabul?

    Answer. Yes, the Department will work with Congress and comply with 
applicable laws on any resumption of operations at Embassy Kabul.

    Question. How does the Department plan to uphold U.S. policy 
priories in the absence of a formal presence?

    Answer. We continue to communicate with the Taliban on a pragmatic, 
operational basis on our vital national interests. We have moved our 
diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs 
team is hard at work. We continue to facilitate departures for U.S. 
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and 
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, if they choose to depart. We are 
focused on monitoring and mitigating the threat of terrorist activity 
emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the Taliban to its 
commitment to prevent any group or individual from using the territory 
of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States or that of 
our allies. We also continue to support humanitarian assistance to the 
Afghan people and continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights 
of all Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive 
government with broad support.

    Question. What are the Department of State's priorities as relates 
to Afghanistan?

    Answer. First, the Department has continued its relentless effort 
to help any remaining U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, leave Afghanistan 
if they so choose. Second, we intend to monitor and mitigate the threat 
of terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the 
Taliban accountable for preventing terrorist groups, such as al Qaida 
and ISIS-K, from using Afghanistan as a base for external operations 
that could threaten the United States or our allies. Third, we will 
continue to support humanitarian assistance to the Afghanistan people. 
Fourth, we continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights of all 
Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive government 
with broad support.

    Question. Where do human rights and counterterrorism fall on the 
spectrum?

    Answer. The United States is committed to respect for human rights 
in all countries. We are deeply concerned about restrictions limiting 
women's participation in public life, including access to education, 
employment, and freedom of movement, and continue to press the Taliban 
to uphold the rights of all Afghans. We are disappointed in the 
composition of the interim ``caretaker'' cabinet announced by the 
Taliban which does not include women and only minimal numbers of 
members of minority groups.

    Question. How do you plan to operationalize these objectives?

    Answer. In all our communications to the Taliban, we have made 
clear that its relationship with the international community will be 
shaped by its own actions, including on counterterrorism, safe passage, 
unhindered humanitarian access, and respect for the human rights of all 
Afghans. We work closely with international partners to maintain unity 
in our approach and to make clear that any legitimacy, which the 
Taliban assert they want, will have to be earned through sustained 
action on these priorities. Mere assurances are not enough. We have 
made clear to the Taliban that the international community is watching 
closely.
    On counterterrorism, we are coordinating closely with the 
Department of Defense, partners, and allies to retain and continue to 
build our counterterrorism capabilities to prevent, detect, and disrupt 
terrorist threats.

    Question. Based on the State Department's most recent report to 
Congress on Chief of Mission staffing levels in Afghanistan 
(transmitted on July 13, 2021), there were 645 locally employed staff 
(LES) members working for the United States in Afghanistan. However, it 
was recently announced that the Department had evacuated 2,800 LES 
members from Afghanistan. Can you confirm all U.S. Embassy Kabul staff, 
including locally employed staff and their families, were safely 
evacuated? If not, why not and what plans are in place to ensure they 
are able to depart Afghanistan? Can you explain the discrepancy between 
these two numbers? Do the 2,800 evacuees include formerly employed LES 
members?

    Answer. During the evacuation and relocation operations in August, 
locally employed staff members working for the United States in 
Afghanistan were evacuated with eligible family members. The figures 
noted represent the number of locally employed staff and the total 
number of people (i.e., locally employed staff and their eligible 
family members) who were safely evacuated.

    Question. What is the total number of Afghans who have worked under 
U.S. Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan (both currently and 
formerly employed)?

    Answer. The number of Afghans who have been employed by Embassy 
Kabul and worked under U.S. Chief of Mission authority is estimated to 
be approximately 14,000 in the years since Embassy Kabul was re-
established in 2001.

    Question. How many of those individuals have been evacuated from 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul, 
there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of 
the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to 
evacuate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel 
on August 30, of which 7 have requested assistance to depart 
Afghanistan.

    Question. How many of those individuals have successfully acquired 
SIV status? How many are still in the application stages?

    Answer. The Department is currently assessing how many Afghans who 
were relocated had outstanding Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
applications. Many of the Afghans relocated had submitted an SIV 
application that was moving through the multi-stage SIV process. Others 
had not yet begun the process or were in the first stages. The number 
of SIV applications in the pipeline changes daily as new applications 
are filed and others completed. We defer to the Department of Homeland 
Security on any questions regarding admission categories and adjustment 
of status.

    Question. Is the United States considering recognizing any 
government of Afghanistan that is under the direction or control of the 
Taliban or members of the Taliban? If so, what conditions would need to 
be met before the United States gave such recognition?

    Answer. As a general matter there is no requirement under 
international law to make a formal statement on recognition of 
governments. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan 
Government is one we and the international community can work with. We 
have also made clear, as have our international partners, that any 
steps toward legitimacy and recognition must be earned. Assurances 
alone are not enough.

    Question. Who is the rightful leader of the Government of 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan 
Government is one we and the international community can work with. We 
continue to press the Taliban and Afghan leaders to form an inclusive 
government that respects the rights and dignity of all Afghans.

    Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to 
U.N. sanctions?

    Answer. There are 135 individuals and five entities associated with 
the Taliban that are currently designated under the UNSC's 1988 (2011) 
Taliban sanctions regime.

    Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to 
United States sanctions?

    Answer. The Taliban organization was designated as a Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist by President George W. Bush in July 2002 
upon issuance of E.O. 13268, which amended E.O. 13224 by adding the 
Taliban to the annex of certain designated individuals and entities. We 
defer to the Department of the Treasury on specifics regarding numbers 
of individuals and entities designated.

    Question. Has the United States Government, any of its agencies, or 
any of its employees or agents (including contractors or any other 
persons working on behalf of the United States) given or donated any 
money or anything else of value to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or 
any member of the Taliban or Haqqani Network since April 14, 2021? If 
so, please specify the amounts of money or other items of value, the 
persons who provided the money or items of value, and the recipients of 
the money or items of value.

    Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We 
have accounted and will account for that, ensuring that all our actions 
are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

    Question. Is the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or any member of the 
Taliban or Haqqani Network requesting any payments of money or other 
items of value in exchange for permitting U.S. citizens, U.S. permanent 
legal residents, or SIV applicants to leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We 
have accounted and will continue to account for that, ensuring that all 
our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

    Question. In your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee on September 14, 2021, you indicated, as a result of the 
February 29 Agreement brokered by the Trump administration, President 
Biden ``faced the choice between ending the war or escalating it.'' 
Were any other options available that would have allowed the United 
States and its NATO allies to maintain existing levels of support to 
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces?

    Answer. As I testified, the choice confronting President Biden was 
either to go forward with the commitments his predecessor had made to 
withdraw forces by May 1, or escalate, not end, the war with the 
Taliban. After the signing of the Doha Agreement, the Taliban refrained 
from any direct attack on U.S. and international forces. Had we 
maintained a military presence indefinitely, the Taliban made clear 
they would have resumed attacks against U.S. and NATO troops. We did 
not believe there was a middle ground where we could safely maintain 
the same number of troops.

    Question. Did military commanders on the ground indicate that they 
could adequately protect U.S. counterterrorism interest, prevent the 
collapse of the government, and protect Americans from Taliban and IS-K 
attacks?

    Answer. I defer questions about military assessments, planning, and 
preparedness to the Department of Defense.

    Question. What is the current status of Afghan military aircraft 
and personnel that fled to Uzbekistan?

    Answer. Following relocation of all 494 Afghan military 
servicemembers and their families out of Termez, Uzbekistan, to the UAE 
on September 13, these individuals are in the pipeline for further 
processing. Embassy Tashkent sought and has received assurances from 
the Government of Uzbekistan that the aircraft will not be returned to 
Afghanistan and Taliban control. The 46 air frames remain under the 
control of Uzbekistan. State defers to the Department of Defense on 
additional details regarding the status of Afghanistan aircraft 
currently located outside of Afghanistan.

    Question. Are there any concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan 
will actively allow the Russian Federation or People's Republic of 
China to gain access to the U.S.-origin military equipment, 
communications gear, or other sensitive technologies that escaping 
Afghan military personnel brought to Uzbekistan?

    Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in 
ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and 
transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
do not fall into the wrong hands. The Department defers all risk 
assessments related to this military equipment to the DoD.

    Question. Are there concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan is 
unable to properly guard this equipment until it can be retrieved?

    Answer. Embassy Tashkent submitted a diplomatic note to 
Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that affirmed U.S. 
responsibility for the aircraft that arrived in Uzbekistan in August 
via the Afghan Air Force. The diplomatic note further requested that 
the Government of Uzbekistan safeguard the aircraft, associated 
equipment and parts, and associated technical information; limit access 
to only officials of Uzbekistan and the U.S.; not operate the aircraft; 
and not transfer the aircraft, associated equipment, or technical 
information and data. Senior Government of Uzbekistan officials have 
confirmed that they will honor this U.S. request and have granted 
Embassy Tashkent officers access to inspect the aircraft.

    Question. Do you believe that the Government of Uzbekistan will 
return this equipment to Afghanistan and the Taliban?

    Answer. No. Senior Department officials have formally asked the 
Government of Uzbekistan not to return these aircraft to the Taliban. 
The Department has received high-level assurances that Uzbekistan will 
honor this request.

    Question. Did the United States inform NATO of its decision to 
begin a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. citizens and 
at-risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on 
August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the NATO command and leadership 
did the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, 
and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Albania of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Albania did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Belgium of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Belgium did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Bulgaria of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Bulgaria did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Canada of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Croatia of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Croatia did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform the Czech Republic of its 
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before 
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to 
whom within the Government of the Czech Republic did the United States 
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what 
date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Denmark of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Denmark did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Estonia of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform France of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of France did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Germany of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Germany did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Greece of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Greece did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Hungary of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Hungary did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Iceland of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Italy of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Latvia of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Latvia did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Lithuania of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Lithuania did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Luxembourg of its decision 
to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Luxembourg did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Montenegro of its decision 
to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Montenegro did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands of its decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-
risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on August 
14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the Government of the Netherlands did 
the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and 
when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform North Macedonia of its 
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before 
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to 
whom within the Government of North Macedonia did the United States 
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what 
date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Norway of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Norway did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Poland of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Poland did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Portugal of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Portugal did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Romania of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Romania did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Slovakia of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Slovakia did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Slovenia of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Slovenia did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Spain of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Spain did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform Turkey of its decision to 
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing 
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within 
the Government of Turkey did the United States communicate its 
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Did the United States inform the United Kingdom of its 
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before 
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to 
whom within the Government of the United Kingdom did the United States 
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what 
date?

    Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the 
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to, 
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in 
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with 
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered 
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and 
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the 
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations. 
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of 
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Putin has been strengthening Russia's security position 
In Central Asia in recent years, and, in August 2021, held military 
exercises on the border with Afghanistan. How worried are you about 
Russia and China strengthening their respective positions in Central 
Asia?

    Answer. The United States remains committed to close cooperation 
and strong engagement with the countries of Central Asia. We continue 
to engage productively with the region in the C5+1 format, through mil-
mil cooperation, and by other means. While Russia has used the 
situation in Afghanistan to press its Central Asian neighbors for 
increased cooperation, the countries of Central Asia have made clear 
they have no desire to become dependent on any one country.

    Question. What do stronger Russian and Chinese presence in this 
region mean for the Biden administration's strategic pivot to focusing 
on great power competition with Russia and China?

    Answer. Russia and China have a stake in preventing global 
terrorism and regional instability. To the extent that their presence 
and influence supports these shared objectives, we are prepared to 
cooperate. Where their actions and preferences negatively affect our 
interests and those of our partners, we will push back forcefully. Our 
withdrawal from Afghanistan will free up significant resources and 
senior level attention to focus on strategic competition, which is one 
of the central challenges that will define the 21st century.

    Question. Moscow has been engaging the Taliban since at least 2014, 
and since 2018 hosted them for several rounds of peace talks. Russian 
officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years. 
They did so while simultaneously cultivating ties with the 
internationally-recognized Afghan Government in an attempt to position 
Russia as a peacemaker. Since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, it seems 
the Russian Government has concluded that the Taliban are a reality 
that they have to deal with, if not empower. Russia's presidential 
envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has called for unfreezing the 
Afghan Government's reserves or risk a spike in illegal narcotics and 
arms traffic. Russia, like China, abstained from the most recent U.N. 
resolution that merely called on the Taliban to live up to its 
commitments is one recent example. How do you see Russia's role in 
Afghanistan going forward?

    Answer. Russia has indeed sought to position itself as a peacemaker 
and will likely continue to do so. This role is motivated to a 
considerable extent by Russia's desire to assert itself as a global 
power. Russia also has serious concerns about Afghanistan's possible 
role as a haven for international terrorism, especially with respect to 
ISIS-K, and thus may be a useful partner for us in pressing the Taliban 
to adhere to the counterterrorism commitments of the U.S.-Taliban 
Agreement. Russia is unlikely to develop significant economic ties with 
Afghanistan.

    Question. Are you concerned about Russia empowering the Taliban and 
by extension possibly other terrorist groups/activities? What do you 
intend to do to prevent Russia from engaging in malign behavior in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. Though Russia maintains its embassy in Kabul, the Taliban 
remain designated as a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior 
Russian officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to 
recognize the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties 
with Afghanistan's neighbors in recent months more so than with the 
Taliban itself. We continue to engage with Russia to reiterate that we 
will not tolerate destabilizing behavior anywhere in the world.

    Question. How will Afghanistan impact the bilateral U.S.-Russia 
relationship? Will Afghanistan be a point of tension or cooperation? 
How important will this issue be within the U.S.-Russia relationship?

    Answer. Despite the tension in the broader U.S.-Russia relationship 
in recent years, Afghanistan has consistently been an area in which 
productive conversation is possible. Though our motives and preferred 
methods differ, there remains significant overlap in terms of several 
key goals, with counterterrorism and counternarcotic efforts chief 
among them. Afghanistan is likely to remain somewhat set aside from our 
various bilateral issues.

    Question. The 2019 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report 
notes a decline in opiate trafficking from Afghanistan along the so-
called ``northern'' route, through Central Asia to Russia. While the 
threat posed by narco-trafficking to Russia appears to be on the 
decline, the threat posed to Western Europe appears to have increased 
significantly. Since Putin aims to weaken the West, how might Putin 
further capitalize on a scenario where more drugs are coming into 
Western Europe after U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan? What can be done 
now to prevent more drugs flowing into Western Europe?

    Answer. UNODC has reported declining seizures on the Northern Route 
since 2015. However, due to the inherent difficulties in researching 
illicit activities, a reduction in reported seizures does not 
necessarily correlate to a reduction in trafficking. In 2019 and 2020, 
there were major seizures of heroin in Kazakhstan and Eastern Europe 
that transited from Iran across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia and 
Russia. The Afghan drug trade is dynamic, and it is likely too soon to 
state with confidence that there has been a significant diminution of 
flow through Russia. With Russia suffering a massive increase in drug 
overdose deaths since the onset of the pandemic and instituting 
increasingly harsh drug-related laws in recent years, the Kremlin has 
significant reason to try to keep narco-trafficking out of Russia and 
Afghanistan. The Department of State's Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) works to strengthen our 
European partners' ability to combat organized crime and corruption 
which are key enablers of smugglers. INL seeks to strengthen law 
enforcement capacity to detect and interdict narcotics and other 
contraband smuggling along known trafficking routes, including the 
Balkans Route. Additionally, INL is increasing its efforts to 
strengthen the rule of law and law enforcement along Europe's 
periphery, which will help authorities to combat narcotics and other 
smuggling.

