[Senate Hearing 117-164]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-164
EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-923 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 4
Blinken, Hon. Antony J., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 8
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement, Dated
September 9, 2021.............................................. 70
Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter, Dated September 2, 2021. 77
Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women
Leaders and Human Rights Defenders............................. 82
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez........................... 83
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................ 94
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................ 125
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen............................ 127
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine................................. 130
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey.......................... 130
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory Booker............................... 132
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio............................... 133
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson............................... 139
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney............................... 145
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Rob Portman............................... 149
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young................................ 151
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso............................. 152
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz.................................. 159
(iii)
EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van
Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Barrasso,
Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Secretary Blinken, thank you for joining us today.
Last week, the New York Times reported on a local Afghan
reporter who goes by the name of Nemat. He was covering a
demonstration by several women protesting against the Taliban.
He was arrested. His camera was confiscated.
Nemat said, ``I told them I was a journalist and showed
them my ID card, but they accused me of organizing the
protests. They took me into a room, tied my hands with a scarf,
and started beating me with a cable.''
The horror he experienced is hard to fathom. He described a
demonstrator covered in blood after being severely beaten and
saw Taliban militants abusing prisoners. One of Nemat's
colleagues said, ``They were mocking us and saying, `You want
freedom? What freedom?'''
This is not the Taliban of 2001. This happened last week.
Amid the extensive oversight work planned in Afghanistan, we
must not lose sight of people like Nemat and the courageous
women who continue to protest in the streets, calling for
freedom in the face of violence and threats. The repression of
the Afghan people is happening in real time, and the world must
bear witness and hold the Taliban accountable.
Let me turn to the focus of today's hearing. Mr. Secretary,
the execution of the U.S. withdrawal was clearly and fatally
flawed. This committee expects to receive a full explanation of
the Administration's decisions on Afghanistan since coming into
office last January. There has to be accountability.
We will have other hearings to develop a set of lessons
learned over the course of the war, to understand the many
mistakes made over the course of 20 years. The diversion of
attention and resources when the Bush administration decided to
invade Iraq despite its irrelevance to the 9/11 attacks, the
double-dealing by Pakistan in providing a safe haven to the
Taliban, and the list goes on.
We need to understand why successive administrations made
so many of the same mistakes repeatedly. Perhaps most urgently,
we need to understand why the Afghan Government and military
collapsed so precipitously. This rapid collapse laid bare a
fundamental fact, that successive administrations lied to the
Congress over the years about the durability of the Afghan
military and governing institutions, and we need to understand
why.
The chaos of last August is due in large part to the
February 2020 surrender deal negotiated by President Trump, a
deal that was clearly built on a set of lies. A deal that led
to the release of 5,000 hardened Taliban fighters, boosting the
militant group on the battlefield this summer.
We know now that the Taliban had no intention of pursuing a
political path and peace deal with the Afghan Government. It
had no intention of pursuing a democratic path. It had no
intention of breaking ties with Al Qaeda and it clearly had no
intention of allowing women to have their rightful seat at the
table and to participate fully in society.
To demand the Taliban abide by its commitments now and
expect a different result I think is somewhat absurd. The
Taliban rules Afghanistan, so we will have to deal with it in
some form, but let us not kid ourselves. There is no such thing
as a reformed Taliban. This group is woefully stuck in the 14th
century with no will to come out. Their concept of political
representation and legitimacy is based squarely on the use of
violent force and intimidation.
The Administration says that we should judge the Taliban by
their actions, and I agree. Their actions since taking over
Afghanistan have been pretty horrifying. Beating women
activists, murdering ethnic and religious minorities such as
the Hazara, separating classrooms by gender, shutting down
local media, refusal to break with Al Qaeda, appointing the
head of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by our
Government from the Haqqani Network to lead the Ministry of
Interior, and the list goes on.
With this in mind, the United States and the United Nations
should maintain existing sanctions on the Taliban. The U.S.
should reimpose those sanctions that were waived during the
negotiations process, and the U.S. should consider new measures
to impose higher costs on the group and its leaders while
ensuring that lifesaving humanitarian aid is able to assist
those most vulnerable to hunger, disease, and disaster.
Nor should any country be in a rush to unilaterally
recognize this regime. At a minimum, the following criteria
must be met before recognition is even considered. Absolute
repudiation by the Taliban of all cross-border terrorism,
including Al Qaeda and associated groups. Equality of rights
for girls and women. Protection of minority, ethnic, and
religious groups. Commitment to democratic elections and ending
all narcotics-related activity.
So, yes, the Taliban now run Afghanistan, but that does not
mean we ever accept their behavior. I supported the decision to
eventually withdraw our military from Afghanistan. I have long
maintained, however, that how the United States left mattered.
Doing the right thing in the wrong way can end up being the
wrong thing. To get this right, the Biden administration needed
to answer two fundamental questions. First, would the
withdrawal leave a durable political arrangement in its wake?
Second, would the U.S. and our allies maintain an ability to
collect intelligence, conduct counterterrorism operations in a
region still rife with groups, including ISIS-K, seeking to do
us harm?
I believe the U.S. clearly fell short on the first measure,
and time will tell on the second. The prospects do not look
promising. So let me start with some framing questions about
the Biden administration's Afghanistan decision-making.
First, upon coming into office, how did the Biden
administration assess the impact on the ground of President
Trump's flawed deal with the Taliban? Did the Administration
attempt to negotiate better terms with the Taliban upon coming
into office?
Second, did the President's April withdrawal announcement
set in motion any explicit contingency planning in the event
that the Taliban rapidly took over the country? What was the
plan to evacuate all Americans? What was the plan to evacuate
SIVs, P1s, P2s, and other at-risk groups? What was the plan to
evacuate staff and those affiliated with Radio Free Europe,
Radio Liberty, Voice of America, the National Endowment for
Democracy, and other U.S.-funded organizations?
President Trump, with Stephen Miller, intentionally blocked
SIVs from being processed, which I think is a barbaric and
cruel decision which likely resulted in death for some U.S.
partners. How did the Biden administration specifically
accelerate processing SIVs upon coming into office?
Third, what was the plan to avoid or deal with a refugee
and humanitarian crisis? I expect you will address some of
these issues in your opening remarks.
Let me applaud the efforts of the personnel on the ground
from the Departments of State and Defense who worked under
horrific circumstances. Their actions in evacuating over
120,000 individuals were nothing short of heroic, and these
personnel deserve answers. The American public deserves
answers. The Afghan people certainly deserve answers.
So let me close with three points. First, while
communication from the Administration has been frequent
throughout this crisis, information from State, the Pentagon,
and the White House has often been vague or contradictory. This
was obviously a fluid and difficult situation. Frustration
among many Members was high, and this has to improve.
To put this in context, Member frustration came on top of
years of stonewalling by the Trump administration and its
refusal to engage the Senate on the Taliban negotiations. This
is one of the examples of why I have been trying to pursue on
the CASE Act to understand what the written agreements are,
that come between an Administration and others. Maybe if we had
seen all of the elements of it, we would have been poised in a
better position.
Second, I am very disappointed that Secretary Austin
declined our request to testify today. A full accounting of the
U.S. response to this crisis is not complete without the
Pentagon, especially when it comes to understanding the
complete collapse of the U.S.-trained and funded Afghan
military.
His decision not to appear before the committee will affect
my personal judgment on Department of Defense nominees. I
expect the Secretary will avail himself to the committee in the
near future, and if he does not, I may consider the use of
committee subpoena power to compel him and others over the
course of these last 20 years to testify.
Third, I implore the Administration to remain focused on
Afghanistan. It is critically important that the world bear
witness and take action when possible in response to Taliban
abuses. Your visit, Mr. Secretary, to Qatar and Germany sent
the right message, and I strongly urge sustained attention to
Afghanistan in the months and years to come.
I also urge the Administration to strengthen its resolve
and efforts to secure the relocation of our civil society
partners now at grave risk who were left behind in Afghanistan.
They include heroic individuals working for organizations on
the frontlines of U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy and
human rights, including the rights of Afghan women and girls.
Finally, I know that Senator Young is not with us today. He
is home in Indiana attending the funeral of Marine Corporal
Humberto Sanchez. Corporal Sanchez was among those killed in
the horrendous terror attack on August 26 at the Kabul airport.
I would like to suggest that we have a moment of silence
and pay our respects to all those brave American service
members who were killed or injured on that day and that we also
honor the thousands of American service members, Afghan
soldiers, and civilians who were casualties of this 20-year
war. Please join me in a moment of silence.
[Moment of silence.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member,
Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Blinken, good morning, and welcome back to our
committee. You are doing the right thing testifying here today,
and I thank you.
However, like the chairman, I am disappointed that some of
your colleagues have declined to testify, particularly
Secretary Austin. There are questions that we really need to
have answered, and it is disheartening that they declined to
testify. The debacle in Afghanistan is an interagency failure,
and the fact that you are the only one stepping up is
disheartening.
I agree with the chairman that the withdrawal was a dismal
failure. One of the things we need to get to the bottom to is,
who is responsible for this? Who made the decisions? There is
real questions right now as to who is making the decisions.
We know for a fact that the President of the United States
is somewhat disadvantaged here in that someone is calling the
shots. He cannot even speak without someone in the White House
censoring it or signing off on it. As recently as yesterday, in
mid-sentence he was cut off by someone in the White House who
makes the decision that the President of the United States is
not speaking correctly.
So I would like to know who this person is. This is a
puppeteer act, if you would, and we need to know who is in
charge and who is making these decisions. The only way we are
going to get that is when we have people like you come in and
answer questions. When we get to questions, I am going to have
more questions for you in that regard.
While I supported a responsible end to the war in
Afghanistan, no American thinks we should have left this way.
America cannot end wars simply by walking away. It is naive to
assume our enemies will lay down their arms, leave us alone,
and suddenly enshrine human rights if we go home. Indeed, there
is a fierce battle of ideas and ambitions on the world stage,
and the U.S. cannot remain neutral.
However, President Biden presented the American people with
a false choice in Afghanistan, and the rushed and embarrassing
retreat is a stain on America's credibility that will have
implications for years to come. There were other options that
could have protected our national security interests, allowed
for a more measured reduction in force, and preserved American
credibility.
I feel this Administration is trying to blame the prior
Administration. Contrary to some that have said that the prior
Administration started this, is responsible, that is simply not
true. The prior Administration, when they took steps toward
withdrawing from Afghanistan, entered into an agreement that
had very, very specific conditions. I was privy to those. So I
have personal knowledge of this.
The February 2020 agreement was contingent, contingent upon
the Taliban reducing violence, meeting counterterrorism
commitments, and engaging in substantive talks with the Afghan
Government. These were all very important, and most
importantly, most importantly, it was telegraphed to the
Taliban that failure to meet their commitments would be met
with grave, grave circumstances for them. The Taliban failed to
meet any of these commitments, and yet, yet this Administration
turned the country over to them.
President Biden chose to withdraw from Afghanistan without
conditions and without prudent planning and obviously without,
most important, telegraphing to the Taliban that they would
enforce the conditions that the Taliban had agreed to. It did
not happen. It was a strategic unforced error, and he did this
against the advice of the commanders on the ground.
One of the most embarrassing things I thought was the
strike that was made--and obviously, we cannot talk about what
we know from an intelligence standpoint--but the kinetic strike
that was made after the Taliban entered the country. This de
minimis strike had dire consequences for civilians, but not for
the Taliban.
These are facts. The President's withdrawal led to a
Taliban offensive to topple the democratically elected
government, slammed the door on any chance for a final peace
agreement, reversed the hard-earned rights of Afghan women and
minorities, and will result in a safe haven for terrorists,
many of whom wish to attack the United States.
The Biden administration left Afghanistan in total disarray
and single-handedly created a humanitarian crisis with
thousands of refugees and internally displaced Afghans in need
of immediate emergency assistance.
Secretary Blinken, you characterized the evacuation as an
extraordinary effort. You have touted over 124,000 evacuees.
However, we abandoned the people we prioritized for departure.
The Department's efforts were plagued by lack of basic
planning, a failure to identify Americans, a failure to
energize the SIV process months in advance, ignoring repeated
congressional offers to help, and a failure to recognize the
Taliban for what it is, a terrorist organization.
The numbers are telling. You evacuated 6,040 Americans and
say only a couple of hundred remain. Your own department told
this committee in July that there were 10,000 to 15,000
Americans in Afghanistan. There is a huge difference between
6,000 and 15,000. What happened to these other Americans?
The situation with the Special Immigrant Visa evacuations
is even more disturbing. Not counting the SIVs that arrived
before Kabul's fall, you evacuated 705 of roughly 20,000
principal SIV applicants. What happened to these people?
This committee reached out to the Department in April, May,
and June to help expedite SIV processing. We asked what
additional authorities or resources you needed. For months, we
received contradictory responses or no responses at all.
I will take a minute here to defend the State Department.
One of the biggest problems to helping process SIVs was the
enormous failure of the Department of Defense to provide the
records needed to validate the Afghans who bravely helped our
forces. The fact that DoD did not keep accurate records is
irresponsible and a slap in the face to those who fought
alongside of us. Obviously, we want to talk to Secretary Austin
about this.
Despite the enormous efforts of our troops and diplomats on
the ground, the preventable tragedy that unfolded at the
airport in Kabul was a disaster of leadership and of the
Administration's own making. Not only were you unable to ensure
that Americans had access to the airport, many were turned away
repeatedly after braving Taliban checkpoints. Americans outside
of Kabul had absolutely no chance of evacuation.
Green card holders and SIVs should have been prioritized
for access to the airport as well, but there was no mechanism
to get inside. It was an informal network of Americans that
helped get Americans and Afghans around the bureaucratic wall
the Administration set up at the airport. It should not have
come to that.
The Administration patting itself on the back for this
evacuation is like an arsonist taking credit for saving people
from the burning building he just set on fire. We know the U.S.
military and our diplomats can do so much more than they did,
if only their political bosses had gotten out of the way.
Now we have an untold number of Americans, U.S.
contractors, and SIVs still in Afghanistan. Despite repeated
assurances that you will get them out, you have been unable to
do so. Planes are stranded in Northern Afghanistan. Our Voice
of America employees and female Afghan students on scholarships
have been abandoned, and our SIV applicants are in hiding as
Taliban death squads hunt them down.
You said you would have mechanisms for continued
evacuations after 31 August. Where is your plan? I have not
seen it. I don't know that I have even talked to anyone who has
seen it.
What I have seen is a rebuke from our European allies. They
begged us for help, but where we were not helping our own
citizens, how could we help them? Instead, we had to rely on
the generosity of partners like Qatar.
What we have all heard and read is that the United States
is no longer a reliable ally. And frankly, the way this
evacuation was conducted, I cannot blame them. For years,
despite strains in our relations with Europe and other allies,
everyone knew the United States was the competent and capable
partner. They trusted us to be the steady hand at the wheel
that could navigate out of any difficult situation.
That confidence has been shattered. Now across the globe,
allies doubt our resolve, and our competitors like China and
Russia see weakness and think they can exploit this situation.
The Biden administration alone is responsible for this debacle
and its consequences.
Going forward, the challenges become even harder to
resolve. U.S. actions must rebuild our credibility and re-
establish deterrence. The U.S. will need more proactive
policies on counterterrorism and security around the globe to
discourage our competitors.
Over the weekend, we marked the 20th anniversary of
September 11, but we have yet to receive details about how the
Administration's so-called ``over the horizon''
counterterrorism plan will succeed. The Taliban's takeover
destroyed the basis of that strategy, and despite repeated
requests from the Hill, we have yet to receive a single piece
of information about the Administration's revised
counterterrorism plan.
Meanwhile, the Taliban continues its relationship with Al
Qaeda, and the new interior minister has a $10 million U.S.
bounty on his head for killing Americans. Any hope that the
Taliban will protect American security is a fatally flawed
assumption. You must redouble efforts with Afghanistan's
neighbors to reach CT agreements and preserve disappearing
intelligence networks.
Additionally, any country that offered support to the
Taliban in their recent offensive should risk a strategic
downgrade in their relationship with the United States. We also
must understand Pakistan's role in this entire matter, as the
chairman has alluded to. This is a difficult, but important
situation.
I also remain concerned that the Administration is rushing
to normalize ties with the Taliban Government. This must not
occur without extensive congressional consultations. Your
notification that you intended to restart foreign assistance is
deeply, deeply concerning. I suspect there are other members of
this committee that are going to speak to that. That is going
to be a heavy lift for you.
On the security front, the United States spent over $80
billion on Afghan security forces. Many of these funds bypassed
the oversight of the State Department and this committee. We
now see the consequences of a Department of Defense that
operates security cooperation on its own. The Taliban is now
one of the best-armed terrorist organizations on the planet.
We have sent repeated requests for the Administration's
plan to address the captured equipment. We have yet to receive
any response. As Secretary, I would hope you would demand that
all DoD assistance programs once again require State Department
concurrence.
In closing, I would like to speak directly to our
diplomats, our men and women in uniform, our Gold Star
families, our humanitarian workers, and our veterans. On behalf
of the American people, I would like to say thank you. The
ineptitude of this Administration does not tarnish your
service. What you did mattered.
You served nobly. You stood on the wall and prevented a
terrorist attack against the United States for over 20 years at
enormous cost to you and your families. America will always be
indebted to you.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Mr. Secretary. The Secretary has agreed to stay with us so
each member has an opportunity to ask their questions. As such
and because of the nature of the subject matter, I have agreed
that the Secretary has an extended opening statement.
With that, Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Ranking Member Risch, thank you very much. To all members, I
appreciate the opportunity to be with all of you today to
discuss our policy on Afghanistan, including where we are, how
we got here, and where we are going in the weeks and months
ahead.
For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided
funding for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my own time
as a staff member here in this room for then-Senator Biden just
how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I said when I was
nominated, I believe strongly in Congress' traditional role as
a partner in foreign policymaking. I am committed to working
with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the
interests of the American people.
On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor nearly 3,000
men, women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded
of why we went to Afghanistan in the first place, to bring
justice to those who attacked us and to ensure it would never
happen again. We achieved those objectives a long time ago.
Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's capabilities
were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan and
conduct external operations.
After 20 years, 2,461 American lives lost, 20,000 injuries,
$2 trillion spent, it was time to end America's longest war.
When President Biden took office in January, he inherited
an agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban
to remove all remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan by May 1
of this year. As part of that agreement, previous
Administration pressed the Afghan Government to release 5,000
Taliban prisoners, including some top war commanders.
Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and
partner forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's
major cities, but the Taliban continued its relentless march on
remote outposts, checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well
as some of the major roads connecting the cities. By January of
2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position since
9/11, and we had the smallest number of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan since 2001.
As a result, upon taking office, President Biden
immediately faced the choice between ending the war or
escalating it. Had he not followed through on his predecessor's
commitment, attacks on our forces and those of our allies would
have resumed, and the Taliban's nationwide assault on
Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would
have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into
Afghanistan to defend ourselves and to prevent a Taliban
takeover, taking casualties and with, at best, the prospect of
restoring a stalemate and remaining stuck in Afghanistan under
fire indefinitely.
There is no evidence that staying longer would have made
the Afghan security forces or the Afghan Government any more
resilient or self-sustaining. If 20 years, hundreds of billions
of dollars in support, equipment, training did not suffice, why
would another year, another 5, another 10?
Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors
like China and Russia or adversaries like Iran and North Korea
would have liked more than for the United States to re-up a 20-
year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for another
decade.
In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant
contact with our allies and partners to hear their views and
factor them into our thinking. When the President announced the
withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. We
all set to work together on the drawdown.
Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of
Americans in Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to
leave the country. In total, between March and August, we sent
19 specific messages with that warning, as well as offers of
help, including financial assistance to pay for plane tickets.
Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began,
there were still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost
all of whom were evacuated by August 31. Many were dual
citizens living in Afghanistan for years, decades, or
generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the place that
they know as home is a wrenching decision.
In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering
nonessential personnel to depart. We also used this time to
significantly speed up the processing of Special Immigrant
Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took office, we
inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a statutory
framework enacted by Congress involving multiple agencies and a
backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.
There had not been a single SIV applicant interview in
Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020. The program was
basically in a stall. Within 2 weeks of taking office, we
restarted the SIV interview process in Kabul. On February 4,
one of the first executive orders issued by President Biden
directed us to immediately review the SIV program to identify
causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV applications
more quickly.
This spring, I directed significant additional resources to
the program, expanding the team of people in Washington
processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling the number of
SIV adjudicators in Kabul in our embassy there. Even as many
embassy personnel began to return, under ordered departure, we
sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV
applications.
As a result of these and other steps, including working
with Congress, especially this committee--Senator Shaheen and
others--by May, we had reduced the average processing time for
Special Immigrant Visas by more than 1 year. Even amid a COVID
surge in Kabul, we continued to issue visas. We went from
issuing about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to
more than 1,000 per week in August when our evacuation and
relocation effort began.
That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of
the Afghan security forces and government. Throughout the year,
we were constantly assessing their staying power and
considering multiple scenarios. Even the most pessimistic
assessments did not predict that the government forces in Kabul
would collapse while U.S. forces remained.
They were focused on what would happen after the United
States withdrew, from September onward. As General Milley, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, ``Nothing I or
anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this
government in 11 days.'' Nonetheless, we planned and exercised
a wide range of contingencies.
Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our
embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within
48 hours. And the military, placed on standby by President
Biden, was able to secure the airport and start the evacuation
within 72 hours. Yes, that evacuation was an extraordinary
effort, under the most difficult conditions imaginable, by our
diplomats, by our military, by our intelligence professionals.
They worked around the clock to get American citizens,
Afghans who helped us, citizens of our allies and partners, and
at-risk Afghans on planes out of the country, off to the United
States or to transit locations that our diplomats had arranged
or negotiated in multiple countries. Our consular team worked
24/7 to reach out to Americans who could still be in country,
making 55,000 phone calls, sending 33,000 emails by August 31,
and they are still at it.
In the midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed
13 service members who were working the gates at HKIA, wounded
20 others, killed and wounded scores of Afghans. Our service
members gave their lives so that others can continue to live
theirs. In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in
history, with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
On August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan
officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began. I want to
acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have helped
with the relocation effort, some serving as transit hubs, some
welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time. As the 9/
11 report suggested, it is essential that we accelerate the
appointment process for national security officials since a
catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice.
Today, there are nearly 80 State Department nominees
pending before the Senate. Nearly two dozen have already been
voted out of this committee on a strong bipartisan basis and
simply await a vote in the Senate. For our national security, I
respectfully urge the Senate and this committee to move as
swiftly as possible to consider and confirm all pending
nominees and to address what is a significant disruption in our
national security policymaking.
Now let me briefly outline what the State Department has
done in the last couple of weeks and where we are going in the
weeks ahead. First, as you know, we moved our diplomatic
operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs
team is hard at work. Many of our key partners have done the
same thing. They have joined us there in Doha.
Second, we have continued our relentless efforts to help
any remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of
allied and partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose.
Last week, on Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with
U.S. citizens and others onboard departed Kabul and landed in
Doha. On Friday, a second flight carrying U.S. citizens and
others departed Afghanistan.
These flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the
United States, Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport and
intense diplomacy to start the flights. In addition to those
flights, half a dozen American citizens, a dozen permanent
residents of the United States, have also left Afghanistan via
overland routes with our assistance.
We are in constant contact with American citizens still in
Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been
assigned a case management team to offer specific guidance and
instructions. Some declined to be on the first flights on
Thursday and Friday for reasons including needing more time to
make arrangements, wanting to remain with extended family for
now, or medical issues that precluded traveling last week.
We will continue to help Americans and Afghans to whom we
have a special commitment depart Afghanistan if they choose,
just as we have done in other countries where we have evacuated
our embassy and hundreds or even thousands of Americans
remained behind--for example, in Libya, Syria, Venezuela,
Yemen, Somalia. There is no deadline to this effort.
Third, we are focused on counterterrorism. Taliban has
committed to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as
a base for external operations that could threaten the United
States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will
hold them accountable for that. That does not mean that we will
rely on them. We will maintain a vigilant effort to monitor
threats, robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to
neutralize those threats, if necessary, and as we do in places
around the world where we do not have military forces on the
ground.
Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with allies and
partners. We initiated a statement joined by more than 100
countries and a United Nations Security Council resolution
setting out the international community's expectations of a
Taliban-led government. We expect the Taliban to ensure freedom
of travel; to make good on its counterterrorism commitments; to
uphold the basic rights of the Afghan people, including women,
girls, and minorities; to name a broadly representative
permanent government; to forswear reprisals. The legitimacy and
support that it seeks from the international community will
depend entirely on its conduct.
We have organized contact groups of key countries to ensure
that the international community continues to speak and act
together on Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence.
Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus
NATO, the EU, the United Nations, to align our efforts.
Fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not
flow through the government, but rather through independent
organizations like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
Yesterday, we announced the United States has provided
nearly $64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people
of Afghanistan to meet critical health and nutrition needs, to
address the protection concerns of women and children and
minorities, to help more children, including girls, go back to
school. This additional funding means the United States has
provided nearly $330 million in assistance to the Afghan people
this fiscal year.
In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans
that we evacuated are being processed before moving on to their
next destinations. Here at home, I spent time at the Dulles
Expo Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed
after arriving in the United States. It is remarkable to see
what our diplomats, our military, employees from many civilian
agencies across the U.S. Government have been able to achieve
in a very short time.
They have met an enormous human need. They have coordinated
food, water, sanitation for thousands of people. They are
arranging medical care, including the delivery of babies. They
are reuniting families that were separated, caring for
unaccompanied minors. It is an extraordinary interagency
effort, a powerful testament to the skill, the dedication, the
humanity of our people.
I think we can all be deeply proud of what they are doing,
and as we have done throughout our history, Americans are now
welcoming families from Afghanistan into our communities,
helping them resettle as they start new lives. That is
something to be proud of as well.
With that, I thank the members of this committee and look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]
Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken
I welcome this opportunity to discuss our policy on Afghanistan--
including where we are, how we got here, and where we're going in the
weeks and months ahead.
For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided funding
for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my time as a staff member
for then-Senator Biden just how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I
said when I was nominated, I believe strongly in Congress's traditional
role as a partner in foreign policy making and am committed to working
with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the
interests of the American people.
On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor the nearly 3,000 men,
women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded why we went
to Afghanistan in the first place: to bring justice to those who
attacked us and ensure it would never happen again. We achieved those
objectives long ago. Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's
capabilities were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan
and conduct external operations. After 20 years, 2,461 American lives
lost, 20,000 injuries, and $2 trillion spent, it was time to end
America's longest war.
When President Biden took office in January, he inherited an
agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban to remove
all remaining U.S. troops by May 1 of this year. As part of that
agreement, the previous Administration pressed the Afghan Government to
release 5,000 Taliban prisoners--including some top war commanders.
Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and partner
forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's major cities. But
the Taliban continued its relentless march on remote outposts,
checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well as the major roads
connecting the cities.
By January 2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position
since 9/11--and we had the smallest number of troops on the ground
since 2001.
As a result, upon taking office, President Biden immediately faced
the choice between ending the war or escalating it. Had he not followed
through on his predecessor's commitment, attacks on our forces and
those of our allies would have resumed and the Taliban's nationwide
assault on Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would
have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into Afghanistan
to defend ourselves and prevent a Taliban takeover, taking casualties--
and with at best the prospect of restoring a stalemate and remaining
stuck in Afghanistan, under fire, indefinitely.
There's no evidence that staying longer would have made the Afghan
security forces or the Afghan Government any more resilient or self-
sustaining. If 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in support,
equipment, and training did not suffice, why would another year, or 5,
or 10, make a difference?
Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors like China
and Russia--or adversaries like Iran and North Korea--would have liked
more than for the United States to re-up a 20-year war and remain
bogged down in Afghanistan for another decade.
In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant contact
with our Allies and partners to hear their views and factor them into
our thinking. When the President announced the withdrawal, NATO
immediately and unanimously embraced it. We all set to work--together--
on the drawdown.
Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of Americans in
Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to leave the country. In
total, between March and August, we sent 19 specific messages with that
warning--and with offers of help, including financial assistance to pay
for plane tickets.
Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began, there were
still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were
evacuated by August 31. Many were dual citizens living in Afghanistan
for years, decades, generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the
place they know as home is a wrenching decision.
In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering non-essential
personnel to depart.
We also used this time to significantly speed up the processing of
Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took
office, we inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a
statutory framework enacted by Congress and involving multiple
government agencies--and a backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.
There had not been a single interview of an SIV applicant in Kabul in 9
months, going back to March of 2020. The program was basically in a
dead stall.
Within 2 weeks of taking office, we restarted the SIV interview
process in Kabul. On February 4, one of the first executive orders
issued by President Biden directed us to immediately review the SIV
program to identify causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV
applications more quickly.
This spring, I directed significant additional resources to the
program, expanding the team of people in Washington processing
applications from 10 to 50 and doubling the number of SIV adjudicators
at our embassy in Kabul. Even as many embassy personnel returned to the
United States, we sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV
applications.
As a result of these and other steps, including working with
Congress, by May we had reduced the average processing time for Special
Immigrant Visas by more than a year. Even amid a COVID surge at Embassy
Kabul in June, we continued to issue visas. And we went from issuing
about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to more than 1,000
per week in August--when our evacuation and relocation operation began.
That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of the Afghan
security forces and Government. Throughout the year, we were constantly
assessing their staying power and considering multiple scenarios. Even
the most pessimistic assessments did not predict that government forces
in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained. They were focused
on what would happen after the United States withdrew, from September
onward. As General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
has said, ``Nothing I or anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this
army and this Government in 11 days.''
Nonetheless, we planned and exercised a wide range of
contingencies. Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our
embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within 48
hours. And the military--placed on stand-by by the President--was able
to secure the airport and start the evacuation within 72 hours.
The evacuation was an extraordinary effort--under the most
difficult conditions imaginable--by our diplomats, military, and
intelligence professionals. They worked around the clock to get
American citizens, Afghans who helped us, citizens of our Allies and
partners, and at-risk Afghans on planes, out of the country, and off to
the United States or transit locations that our diplomats arranged in
multiple countries. Our consular team worked 24-7 to reach out to
Americans who could still be in the country, making 55,000 phone calls
and sending 33,000 emails by August 31--and they're still at it. In the
midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed 13 service members
working the gates at HKIA, wounded 20 others, and killed and wounded
scores of Afghans.
In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in history,
with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
And on August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan
officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began.
I want to acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have
helped with the relocation effort--some serving as transit hubs, some
welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time.
And as the 9/11 report suggested, it is essential that we
accelerate the process for national security appointments since a
catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice. Yet today,
there are nearly 80 State Department nominees pending before the
Senate. Nearly 20 have already been voted out of the Committee on a
strong bipartisan basis and simply await a vote in the Senate.
Yesterday's voice vote to confirm three of them was greatly, greatly
appreciated, and was a demonstration of how quickly the Senate can move
when the need is great and the bipartisan will is there. For our
national security, I respectfully urge the Senate and this Committee to
move swiftly to consider and confirm all pending nominees and to
address what is a significant disruption in our national security
policymaking.
Let me briefly outline what the State Department has done in the
past 2 weeks.
First, we moved our diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where
our new Afghan affairs team is hard at work. Many of our key partners
have joined us there.
Second, we're continuing our relentless efforts to help any
remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of Allied and
partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose.
On Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with U.S. citizens and
others onboard departed Kabul and landed in Doha. On Friday, a second
flight carrying U.S. citizens and others departed Afghanistan. These
flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the United States,
Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport, and intense diplomacy to start
the flights.
In addition to those flights, 6 American citizens and 11 permanent
residents of the United States have also left Afghanistan via an
overland route, with our help.
We are in constant contact with American citizens still in
Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been assigned
a case management team to offer specific guidance and instructions.
Some declined to be on the first flights on Thursday and Friday for
reasons including needing more time to make arrangements, wanting to
remain with extended family for now, or medical issues that preclude
traveling now.
We will continue to help Americans--and Afghans to whom we have a
special commitment--depart Afghanistan if they choose, just as we've
done in other countries where we've evacuated our embassy and hundreds
or even thousands of Americans remained behind--for example, in Libya,
Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia. There is no deadline to this
mission.
Third, we're focused on counterterrorism.
The Taliban has committed to prevent terrorist groups from using
Afghanistan as a base for external operations that could threaten the
United States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will
hold them accountable to that. That does not mean we will rely on them.
We will remain vigilant in monitoring threats, and we'll maintain
robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize those
threats if necessary--as we do in places around the world where we do
not have military forces on the ground.
Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with Allies and
partners.
We initiated a statement joined by more than 100 countries and a
United Nations Security Council Resolution setting out the
international community's expectations of a Taliban-led government. We
expect the Taliban to ensure freedom of travel; make good on its
counter-terrorism commitments; uphold the basic rights of the Afghan
people, including women, girls, and minorities; name a broadly
representative permanent government; and forswear reprisals. The
legitimacy and support it seeks from the international community will
depend on its conduct.
We've organized contact groups of key countries to ensure the
international community continues to speak with one voice on
Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence.
Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus NATO,
the EU, and the U.N., to align our efforts.
And fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not flow
through the government, but rather through independent organizations
like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
Yesterday, we announced that the United States is providing nearly
$64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people of
Afghanistan, to meet critical health and nutrition needs, address the
protection concerns of women, children, and minorities, to help more
children--including girls--go back to school. This additional funding
means the United States has provided nearly $330 million in assistance
to the Afghan people this fiscal year.
In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans that we
evacuated are being processed before moving on to their next
destinations. Here at home, I spent some time at the Dulles Expo
Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed after
arriving in the United States. It's remarkable to see what our
diplomats, military, and employees from other civilian agencies across
the U.S. Government have been able to achieve in a very short time.
They've met an enormous human need. They're coordinating food,
water, and sanitation for thousands of people. They're arranging
medical care, including the delivery of several babies. They're
reuniting families who were separated and caring for unaccompanied
minors. It's an extraordinary interagency effort--and a powerful
testament to the skill, compassion, and dedication of our people.
We can all be deeply proud of what they're doing. And as we've done
throughout our history, Americans are now welcoming families from
Afghanistan into our communities and helping them resettle as they
start their new lives. That's something to be proud of, too.
With that, I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Let me first begin by asking unanimous consent to enter
into the hearing record a letter by the U.S.-Afghan Women's
Council calling on the Biden administration to take immediate
action at the United Nations to protect Afghan civilians,
particularly women and girls.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Let us start a series of 7-minute rounds. I
am going to hold the time tight so that every member can get
their opportunity, and I will start off by making sure that I
do not exceed my 7 minutes.
So prior to the final flight out, we heard from both
American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the
airport they were either not being allowed through the gates,
being sent back home, or simply abandoned. While we understand
and appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is
confounding that such a chaotic process arose to begin with.
So when did the Administration begin to plan for a worst-
case scenario contingency?
Secretary Blinken. In the spring and summer.
The Chairman. In the spring and summer of this year?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. Multiple interagency meetings,
exercises, looking at the different contingencies.
The Chairman. So what was the specific planning put into
the likely scenario that American citizens were going to have
to evacuate under hostile conditions?
Secretary Blinken. Well, planning went to a number of
things, including the ability to move our embassy quickly, as
we did in 48 hours, including the effort to make sure that we
could control the airport, bring flights in and evacuate people
out.
One of the things that happened, as you know, Mr. Chairman,
is that the situation outside the airport became incredibly
chaotic, with thousands of people massing at the airport,
massing at the gates of the airport, and that created, among
other things, a very, very challenging situation.
The Chairman. Should we not have started earlier so there
would not have been a bigger surge on the SIV issue? I
recognize, and I think it is only fair to put in context, that
your own testimony suggested that there was a 17,000 SIV
backlog. Nine months had passed by without a single interview.
So, obviously, you inherited a significant backlog. How many
SIVs were awarded during the Trump administration?
Secretary Blinken. I do not have the numbers in front of
me, but I think over the course of the Administration, there
must have been several thousand issued.
The Chairman. Okay. So the question is then should we not
have surged more significantly? I know you said you put up to
50 individuals, but knowing that you were preparing for a
contingency of the worst-case scenario, should not back in
March there have been a more significant surge to process SIVs
and determine the entire universe of who needed to be taken
out?
Secretary Blinken. Well, I believe we did surge those
resources. As I said, we quadrupled the number of people in
Washington doing processing of SIVs, and this is at a critical
stage in the processing, as I think many members know. The most
important stage in many ways is the so-called Chief of Mission
approval. That is the stage at which SIV applicants are
actually deemed eligible under the criteria established by
Congress for the program.
By the way, those who apply, those who actually get Chief
of Mission approval, the washout rate is about 40 percent
historically. That is because it turns out that many people who
apply do not qualify under the criteria set by Congress, or
they are unable to get the documentation--I think this was
alluded to prove that they had worked faithfully and loyally
for the United States.
There are some situations where people were committing
fraud in order to get into the program, maybe for
understandable reasons, but the point is we have a very lengthy
process, 14 steps, multiple agencies involved. We worked to try
to streamline that. I think there is more work that we would
like to do going forward to do that, but the bottom line is we
did significantly surge our resources to that, particularly to
the Chief of Mission approval process, quadrupling them.
Ultimately, we went from 10 to 50 to now, I believe, 61 or
62 working on that stage of things. We doubled the resources we
had in Kabul, all in an effort to expedite. We did. We went
from 100 visas a week to 1,000 visas a week. What was not
anticipated was the collapse in 11 days of the Afghan
Government and the Afghan military.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. There have been numerous
press reports over the past week about a new or refined process
for the State Department to lead efforts in coordination with
the Department of Defense to work with outside groups to
evacuate American citizens and Afghan allies left behind in
Afghanistan. Can you tell us exactly what these new U.S.
Government-led efforts are? How coordination with outside
groups and individuals is being handled? By who? What is the
nature of the State-DoD cooperation? Give us a sense of that.
Secretary Blinken. Sure. We have within the Department, led
by our former Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass, who went
back to Kabul to the airport to help lead the evacuation
efforts, he is leading an effort to manage, coordinate, all of
the ongoing efforts to bring people who wish to leave
Afghanistan out. That includes, among other things, a
coordination with the many outside groups, as well as Members
of Congress, who are working themselves heroically to help in
this effort.
I met, myself, with about 75 veteran's organizations a
couple of weeks ago, given the extraordinary efforts that
veterans, either individually or as groups, are doing to help.
We want to make sure that we are as coordinated as we possibly
can be on these efforts to make sure that we know who is doing
what, what assistance we can provide, and to make sure that we
are working together going forward.
We have many other people working on this task force. Some
dedicated to American citizens, others focused on SIVs and
other Afghans at risk. Others focused on coordinating with
different groups, including Members of Congress.
The Chairman. Let me give you, in my final minute, I would
like to give you an opportunity to set the record straight on
one point. Several commentators have suggested that had the
Department moved forward with the Crisis Contingency and
Response Bureau proposed by the Trump administration as it was
walking out the door, it would have been able to respond better
to the Afghan situation.
It is my understanding that that bureau had not been stood
up yet when you decided to curtail the proposal nor, as
proposed, did it actually add any additional resources or
capabilities to those that State already had. It was a
bureaucratic movement not creating or getting rid of actual
capabilities, just a new organizational chart. In that
bureaucratic result, potentially creating damage to the
Department's operations, not solving them. Is that a fair
statement?
Secretary Blinken. That is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay. If it is not the CCR, then what is the
answer?
Secretary Blinken. Well, here again, to your point, with
regard to the CCR, whether it became a bureau or not, there was
no change in the assets that we already had at hand to work on
these efforts. The focus of this group, either in its existing
organizational structure or had it become a bureau, which,
among other things, it did not because there were congressional
holds across the aisle on this effort.
The previous Administration, nonetheless, went through and
tried to move it forward. We decided that we needed to review
it. We did the review. As you described very--very accurately,
we found that this would add no assets to what we already had
at hand. It would simply create a different bureaucratic
structure.
Having said that, again, this is something designed
primarily for individual extractions, medical emergencies.
These men and women who are part of our operational medical
unit are remarkable and do incredible work, but not the kind of
work that would have been applicable to the large evacuation
that we had to conduct in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I can tell you, I have listened to you and a
handful of other people try to put the best face on this
possible. I can tell you that the temperature of the American
people is not there with you and that I am not talking from a
partisan basis. This goes both ways.
There is not enough lipstick in the world to put on this
pig to make it look any different than what it actually is. The
American people want to know who is responsible for this. So
let us start with this. Who is responsible? Who made the
decisions on this? Was it the President of the United States?
Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President makes the
decisions. That is correct.
Senator Risch. Did he in this case?
Secretary Blinken. As in every case, ultimately, decisions
that can only be decided by the President are decided by the
President.
Senator Risch. Well----
Secretary Blinken. Now, of course, to be specific, Senator,
there are hundreds, thousands of decisions every single day
that go into a situation as complex as this one. The big
strategic decisions, those are decided by the President. The
tactical operational decisions are made by different agencies,
agency heads, and agency officials.
Senator Risch. Well, I am more interested in the top
decision-making. Look, we have all seen this. We saw it as
recently as yesterday. Somebody in the White House has
authority to press the button and stop the President, cut off
the President's speaking ability and sound. Who is that person?
Secretary Blinken. I think anyone who knows the President,
including members of this committee, knows that he speaks very
clearly and very deliberately for himself. No one else does.
Senator Risch. Well, are you saying that there is no one in
the White House that can cut him off? Because yesterday that
happened, and it has happened a number of times before that. It
has been widely reported that somebody has the ability to push
the button and cut off his sound and stop him from speaking.
Who is that person?
Secretary Blinken. There is no such person. Again, the
President speaks for himself, makes all of the strategic
decisions informed by the best advice that he can get from the
people around him.
Senator Risch. So are you unaware that this is actually
happening? Because it happened yesterday at the Interagency
Fire Center. It was widely reported. The media has reported on
it, and it is not the first time it has happened. It has
happened several times.
Are you telling this committee that this does not happen?
That there is no one in the White House who pushes the button
and cuts him off in mid-sentence?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Risch. So this did not happen yesterday nor on the
other occasions where the media showed the American people that
his sentence was cut off in mid-sentence?
Secretary Blinken. No.
Senator Risch. Are you saying that did not happen?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I really do not know what you
are referring to. All I can tell you is having worked with the
President for now 20 years, both here on this committee and in
over the last 9 months at the White House, the President very
much speaks for himself.
Senator Risch. Well, let us take a different attack. He
does speak for himself, but what happens when somebody does not
want him speaking? You are telling us you do not know anything
about this that somebody cuts him off in mid-sentence? Is that
what you are trying to tell this committee? Because everybody
here has seen it.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am telling you based on my
own experience with the President over the last 20 years,
anyone who tried to stop him from saying what he wanted to say,
speaking his mind, would probably not be long for their job.
Senator Risch. Let us turn to the dissent cable that you
received in July. Are you willing to give a copy of this
dissent cable that you got from two dozen diplomats regarding
the imminent catastrophic collapse in Afghanistan, are you
willing to give a copy of that to this committee?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, this dissent channel is
something that I place tremendous value and importance on. It
is a way for people in the State Department to speak the truth,
as they see it, to power. These cables, I have read every
single one of them, of the dissent channel cables that we have
gotten during this Administration. I have responded to every
single one. I factored what I read and heard into my thinking
and into my actions.
The legitimacy of the channel, the ability for people to be
able to, with confidence, share their thoughts, share their
views, even when they run counter to what their seniors have
said or the policies being prescribed, it is vitally important
that we protect that channel, protect its integrity. It is
designed by its very regulations only to be shared with senior
officials in the Department.
What I do not want to see is some kind of chilling effect
going forward that says to those who would think of writing a
cable in the future that, oh, this will, get out widely, be
distributed in ways that would have that chilling effect.
Senator Risch. Do you admit that you received a dissent
cable in July signed by two dozens diplomats that warned about
the imminent catastrophic collapse that was coming in
Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I certainly received this cable
in mid-July. I read it. I responded to it. I factored its
contents into my thinking.
What the cable said broadly was two things. It did not
suggest that the government and security forces were going to
collapse prior to our departure. It did express real concerns
about the durability of that government force after our
departure, and it focused on the efforts that we were making,
particularly on the SIV front, to try to expedite moving them
out.
