    [Senate Hearing 117-164]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 117-164

                         EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL
                                FROM AFGHANISTAN

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                         COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION
                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 14, 2021

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                      Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    46-923 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2022

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
    BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
    CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
    CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
    TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
    EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
    JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
    CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
    BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
    CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                         BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                     Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
            Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
                        John Dutton, Chief Clerk

                                  (ii)

                             C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

    Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

    Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     4

    Blinken, Hon. Antony J., Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
      State, Washington, DC..........................................     8
        Prepared Statement...........................................    13

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

    U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement, Dated
      September 9, 2021..............................................    70

    Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter, Dated September 2, 2021.    77

    Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women
      Leaders and Human Rights Defenders.............................    82

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez...........................    83

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator James E. Risch............................    94

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin........................   125

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen............................   127

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine.................................   130

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey..........................   130

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Cory Booker...............................   132

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio...............................   133

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson...............................   139

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney...............................   145

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Rob Portman...............................   149

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Todd Young................................   151

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator John Barrasso.............................   152

    Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
      Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz..................................   159

                                     (iii)

                        EXAMINING THE U.S. WITHDRAWAL
                                FROM AFGHANISTAN

                                  ----------

                                          TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2021

                                           U.S. Senate,
                                Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
    room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
    Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
    Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van
    Hollen, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Barrasso,
    Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

        The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee will come to order.
        Secretary Blinken, thank you for joining us today.
        Last week, the New York Times reported on a local Afghan
    reporter who goes by the name of Nemat. He was covering a
    demonstration by several women protesting against the Taliban.
    He was arrested. His camera was confiscated.
        Nemat said, ``I told them I was a journalist and showed
    them my ID card, but they accused me of organizing the
    protests. They took me into a room, tied my hands with a scarf,
    and started beating me with a cable.''
        The horror he experienced is hard to fathom. He described a
    demonstrator covered in blood after being severely beaten and
    saw Taliban militants abusing prisoners. One of Nemat's
    colleagues said, ``They were mocking us and saying, `You want
    freedom? What freedom?'''
        This is not the Taliban of 2001. This happened last week.
    Amid the extensive oversight work planned in Afghanistan, we
    must not lose sight of people like Nemat and the courageous
    women who continue to protest in the streets, calling for
    freedom in the face of violence and threats. The repression of
    the Afghan people is happening in real time, and the world must
    bear witness and hold the Taliban accountable.
        Let me turn to the focus of today's hearing. Mr. Secretary,
    the execution of the U.S. withdrawal was clearly and fatally
    flawed. This committee expects to receive a full explanation of
    the Administration's decisions on Afghanistan since coming into
    office last January. There has to be accountability.
        We will have other hearings to develop a set of lessons
    learned over the course of the war, to understand the many
    mistakes made over the course of 20 years. The diversion of
    attention and resources when the Bush administration decided to
    invade Iraq despite its irrelevance to the 9/11 attacks, the
    double-dealing by Pakistan in providing a safe haven to the
    Taliban, and the list goes on.
        We need to understand why successive administrations made
    so many of the same mistakes repeatedly. Perhaps most urgently,
    we need to understand why the Afghan Government and military
    collapsed so precipitously. This rapid collapse laid bare a
    fundamental fact, that successive administrations lied to the
    Congress over the years about the durability of the Afghan
    military and governing institutions, and we need to understand
    why.
        The chaos of last August is due in large part to the
    February 2020 surrender deal negotiated by President Trump, a
    deal that was clearly built on a set of lies. A deal that led
    to the release of 5,000 hardened Taliban fighters, boosting the
    militant group on the battlefield this summer.
        We know now that the Taliban had no intention of pursuing a
    political path and peace deal with the Afghan Government. It
    had no intention of pursuing a democratic path. It had no
    intention of breaking ties with Al Qaeda and it clearly had no
    intention of allowing women to have their rightful seat at the
    table and to participate fully in society.
        To demand the Taliban abide by its commitments now and
    expect a different result I think is somewhat absurd. The
    Taliban rules Afghanistan, so we will have to deal with it in
    some form, but let us not kid ourselves. There is no such thing
    as a reformed Taliban. This group is woefully stuck in the 14th
    century with no will to come out. Their concept of political
    representation and legitimacy is based squarely on the use of
    violent force and intimidation.
        The Administration says that we should judge the Taliban by
    their actions, and I agree. Their actions since taking over
    Afghanistan have been pretty horrifying. Beating women
    activists, murdering ethnic and religious minorities such as
    the Hazara, separating classrooms by gender, shutting down
    local media, refusal to break with Al Qaeda, appointing the
    head of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by our
    Government from the Haqqani Network to lead the Ministry of
    Interior, and the list goes on.
        With this in mind, the United States and the United Nations
    should maintain existing sanctions on the Taliban. The U.S.
    should reimpose those sanctions that were waived during the
    negotiations process, and the U.S. should consider new measures
    to impose higher costs on the group and its leaders while
    ensuring that lifesaving humanitarian aid is able to assist
    those most vulnerable to hunger, disease, and disaster.
        Nor should any country be in a rush to unilaterally
    recognize this regime. At a minimum, the following criteria
    must be met before recognition is even considered. Absolute
    repudiation by the Taliban of all cross-border terrorism,
    including Al Qaeda and associated groups. Equality of rights
    for girls and women. Protection of minority, ethnic, and
    religious groups. Commitment to democratic elections and ending
    all narcotics-related activity.
        So, yes, the Taliban now run Afghanistan, but that does not
    mean we ever accept their behavior. I supported the decision to
    eventually withdraw our military from Afghanistan. I have long
    maintained, however, that how the United States left mattered.
    Doing the right thing in the wrong way can end up being the
    wrong thing. To get this right, the Biden administration needed
    to answer two fundamental questions. First, would the
    withdrawal leave a durable political arrangement in its wake?
    Second, would the U.S. and our allies maintain an ability to
    collect intelligence, conduct counterterrorism operations in a
    region still rife with groups, including ISIS-K, seeking to do
    us harm?
        I believe the U.S. clearly fell short on the first measure,
    and time will tell on the second. The prospects do not look
    promising. So let me start with some framing questions about
    the Biden administration's Afghanistan decision-making.
        First, upon coming into office, how did the Biden
    administration assess the impact on the ground of President
    Trump's flawed deal with the Taliban? Did the Administration
    attempt to negotiate better terms with the Taliban upon coming
    into office?
        Second, did the President's April withdrawal announcement
    set in motion any explicit contingency planning in the event
    that the Taliban rapidly took over the country? What was the
    plan to evacuate all Americans? What was the plan to evacuate
    SIVs, P1s, P2s, and other at-risk groups? What was the plan to
    evacuate staff and those affiliated with Radio Free Europe,
    Radio Liberty, Voice of America, the National Endowment for
    Democracy, and other U.S.-funded organizations?
        President Trump, with Stephen Miller, intentionally blocked
    SIVs from being processed, which I think is a barbaric and
    cruel decision which likely resulted in death for some U.S.
    partners. How did the Biden administration specifically
    accelerate processing SIVs upon coming into office?
        Third, what was the plan to avoid or deal with a refugee
    and humanitarian crisis? I expect you will address some of
    these issues in your opening remarks.
        Let me applaud the efforts of the personnel on the ground
    from the Departments of State and Defense who worked under
    horrific circumstances. Their actions in evacuating over
    120,000 individuals were nothing short of heroic, and these
    personnel deserve answers. The American public deserves
    answers. The Afghan people certainly deserve answers.
        So let me close with three points. First, while
    communication from the Administration has been frequent
    throughout this crisis, information from State, the Pentagon,
    and the White House has often been vague or contradictory. This
    was obviously a fluid and difficult situation. Frustration
    among many Members was high, and this has to improve.
        To put this in context, Member frustration came on top of
    years of stonewalling by the Trump administration and its
    refusal to engage the Senate on the Taliban negotiations. This
    is one of the examples of why I have been trying to pursue on
    the CASE Act to understand what the written agreements are,
    that come between an Administration and others. Maybe if we had
    seen all of the elements of it, we would have been poised in a
    better position.
        Second, I am very disappointed that Secretary Austin
    declined our request to testify today. A full accounting of the
    U.S. response to this crisis is not complete without the
    Pentagon, especially when it comes to understanding the
    complete collapse of the U.S.-trained and funded Afghan
    military.
        His decision not to appear before the committee will affect
    my personal judgment on Department of Defense nominees. I
    expect the Secretary will avail himself to the committee in the
    near future, and if he does not, I may consider the use of
    committee subpoena power to compel him and others over the
    course of these last 20 years to testify.
        Third, I implore the Administration to remain focused on
    Afghanistan. It is critically important that the world bear
    witness and take action when possible in response to Taliban
    abuses. Your visit, Mr. Secretary, to Qatar and Germany sent
    the right message, and I strongly urge sustained attention to
    Afghanistan in the months and years to come.
        I also urge the Administration to strengthen its resolve
    and efforts to secure the relocation of our civil society
    partners now at grave risk who were left behind in Afghanistan.
    They include heroic individuals working for organizations on
    the frontlines of U.S. efforts to strengthen democracy and
    human rights, including the rights of Afghan women and girls.
        Finally, I know that Senator Young is not with us today. He
    is home in Indiana attending the funeral of Marine Corporal
    Humberto Sanchez. Corporal Sanchez was among those killed in
    the horrendous terror attack on August 26 at the Kabul airport.
        I would like to suggest that we have a moment of silence
    and pay our respects to all those brave American service
    members who were killed or injured on that day and that we also
    honor the thousands of American service members, Afghan
    soldiers, and civilians who were casualties of this 20-year
    war. Please join me in a moment of silence.
        [Moment of silence.]
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member,
    Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.

                   STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

        Senator Risch. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Blinken, good morning, and welcome back to our
    committee. You are doing the right thing testifying here today,
    and I thank you.
        However, like the chairman, I am disappointed that some of
    your colleagues have declined to testify, particularly
    Secretary Austin. There are questions that we really need to
    have answered, and it is disheartening that they declined to
    testify. The debacle in Afghanistan is an interagency failure,
    and the fact that you are the only one stepping up is
    disheartening.
        I agree with the chairman that the withdrawal was a dismal
    failure. One of the things we need to get to the bottom to is,
    who is responsible for this? Who made the decisions? There is
    real questions right now as to who is making the decisions.
        We know for a fact that the President of the United States
    is somewhat disadvantaged here in that someone is calling the
    shots. He cannot even speak without someone in the White House
    censoring it or signing off on it. As recently as yesterday, in
    mid-sentence he was cut off by someone in the White House who
    makes the decision that the President of the United States is
    not speaking correctly.
        So I would like to know who this person is. This is a
    puppeteer act, if you would, and we need to know who is in
    charge and who is making these decisions. The only way we are
    going to get that is when we have people like you come in and
    answer questions. When we get to questions, I am going to have
    more questions for you in that regard.
        While I supported a responsible end to the war in
    Afghanistan, no American thinks we should have left this way.
    America cannot end wars simply by walking away. It is naive to
    assume our enemies will lay down their arms, leave us alone,
    and suddenly enshrine human rights if we go home. Indeed, there
    is a fierce battle of ideas and ambitions on the world stage,
    and the U.S. cannot remain neutral.
        However, President Biden presented the American people with
    a false choice in Afghanistan, and the rushed and embarrassing
    retreat is a stain on America's credibility that will have
    implications for years to come. There were other options that
    could have protected our national security interests, allowed
    for a more measured reduction in force, and preserved American
    credibility.
        I feel this Administration is trying to blame the prior
    Administration. Contrary to some that have said that the prior
    Administration started this, is responsible, that is simply not
    true. The prior Administration, when they took steps toward
    withdrawing from Afghanistan, entered into an agreement that
    had very, very specific conditions. I was privy to those. So I
    have personal knowledge of this.
        The February 2020 agreement was contingent, contingent upon
    the Taliban reducing violence, meeting counterterrorism
    commitments, and engaging in substantive talks with the Afghan
    Government. These were all very important, and most
    importantly, most importantly, it was telegraphed to the
    Taliban that failure to meet their commitments would be met
    with grave, grave circumstances for them. The Taliban failed to
    meet any of these commitments, and yet, yet this Administration
    turned the country over to them.
        President Biden chose to withdraw from Afghanistan without
    conditions and without prudent planning and obviously without,
    most important, telegraphing to the Taliban that they would
    enforce the conditions that the Taliban had agreed to. It did
    not happen. It was a strategic unforced error, and he did this
    against the advice of the commanders on the ground.
        One of the most embarrassing things I thought was the
    strike that was made--and obviously, we cannot talk about what
    we know from an intelligence standpoint--but the kinetic strike
    that was made after the Taliban entered the country. This de
    minimis strike had dire consequences for civilians, but not for
    the Taliban.
        These are facts. The President's withdrawal led to a
    Taliban offensive to topple the democratically elected
    government, slammed the door on any chance for a final peace
    agreement, reversed the hard-earned rights of Afghan women and
    minorities, and will result in a safe haven for terrorists,
    many of whom wish to attack the United States.
        The Biden administration left Afghanistan in total disarray
    and single-handedly created a humanitarian crisis with
    thousands of refugees and internally displaced Afghans in need
    of immediate emergency assistance.
        Secretary Blinken, you characterized the evacuation as an
    extraordinary effort. You have touted over 124,000 evacuees.
    However, we abandoned the people we prioritized for departure.
    The Department's efforts were plagued by lack of basic
    planning, a failure to identify Americans, a failure to
    energize the SIV process months in advance, ignoring repeated
    congressional offers to help, and a failure to recognize the
    Taliban for what it is, a terrorist organization.
        The numbers are telling. You evacuated 6,040 Americans and
    say only a couple of hundred remain. Your own department told
    this committee in July that there were 10,000 to 15,000
    Americans in Afghanistan. There is a huge difference between
    6,000 and 15,000. What happened to these other Americans?
        The situation with the Special Immigrant Visa evacuations
    is even more disturbing. Not counting the SIVs that arrived
    before Kabul's fall, you evacuated 705 of roughly 20,000
    principal SIV applicants. What happened to these people?
        This committee reached out to the Department in April, May,
    and June to help expedite SIV processing. We asked what
    additional authorities or resources you needed. For months, we
    received contradictory responses or no responses at all.
        I will take a minute here to defend the State Department.
    One of the biggest problems to helping process SIVs was the
    enormous failure of the Department of Defense to provide the
    records needed to validate the Afghans who bravely helped our
    forces. The fact that DoD did not keep accurate records is
    irresponsible and a slap in the face to those who fought
    alongside of us. Obviously, we want to talk to Secretary Austin
    about this.
        Despite the enormous efforts of our troops and diplomats on
    the ground, the preventable tragedy that unfolded at the
    airport in Kabul was a disaster of leadership and of the
    Administration's own making. Not only were you unable to ensure
    that Americans had access to the airport, many were turned away
    repeatedly after braving Taliban checkpoints. Americans outside
    of Kabul had absolutely no chance of evacuation.
        Green card holders and SIVs should have been prioritized
    for access to the airport as well, but there was no mechanism
    to get inside. It was an informal network of Americans that
    helped get Americans and Afghans around the bureaucratic wall
    the Administration set up at the airport. It should not have
    come to that.
        The Administration patting itself on the back for this
    evacuation is like an arsonist taking credit for saving people
    from the burning building he just set on fire. We know the U.S.
    military and our diplomats can do so much more than they did,
    if only their political bosses had gotten out of the way.
        Now we have an untold number of Americans, U.S.
    contractors, and SIVs still in Afghanistan. Despite repeated
    assurances that you will get them out, you have been unable to
    do so. Planes are stranded in Northern Afghanistan. Our Voice
    of America employees and female Afghan students on scholarships
    have been abandoned, and our SIV applicants are in hiding as
    Taliban death squads hunt them down.
        You said you would have mechanisms for continued
    evacuations after 31 August. Where is your plan? I have not
    seen it. I don't know that I have even talked to anyone who has
    seen it.
        What I have seen is a rebuke from our European allies. They
    begged us for help, but where we were not helping our own
    citizens, how could we help them? Instead, we had to rely on
    the generosity of partners like Qatar.
        What we have all heard and read is that the United States
    is no longer a reliable ally. And frankly, the way this
    evacuation was conducted, I cannot blame them. For years,
    despite strains in our relations with Europe and other allies,
    everyone knew the United States was the competent and capable
    partner. They trusted us to be the steady hand at the wheel
    that could navigate out of any difficult situation.
        That confidence has been shattered. Now across the globe,
    allies doubt our resolve, and our competitors like China and
    Russia see weakness and think they can exploit this situation.
    The Biden administration alone is responsible for this debacle
    and its consequences.
        Going forward, the challenges become even harder to
    resolve. U.S. actions must rebuild our credibility and re-
    establish deterrence. The U.S. will need more proactive
    policies on counterterrorism and security around the globe to
    discourage our competitors.
        Over the weekend, we marked the 20th anniversary of
    September 11, but we have yet to receive details about how the
    Administration's so-called ``over the horizon''
    counterterrorism plan will succeed. The Taliban's takeover
    destroyed the basis of that strategy, and despite repeated
    requests from the Hill, we have yet to receive a single piece
    of information about the Administration's revised
    counterterrorism plan.
        Meanwhile, the Taliban continues its relationship with Al
    Qaeda, and the new interior minister has a $10 million U.S.
    bounty on his head for killing Americans. Any hope that the
    Taliban will protect American security is a fatally flawed
    assumption. You must redouble efforts with Afghanistan's
    neighbors to reach CT agreements and preserve disappearing
    intelligence networks.
        Additionally, any country that offered support to the
    Taliban in their recent offensive should risk a strategic
    downgrade in their relationship with the United States. We also
    must understand Pakistan's role in this entire matter, as the
    chairman has alluded to. This is a difficult, but important
    situation.
        I also remain concerned that the Administration is rushing
    to normalize ties with the Taliban Government. This must not
    occur without extensive congressional consultations. Your
    notification that you intended to restart foreign assistance is
    deeply, deeply concerning. I suspect there are other members of
    this committee that are going to speak to that. That is going
    to be a heavy lift for you.
        On the security front, the United States spent over $80
    billion on Afghan security forces. Many of these funds bypassed
    the oversight of the State Department and this committee. We
    now see the consequences of a Department of Defense that
    operates security cooperation on its own. The Taliban is now
    one of the best-armed terrorist organizations on the planet.
        We have sent repeated requests for the Administration's
    plan to address the captured equipment. We have yet to receive
    any response. As Secretary, I would hope you would demand that
    all DoD assistance programs once again require State Department
    concurrence.
        In closing, I would like to speak directly to our
    diplomats, our men and women in uniform, our Gold Star
    families, our humanitarian workers, and our veterans. On behalf
    of the American people, I would like to say thank you. The
    ineptitude of this Administration does not tarnish your
    service. What you did mattered.
        You served nobly. You stood on the wall and prevented a
    terrorist attack against the United States for over 20 years at
    enormous cost to you and your families. America will always be
    indebted to you.
        Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
        Mr. Secretary. The Secretary has agreed to stay with us so
    each member has an opportunity to ask their questions. As such
    and because of the nature of the subject matter, I have agreed
    that the Secretary has an extended opening statement.
        With that, Mr. Secretary, you are recognized.

     STATEMENT OF HON. ANTONY J. BLINKEN, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
                  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

        Secretary Blinken. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
    Ranking Member Risch, thank you very much. To all members, I
    appreciate the opportunity to be with all of you today to
    discuss our policy on Afghanistan, including where we are, how
    we got here, and where we are going in the weeks and months
    ahead.
        For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided
    funding for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my own time
    as a staff member here in this room for then-Senator Biden just
    how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I said when I was
    nominated, I believe strongly in Congress' traditional role as
    a partner in foreign policymaking. I am committed to working
    with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the
    interests of the American people.
        On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor nearly 3,000
    men, women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded
    of why we went to Afghanistan in the first place, to bring
    justice to those who attacked us and to ensure it would never
    happen again. We achieved those objectives a long time ago.
    Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's capabilities
    were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan and
    conduct external operations.
        After 20 years, 2,461 American lives lost, 20,000 injuries,
    $2 trillion spent, it was time to end America's longest war.
        When President Biden took office in January, he inherited
    an agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban
    to remove all remaining U.S. forces from Afghanistan by May 1
    of this year. As part of that agreement, previous
    Administration pressed the Afghan Government to release 5,000
    Taliban prisoners, including some top war commanders.
    Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
        In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and
    partner forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's
    major cities, but the Taliban continued its relentless march on
    remote outposts, checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well
    as some of the major roads connecting the cities. By January of
    2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position since
    9/11, and we had the smallest number of U.S. forces in
    Afghanistan since 2001.
        As a result, upon taking office, President Biden
    immediately faced the choice between ending the war or
    escalating it. Had he not followed through on his predecessor's
    commitment, attacks on our forces and those of our allies would
    have resumed, and the Taliban's nationwide assault on
    Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would
    have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into
    Afghanistan to defend ourselves and to prevent a Taliban
    takeover, taking casualties and with, at best, the prospect of
    restoring a stalemate and remaining stuck in Afghanistan under
    fire indefinitely.
        There is no evidence that staying longer would have made
    the Afghan security forces or the Afghan Government any more
    resilient or self-sustaining. If 20 years, hundreds of billions
    of dollars in support, equipment, training did not suffice, why
    would another year, another 5, another 10?
        Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors
    like China and Russia or adversaries like Iran and North Korea
    would have liked more than for the United States to re-up a 20-
    year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for another
    decade.
        In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant
    contact with our allies and partners to hear their views and
    factor them into our thinking. When the President announced the
    withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. We
    all set to work together on the drawdown.
        Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of
    Americans in Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to
    leave the country. In total, between March and August, we sent
    19 specific messages with that warning, as well as offers of
    help, including financial assistance to pay for plane tickets.
        Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began,
    there were still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost
    all of whom were evacuated by August 31. Many were dual
    citizens living in Afghanistan for years, decades, or
    generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the place that
    they know as home is a wrenching decision.
        In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering
    nonessential personnel to depart. We also used this time to
    significantly speed up the processing of Special Immigrant
    Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took office, we
    inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a statutory
    framework enacted by Congress involving multiple agencies and a
    backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.
        There had not been a single SIV applicant interview in
    Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020. The program was
    basically in a stall. Within 2 weeks of taking office, we
    restarted the SIV interview process in Kabul. On February 4,
    one of the first executive orders issued by President Biden
    directed us to immediately review the SIV program to identify
    causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV applications
    more quickly.
        This spring, I directed significant additional resources to
    the program, expanding the team of people in Washington
    processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling the number of
    SIV adjudicators in Kabul in our embassy there. Even as many
    embassy personnel began to return, under ordered departure, we
    sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV
    applications.
        As a result of these and other steps, including working
    with Congress, especially this committee--Senator Shaheen and
    others--by May, we had reduced the average processing time for
    Special Immigrant Visas by more than 1 year. Even amid a COVID
    surge in Kabul, we continued to issue visas. We went from
    issuing about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to
    more than 1,000 per week in August when our evacuation and
    relocation effort began.
        That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of
    the Afghan security forces and government. Throughout the year,
    we were constantly assessing their staying power and
    considering multiple scenarios. Even the most pessimistic
    assessments did not predict that the government forces in Kabul
    would collapse while U.S. forces remained.
        They were focused on what would happen after the United
    States withdrew, from September onward. As General Milley, the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, ``Nothing I or
    anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this
    government in 11 days.'' Nonetheless, we planned and exercised
    a wide range of contingencies.
        Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our
    embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within
    48 hours. And the military, placed on standby by President
    Biden, was able to secure the airport and start the evacuation
    within 72 hours. Yes, that evacuation was an extraordinary
    effort, under the most difficult conditions imaginable, by our
    diplomats, by our military, by our intelligence professionals.
        They worked around the clock to get American citizens,
    Afghans who helped us, citizens of our allies and partners, and
    at-risk Afghans on planes out of the country, off to the United
    States or to transit locations that our diplomats had arranged
    or negotiated in multiple countries. Our consular team worked
    24/7 to reach out to Americans who could still be in country,
    making 55,000 phone calls, sending 33,000 emails by August 31,
    and they are still at it.
        In the midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed
    13 service members who were working the gates at HKIA, wounded
    20 others, killed and wounded scores of Afghans. Our service
    members gave their lives so that others can continue to live
    theirs. In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in
    history, with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
        On August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan
    officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began. I want to
    acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have helped
    with the relocation effort, some serving as transit hubs, some
    welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time. As the 9/
    11 report suggested, it is essential that we accelerate the
    appointment process for national security officials since a
    catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice.
        Today, there are nearly 80 State Department nominees
    pending before the Senate. Nearly two dozen have already been
    voted out of this committee on a strong bipartisan basis and
    simply await a vote in the Senate. For our national security, I
    respectfully urge the Senate and this committee to move as
    swiftly as possible to consider and confirm all pending
    nominees and to address what is a significant disruption in our
    national security policymaking.
        Now let me briefly outline what the State Department has
    done in the last couple of weeks and where we are going in the
    weeks ahead. First, as you know, we moved our diplomatic
    operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs
    team is hard at work. Many of our key partners have done the
    same thing. They have joined us there in Doha.
        Second, we have continued our relentless efforts to help
    any remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of
    allied and partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose.
    Last week, on Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with
    U.S. citizens and others onboard departed Kabul and landed in
    Doha. On Friday, a second flight carrying U.S. citizens and
    others departed Afghanistan.
        These flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the
    United States, Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport and
    intense diplomacy to start the flights. In addition to those
    flights, half a dozen American citizens, a dozen permanent
    residents of the United States, have also left Afghanistan via
    overland routes with our assistance.
        We are in constant contact with American citizens still in
    Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been
    assigned a case management team to offer specific guidance and
    instructions. Some declined to be on the first flights on
    Thursday and Friday for reasons including needing more time to
    make arrangements, wanting to remain with extended family for
    now, or medical issues that precluded traveling last week.
        We will continue to help Americans and Afghans to whom we
    have a special commitment depart Afghanistan if they choose,
    just as we have done in other countries where we have evacuated
    our embassy and hundreds or even thousands of Americans
    remained behind--for example, in Libya, Syria, Venezuela,
    Yemen, Somalia. There is no deadline to this effort.
        Third, we are focused on counterterrorism. Taliban has
    committed to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as
    a base for external operations that could threaten the United
    States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will
    hold them accountable for that. That does not mean that we will
    rely on them. We will maintain a vigilant effort to monitor
    threats, robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to
    neutralize those threats, if necessary, and as we do in places
    around the world where we do not have military forces on the
    ground.
        Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with allies and
    partners. We initiated a statement joined by more than 100
    countries and a United Nations Security Council resolution
    setting out the international community's expectations of a
    Taliban-led government. We expect the Taliban to ensure freedom
    of travel; to make good on its counterterrorism commitments; to
    uphold the basic rights of the Afghan people, including women,
    girls, and minorities; to name a broadly representative
    permanent government; to forswear reprisals. The legitimacy and
    support that it seeks from the international community will
    depend entirely on its conduct.
        We have organized contact groups of key countries to ensure
    that the international community continues to speak and act
    together on Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence.
    Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus
    NATO, the EU, the United Nations, to align our efforts.
        Fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the
    Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not
    flow through the government, but rather through independent
    organizations like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
        Yesterday, we announced the United States has provided
    nearly $64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people
    of Afghanistan to meet critical health and nutrition needs, to
    address the protection concerns of women and children and
    minorities, to help more children, including girls, go back to
    school. This additional funding means the United States has
    provided nearly $330 million in assistance to the Afghan people
    this fiscal year.
        In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans
    that we evacuated are being processed before moving on to their
    next destinations. Here at home, I spent time at the Dulles
    Expo Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed
    after arriving in the United States. It is remarkable to see
    what our diplomats, our military, employees from many civilian
    agencies across the U.S. Government have been able to achieve
    in a very short time.
        They have met an enormous human need. They have coordinated
    food, water, sanitation for thousands of people. They are
    arranging medical care, including the delivery of babies. They
    are reuniting families that were separated, caring for
    unaccompanied minors. It is an extraordinary interagency
    effort, a powerful testament to the skill, the dedication, the
    humanity of our people.
        I think we can all be deeply proud of what they are doing,
    and as we have done throughout our history, Americans are now
    welcoming families from Afghanistan into our communities,
    helping them resettle as they start new lives. That is
    something to be proud of as well.
        With that, I thank the members of this committee and look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Blinken follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken

        I welcome this opportunity to discuss our policy on Afghanistan--
    including where we are, how we got here, and where we're going in the
    weeks and months ahead.
        For 20 years, Congress has conducted oversight and provided funding
    for the mission in Afghanistan. I know from my time as a staff member
    for then-Senator Biden just how invaluable a partner Congress is. As I
    said when I was nominated, I believe strongly in Congress's traditional
    role as a partner in foreign policy making and am committed to working
    with you on the path forward in Afghanistan and to advance the
    interests of the American people.
        On this 20th anniversary of 9/11, as we honor the nearly 3,000 men,
    women, and children who lost their lives, we are reminded why we went
    to Afghanistan in the first place: to bring justice to those who
    attacked us and ensure it would never happen again. We achieved those
    objectives long ago. Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011. Al Qaeda's
    capabilities were degraded significantly, including its ability to plan
    and conduct external operations. After 20 years, 2,461 American lives
    lost, 20,000 injuries, and $2 trillion spent, it was time to end
    America's longest war.
        When President Biden took office in January, he inherited an
    agreement that his predecessor had reached with the Taliban to remove
    all remaining U.S. troops by May 1 of this year. As part of that
    agreement, the previous Administration pressed the Afghan Government to
    release 5,000 Taliban prisoners--including some top war commanders.
    Meanwhile, it reduced our own force presence to 2,500 troops.
        In return, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking U.S. and partner
    forces and to refrain from threatening Afghanistan's major cities. But
    the Taliban continued its relentless march on remote outposts,
    checkpoints, villages, and districts, as well as the major roads
    connecting the cities.
        By January 2021, the Taliban was in its strongest military position
    since 9/11--and we had the smallest number of troops on the ground
    since 2001.
        As a result, upon taking office, President Biden immediately faced
    the choice between ending the war or escalating it. Had he not followed
    through on his predecessor's commitment, attacks on our forces and
    those of our allies would have resumed and the Taliban's nationwide
    assault on Afghanistan's major cities would have commenced. That would
    have required sending substantially more U.S. forces into Afghanistan
    to defend ourselves and prevent a Taliban takeover, taking casualties--
    and with at best the prospect of restoring a stalemate and remaining
    stuck in Afghanistan, under fire, indefinitely.
        There's no evidence that staying longer would have made the Afghan
    security forces or the Afghan Government any more resilient or self-
    sustaining. If 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in support,
    equipment, and training did not suffice, why would another year, or 5,
    or 10, make a difference?
        Conversely, there is nothing that strategic competitors like China
    and Russia--or adversaries like Iran and North Korea--would have liked
    more than for the United States to re-up a 20-year war and remain
    bogged down in Afghanistan for another decade.
        In advance of the President's decision, I was in constant contact
    with our Allies and partners to hear their views and factor them into
    our thinking. When the President announced the withdrawal, NATO
    immediately and unanimously embraced it. We all set to work--together--
    on the drawdown.
        Similarly, we were intensely focused on the safety of Americans in
    Afghanistan. In March, we began urging them to leave the country. In
    total, between March and August, we sent 19 specific messages with that
    warning--and with offers of help, including financial assistance to pay
    for plane tickets.
        Despite this effort, at the time the evacuation began, there were
    still thousands of Americans in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were
    evacuated by August 31. Many were dual citizens living in Afghanistan
    for years, decades, generations. Deciding whether or not to leave the
    place they know as home is a wrenching decision.
        In April, we began drawing down our embassy, ordering non-essential
    personnel to depart.
        We also used this time to significantly speed up the processing of
    Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans who worked for us. When we took
    office, we inherited a program with a 14-step process based on a
    statutory framework enacted by Congress and involving multiple
    government agencies--and a backlog of more than 17,000 SIV applicants.
    There had not been a single interview of an SIV applicant in Kabul in 9
    months, going back to March of 2020. The program was basically in a
    dead stall.
        Within 2 weeks of taking office, we restarted the SIV interview
    process in Kabul. On February 4, one of the first executive orders
    issued by President Biden directed us to immediately review the SIV
    program to identify causes of undue delay and find ways to process SIV
    applications more quickly.
        This spring, I directed significant additional resources to the
    program, expanding the team of people in Washington processing
    applications from 10 to 50 and doubling the number of SIV adjudicators
    at our embassy in Kabul. Even as many embassy personnel returned to the
    United States, we sent more consular officers to Kabul to process SIV
    applications.
        As a result of these and other steps, including working with
    Congress, by May we had reduced the average processing time for Special
    Immigrant Visas by more than a year. Even amid a COVID surge at Embassy
    Kabul in June, we continued to issue visas. And we went from issuing
    about 100 Special Immigrant Visas per week in March to more than 1,000
    per week in August--when our evacuation and relocation operation began.
        That emergency evacuation was sparked by the collapse of the Afghan
    security forces and Government. Throughout the year, we were constantly
    assessing their staying power and considering multiple scenarios. Even
    the most pessimistic assessments did not predict that government forces
    in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained. They were focused
    on what would happen after the United States withdrew, from September
    onward. As General Milley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    has said, ``Nothing I or anyone else saw indicated a collapse of this
    army and this Government in 11 days.''
        Nonetheless, we planned and exercised a wide range of
    contingencies. Because of that planning, we were able to draw down our
    embassy and move our remaining personnel to the airport within 48
    hours. And the military--placed on stand-by by the President--was able
    to secure the airport and start the evacuation within 72 hours.
        The evacuation was an extraordinary effort--under the most
    difficult conditions imaginable--by our diplomats, military, and
    intelligence professionals. They worked around the clock to get
    American citizens, Afghans who helped us, citizens of our Allies and
    partners, and at-risk Afghans on planes, out of the country, and off to
    the United States or transit locations that our diplomats arranged in
    multiple countries. Our consular team worked 24-7 to reach out to
    Americans who could still be in the country, making 55,000 phone calls
    and sending 33,000 emails by August 31--and they're still at it. In the
    midst of this heroic effort, an ISIS-K attack killed 13 service members
    working the gates at HKIA, wounded 20 others, and killed and wounded
    scores of Afghans.
        In the end, we completed one of the biggest airlifts in history,
    with 124,000 people evacuated to safety.
        And on August 31 in Kabul, the military mission in Afghanistan
    officially ended, and a new diplomatic mission began.
        I want to acknowledge the more than two dozen countries that have
    helped with the relocation effort--some serving as transit hubs, some
    welcoming Afghan evacuees for longer periods of time.
        And as the 9/11 report suggested, it is essential that we
    accelerate the process for national security appointments since a
    catastrophic attack could occur with little or no notice. Yet today,
    there are nearly 80 State Department nominees pending before the
    Senate. Nearly 20 have already been voted out of the Committee on a
    strong bipartisan basis and simply await a vote in the Senate.
    Yesterday's voice vote to confirm three of them was greatly, greatly
    appreciated, and was a demonstration of how quickly the Senate can move
    when the need is great and the bipartisan will is there. For our
    national security, I respectfully urge the Senate and this Committee to
    move swiftly to consider and confirm all pending nominees and to
    address what is a significant disruption in our national security
    policymaking.
        Let me briefly outline what the State Department has done in the
    past 2 weeks.
        First, we moved our diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where
    our new Afghan affairs team is hard at work. Many of our key partners
    have joined us there.
        Second, we're continuing our relentless efforts to help any
    remaining Americans, as well as Afghans and citizens of Allied and
    partner nations, leave Afghanistan if they choose.
        On Thursday, a Qatar Airways charter flight with U.S. citizens and
    others onboard departed Kabul and landed in Doha. On Friday, a second
    flight carrying U.S. citizens and others departed Afghanistan. These
    flights were the result of coordinated efforts by the United States,
    Qatar, and Turkey to reopen the airport, and intense diplomacy to start
    the flights.
        In addition to those flights, 6 American citizens and 11 permanent
    residents of the United States have also left Afghanistan via an
    overland route, with our help.
        We are in constant contact with American citizens still in
    Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. Each has been assigned
    a case management team to offer specific guidance and instructions.
    Some declined to be on the first flights on Thursday and Friday for
    reasons including needing more time to make arrangements, wanting to
    remain with extended family for now, or medical issues that preclude
    traveling now.
        We will continue to help Americans--and Afghans to whom we have a
    special commitment--depart Afghanistan if they choose, just as we've
    done in other countries where we've evacuated our embassy and hundreds
    or even thousands of Americans remained behind--for example, in Libya,
    Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia. There is no deadline to this
    mission.
        Third, we're focused on counterterrorism.
        The Taliban has committed to prevent terrorist groups from using
    Afghanistan as a base for external operations that could threaten the
    United States or our allies, including Al Qaeda and ISIS-K. We will
    hold them accountable to that. That does not mean we will rely on them.
    We will remain vigilant in monitoring threats, and we'll maintain
    robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize those
    threats if necessary--as we do in places around the world where we do
    not have military forces on the ground.
        Fourth, we continue our intensive diplomacy with Allies and
    partners.
        We initiated a statement joined by more than 100 countries and a
    United Nations Security Council Resolution setting out the
    international community's expectations of a Taliban-led government. We
    expect the Taliban to ensure freedom of travel; make good on its
    counter-terrorism commitments; uphold the basic rights of the Afghan
    people, including women, girls, and minorities; name a broadly
    representative permanent government; and forswear reprisals. The
    legitimacy and support it seeks from the international community will
    depend on its conduct.
        We've organized contact groups of key countries to ensure the
    international community continues to speak with one voice on
    Afghanistan and to leverage our combined influence.
        Last week, I led a ministerial meeting of 22 countries, plus NATO,
    the EU, and the U.N., to align our efforts.
        And fifth, we will continue to support humanitarian aid to the
    Afghan people. Consistent with sanctions, this aid will not flow
    through the government, but rather through independent organizations
    like NGOs and U.N. agencies.
        Yesterday, we announced that the United States is providing nearly
    $64 million in new humanitarian assistance to the people of
    Afghanistan, to meet critical health and nutrition needs, address the
    protection concerns of women, children, and minorities, to help more
    children--including girls--go back to school. This additional funding
    means the United States has provided nearly $330 million in assistance
    to the Afghan people this fiscal year.
        In Doha and Ramstein, I toured the facilities where Afghans that we
    evacuated are being processed before moving on to their next
    destinations. Here at home, I spent some time at the Dulles Expo
    Center, where more than 45,000 Afghans have been processed after
    arriving in the United States. It's remarkable to see what our
    diplomats, military, and employees from other civilian agencies across
    the U.S. Government have been able to achieve in a very short time.
        They've met an enormous human need. They're coordinating food,
    water, and sanitation for thousands of people. They're arranging
    medical care, including the delivery of several babies. They're
    reuniting families who were separated and caring for unaccompanied
    minors. It's an extraordinary interagency effort--and a powerful
    testament to the skill, compassion, and dedication of our people.
        We can all be deeply proud of what they're doing. And as we've done
    throughout our history, Americans are now welcoming families from
    Afghanistan into our communities and helping them resettle as they
    start their new lives. That's something to be proud of, too.
        With that, I look forward to your questions.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Let me first begin by asking unanimous consent to enter
    into the hearing record a letter by the U.S.-Afghan Women's
    Council calling on the Biden administration to take immediate
    action at the United Nations to protect Afghan civilians,
    particularly women and girls.
        Without objection, it is so ordered.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this hearing.]