    Question. There has been much discussion about how our withdrawal 
from Afghanistan allows the U.S. to shift focus to other pressing 
foreign policy priorities, such as strategic competition with China. 
How do you view U.S. foreign policy priorities post-Afghanistan 
withdrawal, and what resources that had previously been focused on 
Afghanistan will be made available for those priorities?

    Answer. We are focused on strengthening our alliances and 
partnerships to address the issues that have greatest impact on the 
safety and well-being of Americans, including COVID-19, the climate 
crisis, cyber security, and the China challenge. We will continue to 
work with our partners to address enduring threats such as terrorism 
and nuclear proliferation and will remain engaged in holding the 
Taliban to its public commitments, including on counterterrorism, safe 
passage, and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Department is 
currently reviewing all non-humanitarian programs and funding for 
Afghanistan. This review will inform decisions on what non-humanitarian 
assistance to the Afghan people should continue or be reprogrammed. We 
are assessing how much Diplomatic Engagement funding needs to be 
retained for Afghanistan policy and support, and what remainder could 
be available for other priorities, working with Congress.

    Question. Does the Administration believe that the United States 
and China share similar goals with respect to Afghanistan? Are there 
areas with respect to Afghanistan where the interests of the United 
States and the interests of China are different?

    Answer. We continue to engage with countries that border 
Afghanistan and countries in the region, including the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), on the importance of the international 
community holding the Taliban accountable for its public commitments 
and obligations. The PRC is an important regional stakeholder. There 
are certainly areas where our interests are aligned with the PRC 
regarding Afghanistan. The entire international community has a stake 
in ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and 
obligations, not just on safe passage but also respecting the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls, 
and members of minority groups; upholding their commitments on 
counterterrorism; not carrying out reprisal violence against those who 
choose to stay in Afghanistan; and forming an inclusive government that 
can meet the needs and reflect the aspirations of the Afghan people. 
The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do, and Beijing 
has to decide where it is in that effort.

    Question. What is your assessment of the implications should China 
be in a position to secure access to Afghanistan's mineral resources?

    Answer. Increased corruption in countries with major development 
projects backed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), including 
under the Belt and Road Initiative, is a serious problem. Corruption 
erodes economic benefits for local economies and populations, 
undermines the rule of law, fails to adhere to international 
environmental and social best practices, and at times prevents U.S. 
firms from competing. Corruption serves as a gateway to other 
criminality, such as money laundering; labor abuses; bribery; and 
trafficking in minerals, precious metals, and gemstones back to the 
PRC.

    Question. How do you expect India's security concerns and security 
environment to change in light of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan? 
How will U.S.-India collaboration change to account for these changes? 
What are Administration priorities for further deepening security 
collaboration with India, both related to developments in Afghanistan 
but also to ensure that the U.S.-India partnership maintains its focus 
on advancing shared goals in the Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. India has longstanding concerns about regional terrorism 
and instability in South Asia, which have grown more acute in light of 
the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. As noted in the recent leaders' 
joint statement between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, the 
United States will continue to deepen counterterrorism cooperation with 
India and coordinate closely on developments in Afghanistan. U.S.-India 
security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond remains robust and 
we expect it to expand further in the foreseeable future.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. No one group has made more significant strides since 2001 
than Afghan women. In terms of the economy, women have come a long way 
since the fall of the Taliban regime. They returned to work by the 
hundreds of thousands, and many became business owners and 
entrepreneurs. Afghanistan rebuilt an education system that had 
basically stopped functioning. In 2001, only 900,000 students were in 
primary school--all of them male. Prior to the fall of Afghanistan, 
more than 9 million students were in school, with nearly 40 percent of 
them girls. How can the Administration hold the Taliban and Afghan 
Government to account in preserving the rights and gains of Afghan 
women without the support the U.S. military provided to Afghan forces 
and the check it served on the Taliban?

    Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside 
the international community to support the gains that recognized the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women 
and girls, over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint statement 
issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries at the 
U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community is 
deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their rights 
to education, work, freedom of movement, and assembly. We continue to 
expect the Taliban meet its public commitments to respect the rights 
and dignity of all Afghans, including women and girls, in terms of 
their meaningful participation in political processes and public life, 
as well as access to education and employment.

    Question. What is the U.S. planning to do to preserve the rights 
and gains of Afghan women and girls?

    Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside 
the international community to support the gains made by women, girls, 
and members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the 
joint statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other 
countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international 
community is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly 
their rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to 
respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan women and girls in terms 
of their meaningful participation in political processes and public 
life, as well as access to education and employment.

    Question. What is the Administration doing to ensure that any 
agreement with the Taliban preserves and respects the human rights of 
Afghan women and girls, as well as diverse religious and ethnic 
minority groups and other marginalized communities?

    Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside 
the international community to support the gains that recognized the 
rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls, journalists, human 
rights defenders, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+ persons, and 
members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint 
statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries 
at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community 
is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their 
rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to 
respect the rights and dignity of all Afghans, including women and 
girls, in terms of their meaningful participation in political 
processes and public life, as well as access to education and 
employment.

    Question. I remain concerned about specific groups that have worked 
closely with the U.S. Government, such as the U.S. Agency for Global 
Media (USAGM) employees and their families who are still in 
Afghanistan--comprised of more than 100 Voice of America and Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty employees and their families who have not been 
evacuated. I am also concerned about the many women judges and court 
personnel who have been trained by American and international experts, 
such as the American judges affiliated with the National Association of 
Women Judges (NAWJ) here in the United States. And, I remain concerned 
about the employees of the Lincoln Learning Centers (LLCs) and their 
families, many who are still in Afghanistan. The LLCs comprised a 
network of 27 American Spaces, affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, which 
extended across Afghanistan and was managed through a cooperative 
agreement with an Afghan NGO, the Social Development and Research 
Organization for Afghans (SDROA). Part of a network of 600 American 
Spaces worldwide, LLCs served as locations where Afghans can learn the 
truth about the United States and our stance on the importance of 
democratic values like human rights and anticorruption. What steps are 
being taken to facilitate the safe passage of these Afghans at-risk, 
including the USAGM employees and their families, the women judges, and 
the LLC employees and their families?

    Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the 
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable 
populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women, 
children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community, 
members of minority groups, journalists and other at-risk populations. 
We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for 
this population. The State Department has established a team, led by 
the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the 
interagency, including with USAGM regarding USAGM, RFE/RL, and VOA 
staff, and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for 
those who wish to leave Afghanistan including U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans.

    Question. Two weeks ago, I joined my colleagues in sending a letter 
to President Biden asking for assurances that vulnerable Afghans are 
paroled into the United States and not left in third countries awaiting 
processing and asks the Administration to create a designated parole 
category for certain Afghan women and children, activists, human rights 
defenders, parliamentarians, journalists, and others who are in danger. 
The general parole that Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas 
announced last week only allows Afghans coming into the country, 
without any benefits or work authorization. Is the Administration 
looking into providing Afghans coming in under the parole program be 
allowed to received benefits and/or ability to work?

    Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
is the agency that adjudicates and grants parole. The Department of 
State does not grant parole and does not set policy related to parole. 
At the federally funded Department of Defense facilities, Afghan 
nationals are provided with housing and meals at no cost. They receive 
assistance in applying for a work authorization, are enrolled in 
temporary medical insurance, and receive additional medical care, if 
needed. Many evacuees are eligible to apply to adjust status under the 
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program or other legal immigration 
pathway available to them. Afghans who adjust status under the Afghan 
SIV program will be eligible to receive the same benefits as any Afghan 
SIV visa holder admitted to the United States.
    On September 30, President Biden signed into law the continuing 
resolution to fund the government through early December. Among other 
items, the continuing resolution provides funds to help resettle Afghan 
allies in the United States and makes Afghan nationals eligible for 
expedited asylum processing, resettlement assistance, entitlement 
programs, child welfare support, and drivers' licenses if they passed 
background checks and were paroled into the United States by September 
30, 2022.

    Question. What commitments has the Administration secured from 
third countries to host Afghans for a sufficient duration to allow the 
Administration to process their SIV, P-1, P-2 visas, or humanitarian 
parole requests? What happens when someone is unable to secure a U.S. 
visa? Is asylum still a possibility in those countries?

    Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services 
in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa 
(SIV) applications, including by transferring cases that are at the 
interview stage to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world 
where applicants are able to appear. We recognize that it is currently 
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or 
find a way to enter a third country. The U.S. Government is pressing 
the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their 
families, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with travel 
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging 
neighboring countries and Qatar (among others) to allow Afghans to 
enter. Afghan SIV applicants who are able to leave Afghanistan and 
whose SIV case is ready for interview may transfer their cases to any 
immigrant visa processing post. The Department of State has worked with 
various countries to host Afghans long enough to process their 
outstanding applications or transit to countries that will permit this. 
Asylum protections have been offered in certain countries, but the 
possibility for asylum as well as the outcome of any individual asylum 
requests will depend on third country asylum laws and policy as well as 
other factors. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the 
process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens, 
Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many 
countries have permitted Afghans to transit through their territories 
and many other countries made generous offers of support. Many 
countries have committed to permanently resettle Afghans. The United 
States has concluded international agreements with several countries to 
facilitate these activities, and the Department of State continues to 
follow its normal procedure for transmitting the texts of these 
international agreements to Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

    Question. I understand the State Department is still working to 
determine the number of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants who 
remain in Afghanistan. These individuals and their families are in 
direct and imminent danger from the Taliban because of their service to 
their country and the U.S. mission. I also understand that State 
continues to process these applications, though it is unclear where and 
how. What steps is the Department taking, in partnership with the 
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, to continue the 
processing of SIV applications for those who remain in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to process outstanding 
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at all processing 
stages controlled by the Department, including the Chief of Mission 
approval process and administrative processing for those who have been 
interviewed. These stages of the process were conducted outside of 
Afghanistan even before we suspended operations in Kabul. I defer to 
the Department of Homeland Security for updates on its processing of 
the I-360 petition for special immigrant status. While it is difficult 
for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country, we are developing 
processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver these important 
consular services for the people of Afghanistan. Applicants in 
Afghanistan should continue to monitor their email for updates on their 
case statuses.

    Question. Does the Department of State have the capacity to 
continue all steps in the application process, including those that 
were previously done in Kabul?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to prioritize the 
processing of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications, 
including by quintupling the number of people assigned to review cases 
at the Chief of Mission approval stage since May. The Department also 
continues to coordinate with the government contractor at the National 
Visa Center to increase efficiencies and reduce delays, including 
increasing the number of staff processing Afghan SIVs by seven-fold. 
The Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator for 
Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies and 
facilitate the freedom of movement for those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

    Question. How quickly can those applications be processed?

    Answer. The Department of State is expediting the stages of the 
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) application process within its control as 
much as feasible. The Department has supplemented staffing at the Chief 
of Mission approval stage of the process to ensure the cases are 
processed expeditiously. In addition, the Department has coordinated 
with the contractor at the National Visa Center to devote additional 
resources to expeditiously handle SIV pre-processing. We continue to 
prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV applicants. Although 
applicants will not be able to complete the visa interview portion in 
Afghanistan, we are expediting continued SIV processing at all other 
stages of the process outside of Afghanistan. We are prioritizing this 
effort, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no 
expiration date.

    Question. How is the State Department communicating with those 
applicants still in country to let them know of their options if they 
are able to secure safe passage out of Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department of State has added additional information to 
the Department's website to ensure applicants have the appropriate 
information to transfer their cases to another immigrant visa 
processing post.

    Question. I appreciate that the Administration is conducting a 
much-needed review of the Afghan SIV program. When can we expect the 
report on the process?

    Answer. Due to the exigent circumstances in Afghanistan, the 
Department of State and other interagency partners requested an 
extension of the deadline on the report required by E.O. 14013.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, can I receive your commitment that the 
State Department will brief Congressional offices on a weekly basis on 
the SIV process and broader resettlement efforts?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team looks forward to more regular 
engagements with partners in Congress. We appreciate the commitment of 
members of Congress to these issues and acknowledge an opportunity for 
more coordination moving forward.

    Question. In my recent conversation with NATO member ambassadors, 
many expressed a need for NATO to address regional stability following 
our withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as ensuring that the Taliban 
does not once again harbor terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda and others, 
nor provide financial or logistical support to these groups. What can 
the United States and the Alliance do to ensure that Afghanistan does 
not become a haven for terrorists?

    Answer. Discussions with our NATO Allies are underway to determine 
how best to continue the Alliance's work in the current context to 
monitor, prevent, and potentially counter terrorist activity emanating 
from Afghanistan. NATO played an absolutely critical role in leading 
the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan until its termination in 
September, and we will continue to work with NATO Allies to address our 
shared interests.

    Question. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the decision to 
withdraw from Afghanistan and the hastened withdrawal has damaged the 
strength of the NATO alliance?

    Answer. The Alliance and U.S. standing within NATO remain strong. 
The June Summit that followed NATO's collective decision to withdraw 
troops showed the Alliance is unified and forward-looking. After 20 
years and a reassessment of where to position our militaries based on 
today's global threat picture, Allies agreed to end our military 
engagement in Afghanistan. NATO is the foundation of Euro-Atlantic 
collective defense. The Alliance has overcome divisive issues in the 
past because of the strength of our approach based on consultation and 
consensus.

    Question. What resources is the Department of State planning to 
mobilize in order to support our allies who are hosting Afghan refugees 
while visa processing is underway?

    Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and 
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable 
Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee 
resettlement. The United States coordinates closely with and provides 
funding to UNHCR to support its efforts to provide third-country 
resettlement to refugees around the world. We are in discussion with 
UNHCR which works with many other countries to resettle refugees, 
including those from Afghanistan. We commend countries who have already 
started to accept Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. And we 
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border 
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with 
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also urge states to 
uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or 
asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle 
of non-refoulement.

    Question. After U.S. withdrawal completed, thousands at-risk 
individuals remain in Afghanistan at great personal risk. Charter 
aircraft have been ready to fly them to safety for weeks but the 
Taliban now refuses to allow their departure. How is the State 
Department engaging with the Taliban to allow the departure of charter 
planes, including from Mazar-E-Sharif?

    Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for 
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State 
Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the 
flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating 
requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately 
organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger 
manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these 
flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially 
eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States. We are also 
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment 
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.

    Question. The people of Afghanistan face a humanitarian catastrophe 
with limited access to basic necessities. How is the State Department 
vetting non-government recipients of U.S. assistance inside Afghanistan 
to ensure that they are not under the coercion of the Taliban regime 
and are safeguarded from having their assets and operations seized by 
Taliban-controlled ministries?

    Answer. The U.S. Government has put multiple measures in place to 
help ensure ongoing humanitarian assistance does not support any 
individual or entity that is or has been engaged in, or supportive of, 
terrorist activities or other activities inconsistent with U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests. This may include 
vetting, pre-award risk assessments, ongoing risk analysis processes 
that mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse, and carefully 
monitoring progress toward award objectives and achievement of expected 
results.