In fact, a number of the recommendations, the very good
recommendations it made were already entrained. Others were
not, but one of the ones that was entrained was the
establishment of Operation Allies Refuge. We received the cable
on July 13. That operation was actually put into force on July
14. It had already been planned for some time, and this was an
effort to expedite the identification and relocation of SIVs,
actually putting them on planes, which, as you know, is not
part of the program. Actually relocating them and working to
establish transit sites so that we could put them there while
we finished processing them.
Senator Risch. Well, you see that is the problem with us
not having access to that cable. You are telling us that, but
we have been told by others that it was significantly different
than what you are saying. Also we really would like to see the
response to that because I think history is going to be
interested in that particular cable and your response to it.
I will save my next question for the next round. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin, I have asked
Senator Cardin to, in addition to his questions, preside for a
few minutes since I have a hearing that I have to just go to.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Blinken, thank you so much for being with us
today. Thank you during the Afghan evacuations for almost the
daily briefings you had for all members of the United States
Senate and keeping us totally informed as to the events
unfolding.
Now I contrast that to what happened during the Trump
years, where we were not kept informed at all about the
negotiations between the Trump administration and the Taliban,
that we had no briefings or information at all in regards to
the summit meetings between the United States and North Korea,
or the United States and Russia. Where our committee could not
conduct the oversight that is so important, as you have pointed
out, working with the executive branch in a check and balance
for the unity of our country.
So I thank you very much for the way that you have kept us
engaged and informed as decisions have been made.
As you pointed out, the Biden administration was dealt a
very difficult hand on the withdrawal from Afghanistan. We all
recognize we needed to withdraw. The options were extremely
limited.
The mistakes made by previous administrations, we have
talked about it. I think we need to understand that many of us
did not support the 2002 campaign to go into Iraq. One of those
reasons was that we wanted to complete the mission in
Afghanistan when we had a chance to do it when the Taliban was
diminished after our military came in, after the attack on our
country.
Instead, we went into Iraq, which was not engaged in the 9/
11 activities, and we never finished Afghanistan, a mistake
made by the Bush administration.
Now we have already talked about the Trump administration
and setting a deadline and releasing prisoners and moving
forward with the reduction of troops when there was really very
little options that the Administration had. It does not negate
the information that was made available to you about the
strength of the Afghan security forces and the Ghani
administration's will to stick with it in Afghanistan.
I think many of us are interested in knowing how
intelligence got that so wrong, and the contingency plans are
ones that we really do want to review because it seems to us
there had to be better ways to secure passage into the airport
than what ultimately happened. Considering the hand that you
were dealt, considering the crisis that developed, evacuating
124,000 was a miraculous task. So we congratulate all that were
involved in the evacuation of so many people under such a short
period of time under such difficult circumstances.
I want to get to where we are today. During this process,
the State Department was very open to all Members of Congress--
Democrats, Republicans--as we filtered information in to you
about vulnerable people in an effort to get them out of
Afghanistan. Today, our offices are still being deluged by
requests to help people that are in Afghanistan. NGOs are
working very aggressively.
Can you share with us the process that you are using in
order to filter information about Americans that are still in
Afghanistan who want to leave, those that apply for SIV status,
and those Afghans that are at risk? How do we transmit that
information, and what process is in place so that we can try to
get these people out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you, Senator.
As I noted, we have established a task force focused
entirely on relocation to help those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, whether there be any remaining American citizens,
whether it is SIV applicants, whether it is Afghans at-risk,
whether it is the nationals of our partner countries, get out.
That involves a number of things.
It involves, for the American citizens, case management
teams. Five hundred individuals whose task is to be in constant
contact with any remaining American citizens who wish to leave,
and that is what they are doing.
It also includes, together with our Legislative Affairs
Office, being in constant contact with you, as well as with
outside groups who have identified and are trying to help
people who seek to leave. This here is the sum total of cases
brought to us by members of this committee, just this
committee, that all of you or many of you have been working,
and we are deeply grateful for those efforts, for this
information. It ensures that when you send us the information,
we put it into our database if it is not already there. We make
sure that we are able to track it. We make sure we are able to
coordinate with you.
I recognize that especially in the early going, during the
evacuation itself, some of the feedback was lacking. We were
trying to do all of this in real time, making sure that we took
in the information that you were providing and acting on it. In
some cases, we did not get back to people to say here is what
we have done, and we have been working to make sure that we get
back to everyone. I think we have 26,000 inquiries from
Congress. We have responded to 21,000 or 22,000 of them.
Senator Cardin. So we still have the categories of
reporters that work for us that are still in Afghanistan. We
have women that were officials in Afghanistan that are at risk.
We have NGOs that worked with us in Afghanistan, their
employees that are at risk.
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Cardin. So you are saying we still have an
opportunity to work with you to get that information to the
sources that you are using to try to arrange for their exit
from Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, absolutely. We very much invite
that, and we want to make sure that we have as best possible a
unified, coordinated list so that we know what everyone is
working on, and we can track and we can help. Or we can take on
depending on the----
Senator Cardin. Can I get your best guess on the numbers?
At one point when we first started, we thought there might be
somewhere around a little less than 100,000 of U.S. citizens,
SIVs, and Afghans at-risk that wanted to leave. Obviously, that
number was low. We have already evacuated over 124,000.
Do we know how many U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan that
want to exit today? How many are in SIV status that want to
exit? How many Afghans at-risk we want to help?
Secretary Blinken. On the American citizens who wish to
leave, the number is about 100, and it is very hard to give a
real-time number at any given moment because it is very fluid,
by which I mean this. Some people--and we are in direct contact
with this group.
Some, for very understandable reasons, are changing their
mind from day-to-day about whether or not they want to leave.
Others continue, even now, to raise their hands and say I am an
American citizen in Afghanistan, someone who had not identified
themselves before. Again, I think, as all of you know very,
very well, we do not require, as a country, our citizens to
register or identify themselves to our embassies in any country
in the world when they travel there or if they reside there.
Senator Cardin. Do you have the numbers for SIV and for----
Secretary Blinken. So the SIV numbers, that we are
tabulating right now because we are trying to account for
everyone who has come in. Some people remain in transit
countries. Other people are now in the United States.
We are putting all of those numbers together to determine--
but the overwhelming majority of Afghans who have come out of
Afghanistan, thanks to our evacuation efforts, are in one way
or another Afghans at-risk. Some will be SIV applicants. Others
will be P1 or P2 applicants. Others will be in none of those
categories, but Afghans at-risk. We are breaking down all of
those numbers, and we should have a breakdown for you in the
next couple of weeks.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to seeing that.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, in your statement, I think that the most
troubling thing is the following quote from you. ``Even the
most pessimistic assessment did not predict the government
forces in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained.'' I
back that up by saying you also cite General Milley, who said
there was no indication that there would be a rapid collapse of
the Afghan army and government.
For much of last year, I was the acting chairman of
intelligence. I am now the vice chairman of intelligence. I
have been tracking this very, very closely. Just going back to
the beginning of this year, obviously, I cannot quote the
titles of the pieces, but let me suffice it to say that there
are numerous pieces that would be categorized as, ``It is going
to hit the fan.''
Let us just for a moment put that aside, okay? Because I
think any analysis of those pieces would have led anyone to
that conclusion. Putting that aside for a moment, we had every
reason to believe and to plan for the rapid collapse of the
Afghan military and the Afghan Government.
At the beginning of 2020, by all admissions, we had already
really bad status quo in Afghanistan. Okay, we had a small
footprint, but we had a strong commitment to air support, and
that sustained the Afghan security force's ability to resist
the Taliban. The security forces of Afghanistan were suffering
10,000 casualties a year. The Taliban was suffering casualties,
too, but they enjoyed safe haven in Pakistan. They were able to
go there to rest, to refit, to train, to recruit.
So, in summary, even before the withdrawal, we had a
terrible status quo. The security forces, a small number of
U.S. forces continued to die. We had U.S. losses as well. I
want to mention that, but the Afghan Government was still
fractious and corrupt, and the Taliban had an unchallenged safe
haven in Pakistan.
Or put another way, and paraphrasing your own words from
your opening statement, if after 20 years and hundreds of
billions of dollars in support, equipment, and training, there
is not enough for the Afghan Government or the Afghan security
forces to become more resilient or self-sustaining, what did we
think was going to happen as that support began to be removed?
What did we think was going to happen when that terrible
status quo was changed? It does not take some exquisite piece
of intelligence or some brilliant analysis to conclude that if
you radically change an already bad status quo, by removing
U.S. and NATO forces, by ending enablers and air support, the
status quo was going to collapse in favor of the Taliban.
This is not an argument in favor of staying. I think that
ship has sailed, okay? Because I know a lot of time has been
spent on justifying the withdrawal. We are not debating the
withdrawal. What I am arguing is we had a terrible status quo
as is. By your own admission, the Afghan Government, even after
billions of dollars and 20 years, was not self-sustaining, was
not resilient. We should have known that as we began to draw
down support we were going to see the potential for a collapse,
and that is what all these pieces pointed to as well.
So it is concerning that no one saw all of this and
concluded that there was no evidence or no reason to believe
that there could be a rapid collapse. More to that point, we
began to see clear signs weeks ago that this is where it was
headed. Without air strikes, the Taliban now began to mass and
maneuver, going from intimidating these small Afghan outposts
to actually getting them into quitting. We were seeing Afghan
outposts begin to quit.
The Taliban could now--they went from surrounding these
small provincial capitals to surrounding major cities, with
5,000 to 8,000 Taliban fighters. This is weeks before. By the
way, this is at the same time as, I believe, on July 8
President Biden was still giving this naive optimistic
prediction about the fighting capabilities of the Afghan forces
and so forth.
We could see them meticulously focused on the north. You
could see that they were methodically and carefully splintering
the sporadic remains of any sort of resistance. Weeks before
the fall of Kabul, you could see the Taliban was on the verge,
was headed towards doing something they had not done before.
They were going to isolate Kabul from the north, cutting off
all their supply routes.
So we knew weeks before that we were headed for a Taliban
control of the north, all the traditional routes of Taliban
encroachment on Kabul were nearly sealed, the south and the
east. Kabul faced the prospect of no fuel. The Afghan
Government faced the prospect of being unable to mount any
viable opposition and sustained defense. What did we think was
going to happen? All of those things were in place at the time.
I think the most concerning part of it is that if we did
not have an analysis that looked at all this, this was not a
failure of intelligence. This was a failure of policy and
planning. We had the wrong people analyzing this. Someone did
not see this. Either someone did not see this or someone did
not want to see this because we had established this, we wanted
to be out by September 11 so that we could have some ceremony
arguing that we got and pulled out of Afghanistan on the
anniversary of 9/11.
The fact of the matter is where it leaves us now, on top of
all the other things that have been mentioned here, from a
geopolitical perspective, is not a good place. I think China
and Russia and Iran, they look at this botched withdrawal, and
what they see is incompetence that they think they might be
able to exploit, may lead to miscalculation.
I think the Europeans, our allies, who had very little say,
if any, or control certainly over the timing and the execution
of all this, they are now, number one, have to be wondering
about our reliability, the credibility of our defense
agreements with them. They also have to be really, really upset
at the prospects of a massive refugee crisis landing right on
their borders here very soon.
India, and I know that there was an announcement today
there will be a meeting of the Quad fairly soon, which is a
good development, except that in the Pacific region, if you are
India, you are looking at this and saying if the United States
allowed Pakistan to unravel their standing--the Pakistani role
in all this, and I think multiple administrations are guilty of
ignoring it. The Pakistani role in enabling the Taliban is
ultimately a victory for those pro-Taliban hardliners in the
Pakistani Government. They have to be looking at this and
saying if the United States could have a third-rate power like
Pakistan unravel its aims, what chance do they have of
confronting China?
So I think this leaves us in a terrible situation. I go
back to the initial point. I do not know how it is possible if,
in fact, the people in charge of our foreign policy did not see
all of these factors and conclude that there was a very real
possibility of a very rapid collapse, then we have got the
wrong people making military and diplomacy decisions in our
government.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to respond briefly
in the time that we have. As you know from your own expertise
and leadership on these matters, there are constant assessments
being done. In this particular case, assessments being done of
the resilience of Afghan security forces, of the Afghan
Government, and different scenarios established, from worst
case to best case to everything in between.
Ultimately, the preponderance of the intelligence and
assessments land someplace, and there are always going to be
voices, and critically important that we listen to all of them,
who may be talking about exclusively the worst case, some best
case, some in-between. Here is what I can say in this setting,
and we can take this up as well in other settings.
Back in February, the overall assessment of the community
was that after a complete U.S. military withdrawal, that could
potentially in the worst-case scenario lead to the Taliban
capturing Kabul within a year or two. So that is back in
February, and that was more or less where things stood in the
winter and into the spring.
You are exactly right that the situation was deteriorating
as the Taliban continued to make progress on the ground
throughout the summer. In July, the IC indicated that it was
more likely than not that the Taliban would take over by the
end of the year, the end of this year. That said, we, the
intelligence community, did not say that the country-wide
collapse of all meaningful resistance would be likely to occur
in a matter of days.
You referenced Chairman Milley, as I did earlier. Nothing
that he saw, that I saw, that we saw, suggested that this
government and the security force would collapse in a matter of
11 days.
You are right that I think we need to look back at all of
this because, to your point, we collectively over 20 years
invested extraordinary amounts in those security forces and in
that government. Hundreds of billions of dollars, equipment,
training, advice, support. Based on that, as well as based on
what we were looking at real time, again, we did not see this
collapse in a matter of 11 days.
It is important that we go back and look at all of this.
Senator Cardin. The time has expired.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Secretary Blinken, for appearing before the committee today.
I appreciate and share the frustration of my colleagues
over the challenges with the evacuation, over the situation of
Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and the Taliban's treatment
of women and girls and other minorities. I also agree with your
assessment and that that has been given by several others that
where we were when we got to that evacuation was because of the
failure of both Democratic and Republican administrations.
I want to know where that outrage was when year after year
for 10 years, starting with Senator McCain, I and others in the
Senate tried to get more Special Immigrant Visa applicants
through the process so that they could leave Afghanistan, leave
the threat, and come to the United States. There were a few
Republicans in the Senate who blocked us year after year from
getting more SIV applicants to the United States.
I want to know where that outrage was during the
negotiations by the Trump administration and former Secretary
Pompeo, when they were giving away the rights of women and
girls and when Secretary Pompeo came before this committee and
blew off questions about what they were doing to pressure the
Taliban to have women at the negotiating table for that peace
treaty.
So I think there is a lot of regret and a lot of
recriminations to go around, and the important thing for us to
do now is to figure out how we can work together to address
those people who still need to be evacuated from Afghanistan
and also to ensure that we can do everything possible with the
international community to help protect the human rights of the
women and girls who remain in the country and those minorities.
So, Mr. Secretary, that is where I am going to put my
effort. I do think we need an accounting. That is important for
history and for us going forward, but let us stop with the
hypocrisy about who is to blame. There are a lot of people to
blame, and we all share in it.
Now, Mr. Secretary, as you know, I was one of those who was
opposed to our withdrawing from Afghanistan. I am not going to
revisit that, but a lot of my concerns were around the rights
of women and girls if Afghanistan fell into the hands of the
Taliban.
So I want to ask you now, and you have been very specific
on briefing calls that you share the concern, and I recognize
that you believe it is a priority for this Administration to do
what you can to protect the rights of women and girls. So can
you talk specifically about what steps the Department is taking
to provide for the safety of women and girls and how we are
trying to rally the international community behind that effort?
Secretary Blinken. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
Let me just start by thanking you personally for your
leadership for a long time now on these issues, both on the
SIVs and the work that we have actually been able to do to try
to improve the program, but more work needs to be done, as
well, of course, as on women and girls. From advancing women,
peace, and security and that agenda to ensuring that there is
an equal playing field for women and girls, you have made a
huge difference.
I have to say over the last 20 years, we have made a
difference, collectively, in Afghanistan. Possibly the biggest
difference we made was for women and girls. Access to
education, access to healthcare, access to work and
opportunity. All of that was as a result of many of the efforts
that we made and that this Congress made and supported,
including with very, very significant assistance.
This is hard. I was in Kabul after the President announced
his decision. I met with women leaders from the then-
parliament, NGOs, a lawyer, human rights defenders, listened
and heard from them about their concerns about the future. Just
the past couple of weeks when I was out in Doha and then in
Ramstein, I talked to young women and girls who we had
evacuated and heard from them, both their gratitude for having
been evacuated, but also their deep concerns, more than deep
concerns about the future for the women and girls who remain in
Afghanistan.
So, with that bearing in mind, we have done a few things,
and this is where we really want to work closely with you and
with every member. One, we have worked to rally the
international community to set very clear expectations of the
Taliban going forward, to include the expectation that it will
uphold the basic rights of women and girls, as well as
minorities.
That is visible in the statement that more than 100
countries have signed at our initiative. It is also in a U.N.
Security Council resolution that we initiated and got passed. I
know people say, oh, it is a statement or a Security Council
resolution, it does not matter. Well, in the case of the
Security Council resolution, just to cite one example, there
are significant sanctions from the United Nations on the
Taliban. There are travel restrictions on the Taliban. The idea
that if the Taliban is in violation of the Security Council
resolution that we established, it will get any relief just on
that alone, the U.N. sanctions or travel restrictions, I think
that is pretty clear that that will not happen. That is just
one point of leverage.
We have been working to make sure that the international
community speaks with one voice and acts together, including on
this. That is one.
Second, we want to make sure that assistance continues to
flow. Humanitarian assistance, including assistance that is
directed at the special needs of women and girls. We are doing
that consistent with our sanctions, and we are able to do that
by working through NGOs and the U.N. agencies.
Now I do not want to sugarcoat this because we know that
while the Taliban seeks and will probably support and protect
basic humanitarian assistance through these agencies like for
food and medicine, it may be a different story when it comes to
things that are directed specifically at women and girls. So we
are going to be very focused on that and trying to make sure
that that assistance can go through, that it is monitored
effectively, including by the agencies doing it. I had spent
some time talking with the head of the United Nations effort on
this in terms of having a clear monitoring mechanisms for this
and to carry that forward.
Next, we will soon appoint, at my direction, a senior
official responsible for focusing and marshaling all of our
efforts on support for women, girls, and minorities in
Afghanistan. I think it is very important that we have a focal
point in the U.S. Government at the State Department whose
responsibility is to carry forward this agenda, working closely
with you in the weeks and months ahead.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of
time, but can you share with us who that official is as soon as
they are appointed?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, of course.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Johnson.
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, if I were just to read your testimony, not
having watched any news, I would literally think this was a
smashing success, but I do read the news, as most Americans do,
and we realize this was a complete debacle. I think what
concerns me the most among many things is that detachment from
reality. It is the same denial of reality, for example, on the
border. A self-inflicted wound. A crisis created by President
Biden's policies that have completely thrown open our borders,
and yet the Administration denies that we have a problem at the
border.
I have got a number of questions. First of all,
approximately, what is the dollar value of the equipment that
has been left behind that now the Taliban controls? What is the
dollar value of that?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I believe the equipment
provided over the last 20--well, little less than 20 years, 15
years, is about $80 billion. Of that equipment that remains, as
you know, it was given--some of it was handed over to the
Afghan security forces----
Senator Johnson. I understand.
Secretary Blinken. --and of course, some of that is now in
the hands of the Taliban.
Senator Johnson. So I was also struck by your comment that
in your testimony that even the most pessimistic assessment did
not predict the government would collapse as quickly as it did.
You just in your testimony said that the realistic predictions
before the complete withdrawal was that it was going to
collapse by the end of this year.
So the Administration continued with their plans of
withdrawal, of evacuation, of surrender, knowing the Taliban
would be in control of $80 billion worth of sophisticated
equipment at the end of that. Correct? I mean, did that ever--
--
Secretary Blinken. That----
Senator Johnson. Did that discussion ever come up in terms
of maybe that would not be a good idea, leaving all that
equipment behind as we bug out of Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. That assessment came in July. Much of
the equipment--and again, I will defer to my colleagues at the
Pentagon, who are more expert in this than I am. Much of that
equipment was made inoperable. Other pieces of equipment will
become inoperable because there is no ability on the part of
the Taliban to maintain it. None of it, to the best of my
knowledge, poses a strategic threat to us or to any of
Afghanistan's neighbors. What we are looking at are----
Senator Johnson. Okay. So we have an oversight letter. We
would like response on that.
Let us just quick talk about the decision to close down
Bagram. I mean, again, the President says this was unanimously
decided by the military. Is it not true that the President
decided what the troop level would be, a very minimal troop
level? The President decided that we would keep the embassy
open, and it had to be protected. He forced the military's
hands, right?
In the end, it was his decision. It was not the military's
decision to close Bagram.
Secretary Blinken. The President makes the strategic
decisions. When it comes to the actual drawdown, the
retrograde, to use the technical language, those were decisions
made by his military commanders. He sought their best advice,
and that is what was carried out, including the timing of the
decision to leave----
Senator Johnson. Okay. Another troubling piece of your
testimony. You said when the President announced the
withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. Josep
Borrell, the Foreign Affairs Chief for the European Union, his
statement on the surrender is that it is ``a catastrophe for
the Afghan people, for Western values and credibility, and for
the developing of international relations.''
The Wall Street Journal summarizes it quite nicely in their
piece, just the title, ``How Biden Broke NATO: The Chaotic
Afghan Withdrawal Has Shocked and Angered U.S. Allies.'' Again,
that is detachment from reality that our NATO allies are
onboard with this thing. They are not.
Secretary Blinken. Senator----
Senator Johnson. That is not what we are hearing.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I went to NATO well before the
President's decision, along with Secretary of Defense Austin,
and spent the day with all of our NATO allies listening to
them, their views, their prescriptions, their ideas for what we
should do moving forward in Afghanistan. I shared some of our
initial thinking at that point.
We factored in everything we heard from our allies into our
own decision-making process. When the President made----
Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for----
Secretary Blinken. When the President made the----
Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for every
contingency. Okay, I got it.
Secretary Blinken. If I could continue?
Senator Johnson. Now, listen, it is bureaucratic-speak. I
have some questions. So, again, my concern is detachment from
reality. As we surrendered, as we are evacuating, as we are
bugging out, we are hearing all these soothing comments from
the Administration. This is almost like a well-oiled machine
here. We have got flights just leaving and 124,000 people being
evacuated.
We heard something completely different. So tell me what is
wrong about what I had heard. First of all, prior to the
Taliban providing perimeter security, there was no security,
and basically, tens of thousands of the Afghanis flooded into
the Kabul airport. Correct?
Secretary Blinken. There was perimeter security around the
airport established by our----
Senator Johnson. You had--we literally had tens of
thousands of people.
Secretary Blinken. We did not----
Senator Johnson. We did not know who these people were. It
was not like people we invited in that were Special Immigrant
Visa holders. Correct?
Secretary Blinken. We controlled the airport. We did not
control the city. We controlled the airport. Sorry for speaking
over you.
Senator Johnson. Again, so we had tens of thousands of
people in Kabul airport. The reports we were getting on the
ground is many had no form of ID whatsoever. When I went to
Fort McCoy, I asked the commanding general--again, all the--
every contingency planned for. I asked the commanding general,
when did you first find out that your mission would be as an
intake facility for the Afghanistan refugees? He said 10 days
ago.
I asked the commanding general. I asked the representative
for the Department of State, as well as from Department of
Homeland Security. Do we know that every refugee that you have
received so far--and there was only 1,000 at that point in
time--but do we know that they at least have some form of ID?
We did not.
We are hearing all these assurances that we are getting
biometrically screened, a 14-step plan. I asked the head of
Northern Command, he was at Fort McCoy, describe those steps to
me, and what are we screening them against? I mean, are ISIS
terrorists? Are Al Qaeda terrorists? Have we biometrically
screened them in the past that we can compare them to a
database?
What is that 14-step process in detail? Not just 14 steps.
Tell me, describe to us in detail how are we keeping this
nation safe from such a chaotic situation.
Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, the 14-step process refers
specifically to the Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and
there is a lengthy process----
Senator Johnson. So how about for the other 124,000 people?
Secretary Blinken. So, yes. So to come to your point,
Senator, a couple of things. We arranged, as you know, transit
countries so that any Afghan coming out of Afghanistan would
initially go to a transit country where we could initiate the
screening, the vetting, and the background checks. We surged
Customs and Border Protection officials to those transit
points, as well, of course, as other security law enforcement
agencies to do these checks with biometric, biographic, other
information that we have.
Then as people are cleared in these transit points, they
then come into the United States, but they are not being
resettled immediately. They are going, once they land at Dulles
or in Philadelphia, they are then being sent to military bases,
where the checks continue and are completed.
Senator Johnson. Again, what checks? We need specifically
what the checks are going to be.
The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired. I am
sure you can follow up for the rest of your questions.
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, for this hearing. Thank you, Secretary Blinken, for your
service and your testimony today.
We have, I am sure, lots of opportunities to look backwards
at the 20 years of our engagement in Afghanistan and at
decisions. I had hoped this committee would rise above the
temptations of partisan politics and use this hearing to
consider the urgent questions still before us, and I hope we
will get a few minutes to focus on this, Mr. Secretary.
How do we get the remaining American citizens, legal
permanent residents, and those Afghans who served alongside us
or worked with and for us and who are most at risk out of
Afghanistan? How do we make sure Afghanistan does not become a
safe haven for terrorists again and deal with the Taliban? What
leverage do we have in doing so and to also make sure
humanitarian aid gets into Afghanistan? Most urgently, how do
we support and resettle those Afghan refugees whom we have
evacuated to third countries and that much smaller population
that has reached the United States?
So let me just start with my thanks to the State
Department, to the employees in Kabul and Qatar, and the DC-
based task force that has worked with the evacuation
repatriation of Americans and Afghans, and to the many
Delawareans and Americans whom I have heard from. Former
military folks who served in Afghanistan, former diplomats, and
development professionals eager to help.
I look forward to continuing to coordinate with you and
with the agencies of our Government, advocacy groups, and other
partners on resettlement efforts. I am glad that the former
Governor of Delaware, Jack Markell, has been asked to step
forward and help coordinate this resettlement effort.
I was encouraged today to see Welcome.US launch, a broad,
multi-faith, bipartisan national organization, co-chaired by
three former Presidents--Bush, Obama, and Clinton--and dozens
and dozens of faith groups and nonprofits to welcome Afghans to
the United States.
So let me just start with a question about visa status.
Senator Sullivan and I wrote a bipartisan letter in mid-August,
urging expanded eligibility for the SIV program. I am
interested in how you are working to expand eligibility under
the existing visa programs to include family members and to
support those the U.S. Government supported and worked
alongside, but who were not direct employees?
I want to start, if I could, Mr. Secretary, by asking you
just ``yes'' or ``no'' questions about three groups that other
Senators have mentioned.
Secretary Blinken. Sure.
Senator Coons. There is about 550 employees and family
members from Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio
Liberty, who were not evacuated. Is the Department prioritizing
their evacuation?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Coons. The Department committed to evacuating our
partners from NED, the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI,
IRI. Are those also being prioritized?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, they are.
Senator Coons. Our partners from the American University of
Afghanistan as well?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Coons. So if you would take the 4 minutes we have
got left and explore with me how do we ensure safe passage
across land borders, whether into Tajikistan or Pakistan, safe
and regular flights out of Afghanistan, whether from Mazar-i-
Sharif or Kabul? How do we get documents into the hands of
those who do not have identity documents, either because they
were destroyed in our embassy or they destroyed them themselves
out of fear of the Taliban? How do we make sure that we are
providing the financial support needed for the whole group of
refugees who, after thorough vetting, ultimately reached the
United States?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. Those
are all very important questions, and let me try to respond
briefly to them, and we can take on the details after this
session if need be.
First, we needed and we have established a clear
expectation from the Taliban about allowing people to continue
to leave the country, to include American citizens, green card
holders, Afghans who are properly documented with a visa,
including specifically those who worked in some capacity for
the United States.
Not only do we have that understanding in public statements
by the Taliban, of course, it is built into everything we have
done with a large coalition of countries in terms of setting an
expectation and making very clear that the failure to fulfill
that expectation will have significant consequences, which we
can get into.
Second, very important to actually make sure that there are
ways to travel freely from the country. We made an intensive
effort before we left to understand and share with Qatar and
Turkey, the countries that stepped up to do this, what was
necessary to make sure that the airport in Kabul could continue
to function. Ultimately not--to have charter flights and then
commercial flights going in under international civil aviation
organization standards.
We did intensive work. We brought the American contractors
back in the midst of the evacuation who had been running the
airport to work that, and we handed off a very detailed plan,
which is now being implemented.
Third, the land crossings. We have worked with Pakistan,
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on this to make sure that as we
moved people out of Afghanistan, they would facilitate their
crossing into their countries. We would have consular officials
surged in the necessary places to handle people coming out in
that fashion.
Now, to your very important point about documentation--and
this is something that maybe we can take offline--we are
working on a mechanism and a means by which--and there are
multiple ways of doing this, to make sure that people who do
not have the necessary document, for example, a visa, from us,
a physical visa, to get that to them. I prefer to go into more
detail on that in another setting.
Senator Coons. Understood. If I might, just as a closing
question, you were asked at the outset sort of what are the
factors we weigh as we decide the future of our relationship
with the Taliban? We are in this difficult situation. Many
recognize the Taliban is a terrorist organization that has done
horrific things within Afghanistan in the past, yet we need to
have some working relationship with them to secure the safe
passage out of thousands of people who we still care deeply
about.
A number of American citizens with Delaware ties who I have
been in contact with did not leave because their families were
still in Afghanistan, and there are clear measures that they
should be expected to meet that you laid out in your opening
statement. What do you think will be the most important aspects
of our leverage to ensure the Taliban perform in ways that we
would accept, and what do you think will be the turning point
at which we will make decisions with our allies to take sharper
and harsher measures against the Taliban?
Secretary Blinken. So, simply put, the nature of the
relationship that the Taliban would have with us or most other
countries around the world will depend entirely on its conduct
and actions, specifically with regard to freedom of travel as
well as to making good on its counterterrorism commitments,
upholding basic rights of the Afghan people, not engaging in
reprisals, et cetera. These are the things that not only we,
but countries around the world are looking at.
There is, I think, significant leverage that we and other
countries hold when it comes to things that the Taliban says it
wants but will not get if it does not act in a way that meets
these expectations. For example, we talked a little bit before
about the existing U.N. sanctions on the Taliban--these are
significant--as well as travel restrictions.
There is now a new Security Council resolution that we
initiated setting out the expectations for what the Taliban has
do to. If it is in violation of that resolution, it is hard to
see any of these U.N. sanctions being lifted, travel
restrictions being lifted, and indeed, additional sanctions
could well be imposed.
Similarly, the foreign reserves of Afghanistan are almost
exclusively in banks here in the United States, including the
Federal Reserve. Other banks, about $9 billion. All of that has
been frozen. There are significant resources as well that are
in the international financial institutions that Afghanistan
normally would have access to. Those, too, have been frozen.
Over the last 20 years or so, the international community
has provided about 75 percent of the Afghan Government's annual
operating budget. That, too, has been frozen.
So among many things that the Taliban says it seeks, both
basic legitimacy and basic support, the United States, the
international community has a hand on a lot of that, much of
that, most of that. So we will have to see going forward what
conclusions the Taliban draws from that and what its conduct
will be matching these basic expectations that we have set.
Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for taking time to answer our questions today.
I would like to associate myself with the comments that
Senator Rubio made about planning for a potential immediate
collapse of the Afghan Government and security forces. It
seemed that as the Taliban was running the table throughout
Afghanistan that the prospect of them continuing to run the
table by coming into Kabul was a significant probability that
should have been planned for.
In your view, Mr. Secretary, has the Taliban abandoned
their sympathy and collaboration with groups like Al Qaeda and
the Haqqani Network? Do they continue to have the same aim, and
are they of like spirit? Or has that relationship been severed?
Secretary Blinken. The relationship has not been severed,
and it is a very open question as to whether their views and
the relationship has changed in any kind of definitive way. I
think it is fair to say two things.
One, whatever the Taliban's views on Al Qaeda, they do know
that the last time they harbored Al Qaeda and it engaged in an
outwardly directed attack, an attack on our homeland, certain
things followed, which I believe it would have an interest in
not seeing repeated. So whatever their views on Al Qaeda, there
is a strong disincentive built-in to allow it to engage in
outwardly directed attacks, which the assessment of the
intelligence community is they are not currently capable of
doing.
ISIS-K, the other main group, is a different thing, as you
know, because the Taliban and ISIS-K are sworn enemies. In
fact, over the last 5 or 6 years since the emergence of ISIS-K,
the fight has actually been between the Taliban and ISIS-K,
with the Taliban taking most of the territory that ISIS-K
sought to hold onto in Afghanistan. The question there, I
think, is less whether they have the will to deal with ISIS-K
and more whether they have the capacity.
Senator Romney. Given that response, I know that previously
the position of the Administration and the State Department was
that the 2001 AUMF no longer played a role of significance.
Given the developments in Afghanistan and the Taliban's ongoing
collaboration with and sympathy with Al Qaeda and the Haqqani
Network and like-minded groups, is it not appropriate for the
State Department to revisit your recommendation that we abandon
the 2001 AUMF?
Secretary Blinken. I think, Senator, we need to look to
make sure that we have all the authorities that we would need
for any potential contingency, including the re-emergence as a
threat of Al Qaeda or the further emergence of ISIS-K as an
outwardly directed threat. If we do not have those authorities,
we should get them. Whether that means relooking at those
authorizations or writing new ones, which I think would be the
most appropriate thing to do, if necessary, we need to look at
that.
Senator Romney. I appreciate your willingness to change
your point of view in part because of the conditions that have
developed in the most recent weeks. Nothing wrong with
conditions leading to a change in perspective.
I, for one, thought some years ago that we should withdraw
from Afghanistan. The conditions that I saw in the ensuing
years convinced me that I was wrong, and I, like Senator
Shaheen, was one of those that felt that President Trump was
wrong to enter into an agreement to withdraw. I thought
President Biden was wrong to enter into an agreement--or to
continue with that agreement to withdraw. Of course, I was
appalled by the disastrous withdrawal process itself.
For us today, however, I guess I would like to focus more
on the moral stain of leaving people behind and understand what
we can do to make sure that we are not leaving people behind. I
understand we are down to a small number of Americans. It is
hard to know exactly how many are left behind.
In terms of legal permanent residents, is your priority
just as high to get them out as it is to get out citizens? Or
is there a different level of commitment for a legal permanent
resident's return to the United States relative to a citizen?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, our number-one priority is
American citizens, and that has, I think, long been the case.
In this situation in Afghanistan, in this emergency evacuation
in Afghanistan, we did everything we could as well to make sure
that legal permanent residents, green card holders would also
identify themselves to us. Like with American citizens, we do
not know at any given time how many there are in any given
country around the world, and to make available resources to
help them.
Our number-one priority is any remaining American citizens
who wish to leave.
Senator Romney. I did not realize there is a secondary
level of priority then for a legal permanent resident. If that
is the case, how many of them approximately? So we do not know
the exact number, but how many legal permanent residents are we
convinced are still in Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. We do not have an exact number, but it
is in the thousands.
Senator Romney. A round number? Pardon?
Secretary Blinken. In the thousands.
Senator Romney. In the thousands. Likewise, in terms of SIV
holders or SIV applicants, or people who worked with us that
have been our partners through the years, how many of them
approximately are still in Afghanistan that want to come to the
United States?
Secretary Blinken. So this is what we are doing an
accounting of right now based on two things, based on the
pipeline of applicants as it existed before the evacuation and
then looking at those who we were able to evacuate. We do not
have those numbers yet because as we have moved to evacuate
people, a number of them are still at transit points around the
world. Others that----
Senator Romney. But it would be tens of thousands?
Secretary Blinken. So, realistically, two things. One, we
talked about this a little bit earlier. Of the applicants in
the program, and as I said, we inherited about 18,000. About
half of those, and this remains more or less the case now, are
at a point where it is before the Chief of Mission has given
his or her approval that they are, in fact, eligible for the
program.
Senator Romney. I understand.
Secretary Blinken. So we focused on the----
Senator Romney. I was looking for a number, and I guess the
question I was leading to was this, which is given the fact
that the SIV process was so slow and not undertaken during the
Trump years in a significant way, you sped it up. That is
great. Although you knew that there was no way you were going
to get all these people out in time----
Secretary Blinken. Let me put a finer point on it.
Senator Romney. --given the rapid collapse of the Afghan
security forces. You said, yesterday, that you inherited a
date, but in fact, you did not inherit the date. The date was
May 1, and you pushed it to August 31. Why did you not push it
much later so that we would have been able to process the SIV
applicants, as well as those who had worked with us that had
not yet applied?
I do not understand why a date was actually not inherited,
and a date was not selected that would be sufficient to
actually remove people from the nation in a way that would be
in keeping with our moral commitment to honor our citizens, our
green card holders, as well as those who have worked us over
the years.
Secretary Blinken. Two things, if I may? First, we took
some risks in terms of what the Taliban would do or not do
after May 1 in pushing beyond May 1. We, of course, worked this
very hard because----
Senator Romney. It is a risk with other people we took.
Secretary Blinken. It is a risk----
Senator Romney. The risk was on people we care for.
Secretary Blinken. Yes, just to be clear, if I could? The
military told us that in order to do its retrograde, its
drawdown from Afghanistan in a safe and orderly way, it needed
3 to 4 months. That is why we pushed to move beyond May 1 and
to get to the end of August, early September.
Second, to your point, which is an important one and a good
one, our expectation was that beyond August 31, beyond the
military drawdown, the government, the security forces were
going to remain in control of Kabul, of the major cities. Our
embassy was fully planned to remain up and running. We were
leaving about 600 military behind to make sure that we could
secure the embassy so that it could continue to operate.
We had robust programming planned, to include continuing to
bring out anyone who wished to leave on notably SIVs. So that
was very much the plan and the expectation.
What we did not anticipate was that 11-day collapse of the
government and security forces. That is what changed
everything.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for spending so much time with us.
I think what links our failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is
that they are both fundamentally failures of hubris, believing
that we can control things and influence events on the other
side of the world that are beyond our control or influence.
America can be a force for good in the world, but there is a
limit to what we can achieve, and so there has been decades-
long magical thinking with respect to what is in our control
and what is outside of our control.
As it turns out, it was not within our control to be able
to stand up an American-style democracy, an American-looking
military in Afghanistan that was going to be able to protect
the country from the Taliban, but we spent 20 years trying to
achieve it.
So, Mr. Secretary, you covered some of this in your opening
remarks, but I wanted to ask you a series of questions to try
to level set for the committee the situation you inherited,
right? What was in your control, what was outside of your
control? Then to look at the events of the last 30 to 40 days
with that same lens. What was in your control, what was outside
of your control?
I think these are ``yes'' or ``no'' answers. Some of it you
covered in your testimony, but I think it is important to get
it on the record.
So, Mr. Secretary, if President Biden had chosen to breach
the agreement that President Trump had signed with the Taliban,
would the Taliban have restarted attacks against U.S. troops
and bases?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Murphy. As you said in your opening testimony, by
the time the Administration took office, the Taliban was on the
outskirts of several provincial capitals. If President Biden
had chosen to breach the agreement between President Trump and
the Taliban, would the Taliban have begun offensives on these
urban centers?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Murphy. So if the Taliban had begun a siege on
these cities and resumed attacks on U.S. troops, would 2,500
troops have been enough to keep the country from falling to the
Taliban?
Secretary Blinken. No.
Senator Murphy. Would double that number have been enough?
Do we know how big our force would have had to have gotten?
Secretary Blinken. I think it was the assessment of our
military leaders not to put a number on it, but significant
additional U.S. forces would have been required, both to
protect ourselves and to prevent the onslaught from the Taliban
against the provincial capitals and ultimately against Kabul.
Senator Murphy. So it was not a decision between leaving
and the status quo? This was a decision between a significant
commitment of new U.S. resources to the fight or the
continuation of a withdrawal plan?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Murphy. Okay. Let us talk about the last month. So
once the Afghan Government and military disintegrate all at
once, it seems to me it was pretty predictable and
understandable that there would be panic on the ground amongst
the Afghan people. So could it be expected that a few thousand
U.S. troops and diplomats on the ground at the time would have
been able to prevent this panic?
Secretary Blinken. No.
Senator Murphy. Much has been made about these dramatic,
heartbreaking scenes at the airport. Were 2,500 or 5,000 troops
enough to stop the Afghan people from rushing to the airport?
It created this security nightmare for you, but was there any
way for the limited number of personnel that were there to
prevent individuals from rushing to the airport?
Secretary Blinken. No. They could control the airport, as
we did. They could establish a basic immediate perimeter around
the airport, as we did, but they could not control what
happened beyond that perimeter.
Senator Murphy. So let us talk about that perimeter. Others
say, well we should have controlled a bigger perimeter. We
should have taken back over parts of Kabul to secure the
passage of Americans and Afghans to the airport. I mean, let us
say you had quadrupled the number of troops you had there. Let
us say you had 10,000 troops there.
Without the Afghan military or a functioning government,
would that have been enough to retake Kabul, to be able to
secure the passage of everyone to the airport?
Secretary Blinken. I do not want to profess to be a
military expert. So I would really defer to my colleagues at
the Pentagon on that, but I can say that I think--safely say
that it would have taken a substantial number of forces to try
to retake the city or establish a much broader perimeter. Of
course, if that was ultimately opposed by the Taliban, in a
sense it would have defeated the purpose because anyone outside
that perimeter would not have been allowed to get through it to
come to the airport, among other things.
Senator Murphy. Right. So once the Afghan military
collapses, it disintegrates, we do not have enough troops to
retake Kabul. We are in the position of having to rely on the
Taliban, or at least communicate with the Taliban, to make sure
that we get individuals to the airport?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Murphy. Okay. I just think this is important to put
on the record in a clear and concise way because we have to
have a reckoning in this country about what we can accomplish
and what we cannot accomplish. It is extraordinary that this
Administration got 130,000 people out of Afghanistan, given
those circumstances, given the situation that they inherited,
that you inherited in January of this year.
My worry, Mr. Chairman, is that the malady that we suffered
for the last 20 years, this idea that it was just a bad plan,
that it was the failure of execution as to why we could not
succeed in Iraq or Afghanistan, is plaguing us again today.
That right now we are having a conversation as if we just had a
better plan, if we just executed better, we could have avoided
these scenes at the airport. We could have guaranteed the easy
and safe passage of everyone into that facility.
It is heartbreaking what happened. It was impossible for
Americans to watch, but if we just simply leave today believing
that if we had planned better, if we had better execution, we
could have avoided this panic and confusion, I think we are
just inviting another Iraq, another Afghanistan in the future.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, just quickly expand on your point
about the message that it sends to China, this idea that the
Chinese would love it if we stayed another 10 or 20 years, and
why this is not a sign of weakness and, in fact, this is an
ability for you and the national security infrastructure to be
able to reorient resources toward fights that we actually can
win?
Secretary Blinken. Well, I think, Senator, you have put it
very well. In my assessment and the assessment of many others,
as I said, there is nothing that strategic competitors like
China, like Russia, or adversaries like Iran and North Korea,
would like better than for us to have re-upped the war, doubled
down on it, and remained bogged down in Afghanistan for another
year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, with all of that dedication
of resources, all of that energy and focus on that, as opposed
to the challenges that we have to face today.
I might add, this committee has done, I think, a very good
job on trying to refocus us on, notably the competition from
China. So I think that would have been--doubling down on this
war after 20 years, after nearly $2 trillion, after 2,461
American lives lost, 20,000 injuries, and not to preserve the
status quo that existed before May 1, that would have been one
thing. To be in the situation where the war with us was
restarted, the Taliban attacking our forces, attacking our
partners and allies, going on an offensive across the country
to retake the cities, that would have required a doubling down
on the war.
The bottom line is this. We were right to end the war. We
were right not to send a third generation of Americans to
Afghanistan to fight and die there. I believe we were right in
the extraordinary efforts that were made to make sure we could
bring out as many people as possible. Now we have an obligation
to make sure that we continue to do that and, of course, to
guard against the re-emergence of any threats coming from
Afghanistan.
Senator Murphy. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Portman.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
fact you are having this critical hearing today.
I must say I am going to change what I was going to talk
about based on the last interaction. Thank you for being here.
I wish General Austin were here because Secretary Austin could
answer many of the questions that just been posed.
I have a lot of respect for my colleague, Senator Murphy,
as he knows, but this was not a choice between either a
dangerous escalation of the war, which has just been laid out,
or a precipitous, chaotic withdrawal that embarrassed us around
the globe. To say that it was not a sign of weakness the way we
left, I mean, I do not know who you are talking to. If you are
talking to our allies in NATO, they will say it was a sign of
weakness.