        The Chairman. Let us start a series of 7-minute rounds. I
    am going to hold the time tight so that every member can get
    their opportunity, and I will start off by making sure that I
    do not exceed my 7 minutes.
        So prior to the final flight out, we heard from both
    American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the
    airport they were either not being allowed through the gates,
    being sent back home, or simply abandoned. While we understand
    and appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is
    confounding that such a chaotic process arose to begin with.
        So when did the Administration begin to plan for a worst-
    case scenario contingency?
        Secretary Blinken. In the spring and summer.
        The Chairman. In the spring and summer of this year?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes. Multiple interagency meetings,
    exercises, looking at the different contingencies.
        The Chairman. So what was the specific planning put into
    the likely scenario that American citizens were going to have
    to evacuate under hostile conditions?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, planning went to a number of
    things, including the ability to move our embassy quickly, as
    we did in 48 hours, including the effort to make sure that we
    could control the airport, bring flights in and evacuate people
    out.
        One of the things that happened, as you know, Mr. Chairman,
    is that the situation outside the airport became incredibly
    chaotic, with thousands of people massing at the airport,
    massing at the gates of the airport, and that created, among
    other things, a very, very challenging situation.
        The Chairman. Should we not have started earlier so there
    would not have been a bigger surge on the SIV issue? I
    recognize, and I think it is only fair to put in context, that
    your own testimony suggested that there was a 17,000 SIV
    backlog. Nine months had passed by without a single interview.
    So, obviously, you inherited a significant backlog. How many
    SIVs were awarded during the Trump administration?
        Secretary Blinken. I do not have the numbers in front of
    me, but I think over the course of the Administration, there
    must have been several thousand issued.
        The Chairman. Okay. So the question is then should we not
    have surged more significantly? I know you said you put up to
    50 individuals, but knowing that you were preparing for a
    contingency of the worst-case scenario, should not back in
    March there have been a more significant surge to process SIVs
    and determine the entire universe of who needed to be taken
    out?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, I believe we did surge those
    resources. As I said, we quadrupled the number of people in
    Washington doing processing of SIVs, and this is at a critical
    stage in the processing, as I think many members know. The most
    important stage in many ways is the so-called Chief of Mission
    approval. That is the stage at which SIV applicants are
    actually deemed eligible under the criteria established by
    Congress for the program.
        By the way, those who apply, those who actually get Chief
    of Mission approval, the washout rate is about 40 percent
    historically. That is because it turns out that many people who
    apply do not qualify under the criteria set by Congress, or
    they are unable to get the documentation--I think this was
    alluded to prove that they had worked faithfully and loyally
    for the United States.
        There are some situations where people were committing
    fraud in order to get into the program, maybe for
    understandable reasons, but the point is we have a very lengthy
    process, 14 steps, multiple agencies involved. We worked to try
    to streamline that. I think there is more work that we would
    like to do going forward to do that, but the bottom line is we
    did significantly surge our resources to that, particularly to
    the Chief of Mission approval process, quadrupling them.
        Ultimately, we went from 10 to 50 to now, I believe, 61 or
    62 working on that stage of things. We doubled the resources we
    had in Kabul, all in an effort to expedite. We did. We went
    from 100 visas a week to 1,000 visas a week. What was not
    anticipated was the collapse in 11 days of the Afghan
    Government and the Afghan military.
        The Chairman. Let me ask you this. There have been numerous
    press reports over the past week about a new or refined process
    for the State Department to lead efforts in coordination with
    the Department of Defense to work with outside groups to
    evacuate American citizens and Afghan allies left behind in
    Afghanistan. Can you tell us exactly what these new U.S.
    Government-led efforts are? How coordination with outside
    groups and individuals is being handled? By who? What is the
    nature of the State-DoD cooperation? Give us a sense of that.
        Secretary Blinken. Sure. We have within the Department, led
    by our former Ambassador to Afghanistan John Bass, who went
    back to Kabul to the airport to help lead the evacuation
    efforts, he is leading an effort to manage, coordinate, all of
    the ongoing efforts to bring people who wish to leave
    Afghanistan out. That includes, among other things, a
    coordination with the many outside groups, as well as Members
    of Congress, who are working themselves heroically to help in
    this effort.
        I met, myself, with about 75 veteran's organizations a
    couple of weeks ago, given the extraordinary efforts that
    veterans, either individually or as groups, are doing to help.
    We want to make sure that we are as coordinated as we possibly
    can be on these efforts to make sure that we know who is doing
    what, what assistance we can provide, and to make sure that we
    are working together going forward.
        We have many other people working on this task force. Some
    dedicated to American citizens, others focused on SIVs and
    other Afghans at risk. Others focused on coordinating with
    different groups, including Members of Congress.
        The Chairman. Let me give you, in my final minute, I would
    like to give you an opportunity to set the record straight on
    one point. Several commentators have suggested that had the
    Department moved forward with the Crisis Contingency and
    Response Bureau proposed by the Trump administration as it was
    walking out the door, it would have been able to respond better
    to the Afghan situation.
        It is my understanding that that bureau had not been stood
    up yet when you decided to curtail the proposal nor, as
    proposed, did it actually add any additional resources or
    capabilities to those that State already had. It was a
    bureaucratic movement not creating or getting rid of actual
    capabilities, just a new organizational chart. In that
    bureaucratic result, potentially creating damage to the
    Department's operations, not solving them. Is that a fair
    statement?
        Secretary Blinken. That is a fair statement, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Okay. If it is not the CCR, then what is the
    answer?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, here again, to your point, with
    regard to the CCR, whether it became a bureau or not, there was
    no change in the assets that we already had at hand to work on
    these efforts. The focus of this group, either in its existing
    organizational structure or had it become a bureau, which,
    among other things, it did not because there were congressional
    holds across the aisle on this effort.
        The previous Administration, nonetheless, went through and
    tried to move it forward. We decided that we needed to review
    it. We did the review. As you described very--very accurately,
    we found that this would add no assets to what we already had
    at hand. It would simply create a different bureaucratic
    structure.
        Having said that, again, this is something designed
    primarily for individual extractions, medical emergencies.
    These men and women who are part of our operational medical
    unit are remarkable and do incredible work, but not the kind of
    work that would have been applicable to the large evacuation
    that we had to conduct in Afghanistan.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Risch.
        Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, I can tell you, I have listened to you and a
    handful of other people try to put the best face on this
    possible. I can tell you that the temperature of the American
    people is not there with you and that I am not talking from a
    partisan basis. This goes both ways.
        There is not enough lipstick in the world to put on this
    pig to make it look any different than what it actually is. The
    American people want to know who is responsible for this. So
    let us start with this. Who is responsible? Who made the
    decisions on this? Was it the President of the United States?
        Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President makes the
    decisions. That is correct.
        Senator Risch. Did he in this case?
        Secretary Blinken. As in every case, ultimately, decisions
    that can only be decided by the President are decided by the
    President.
        Senator Risch. Well----
        Secretary Blinken. Now, of course, to be specific, Senator,
    there are hundreds, thousands of decisions every single day
    that go into a situation as complex as this one. The big
    strategic decisions, those are decided by the President. The
    tactical operational decisions are made by different agencies,
    agency heads, and agency officials.
        Senator Risch. Well, I am more interested in the top
    decision-making. Look, we have all seen this. We saw it as
    recently as yesterday. Somebody in the White House has
    authority to press the button and stop the President, cut off
    the President's speaking ability and sound. Who is that person?
        Secretary Blinken. I think anyone who knows the President,
    including members of this committee, knows that he speaks very
    clearly and very deliberately for himself. No one else does.
        Senator Risch. Well, are you saying that there is no one in
    the White House that can cut him off? Because yesterday that
    happened, and it has happened a number of times before that. It
    has been widely reported that somebody has the ability to push
    the button and cut off his sound and stop him from speaking.
    Who is that person?
        Secretary Blinken. There is no such person. Again, the
    President speaks for himself, makes all of the strategic
    decisions informed by the best advice that he can get from the
    people around him.
        Senator Risch. So are you unaware that this is actually
    happening? Because it happened yesterday at the Interagency
    Fire Center. It was widely reported. The media has reported on
    it, and it is not the first time it has happened. It has
    happened several times.
        Are you telling this committee that this does not happen?
    That there is no one in the White House who pushes the button
    and cuts him off in mid-sentence?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Risch. So this did not happen yesterday nor on the
    other occasions where the media showed the American people that
    his sentence was cut off in mid-sentence?
        Secretary Blinken. No.
        Senator Risch. Are you saying that did not happen?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I really do not know what you
    are referring to. All I can tell you is having worked with the
    President for now 20 years, both here on this committee and in
    over the last 9 months at the White House, the President very
    much speaks for himself.
        Senator Risch. Well, let us take a different attack. He
    does speak for himself, but what happens when somebody does not
    want him speaking? You are telling us you do not know anything
    about this that somebody cuts him off in mid-sentence? Is that
    what you are trying to tell this committee? Because everybody
    here has seen it.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am telling you based on my
    own experience with the President over the last 20 years,
    anyone who tried to stop him from saying what he wanted to say,
    speaking his mind, would probably not be long for their job.
        Senator Risch. Let us turn to the dissent cable that you
    received in July. Are you willing to give a copy of this
    dissent cable that you got from two dozen diplomats regarding
    the imminent catastrophic collapse in Afghanistan, are you
    willing to give a copy of that to this committee?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, this dissent channel is
    something that I place tremendous value and importance on. It
    is a way for people in the State Department to speak the truth,
    as they see it, to power. These cables, I have read every
    single one of them, of the dissent channel cables that we have
    gotten during this Administration. I have responded to every
    single one. I factored what I read and heard into my thinking
    and into my actions.
        The legitimacy of the channel, the ability for people to be
    able to, with confidence, share their thoughts, share their
    views, even when they run counter to what their seniors have
    said or the policies being prescribed, it is vitally important
    that we protect that channel, protect its integrity. It is
    designed by its very regulations only to be shared with senior
    officials in the Department.
        What I do not want to see is some kind of chilling effect
    going forward that says to those who would think of writing a
    cable in the future that, oh, this will, get out widely, be
    distributed in ways that would have that chilling effect.
        Senator Risch. Do you admit that you received a dissent
    cable in July signed by two dozens diplomats that warned about
    the imminent catastrophic collapse that was coming in
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I certainly received this cable
    in mid-July. I read it. I responded to it. I factored its
    contents into my thinking.
        What the cable said broadly was two things. It did not
    suggest that the government and security forces were going to
    collapse prior to our departure. It did express real concerns
    about the durability of that government force after our
    departure, and it focused on the efforts that we were making,
    particularly on the SIV front, to try to expedite moving them
    out.
        In fact, a number of the recommendations, the very good
    recommendations it made were already entrained. Others were
    not, but one of the ones that was entrained was the
    establishment of Operation Allies Refuge. We received the cable
    on July 13. That operation was actually put into force on July
    14. It had already been planned for some time, and this was an
    effort to expedite the identification and relocation of SIVs,
    actually putting them on planes, which, as you know, is not
    part of the program. Actually relocating them and working to
    establish transit sites so that we could put them there while
    we finished processing them.
        Senator Risch. Well, you see that is the problem with us
    not having access to that cable. You are telling us that, but
    we have been told by others that it was significantly different
    than what you are saying. Also we really would like to see the
    response to that because I think history is going to be
    interested in that particular cable and your response to it.
        I will save my next question for the next round. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin, I have asked
    Senator Cardin to, in addition to his questions, preside for a
    few minutes since I have a hearing that I have to just go to.
        Thank you.
        Senator Cardin [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Blinken, thank you so much for being with us
    today. Thank you during the Afghan evacuations for almost the
    daily briefings you had for all members of the United States
    Senate and keeping us totally informed as to the events
    unfolding.
        Now I contrast that to what happened during the Trump
    years, where we were not kept informed at all about the
    negotiations between the Trump administration and the Taliban,
    that we had no briefings or information at all in regards to
    the summit meetings between the United States and North Korea,
    or the United States and Russia. Where our committee could not
    conduct the oversight that is so important, as you have pointed
    out, working with the executive branch in a check and balance
    for the unity of our country.
        So I thank you very much for the way that you have kept us
    engaged and informed as decisions have been made.
        As you pointed out, the Biden administration was dealt a
    very difficult hand on the withdrawal from Afghanistan. We all
    recognize we needed to withdraw. The options were extremely
    limited.
        The mistakes made by previous administrations, we have
    talked about it. I think we need to understand that many of us
    did not support the 2002 campaign to go into Iraq. One of those
    reasons was that we wanted to complete the mission in
    Afghanistan when we had a chance to do it when the Taliban was
    diminished after our military came in, after the attack on our
    country.
        Instead, we went into Iraq, which was not engaged in the 9/
    11 activities, and we never finished Afghanistan, a mistake
    made by the Bush administration.
        Now we have already talked about the Trump administration
    and setting a deadline and releasing prisoners and moving
    forward with the reduction of troops when there was really very
    little options that the Administration had. It does not negate
    the information that was made available to you about the
    strength of the Afghan security forces and the Ghani
    administration's will to stick with it in Afghanistan.
        I think many of us are interested in knowing how
    intelligence got that so wrong, and the contingency plans are
    ones that we really do want to review because it seems to us
    there had to be better ways to secure passage into the airport
    than what ultimately happened. Considering the hand that you
    were dealt, considering the crisis that developed, evacuating
    124,000 was a miraculous task. So we congratulate all that were
    involved in the evacuation of so many people under such a short
    period of time under such difficult circumstances.
        I want to get to where we are today. During this process,
    the State Department was very open to all Members of Congress--
    Democrats, Republicans--as we filtered information in to you
    about vulnerable people in an effort to get them out of
    Afghanistan. Today, our offices are still being deluged by
    requests to help people that are in Afghanistan. NGOs are
    working very aggressively.
        Can you share with us the process that you are using in
    order to filter information about Americans that are still in
    Afghanistan who want to leave, those that apply for SIV status,
    and those Afghans that are at risk? How do we transmit that
    information, and what process is in place so that we can try to
    get these people out of Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you, Senator.
        As I noted, we have established a task force focused
    entirely on relocation to help those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, whether there be any remaining American citizens,
    whether it is SIV applicants, whether it is Afghans at-risk,
    whether it is the nationals of our partner countries, get out.
    That involves a number of things.
        It involves, for the American citizens, case management
    teams. Five hundred individuals whose task is to be in constant
    contact with any remaining American citizens who wish to leave,
    and that is what they are doing.
        It also includes, together with our Legislative Affairs
    Office, being in constant contact with you, as well as with
    outside groups who have identified and are trying to help
    people who seek to leave. This here is the sum total of cases
    brought to us by members of this committee, just this
    committee, that all of you or many of you have been working,
    and we are deeply grateful for those efforts, for this
    information. It ensures that when you send us the information,
    we put it into our database if it is not already there. We make
    sure that we are able to track it. We make sure we are able to
    coordinate with you.
        I recognize that especially in the early going, during the
    evacuation itself, some of the feedback was lacking. We were
    trying to do all of this in real time, making sure that we took
    in the information that you were providing and acting on it. In
    some cases, we did not get back to people to say here is what
    we have done, and we have been working to make sure that we get
    back to everyone. I think we have 26,000 inquiries from
    Congress. We have responded to 21,000 or 22,000 of them.
        Senator Cardin. So we still have the categories of
    reporters that work for us that are still in Afghanistan. We
    have women that were officials in Afghanistan that are at risk.
    We have NGOs that worked with us in Afghanistan, their
    employees that are at risk.
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Cardin. So you are saying we still have an
    opportunity to work with you to get that information to the
    sources that you are using to try to arrange for their exit
    from Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, absolutely. We very much invite
    that, and we want to make sure that we have as best possible a
    unified, coordinated list so that we know what everyone is
    working on, and we can track and we can help. Or we can take on
    depending on the----
        Senator Cardin. Can I get your best guess on the numbers?
    At one point when we first started, we thought there might be
    somewhere around a little less than 100,000 of U.S. citizens,
    SIVs, and Afghans at-risk that wanted to leave. Obviously, that
    number was low. We have already evacuated over 124,000.
        Do we know how many U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan that
    want to exit today? How many are in SIV status that want to
    exit? How many Afghans at-risk we want to help?
        Secretary Blinken. On the American citizens who wish to
    leave, the number is about 100, and it is very hard to give a
    real-time number at any given moment because it is very fluid,
    by which I mean this. Some people--and we are in direct contact
    with this group.
        Some, for very understandable reasons, are changing their
    mind from day-to-day about whether or not they want to leave.
    Others continue, even now, to raise their hands and say I am an
    American citizen in Afghanistan, someone who had not identified
    themselves before. Again, I think, as all of you know very,
    very well, we do not require, as a country, our citizens to
    register or identify themselves to our embassies in any country
    in the world when they travel there or if they reside there.
        Senator Cardin. Do you have the numbers for SIV and for----
        Secretary Blinken. So the SIV numbers, that we are
    tabulating right now because we are trying to account for
    everyone who has come in. Some people remain in transit
    countries. Other people are now in the United States.
        We are putting all of those numbers together to determine--
    but the overwhelming majority of Afghans who have come out of
    Afghanistan, thanks to our evacuation efforts, are in one way
    or another Afghans at-risk. Some will be SIV applicants. Others
    will be P1 or P2 applicants. Others will be in none of those
    categories, but Afghans at-risk. We are breaking down all of
    those numbers, and we should have a breakdown for you in the
    next couple of weeks.
        Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to seeing that.
        Senator Rubio.
        Senator Rubio. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, in your statement, I think that the most
    troubling thing is the following quote from you. ``Even the
    most pessimistic assessment did not predict the government
    forces in Kabul would collapse while U.S. forces remained.'' I
    back that up by saying you also cite General Milley, who said
    there was no indication that there would be a rapid collapse of
    the Afghan army and government.
        For much of last year, I was the acting chairman of
    intelligence. I am now the vice chairman of intelligence. I
    have been tracking this very, very closely. Just going back to
    the beginning of this year, obviously, I cannot quote the
    titles of the pieces, but let me suffice it to say that there
    are numerous pieces that would be categorized as, ``It is going
    to hit the fan.''
        Let us just for a moment put that aside, okay? Because I
    think any analysis of those pieces would have led anyone to
    that conclusion. Putting that aside for a moment, we had every
    reason to believe and to plan for the rapid collapse of the
    Afghan military and the Afghan Government.
        At the beginning of 2020, by all admissions, we had already
    really bad status quo in Afghanistan. Okay, we had a small
    footprint, but we had a strong commitment to air support, and
    that sustained the Afghan security force's ability to resist
    the Taliban. The security forces of Afghanistan were suffering
    10,000 casualties a year. The Taliban was suffering casualties,
    too, but they enjoyed safe haven in Pakistan. They were able to
    go there to rest, to refit, to train, to recruit.
        So, in summary, even before the withdrawal, we had a
    terrible status quo. The security forces, a small number of
    U.S. forces continued to die. We had U.S. losses as well. I
    want to mention that, but the Afghan Government was still
    fractious and corrupt, and the Taliban had an unchallenged safe
    haven in Pakistan.
        Or put another way, and paraphrasing your own words from
    your opening statement, if after 20 years and hundreds of
    billions of dollars in support, equipment, and training, there
    is not enough for the Afghan Government or the Afghan security
    forces to become more resilient or self-sustaining, what did we
    think was going to happen as that support began to be removed?
        What did we think was going to happen when that terrible
    status quo was changed? It does not take some exquisite piece
    of intelligence or some brilliant analysis to conclude that if
    you radically change an already bad status quo, by removing
    U.S. and NATO forces, by ending enablers and air support, the
    status quo was going to collapse in favor of the Taliban.
        This is not an argument in favor of staying. I think that
    ship has sailed, okay? Because I know a lot of time has been
    spent on justifying the withdrawal. We are not debating the
    withdrawal. What I am arguing is we had a terrible status quo
    as is. By your own admission, the Afghan Government, even after
    billions of dollars and 20 years, was not self-sustaining, was
    not resilient. We should have known that as we began to draw
    down support we were going to see the potential for a collapse,
    and that is what all these pieces pointed to as well.
        So it is concerning that no one saw all of this and
    concluded that there was no evidence or no reason to believe
    that there could be a rapid collapse. More to that point, we
    began to see clear signs weeks ago that this is where it was
    headed. Without air strikes, the Taliban now began to mass and
    maneuver, going from intimidating these small Afghan outposts
    to actually getting them into quitting. We were seeing Afghan
    outposts begin to quit.
        The Taliban could now--they went from surrounding these
    small provincial capitals to surrounding major cities, with
    5,000 to 8,000 Taliban fighters. This is weeks before. By the
    way, this is at the same time as, I believe, on July 8
    President Biden was still giving this naive optimistic
    prediction about the fighting capabilities of the Afghan forces
    and so forth.
        We could see them meticulously focused on the north. You
    could see that they were methodically and carefully splintering
    the sporadic remains of any sort of resistance. Weeks before
    the fall of Kabul, you could see the Taliban was on the verge,
    was headed towards doing something they had not done before.
    They were going to isolate Kabul from the north, cutting off
    all their supply routes.
        So we knew weeks before that we were headed for a Taliban
    control of the north, all the traditional routes of Taliban
    encroachment on Kabul were nearly sealed, the south and the
    east. Kabul faced the prospect of no fuel. The Afghan
    Government faced the prospect of being unable to mount any
    viable opposition and sustained defense. What did we think was
    going to happen? All of those things were in place at the time.
        I think the most concerning part of it is that if we did
    not have an analysis that looked at all this, this was not a
    failure of intelligence. This was a failure of policy and
    planning. We had the wrong people analyzing this. Someone did
    not see this. Either someone did not see this or someone did
    not want to see this because we had established this, we wanted
    to be out by September 11 so that we could have some ceremony
    arguing that we got and pulled out of Afghanistan on the
    anniversary of 9/11.
        The fact of the matter is where it leaves us now, on top of
    all the other things that have been mentioned here, from a
    geopolitical perspective, is not a good place. I think China
    and Russia and Iran, they look at this botched withdrawal, and
    what they see is incompetence that they think they might be
    able to exploit, may lead to miscalculation.
        I think the Europeans, our allies, who had very little say,
    if any, or control certainly over the timing and the execution
    of all this, they are now, number one, have to be wondering
    about our reliability, the credibility of our defense
    agreements with them. They also have to be really, really upset
    at the prospects of a massive refugee crisis landing right on
    their borders here very soon.
        India, and I know that there was an announcement today
    there will be a meeting of the Quad fairly soon, which is a
    good development, except that in the Pacific region, if you are
    India, you are looking at this and saying if the United States
    allowed Pakistan to unravel their standing--the Pakistani role
    in all this, and I think multiple administrations are guilty of
    ignoring it. The Pakistani role in enabling the Taliban is
    ultimately a victory for those pro-Taliban hardliners in the
    Pakistani Government. They have to be looking at this and
    saying if the United States could have a third-rate power like
    Pakistan unravel its aims, what chance do they have of
    confronting China?
        So I think this leaves us in a terrible situation. I go
    back to the initial point. I do not know how it is possible if,
    in fact, the people in charge of our foreign policy did not see
    all of these factors and conclude that there was a very real
    possibility of a very rapid collapse, then we have got the
    wrong people making military and diplomacy decisions in our
    government.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to respond briefly
    in the time that we have. As you know from your own expertise
    and leadership on these matters, there are constant assessments
    being done. In this particular case, assessments being done of
    the resilience of Afghan security forces, of the Afghan
    Government, and different scenarios established, from worst
    case to best case to everything in between.
        Ultimately, the preponderance of the intelligence and
    assessments land someplace, and there are always going to be
    voices, and critically important that we listen to all of them,
    who may be talking about exclusively the worst case, some best
    case, some in-between. Here is what I can say in this setting,
    and we can take this up as well in other settings.
        Back in February, the overall assessment of the community
    was that after a complete U.S. military withdrawal, that could
    potentially in the worst-case scenario lead to the Taliban
    capturing Kabul within a year or two. So that is back in
    February, and that was more or less where things stood in the
    winter and into the spring.
        You are exactly right that the situation was deteriorating
    as the Taliban continued to make progress on the ground
    throughout the summer. In July, the IC indicated that it was
    more likely than not that the Taliban would take over by the
    end of the year, the end of this year. That said, we, the
    intelligence community, did not say that the country-wide
    collapse of all meaningful resistance would be likely to occur
    in a matter of days.
        You referenced Chairman Milley, as I did earlier. Nothing
    that he saw, that I saw, that we saw, suggested that this
    government and the security force would collapse in a matter of
    11 days.
        You are right that I think we need to look back at all of
    this because, to your point, we collectively over 20 years
    invested extraordinary amounts in those security forces and in
    that government. Hundreds of billions of dollars, equipment,
    training, advice, support. Based on that, as well as based on
    what we were looking at real time, again, we did not see this
    collapse in a matter of 11 days.
        It is important that we go back and look at all of this.
        Senator Cardin. The time has expired.
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
        Senator Cardin. Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Secretary Blinken, for appearing before the committee today.
        I appreciate and share the frustration of my colleagues
    over the challenges with the evacuation, over the situation of
    Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and the Taliban's treatment
    of women and girls and other minorities. I also agree with your
    assessment and that that has been given by several others that
    where we were when we got to that evacuation was because of the
    failure of both Democratic and Republican administrations.
        I want to know where that outrage was when year after year
    for 10 years, starting with Senator McCain, I and others in the
    Senate tried to get more Special Immigrant Visa applicants
    through the process so that they could leave Afghanistan, leave
    the threat, and come to the United States. There were a few
    Republicans in the Senate who blocked us year after year from
    getting more SIV applicants to the United States.
        I want to know where that outrage was during the
    negotiations by the Trump administration and former Secretary
    Pompeo, when they were giving away the rights of women and
    girls and when Secretary Pompeo came before this committee and
    blew off questions about what they were doing to pressure the
    Taliban to have women at the negotiating table for that peace
    treaty.
        So I think there is a lot of regret and a lot of
    recriminations to go around, and the important thing for us to
    do now is to figure out how we can work together to address
    those people who still need to be evacuated from Afghanistan
    and also to ensure that we can do everything possible with the
    international community to help protect the human rights of the
    women and girls who remain in the country and those minorities.
        So, Mr. Secretary, that is where I am going to put my
    effort. I do think we need an accounting. That is important for
    history and for us going forward, but let us stop with the
    hypocrisy about who is to blame. There are a lot of people to
    blame, and we all share in it.
        Now, Mr. Secretary, as you know, I was one of those who was
    opposed to our withdrawing from Afghanistan. I am not going to
    revisit that, but a lot of my concerns were around the rights
    of women and girls if Afghanistan fell into the hands of the
    Taliban.
        So I want to ask you now, and you have been very specific
    on briefing calls that you share the concern, and I recognize
    that you believe it is a priority for this Administration to do
    what you can to protect the rights of women and girls. So can
    you talk specifically about what steps the Department is taking
    to provide for the safety of women and girls and how we are
    trying to rally the international community behind that effort?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
        Let me just start by thanking you personally for your
    leadership for a long time now on these issues, both on the
    SIVs and the work that we have actually been able to do to try
    to improve the program, but more work needs to be done, as
    well, of course, as on women and girls. From advancing women,
    peace, and security and that agenda to ensuring that there is
    an equal playing field for women and girls, you have made a
    huge difference.
        I have to say over the last 20 years, we have made a
    difference, collectively, in Afghanistan. Possibly the biggest
    difference we made was for women and girls. Access to
    education, access to healthcare, access to work and
    opportunity. All of that was as a result of many of the efforts
    that we made and that this Congress made and supported,
    including with very, very significant assistance.
        This is hard. I was in Kabul after the President announced
    his decision. I met with women leaders from the then-
    parliament, NGOs, a lawyer, human rights defenders, listened
    and heard from them about their concerns about the future. Just
    the past couple of weeks when I was out in Doha and then in
    Ramstein, I talked to young women and girls who we had
    evacuated and heard from them, both their gratitude for having
    been evacuated, but also their deep concerns, more than deep
    concerns about the future for the women and girls who remain in
    Afghanistan.
        So, with that bearing in mind, we have done a few things,
    and this is where we really want to work closely with you and
    with every member. One, we have worked to rally the
    international community to set very clear expectations of the
    Taliban going forward, to include the expectation that it will
    uphold the basic rights of women and girls, as well as
    minorities.
        That is visible in the statement that more than 100
    countries have signed at our initiative. It is also in a U.N.
    Security Council resolution that we initiated and got passed. I
    know people say, oh, it is a statement or a Security Council
    resolution, it does not matter. Well, in the case of the
    Security Council resolution, just to cite one example, there
    are significant sanctions from the United Nations on the
    Taliban. There are travel restrictions on the Taliban. The idea
    that if the Taliban is in violation of the Security Council
    resolution that we established, it will get any relief just on
    that alone, the U.N. sanctions or travel restrictions, I think
    that is pretty clear that that will not happen. That is just
    one point of leverage.
        We have been working to make sure that the international
    community speaks with one voice and acts together, including on
    this. That is one.
        Second, we want to make sure that assistance continues to
    flow. Humanitarian assistance, including assistance that is
    directed at the special needs of women and girls. We are doing
    that consistent with our sanctions, and we are able to do that
    by working through NGOs and the U.N. agencies.
        Now I do not want to sugarcoat this because we know that
    while the Taliban seeks and will probably support and protect
    basic humanitarian assistance through these agencies like for
    food and medicine, it may be a different story when it comes to
    things that are directed specifically at women and girls. So we
    are going to be very focused on that and trying to make sure
    that that assistance can go through, that it is monitored
    effectively, including by the agencies doing it. I had spent
    some time talking with the head of the United Nations effort on
    this in terms of having a clear monitoring mechanisms for this
    and to carry that forward.
        Next, we will soon appoint, at my direction, a senior
    official responsible for focusing and marshaling all of our
    efforts on support for women, girls, and minorities in
    Afghanistan. I think it is very important that we have a focal
    point in the U.S. Government at the State Department whose
    responsibility is to carry forward this agenda, working closely
    with you in the weeks and months ahead.
        Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I am out of
    time, but can you share with us who that official is as soon as
    they are appointed?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, of course.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Johnson.
        Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, if I were just to read your testimony, not
    having watched any news, I would literally think this was a
    smashing success, but I do read the news, as most Americans do,
    and we realize this was a complete debacle. I think what
    concerns me the most among many things is that detachment from
    reality. It is the same denial of reality, for example, on the
    border. A self-inflicted wound. A crisis created by President
    Biden's policies that have completely thrown open our borders,
    and yet the Administration denies that we have a problem at the
    border.
        I have got a number of questions. First of all,
    approximately, what is the dollar value of the equipment that
    has been left behind that now the Taliban controls? What is the
    dollar value of that?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I believe the equipment
    provided over the last 20--well, little less than 20 years, 15
    years, is about $80 billion. Of that equipment that remains, as
    you know, it was given--some of it was handed over to the
    Afghan security forces----
        Senator Johnson. I understand.
        Secretary Blinken. --and of course, some of that is now in
    the hands of the Taliban.
        Senator Johnson. So I was also struck by your comment that
    in your testimony that even the most pessimistic assessment did
    not predict the government would collapse as quickly as it did.
    You just in your testimony said that the realistic predictions
    before the complete withdrawal was that it was going to
    collapse by the end of this year.
        So the Administration continued with their plans of
    withdrawal, of evacuation, of surrender, knowing the Taliban
    would be in control of $80 billion worth of sophisticated
    equipment at the end of that. Correct? I mean, did that ever--
    --
        Secretary Blinken. That----
        Senator Johnson. Did that discussion ever come up in terms
    of maybe that would not be a good idea, leaving all that
    equipment behind as we bug out of Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. That assessment came in July. Much of
    the equipment--and again, I will defer to my colleagues at the
    Pentagon, who are more expert in this than I am. Much of that
    equipment was made inoperable. Other pieces of equipment will
    become inoperable because there is no ability on the part of
    the Taliban to maintain it. None of it, to the best of my
    knowledge, poses a strategic threat to us or to any of
    Afghanistan's neighbors. What we are looking at are----
        Senator Johnson. Okay. So we have an oversight letter. We
    would like response on that.
        Let us just quick talk about the decision to close down