    Question. In cases where primary funding recipients are sub-
contracting with other local entities, how does the State Department 
monitor funding to ensure it gets to the Afghan people in need rather 
than exploited by malign actors?

    Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarians programs, the operating environment, and potential issues 
to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are planning for how they 
will make adjustments to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of 
continuing programs from outside Afghanistan, including through 
existing third parties, given the current footprint. Additionally, 
bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk that our programs 
could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This may include 
mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific program 
design to reduce those risks.

    Question. Noting that decades of evidence has demonstrated that in 
order to effectively address the needs of women and girls, the safety 
and security of female aid workers is critical--how is the 
Administration working right now to ensure that female humanitarian 
staff at every level are able to safely operate, including work 
directly consulting with Afghan women and girls on their priorities and 
needs, producing rapid humanitarian needs assessments, and designing 
and implementing humanitarian interventions?

    Answer. We are working with the international community to set 
clear, unified expectations for a united, inclusive, and representative 
government with the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women; 
for parties to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and for 
immediate, safe, and unhindered access for humanitarian actors. Our 
humanitarian partners are working with staff on the ground, 
particularly women staff, to identify the safest ways to reach women 
and girls with life-saving humanitarian assistance. Our humanitarian 
programs are designed to be flexible, and we are supporting partners to 
adapt to the new environment in line with the recommendations of the 
women most impacted.

    Question. Improving access to quality education, especially for 
girls, has been a key objective for U.S. foreign assistance in 
Afghanistan over the past two decades, and our investment has 
contributed to significant progress for Afghan children and youth. From 
2001 to 2021, the number of children enrolled in general education 
(grades 1-12) in Afghanistan rose from 0.9 million (with almost no 
girls) to 9.2 million (39 percent girls). The number of schools has 
also increased from 3,400 to 16,400.

  1.  Will the United States continue to support education in 
        Afghanistan to protect these gains and prevent backsliding, 
        especially for Afghan women and girls?

  2.  If so, how will the Administration ensure that aid does not end 
        up in the hands of the Taliban?

    Answer. The United States is committing to supporting the Afghan 
people, especially women, girls, and members of minority groups. As I 
have said, humanitarian will continue to be provided in Afghanistan, 
including to women, girls, and members of minority groups. We will be 
very focused on monitoring this humanitarian assistance to help ensure 
it is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I 
noted in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a 
senior official who will coordinate the U.S. Government's effort to 
support women in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are engaged 
diplomatically and coordinating with the international community to 
hold the Taliban accountable for respecting the human rights of women 
and girls.

    Question. Furthermore, will the Administration expand the license 
to operate humanitarian programs in Afghanistan to allow for continued 
education assistance?

    Answer. The Administration has been clear about its intention to 
continue to provide humanitarian assistance in support of the Afghan 
people. As part of an ongoing review of our assistance to support the 
Afghan people, the Department is determining whether community basic 
education programs that promote U.S. national interests and provide 
equal education opportunities for girls and boys should continue to the 
extent possible in support of the Afghan people. Prohibited 
transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to such 
activities are authorized by a specific license the Department of the 
Treasury updated on September 21.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

    Question. On August 30, 2021, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) announced that, ``due to both the lack of air traffic services 
and a functional civil aviation authority in Afghanistan, as well as 
ongoing security concerns, U.S. civil operators, pilots, and U.S.-
registered civil aircraft are prohibited from operating at any altitude 
over much of Afghanistan.'' Additional concerns have been brought to my 
staff that all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
certified Afghan national air traffic controllers departed the country 
during the evacuation. Qatar and Turkey are working to restore 
commercial flights at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), but 
these are dependent on negotiations with the Taliban-led government. 
Can you please update me on the Department of State's efforts to ensure 
air traffic control and management of Afghan airspace? Do Qatar and 
Turkey have the experience and equipment needed to facilitate the 
reopening of HKIA to commercial air travel and its safe operation over 
the long term? What, if any, assistance does the Department or the FAA 
anticipate providing to Qatar and Turkey in this regard?

    Answer. We recognize the need for Kabul International Airport (KIA) 
to resume normal operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously 
with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, 
but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that 
there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. The 
Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve 
any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people 
valid with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have 
reiterated this point to the Taliban.

    Question. Will Qatar and Turkey's activities in support of Hamid 
Karzai International Airport (HKIA) operations--and that of any 
potential American contracting companies working with them--be 
considered activity subject to existing sanctions on the Taliban?

    Answer. Our top priorities are to minimize the disruption to 
humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, while still denying assets to the 
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other sanctioned entities and 
individuals. The international community needs to quickly coordinate on 
identifying both an international funding mechanism and civil aviation 
partners who can assist in creating the conditions necessary for 
aircraft insurance and safe flight operations, including cargo. For any 
further questions on sanctions, I refer you to the Department of the 
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. Impartial international humanitarian organizations have 
raised serious concerns regarding their ability to continue assistance 
operations in Afghanistan given the Taliban are listed by the Treasury 
Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group. In 
order avoid unwanted negative impacts for Afghan civilians the U.S. 
Treasury must provide a broad OFAC general license covering all 
humanitarian activities. Will you commit to supporting such a license, 
perhaps modeled on the general license OFAC issued for Ansarallah in 
Yemen prior to the designation revocation, and work in close 
collaboration with the humanitarian community to ensure a license is 
issued quickly?

    Answer. On September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses 
authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international organizations 
(including the U.N. and its specialized agencies, such as the World 
Bank) and NGOs, and those acting on their behalf, to continue 
humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human 
needs in Afghanistan as well as the export to Afghanistan of critical 
food and medicine. These licenses and corresponding FAQs facilitate 
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons--including NGOs and foreign financial 
institutions--to continue to support critical and life-saving 
activities like the delivery of food, shelter, medicine, and public 
health and medical services (including COVID-19-assistance) to the 
Afghan people. This follows past precedent in which the U.S. Government 
has taken steps to address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where 
sanctioned entities and individuals are active, such as in Yemen. The 
State Department fully supports continued humanitarian assistance and 
other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan as well 
as the export to Afghanistan of critical food and medicine.

    Question. Thousands of U.S. citizens, green card holders, and 
vulnerable Afghans were not evacuated prior to the departure of U.S. 
troops from Afghanistan. It is reassuring that efforts to evacuate 
vulnerable categories of individuals from Afghanistan have continued 
via negotiated evacuation flights and land crossings. Will you commit 
to continuing to process all requests and applications received by the 
Afghanistan Taskforce to secure safe haven for those who were not able 
to depart Afghanistan prior to the final withdrawal of U.S. troops? And 
specifically, will you clarify that P-2 category of the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program (USRAP) will be among those prioritized?

    Answer. The Department of State continues to receive and process P-
2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Once 
outside of Afghanistan, an individual can begin processing through the 
USRAP.
    We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans 
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third 
country, and like many refugees, they may face significant challenges 
fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the 
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will 
continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and 
those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate 
with international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their 
respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers 
to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.

    Question. Refugee Council USA and its nine national refugee 
resettlement agency members have advocated for the need to raise the 
U.S. refugee acceptance cap from 125,000 to no less than 200,000 for 
fiscal year 2022. Will you commit to working closely with President 
Biden to answer their call to raise the cap? If the cap is not raised 
above 125,000, how would the Administration provide for the needs of 
Afghans who do not receive refugee status either through new 
legislative action or pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act?

    Answer. The President affirmed the United States' commitment to 
welcoming refugees by issuing the Presidential Determination (PD) on 
Refugee Admissions that raises the refugee admissions ceiling to 
125,000 for FY 2022. The State Department's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration has engaged in listening sessions and worked in 
close coordination with U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) 
partners, including resettlement agencies, RCUSA, and federal and state 
partners. We are incorporating feedback into our efforts to rebuild the 
program and will continue to partner closely with them going forward. 
Persons admitted with Special Immigrant Visas or who have been paroled 
into the United States do not count against the refugee ceiling. We 
anticipate admitting significant numbers of Afghan refugees through 
USRAP in FY 2022, with a regional allocation for refugees from the Near 
East/South Asia (including Afghanistan) of 35,000 under the new PD. On 
September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan 
Supplemental Appropriations Act, which allows for certain Afghan 
nationals paroled into the United States to receive domestic refugee 
benefits in the United States and contains a provision requiring USCIS 
to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications filed by certain Afghan 
nationals described in the Act.

    Question. What additional funds would be needed outside of the $6.4 
billion supplemental request to help resettle Afghans and other 
refugees to meet a 200,000 Presidential Determination in 2022?

    Answer. Congress appropriated $976.1 million in Emergency Refugee 
and Migration Assistance funds in the Afghanistan Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, 2022 for support for Operation Allies Welcome and 
related efforts by the Department of State, including additional 
relocations of individuals at risk as a result of the situation in 
Afghanistan and related expenses. Given the size, scope, and scale of 
this operation, the Department will continue to evaluate the 
requirements and may require additional funds to support urgent refugee 
and migration needs.
    The FY 2022 President's Budget requested sufficient funding to 
support the goal of up to 125,000 refugee admissions in FY 2022. On 
October 8, President Biden issued the Presidential Determination on 
Refugee Admissions for FY 2022, which raises the refugee admissions 
target to 125,000. If the President determines to increase the 
admissions target over this 125,000 target, the Department would need 
to consult with Congress and then reassess funding needs and may 
require additional funds.

    Question. Our NATO allies worked hand-in-hand with Afghan allies as 
part of the International Security Assistance Force mission. With the 
end of the mission the need to resettle vulnerable Afghans remains 
high. What commitments have other NATO allies given to accept 
vulnerable Afghans and refugees post drawdown of troops, and what 
diplomatic efforts are ongoing to ensure all NATO members, and other 
countries who committed to the mission, do their fair share to provide 
safe refuge to those in need?

    Answer. The United States consulted with Allies and partners 
throughout the process of ending NATO's military presence in 
Afghanistan, including on the resettlement of Afghans at risk due to 
their association with Allied countries or NATO. Many governments have 
already stepped up, accepting thousands of vulnerable Afghans into 
their countries. The process is ongoing, and deliberations continue at 
NATO and bilaterally with our NATO partners on how to support Afghans 
in need of protection and those who still wish to leave Afghanistan.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Cory Booker

    Question. On Monday, August 23, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst 
(JBMDL) was officially tasked by the DoD to serve as one of four 
military installations that will house Afghan Refugees as part of 
Operation Allies Welcome. JBMDL is currently housing 9,000 refugees, 
with the capacity to house a total of 13,000. I understand that JBMDL, 
in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Department of State, is providing all refuges with COVID-19 testing and 
offering vaccines, as well as full medical screening and other health 
services. What is the plan for these individuals and how long do you 
foresee them staying there?

    Answer. Afghan nationals who are paroled will be required to stay 
at a DoD facility until a tuberculosis screening has occurred, and 
vaccinations have been received followed by a 21-day quarantine period. 
At federally-funded facilities, Afghan nationals will be provided 
housing and meals at no cost. They will be able to apply for work 
authorization, be enrolled in temporary medical insurance, and receive 
additional medical care, if needed. They are matched with a 
resettlement agency affiliate in the United States and assisted with 
travel plans once that affiliate has indicated it is ready to receive 
the family at their final destination.
    We are already helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming 
communities across the United States and expect to increase these 
movements significantly in the coming weeks. However, we do not have a 
timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who 
arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

    Question. Is the plan to eventually resettle them to civilian 
facilities while they await either the processing of SIVs or P visas or 
refugee status determinations?

    Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming 
communities across the United States and expect to increase these 
movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to 
relocate Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they 
arrive in their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do 
not have a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for 
those who arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

    Question. If so, what plans are in place or being put in place for 
such a transition?

    Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming 
communities across the United States and expect to increase these 
movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to move 
Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they arrive in 
their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do not have 
a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who 
arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

    Question. As each military base currently participating in 
Operation Allies Welcome has a set capacity for housing Afghan 
Refugees, does the Department of State have plans to continue sending 
refugees to these installations as others are resettled? Or, will each 
installation's population diminish as they begin the resettlement 
process?

    Answer. We are already helping Afghans move into welcoming 
communities across the United States and expect to increase these 
movements significantly in the coming weeks. As these newcomers reach 
their final U.S. destination, there will be some new Afghan arrivals 
from those overseas military installations that were transit points in 
Operation Allies Refuge. Those new arrivals will go through the same 
medical, health, and work authorization processes for all arriving 
Afghans.
    As some individuals move to their new communities, and others 
arrive from overseas to domestic DoD facilities, the population at each 
facility will change. However, we do not have a timeline right now for 
the completion of all travel for those who arrived and are staying in 
DoD facilities.

    Question. Outside of resettlement, are there any plans to increase 
the number of translators, specifically female translators, at each 
military installation?

    Answer. We are working closely with the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security in ensuring that Afghan arrivals have safe conditions 
and are able to complete medical and immigration processing swiftly at 
each of the DoD facilities where they are being processed. For more 
information on interpretation, including any plans to increase the 
number of female interpreters, I defer to the United Coordination Group 
within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead for Operation 
Allies Welcome.

    Question. Are there any plans to utilize SIV translators currently 
housed at each base as official translators in partnership with NGOs?

    Answer. For more information on interpretation, including any plans 
to utilize Special Immigrant Visa interpreters, I defer to the United 
Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead 
for Operation Allies Welcome.

    Question. Does the Department of State have any plans to meet the 
increased demand for health care services--specifically women's health 
services--at military installations without robust local health care 
offerings?

    Answer. We are inviting all arrivals to take advantage of the 
services offered on military bases, such as applying for work 
authorizations and health care services. For Afghans who need 
specialized assistance, we are making a range of services available 
including basic family medicine; pediatric care; obstetric care; 
emergency medicine; basic laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy services; 
basic dental care; and psychosocial support and mental health services.
    For more information on the demand for health services and women's 
health care services at DoD facilities, I defer to the United 
Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead 
for Operation Allies Welcome.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

    Question. In his speech to the American people on August 26, 
President Biden admitted that ``it could very well have happened'' that 
the U.S. military provided a list or multiple lists of names of 
American citizens, SIV holders and other vulnerable Afghans to the 
Taliban. Since then, members of the Biden Administration, including 
you, have issued confusing denials. On ``Meet the Press'' I believe you 
said that ``the idea that we shared lists of Americans or others with 
the Taliban is simply wrong,'' but then later on you said that there 
were instances where you shared ``names on a list of people on the 
bus'' with the Taliban. I sent a letter to President Biden on August 27 
asking for clarity on this. At any point during the evacuation of 
American citizens and vulnerable Afghans from Afghanistan, were the 
Taliban provided lists or names of any potential evacuees?

    Answer. We are also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to 
their public commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the 
country. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic operational 
communications to the Taliban and in tandem with our allies and 
partners around the world. The Department of State did not provide 
names of any potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at 
any point during evacuation and relocation operations.

    Question. Who authorized sharing lists of potential evacuees with 
the Taliban?

    Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any 
potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point 
during evacuation and relocation operations.