If you are talking honestly to our adversaries, they will
certainly say it is a sign of weakness, as will terrorist
groups around the world. So I hope the lesson we learn here is
not that this was the right way to leave. I hope the lesson we
learn here is that there was a better way to leave. If the
decision was made to pull out, it should not have been a
precipitous, chaotic, and unfortunately deadly departure.
This afternoon, I will be speaking on the floor about Max
Soviak. He is a Navy corpsman who was one of the 13 American
soldiers, sailors, and Marines who were killed on the wall,
trying to help others escape from the tyranny of the Taliban.
He should never have been put in that position. It was an
impossible position for our troops, for your diplomats, and the
impossibility that they faced was due to our policy decisions.
There was an alternative. Bagram Air Base, I mean it was
shut down in the middle of the night with no notice to anybody.
It was a surprise. I have talked to people who know a lot more
about the military side of this than I do who tell me that,
yes, the Afghan troops were a disappointment, but that is
partly because they were used to having Americans provide that
close air support. If they had had that, they could have pushed
back against the Taliban.
I think we will hear that from your military. I think if
General Austin were here, we would hear this.
We just left, like just pulled out all the military
underpinnings. So without the cover, literally, of close air
support and other military support, yes, it became extremely
dangerous and chaotic. We left a lot of people behind.
Senator Romney has asked you to give him some numbers, and
you said you are still working on that. Here are the numbers
that I have, the best that I have. As the ranking member on the
Homeland Security Committee, we pushed and pushed and pushed.
Eighteen thousand applicants for SIV. We got 705 out.
You said earlier the overwhelming number of people who were
at risk got out. I do not think that is true.
Secretary Blinken. If I could, sir, just to----
Senator Portman. No, let me just finish giving you the
numbers that I have. We think about 30,000 at-risk Afghans were
evacuated out of an estimated 60,000. That is the best numbers
we can come up with because we cannot get good numbers from the
Administration. That is the best estimate.
So that is true that we left people behind who had stood
with us and helped us. Obviously, American citizens were left
behind. Green card holders were left behind. Thousands of
people who stood with us and helped us. Then let us ask about
who came.
Earlier, there was discussion about what kind of vetting
has taken place. The best numbers we have is that about three-
quarters of the people who were evacuated were not green card
holders, were not American citizens, were not SIV applicants,
were not P1 or P2 visa holders. So about three-quarters of
these individuals may not have qualified in this sense.
Now you say that they are being vetted. Good. They should
be, and you know, nobody knows because we cannot get good
information from the Department of Homeland Security, from the
State Department, and others. From the start, many of us have
said what we do there needs to be based on conditions on the
ground.
Quite frankly, the President's decision was not based on
conditions on the ground. That is why it was a disastrous
withdrawal. That is why it put so many people at risk. It
should have been an orderly withdrawal under the cover of
superior U.S. and NATO military force. We did have 2,500 troops
there, but we had 7,500 NATO troops with us, too.
Again, many of their commanders were shocked at what
happened because they were surprised because there was not good
coordination. There was a lack of coordination with the people
who had stuck with us. I talked about Bagram. There was also a
lack of integrated interagency planning. Of course, we have
seen this in terms of how the chaotic withdrawal occurred.
These were preventable problems, and they put our military
and your diplomats in this impossible situation. They did the
best they could, and I commend them for that. In an impossible
situation, it is amazing what they were able to perform. It was
so rushed and so chaotic that, again, we did not get the right
people out. Many who did get out seemed not to fall into any of
the categories that we are concerned about.
So now what do we do? Let us look forward, as was suggested
by Senator Coons, and I agree with that. You said that you do
not believe that it will be a platform for terrorism going
forward, that the current government, the Taliban Government
has said that they will fight back against terrorists.
Do you believe that the Haqqani Network and particularly
the new Secretary of the Interior who is a wanted terrorist,
based on your Administration's assessment, do you believe that
that is indication that they are going to fight back against
terrorists?
Secretary Blinken. The question, Senator, from our
perspective and our partners' perspective is whether the
Taliban will make good on commitments to ensure that
Afghanistan is not used as a place for outwardly directed
terrorist attacks. They have made commitments, but we are not
relying on those commitments. We are going to make sure that we
have in place the ability to detect any re-emergence of that
threat and to be able to do something about it if it does re-
emerge, something that we can talk about in more detail in
another setting.
Senator Portman. Is the Haqqani Network considered a
terrorist group?
Secretary Blinken. It is.
Senator Portman. Is it true that the interior minister is a
leader of the Haqqani Network?
Secretary Blinken. That is accurate.
Senator Portman. I just think, sadly, we have shaken the
foundations of a lot of our alliances, and we have work to do.
I think we have demonstrated weakness and made the world more
dangerous as a result.
Let me ask you about one specific question. Well, I guess
my time has expired.
The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
Senator Portman. I will follow up with regard to some of
the international financing questions in a letter we sent to
Secretary Yellen from Senator Rubio and myself regarding
foreign assets.
Secretary Blinken. Good. Thank you for that.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Mr. Secretary.
I want to turn to the humanitarian situation in
Afghanistan. The World Food Program observed that half the
children under 5 are acutely malnourished in the country, that
14 million individuals in Afghanistan are on the brink of
starvation, that 31 of 34 provinces are at risk of losing their
health services entirely, and that only 1 percent of the
country is vaccinated. This is a fairly accurate description of
the challenge for both food and for healthcare?
Secretary Blinken. It is. The humanitarian situation is
dire.
Senator Merkley. Thank you. The U.S. just participated in
an international conference in which $1.1 billion was pledged
in humanitarian relief from a variety of nations, including an
additional commitment by the United States.
NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, that often are
essential for providing aid, are very concerned about a legal
pathway to do so because in 2002, the Taliban was listed as a
specially designated global terrorist organization under the
International Economic Emergency Powers Act, and it does not
have a humanitarian exception.
Previously, where we faced this situation in Yemen, the
Treasury Department stepped in to create a legal pathway. A
number of Senators have written to Secretary Yellen and with
copies to you and to Samantha Powers saying let us use that
same pathway here in which the Office of Foreign Asset Controls
issues a general license, creating kind of legal insulation
providing humanitarian assistance. Are you engaged in a
conversation about how to create a legal pathway to provide
humanitarian assistance?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, we are. We have issued one initial
license, as you know. The Treasury issued about 10 days ago. We
are looking at what other authorities might be needed to make
sure that humanitarian assistance can flow as best possible in
Afghanistan.
Senator Merkley. Great. Thank you. That is absolutely
essential, and I think we have a significant responsibility. We
have the chaos of war in combination with the pandemic and
general disruption in the country, and it is a moral
responsibility to provide assistance.
I am going to ask to enter into the record the letter from
September 2 that the Senators and Members of House sent to the
Administration.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
So as provincial capitals started to fall, and we had 9
provincial capitals fall in 6 days, there was a lot of
discussion about whether the Government of Afghanistan would
direct a reconsolidation of forces to essentially consolidate
protection of the territories still held, which was shrinking.
Did the Government of Afghanistan take key strategic military
decisions to consolidate its forces?
Secretary Blinken. It did not, and this was a source of
tremendous frustration across the Administration from the
President on down. As the summer went on and we saw the Taliban
moving across the country, we repeatedly pressed the Afghan
Government to do just what you described, which is to
consolidate its forces and to defend what was essential to
defend and what could be defended. Not to extend itself across
the entire country, which it did not have the full capacity to
do.
Unfortunately, that consolidation and the plan that we
urged on them for how to effectively defend the major cities
never took shape.
Senator Merkley. What was the response of the government or
from President Ashraf Ghani about why they chose not to
consolidate their forces to protect the areas they controlled?
Secretary Blinken. Well, at different moments, there were
different responses. At some point, I think initially the
response was, oh, we cannot be seen to be giving up on any part
of the country. Never mind that over the last 5 or 6 years, the
part of the country by population controlled by the Government
of Afghanistan, if you go back to 2014, 2015, went from about
60 percent to, at the end of last year, about 48 percent.
So this was happening, to some extent, outside the cities,
of course, relentlessly. Slowly, but relentlessly. Then, as we
pressed and pressed and pressed on them, the response was, yes,
we will do it, but they did not.
Senator Merkley. Well, we have seen over a number of years
we had the challenge of the elections that were considered
illegitimate by a portion of the country. We had Abdullah
Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani kind of facing off against each other
and creating paralysis, great difficulty appointing key
ministers to key positions.
As we analyze and try to understand the rapid collapse, was
there essentially a failure to create an effective decision-
making capability within the Afghanistan Government?
Secretary Blinken. I think there are a number of factors,
and this is something that I hope we all look at, going back
really over the last 20 years at various key points. Certainly,
there was a lack of unity in the government. It was comprised
of different groups, different factions. Despite, again, very
significant efforts to get them to act in a unified way, they
could not or would not.
Second, I think in terms of their effectiveness, there are
obvious serious concerns that manifested themselves. Third, one
of the endemic problems that we have had over the last 20 years
that we have not been able to effectively address is pervasive
corruption. That has so many consequences.
One of the consequences, though, is that if you are being
asked to fight and put your life on the line for a government,
for an institution that is corrupt, that is a pretty hard
decision to make. So I think, as we saw with many Afghan forces
and soldiers fighting very, very bravely and giving their
lives. Institutionally, the military collapsed in totally
unanticipated ways in the course of 11 days.
I think as we go back and look, one of the things we have
to look at is the impact that this pervasive corruption had in
terms of giving the institution the will to fight for the
country.
Senator Merkley. Absolutely. In those final days as the
provincial capitals were falling, President Ghani refused to
acknowledge that there were falling capitals. It was almost
like a world in which he was disengaged. Then the finance
minister resigned and said he was leaving the country for
family reasons, but it was taken as a symbol of the government
on the verge of collapse. Then, shortly thereafter, President
Ghani fled himself. I think it was Sunday, August 15.
Did we have forewarning of this beginning of the cabinet to
essentially flee the country, and how did we respond to that?
Secretary Blinken. We did not. On Saturday, as it happens,
I spoke to President Ghani. We were working on a plan to have a
transfer of power to a Taliban-led, but more broadly
representative government to include many of the different
actors in Afghanistan, working on that in Doha.
I was calling President Ghani to make sure that he would
support that. That was critical. He told me he would, but he
said if the Taliban would not go ahead with it, he would--and I
am paraphrasing here--fight to the death. That was Saturday. He
left Afghanistan the next day on Sunday.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. For the awareness of Senators,
there is a vote going on. There is a subsequent vote going on
as well. It is my intention to try to continue through the
process, but I just wanted to make members aware.
Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. I have advocated for an end to the Afghan war
for over a decade. I am glad it is finally over, but never in
my worst nightmares could I have imagined that an
Administration would leave and leave $80 billion worth of
weaponry to the Taliban, dozens of planes and helicopters,
thousands of armored carriers, hundreds of thousands of
automatic weapons. Worst of all, 13 of our brave young men and
women.
Never in my worst nightmares did anyone conceive of such a
colossal incompetence. Abandoning Bagram Air Force Base will be
remembered as one of the worst military decisions in our
history.
Holding no one accountable, having everyone circle the
wagons and say, hey, we all agreed abandoning Bagram Air Force
Base was a great idea, this is going to be remembered by the
people. Holding no one accountable for letting the base go, it
will be remembered.
To add insult to injury, this week you have now released
$64 million in aid to Afghanistan. Do we not have some
prohibition against giving aid and comfort to the enemy?
Now the argument from the Biden administration is, oh, we
are giving it to charities, and it is for the good of the
people, for poor people and for women. Well, the Taliban has a
history of taking this. Throughout their governance, they would
take the money. This was a big complaint we had when they were
in power the last time.
They now have $80 billion worth of weapons, 350,000
automatic weapons. Are we really naive enough to believe that
we are just going to keep sending charity to Afghanistan and
they are not going to interrupt it? I think that is a foolish
notion.
The $64 million, though, is the tip of the iceberg. There
is still about $10 billion out there that was designated for
the Afghan Government. Can you pledge today without
equivocation that the Biden administration will not release any
of this money to the Taliban?
Secretary Blinken. Absent the Taliban making good on the
commitments and expectations of the international community
that I have outlined previously, that is correct.
Senator Paul. Maybe we could deduct a few for the weapons
they took?
Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, on the weapons, again I
will defer to my colleagues at the Pentagon who are more expert
in this. You are right that about $80 billion worth of weaponry
has been provided over the course of the last 15 or 16 years.
Much of that, the significant weaponry--planes, helicopters--is
actually inoperable, will soon become inoperable because it
cannot be maintained.
In terms of the strategic threat that that weaponry poses,
it does not to us or to Afghanistan----
Senator Paul. You cannot say you are not going to give them
the money. If they behave, you are going to give them the
money. Why do we not subtract the $80 billion from the $10
billion you are going to give them? Then they are minus 70
still.
I mean, really, the fact that you are entertaining good
behavior that they will get more money I think is a big mistake
and a naive notion that we are going to somehow change this
Stone Age philosophy by giving them more of our money. We have
sunk trillions of dollars over there. This is our chance to
have a peace dividend. Let us quit sending good money after
bad.
The guy the Biden administration droned, was he an aid
worker or an ISIS-K operative?
Secretary Blinken. The Administration is, of course,
reviewing that strike, and I am sure that a full assessment
will be forthcoming.
Senator Paul. So you do not know if it was an aid worker or
an ISIS-K operative?
Secretary Blinken. I cannot speak to that, and I cannot
speak to that in this setting, in any event.
Senator Paul. So you do not know or will not tell us?
Secretary Blinken. I do not know because we are reviewing
it.
Senator Paul. Well, see, you would think you would kind of
know before you off somebody with a Predator drone whether he
is an aid worker or he is an ISIS-K. See, the thing is, this is
not just you. It has been going on for Administration after
Administration.
The Obama administration droned hundreds and hundreds of
people, and the thing is, is there is blowback to that. I mean,
I do not know if it is true. I see these pictures of these
beautiful children that were killed in the attack. If that is
true and not propaganda, if that is true, guess what? Maybe you
have created hundreds or thousands of new potential terrorists
from bombing the wrong people.
So you have got to know who you--we cannot sort of have an
investigation after we kill people. We have an investigation
before we kill people.
We have got plenty of bombs. We can bomb almost anything we
want from anywhere in the world. Maybe we should have bombed
the helicopters and the planes that we left behind. I mean,
even though you said you did not know any of this and was all
surprised, once they took all of our stuff, we should have said
you have got 20 minutes to get out of it because we are going
to blow it all up.
Then you would have sent a message of strength. Instead, we
bombed somebody who we are not sure whether it was an aid
worker or an ISIS-K operative. See, that is not sending a
signal of strength, and in the end, there will be more blowback
from it. If you killed an aid worker on accident, I mean, do
you think we are better off because of that?
You really could have acted in a position of strength, but
you could have made the basic, fundamental decision that really
ruined the whole thing for you was a military decision to
abandon Bagram Air Force Base before you left, before the
Americans were out.
Anybody can argue, and you may have a point, that it
happened more quickly than we thought it was going to happen.
Okay, that is an honest mistake. Still a huge mistake. When
people make judgment mistakes in the military, they ought to be
relieved of their post.
Leaving Bagram Air Force Base I think is an unforgivable
sort of mistake. It is going to be remembered in history. But
if you do nothing about it, you leave all these people in place
and say, oh, well, we all agreed. It is like then maybe
everybody needs to go.
I mean, but really it was a terrible mistake, but releasing
money to the Taliban will add insult to injury. It will be
terrible for the memory of the 13 soldiers who died in the end,
who were the final soldiers to die in this war, if you end up
giving money to the people that had been ruining the Middle
East and Afghanistan for decades.
I hope you will not release the money, and I think it would
be a big mistake.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Schatz is
with us virtually?
Senator Schatz. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Before Senator Schatz begins, I am going to
ask Senator Kaine to preside so I can vote and come back.
Thank you.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Blinken, thank you for appearing before the
committee. I want to sort of zoom out a little bit. The defense
establishment, political appointees, so-called think tank
experts, defense contractors are complaining loudly about
tactics because it is their strategy that failed. They are
complaining about how America's longest war ended because they
did not want it to ever end, and they are mad because they
think we should be an occupying force indefinitely, and they
know that position is untenable so they dive into tactics.
They want to talk about holding onto Bagram for longer or
sending forces into Kabul. They will not acknowledge the
fundamental mistake was that we invaded a country in Central
Asia without a good understanding of its people, its history,
or of its culture.
After 20 years, trillions of dollars spent, and training of
hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces, the Afghan
Government reinstalled was no more capable of being a referee
in a civil war than before we invaded. That is not the fault of
our service members or diplomats. It is the fault of
policymakers who set unrealistic goals.
So the basic question I have for you, Mr. Secretary, is:
What are the lessons of the last 20 years of war?
Secretary Blinken. Well, Senator, I think you actually
summed it up extremely well, and I would say two things, just
to put a fine point on it.
We went to Afghanistan for one reason, and that was to deal
with the people who attacked us on 9/11, to bring them to
justice, and to the best of our ability make sure that that
would not happen again from Afghanistan. We largely succeeded
in that effort a long time ago with Bin Laden being killed in
2011 and Al Qaeda, in terms of its capacity to conduct attacks
on the homeland from Afghanistan, vastly degraded to the point
where it is currently assessed that it does not have that
capacity.
Somewhere along the way, with the best of intentions, we
also sought to remake the country and, in effect, to use
military force to remake another society. I think to your point
and the point that Senator Murphy and others have made,
whatever our intentions, that is probably something that is
beyond our capacity. The net of that is that we were there for
20 years. We lost 2,461 Americans, 20,000 were injured. About
$2 trillion were spent in direct and indirect costs. That is
the equivalent of about $300 million every single day for 20
years on average.
To those who say, well, yes, but you arrived in a place
where the expenditures in terms of people and resources were
sustainable. Well, that is simply not the reality that we faced
because, as we have discussed, given the deadline established
for the removal of U.S. forces by the previous Administration,
the choice we had was either to go through with that and
withdraw our forces or to re-up the war, to escalate, to send
in more forces, more loss of life, more loss of resources
indefinitely.
To what end? To what result? In terms of having something
sustainable in a government or in security forces that could
protect the country and uphold basic rights. So I think those
lessons are important. They are profound, and I hope that all
of us together will reflect on those and other lessons that we
have learned, both in what we have done tactically, including
in this Administration, as well as what we have done
strategically across many administrations over 20 years.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
I am worried about reports that we are seeing about acts of
violence against journalists, women, and girls and the Taliban
targeting minority groups like the Hazara people, groups who
have a brutal history of committing violence against them are
probably going to get worse.
So what are we doing to ensure physical access for the NGOs
that service these constituencies?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
These reports, which I have also seen, whether in media
reporting, in videos and other reports, are deeply, deeply
disturbing. I think whether it is us or whether it is many
other countries around the world that we have been working to
organize and to focus, this, of course, violates the basic
expectations that we have of a Taliban-led government in terms
of its need to not abuse these rights, but to uphold them.
So we are working to make sure that we are all both
speaking with one voice and acting together when it comes to
using the influence and leverage we have with the Taliban to
insist that it meet these expectations. Second, when it comes
to humanitarian assistance and other kinds of support, besides
providing that support to NGOs, to the United Nations and its
agencies, we are doing whatever we can to help ensure that
those agencies and those NGOs are able to operate, pressing
directly and indirectly on the Taliban-led government to ensure
their ability to do that and their protection.
This is very much a moving picture and something we are
very focused on right now and in the days and weeks ahead.
Senator Schatz. One final question. I understand this is
not the main thing. I understand there are people who remain in
mortal danger, but from your standpoint, the Department of
State, you have got to be a little worried about morale for
those people who have dedicated the better part of 20 years to
this effort.
So what can we do, not what can we say, but what can we do
on behalf of the Foreign Service, especially at a time when we
need to building back our diplomatic corps?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you for raising that,
Senator, because it is--you are exactly right, and it is very,
very important to me, and it is very, very important
institutionally.
I spent time with all of our returning diplomats from
Afghanistan, either personally or virtually depending on where
they were, and spent a lot of time listening to them, hearing
them, and trying to address the concerns that they have. To
your point, we have so many people who have invested their
work, their careers, their lives in Afghanistan, developed
relationships, a deep love for the country, and this is very
challenging, painful for many of them.
Of course, those who participated in the evacuation itself
who were literally at the gates at the Kabul airport side-by-
side with these extraordinary men and women in uniform, doing
that work, including the 13 who lost their lives who were
killed in the terrorist attack. I had officers who were
literally serving next to them up to a couple of hours before
that attack, knew them by first name.
So the impacts, both over 20 years and more immediately,
with our people who were there literally pulling people in to
safety, helping to talk people in, to walk people in, officers
around the Department who stood up and volunteered to help in
some way. Many of them who ran into HKIA, to the airport, to
help get people out.
So we are spending time talking to them, listening to them,
and also providing them the support that some of them may need,
including emotional support----
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, if I can ask you
to sum up, we are over time, and there are still eight Senators
who want to ask questions.
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Kaine. Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, President Biden has described the evacuation
from Afghanistan as an extraordinary success. His words,
``extraordinary success.'' This has to be the lie of the 21st
century.
It is dishonest, and if he believes it, it is delusional.
America can no longer ever say we leave no American behind
because Joe Biden did, and by your own testimony and your words
this morning, there are still about 100 Americans trapped
behind enemy lines.
We have heard a lot about the 13 U.S. service members who
died a couple of weeks ago. One was Rylee McCollum of Jackson
Hole, Wyoming. He was 20 years old, signed up for the Marines
on his 18th birthday.
His wife Gigi, expecting a baby. The baby was delivered
just yesterday, a baby girl. I stood with Rylee's family and
his then-pregnant wife on Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as
his remains were brought back in a flag-draped coffin from
Afghanistan. Never made it back home alive, as a result of this
Administration's failures. People in Wyoming view this as
having lost one of their sons, one of their children, and it is
a devastating loss. They really do believe it is the
Administration who should hold the blame for what has occurred.
This withdrawal, and you have heard it from other Senators
on both sides of the aisle, has been an epic failure. No
planning, no strategy. It was cobbled together at the last
minute, disorganized. It did not have to be this way.
I am thinking back to your confirmation hearing. I raised a
number of questions and concerns about your record on foreign
policy failures in Syria, in Libya, in Iran. I said these
botched decisions have serious consequences. I said I believe
they embolden terrorist organizations around the globe.
I said your decisions in the past have put lives of men and
women who serve our nation at risk because of these failures,
and I said I think it would be a grave mistake to confirm a
Secretary of State who has a demonstrated track record of
repeatedly making the wrong decisions when it comes to American
foreign policy and national security. The actions I have seen
from you over the last 7 months have proven my assessment to be
correct.
The Biden administration's missteps are numerous. Failed to
start evacuation operations until the fall of Kabul in August,
despite announcing the withdrawal in April. Failed to heed the
warnings of a collapse of the Afghan Government and security
forces in spite of warnings. Failed to prepare for a rapid
Taliban takeover. Failed to adapt the politically motivated
deadline for withdrawal to the situation taking place on the
ground because you were so focused on the calendar on the wall.
Failed to keep Bagram Air Force Base, a place I visited
about eight or nine times. The U.S. military base with two
runways that could be used to help evacuate civilians. We just
heard failure to prevent a vast arsenal of weapons from getting
into the hands of the Taliban.
I mean, it seems the most egregious, though, that I hear
about in Wyoming and people all across the country are most
offended by is abandoning American citizens, as well as
abandoning our allies in Afghanistan. Senator Portman went over
the numbers. The Washington Post called it a ``moral
disaster.'' I think it is a moral disgrace.
You nearly dislocated your shoulder, though, patting
yourself on the back for the great job you have done. I mean,
just yesterday you stated, ``We did the right thing by our
citizens in working feverishly to get every one of them out.''
You did not get every one of them out. You have admitted
again and again we are talking about over 100 Americans. The
top priority must always be getting all Americans home safely.
Now with no U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, the Americans that
President Biden left behind, instead of going on national TV
and saying we will not take the troops out until every American
is out, their options for escaping are dwindling.
So I am trying to put this all together to say how did we
end up here? In April, the President made the decision to
announce everyone would be out by August 31. May 8, there was a
rehearsal of concept, which is a dress rehearsal for
withdrawal.
I know that the National Security Council was there. The
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Secretary of Homeland Security, they were all there. My
understanding is that you did not attend. Is that true?
Secretary Blinken. My Deputy responsible for the operation
was there.
Senator Barrasso. I know where you were. I think you should
have been here instead. I understand in late June the State
Department was getting nervous because the military drawdown
was moving on schedule, but not the civilian drawdown. You were
running behind.
I understand State Department was talking to the Defense
Department to slow down the pace of military withdrawal,
calling actually for ``tapping the brakes'' on military
withdrawal. Is that not true?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not going to get into any
internal deliberations or discussions that we had. We worked on
this together every step of the way.
Senator Barrasso. In July, you got more warnings at the
State Department things were getting bad. When did the State
Department formally make the request to the Department of
Defense for military-assisted evacuation, the noncombatant
evacuation operation? Because that is a Secretary or Ambassador
job.
Secretary Blinken. The NEO was being planned, if necessary,
throughout the spring and summer. We revised the plans on a
number of occasions, and ultimately, when the government and
security forces unexpectedly collapsed in the 11 days, the NEO
went into effect.
Senator Barrasso. So middle of August?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Barrasso. Why did you wait so long?
Secretary Blinken. Because we had a government and security
forces in place that, by every estimate, would be able to
protect the city, protect Kabul, protect the other provincial
capitals certainly through the year.
Senator Barrasso. So yesterday, you testified that the
Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization. I want to
be very clear on this because that is what you said yesterday.
``The Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization.''
Does this Administration believe the Taliban is a terrorist
organization?
Secretary Blinken. It is designated under one of the
designations, and any engagement that we have will be purely
for the purposes of advancing our interests.
Senator Barrasso. Under one of the designations?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, a specially designated terrorist--
--
Senator Barrasso. When does this Administration plan to
list the Taliban as a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization?
Secretary Blinken. A specially designated terrorist
organization, that is correct.
Senator Barrasso. You testified this morning about the SIV
washout rate. I think you said about 40 percent that they do
not qualify----
Secretary Blinken. Before the Chief of Mission approval,
that is correct.
Senator Barrasso. So what percentage of the Afghan
population that left Afghanistan as part of our U.S. evacuation
efforts, what percentage of those were vetted before they
actually got on the airplanes?
Secretary Blinken. Before they got on the airplanes----
Senator Barrasso. Yes.
Secretary Blinken. --to leave Kabul? Certainly not--most of
them were not. That is exactly why we established transit
points in countries through negotiations with those countries
to make sure that before anyone came to the United States, they
would be vetted by the different law enforcement and security
agencies. So we established agreements with well more than a
dozen countries.
Senator Barrasso. So who were you letting on the planes?
Anybody that showed up?
Secretary Blinken. Well, initially, as you know, there were
people who managed to flood the airport. We had to do an
immediate assessment of those. We had to make sure we could
clear people out of the airport so that the flights could come
in, go out.
No one came to the United States without being checked
somewhere else first to make sure that they do not pose a
security threat.
Senator Barrasso. My time has expired. Thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
I would just have to say I spent time overseas last week
talking to our NATO allies at a security conference, as well as
with NATO individuals. I will tell you, our enemies are
emboldened, and our allies are enraged.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here,
and thank you for allotting so much time and taking every
single question posed to you.
I want to first maybe just pick up with what my friend and
colleague asked. Could you characterize the Americans that are
still there? I know there are a lot of them that did not
necessarily want to come back. There is a whole array of
different reasons. Could you give us a better understanding of
those that have remained and what their circumstances are?
Secretary Blinken. Certainly. Senator, as we have noted,
starting back in March, we issued 19 separate messages to any
American citizen who was registered with the embassy, urging
them to leave Afghanistan. To avail themselves of commercial
flights that were running, offering assistance if they needed
it, because we knew it was a very volatile security
environment.
Especially when we went, started the ordered departure of
our embassy on April 27, it is also very incumbent upon us to
make sure that we are making clear to any American citizens
that they should take the opportunity to leave.
By the time of the evacuation, despite these 19 separate
messages, there were still somewhere around 5,000 or 6,000
American citizens left in Afghanistan. As we have noted
earlier, we never know, whether it is Afghanistan or any other
country around the world, at any given moment how many American
citizens are there because they are not--no one is required,
when you travel abroad, when you reside abroad, you are not
required to register with the embassy or with anyone else.
Many people do. Many do not. We made a massive effort to
try to determine how many people were there. To get to your
point, the reason that despite all of these warnings, despite
the environment people remained is because for virtually all of
them Afghanistan was their home. They have lived there for
years, for decades, for generations.
Their extended family was there, and it is the most
wrenching of all decisions to have to decide whether or not to
leave the place you have come to know as home.
Senator Booker. I wanted to ask that because I wanted to
give more texture to this complex situation. This is not that
there were people there--there were many people that fall into
the category of not being abandoned by our country but have
made the conscious choice to stay in country. Correct?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Booker. I have only been here 8 years, but I will
say to you and your staff, you have been the most responsive
State Department team that my office has dealt with. We have
brought many, as you know, people to your attention, both
American citizens and Afghanis, who wanted to get out, have
worked with us to many different degrees of success. I am
grateful for that.
I have now witnessed with my senior Senator, we went to our
joint base and saw the facilities being done for those who have
met extreme vetting and have made it to the United States. What
is going on with the 13,000 expected in New Jersey and the
65,000 to 70,000 is America at its best. I meant, for military
personnel and State Department talking to me about this being
some of the proudest work they have ever done, and I think
Americans should be aware of that and what is going on. We are
a great nation, and this is a reflection of those words on the
Statue of Liberty.
I want to pick up, though, on the situation as it is. I
think it was Senator Merkley who brought up the concerns about
humanitarian interests, humanitarian crisis that is really
boiling over there. I want to just get you to reiterate that
you issued one license, but we really need more. Correct?
Secretary Blinken. Yes, I understand that, and that is
exactly what we are looking at. We want to make sure that all
the authorities exist to provide that humanitarian assistance,
including by not just our own NGOs, but others as well.
Senator Booker. It is a strategic situation. We know we
control significant resources the Afghan Government has been
relying on to run basic services. This is a strategic leverage
that we have over the Taliban to continue to try to pressure
them into honoring human rights, honoring the rights of women,
countering some of the terrorist concerns that we have, and it
is very important.
However, given what we understand, without those resources
there are going to be continued humanitarian suffering. As the
New York Times reported, the World Food Program is estimating
about 40 percent of Afghans' crops are going to be lost. There
is going to be tremendous hunger as the price of wheat is
expected to go up 25 percent.
The World Food Program's own food stock is expected to run
out by September. So this is tremendous suffering that will
come. It is going to be exacerbated by climate change. We can
literally see issues of starvation hitting the general
population.
I guess, if you can give me specifically what assurances
has the Biden administration been able to secure from the
Taliban as it is to humanitarian access, and how is the State
Department working with international partners? Because it is
not just our responsibility to coordinate and provide near-term
and long-term assistance for those Afghans who have ended up in
locations without the proper support mechanisms.
Secretary Blinken. Yes. First, you are exactly right I
think to draw a distinction between basic humanitarian
assistance to respond to what is a crisis among so many Afghan
people. By the U.N.'s estimates, well over 50 percent are in
need of humanitarian assistance. We have had a drought. We have
had horrific economic conditions. We have had COVID, everything
piling on to one of the poorest countries on Earth to begin
with.
So when it comes to food, when it comes to medicine, when
it comes to the basics, we, the international community,
irrespective of anything else, ought to be able to provide
that, provided that we can do it knowing that the assistance is
going to get to the people who need it and not diverted or used
in any other way.
We have longstanding mechanisms and arrangements in place,
including with leading NGOs, including with the U.N. agencies
to do just that, as well as very clear monitoring mechanisms to
make sure even in an environment that we do not control, that
assistance gets to the people who need it. I spent time with
the head of the U.N. agency responsible for that to make sure
that that is what is happening.
We are coordinating with dozens of countries on this. The
U.N. is playing a lead role. They just had a donor's conference
to make sure that everyone else is feeding into this as well.
Senator Booker. I just want to end by saying thank you to
many of the State Department personnel still in that region as
well as here in the United States that are working through this
crisis.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Rounds I understand is with us
virtually.
Senator Rounds. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Secretary Blinken, thank you for your willingness to appear
before the committee and to answer questions on the Afghanistan
withdrawal. I understand you have been there for almost 3 hours
now. I appreciate your persistence in this.
Mr. Secretary, my staff has been working very closely with
yours on the issue of Afghan Special Immigration applications,
or SIVs, some of which have been initiated for over 3 years. As
you are aware, I sent a letter to you last week that outlines
my concerns, and I spoke to Deputy Secretary McKeon 3 weeks
ago.
Due to the preparation for the hearing, I received updates
on three of the five SIV cases my staff has been working for
months on. I sincerely appreciate the efforts of your staff to
get me this information, which I provided last night to the
South Dakota veterans who requested my help. For that, I want
to thank you.
I would, however, like you to be aware of my concern
pertaining to a key reason that has hamstrung my efforts to
assist SIV applicants. This is the Department's position stated
to my staff on multiple occasions that it is precluded by law
from providing updates or noting any potential defects in
applications.
Mr. Secretary, if true, this would prevent Members of
Congress from executing oversight and constituent service
responsibilities, specifically when they are advocating in
support of an applicant. It would also, incidentally, violate
the Department's own foreign affairs manual.
Will you commit to me today that you will review the
Department's procedures and fix this unacceptable procedure?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to review that. Let
me say, first, thank you. Thank you for the work that you and
your team and staff have done to help folks in need and to make
sure that we had the information that we needed to try to be
helpful and to get people out. I am really grateful for that
and grateful for the work that we have been able to do
together.
We will certainly review all of these procedures. There are
requirements either built into the law, privacy concerns, et
cetera, that may have to be addressed, but we should look at
everything.
Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think this is
important enough to where we will follow up, and hopefully,
within a time certain, we will be able to come up with what
changes need to be made, either statutorily or within the rules
process, to clarify this because this should not be that hard
to be able to stay in contact and to make those communications
back and forth between your Department and Members of the
United States Senate.
Our adversaries, Mr. Secretary, are celebrating the
departure of U.S. troops, and they most certainly are
celebrating the creation of a power vacuum. Most certainly,
they are also prepared to take this opportunity and use it to
their advantage. China has announced last week that it will
send $31 million worth of aid to Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. There have also been reports that they are looking
at Bagram Air Base for their own use.
The Russian embassy in Afghanistan has remained open, and
the Ambassador met with Taliban leadership after the takeover.
Pakistan is considering the Taliban Government as a partner to
counter India, and the Iranian President openly called this an
American military defeat and is considering working with the
Taliban.
Did the Administration consider all of these foreign policy
implications before such an abrupt withdrawal? If they did,
does the Department have a strategy to counter our adversaries'
malign influence in the region?
Secretary Blinken. We certainly did. We factored everything
into the decisions we made, including the impact that it might
have on the neighboring countries, regional countries, and
others with various interests in Afghanistan.
A number of the countries that you cited have a whole
series of different interests in Afghanistan, to include making
sure that it is not a place for terrorism directed against
them, to ensure that it is not a source of drugs flowing out
into their countries, to make sure that it is not a source of
potential refugees flowing out into the countries as well. So
all of those things are in play, and countries are looking to
take steps that they need to take to protect some of their
basic interests.
At the same time, we have established across more than 100
countries and in the U.N. through a Security Council resolution
basic expectations of the Taliban-led government. If those
expectations are not met, and other countries are aiding and
abetting so that the Taliban is able to not fulfill those
expectations, there will be consequences for that, too.
Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, if I could, what I am
really curious about is do you have a strategy that you
established? Did you have enough time before this withdrawal to
actually establish a strategy, knowing that there would be a
void in Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. The work that we have done to bring
together across dozens of countries, very active contact
groups, looking as we work together across these countries with
NATO, the EU, as well as the U.N., we have a collective
strategy on the way forward, and we are working that as we
speak.
Senator Rounds. Does our country, do we have a strategy
that if this has been laid out and based upon the need to move
out as quickly as we did, did you have time to actually
establish a strategy to take care of what will be this power
void? I understand that you have been there now for almost 3
hours, but simply to say that you are working on it with our
other countries seems to me, looks to me like we need our own
strategy here, and it does not sound like you are in a position
to share with us that that strategy actually exists today.
Secretary Blinken. I am happy, Senator, to follow up with
you and to share both our thinking and more of our work on
that. We have organized several dozens countries that are
collectively working----
Senator Rounds. Mr. Secretary, and my time is getting----
Secretary Blinken. --working on and implementing a strategy
both----
Senator Rounds. My time is getting short.
Secretary Blinken. Oh, I am sorry. Go ahead, Senator. Go
ahead.
Senator Rounds. What I hope is that if you would, whether
it be in a classified setting or publicly, if you could share
with us in the next week to 10 days what that strategy is. If
it needs to be in a classified setting, I would ask the
chairman to provide us with the opportunity.
Most certainly, I think it is important that we have a
strategy to combat what will be a void in Afghanistan, which is
a void now and most certainly is something that we should be in
better position, I believe, than what it sounds like you are
able to articulate today.
Mr. Chairman, I would suspect that my time is up at this
point.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey.
Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very
much.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for all of your work
and all of your colleagues' as well.
President Biden was right to end the United States' longest
war. If leaving Afghanistan was ever going to be clean and
easy, one of the President's three predecessors would have done
so. If we have learned anything from our 20-year war in
Afghanistan, it is that it is easier to get into a war than to
get out of one.
However, given the amount of second-guessing and arm-chair
quarterbacking that I have seen over the last month, I fear
that we have not learned anything. We must re-imagine a
national security policy that prioritizes diplomacy and stops
endless, undefined military engagements before they can begin.
I want to be sure that Americans at home understand the
position President Biden was placed in. President Trump's deal
with the Taliban exchanged a halt in Taliban offensives against
our troops for a commitment that we would leave the country by
May of this year. President Trump, with the support of his
national security team and many Republican Members of Congress,
negotiated this deal without the participation or buy-in of the
Afghan Government.
President Biden faced a choice of having to break that
deal, essentially restarting the war in Afghanistan and risk
increased attacks against U.S. troops or to get our troops home
as promised. President Trump, of course, did not leave an
actual plan to evacuate all of those who should have been taken
out of Afghanistan, and President Trump's vision without a plan
is and was a hallucination.
So that left it then ultimately to the Biden
administration, which did its best in order to effectuate that
agreement, which President Trump, in fact, made. President
Biden ultimately was right to follow through on that commitment
to end our country's longest war, one that claimed so many
military lives, so many tens of thousands of Afghan civilian
lives, and saddled U.S. taxpayers with $2 trillion worth of
debt over the last two decades.
The tremendous cost of war hit home in its final chapter,
as our armed forces and diplomats executed one of the largest
airlifts in U.S. history. We owe them a debt of gratitude.
Yesterday, Senator Warren and I both attended the funeral
service for U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Johanny Rosario-Pichardo
in Lawrence, Massachusetts. One of 13 American heroes who lost
her life on August 26 in that suicide bombing, as she was
guiding Afghan women and girls to safety at the Kabul airport's
Abbey gate.
The work of Purple Heart recipient Sergeant Rosario and
others during Operation Allies Refuge saved thousands of
innocent lives, and we have to ensure that our own commitment
to help the Afghan people endures past the takeoff of that last
U.S. military transport plane 2 weeks ago. We honor her, and we
honor all of those who gave their lives and sacrificed in
Afghanistan.
Every member of this committee I think has to agree that we
have to ensure that there is humanitarian aid that goes into
Afghanistan to help those who are in need. We spent $300
million every single day to conduct the war in Afghanistan,
roughly equivalent to what we spent this entire year in
humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.
Mr. Secretary, I sent a letter with four of my colleagues
today asking for the Administration to ensure that the money
previously allocated or requested for Afghan war efforts be
repurposed to assist Afghans in need. Could you give your view
as to what should happen with that funding now that the defunct
Afghan defense and national security forces are not there to
receive this funding, in terms of ensuring that we avert
further humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan?
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator, and I got your
letter. We are looking at all of that.
We want to make sure in the first instance that we are
making good on our own contributions to the humanitarian
assistance that the Afghan people need. We did that again
yesterday at the pledging conference organized by the United
Nations. We are going to continue to look at the needs going
forward and to look at what we can do effectively to make sure
that assistance is getting to the people who need it, not
diverted, of course, to the Taliban-led government and making
sure that agencies, whether the U.N. or NGOs, can operate
safely and effectively in Afghanistan.
Senator Markey. Thank you. As the last planes left, many
international relief organizations stayed behind. We owe it to
them not to create red tape and free them from the risk of
sanctions. Are you working with the Treasury Department to
issue a general license so that these groups' lifesaving work
can continue?
Secretary Blinken. We are working on the necessary
licensing authorities. As you know, we issued one license, the
Treasury did, a couple of weeks ago. We are looking to see what
additional authorities may be needed to make sure that
humanitarian assistance can get in there freely.
Senator Markey. Thank you. I think that is very important,
and I think telescoping the timeframe to get that completed is
very important.
Just about every major refugee assistance group has called
for lifting the level to 200,000 people as refugee admissions
into our country. What is the Administration's view on that
200,000 person goal in order to ensure that we deal with the
magnitude of this humanitarian crisis?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, as you know, we have already
significantly lifted the refugee cap from its historic lows
that were in place when we took office. Of course, we are
assessing whether there are going to be additional needs.
Having said that, the work we are doing now to bring
Afghans in need were vetted and checked into this country,
including support we need from Congress on that, will not for
the most part tap into the refugee cap. There are other means
and mechanisms by which we are looking to bring people in to
ensure, with your support, that they are given the assistance
that they would get were they coming in as refugees, but not
actually cutting into the existing cap or any future cap.
Senator Markey. Thank you, and thanks for all your great
work. I just would hope the 200,000 is the goal. The
resettlement agencies are pointing toward that number, and I
think it is a number that we should all strive to meet in order
to just be sure that these individuals not only survive, but
thrive in their new environment.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thanks for all your great work.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine, Ranking Member
Risch, Secretary Blinken.
Secretary Blinken. Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Before I start, I would just like to
acknowledge a young man, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss. Ryan
is a Tennessean, one of the 13 service members who lost his
life at the airport in Kabul, trying to rescue and save others.
My heart goes out to he and his family and the tragic loss
associated with this evacuation.
Regarding this evacuation, I agree with Senator Barrasso.
For President Biden to call this an extraordinary success is
beyond the pale when we leave Americans, when we leave our
allies, when we leave those that have helped us behind.
I have also just been over to visit with our allies in the
U.K. and in NATO, and their sense of surprise and enragement is
palpable. We have a very significant failure that is taking
place here, a failure of global proportion. It has placed our
allies in the position of questioning America's resolve, of
questioning our Nation's integrity, and frankly, they put us in
a situation where they are questioning whether we are a
reliable partner.
Our reputation as a nation, I think, has been put at risk
as a result of the failed evacuation here. Our job now is to
get to the bottom of this failure as a committee, this failure
that has left the world a more dangerous place for the United
States, for our allies, for those that depend on us. It has
also armed our enemies like never before, and it has emboldened
our strategic adversaries. There must be accountability.
Secretary Blinken, my office and other congressional
offices have heard rumors regarding potential Cabinet
resignations over the situation in Afghanistan. So I want to
ask you, have you submitted your resignation regarding this
issue?
Secretary Blinken. I have not.
Senator Hagerty. The lack of accountability here, the lack
of accountability in this Administration is shocking to me. I
would like to turn to another question regarding the
intelligence that we have relied upon.
In an internal report given to the State Department by
Embassy Kabul on August 16, there was warning of a breach at
the Kabul airport, and it said, ``A breach cannot be fully
prevented at current force levels.''
Mr. Secretary, did you see that report?
Secretary Blinken. I am sorry. Can you tell me the date
again, Senator?
Senator Hagerty. August 16, a report given to Embassy
Kabul, an internal report from Embassy Kabul to the State
Department saying that a breach at the airport cannot be fully
prevented at current force levels.
Secretary Blinken. I cannot tell you whether I saw that
specific report, but that is exactly why the President had on
standby 6,000 forces to be able to deploy immediately into
Afghanistan, into the airport in case the airport was in
jeopardy, and that is exactly what we did.