    Bagram. I mean, again, the President says this was unanimously
    decided by the military. Is it not true that the President
    decided what the troop level would be, a very minimal troop
    level? The President decided that we would keep the embassy
    open, and it had to be protected. He forced the military's
    hands, right?
        In the end, it was his decision. It was not the military's
    decision to close Bagram.
        Secretary Blinken. The President makes the strategic
    decisions. When it comes to the actual drawdown, the
    retrograde, to use the technical language, those were decisions
    made by his military commanders. He sought their best advice,
    and that is what was carried out, including the timing of the
    decision to leave----
        Senator Johnson. Okay. Another troubling piece of your
    testimony. You said when the President announced the
    withdrawal, NATO immediately and unanimously embraced it. Josep
    Borrell, the Foreign Affairs Chief for the European Union, his
    statement on the surrender is that it is ``a catastrophe for
    the Afghan people, for Western values and credibility, and for
    the developing of international relations.''
        The Wall Street Journal summarizes it quite nicely in their
    piece, just the title, ``How Biden Broke NATO: The Chaotic
    Afghan Withdrawal Has Shocked and Angered U.S. Allies.'' Again,
    that is detachment from reality that our NATO allies are
    onboard with this thing. They are not.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator----
        Senator Johnson. That is not what we are hearing.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I went to NATO well before the
    President's decision, along with Secretary of Defense Austin,
    and spent the day with all of our NATO allies listening to
    them, their views, their prescriptions, their ideas for what we
    should do moving forward in Afghanistan. I shared some of our
    initial thinking at that point.
        We factored in everything we heard from our allies into our
    own decision-making process. When the President made----
        Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for----
        Secretary Blinken. When the President made the----
        Senator Johnson. Just like you planned for every
    contingency. Okay, I got it.
        Secretary Blinken. If I could continue?
        Senator Johnson. Now, listen, it is bureaucratic-speak. I
    have some questions. So, again, my concern is detachment from
    reality. As we surrendered, as we are evacuating, as we are
    bugging out, we are hearing all these soothing comments from
    the Administration. This is almost like a well-oiled machine
    here. We have got flights just leaving and 124,000 people being
    evacuated.
        We heard something completely different. So tell me what is
    wrong about what I had heard. First of all, prior to the
    Taliban providing perimeter security, there was no security,
    and basically, tens of thousands of the Afghanis flooded into
    the Kabul airport. Correct?
        Secretary Blinken. There was perimeter security around the
    airport established by our----
        Senator Johnson. You had--we literally had tens of
    thousands of people.
        Secretary Blinken. We did not----
        Senator Johnson. We did not know who these people were. It
    was not like people we invited in that were Special Immigrant
    Visa holders. Correct?
        Secretary Blinken. We controlled the airport. We did not
    control the city. We controlled the airport. Sorry for speaking
    over you.
        Senator Johnson. Again, so we had tens of thousands of
    people in Kabul airport. The reports we were getting on the
    ground is many had no form of ID whatsoever. When I went to
    Fort McCoy, I asked the commanding general--again, all the--
    every contingency planned for. I asked the commanding general,
    when did you first find out that your mission would be as an
    intake facility for the Afghanistan refugees? He said 10 days
    ago.
        I asked the commanding general. I asked the representative
    for the Department of State, as well as from Department of
    Homeland Security. Do we know that every refugee that you have
    received so far--and there was only 1,000 at that point in
    time--but do we know that they at least have some form of ID?
    We did not.
        We are hearing all these assurances that we are getting
    biometrically screened, a 14-step plan. I asked the head of
    Northern Command, he was at Fort McCoy, describe those steps to
    me, and what are we screening them against? I mean, are ISIS
    terrorists? Are Al Qaeda terrorists? Have we biometrically
    screened them in the past that we can compare them to a
    database?
        What is that 14-step process in detail? Not just 14 steps.
    Tell me, describe to us in detail how are we keeping this
    nation safe from such a chaotic situation.
        Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, the 14-step process refers
    specifically to the Special Immigrant Visa applicants, and
    there is a lengthy process----
        Senator Johnson. So how about for the other 124,000 people?
        Secretary Blinken. So, yes. So to come to your point,
    Senator, a couple of things. We arranged, as you know, transit
    countries so that any Afghan coming out of Afghanistan would
    initially go to a transit country where we could initiate the
    screening, the vetting, and the background checks. We surged
    Customs and Border Protection officials to those transit
    points, as well, of course, as other security law enforcement
    agencies to do these checks with biometric, biographic, other
    information that we have.
        Then as people are cleared in these transit points, they
    then come into the United States, but they are not being
    resettled immediately. They are going, once they land at Dulles
    or in Philadelphia, they are then being sent to military bases,
    where the checks continue and are completed.
        Senator Johnson. Again, what checks? We need specifically
    what the checks are going to be.
        The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired. I am
    sure you can follow up for the rest of your questions.
        Senator Coons.
        Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
    Risch, for this hearing. Thank you, Secretary Blinken, for your
    service and your testimony today.
        We have, I am sure, lots of opportunities to look backwards
    at the 20 years of our engagement in Afghanistan and at
    decisions. I had hoped this committee would rise above the
    temptations of partisan politics and use this hearing to
    consider the urgent questions still before us, and I hope we
    will get a few minutes to focus on this, Mr. Secretary.
        How do we get the remaining American citizens, legal
    permanent residents, and those Afghans who served alongside us
    or worked with and for us and who are most at risk out of
    Afghanistan? How do we make sure Afghanistan does not become a
    safe haven for terrorists again and deal with the Taliban? What
    leverage do we have in doing so and to also make sure
    humanitarian aid gets into Afghanistan? Most urgently, how do
    we support and resettle those Afghan refugees whom we have
    evacuated to third countries and that much smaller population
    that has reached the United States?
        So let me just start with my thanks to the State
    Department, to the employees in Kabul and Qatar, and the DC-
    based task force that has worked with the evacuation
    repatriation of Americans and Afghans, and to the many
    Delawareans and Americans whom I have heard from. Former
    military folks who served in Afghanistan, former diplomats, and
    development professionals eager to help.
        I look forward to continuing to coordinate with you and
    with the agencies of our Government, advocacy groups, and other
    partners on resettlement efforts. I am glad that the former
    Governor of Delaware, Jack Markell, has been asked to step
    forward and help coordinate this resettlement effort.
        I was encouraged today to see Welcome.US launch, a broad,
    multi-faith, bipartisan national organization, co-chaired by
    three former Presidents--Bush, Obama, and Clinton--and dozens
    and dozens of faith groups and nonprofits to welcome Afghans to
    the United States.
        So let me just start with a question about visa status.
    Senator Sullivan and I wrote a bipartisan letter in mid-August,
    urging expanded eligibility for the SIV program. I am
    interested in how you are working to expand eligibility under
    the existing visa programs to include family members and to
    support those the U.S. Government supported and worked
    alongside, but who were not direct employees?
        I want to start, if I could, Mr. Secretary, by asking you
    just ``yes'' or ``no'' questions about three groups that other
    Senators have mentioned.
        Secretary Blinken. Sure.
        Senator Coons. There is about 550 employees and family
    members from Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio
    Liberty, who were not evacuated. Is the Department prioritizing
    their evacuation?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Coons. The Department committed to evacuating our
    partners from NED, the National Endowment for Democracy, NDI,
    IRI. Are those also being prioritized?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, they are.
        Senator Coons. Our partners from the American University of
    Afghanistan as well?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Coons. So if you would take the 4 minutes we have
    got left and explore with me how do we ensure safe passage
    across land borders, whether into Tajikistan or Pakistan, safe
    and regular flights out of Afghanistan, whether from Mazar-i-
    Sharif or Kabul? How do we get documents into the hands of
    those who do not have identity documents, either because they
    were destroyed in our embassy or they destroyed them themselves
    out of fear of the Taliban? How do we make sure that we are
    providing the financial support needed for the whole group of
    refugees who, after thorough vetting, ultimately reached the
    United States?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you very much, Senator. Those
    are all very important questions, and let me try to respond
    briefly to them, and we can take on the details after this
    session if need be.
        First, we needed and we have established a clear
    expectation from the Taliban about allowing people to continue
    to leave the country, to include American citizens, green card
    holders, Afghans who are properly documented with a visa,
    including specifically those who worked in some capacity for
    the United States.
        Not only do we have that understanding in public statements
    by the Taliban, of course, it is built into everything we have
    done with a large coalition of countries in terms of setting an
    expectation and making very clear that the failure to fulfill
    that expectation will have significant consequences, which we
    can get into.
        Second, very important to actually make sure that there are
    ways to travel freely from the country. We made an intensive
    effort before we left to understand and share with Qatar and
    Turkey, the countries that stepped up to do this, what was
    necessary to make sure that the airport in Kabul could continue
    to function. Ultimately not--to have charter flights and then
    commercial flights going in under international civil aviation
    organization standards.
        We did intensive work. We brought the American contractors
    back in the midst of the evacuation who had been running the
    airport to work that, and we handed off a very detailed plan,
    which is now being implemented.
        Third, the land crossings. We have worked with Pakistan,
    Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan on this to make sure that as we
    moved people out of Afghanistan, they would facilitate their
    crossing into their countries. We would have consular officials
    surged in the necessary places to handle people coming out in
    that fashion.
        Now, to your very important point about documentation--and
    this is something that maybe we can take offline--we are
    working on a mechanism and a means by which--and there are
    multiple ways of doing this, to make sure that people who do
    not have the necessary document, for example, a visa, from us,
    a physical visa, to get that to them. I prefer to go into more
    detail on that in another setting.
        Senator Coons. Understood. If I might, just as a closing
    question, you were asked at the outset sort of what are the
    factors we weigh as we decide the future of our relationship
    with the Taliban? We are in this difficult situation. Many
    recognize the Taliban is a terrorist organization that has done
    horrific things within Afghanistan in the past, yet we need to
    have some working relationship with them to secure the safe
    passage out of thousands of people who we still care deeply
    about.
        A number of American citizens with Delaware ties who I have
    been in contact with did not leave because their families were
    still in Afghanistan, and there are clear measures that they
    should be expected to meet that you laid out in your opening
    statement. What do you think will be the most important aspects
    of our leverage to ensure the Taliban perform in ways that we
    would accept, and what do you think will be the turning point
    at which we will make decisions with our allies to take sharper
    and harsher measures against the Taliban?
        Secretary Blinken. So, simply put, the nature of the
    relationship that the Taliban would have with us or most other
    countries around the world will depend entirely on its conduct
    and actions, specifically with regard to freedom of travel as
    well as to making good on its counterterrorism commitments,
    upholding basic rights of the Afghan people, not engaging in
    reprisals, et cetera. These are the things that not only we,
    but countries around the world are looking at.
        There is, I think, significant leverage that we and other
    countries hold when it comes to things that the Taliban says it
    wants but will not get if it does not act in a way that meets
    these expectations. For example, we talked a little bit before
    about the existing U.N. sanctions on the Taliban--these are
    significant--as well as travel restrictions.
        There is now a new Security Council resolution that we
    initiated setting out the expectations for what the Taliban has
    do to. If it is in violation of that resolution, it is hard to
    see any of these U.N. sanctions being lifted, travel
    restrictions being lifted, and indeed, additional sanctions
    could well be imposed.
        Similarly, the foreign reserves of Afghanistan are almost
    exclusively in banks here in the United States, including the
    Federal Reserve. Other banks, about $9 billion. All of that has
    been frozen. There are significant resources as well that are
    in the international financial institutions that Afghanistan
    normally would have access to. Those, too, have been frozen.
        Over the last 20 years or so, the international community
    has provided about 75 percent of the Afghan Government's annual
    operating budget. That, too, has been frozen.
        So among many things that the Taliban says it seeks, both
    basic legitimacy and basic support, the United States, the
    international community has a hand on a lot of that, much of
    that, most of that. So we will have to see going forward what
    conclusions the Taliban draws from that and what its conduct
    will be matching these basic expectations that we have set.
        Thank you.
        Senator Coons. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Romney.
        Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
    Secretary, for taking time to answer our questions today.
        I would like to associate myself with the comments that
    Senator Rubio made about planning for a potential immediate
    collapse of the Afghan Government and security forces. It
    seemed that as the Taliban was running the table throughout
    Afghanistan that the prospect of them continuing to run the
    table by coming into Kabul was a significant probability that
    should have been planned for.
        In your view, Mr. Secretary, has the Taliban abandoned
    their sympathy and collaboration with groups like Al Qaeda and
    the Haqqani Network? Do they continue to have the same aim, and
    are they of like spirit? Or has that relationship been severed?
        Secretary Blinken. The relationship has not been severed,
    and it is a very open question as to whether their views and
    the relationship has changed in any kind of definitive way. I
    think it is fair to say two things.
        One, whatever the Taliban's views on Al Qaeda, they do know
    that the last time they harbored Al Qaeda and it engaged in an
    outwardly directed attack, an attack on our homeland, certain
    things followed, which I believe it would have an interest in
    not seeing repeated. So whatever their views on Al Qaeda, there
    is a strong disincentive built-in to allow it to engage in
    outwardly directed attacks, which the assessment of the
    intelligence community is they are not currently capable of
    doing.
        ISIS-K, the other main group, is a different thing, as you
    know, because the Taliban and ISIS-K are sworn enemies. In
    fact, over the last 5 or 6 years since the emergence of ISIS-K,
    the fight has actually been between the Taliban and ISIS-K,
    with the Taliban taking most of the territory that ISIS-K
    sought to hold onto in Afghanistan. The question there, I
    think, is less whether they have the will to deal with ISIS-K
    and more whether they have the capacity.
        Senator Romney. Given that response, I know that previously
    the position of the Administration and the State Department was
    that the 2001 AUMF no longer played a role of significance.
    Given the developments in Afghanistan and the Taliban's ongoing
    collaboration with and sympathy with Al Qaeda and the Haqqani
    Network and like-minded groups, is it not appropriate for the
    State Department to revisit your recommendation that we abandon
    the 2001 AUMF?
        Secretary Blinken. I think, Senator, we need to look to
    make sure that we have all the authorities that we would need
    for any potential contingency, including the re-emergence as a
    threat of Al Qaeda or the further emergence of ISIS-K as an
    outwardly directed threat. If we do not have those authorities,
    we should get them. Whether that means relooking at those
    authorizations or writing new ones, which I think would be the
    most appropriate thing to do, if necessary, we need to look at
    that.
        Senator Romney. I appreciate your willingness to change
    your point of view in part because of the conditions that have
    developed in the most recent weeks. Nothing wrong with
    conditions leading to a change in perspective.
        I, for one, thought some years ago that we should withdraw
    from Afghanistan. The conditions that I saw in the ensuing
    years convinced me that I was wrong, and I, like Senator
    Shaheen, was one of those that felt that President Trump was
    wrong to enter into an agreement to withdraw. I thought
    President Biden was wrong to enter into an agreement--or to
    continue with that agreement to withdraw. Of course, I was
    appalled by the disastrous withdrawal process itself.
        For us today, however, I guess I would like to focus more
    on the moral stain of leaving people behind and understand what
    we can do to make sure that we are not leaving people behind. I
    understand we are down to a small number of Americans. It is
    hard to know exactly how many are left behind.
        In terms of legal permanent residents, is your priority
    just as high to get them out as it is to get out citizens? Or
    is there a different level of commitment for a legal permanent
    resident's return to the United States relative to a citizen?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, our number-one priority is
    American citizens, and that has, I think, long been the case.
    In this situation in Afghanistan, in this emergency evacuation
    in Afghanistan, we did everything we could as well to make sure
    that legal permanent residents, green card holders would also
    identify themselves to us. Like with American citizens, we do
    not know at any given time how many there are in any given
    country around the world, and to make available resources to
    help them.
        Our number-one priority is any remaining American citizens
    who wish to leave.
        Senator Romney. I did not realize there is a secondary
    level of priority then for a legal permanent resident. If that
    is the case, how many of them approximately? So we do not know
    the exact number, but how many legal permanent residents are we
    convinced are still in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. We do not have an exact number, but it
    is in the thousands.
        Senator Romney. A round number? Pardon?
        Secretary Blinken. In the thousands.
        Senator Romney. In the thousands. Likewise, in terms of SIV
    holders or SIV applicants, or people who worked with us that
    have been our partners through the years, how many of them
    approximately are still in Afghanistan that want to come to the
    United States?
        Secretary Blinken. So this is what we are doing an
    accounting of right now based on two things, based on the
    pipeline of applicants as it existed before the evacuation and
    then looking at those who we were able to evacuate. We do not
    have those numbers yet because as we have moved to evacuate
    people, a number of them are still at transit points around the
    world. Others that----
        Senator Romney. But it would be tens of thousands?
        Secretary Blinken. So, realistically, two things. One, we
    talked about this a little bit earlier. Of the applicants in
    the program, and as I said, we inherited about 18,000. About
    half of those, and this remains more or less the case now, are
    at a point where it is before the Chief of Mission has given
    his or her approval that they are, in fact, eligible for the
    program.
        Senator Romney. I understand.
        Secretary Blinken. So we focused on the----
        Senator Romney. I was looking for a number, and I guess the
    question I was leading to was this, which is given the fact
    that the SIV process was so slow and not undertaken during the
    Trump years in a significant way, you sped it up. That is
    great. Although you knew that there was no way you were going
    to get all these people out in time----
        Secretary Blinken. Let me put a finer point on it.
        Senator Romney. --given the rapid collapse of the Afghan
    security forces. You said, yesterday, that you inherited a
    date, but in fact, you did not inherit the date. The date was
    May 1, and you pushed it to August 31. Why did you not push it
    much later so that we would have been able to process the SIV
    applicants, as well as those who had worked with us that had
    not yet applied?
        I do not understand why a date was actually not inherited,
    and a date was not selected that would be sufficient to
    actually remove people from the nation in a way that would be
    in keeping with our moral commitment to honor our citizens, our
    green card holders, as well as those who have worked us over
    the years.
        Secretary Blinken. Two things, if I may? First, we took
    some risks in terms of what the Taliban would do or not do
    after May 1 in pushing beyond May 1. We, of course, worked this
    very hard because----
        Senator Romney. It is a risk with other people we took.
        Secretary Blinken. It is a risk----
        Senator Romney. The risk was on people we care for.
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, just to be clear, if I could? The
    military told us that in order to do its retrograde, its
    drawdown from Afghanistan in a safe and orderly way, it needed
    3 to 4 months. That is why we pushed to move beyond May 1 and
    to get to the end of August, early September.
        Second, to your point, which is an important one and a good
    one, our expectation was that beyond August 31, beyond the
    military drawdown, the government, the security forces were
    going to remain in control of Kabul, of the major cities. Our
    embassy was fully planned to remain up and running. We were
    leaving about 600 military behind to make sure that we could
    secure the embassy so that it could continue to operate.
        We had robust programming planned, to include continuing to
    bring out anyone who wished to leave on notably SIVs. So that
    was very much the plan and the expectation.
        What we did not anticipate was that 11-day collapse of the
    government and security forces. That is what changed
    everything.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Murphy.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
    Secretary, for spending so much time with us.
        I think what links our failures in Iraq and Afghanistan is
    that they are both fundamentally failures of hubris, believing
    that we can control things and influence events on the other
    side of the world that are beyond our control or influence.
    America can be a force for good in the world, but there is a
    limit to what we can achieve, and so there has been decades-
    long magical thinking with respect to what is in our control
    and what is outside of our control.
        As it turns out, it was not within our control to be able
    to stand up an American-style democracy, an American-looking
    military in Afghanistan that was going to be able to protect
    the country from the Taliban, but we spent 20 years trying to
    achieve it.
        So, Mr. Secretary, you covered some of this in your opening
    remarks, but I wanted to ask you a series of questions to try
    to level set for the committee the situation you inherited,
    right? What was in your control, what was outside of your
    control? Then to look at the events of the last 30 to 40 days
    with that same lens. What was in your control, what was outside
    of your control?
        I think these are ``yes'' or ``no'' answers. Some of it you
    covered in your testimony, but I think it is important to get
    it on the record.
        So, Mr. Secretary, if President Biden had chosen to breach
    the agreement that President Trump had signed with the Taliban,
    would the Taliban have restarted attacks against U.S. troops
    and bases?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Murphy. As you said in your opening testimony, by
    the time the Administration took office, the Taliban was on the
    outskirts of several provincial capitals. If President Biden
    had chosen to breach the agreement between President Trump and
    the Taliban, would the Taliban have begun offensives on these
    urban centers?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Murphy. So if the Taliban had begun a siege on
    these cities and resumed attacks on U.S. troops, would 2,500
    troops have been enough to keep the country from falling to the
    Taliban?
        Secretary Blinken. No.
        Senator Murphy. Would double that number have been enough?
    Do we know how big our force would have had to have gotten?
        Secretary Blinken. I think it was the assessment of our
    military leaders not to put a number on it, but significant
    additional U.S. forces would have been required, both to
    protect ourselves and to prevent the onslaught from the Taliban
    against the provincial capitals and ultimately against Kabul.
        Senator Murphy. So it was not a decision between leaving
    and the status quo? This was a decision between a significant
    commitment of new U.S. resources to the fight or the
    continuation of a withdrawal plan?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Murphy. Okay. Let us talk about the last month. So
    once the Afghan Government and military disintegrate all at
    once, it seems to me it was pretty predictable and
    understandable that there would be panic on the ground amongst
    the Afghan people. So could it be expected that a few thousand
    U.S. troops and diplomats on the ground at the time would have
    been able to prevent this panic?
        Secretary Blinken. No.
        Senator Murphy. Much has been made about these dramatic,
    heartbreaking scenes at the airport. Were 2,500 or 5,000 troops
    enough to stop the Afghan people from rushing to the airport?
    It created this security nightmare for you, but was there any
    way for the limited number of personnel that were there to
    prevent individuals from rushing to the airport?
        Secretary Blinken. No. They could control the airport, as
    we did. They could establish a basic immediate perimeter around
    the airport, as we did, but they could not control what
    happened beyond that perimeter.
        Senator Murphy. So let us talk about that perimeter. Others
    say, well we should have controlled a bigger perimeter. We
    should have taken back over parts of Kabul to secure the
    passage of Americans and Afghans to the airport. I mean, let us
    say you had quadrupled the number of troops you had there. Let
    us say you had 10,000 troops there.
        Without the Afghan military or a functioning government,
    would that have been enough to retake Kabul, to be able to
    secure the passage of everyone to the airport?
        Secretary Blinken. I do not want to profess to be a
    military expert. So I would really defer to my colleagues at
    the Pentagon on that, but I can say that I think--safely say
    that it would have taken a substantial number of forces to try
    to retake the city or establish a much broader perimeter. Of
    course, if that was ultimately opposed by the Taliban, in a
    sense it would have defeated the purpose because anyone outside
    that perimeter would not have been allowed to get through it to
    come to the airport, among other things.
        Senator Murphy. Right. So once the Afghan military
    collapses, it disintegrates, we do not have enough troops to
    retake Kabul. We are in the position of having to rely on the
    Taliban, or at least communicate with the Taliban, to make sure
    that we get individuals to the airport?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Murphy. Okay. I just think this is important to put
    on the record in a clear and concise way because we have to
    have a reckoning in this country about what we can accomplish
    and what we cannot accomplish. It is extraordinary that this
    Administration got 130,000 people out of Afghanistan, given
    those circumstances, given the situation that they inherited,
    that you inherited in January of this year.
        My worry, Mr. Chairman, is that the malady that we suffered
    for the last 20 years, this idea that it was just a bad plan,
    that it was the failure of execution as to why we could not
    succeed in Iraq or Afghanistan, is plaguing us again today.
    That right now we are having a conversation as if we just had a
    better plan, if we just executed better, we could have avoided
    these scenes at the airport. We could have guaranteed the easy
    and safe passage of everyone into that facility.
        It is heartbreaking what happened. It was impossible for
    Americans to watch, but if we just simply leave today believing
    that if we had planned better, if we had better execution, we
    could have avoided this panic and confusion, I think we are
    just inviting another Iraq, another Afghanistan in the future.
        Finally, Mr. Secretary, just quickly expand on your point
    about the message that it sends to China, this idea that the
    Chinese would love it if we stayed another 10 or 20 years, and
    why this is not a sign of weakness and, in fact, this is an
    ability for you and the national security infrastructure to be
    able to reorient resources toward fights that we actually can
    win?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, I think, Senator, you have put it
    very well. In my assessment and the assessment of many others,
    as I said, there is nothing that strategic competitors like
    China, like Russia, or adversaries like Iran and North Korea,
    would like better than for us to have re-upped the war, doubled
    down on it, and remained bogged down in Afghanistan for another
    year, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, with all of that dedication
    of resources, all of that energy and focus on that, as opposed
    to the challenges that we have to face today.
        I might add, this committee has done, I think, a very good
    job on trying to refocus us on, notably the competition from
    China. So I think that would have been--doubling down on this
    war after 20 years, after nearly $2 trillion, after 2,461
    American lives lost, 20,000 injuries, and not to preserve the
    status quo that existed before May 1, that would have been one
    thing. To be in the situation where the war with us was
    restarted, the Taliban attacking our forces, attacking our
    partners and allies, going on an offensive across the country
    to retake the cities, that would have required a doubling down
    on the war.
        The bottom line is this. We were right to end the war. We
    were right not to send a third generation of Americans to
    Afghanistan to fight and die there. I believe we were right in
    the extraordinary efforts that were made to make sure we could
    bring out as many people as possible. Now we have an obligation
    to make sure that we continue to do that and, of course, to
    guard against the re-emergence of any threats coming from
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Murphy. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Portman.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    fact you are having this critical hearing today.
        I must say I am going to change what I was going to talk
    about based on the last interaction. Thank you for being here.
    I wish General Austin were here because Secretary Austin could
    answer many of the questions that just been posed.
        I have a lot of respect for my colleague, Senator Murphy,
    as he knows, but this was not a choice between either a
    dangerous escalation of the war, which has just been laid out,
    or a precipitous, chaotic withdrawal that embarrassed us around
    the globe. To say that it was not a sign of weakness the way we
    left, I mean, I do not know who you are talking to. If you are
    talking to our allies in NATO, they will say it was a sign of
    weakness.
        If you are talking honestly to our adversaries, they will
    certainly say it is a sign of weakness, as will terrorist
    groups around the world. So I hope the lesson we learn here is
    not that this was the right way to leave. I hope the lesson we
    learn here is that there was a better way to leave. If the
    decision was made to pull out, it should not have been a
    precipitous, chaotic, and unfortunately deadly departure.
        This afternoon, I will be speaking on the floor about Max
    Soviak. He is a Navy corpsman who was one of the 13 American
    soldiers, sailors, and Marines who were killed on the wall,
    trying to help others escape from the tyranny of the Taliban.
    He should never have been put in that position. It was an
    impossible position for our troops, for your diplomats, and the
    impossibility that they faced was due to our policy decisions.
        There was an alternative. Bagram Air Base, I mean it was
    shut down in the middle of the night with no notice to anybody.
    It was a surprise. I have talked to people who know a lot more
    about the military side of this than I do who tell me that,
    yes, the Afghan troops were a disappointment, but that is
    partly because they were used to having Americans provide that
    close air support. If they had had that, they could have pushed
    back against the Taliban.
        I think we will hear that from your military. I think if
    General Austin were here, we would hear this.
        We just left, like just pulled out all the military
    underpinnings. So without the cover, literally, of close air
    support and other military support, yes, it became extremely
    dangerous and chaotic. We left a lot of people behind.
        Senator Romney has asked you to give him some numbers, and
    you said you are still working on that. Here are the numbers
    that I have, the best that I have. As the ranking member on the
    Homeland Security Committee, we pushed and pushed and pushed.
    Eighteen thousand applicants for SIV. We got 705 out.
        You said earlier the overwhelming number of people who were
    at risk got out. I do not think that is true.
        Secretary Blinken. If I could, sir, just to----
        Senator Portman. No, let me just finish giving you the
    numbers that I have. We think about 30,000 at-risk Afghans were
    evacuated out of an estimated 60,000. That is the best numbers
    we can come up with because we cannot get good numbers from the
    Administration. That is the best estimate.
        So that is true that we left people behind who had stood
    with us and helped us. Obviously, American citizens were left
    behind. Green card holders were left behind. Thousands of
    people who stood with us and helped us. Then let us ask about
    who came.
        Earlier, there was discussion about what kind of vetting
    has taken place. The best numbers we have is that about three-
    quarters of the people who were evacuated were not green card
    holders, were not American citizens, were not SIV applicants,
    were not P1 or P2 visa holders. So about three-quarters of
    these individuals may not have qualified in this sense.
        Now you say that they are being vetted. Good. They should
    be, and you know, nobody knows because we cannot get good
    information from the Department of Homeland Security, from the
    State Department, and others. From the start, many of us have
    said what we do there needs to be based on conditions on the
    ground.
        Quite frankly, the President's decision was not based on
    conditions on the ground. That is why it was a disastrous
    withdrawal. That is why it put so many people at risk. It
    should have been an orderly withdrawal under the cover of
    superior U.S. and NATO military force. We did have 2,500 troops
    there, but we had 7,500 NATO troops with us, too.
        Again, many of their commanders were shocked at what
    happened because they were surprised because there was not good
    coordination. There was a lack of coordination with the people
    who had stuck with us. I talked about Bagram. There was also a
    lack of integrated interagency planning. Of course, we have
    seen this in terms of how the chaotic withdrawal occurred.
        These were preventable problems, and they put our military
    and your diplomats in this impossible situation. They did the
    best they could, and I commend them for that. In an impossible
    situation, it is amazing what they were able to perform. It was
    so rushed and so chaotic that, again, we did not get the right
    people out. Many who did get out seemed not to fall into any of
    the categories that we are concerned about.
        So now what do we do? Let us look forward, as was suggested
    by Senator Coons, and I agree with that. You said that you do
    not believe that it will be a platform for terrorism going
    forward, that the current government, the Taliban Government
    has said that they will fight back against terrorists.
        Do you believe that the Haqqani Network and particularly
    the new Secretary of the Interior who is a wanted terrorist,
    based on your Administration's assessment, do you believe that
    that is indication that they are going to fight back against
    terrorists?
        Secretary Blinken. The question, Senator, from our
    perspective and our partners' perspective is whether the
    Taliban will make good on commitments to ensure that
    Afghanistan is not used as a place for outwardly directed
    terrorist attacks. They have made commitments, but we are not
    relying on those commitments. We are going to make sure that we
    have in place the ability to detect any re-emergence of that
    threat and to be able to do something about it if it does re-
    emerge, something that we can talk about in more detail in
    another setting.
        Senator Portman. Is the Haqqani Network considered a
    terrorist group?
        Secretary Blinken. It is.
        Senator Portman. Is it true that the interior minister is a
    leader of the Haqqani Network?
        Secretary Blinken. That is accurate.
        Senator Portman. I just think, sadly, we have shaken the
    foundations of a lot of our alliances, and we have work to do.
    I think we have demonstrated weakness and made the world more
    dangerous as a result.
        Let me ask you about one specific question. Well, I guess
    my time has expired.
        The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
        Senator Portman. I will follow up with regard to some of
    the international financing questions in a letter we sent to
    Secretary Yellen from Senator Rubio and myself regarding
    foreign assets.
        Secretary Blinken. Good. Thank you for that.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Merkley.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    Mr. Secretary.
        I want to turn to the humanitarian situation in
    Afghanistan. The World Food Program observed that half the
    children under 5 are acutely malnourished in the country, that
    14 million individuals in Afghanistan are on the brink of
    starvation, that 31 of 34 provinces are at risk of losing their
    health services entirely, and that only 1 percent of the
    country is vaccinated. This is a fairly accurate description of
    the challenge for both food and for healthcare?
        Secretary Blinken. It is. The humanitarian situation is
    dire.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you. The U.S. just participated in
    an international conference in which $1.1 billion was pledged
    in humanitarian relief from a variety of nations, including an
    additional commitment by the United States.
        NGOs, nongovernmental organizations, that often are
    essential for providing aid, are very concerned about a legal
    pathway to do so because in 2002, the Taliban was listed as a
    specially designated global terrorist organization under the
    International Economic Emergency Powers Act, and it does not
    have a humanitarian exception.
        Previously, where we faced this situation in Yemen, the
    Treasury Department stepped in to create a legal pathway. A
    number of Senators have written to Secretary Yellen and with
    copies to you and to Samantha Powers saying let us use that
    same pathway here in which the Office of Foreign Asset Controls
    issues a general license, creating kind of legal insulation
    providing humanitarian assistance. Are you engaged in a
    conversation about how to create a legal pathway to provide
    humanitarian assistance?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, we are. We have issued one initial
    license, as you know. The Treasury issued about 10 days ago. We
    are looking at what other authorities might be needed to make
    sure that humanitarian assistance can flow as best possible in
    Afghanistan.
        Senator Merkley. Great. Thank you. That is absolutely
    essential, and I think we have a significant responsibility. We
    have the chaos of war in combination with the pandemic and
    general disruption in the country, and it is a moral
    responsibility to provide assistance.
        I am going to ask to enter into the record the letter from
    September 2 that the Senators and Members of House sent to the
    Administration.
        The Chairman. Without objection.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this hearing.]