    Question. Can you confirm that every person whose name was on such 
as list was safely evacuated?

    Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any 
potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point 
during evacuation and relocation operations. As of September 1, 
approximately 124,000 people were relocated out of Afghanistan with 
U.S. support. Of these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who 
evacuated on or before August 31; between September 1 and November 9, 
we have assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful 
Permanent Residents.

    Question. Do you commit to rescuing those included on a list, but 
who wasn't evacuated?

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, 
if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to 
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave 
Afghanistan.
    We also recognize the need for international flights to resume 
regular operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the 
Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also 
safely and securely. We will continue to engage diplomatically to 
resolve any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public commitment 
to let people with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have 
reiterated this point to the Taliban.
    We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans 
to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way to 
enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant 
challenges fleeing to safety. The United States is working closely with 
allies and partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting 
vulnerable Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee 
resettlement.

    Question. Do you commit to informing every individual that was 
included on a list of the potential threat they or their family members 
in Afghanistan may face?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 
31, 2021, and a team at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, is supporting 
these functions. While the U.S. Government has withdrawn its personnel 
from Kabul, we will continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families 
in Afghanistan. Our team in Doha is managing our diplomacy with 
Afghanistan, including consular affairs, administering humanitarian 
assistance, and working with allies, partners, and regional and 
international stakeholders to coordinate our messaging to the Taliban.
    U.S. citizens are encouraged to register their presence through the 
Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive security alerts and 
updated information on travel in Afghanistan.

    Question. Over the long term, one of the most significant 
implications from this disaster will be our policy toward the Chinese 
Communist Party. In justifying the withdrawal of troops from 
Afghanistan, you personally made the case that it was in our national 
interest because our strategic competitors would like nothing more than 
to see the United States remain in Afghanistan. Do you still believe 
the Chinese Communist Party is committing genocide?

    Answer. I continue to believe that the Government of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide and crimes against 
humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of 
other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. These 
atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with serious 
consequences. I support using all appropriate tools, including those 
provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC 
to end these atrocities and to promote justice and accountability for 
the victims.
    Our strategic competitors like China and Russia--or adversaries 
like Iran and North Korea--would have liked nothing more than for the 
United States to continue to funnel billions of dollars in resources 
and attention into stabilizing Afghanistan indefinitely. We have 
significant vital interests in the world that we cannot afford to 
ignore.

    Question. Do you believe the Chinese Communist Party will enlist 
the Taliban in its efforts to wipe out Uyghurs and other Turkic 
Muslims?

    Answer. We continue to monitor relations between the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) and Afghanistan. Uyghurs and members of other 
religious and ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang have suffered 
unspeakable oppression, including genocide and crimes against humanity, 
at the hands of the PRC's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged 
in human rights violations and abuses that shock the conscience and 
must be met with serious consequences. The United States must speak out 
consistently and jointly with allies and partners, impose costs and 
sanctions on those responsible, and help those fleeing persecution.

    Question. Do you believe Beijing when it says that it is not 
interested in occupying Bagram Air Force base?

    Answer. We are aware of reports that Beijing claims it is not 
interested in occupying Bagram Air Base.

    Question. Do you trust the Chinese Communist Party to keep its word 
in any future climate negotiations?

    Answer. The United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not 
its words. We know that addressing the climate crisis will require 
significant additional action by the People's Republic of China (PRC). 
We conduct results-oriented diplomacy with the PRC in climate 
negotiations. Current climate commitments by the PRC are not sufficient 
to hold the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C. We and others 
in the international community continue to press for the PRC to 
increase its emission reductions in this critical decade to get on a 
Paris-aligned trajectory.

    Question. When will the Biden administration's China policy review 
be complete?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will address the China 
challenge from a position of strength in which we work closely with our 
allies and partners. There is no doubt that China poses the most 
significant challenge of any nation to the United States in terms of 
our interests and the interests of the American people. The Biden-
Harris administration approaches China through the lens of competition 
and recognizes that there are adversarial and cooperative aspects to 
the U.S.-China relationship.

    Question. Since the start of the evacuation, the Biden 
administration, and you, have consistently spoken of the need to work 
with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens and vulnerable Afghans 
out of the country. In your speeches with the Foreign Minister of Qatar 
and with Heiko Maas last week, you repeatedly referred to our 
``engagement with the Taliban.'' It's puzzling to me that the State 
Department is now engaging with the Taliban, when just a few short 
weeks ago, U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul were shredding passports and 
visas in their possession, so that they're not being used for kill 
lists. At what point did the State Department's approach towards the 
Taliban change from worrying about it forming kill lists to target 
American citizens and vulnerable Afghans to now considering the Taliban 
essential is evacuating those same people?

    Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban concerning our 
vital national interests, including safe passage for U.S. citizens and 
others with valid travel documents. However, the legitimacy and support 
the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend on their 
adherence to their commitments on ensuring freedom of travel; to making 
good on their counterterrorism commitments; upholding the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls, and 
members of minority groups; naming a broadly representative permanent 
government; and forswearing retaliation.

    Question. In public statements, the State Department has described 
the al-Qaida-aligned Haqqani Network as somewhat independent of the 
Taliban. In fact, the Haqqani Network is indeed a critical part of the 
Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani has been the deputy leader of the Taliban 
since at least 2015 and has been named as the ``Acting Interior 
Minister,'' of the Taliban regime while Khalil Haqqani is the acting 
minister for refugees. The Haqqani Network, as you know, is a 
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. When the State Department 
cooperated with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens, did State 
Department officials ever coordinate with members of the Haqqani 
Network?

    Answer. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban are distinct entities, 
but they are affiliated. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global 
Terrorist Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
Entity. We have accounted for and will account for that, ensuring that 
all our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

    Question. Looking to the future, as the Biden Administration 
considers the provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, how will 
you ensure that such aid does not benefit the Haqqani Network or other 
terrorist groups?

    Answer. State and USAID Bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other 
potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that process, bureaus 
are planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen the 
monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from outside 
Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given the 
current footprint. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard 
against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their 
supporters. These steps may include mitigation measures such as name 
check vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.

    Question. When the last American C-17 left Kabul on August 31, 
there were at least several hundred American citizens left in 
Afghanistan. My office, and I know other Senate offices as well, have 
received reports from U.S. citizens claiming that the Taliban are not 
allowing them to enter airports, either for lack of travel documents or 
in some instances, not being accompanied by a male guardian. This 
Administration, writ large, has made excuses for the decision to leave 
these Americans behind by claiming that many of these Americans have 
decided not to leave Afghanistan, because they are dual nationals 
wishing to stay with their families or because they just have responded 
to State Department emails coordinating their evacuation. What makes 
you so confident that these Americans truly do not, or did not, want to 
leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and 
their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, 
and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping 
them depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. When the 
Department of State suspended Embassy operations in Kabul on August 31, 
2021, we were specifically aware at that time of approximately 100 U.S. 
citizens who still wanted to depart but due to the security situation, 
could not do so. The Department has made every effort to contact U.S. 
citizens who are interested in leaving Afghanistan, and our commitment 
to help them depart remains steadfast. Several U.S. citizens have told 
us on calls that they are not yet ready to depart for family or other 
reasons. As we have said, our mission to assist U.S. citizens and their 
families to depart Afghanistan has no expiration date, and we continue 
to assist U.S. citizens and their families in Afghanistan who wish to 
depart. We continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families with 
departing from Afghanistan. Between September 1 and November 9, we have 
assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens.

    Question. Is it likely that some, if not all, want to leave but are 
being prevented from leaving?

    Answer. We will be relentless in our efforts to assist U.S. 
citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans to depart 
Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. The U.S. Government is 
pressing the Taliban keep its public commitment to provide safe passage 
to U.S. citizens and their families, LPRs, and Afghans with travel 
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging 
countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.
    We are prepared to assist U.S. citizens and their families to 
depart Afghanistan when they are ready to do so, whether it is today, 
tomorrow, a year from now or longer. Interactions with some U.S. 
citizens and their family members currently in Afghanistan have 
indicated that they are not ready to depart at this time. While some 
have stated they consider Afghanistan their home and do not wish to 
leave, others are working to get their affairs in order before seeking 
to depart. Others have indicated hesitancy, as they do not want to 
leave extended family behind.

    Question. Is there the possibility that these dual nationals could 
be women whose more conservative family members are pressuring them 
into staying?

    Answer. The decision for an individual to remain in or leave 
Afghanistan is incredibly complex and personal. The Department of State 
is working closely with interagency partners and others to facilitate 
the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan.

    Question. In his first speech to the American people on August 16, 
President Biden had proudly announced that the U.S. Government had 
assisted in the evacuation of New York Times and Washington Post 
journalists from Afghanistan. Media reports have indicated that as many 
as 550 journalists of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of 
America and their families remain in Afghanistan. These are entities 
funded by American taxpayers through the U.S. Agency for Global Media. 
Why did this Administration prioritize the evacuation of New York Times 
and Washington Post journalists from Afghanistan, but not those 
journalists on the Government's payroll?

    Answer. We supported the movement of more than 124,000 people out 
of Afghanistan between August 14 and August 31. Among those were U.S. 
Government employees, Embassy employees, U.S. citizens, and many 
others, including journalists. Since August 31, we have worked closely 
with the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-
affiliated employees and family members. Many have already been 
relocated and we remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM, 
RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues 
will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top 
priorities.

    Question. In the last few days before the evacuation ended on 
August 31, I believe the State Department had designated these 
journalists and their families as locally employed staff of Embassy 
Kabul so that they could be included in the final evacuation flights. 
Is this true?

    Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were 
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the 
August evacuation, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of 
the U.S. embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as 
translators and interpreters for our government, and other Afghans at 
risk.

    Question. If this is true, why were they not evacuated?

    Answer. A small number of embassy local employees chose not to be 
evacuated, for a variety of reasons. We remain in close contact with 
them to provide ongoing support.

    Question. How many other U.S. Government employed staff were not 
evacuated?

    Answer. During the evacuation operations in August, locally 
employed staff members working for the United States in Afghanistan 
were evacuated with eligible family members. A small number chose not 
to be evacuated and we remain in close contact with them to provide 
ongoing support.

    Question. What steps will you take to guarantee that the RFE/RL and 
VOA journalists will be evacuated?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation 
efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups, 
nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely 
across the interagency, including with USAGM, and with other partners 
to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave 
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

    Question. In addition to American citizens, there are thousands of 
Afghans who worked alongside American service members, soldiers, 
diplomats and other staff that now face a real threat of death, because 
of their association with our nation. What is the status of the 
Priority 2 refugees' admissions program for journalists and those who 
worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects? Is the system at 
capacity?

    Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2 
referrals from U.S. Government employers and qualifying media and non-
governmental organizations. After the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based 
non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and 
the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can 
occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing 
their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to 
contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded 
overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing.

    Question. We have received reports that the State Department is 
reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system 
due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?

    Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2 
referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of 
Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is 
not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee 
referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for 
resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we 
are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific 
number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process 
in the next year.

    Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into 
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while 
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could 
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

    Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow 
procedures to register for international protection and assistance with 
the government of the country they are in. They may also register and 
seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). We are working with international humanitarian partners and 
other governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns 
are able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program processing.

    Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are 
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them 
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to 
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

    Answer. For individuals who are in a third country and have 
contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-funded Resettlement 
Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based on the individual's 
location. The Administration has sought to increase the capacity of 
these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases as part of an 
overall larger USRAP program. Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work 
regionally and can process cases in some countries even if there is not 
a physical RSC presence. While we are working expeditiously, there is 
no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that 
the Department expects to process in the next year. In general, it 
takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee resettlement 
case from start to finish including pre-screening, the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous security vetting.

    Question. It is my understanding that U.S. allies and partners in 
the region, such as Qatar, have provided critical support for the 
evacuation. Going forward, what is the Administration's plan to 
coordinate with these regional partners to ensure that U.S. citizens 
and vulnerable Afghans who have been left stranded in Afghanistan can 
be evacuated now that the U.S. has withdrawn?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation 
efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups, 
nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely 
across the interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of 
movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. 
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and 
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

    Question. On September 2, the State Department said in the press 
briefing that 77 percent of those evacuated from Afghanistan are ``at-
risk Afghans.'' More specifically, the State Department said that these 
are ``those Afghans to whom we have a special commitment.'' I assume 
that these include SIV and P2 status holders, but can you clarify which 
Afghans are included in this group?

    Answer. At the time of the August evacuation, these Afghans 
included people who worked as staff of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and 
their families, those who served as translators and interpreters for 
our government, and other Afghans at risk. This group includes a broad 
range of individuals who were at risk due to their association with the 
U.S. Government or support for our goals.

    Question. Does it include USAGM journalists?

    Answer. Yes.

    Question. Does it include Afghan women who are students at the 
American University of Afghanistan?

    Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation flights out of Afghanistan 
have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents 
(LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans remains 
steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and 
at-risk groups in Afghanistan such as the students, faculty, and staff 
of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States is 
committed to supporting equal access to education in Afghanistan. The 
Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart, 
and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial 
flights out of the airport in Kabul.

    Question. Does it include the former contractors and staff employed 
by the USAID programs?

    Answer. This group of evacuees includes a broad range of 
individuals who were at risk due to their association with the U.S. 
Government or support for our goals. While U.S. Government evacuation 
flights out of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, 
Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable 
and at-risk Afghans remains steadfast. We have no deadline for 
supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such 
as the staff and contractors employed to oversee and implement USAID 
programs. The United States continues to support humanitarian 
assistance in Afghanistan. The Department continues to explore options 
for those who wish to depart, and we continue to advocate for the full 
resumption of commercial flights out of the airport in Kabul.

    Question. Does it include Afghans who converted to religions other 
than Islam?

    Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection 
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. The 
situation for so many Afghans is stark, and the needs remain great. We 
will continue to support the Afghan people through diplomacy, 
international influence, and humanitarian aid.
    We understand that the Taliban have targeted certain populations 
among Afghan civilians in the past and denied access to services for 
members of vulnerable populations. The United States will work 
vigorously with the international community to explore all options to 
support members of vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but 
not limited to--women, children, journalists, persons with 
disabilities, LGBTQI+ individuals, and members of the ethnic and 
religious minority groups. We also continue to call on the Taliban to 
protect freedom of movement for all Afghans and allow the departure of 
those who seek to leave Afghanistan.

    Question. With regard to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, 
you personally justified the decision as being in the national interest 
of the United States. You even stated that our strategic competitors 
would like nothing more than to see the United States remain in 
Afghanistan. While I have long argued that the United States must focus 
on addressing the threat posed by authoritarians around the world, it's 
clear to me that the execution of this withdrawal has dramatically 
undermined the credibility we need to address the threat posed by these 
dictators. Already the Kremlin has used the withdrawal to call into 
question the American commitment to protect Ukraine. What is the State 
Department doing to reassure our allies and partners abroad of American 
defensive commitments?