Senator Hagerty. Well, the force levels being insufficient
I think was a significant reason for concern, something that in
a plan of action I think should have been accounted for
certainly earlier.
Going to the NEO plan, I would like to cover that with you
for a few minutes. The noncombatant evacuation operational plan
for Afghanistan would be a plan on how we evacuate American
civilians from a foreign country should a dangerous situation
arise.
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Hagerty. Prior to turning over the Bagram Air Base
on July 2, did the NEO plan to evacuate Americans have the
Bagram Air Base as a critical element of its strategy?
Secretary Blinken. The critical element for any evacuation
was actually the airport in Kabul, known as HKIA. Because, as
you know, Senator, Bagram is about 40 miles from Kabul. To the
extent that the population that you are seeking to evacuate is
mostly in Kabul, the airport by far most convenient to them
would be the airport in Kabul, HKIA.
Senator Hagerty. A civilian airport in a neighborhood that
is much more difficult to protect than an airport the size of
Bagram with two runways and the ability to land and lift off,
significant airlift capacity. I am frankly quite shocked that
our NEO plan would have had no inclusion of the Bagram Air
Base, but if I understand you correctly, it did not include
Bagram?
Secretary Blinken. The plan focused on the airport in
Kabul.
Senator Hagerty. I wonder how the evacuation plan was
updated, Mr. Secretary, as things began to change on the
ground. What was the process that you deployed there?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, through the course of the
spring and summer, we reviewed all of these plans, different
contingencies, including the NEO plan. Of course, the element
that no one anticipated, as we have discussed on numerous
occasions, was the rapid collapse of the Afghan Government and
the Afghan security forces in the space of about 11 days.
Having said that, we had plans in place to do the two
critical things that we did. We were able to evacuate our
embassy, all its personnel, destroy sensitive materials, and
get people to the airport in 48 hours and in many cases much
less than that.
Second, as I mentioned, the President ordered that there be
a standby force in place to make sure that HKIA, the airport in
Kabul, was secured. Planes could come in, planes could take
off, and we had a secure facility. We did that in the course of
about 72 hours.
Senator Hagerty. Back to the NEO discussion. In an August
14 briefing, the Pentagon spokesman John Kirby denied that
there was an NEO operation in Afghanistan at that point. But 2
days later, on the 16th, he belatedly admitted there was a NEO
operation going on.
So I am curious, Mr. Secretary, what date did the
Administration actually decide to execute the NEO plan, and
when did they begin to actively evacuate all Americans and
allies?
Secretary Blinken. I believe, Senator, it was triggered by
the collapse of the government and the security forces.
Senator Hagerty. Who would have made the decision to
execute the NEO?
Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President would be asked
for his decision, approval to do that, based on the
recommendation of the different Government agencies involved.
Senator Hagerty. Is that what happened in this case?
Secretary Blinken. I believe that is right. Yes, sir.
Senator Hagerty. You know, oversight is not a simple check
the box exercise. It requires getting to the bottom of what has
come to be the greatest U.S. foreign policy disaster, at least
in my lifetime. Mr. Chairman, we need more hearings on this
Afghanistan withdrawal failure.
I would also like to say this. Leadership requires owning
one's mistakes, and leadership requires introspection and a
commitment to achieve what is right. What we have witnessed
here has been a failure of leadership. What it is has been a
press-driven spin cycle. It is one that has deflected blame,
and it is one that shamed us as a nation. It is time to leave.
Secretary Blinken. Senator, if I could just say briefly in
response?
Senator Kaine. Please be brief, if you would.
Secretary Blinken. Yes. I am responsible for the decisions
I make. I am responsible for the actions of my Department. I am
responsible for learning any lessons that flowed from those
decisions or those actions, and I am also responsible to
holding myself accountable to you and through you to the
American people, which is exactly what I am doing here today,
what I have been doing these past weeks in repeated
conversations and briefings with Members of Congress, both the
Senate and the House, and what I will continue to do going
forward.
We can all draw our own conclusions from that. I respect
yours. I may disagree with them, but that is exactly the
process that I am engaged in and that we are engaged in, and we
will continue to do that going forward.
Senator Hagerty. Well, my constituents expect that sort of
accountability as well, particularly the veterans that serve in
Tennessee and across the Nation that have reached out to me
that are absolutely heartbroken about what has gone on. There
has been loss of life. There has been loss of treasure.
We have now armed terrorists at a level that I have never
expected. Our allies are more proximate to this threat than we
are. They could not have been more frustrated with me when I
spoke with them. They are concerned that we now have a threat
level that we have never seen before, and we have got to find
ways to work together with them to address that.
I will look to you for accountability on that as well as we
move forward, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I recognize what a huge
undertaking it is to airlift every American out of Afghanistan
and work to get some of our closest Afghan partners out of
harm's way after 20 years of American presence and troops in
Afghanistan.
The United States Government conducted the biggest airlift
in our history, over 120,000 people. I understand and want to
thank all the people who were involved in that.
That said, I really urge you to have the State Department
surge more people to this process to help the remaining
Americans out of Afghanistan, to help others, legal permanent
residents and others. Mr. Secretary, I have with me a list of a
lot of the constituent cases that are on our office. I am going
to give it to you and your staff. If I could just get your
commitment that you will get back to us on these cases?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Because we have had your
help, we have one case of a 2-year-old American citizen, and we
have been working with you on that. We also have cases of 15
legal permanent residents and a number of our close Afghan
partners. At this point, the system at the State Department and
DHS is overwhelmed. We are just getting back form responses
without any feedback as to the state of the case. So I really
urge you to keep at that.
I must say I guess I should not be surprised. As Senator
Shaheen said, the level of hypocrisy in this room and this
Congress is staggering. You know, we should have more hearings
on what happened in Afghanistan, starting with the decision to
divert huge amounts of U.S. troops and resources to Iraq in one
of the biggest strategic blunders in modern American history,
where it is a clear matter of record that Iran has been the
biggest beneficiary of that decision.
Let us fast forward now to the Trump administration. I did
not oppose the decision of the Trump administration to open up
negotiations with the Taliban. Everybody in this room, I
suspect, recognized there was no military solution to this
conflict, that there had to be a political solution. So I
supported opening up that process.
Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the Trump
administration asked the Pakistani Government to release three
top Taliban commanders as part of that process?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. One of them is the person who is now
number two, Baradar, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. He is the person everybody saw in those
photos in Kabul, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. There was another senior
commander released, and they began the discussions in Doha?
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Van Hollen. They did not include the Afghan
Government, did they?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. Right. They, in fact, essentially
ordered, pressured the Afghan Government to release 5,000
Taliban fighters, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. Many of those fighters involved in the
attack on Kabul today, right?
Secretary Blinken. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now let us see what the
negotiation was. Here was the negotiation. I supported the
beginning of it. The United States will leave by a date
certain, May of this year, right?
Secretary Blinken. Correct.
Senator Van Hollen. You cannot attack American forces, but
you can attack Afghan forces with impunity, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. That is right. So we pick a date, we
say to the Taliban you can attack Afghan forces, and then we
say, okay, now let us negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Is
that not the way it was set up when you walked in?
Secretary Blinken. That is essentially correct, yes.
Senator Van Hollen. There is a saying in Afghanistan that
foreigners have the watches, we have the time. So the Trump
administration, through those negotiations, set it up perfectly
for the Taliban. Green light to attack the Afghan forces. No
discussion going forward.
Then is it not true that the former President criticized
President Biden for not pulling out our forces earlier?
Secretary Blinken. I believe that is accurate.
Senator Van Hollen. I think he said we have got to stick to
our May timetable. So President Trump, ``stick to our May
timetable,'' and by the way I am handing you negotiation where
I have already said we are getting out, and I have said go
ahead and attack the Afghan forces. Now we are going to talk
about the future.
So that is the hand you have been dealt. Let me talk to you
a little bit about the future, and I am glad you brought
together the ministerial meeting with our NATO partners, with
surrounding countries. This will never work if the surrounding
countries do not participate and others in the region. You had
both Pakistan and India at the table, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now I am very much in the mode,
and I know you are, too, you watch what they do, not what they
say, right?
Secretary Blinken. Exactly.
Senator Van Hollen. The Taliban clearly have new PR people.
They also recognize that their actions they have to take in
order to get any kind of support whatsoever from some of the
Western countries, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. So I have heard you testify today
to some of those conditions, free and safe passage for people
who want to leave, right?
Secretary Blinken. Right.
Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Access by international
humanitarian organizations directly to the Afghan people, not
through any Taliban, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is Right.
Senator Van Hollen. Protection of girls, women, and
minorities.
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Van Hollen. This is going to be one, obviously, we
have to keep a very close eye on.
Fourth, you cannot use the territory of Afghanistan as a
base for future terrorist attacks, whether it is Al Qaeda or
anybody else, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Van Hollen. A more inclusive government because,
right now, we have a government comprised of Taliban, including
two members of the Haqqani Network, one of who is wanted for
questioning and for violent activities.
So my question to you is that was a really important first
step because we want everybody on the same page, meaning our
close partners and surrounding countries, right?
Secretary Blinken. That is right.
Senator Van Hollen. All right. Do you have that buy-in from
all the partners around the table that we will act in unison?
Secretary Blinken. We do have that buy-in. We have that
buy-in not only from the meetings we have. We have that buy-in
in the statements that many countries have signed onto. We have
that in a U.N. Security Council resolution that we initiated,
and critically, we have moving forward established an ongoing
group of countries and institutions that are going to work
together to track this, to continue to make sure we are
speaking with one voice and acting in unison.
Senator Van Hollen. Got it.
Secretary Blinken. Now there are countries that may be
outliers in this effort. Some of them have been referenced to
include China, to include Russia, to include Pakistan, and that
is something that we are being very vigilant about as well.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, I know time is up, but I think a
number of those countries, at least Pakistan, like India, like
the others, have an interest in preventing chaos and civil war
in Afghanistan.
Secretary Blinken. They do.
Senator Van Hollen. Obviously, we asked them to release
prisoners that they had locked up, Taliban prisoners. So,
obviously, we have to keep an eye on the ISI, I get that. Let
us all work together to achieve the goal of a stable
Afghanistan that protects the rights of its people.
Thank you.
Secretary Blinken. Appreciate that.
The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
Secretary Blinken. Senator.
Senator Cruz. President Biden and the Biden administration
have presided over the worst foreign policy catastrophe in a
generation. Americans across the Nation are horrified. Our
servicemen and women, our active duty military are angry, they
are disillusioned, and they are frustrated.
Our enemies across the globe are emboldened, which makes
the world more dangerous today for America, and our allies are
dispirited. Ever since the disaster began unfolding in
Afghanistan, we have seen the Biden administration making
political excuses. We have seen Democrats on this committee
explaining at great length how everything that happened in
Afghanistan is Trump's fault. It is all Trump's fault.
Mr. Secretary, Joe Biden is the President of the United
States. Kamala Harris is the Vice President of the United
States. You are the United States Secretary of State. Just like
Jimmy Carter owns the disaster of the Iran hostage crisis, you
own this.
The Biden administration caused this disaster. It was
caused by two things. Number one, ideological naivete and
extremism. Repeatedly, Mr. Secretary, in this hearing and also
on multiple conference calls over the last month, you keep
saying things like the steps the Taliban needs to take to be
welcomed into the community of civilized nations.
Mr. Secretary, they do not want to be welcomed into the
community of civilized nations. They are terrorists who want to
murder us. This Administration does not understand that. Joe
Biden does not understand that.
Sadly, that ideological extremism was combined with
manifest incompetence. There were four decisions this
Administration made that I think were utterly indefensible.
Number one, abandoning the Bagram airfield, giving it to the
Taliban. That is a decision that 100 years from now will be
studied at war colleges as a colossal strategic mistake, giving
up two secure airfields, necessitating an evacuation from a
dense urban environment, a commercial airport, which led
tragically to the suicide bombings and murders that killed 13
American servicemen and women.
Had we been evacuating from Bagram with a secure perimeter,
the odds are quite high that attack either would not have
happened or if it had happened, it would have been far less
severe in its consequences.
Secondly, the Biden administration giving the Taliban a
list of Americans and of Afghans we wanted out. Third, the
decision to leave Americans behind. Hundreds of Americans,
perhaps more, perhaps thousands; thousands of green card
holders; tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted the U.S.
military, the Biden administration abandoned them and left them
behind.
Fourth, leaving billions of dollars of American military
equipment that the Taliban will now use to threaten our lives.
Earlier in this hearing, you said about that equipment, ``None
of it poses a strategic threat to us or their neighbors.'' That
does not pass the laugh test. When you are looking at the
Taliban potentially having 64,000 machine guns, 33 Black Hawk
helicopters, 16,000 night vision goggles, we will see American
blood spilled because of these colossal mistakes.
Now abandoning Bagram was not your call. It was the
Pentagon's and the White House's ultimately. I want to ask you
flat out, did the State Department give the Taliban a list or
multiple lists of Americans and/or Afghans that we wanted out?
Secretary Blinken. Those reports and the idea that we would
do anything to endanger our citizens or anyone else at a time
when we were trying to save their lives is flat-out wrong. Let
me----
Senator Cruz. So I would just like a ``yes'' or ``no,'' did
you give them a list?
Secretary Blinken. Let me be very clear, Senator, if I may,
please? Thank you.
In limited instances where we were seeking to get a bus or
a group of people through a checkpoint, we gave a manifest to
the people at the checkpoint to demonstrate that those people
were expected to----
Senator Cruz. Roughly how many names were on the list you
gave?
Secretary Blinken. Does not matter because they all----
Senator Cruz. Dozens, hundreds, thousands, give us some
order of magnitude.
Secretary Blinken. This happened in a handful of situations
where to get through----
Senator Cruz. Dozens? So is it your testimony it was not
hundreds? I want to understand. Did you give them thousands of
names?
Secretary Blinken. No, we did not.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Hundreds?
Secretary Blinken. I am not going to put a number on it,
but it was--again----
Senator Cruz. Why not? This is a hearing to discover. How
many names and how many of those individuals you gave the
Taliban the name to have been targeted for torture or murder?
Secretary Blinken. Senator, by definition, these were in
limited instances with a bus or a group of people to get them
through a checkpoint. They got through the checkpoint.
Senator Cruz. So not only did you fail to evacuate
Americans and green card holders who were there, but you also
brought in tens of thousands of Afghans who had wholly
inadequate vetting, bringing many of them to the United States.
One of the things that has done is that has brought in a
humanitarian crisis to America.
Child marriage and domestic abuse tragically are widespread
in Afghanistan. According to the World Health Organization,
more than half of the women in Afghanistan are married as child
brides, and 90 percent of women are subject to domestic abuse,
90 percent.
On August 27, according to public reports, you distributed
internal documentation highlighting numerous instances at
intake centers of sexual abuse in which much older, grown
Afghan males appeared with children, young children, claimed
they were their brides, claimed they were their wives, and the
document said the State Department urgently requested guidance.
That was your word, ``urgently.''
Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security said that
it showed the desperation of families that they were willing to
give little girls to grown men to be subject to sexual abuse
and child wives. My question is as follows. Did you receive
that urgent guidance? How many children have been subject to
sexual abuse? What have you done to rescue young children from
illegal and abusive relationships after being brought to
America by the State Department?
Secretary Blinken. Across the entire Government, everyone
involved in the evacuation effort, whether it is at a transit
point in one of the countries that we negotiated with, whether
it is here in the United States at Dulles or Philadelphia or
the military bases, we have all of our officers at extreme
vigilance to look for and to deal with any cases or concerns
that arise----
Senator Cruz. Did you receive the urgent guidance, and how
many child brides have you seen?
Secretary Blinken. I do not know the specific guidance you
are referring to. I am happy to look at it.
Senator Cruz. So was there not urgency to discover if
children are being abused?
Secretary Blinken. Absolutely. Absolutely.
The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
Secretary Blinken. We could detect and deal with many
cases, and there have been, to my knowledge, a limited number
of cases where we have separated people because we were
concerned that they were----
Senator Cruz. How many?
Secretary Blinken. Cases I am aware of? A handful.
[Gavel sounding.]
The Chairman. Senator Kaine, you have the last word today.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
Risch.
Secretary Blinken, thank you for the time that you have
spent with us today. It is an important hearing, and there will
be many more. I am going to a second one in the Armed Services
Committee in about 2 hours, and I expect over the course of the
next weeks, there will be many. I am just going to really speak
from the heart to kind of set out what I am thinking at a very
important moment, a complicated moment.
I am the father of a Marine. I come from a state that is
very, very heavily affected by the wars of the last 20 years.
It was one of the States that was attacked on 9/11. In the
weeks of August and early September, this is basically what I
have done. I have watched Afghanistan on television. I have
talked to active duty and veterans. I have talked to you and
other colleagues.
I have visited the Pentagon for the Pentagon employees'
commemoration of the 9/11 attack. I went to Arlington on 9/11
to go to the fire station where the relief effort was
spearheaded. I have also gone to Fort Lee, as you have, to see
the incredible work that is being done to help Afghans who have
stood with us integrate into American life.
I have been to the Dulles Expo Center to see these families
that have traveled halfway around the world, still traumatized,
but looking forward to a chapter where they can be free. I have
a lot of emotions. So let me just tell you what they are. They
are sadness, and they are anger, and they are pride, and they
are relief.
Sadness. I am saddened by the unnecessary deaths of the
3,000 or so who were killed on 9/11. I am saddened by the
deaths of more than 7,000 U.S. troops. I am saddened by the
deaths of more than 8,000 American contractors. I doubt there
has been a war in the history of the United States where more
contractors died than troops, but this global war on terror is
one such war.
I am saddened at the deaths of 400,000 innocent civilians
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. I am saddened at those who are
now going to have to live under Taliban rule. I am particularly
saddened for the families of the 13 troops who were killed. To
lose a child in any circumstance is horrible, and war is
horrible. In the last days of a war, in the last days of a war
that has been declared over and is winding down, I do not know
how that wound could ever heal for a parent. Yet, those 13 died
to save the lives of about 120,000 people who will have the
chance to live in a freer and better society because of their
heroism.
I am angry. I am angry at the terrorist impulse. I was
angry about it on 9/11/01, the urge to destroy with the planes
flying into buildings and killing people indiscriminately--
young, old, American, and other nationalities, Muslim,
Christian, Jewish, no religion. That indiscriminate urge to
destroy, to blow up a demolition vest at the Kabul airport and
kill 13 American troops and hundreds of your own countrymen and
women. For what? That angers me.
I am angered that after 20 years of American investment in
an Afghan security force dramatically larger than the Taliban,
dramatically better equipped than the Taliban, that security
force just melted away and failed. The one thing I would be a
little bit critical of you and the Administration is the same
point that Senator Romney was making earlier and Senator Rubio.
The notion that General Milley said that nothing I or anyone
else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this government
in 11 days, I just do not think that is true.
I know it was not the consensus opinion, and I know it was
not the most likely possibility, but the possibility of a
collapse was not zero percent, and it was not 1 percent. It
probably was not 10 percent. It was probably, based on what we
have been hearing in this committee and others have, too, that
was always a fairly--it was a possibility that had to be
grappled with.
I guess one of the questions that I will get into over
coming weeks is if the Administration really said nobody could
see this coming, then that probably suggests that the
contingency planning for something that was a real possibility
was not all that it should have been.
My anger at the collapse of the security force, we have got
to get into it, and we have to decide did we train them wrong?
Did our equipping them lead to corruption? Were they good
fighters that lacked confidence in their own military and
civilian leadership? Did we want things for Afghans that the
Afghan leadership did not want for themselves?
We had good intentions about what we might have wanted in
Afghanistan, but let us face it. We cannot get 30 percent of
Americans to get a vaccine. We cannot get 30 percent of
Americans to acknowledge the results of a presidential
election. Do we really think that we can determine what the
culture of another country should be?
I am proud. I am proud of those who served in so many
different ways, from first responders who ran into the
buildings on 9/11, to this generation of Americans, many of
whom did not come from military families necessarily, but who
volunteered to serve.
Not just serve once or twice, but this is the only
generation, I believe, of the American military that has seen
five, six, seven, eight, nine deployments again and again and
again. Injured, wounded, carrying some invisible scars that
will affect the rest of their life. I am proud of their
service.
I am proud of the country and my Virginians for what they
are doing in welcoming Afghans here. The outreach from
Virginians to my office, from our Vietnamese community, we want
to help Afghans settle. From churches, where do we donate? How
do we give to resettlement agencies?
When I visited Fort Lee and Dulles, to hear the Afghans
express their appreciation to the United States and, even in
the midst of their trauma and their anxiety about the next
chapter, to be excited about the opportunity to live in a place
not under Taliban rule and have an opportunity for better lives
for their children, I am proud that even amidst all of the
challenge that is the way they look at us.
I am proud of the military who are there who say I have
been deployed five times. This mission is the most important
mission I will ever undertake.
The last thing--and Mr. Chair, if you might indulge me
because I may go another 30 seconds past--I am relieved. No one
has said this yet. I am relieved that a child born at Inova
Fairfax today is not born into a nation at war. Some will
challenge my characterization because the world is a dangerous
place, and American troops are deployed all over the world.
There is risks, and there is threats, but we have been a nation
at permanent war for 20 years.
We were never supposed to be that nation, never. Never. We
were never supposed to be that nation. I heard a college
student at George Washington say recently, ``I know nothing of
war''--because with an all-volunteer army, she does not have
to--``but all I know is war.'' ``All I know is war.''
President Biden had the courage to say this Nation is not a
nation that should be permanently at war. It is going to take a
while for people to wrap their head around the notion that
though there are serious threats for us everywhere, we are not
a nation now that is at war, ground wars in the Middle East. It
is going to take people a while to get used to it.
Some people will resist it. Some people will want to say,
no, we have got to be on the front edge of our feet and be on
permanent war footing at all moments for now into infinity. I
am relieved. I am relieved that for the first time in 20 years,
children being born in this country today are not being born
into a nation at war.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me move and place into today's
hearing record a statement on Afghanistan from recently exiled
Afghan women leaders and human rights defenders that urges the
United States to continue to support women's groups across
Afghanistan as central drivers of change.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
at the end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony.
You have been here over 3 and a half hours. I think every
member of the committee was present and had an opportunity to
ask questions, and you give substantive answers.
I will just close by saying while the focus today has been
the present Administration's decisions, this is going back 20
years. As someone who sat here as a staff director of this
committee, as someone who was at the NSC at one time, as
someone who was an Assistant Deputy Secretary and now the
Secretary, I think you might join me in saying that over the
last 20 years at different times, Congress has been misled.
Assessments were definitely overly rosy, to say the best.
If we are not to repeat the past, we need to learn from it, and
that is what the committee's ultimate pursuit will be.
The record of this hearing will remain open until the close
of business on Thursday. With the thanks and respect of the
committee for your participation, this hearing is adjourned.
Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement,
Dated September 9, 2021
______
Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter,
Dated September 2, 2021
______
Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women Leaders and
Human Rights Defenders
Secretary Blinken and Members of Congress:
With the fall of the Afghan Government, it has been a blow to many
of our achievements of the last 20 years that have been gained with
your government's support. In the last few weeks since being overtaken
by the Taliban, it is evident that the peace process has been a fallacy
that had no guarantee of securing what the United States and people of
Afghanistan invested in over the last two decades.
Many of us women activists have been working for an inclusive and
just peace for years. We repeatedly warned the United States Government
and the international community that if the withdrawal was not managed
responsibly, and if the peace process was not Afghan-centric, it would
be a disastrous failure.
We were incredibly disappointed with the peace process that your
government facilitated, especially when the talks in Istanbul were
supposed to happen but then the announcement of the non-conditional
troop withdrawal effectively ended them before they could begin. We do
understand the United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan as its
longest war, however a few months more where your troops were not
involved in combat would have at least helped with reaching an
acceptable political settlement that would have allowed some level of
inclusivity.
Today the Taliban Government is run by unqualified fighters and by
Pakistani proxy. Women are nowhere in the new structure of government
and women's activities and freedoms are being limited in health and
education in 7 out of 34 provinces. The media is strictly under
scrutiny and minorities have been marginalized in the disorganized new
government structure. Protests have been met with brutality, with women
protestors arrested and tortured badly. Many people were massacred in
Panjsheer, and elsewhere in Afghanistan.
Some of us have made it to the United States through the parole
process and with the support of U.S. women's rights groups and
political leaders. This journey started under extremely difficult
conditions, and we still don't know when it will end. We women leaders
and activists have been mixed with U.S. trained Afghan troops and other
groups. The entire evacuation process was gravely mismanaged for women.
Even those who had U.S. visas were denied safe entry into the airport
as timely information was not communicated with relevant troops
managing the airport gates. Worst of all, not all of our friends made
it out with us. At the airport gates we faced gun fire from both
Taliban and U.S. troops, tear gas, and a suicide bomb attack. Many
people died trying to escape a regime that they don't believe in.
The Taliban has proven to be an extreme regime lacking law and
order, essentially being run by several groups of outlaws. They are now
targeting activists, former government employees, and women Members of
Parliament, and entering their homes, taking their cars, and collecting
any means of security that they possessed in the past. Even NGO offices
run by women have been shut down and their valuables, such as cars,
have been taken from them.
While we are disheartened by the way things evolved on the ground,
the United States still has an opportunity to support the Afghan
people. We women leaders of Afghanistan call on the U.S. Government to
provide a humanitarian response to the double catastrophe of the
Taliban regime and the drought and famine that are causing suffering
across the country. Beyond humanitarian assistance, we call on the U.S.
to support women's groups across Afghanistan as the real drivers of
change. Women should be given any and all political support to help
ensure their safety as they continue their life saving work on behalf
of thousands of women across the country.
We also call on the United States to include a more responsible
team in the peace process and help end the current catastrophe before
it engulfs everyone in the country and region. Particular pressure
should be maintained and increased on Pakistan for supporting the
Taliban and offering safe haven to ISIS.
Today Al-Qaida, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist
groups are in Afghanistan enjoying safe sanctuary. This is a threat to
the U.S. and the world that needs to be contained through a revised
strategy in Afghanistan and the region. Just like all other strategies,
women should be at the center if there is to be a guarantee for a safe
and balanced Afghanistan. As we have been saying all along, our rights
are not separate from peace and security, but are necessary for peace
and security to be achieved.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. In August, my staff reached out to the State Department
regarding the family of Sharif Azizi who interpreted for U.S. forces in
Afghanistan and resides in the United States as an SIV. We have
received credible reports the Taliban are actively hunting for members
of his family, who remain unable to leave Afghanistan. On August 29, a
rocket hit about 300 yards away from where they were hiding. The family
is now trying to cross into Pakistan. We've asked your office to get
him an expedited travel document so he can travel to Pakistan and
escort his family from the border to U.S. Embassy Islamabad. I have one
simple ask: can you please work with me to get this individual an
expedited travel document ASAP and ensure that State is prepared to
process the family's application, if they can safely cross the border?
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
and when they choose to do so. We are continuing to process Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process,
including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates
around the world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it
is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a
third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we are
developing processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver
these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan.
Question. The Taliban continue to imprison Mark Frerichs, (Free-
ricks) an American contractor. He should have been on that plane to
Qatar last week along with other Americans inside the country. What
steps are you taking to secure his release?
Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran
Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to
hold an American hostage. We continue to raise the need for Mark's
immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible
opportunity. The Taliban must immediately release him. We have been
clear that any legitimacy and any support will have to be earned. We
have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar, Pakistan, and
others while we continue to press the Taliban to release Mark.
Question. We have received credible reports that there were 1,200
students, faculty and staff from the American University of Afghanistan
mobilized and ready to depart well before the August 31 deadline--all
with the proper paperwork. The Taliban gave assurances that they would
let the convoy through the airport but reversed themselves on August
27, apparently citing a decision from Washington that AUAF evacuees
were no longer a priority. Nearly half of the 1,000 students are women,
and about 200 Afghan women were handpicked by the State Department and
given full-ride scholarships. Now the campus is under the control of
the Haqqanis. What are your plans to ensure continued support for this
university--one of the few investments we have left--and can you
confirm you will help these vulnerable young people, who are desperate
to evacuate, leave Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States will continue to support equal access to
education in Afghanistan, and we are exploring options regarding our
support for the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) and its
students under current circumstances. We are aware that AUAF is also
exploring options, including the possibility of remote learning. We
would refer you to AUAF leadership for details. The Department
continues to explore options for those students who wish to depart
Afghanistan, and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of
commercial flights out of Kabul International Airport.
Question. It is my understanding that a number of Afghan passports
and documents associated with visa applications were destroyed by
embassy staff when the embassy closed down, resulting in a number of
Afghans now lacking the documents that they would need in order to meet
Taliban document demands in order to be able to leave the country.
While I understand the security concerns in not wanting to leave those
materials behind, this again strikes me as indicative of the lack of
planning and preparation made for the collapse of Afghanistan and our
hasty exit. I also understand we don't even know the number, let alone
the identities, of Afghans who we've stranded in this way. Can you
explain to us what happened with this incident, why, and where it
leaves our Afghan partners?
Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency
drawdown to mitigate risk by reducing the amount of sensitive material
remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown was conducted in accordance
with this procedure. For Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) recipients
traveling to the United States under U.S. Government care, we
collaborated with the Department of Homeland Security to provide
electronic proof of recent visa issuance. While we are currently unable
to provide consular services for visa applicants in Afghanistan, we
will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear.
We are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to
deliver consular services for Afghans. In tandem with our allies and
partners, we continue to press the Taliban to live up to their public
commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.
Question. Prior to the final flight out, we heard from both
American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the airport but
were either not being allowed through the gates, being sent back home,
or simply abandoned with no guidance. While we understand and
appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is confounding
that such a chaotic process arose to begin with. It speaks to the
failure to plan and resource to get this withdrawal right. Or it speaks
to a failure of implementation. Why was the Administration unable to
implement clear and concise plans to wind down our presence in
Afghanistan?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel
is a top priority for the Department. A major component of executing
contingency plans is adjusting to the situation on the ground as the
operating environment warrants. The U.S. embassy was able to safely
relocate personnel to the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul
International Airport (KIA) on August 15 and 16, 2021. The security
situation was dynamic and required the U.S. military to send additional
troops to secure the perimeter of KIA. The embassy released 15 consular
messages to the public between August 15 and August 31, 2021, to
provide the latest information to U.S. citizens on the evacuation
operations. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and
partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from
Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a
pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats. I defer
to the Department of Defense on any questions related to the withdrawal
of U.S. military personnel.
Question. Precisely when did the Administration begin to plan for a
worst case scenario contingency?
Answer. The Department of State engaged in contingency planning for
a range of scenarios starting in January 2019. The planning scenarios
were based on a range of potential security conditions on the ground
and a declining level of mission functions. The scenarios assumed
reduced embassy footprints while maintaining core mission functions
under various scenarios. Planning continued following the change in
administration in January 2021.
Question. Why didn't we have the security, personnel for
processing, and airlift capabilities in place for what was a very
predictable set of circumstances?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy was able to safely relocate personnel to
the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul International Airport
(KIA) August 15-16, 2021. The security situation was dynamic and
required the U.S. military to send additional troops to secure the
perimeter of KIA and the Department to send in additional logistics and
consular personnel. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and
partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from
Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a
pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats.
Question. What was the specific planning put into the likely
scenario that American citizens were going to have to evacuate under
hostile conditions?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens, U.S. Government
personnel, and their dependents is the highest Department priority. All
embassies and consulates around the world prepare detailed Emergency
Action Plans that include sections related to Department of Defense
support to assist with crises abroad. U.S. Embassy Kabul completed an
annual Crisis Management Exercise in December 2020 to prepare for a
potential large-scale evacuation. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various
Department offices participated with interagency partners in evacuation
planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of 2021. Planning
efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S. Embassy Kabul
worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure close
coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan, and
with CENTCOM.
Question. In your remarks on August 30, you said the United States
will continue to work with Afghans at risk who want to leave. How do
you define an ``Afghan at risk'' and how many Afghans in that category
remain in Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
international community to explore all options to support members of
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--
women, children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+
community, members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk
populations. We are continuing to examine all available avenues for
protection for this population. We recognize that it is currently
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a
third country or find a way to enter a third country, and like many
refugees, they may face significant challenges fleeing to safety. We
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need.
Question. What role did individual vulnerability based on religion,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.--factors beyond U.S. affiliation or
NGO affiliation--play in prioritizing evacuations? If at all, when in
the planning process did this consideration arise? How many resources
did the Department devote to this line of effort?
Answer. The Department of State's priority is supporting departures
of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents and their immediate
families. The Department of State is also committed to providing
assistance to Special Immigrant Visa applicants and vulnerable Afghans,
including refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans,
victims of conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with
disabilities, members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and
other at-risk populations. The Department of State established a team,
led by the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate
across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to
leave Afghanistan.
Question. Of those identified by the State Department as ``most
vulnerable'' Afghans, including activists, journalists, and human
rights defenders, how many were evacuated by the U.S. or with U.S.
facilitation? How many of these were implementers of USG democracy and
human rights programs? What is your plan to assist them?
Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women,
children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community,
members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk populations.
We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for
this population.
Question. How and when did you brief NGOs regarding requirements
for facilitating charters how did you share the information those NGOs
needed to facilitate safe passage of their employees through Kabul and
into the airport? During the approximately 2 weeks of evacuation
operations following the fall of Kabul, how did you prioritize private
charter requests and the entry of their manifested passengers to the
Kabul airport? What efforts did your Department take to facilitate
access to the airport for those assigned seats on charter aircraft that
had been given landing clearance?
Answer. During the operations in August led by the Department of
Defense (DoD), the Department of State had a dedicated team liaising
across State and with DoD to coordinate information and communications
with private charter operators. Guidance provided by the DoD was
communicated as inquiries were received by the Department of State, and
planning and arrangements were further facilitated by the assigned case
manager for each private charter inquiry that was received. Airport
access for those manifested for private charter flights was coordinated
with security at the airport in Kabul, and the Department of State case
managers worked with private charter operators to facilitate this
access as conditions allowed.
Question. To what do you attribute claims that your Department gave
no clear guidance to anybody other than those with U.S. visas or
passports to enter the airport?
Answer. The Department of State provided regular notifications and
security alerts on our public website prior to the suspension of
operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 31,
2021. These notifications are available for review here: https://
af.usembassy.gov/news-events/.
Question. How is the Administration coordinating with the NGO
coalition and private entities still conducting time-sensitive private
evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan? In particular, how is the
Administration supporting efforts to facilitate civilian evacuation
flights, including with regard to landing rights at destination
locations and travel to and capacity at lily-pad location?
Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State
Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the
flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating
requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately
organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger
manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these
flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially
eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States.
The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate
the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S.
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.
Question. I applaud the Administration's decision to appoint
Governor Markell and Mr. Robert Fenton as senior officials responsible
for addressing the resettlement of Afghans in the United States. Who is
the corresponding lead official at the Department of State responsible
for addressing the evacuation of and support to those Afghans at risk
who remain left behind in Afghanistan or are now in third countries?
What planning has been done to help all of these people who remain left
behind?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
partners and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. The United States will work vigorously with the international
community to explore all options to support vulnerable populations in
Afghanistan.
Question. More than 3,200 Afghans are part of the United Nations'
presence in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were left behind during the
evacuation and remain trapped there. The Taliban have been very clear
about how they view any Afghan who has worked with the international
community, and as such these women and men--and their families--face
much the same threat as those who worked with the United States. While
the U.N.'s humanitarian presence in Afghanistan is critical, a great
many of these Afghans are not directly involved in humanitarian aid
delivery or other urgent life-saving work. Certainly the international
community shares a profound responsibility for their safety. What is
being done to help get them and their families to safety? Which
countries are offering them visas? What options are available to
provide them safe passage out of Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department of State is working with U.N. leadership to
consolidate lists of Afghan national staff who are known to a U.S.
Government agency and are at risk and have referred them to the
Priority 1 (P-1) refugee program for access to the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP). Individuals referred to the USRAP can begin
processing their case once in a third country where refugee processing
is possible. We consider the U.N.'s work in Afghanistan more critical
than ever, particularly for its human rights reporting, humanitarian
assistance coordination, and other key roles crucial for peace and
stability in Afghanistan. The United States is carefully tracking
allegations of violence or intimidation against U.N. staff and are
engaging with U.N. leadership to improve security provisions for those
at risk. We have also emphasized and have called on the Taliban
leadership to ensure that Taliban members at all levels comply with
obligations under international humanitarian law and take every action
to respect the independence and neutrality of the U.N. system and all
its staff operating in Afghanistan.
Question. How many locally employed staff remain to be evacuated?
Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were
unable or chose not to travel by August 30, 2021, of which 7 have
requested assistance departing Afghanistan.
Question. Embassy Kabul drew down during the pandemic and consular
activity dramatically decreased. There was a particular decrease in the
processing of non-immigrant visas. Did the Department shift resources
to SIV and other Afghanistan-related immigration cases? If so, how? Why
did the Department not waive in person interviews for processing given
the pandemic?
Answer. Due to the pandemic, U.S. Embassy Kabul adjusted its
consular operations to conform with prioritization guidelines issued by
the Department of State. The prioritization plan focuses on the
provision of services to U.S. citizens, and then, as feasible, visa
processing including immigrant visa processing.
The Department temporarily extended the validity of certain
immigrant visa applications, thus reducing repeat in-person
appearances, for individuals who had been interviewed and signed their
immigrant visa applications under oath before a consular officer, but
whose visa applications have not been approved within 1 year of the
oath. U.S. law requires immigrant visa applicants to appear personally
before a consular officer to take an oath and execute their visa
application biometrically, in addition to submitting to the collection
of biometric information for security vetting.
Question. How many SIV applicants and their families were killed
while waiting for their cases to be approved?
Answer. The Department of State expresses its sincere condolences
for the loss of life of any Afghan at risk, including Special Immigrant
Visa (SIV) applicants and their family members. However, the Department
does not have information on the numbers of SIV applicants and family
members who may have died.
Question. Why were SIV approvals not significantly ramped up
following the Biden's April withdrawal announcement? Why didn't the
Administration start in April to evacuate SIVs to Guam or third
countries and then start the lengthy visa approval process?
Answer. Efforts to decrease processing time include quintupling
(since May 2021) the staff who process Chief of Mission (COM) approval
applications, doubling the number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul,
waiving the requirement for a medical examination for Special Immigrant
Visa (SIV) applicants in Afghanistan, and issuing foil-less visas to
applicants who have completed consular interviews and administrative
processing. These efforts led to a significant increase in COM
approvals and visa issuances since the resumption of visa interviews in
February 2021. In the third quarter of FY 2021 (April 1 to June 30),
the Department issued SIVs to 615 Afghan principal applicants and 1,975
derivative family members. This is approximately three times the number
of visas issued in previous quarters.
On July 19, the Department of State activated the Afghanistan
Coordination Task Force. The task force consists of experts from the
Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
Services. From July 30 through August 15, 2021, 10 flights arrived at
Dulles under Operation Allies Refuge carrying a total of 1,962 SIV
applicants and family members.
We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV
applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa
interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting
continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of
Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S.
Government, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no
expiration date.
Question. What were the average processing days for SIVs in May
2021? How did that compare to January 2021?
Answer. In January 2021, average processing time was 996 days while
in June 2021, it had decreased to 665 days. Since February 2021, there
has been a whole-of-government effort to decrease the processing time
for SIVs at every step of the process. These numbers do not tell the
whole story, as our reporting calculates only the cases completed in a
given quarter. Therefore, completing long outstanding cases in a
particular quarter results in higher average processing times.
Question. What has been done to assist Afghans who had been
approved for visas-including non-SIV immigrant visas-but could not
obtain them because of the precipitous collapse of the Government? Can
they have their visas issued by U.S. Embassies in another country?
Answer. Consular staff at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide
have assisted with adjudication of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applications; Consulate General Guangzhou has processed visa
applications since late August for 1,398 Afghan individuals who
completed consular interviews and administrative processing. We are
continuing to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. We
know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa
to a third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we
are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver
these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are
also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public
commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We
are doing this ourselves in our direct and pragmatic communications to
the Taliban on this national security concern and national priority.
We're also doing this in tandem with our allies and partners around the
world. Immigrant visa applicants may request to have their cases
transferred to another immigrant visa processing post for interview and
processing. Several posts, including Islamabad, Ankara, Frankfurt, New
Delhi, and Warsaw, have issued Afghan SIVs since the suspension of
operations in Kabul.
Question. What has the Department of State communicated to U.S.
embassies and consulates around the world about providing consular
services to Afghan P2 applicants? What are the Administration's plans
to process Afghans in third countries? If they must complete processing
in a third country, how will the Administration ensure that they have
access to basic services while awaiting processing?
Answer. For P1 and P2-referred individuals who are in a third
country and have contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-
funded Resettlement Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based
on the individual's location. The Administration has sought to increase
the capacity of these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases
as part of an overall larger U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).
Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work regionally and can process
cases in some countries even if there is not a physical RSC presence,
though it might take some time for a team to deploy to a particular
location for processing. While we are working expeditiously, there is
no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that
the Department expects to process in the next year, and there is no
limit to the number of referrals the Department will accept. In
general, it takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee
resettlement case from start to finish including pre-screening, the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous
security vetting.
Question. Thousands of our Afghan partners either do not have
passports or have had their passports taken or destroyed due to recent
events. The Taliban and bordering countries are reportedly blocking
travel without these documents. What is the Administration doing to
ensure that Afghans who do not have passports, but who are eligible as
an SIV, P-1, P-2, or P-3 designation, or through humanitarian parole,
have access to safe pathways out of the country?
Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for
Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way
to enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant
challenges fleeing to safety. Many refugees worldwide do not have
passports, and passports are generally not required to register with
UNHCR or for referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. We
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
respective obligations related to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers,
and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.
Question. Secretary Blinken has repeatedly said that the Taliban
must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid
travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who
worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas.
Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or
verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special
Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?
Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department
or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. As operations
at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible and
referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of
Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We
recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a
visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country, and
like many refugees, may face significant challenges fleeing to safety.
We strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
Afghans in need.
Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban
about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?
Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S.
and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents.
We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment.
Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be
located outside the U.S. for their applications to begin processing.
However, many eligible applicants were brought to the U.S. directly, by
the U.S. Government, in recognition of the dangerous situation they
faced in Afghanistan. As a result, they are not able to have their P-2
applications processed. This unnecessary bureaucratic obstacle will
limit them to applying for asylum in the U.S., which was not
specifically designed for their situations and can quickly become
overburdened. These journalists have past and current employers willing
to sponsor their P-2 applications. Will the Administration modify the
P-2 program to allow for processing while in the U.S.?
Answer. The Department continues to evaluate all options related to
the protection of Afghan nationals at risk, particularly those
affiliated with the United States.
On September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, which allows for relocated
Afghan nationals to receive domestic refugee benefits in the United
States and contains a provision requiring United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications
filed by certain Afghan nationals described in the Act.
Question. The U.S. announced that a number of countries have
pledged to accept and have taken in at-risk Afghans. How are you
working with these governments to relocate Afghans who are still in
need of evacuation? And how are you working with these governments to
help those who managed to flee but have limited legal status in their
current countries of relocation?
Answer. The United States is working vigorously with the
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
populations in Afghanistan. We strongly encourage countries in the
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and
coordinate with international organizations and other humanitarian
partners to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations to not
return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and
to respect the principle of non-refoulement.
Question. The U.S. itself accepted many at-risk Afghans at its
military base in Doha. How long will those individuals be allowed to
stay in Doha? What is the State Department doing to process or refer
those individuals to third countries? Do you have a process in place?
Answer. The Government of Qatar agreed to allow thousands of
Afghans at risk to transit through Qatar as part of Operation Allies
Refuge. The majority of them are already in the United States and are
being processed for parole at domestic bases. Remaining Afghans are
housed at Qatar-based U.S. facilities while they are being vetted and
prepared for onward travel to the United States. The U.S. Government
and the Government of Qatar are discussing arrangements to use a
facility to transit smaller numbers of Afghans-at-risk over the coming
months.
Question. Do you support the application of the Priority 2
designation for Afghan religious minorities, namely Sikhs, Hindus,
Christians, and Jews?
Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection
of the rights of all Afghans. The United States will work vigorously
with the international community and civil society partners to explore
all options to ensure that vulnerable individuals, including members of
Afghan religious minority groups, have equal access to protection,
including refugee resettlement in the United States and other
countries.