        Senator Merkley. Thank you.
        So as provincial capitals started to fall, and we had 9
    provincial capitals fall in 6 days, there was a lot of
    discussion about whether the Government of Afghanistan would
    direct a reconsolidation of forces to essentially consolidate
    protection of the territories still held, which was shrinking.
    Did the Government of Afghanistan take key strategic military
    decisions to consolidate its forces?
        Secretary Blinken. It did not, and this was a source of
    tremendous frustration across the Administration from the
    President on down. As the summer went on and we saw the Taliban
    moving across the country, we repeatedly pressed the Afghan
    Government to do just what you described, which is to
    consolidate its forces and to defend what was essential to
    defend and what could be defended. Not to extend itself across
    the entire country, which it did not have the full capacity to
    do.
        Unfortunately, that consolidation and the plan that we
    urged on them for how to effectively defend the major cities
    never took shape.
        Senator Merkley. What was the response of the government or
    from President Ashraf Ghani about why they chose not to
    consolidate their forces to protect the areas they controlled?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, at different moments, there were
    different responses. At some point, I think initially the
    response was, oh, we cannot be seen to be giving up on any part
    of the country. Never mind that over the last 5 or 6 years, the
    part of the country by population controlled by the Government
    of Afghanistan, if you go back to 2014, 2015, went from about
    60 percent to, at the end of last year, about 48 percent.
        So this was happening, to some extent, outside the cities,
    of course, relentlessly. Slowly, but relentlessly. Then, as we
    pressed and pressed and pressed on them, the response was, yes,
    we will do it, but they did not.
        Senator Merkley. Well, we have seen over a number of years
    we had the challenge of the elections that were considered
    illegitimate by a portion of the country. We had Abdullah
    Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani kind of facing off against each other
    and creating paralysis, great difficulty appointing key
    ministers to key positions.
        As we analyze and try to understand the rapid collapse, was
    there essentially a failure to create an effective decision-
    making capability within the Afghanistan Government?
        Secretary Blinken. I think there are a number of factors,
    and this is something that I hope we all look at, going back
    really over the last 20 years at various key points. Certainly,
    there was a lack of unity in the government. It was comprised
    of different groups, different factions. Despite, again, very
    significant efforts to get them to act in a unified way, they
    could not or would not.
        Second, I think in terms of their effectiveness, there are
    obvious serious concerns that manifested themselves. Third, one
    of the endemic problems that we have had over the last 20 years
    that we have not been able to effectively address is pervasive
    corruption. That has so many consequences.
        One of the consequences, though, is that if you are being
    asked to fight and put your life on the line for a government,
    for an institution that is corrupt, that is a pretty hard
    decision to make. So I think, as we saw with many Afghan forces
    and soldiers fighting very, very bravely and giving their
    lives. Institutionally, the military collapsed in totally
    unanticipated ways in the course of 11 days.
        I think as we go back and look, one of the things we have
    to look at is the impact that this pervasive corruption had in
    terms of giving the institution the will to fight for the
    country.
        Senator Merkley. Absolutely. In those final days as the
    provincial capitals were falling, President Ghani refused to
    acknowledge that there were falling capitals. It was almost
    like a world in which he was disengaged. Then the finance
    minister resigned and said he was leaving the country for
    family reasons, but it was taken as a symbol of the government
    on the verge of collapse. Then, shortly thereafter, President
    Ghani fled himself. I think it was Sunday, August 15.
        Did we have forewarning of this beginning of the cabinet to
    essentially flee the country, and how did we respond to that?
        Secretary Blinken. We did not. On Saturday, as it happens,
    I spoke to President Ghani. We were working on a plan to have a
    transfer of power to a Taliban-led, but more broadly
    representative government to include many of the different
    actors in Afghanistan, working on that in Doha.
        I was calling President Ghani to make sure that he would
    support that. That was critical. He told me he would, but he
    said if the Taliban would not go ahead with it, he would--and I
    am paraphrasing here--fight to the death. That was Saturday. He
    left Afghanistan the next day on Sunday.
        Senator Merkley. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you. For the awareness of Senators,
    there is a vote going on. There is a subsequent vote going on
    as well. It is my intention to try to continue through the
    process, but I just wanted to make members aware.
        Senator Paul.
        Senator Paul. I have advocated for an end to the Afghan war
    for over a decade. I am glad it is finally over, but never in
    my worst nightmares could I have imagined that an
    Administration would leave and leave $80 billion worth of
    weaponry to the Taliban, dozens of planes and helicopters,
    thousands of armored carriers, hundreds of thousands of
    automatic weapons. Worst of all, 13 of our brave young men and
    women.
        Never in my worst nightmares did anyone conceive of such a
    colossal incompetence. Abandoning Bagram Air Force Base will be
    remembered as one of the worst military decisions in our
    history.
        Holding no one accountable, having everyone circle the
    wagons and say, hey, we all agreed abandoning Bagram Air Force
    Base was a great idea, this is going to be remembered by the
    people. Holding no one accountable for letting the base go, it
    will be remembered.
        To add insult to injury, this week you have now released
    $64 million in aid to Afghanistan. Do we not have some
    prohibition against giving aid and comfort to the enemy?
        Now the argument from the Biden administration is, oh, we
    are giving it to charities, and it is for the good of the
    people, for poor people and for women. Well, the Taliban has a
    history of taking this. Throughout their governance, they would
    take the money. This was a big complaint we had when they were
    in power the last time.
        They now have $80 billion worth of weapons, 350,000
    automatic weapons. Are we really naive enough to believe that
    we are just going to keep sending charity to Afghanistan and
    they are not going to interrupt it? I think that is a foolish
    notion.
        The $64 million, though, is the tip of the iceberg. There
    is still about $10 billion out there that was designated for
    the Afghan Government. Can you pledge today without
    equivocation that the Biden administration will not release any
    of this money to the Taliban?
        Secretary Blinken. Absent the Taliban making good on the
    commitments and expectations of the international community
    that I have outlined previously, that is correct.
        Senator Paul. Maybe we could deduct a few for the weapons
    they took?
        Secretary Blinken. So, Senator, on the weapons, again I
    will defer to my colleagues at the Pentagon who are more expert
    in this. You are right that about $80 billion worth of weaponry
    has been provided over the course of the last 15 or 16 years.
    Much of that, the significant weaponry--planes, helicopters--is
    actually inoperable, will soon become inoperable because it
    cannot be maintained.
        In terms of the strategic threat that that weaponry poses,
    it does not to us or to Afghanistan----
        Senator Paul. You cannot say you are not going to give them
    the money. If they behave, you are going to give them the
    money. Why do we not subtract the $80 billion from the $10
    billion you are going to give them? Then they are minus 70
    still.
        I mean, really, the fact that you are entertaining good
    behavior that they will get more money I think is a big mistake
    and a naive notion that we are going to somehow change this
    Stone Age philosophy by giving them more of our money. We have
    sunk trillions of dollars over there. This is our chance to
    have a peace dividend. Let us quit sending good money after
    bad.
        The guy the Biden administration droned, was he an aid
    worker or an ISIS-K operative?
        Secretary Blinken. The Administration is, of course,
    reviewing that strike, and I am sure that a full assessment
    will be forthcoming.
        Senator Paul. So you do not know if it was an aid worker or
    an ISIS-K operative?
        Secretary Blinken. I cannot speak to that, and I cannot
    speak to that in this setting, in any event.
        Senator Paul. So you do not know or will not tell us?
        Secretary Blinken. I do not know because we are reviewing
    it.
        Senator Paul. Well, see, you would think you would kind of
    know before you off somebody with a Predator drone whether he
    is an aid worker or he is an ISIS-K. See, the thing is, this is
    not just you. It has been going on for Administration after
    Administration.
        The Obama administration droned hundreds and hundreds of
    people, and the thing is, is there is blowback to that. I mean,
    I do not know if it is true. I see these pictures of these
    beautiful children that were killed in the attack. If that is
    true and not propaganda, if that is true, guess what? Maybe you
    have created hundreds or thousands of new potential terrorists
    from bombing the wrong people.
        So you have got to know who you--we cannot sort of have an
    investigation after we kill people. We have an investigation
    before we kill people.
        We have got plenty of bombs. We can bomb almost anything we
    want from anywhere in the world. Maybe we should have bombed
    the helicopters and the planes that we left behind. I mean,
    even though you said you did not know any of this and was all
    surprised, once they took all of our stuff, we should have said
    you have got 20 minutes to get out of it because we are going
    to blow it all up.
        Then you would have sent a message of strength. Instead, we
    bombed somebody who we are not sure whether it was an aid
    worker or an ISIS-K operative. See, that is not sending a
    signal of strength, and in the end, there will be more blowback
    from it. If you killed an aid worker on accident, I mean, do
    you think we are better off because of that?
        You really could have acted in a position of strength, but
    you could have made the basic, fundamental decision that really
    ruined the whole thing for you was a military decision to
    abandon Bagram Air Force Base before you left, before the
    Americans were out.
        Anybody can argue, and you may have a point, that it
    happened more quickly than we thought it was going to happen.
    Okay, that is an honest mistake. Still a huge mistake. When
    people make judgment mistakes in the military, they ought to be
    relieved of their post.
        Leaving Bagram Air Force Base I think is an unforgivable
    sort of mistake. It is going to be remembered in history. But
    if you do nothing about it, you leave all these people in place
    and say, oh, well, we all agreed. It is like then maybe
    everybody needs to go.
        I mean, but really it was a terrible mistake, but releasing
    money to the Taliban will add insult to injury. It will be
    terrible for the memory of the 13 soldiers who died in the end,
    who were the final soldiers to die in this war, if you end up
    giving money to the people that had been ruining the Middle
    East and Afghanistan for decades.
        I hope you will not release the money, and I think it would
    be a big mistake.
        The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Schatz is
    with us virtually?
        Senator Schatz. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Before Senator Schatz begins, I am going to
    ask Senator Kaine to preside so I can vote and come back.
        Thank you.
        Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Blinken, thank you for appearing before the
    committee. I want to sort of zoom out a little bit. The defense
    establishment, political appointees, so-called think tank
    experts, defense contractors are complaining loudly about
    tactics because it is their strategy that failed. They are
    complaining about how America's longest war ended because they
    did not want it to ever end, and they are mad because they
    think we should be an occupying force indefinitely, and they
    know that position is untenable so they dive into tactics.
        They want to talk about holding onto Bagram for longer or
    sending forces into Kabul. They will not acknowledge the
    fundamental mistake was that we invaded a country in Central
    Asia without a good understanding of its people, its history,
    or of its culture.
        After 20 years, trillions of dollars spent, and training of
    hundreds of thousands of Afghan security forces, the Afghan
    Government reinstalled was no more capable of being a referee
    in a civil war than before we invaded. That is not the fault of
    our service members or diplomats. It is the fault of
    policymakers who set unrealistic goals.
        So the basic question I have for you, Mr. Secretary, is:
    What are the lessons of the last 20 years of war?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, Senator, I think you actually
    summed it up extremely well, and I would say two things, just
    to put a fine point on it.
        We went to Afghanistan for one reason, and that was to deal
    with the people who attacked us on 9/11, to bring them to
    justice, and to the best of our ability make sure that that
    would not happen again from Afghanistan. We largely succeeded
    in that effort a long time ago with Bin Laden being killed in
    2011 and Al Qaeda, in terms of its capacity to conduct attacks
    on the homeland from Afghanistan, vastly degraded to the point
    where it is currently assessed that it does not have that
    capacity.
        Somewhere along the way, with the best of intentions, we
    also sought to remake the country and, in effect, to use
    military force to remake another society. I think to your point
    and the point that Senator Murphy and others have made,
    whatever our intentions, that is probably something that is
    beyond our capacity. The net of that is that we were there for
    20 years. We lost 2,461 Americans, 20,000 were injured. About
    $2 trillion were spent in direct and indirect costs. That is
    the equivalent of about $300 million every single day for 20
    years on average.
        To those who say, well, yes, but you arrived in a place
    where the expenditures in terms of people and resources were
    sustainable. Well, that is simply not the reality that we faced
    because, as we have discussed, given the deadline established
    for the removal of U.S. forces by the previous Administration,
    the choice we had was either to go through with that and
    withdraw our forces or to re-up the war, to escalate, to send
    in more forces, more loss of life, more loss of resources
    indefinitely.
        To what end? To what result? In terms of having something
    sustainable in a government or in security forces that could
    protect the country and uphold basic rights. So I think those
    lessons are important. They are profound, and I hope that all
    of us together will reflect on those and other lessons that we
    have learned, both in what we have done tactically, including
    in this Administration, as well as what we have done
    strategically across many administrations over 20 years.
        Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        I am worried about reports that we are seeing about acts of
    violence against journalists, women, and girls and the Taliban
    targeting minority groups like the Hazara people, groups who
    have a brutal history of committing violence against them are
    probably going to get worse.
        So what are we doing to ensure physical access for the NGOs
    that service these constituencies?
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
        These reports, which I have also seen, whether in media
    reporting, in videos and other reports, are deeply, deeply
    disturbing. I think whether it is us or whether it is many
    other countries around the world that we have been working to
    organize and to focus, this, of course, violates the basic
    expectations that we have of a Taliban-led government in terms
    of its need to not abuse these rights, but to uphold them.
        So we are working to make sure that we are all both
    speaking with one voice and acting together when it comes to
    using the influence and leverage we have with the Taliban to
    insist that it meet these expectations. Second, when it comes
    to humanitarian assistance and other kinds of support, besides
    providing that support to NGOs, to the United Nations and its
    agencies, we are doing whatever we can to help ensure that
    those agencies and those NGOs are able to operate, pressing
    directly and indirectly on the Taliban-led government to ensure
    their ability to do that and their protection.
        This is very much a moving picture and something we are
    very focused on right now and in the days and weeks ahead.
        Senator Schatz. One final question. I understand this is
    not the main thing. I understand there are people who remain in
    mortal danger, but from your standpoint, the Department of
    State, you have got to be a little worried about morale for
    those people who have dedicated the better part of 20 years to
    this effort.
        So what can we do, not what can we say, but what can we do
    on behalf of the Foreign Service, especially at a time when we
    need to building back our diplomatic corps?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, thank you for raising that,
    Senator, because it is--you are exactly right, and it is very,
    very important to me, and it is very, very important
    institutionally.
        I spent time with all of our returning diplomats from
    Afghanistan, either personally or virtually depending on where
    they were, and spent a lot of time listening to them, hearing
    them, and trying to address the concerns that they have. To
    your point, we have so many people who have invested their
    work, their careers, their lives in Afghanistan, developed
    relationships, a deep love for the country, and this is very
    challenging, painful for many of them.
        Of course, those who participated in the evacuation itself
    who were literally at the gates at the Kabul airport side-by-
    side with these extraordinary men and women in uniform, doing
    that work, including the 13 who lost their lives who were
    killed in the terrorist attack. I had officers who were
    literally serving next to them up to a couple of hours before
    that attack, knew them by first name.
        So the impacts, both over 20 years and more immediately,
    with our people who were there literally pulling people in to
    safety, helping to talk people in, to walk people in, officers
    around the Department who stood up and volunteered to help in
    some way. Many of them who ran into HKIA, to the airport, to
    help get people out.
        So we are spending time talking to them, listening to them,
    and also providing them the support that some of them may need,
    including emotional support----
        Senator Kaine [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, if I can ask you
    to sum up, we are over time, and there are still eight Senators
    who want to ask questions.
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Kaine. Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
        Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, President Biden has described the evacuation
    from Afghanistan as an extraordinary success. His words,
    ``extraordinary success.'' This has to be the lie of the 21st
    century.
        It is dishonest, and if he believes it, it is delusional.
    America can no longer ever say we leave no American behind
    because Joe Biden did, and by your own testimony and your words
    this morning, there are still about 100 Americans trapped
    behind enemy lines.
        We have heard a lot about the 13 U.S. service members who
    died a couple of weeks ago. One was Rylee McCollum of Jackson
    Hole, Wyoming. He was 20 years old, signed up for the Marines
    on his 18th birthday.
        His wife Gigi, expecting a baby. The baby was delivered
    just yesterday, a baby girl. I stood with Rylee's family and
    his then-pregnant wife on Friday in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, as
    his remains were brought back in a flag-draped coffin from
    Afghanistan. Never made it back home alive, as a result of this
    Administration's failures. People in Wyoming view this as
    having lost one of their sons, one of their children, and it is
    a devastating loss. They really do believe it is the
    Administration who should hold the blame for what has occurred.
        This withdrawal, and you have heard it from other Senators
    on both sides of the aisle, has been an epic failure. No
    planning, no strategy. It was cobbled together at the last
    minute, disorganized. It did not have to be this way.
        I am thinking back to your confirmation hearing. I raised a
    number of questions and concerns about your record on foreign
    policy failures in Syria, in Libya, in Iran. I said these
    botched decisions have serious consequences. I said I believe
    they embolden terrorist organizations around the globe.
        I said your decisions in the past have put lives of men and
    women who serve our nation at risk because of these failures,
    and I said I think it would be a grave mistake to confirm a
    Secretary of State who has a demonstrated track record of
    repeatedly making the wrong decisions when it comes to American
    foreign policy and national security. The actions I have seen
    from you over the last 7 months have proven my assessment to be
    correct.
        The Biden administration's missteps are numerous. Failed to
    start evacuation operations until the fall of Kabul in August,
    despite announcing the withdrawal in April. Failed to heed the
    warnings of a collapse of the Afghan Government and security
    forces in spite of warnings. Failed to prepare for a rapid
    Taliban takeover. Failed to adapt the politically motivated
    deadline for withdrawal to the situation taking place on the
    ground because you were so focused on the calendar on the wall.
        Failed to keep Bagram Air Force Base, a place I visited
    about eight or nine times. The U.S. military base with two
    runways that could be used to help evacuate civilians. We just
    heard failure to prevent a vast arsenal of weapons from getting
    into the hands of the Taliban.
        I mean, it seems the most egregious, though, that I hear
    about in Wyoming and people all across the country are most
    offended by is abandoning American citizens, as well as
    abandoning our allies in Afghanistan. Senator Portman went over
    the numbers. The Washington Post called it a ``moral
    disaster.'' I think it is a moral disgrace.
        You nearly dislocated your shoulder, though, patting
    yourself on the back for the great job you have done. I mean,
    just yesterday you stated, ``We did the right thing by our
    citizens in working feverishly to get every one of them out.''
        You did not get every one of them out. You have admitted
    again and again we are talking about over 100 Americans. The
    top priority must always be getting all Americans home safely.
    Now with no U.S. personnel in Afghanistan, the Americans that
    President Biden left behind, instead of going on national TV
    and saying we will not take the troops out until every American
    is out, their options for escaping are dwindling.
        So I am trying to put this all together to say how did we
    end up here? In April, the President made the decision to
    announce everyone would be out by August 31. May 8, there was a
    rehearsal of concept, which is a dress rehearsal for
    withdrawal.
        I know that the National Security Council was there. The
    Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
    Secretary of Homeland Security, they were all there. My
    understanding is that you did not attend. Is that true?
        Secretary Blinken. My Deputy responsible for the operation
    was there.
        Senator Barrasso. I know where you were. I think you should
    have been here instead. I understand in late June the State
    Department was getting nervous because the military drawdown
    was moving on schedule, but not the civilian drawdown. You were
    running behind.
        I understand State Department was talking to the Defense
    Department to slow down the pace of military withdrawal,
    calling actually for ``tapping the brakes'' on military
    withdrawal. Is that not true?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am not going to get into any
    internal deliberations or discussions that we had. We worked on
    this together every step of the way.
        Senator Barrasso. In July, you got more warnings at the
    State Department things were getting bad. When did the State
    Department formally make the request to the Department of
    Defense for military-assisted evacuation, the noncombatant
    evacuation operation? Because that is a Secretary or Ambassador
    job.
        Secretary Blinken. The NEO was being planned, if necessary,
    throughout the spring and summer. We revised the plans on a
    number of occasions, and ultimately, when the government and
    security forces unexpectedly collapsed in the 11 days, the NEO
    went into effect.
        Senator Barrasso. So middle of August?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Barrasso. Why did you wait so long?
        Secretary Blinken. Because we had a government and security
    forces in place that, by every estimate, would be able to
    protect the city, protect Kabul, protect the other provincial
    capitals certainly through the year.
        Senator Barrasso. So yesterday, you testified that the
    Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization. I want to
    be very clear on this because that is what you said yesterday.
    ``The Taliban has been designated a terrorist organization.''
        Does this Administration believe the Taliban is a terrorist
    organization?
        Secretary Blinken. It is designated under one of the
    designations, and any engagement that we have will be purely
    for the purposes of advancing our interests.
        Senator Barrasso. Under one of the designations?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, a specially designated terrorist--
    --
        Senator Barrasso. When does this Administration plan to
    list the Taliban as a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
    organization?
        Secretary Blinken. A specially designated terrorist
    organization, that is correct.
        Senator Barrasso. You testified this morning about the SIV
    washout rate. I think you said about 40 percent that they do
    not qualify----
        Secretary Blinken. Before the Chief of Mission approval,
    that is correct.
        Senator Barrasso. So what percentage of the Afghan
    population that left Afghanistan as part of our U.S. evacuation
    efforts, what percentage of those were vetted before they
    actually got on the airplanes?
        Secretary Blinken. Before they got on the airplanes----
        Senator Barrasso. Yes.
        Secretary Blinken. --to leave Kabul? Certainly not--most of
    them were not. That is exactly why we established transit
    points in countries through negotiations with those countries
    to make sure that before anyone came to the United States, they
    would be vetted by the different law enforcement and security
    agencies. So we established agreements with well more than a
    dozen countries.
        Senator Barrasso. So who were you letting on the planes?
    Anybody that showed up?
        Secretary Blinken. Well, initially, as you know, there were
    people who managed to flood the airport. We had to do an
    immediate assessment of those. We had to make sure we could
    clear people out of the airport so that the flights could come
    in, go out.
        No one came to the United States without being checked
    somewhere else first to make sure that they do not pose a
    security threat.
        Senator Barrasso. My time has expired. Thank you very much,
    Mr. Chairman.
        I would just have to say I spent time overseas last week
    talking to our NATO allies at a security conference, as well as
    with NATO individuals. I will tell you, our enemies are
    emboldened, and our allies are enraged.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Senator Booker.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here,
    and thank you for allotting so much time and taking every
    single question posed to you.
        I want to first maybe just pick up with what my friend and
    colleague asked. Could you characterize the Americans that are
    still there? I know there are a lot of them that did not
    necessarily want to come back. There is a whole array of
    different reasons. Could you give us a better understanding of
    those that have remained and what their circumstances are?
        Secretary Blinken. Certainly. Senator, as we have noted,
    starting back in March, we issued 19 separate messages to any
    American citizen who was registered with the embassy, urging
    them to leave Afghanistan. To avail themselves of commercial
    flights that were running, offering assistance if they needed
    it, because we knew it was a very volatile security
    environment.
        Especially when we went, started the ordered departure of
    our embassy on April 27, it is also very incumbent upon us to
    make sure that we are making clear to any American citizens
    that they should take the opportunity to leave.
        By the time of the evacuation, despite these 19 separate
    messages, there were still somewhere around 5,000 or 6,000
    American citizens left in Afghanistan. As we have noted
    earlier, we never know, whether it is Afghanistan or any other
    country around the world, at any given moment how many American
    citizens are there because they are not--no one is required,
    when you travel abroad, when you reside abroad, you are not
    required to register with the embassy or with anyone else.
        Many people do. Many do not. We made a massive effort to
    try to determine how many people were there. To get to your
    point, the reason that despite all of these warnings, despite
    the environment people remained is because for virtually all of
    them Afghanistan was their home. They have lived there for
    years, for decades, for generations.
        Their extended family was there, and it is the most
    wrenching of all decisions to have to decide whether or not to
    leave the place you have come to know as home.
        Senator Booker. I wanted to ask that because I wanted to
    give more texture to this complex situation. This is not that
    there were people there--there were many people that fall into
    the category of not being abandoned by our country but have
    made the conscious choice to stay in country. Correct?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Booker. I have only been here 8 years, but I will
    say to you and your staff, you have been the most responsive
    State Department team that my office has dealt with. We have
    brought many, as you know, people to your attention, both
    American citizens and Afghanis, who wanted to get out, have
    worked with us to many different degrees of success. I am
    grateful for that.
        I have now witnessed with my senior Senator, we went to our
    joint base and saw the facilities being done for those who have
    met extreme vetting and have made it to the United States. What
    is going on with the 13,000 expected in New Jersey and the
    65,000 to 70,000 is America at its best. I meant, for military
    personnel and State Department talking to me about this being
    some of the proudest work they have ever done, and I think
    Americans should be aware of that and what is going on. We are
    a great nation, and this is a reflection of those words on the
    Statue of Liberty.
        I want to pick up, though, on the situation as it is. I
    think it was Senator Merkley who brought up the concerns about
    humanitarian interests, humanitarian crisis that is really
    boiling over there. I want to just get you to reiterate that
    you issued one license, but we really need more. Correct?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes, I understand that, and that is
    exactly what we are looking at. We want to make sure that all
    the authorities exist to provide that humanitarian assistance,
    including by not just our own NGOs, but others as well.
        Senator Booker. It is a strategic situation. We know we
    control significant resources the Afghan Government has been
    relying on to run basic services. This is a strategic leverage
    that we have over the Taliban to continue to try to pressure
    them into honoring human rights, honoring the rights of women,
    countering some of the terrorist concerns that we have, and it
    is very important.
        However, given what we understand, without those resources
    there are going to be continued humanitarian suffering. As the
    New York Times reported, the World Food Program is estimating
    about 40 percent of Afghans' crops are going to be lost. There
    is going to be tremendous hunger as the price of wheat is
    expected to go up 25 percent.
        The World Food Program's own food stock is expected to run
    out by September. So this is tremendous suffering that will
    come. It is going to be exacerbated by climate change. We can
    literally see issues of starvation hitting the general
    population.
        I guess, if you can give me specifically what assurances
    has the Biden administration been able to secure from the
    Taliban as it is to humanitarian access, and how is the State
    Department working with international partners? Because it is
    not just our responsibility to coordinate and provide near-term
    and long-term assistance for those Afghans who have ended up in
    locations without the proper support mechanisms.
        Secretary Blinken. Yes. First, you are exactly right I
    think to draw a distinction between basic humanitarian
    assistance to respond to what is a crisis among so many Afghan
    people. By the U.N.'s estimates, well over 50 percent are in
    need of humanitarian assistance. We have had a drought. We have
    had horrific economic conditions. We have had COVID, everything
    piling on to one of the poorest countries on Earth to begin
    with.
        So when it comes to food, when it comes to medicine, when
    it comes to the basics, we, the international community,
    irrespective of anything else, ought to be able to provide
    that, provided that we can do it knowing that the assistance is
    going to get to the people who need it and not diverted or used
    in any other way.
        We have longstanding mechanisms and arrangements in place,
    including with leading NGOs, including with the U.N. agencies
    to do just that, as well as very clear monitoring mechanisms to
    make sure even in an environment that we do not control, that
    assistance gets to the people who need it. I spent time with
    the head of the U.N. agency responsible for that to make sure
    that that is what is happening.
        We are coordinating with dozens of countries on this. The
    U.N. is playing a lead role. They just had a donor's conference
    to make sure that everyone else is feeding into this as well.
        Senator Booker. I just want to end by saying thank you to
    many of the State Department personnel still in that region as
    well as here in the United States that are working through this
    crisis.
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Senator Rounds I understand is with us
    virtually.
        Senator Rounds. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Secretary Blinken, thank you for your willingness to appear
    before the committee and to answer questions on the Afghanistan
    withdrawal. I understand you have been there for almost 3 hours
    now. I appreciate your persistence in this.
        Mr. Secretary, my staff has been working very closely with
    yours on the issue of Afghan Special Immigration applications,
    or SIVs, some of which have been initiated for over 3 years. As
    you are aware, I sent a letter to you last week that outlines
    my concerns, and I spoke to Deputy Secretary McKeon 3 weeks
    ago.
        Due to the preparation for the hearing, I received updates
    on three of the five SIV cases my staff has been working for
    months on. I sincerely appreciate the efforts of your staff to
    get me this information, which I provided last night to the
    South Dakota veterans who requested my help. For that, I want
    to thank you.
        I would, however, like you to be aware of my concern
    pertaining to a key reason that has hamstrung my efforts to
    assist SIV applicants. This is the Department's position stated
    to my staff on multiple occasions that it is precluded by law
    from providing updates or noting any potential defects in
    applications.
        Mr. Secretary, if true, this would prevent Members of
    Congress from executing oversight and constituent service
    responsibilities, specifically when they are advocating in
    support of an applicant. It would also, incidentally, violate
    the Department's own foreign affairs manual.
        Will you commit to me today that you will review the
    Department's procedures and fix this unacceptable procedure?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, I am happy to review that. Let
    me say, first, thank you. Thank you for the work that you and
    your team and staff have done to help folks in need and to make
    sure that we had the information that we needed to try to be
    helpful and to get people out. I am really grateful for that
    and grateful for the work that we have been able to do
    together.
        We will certainly review all of these procedures. There are
    requirements either built into the law, privacy concerns, et
    cetera, that may have to be addressed, but we should look at
    everything.
        Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, I think this is
    important enough to where we will follow up, and hopefully,
    within a time certain, we will be able to come up with what
    changes need to be made, either statutorily or within the rules
    process, to clarify this because this should not be that hard
    to be able to stay in contact and to make those communications
    back and forth between your Department and Members of the
    United States Senate.
        Our adversaries, Mr. Secretary, are celebrating the
    departure of U.S. troops, and they most certainly are
    celebrating the creation of a power vacuum. Most certainly,
    they are also prepared to take this opportunity and use it to
    their advantage. China has announced last week that it will
    send $31 million worth of aid to Taliban-controlled
    Afghanistan. There have also been reports that they are looking
    at Bagram Air Base for their own use.
        The Russian embassy in Afghanistan has remained open, and
    the Ambassador met with Taliban leadership after the takeover.
    Pakistan is considering the Taliban Government as a partner to
    counter India, and the Iranian President openly called this an
    American military defeat and is considering working with the
    Taliban.
        Did the Administration consider all of these foreign policy
    implications before such an abrupt withdrawal? If they did,
    does the Department have a strategy to counter our adversaries'
    malign influence in the region?
        Secretary Blinken. We certainly did. We factored everything
    into the decisions we made, including the impact that it might
    have on the neighboring countries, regional countries, and
    others with various interests in Afghanistan.
        A number of the countries that you cited have a whole
    series of different interests in Afghanistan, to include making
    sure that it is not a place for terrorism directed against
    them, to ensure that it is not a source of drugs flowing out
    into their countries, to make sure that it is not a source of
    potential refugees flowing out into the countries as well. So
    all of those things are in play, and countries are looking to
    take steps that they need to take to protect some of their
    basic interests.
        At the same time, we have established across more than 100
    countries and in the U.N. through a Security Council resolution
    basic expectations of the Taliban-led government. If those
    expectations are not met, and other countries are aiding and
    abetting so that the Taliban is able to not fulfill those
    expectations, there will be consequences for that, too.
        Senator Rounds. Well, Mr. Secretary, if I could, what I am
    really curious about is do you have a strategy that you
    established? Did you have enough time before this withdrawal to
    actually establish a strategy, knowing that there would be a
    void in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. The work that we have done to bring
    together across dozens of countries, very active contact
    groups, looking as we work together across these countries with
    NATO, the EU, as well as the U.N., we have a collective
    strategy on the way forward, and we are working that as we
    speak.
        Senator Rounds. Does our country, do we have a strategy
    that if this has been laid out and based upon the need to move
    out as quickly as we did, did you have time to actually
    establish a strategy to take care of what will be this power
    void? I understand that you have been there now for almost 3
    hours, but simply to say that you are working on it with our
    other countries seems to me, looks to me like we need our own
    strategy here, and it does not sound like you are in a position
    to share with us that that strategy actually exists today.
        Secretary Blinken. I am happy, Senator, to follow up with
    you and to share both our thinking and more of our work on
    that. We have organized several dozens countries that are
    collectively working----
        Senator Rounds. Mr. Secretary, and my time is getting----
        Secretary Blinken. --working on and implementing a strategy
    both----
        Senator Rounds. My time is getting short.
        Secretary Blinken. Oh, I am sorry. Go ahead, Senator. Go
    ahead.
        Senator Rounds. What I hope is that if you would, whether
    it be in a classified setting or publicly, if you could share
    with us in the next week to 10 days what that strategy is. If
    it needs to be in a classified setting, I would ask the
    chairman to provide us with the opportunity.
        Most certainly, I think it is important that we have a
    strategy to combat what will be a void in Afghanistan, which is
    a void now and most certainly is something that we should be in
    better position, I believe, than what it sounds like you are
    able to articulate today.
        Mr. Chairman, I would suspect that my time is up at this
    point.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Markey.
        Senator Markey. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very
    much.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for all of your work
    and all of your colleagues' as well.
        President Biden was right to end the United States' longest
    war. If leaving Afghanistan was ever going to be clean and
    easy, one of the President's three predecessors would have done
    so. If we have learned anything from our 20-year war in
    Afghanistan, it is that it is easier to get into a war than to
    get out of one.
        However, given the amount of second-guessing and arm-chair
    quarterbacking that I have seen over the last month, I fear
    that we have not learned anything. We must re-imagine a
    national security policy that prioritizes diplomacy and stops
    endless, undefined military engagements before they can begin.
        I want to be sure that Americans at home understand the
    position President Biden was placed in. President Trump's deal
    with the Taliban exchanged a halt in Taliban offensives against
    our troops for a commitment that we would leave the country by
    May of this year. President Trump, with the support of his
    national security team and many Republican Members of Congress,
    negotiated this deal without the participation or buy-in of the
    Afghan Government.
        President Biden faced a choice of having to break that
    deal, essentially restarting the war in Afghanistan and risk
    increased attacks against U.S. troops or to get our troops home
    as promised. President Trump, of course, did not leave an
    actual plan to evacuate all of those who should have been taken
    out of Afghanistan, and President Trump's vision without a plan
    is and was a hallucination.
        So that left it then ultimately to the Biden
    administration, which did its best in order to effectuate that
    agreement, which President Trump, in fact, made. President
    Biden ultimately was right to follow through on that commitment
    to end our country's longest war, one that claimed so many
    military lives, so many tens of thousands of Afghan civilian
    lives, and saddled U.S. taxpayers with $2 trillion worth of
    debt over the last two decades.
        The tremendous cost of war hit home in its final chapter,
    as our armed forces and diplomats executed one of the largest
    airlifts in U.S. history. We owe them a debt of gratitude.
        Yesterday, Senator Warren and I both attended the funeral
    service for U.S. Marine Corps Sergeant Johanny Rosario-Pichardo
    in Lawrence, Massachusetts. One of 13 American heroes who lost
    her life on August 26 in that suicide bombing, as she was
    guiding Afghan women and girls to safety at the Kabul airport's
    Abbey gate.
        The work of Purple Heart recipient Sergeant Rosario and
    others during Operation Allies Refuge saved thousands of
    innocent lives, and we have to ensure that our own commitment
    to help the Afghan people endures past the takeoff of that last
    U.S. military transport plane 2 weeks ago. We honor her, and we
    honor all of those who gave their lives and sacrificed in
    Afghanistan.
        Every member of this committee I think has to agree that we
    have to ensure that there is humanitarian aid that goes into
    Afghanistan to help those who are in need. We spent $300
    million every single day to conduct the war in Afghanistan,
    roughly equivalent to what we spent this entire year in
    humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan.
        Mr. Secretary, I sent a letter with four of my colleagues
    today asking for the Administration to ensure that the money
    previously allocated or requested for Afghan war efforts be
    repurposed to assist Afghans in need. Could you give your view
    as to what should happen with that funding now that the defunct
    Afghan defense and national security forces are not there to
    receive this funding, in terms of ensuring that we avert
    further humanitarian catastrophe in Afghanistan?
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator, and I got your
    letter. We are looking at all of that.
        We want to make sure in the first instance that we are
    making good on our own contributions to the humanitarian
    assistance that the Afghan people need. We did that again
    yesterday at the pledging conference organized by the United
    Nations. We are going to continue to look at the needs going
    forward and to look at what we can do effectively to make sure
    that assistance is getting to the people who need it, not
    diverted, of course, to the Taliban-led government and making
    sure that agencies, whether the U.N. or NGOs, can operate
    safely and effectively in Afghanistan.
        Senator Markey. Thank you. As the last planes left, many
    international relief organizations stayed behind. We owe it to
    them not to create red tape and free them from the risk of
    sanctions. Are you working with the Treasury Department to
    issue a general license so that these groups' lifesaving work
    can continue?
        Secretary Blinken. We are working on the necessary
    licensing authorities. As you know, we issued one license, the
    Treasury did, a couple of weeks ago. We are looking to see what
    additional authorities may be needed to make sure that
    humanitarian assistance can get in there freely.
        Senator Markey. Thank you. I think that is very important,
    and I think telescoping the timeframe to get that completed is
    very important.
        Just about every major refugee assistance group has called
    for lifting the level to 200,000 people as refugee admissions
    into our country. What is the Administration's view on that
    200,000 person goal in order to ensure that we deal with the
    magnitude of this humanitarian crisis?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, as you know, we have already
    significantly lifted the refugee cap from its historic lows
    that were in place when we took office. Of course, we are
    assessing whether there are going to be additional needs.
        Having said that, the work we are doing now to bring
    Afghans in need were vetted and checked into this country,
    including support we need from Congress on that, will not for
    the most part tap into the refugee cap. There are other means
    and mechanisms by which we are looking to bring people in to
    ensure, with your support, that they are given the assistance
    that they would get were they coming in as refugees, but not
    actually cutting into the existing cap or any future cap.
        Senator Markey. Thank you, and thanks for all your great
    work. I just would hope the 200,000 is the goal. The
    resettlement agencies are pointing toward that number, and I
    think it is a number that we should all strive to meet in order
    to just be sure that these individuals not only survive, but
    thrive in their new environment.
        Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thanks for all your great work.
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Kaine [presiding]. Senator Hagerty.
        Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine, Ranking Member
    Risch, Secretary Blinken.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator.
        Senator Hagerty. Before I start, I would just like to
    acknowledge a young man, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan Knauss. Ryan
    is a Tennessean, one of the 13 service members who lost his
    life at the airport in Kabul, trying to rescue and save others.
    My heart goes out to he and his family and the tragic loss
    associated with this evacuation.
        Regarding this evacuation, I agree with Senator Barrasso.
    For President Biden to call this an extraordinary success is
    beyond the pale when we leave Americans, when we leave our
    allies, when we leave those that have helped us behind.
        I have also just been over to visit with our allies in the
    U.K. and in NATO, and their sense of surprise and enragement is
    palpable. We have a very significant failure that is taking
    place here, a failure of global proportion. It has placed our
    allies in the position of questioning America's resolve, of
    questioning our Nation's integrity, and frankly, they put us in
    a situation where they are questioning whether we are a
    reliable partner.
        Our reputation as a nation, I think, has been put at risk
    as a result of the failed evacuation here. Our job now is to
    get to the bottom of this failure as a committee, this failure
    that has left the world a more dangerous place for the United
    States, for our allies, for those that depend on us. It has
    also armed our enemies like never before, and it has emboldened
    our strategic adversaries. There must be accountability.
        Secretary Blinken, my office and other congressional
    offices have heard rumors regarding potential Cabinet
    resignations over the situation in Afghanistan. So I want to
    ask you, have you submitted your resignation regarding this
    issue?
        Secretary Blinken. I have not.
        Senator Hagerty. The lack of accountability here, the lack
    of accountability in this Administration is shocking to me. I
    would like to turn to another question regarding the
    intelligence that we have relied upon.
        In an internal report given to the State Department by
    Embassy Kabul on August 16, there was warning of a breach at
    the Kabul airport, and it said, ``A breach cannot be fully
    prevented at current force levels.''
        Mr. Secretary, did you see that report?
        Secretary Blinken. I am sorry. Can you tell me the date
    again, Senator?
        Senator Hagerty. August 16, a report given to Embassy
    Kabul, an internal report from Embassy Kabul to the State
    Department saying that a breach at the airport cannot be fully
    prevented at current force levels.
        Secretary Blinken. I cannot tell you whether I saw that
    specific report, but that is exactly why the President had on
    standby 6,000 forces to be able to deploy immediately into
    Afghanistan, into the airport in case the airport was in
    jeopardy, and that is exactly what we did.
        Senator Hagerty. Well, the force levels being insufficient
    I think was a significant reason for concern, something that in
    a plan of action I think should have been accounted for
    certainly earlier.
        Going to the NEO plan, I would like to cover that with you
    for a few minutes. The noncombatant evacuation operational plan
    for Afghanistan would be a plan on how we evacuate American
    civilians from a foreign country should a dangerous situation
    arise.
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Hagerty. Prior to turning over the Bagram Air Base
    on July 2, did the NEO plan to evacuate Americans have the
    Bagram Air Base as a critical element of its strategy?
        Secretary Blinken. The critical element for any evacuation
    was actually the airport in Kabul, known as HKIA. Because, as
    you know, Senator, Bagram is about 40 miles from Kabul. To the
    extent that the population that you are seeking to evacuate is
    mostly in Kabul, the airport by far most convenient to them
    would be the airport in Kabul, HKIA.
        Senator Hagerty. A civilian airport in a neighborhood that
    is much more difficult to protect than an airport the size of
    Bagram with two runways and the ability to land and lift off,
    significant airlift capacity. I am frankly quite shocked that
    our NEO plan would have had no inclusion of the Bagram Air
    Base, but if I understand you correctly, it did not include
    Bagram?
        Secretary Blinken. The plan focused on the airport in
    Kabul.
        Senator Hagerty. I wonder how the evacuation plan was
    updated, Mr. Secretary, as things began to change on the
    ground. What was the process that you deployed there?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, through the course of the
    spring and summer, we reviewed all of these plans, different
    contingencies, including the NEO plan. Of course, the element
    that no one anticipated, as we have discussed on numerous
    occasions, was the rapid collapse of the Afghan Government and
    the Afghan security forces in the space of about 11 days.
        Having said that, we had plans in place to do the two
    critical things that we did. We were able to evacuate our
    embassy, all its personnel, destroy sensitive materials, and
    get people to the airport in 48 hours and in many cases much
    less than that.
        Second, as I mentioned, the President ordered that there be
    a standby force in place to make sure that HKIA, the airport in
    Kabul, was secured. Planes could come in, planes could take
    off, and we had a secure facility. We did that in the course of
    about 72 hours.
        Senator Hagerty. Back to the NEO discussion. In an August
    14 briefing, the Pentagon spokesman John Kirby denied that
    there was an NEO operation in Afghanistan at that point. But 2
    days later, on the 16th, he belatedly admitted there was a NEO
    operation going on.
        So I am curious, Mr. Secretary, what date did the
    Administration actually decide to execute the NEO plan, and
    when did they begin to actively evacuate all Americans and
    allies?
        Secretary Blinken. I believe, Senator, it was triggered by
    the collapse of the government and the security forces.
        Senator Hagerty. Who would have made the decision to
    execute the NEO?
        Secretary Blinken. Ultimately, the President would be asked
    for his decision, approval to do that, based on the
    recommendation of the different Government agencies involved.
        Senator Hagerty. Is that what happened in this case?
        Secretary Blinken. I believe that is right. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hagerty. You know, oversight is not a simple check
    the box exercise. It requires getting to the bottom of what has
    come to be the greatest U.S. foreign policy disaster, at least
    in my lifetime. Mr. Chairman, we need more hearings on this
    Afghanistan withdrawal failure.
        I would also like to say this. Leadership requires owning
    one's mistakes, and leadership requires introspection and a
    commitment to achieve what is right. What we have witnessed
    here has been a failure of leadership. What it is has been a
    press-driven spin cycle. It is one that has deflected blame,
    and it is one that shamed us as a nation. It is time to leave.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, if I could just say briefly in
    response?
        Senator Kaine. Please be brief, if you would.
        Secretary Blinken. Yes. I am responsible for the decisions
    I make. I am responsible for the actions of my Department. I am
    responsible for learning any lessons that flowed from those
    decisions or those actions, and I am also responsible to
    holding myself accountable to you and through you to the
    American people, which is exactly what I am doing here today,
    what I have been doing these past weeks in repeated
    conversations and briefings with Members of Congress, both the
    Senate and the House, and what I will continue to do going
    forward.
        We can all draw our own conclusions from that. I respect
    yours. I may disagree with them, but that is exactly the
    process that I am engaged in and that we are engaged in, and we
    will continue to do that going forward.
        Senator Hagerty. Well, my constituents expect that sort of
    accountability as well, particularly the veterans that serve in
    Tennessee and across the Nation that have reached out to me
    that are absolutely heartbroken about what has gone on. There
    has been loss of life. There has been loss of treasure.
        We have now armed terrorists at a level that I have never
    expected. Our allies are more proximate to this threat than we
    are. They could not have been more frustrated with me when I
    spoke with them. They are concerned that we now have a threat
    level that we have never seen before, and we have got to find
    ways to work together with them to address that.
        I will look to you for accountability on that as well as we
    move forward, Mr. Secretary.
        Senator Kaine. Mr. Van Hollen.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Senator.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome, and I recognize what a huge
    undertaking it is to airlift every American out of Afghanistan
    and work to get some of our closest Afghan partners out of
    harm's way after 20 years of American presence and troops in
    Afghanistan.
        The United States Government conducted the biggest airlift
    in our history, over 120,000 people. I understand and want to
    thank all the people who were involved in that.
        That said, I really urge you to have the State Department
    surge more people to this process to help the remaining
    Americans out of Afghanistan, to help others, legal permanent
    residents and others. Mr. Secretary, I have with me a list of a
    lot of the constituent cases that are on our office. I am going
    to give it to you and your staff. If I could just get your
    commitment that you will get back to us on these cases?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Because we have had your
    help, we have one case of a 2-year-old American citizen, and we
    have been working with you on that. We also have cases of 15
    legal permanent residents and a number of our close Afghan
    partners. At this point, the system at the State Department and
    DHS is overwhelmed. We are just getting back form responses
    without any feedback as to the state of the case. So I really
    urge you to keep at that.
        I must say I guess I should not be surprised. As Senator
    Shaheen said, the level of hypocrisy in this room and this
    Congress is staggering. You know, we should have more hearings
    on what happened in Afghanistan, starting with the decision to
    divert huge amounts of U.S. troops and resources to Iraq in one
    of the biggest strategic blunders in modern American history,
    where it is a clear matter of record that Iran has been the
    biggest beneficiary of that decision.
        Let us fast forward now to the Trump administration. I did
    not oppose the decision of the Trump administration to open up
    negotiations with the Taliban. Everybody in this room, I
    suspect, recognized there was no military solution to this
    conflict, that there had to be a political solution. So I
    supported opening up that process.
        Mr. Secretary, is it not a fact that the Trump
    administration asked the Pakistani Government to release three
    top Taliban commanders as part of that process?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. One of them is the person who is now
    number two, Baradar, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. He is the person everybody saw in those
    photos in Kabul, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. Right. There was another senior
    commander released, and they began the discussions in Doha?
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Van Hollen. They did not include the Afghan
    Government, did they?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. Right. They, in fact, essentially
    ordered, pressured the Afghan Government to release 5,000
    Taliban fighters, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. Many of those fighters involved in the
    attack on Kabul today, right?
        Secretary Blinken. Yes.
        Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now let us see what the
    negotiation was. Here was the negotiation. I supported the
    beginning of it. The United States will leave by a date
    certain, May of this year, right?
        Secretary Blinken. Correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. You cannot attack American forces, but
    you can attack Afghan forces with impunity, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. That is right. So we pick a date, we
    say to the Taliban you can attack Afghan forces, and then we
    say, okay, now let us negotiate the future of Afghanistan. Is
    that not the way it was set up when you walked in?
        Secretary Blinken. That is essentially correct, yes.
        Senator Van Hollen. There is a saying in Afghanistan that
    foreigners have the watches, we have the time. So the Trump
    administration, through those negotiations, set it up perfectly
    for the Taliban. Green light to attack the Afghan forces. No
    discussion going forward.
        Then is it not true that the former President criticized
    President Biden for not pulling out our forces earlier?
        Secretary Blinken. I believe that is accurate.
        Senator Van Hollen. I think he said we have got to stick to
    our May timetable. So President Trump, ``stick to our May
    timetable,'' and by the way I am handing you negotiation where
    I have already said we are getting out, and I have said go
    ahead and attack the Afghan forces. Now we are going to talk
    about the future.
        So that is the hand you have been dealt. Let me talk to you
    a little bit about the future, and I am glad you brought
    together the ministerial meeting with our NATO partners, with
    surrounding countries. This will never work if the surrounding
    countries do not participate and others in the region. You had
    both Pakistan and India at the table, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Now I am very much in the mode,
    and I know you are, too, you watch what they do, not what they
    say, right?
        Secretary Blinken. Exactly.
        Senator Van Hollen. The Taliban clearly have new PR people.
    They also recognize that their actions they have to take in
    order to get any kind of support whatsoever from some of the
    Western countries, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is correct.
        Senator Van Hollen. Okay. So I have heard you testify today
    to some of those conditions, free and safe passage for people
    who want to leave, right?
        Secretary Blinken. Right.
        Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Access by international
    humanitarian organizations directly to the Afghan people, not
    through any Taliban, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is Right.
        Senator Van Hollen. Protection of girls, women, and
    minorities.
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Van Hollen. This is going to be one, obviously, we
    have to keep a very close eye on.
        Fourth, you cannot use the territory of Afghanistan as a
    base for future terrorist attacks, whether it is Al Qaeda or
    anybody else, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Van Hollen. A more inclusive government because,
    right now, we have a government comprised of Taliban, including
    two members of the Haqqani Network, one of who is wanted for
    questioning and for violent activities.
        So my question to you is that was a really important first
    step because we want everybody on the same page, meaning our
    close partners and surrounding countries, right?
        Secretary Blinken. That is right.
        Senator Van Hollen. All right. Do you have that buy-in from
    all the partners around the table that we will act in unison?
        Secretary Blinken. We do have that buy-in. We have that
    buy-in not only from the meetings we have. We have that buy-in
    in the statements that many countries have signed onto. We have
    that in a U.N. Security Council resolution that we initiated,
    and critically, we have moving forward established an ongoing
    group of countries and institutions that are going to work
    together to track this, to continue to make sure we are
    speaking with one voice and acting in unison.
        Senator Van Hollen. Got it.
        Secretary Blinken. Now there are countries that may be
    outliers in this effort. Some of them have been referenced to
    include China, to include Russia, to include Pakistan, and that
    is something that we are being very vigilant about as well.
        Senator Van Hollen. Well, I know time is up, but I think a
    number of those countries, at least Pakistan, like India, like
    the others, have an interest in preventing chaos and civil war
    in Afghanistan.
        Secretary Blinken. They do.
        Senator Van Hollen. Obviously, we asked them to release
    prisoners that they had locked up, Taliban prisoners. So,
    obviously, we have to keep an eye on the ISI, I get that. Let
    us all work together to achieve the goal of a stable
    Afghanistan that protects the rights of its people.
        Thank you.
        Secretary Blinken. Appreciate that.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Cruz.
        Senator Cruz. Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
        Secretary Blinken. Senator.
        Senator Cruz. President Biden and the Biden administration
    have presided over the worst foreign policy catastrophe in a
    generation. Americans across the Nation are horrified. Our
    servicemen and women, our active duty military are angry, they
    are disillusioned, and they are frustrated.
        Our enemies across the globe are emboldened, which makes
    the world more dangerous today for America, and our allies are
    dispirited. Ever since the disaster began unfolding in
    Afghanistan, we have seen the Biden administration making
    political excuses. We have seen Democrats on this committee
    explaining at great length how everything that happened in
    Afghanistan is Trump's fault. It is all Trump's fault.
        Mr. Secretary, Joe Biden is the President of the United
    States. Kamala Harris is the Vice President of the United
    States. You are the United States Secretary of State. Just like
    Jimmy Carter owns the disaster of the Iran hostage crisis, you
    own this.
        The Biden administration caused this disaster. It was
    caused by two things. Number one, ideological naivete and
    extremism. Repeatedly, Mr. Secretary, in this hearing and also
    on multiple conference calls over the last month, you keep
    saying things like the steps the Taliban needs to take to be
    welcomed into the community of civilized nations.
        Mr. Secretary, they do not want to be welcomed into the
    community of civilized nations. They are terrorists who want to
    murder us. This Administration does not understand that. Joe
    Biden does not understand that.
        Sadly, that ideological extremism was combined with
    manifest incompetence. There were four decisions this
    Administration made that I think were utterly indefensible.
    Number one, abandoning the Bagram airfield, giving it to the
    Taliban. That is a decision that 100 years from now will be
    studied at war colleges as a colossal strategic mistake, giving
    up two secure airfields, necessitating an evacuation from a
    dense urban environment, a commercial airport, which led
    tragically to the suicide bombings and murders that killed 13
    American servicemen and women.
        Had we been evacuating from Bagram with a secure perimeter,
    the odds are quite high that attack either would not have
    happened or if it had happened, it would have been far less
    severe in its consequences.
        Secondly, the Biden administration giving the Taliban a
    list of Americans and of Afghans we wanted out. Third, the
    decision to leave Americans behind. Hundreds of Americans,
    perhaps more, perhaps thousands; thousands of green card
    holders; tens of thousands of Afghans who assisted the U.S.
    military, the Biden administration abandoned them and left them
    behind.
        Fourth, leaving billions of dollars of American military
    equipment that the Taliban will now use to threaten our lives.
    Earlier in this hearing, you said about that equipment, ``None
    of it poses a strategic threat to us or their neighbors.'' That
    does not pass the laugh test. When you are looking at the
    Taliban potentially having 64,000 machine guns, 33 Black Hawk
    helicopters, 16,000 night vision goggles, we will see American
    blood spilled because of these colossal mistakes.
        Now abandoning Bagram was not your call. It was the
    Pentagon's and the White House's ultimately. I want to ask you
    flat out, did the State Department give the Taliban a list or
    multiple lists of Americans and/or Afghans that we wanted out?
        Secretary Blinken. Those reports and the idea that we would
    do anything to endanger our citizens or anyone else at a time
    when we were trying to save their lives is flat-out wrong. Let
    me----
        Senator Cruz. So I would just like a ``yes'' or ``no,'' did
    you give them a list?
        Secretary Blinken. Let me be very clear, Senator, if I may,
    please? Thank you.
        In limited instances where we were seeking to get a bus or
    a group of people through a checkpoint, we gave a manifest to
    the people at the checkpoint to demonstrate that those people
    were expected to----
        Senator Cruz. Roughly how many names were on the list you
    gave?
        Secretary Blinken. Does not matter because they all----
        Senator Cruz. Dozens, hundreds, thousands, give us some
    order of magnitude.
        Secretary Blinken. This happened in a handful of situations
    where to get through----
        Senator Cruz. Dozens? So is it your testimony it was not
    hundreds? I want to understand. Did you give them thousands of
    names?
        Secretary Blinken. No, we did not.
        Senator Cruz. Okay. Hundreds?
        Secretary Blinken. I am not going to put a number on it,
    but it was--again----
        Senator Cruz. Why not? This is a hearing to discover. How
    many names and how many of those individuals you gave the
    Taliban the name to have been targeted for torture or murder?
        Secretary Blinken. Senator, by definition, these were in
    limited instances with a bus or a group of people to get them
    through a checkpoint. They got through the checkpoint.
        Senator Cruz. So not only did you fail to evacuate
    Americans and green card holders who were there, but you also
    brought in tens of thousands of Afghans who had wholly
    inadequate vetting, bringing many of them to the United States.
    One of the things that has done is that has brought in a
    humanitarian crisis to America.
        Child marriage and domestic abuse tragically are widespread
    in Afghanistan. According to the World Health Organization,
    more than half of the women in Afghanistan are married as child
    brides, and 90 percent of women are subject to domestic abuse,
    90 percent.
        On August 27, according to public reports, you distributed
    internal documentation highlighting numerous instances at
    intake centers of sexual abuse in which much older, grown
    Afghan males appeared with children, young children, claimed
    they were their brides, claimed they were their wives, and the
    document said the State Department urgently requested guidance.
    That was your word, ``urgently.''
        Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security said that
    it showed the desperation of families that they were willing to
    give little girls to grown men to be subject to sexual abuse
    and child wives. My question is as follows. Did you receive
    that urgent guidance? How many children have been subject to
    sexual abuse? What have you done to rescue young children from
    illegal and abusive relationships after being brought to
    America by the State Department?
        Secretary Blinken. Across the entire Government, everyone
    involved in the evacuation effort, whether it is at a transit
    point in one of the countries that we negotiated with, whether
    it is here in the United States at Dulles or Philadelphia or
    the military bases, we have all of our officers at extreme
    vigilance to look for and to deal with any cases or concerns
    that arise----
        Senator Cruz. Did you receive the urgent guidance, and how
    many child brides have you seen?
        Secretary Blinken. I do not know the specific guidance you
    are referring to. I am happy to look at it.
        Senator Cruz. So was there not urgency to discover if
    children are being abused?
        Secretary Blinken. Absolutely. Absolutely.
        The Chairman. The time of the Senator has expired.
        Secretary Blinken. We could detect and deal with many
    cases, and there have been, to my knowledge, a limited number
    of cases where we have separated people because we were
    concerned that they were----
        Senator Cruz. How many?
        Secretary Blinken. Cases I am aware of? A handful.
        [Gavel sounding.]
        The Chairman. Senator Kaine, you have the last word today.
        Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
    Risch.
        Secretary Blinken, thank you for the time that you have
    spent with us today. It is an important hearing, and there will
    be many more. I am going to a second one in the Armed Services
    Committee in about 2 hours, and I expect over the course of the
    next weeks, there will be many. I am just going to really speak
    from the heart to kind of set out what I am thinking at a very
    important moment, a complicated moment.
        I am the father of a Marine. I come from a state that is
    very, very heavily affected by the wars of the last 20 years.
    It was one of the States that was attacked on 9/11. In the
    weeks of August and early September, this is basically what I
    have done. I have watched Afghanistan on television. I have
    talked to active duty and veterans. I have talked to you and
    other colleagues.
        I have visited the Pentagon for the Pentagon employees'
    commemoration of the 9/11 attack. I went to Arlington on 9/11
    to go to the fire station where the relief effort was
    spearheaded. I have also gone to Fort Lee, as you have, to see
    the incredible work that is being done to help Afghans who have
    stood with us integrate into American life.
        I have been to the Dulles Expo Center to see these families
    that have traveled halfway around the world, still traumatized,
    but looking forward to a chapter where they can be free. I have
    a lot of emotions. So let me just tell you what they are. They
    are sadness, and they are anger, and they are pride, and they
    are relief.
        Sadness. I am saddened by the unnecessary deaths of the
    3,000 or so who were killed on 9/11. I am saddened by the
    deaths of more than 7,000 U.S. troops. I am saddened by the
    deaths of more than 8,000 American contractors. I doubt there
    has been a war in the history of the United States where more
    contractors died than troops, but this global war on terror is
    one such war.
        I am saddened at the deaths of 400,000 innocent civilians
    in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. I am saddened at those who are
    now going to have to live under Taliban rule. I am particularly
    saddened for the families of the 13 troops who were killed. To
    lose a child in any circumstance is horrible, and war is
    horrible. In the last days of a war, in the last days of a war
    that has been declared over and is winding down, I do not know
    how that wound could ever heal for a parent. Yet, those 13 died
    to save the lives of about 120,000 people who will have the
    chance to live in a freer and better society because of their
    heroism.
        I am angry. I am angry at the terrorist impulse. I was
    angry about it on 9/11/01, the urge to destroy with the planes
    flying into buildings and killing people indiscriminately--
    young, old, American, and other nationalities, Muslim,
    Christian, Jewish, no religion. That indiscriminate urge to
    destroy, to blow up a demolition vest at the Kabul airport and
    kill 13 American troops and hundreds of your own countrymen and
    women. For what? That angers me.
        I am angered that after 20 years of American investment in
    an Afghan security force dramatically larger than the Taliban,
    dramatically better equipped than the Taliban, that security
    force just melted away and failed. The one thing I would be a
    little bit critical of you and the Administration is the same
    point that Senator Romney was making earlier and Senator Rubio.
    The notion that General Milley said that nothing I or anyone
    else saw indicated a collapse of this army and this government
    in 11 days, I just do not think that is true.
        I know it was not the consensus opinion, and I know it was
    not the most likely possibility, but the possibility of a
    collapse was not zero percent, and it was not 1 percent. It
    probably was not 10 percent. It was probably, based on what we
    have been hearing in this committee and others have, too, that
    was always a fairly--it was a possibility that had to be
    grappled with.
        I guess one of the questions that I will get into over
    coming weeks is if the Administration really said nobody could
    see this coming, then that probably suggests that the
    contingency planning for something that was a real possibility
    was not all that it should have been.
        My anger at the collapse of the security force, we have got
    to get into it, and we have to decide did we train them wrong?
    Did our equipping them lead to corruption? Were they good
    fighters that lacked confidence in their own military and
    civilian leadership? Did we want things for Afghans that the
    Afghan leadership did not want for themselves?
        We had good intentions about what we might have wanted in
    Afghanistan, but let us face it. We cannot get 30 percent of
    Americans to get a vaccine. We cannot get 30 percent of
    Americans to acknowledge the results of a presidential
    election. Do we really think that we can determine what the
    culture of another country should be?
        I am proud. I am proud of those who served in so many
    different ways, from first responders who ran into the
    buildings on 9/11, to this generation of Americans, many of
    whom did not come from military families necessarily, but who
    volunteered to serve.
        Not just serve once or twice, but this is the only
    generation, I believe, of the American military that has seen
    five, six, seven, eight, nine deployments again and again and
    again. Injured, wounded, carrying some invisible scars that
    will affect the rest of their life. I am proud of their
    service.
        I am proud of the country and my Virginians for what they
    are doing in welcoming Afghans here. The outreach from
    Virginians to my office, from our Vietnamese community, we want
    to help Afghans settle. From churches, where do we donate? How
    do we give to resettlement agencies?
        When I visited Fort Lee and Dulles, to hear the Afghans
    express their appreciation to the United States and, even in
    the midst of their trauma and their anxiety about the next
    chapter, to be excited about the opportunity to live in a place
    not under Taliban rule and have an opportunity for better lives
    for their children, I am proud that even amidst all of the
    challenge that is the way they look at us.
        I am proud of the military who are there who say I have
    been deployed five times. This mission is the most important
    mission I will ever undertake.
        The last thing--and Mr. Chair, if you might indulge me
    because I may go another 30 seconds past--I am relieved. No one
    has said this yet. I am relieved that a child born at Inova
    Fairfax today is not born into a nation at war. Some will
    challenge my characterization because the world is a dangerous
    place, and American troops are deployed all over the world.
    There is risks, and there is threats, but we have been a nation
    at permanent war for 20 years.
        We were never supposed to be that nation, never. Never. We
    were never supposed to be that nation. I heard a college
    student at George Washington say recently, ``I know nothing of
    war''--because with an all-volunteer army, she does not have
    to--``but all I know is war.'' ``All I know is war.''
        President Biden had the courage to say this Nation is not a
    nation that should be permanently at war. It is going to take a
    while for people to wrap their head around the notion that
    though there are serious threats for us everywhere, we are not
    a nation now that is at war, ground wars in the Middle East. It
    is going to take people a while to get used to it.
        Some people will resist it. Some people will want to say,
    no, we have got to be on the front edge of our feet and be on
    permanent war footing at all moments for now into infinity. I
    am relieved. I am relieved that for the first time in 20 years,
    children being born in this country today are not being born
    into a nation at war.
        I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        The Chairman. Thank you. Let me move and place into today's
    hearing record a statement on Afghanistan from recently exiled
    Afghan women leaders and human rights defenders that urges the
    United States to continue to support women's groups across
    Afghanistan as central drivers of change.