    Answer. The Department and our interagency colleagues are deeply 
engaged globally in strengthening and broadening security cooperation 
with U.S. forces. In addition to our close cooperation with NATO, the 
recently concluded Special Measures Agreement with Korea, negotiated by 
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, is evidence of the value our 
allies and partners place our cooperation. The United States is firmly 
committed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it 
remains the top security assistance recipient in Europe. In FY 2021, 
the U.S. Government provided $393 million in security assistance to 
Ukraine. Our values and commitment to international norms set us apart 
from Russia in reassuring our allies and partners.

    Question. Afghanistan was a major non-NATO ally, to whom we had 
made commitment to support and defend. Having abandoned Afghanistan, 
how will we assure allies and partners, like Ukraine, that also face 
significant military threats from authoritarian states?

    Answer. The State Department is committed to building enduring 
security ties with allies and partners around the world to advance our 
national security. As I have said, there is nothing that our 
competitors and adversaries would have liked more than for the United 
States to re-up a 20-year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for 
another decade. Regarding Ukraine specifically, the United States is 
firmly committed to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity, and it remains our top security assistance 
recipient in Europe. In FY 2021, the U.S. Government provided $393 
million in security assistance to Ukraine, including an additional $60 
million in equipment and services via Presidential Drawdown Authority, 
highlighted during President Zelensky's September 1 White House visit 
as a symbol of our deepening strategic partnership and support for 
Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression. Further, the 
President's FY 2022 budget request continues to reflect Ukraine as the 
top priority within Europe for out-year resources. We appreciate the 
robust Congressional appropriations that have allowed us to support 
Ukraine as a foreign policy priority.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson

    Question. Secretary Blinken, on August 27, 2021, I sent a letter to 
you and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin regarding a reported incident 
on August 26, 2021, in which it has been alleged over 400 individuals, 
including U.S. citizens, were turned away from the evacuation site at 
Hamid Karzai International Airport. The letter (attached) included four 
questions related to the alleged event, which I will repeat here. 
Please answer the following: Is the Department of Defense and/or the 
Department of State aware of this alleged incident? If so, is there an 
open investigation into this matter?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions 
related to the security of and access to the airport.

    Question. It is hard to believe that any U.S. military official 
would deny Americans the ability to evacuate Afghanistan. If this did 
in fact occur on August 26 (or any other date), what generalized or 
specific order was given to the commander that caused him to take such 
action?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions 
related to security of or access to the airport.

    Question. Who gave the order to this commander? Please provide that 
individual's name, title, and department/agency. Where did this order 
ultimately originate?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions 
related to security of or access to the airport.

    Question. What actions are being taken to locate and evacuate the 
American citizens that were allegedly turned away?

    Answer. Our mission to assist U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan 
has no deadline, and we are continuing to assist U.S. citizens and 
their families in Afghanistan who wish to depart. I defer to the 
Department of Defense for all questions related to security of or 
access to the airport.

    Question. Please describe in detail the vetting process for 
evacuees from Afghanistan.

    Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan 
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our 
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and 
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are 
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process 
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism 
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and 
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos, 
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan 
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As 
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a 
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary 
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting 
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety 
and national security.

    Question. During the hearing, you stated that there was a round of 
vetting in third countries and another round once individuals arrived 
in the United States. Please explain each stage in detail, including 
what vetting was performed in Afghanistan before individuals were 
allowed to board planes, in third countries, and after arrival in the 
U.S.

    Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan 
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our 
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and 
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are 
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process 
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism 
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and 
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos, 
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan 
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As 
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a 
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary 
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting 
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety 
and national security.

    Question. Please explain how we are verifying the identities of 
evacuees and establishing the identities of those without 
identification papers.

    Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting 
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and 
Border Protection, who are responsible for recording the arrival and 
processing the parole into the United States of evacuees.

    Question. Are we asking U.S. service members to participate in the 
identification process?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information 
relating what role its personnel may play in this process.

    Question. Are we seeking personal confirmations or recommendations 
from U.S. service members?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information on 
what role its personnel may play in this process.

    Question. What databases are we comparing identification 
information against?

    Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting 
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and 
Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.

    Question. How confident are you that the databases being used 
contain sufficient information to detect matches?

    Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting 
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and 
Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.

    Question. Are we conducting biometric screening on each evacuee, 
and if so what does this entail?

    Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting 
community, including the Department of Homeland Security/Customs and 
Border Protection, which is responsible for performing this work.

    Question. Has the Department of Defense kept accurate and up-to-
date records of individuals who have worked for the U.S. in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. I defer all questions regarding employment with the 
Department of Defense to the Department of Defense.

    Question. What gaps do you believe exist in the information 
available for identification?

    Answer. The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program is open to 
individuals who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government, 
including U.S. Government contractors, and individuals who worked for 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or its successor 
mission. Applicants must provide proof that they meet the statutory 
requirements for this visa program including proof of identity and 
nationality, length of employment, letters of recommendation from a 
direct supervisor or senior official, and other information. In many 
circumstances applicants are unable to provide all of the required 
documents. U.S. Government contracting files often do not contain 
information on the individuals who worked for specific contractors or 
the period of time an individual was employed for a contractor under a 
specific contract. To confirm this information, the Afghan SIV unit 
must review information from the individual contractor, if they can 
locate them, to confirm the applicant's eligibility. This information 
is then reviewed by the Chief of Mission (COM) in determining whether 
to grant an applicant COM approval.

    Question. Please provide the number of evacuees that do not have 
identification.

    Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for 
recording the arrival and processing the parole of all Afghan evacuees 
into the U.S. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding 
identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently 
in the United States.

    Question. Are there individuals whose identities remain 
unconfirmed, and if so how many?

    Answer. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding 
identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently 
in the United States.

    Question. What security measures are in place for individuals 
without confirmed identities?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more 
information on security measures and requirements for admittance or 
parole into the United States.

    Question. How many of the individuals among the Afghan evacuees are 
believed to be criminals or possible threats to U.S. national security?

    Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered 
screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States 
and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This 
process includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism 
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and 
other Intelligence Community partners. I defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security for more information regarding any such identified 
individuals.

    Question. Are there individuals among the Afghan evacuees who have 
been specifically identified as taking up arms against the United 
States or our allies, or providing assistance to our enemies?

    Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered 
screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States 
and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. For 
further information, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security.

    Question. What is being done with those individuals when found? Are 
we detaining those individuals, deporting them, etc.?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as its 
component entities coordinate the interagency screening process, make 
final decisions on clearance for travel, parole, and related issues, 
and would take any action on detention or removal of a foreign national 
from the United States.

    Question. Please provide the number of Afghan evacuees that have 
been denied entry into the United States due to vetting.

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which 
has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who relocate.

    Question. Please provide the reason(s) for denial (ties to 
terrorism, evidence of taking up arms against the United States, 
criminal background, etc.).

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which 
has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who are relocated.

    Question. Are you confident that the process in place is sufficient 
to keep out individuals seeking to harm the United States?

    Answer. Yes. The Department of State is a part of the whole-of-
government effort to appropriately screen and vet all potential 
travelers to the United States. We and other U.S. Government agencies 
have decades of experience working together to perform this critical 
work not just for these evacuees but for every traveler to the U.S.

    Question. Has the U.S. Government identified any evacuees that were 
previously detained or incarcerated by U.S. forces in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere?

    Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as 
Customs and Border Protection coordinates the interagency screening and 
vetting process and makes final decisions on clearance for travel, 
parole, and related issues.

    Question. How many Afghan evacuees have been identified as 
Unaccompanied Alien Children?

    Answer. As of October 15, our partners conducted over 300 best 
interest assessments for identified unaccompanied children outside the 
United States. Prior to arrival in the United States, the Department of 
State supports international organization partners to conduct best 
interest assessments for known unaccompanied children when possible. 
All unaccompanied children are referred to HHS's Office of Refugee 
Resettlement upon arrival in the United States. The Department of State 
works closely with HHS to facilitate reunification of children with 
their caregivers.

    Question. There are reports of male evacuees at Ft. McCoy and 
elsewhere that have presented much younger, underage females as their 
wives. Can you confirm these cases and whether any of these individuals 
have made it into the United States?

    Answer. We are aware of these reports and are working closely with 
the Department of Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on any 
protection-related concerns at the safe havens. We have provided 
guidance, developed in consultation with the Department of Health and 
Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), to staff to 
help them look out for such cases and provide appropriate referrals for 
protective services. Any children arriving without a parent or legal 
guardian are referred to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), including married 
minors.

    Question. How many cases of possible underage marriages have been 
reported?

    Answer. The State Department does not independently track these 
figures. We understand cases have been reported. Any children arriving 
without a parent or legal guardian are referred to HHS/ORR, including 
married minors. I defer to HHS/ORR for specific figures.

    Question. What guidance has been given regarding child brides and 
forced marriage?

    Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child and forced 
``marriages'' very seriously and has worked closely with interagency 
partners to identify and respond to any cases that have been uncovered. 
HHS/ORR is notified regarding any children arriving without a parent or 
legal guardian, including married minors. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is now the lead agency on protection of vulnerable 
populations at the CONUS safe havens. I refer you to DHS for further 
information on child brides and forced marriages, including guidance. 
At the OCONUS lily pads, the Department of State is supporting 
international organizations to help identify cases involving child and 
forced ``marriages'' and refer them to appropriate services, when 
possible.

    Question. Is the first stage of vetting in third countries failing 
to identify and address these alleged incidents?

    Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to 
staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. There have not 
been many cases, but when staff identified them, appropriate action was 
taken in accordance with humanitarian standards and relevant 
immigration laws and practices.

    Question. What is being done when possible cases of forced 
marriage, underage marriage, and polygamy are detected?

    Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to 
staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. When staff 
identified them, appropriate action was taken in accordance with 
humanitarian standards and relevant immigration laws and practices.

    Question. There are also reports of child brides being sexually 
abused and assaulted by older male evacuees. Where have these alleged 
assaults occurred?

    Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child 
``marriage'' and abuse very seriously and has worked closely with 
interagency partners to identify and respond to any cases that have 
been uncovered. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the 
lead agency on protection of vulnerable populations at the CONUS safe 
havens. I refer you to DHS for further information on gender and child 
protection services. Regarding incidents involving abuse, since these 
are open law enforcement matters, I refer you to the Department of 
Justice for further information. Afghan parolees are expected to abide 
by the laws of the United States, both while in Department of Defense 
(DoD) installations and as resettled members of local communities. 
Incidents of criminal behavior on DoD installations are not tolerated 
and will be referred to law enforcement for appropriate action.

    Question. What guidance, if any, has been issued to National 
Guardsmen or other U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates and 
elsewhere for when they witness such abuse or assaults or receive a 
report of such?

    Answer. All U.S. officials are encouraged to report abuse or 
assault when they witness it or receive reports of it, and some U.S. 
officials are required to do so, including reporting certain instances 
of child abuse pursuant to 34 U.S.C.  20341. Protection of vulnerable 
persons, including those fleeing Afghanistan, is a top priority. U.S. 
partner organizations similarly work under strict codes of conduct 
meant to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

    Question. We have all seen photos and video footage of what appears 
to be fully functioning U.S. equipment in Taliban hands. Please 
describe in detail what U.S. military equipment was left behind after 
the withdrawal.

    Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan 
military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, a 
Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10 authority. 
DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and quantities 
of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title 10 
authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation 
programs. I defer to DoD for this information.

    Question. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan was 
quoted in the press as saying, ``We don't have a complete picture, 
obviously, of where every article of defense materials has gone, but 
certainly a fair amount of it has fallen into the hands of the 
Taliban.'' Please detail what was not destroyed or made inoperable.

    Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) determined which pieces of 
equipment to destroy or render inoperable by unauthorized users. I 
defer to DoD to provide this information.

    Question. During the hearing, you stated that some of this 
equipment will become inoperable because the Taliban will not be able 
to maintain it. Is there an assessment of if and how much of the 
equipment you referenced can be maintained with assistance from foreign 
sources, e.g., China, Russia, etc.?

    Answer. We are not aware of any offers Russia or China have made to 
the Taliban regarding the sustainment of U.S.-origin equipment. DoD or 
the intelligence community will be better positioned to assess the 
Taliban's level of technical expertise and its ability to maintain the 
equipment, with or without assistance from foreign sources.

    Question. Has the U.S. seen evidence of any of that equipment being 
sold to, transferred to, or inspected by Iran or other foreign nations? 
Please provide as much unclassified information as possible.

    Answer. The State Department has not received any verifiable 
reports of equipment that is being sold to, transferred to, or 
inspected by Iran. The Department of State continues monitoring 
reports, including for any information that may indicate that such 
transactions are taking place, at which point we would work with the 
DoD to determine how to respond. There are some assets that were out of 
the country when the Taliban took control of Kabul, and others were 
flown out of the country by Afghan Air Force personnel. The State 
Department is working with the interagency to safeguard and determine 
the disposition of these assets together with the partner nations where 
they reside.

    Question. Secretary Blinken, you stated that approximately 124,000 
people were evacuated from Afghanistan. Please break down that figure 
according to U.S. citizens, citizens of NATO allies, SIV applicants and 
their families, Afghans with valid visas, P2 applicants, and other 
relevant categories.

    Answer. Of the approximately 124,000 people evacuated or relocated 
from August 14 to August 31, approximately 60,000 were brought to the 
United States as of September 14. Of those 60,000, approximately, seven 
percent are U.S. citizens, six percent are Lawful Permanent Residents, 
three percent hold Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), and the rest are 
individuals either referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
through the P-1/P-2 program or otherwise vulnerable Afghans, the 
majority of whom worked with the United States. We believe 
approximately 50 percent of these may be eligible for SIVs.

    Question. Please explain the differences in the vetting process for 
Afghans in these particular categories, if applicable.

    Answer. Before visa issuance, Afghan Special Immigrant Visa 
applicants are reviewed at several stages of the application process. 
First, they are reviewed by the Chief of Mission for eligibility for 
the program. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security conducts 
a TECS search during the I-360 petition for special immigrant status 
approval process. At the visa interview, the consular officer will take 
biometric fingerprints for security vetting and review Department of 
State systems to determine whether an applicant requires additional 
security processing before the visa can be issued.
    We will also continue to assist Afghans who may be eligible for 
referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Afghans eligible and 
referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) must be outside 
of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. 
Afghan applicants in the USRAP pipeline are subject to the same vetting 
process as all refugee applicants. They undergo an interagency security 
vetting process and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) officers conduce 
extensive in-person interviews overseas to verify identity, establish 
eligibility, and identify information that could render an applicant 
inadmissible. DHS/USCI makes the final security determination and only 
DHS has the legal authority to grant a refugee admission to the United 
States.

    Question. Please estimate how many SIV applicants and P2 referred 
applicants remain in Afghanistan and what is being done to assist their 
evacuation post-U.S. withdrawal.

    Answer. We do not have estimates of how many Special Immigrant Visa 
applicants or P2-referred applicants remain in Afghanistan. We continue 
to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if 
and when they choose to do so.

    Question. Given that applicants do not currently hold U.S. visas, 
are they able to leave?

    Answer. We are consistently and diligently working with our 
partners in the region, across U.S. government agencies, and with 
partners in the private sector to explore all options to assist in the 
ongoing relocation of U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any 
issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people 
with travel authorization, including U.S. citizens and their families, 
freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this point to the 
Taliban.