By law, religion is one of the five grounds of persecution that is
part of establishing refugee status in the United States together with
race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and
political opinion. Many of the most vulnerable refugee applicants have
suffered religious persecution. Increasing the resettlement ceiling to
125,000 in FY 2022 increases the ability of the United States to
resettle those facing persecution based on religion, including members
of Afghan religious minority groups.
Question. How should Afghans fleeing Taliban persecution but still
stuck in Afghanistan apply for humanitarian parole? Does the Department
expect them to simply use the global process via Form I-131?
Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
is the agency that adjudicates Form I-131 and grants parole. Afghans-
at-risk within Afghanistan may file a request for humanitarian parole
or have someone file on their behalf. However, because the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul has suspended operations and consular services are not
available in Afghanistan, Afghans-at-risk may need to travel to a third
country for processing before USCIS approves their humanitarian parole.
I defer to USCIS for further information on the parole process for
Afghans-at-risk.
Question. What is the current status of airports in Kabul and
Mazar-i-Sharif? Is the Administration working to coordinate evacuations
from these airports with evacuees, outside groups, and/or third
countries? If so, for what categories of at-risk Afghans?
Answer. Taliban leaders currently have control over the airports in
Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Commercial airlines have been operating some
relief and charter flights via the airport in Kabul. I defer to the
airlines for details of their operations.
We recognize the need for international flights to resume regular
operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the Qatari
and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also safely
and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that there is an urgent
need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. I defer to them for details
of their presence and support in Afghanistan going forward.
We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any issues and
to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people with valid
travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this
point to the Taliban.
Question. Media reports state Turkish private security companies
are guarding HKIA. Can you confirm if those reports are true? How many
Turkish private security personnel are at HKIA?
Answer. There have been some private charter flights operated by
commercial carriers via the airport in Kabul. We refer you to the
airlines for details of their operations, including how visual flight
rules currently in effect at all Afghan airports limit their ability to
operate flights into and out of Afghanistan. We recognize the need for
international flights to resume regular operations and urge the Taliban
to work expeditiously with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure
this is done quickly, but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey
share our view that there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and
safe travel. I defer to them for details of their presence and support
in Afghanistan going forward.
Question. Throughout August, press freedom organizations including
the Committee to Protect Journalists regularly shared with various
State Department staff lists of at-risk journalists who needed
evacuation from the country including their biographical and contact
information. Three questions: How many of these individuals were
contacted by the State Department? Was this list ever shared with other
governments who offered to help? How many of these individuals were
evacuated by the U.S.?
Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across
agencies, as we have done, but we also appreciate the desire of NGOs
and private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for
coordination there.
The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate
freedom of movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including
U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies,
and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on
supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their immediate
families. We are not in a position to detail our involvement with any
specific groups at this time.
Question. On August 31, the U.S. left behind thousands of Afghan
journalists who risked their lives to help cover the war and inform the
public over the last 20 years. Because of their work and public
profile, these journalists are now at heightened risk of Taliban
violence. What is the State Department doing to negotiate a path for
these vulnerable Afghans seeking to leave Afghanistan? Are you pursuing
a diplomatic solution brokered by the U.S. to ensure the protection of
these individuals in the country and allow for a pathway for them to
leave safely?
Answer. The Department of State continues to examine all available
avenues to provide protection for vulnerable Afghans, including
refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans, victims of
conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities,
members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and other at-risk
populations. The Department of State has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to
leave Afghanistan.
Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists
and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?
Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2
referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) from U.S.
Government employers and qualifying media and non-governmental
organizations. A P-2 referral is separate from the visa process. After
USRAP has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-
based non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media
organization, and the individual has relocated to a country where
refugee processing can occur, the referred individual may contact PRM
to begin processing their case. Individuals should follow the
guidelines on wrapsnet.org to contact PRM. At that point, PRM will
assign the case to a PRM-funded overseas Resettlement Support Center
for processing. Please note a P-2 referral enables applicants to access
the USRAP and is not a visa category.
Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?
Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow
procedures to register for international protection and assistance with
the government of the country they are in. They may also register and
seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
We are working with international humanitarian partners and other
governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns are
able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program processing.
Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?
Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those
that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge
states to uphold their respective obligations related to Afghan
refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.
Question. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Journalists and Staff:
Media reports have indicated that as many as 550 congressionally funded
journalists and their families working for Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty and Voice of America remain in Afghanistan after the U.S.
withdrawal. The reports indicate that in the final days of the
evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed staff
of Embassy Kabul. Is that correct?
Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the
August operations, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of
the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as
translators and interpreters for our Government, and other at-risk
Afghans. Since August 31, we have worked closely with the U.S. Agency
for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-affiliated employees and
family members. We remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM,
RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues
will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top
priorities.
Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed
staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?
Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were
unable or unwilling to travel on August 30, 2021, of which seven have
requested assistance to depart Afghanistan.
Question. What steps are being taken to evacuate these journalists?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely with DoD and
other partners to facilitate onward travel for those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The
initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs
and their immediate families. We are not in a position to detail our
involvement with any specific groups at this time.
Question. Can you commit to us they will be given the opportunity
to depart Afghanistan and brought to the United States?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
interagency and with other partners to facilitate onward travel for
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. The initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S.
citizens and LPRs and their immediate families. We are not in a
position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at this
time.
Admission into the United States, as well as the granting of
humanitarian parole or significant public benefit parole, is overseen
by the Department of Homeland Security.
Question. We remain concerned about reports that female
humanitarian workers in Afghanistan are not receiving the same level of
access and mobility as their male counterparts. Women's full
participation in humanitarian interventions is critical to identifying
the priorities and needs of women and girls. Without female staff,
humanitarians simply cannot deliver programs at scale for women and
girls, particularly health and protection services for victims of
violence. How is the United States supporting humanitarians' efforts to
secure commitments from the Taliban for a principled response,
including the ability for women to work in the humanitarian response?
What is the Administration doing to ensure that female humanitarian
workers have safe, equal, and unrestricted access to perform
humanitarian work?
Answer. The United States is working with the international
community to ensure that the Taliban follow through on their public
commitments to allow unhindered humanitarian access, including freedom
of movement for aid workers of all genders in Afghanistan. The Taliban
has publicly reiterated their desire for humanitarian operations to
resume, and we will continue to advocate at the highest levels for
unimpeded humanitarian access and delivery, particularly for female
staff and beneficiaries. We are coordinating with international
partners, U.N. agencies, and NGOs on the way forward to deliver
humanitarian assistance with independence, impartiality, and
neutrality; this coordination includes ensuring the safety and security
of female staff, and provision of assistance to all Afghans who need
it.
Question. How will the Administration continue to support women's
rights programs in Afghanistan, particularly programs related to
gender-based violence, girls' education, and sexual and reproductive
health? At a time when support for Afghan women's rights organizations
is most needed, what is the Administration doing to ensure they have
the funding/resources and other support to continue operating?
Answer. The United States remains committed to providing
humanitarian assistance to women and girls in Afghanistan, such as
child protection, psychosocial support, and sexual and reproductive
health services. These programs hinge on female aid workers, and we are
collaborating with fellow donors and the humanitarian response
community to advocate for safe, unhindered access for all humanitarian
personnel.
We will be very focused on monitoring this assistance to ensure it
is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I noted
in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a senior
official who will coordinate the USG's effort to support women in
Afghanistan.
Question. We understand that the Department of the Treasury issued
a Specific License for USAID and the Department of State--and their
partner organizations--to deliver humanitarian programming in
Afghanistan on August 25. This unfortunately may not be an adequate
safeguard for humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan--
including those operating with the funding of other governments as well
as local organizations. It also does not cover private financial and
commercial institutions, which we note have scaled back or completely
curtailed operations in Afghanistan for fear of running afoul of
sanctions. What further steps--including general licenses--is the
Administration considering to ensure a sufficient number of
humanitarian organizations and financial entities are able to operate
in Afghanistan?
Answer. On August 25, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
(``Treasury'') did issue a specific license authorizing transactions
necessary to provisions by U.S. Government implementers of humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan. This allows the U.S. Government and its
implementing partners to continue to support critical and life-saving
humanitarian assistance such as the delivery of food, shelter, certain
health services, and to provide other critical humanitarian assistance
to the Afghan people. On September 24, Treasury also issued two general
licenses authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international
organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and those
acting on their behalf to engage in transactions that are ordinarily
incident and necessary to providing humanitarian assistance and
engaging in other activities to support the basic needs in Afghanistan
during this critical time. Treasury also issued answers to frequently
asked questions providing further clarity on the scope of the general
licenses and guidance for non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign
financial institutions, explaining that such persons generally do not
risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in, or facilitating
transactions or payments for, activities authorized for U.S. persons
under these general licenses. The State Department remains committed to
supporting the people of Afghanistan.
Question. The U.N. has estimated as many as half a million Afghans
may flee the country by the end of this year in a worst case scenario.
Afghanistan's neighbors have expressed varying levels of willingness to
allow Afghans to cross their borders. Lessons from other mass
displacements--from Syria, Venezuela and elsewhere--have shown closed
borders do not stop refugee crises, but instead push people to take
more dangerous, informal routes that put them at greater risk of human
trafficking, recruitment by armed groups, and exploitation and abuse,
particularly for women and girls. What is the U.S. strategy to ensure a
regional response that welcomes these populations?
Answer. The United States engages in humanitarian diplomacy with
the countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to
advocate for continued humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need,
including coordination between our partners at UNHCR, other
international organizations, NGOs, and host governments to monitor and
respond to refugee outflows in the region. The United States is working
with its partners to review and strengthen humanitarian preparedness
and priority interventions in the region in the event of new refugee
outflows from Afghanistan. We will encourage continued coordination
between host governments and humanitarian organizations to monitor and
respond to the protection and assistance needs of displaced Afghans in
the region.
Question. Afghanistan's growing humanitarian emergency threatens to
generate new refugee flows and to foster conditions in which ISIS-K
could regenerate. Demining groups are some of the very few humanitarian
organizations continuing to operate in Afghanistan. Given the numerous
IEDs and explosives remaining from the final phase of fighting, their
work is needed more than ever. Will you commit to increasing U.S.
support for this vital work that will create safe conditions for
refugees to return home and provide employment for young Afghans who
might otherwise turn to radical movements, such as ISIS-K?
Answer. We must remain vigilant and monitor threats, especially any
reemergence of externally directed plotting, and address them swiftly
when they arise. As President Biden has made clear, the United States
will maintain robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to
neutralize any threats, and we will not hesitate to use those
capabilities if we have to do so. We have made clear our expectation
that the Afghan people deserve an inclusive government, which is
essential for stability.
Question. The withdrawal has already had an extremely negative
impact on women leaders, parliamentarians, activists, and human rights
defenders, many of whom have already been targeted and killed. Women
and girls from all walks of life across the country are facing
dangerous forms of oppression and roll backs of their rights. However,
as we have already seen during ongoing protests, most of which have
been met with brutal violence, they are courageously standing up to the
Taliban and demanding their rights be protected. How does the U.S.
Government plan on supporting women in this current situation? Does the
Administration commit to continued funding for women's groups,
including those working to promote human rights and protect women and
girls from gender-based violence? How does the Administration plan to
continue implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act and Strategy
in Afghanistan? Does the Administration commit to providing visas for
high-risk women who are seeking to evacuate the country?
Answer. The United States is committed to supporting the rights of
all Afghans, especially women and girls, and the gains they have
achieved in the past 20 years through our diplomatic engagement and
humanitarian assistance. Along with the international community, we
have made it very clear that the legitimacy and support that the
Taliban seek from the international community will depend on their
conduct, especially how they treat women and girls.
Question. What process has the Department put in place for Afghan
students who have received acceptance from U.S. higher education
institutions to apply for student visas? What guidance have you
developed to communicate to these students and the higher education
institutions issuing acceptances?
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
and when they choose to do so. This effort has no expiration date.
Afghan nonimmigrant visa applicants, including students, may
request an appointment at any visa processing post. They should request
an appointment by following the instructions available on each post's
website. We know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to
obtain a visa to a third country or to find a way to enter a third
country, but we are developing processing alternatives so we can
continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of
Afghanistan.
Question. On August 19, Amnesty International reported that Taliban
fighters murdered nine ethnic Hazara men in Ghazni province between
July 4 and 6. ``Six of the men were shot and three were tortured to
death, including one man who was strangled with his own scarf and had
his arm muscles sliced off,'' Amnesty reported. On September 13, the
BBC reported that 20 civilians were killed in the Panjshir Valley. How
do you assess the risk of ethnic cleansing of ethnic and religious
minorities in Afghanistan? Have you received other reports of attacks
against ethnic and religious minorities? Is the State Department
prioritizing prevention of ethnic cleansing in its talks with the
Taliban?
Answer. The Department of State is concerned about any credible
reports of attacks on Afghans because of their ethnic or religious
background. We continue to hold the Taliban to their public
commitments, which include ensuring the safety of all Afghans and not
engaging in retaliatory attacks. We have communicated this concern to
the Taliban, and we will continue to press them to investigate any
incidents and to bring perpetrators to justice. We also continue to
press the Taliban to adhere to their public commitment to form an
inclusive government, including one that includes representation from
members of ethnic and religious minority groups.
Question. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain Major Non-NATO
Allies even after the Taliban took Kabul with the public cheerleading
of the Pakistani Government. Do you think both Afghanistan and Pakistan
should remain Major Non-NATO Allies with all the benefits afforded to
countries on that list?
Answer. Events in Afghanistan necessitate reexamination of our
regional relationships, including with Pakistan. We continue to engage
closely with Pakistan on U.S. strategic interests in the region,
including shared counterterrorism concerns, calls for a more inclusive
Afghan Government, and support for the evacuation of persons of
interest to the United States. We are currently reviewing Afghanistan's
Major Non-NATO Allies designation.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The Biden administration has stressed its commitment to
holding the Taliban to the counter commitments it made under the
February 29 Agreement. Despite promises to break with al Qaeda, the
Taliban remains ideologically aligned with the group. According to a
June 2020 United Nations report, ``The senior leadership of Al-Qaida
remains present in Afghanistan, as well as hundreds of armed
operatives, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, and groups of foreign
terrorist fighters aligned with the Taliban.'' What are your views of
the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda and impacts on U.S.
CT interests?
Answer. On August 31, al-Qa'ida released a public statement
congratulating the Taliban on their ``victory'' in Afghanistan. The
Taliban did not issue any public response to the statement, though in a
September 21 interview Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid repeated a
longstanding Taliban message that al-Qa'ida does not have a presence in
Afghanistan. Separately, international media reported that Amin al Haq,
Osama bin Laden's former security chief, entered Afghanistan and
transited to Nangarhar on August 30. Speaking to the BBC on September
29, Mujahid also noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
world that there will not be any threat against any country, including
the United States, from Afghan soil.''
Such statements, and the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent
an ISIS-K attack at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, reflect the
Taliban's aim of demonstrating they are adhering to their
counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The
United States continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their
commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups or individuals
from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.
Question. What tools does State have at its disposal to ensure the
Taliban complies with its CT commitments? How specifically will the
Department hold the Taliban to account if they fail to fulfill the CT
pledges?
Answer. The United States Government continues to call on the
Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing
terrorist groups or individuals from training, fundraising, and
recruiting, and not hosting them. The Taliban are aware that we are
closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that
we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S.
national security concerns.
Question. How does the new interim government impact your
assessment of the Taliban's willingness to prevent terrorist
organizations from freely operating in Afghanistan?
Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman
Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
world that there will not be any threat against any country including
the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the
agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and
the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at the
Hamid Karzai International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of
demonstrating they are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments
under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The United States Government
continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which
include preventing terrorist groups or individuals from training,
fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.
Question. The Administration's over-the-horizon counterterrorism
plan was contingent on a semi-permissive security environment and a
willing Afghan partner on the ground. The Taliban takeover has
transitioned Afghanistan to a non-permissive environment without a
suitable CT partner. What is the status of diplomatic discussions with
Afghanistan's neighbors to secure access, basing, and overflight
permissions?
Answer. The United States has access arrangements necessary for
ongoing U.S. over-the-horizon operations over Afghanistan. These
arrangements have allowed the United States to maintain uninterrupted
counterterrorism operations over Afghanistan. Our ongoing engagement
seeks to further bolster those capabilities.
Question. Is Russia involved in these negotiations or are Russian
bases under consideration?
Answer. Fighting the scourge of terrorism is a global effort. We
will continue to engage partners, allies, and key states around the
world on how best to address it, and in the case of Afghanistan, we
have long worked closely with the nations of Central Asia. We deal
directly with our sovereign Central Asian counterparts on these issues.
Separately, we engage regularly with Russia in order to understand
Moscow's views as a regional government that is also concerned about
possible terrorist threats in Afghanistan.
Question. What do you characterize as the risk to U.S.
counterterrorism interests through over-the-horizon operations from the
Gulf that include long travel times, dramatically reduced time on
station, and inability to observe targets with an ``ISR soak'' to avoid
civilian casualties?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for questions about
their operational capacities.
Question. The governments of Pakistan, China, Iran, India, and the
Central Asian republics are all concerned, to varying degrees, about
the possibility of Afghanistan-based terrorist threats. To what extent
to you view any of these countries as legitimate counterterrorism
partners?
Answer. We are open to exploring varying degrees of
counterterrorism cooperation with a range of countries, as long as the
activities further U.S. national interests, have sufficient human
rights protections, and are consistent with applicable law and policy
guidance.
Question. In his public comments, President Biden indicated the
U.S. struck a deal with the Taliban for Kabul evacuations and continued
evacuations after 31 August. Specifically, what was agreed to between
the U.S. and the Taliban with respect to the evacuation of U.S.
citizens and vulnerable Afghan allies?
Answer. The Department of State continues to engage on a practical,
pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of U.S. national interest,
including counterterrorism, safe passage, and unhindered humanitarian
assistance. The Taliban have assured the U.S. Government--and publicly
declared--that they will not retaliate against individuals associated
with the United States or the Ghani Government, and that those who wish
to leave Afghanistan will be able to do so, provided they have valid
travel documents. U.S. citizens and vulnerable Afghans continue to
depart Afghanistan, a positive indication that the Taliban are
delivering on their commitment to freedom of movement. The United
States will continue to press the Taliban to ensure that all who wish
to leave Afghanistan are able to and will monitor the Taliban's
adherence to their commitments closely.
Question. Section 1217 of the NDAA FY 2021 requires that the
Administration transmit any agreement or arrangement with the Taliban
to Congress within 5 days. Why has the State Department not provided
Congress any such agreement or arrangement as required by law?
Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
is under the purview of the State Department.
Question. Do you commit to providing Congress any agreement or
arrangement, and relevant materials, made between the U.S. and the
Taliban since August 14?
Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
is under the purview of the State Department.
Question. What is the status of captured equipment to include small
arms, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery, anti-tank weapons,
armored vehicles, rotary wing and aircraft? Will we destroy or allow
them to atrophy over time? What will rise to threshold of destruction?
Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan
military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF), a Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10
authority. DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and
quantities of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title
10 authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation
programs, including determining the disposition of the equipment. We
defer to DoD to provide this information.
Question. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you emphasized that the
military equipment left behind by the United States would soon be
inoperable and would not pose challenges to the United States. However,
there is another significant risk that the Taliban allows adversaries,
especially China, Russia, and Iran--to examine U.S. military equipment.
Did the Departments of State and Defense consider this risk, and
incorporate that into its advice to the President? Do the Departments
of State and Defense plan to take any action if you become aware of
reports that sophisticated adversaries gain access to U.S. equipment?
Are there concerns that foreign actors will provide Taliban training on
captured equipment?
Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of
Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
(ASFF) and transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and
Security Forces does not fall into the hands of sophisticated
adversaries of the United States. The Department defers all questions
on risk assessments related to this military equipment to the
Department of Defense.
Question. What support, if any, did external nations or forces
provide to the Taliban before and during its summer 2021 offensive?
Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials continued to support
Afghan peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in
negotiations up until August 15. Various senior Pakistan officials also
made repeated public calls for a political solution to the Afghan
conflict and expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban
would lead to a protracted civil war.
Question. What role did Pakistan play in the Taliban offensive?
Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister
Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in
Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15.
In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban
attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by force it would
lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into Pakistan.
Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools necessary to
support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior Pakistani
officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive political
settlement and the protection of women's educational rights in
Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made repeated
public calls for the international community to directly engage with
the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic collapse, and
avert a humanitarian disaster.
Question. What steps did the State Department take to reduce the
levels of external support to the Taliban prior to and during the
offensive that toppled the Afghan Government?
Answer. Up until August 15, the Department was actively working
with the Government of Pakistan through a variety of regional
initiatives in calling for the Taliban to pursue a political solution
to the Afghan conflict by forming an inclusive government.
Question. What actions have Russia and China taken since Kabul fell
to strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties with the Taliban, provide
support for Taliban efforts to consolidate control over the country, or
gain access to captured U.S. military equipment, communications gear,
or any other sensitive technologies left behind?
Answer. While Russia maintains its Embassy in Kabul, the Taliban is
still designated a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior Russian
officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to recognize
the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties with
countries that border Afghanistan in recent months more so than with
the Taliban itself.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its Embassy in
Kabul. We continue to engage with countries that border Afghanistan and
countries in the region, including the PRC, on the importance of the
international community holding the Taliban accountable for their
public commitments. The entire international community has a stake in
ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and
obligations. The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do,
and Beijing has to decide where it is in that effort.
Question. Has the Taliban requested any specific diplomatic,
financial, military, intelligence, or technical assistance from Russia,
China, or Pakistan since the fall of the Afghan Government?
Answer. The Taliban have publicly called for increased economic
ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including through the
Belt and Road Initiative. In September 2021, the PRC pledged
approximately $31 million worth of grant-based aid to Afghanistan,
including food supplies and coronavirus vaccines. Through active
regional diplomacy Pakistan has made consistent, public calls for the
international community to directly engage with the Taliban, including
by calling for their assets to be unfrozen to avoid economic collapse
and avert a humanitarian disaster. Further, Pakistan is providing
limited humanitarian aid to the Taliban and is encouraging other
countries to pursue similar policies. Russia has also called publicly
for the unfreezing of Taliban assets.
Question. Please provide an assessment of the Taliban's compliance
with the February 29 Agreement prior to April 14, 2021 to include a
reduction in violence, adherence to counterterror commitments, and
substantive dialogue with the Afghan Government.
Answer. Under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, the Taliban committed to
prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the
security of the United States and its allies, and to prevent any such
group from recruiting, training, and fundraising and not to host them.
We assess that the Taliban has made some progress on these commitments,
but there is significantly more to do. We continue to press the Taliban
to fulfill their counterterrorism commitments.
As part of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban agreed to enter
into intra-Afghan negotiations on a political roadmap and permanent and
comprehensive ceasefire. Negotiations began September 12, 2020. The
Taliban and Ghani Government teams have not met since the Taliban took
control of Kabul on August 15, 2021.
Question. Section 1215 of the NDAA FY 2021 restricts funding for
the Department of Defense for any activity to reduce force levels below
both 4,000 and 2,000, until DoD submits a report to Congress or the
President provides a written waiver. During the Afghanistan withdrawal,
troop levels again exceeded 4,000 on the ground. Why has Congress has
not received either the required report or written waiver as mandated
by law?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense.
Question. President Biden previously said the United States ``will
not conduct a hasty rush to exit. We'll do it responsibly deliberately
and safely. And we will do it in full coordination with our allies and
partners.'' However, scenes from the U.S.-led evacuation effort based
out of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) suggested anything but
a responsible, deliberate, and safe exit. Can you elaborate on the
scale of forward planning?
Answer. The Department of State engaged in prudent contingency
planning with interagency partners for a range of scenarios. The
planning scenarios were based on a range of potential security
conditions on the ground and a declining level of mission functions.
The scenarios assumed reductions in embassy staffing while maintaining
core mission functions under various conditions, up to and including
suspension of operations and physical closure of the embassy.
Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the world
were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the evacuation and relocation operations in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Question. What contingencies were put in place in the wake of
President Biden's April announcement that the United States would
withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel
is my highest priority. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various Department
offices participated with the interagency in Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of
2021. Planning efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S.
Embassy Kabul worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure
close coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan,
and with CENTCOM.
Question. How many U.S. citizens are currently in Afghanistan?
Please address how many total U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan,
independent of how many may have indicated at some point an interest in
staying in Afghanistan. Of the persons evacuated from Afghanistan in
August, how many are U.S. citizens? How many are U.S. legal permanent
residents? How many are SIV applicants?
Answer. U.S. citizens are not required to register with the
Department of State or an embassy when they arrive in or depart from a
country, and as a result we have no means of providing an exact number
of U.S. citizens currently in Afghanistan. On April 27, the Department
ordered the departure of U.S. Government employees from U.S. Embassy
Kabul due to increasing violence and threat reports in Kabul. When we
expanded our evacuation operations on August 15, 2021, there were an
estimated 6,000 U.S. citizens in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government
facilitated the evacuation of approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens from
Afghanistan through August 31. Between September 1 and November 9, the
Department has assisted an additional 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs) depart Afghanistan, not including those that
have departed on private charters or independently crossed a land
border. We will continue to facilitate this travel. Like U.S. citizens,
Lawful Permanent Residents are not required to register with the U.S.
Embassy. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for statistics
on the number of LPR evacuees admitted into the United States. In
addition, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for numbers of
SIV holder evacuees admitted into the United States. We estimate that
40-50 percent of Afghan parolees may be SIV eligible because they took
significant risks to support our military and civilian personnel in
Afghanistan, working for or on behalf of the U.S. Government in
Afghanistan or our coalition forces, or are a family member of someone
who did. The Department is currently assessing how many of these Afghan
evacuees had outstanding SIV applications.
Question. How many U.S. permanent legal residents are currently in
Afghanistan? Please address how many total U.S. permanent legal
residents are in Afghanistan, independent of how many may have
indicated at some point an interest in staying in Afghanistan.
Answer. Like U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) do
not register their location with the Department of State. As a result,
we are unable to determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any
other given country. Between September 1 and November 9, the Department
has assisted 285 LPRs depart Afghanistan, not including those that have
departed on private charters or independently crossed a land border. We
will continue to facilitate this travel and will be relentless in
helping LPRs depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa applicants are currently
in Afghanistan?
Answer. We do not have a figure of how many Special Immigrant Visa
(SIV) applicants are currently in Afghanistan. This number is
constantly changing since the Afghan SIV program continues to accept
new applicants. As of October 6, 2021, there were approximately 27,000
Afghan SIV principal applicants at various stages of the application
process. At this time, we cannot determine how many are still in
Afghanistan.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain
in the pipeline? How many applications did the department process
between April 2021 and August 2021? Specifically, what steps has the
Department taken to streamline the process since Biden took office in
January 2021?
Answer. As of October 6, 2021, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
pipeline has approximately 27,000 SIV principal applicants. More than
19,000 are at the initial stage of the process, pending applicant
action to submit a complete set of documents for consideration of Chief
of Mission (COM) approval. The Department of State continues to accept
new SIV applications and add them to the pipeline. From April 1, 2021,
to August 31, 2021, the Department issued SIVs to 1,812 principal
applicants (and 5,937 derivative applicants). The Department took
efforts to decrease processing time to include quintupling (since May
2021) the staff who assess applications for COM approval, doubling the
number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul, increasing the staffing at the
National Visa Center (NVC), initiating Project Rabbit with the
Department of Defense (where the Department of Defense provides letters
of recommendation for applicants after reviewing the human resources
and employment records of Afghan SIV applicants), eliminating the COM
Committee from the COM approval process, streamlining screening and
vetting to be more time efficient while remaining secure, and utilizing
the waiver of the requirement for a medical examination for SIV
applicants in Afghanistan who completed all other steps for visa
issuance.
Question. What is the U.S. plan for evacuating U.S. citizens, legal
permanent residents, and SIV applicants from Afghanistan?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish
to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent
Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The
initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs
and their immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing
departure of Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government, and
Special Immigrant Visa holders.
Question. Where will these people go?
Answer. Evacuees continue to arrive in a variety of destinations.
While we are currently unable to provide consular services in
Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
world where applicants are able to appear. Posts which have received
Afghan SIV applications are prioritizing their processing.
We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a
visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country. The
U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S.
citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and
Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while
encouraging countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan
to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing processing alternatives so
that we can continue to deliver these important consular services for
the people of Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the
U.S. Government.
Question. What role has the State Department played in receiving
Afghan evacuees in Washington, DC and Philadelphia?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the designated
lead federal agency for U.S.-based Afghanistan-related relocation
operations. Prior to that designation, the Department of State, with
support from USAID, had opened a temporary transit facility near Dulles
Airport. DHS assumed overall control of Dulles operations on August 29,
2021, when it was directed to serve as the lead agency to coordinate
efforts to resettle Afghans, and the Philadelphia airport opened for
arrivals as well. Department of State and USAID employees continued to
support the Dulles operations of DHS in large numbers. Following
admission of individuals relocated from Afghanistan to the United
States by Customs and Border Protection at Dulles Airport, these
employees worked closely with DHS, DoD, and federal health agencies to
manifest Afghan travelers for flights and buses to their final safe
haven base around the country for further processing. The Department
had a small team at the Philadelphia airport to share lessons learned
from Dulles, provide information to individuals relocated from
Afghanistan who worked at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, coordinate family
reunifications, and participate in interagency coordination meetings.
The Department provided ``wrap-around'' services support at
Philadelphia airport, specifically interpretation services to
individuals upon their arrival.
Question. How much money has the State Department spent on the
evacuation from Afghanistan, including the housing and transportation
of evacuees?
Answer. As of October 13, 2021, the Department has obligated $689.9
million in support of Operation Allies Welcome and related Afghanistan
efforts, primarily involving relocation and resettlement of individuals
at risk as a result of the situation in Afghanistan. Obligations by
bureau and fund source are shown below. Obligations reported under CGFS
include EDCS funded activities across multiple State bureaus, which are
consolidated for reporting purposes under CGFS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bureau Fund Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CGFS EDCS $92.8 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CA CBSP $3.8 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRM ERMA $591.1 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SCA Diplomatic Programs $2.2 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total (as of 10/13/21) $689.9 million
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. Mr. Secretary, you previously committed to providing
details on the Department's plans to support the continued evacuation
of American Citizens, Legal Permanent Residences, Green Card Holders,
and at-risk Afghans, thousands of whom were left behind after the U.S.
military withdrawal. These include Afghan journalists, human rights
defenders, members of parliament, women and girls, aid workers, and
interpreters, among others. Many of these individuals played key roles
in supporting the United States mission in Afghanistan and as a result
of their work and public profile, are now at heightened risk of Taliban
violence. Since the U.S. finalized its withdrawal from Afghanistan on
August 31, this committee has received no additional clarity on the
Department's long-term planning, particularly as relates to at-risk
Afghans. Those who dedicated themselves to supporting the U.S. and
promoting democratic ideals, despite the risk, must not now be
forgotten. Moving forward, how does the State Department plan to assist
these at-risk Afghans, many of whom are now under increasing threat
from the Taliban as result of their occupation, identity, or
connections with the West? What does future evacuation planning look
like for this class?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, international organizations, and others to facilitate
the departure of those who still wish to leave. We understand that the
Taliban have targeted certain populations and professions among Afghan
civilians in the past and denied access to services for vulnerable
populations. The United States will work vigorously with the
international community to explore all options to support members of
vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but not limited to--
women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+
individuals, and members of the ethnic and religious minority groups.
Question. Is the Taliban currently allowing at-risk Afghans to
leave the country?
Answer. The departures of the Qatar Airways flights and others are
a positive step in upholding the commitment to free movement. We
continue to press the Taliban to see to it that U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, and others with valid travel documents, including
our Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, are able to
depart the country, if they so choose.
Question. If the Taliban requires visas for persons to exit
Afghanistan and the U.S. no longer has a diplomatic presence inside
Afghanistan, how will the U.S. get visas to those trying to exit the
country?
Answer. We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to
obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe
passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPRs), and Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave
Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the region and those that
border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. This effort
is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.
Question. How will the State Department facilitate the evacuation
of eligible Afghans whose passports were destroyed by the U.S. during
the withdrawal?
Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency
drawdown to mitigate risk by minimizing our footprint and reducing the
amount of sensitive material remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown
was conducted in accordance with this standard operating procedure.
We are developing processing alternatives so that we can continue
to deliver important consular services for the people of Afghanistan.
This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.
Question. In cases where safe evacuation isn't an option, what
steps is the Department of State taking to mitigate the threat the
Taliban poses to at-risk Afghans? To what extent is the Department
collaborating with local or international non-government organizations
in this effort?
Answer. We are continuing to examine all available avenues to
provide protection for vulnerable Afghans. Our commitment to providing
humanitarian assistance directly to the United Nations and NGO partners
inside Afghanistan also has not changed. The United States is the
largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and we
will continue our support for vulnerable populations in Afghanistan and
in neighboring countries in the region. We strongly encourage countries
in the region and that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans
and coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian
assistance to Afghans in need. Our humanitarian assistance for Afghans
in need allows our partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition,
protection, shelter, livelihoods opportunities, essential health care,
water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the humanitarian
needs generated by conflict, drought, and the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic.
Question. State Department spokesperson Ned Price recently
indicated efforts to secure the release of Mark Frerichs ``will not
stop until Mark comes home.'' What is the status of negotiations with
the Taliban with respect to American hostage Mark Frerichs? What steps
has the Department taken to secure his release? What additional avenues
will the Department pursue to secure his release?
Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran
Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to
hold an American hostage. .We continue to raise the need for Mark's
immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible
opportunity. The Taliban-led Government must meet its commitments and
obligations, which include the immediate release of Mark Frerichs. We
have been clear that any legitimacy and any recognition will have to be
earned. We have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar,
Pakistan, and others while we continue to press the Taliban to release
Mark.
Question. Beyond Mark Frerichs, how many Americans citizens are
currently held hostage by the Taliban, or the Haqqani network?
Answer. There are three open hostage cases of U.S. citizens in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition to U.S. citizen and Navy
veteran Mark Frerichs, there is an open hostage case for Paul Overby,
who was kidnapped in Khost in May 2014 and Cydney Mizell, who was
abducted and likely killed in Kandahar in 2008. The Department of State
has sponsored a Rewards for Justice campaign of up to $5 million for
information on all three hostage cases. The Taliban, including the
Haqqani Network, and their Haqqani affiliates, must release Mark
Frerichs, provide answers and accountability for the other U.S.
citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent act of hostage taking
going forward.
Question. To what extent does the Department feel hostage cases,
like that of Mark Frerichs, will be used by the Taliban as leverage to
secure concessions from the United States? How many nationals of NATO
allies are currently in Afghanistan? How many nationals of other U.S.
allies and partners are currently in Afghanistan? What is the United
States doing to help those countries evacuate their nationals?
Answer. I am concerned with the risk of future hostage-takings. The
Taliban must release Mark Frerichs, provide answers and accountability
for the other U.S. citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent
act of hostage taking going forward. We coordinate regularly with
partners and NATO Allies on both hostages and wrongfully detained
citizens. The United States stands ready to assist partners and allies
with recovery and reintegration.
Question. The private sector and NGOs took evaluation measures upon
themselves given the lack of attention by the State Department to allow
charter flights but are being met with substantive bureaucratic
obstacles. Can you please elaborate why the U.S. Department of State
inhibited private entities from allowing chartered flights to evacuate
at-risk Afghans?
Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. There have been significant
challenges with these flights. Without personnel on the ground to
ensure the fidelity of the intended manifests, there is no ability to
determine whether the passengers aboard the plane would be eligible for
relocation or resettlement in the United States. In several instances
where private entities have chartered aircraft to transport individuals
out of Afghanistan, identity checks on arrival at transit destinations
have revealed that many passengers were not eligible for relocation to
the United States and, in some cases, that the manifests were not
accurate, despite the best efforts of the private organizations
supporting these charters. This puts the individual travelers at risk
with no plan for relocation to the United States; damages the bilateral
relationship of the United States with the destination countries; and
makes it more difficult for the U.S. Government to rely on those
partner countries to assist in future relocations out of Afghanistan.
Question. Media reports have indicated that as many as 550
congressionally funded journalists and their families working for Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) were
abandoned in Afghanistan after the U.S. military withdrawal. Over 100
VOA and RFE/RL staff are still in Afghanistan and at great risk of
reprisal by the Taliban. The reports indicate that in the final days of
the evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed
staff of Embassy Kabul, is that correct?
Answer. Yes, that is correct. VOA and RFE/RL staff were designated
as Locally Employed Staff during the August evacuation and relocation
operation. The Department of State is in close and regular
communication with USAGM regarding VOA and RFE/RL staff who may still
be in Afghanistan and wish to leave.
Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed
staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?
Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
there were 689 direct-hire local staff employed by the embassy. Sixteen
of the embassy locally employed staff remained in Kabul. Nine remained
in Kabul by choice. Seven were unable to travel on August 30 and have
requested assistance to depart Afghanistan. We will continue our
efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly travel of those who were
employed by Embassy Kabul as local staff.
Question. What steps were taken to prioritize the evacuation of VOA
and RFE/RL employees and journalists in particular? Moving forward, can
the Department commit to prioritizing the evacuation of RFE/RL and VOA
staff who face heightened risk of Taliban violence in light of their
work for a U.S.-funded press outlet?
Answer. Yes, we are in regular communication with USAGM about the
staff of both outlets who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to
depart. The Department of State has established a team to coordinate
across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nonprofits, and
others to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk Afghans to whom
we have a commitment. This group includes the staff of RFE/RL and VOA.
Question. To what extent did the Department work with VOA and RFE/
RL partners to support this objective? Were there particular obstacles
to the Department of State doing so?
Answer. The State Department and Department of Defense worked
around the clock to facilitate the departure of VOA and RFE/RL staff
via both military and charter aircraft. The Department of State was in
regular communication with USAGM throughout the operation in August and
continues to maintain these lines of communication about the staff of
VOA and RFE/RL who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to leave. As
the situation outside of Kabul International Airport grew increasingly
dangerous, we advised all local staff to shelter in place while we
continued to develop departure options. We did not forget about USAGM
employees and their families, nor will we.
Question. Are you aware of the fact that a number of these
journalists have received death threats and inquiries from the Taliban
about their work in the weeks since the collapse of the government?
Answer. We have seen the footage of brave Afghan human rights
defenders making their voices heard and protesting in public spaces. We
have also seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by journalists in
Taliban detention as well as the violence against protesters. The
United States will continue to monitor the human rights situation in
Afghanistan. The Department will also continue to chronicle human
rights abuses in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Question. What steps does the Department plan on taking to ensure
their safety in the interim? Specifically, what is the Department doing
to ensure that they are safe and that the Taliban do not continue to
harass them and their families?
Answer. The United States calls for the protection of, and respect
for, media organizations and journalists to allow accurate reporting,
which is key to press freedom. Over the last 20 years, Afghanistan's
media sector has grown exponentially. We are extremely grateful for
those members of the media who have courageously associated themselves
with the American press to report on Afghanistan.
Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be
located outside Afghanistan for their applications to begin processing.
However, many eligible applicants weren't safely evacuated from
Afghanistan before the end of the U.S. NEO on August 31 and are now
barred from leaving the country by the Taliban. As a result, they are
not able to have their P-2 applications processed. Will the
Administration modify the P-2 program to allow for processing while
inside Afghanistan?
Answer. This Administration has been clear about its enduring
commitment to supporting the people of Afghanistan, including those who
remain in country as well as those who seek to leave. While there are
no plans for in-country processing or relocation support for
individuals referred to the Priority 1 or Priority 2 program who remain
in Afghanistan, the Administration is encouraging countries in the
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and
is coordinating with humanitarian international organizations to
provide assistance to Afghans in need. The United States is also urging
countries to comply with their respective non-refoulement obligations
and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.
Question. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that the Taliban
must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid
travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who
worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas.
Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or
verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special
Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?
Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department
or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. While we are
currently unable to provide consular services for immigrant visa
applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), in Afghanistan,
we will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV
process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. As
operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible
and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of
Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
Afghanistan, as well as other countries, to allow entry for Afghans and
to coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian
assistance to Afghans in need.
Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban
about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?
Answer. The Taliban have publicly pledged to let people with valid
travel documents, including U.S. citizens, freely depart Afghanistan.
We continue to press the Taliban to live up to their commitment of free
passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing this in
our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are also
doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world.
Freedom of movement is a top national security concern and national
priority for us.
Question. Many of these journalists don't have passports. How does
the United States Government plan to assist those without passports who
were left behind by the military evacuation?
Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for
Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way
to enter a third country, and like many refugees, they may face
significant challenges fleeing to safety. We strongly encourage
countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow
entry for Afghans and to coordinate with international organizations to
provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related
to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of
non-refoulement.
Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department or any
other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. We are also
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing
this in our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are
also doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world.
Question. Other governments like the United Kingdom and Germany
have provided expedited entry into their country for their government-
funded media. Why have similar arrangements only been made for private
media outlets, like the New York Times, and not congressionally funded
ones?
Answer. Admission to the United States is granted by the Department
of Homeland Security. We are working closely with our interagency
colleagues to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of all
qualified, screened and vetted Afghans referred to the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program through the expedited processing of individuals
through our transit sites in third countries.
Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists
and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?
Answer. The State Department continues to receive and process P-2
referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). After USRAP
has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based
non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and
the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can
occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing
their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to
contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded
overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing. Please note a P-2
referral enables applicants to access the USRAP and is not a visa
category.
Question. We have received reports that the State Department is
reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system
due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?
Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2
referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of
Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is
not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee
referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for
resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we
are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific
number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process
in the next year.
Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?
Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
Afghans, including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
resettlement. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended,
Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be
processed.
We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
country, and like many refugees, may face significant challenges
fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and
those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate
with international organizations and other humanitarian partners to
provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related
to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of
non-refoulement.
Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?
Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those
that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge
states to uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan
refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect
the principle of non-refoulement.
Question. Well before the August 31 deadline, 1,200 American
University of Afghanistan (AUAF) students, staff and faculty were
mobilized and ready to evacuate with the proper paperwork and
logistical support. AUAF successfully secured planes to transport the
students to multiple third-site locations. However, the Biden
administration reversed its prior authorization granting AUAF access to
Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) gates, allegedly claiming it
was no longer a priority. Nearly 200 Afghan women who hoped to evacuate
with this convoy are part of the Embassy Scholars program. These women
were hand-picked by the U.S. Embassy to attend AUAF and given full-ride
scholarships. How do you plan to support the evacuation of AUAF
students and staff moving forward?
Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation and relocation flights out
of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), and at-risk Afghans in Afghanistan remains
steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such as the students, faculty, and staff
of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States will
continue to support equal access to education in Afghanistan. The
Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart,
and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial
flights out of the airport in Kabul.
Question. How is the Taliban treating current or former students of
the AUAF?
Answer. The State Department is aware of reports the Taliban have
mistreated AUAF students, alumni, and staff. We take these reports
seriously. The Taliban have committed to full access to education,
general amnesty, and preventing retaliation. The Department continues
to press the Taliban to fully adhere to these commitments, including
their commitment not to retaliate. Any report or violations should be
promptly investigated and those responsible should be held accountable.
Question. Mr. Secretary, have you determined whether Section 7008
of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which restricts certain
forms of assistance ``to the government of any country whose duly
elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree
or . . . a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive
role'' applies to the Taliban in Afghanistan?
Answer. Afghanistan's military forces did not support or
participate in the Taliban's advance on Kabul, nor did they depose
President Ghani or other leaders of the Government of Afghanistan.
Question. The Department and USAID have announced the intent to
continue ``certain forms of foreign assistance programs that advance
U.S. national interests'' in Afghanistan. Decisions about which
programs will continue--and those that will be paused or reprogrammed--
reportedly will be subject to review. Yet, beyond the suggestion that
humanitarian assistance will be exempted, the Department has provided
the Committee with virtually zero information about the anticipated
scope, process, timeline, benchmarks, and indicators of this review.
What is the full scope of U.S. foreign assistance under review?
Answer. All humanitarian assistance programming to Afghanistan to
support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people continues directly
through the United Nations and NGO partners. State and USAID are
continuing to review all non-humanitarian assistance programs to
Afghanistan.
Question. Who is leading the review?
Answer. The Office of Foreign Assistance is coordinating the review
across State and USAID Bureaus for non-humanitarian assistance funds in
Afghanistan and is working closely with interagency partners.