    [Editor's note.--The information referred to above can be found
    in the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section
    at the end of this hearing.]

        The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, thank you for your testimony.
    You have been here over 3 and a half hours. I think every
    member of the committee was present and had an opportunity to
    ask questions, and you give substantive answers.
        I will just close by saying while the focus today has been
    the present Administration's decisions, this is going back 20
    years. As someone who sat here as a staff director of this
    committee, as someone who was at the NSC at one time, as
    someone who was an Assistant Deputy Secretary and now the
    Secretary, I think you might join me in saying that over the
    last 20 years at different times, Congress has been misled.
        Assessments were definitely overly rosy, to say the best.
    If we are not to repeat the past, we need to learn from it, and
    that is what the committee's ultimate pursuit will be.
        The record of this hearing will remain open until the close
    of business on Thursday. With the thanks and respect of the
    committee for your participation, this hearing is adjourned.
        Secretary Blinken. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                  Additional Material Submitted for the Record

             U.S. Afghan Women's Council Call to Action Statement,
                            Dated September 9, 2021

                                     ______

                   Afghanistan OFAC General License Letter,
                            Dated September 2, 2021

                                     ______

    Statement on Afghanistan From Recently Exiled Afghan Women Leaders and
                             Human Rights Defenders

    Secretary Blinken and Members of Congress:

        With the fall of the Afghan Government, it has been a blow to many
    of our achievements of the last 20 years that have been gained with
    your government's support. In the last few weeks since being overtaken
    by the Taliban, it is evident that the peace process has been a fallacy
    that had no guarantee of securing what the United States and people of
    Afghanistan invested in over the last two decades.
        Many of us women activists have been working for an inclusive and
    just peace for years. We repeatedly warned the United States Government
    and the international community that if the withdrawal was not managed
    responsibly, and if the peace process was not Afghan-centric, it would
    be a disastrous failure.
        We were incredibly disappointed with the peace process that your
    government facilitated, especially when the talks in Istanbul were
    supposed to happen but then the announcement of the non-conditional
    troop withdrawal effectively ended them before they could begin. We do
    understand the United States spent 20 years in Afghanistan as its
    longest war, however a few months more where your troops were not
    involved in combat would have at least helped with reaching an
    acceptable political settlement that would have allowed some level of
    inclusivity.
        Today the Taliban Government is run by unqualified fighters and by
    Pakistani proxy. Women are nowhere in the new structure of government
    and women's activities and freedoms are being limited in health and
    education in 7 out of 34 provinces. The media is strictly under
    scrutiny and minorities have been marginalized in the disorganized new
    government structure. Protests have been met with brutality, with women
    protestors arrested and tortured badly. Many people were massacred in
    Panjsheer, and elsewhere in Afghanistan.
        Some of us have made it to the United States through the parole
    process and with the support of U.S. women's rights groups and
    political leaders. This journey started under extremely difficult
    conditions, and we still don't know when it will end. We women leaders
    and activists have been mixed with U.S. trained Afghan troops and other
    groups. The entire evacuation process was gravely mismanaged for women.
    Even those who had U.S. visas were denied safe entry into the airport
    as timely information was not communicated with relevant troops
    managing the airport gates. Worst of all, not all of our friends made
    it out with us. At the airport gates we faced gun fire from both
    Taliban and U.S. troops, tear gas, and a suicide bomb attack. Many
    people died trying to escape a regime that they don't believe in.
        The Taliban has proven to be an extreme regime lacking law and
    order, essentially being run by several groups of outlaws. They are now
    targeting activists, former government employees, and women Members of
    Parliament, and entering their homes, taking their cars, and collecting
    any means of security that they possessed in the past. Even NGO offices
    run by women have been shut down and their valuables, such as cars,
    have been taken from them.
        While we are disheartened by the way things evolved on the ground,
    the United States still has an opportunity to support the Afghan
    people. We women leaders of Afghanistan call on the U.S. Government to
    provide a humanitarian response to the double catastrophe of the
    Taliban regime and the drought and famine that are causing suffering
    across the country. Beyond humanitarian assistance, we call on the U.S.
    to support women's groups across Afghanistan as the real drivers of
    change. Women should be given any and all political support to help
    ensure their safety as they continue their life saving work on behalf
    of thousands of women across the country.
        We also call on the United States to include a more responsible
    team in the peace process and help end the current catastrophe before
    it engulfs everyone in the country and region. Particular pressure
    should be maintained and increased on Pakistan for supporting the
    Taliban and offering safe haven to ISIS.
        Today Al-Qaida, ISIS, the Haqqani network, and other terrorist
    groups are in Afghanistan enjoying safe sanctuary. This is a threat to
    the U.S. and the world that needs to be contained through a revised
    strategy in Afghanistan and the region. Just like all other strategies,
    women should be at the center if there is to be a guarantee for a safe
    and balanced Afghanistan. As we have been saying all along, our rights
    are not separate from peace and security, but are necessary for peace
    and security to be achieved.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

        Question. In August, my staff reached out to the State Department
    regarding the family of Sharif Azizi who interpreted for U.S. forces in
    Afghanistan and resides in the United States as an SIV. We have
    received credible reports the Taliban are actively hunting for members
    of his family, who remain unable to leave Afghanistan. On August 29, a
    rocket hit about 300 yards away from where they were hiding. The family
    is now trying to cross into Pakistan. We've asked your office to get
    him an expedited travel document so he can travel to Pakistan and
    escort his family from the border to U.S. Embassy Islamabad. I have one
    simple ask: can you please work with me to get this individual an
    expedited travel document ASAP and ensure that State is prepared to
    process the family's application, if they can safely cross the border?

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
    and when they choose to do so. We are continuing to process Special
    Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process,
    including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates
    around the world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it
    is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a
    third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we are
    developing processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver
    these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan.

        Question. The Taliban continue to imprison Mark Frerichs, (Free-
    ricks) an American contractor. He should have been on that plane to
    Qatar last week along with other Americans inside the country. What
    steps are you taking to secure his release?

        Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran
    Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to
    hold an American hostage. We continue to raise the need for Mark's
    immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible
    opportunity. The Taliban must immediately release him. We have been
    clear that any legitimacy and any support will have to be earned. We
    have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar, Pakistan, and
    others while we continue to press the Taliban to release Mark.

        Question. We have received credible reports that there were 1,200
    students, faculty and staff from the American University of Afghanistan
    mobilized and ready to depart well before the August 31 deadline--all
    with the proper paperwork. The Taliban gave assurances that they would
    let the convoy through the airport but reversed themselves on August
    27, apparently citing a decision from Washington that AUAF evacuees
    were no longer a priority. Nearly half of the 1,000 students are women,
    and about 200 Afghan women were handpicked by the State Department and
    given full-ride scholarships. Now the campus is under the control of
    the Haqqanis. What are your plans to ensure continued support for this
    university--one of the few investments we have left--and can you
    confirm you will help these vulnerable young people, who are desperate
    to evacuate, leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. The United States will continue to support equal access to
    education in Afghanistan, and we are exploring options regarding our
    support for the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF) and its
    students under current circumstances. We are aware that AUAF is also
    exploring options, including the possibility of remote learning. We
    would refer you to AUAF leadership for details. The Department
    continues to explore options for those students who wish to depart
    Afghanistan, and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of
    commercial flights out of Kabul International Airport.

        Question. It is my understanding that a number of Afghan passports
    and documents associated with visa applications were destroyed by
    embassy staff when the embassy closed down, resulting in a number of
    Afghans now lacking the documents that they would need in order to meet
    Taliban document demands in order to be able to leave the country.
    While I understand the security concerns in not wanting to leave those
    materials behind, this again strikes me as indicative of the lack of
    planning and preparation made for the collapse of Afghanistan and our
    hasty exit. I also understand we don't even know the number, let alone
    the identities, of Afghans who we've stranded in this way. Can you
    explain to us what happened with this incident, why, and where it
    leaves our Afghan partners?

        Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency
    drawdown to mitigate risk by reducing the amount of sensitive material
    remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown was conducted in accordance
    with this procedure. For Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) recipients
    traveling to the United States under U.S. Government care, we
    collaborated with the Department of Homeland Security to provide
    electronic proof of recent visa issuance. While we are currently unable
    to provide consular services for visa applicants in Afghanistan, we
    will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the
    process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
    consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear.
        We are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to
    deliver consular services for Afghans. In tandem with our allies and
    partners, we continue to press the Taliban to live up to their public
    commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.

        Question. Prior to the final flight out, we heard from both
    American citizens and Afghan partners seeking to access the airport but
    were either not being allowed through the gates, being sent back home,
    or simply abandoned with no guidance. While we understand and
    appreciate the security issues that were at play, it is confounding
    that such a chaotic process arose to begin with. It speaks to the
    failure to plan and resource to get this withdrawal right. Or it speaks
    to a failure of implementation. Why was the Administration unable to
    implement clear and concise plans to wind down our presence in
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel
    is a top priority for the Department. A major component of executing
    contingency plans is adjusting to the situation on the ground as the
    operating environment warrants. The U.S. embassy was able to safely
    relocate personnel to the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul
    International Airport (KIA) on August 15 and 16, 2021. The security
    situation was dynamic and required the U.S. military to send additional
    troops to secure the perimeter of KIA. The embassy released 15 consular
    messages to the public between August 15 and August 31, 2021, to
    provide the latest information to U.S. citizens on the evacuation
    operations. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and
    partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from
    Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a
    pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats. I defer
    to the Department of Defense on any questions related to the withdrawal
    of U.S. military personnel.

        Question. Precisely when did the Administration begin to plan for a
    worst case scenario contingency?

        Answer. The Department of State engaged in contingency planning for
    a range of scenarios starting in January 2019. The planning scenarios
    were based on a range of potential security conditions on the ground
    and a declining level of mission functions. The scenarios assumed
    reduced embassy footprints while maintaining core mission functions
    under various scenarios. Planning continued following the change in
    administration in January 2021.

        Question. Why didn't we have the security, personnel for
    processing, and airlift capabilities in place for what was a very
    predictable set of circumstances?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy was able to safely relocate personnel to
    the Chief of Mission facilities at the Kabul International Airport
    (KIA) August 15-16, 2021. The security situation was dynamic and
    required the U.S. military to send additional troops to secure the
    perimeter of KIA and the Department to send in additional logistics and
    consular personnel. Through a coordinated effort, the United States and
    partners evacuated and relocated more than 124,000 civilians from
    Afghanistan, including nearly 6,000 U.S. citizens, in the midst of a
    pandemic and in the face of grave and growing security threats.

        Question. What was the specific planning put into the likely
    scenario that American citizens were going to have to evacuate under
    hostile conditions?

        Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens, U.S. Government
    personnel, and their dependents is the highest Department priority. All
    embassies and consulates around the world prepare detailed Emergency
    Action Plans that include sections related to Department of Defense
    support to assist with crises abroad. U.S. Embassy Kabul completed an
    annual Crisis Management Exercise in December 2020 to prepare for a
    potential large-scale evacuation. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various
    Department offices participated with interagency partners in evacuation
    planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of 2021. Planning
    efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S. Embassy Kabul
    worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure close
    coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan, and
    with CENTCOM.

        Question. In your remarks on August 30, you said the United States
    will continue to work with Afghans at risk who want to leave. How do
    you define an ``Afghan at risk'' and how many Afghans in that category
    remain in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
    international community to explore all options to support members of
    vulnerable populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--
    women, children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+
    community, members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk
    populations. We are continuing to examine all available avenues for
    protection for this population. We recognize that it is currently
    extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a
    third country or find a way to enter a third country, and like many
    refugees, they may face significant challenges fleeing to safety. We
    strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
    Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
    humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need.

        Question. What role did individual vulnerability based on religion,
    ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc.--factors beyond U.S. affiliation or
    NGO affiliation--play in prioritizing evacuations? If at all, when in
    the planning process did this consideration arise? How many resources
    did the Department devote to this line of effort?

        Answer. The Department of State's priority is supporting departures
    of U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents and their immediate
    families. The Department of State is also committed to providing
    assistance to Special Immigrant Visa applicants and vulnerable Afghans,
    including refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans,
    victims of conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with
    disabilities, members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and
    other at-risk populations. The Department of State established a team,
    led by the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate
    across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
    partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to
    leave Afghanistan.

        Question. Of those identified by the State Department as ``most
    vulnerable'' Afghans, including activists, journalists, and human
    rights defenders, how many were evacuated by the U.S. or with U.S.
    facilitation? How many of these were implementers of USG democracy and
    human rights programs? What is your plan to assist them?

        Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
    international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
    populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women,
    children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community,
    members of minority groups, journalists, and other at-risk populations.
    We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for
    this population.

        Question. How and when did you brief NGOs regarding requirements
    for facilitating charters how did you share the information those NGOs
    needed to facilitate safe passage of their employees through Kabul and
    into the airport? During the approximately 2 weeks of evacuation
    operations following the fall of Kabul, how did you prioritize private
    charter requests and the entry of their manifested passengers to the
    Kabul airport? What efforts did your Department take to facilitate
    access to the airport for those assigned seats on charter aircraft that
    had been given landing clearance?

        Answer. During the operations in August led by the Department of
    Defense (DoD), the Department of State had a dedicated team liaising
    across State and with DoD to coordinate information and communications
    with private charter operators. Guidance provided by the DoD was
    communicated as inquiries were received by the Department of State, and
    planning and arrangements were further facilitated by the assigned case
    manager for each private charter inquiry that was received. Airport
    access for those manifested for private charter flights was coordinated
    with security at the airport in Kabul, and the Department of State case
    managers worked with private charter operators to facilitate this
    access as conditions allowed.

        Question. To what do you attribute claims that your Department gave
    no clear guidance to anybody other than those with U.S. visas or
    passports to enter the airport?

        Answer. The Department of State provided regular notifications and
    security alerts on our public website prior to the suspension of
    operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on August 31,
    2021. These notifications are available for review here: https://
    af.usembassy.gov/news-events/.

        Question. How is the Administration coordinating with the NGO
    coalition and private entities still conducting time-sensitive private
    evacuation efforts out of Afghanistan? In particular, how is the
    Administration supporting efforts to facilitate civilian evacuation
    flights, including with regard to landing rights at destination
    locations and travel to and capacity at lily-pad location?

        Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
    private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State
    Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the
    flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating
    requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately
    organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger
    manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these
    flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially
    eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States.
        The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
    for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
    and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
    The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate
    the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S.
    citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
    vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

        Question. I applaud the Administration's decision to appoint
    Governor Markell and Mr. Robert Fenton as senior officials responsible
    for addressing the resettlement of Afghans in the United States. Who is
    the corresponding lead official at the Department of State responsible
    for addressing the evacuation of and support to those Afghans at risk
    who remain left behind in Afghanistan or are now in third countries?
    What planning has been done to help all of these people who remain left
    behind?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
    partners and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for
    those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. The United States will work vigorously with the international
    community to explore all options to support vulnerable populations in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. More than 3,200 Afghans are part of the United Nations'
    presence in Afghanistan, almost all of whom were left behind during the
    evacuation and remain trapped there. The Taliban have been very clear
    about how they view any Afghan who has worked with the international
    community, and as such these women and men--and their families--face
    much the same threat as those who worked with the United States. While
    the U.N.'s humanitarian presence in Afghanistan is critical, a great
    many of these Afghans are not directly involved in humanitarian aid
    delivery or other urgent life-saving work. Certainly the international
    community shares a profound responsibility for their safety. What is
    being done to help get them and their families to safety? Which
    countries are offering them visas? What options are available to
    provide them safe passage out of Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department of State is working with U.N. leadership to
    consolidate lists of Afghan national staff who are known to a U.S.
    Government agency and are at risk and have referred them to the
    Priority 1 (P-1) refugee program for access to the U.S. Refugee
    Admissions Program (USRAP). Individuals referred to the USRAP can begin
    processing their case once in a third country where refugee processing
    is possible. We consider the U.N.'s work in Afghanistan more critical
    than ever, particularly for its human rights reporting, humanitarian
    assistance coordination, and other key roles crucial for peace and
    stability in Afghanistan. The United States is carefully tracking
    allegations of violence or intimidation against U.N. staff and are
    engaging with U.N. leadership to improve security provisions for those
    at risk. We have also emphasized and have called on the Taliban
    leadership to ensure that Taliban members at all levels comply with
    obligations under international humanitarian law and take every action
    to respect the independence and neutrality of the U.N. system and all
    its staff operating in Afghanistan.

        Question. How many locally employed staff remain to be evacuated?

        Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were
    unable or chose not to travel by August 30, 2021, of which 7 have
    requested assistance departing Afghanistan.

        Question. Embassy Kabul drew down during the pandemic and consular
    activity dramatically decreased. There was a particular decrease in the
    processing of non-immigrant visas. Did the Department shift resources
    to SIV and other Afghanistan-related immigration cases? If so, how? Why
    did the Department not waive in person interviews for processing given
    the pandemic?

        Answer. Due to the pandemic, U.S. Embassy Kabul adjusted its
    consular operations to conform with prioritization guidelines issued by
    the Department of State. The prioritization plan focuses on the
    provision of services to U.S. citizens, and then, as feasible, visa
    processing including immigrant visa processing.
        The Department temporarily extended the validity of certain
    immigrant visa applications, thus reducing repeat in-person
    appearances, for individuals who had been interviewed and signed their
    immigrant visa applications under oath before a consular officer, but
    whose visa applications have not been approved within 1 year of the
    oath. U.S. law requires immigrant visa applicants to appear personally
    before a consular officer to take an oath and execute their visa
    application biometrically, in addition to submitting to the collection
    of biometric information for security vetting.

        Question. How many SIV applicants and their families were killed
    while waiting for their cases to be approved?

        Answer. The Department of State expresses its sincere condolences
    for the loss of life of any Afghan at risk, including Special Immigrant
    Visa (SIV) applicants and their family members. However, the Department
    does not have information on the numbers of SIV applicants and family
    members who may have died.

        Question. Why were SIV approvals not significantly ramped up
    following the Biden's April withdrawal announcement? Why didn't the
    Administration start in April to evacuate SIVs to Guam or third
    countries and then start the lengthy visa approval process?

        Answer. Efforts to decrease processing time include quintupling
    (since May 2021) the staff who process Chief of Mission (COM) approval
    applications, doubling the number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul,
    waiving the requirement for a medical examination for Special Immigrant
    Visa (SIV) applicants in Afghanistan, and issuing foil-less visas to
    applicants who have completed consular interviews and administrative
    processing. These efforts led to a significant increase in COM
    approvals and visa issuances since the resumption of visa interviews in
    February 2021. In the third quarter of FY 2021 (April 1 to June 30),
    the Department issued SIVs to 615 Afghan principal applicants and 1,975
    derivative family members. This is approximately three times the number
    of visas issued in previous quarters.
        On July 19, the Department of State activated the Afghanistan
    Coordination Task Force. The task force consists of experts from the
    Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
    Services. From July 30 through August 15, 2021, 10 flights arrived at
    Dulles under Operation Allies Refuge carrying a total of 1,962 SIV
    applicants and family members.
        We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV
    applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa
    interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting
    continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of
    Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S.
    Government, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no
    expiration date.

        Question. What were the average processing days for SIVs in May
    2021? How did that compare to January 2021?

        Answer. In January 2021, average processing time was 996 days while
    in June 2021, it had decreased to 665 days. Since February 2021, there
    has been a whole-of-government effort to decrease the processing time
    for SIVs at every step of the process. These numbers do not tell the
    whole story, as our reporting calculates only the cases completed in a
    given quarter. Therefore, completing long outstanding cases in a
    particular quarter results in higher average processing times.

        Question. What has been done to assist Afghans who had been
    approved for visas-including non-SIV immigrant visas-but could not
    obtain them because of the precipitous collapse of the Government? Can
    they have their visas issued by U.S. Embassies in another country?

        Answer. Consular staff at U.S. embassies and consulates worldwide
    have assisted with adjudication of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    applications; Consulate General Guangzhou has processed visa
    applications since late August for 1,398 Afghan individuals who
    completed consular interviews and administrative processing. We are
    continuing to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV
    process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
    consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. We
    know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa
    to a third country or to find a way to enter a third country, but we
    are developing processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver
    these important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are
    also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public
    commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We
    are doing this ourselves in our direct and pragmatic communications to
    the Taliban on this national security concern and national priority.
    We're also doing this in tandem with our allies and partners around the
    world. Immigrant visa applicants may request to have their cases
    transferred to another immigrant visa processing post for interview and
    processing. Several posts, including Islamabad, Ankara, Frankfurt, New
    Delhi, and Warsaw, have issued Afghan SIVs since the suspension of
    operations in Kabul.

        Question. What has the Department of State communicated to U.S.
    embassies and consulates around the world about providing consular
    services to Afghan P2 applicants? What are the Administration's plans
    to process Afghans in third countries? If they must complete processing
    in a third country, how will the Administration ensure that they have
    access to basic services while awaiting processing?

        Answer. For P1 and P2-referred individuals who are in a third
    country and have contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-
    funded Resettlement Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based
    on the individual's location. The Administration has sought to increase
    the capacity of these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases
    as part of an overall larger U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).
    Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work regionally and can process
    cases in some countries even if there is not a physical RSC presence,
    though it might take some time for a team to deploy to a particular
    location for processing. While we are working expeditiously, there is
    no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that
    the Department expects to process in the next year, and there is no
    limit to the number of referrals the Department will accept. In
    general, it takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee
    resettlement case from start to finish including pre-screening, the
    U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous
    security vetting.