    Question. Please describe your strategy and options available for 
preventing the Taliban from blocking SIV applicants from leaving the 
country or detaining and mistreating them due to their service to the 
United States.

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, 
if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to 
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, and 
Afghans to whom we have a commitment and who wish to leave Afghanistan. 
Because there is an ongoing terrorist threat to operations of this 
nature, we will not be sharing details of these efforts before people 
are safely out of the country.
    We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by 
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the 
world where applicants are able to appear. We know it is currently 
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or 
to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing 
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these 
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are also 
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment 
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country including 
Afghans at risk. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic 
operational communications with the Taliban and in tandem with our 
allies and partners around the world.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney

    Question. My office has heard multiple reports--including from 
Special Forces veterans and NGOs working to evacuate the SIV holders, 
SIV applicants, and at-risk Afghans whom they've worked with for 
years--indicating that the State Department has been recommending third 
countries not accept them. Is this accurate? Please explain in detail. 
If so, what is the State Department's plan to resolve these concerns 
and ensure that at-risk Afghans--especially those already vetted SIV 
holders--are able to evacuate before being further subjected to 
brutality at the hands of the Taliban?

    Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the 
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across 
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental 
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the 
interagency and with other partners to facilitate for the departure of 
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans.

    Question. Will the change of the U.S. intelligence posture in 
Afghanistan make it more difficult to review SIV applications, and 
specifically do you expect the withdrawal to lengthen the already 
oftentimes years-long timeframe it takes to review and make a decision 
on an application?

    Answer. The Department of State does not anticipate the U.S. 
intelligence posture will impact Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
processing timelines. Most aspects of SIV application processing 
occurred outside of Afghanistan even before the U.S. withdrawal from 
the country. The Department is expediting SIV processing at all stages 
within our control. Currently, the main impediment to issuing Special 
Immigrant Visas for Afghans who have completed the Chief of Mission 
approval process is the suspension of operations at the U.S. embassy in 
Kabul. While we are currently unable to provide consular services in 
Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at all points 
of the process, including by assisting to transfer cases to other U.S. 
embassies and consulates around the world where applicants are able to 
appear. We recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to 
obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third 
country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe 
passage to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with 
travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging 
countries in the region, like Qatar, and those that border Afghanistan 
to allow Afghans to enter.

    Question. What is the State Department plan for people who safely 
made it to third countries, but subsequently fail the vetting process?

    Answer. Intelligence, law enforcement, and security professionals 
are conducting screening and security vetting, using biographic and 
biometric data, for all Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants and 
other vulnerable Afghans before they are allowed into the United 
States. If someone does not pass these checks while they are still 
overseas, the State Department will work with partners and allies 
around the world to identify countries that will accept Afghans for 
relocation.

    Question. Which U.S. allies and partners have agreed to permanently 
take at-risk Afghans?

    Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and 
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable 
Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee 
resettlement.
    The United States coordinates closely with and provides funding to 
UNHCR to support their efforts to provide third-country resettlement to 
refugees around the world. We are in discussion with UNHCR who works 
with many other countries to resettle refugees, including those from 
Afghanistan.
    We commend other countries who have already started to accept 
Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. We strongly encourage 
countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow 
entry for Afghans and coordinate with international organizations and 
other humanitarian partners to provide humanitarian assistance to 
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their 
respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers 
to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.

    Question. What is the state of negotiations for third countries 
that are taking SIVs during processing?

    Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services 
in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa 
(SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by 
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the 
world where applicants are able to appear.
    We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans 
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third 
country. We are developing processing alternatives so that we can 
continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of 
Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S. 
Government.
    Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the process of 
relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens, lawful permanent 
residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many countries have 
transited Afghans through their territories and many other countries 
made generous offers of support. Many countries have committed to 
permanently resettle Afghans. The United States has concluded 
international agreements with several countries to facilitate these 
activities, and the Department of State continues to follow its normal 
procedure for transmitting the texts of these international agreements 
to the Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.

    Question. The State Department, through its Rewards for Justice 
Program, is offering a reward of $10 million for information that leads 
to Sirajuddin Haqqani's arrest. He's wanted in connection with the 
Serena Hotel suicide bombing attack in Kabul in 2008 that killed 
American Thor Hesla, as well as five others, including a number of 
Norwegians. He tried to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He 
oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Haqqani network, infamous for 
their brutality and attacks such as a 2017 car bomb that massacred 170 
people and wounded hundreds. This is a man who has directed brutal 
indiscriminate killing. This is the man who was just named Acting 
Interior Minister by the Taliban. Does the State department plan on 
maintaining the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani (who was 
recently named Acting Interior Minister)?

    Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist 
entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization; and we have and will account for that, ensuring that all 
we do is consistent with U.S. law and policy. No decision has been made 
yet on whether to maintain the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin 
Haqqani. The Department will consult with our interagency partners on 
this issue and make a determination that is based on the best interests 
of the United States. The State Department does not comment on such 
deliberations.

    Question. What exactly does the Acting Interior Minister do, and 
does he have a role in allowing or disallowing people to leave the 
country?

    Answer. The Ministry of Interior has traditionally had 
responsibility for Afghanistan's police force and some aspects of the 
country's internal security. Ministry of Interior personnel will likely 
have some influence on individuals' ability to travel freely in 
Afghanistan, including their ability to leave the country. The 
Department is watching the Taliban's actions closely.

    Question. How many Americans left on the ground in Afghanistan are 
now subject to Haqqani's control/jurisdiction?

    Answer. The United States does not require U.S. citizens to notify 
us of their location, and, consequently, the Department is unable to 
speak to the number of U.S. citizens residing in areas of Afghanistan 
where the Haqqani Network is present. The Department has made every 
effort to contact U.S. citizens who are interested in leaving 
Afghanistan, however, and our commitment to helping those who wish to 
leave remains steadfast.

    Question. Does the U.S. still consider the Haqqani Network a 
terrorist organization?

    Answer. The Haqqani Network is designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under E.O. 13224.

    Question. Given the known terrorist in the Taliban leadership, will 
you commit not to recognize the Taliban Government?

    Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy, albeit with 
several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on 
recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not 
changed. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the 
international community will depend on their adherence to their 
commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom 
of passage, preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the 
United States from Afghanistan, allowing unimpeded humanitarian access, 
and forming an inclusive government. The United States maintains a wide 
range of tools to ensure the Taliban uphold these public commitments, 
including sanctions and economic assistance.

    Question. Did the U.S. make any agreements with the Taliban in 
order to maintain access to the Kabul airport for evacuation 
operations? If so, please detail the terms of the agreement.

    Answer. The United States engaged in dialogue with the Taliban on 
matters of important U.S. interests, including the evacuation of U.S. 
citizens and lawful permanent residents from Afghanistan. As a result 
of these discussions, the Taliban took steps to moderate their actions 
in ways that allowed us to complete our evacuation mission. I remain 
committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement 
with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban 
Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or 
arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
(P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the 
purview of the State Department.

    Question. Additionally, will you commit to provide a copy of the 
agreements to Congress?

    Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any 
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February 
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such 
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and 
is under the purview of the State Department.

    Question. In the Panjshir province, the National Resistance Front 
has mobilized against the Taliban. This group includes the Vice 
President of the Afghan Government (Amrullah Saleh). What is the 
position of the U.S. Government on the National Resistance Front and 
militia efforts to prevent Taliban control over territory?

    Answer. The Department is not aware of Amrullah Saleh's current 
whereabouts.

    Question. Are the Taliban and surrounding countries allowing 
American citizens, green card holders, and other at-risk Afghans across 
borders?

    Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk 
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if 
and when they choose to do so. Travelers do not require a letter from 
the State Department or any other U.S. Government entity to leave 
Afghanistan. If they have made their own arrangements with their onward 
destination country and any transit countries, individuals do not 
require permission from the United States. We are also continuing to 
press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment of free passage 
for those who wish to leave the country.

    Question. In the few short weeks since they took control, what 
restrictions have already been put in place by the Taliban on women and 
girls?

    Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions 
regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls. 
Taliban political leaders have stated women have a right to education 
while also communicating adjustments must be made to make access 
consistent with Islam and Afghan culture. According to public, 
international news sources, public universities will be segregated by 
gender and include potential new dress codes for female students. 
Female professors will teach female students while male professors may 
teach female students from behind a curtain. In some cases, women have 
been asked to stay away from work, though exceptions are being made for 
women in the public health sector.

    Question. How does State plan to balance getting aid to needy 
Afghans while making sure that aid does not get in the hands of Taliban 
terrorists?

    Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other 
potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are 
planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen monitoring 
and evaluation of continuing programs from outside Afghanistan, 
including through existing third parties, given the current footprint. 
Both agencies have years of experience in successfully managing 
projects remotely and through third party monitors from inside and 
outside of Afghanistan. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard 
against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their 
supporters. This may include mitigation measures such as name check 
vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.
    The U.S. Government takes seriously its duty as a steward of U.S. 
taxpayer funding and holds our implementing partners to the highest 
standards to ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively and for 
their intended purpose. We require our partners to have proper 
safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place to help ensure that 
humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. Our partners are 
required to take steps to mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and 
abuse, including any such incidents involving the Taliban and Haqqani 
Network.

    Question. Will you commit to working with this committee on 
developing a strategy for aid moving forward?

    Answer. Apart from humanitarian assistance, which will continue, 
the Department is continuing to review its non-humanitarian assistance 
programs and funding. We look forward to working closely with Congress 
as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in Afghanistan.

    Question. For the past few months, the Administration has told the 
Senate that withdrawal of forces will not negatively impact 
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. These briefings continued 
even as the Administration chose to withdraw without conditions, given 
that the Taliban did not, as it agreed in February 2020, cut ties with 
Al Qaeda. Will the Taliban prevent terrorists from organizing on Afghan 
soil?

    Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban regarding these 
public counterterrorism commitments, including that they will not host 
terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. The Taliban are aware that we are 
closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that 
we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S. 
national security concerns.

    Question. Will the U.S. have to increase its diplomatic or military 
resources devoted to counterterrorism operations as a result of Taliban 
control of Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department continues to evaluate what resources will be 
needed to effectively address terrorism challenges in Afghanistan and 
the region without a counterterrorism presence in Afghanistan. Part of 
that effort entails intensified diplomatic engagement on issues of 
shared concern with countries in the region and that border 
Afghanistan. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding any shifts 
in military resources.

    Question. How does the collapse of the Afghan Security Forces 
impact our ability to do intelligence gathering on the ground?

    Answer. As President Biden has articulated, it is critical for the 
United States to retain over the horizon counterterrorism capabilities 
to prevent, detect, and disrupt terrorism threats. I defer to the 
Intelligence Community for questions on intelligence collection 
capabilities for Afghanistan.

    Question. How far away is the closest U.S. military base or 
installation from which we can conduct over-the-horizon strikes in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. The United States maintains defense agreements and 
arrangements with allies and partners worldwide to enable our military 
to operate on a global scale.
    I defer to the Department of Defense regarding the specific 
deployment of any assets at overseas installations or naval deployments 
in maritime locations.

    Question. Roundtrip, how much time would it take to conduct an 
operation at the farthest away point in Afghanistan?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding planning 
timelines associated with any potential military operations.

    Question. Have Russia or other adversaries tried to intervene to 
prevent new installations?

    Answer. We take seriously any Russian or other interference in our 
security cooperation with allies and partners around the world as we 
continue to deepen relationships that enable our military to respond to 
threats to our homeland, no matter where those threats may emanate 
from. As President Biden has said, ``We will not hesitate to raise the 
cost on Russia and defend our vital interests and our people.'' Further 
information would need to be provided in a different setting.

    Question. How many at-risk Afghans have been killed or brutalized 
since the U.S. withdrawal announcement in March?

    Answer. The Department of State does not have specific figures; 
however, we have seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by 
journalists in Taliban detention as well as violence against 
protesters. The United States condemns in the strongest terms reports 
of Taliban kidnappings, beatings, intimidation, and killings of Afghan 
civilians. We stand firm with the international community in our 
commitment to hold perpetrators of these abuses accountable.

    Question. Some of our allies have been extremely critical of the 
U.S. for not consulting with them on the withdrawal plan. This is 
contrary to the Administration's messaging on the need to work closely 
with allies. What plans does the Administration have moving forward for 
coordination with our allies and partners on Afghan refugees, 
counterterrorism, and other issues that are arising from the 
withdrawal?

    Answer. Along with other senior Department officials, I have 
convened or taken part in a series of bilateral and multilateral 
engagements to coordinate with our allies and partners about what we 
need to see from the Taliban and from any Government of Afghanistan. As 
President Biden has made clear, the United States will maintain robust 
counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize any threats, 
and we will not hesitate to use those capabilities if we have to do so. 
I have noted that the legitimacy and support that the Taliban seek from 
the international community will depend on their conduct, including 
respecting human rights.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

    Question. As I mentioned earlier, I am concerned about the close 
relationship between the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Your 
spokesman said the two are ``separate entities,'' but the head of that 
network is now the Interior Minister. So, it is pretty clear that they 
are not separate entities, but a closely combined organization. With 
known terrorists now part of the Taliban Government, what confidence do 
you have that they will not harbor terrorist training camps in 
Afghanistan and plot against us and our allies?

    Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman 
Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the 
world that there will not be any threat against any country including 
the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the 
agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and 
the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at Kabul 
International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of demonstrating they 
are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-
Taliban Agreement. The United States continues to call on the Taliban 
to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups 
or individuals from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not 
hosting them.

    Question. How does this fact influence your decision to resume U.S. 
aid to Afghanistan? Will any of this aid be passed to the United 
Nations or any other multi-lateral implementing partners? How much of 
the recently announced $64 million will be implemented through USAID 
rather than State?

    Answer. The United States delivers humanitarian aid through non-
government partners, international organizations, and third parties 
according to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and 
independence.
    On September 13, the United States announced nearly $64 million in 
additional humanitarian assistance for Afghans. Of this amount, nearly 
$40 million was provided through USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian 
Assistance and nearly $24 million through State's Bureau of Population, 
Refugees, and Migration. This assistance went to independent 
humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization to provide 
lifesaving protection, shelter, livelihood support, essential health 
care, emergency food aid, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to 
respond to the needs generated by recent conflict and compounded by the 
severe drought and other natural disasters, as well as the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic.

    Question. Recently, I sent a letter with Senator Rubio to Secretary 
Yellen to use all means necessary to keep internationally held reserve 
assets out of the hands of the Taliban. I am very concerned that these 
funds would not be used to help the people of Afghanistan, but rather 
to promote suppression and terror. What is the State Department's 
position on recognizing the Taliban in Afghanistan? What coordination 
and talks have you had with the Treasury Department on leveraging 
sanctions to decrease the Taliban's capability to sponsor international 
terrorism?

    Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy to avoid, in 
most cases, formal statements on recognition in cases of changes of 
governments. Our policy has not changed. We will continue to 
communicate to the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan. The 
Taliban will be judged on their actions, specifically with regard to 
meeting counterterrorism commitments and respecting the human rights of 
those in Afghanistan. The Department of State's understanding is that 
the Taliban does not have access to internationally held Afghan Central 
Bank reserve assets. The Taliban is designated as a Specially 
Designated Global Terrorist under E.O. 13224, as amended. The 
Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of the 
Treasury on sanctions policy and implementation.