Question. Who will be consulted? Will Congress be consulted?
Answer. In addition to working closely with interagency partners,
we look forward to working closely with the White House, OMB, and
Congress as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in
Afghanistan.
Question. When do you anticipate completing the review?
Answer. We are undertaking the review on an expedited timeline.
Question. What metrics, benchmarks, and indicators will be used to
determine whether a program ``advances U.S. national interests''?
Answer. The review of non-humanitarian assistance is intended to
ensure programs align with U.S. policy objectives, which include to:
(i) prevent threats of terrorism against the United States and its
interests; (ii) ensure the safe passage and freedom of movement of all
U.S. citizens, Allies, and other individuals at risk from Afghanistan;
(iii) prevent or mitigate a humanitarian disaster, including the
humanitarian impacts of an economic collapse; (iv) support U.S. values,
especially regarding human rights including the rights of women, girls,
and members of minority groups; and (v) prevent broader regional
destabilization.
Question. Is it both feasible and advisable to re-start non-
humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan while we are still
working to evacuate U.S. citizens and implementing partners?
Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
potential issues to mitigate risks. This review will consider how
programs may be affected by the new security environment, as it is
important that we consider how to mitigate the risks to on-the-ground
implementers and beneficiaries, including to ensure assistance
resources do not directly benefit the Taliban.
Question. What mechanisms will be put in place to guard against
diversion?
Answer. Bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
monitor and evaluate continuing potential non-humanitarian assistance
programs from outside Afghanistan, including through third parties,
given that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended.
State and USAID and our implementers have experience using similar
mechanisms, such as in Syria, and some bureaus already have years of
experience in successfully managing programs from outside of
Afghanistan.
Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
program design to reduce those risks.
Question. Are you concerned by arguments that the resumption of
U.S. non-humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan will legitimize the
Taliban?
Answer. The President and I have been clear about the U.S.
commitment to supporting the Afghan people, including women, girls, and
members of minority groups. Our efforts to continue humanitarian
assistance to support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people
demonstrates this commitment.
Question. Can you confirm that no U.S. foreign assistance, in any
form, will be programmed with, through, or for the Taliban?
Answer. No U.S. assistance will be directed to the Taliban. We plan
to provide assistance all through non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, or other third parties to directly support
the Afghan people.
Question. Former Administrator of USAID Andrew Natsios asserts that
shipments of U.S. wheat, intended to ameliorate famine conditions in
certain areas of Afghanistan in 2001, severely undercut the market for
locally grown wheat on the eve of a bumper harvest (which, ironically,
can largely be attributed to U.S. foreign assistance to incentivize
alternative crop production, including through the introduction of
improved seed varieties). Yet, faced with excess wheat supply and low
demand (farmers simply could not compete with ``free'' U.S. wheat),
continued production of wheat became unviable and farmers returned to
poppy production. According to the Executive Director of the World Food
Program, today, Afghanistan is once again ``marching toward famine.''
How will you ensure that U.S. humanitarian assistance, notably
assistance delivered through the Food for Peace Program and U.S.
contributions to WFP, will not result in a similar outcome?
Answer. USAID and State, through our implementing partners,
including the World Food Program (WFP), undertake rigorous market
analyses to ensure humanitarian assistance will not have adverse
impacts on local producers or markets. In Afghanistan, USAID supports
WFP to improve food security and nutrition conditions through in-kind
aid, as well as cash and voucher assistance. WFP conducts frequent
market and price monitoring to prevent potential disruptions, and
predominantly uses locally procured wheat flour to support local
production. WFP has also scaled up its cash transfer options, as cash
is used where markets are easily accessible, supply routes are
functioning, food commodities are available, and prices are stable.
USAID does not currently provide U.S. wheat to Afghanistan but does
support the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization in providing
assistance to vulnerable farming households.
Question. How is the Department working with other donors to ensure
that humanitarian assistance actually helps ameliorate, rather than
exacerbate, humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan?
Answer. U.S. humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan enables our
partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition, protection, shelter,
health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the
needs generated by the complex emergency. U.S. humanitarian assistance
is provided directly through international organizations and NGOs with
extensive experience working in challenging environments, and they
remain committed to delivering needs-based assistance with
impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Close coordination with
donor governments and partners is critical during this time, and we
will continue to work closely with and support our partners to monitor
and respond to the situation and to encourage other donors to do the
same.
Question. What is the status of discussions with the Department of
Treasury on the issuance of licenses and related guidance for
humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan, including specific
guidance relating to access to financial services?
Answer. As of September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses to
support the continued flow of humanitarian assistance and other
activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan, including
critical food and medicine. OFAC also issued a specific license
authorizing transactions necessary for U.S. Government implementers of
humanitarian assistance. These actions authorize the U.S. Government,
certain international organizations (including the U.N. and its
specialized agencies such as the World Bank), NGOs, and those acting on
their behalf, to continue to engage in transactions that are ordinarily
incident or necessary to the provision of humanitarian assistance and
other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan. This
follows past precedent in which the United States has taken steps to
address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where sanctioned individuals
and entities are active.
Question. In the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the
United States, alongside other international donors announced a
suspensions in assistance to Afghanistan. Western powers maintain that
a resumption of aid is contingent upon assurances from the Taliban that
it will respect human rights, and in particular the rights of women and
girls. Despite the Taliban's efforts to portray a more liberal face,
its actions suggest we are headed toward a style of rule similar to
that which dominated the 1990s, when women were banished from public
life, media was strictly controlled, and all forms of entertainment
banned. Already, since taking power, there have been widespread reports
of Taliban fighters violently assaulting peaceful protestors and
arbitrarily detaining journalists, in addition to imposing restrictions
on the rights of Afghan women. Given the Taliban's proven record of
serious human rights abuses, do you intend to hold the Taliban
accountable? How?
Answer. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the
international community will depend on their adherence to their
commitments on preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the
United States from Afghanistan and on protecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allowing freedom of passage for
American citizens, third country nationals and Afghans with the proper
documentation that desire to leave, allowing unimpeded humanitarian
access, and forming an inclusive government. The United States
maintains a wide range of tools to ensure the Taliban upholds these
commitments, including diplomatic engagement, economic and financial
sanctions, and economic assistance.
Question. Will the Taliban's human rights record be factored into
any decision to diplomatically recognize a Taliban-led Government?
Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy, albeit with
several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on
recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not
changed. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan Government
is one we and the international community can work with. We will
continue to engage the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan,
but they have a long path to legitimacy and will be judged by their
actions, including actions to prevent terrorist groups from posing a
threat to the United States from Afghanistan, uphold human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allow freedom of passage, allow
unimpeded humanitarian access, and form an inclusive government.
Question. What type of relationship do you envision the United
States having with the Taliban if they continue to perpetrate
widespread human rights violations? What would this mean for the future
of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan?
Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
Government is one we and the international community can work with. As
we have consistently said, we are prepared to engage on a practical,
pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of core U.S. national
interests, including safe passage and counterterrorism. The legitimacy
and recognition that the Taliban seek from the international community
will depend on their conduct in areas that include, among other things,
countering threats of terrorism, respecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all Afghans and refraining from carrying out
reprisals. Their actions, not their words, will factor into whether and
how we decide to provide continued non-humanitarian assistance. The
United States is committed to providing lifesaving humanitarian
assistance for Afghans in need.
Question. In a Question for the Record I submitted to you after
your confirmation hearing on January 19, 2021, I asked, ``In addition
to vital counterterrorism interests, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have
dramatically improved conditions for women, minority and youth. How
would your State Department safeguard the gains made for Afghan women,
minority and youth?'' You responded, ``Women, girls, and minority
groups in Afghanistan have made extraordinary gains over the past 20
years, and protecting those gains will be a high priority in the Biden-
Harris administration. For a peace agreement between the Afghan
Government and the Taliban to be durable and just, it must account for
the rights of women, girls, and minority groups.'' Obviously, that
``durable and just'' peace agreement never materialized and,
immediately upon seizing power, the Taliban began rolling-back the
hard-fought gains of women and girls over the past two decades.
Answer. We have consistently been clear that the future of
Afghanistan is for Afghans themselves to decide but that our future
political relationship will be shaped by their actions, especially with
respect to the rights of women and girls. As we continue to engage the
Taliban on issues of vital national interest, we have made clear that
the international community is watching closely. We continue to press
the Taliban to respect the rights of all Afghans, including women,
girls, and members of minority groups.
Question. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, has said the
rights of women and girls in Afghanistan will be respected ``in
accordance with the respect of the principles of Islam'' and ``within
the margins that we have.'' What does this mean?
Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions
with respect to the human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and
girls. We will monitor closely how any government respects the human
rights and fundamental freedoms that have been recognized as an
integral part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the
last 20 years.
Question. Have the Taliban's verbal commitments to respect the
rights of women and girls ``within the margins'' provided the
Administration with assurances that the Taliban's rule will be
``durable and just'' in regards to women?
Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
the international community to support the gains that recognized the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women
and girls. As seen in the joint statement issued by the United States
and more than 60 other countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in
August, the international community is deeply worried about Afghan
women and girls, particularly their rights to education, work, freedom
of movement, and peaceful assembly. We will continue to press the
Taliban on the need to respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan
women and girls in terms of their meaningful participation in political
processes and public life, as well as access to education, health care,
and employment.
Question. How will you protect the gains of the past 20 years as
``a high priority for the Biden-Harris administration'' under Taliban
rule?
Answer. The Taliban can only earn legitimacy gradually through a
sustained pattern of action that demonstrates a genuine commitment to
core expectations, such as respect for the human rights of all Afghans,
including women and girls. We are working with the international
community to remain unified in holding the Taliban accountable for
these expectations. In our communications to the Taliban, we have been
clear that the international community is watching closely, and that
any future relationship will be shaped by the Taliban's own actions. We
have stressed that legitimacy cannot be earned quickly or by words
alone; it must be demonstrated through concrete action.
Question. Women in Afghanistan made great progress over the last 20
years, but due to the erratic U.S. military withdrawal and subsequent
diplomatic evacuation, now face an untenable future. Women will be
segregated in schools and forced to cease activities they previously
enjoyed. This is a monstrous step backwards. How do you respond to
criticism that the United States turned its back on Afghan women and
children? Did our withdrawal create an environment that will set Afghan
women back even farther?
Answer. We stand by our ongoing commitment to supporting the
aspirations of Afghan women and girls, and we are encouraged that our
bilateral and multilateral partners stand with us and do the same. We
will continue to closely monitor how any government in Afghanistan
respects the human rights and freedoms that have become an integral
part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the last 20
years. We remain committed to providing robust humanitarian assistance,
which provides vulnerable Afghans with critically needed food, health
care, nutrition, medical supplies, hygiene supplies, and other urgently
needed relief. It also addresses the protection concerns of women,
children, and minorities.
Question. How do you plan to continue to promote women and girls'
rights in Afghanistan without a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground?
Answer. We are committed to use every tool at our disposal--through
our diplomacy and humanitarian efforts--to support, in coordination
with many other countries, women, girls, and minorities in Afghanistan.
Embassy Kabul's operations have been transitioned to Doha and, together
with the Special Representative for Afghanistan, these entities
communicate to the Taliban on issues of vital national interest. Given
the important and complex nature of coordinate support for the rights
of Afghan women and girls, the Secretary will be naming a Senior
Official for Afghan Women and Girls at the State Department to focus
entirely on the ongoing effort both from the United States Government
and in coordination with other countries.
Question. Throughout the period before final withdrawal, non-
governmental organizations including the Committee to Protect
Journalists regularly shared with various State Department entities
lists of at-risk journalists and Afghans who needed evacuation from the
country including their biographical and contact information. How many
of these individuals were contacted by the State Department?
Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across
agencies, as we have done. We also appreciate the desire of NGOs and
private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for
coordination there.
The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
The team is working closely across the interagency and with other
partners to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority
was and is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their
immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing departure of
Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government and Special
Immigrant Visa holders. We are not in a position to detail our
involvement with any specific groups at this time.
Question. Was this list ever shared with other governments who
offered to help?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement
for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens,
Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies and vulnerable
and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on supporting
departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs, and their immediate families. We
are also facilitating the ongoing departure of Afghans who worked with
and for the U.S. Government, and Special Immigrant Visa holders. We are
not in a position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at
this time.
Question. How many of these individuals were evacuated by the
United States?
Answer. During operations in Afghanistan in August 2021, the U.S.
Government facilitated the departure of 124,000 individuals on U.S.
military aircraft, foreign military aircraft, and charter aircraft
organized by private groups. Not all of these travelers went to the
United States as their final destination.
Question. Given the Taliban's lack of adherence to fundamental
human rights, like the freedom of religion, what dangers remain for
religious minorities, including Christians, Hazara Shia Muslims,
Hindus, and Sikhs?
Answer. We have seen reports of harassment and violence targeted
against members of religious minority groups. As the State Department's
2020 Religious Freedom Report stated, both the Taliban and ISIS-K, an
affiliate of ISIS and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization,
targeted and killed members of minority religious communities and
individuals because of their religious beliefs. We have no reason to
believe these dangers have decreased; we will judge the Taliban by
their actions, not their words.
Question. The United States evacuated Afghan nationals to various
military bases around the world, including some in the continental
United States. How long will refugees be housed on U.S. Bases?
Answer. Individuals relocated from Afghanistan were temporarily
hosted at military bases outside the United States. Over 50,000 moved
on to the United States before a measles outbreak required a
vaccination campaign. Because the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella)
vaccine requires 21 days post vaccination to become fully effective,
the Centers for Disease Control ordered a 21-day post vaccination hold
for all individuals relocated from Afghanistan to U.S. military bases,
both in the United States and outside the United States. During that
period, other resettlement processes continued for those already on the
U.S. safe haven bases. As travelers complete the conditions established
for their parole, the Department is coordinating with the International
Organization for Migration, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and Department of Defense to resettle individuals relocated
from Afghanistan to their final destinations as quickly as possible
within limits of local resettlement agency capacities. Those on bases
overseas are being moved to the United States as soon as possible to
complete their processing.
Question. Has the United States entered into any agreements with
foreign governments to host Afghan nationals?
Answer. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the
process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens,
Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many
countries have transited Afghans through their territories and many
other countries made generous offers of support. Many countries have
committed to permanently resettle Afghans.
Question. What percentage of those evacuated to the United States
were admitted on parole alone? To what benefits will humanitarian
parolees in the United States have access? What about those on U.S.
bases overseas?
Answer. The decision on an individual's status in the United
States, including whether they are paroled into the United States or
admitted as a U.S. citizen, Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), Special
Immigrant (SI), or other category, including Afghans who were relocated
from overseas as a part of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), resides with
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services and Customs and Border Protection. DHS, working
with its representatives located at the various military safe havens,
continues to process information on Afghans at the safe havens and
ultimately will be in the best position to provide the most accurate
breakdown of the various categories of individuals relocated to the
United States as a part of OAW. The individuals at safe havens overseas
still waiting to travel to the United States are being fully supported,
including with MMR and varicella vaccines, prior to transport to the
United States.
Question. What vetting procedures are in place to move refugees and
their families expeditiously?
Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
and national security.
Question. What happens to refugees if they fail vetting procedures
at any step of the process?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the
screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to
the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.
Question. What entails ``failing''?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the
screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to
the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.
Question. Under what authorities and with what funding are State/
USAID operating the refugee intake centers at the Dulles Expo Center
and in Philadelphia? What other agencies are contributing funding?
Answer. The Department of State provided support for individuals
relocated from Afghanistan at the Dulles Expo Center under section
2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (MRAA) (22
U.S.C. 2601(c)(1)), which authorizes the President, when he determines
it to be important to the national interest, to furnish assistance to
meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, and establishes the
Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund to carry out
these purposes. The intake center at Philadelphia is operated by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as lead agency for Operation
Allies Welcome. State is providing funding for services to individuals
relocated from Afghanistan at the Philadelphia intake center, including
interpreters, [certain] medical care, and meals, under section 2(c) of
the MRAA and Presidential determinations identified above. Other
agencies supporting this effort including USAID, DoD, DHS, HHS, and
Peace Corps are also relying on funding and authorities that may be
available to these agencies for this purpose, including, as necessary,
the drawdown directed under section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961.
Question. Why were State and USAID, who do not handle domestic
immigration or law enforcement, in charge of a domestic intake facility
for Afghans attempting to immigrate to the United States as refugees or
visa holders?
Answer. The August 2021 relocation of individuals from Afghanistan
required a comprehensive government approach involving a coordinated
interagency effort. Individuals who arrived at the Dulles Expo Center
had already been admitted to the United States by Customs and Border
Protection Officers at Dulles Airport in accordance with U.S.
immigration laws. Department of State, with support from USAID, with
local staffing in the area, were able to quickly stand up the Dulles
Expo center, with 24/7 staffing levels to meet the demands of the
thousands of Afghans who needed to be onward processed to domestic
military safe havens for additional resettlement processing.
Question. When did the Department start keeping track of Afghans
who left the Dulles facility upon arrival? How many Afghans are
believed to have left the Dulles facility without authorization? How
long did it take the Department to clarify the guidance governing
whether Afghans were free to leave the facility or not?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border
Protection establishes conditions of parole and I refer you to it for
full information in this regard.
Question. Did the Department possess sufficient biometric equipment
to collect the samples necessary for vetting the Afghans transiting
through the ports of entry in Dulles and Philadelphia? If not, what
steps were taken to rectify the situation and ensure sufficient data
was collected for vetting?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
information on biometric data collection required for vetting and
admittance into the United States.
Question. Approximately how many of the Afghans processed through
Dulles/Philadelphia have no identifiable connection to the U.S.
Government?
Answer. Many individuals were admitted to the United States under
humanitarian parole but may have been in the processing stage for a
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or been employed by the U.S. Government
but not yet qualified for an SIV. We estimate that 40-50 percent of
evacuees are potentially eligible to apply for the SIV program.
Additionally, some individuals may have a U.S. tie as the family member
of a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident. DHS, as the lead agency
for Operation Allies Welcome, in coordination with the Department of
Defense at eight locations throughout the United States, continues to
document individuals relocated from Afghanistan.
Question. What documentation providing proof of identity did the
Department deem was sufficient for Afghan refugees transiting into the
United States?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
information on identity requirements for admittance into the United
States.
Question. Without a resumption in international assistance--which
previously accounted for around 40 percent of GDP--Afghanistan will
face further economic instability. As long as Afghanistan's economy
continues to deteriorate, humanitarian needs will remain high and new
waves of refugees will seek refugee outside the country. How do you
plan to work with USAID to address these needs, barring a full-scale
resumption in U.S. assistance? How do you expect third countries to
respond to fresh waves of Afghan refugees?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to providing humanitarian
assistance to the Afghan people directly through the United Nations and
NGO partners. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian
donor to the Afghan response and provided nearly $330 million in
humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2021. Immediate priorities are
the safety and security of our partners; ensuring aid is delivered in
accordance with internationally recognized humanitarian principles; and
responsibly scaling up humanitarian assistance. State and USAID are
monitoring the situation very closely, staying in daily contact with
our partners, and assessing and adjusting to meet these priorities. We
are also working closely with the international community to respond to
the humanitarian crisis and worsening economic crisis.
Question. The hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and its
failure to provide adequate safeguards for thousands of at risk
Afghans, has bolstered the position of our adversaries, including Iran.
With the arrival of fresh waves of Afghan refugees, how do you
anticipate this will impact Iran's Fatemiyoun Brigade, and specifically
its ability to undermine U.S. national security interests both in
Afghanistan and beyond?
Answer. Iran has for years recruited Afghan Shia militants from
within Afghanistan and from among Afghan emigres to Iran to fight on
its behalf in Syria in so-called ``Fatemiyoun Brigades.'' Iran will
likely continue this practice in an attempt to avoid committing its own
troops in Syria and potentially engage in similar practices in
Afghanistan. The Administration will remain vigilant to developments in
this regard and is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
forces, personnel, and vital interests with all appropriate means.
Regarding the issue of refugees, our priority is the safety and
welfare of refugees and other individuals at risk as a result of the
situation in Afghanistan. We are working within the United Nations and
other international organizations to ensure the safety and welfare of
refugees and other individuals at risk. We expect all states to uphold
their obligations under international law, including applicable human
rights and refugee law obligations, and to respect the principle of
non-refoulement.
Question. Please elaborate on the Department's plans for the
maintaining a diplomatic presence as relates to Afghanistan. Will the
decision to re-establish a presence in Kabul be contingent upon
diplomatic recognition of the Taliban?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan suspended operations on
August 31, 2021. For the time being, the U.S. Government is managing
our diplomacy with Afghanistan out of Doha, Qatar, to include consular
affairs, administering humanitarian assistance, and working with
allies, partners, and regional and international stakeholders. To
resume operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Department will
need to complete a deliberative planning process. A decision to resume
operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul would be made based on an
assessment of U.S. national security interests and the security
situation on the ground.
Question. What, if any, other factors will be considered?
Answer. Resuming operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul will be subject
to Congressional notification procedures and Department planning
processes. The decision-making process will consider a variety of
factors to include, but not limited to foreign policy priorities;
representation maintained by other governments in the locality; and
security requirements and policies necessary to mitigate identified
threats, including to but not limited to those stemming from terrorism,
political violence, crime, and Afghanistan's ability to provide
security in accordance with its international obligations.
Question. Can you commit to consulting with the Chair and Ranking
Member before finalizing any decision to establish a U.S. presence in
Kabul?
Answer. Yes, the Department will work with Congress and comply with
applicable laws on any resumption of operations at Embassy Kabul.
Question. How does the Department plan to uphold U.S. policy
priories in the absence of a formal presence?
Answer. We continue to communicate with the Taliban on a pragmatic,
operational basis on our vital national interests. We have moved our
diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs
team is hard at work. We continue to facilitate departures for U.S.
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, if they choose to depart. We are
focused on monitoring and mitigating the threat of terrorist activity
emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the Taliban to its
commitment to prevent any group or individual from using the territory
of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States or that of
our allies. We also continue to support humanitarian assistance to the
Afghan people and continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights
of all Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive
government with broad support.
Question. What are the Department of State's priorities as relates
to Afghanistan?
Answer. First, the Department has continued its relentless effort
to help any remaining U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, leave Afghanistan
if they so choose. Second, we intend to monitor and mitigate the threat
of terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the
Taliban accountable for preventing terrorist groups, such as al Qaida
and ISIS-K, from using Afghanistan as a base for external operations
that could threaten the United States or our allies. Third, we will
continue to support humanitarian assistance to the Afghanistan people.
Fourth, we continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights of all
Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive government
with broad support.
Question. Where do human rights and counterterrorism fall on the
spectrum?
Answer. The United States is committed to respect for human rights
in all countries. We are deeply concerned about restrictions limiting
women's participation in public life, including access to education,
employment, and freedom of movement, and continue to press the Taliban
to uphold the rights of all Afghans. We are disappointed in the
composition of the interim ``caretaker'' cabinet announced by the
Taliban which does not include women and only minimal numbers of
members of minority groups.
Question. How do you plan to operationalize these objectives?
Answer. In all our communications to the Taliban, we have made
clear that its relationship with the international community will be
shaped by its own actions, including on counterterrorism, safe passage,
unhindered humanitarian access, and respect for the human rights of all
Afghans. We work closely with international partners to maintain unity
in our approach and to make clear that any legitimacy, which the
Taliban assert they want, will have to be earned through sustained
action on these priorities. Mere assurances are not enough. We have
made clear to the Taliban that the international community is watching
closely.
On counterterrorism, we are coordinating closely with the
Department of Defense, partners, and allies to retain and continue to
build our counterterrorism capabilities to prevent, detect, and disrupt
terrorist threats.
Question. Based on the State Department's most recent report to
Congress on Chief of Mission staffing levels in Afghanistan
(transmitted on July 13, 2021), there were 645 locally employed staff
(LES) members working for the United States in Afghanistan. However, it
was recently announced that the Department had evacuated 2,800 LES
members from Afghanistan. Can you confirm all U.S. Embassy Kabul staff,
including locally employed staff and their families, were safely
evacuated? If not, why not and what plans are in place to ensure they
are able to depart Afghanistan? Can you explain the discrepancy between
these two numbers? Do the 2,800 evacuees include formerly employed LES
members?
Answer. During the evacuation and relocation operations in August,
locally employed staff members working for the United States in
Afghanistan were evacuated with eligible family members. The figures
noted represent the number of locally employed staff and the total
number of people (i.e., locally employed staff and their eligible
family members) who were safely evacuated.
Question. What is the total number of Afghans who have worked under
U.S. Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan (both currently and
formerly employed)?
Answer. The number of Afghans who have been employed by Embassy
Kabul and worked under U.S. Chief of Mission authority is estimated to
be approximately 14,000 in the years since Embassy Kabul was re-
established in 2001.
Question. How many of those individuals have been evacuated from
Afghanistan?
Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of
the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to
evacuate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel
on August 30, of which 7 have requested assistance to depart
Afghanistan.
Question. How many of those individuals have successfully acquired
SIV status? How many are still in the application stages?
Answer. The Department is currently assessing how many Afghans who
were relocated had outstanding Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applications. Many of the Afghans relocated had submitted an SIV
application that was moving through the multi-stage SIV process. Others
had not yet begun the process or were in the first stages. The number
of SIV applications in the pipeline changes daily as new applications
are filed and others completed. We defer to the Department of Homeland
Security on any questions regarding admission categories and adjustment
of status.
Question. Is the United States considering recognizing any
government of Afghanistan that is under the direction or control of the
Taliban or members of the Taliban? If so, what conditions would need to
be met before the United States gave such recognition?
Answer. As a general matter there is no requirement under
international law to make a formal statement on recognition of
governments. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
Government is one we and the international community can work with. We
have also made clear, as have our international partners, that any
steps toward legitimacy and recognition must be earned. Assurances
alone are not enough.
Question. Who is the rightful leader of the Government of
Afghanistan?
Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
Government is one we and the international community can work with. We
continue to press the Taliban and Afghan leaders to form an inclusive
government that respects the rights and dignity of all Afghans.
Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to
U.N. sanctions?
Answer. There are 135 individuals and five entities associated with
the Taliban that are currently designated under the UNSC's 1988 (2011)
Taliban sanctions regime.
Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to
United States sanctions?
Answer. The Taliban organization was designated as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist by President George W. Bush in July 2002
upon issuance of E.O. 13268, which amended E.O. 13224 by adding the
Taliban to the annex of certain designated individuals and entities. We
defer to the Department of the Treasury on specifics regarding numbers
of individuals and entities designated.
Question. Has the United States Government, any of its agencies, or
any of its employees or agents (including contractors or any other
persons working on behalf of the United States) given or donated any
money or anything else of value to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or
any member of the Taliban or Haqqani Network since April 14, 2021? If
so, please specify the amounts of money or other items of value, the
persons who provided the money or items of value, and the recipients of
the money or items of value.
Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We
have accounted and will account for that, ensuring that all our actions
are consistent with U.S. law and policy.
Question. Is the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or any member of the
Taliban or Haqqani Network requesting any payments of money or other
items of value in exchange for permitting U.S. citizens, U.S. permanent
legal residents, or SIV applicants to leave Afghanistan?
Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We
have accounted and will continue to account for that, ensuring that all
our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.
Question. In your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on September 14, 2021, you indicated, as a result of the
February 29 Agreement brokered by the Trump administration, President
Biden ``faced the choice between ending the war or escalating it.''
Were any other options available that would have allowed the United
States and its NATO allies to maintain existing levels of support to
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces?
Answer. As I testified, the choice confronting President Biden was
either to go forward with the commitments his predecessor had made to
withdraw forces by May 1, or escalate, not end, the war with the
Taliban. After the signing of the Doha Agreement, the Taliban refrained
from any direct attack on U.S. and international forces. Had we
maintained a military presence indefinitely, the Taliban made clear
they would have resumed attacks against U.S. and NATO troops. We did
not believe there was a middle ground where we could safely maintain
the same number of troops.
Question. Did military commanders on the ground indicate that they
could adequately protect U.S. counterterrorism interest, prevent the
collapse of the government, and protect Americans from Taliban and IS-K
attacks?
Answer. I defer questions about military assessments, planning, and
preparedness to the Department of Defense.
Question. What is the current status of Afghan military aircraft
and personnel that fled to Uzbekistan?
Answer. Following relocation of all 494 Afghan military
servicemembers and their families out of Termez, Uzbekistan, to the UAE
on September 13, these individuals are in the pipeline for further
processing. Embassy Tashkent sought and has received assurances from
the Government of Uzbekistan that the aircraft will not be returned to
Afghanistan and Taliban control. The 46 air frames remain under the
control of Uzbekistan. State defers to the Department of Defense on
additional details regarding the status of Afghanistan aircraft
currently located outside of Afghanistan.
Question. Are there any concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan
will actively allow the Russian Federation or People's Republic of
China to gain access to the U.S.-origin military equipment,
communications gear, or other sensitive technologies that escaping
Afghan military personnel brought to Uzbekistan?
Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of
Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and
transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
do not fall into the wrong hands. The Department defers all risk
assessments related to this military equipment to the DoD.
Question. Are there concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan is
unable to properly guard this equipment until it can be retrieved?
Answer. Embassy Tashkent submitted a diplomatic note to
Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that affirmed U.S.
responsibility for the aircraft that arrived in Uzbekistan in August
via the Afghan Air Force. The diplomatic note further requested that
the Government of Uzbekistan safeguard the aircraft, associated
equipment and parts, and associated technical information; limit access
to only officials of Uzbekistan and the U.S.; not operate the aircraft;
and not transfer the aircraft, associated equipment, or technical
information and data. Senior Government of Uzbekistan officials have
confirmed that they will honor this U.S. request and have granted
Embassy Tashkent officers access to inspect the aircraft.
Question. Do you believe that the Government of Uzbekistan will
return this equipment to Afghanistan and the Taliban?
Answer. No. Senior Department officials have formally asked the
Government of Uzbekistan not to return these aircraft to the Taliban.
The Department has received high-level assurances that Uzbekistan will
honor this request.
Question. Did the United States inform NATO of its decision to
begin a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. citizens and
at-risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on
August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the NATO command and leadership
did the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO,
and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Albania of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Albania did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Belgium of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Belgium did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Bulgaria of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Bulgaria did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Canada of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Croatia of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Croatia did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform the Czech Republic of its
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
whom within the Government of the Czech Republic did the United States
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Denmark of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Denmark did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Estonia of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform France of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of France did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Germany of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Germany did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Greece of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Greece did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Hungary of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Hungary did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Iceland of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Italy of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Latvia of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Latvia did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Lithuania of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Lithuania did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Luxembourg of its decision
to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Luxembourg did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Montenegro of its decision
to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Montenegro did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform the Kingdom of the
Netherlands of its decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-
risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on August
14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the Government of the Netherlands did
the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and
when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform North Macedonia of its
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
whom within the Government of North Macedonia did the United States
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Norway of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Norway did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Poland of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Poland did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Portugal of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Portugal did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Romania of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Romania did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Slovakia of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Slovakia did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Slovenia of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Slovenia did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Spain of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Spain did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform Turkey of its decision to
begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
the Government of Turkey did the United States communicate its
intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Did the United States inform the United Kingdom of its
decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
whom within the Government of the United Kingdom did the United States
communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
date?
Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
Afghanistan.
Question. Putin has been strengthening Russia's security position
In Central Asia in recent years, and, in August 2021, held military
exercises on the border with Afghanistan. How worried are you about
Russia and China strengthening their respective positions in Central
Asia?
Answer. The United States remains committed to close cooperation
and strong engagement with the countries of Central Asia. We continue
to engage productively with the region in the C5+1 format, through mil-
mil cooperation, and by other means. While Russia has used the
situation in Afghanistan to press its Central Asian neighbors for
increased cooperation, the countries of Central Asia have made clear
they have no desire to become dependent on any one country.
Question. What do stronger Russian and Chinese presence in this
region mean for the Biden administration's strategic pivot to focusing
on great power competition with Russia and China?
Answer. Russia and China have a stake in preventing global
terrorism and regional instability. To the extent that their presence
and influence supports these shared objectives, we are prepared to
cooperate. Where their actions and preferences negatively affect our
interests and those of our partners, we will push back forcefully. Our
withdrawal from Afghanistan will free up significant resources and
senior level attention to focus on strategic competition, which is one
of the central challenges that will define the 21st century.
Question. Moscow has been engaging the Taliban since at least 2014,
and since 2018 hosted them for several rounds of peace talks. Russian
officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years.
They did so while simultaneously cultivating ties with the
internationally-recognized Afghan Government in an attempt to position
Russia as a peacemaker. Since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, it seems
the Russian Government has concluded that the Taliban are a reality
that they have to deal with, if not empower. Russia's presidential
envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has called for unfreezing the
Afghan Government's reserves or risk a spike in illegal narcotics and
arms traffic. Russia, like China, abstained from the most recent U.N.
resolution that merely called on the Taliban to live up to its
commitments is one recent example. How do you see Russia's role in
Afghanistan going forward?
Answer. Russia has indeed sought to position itself as a peacemaker
and will likely continue to do so. This role is motivated to a
considerable extent by Russia's desire to assert itself as a global
power. Russia also has serious concerns about Afghanistan's possible
role as a haven for international terrorism, especially with respect to
ISIS-K, and thus may be a useful partner for us in pressing the Taliban
to adhere to the counterterrorism commitments of the U.S.-Taliban
Agreement. Russia is unlikely to develop significant economic ties with
Afghanistan.
Question. Are you concerned about Russia empowering the Taliban and
by extension possibly other terrorist groups/activities? What do you
intend to do to prevent Russia from engaging in malign behavior in
Afghanistan?
Answer. Though Russia maintains its embassy in Kabul, the Taliban
remain designated as a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior
Russian officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to
recognize the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties
with Afghanistan's neighbors in recent months more so than with the
Taliban itself. We continue to engage with Russia to reiterate that we
will not tolerate destabilizing behavior anywhere in the world.
Question. How will Afghanistan impact the bilateral U.S.-Russia
relationship? Will Afghanistan be a point of tension or cooperation?
How important will this issue be within the U.S.-Russia relationship?
Answer. Despite the tension in the broader U.S.-Russia relationship
in recent years, Afghanistan has consistently been an area in which
productive conversation is possible. Though our motives and preferred
methods differ, there remains significant overlap in terms of several
key goals, with counterterrorism and counternarcotic efforts chief
among them. Afghanistan is likely to remain somewhat set aside from our
various bilateral issues.
Question. The 2019 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report
notes a decline in opiate trafficking from Afghanistan along the so-
called ``northern'' route, through Central Asia to Russia. While the
threat posed by narco-trafficking to Russia appears to be on the
decline, the threat posed to Western Europe appears to have increased
significantly. Since Putin aims to weaken the West, how might Putin
further capitalize on a scenario where more drugs are coming into
Western Europe after U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan? What can be done
now to prevent more drugs flowing into Western Europe?
Answer. UNODC has reported declining seizures on the Northern Route
since 2015. However, due to the inherent difficulties in researching
illicit activities, a reduction in reported seizures does not
necessarily correlate to a reduction in trafficking. In 2019 and 2020,
there were major seizures of heroin in Kazakhstan and Eastern Europe
that transited from Iran across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia and
Russia. The Afghan drug trade is dynamic, and it is likely too soon to
state with confidence that there has been a significant diminution of
flow through Russia. With Russia suffering a massive increase in drug
overdose deaths since the onset of the pandemic and instituting
increasingly harsh drug-related laws in recent years, the Kremlin has
significant reason to try to keep narco-trafficking out of Russia and
Afghanistan. The Department of State's Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) works to strengthen our
European partners' ability to combat organized crime and corruption
which are key enablers of smugglers. INL seeks to strengthen law
enforcement capacity to detect and interdict narcotics and other
contraband smuggling along known trafficking routes, including the
Balkans Route. Additionally, INL is increasing its efforts to
strengthen the rule of law and law enforcement along Europe's
periphery, which will help authorities to combat narcotics and other
smuggling.
Question. There has been much discussion about how our withdrawal
from Afghanistan allows the U.S. to shift focus to other pressing
foreign policy priorities, such as strategic competition with China.
How do you view U.S. foreign policy priorities post-Afghanistan
withdrawal, and what resources that had previously been focused on
Afghanistan will be made available for those priorities?
Answer. We are focused on strengthening our alliances and
partnerships to address the issues that have greatest impact on the
safety and well-being of Americans, including COVID-19, the climate
crisis, cyber security, and the China challenge. We will continue to
work with our partners to address enduring threats such as terrorism
and nuclear proliferation and will remain engaged in holding the
Taliban to its public commitments, including on counterterrorism, safe
passage, and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Department is
currently reviewing all non-humanitarian programs and funding for
Afghanistan. This review will inform decisions on what non-humanitarian
assistance to the Afghan people should continue or be reprogrammed. We
are assessing how much Diplomatic Engagement funding needs to be
retained for Afghanistan policy and support, and what remainder could
be available for other priorities, working with Congress.
Question. Does the Administration believe that the United States
and China share similar goals with respect to Afghanistan? Are there
areas with respect to Afghanistan where the interests of the United
States and the interests of China are different?
Answer. We continue to engage with countries that border
Afghanistan and countries in the region, including the People's
Republic of China (PRC), on the importance of the international
community holding the Taliban accountable for its public commitments
and obligations. The PRC is an important regional stakeholder. There
are certainly areas where our interests are aligned with the PRC
regarding Afghanistan. The entire international community has a stake
in ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and
obligations, not just on safe passage but also respecting the human
rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls,
and members of minority groups; upholding their commitments on
counterterrorism; not carrying out reprisal violence against those who
choose to stay in Afghanistan; and forming an inclusive government that
can meet the needs and reflect the aspirations of the Afghan people.
The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do, and Beijing
has to decide where it is in that effort.
Question. What is your assessment of the implications should China
be in a position to secure access to Afghanistan's mineral resources?
Answer. Increased corruption in countries with major development
projects backed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), including
under the Belt and Road Initiative, is a serious problem. Corruption
erodes economic benefits for local economies and populations,
undermines the rule of law, fails to adhere to international
environmental and social best practices, and at times prevents U.S.
firms from competing. Corruption serves as a gateway to other
criminality, such as money laundering; labor abuses; bribery; and
trafficking in minerals, precious metals, and gemstones back to the
PRC.
Question. How do you expect India's security concerns and security
environment to change in light of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan?
How will U.S.-India collaboration change to account for these changes?
What are Administration priorities for further deepening security
collaboration with India, both related to developments in Afghanistan
but also to ensure that the U.S.-India partnership maintains its focus
on advancing shared goals in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. India has longstanding concerns about regional terrorism
and instability in South Asia, which have grown more acute in light of
the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. As noted in the recent leaders'
joint statement between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, the
United States will continue to deepen counterterrorism cooperation with
India and coordinate closely on developments in Afghanistan. U.S.-India
security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond remains robust and
we expect it to expand further in the foreseeable future.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. No one group has made more significant strides since 2001
than Afghan women. In terms of the economy, women have come a long way
since the fall of the Taliban regime. They returned to work by the
hundreds of thousands, and many became business owners and
entrepreneurs. Afghanistan rebuilt an education system that had
basically stopped functioning. In 2001, only 900,000 students were in
primary school--all of them male. Prior to the fall of Afghanistan,
more than 9 million students were in school, with nearly 40 percent of
them girls. How can the Administration hold the Taliban and Afghan
Government to account in preserving the rights and gains of Afghan
women without the support the U.S. military provided to Afghan forces
and the check it served on the Taliban?
Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
the international community to support the gains that recognized the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women
and girls, over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint statement
issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries at the
U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community is
deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their rights
to education, work, freedom of movement, and assembly. We continue to
expect the Taliban meet its public commitments to respect the rights
and dignity of all Afghans, including women and girls, in terms of
their meaningful participation in political processes and public life,
as well as access to education and employment.
Question. What is the U.S. planning to do to preserve the rights
and gains of Afghan women and girls?
Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
the international community to support the gains made by women, girls,
and members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the
joint statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other
countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international
community is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly
their rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of
assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to
respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan women and girls in terms
of their meaningful participation in political processes and public
life, as well as access to education and employment.
Question. What is the Administration doing to ensure that any
agreement with the Taliban preserves and respects the human rights of
Afghan women and girls, as well as diverse religious and ethnic
minority groups and other marginalized communities?
Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
the international community to support the gains that recognized the
rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls, journalists, human
rights defenders, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+ persons, and
members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint
statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries
at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community
is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their
rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of
assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to
respect the rights and dignity of all Afghans, including women and
girls, in terms of their meaningful participation in political
processes and public life, as well as access to education and
employment.
Question. I remain concerned about specific groups that have worked
closely with the U.S. Government, such as the U.S. Agency for Global
Media (USAGM) employees and their families who are still in
Afghanistan--comprised of more than 100 Voice of America and Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty employees and their families who have not been
evacuated. I am also concerned about the many women judges and court
personnel who have been trained by American and international experts,
such as the American judges affiliated with the National Association of
Women Judges (NAWJ) here in the United States. And, I remain concerned
about the employees of the Lincoln Learning Centers (LLCs) and their
families, many who are still in Afghanistan. The LLCs comprised a
network of 27 American Spaces, affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, which
extended across Afghanistan and was managed through a cooperative
agreement with an Afghan NGO, the Social Development and Research
Organization for Afghans (SDROA). Part of a network of 600 American
Spaces worldwide, LLCs served as locations where Afghans can learn the
truth about the United States and our stance on the importance of
democratic values like human rights and anticorruption. What steps are
being taken to facilitate the safe passage of these Afghans at-risk,
including the USAGM employees and their families, the women judges, and
the LLC employees and their families?
Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women,
children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community,
members of minority groups, journalists and other at-risk populations.
We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for
this population. The State Department has established a team, led by
the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
interagency, including with USAGM regarding USAGM, RFE/RL, and VOA
staff, and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for
those who wish to leave Afghanistan including U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans.
Question. Two weeks ago, I joined my colleagues in sending a letter
to President Biden asking for assurances that vulnerable Afghans are
paroled into the United States and not left in third countries awaiting
processing and asks the Administration to create a designated parole
category for certain Afghan women and children, activists, human rights
defenders, parliamentarians, journalists, and others who are in danger.
The general parole that Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
announced last week only allows Afghans coming into the country,
without any benefits or work authorization. Is the Administration
looking into providing Afghans coming in under the parole program be
allowed to received benefits and/or ability to work?
Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
is the agency that adjudicates and grants parole. The Department of
State does not grant parole and does not set policy related to parole.
At the federally funded Department of Defense facilities, Afghan
nationals are provided with housing and meals at no cost. They receive
assistance in applying for a work authorization, are enrolled in
temporary medical insurance, and receive additional medical care, if
needed. Many evacuees are eligible to apply to adjust status under the
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program or other legal immigration
pathway available to them. Afghans who adjust status under the Afghan
SIV program will be eligible to receive the same benefits as any Afghan
SIV visa holder admitted to the United States.
On September 30, President Biden signed into law the continuing
resolution to fund the government through early December. Among other
items, the continuing resolution provides funds to help resettle Afghan
allies in the United States and makes Afghan nationals eligible for
expedited asylum processing, resettlement assistance, entitlement
programs, child welfare support, and drivers' licenses if they passed
background checks and were paroled into the United States by September
30, 2022.
Question. What commitments has the Administration secured from
third countries to host Afghans for a sufficient duration to allow the
Administration to process their SIV, P-1, P-2 visas, or humanitarian
parole requests? What happens when someone is unable to secure a U.S.
visa? Is asylum still a possibility in those countries?
Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa
(SIV) applications, including by transferring cases that are at the
interview stage to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world
where applicants are able to appear. We recognize that it is currently
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
find a way to enter a third country. The U.S. Government is pressing
the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their
families, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with travel
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
neighboring countries and Qatar (among others) to allow Afghans to
enter. Afghan SIV applicants who are able to leave Afghanistan and
whose SIV case is ready for interview may transfer their cases to any
immigrant visa processing post. The Department of State has worked with
various countries to host Afghans long enough to process their
outstanding applications or transit to countries that will permit this.