        Question. Thousands of our Afghan partners either do not have
    passports or have had their passports taken or destroyed due to recent
    events. The Taliban and bordering countries are reportedly blocking
    travel without these documents. What is the Administration doing to
    ensure that Afghans who do not have passports, but who are eligible as
    an SIV, P-1, P-2, or P-3 designation, or through humanitarian parole,
    have access to safe pathways out of the country?

        Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for
    Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way
    to enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant
    challenges fleeing to safety. Many refugees worldwide do not have
    passports, and passports are generally not required to register with
    UNHCR or for referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. We
    strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
    Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
    Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
    respective obligations related to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers,
    and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

        Question. Secretary Blinken has repeatedly said that the Taliban
    must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid
    travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who
    worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas.
    Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or
    verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special
    Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?

        Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department
    or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. As operations
    at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible and
    referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of
    Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We
    recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a
    visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country, and
    like many refugees, may face significant challenges fleeing to safety.
    We strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
    Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
    Afghans in need.

        Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban
    about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
    task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S.
    and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents.
    We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment.

        Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be
    located outside the U.S. for their applications to begin processing.
    However, many eligible applicants were brought to the U.S. directly, by
    the U.S. Government, in recognition of the dangerous situation they
    faced in Afghanistan. As a result, they are not able to have their P-2
    applications processed. This unnecessary bureaucratic obstacle will
    limit them to applying for asylum in the U.S., which was not
    specifically designed for their situations and can quickly become
    overburdened. These journalists have past and current employers willing
    to sponsor their P-2 applications. Will the Administration modify the
    P-2 program to allow for processing while in the U.S.?

        Answer. The Department continues to evaluate all options related to
    the protection of Afghan nationals at risk, particularly those
    affiliated with the United States.
        On September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan
    Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022, which allows for relocated
    Afghan nationals to receive domestic refugee benefits in the United
    States and contains a provision requiring United States Citizenship and
    Immigration Services to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications
    filed by certain Afghan nationals described in the Act.

        Question. The U.S. announced that a number of countries have
    pledged to accept and have taken in at-risk Afghans. How are you
    working with these governments to relocate Afghans who are still in
    need of evacuation? And how are you working with these governments to
    help those who managed to flee but have limited legal status in their
    current countries of relocation?

        Answer. The United States is working vigorously with the
    international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
    populations in Afghanistan. We strongly encourage countries in the
    region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and
    coordinate with international organizations and other humanitarian
    partners to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
    particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations to not
    return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and
    to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

        Question. The U.S. itself accepted many at-risk Afghans at its
    military base in Doha. How long will those individuals be allowed to
    stay in Doha? What is the State Department doing to process or refer
    those individuals to third countries? Do you have a process in place?

        Answer. The Government of Qatar agreed to allow thousands of
    Afghans at risk to transit through Qatar as part of Operation Allies
    Refuge. The majority of them are already in the United States and are
    being processed for parole at domestic bases. Remaining Afghans are
    housed at Qatar-based U.S. facilities while they are being vetted and
    prepared for onward travel to the United States. The U.S. Government
    and the Government of Qatar are discussing arrangements to use a
    facility to transit smaller numbers of Afghans-at-risk over the coming
    months.

        Question. Do you support the application of the Priority 2
    designation for Afghan religious minorities, namely Sikhs, Hindus,
    Christians, and Jews?

        Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection
    of the rights of all Afghans. The United States will work vigorously
    with the international community and civil society partners to explore
    all options to ensure that vulnerable individuals, including members of
    Afghan religious minority groups, have equal access to protection,
    including refugee resettlement in the United States and other
    countries.
        By law, religion is one of the five grounds of persecution that is
    part of establishing refugee status in the United States together with
    race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, and
    political opinion. Many of the most vulnerable refugee applicants have
    suffered religious persecution. Increasing the resettlement ceiling to
    125,000 in FY 2022 increases the ability of the United States to
    resettle those facing persecution based on religion, including members
    of Afghan religious minority groups.

        Question. How should Afghans fleeing Taliban persecution but still
    stuck in Afghanistan apply for humanitarian parole? Does the Department
    expect them to simply use the global process via Form I-131?

        Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
    is the agency that adjudicates Form I-131 and grants parole. Afghans-
    at-risk within Afghanistan may file a request for humanitarian parole
    or have someone file on their behalf. However, because the U.S. Embassy
    in Kabul has suspended operations and consular services are not
    available in Afghanistan, Afghans-at-risk may need to travel to a third
    country for processing before USCIS approves their humanitarian parole.
    I defer to USCIS for further information on the parole process for
    Afghans-at-risk.

        Question. What is the current status of airports in Kabul and
    Mazar-i-Sharif? Is the Administration working to coordinate evacuations
    from these airports with evacuees, outside groups, and/or third
    countries? If so, for what categories of at-risk Afghans?

        Answer. Taliban leaders currently have control over the airports in
    Kabul and Mazar-e-Sharif. Commercial airlines have been operating some
    relief and charter flights via the airport in Kabul. I defer to the
    airlines for details of their operations.
        We recognize the need for international flights to resume regular
    operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the Qatari
    and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also safely
    and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that there is an urgent
    need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. I defer to them for details
    of their presence and support in Afghanistan going forward.
        We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any issues and
    to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people with valid
    travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this
    point to the Taliban.

        Question. Media reports state Turkish private security companies
    are guarding HKIA. Can you confirm if those reports are true? How many
    Turkish private security personnel are at HKIA?

        Answer. There have been some private charter flights operated by
    commercial carriers via the airport in Kabul. We refer you to the
    airlines for details of their operations, including how visual flight
    rules currently in effect at all Afghan airports limit their ability to
    operate flights into and out of Afghanistan. We recognize the need for
    international flights to resume regular operations and urge the Taliban
    to work expeditiously with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure
    this is done quickly, but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey
    share our view that there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and
    safe travel. I defer to them for details of their presence and support
    in Afghanistan going forward.

        Question. Throughout August, press freedom organizations including
    the Committee to Protect Journalists regularly shared with various
    State Department staff lists of at-risk journalists who needed
    evacuation from the country including their biographical and contact
    information. Three questions: How many of these individuals were
    contacted by the State Department? Was this list ever shared with other
    governments who offered to help? How many of these individuals were
    evacuated by the U.S.?

        Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
    task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across
    agencies, as we have done, but we also appreciate the desire of NGOs
    and private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for
    coordination there.
        The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
    for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
    and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
    The team is working closely with DoD and other partners to facilitate
    freedom of movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including
    U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies,
    and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on
    supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their immediate
    families. We are not in a position to detail our involvement with any
    specific groups at this time.

        Question. On August 31, the U.S. left behind thousands of Afghan
    journalists who risked their lives to help cover the war and inform the
    public over the last 20 years. Because of their work and public
    profile, these journalists are now at heightened risk of Taliban
    violence. What is the State Department doing to negotiate a path for
    these vulnerable Afghans seeking to leave Afghanistan? Are you pursuing
    a diplomatic solution brokered by the U.S. to ensure the protection of
    these individuals in the country and allow for a pathway for them to
    leave safely?

        Answer. The Department of State continues to examine all available
    avenues to provide protection for vulnerable Afghans, including
    refugees and asylum seekers, internally displaced Afghans, victims of
    conflict, women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities,
    members of ethnic and/or religious minority groups, and other at-risk
    populations. The Department of State has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely with interagency
    partners and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish to
    leave Afghanistan.

        Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists
    and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?

        Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2
    referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) from U.S.
    Government employers and qualifying media and non-governmental
    organizations. A P-2 referral is separate from the visa process. After
    USRAP has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-
    based non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media
    organization, and the individual has relocated to a country where
    refugee processing can occur, the referred individual may contact PRM
    to begin processing their case. Individuals should follow the
    guidelines on wrapsnet.org to contact PRM. At that point, PRM will
    assign the case to a PRM-funded overseas Resettlement Support Center
    for processing. Please note a P-2 referral enables applicants to access
    the USRAP and is not a visa category.

        Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
    the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
    their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
    take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

        Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow
    procedures to register for international protection and assistance with
    the government of the country they are in. They may also register and
    seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
    We are working with international humanitarian partners and other
    governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns are
    able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee
    Admissions Program processing.

        Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
    stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
    to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
    assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

        Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those
    that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
    humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge
    states to uphold their respective obligations related to Afghan
    refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of non-
    refoulement.

        Question. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Journalists and Staff:
    Media reports have indicated that as many as 550 congressionally funded
    journalists and their families working for Radio Free Europe/Radio
    Liberty and Voice of America remain in Afghanistan after the U.S.
    withdrawal. The reports indicate that in the final days of the
    evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed staff
    of Embassy Kabul. Is that correct?

        Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
    relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the
    August operations, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of
    the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as
    translators and interpreters for our Government, and other at-risk
    Afghans. Since August 31, we have worked closely with the U.S. Agency
    for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-affiliated employees and
    family members. We remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM,
    RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues
    will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top
    priorities.

        Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed
    staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?

        Answer. Eleven out of 689 Embassy Kabul locally employed staff were
    unable or unwilling to travel on August 30, 2021, of which seven have
    requested assistance to depart Afghanistan.

        Question. What steps are being taken to evacuate these journalists?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely with DoD and
    other partners to facilitate onward travel for those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents
    (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The
    initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs
    and their immediate families. We are not in a position to detail our
    involvement with any specific groups at this time.

        Question. Can you commit to us they will be given the opportunity
    to depart Afghanistan and brought to the United States?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
    interagency and with other partners to facilitate onward travel for
    those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
    risk Afghans. The initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S.
    citizens and LPRs and their immediate families. We are not in a
    position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at this
    time.
        Admission into the United States, as well as the granting of
    humanitarian parole or significant public benefit parole, is overseen
    by the Department of Homeland Security.

        Question. We remain concerned about reports that female
    humanitarian workers in Afghanistan are not receiving the same level of
    access and mobility as their male counterparts. Women's full
    participation in humanitarian interventions is critical to identifying
    the priorities and needs of women and girls. Without female staff,
    humanitarians simply cannot deliver programs at scale for women and
    girls, particularly health and protection services for victims of
    violence. How is the United States supporting humanitarians' efforts to
    secure commitments from the Taliban for a principled response,
    including the ability for women to work in the humanitarian response?
    What is the Administration doing to ensure that female humanitarian
    workers have safe, equal, and unrestricted access to perform
    humanitarian work?

        Answer. The United States is working with the international
    community to ensure that the Taliban follow through on their public
    commitments to allow unhindered humanitarian access, including freedom
    of movement for aid workers of all genders in Afghanistan. The Taliban
    has publicly reiterated their desire for humanitarian operations to
    resume, and we will continue to advocate at the highest levels for
    unimpeded humanitarian access and delivery, particularly for female
    staff and beneficiaries. We are coordinating with international
    partners, U.N. agencies, and NGOs on the way forward to deliver
    humanitarian assistance with independence, impartiality, and
    neutrality; this coordination includes ensuring the safety and security
    of female staff, and provision of assistance to all Afghans who need
    it.

        Question. How will the Administration continue to support women's
    rights programs in Afghanistan, particularly programs related to
    gender-based violence, girls' education, and sexual and reproductive
    health? At a time when support for Afghan women's rights organizations
    is most needed, what is the Administration doing to ensure they have
    the funding/resources and other support to continue operating?

        Answer. The United States remains committed to providing
    humanitarian assistance to women and girls in Afghanistan, such as
    child protection, psychosocial support, and sexual and reproductive
    health services. These programs hinge on female aid workers, and we are
    collaborating with fellow donors and the humanitarian response
    community to advocate for safe, unhindered access for all humanitarian
    personnel.
        We will be very focused on monitoring this assistance to ensure it
    is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I noted
    in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a senior
    official who will coordinate the USG's effort to support women in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. We understand that the Department of the Treasury issued
    a Specific License for USAID and the Department of State--and their
    partner organizations--to deliver humanitarian programming in
    Afghanistan on August 25. This unfortunately may not be an adequate
    safeguard for humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan--
    including those operating with the funding of other governments as well
    as local organizations. It also does not cover private financial and
    commercial institutions, which we note have scaled back or completely
    curtailed operations in Afghanistan for fear of running afoul of
    sanctions. What further steps--including general licenses--is the
    Administration considering to ensure a sufficient number of
    humanitarian organizations and financial entities are able to operate
    in Afghanistan?

        Answer. On August 25, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
    (``Treasury'') did issue a specific license authorizing transactions
    necessary to provisions by U.S. Government implementers of humanitarian
    assistance in Afghanistan. This allows the U.S. Government and its
    implementing partners to continue to support critical and life-saving
    humanitarian assistance such as the delivery of food, shelter, certain
    health services, and to provide other critical humanitarian assistance
    to the Afghan people. On September 24, Treasury also issued two general
    licenses authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international
    organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and those
    acting on their behalf to engage in transactions that are ordinarily
    incident and necessary to providing humanitarian assistance and
    engaging in other activities to support the basic needs in Afghanistan
    during this critical time. Treasury also issued answers to frequently
    asked questions providing further clarity on the scope of the general
    licenses and guidance for non-U.S. persons, including NGOs and foreign
    financial institutions, explaining that such persons generally do not
    risk exposure to U.S. sanctions for engaging in, or facilitating
    transactions or payments for, activities authorized for U.S. persons
    under these general licenses. The State Department remains committed to
    supporting the people of Afghanistan.

        Question. The U.N. has estimated as many as half a million Afghans
    may flee the country by the end of this year in a worst case scenario.
    Afghanistan's neighbors have expressed varying levels of willingness to
    allow Afghans to cross their borders. Lessons from other mass
    displacements--from Syria, Venezuela and elsewhere--have shown closed
    borders do not stop refugee crises, but instead push people to take
    more dangerous, informal routes that put them at greater risk of human
    trafficking, recruitment by armed groups, and exploitation and abuse,
    particularly for women and girls. What is the U.S. strategy to ensure a
    regional response that welcomes these populations?

        Answer. The United States engages in humanitarian diplomacy with
    the countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to
    advocate for continued humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need,
    including coordination between our partners at UNHCR, other
    international organizations, NGOs, and host governments to monitor and
    respond to refugee outflows in the region. The United States is working
    with its partners to review and strengthen humanitarian preparedness
    and priority interventions in the region in the event of new refugee
    outflows from Afghanistan. We will encourage continued coordination
    between host governments and humanitarian organizations to monitor and
    respond to the protection and assistance needs of displaced Afghans in
    the region.

        Question. Afghanistan's growing humanitarian emergency threatens to
    generate new refugee flows and to foster conditions in which ISIS-K
    could regenerate. Demining groups are some of the very few humanitarian
    organizations continuing to operate in Afghanistan. Given the numerous
    IEDs and explosives remaining from the final phase of fighting, their
    work is needed more than ever. Will you commit to increasing U.S.
    support for this vital work that will create safe conditions for
    refugees to return home and provide employment for young Afghans who
    might otherwise turn to radical movements, such as ISIS-K?

        Answer. We must remain vigilant and monitor threats, especially any
    reemergence of externally directed plotting, and address them swiftly
    when they arise. As President Biden has made clear, the United States
    will maintain robust counterterrorism capabilities in the region to
    neutralize any threats, and we will not hesitate to use those
    capabilities if we have to do so. We have made clear our expectation
    that the Afghan people deserve an inclusive government, which is
    essential for stability.

        Question. The withdrawal has already had an extremely negative
    impact on women leaders, parliamentarians, activists, and human rights
    defenders, many of whom have already been targeted and killed. Women
    and girls from all walks of life across the country are facing
    dangerous forms of oppression and roll backs of their rights. However,
    as we have already seen during ongoing protests, most of which have
    been met with brutal violence, they are courageously standing up to the
    Taliban and demanding their rights be protected. How does the U.S.
    Government plan on supporting women in this current situation? Does the
    Administration commit to continued funding for women's groups,
    including those working to promote human rights and protect women and
    girls from gender-based violence? How does the Administration plan to
    continue implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act and Strategy
    in Afghanistan? Does the Administration commit to providing visas for
    high-risk women who are seeking to evacuate the country?

        Answer. The United States is committed to supporting the rights of
    all Afghans, especially women and girls, and the gains they have
    achieved in the past 20 years through our diplomatic engagement and
    humanitarian assistance. Along with the international community, we
    have made it very clear that the legitimacy and support that the
    Taliban seek from the international community will depend on their
    conduct, especially how they treat women and girls.

        Question. What process has the Department put in place for Afghan
    students who have received acceptance from U.S. higher education
    institutions to apply for student visas? What guidance have you
    developed to communicate to these students and the higher education
    institutions issuing acceptances?

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
    and when they choose to do so. This effort has no expiration date.
        Afghan nonimmigrant visa applicants, including students, may
    request an appointment at any visa processing post. They should request
    an appointment by following the instructions available on each post's
    website. We know it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to
    obtain a visa to a third country or to find a way to enter a third
    country, but we are developing processing alternatives so we can
    continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of
    Afghanistan.

        Question. On August 19, Amnesty International reported that Taliban
    fighters murdered nine ethnic Hazara men in Ghazni province between
    July 4 and 6. ``Six of the men were shot and three were tortured to
    death, including one man who was strangled with his own scarf and had
    his arm muscles sliced off,'' Amnesty reported. On September 13, the
    BBC reported that 20 civilians were killed in the Panjshir Valley. How
    do you assess the risk of ethnic cleansing of ethnic and religious
    minorities in Afghanistan? Have you received other reports of attacks
    against ethnic and religious minorities? Is the State Department
    prioritizing prevention of ethnic cleansing in its talks with the
    Taliban?

        Answer. The Department of State is concerned about any credible
    reports of attacks on Afghans because of their ethnic or religious
    background. We continue to hold the Taliban to their public
    commitments, which include ensuring the safety of all Afghans and not
    engaging in retaliatory attacks. We have communicated this concern to
    the Taliban, and we will continue to press them to investigate any
    incidents and to bring perpetrators to justice. We also continue to
    press the Taliban to adhere to their public commitment to form an
    inclusive government, including one that includes representation from
    members of ethnic and religious minority groups.

        Question. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan remain Major Non-NATO
    Allies even after the Taliban took Kabul with the public cheerleading
    of the Pakistani Government. Do you think both Afghanistan and Pakistan
    should remain Major Non-NATO Allies with all the benefits afforded to
    countries on that list?

        Answer. Events in Afghanistan necessitate reexamination of our
    regional relationships, including with Pakistan. We continue to engage
    closely with Pakistan on U.S. strategic interests in the region,
    including shared counterterrorism concerns, calls for a more inclusive
    Afghan Government, and support for the evacuation of persons of
    interest to the United States. We are currently reviewing Afghanistan's
    Major Non-NATO Allies designation.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

        Question. The Biden administration has stressed its commitment to
    holding the Taliban to the counter commitments it made under the
    February 29 Agreement. Despite promises to break with al Qaeda, the
    Taliban remains ideologically aligned with the group. According to a
    June 2020 United Nations report, ``The senior leadership of Al-Qaida
    remains present in Afghanistan, as well as hundreds of armed
    operatives, Al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, and groups of foreign
    terrorist fighters aligned with the Taliban.'' What are your views of
    the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda and impacts on U.S.
    CT interests?

        Answer. On August 31, al-Qa'ida released a public statement
    congratulating the Taliban on their ``victory'' in Afghanistan. The
    Taliban did not issue any public response to the statement, though in a
    September 21 interview Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid repeated a
    longstanding Taliban message that al-Qa'ida does not have a presence in
    Afghanistan. Separately, international media reported that Amin al Haq,
    Osama bin Laden's former security chief, entered Afghanistan and
    transited to Nangarhar on August 30. Speaking to the BBC on September
    29, Mujahid also noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
    world that there will not be any threat against any country, including
    the United States, from Afghan soil.''
        Such statements, and the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent
    an ISIS-K attack at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, reflect the
    Taliban's aim of demonstrating they are adhering to their
    counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The
    United States continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their
    commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups or individuals
    from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.

        Question. What tools does State have at its disposal to ensure the
    Taliban complies with its CT commitments? How specifically will the
    Department hold the Taliban to account if they fail to fulfill the CT
    pledges?

        Answer. The United States Government continues to call on the
    Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing
    terrorist groups or individuals from training, fundraising, and
    recruiting, and not hosting them. The Taliban are aware that we are
    closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that
    we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S.
    national security concerns.

        Question. How does the new interim government impact your
    assessment of the Taliban's willingness to prevent terrorist
    organizations from freely operating in Afghanistan?

        Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman
    Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
    world that there will not be any threat against any country including
    the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the
    agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of
    Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and
    the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at the
    Hamid Karzai International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of
    demonstrating they are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments
    under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement. The United States Government
    continues to call on the Taliban to fulfill their commitments, which
    include preventing terrorist groups or individuals from training,
    fundraising, and recruiting, and not hosting them.

        Question. The Administration's over-the-horizon counterterrorism
    plan was contingent on a semi-permissive security environment and a
    willing Afghan partner on the ground. The Taliban takeover has
    transitioned Afghanistan to a non-permissive environment without a
    suitable CT partner. What is the status of diplomatic discussions with
    Afghanistan's neighbors to secure access, basing, and overflight
    permissions?

        Answer. The United States has access arrangements necessary for
    ongoing U.S. over-the-horizon operations over Afghanistan. These
    arrangements have allowed the United States to maintain uninterrupted
    counterterrorism operations over Afghanistan. Our ongoing engagement
    seeks to further bolster those capabilities.

        Question. Is Russia involved in these negotiations or are Russian
    bases under consideration?

        Answer. Fighting the scourge of terrorism is a global effort. We
    will continue to engage partners, allies, and key states around the
    world on how best to address it, and in the case of Afghanistan, we
    have long worked closely with the nations of Central Asia. We deal
    directly with our sovereign Central Asian counterparts on these issues.
    Separately, we engage regularly with Russia in order to understand
    Moscow's views as a regional government that is also concerned about
    possible terrorist threats in Afghanistan.

        Question. What do you characterize as the risk to U.S.
    counterterrorism interests through over-the-horizon operations from the
    Gulf that include long travel times, dramatically reduced time on
    station, and inability to observe targets with an ``ISR soak'' to avoid
    civilian casualties?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for questions about
    their operational capacities.

        Question. The governments of Pakistan, China, Iran, India, and the
    Central Asian republics are all concerned, to varying degrees, about
    the possibility of Afghanistan-based terrorist threats. To what extent
    to you view any of these countries as legitimate counterterrorism
    partners?

        Answer. We are open to exploring varying degrees of
    counterterrorism cooperation with a range of countries, as long as the
    activities further U.S. national interests, have sufficient human
    rights protections, and are consistent with applicable law and policy
    guidance.

        Question. In his public comments, President Biden indicated the
    U.S. struck a deal with the Taliban for Kabul evacuations and continued
    evacuations after 31 August. Specifically, what was agreed to between
    the U.S. and the Taliban with respect to the evacuation of U.S.
    citizens and vulnerable Afghan allies?

        Answer. The Department of State continues to engage on a practical,
    pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of U.S. national interest,
    including counterterrorism, safe passage, and unhindered humanitarian
    assistance. The Taliban have assured the U.S. Government--and publicly
    declared--that they will not retaliate against individuals associated
    with the United States or the Ghani Government, and that those who wish
    to leave Afghanistan will be able to do so, provided they have valid
    travel documents. U.S. citizens and vulnerable Afghans continue to
    depart Afghanistan, a positive indication that the Taliban are
    delivering on their commitment to freedom of movement. The United
    States will continue to press the Taliban to ensure that all who wish
    to leave Afghanistan are able to and will monitor the Taliban's
    adherence to their commitments closely.

        Question. Section 1217 of the NDAA FY 2021 requires that the
    Administration transmit any agreement or arrangement with the Taliban
    to Congress within 5 days. Why has the State Department not provided
    Congress any such agreement or arrangement as required by law?

        Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
    agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
    29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
    agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
    William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
    is under the purview of the State Department.

        Question. Do you commit to providing Congress any agreement or
    arrangement, and relevant materials, made between the U.S. and the
    Taliban since August 14?

        Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
    agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
    29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
    agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
    William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
    is under the purview of the State Department.

        Question. What is the status of captured equipment to include small
    arms, heavy machine guns, mortars, artillery, anti-tank weapons,
    armored vehicles, rotary wing and aircraft? Will we destroy or allow
    them to atrophy over time? What will rise to threshold of destruction?

        Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan
    military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
    (ASFF), a Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10
    authority. DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and
    quantities of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title
    10 authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation
    programs, including determining the disposition of the equipment. We
    defer to DoD to provide this information.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, in your testimony, you emphasized that the
    military equipment left behind by the United States would soon be
    inoperable and would not pose challenges to the United States. However,
    there is another significant risk that the Taliban allows adversaries,
    especially China, Russia, and Iran--to examine U.S. military equipment.
    Did the Departments of State and Defense consider this risk, and
    incorporate that into its advice to the President? Do the Departments
    of State and Defense plan to take any action if you become aware of
    reports that sophisticated adversaries gain access to U.S. equipment?
    Are there concerns that foreign actors will provide Taliban training on
    captured equipment?

        Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
    ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of
    Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
    (ASFF) and transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and
    Security Forces does not fall into the hands of sophisticated
    adversaries of the United States. The Department defers all questions
    on risk assessments related to this military equipment to the
    Department of Defense.

        Question. What support, if any, did external nations or forces
    provide to the Taliban before and during its summer 2021 offensive?

        Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials continued to support
    Afghan peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in
    negotiations up until August 15. Various senior Pakistan officials also
    made repeated public calls for a political solution to the Afghan
    conflict and expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban
    would lead to a protracted civil war.

        Question. What role did Pakistan play in the Taliban offensive?

        Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister
    Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in
    Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15.
    In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban
    attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by force it would
    lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into Pakistan.
    Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools necessary to
    support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior Pakistani
    officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive political
    settlement and the protection of women's educational rights in
    Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made repeated
    public calls for the international community to directly engage with
    the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic collapse, and
    avert a humanitarian disaster.

        Question. What steps did the State Department take to reduce the
    levels of external support to the Taliban prior to and during the
    offensive that toppled the Afghan Government?

        Answer. Up until August 15, the Department was actively working
    with the Government of Pakistan through a variety of regional
    initiatives in calling for the Taliban to pursue a political solution
    to the Afghan conflict by forming an inclusive government.

        Question. What actions have Russia and China taken since Kabul fell
    to strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties with the Taliban, provide
    support for Taliban efforts to consolidate control over the country, or
    gain access to captured U.S. military equipment, communications gear,
    or any other sensitive technologies left behind?

        Answer. While Russia maintains its Embassy in Kabul, the Taliban is
    still designated a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior Russian
    officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to recognize
    the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties with
    countries that border Afghanistan in recent months more so than with
    the Taliban itself.
        The People's Republic of China (PRC) has maintained its Embassy in
    Kabul. We continue to engage with countries that border Afghanistan and
    countries in the region, including the PRC, on the importance of the
    international community holding the Taliban accountable for their
    public commitments. The entire international community has a stake in
    ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and
    obligations. The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do,
    and Beijing has to decide where it is in that effort.

        Question. Has the Taliban requested any specific diplomatic,
    financial, military, intelligence, or technical assistance from Russia,
    China, or Pakistan since the fall of the Afghan Government?

        Answer. The Taliban have publicly called for increased economic
    ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), including through the
    Belt and Road Initiative. In September 2021, the PRC pledged
    approximately $31 million worth of grant-based aid to Afghanistan,
    including food supplies and coronavirus vaccines. Through active
    regional diplomacy Pakistan has made consistent, public calls for the
    international community to directly engage with the Taliban, including
    by calling for their assets to be unfrozen to avoid economic collapse
    and avert a humanitarian disaster. Further, Pakistan is providing
    limited humanitarian aid to the Taliban and is encouraging other
    countries to pursue similar policies. Russia has also called publicly
    for the unfreezing of Taliban assets.

        Question. Please provide an assessment of the Taliban's compliance
    with the February 29 Agreement prior to April 14, 2021 to include a
    reduction in violence, adherence to counterterror commitments, and
    substantive dialogue with the Afghan Government.

        Answer. Under the U.S.-Taliban Agreement, the Taliban committed to
    prevent any group or individual in Afghanistan from threatening the
    security of the United States and its allies, and to prevent any such
    group from recruiting, training, and fundraising and not to host them.
    We assess that the Taliban has made some progress on these commitments,
    but there is significantly more to do. We continue to press the Taliban
    to fulfill their counterterrorism commitments.
        As part of the U.S.-Taliban agreement, the Taliban agreed to enter
    into intra-Afghan negotiations on a political roadmap and permanent and
    comprehensive ceasefire. Negotiations began September 12, 2020. The
    Taliban and Ghani Government teams have not met since the Taliban took
    control of Kabul on August 15, 2021.

        Question. Section 1215 of the NDAA FY 2021 restricts funding for
    the Department of Defense for any activity to reduce force levels below
    both 4,000 and 2,000, until DoD submits a report to Congress or the
    President provides a written waiver. During the Afghanistan withdrawal,
    troop levels again exceeded 4,000 on the ground. Why has Congress has
    not received either the required report or written waiver as mandated
    by law?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense.

        Question. President Biden previously said the United States ``will
    not conduct a hasty rush to exit. We'll do it responsibly deliberately
    and safely. And we will do it in full coordination with our allies and
    partners.'' However, scenes from the U.S.-led evacuation effort based
    out of Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) suggested anything but
    a responsible, deliberate, and safe exit. Can you elaborate on the
    scale of forward planning?

        Answer. The Department of State engaged in prudent contingency
    planning with interagency partners for a range of scenarios. The
    planning scenarios were based on a range of potential security
    conditions on the ground and a declining level of mission functions.
    The scenarios assumed reductions in embassy staffing while maintaining
    core mission functions under various conditions, up to and including
    suspension of operations and physical closure of the embassy.
        Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the world
    were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the evacuation and relocation operations in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.

        Question. What contingencies were put in place in the wake of
    President Biden's April announcement that the United States would
    withdraw all forces by September 11, 2021?

        Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens and our personnel
    is my highest priority. U.S. Embassy Kabul and various Department
    offices participated with the interagency in Noncombatant Evacuation
    Operations planning discussions throughout the spring and summer of
    2021. Planning efforts included a range of evacuation scenarios. U.S.
    Embassy Kabul worked closely with U.S. Forces-Afghanistan to ensure
    close coordination with the U.S. military on the ground in Afghanistan,
    and with CENTCOM.

        Question. How many U.S. citizens are currently in Afghanistan?
    Please address how many total U.S. citizens are in Afghanistan,
    independent of how many may have indicated at some point an interest in
    staying in Afghanistan. Of the persons evacuated from Afghanistan in
    August, how many are U.S. citizens? How many are U.S. legal permanent
    residents? How many are SIV applicants?

        Answer. U.S. citizens are not required to register with the
    Department of State or an embassy when they arrive in or depart from a
    country, and as a result we have no means of providing an exact number
    of U.S. citizens currently in Afghanistan. On April 27, the Department
    ordered the departure of U.S. Government employees from U.S. Embassy
    Kabul due to increasing violence and threat reports in Kabul. When we
    expanded our evacuation operations on August 15, 2021, there were an
    estimated 6,000 U.S. citizens in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government
    facilitated the evacuation of approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens from
    Afghanistan through August 31. Between September 1 and November 9, the
    Department has assisted an additional 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs) depart Afghanistan, not including those that
    have departed on private charters or independently crossed a land
    border. We will continue to facilitate this travel. Like U.S. citizens,
    Lawful Permanent Residents are not required to register with the U.S.
    Embassy. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for statistics
    on the number of LPR evacuees admitted into the United States. In
    addition, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security for numbers of
    SIV holder evacuees admitted into the United States. We estimate that
    40-50 percent of Afghan parolees may be SIV eligible because they took
    significant risks to support our military and civilian personnel in
    Afghanistan, working for or on behalf of the U.S. Government in
    Afghanistan or our coalition forces, or are a family member of someone
    who did. The Department is currently assessing how many of these Afghan
    evacuees had outstanding SIV applications.