    Question. What is the State Department's assessment of future 
civil-society support for foreign aid and programming in Afghanistan? 
If possible, what safeguards will you use to ensure that this support 
does not end up in the hands of the Taliban? Will we also ask our 
allies to follow suit with those same safeguards?

    Answer. The Department is continuing to review all non-humanitarian 
assistance programs in Afghanistan. The outcomes of this review will 
inform our decisions regarding what non-humanitarian assistance to the 
Afghan people should continue and what programs will be stopped.
    As part of this review, State and USAID bureaus are assessing their 
programs, the operating environment, and other issues to mitigate 
risks. Bureaus are planning for how they may make adjustments to 
monitor and evaluate continuing programs from outside Afghanistan, 
including through third parties, given that the operations of the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul are suspended. State and USAID and our implementers 
have experience using similar mechanisms, such as in Syria, in addition 
to some bureaus with historical experience successfully managing 
programs from outside of Afghanistan.
    Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk 
that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This 
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific 
program design to reduce those risks.

    Question. It is clear that at some level, we coordinated with the 
Taliban to conduct the evacuation. However, the State Department, or 
any Agency of Department for that matter, has not been able to detail 
what assurances we gave or received from the Taliban. Are you able to 
explain the assurances that were exchanged between the Taliban and the 
United States during the evacuation effort? The reporting of such 
agreements to Congress in mandated in section 1217 of the FY21 NDAA.

    Answer. The United States will continue to press the Taliban to 
ensure that all who wish to leave Afghanistan are able to, and will 
monitor the Taliban's adherence to their commitments closely. I remain 
committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement 
with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban 
Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or 
arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac) 
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 
(P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the 
purview of the State Department.

    Question. The United States has spent close to $780 million over 20 
years to support a future of Afghan women. There are reports of 
peaceful protests by women in Afghanistan being broken up with gunshots 
and violence. With our withdrawal and the collapse of the Government we 
are looking at a whole generation of Afghan women who are now at risk 
of losing the gains they have made in regards of education and 
inclusion in the Government. What is the United States strategy to 
support women in Afghanistan and protect the progress we have made?

    Answer. The United States will continue to support Afghan women and 
girls through our diplomatic engagement and robust humanitarian 
assistance. No society can succeed if half of its population is left 
out. Afghanistan can have neither security nor prosperity if its women 
and girls are not afforded opportunities to fully participate in 
society, including educational opportunities at all levels. We will 
monitor closely how any government respects the human rights and 
freedoms that have become an integral part of the life of women and 
girls in Afghanistan during the last 20 years.

    Question. The number reported in the media is that we only 
evacuated 705 SIV applicants out of Afghanistan. The Department of 
State and other agencies have said this number is incorrect, however, 
they have refused to provide a different number. What is the final 
number of SIV applicants that were evacuated out of Afghanistan by the 
August 31 deadline?

    Answer. Many of the individuals who were relocated out of 
Afghanistan were at various stages of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
processing. The Department of State is currently assessing how many of 
these individuals had outstanding SIV applications.
    We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV 
applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa 
interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting 
continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of 
Afghanistan. We continue to prioritize this effort and our commitment 
to continue to provide services has no expiration date.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

    Question. What is your strategy for effectively providing consular 
services from Doha, Qatar to U.S. citizens, legal residents, and valid 
visa holders currently in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The U.S. Government continues to expect the Taliban to 
provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), and Afghans with valid travel documentation 
who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the 
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. The 
Department of State relocated consular staff from Kabul and added 
temporary duty personnel to Doha to assist with the increased volume of 
casework. We are first focusing on U.S. citizens and immediate family 
members who are ready to depart and have travel documents including 
passports, LPR cards, or visas for non-U.S. citizen family members. We 
are exploring options for the subset of U.S. citizens with immediate 
family members for whom documentation has been an issue to identify 
ways to assist them, but this poses challenges.

    Question. How will you seek to assist Afghan nationals who remain 
in Afghanistan and need to complete the application process to receive 
a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or Priority 2 (P-2) refugee designation?

    Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services 
for immigrant visa applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas 
(SIVs), in Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at 
every stage of the SIV process, including by transferring cases to 
other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world where applicants 
are able to appear. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been 
suspended, Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their 
cases to be processed. We are continuing to review the situation on the 
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will 
continue to evolve.

    Question. Is the SIV or P-2 determination process for those who 
have been evacuated from Afghanistan, regardless of their current 
location or plans to bring them to the United States, still being 
expedited?

    Answer. We are continuing to process SIV applications, including by 
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the 
world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it is currently 
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or 
to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing 
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these 
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. The 
interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to identify individuals and associate them with their SIV 
applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, 
and other categories of eligibility as they continue the relocation 
process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to the U.S. 
Refugee Admissions Program; these are not visas and are not linked to 
any status. For additional information, we refer you to DHS.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                   Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

    Question. How many individuals did the United States evacuate 
between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021 as part of the military 
assisted evacuation from Afghanistan? Please provide the total number 
and a breakdown of the number based on the citizenship of those 
individuals.

    Answer. As of September 1, we estimated that 124,000 individuals 
had been relocated from Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of 
these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens. Also included were 
individuals who worked for us or supported us in our two-decade mission 
in Afghanistan.
    The interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to survey relocated individuals and identify if they 
have or are eligible for Special Immigrant status, P-1/P-2 referrals to 
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and other categories of 
eligibility as they continue the relocation process. For additional 
information, we refer you to DHS.

    Question. How many of the individuals evacuated by the United 
States were not U.S. citizens, special immigrant visa holders, P1 visa 
holders, or P2 visa holders?

    Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were 
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of these, 
approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who evacuated on or before 
August 31; between September 1 and November 9, the Department assisted 
385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful Permanent Residents to depart.
    We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by 
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the 
world where applicants are able to appear. The interagency continues to 
work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify 
individuals and associate them with their existing or newly created SIV 
applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program 
(USRAP), and other categories of eligibility as they continue the 
relocation process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to 
the USRAP; these are not visas and are not linked to any immigration 
status. For additional information, I refer you to DHS.

    Question. What percentage of the Afghan citizens that left 
Afghanistan as part of the U.S. evacuation efforts were vetted before 
they got on the airplane?

    Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan 
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our 
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and 
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are 
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process 
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism 
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and 
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos, 
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan 
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As 
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghans who have been 
relocated out of Afghanistan undergo a primary inspection when they 
arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary inspection is conducted as 
the circumstances require. The vetting process is ongoing to ensure the 
continued protection of public safety and national security.

    Question. It was reported that no U.S. citizens made it to the 
airport to depart on any of the last five planes that departed as part 
of the U.S. evacuation on August 30, 2021. When did the last U.S. 
evacuation flight containing a U.S. citizen leave Afghanistan?

    Answer. The last U.S. flight to leave Afghanistan transporting 
private U.S. citizens was August 30, 2021.
    We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful 
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, 
if and when they choose to do so. And we will continue our efforts to 
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our 
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave 
Afghanistan. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide 
safe passage to U.S. citizens, LPRs, and Afghans with travel 
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging 
countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.

    Question. How many U.S. citizens were evacuated by the United 
States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. There were approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens evacuated 
between August 12 and August 30, 2021.

    Question. How many legal permanent residents were evacuated by the 
United States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. The Department of State cannot definitively state the 
number of Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) relocated by the U.S. prior 
to August 31. Like U.S. citizens, LPRs are not required to register 
their location with the Department. As a result, we are unable to 
determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any other given country 
at any particular time.

    Question. How many locally employed staff were at the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul prior to the evacuation? How many were evacuated by August 30, 
2021?

    Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul, 
there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of 
the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to 
relocate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel 
on August 30, of which seven have requested assistance to depart 
Afghanistan.

    Question. How many U.S. citizens was the State Department aware of 
that were seeking to leave Afghanistan as of August 30, 2021?

    Answer. The Department of State believes there were about 100 U.S. 
citizens seeking to depart immediately after we suspended operations on 
August 31, 2021. However, this number has fluctuated as additional U.S. 
citizens seek to depart and others change their decision to stay or to 
depart.

    Question. With no U.S. diplomatic or military presence on the 
ground, what mechanisms are being used by the Administration to ensure 
the safe evacuation of the Americans the Biden administration left 
behind in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department of State is in constant contact with U.S. 
citizens in Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. We 
continue to look for options for U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan. 
We are working with bordering countries to allow U.S. citizens to enter 
via border crossings or other means of transportation and will continue 
to press the Taliban to keep their public promise that all U.S. 
citizens who want to leave will be able to depart.

    Question. During your testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, you stated, ``There had not been a single SIV 
applicant interview in Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020. 
The program was basically in a stall.'' How many Afghan Special 
Immigrant Visas (SIVs) were issued between March 2020 and the end of 
December 2020?

    Answer. While the U.S. embassy in Kabul was not conducting 
interviews for any visa categories (including SIVs) from March 2020 
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan, 
the consular section continued to process applications that were past 
the interview stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from 
applicants who were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add 
newborn children to their cases. Also, a small number of cases were 
processed at consular posts outside of Afghanistan.
    In all, the Department of State issued 643 Afghan SIV for principal 
applicants from March 2020 until December 2020.

    Question. Were visa applications of individuals who had already 
been interviewed still being processed between March 2020 through the 
end of December 2020?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for 
any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020 
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan. 
They continued processing applications that were past the interview 
stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from applicants who 
were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add newborn 
children or take other actions to their existing cases. Also, a small 
number of cases were processed at consular posts outside of 
Afghanistan.

    Question. On December 31, 2020, how many Afghan Special Immigrant 
Visas (SIVs) and family members were pending scheduling for visa 
interviews?

    Answer. On December 31, 2020, there were 622 principal applicants 
pending scheduling for visa interviews.

    Question. What was the reason interviews were stopped between March 
2020 through the end of December 2020?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for 
any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020 
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in 
order to protect the health of visa applicants and its staff. The 
Country Team in Kabul assessed all factors and determined it was not 
safe for embassy staff or visa applicants to conduct interviews, 
especially given the lack of adequate medical care in Afghanistan.

    Question. What impact did the coronavirus pandemic have on the 
ability to hold in person interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant Visas 
(SIVs) in Kabul?

    Answer. Due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan, U.S. 
Embassy Kabul did not conduct interviews for any visa categories 
(including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020 until February 
2021. From June 13 to July 5, 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak at the embassy 
again forced a 3-week suspension of visa interviews. During those 
periods, however the embassy continued to process existing SIV 
applications that did not require close contact with applicants, such 
as reviewing documents, printing visas, and returning passports.

    Question. Were in person interviews mandated by law as part of the 
Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) process?

    Answer. Although the Afghan Allies Protection Act does not 
specifically mandate interviews, U.S. law and Department of State 
regulations require immigrant visa applicants appear personally before 
a consular officer to sign their application and verify their 
application by oath and, at that time, provide fingerprints. 
Fingerprints are required for security vetting.

    Question. When did the in-person interviews at the U.S. Embassy in 
Kabul resume for Afghan special immigrant visas?

    Answer. In-person visa interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant 
Visas and other immigrant visas at Embassy Kabul resumed in February 
2021 after it was deemed safe for both visa applicants and Embassy 
staff. COVID-19 spikes later forced the embassy to suspend in-person 
visa services from June 15 to July 3.

    Question. During your testimony you stated, ``On February 4, one of 
the first executive orders issued by President Biden directed us to 
immediately review the SIV program to identify causes of undue delay 
and find ways to process SIV applications more quickly.'' When was the 
review completed and what were the findings?

    Answer. The Department of State remains engaged with the 
interagency in reviewing the SIV program and finding ways to improve 
the efficiency of SIV processing, including with respect to the topics 
addressed in E.O. 14013.

    Question. During the hearing, you stated, ``This spring, I directed 
significant additional resources to the program, expanding the team of 
people in Washington processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling 
the number of SIV adjudicators in Kabul and our embassy there.'' Based 
on the analysis you did to determine what additional resources were 
needed, how many Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans did you 
estimate could be reviewed and completed per month with the additional 
resource you provided?

    Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul estimated that with the 
additional adjudicators, the consular section would be able to 
interview approximately 850 Afghan SIV cases per month and with 
additional staff, the Afghan SIV Unit could process up to 1000 or more 
Chief of Mission approval applications per month. Each Afghan SIV case 
includes the principal applicant, plus their immediate family members 
(spouse and minor children). While the number of family members varied 
per case, Embassy Kabul processed many more than 850 individuals each 
month when including SIV family members.

    Question. When did the additional SIV adjudicators arrive in Kabul?

    Answer. The additional Special Immigrant Visa adjudicators arrived 
on April 1, 2021.

    Question. From January 20, 2021 through August 12, 2021, how many 
SIV special immigrant visas for Afghans were approved? How many 
individuals were denied?

    Answer. From January 20 until August 12, 2021, the Department of 
State issued 1,527 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa principal applicants 
and 5,076 derivative applicants. Individuals may be denied an immigrant 
visa for a variety of reasons but most often for lacking required 
documentation or pending administrative processing. Such refusals can 
be overcome once additional documentation is submitted or 
administrative processing is completed. From January 20 through August 
12, 2021, the Department of State refused 1,154 principal applicants 
and 4,140 derivative applicants. However, 99 percent of those refusals 
were due to additional documentation required or administrative 
processing (which can be overcome) and only one percent were related to 
other ineligibilities. Since the SIV program's inception, less than one 
percent of all SIV applicants (including family members) receive final 
refusals that cannot be overcome and are not ultimately issued visas.

    Question. The State Department issued a statement on August 24, 
2021 that ``all immigrant visa appointments, including Special 
Immigrant Visas (SIVs), at the Embassy have been canceled.'' How many 
Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans were still pending review on 
August 24, 2021?

    Answer. There were approximately 18,000 Special Immigrant Visas at 
various stages of the pipeline on August 31, 2021. Almost 8,500 of 
these were at the initial stage of the process, where the National Visa 
Center has requested additional documentation before the application 
can be referred to the Chief of Mission for review. Approximately 540 
applicants had documentarily complete cases at the National Visa Center 
that were pending interview scheduling for the future and 400 
applicants had interviews scheduled that had to be canceled.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders from 
Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between August 12, 2021 
and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United 
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those 
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders, 
and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders' family 
members from Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between 
August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United 
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those 
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus 
their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family 
size was five to six persons.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants were 
evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between August 12, 2021 
and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United 
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those 
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders, 
and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.

    Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicant family 
members were evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between 
August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

    Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United 
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those 
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus 
their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family 
size was five to six persons.

    Question. What affiliation if any does the Tehrik-e Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) have with the Afghanistan Taliban?

    Answer. Though the TTP has a presence in Afghanistan, the group is 
a separate organization and perpetrates attacks against Pakistan 
independent of the Afghan Taliban. We do not have indications of 
Taliban support for TTP but believe large numbers of the group remain 
in Afghanistan.

    Question. Was the Government of Pakistan supportive of the 
Taliban's offensive takeover of Afghanistan?

    Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister 
Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in 
Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15. 
In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban 
attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by military force 
it would lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into 
Pakistan. Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools 
necessary to support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior 
Pakistani officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive 
political settlement and the protection of women's educational rights 
in Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made 
repeated public calls for the international community to directly 
engage with the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic 
collapse, and avert a humanitarian disaster.

    Question. What support did the government and military in Pakistan 
provide the Taliban in taking over control of Afghanistan from the 
democratically elected government?

    Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials supported Afghan 
peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in 
negotiations. Various senior Pakistan officials also made repeated 
public calls for a political solution to the Afghan conflict and 
expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban would lead to a 
protracted civil war.

    Question. What efforts did the Biden administration take to curb 
Pakistan's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The State Department has engaged with the Pakistani 
Government at senior levels, including with my personal engagement and 
that of and Deputy Secretary Sherman, to urge close coordination and 
alignment with the international community on the way forward in 
Afghanistan. We have made it clear that a government in Kabul that is 
inclusive, protects the rights of women and minorities, adheres to its 
counterterrorism commitments, and ensures humanitarian access and safe 
passage for those who wish to leave Afghanistan would be in the best 
interests of all countries in the region, including Pakistan. We will 
continue to convey at the highest levels the importance the Biden 
administration places on Pakistan's constructive role moving forward.

    Question. Is the Government of Pakistan currently providing 
financial support, logistics, and weaponry to the Taliban? If so, what 
is it providing?

    Answer. Pakistan is providing limited humanitarian aid to the new 
Taliban Government and is encouraging other countries to pursue similar 
policies. Pakistan has not announced other assistance to the Taliban.

    Question. Do you support additional sanctions on Pakistan and 
Pakistani Government officials involved in support for the Taliban?

    Answer. U.S. sanctions designations are regularly reviewed and 
updated consistent with U.S. law and policy. Given Pakistan's critical 
cooperation, we do not support sanctions against the Government of 
Pakistan or its government officials.

    Question. What is the Biden administration's strategy to prevent 
terrorists from once again having a platform in Afghanistan to plan and 
launch attacks against the United States?

    Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe 
haven for terrorists remains our top priority and we continue to apply 
a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for 
Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use 
of sanctions regimes, engagement with the Taliban on our 
counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security 
sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering 
regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral over 
the horizon counterterrorism capabilities.

    Question. How has the counter-terrorism strategy changed since the 
fall of the Government of Afghanistan?

    Answer. Our counterterrorism objectives of ensuring Afghanistan is 
never again used as a safe-haven for terrorism have not changed, but 
our strategies necessarily evolve with the changing circumstances. We 
are seeking to bolster security partnerships and capabilities in the 
region, as well as continue to maintain our over-the-horizon 
capabilities. We continue to use a whole-of- government approach to 
address terrorist threats that may emanate from Afghanistan.

    Question. What specific agreements has the Biden administration 
made with the Taliban since the January 2021?

    Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any 
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February 
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such 
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and 
is under the purview of the State Department.

    Question. During the evacuation efforts in Afghanistan, what 
commitments or promises did the Biden administration make to the 
Taliban?

    Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental 
task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S. 
and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents. 
We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment on assuring 
safe passage.

    Question. What counter-terrorism commitments did the Taliban agree 
to with the United States and what is your assessment on whether the 
Taliban has upheld its commitments?

    Answer. The Taliban publicly committed to not allow individuals or 
groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use Afghanistan to threaten the 
security of the United States and its allies; to send a clear message 
that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and 
its allies have no place in Afghanistan, and to instruct their members 
not to cooperate with such groups or individuals; to prevent them from 
recruiting, training, and fundraising and not host them; and not to 
provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to 
those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its 
allies to enter Afghanistan. The Taliban have taken some positive steps 
but have not fully upheld all these public commitments.

    Question. What tools does the United State have to ensure the 
Taliban upholds its commitments?

    Answer. The United States maintains a wide range of tools to ensure 
the Taliban upholds these public commitments, including diplomatic 
engagement, sanctions, and economic assistance. The legitimacy and 
support the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend 
on their actions, including preventing terrorist groups from posing a 
threat to the United States from Afghanistan, adherence to upholding 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom of passage for 
American citizens, third country nationals, and Afghans with proper 
documentation that desire to leave allowing unimpeded humanitarian 
access, and forming an inclusive government that includes women and 
members of minority groups.

    Question. Media reports indicate that members of the Afghan Air 
Force reportedly flew 46 aircrafts, including A-29 light attack planes, 
Cessna C-208 utility aircraft, and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, to 
Uzbekistan. What is the Administration doing to ensure these aircraft 
are never handed over to the Taliban?

    Answer. While this process falls under DoD authority because of the 
original source of funding, the Department of State continues to 
participate in our regional security engagements with the governments 
of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as the Department of Defense determines, 
in discussion with the interagency, the final disposition options for 
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) funded aircraft as well as 
a variety of other ASFF-funded materiel that is outside Afghanistan. I 
defer to the Department of Defense on additional details for the status 
of Afghanistan aircraft currently located outside of Afghanistan.

    Question. Is the Administration negotiating to bring the aircraft 
to U.S. military bases in the Middle East?

    Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in 
ensuring that the U.S. military aircraft that the Department of Defense 
(DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund or other DoD 
authorities and then transferred to the Afghanistan Government do not 
fall into the wrong hands. As the aircraft were transferred under DoD 
authorities, the process of repossessing the aircraft fall under DoD 
authority as well. The Department of State participates in discussions 
with the interagency regarding the final disposition options for 
aircraft and other materiel that is outside Afghanistan. DoD may take 
the equipment back into its own stock, offer it to other USG entities, 
or consider transfer of the equipment to a foreign partner under 
section 333 authority with State concurrence. DoD may also declare the 
aircraft as Excess Defense Articles, at which point State authorities 
would govern any transfer to a foreign government. State defers to DoD 
on additional details for the status of Afghanistan aircraft currently 
located outside of Afghanistan.

    Question. During his testimony before the House Subcommittee on 
National Security, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction stated, ``A reduced U.S. civilian and military presence 
in Afghanistan amid a deteriorating security environment could create 
new challenges for conducting effective oversight of U.S. funded 
programs, grants, and contracts for reconstruction work.'' Given the 
fact there is now no U.S. diplomatic or military presence in 
Afghanistan, how can the Administration ensure U.S. taxpayer resources 
will be used appropriately and go to the intended recipients?

    Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the 
operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks 
associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of 
that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to 
strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from 
outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given 
that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended. A 
number of bureaus have years of experience in successfully managing 
projects from outside of Afghanistan.
    Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk 
that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This 
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific 
program design to reduce those risks.

    Question. What is your plan to conduct effective oversight of U.S. 
funded programs and grants under the current security environment in 
Afghanistan?

    Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the 
operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks 
associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of 
that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to 
strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from 
outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given 
the current footprint. A number of bureaus have years of experience in 
successfully managing projects from outside of Afghanistan.
    Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk 
that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This 
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific 
program design to reduce those risks.
    Our partners are required to take steps to mitigate against 
diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse.

    Question. How many implementing partners are still up and running 
on the ground in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The United States partners with a range of non-governmental 
organizations, international organizations, and third parties in 
Afghanistan to deliver vital humanitarian assistance to the Afghan 
people.
    To respond to humanitarian needs, State and USAID are currently 
working with 10 public international organizations including IFRC, FAO, 
WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM, ILO, and UNFPA. In addition, USAID 
has nine non-governmental organization partners operating humanitarian 
programs in Afghanistan.
    The U.S. Government continues to be in communication with 
implementing partners in Afghanistan, both regarding security 
conditions on the ground and about their ability to continue their 
work.

    Question. How does the Biden administration intend to facilitate 
humanitarian access in Afghanistan?

    Answer. The Department can, and will, continue to provide 
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need directly through the U.N. 
system, partners, and NGOs; and will do so in a way that is consistent 
with any sanctions that apply to Afghanistan. No humanitarian 
assistance will be provided to the Taliban.

    Question. Have you negotiated any deal with the Taliban regarding 
humanitarian assistance?

    Answer. The United States is working with the international 
community to ensure the Taliban follows through on their commitments to 
allow unhindered humanitarian access, freedom of movement for aid 
workers of all genders, safety and security of humanitarian staff, and 
safe passage for all those who wish to leave Afghanistan. This united 
effort is of utmost priority for leaders across the international 
community, U.N. agencies, and NGOs committed to providing assistance in 
Afghanistan. No humanitarian assistance will be provided directly to 
the Taliban.
                                 ______
                                 

   Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    Question. Terror Ties/Haqqani Network: There is an ongoing debate 
about the degree to which terrorist groups, including as especially Al 
Qaeda and ISIS, are likely to find safe-havens in Taliban-controlled 
Afghanistan. Part of that debate involves the degree to which such 
groups are supported by and entangled with the Taliban. You and other 
Administration officials have downplayed the Taliban's ties to the 
Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda, the President himself said al-Qaeda was 
``gone from Afghanistan,'' and a State Department spokesman said last 
month that ``the Taliban and the Haqqani Network are separate 
entities.'' According to public reports, Undersecretary of Defense 
Colin Kahl even told Senators that that al-Qaeda in the region does not 
pose an ``imminent threat to the homeland.''
    There are public reports indicating that the intelligence community 
assesses al-Qaeda is rebuilding in Afghanistan and will have the 
ability to threaten the United States within the next 2 years. Do you 
agree with those assessments?

    Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe-
haven for terrorists remains our top priority, and we continue to apply 
a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for 
Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use 
of sanctions regimes, communicating to the Taliban on our 
counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security 
sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering 
regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral 
counterterrorism capabilities from ``over the horizon.'' The Taliban 
committed to not allow individuals or groups, including al-Qa'ida, to 
use Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its 
allies. The State Department is actively engaged throughout South and 
Central Asia to bolster our counterterrorism partnerships and efforts 
to prevent and counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan.

    Question. Siraj Haqqani is now the Interior Minister and Khalil 
Haqqani is the Minister of Refugee Affairs. Please describe the full 
extent to which you assess designated terrorists or officials 
affiliated with terrorist groups have significant influence inside the 
Afghan Government.

    Answer. We are concerned that Haqqani Network leadership has been 
appointed to these positions. The Haqqani Network is designated as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act and a SDGT under E.O. 13224. The Taliban itself is a 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and we have and will account for 
that, ensuring that our interactions are consistent with U.S. law and 
policy. Engagement with the Taliban is conducted consistent with U.S. 
law and to advance U.S. national security goals. At this time, the U.S. 
Government has not taken a position on whether the Taliban is the 
government of Afghanistan. Any future relationship between the Taliban 
and the international community will depend on the Taliban's actions.

    Question. On August 27, according to public reports, you 
distributed an internal document highlighting numerous incidents at 
intake centers of sexual abuse and situations in which much older 
Afghan men have presented young. How many cases have there been in 
which the State Department or other government girls to authorities as 
their ``wives.'' That document noted that the State Department had 
urgently requested guidance from across the Administration about what 
to do--but had not received it. According to public reports, a 
subsequent report by DHS concluded that the dynamic showed the 
``desperation'' of families to get children out of Afghanistan: your 
process itself facilitated coercion and forced marriages of little 
girls. On September 14, you confirmed before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that ``there have been a limited number of cases 
where we have separated people because we were concerned.''
    How many cases have there been in which the State Department or 
other government officials separated people due to such concerns?

    Answer. Protection of Afghans at-risk in U.S. safe havens is among 
our key objectives in relocating SIV holders, parolees, and their 
family members. This includes protection from gender-based violence, 
human trafficking, and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security as the lead federal agency at U.S. safe havens for 
the number of cases of forced marriage identified.

    Question. The State Department requested ``urgent guidance'' from 
other agencies after purported child brides were brought to intake 
centers and presented as ``wives.'' Have you received guidance? If yes, 
what was it?

    Answer. U.S. Government staff at overseas processing locations for 
Afghans are utilizing guidance from the State Department to screen for 
early and/or forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Through the 
Department's participation in the interagency Unified Coordination 
Group, we understand that the Departments of Homeland Security and 
Health and Human Services have screening tools, but I defer to these 
agencies for specific guidance they may have promulgated to address 
these and other protection concerns at U.S. safe havens.

    Question. What steps, if any, has the Department taken to address 
child exploitation, including forced marriages and other sexual 
exploitation, inside transit and intake centers in the United States?

    Answer. The Department of State is coordinating across the U.S. 
Government and with domestic and international partners to detect 
potential cases of forced marriage or other forms of abuse among 
vulnerable Afghans at relocation sites, as well as to prevent and 
investigate crimes and to protect any victims identified. U.S. funding 
to international organizations supports the deployment of expert 
protection staff to identify and assist Afghans with particular 
vulnerabilities at overseas processing locations, including those at 
risk of early and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of 
Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on steps taken at U.S. 
safe havens.

    Question. The State Department has been aware of child trafficking 
linked to the withdrawal for almost a month. Which agency or entity 
brought this situation to the attention of your office?

    Answer. My staff alerted me to the risks of trafficking in persons 
and forced marriage inherent in displacement contexts and particular to 
Afghan relocation operations. State Department staff with expertise in 
humanitarian response, international migration, child protection, 
gender-based violence prevention and response, and combatting human 
trafficking have advised on and taken actions to prevent these risks 
throughout Operation Allies Welcome.

    Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that each Afghan 
evacuee has been properly vetted, including screening to ensure that 
each Afghan evacuee has never raised arms against the United States or 
otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S. military personnel?

    Answer. Prior to entering the United States, all Afghan nationals 
undergo a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) led multi-layered 
screening and vetting process that includes national security and 
criminal record checks. Upon relocation from Afghanistan, individuals 
are brought to international transit points in Europe and the Middle 
East, which are known as lily pads. At these international transit 
points, DHS or the Department of Defense (DOD) collects biometric 
(e.g., facial image and fingerprints) and biographic information (e.g., 
name, date of birth and ID number). Fingerprints are compared against 
DoD, DHS, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) repositories. 
Biographic information is vetted by the National Counterterrorism 
Center, FBI, and other Intelligence Community partners. DHS then 
consolidates biometric and biographic results.
    If these checks raise unresolved questions about an individual, 
that individual is not permitted to board a flight to the United 
States. Screening is ongoing, so even while individuals are continued 
to be processed at the safe havens, checks against the various national 
security and public safety databases continue in order to account for 
any new information identified.

    Question. Does/will the State Department and any/or Department of 
Homeland Security vetting process require each Afghan evacuee to 
provide a sworn statement under oath that he/she did not raise arms 
against the United States or otherwise engage in armed conflict against 
U.S. military personnel?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of 
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.

    Question. Please provide the committee with a complete sets of all 
forms being used in the process to vet Afghan evacuees.

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of 
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.

    Question. Yes or No--Can you assure the American people, with 100 
percent confidence that the vetting process the Biden administration is 
using to vet Afghan evacuees will be completely effective to screen out 
and deny entry to every Afghan evacuee who raised arms against the 
United States or otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S. 
military personnel?

    Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is 
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of 
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States, and which 
holds the authority to admit foreign nationals into the United States 
if eligible.

                                  [all]