Asylum protections have been offered in certain countries, but the
possibility for asylum as well as the outcome of any individual asylum
requests will depend on third country asylum laws and policy as well as
other factors. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the
process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens,
Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many
countries have permitted Afghans to transit through their territories
and many other countries made generous offers of support. Many
countries have committed to permanently resettle Afghans. The United
States has concluded international agreements with several countries to
facilitate these activities, and the Department of State continues to
follow its normal procedure for transmitting the texts of these
international agreements to Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. I understand the State Department is still working to
determine the number of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants who
remain in Afghanistan. These individuals and their families are in
direct and imminent danger from the Taliban because of their service to
their country and the U.S. mission. I also understand that State
continues to process these applications, though it is unclear where and
how. What steps is the Department taking, in partnership with the
Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, to continue the
processing of SIV applications for those who remain in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department of State continues to process outstanding
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at all processing
stages controlled by the Department, including the Chief of Mission
approval process and administrative processing for those who have been
interviewed. These stages of the process were conducted outside of
Afghanistan even before we suspended operations in Kabul. I defer to
the Department of Homeland Security for updates on its processing of
the I-360 petition for special immigrant status. While it is difficult
for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country, we are developing
processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver these important
consular services for the people of Afghanistan. Applicants in
Afghanistan should continue to monitor their email for updates on their
case statuses.
Question. Does the Department of State have the capacity to
continue all steps in the application process, including those that
were previously done in Kabul?
Answer. The Department of State continues to prioritize the
processing of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications,
including by quintupling the number of people assigned to review cases
at the Chief of Mission approval stage since May. The Department also
continues to coordinate with the government contractor at the National
Visa Center to increase efficiencies and reduce delays, including
increasing the number of staff processing Afghan SIVs by seven-fold.
The Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator for
Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies and
facilitate the freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.
Question. How quickly can those applications be processed?
Answer. The Department of State is expediting the stages of the
Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) application process within its control as
much as feasible. The Department has supplemented staffing at the Chief
of Mission approval stage of the process to ensure the cases are
processed expeditiously. In addition, the Department has coordinated
with the contractor at the National Visa Center to devote additional
resources to expeditiously handle SIV pre-processing. We continue to
prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV applicants. Although
applicants will not be able to complete the visa interview portion in
Afghanistan, we are expediting continued SIV processing at all other
stages of the process outside of Afghanistan. We are prioritizing this
effort, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no
expiration date.
Question. How is the State Department communicating with those
applicants still in country to let them know of their options if they
are able to secure safe passage out of Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department of State has added additional information to
the Department's website to ensure applicants have the appropriate
information to transfer their cases to another immigrant visa
processing post.
Question. I appreciate that the Administration is conducting a
much-needed review of the Afghan SIV program. When can we expect the
report on the process?
Answer. Due to the exigent circumstances in Afghanistan, the
Department of State and other interagency partners requested an
extension of the deadline on the report required by E.O. 14013.
Question. Mr. Secretary, can I receive your commitment that the
State Department will brief Congressional offices on a weekly basis on
the SIV process and broader resettlement efforts?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team looks forward to more regular
engagements with partners in Congress. We appreciate the commitment of
members of Congress to these issues and acknowledge an opportunity for
more coordination moving forward.
Question. In my recent conversation with NATO member ambassadors,
many expressed a need for NATO to address regional stability following
our withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as ensuring that the Taliban
does not once again harbor terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda and others,
nor provide financial or logistical support to these groups. What can
the United States and the Alliance do to ensure that Afghanistan does
not become a haven for terrorists?
Answer. Discussions with our NATO Allies are underway to determine
how best to continue the Alliance's work in the current context to
monitor, prevent, and potentially counter terrorist activity emanating
from Afghanistan. NATO played an absolutely critical role in leading
the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan until its termination in
September, and we will continue to work with NATO Allies to address our
shared interests.
Question. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the decision to
withdraw from Afghanistan and the hastened withdrawal has damaged the
strength of the NATO alliance?
Answer. The Alliance and U.S. standing within NATO remain strong.
The June Summit that followed NATO's collective decision to withdraw
troops showed the Alliance is unified and forward-looking. After 20
years and a reassessment of where to position our militaries based on
today's global threat picture, Allies agreed to end our military
engagement in Afghanistan. NATO is the foundation of Euro-Atlantic
collective defense. The Alliance has overcome divisive issues in the
past because of the strength of our approach based on consultation and
consensus.
Question. What resources is the Department of State planning to
mobilize in order to support our allies who are hosting Afghan refugees
while visa processing is underway?
Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
resettlement. The United States coordinates closely with and provides
funding to UNHCR to support its efforts to provide third-country
resettlement to refugees around the world. We are in discussion with
UNHCR which works with many other countries to resettle refugees,
including those from Afghanistan. We commend countries who have already
started to accept Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. And we
strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also urge states to
uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or
asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle
of non-refoulement.
Question. After U.S. withdrawal completed, thousands at-risk
individuals remain in Afghanistan at great personal risk. Charter
aircraft have been ready to fly them to safety for weeks but the
Taliban now refuses to allow their departure. How is the State
Department engaging with the Taliban to allow the departure of charter
planes, including from Mazar-E-Sharif?
Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State
Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the
flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating
requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately
organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger
manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these
flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially
eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States. We are also
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.
Question. The people of Afghanistan face a humanitarian catastrophe
with limited access to basic necessities. How is the State Department
vetting non-government recipients of U.S. assistance inside Afghanistan
to ensure that they are not under the coercion of the Taliban regime
and are safeguarded from having their assets and operations seized by
Taliban-controlled ministries?
Answer. The U.S. Government has put multiple measures in place to
help ensure ongoing humanitarian assistance does not support any
individual or entity that is or has been engaged in, or supportive of,
terrorist activities or other activities inconsistent with U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests. This may include
vetting, pre-award risk assessments, ongoing risk analysis processes
that mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse, and carefully
monitoring progress toward award objectives and achievement of expected
results.
Question. In cases where primary funding recipients are sub-
contracting with other local entities, how does the State Department
monitor funding to ensure it gets to the Afghan people in need rather
than exploited by malign actors?
Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarians programs, the operating environment, and potential issues
to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are planning for how they
will make adjustments to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of
continuing programs from outside Afghanistan, including through
existing third parties, given the current footprint. Additionally,
bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk that our programs
could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This may include
mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific program
design to reduce those risks.
Question. Noting that decades of evidence has demonstrated that in
order to effectively address the needs of women and girls, the safety
and security of female aid workers is critical--how is the
Administration working right now to ensure that female humanitarian
staff at every level are able to safely operate, including work
directly consulting with Afghan women and girls on their priorities and
needs, producing rapid humanitarian needs assessments, and designing
and implementing humanitarian interventions?
Answer. We are working with the international community to set
clear, unified expectations for a united, inclusive, and representative
government with the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women;
for parties to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and for
immediate, safe, and unhindered access for humanitarian actors. Our
humanitarian partners are working with staff on the ground,
particularly women staff, to identify the safest ways to reach women
and girls with life-saving humanitarian assistance. Our humanitarian
programs are designed to be flexible, and we are supporting partners to
adapt to the new environment in line with the recommendations of the
women most impacted.
Question. Improving access to quality education, especially for
girls, has been a key objective for U.S. foreign assistance in
Afghanistan over the past two decades, and our investment has
contributed to significant progress for Afghan children and youth. From
2001 to 2021, the number of children enrolled in general education
(grades 1-12) in Afghanistan rose from 0.9 million (with almost no
girls) to 9.2 million (39 percent girls). The number of schools has
also increased from 3,400 to 16,400.
1. Will the United States continue to support education in
Afghanistan to protect these gains and prevent backsliding,
especially for Afghan women and girls?
2. If so, how will the Administration ensure that aid does not end
up in the hands of the Taliban?
Answer. The United States is committing to supporting the Afghan
people, especially women, girls, and members of minority groups. As I
have said, humanitarian will continue to be provided in Afghanistan,
including to women, girls, and members of minority groups. We will be
very focused on monitoring this humanitarian assistance to help ensure
it is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I
noted in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a
senior official who will coordinate the U.S. Government's effort to
support women in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are engaged
diplomatically and coordinating with the international community to
hold the Taliban accountable for respecting the human rights of women
and girls.
Question. Furthermore, will the Administration expand the license
to operate humanitarian programs in Afghanistan to allow for continued
education assistance?
Answer. The Administration has been clear about its intention to
continue to provide humanitarian assistance in support of the Afghan
people. As part of an ongoing review of our assistance to support the
Afghan people, the Department is determining whether community basic
education programs that promote U.S. national interests and provide
equal education opportunities for girls and boys should continue to the
extent possible in support of the Afghan people. Prohibited
transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to such
activities are authorized by a specific license the Department of the
Treasury updated on September 21.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. On August 30, 2021, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) announced that, ``due to both the lack of air traffic services
and a functional civil aviation authority in Afghanistan, as well as
ongoing security concerns, U.S. civil operators, pilots, and U.S.-
registered civil aircraft are prohibited from operating at any altitude
over much of Afghanistan.'' Additional concerns have been brought to my
staff that all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
certified Afghan national air traffic controllers departed the country
during the evacuation. Qatar and Turkey are working to restore
commercial flights at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), but
these are dependent on negotiations with the Taliban-led government.
Can you please update me on the Department of State's efforts to ensure
air traffic control and management of Afghan airspace? Do Qatar and
Turkey have the experience and equipment needed to facilitate the
reopening of HKIA to commercial air travel and its safe operation over
the long term? What, if any, assistance does the Department or the FAA
anticipate providing to Qatar and Turkey in this regard?
Answer. We recognize the need for Kabul International Airport (KIA)
to resume normal operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously
with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly,
but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that
there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. The
Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve
any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people
valid with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have
reiterated this point to the Taliban.
Question. Will Qatar and Turkey's activities in support of Hamid
Karzai International Airport (HKIA) operations--and that of any
potential American contracting companies working with them--be
considered activity subject to existing sanctions on the Taliban?
Answer. Our top priorities are to minimize the disruption to
humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, while still denying assets to the
Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other sanctioned entities and
individuals. The international community needs to quickly coordinate on
identifying both an international funding mechanism and civil aviation
partners who can assist in creating the conditions necessary for
aircraft insurance and safe flight operations, including cargo. For any
further questions on sanctions, I refer you to the Department of the
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Impartial international humanitarian organizations have
raised serious concerns regarding their ability to continue assistance
operations in Afghanistan given the Taliban are listed by the Treasury
Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group. In
order avoid unwanted negative impacts for Afghan civilians the U.S.
Treasury must provide a broad OFAC general license covering all
humanitarian activities. Will you commit to supporting such a license,
perhaps modeled on the general license OFAC issued for Ansarallah in
Yemen prior to the designation revocation, and work in close
collaboration with the humanitarian community to ensure a license is
issued quickly?
Answer. On September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses
authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international organizations
(including the U.N. and its specialized agencies, such as the World
Bank) and NGOs, and those acting on their behalf, to continue
humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human
needs in Afghanistan as well as the export to Afghanistan of critical
food and medicine. These licenses and corresponding FAQs facilitate
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons--including NGOs and foreign financial
institutions--to continue to support critical and life-saving
activities like the delivery of food, shelter, medicine, and public
health and medical services (including COVID-19-assistance) to the
Afghan people. This follows past precedent in which the U.S. Government
has taken steps to address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where
sanctioned entities and individuals are active, such as in Yemen. The
State Department fully supports continued humanitarian assistance and
other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan as well
as the export to Afghanistan of critical food and medicine.
Question. Thousands of U.S. citizens, green card holders, and
vulnerable Afghans were not evacuated prior to the departure of U.S.
troops from Afghanistan. It is reassuring that efforts to evacuate
vulnerable categories of individuals from Afghanistan have continued
via negotiated evacuation flights and land crossings. Will you commit
to continuing to process all requests and applications received by the
Afghanistan Taskforce to secure safe haven for those who were not able
to depart Afghanistan prior to the final withdrawal of U.S. troops? And
specifically, will you clarify that P-2 category of the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program (USRAP) will be among those prioritized?
Answer. The Department of State continues to receive and process P-
2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Once
outside of Afghanistan, an individual can begin processing through the
USRAP.
We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
country, and like many refugees, they may face significant challenges
fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and
those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate
with international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers
to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.
Question. Refugee Council USA and its nine national refugee
resettlement agency members have advocated for the need to raise the
U.S. refugee acceptance cap from 125,000 to no less than 200,000 for
fiscal year 2022. Will you commit to working closely with President
Biden to answer their call to raise the cap? If the cap is not raised
above 125,000, how would the Administration provide for the needs of
Afghans who do not receive refugee status either through new
legislative action or pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act?
Answer. The President affirmed the United States' commitment to
welcoming refugees by issuing the Presidential Determination (PD) on
Refugee Admissions that raises the refugee admissions ceiling to
125,000 for FY 2022. The State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration has engaged in listening sessions and worked in
close coordination with U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)
partners, including resettlement agencies, RCUSA, and federal and state
partners. We are incorporating feedback into our efforts to rebuild the
program and will continue to partner closely with them going forward.
Persons admitted with Special Immigrant Visas or who have been paroled
into the United States do not count against the refugee ceiling. We
anticipate admitting significant numbers of Afghan refugees through
USRAP in FY 2022, with a regional allocation for refugees from the Near
East/South Asia (including Afghanistan) of 35,000 under the new PD. On
September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan
Supplemental Appropriations Act, which allows for certain Afghan
nationals paroled into the United States to receive domestic refugee
benefits in the United States and contains a provision requiring USCIS
to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications filed by certain Afghan
nationals described in the Act.
Question. What additional funds would be needed outside of the $6.4
billion supplemental request to help resettle Afghans and other
refugees to meet a 200,000 Presidential Determination in 2022?
Answer. Congress appropriated $976.1 million in Emergency Refugee
and Migration Assistance funds in the Afghanistan Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2022 for support for Operation Allies Welcome and
related efforts by the Department of State, including additional
relocations of individuals at risk as a result of the situation in
Afghanistan and related expenses. Given the size, scope, and scale of
this operation, the Department will continue to evaluate the
requirements and may require additional funds to support urgent refugee
and migration needs.
The FY 2022 President's Budget requested sufficient funding to
support the goal of up to 125,000 refugee admissions in FY 2022. On
October 8, President Biden issued the Presidential Determination on
Refugee Admissions for FY 2022, which raises the refugee admissions
target to 125,000. If the President determines to increase the
admissions target over this 125,000 target, the Department would need
to consult with Congress and then reassess funding needs and may
require additional funds.
Question. Our NATO allies worked hand-in-hand with Afghan allies as
part of the International Security Assistance Force mission. With the
end of the mission the need to resettle vulnerable Afghans remains
high. What commitments have other NATO allies given to accept
vulnerable Afghans and refugees post drawdown of troops, and what
diplomatic efforts are ongoing to ensure all NATO members, and other
countries who committed to the mission, do their fair share to provide
safe refuge to those in need?
Answer. The United States consulted with Allies and partners
throughout the process of ending NATO's military presence in
Afghanistan, including on the resettlement of Afghans at risk due to
their association with Allied countries or NATO. Many governments have
already stepped up, accepting thousands of vulnerable Afghans into
their countries. The process is ongoing, and deliberations continue at
NATO and bilaterally with our NATO partners on how to support Afghans
in need of protection and those who still wish to leave Afghanistan.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Cory Booker
Question. On Monday, August 23, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
(JBMDL) was officially tasked by the DoD to serve as one of four
military installations that will house Afghan Refugees as part of
Operation Allies Welcome. JBMDL is currently housing 9,000 refugees,
with the capacity to house a total of 13,000. I understand that JBMDL,
in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of State, is providing all refuges with COVID-19 testing and
offering vaccines, as well as full medical screening and other health
services. What is the plan for these individuals and how long do you
foresee them staying there?
Answer. Afghan nationals who are paroled will be required to stay
at a DoD facility until a tuberculosis screening has occurred, and
vaccinations have been received followed by a 21-day quarantine period.
At federally-funded facilities, Afghan nationals will be provided
housing and meals at no cost. They will be able to apply for work
authorization, be enrolled in temporary medical insurance, and receive
additional medical care, if needed. They are matched with a
resettlement agency affiliate in the United States and assisted with
travel plans once that affiliate has indicated it is ready to receive
the family at their final destination.
We are already helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
communities across the United States and expect to increase these
movements significantly in the coming weeks. However, we do not have a
timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who
arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.
Question. Is the plan to eventually resettle them to civilian
facilities while they await either the processing of SIVs or P visas or
refugee status determinations?
Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
communities across the United States and expect to increase these
movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to
relocate Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they
arrive in their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do
not have a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for
those who arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.
Question. If so, what plans are in place or being put in place for
such a transition?
Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
communities across the United States and expect to increase these
movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to move
Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they arrive in
their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do not have
a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who
arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.
Question. As each military base currently participating in
Operation Allies Welcome has a set capacity for housing Afghan
Refugees, does the Department of State have plans to continue sending
refugees to these installations as others are resettled? Or, will each
installation's population diminish as they begin the resettlement
process?
Answer. We are already helping Afghans move into welcoming
communities across the United States and expect to increase these
movements significantly in the coming weeks. As these newcomers reach
their final U.S. destination, there will be some new Afghan arrivals
from those overseas military installations that were transit points in
Operation Allies Refuge. Those new arrivals will go through the same
medical, health, and work authorization processes for all arriving
Afghans.
As some individuals move to their new communities, and others
arrive from overseas to domestic DoD facilities, the population at each
facility will change. However, we do not have a timeline right now for
the completion of all travel for those who arrived and are staying in
DoD facilities.
Question. Outside of resettlement, are there any plans to increase
the number of translators, specifically female translators, at each
military installation?
Answer. We are working closely with the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security in ensuring that Afghan arrivals have safe conditions
and are able to complete medical and immigration processing swiftly at
each of the DoD facilities where they are being processed. For more
information on interpretation, including any plans to increase the
number of female interpreters, I defer to the United Coordination Group
within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead for Operation
Allies Welcome.
Question. Are there any plans to utilize SIV translators currently
housed at each base as official translators in partnership with NGOs?
Answer. For more information on interpretation, including any plans
to utilize Special Immigrant Visa interpreters, I defer to the United
Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead
for Operation Allies Welcome.
Question. Does the Department of State have any plans to meet the
increased demand for health care services--specifically women's health
services--at military installations without robust local health care
offerings?
Answer. We are inviting all arrivals to take advantage of the
services offered on military bases, such as applying for work
authorizations and health care services. For Afghans who need
specialized assistance, we are making a range of services available
including basic family medicine; pediatric care; obstetric care;
emergency medicine; basic laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy services;
basic dental care; and psychosocial support and mental health services.
For more information on the demand for health services and women's
health care services at DoD facilities, I defer to the United
Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead
for Operation Allies Welcome.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In his speech to the American people on August 26,
President Biden admitted that ``it could very well have happened'' that
the U.S. military provided a list or multiple lists of names of
American citizens, SIV holders and other vulnerable Afghans to the
Taliban. Since then, members of the Biden Administration, including
you, have issued confusing denials. On ``Meet the Press'' I believe you
said that ``the idea that we shared lists of Americans or others with
the Taliban is simply wrong,'' but then later on you said that there
were instances where you shared ``names on a list of people on the
bus'' with the Taliban. I sent a letter to President Biden on August 27
asking for clarity on this. At any point during the evacuation of
American citizens and vulnerable Afghans from Afghanistan, were the
Taliban provided lists or names of any potential evacuees?
Answer. We are also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to
their public commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the
country. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic operational
communications to the Taliban and in tandem with our allies and
partners around the world. The Department of State did not provide
names of any potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at
any point during evacuation and relocation operations.
Question. Who authorized sharing lists of potential evacuees with
the Taliban?
Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any
potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point
during evacuation and relocation operations.
Question. Can you confirm that every person whose name was on such
as list was safely evacuated?
Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any
potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point
during evacuation and relocation operations. As of September 1,
approximately 124,000 people were relocated out of Afghanistan with
U.S. support. Of these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who
evacuated on or before August 31; between September 1 and November 9,
we have assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful
Permanent Residents.
Question. Do you commit to rescuing those included on a list, but
who wasn't evacuated?
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave
Afghanistan.
We also recognize the need for international flights to resume
regular operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the
Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also
safely and securely. We will continue to engage diplomatically to
resolve any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public commitment
to let people with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have
reiterated this point to the Taliban.
We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way to
enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant
challenges fleeing to safety. The United States is working closely with
allies and partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting
vulnerable Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
resettlement.
Question. Do you commit to informing every individual that was
included on a list of the potential threat they or their family members
in Afghanistan may face?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August
31, 2021, and a team at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, is supporting
these functions. While the U.S. Government has withdrawn its personnel
from Kabul, we will continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families
in Afghanistan. Our team in Doha is managing our diplomacy with
Afghanistan, including consular affairs, administering humanitarian
assistance, and working with allies, partners, and regional and
international stakeholders to coordinate our messaging to the Taliban.
U.S. citizens are encouraged to register their presence through the
Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive security alerts and
updated information on travel in Afghanistan.
Question. Over the long term, one of the most significant
implications from this disaster will be our policy toward the Chinese
Communist Party. In justifying the withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan, you personally made the case that it was in our national
interest because our strategic competitors would like nothing more than
to see the United States remain in Afghanistan. Do you still believe
the Chinese Communist Party is committing genocide?
Answer. I continue to believe that the Government of the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide and crimes against
humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of
other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. These
atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with serious
consequences. I support using all appropriate tools, including those
provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC
to end these atrocities and to promote justice and accountability for
the victims.
Our strategic competitors like China and Russia--or adversaries
like Iran and North Korea--would have liked nothing more than for the
United States to continue to funnel billions of dollars in resources
and attention into stabilizing Afghanistan indefinitely. We have
significant vital interests in the world that we cannot afford to
ignore.
Question. Do you believe the Chinese Communist Party will enlist
the Taliban in its efforts to wipe out Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslims?
Answer. We continue to monitor relations between the People's
Republic of China (PRC) and Afghanistan. Uyghurs and members of other
religious and ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang have suffered
unspeakable oppression, including genocide and crimes against humanity,
at the hands of the PRC's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged
in human rights violations and abuses that shock the conscience and
must be met with serious consequences. The United States must speak out
consistently and jointly with allies and partners, impose costs and
sanctions on those responsible, and help those fleeing persecution.
Question. Do you believe Beijing when it says that it is not
interested in occupying Bagram Air Force base?
Answer. We are aware of reports that Beijing claims it is not
interested in occupying Bagram Air Base.
Question. Do you trust the Chinese Communist Party to keep its word
in any future climate negotiations?
Answer. The United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not
its words. We know that addressing the climate crisis will require
significant additional action by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
We conduct results-oriented diplomacy with the PRC in climate
negotiations. Current climate commitments by the PRC are not sufficient
to hold the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C. We and others
in the international community continue to press for the PRC to
increase its emission reductions in this critical decade to get on a
Paris-aligned trajectory.
Question. When will the Biden administration's China policy review
be complete?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will address the China
challenge from a position of strength in which we work closely with our
allies and partners. There is no doubt that China poses the most
significant challenge of any nation to the United States in terms of
our interests and the interests of the American people. The Biden-
Harris administration approaches China through the lens of competition
and recognizes that there are adversarial and cooperative aspects to
the U.S.-China relationship.
Question. Since the start of the evacuation, the Biden
administration, and you, have consistently spoken of the need to work
with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens and vulnerable Afghans
out of the country. In your speeches with the Foreign Minister of Qatar
and with Heiko Maas last week, you repeatedly referred to our
``engagement with the Taliban.'' It's puzzling to me that the State
Department is now engaging with the Taliban, when just a few short
weeks ago, U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul were shredding passports and
visas in their possession, so that they're not being used for kill
lists. At what point did the State Department's approach towards the
Taliban change from worrying about it forming kill lists to target
American citizens and vulnerable Afghans to now considering the Taliban
essential is evacuating those same people?
Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban concerning our
vital national interests, including safe passage for U.S. citizens and
others with valid travel documents. However, the legitimacy and support
the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend on their
adherence to their commitments on ensuring freedom of travel; to making
good on their counterterrorism commitments; upholding the human rights
and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls, and
members of minority groups; naming a broadly representative permanent
government; and forswearing retaliation.
Question. In public statements, the State Department has described
the al-Qaida-aligned Haqqani Network as somewhat independent of the
Taliban. In fact, the Haqqani Network is indeed a critical part of the
Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani has been the deputy leader of the Taliban
since at least 2015 and has been named as the ``Acting Interior
Minister,'' of the Taliban regime while Khalil Haqqani is the acting
minister for refugees. The Haqqani Network, as you know, is a
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. When the State Department
cooperated with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens, did State
Department officials ever coordinate with members of the Haqqani
Network?
Answer. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban are distinct entities,
but they are affiliated. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
Entity. We have accounted for and will account for that, ensuring that
all our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.
Question. Looking to the future, as the Biden Administration
considers the provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, how will
you ensure that such aid does not benefit the Haqqani Network or other
terrorist groups?
Answer. State and USAID Bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that process, bureaus
are planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen the
monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from outside
Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given the
current footprint. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard
against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their
supporters. These steps may include mitigation measures such as name
check vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.
Question. When the last American C-17 left Kabul on August 31,
there were at least several hundred American citizens left in
Afghanistan. My office, and I know other Senate offices as well, have
received reports from U.S. citizens claiming that the Taliban are not
allowing them to enter airports, either for lack of travel documents or
in some instances, not being accompanied by a male guardian. This
Administration, writ large, has made excuses for the decision to leave
these Americans behind by claiming that many of these Americans have
decided not to leave Afghanistan, because they are dual nationals
wishing to stay with their families or because they just have responded
to State Department emails coordinating their evacuation. What makes
you so confident that these Americans truly do not, or did not, want to
leave Afghanistan?
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and
their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies,
and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping
them depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. When the
Department of State suspended Embassy operations in Kabul on August 31,
2021, we were specifically aware at that time of approximately 100 U.S.
citizens who still wanted to depart but due to the security situation,
could not do so. The Department has made every effort to contact U.S.
citizens who are interested in leaving Afghanistan, and our commitment
to help them depart remains steadfast. Several U.S. citizens have told
us on calls that they are not yet ready to depart for family or other
reasons. As we have said, our mission to assist U.S. citizens and their
families to depart Afghanistan has no expiration date, and we continue
to assist U.S. citizens and their families in Afghanistan who wish to
depart. We continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families with
departing from Afghanistan. Between September 1 and November 9, we have
assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens.
Question. Is it likely that some, if not all, want to leave but are
being prevented from leaving?
Answer. We will be relentless in our efforts to assist U.S.
citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans to depart
Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. The U.S. Government is
pressing the Taliban keep its public commitment to provide safe passage
to U.S. citizens and their families, LPRs, and Afghans with travel
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.
We are prepared to assist U.S. citizens and their families to
depart Afghanistan when they are ready to do so, whether it is today,
tomorrow, a year from now or longer. Interactions with some U.S.
citizens and their family members currently in Afghanistan have
indicated that they are not ready to depart at this time. While some
have stated they consider Afghanistan their home and do not wish to
leave, others are working to get their affairs in order before seeking
to depart. Others have indicated hesitancy, as they do not want to
leave extended family behind.
Question. Is there the possibility that these dual nationals could
be women whose more conservative family members are pressuring them
into staying?
Answer. The decision for an individual to remain in or leave
Afghanistan is incredibly complex and personal. The Department of State
is working closely with interagency partners and others to facilitate
the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan.
Question. In his first speech to the American people on August 16,
President Biden had proudly announced that the U.S. Government had
assisted in the evacuation of New York Times and Washington Post
journalists from Afghanistan. Media reports have indicated that as many
as 550 journalists of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of
America and their families remain in Afghanistan. These are entities
funded by American taxpayers through the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
Why did this Administration prioritize the evacuation of New York Times
and Washington Post journalists from Afghanistan, but not those
journalists on the Government's payroll?
Answer. We supported the movement of more than 124,000 people out
of Afghanistan between August 14 and August 31. Among those were U.S.
Government employees, Embassy employees, U.S. citizens, and many
others, including journalists. Since August 31, we have worked closely
with the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-
affiliated employees and family members. Many have already been
relocated and we remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM,
RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues
will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top
priorities.
Question. In the last few days before the evacuation ended on
August 31, I believe the State Department had designated these
journalists and their families as locally employed staff of Embassy
Kabul so that they could be included in the final evacuation flights.
Is this true?
Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the
August evacuation, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of
the U.S. embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as
translators and interpreters for our government, and other Afghans at
risk.
Question. If this is true, why were they not evacuated?
Answer. A small number of embassy local employees chose not to be
evacuated, for a variety of reasons. We remain in close contact with
them to provide ongoing support.
Question. How many other U.S. Government employed staff were not
evacuated?
Answer. During the evacuation operations in August, locally
employed staff members working for the United States in Afghanistan
were evacuated with eligible family members. A small number chose not
to be evacuated and we remain in close contact with them to provide
ongoing support.
Question. What steps will you take to guarantee that the RFE/RL and
VOA journalists will be evacuated?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation
efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups,
nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely
across the interagency, including with USAGM, and with other partners
to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.
Question. In addition to American citizens, there are thousands of
Afghans who worked alongside American service members, soldiers,
diplomats and other staff that now face a real threat of death, because
of their association with our nation. What is the status of the
Priority 2 refugees' admissions program for journalists and those who
worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects? Is the system at
capacity?
Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2
referrals from U.S. Government employers and qualifying media and non-
governmental organizations. After the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based
non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and
the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can
occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing
their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to
contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded
overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing.
Question. We have received reports that the State Department is
reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system
due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?
Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2
referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of
Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is
not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee
referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for
resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we
are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific
number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process
in the next year.
Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?
Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow
procedures to register for international protection and assistance with
the government of the country they are in. They may also register and
seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). We are working with international humanitarian partners and
other governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns
are able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee
Admissions Program processing.
Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?
Answer. For individuals who are in a third country and have
contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-funded Resettlement
Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based on the individual's
location. The Administration has sought to increase the capacity of
these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases as part of an
overall larger USRAP program. Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work
regionally and can process cases in some countries even if there is not
a physical RSC presence. While we are working expeditiously, there is
no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that
the Department expects to process in the next year. In general, it
takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee resettlement
case from start to finish including pre-screening, the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous security vetting.
Question. It is my understanding that U.S. allies and partners in
the region, such as Qatar, have provided critical support for the
evacuation. Going forward, what is the Administration's plan to
coordinate with these regional partners to ensure that U.S. citizens
and vulnerable Afghans who have been left stranded in Afghanistan can
be evacuated now that the U.S. has withdrawn?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation
efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups,
nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely
across the interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of
movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S.
citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.
Question. On September 2, the State Department said in the press
briefing that 77 percent of those evacuated from Afghanistan are ``at-
risk Afghans.'' More specifically, the State Department said that these
are ``those Afghans to whom we have a special commitment.'' I assume
that these include SIV and P2 status holders, but can you clarify which
Afghans are included in this group?
Answer. At the time of the August evacuation, these Afghans
included people who worked as staff of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
their families, those who served as translators and interpreters for
our government, and other Afghans at risk. This group includes a broad
range of individuals who were at risk due to their association with the
U.S. Government or support for our goals.
Question. Does it include USAGM journalists?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Does it include Afghan women who are students at the
American University of Afghanistan?
Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation flights out of Afghanistan
have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents
(LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans remains
steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
at-risk groups in Afghanistan such as the students, faculty, and staff
of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States is
committed to supporting equal access to education in Afghanistan. The
Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart,
and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial
flights out of the airport in Kabul.
Question. Does it include the former contractors and staff employed
by the USAID programs?
Answer. This group of evacuees includes a broad range of
individuals who were at risk due to their association with the U.S.
Government or support for our goals. While U.S. Government evacuation
flights out of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens,
Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable
and at-risk Afghans remains steadfast. We have no deadline for
supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such
as the staff and contractors employed to oversee and implement USAID
programs. The United States continues to support humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan. The Department continues to explore options
for those who wish to depart, and we continue to advocate for the full
resumption of commercial flights out of the airport in Kabul.
Question. Does it include Afghans who converted to religions other
than Islam?
Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. The
situation for so many Afghans is stark, and the needs remain great. We
will continue to support the Afghan people through diplomacy,
international influence, and humanitarian aid.
We understand that the Taliban have targeted certain populations
among Afghan civilians in the past and denied access to services for
members of vulnerable populations. The United States will work
vigorously with the international community to explore all options to
support members of vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but
not limited to--women, children, journalists, persons with
disabilities, LGBTQI+ individuals, and members of the ethnic and
religious minority groups. We also continue to call on the Taliban to
protect freedom of movement for all Afghans and allow the departure of
those who seek to leave Afghanistan.
Question. With regard to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan,
you personally justified the decision as being in the national interest
of the United States. You even stated that our strategic competitors
would like nothing more than to see the United States remain in
Afghanistan. While I have long argued that the United States must focus
on addressing the threat posed by authoritarians around the world, it's
clear to me that the execution of this withdrawal has dramatically
undermined the credibility we need to address the threat posed by these
dictators. Already the Kremlin has used the withdrawal to call into
question the American commitment to protect Ukraine. What is the State
Department doing to reassure our allies and partners abroad of American
defensive commitments?
Answer. The Department and our interagency colleagues are deeply
engaged globally in strengthening and broadening security cooperation
with U.S. forces. In addition to our close cooperation with NATO, the
recently concluded Special Measures Agreement with Korea, negotiated by
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, is evidence of the value our
allies and partners place our cooperation. The United States is firmly
committed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it
remains the top security assistance recipient in Europe. In FY 2021,
the U.S. Government provided $393 million in security assistance to
Ukraine. Our values and commitment to international norms set us apart
from Russia in reassuring our allies and partners.
Question. Afghanistan was a major non-NATO ally, to whom we had
made commitment to support and defend. Having abandoned Afghanistan,
how will we assure allies and partners, like Ukraine, that also face
significant military threats from authoritarian states?
Answer. The State Department is committed to building enduring
security ties with allies and partners around the world to advance our
national security. As I have said, there is nothing that our
competitors and adversaries would have liked more than for the United
States to re-up a 20-year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for
another decade. Regarding Ukraine specifically, the United States is
firmly committed to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity, and it remains our top security assistance
recipient in Europe. In FY 2021, the U.S. Government provided $393
million in security assistance to Ukraine, including an additional $60
million in equipment and services via Presidential Drawdown Authority,
highlighted during President Zelensky's September 1 White House visit
as a symbol of our deepening strategic partnership and support for
Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression. Further, the
President's FY 2022 budget request continues to reflect Ukraine as the
top priority within Europe for out-year resources. We appreciate the
robust Congressional appropriations that have allowed us to support
Ukraine as a foreign policy priority.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson
Question. Secretary Blinken, on August 27, 2021, I sent a letter to
you and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin regarding a reported incident
on August 26, 2021, in which it has been alleged over 400 individuals,
including U.S. citizens, were turned away from the evacuation site at
Hamid Karzai International Airport. The letter (attached) included four
questions related to the alleged event, which I will repeat here.
Please answer the following: Is the Department of Defense and/or the
Department of State aware of this alleged incident? If so, is there an
open investigation into this matter?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
related to the security of and access to the airport.
Question. It is hard to believe that any U.S. military official
would deny Americans the ability to evacuate Afghanistan. If this did
in fact occur on August 26 (or any other date), what generalized or
specific order was given to the commander that caused him to take such
action?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
related to security of or access to the airport.
Question. Who gave the order to this commander? Please provide that
individual's name, title, and department/agency. Where did this order
ultimately originate?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
related to security of or access to the airport.
Question. What actions are being taken to locate and evacuate the
American citizens that were allegedly turned away?
Answer. Our mission to assist U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan
has no deadline, and we are continuing to assist U.S. citizens and
their families in Afghanistan who wish to depart. I defer to the
Department of Defense for all questions related to security of or
access to the airport.
Question. Please describe in detail the vetting process for
evacuees from Afghanistan.
Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
and national security.
Question. During the hearing, you stated that there was a round of
vetting in third countries and another round once individuals arrived
in the United States. Please explain each stage in detail, including
what vetting was performed in Afghanistan before individuals were
allowed to board planes, in third countries, and after arrival in the
U.S.
Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
and national security.
Question. Please explain how we are verifying the identities of
evacuees and establishing the identities of those without
identification papers.
Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
Border Protection, who are responsible for recording the arrival and
processing the parole into the United States of evacuees.
Question. Are we asking U.S. service members to participate in the
identification process?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information
relating what role its personnel may play in this process.
Question. Are we seeking personal confirmations or recommendations
from U.S. service members?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information on
what role its personnel may play in this process.
Question. What databases are we comparing identification
information against?
Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.
Question. How confident are you that the databases being used
contain sufficient information to detect matches?
Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.
Question. Are we conducting biometric screening on each evacuee,
and if so what does this entail?
Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
community, including the Department of Homeland Security/Customs and
Border Protection, which is responsible for performing this work.
Question. Has the Department of Defense kept accurate and up-to-
date records of individuals who have worked for the U.S. in
Afghanistan?
Answer. I defer all questions regarding employment with the
Department of Defense to the Department of Defense.
Question. What gaps do you believe exist in the information
available for identification?
Answer. The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program is open to
individuals who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government,
including U.S. Government contractors, and individuals who worked for
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or its successor
mission. Applicants must provide proof that they meet the statutory
requirements for this visa program including proof of identity and
nationality, length of employment, letters of recommendation from a
direct supervisor or senior official, and other information. In many
circumstances applicants are unable to provide all of the required
documents. U.S. Government contracting files often do not contain
information on the individuals who worked for specific contractors or
the period of time an individual was employed for a contractor under a
specific contract. To confirm this information, the Afghan SIV unit
must review information from the individual contractor, if they can
locate them, to confirm the applicant's eligibility. This information
is then reviewed by the Chief of Mission (COM) in determining whether
to grant an applicant COM approval.
Question. Please provide the number of evacuees that do not have
identification.
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for
recording the arrival and processing the parole of all Afghan evacuees
into the U.S. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding
identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently
in the United States.
Question. Are there individuals whose identities remain
unconfirmed, and if so how many?
Answer. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding
identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently
in the United States.
Question. What security measures are in place for individuals
without confirmed identities?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
information on security measures and requirements for admittance or
parole into the United States.
Question. How many of the individuals among the Afghan evacuees are
believed to be criminals or possible threats to U.S. national security?
Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered
screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States
and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This
process includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
other Intelligence Community partners. I defer to the Department of
Homeland Security for more information regarding any such identified
individuals.
Question. Are there individuals among the Afghan evacuees who have
been specifically identified as taking up arms against the United
States or our allies, or providing assistance to our enemies?
Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered
screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States
and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. For
further information, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security.
Question. What is being done with those individuals when found? Are
we detaining those individuals, deporting them, etc.?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as its
component entities coordinate the interagency screening process, make
final decisions on clearance for travel, parole, and related issues,
and would take any action on detention or removal of a foreign national
from the United States.
Question. Please provide the number of Afghan evacuees that have
been denied entry into the United States due to vetting.
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which
has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who relocate.
Question. Please provide the reason(s) for denial (ties to
terrorism, evidence of taking up arms against the United States,
criminal background, etc.).
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which
has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who are relocated.
Question. Are you confident that the process in place is sufficient
to keep out individuals seeking to harm the United States?
Answer. Yes. The Department of State is a part of the whole-of-
government effort to appropriately screen and vet all potential
travelers to the United States. We and other U.S. Government agencies
have decades of experience working together to perform this critical
work not just for these evacuees but for every traveler to the U.S.
Question. Has the U.S. Government identified any evacuees that were
previously detained or incarcerated by U.S. forces in Afghanistan or
elsewhere?
Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as
Customs and Border Protection coordinates the interagency screening and
vetting process and makes final decisions on clearance for travel,
parole, and related issues.
Question. How many Afghan evacuees have been identified as
Unaccompanied Alien Children?
Answer. As of October 15, our partners conducted over 300 best
interest assessments for identified unaccompanied children outside the
United States. Prior to arrival in the United States, the Department of
State supports international organization partners to conduct best
interest assessments for known unaccompanied children when possible.
All unaccompanied children are referred to HHS's Office of Refugee
Resettlement upon arrival in the United States. The Department of State
works closely with HHS to facilitate reunification of children with
their caregivers.
Question. There are reports of male evacuees at Ft. McCoy and
elsewhere that have presented much younger, underage females as their
wives. Can you confirm these cases and whether any of these individuals
have made it into the United States?
Answer. We are aware of these reports and are working closely with
the Department of Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on any
protection-related concerns at the safe havens. We have provided
guidance, developed in consultation with the Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), to staff to
help them look out for such cases and provide appropriate referrals for
protective services. Any children arriving without a parent or legal
guardian are referred to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), including married
minors.
Question. How many cases of possible underage marriages have been
reported?
Answer. The State Department does not independently track these
figures. We understand cases have been reported. Any children arriving
without a parent or legal guardian are referred to HHS/ORR, including
married minors. I defer to HHS/ORR for specific figures.
Question. What guidance has been given regarding child brides and
forced marriage?
Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child and forced
``marriages'' very seriously and has worked closely with interagency
partners to identify and respond to any cases that have been uncovered.
HHS/ORR is notified regarding any children arriving without a parent or
legal guardian, including married minors. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is now the lead agency on protection of vulnerable
populations at the CONUS safe havens. I refer you to DHS for further
information on child brides and forced marriages, including guidance.
At the OCONUS lily pads, the Department of State is supporting
international organizations to help identify cases involving child and
forced ``marriages'' and refer them to appropriate services, when
possible.
Question. Is the first stage of vetting in third countries failing
to identify and address these alleged incidents?
Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to
staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. There have not
been many cases, but when staff identified them, appropriate action was
taken in accordance with humanitarian standards and relevant
immigration laws and practices.
Question. What is being done when possible cases of forced
marriage, underage marriage, and polygamy are detected?
Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to
staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. When staff
identified them, appropriate action was taken in accordance with
humanitarian standards and relevant immigration laws and practices.
Question. There are also reports of child brides being sexually
abused and assaulted by older male evacuees. Where have these alleged
assaults occurred?
Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child
``marriage'' and abuse very seriously and has worked closely with
interagency partners to identify and respond to any cases that have
been uncovered. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the
lead agency on protection of vulnerable populations at the CONUS safe
havens. I refer you to DHS for further information on gender and child
protection services. Regarding incidents involving abuse, since these
are open law enforcement matters, I refer you to the Department of
Justice for further information. Afghan parolees are expected to abide
by the laws of the United States, both while in Department of Defense
(DoD) installations and as resettled members of local communities.
Incidents of criminal behavior on DoD installations are not tolerated
and will be referred to law enforcement for appropriate action.
Question. What guidance, if any, has been issued to National
Guardsmen or other U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates and
elsewhere for when they witness such abuse or assaults or receive a
report of such?
Answer. All U.S. officials are encouraged to report abuse or
assault when they witness it or receive reports of it, and some U.S.
officials are required to do so, including reporting certain instances
of child abuse pursuant to 34 U.S.C. 20341. Protection of vulnerable
persons, including those fleeing Afghanistan, is a top priority. U.S.
partner organizations similarly work under strict codes of conduct
meant to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.
Question. We have all seen photos and video footage of what appears
to be fully functioning U.S. equipment in Taliban hands. Please
describe in detail what U.S. military equipment was left behind after
the withdrawal.
Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan
military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, a
Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10 authority.
DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and quantities
of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title 10
authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation
programs. I defer to DoD for this information.
Question. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan was
quoted in the press as saying, ``We don't have a complete picture,
obviously, of where every article of defense materials has gone, but
certainly a fair amount of it has fallen into the hands of the
Taliban.'' Please detail what was not destroyed or made inoperable.
Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) determined which pieces of
equipment to destroy or render inoperable by unauthorized users. I
defer to DoD to provide this information.
Question. During the hearing, you stated that some of this
equipment will become inoperable because the Taliban will not be able
to maintain it. Is there an assessment of if and how much of the
equipment you referenced can be maintained with assistance from foreign
sources, e.g., China, Russia, etc.?
Answer. We are not aware of any offers Russia or China have made to
the Taliban regarding the sustainment of U.S.-origin equipment. DoD or
the intelligence community will be better positioned to assess the
Taliban's level of technical expertise and its ability to maintain the
equipment, with or without assistance from foreign sources.
Question. Has the U.S. seen evidence of any of that equipment being
sold to, transferred to, or inspected by Iran or other foreign nations?
Please provide as much unclassified information as possible.
Answer. The State Department has not received any verifiable
reports of equipment that is being sold to, transferred to, or
inspected by Iran. The Department of State continues monitoring
reports, including for any information that may indicate that such
transactions are taking place, at which point we would work with the
DoD to determine how to respond. There are some assets that were out of
the country when the Taliban took control of Kabul, and others were
flown out of the country by Afghan Air Force personnel. The State
Department is working with the interagency to safeguard and determine
the disposition of these assets together with the partner nations where
they reside.
Question. Secretary Blinken, you stated that approximately 124,000
people were evacuated from Afghanistan. Please break down that figure
according to U.S. citizens, citizens of NATO allies, SIV applicants and
their families, Afghans with valid visas, P2 applicants, and other
relevant categories.
Answer. Of the approximately 124,000 people evacuated or relocated
from August 14 to August 31, approximately 60,000 were brought to the
United States as of September 14. Of those 60,000, approximately, seven
percent are U.S. citizens, six percent are Lawful Permanent Residents,
three percent hold Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), and the rest are
individuals either referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
through the P-1/P-2 program or otherwise vulnerable Afghans, the
majority of whom worked with the United States. We believe
approximately 50 percent of these may be eligible for SIVs.
Question. Please explain the differences in the vetting process for
Afghans in these particular categories, if applicable.
Answer. Before visa issuance, Afghan Special Immigrant Visa
applicants are reviewed at several stages of the application process.
First, they are reviewed by the Chief of Mission for eligibility for
the program. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security conducts
a TECS search during the I-360 petition for special immigrant status
approval process. At the visa interview, the consular officer will take
biometric fingerprints for security vetting and review Department of
State systems to determine whether an applicant requires additional
security processing before the visa can be issued.
We will also continue to assist Afghans who may be eligible for
referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Afghans eligible and
referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) must be outside
of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed.
Afghan applicants in the USRAP pipeline are subject to the same vetting
process as all refugee applicants. They undergo an interagency security
vetting process and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) officers conduce
extensive in-person interviews overseas to verify identity, establish
eligibility, and identify information that could render an applicant
inadmissible. DHS/USCI makes the final security determination and only
DHS has the legal authority to grant a refugee admission to the United
States.
Question. Please estimate how many SIV applicants and P2 referred
applicants remain in Afghanistan and what is being done to assist their
evacuation post-U.S. withdrawal.
Answer. We do not have estimates of how many Special Immigrant Visa
applicants or P2-referred applicants remain in Afghanistan. We continue
to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
and when they choose to do so.
Question. Given that applicants do not currently hold U.S. visas,
are they able to leave?
Answer. We are consistently and diligently working with our
partners in the region, across U.S. government agencies, and with
partners in the private sector to explore all options to assist in the
ongoing relocation of U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any
issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people
with travel authorization, including U.S. citizens and their families,
freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this point to the
Taliban.
Question. Please describe your strategy and options available for
preventing the Taliban from blocking SIV applicants from leaving the
country or detaining and mistreating them due to their service to the
United States.
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
Afghans to whom we have a commitment and who wish to leave Afghanistan.
Because there is an ongoing terrorist threat to operations of this
nature, we will not be sharing details of these efforts before people
are safely out of the country.
We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
world where applicants are able to appear. We know it is currently
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are also
continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
of free passage for those who wish to leave the country including
Afghans at risk. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic
operational communications with the Taliban and in tandem with our
allies and partners around the world.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney
Question. My office has heard multiple reports--including from
Special Forces veterans and NGOs working to evacuate the SIV holders,
SIV applicants, and at-risk Afghans whom they've worked with for
years--indicating that the State Department has been recommending third
countries not accept them. Is this accurate? Please explain in detail.
If so, what is the State Department's plan to resolve these concerns
and ensure that at-risk Afghans--especially those already vetted SIV
holders--are able to evacuate before being further subjected to
brutality at the hands of the Taliban?
Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
interagency and with other partners to facilitate for the departure of
those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans.
Question. Will the change of the U.S. intelligence posture in
Afghanistan make it more difficult to review SIV applications, and
specifically do you expect the withdrawal to lengthen the already
oftentimes years-long timeframe it takes to review and make a decision
on an application?
Answer. The Department of State does not anticipate the U.S.
intelligence posture will impact Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
processing timelines. Most aspects of SIV application processing
occurred outside of Afghanistan even before the U.S. withdrawal from
the country. The Department is expediting SIV processing at all stages
within our control. Currently, the main impediment to issuing Special
Immigrant Visas for Afghans who have completed the Chief of Mission
approval process is the suspension of operations at the U.S. embassy in
Kabul. While we are currently unable to provide consular services in
Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at all points
of the process, including by assisting to transfer cases to other U.S.
embassies and consulates around the world where applicants are able to
appear. We recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to
obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe
passage to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with
travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
countries in the region, like Qatar, and those that border Afghanistan
to allow Afghans to enter.
Question. What is the State Department plan for people who safely
made it to third countries, but subsequently fail the vetting process?
Answer. Intelligence, law enforcement, and security professionals
are conducting screening and security vetting, using biographic and
biometric data, for all Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants and
other vulnerable Afghans before they are allowed into the United
States. If someone does not pass these checks while they are still
overseas, the State Department will work with partners and allies
around the world to identify countries that will accept Afghans for
relocation.
Question. Which U.S. allies and partners have agreed to permanently
take at-risk Afghans?
Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
resettlement.
The United States coordinates closely with and provides funding to
UNHCR to support their efforts to provide third-country resettlement to
refugees around the world. We are in discussion with UNHCR who works
with many other countries to resettle refugees, including those from
Afghanistan.
We commend other countries who have already started to accept
Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. We strongly encourage
countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow
entry for Afghans and coordinate with international organizations and
other humanitarian partners to provide humanitarian assistance to
Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers
to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
refoulement.
Question. What is the state of negotiations for third countries
that are taking SIVs during processing?
Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa
(SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
world where applicants are able to appear.
We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
country. We are developing processing alternatives so that we can
continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of
Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S.
Government.
Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the process of
relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many countries have
transited Afghans through their territories and many other countries
made generous offers of support. Many countries have committed to
permanently resettle Afghans. The United States has concluded
international agreements with several countries to facilitate these
activities, and the Department of State continues to follow its normal
procedure for transmitting the texts of these international agreements
to the Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.
Question. The State Department, through its Rewards for Justice
Program, is offering a reward of $10 million for information that leads
to Sirajuddin Haqqani's arrest. He's wanted in connection with the
Serena Hotel suicide bombing attack in Kabul in 2008 that killed
American Thor Hesla, as well as five others, including a number of
Norwegians. He tried to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He
oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Haqqani network, infamous for
their brutality and attacks such as a 2017 car bomb that massacred 170
people and wounded hundreds. This is a man who has directed brutal
indiscriminate killing. This is the man who was just named Acting
Interior Minister by the Taliban. Does the State department plan on
maintaining the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani (who was
recently named Acting Interior Minister)?
Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization; and we have and will account for that, ensuring that all
we do is consistent with U.S. law and policy. No decision has been made
yet on whether to maintain the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin
Haqqani. The Department will consult with our interagency partners on
this issue and make a determination that is based on the best interests
of the United States. The State Department does not comment on such
deliberations.
Question. What exactly does the Acting Interior Minister do, and
does he have a role in allowing or disallowing people to leave the
country?
Answer. The Ministry of Interior has traditionally had
responsibility for Afghanistan's police force and some aspects of the
country's internal security. Ministry of Interior personnel will likely
have some influence on individuals' ability to travel freely in
Afghanistan, including their ability to leave the country. The
Department is watching the Taliban's actions closely.
Question. How many Americans left on the ground in Afghanistan are
now subject to Haqqani's control/jurisdiction?
Answer. The United States does not require U.S. citizens to notify
us of their location, and, consequently, the Department is unable to
speak to the number of U.S. citizens residing in areas of Afghanistan
where the Haqqani Network is present. The Department has made every
effort to contact U.S. citizens who are interested in leaving
Afghanistan, however, and our commitment to helping those who wish to
leave remains steadfast.
Question. Does the U.S. still consider the Haqqani Network a
terrorist organization?
Answer. The Haqqani Network is designated as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under E.O. 13224.
Question. Given the known terrorist in the Taliban leadership, will
you commit not to recognize the Taliban Government?
Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy, albeit with
several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on
recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not
changed. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the
international community will depend on their adherence to their
commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom
of passage, preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the
United States from Afghanistan, allowing unimpeded humanitarian access,
and forming an inclusive government. The United States maintains a wide
range of tools to ensure the Taliban uphold these public commitments,
including sanctions and economic assistance.
Question. Did the U.S. make any agreements with the Taliban in
order to maintain access to the Kabul airport for evacuation
operations? If so, please detail the terms of the agreement.
Answer. The United States engaged in dialogue with the Taliban on
matters of important U.S. interests, including the evacuation of U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents from Afghanistan. As a result
of these discussions, the Taliban took steps to moderate their actions
in ways that allowed us to complete our evacuation mission. I remain
committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement
with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban
Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or
arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the
purview of the State Department.
Question. Additionally, will you commit to provide a copy of the
agreements to Congress?
Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
is under the purview of the State Department.
Question. In the Panjshir province, the National Resistance Front
has mobilized against the Taliban. This group includes the Vice
President of the Afghan Government (Amrullah Saleh). What is the
position of the U.S. Government on the National Resistance Front and
militia efforts to prevent Taliban control over territory?
Answer. The Department is not aware of Amrullah Saleh's current
whereabouts.
Question. Are the Taliban and surrounding countries allowing
American citizens, green card holders, and other at-risk Afghans across
borders?
Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
and when they choose to do so. Travelers do not require a letter from
the State Department or any other U.S. Government entity to leave
Afghanistan. If they have made their own arrangements with their onward
destination country and any transit countries, individuals do not
require permission from the United States. We are also continuing to
press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment of free passage
for those who wish to leave the country.
Question. In the few short weeks since they took control, what
restrictions have already been put in place by the Taliban on women and
girls?
Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions
regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls.
Taliban political leaders have stated women have a right to education
while also communicating adjustments must be made to make access
consistent with Islam and Afghan culture. According to public,
international news sources, public universities will be segregated by
gender and include potential new dress codes for female students.
Female professors will teach female students while male professors may
teach female students from behind a curtain. In some cases, women have
been asked to stay away from work, though exceptions are being made for
women in the public health sector.
Question. How does State plan to balance getting aid to needy
Afghans while making sure that aid does not get in the hands of Taliban
terrorists?
Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are
planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen monitoring
and evaluation of continuing programs from outside Afghanistan,
including through existing third parties, given the current footprint.
Both agencies have years of experience in successfully managing
projects remotely and through third party monitors from inside and
outside of Afghanistan. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard
against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their
supporters. This may include mitigation measures such as name check
vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.
The U.S. Government takes seriously its duty as a steward of U.S.
taxpayer funding and holds our implementing partners to the highest
standards to ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively and for
their intended purpose. We require our partners to have proper
safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place to help ensure that
humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. Our partners are
required to take steps to mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and
abuse, including any such incidents involving the Taliban and Haqqani
Network.
Question. Will you commit to working with this committee on
developing a strategy for aid moving forward?
Answer. Apart from humanitarian assistance, which will continue,
the Department is continuing to review its non-humanitarian assistance
programs and funding. We look forward to working closely with Congress
as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in Afghanistan.
Question. For the past few months, the Administration has told the
Senate that withdrawal of forces will not negatively impact
counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. These briefings continued
even as the Administration chose to withdraw without conditions, given
that the Taliban did not, as it agreed in February 2020, cut ties with
Al Qaeda. Will the Taliban prevent terrorists from organizing on Afghan
soil?
Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban regarding these
public counterterrorism commitments, including that they will not host
terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. The Taliban are aware that we are
closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that
we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S.
national security concerns.
Question. Will the U.S. have to increase its diplomatic or military
resources devoted to counterterrorism operations as a result of Taliban
control of Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department continues to evaluate what resources will be
needed to effectively address terrorism challenges in Afghanistan and
the region without a counterterrorism presence in Afghanistan. Part of
that effort entails intensified diplomatic engagement on issues of
shared concern with countries in the region and that border
Afghanistan. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding any shifts
in military resources.
Question. How does the collapse of the Afghan Security Forces
impact our ability to do intelligence gathering on the ground?
Answer. As President Biden has articulated, it is critical for the
United States to retain over the horizon counterterrorism capabilities
to prevent, detect, and disrupt terrorism threats. I defer to the
Intelligence Community for questions on intelligence collection
capabilities for Afghanistan.
Question. How far away is the closest U.S. military base or
installation from which we can conduct over-the-horizon strikes in
Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States maintains defense agreements and
arrangements with allies and partners worldwide to enable our military
to operate on a global scale.
I defer to the Department of Defense regarding the specific
deployment of any assets at overseas installations or naval deployments
in maritime locations.
Question. Roundtrip, how much time would it take to conduct an
operation at the farthest away point in Afghanistan?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding planning
timelines associated with any potential military operations.
Question. Have Russia or other adversaries tried to intervene to
prevent new installations?
Answer. We take seriously any Russian or other interference in our
security cooperation with allies and partners around the world as we
continue to deepen relationships that enable our military to respond to
threats to our homeland, no matter where those threats may emanate
from. As President Biden has said, ``We will not hesitate to raise the
cost on Russia and defend our vital interests and our people.'' Further
information would need to be provided in a different setting.
Question. How many at-risk Afghans have been killed or brutalized
since the U.S. withdrawal announcement in March?
Answer. The Department of State does not have specific figures;
however, we have seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by
journalists in Taliban detention as well as violence against
protesters. The United States condemns in the strongest terms reports
of Taliban kidnappings, beatings, intimidation, and killings of Afghan
civilians. We stand firm with the international community in our
commitment to hold perpetrators of these abuses accountable.
Question. Some of our allies have been extremely critical of the
U.S. for not consulting with them on the withdrawal plan. This is
contrary to the Administration's messaging on the need to work closely
with allies. What plans does the Administration have moving forward for
coordination with our allies and partners on Afghan refugees,
counterterrorism, and other issues that are arising from the
withdrawal?
Answer. Along with other senior Department officials, I have
convened or taken part in a series of bilateral and multilateral
engagements to coordinate with our allies and partners about what we
need to see from the Taliban and from any Government of Afghanistan. As
President Biden has made clear, the United States will maintain robust
counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize any threats,
and we will not hesitate to use those capabilities if we have to do so.
I have noted that the legitimacy and support that the Taliban seek from
the international community will depend on their conduct, including
respecting human rights.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Rob Portman
Question. As I mentioned earlier, I am concerned about the close
relationship between the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Your
spokesman said the two are ``separate entities,'' but the head of that
network is now the Interior Minister. So, it is pretty clear that they
are not separate entities, but a closely combined organization. With
known terrorists now part of the Taliban Government, what confidence do
you have that they will not harbor terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan and plot against us and our allies?
Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman
Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
world that there will not be any threat against any country including
the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the
agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and
the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at Kabul
International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of demonstrating they
are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-
Taliban Agreement. The United States continues to call on the Taliban
to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups
or individuals from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not
hosting them.
Question. How does this fact influence your decision to resume U.S.
aid to Afghanistan? Will any of this aid be passed to the United
Nations or any other multi-lateral implementing partners? How much of
the recently announced $64 million will be implemented through USAID
rather than State?
Answer. The United States delivers humanitarian aid through non-
government partners, international organizations, and third parties
according to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and
independence.
On September 13, the United States announced nearly $64 million in
additional humanitarian assistance for Afghans. Of this amount, nearly
$40 million was provided through USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian
Assistance and nearly $24 million through State's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration. This assistance went to independent
humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization to provide
lifesaving protection, shelter, livelihood support, essential health
care, emergency food aid, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to
respond to the needs generated by recent conflict and compounded by the
severe drought and other natural disasters, as well as the ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic.
Question. Recently, I sent a letter with Senator Rubio to Secretary
Yellen to use all means necessary to keep internationally held reserve
assets out of the hands of the Taliban. I am very concerned that these
funds would not be used to help the people of Afghanistan, but rather
to promote suppression and terror. What is the State Department's
position on recognizing the Taliban in Afghanistan? What coordination
and talks have you had with the Treasury Department on leveraging
sanctions to decrease the Taliban's capability to sponsor international
terrorism?
Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy to avoid, in
most cases, formal statements on recognition in cases of changes of
governments. Our policy has not changed. We will continue to
communicate to the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan. The
Taliban will be judged on their actions, specifically with regard to
meeting counterterrorism commitments and respecting the human rights of
those in Afghanistan. The Department of State's understanding is that
the Taliban does not have access to internationally held Afghan Central
Bank reserve assets. The Taliban is designated as a Specially
Designated Global Terrorist under E.O. 13224, as amended. The
Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of the
Treasury on sanctions policy and implementation.
Question. What is the State Department's assessment of future
civil-society support for foreign aid and programming in Afghanistan?
If possible, what safeguards will you use to ensure that this support
does not end up in the hands of the Taliban? Will we also ask our
allies to follow suit with those same safeguards?
Answer. The Department is continuing to review all non-humanitarian
assistance programs in Afghanistan. The outcomes of this review will
inform our decisions regarding what non-humanitarian assistance to the
Afghan people should continue and what programs will be stopped.
As part of this review, State and USAID bureaus are assessing their
programs, the operating environment, and other issues to mitigate
risks. Bureaus are planning for how they may make adjustments to
monitor and evaluate continuing programs from outside Afghanistan,
including through third parties, given that the operations of the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul are suspended. State and USAID and our implementers
have experience using similar mechanisms, such as in Syria, in addition
to some bureaus with historical experience successfully managing
programs from outside of Afghanistan.
Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
program design to reduce those risks.
Question. It is clear that at some level, we coordinated with the
Taliban to conduct the evacuation. However, the State Department, or
any Agency of Department for that matter, has not been able to detail
what assurances we gave or received from the Taliban. Are you able to
explain the assurances that were exchanged between the Taliban and the
United States during the evacuation effort? The reporting of such
agreements to Congress in mandated in section 1217 of the FY21 NDAA.
Answer. The United States will continue to press the Taliban to
ensure that all who wish to leave Afghanistan are able to, and will
monitor the Taliban's adherence to their commitments closely. I remain
committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement
with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban
Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or
arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the
purview of the State Department.
Question. The United States has spent close to $780 million over 20
years to support a future of Afghan women. There are reports of
peaceful protests by women in Afghanistan being broken up with gunshots
and violence. With our withdrawal and the collapse of the Government we
are looking at a whole generation of Afghan women who are now at risk
of losing the gains they have made in regards of education and
inclusion in the Government. What is the United States strategy to
support women in Afghanistan and protect the progress we have made?
Answer. The United States will continue to support Afghan women and
girls through our diplomatic engagement and robust humanitarian
assistance. No society can succeed if half of its population is left
out. Afghanistan can have neither security nor prosperity if its women
and girls are not afforded opportunities to fully participate in
society, including educational opportunities at all levels. We will
monitor closely how any government respects the human rights and
freedoms that have become an integral part of the life of women and
girls in Afghanistan during the last 20 years.
Question. The number reported in the media is that we only
evacuated 705 SIV applicants out of Afghanistan. The Department of
State and other agencies have said this number is incorrect, however,
they have refused to provide a different number. What is the final
number of SIV applicants that were evacuated out of Afghanistan by the
August 31 deadline?
Answer. Many of the individuals who were relocated out of
Afghanistan were at various stages of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
processing. The Department of State is currently assessing how many of
these individuals had outstanding SIV applications.
We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV
applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa
interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting
continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of
Afghanistan. We continue to prioritize this effort and our commitment
to continue to provide services has no expiration date.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Todd Young
Question. What is your strategy for effectively providing consular
services from Doha, Qatar to U.S. citizens, legal residents, and valid
visa holders currently in Afghanistan?
Answer. The U.S. Government continues to expect the Taliban to
provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), and Afghans with valid travel documentation
who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the
region and those that border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. The
Department of State relocated consular staff from Kabul and added
temporary duty personnel to Doha to assist with the increased volume of
casework. We are first focusing on U.S. citizens and immediate family
members who are ready to depart and have travel documents including
passports, LPR cards, or visas for non-U.S. citizen family members. We
are exploring options for the subset of U.S. citizens with immediate
family members for whom documentation has been an issue to identify
ways to assist them, but this poses challenges.
Question. How will you seek to assist Afghan nationals who remain
in Afghanistan and need to complete the application process to receive
a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or Priority 2 (P-2) refugee designation?
Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
for immigrant visa applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas
(SIVs), in Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at
every stage of the SIV process, including by transferring cases to
other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world where applicants
are able to appear. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been
suspended, Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their
cases to be processed. We are continuing to review the situation on the
ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
continue to evolve.
Question. Is the SIV or P-2 determination process for those who
have been evacuated from Afghanistan, regardless of their current
location or plans to bring them to the United States, still being
expedited?
Answer. We are continuing to process SIV applications, including by
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it is currently
extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing
processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. The
interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to identify individuals and associate them with their SIV
applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,
and other categories of eligibility as they continue the relocation
process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program; these are not visas and are not linked to
any status. For additional information, we refer you to DHS.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator John Barrasso
Question. How many individuals did the United States evacuate
between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021 as part of the military
assisted evacuation from Afghanistan? Please provide the total number
and a breakdown of the number based on the citizenship of those
individuals.
Answer. As of September 1, we estimated that 124,000 individuals
had been relocated from Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of
these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens. Also included were
individuals who worked for us or supported us in our two-decade mission
in Afghanistan.
The interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to survey relocated individuals and identify if they
have or are eligible for Special Immigrant status, P-1/P-2 referrals to
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and other categories of
eligibility as they continue the relocation process. For additional
information, we refer you to DHS.
Question. How many of the individuals evacuated by the United
States were not U.S. citizens, special immigrant visa holders, P1 visa
holders, or P2 visa holders?
Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of these,
approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who evacuated on or before
August 31; between September 1 and November 9, the Department assisted
385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful Permanent Residents to depart.
We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
world where applicants are able to appear. The interagency continues to
work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify
individuals and associate them with their existing or newly created SIV
applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP), and other categories of eligibility as they continue the
relocation process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to
the USRAP; these are not visas and are not linked to any immigration
status. For additional information, I refer you to DHS.
Question. What percentage of the Afghan citizens that left
Afghanistan as part of the U.S. evacuation efforts were vetted before
they got on the airplane?
Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghans who have been
relocated out of Afghanistan undergo a primary inspection when they
arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary inspection is conducted as
the circumstances require. The vetting process is ongoing to ensure the
continued protection of public safety and national security.
Question. It was reported that no U.S. citizens made it to the
airport to depart on any of the last five planes that departed as part
of the U.S. evacuation on August 30, 2021. When did the last U.S.
evacuation flight containing a U.S. citizen leave Afghanistan?
Answer. The last U.S. flight to leave Afghanistan transporting
private U.S. citizens was August 30, 2021.
We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
if and when they choose to do so. And we will continue our efforts to
facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our
Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave
Afghanistan. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide
safe passage to U.S. citizens, LPRs, and Afghans with travel
documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.
Question. How many U.S. citizens were evacuated by the United
States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?
Answer. There were approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens evacuated
between August 12 and August 30, 2021.
Question. How many legal permanent residents were evacuated by the
United States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?
Answer. The Department of State cannot definitively state the
number of Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) relocated by the U.S. prior
to August 31. Like U.S. citizens, LPRs are not required to register
their location with the Department. As a result, we are unable to
determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any other given country
at any particular time.
Question. How many locally employed staff were at the U.S. Embassy
in Kabul prior to the evacuation? How many were evacuated by August 30,
2021?
Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of
the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to
relocate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel
on August 30, of which seven have requested assistance to depart
Afghanistan.
Question. How many U.S. citizens was the State Department aware of
that were seeking to leave Afghanistan as of August 30, 2021?
Answer. The Department of State believes there were about 100 U.S.
citizens seeking to depart immediately after we suspended operations on
August 31, 2021. However, this number has fluctuated as additional U.S.
citizens seek to depart and others change their decision to stay or to
depart.
Question. With no U.S. diplomatic or military presence on the
ground, what mechanisms are being used by the Administration to ensure
the safe evacuation of the Americans the Biden administration left
behind in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department of State is in constant contact with U.S.
citizens in Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. We
continue to look for options for U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan.
We are working with bordering countries to allow U.S. citizens to enter
via border crossings or other means of transportation and will continue
to press the Taliban to keep their public promise that all U.S.
citizens who want to leave will be able to depart.
Question. During your testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, you stated, ``There had not been a single SIV
applicant interview in Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020.
The program was basically in a stall.'' How many Afghan Special
Immigrant Visas (SIVs) were issued between March 2020 and the end of
December 2020?
Answer. While the U.S. embassy in Kabul was not conducting
interviews for any visa categories (including SIVs) from March 2020
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan,
the consular section continued to process applications that were past
the interview stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from
applicants who were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add
newborn children to their cases. Also, a small number of cases were
processed at consular posts outside of Afghanistan.
In all, the Department of State issued 643 Afghan SIV for principal
applicants from March 2020 until December 2020.
Question. Were visa applications of individuals who had already
been interviewed still being processed between March 2020 through the
end of December 2020?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for
any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan.
They continued processing applications that were past the interview
stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from applicants who
were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add newborn
children or take other actions to their existing cases. Also, a small
number of cases were processed at consular posts outside of
Afghanistan.
Question. On December 31, 2020, how many Afghan Special Immigrant
Visas (SIVs) and family members were pending scheduling for visa
interviews?
Answer. On December 31, 2020, there were 622 principal applicants
pending scheduling for visa interviews.
Question. What was the reason interviews were stopped between March
2020 through the end of December 2020?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for
any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020
until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in
order to protect the health of visa applicants and its staff. The
Country Team in Kabul assessed all factors and determined it was not
safe for embassy staff or visa applicants to conduct interviews,
especially given the lack of adequate medical care in Afghanistan.
Question. What impact did the coronavirus pandemic have on the
ability to hold in person interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant Visas
(SIVs) in Kabul?
Answer. Due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan, U.S.
Embassy Kabul did not conduct interviews for any visa categories
(including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020 until February
2021. From June 13 to July 5, 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak at the embassy
again forced a 3-week suspension of visa interviews. During those
periods, however the embassy continued to process existing SIV
applications that did not require close contact with applicants, such
as reviewing documents, printing visas, and returning passports.
Question. Were in person interviews mandated by law as part of the
Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) process?
Answer. Although the Afghan Allies Protection Act does not
specifically mandate interviews, U.S. law and Department of State
regulations require immigrant visa applicants appear personally before
a consular officer to sign their application and verify their
application by oath and, at that time, provide fingerprints.
Fingerprints are required for security vetting.
Question. When did the in-person interviews at the U.S. Embassy in
Kabul resume for Afghan special immigrant visas?
Answer. In-person visa interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant
Visas and other immigrant visas at Embassy Kabul resumed in February
2021 after it was deemed safe for both visa applicants and Embassy
staff. COVID-19 spikes later forced the embassy to suspend in-person
visa services from June 15 to July 3.
Question. During your testimony you stated, ``On February 4, one of
the first executive orders issued by President Biden directed us to
immediately review the SIV program to identify causes of undue delay
and find ways to process SIV applications more quickly.'' When was the
review completed and what were the findings?
Answer. The Department of State remains engaged with the
interagency in reviewing the SIV program and finding ways to improve
the efficiency of SIV processing, including with respect to the topics
addressed in E.O. 14013.
Question. During the hearing, you stated, ``This spring, I directed
significant additional resources to the program, expanding the team of
people in Washington processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling
the number of SIV adjudicators in Kabul and our embassy there.'' Based
on the analysis you did to determine what additional resources were
needed, how many Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans did you
estimate could be reviewed and completed per month with the additional
resource you provided?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul estimated that with the
additional adjudicators, the consular section would be able to
interview approximately 850 Afghan SIV cases per month and with
additional staff, the Afghan SIV Unit could process up to 1000 or more
Chief of Mission approval applications per month. Each Afghan SIV case
includes the principal applicant, plus their immediate family members
(spouse and minor children). While the number of family members varied
per case, Embassy Kabul processed many more than 850 individuals each
month when including SIV family members.
Question. When did the additional SIV adjudicators arrive in Kabul?
Answer. The additional Special Immigrant Visa adjudicators arrived
on April 1, 2021.
Question. From January 20, 2021 through August 12, 2021, how many
SIV special immigrant visas for Afghans were approved? How many
individuals were denied?
Answer. From January 20 until August 12, 2021, the Department of
State issued 1,527 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa principal applicants
and 5,076 derivative applicants. Individuals may be denied an immigrant
visa for a variety of reasons but most often for lacking required
documentation or pending administrative processing. Such refusals can
be overcome once additional documentation is submitted or
administrative processing is completed. From January 20 through August
12, 2021, the Department of State refused 1,154 principal applicants
and 4,140 derivative applicants. However, 99 percent of those refusals
were due to additional documentation required or administrative
processing (which can be overcome) and only one percent were related to
other ineligibilities. Since the SIV program's inception, less than one
percent of all SIV applicants (including family members) receive final
refusals that cannot be overcome and are not ultimately issued visas.
Question. The State Department issued a statement on August 24,
2021 that ``all immigrant visa appointments, including Special
Immigrant Visas (SIVs), at the Embassy have been canceled.'' How many
Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans were still pending review on
August 24, 2021?
Answer. There were approximately 18,000 Special Immigrant Visas at
various stages of the pipeline on August 31, 2021. Almost 8,500 of
these were at the initial stage of the process, where the National Visa
Center has requested additional documentation before the application
can be referred to the Chief of Mission for review. Approximately 540
applicants had documentarily complete cases at the National Visa Center
that were pending interview scheduling for the future and 400
applicants had interviews scheduled that had to be canceled.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders from
Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between August 12, 2021
and August 30, 2021?
Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders,
and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders' family
members from Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between
August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?
Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus
their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family
size was five to six persons.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants were
evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between August 12, 2021
and August 30, 2021?
Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders,
and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.
Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicant family
members were evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between
August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?
Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus
their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family
size was five to six persons.
Question. What affiliation if any does the Tehrik-e Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) have with the Afghanistan Taliban?
Answer. Though the TTP has a presence in Afghanistan, the group is
a separate organization and perpetrates attacks against Pakistan
independent of the Afghan Taliban. We do not have indications of
Taliban support for TTP but believe large numbers of the group remain
in Afghanistan.
Question. Was the Government of Pakistan supportive of the
Taliban's offensive takeover of Afghanistan?
Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister
Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in
Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15.
In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban
attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by military force
it would lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into
Pakistan. Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools
necessary to support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior
Pakistani officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive
political settlement and the protection of women's educational rights
in Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made
repeated public calls for the international community to directly
engage with the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic
collapse, and avert a humanitarian disaster.
Question. What support did the government and military in Pakistan
provide the Taliban in taking over control of Afghanistan from the
democratically elected government?
Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials supported Afghan
peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in
negotiations. Various senior Pakistan officials also made repeated
public calls for a political solution to the Afghan conflict and
expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban would lead to a
protracted civil war.
Question. What efforts did the Biden administration take to curb
Pakistan's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan?
Answer. The State Department has engaged with the Pakistani
Government at senior levels, including with my personal engagement and
that of and Deputy Secretary Sherman, to urge close coordination and
alignment with the international community on the way forward in
Afghanistan. We have made it clear that a government in Kabul that is
inclusive, protects the rights of women and minorities, adheres to its
counterterrorism commitments, and ensures humanitarian access and safe
passage for those who wish to leave Afghanistan would be in the best
interests of all countries in the region, including Pakistan. We will
continue to convey at the highest levels the importance the Biden
administration places on Pakistan's constructive role moving forward.
Question. Is the Government of Pakistan currently providing
financial support, logistics, and weaponry to the Taliban? If so, what
is it providing?
Answer. Pakistan is providing limited humanitarian aid to the new
Taliban Government and is encouraging other countries to pursue similar
policies. Pakistan has not announced other assistance to the Taliban.
Question. Do you support additional sanctions on Pakistan and
Pakistani Government officials involved in support for the Taliban?
Answer. U.S. sanctions designations are regularly reviewed and
updated consistent with U.S. law and policy. Given Pakistan's critical
cooperation, we do not support sanctions against the Government of
Pakistan or its government officials.
Question. What is the Biden administration's strategy to prevent
terrorists from once again having a platform in Afghanistan to plan and
launch attacks against the United States?
Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe
haven for terrorists remains our top priority and we continue to apply
a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for
Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use
of sanctions regimes, engagement with the Taliban on our
counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security
sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering
regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral over
the horizon counterterrorism capabilities.
Question. How has the counter-terrorism strategy changed since the
fall of the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. Our counterterrorism objectives of ensuring Afghanistan is
never again used as a safe-haven for terrorism have not changed, but
our strategies necessarily evolve with the changing circumstances. We
are seeking to bolster security partnerships and capabilities in the
region, as well as continue to maintain our over-the-horizon
capabilities. We continue to use a whole-of- government approach to
address terrorist threats that may emanate from Afghanistan.
Question. What specific agreements has the Biden administration
made with the Taliban since the January 2021?
Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
is under the purview of the State Department.
Question. During the evacuation efforts in Afghanistan, what
commitments or promises did the Biden administration make to the
Taliban?
Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S.
and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents.
We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment on assuring
safe passage.
Question. What counter-terrorism commitments did the Taliban agree
to with the United States and what is your assessment on whether the
Taliban has upheld its commitments?
Answer. The Taliban publicly committed to not allow individuals or
groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use Afghanistan to threaten the
security of the United States and its allies; to send a clear message
that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and
its allies have no place in Afghanistan, and to instruct their members
not to cooperate with such groups or individuals; to prevent them from
recruiting, training, and fundraising and not host them; and not to
provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to
those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its
allies to enter Afghanistan. The Taliban have taken some positive steps
but have not fully upheld all these public commitments.
Question. What tools does the United State have to ensure the
Taliban upholds its commitments?
Answer. The United States maintains a wide range of tools to ensure
the Taliban upholds these public commitments, including diplomatic
engagement, sanctions, and economic assistance. The legitimacy and
support the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend
on their actions, including preventing terrorist groups from posing a
threat to the United States from Afghanistan, adherence to upholding
human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom of passage for
American citizens, third country nationals, and Afghans with proper
documentation that desire to leave allowing unimpeded humanitarian
access, and forming an inclusive government that includes women and
members of minority groups.
Question. Media reports indicate that members of the Afghan Air
Force reportedly flew 46 aircrafts, including A-29 light attack planes,
Cessna C-208 utility aircraft, and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, to
Uzbekistan. What is the Administration doing to ensure these aircraft
are never handed over to the Taliban?
Answer. While this process falls under DoD authority because of the
original source of funding, the Department of State continues to
participate in our regional security engagements with the governments
of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as the Department of Defense determines,
in discussion with the interagency, the final disposition options for
the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) funded aircraft as well as
a variety of other ASFF-funded materiel that is outside Afghanistan. I
defer to the Department of Defense on additional details for the status
of Afghanistan aircraft currently located outside of Afghanistan.
Question. Is the Administration negotiating to bring the aircraft
to U.S. military bases in the Middle East?
Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
ensuring that the U.S. military aircraft that the Department of Defense
(DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund or other DoD
authorities and then transferred to the Afghanistan Government do not
fall into the wrong hands. As the aircraft were transferred under DoD
authorities, the process of repossessing the aircraft fall under DoD
authority as well. The Department of State participates in discussions
with the interagency regarding the final disposition options for
aircraft and other materiel that is outside Afghanistan. DoD may take
the equipment back into its own stock, offer it to other USG entities,
or consider transfer of the equipment to a foreign partner under
section 333 authority with State concurrence. DoD may also declare the
aircraft as Excess Defense Articles, at which point State authorities
would govern any transfer to a foreign government. State defers to DoD
on additional details for the status of Afghanistan aircraft currently
located outside of Afghanistan.
Question. During his testimony before the House Subcommittee on
National Security, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction stated, ``A reduced U.S. civilian and military presence
in Afghanistan amid a deteriorating security environment could create
new challenges for conducting effective oversight of U.S. funded
programs, grants, and contracts for reconstruction work.'' Given the
fact there is now no U.S. diplomatic or military presence in
Afghanistan, how can the Administration ensure U.S. taxpayer resources
will be used appropriately and go to the intended recipients?
Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the
operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks
associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of
that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from
outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given
that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended. A
number of bureaus have years of experience in successfully managing
projects from outside of Afghanistan.
Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
program design to reduce those risks.
Question. What is your plan to conduct effective oversight of U.S.
funded programs and grants under the current security environment in
Afghanistan?
Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the
operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks
associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of
that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from
outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given
the current footprint. A number of bureaus have years of experience in
successfully managing projects from outside of Afghanistan.
Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This
may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
program design to reduce those risks.
Our partners are required to take steps to mitigate against
diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse.
Question. How many implementing partners are still up and running
on the ground in Afghanistan?
Answer. The United States partners with a range of non-governmental
organizations, international organizations, and third parties in
Afghanistan to deliver vital humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
people.
To respond to humanitarian needs, State and USAID are currently
working with 10 public international organizations including IFRC, FAO,
WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM, ILO, and UNFPA. In addition, USAID
has nine non-governmental organization partners operating humanitarian
programs in Afghanistan.
The U.S. Government continues to be in communication with
implementing partners in Afghanistan, both regarding security
conditions on the ground and about their ability to continue their
work.
Question. How does the Biden administration intend to facilitate
humanitarian access in Afghanistan?
Answer. The Department can, and will, continue to provide
humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need directly through the U.N.
system, partners, and NGOs; and will do so in a way that is consistent
with any sanctions that apply to Afghanistan. No humanitarian
assistance will be provided to the Taliban.
Question. Have you negotiated any deal with the Taliban regarding
humanitarian assistance?
Answer. The United States is working with the international
community to ensure the Taliban follows through on their commitments to
allow unhindered humanitarian access, freedom of movement for aid
workers of all genders, safety and security of humanitarian staff, and
safe passage for all those who wish to leave Afghanistan. This united
effort is of utmost priority for leaders across the international
community, U.N. agencies, and NGOs committed to providing assistance in
Afghanistan. No humanitarian assistance will be provided directly to
the Taliban.
______
Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Terror Ties/Haqqani Network: There is an ongoing debate
about the degree to which terrorist groups, including as especially Al
Qaeda and ISIS, are likely to find safe-havens in Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan. Part of that debate involves the degree to which such
groups are supported by and entangled with the Taliban. You and other
Administration officials have downplayed the Taliban's ties to the
Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda, the President himself said al-Qaeda was
``gone from Afghanistan,'' and a State Department spokesman said last
month that ``the Taliban and the Haqqani Network are separate
entities.'' According to public reports, Undersecretary of Defense
Colin Kahl even told Senators that that al-Qaeda in the region does not
pose an ``imminent threat to the homeland.''
There are public reports indicating that the intelligence community
assesses al-Qaeda is rebuilding in Afghanistan and will have the
ability to threaten the United States within the next 2 years. Do you
agree with those assessments?
Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe-
haven for terrorists remains our top priority, and we continue to apply
a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for
Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use
of sanctions regimes, communicating to the Taliban on our
counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security
sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering
regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral
counterterrorism capabilities from ``over the horizon.'' The Taliban
committed to not allow individuals or groups, including al-Qa'ida, to
use Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its
allies. The State Department is actively engaged throughout South and
Central Asia to bolster our counterterrorism partnerships and efforts
to prevent and counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan.
Question. Siraj Haqqani is now the Interior Minister and Khalil
Haqqani is the Minister of Refugee Affairs. Please describe the full
extent to which you assess designated terrorists or officials
affiliated with terrorist groups have significant influence inside the
Afghan Government.
Answer. We are concerned that Haqqani Network leadership has been
appointed to these positions. The Haqqani Network is designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and a SDGT under E.O. 13224. The Taliban itself is a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and we have and will account for
that, ensuring that our interactions are consistent with U.S. law and
policy. Engagement with the Taliban is conducted consistent with U.S.
law and to advance U.S. national security goals. At this time, the U.S.
Government has not taken a position on whether the Taliban is the
government of Afghanistan. Any future relationship between the Taliban
and the international community will depend on the Taliban's actions.
Question. On August 27, according to public reports, you
distributed an internal document highlighting numerous incidents at
intake centers of sexual abuse and situations in which much older
Afghan men have presented young. How many cases have there been in
which the State Department or other government girls to authorities as
their ``wives.'' That document noted that the State Department had
urgently requested guidance from across the Administration about what
to do--but had not received it. According to public reports, a
subsequent report by DHS concluded that the dynamic showed the
``desperation'' of families to get children out of Afghanistan: your
process itself facilitated coercion and forced marriages of little
girls. On September 14, you confirmed before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that ``there have been a limited number of cases
where we have separated people because we were concerned.''
How many cases have there been in which the State Department or
other government officials separated people due to such concerns?
Answer. Protection of Afghans at-risk in U.S. safe havens is among
our key objectives in relocating SIV holders, parolees, and their
family members. This includes protection from gender-based violence,
human trafficking, and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of
Homeland Security as the lead federal agency at U.S. safe havens for
the number of cases of forced marriage identified.
Question. The State Department requested ``urgent guidance'' from
other agencies after purported child brides were brought to intake
centers and presented as ``wives.'' Have you received guidance? If yes,
what was it?
Answer. U.S. Government staff at overseas processing locations for
Afghans are utilizing guidance from the State Department to screen for
early and/or forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Through the
Department's participation in the interagency Unified Coordination
Group, we understand that the Departments of Homeland Security and
Health and Human Services have screening tools, but I defer to these
agencies for specific guidance they may have promulgated to address
these and other protection concerns at U.S. safe havens.
Question. What steps, if any, has the Department taken to address
child exploitation, including forced marriages and other sexual
exploitation, inside transit and intake centers in the United States?
Answer. The Department of State is coordinating across the U.S.
Government and with domestic and international partners to detect
potential cases of forced marriage or other forms of abuse among
vulnerable Afghans at relocation sites, as well as to prevent and
investigate crimes and to protect any victims identified. U.S. funding
to international organizations supports the deployment of expert
protection staff to identify and assist Afghans with particular
vulnerabilities at overseas processing locations, including those at
risk of early and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of
Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on steps taken at U.S.
safe havens.
Question. The State Department has been aware of child trafficking
linked to the withdrawal for almost a month. Which agency or entity
brought this situation to the attention of your office?
Answer. My staff alerted me to the risks of trafficking in persons
and forced marriage inherent in displacement contexts and particular to
Afghan relocation operations. State Department staff with expertise in
humanitarian response, international migration, child protection,
gender-based violence prevention and response, and combatting human
trafficking have advised on and taken actions to prevent these risks
throughout Operation Allies Welcome.
Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that each Afghan
evacuee has been properly vetted, including screening to ensure that
each Afghan evacuee has never raised arms against the United States or
otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S. military personnel?
Answer. Prior to entering the United States, all Afghan nationals
undergo a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) led multi-layered
screening and vetting process that includes national security and
criminal record checks. Upon relocation from Afghanistan, individuals
are brought to international transit points in Europe and the Middle
East, which are known as lily pads. At these international transit
points, DHS or the Department of Defense (DOD) collects biometric
(e.g., facial image and fingerprints) and biographic information (e.g.,
name, date of birth and ID number). Fingerprints are compared against
DoD, DHS, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) repositories.
Biographic information is vetted by the National Counterterrorism
Center, FBI, and other Intelligence Community partners. DHS then
consolidates biometric and biographic results.
If these checks raise unresolved questions about an individual,
that individual is not permitted to board a flight to the United
States. Screening is ongoing, so even while individuals are continued
to be processed at the safe havens, checks against the various national
security and public safety databases continue in order to account for
any new information identified.
Question. Does/will the State Department and any/or Department of
Homeland Security vetting process require each Afghan evacuee to
provide a sworn statement under oath that he/she did not raise arms
against the United States or otherwise engage in armed conflict against
U.S. military personnel?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.
Question. Please provide the committee with a complete sets of all
forms being used in the process to vet Afghan evacuees.
Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.
Question. Yes or No--Can you assure the American people, with 100
percent confidence that the vetting process the Biden administration is
using to vet Afghan evacuees will be completely effective to screen out
and deny entry to every Afghan evacuee who raised arms against the
United States or otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S.
military personnel?
Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States, and which
holds the authority to admit foreign nationals into the United States
if eligible.
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