        Question. How many U.S. permanent legal residents are currently in
    Afghanistan? Please address how many total U.S. permanent legal
    residents are in Afghanistan, independent of how many may have
    indicated at some point an interest in staying in Afghanistan.

        Answer. Like U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) do
    not register their location with the Department of State. As a result,
    we are unable to determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any
    other given country. Between September 1 and November 9, the Department
    has assisted 285 LPRs depart Afghanistan, not including those that have
    departed on private charters or independently crossed a land border. We
    will continue to facilitate this travel and will be relentless in
    helping LPRs depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa applicants are currently
    in Afghanistan?

        Answer. We do not have a figure of how many Special Immigrant Visa
    (SIV) applicants are currently in Afghanistan. This number is
    constantly changing since the Afghan SIV program continues to accept
    new applicants. As of October 6, 2021, there were approximately 27,000
    Afghan SIV principal applicants at various stages of the application
    process. At this time, we cannot determine how many are still in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants remain
    in the pipeline? How many applications did the department process
    between April 2021 and August 2021? Specifically, what steps has the
    Department taken to streamline the process since Biden took office in
    January 2021?

        Answer. As of October 6, 2021, the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    pipeline has approximately 27,000 SIV principal applicants. More than
    19,000 are at the initial stage of the process, pending applicant
    action to submit a complete set of documents for consideration of Chief
    of Mission (COM) approval. The Department of State continues to accept
    new SIV applications and add them to the pipeline. From April 1, 2021,
    to August 31, 2021, the Department issued SIVs to 1,812 principal
    applicants (and 5,937 derivative applicants). The Department took
    efforts to decrease processing time to include quintupling (since May
    2021) the staff who assess applications for COM approval, doubling the
    number of adjudicators at Embassy Kabul, increasing the staffing at the
    National Visa Center (NVC), initiating Project Rabbit with the
    Department of Defense (where the Department of Defense provides letters
    of recommendation for applicants after reviewing the human resources
    and employment records of Afghan SIV applicants), eliminating the COM
    Committee from the COM approval process, streamlining screening and
    vetting to be more time efficient while remaining secure, and utilizing
    the waiver of the requirement for a medical examination for SIV
    applicants in Afghanistan who completed all other steps for visa
    issuance.

        Question. What is the U.S. plan for evacuating U.S. citizens, legal
    permanent residents, and SIV applicants from Afghanistan?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others to facilitate the departure of those who wish
    to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent
    Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The
    initial priority is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs
    and their immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing
    departure of Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government, and
    Special Immigrant Visa holders.

        Question. Where will these people go?

        Answer. Evacuees continue to arrive in a variety of destinations.
    While we are currently unable to provide consular services in
    Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
    transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
    world where applicants are able to appear. Posts which have received
    Afghan SIV applications are prioritizing their processing.
        We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a
    visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third country. The
    U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S.
    citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), and
    Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while
    encouraging countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan
    to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing processing alternatives so
    that we can continue to deliver these important consular services for
    the people of Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the
    U.S. Government.

        Question. What role has the State Department played in receiving
    Afghan evacuees in Washington, DC and Philadelphia?

        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the designated
    lead federal agency for U.S.-based Afghanistan-related relocation
    operations. Prior to that designation, the Department of State, with
    support from USAID, had opened a temporary transit facility near Dulles
    Airport. DHS assumed overall control of Dulles operations on August 29,
    2021, when it was directed to serve as the lead agency to coordinate
    efforts to resettle Afghans, and the Philadelphia airport opened for
    arrivals as well. Department of State and USAID employees continued to
    support the Dulles operations of DHS in large numbers. Following
    admission of individuals relocated from Afghanistan to the United
    States by Customs and Border Protection at Dulles Airport, these
    employees worked closely with DHS, DoD, and federal health agencies to
    manifest Afghan travelers for flights and buses to their final safe
    haven base around the country for further processing. The Department
    had a small team at the Philadelphia airport to share lessons learned
    from Dulles, provide information to individuals relocated from
    Afghanistan who worked at the U.S. embassy in Kabul, coordinate family
    reunifications, and participate in interagency coordination meetings.
    The Department provided ``wrap-around'' services support at
    Philadelphia airport, specifically interpretation services to
    individuals upon their arrival.

        Question. How much money has the State Department spent on the
    evacuation from Afghanistan, including the housing and transportation
    of evacuees?

        Answer. As of October 13, 2021, the Department has obligated $689.9
    million in support of Operation Allies Welcome and related Afghanistan
    efforts, primarily involving relocation and resettlement of individuals
    at risk as a result of the situation in Afghanistan. Obligations by
    bureau and fund source are shown below. Obligations reported under CGFS
    include EDCS funded activities across multiple State bureaus, which are
    consolidated for reporting purposes under CGFS.

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Bureau                       Fund                  Amount
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CGFS                        EDCS                           $92.8 million
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CA                          CBSP                            $3.8 million
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    PRM                         ERMA                          $591.1 million
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    SCA                         Diplomatic Programs             $2.2 million
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total (as of 10/13/21)                                    $689.9 million
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Question. Mr. Secretary, you previously committed to providing
    details on the Department's plans to support the continued evacuation
    of American Citizens, Legal Permanent Residences, Green Card Holders,
    and at-risk Afghans, thousands of whom were left behind after the U.S.
    military withdrawal. These include Afghan journalists, human rights
    defenders, members of parliament, women and girls, aid workers, and
    interpreters, among others. Many of these individuals played key roles
    in supporting the United States mission in Afghanistan and as a result
    of their work and public profile, are now at heightened risk of Taliban
    violence. Since the U.S. finalized its withdrawal from Afghanistan on
    August 31, this committee has received no additional clarity on the
    Department's long-term planning, particularly as relates to at-risk
    Afghans. Those who dedicated themselves to supporting the U.S. and
    promoting democratic ideals, despite the risk, must not now be
    forgotten. Moving forward, how does the State Department plan to assist
    these at-risk Afghans, many of whom are now under increasing threat
    from the Taliban as result of their occupation, identity, or
    connections with the West? What does future evacuation planning look
    like for this class?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, international organizations, and others to facilitate
    the departure of those who still wish to leave. We understand that the
    Taliban have targeted certain populations and professions among Afghan
    civilians in the past and denied access to services for vulnerable
    populations. The United States will work vigorously with the
    international community to explore all options to support members of
    vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but not limited to--
    women, children, journalists, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+
    individuals, and members of the ethnic and religious minority groups.

        Question. Is the Taliban currently allowing at-risk Afghans to
    leave the country?

        Answer. The departures of the Qatar Airways flights and others are
    a positive step in upholding the commitment to free movement. We
    continue to press the Taliban to see to it that U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, and others with valid travel documents, including
    our Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, are able to
    depart the country, if they so choose.

        Question. If the Taliban requires visas for persons to exit
    Afghanistan and the U.S. no longer has a diplomatic presence inside
    Afghanistan, how will the U.S. get visas to those trying to exit the
    country?

        Answer. We recognize that it is extremely difficult for Afghans to
    obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
    country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe
    passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents
    (LPRs), and Afghans with travel documentation who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the region and those that
    border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. We are developing
    processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
    important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. This effort
    is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.

        Question. How will the State Department facilitate the evacuation
    of eligible Afghans whose passports were destroyed by the U.S. during
    the withdrawal?

        Answer. It is standard operating procedure during an emergency
    drawdown to mitigate risk by minimizing our footprint and reducing the
    amount of sensitive material remaining. U.S. Embassy Kabul's drawdown
    was conducted in accordance with this standard operating procedure.
        We are developing processing alternatives so that we can continue
    to deliver important consular services for the people of Afghanistan.
    This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S. Government.

        Question. In cases where safe evacuation isn't an option, what
    steps is the Department of State taking to mitigate the threat the
    Taliban poses to at-risk Afghans? To what extent is the Department
    collaborating with local or international non-government organizations
    in this effort?

        Answer. We are continuing to examine all available avenues to
    provide protection for vulnerable Afghans. Our commitment to providing
    humanitarian assistance directly to the United Nations and NGO partners
    inside Afghanistan also has not changed. The United States is the
    largest single donor of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and we
    will continue our support for vulnerable populations in Afghanistan and
    in neighboring countries in the region. We strongly encourage countries
    in the region and that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans
    and coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian
    assistance to Afghans in need. Our humanitarian assistance for Afghans
    in need allows our partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition,
    protection, shelter, livelihoods opportunities, essential health care,
    water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the humanitarian
    needs generated by conflict, drought, and the ongoing COVID-19
    pandemic.

        Question. State Department spokesperson Ned Price recently
    indicated efforts to secure the release of Mark Frerichs ``will not
    stop until Mark comes home.'' What is the status of negotiations with
    the Taliban with respect to American hostage Mark Frerichs? What steps
    has the Department taken to secure his release? What additional avenues
    will the Department pursue to secure his release?

        Answer. The Taliban have claimed they are holding U.S. Navy veteran
    Mark Frerichs. As the Taliban seek legitimacy, they cannot continue to
    hold an American hostage. .We continue to raise the need for Mark's
    immediate release and safe return with the Taliban at every possible
    opportunity. The Taliban-led Government must meet its commitments and
    obligations, which include the immediate release of Mark Frerichs. We
    have been clear that any legitimacy and any recognition will have to be
    earned. We have also sought assistance from senior leaders in Qatar,
    Pakistan, and others while we continue to press the Taliban to release
    Mark.

        Question. Beyond Mark Frerichs, how many Americans citizens are
    currently held hostage by the Taliban, or the Haqqani network?

        Answer. There are three open hostage cases of U.S. citizens in the
    Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In addition to U.S. citizen and Navy
    veteran Mark Frerichs, there is an open hostage case for Paul Overby,
    who was kidnapped in Khost in May 2014 and Cydney Mizell, who was
    abducted and likely killed in Kandahar in 2008. The Department of State
    has sponsored a Rewards for Justice campaign of up to $5 million for
    information on all three hostage cases. The Taliban, including the
    Haqqani Network, and their Haqqani affiliates, must release Mark
    Frerichs, provide answers and accountability for the other U.S.
    citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent act of hostage taking
    going forward.

        Question. To what extent does the Department feel hostage cases,
    like that of Mark Frerichs, will be used by the Taliban as leverage to
    secure concessions from the United States? How many nationals of NATO
    allies are currently in Afghanistan? How many nationals of other U.S.
    allies and partners are currently in Afghanistan? What is the United
    States doing to help those countries evacuate their nationals?

        Answer. I am concerned with the risk of future hostage-takings. The
    Taliban must release Mark Frerichs, provide answers and accountability
    for the other U.S. citizens taken hostage, and disavow the abhorrent
    act of hostage taking going forward. We coordinate regularly with
    partners and NATO Allies on both hostages and wrongfully detained
    citizens. The United States stands ready to assist partners and allies
    with recovery and reintegration.

        Question. The private sector and NGOs took evaluation measures upon
    themselves given the lack of attention by the State Department to allow
    charter flights but are being met with substantive bureaucratic
    obstacles. Can you please elaborate why the U.S. Department of State
    inhibited private entities from allowing chartered flights to evacuate
    at-risk Afghans?

        Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
    private charter flights out of Afghanistan. There have been significant
    challenges with these flights. Without personnel on the ground to
    ensure the fidelity of the intended manifests, there is no ability to
    determine whether the passengers aboard the plane would be eligible for
    relocation or resettlement in the United States. In several instances
    where private entities have chartered aircraft to transport individuals
    out of Afghanistan, identity checks on arrival at transit destinations
    have revealed that many passengers were not eligible for relocation to
    the United States and, in some cases, that the manifests were not
    accurate, despite the best efforts of the private organizations
    supporting these charters. This puts the individual travelers at risk
    with no plan for relocation to the United States; damages the bilateral
    relationship of the United States with the destination countries; and
    makes it more difficult for the U.S. Government to rely on those
    partner countries to assist in future relocations out of Afghanistan.

        Question. Media reports have indicated that as many as 550
    congressionally funded journalists and their families working for Radio
    Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Voice of America (VOA) were
    abandoned in Afghanistan after the U.S. military withdrawal. Over 100
    VOA and RFE/RL staff are still in Afghanistan and at great risk of
    reprisal by the Taliban. The reports indicate that in the final days of
    the evacuation, these journalists were designated as locally employed
    staff of Embassy Kabul, is that correct?

        Answer. Yes, that is correct. VOA and RFE/RL staff were designated
    as Locally Employed Staff during the August evacuation and relocation
    operation. The Department of State is in close and regular
    communication with USAGM regarding VOA and RFE/RL staff who may still
    be in Afghanistan and wish to leave.

        Question. Other than these journalists, how many locally employed
    staff of Embassy Kabul remain to be evacuated?

        Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
    there were 689 direct-hire local staff employed by the embassy. Sixteen
    of the embassy locally employed staff remained in Kabul. Nine remained
    in Kabul by choice. Seven were unable to travel on August 30 and have
    requested assistance to depart Afghanistan. We will continue our
    efforts to facilitate the safe and orderly travel of those who were
    employed by Embassy Kabul as local staff.

        Question. What steps were taken to prioritize the evacuation of VOA
    and RFE/RL employees and journalists in particular? Moving forward, can
    the Department commit to prioritizing the evacuation of RFE/RL and VOA
    staff who face heightened risk of Taliban violence in light of their
    work for a U.S.-funded press outlet?

        Answer. Yes, we are in regular communication with USAGM about the
    staff of both outlets who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to
    depart. The Department of State has established a team to coordinate
    across government agencies and with advocacy groups, nonprofits, and
    others to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk Afghans to whom
    we have a commitment. This group includes the staff of RFE/RL and VOA.

        Question. To what extent did the Department work with VOA and RFE/
    RL partners to support this objective? Were there particular obstacles
    to the Department of State doing so?

        Answer. The State Department and Department of Defense worked
    around the clock to facilitate the departure of VOA and RFE/RL staff
    via both military and charter aircraft. The Department of State was in
    regular communication with USAGM throughout the operation in August and
    continues to maintain these lines of communication about the staff of
    VOA and RFE/RL who may still be in Afghanistan and wish to leave. As
    the situation outside of Kabul International Airport grew increasingly
    dangerous, we advised all local staff to shelter in place while we
    continued to develop departure options. We did not forget about USAGM
    employees and their families, nor will we.

        Question. Are you aware of the fact that a number of these
    journalists have received death threats and inquiries from the Taliban
    about their work in the weeks since the collapse of the government?

        Answer. We have seen the footage of brave Afghan human rights
    defenders making their voices heard and protesting in public spaces. We
    have also seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by journalists in
    Taliban detention as well as the violence against protesters. The
    United States will continue to monitor the human rights situation in
    Afghanistan. The Department will also continue to chronicle human
    rights abuses in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

        Question. What steps does the Department plan on taking to ensure
    their safety in the interim? Specifically, what is the Department doing
    to ensure that they are safe and that the Taliban do not continue to
    harass them and their families?

        Answer. The United States calls for the protection of, and respect
    for, media organizations and journalists to allow accurate reporting,
    which is key to press freedom. Over the last 20 years, Afghanistan's
    media sector has grown exponentially. We are extremely grateful for
    those members of the media who have courageously associated themselves
    with the American press to report on Afghanistan.

        Question. The recently announced U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    Priority 2 Designation for Afghan Nationals requires that applicants be
    located outside Afghanistan for their applications to begin processing.
    However, many eligible applicants weren't safely evacuated from
    Afghanistan before the end of the U.S. NEO on August 31 and are now
    barred from leaving the country by the Taliban. As a result, they are
    not able to have their P-2 applications processed. Will the
    Administration modify the P-2 program to allow for processing while
    inside Afghanistan?

        Answer. This Administration has been clear about its enduring
    commitment to supporting the people of Afghanistan, including those who
    remain in country as well as those who seek to leave. While there are
    no plans for in-country processing or relocation support for
    individuals referred to the Priority 1 or Priority 2 program who remain
    in Afghanistan, the Administration is encouraging countries in the
    region and those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and
    is coordinating with humanitarian international organizations to
    provide assistance to Afghans in need. The United States is also urging
    countries to comply with their respective non-refoulement obligations
    and to respect the principle of non-refoulement.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that the Taliban
    must allow those Afghan nationals who want to leave and have valid
    travel documents to do so yet many of these journalists and those who
    worked for U.S.-funded projects have no such documents or onward visas.
    Why has the State Department not issued travel documents or
    verification letters to those Afghans who are eligible for Special
    Immigrant Visas or P2 visas?

        Answer. Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department
    or any other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. While we are
    currently unable to provide consular services for immigrant visa
    applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), in Afghanistan,
    we will continue to process SIV applications at every stage of the SIV
    process, including by transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and
    consulates around the world where applicants are able to appear. As
    operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended, Afghans eligible
    and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program must be outside of
    Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed. We
    strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
    Afghanistan, as well as other countries, to allow entry for Afghans and
    to coordinate with international organizations to provide humanitarian
    assistance to Afghans in need.

        Question. What exact assurances have you obtained from the Taliban
    about their commitment to let such individuals leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Taliban have publicly pledged to let people with valid
    travel documents, including U.S. citizens, freely depart Afghanistan.
    We continue to press the Taliban to live up to their commitment of free
    passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing this in
    our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are also
    doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world.
    Freedom of movement is a top national security concern and national
    priority for us.

        Question. Many of these journalists don't have passports. How does
    the United States Government plan to assist those without passports who
    were left behind by the military evacuation?

        Answer. We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for
    Afghans to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way
    to enter a third country, and like many refugees, they may face
    significant challenges fleeing to safety. We strongly encourage
    countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow
    entry for Afghans and to coordinate with international organizations to
    provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
    particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related
    to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of
    non-refoulement.
        Travelers do not require a letter from the State Department or any
    other U.S. Government entity to leave Afghanistan. We are also
    continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
    of free passage for those who wish to leave the country. We are doing
    this in our direct and pragmatic communications to the Taliban. We are
    also doing it in tandem with our allies and partners around the world.

        Question. Other governments like the United Kingdom and Germany
    have provided expedited entry into their country for their government-
    funded media. Why have similar arrangements only been made for private
    media outlets, like the New York Times, and not congressionally funded
    ones?

        Answer. Admission to the United States is granted by the Department
    of Homeland Security. We are working closely with our interagency
    colleagues to facilitate the relocation and resettlement of all
    qualified, screened and vetted Afghans referred to the U.S. Refugee
    Admissions Program through the expedited processing of individuals
    through our transit sites in third countries.

        Question. What is the status of the P2 visa program for journalists
    and those who worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects?

        Answer. The State Department continues to receive and process P-2
    referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). After USRAP
    has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based
    non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and
    the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can
    occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing
    their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to
    contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded
    overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing. Please note a P-2
    referral enables applicants to access the USRAP and is not a visa
    category.

        Question. We have received reports that the State Department is
    reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system
    due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?

        Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2
    referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of
    Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is
    not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee
    referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for
    resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we
    are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific
    number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process
    in the next year.

        Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
    the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
    their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
    take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

        Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
    partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
    Afghans, including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
    resettlement. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been suspended,
    Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be
    processed.
        We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
    to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
    country, and like many refugees, may face significant challenges
    fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the
    ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
    continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and
    those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate
    with international organizations and other humanitarian partners to
    provide humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also
    particularly urge states to uphold their respective obligations related
    to Afghan refugees or asylum seekers, and to respect the principle of
    non-refoulement.

        Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
    stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
    to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
    assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

        Answer. We strongly encourage countries in the region and those
    that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
    humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also particularly urge
    states to uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan
    refugees or asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect
    the principle of non-refoulement.

        Question. Well before the August 31 deadline, 1,200 American
    University of Afghanistan (AUAF) students, staff and faculty were
    mobilized and ready to evacuate with the proper paperwork and
    logistical support. AUAF successfully secured planes to transport the
    students to multiple third-site locations. However, the Biden
    administration reversed its prior authorization granting AUAF access to
    Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) gates, allegedly claiming it
    was no longer a priority. Nearly 200 Afghan women who hoped to evacuate
    with this convoy are part of the Embassy Scholars program. These women
    were hand-picked by the U.S. Embassy to attend AUAF and given full-ride
    scholarships. How do you plan to support the evacuation of AUAF
    students and staff moving forward?

        Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation and relocation flights out
    of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), and at-risk Afghans in Afghanistan remains
    steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
    at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such as the students, faculty, and staff
    of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States will
    continue to support equal access to education in Afghanistan. The
    Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart,
    and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial
    flights out of the airport in Kabul.

        Question. How is the Taliban treating current or former students of
    the AUAF?

        Answer. The State Department is aware of reports the Taliban have
    mistreated AUAF students, alumni, and staff. We take these reports
    seriously. The Taliban have committed to full access to education,
    general amnesty, and preventing retaliation. The Department continues
    to press the Taliban to fully adhere to these commitments, including
    their commitment not to retaliate. Any report or violations should be
    promptly investigated and those responsible should be held accountable.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, have you determined whether Section 7008
    of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which restricts certain
    forms of assistance ``to the government of any country whose duly
    elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat or decree
    or . . . a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive
    role'' applies to the Taliban in Afghanistan?

        Answer. Afghanistan's military forces did not support or
    participate in the Taliban's advance on Kabul, nor did they depose
    President Ghani or other leaders of the Government of Afghanistan.

        Question. The Department and USAID have announced the intent to
    continue ``certain forms of foreign assistance programs that advance
    U.S. national interests'' in Afghanistan. Decisions about which
    programs will continue--and those that will be paused or reprogrammed--
    reportedly will be subject to review. Yet, beyond the suggestion that
    humanitarian assistance will be exempted, the Department has provided
    the Committee with virtually zero information about the anticipated
    scope, process, timeline, benchmarks, and indicators of this review.
    What is the full scope of U.S. foreign assistance under review?

        Answer. All humanitarian assistance programming to Afghanistan to
    support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people continues directly
    through the United Nations and NGO partners. State and USAID are
    continuing to review all non-humanitarian assistance programs to
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Who is leading the review?

        Answer. The Office of Foreign Assistance is coordinating the review
    across State and USAID Bureaus for non-humanitarian assistance funds in
    Afghanistan and is working closely with interagency partners.

        Question. Who will be consulted? Will Congress be consulted?

        Answer. In addition to working closely with interagency partners,
    we look forward to working closely with the White House, OMB, and
    Congress as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. When do you anticipate completing the review?

        Answer. We are undertaking the review on an expedited timeline.

        Question. What metrics, benchmarks, and indicators will be used to
    determine whether a program ``advances U.S. national interests''?

        Answer. The review of non-humanitarian assistance is intended to
    ensure programs align with U.S. policy objectives, which include to:
    (i) prevent threats of terrorism against the United States and its
    interests; (ii) ensure the safe passage and freedom of movement of all
    U.S. citizens, Allies, and other individuals at risk from Afghanistan;
    (iii) prevent or mitigate a humanitarian disaster, including the
    humanitarian impacts of an economic collapse; (iv) support U.S. values,
    especially regarding human rights including the rights of women, girls,
    and members of minority groups; and (v) prevent broader regional
    destabilization.

        Question. Is it both feasible and advisable to re-start non-
    humanitarian assistance programs in Afghanistan while we are still
    working to evacuate U.S. citizens and implementing partners?

        Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
    humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
    potential issues to mitigate risks. This review will consider how
    programs may be affected by the new security environment, as it is
    important that we consider how to mitigate the risks to on-the-ground
    implementers and beneficiaries, including to ensure assistance
    resources do not directly benefit the Taliban.

        Question. What mechanisms will be put in place to guard against
    diversion?

        Answer. Bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
    monitor and evaluate continuing potential non-humanitarian assistance
    programs from outside Afghanistan, including through third parties,
    given that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended.
    State and USAID and our implementers have experience using similar
    mechanisms, such as in Syria, and some bureaus already have years of
    experience in successfully managing programs from outside of
    Afghanistan.
        Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
    that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This
    may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
    program design to reduce those risks.

        Question. Are you concerned by arguments that the resumption of
    U.S. non-humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan will legitimize the
    Taliban?

        Answer. The President and I have been clear about the U.S.
    commitment to supporting the Afghan people, including women, girls, and
    members of minority groups. Our efforts to continue humanitarian
    assistance to support the lifesaving needs of the Afghan people
    demonstrates this commitment.

        Question. Can you confirm that no U.S. foreign assistance, in any
    form, will be programmed with, through, or for the Taliban?

        Answer. No U.S. assistance will be directed to the Taliban. We plan
    to provide assistance all through non-governmental organizations,
    international organizations, or other third parties to directly support
    the Afghan people.

        Question. Former Administrator of USAID Andrew Natsios asserts that
    shipments of U.S. wheat, intended to ameliorate famine conditions in
    certain areas of Afghanistan in 2001, severely undercut the market for
    locally grown wheat on the eve of a bumper harvest (which, ironically,
    can largely be attributed to U.S. foreign assistance to incentivize
    alternative crop production, including through the introduction of
    improved seed varieties). Yet, faced with excess wheat supply and low
    demand (farmers simply could not compete with ``free'' U.S. wheat),
    continued production of wheat became unviable and farmers returned to
    poppy production. According to the Executive Director of the World Food
    Program, today, Afghanistan is once again ``marching toward famine.''
    How will you ensure that U.S. humanitarian assistance, notably
    assistance delivered through the Food for Peace Program and U.S.
    contributions to WFP, will not result in a similar outcome?

        Answer. USAID and State, through our implementing partners,
    including the World Food Program (WFP), undertake rigorous market
    analyses to ensure humanitarian assistance will not have adverse
    impacts on local producers or markets. In Afghanistan, USAID supports
    WFP to improve food security and nutrition conditions through in-kind
    aid, as well as cash and voucher assistance. WFP conducts frequent
    market and price monitoring to prevent potential disruptions, and
    predominantly uses locally procured wheat flour to support local
    production. WFP has also scaled up its cash transfer options, as cash
    is used where markets are easily accessible, supply routes are
    functioning, food commodities are available, and prices are stable.
    USAID does not currently provide U.S. wheat to Afghanistan but does
    support the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization in providing
    assistance to vulnerable farming households.

        Question. How is the Department working with other donors to ensure
    that humanitarian assistance actually helps ameliorate, rather than
    exacerbate, humanitarian conditions in Afghanistan?

        Answer. U.S. humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan enables our
    partners to provide lifesaving food, nutrition, protection, shelter,
    health care, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to respond to the
    needs generated by the complex emergency. U.S. humanitarian assistance
    is provided directly through international organizations and NGOs with
    extensive experience working in challenging environments, and they
    remain committed to delivering needs-based assistance with
    impartiality, neutrality, and independence. Close coordination with
    donor governments and partners is critical during this time, and we
    will continue to work closely with and support our partners to monitor
    and respond to the situation and to encourage other donors to do the
    same.

        Question. What is the status of discussions with the Department of
    Treasury on the issuance of licenses and related guidance for
    humanitarian organizations operating in Afghanistan, including specific
    guidance relating to access to financial services?

        Answer. As of September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses to
    support the continued flow of humanitarian assistance and other
    activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan, including
    critical food and medicine. OFAC also issued a specific license
    authorizing transactions necessary for U.S. Government implementers of
    humanitarian assistance. These actions authorize the U.S. Government,
    certain international organizations (including the U.N. and its
    specialized agencies such as the World Bank), NGOs, and those acting on
    their behalf, to continue to engage in transactions that are ordinarily
    incident or necessary to the provision of humanitarian assistance and
    other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan. This
    follows past precedent in which the United States has taken steps to
    address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where sanctioned individuals
    and entities are active.

        Question. In the aftermath of the Taliban's takeover of Kabul, the
    United States, alongside other international donors announced a
    suspensions in assistance to Afghanistan. Western powers maintain that
    a resumption of aid is contingent upon assurances from the Taliban that
    it will respect human rights, and in particular the rights of women and
    girls. Despite the Taliban's efforts to portray a more liberal face,
    its actions suggest we are headed toward a style of rule similar to
    that which dominated the 1990s, when women were banished from public
    life, media was strictly controlled, and all forms of entertainment
    banned. Already, since taking power, there have been widespread reports
    of Taliban fighters violently assaulting peaceful protestors and
    arbitrarily detaining journalists, in addition to imposing restrictions
    on the rights of Afghan women. Given the Taliban's proven record of
    serious human rights abuses, do you intend to hold the Taliban
    accountable? How?

        Answer. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the
    international community will depend on their adherence to their
    commitments on preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the
    United States from Afghanistan and on protecting human rights and
    fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allowing freedom of passage for
    American citizens, third country nationals and Afghans with the proper
    documentation that desire to leave, allowing unimpeded humanitarian
    access, and forming an inclusive government. The United States
    maintains a wide range of tools to ensure the Taliban upholds these
    commitments, including diplomatic engagement, economic and financial
    sanctions, and economic assistance.

        Question. Will the Taliban's human rights record be factored into
    any decision to diplomatically recognize a Taliban-led Government?

        Answer. The United States has a longstanding policy, albeit with
    several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on
    recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not
    changed. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan Government
    is one we and the international community can work with. We will
    continue to engage the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan,
    but they have a long path to legitimacy and will be judged by their
    actions, including actions to prevent terrorist groups from posing a
    threat to the United States from Afghanistan, uphold human rights and
    fundamental freedoms for all Afghans, allow freedom of passage, allow
    unimpeded humanitarian access, and form an inclusive government.

        Question. What type of relationship do you envision the United
    States having with the Taliban if they continue to perpetrate
    widespread human rights violations? What would this mean for the future
    of U.S. assistance to Afghanistan?

        Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
    Government is one we and the international community can work with. As
    we have consistently said, we are prepared to engage on a practical,
    pragmatic basis with the Taliban on issues of core U.S. national
    interests, including safe passage and counterterrorism. The legitimacy
    and recognition that the Taliban seek from the international community
    will depend on their conduct in areas that include, among other things,
    countering threats of terrorism, respecting human rights and
    fundamental freedoms for all Afghans and refraining from carrying out
    reprisals. Their actions, not their words, will factor into whether and
    how we decide to provide continued non-humanitarian assistance. The
    United States is committed to providing lifesaving humanitarian
    assistance for Afghans in need.

        Question. In a Question for the Record I submitted to you after
    your confirmation hearing on January 19, 2021, I asked, ``In addition
    to vital counterterrorism interests, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have
    dramatically improved conditions for women, minority and youth. How
    would your State Department safeguard the gains made for Afghan women,
    minority and youth?'' You responded, ``Women, girls, and minority
    groups in Afghanistan have made extraordinary gains over the past 20
    years, and protecting those gains will be a high priority in the Biden-
    Harris administration. For a peace agreement between the Afghan
    Government and the Taliban to be durable and just, it must account for
    the rights of women, girls, and minority groups.'' Obviously, that
    ``durable and just'' peace agreement never materialized and,
    immediately upon seizing power, the Taliban began rolling-back the
    hard-fought gains of women and girls over the past two decades.

        Answer. We have consistently been clear that the future of
    Afghanistan is for Afghans themselves to decide but that our future
    political relationship will be shaped by their actions, especially with
    respect to the rights of women and girls. As we continue to engage the
    Taliban on issues of vital national interest, we have made clear that
    the international community is watching closely. We continue to press
    the Taliban to respect the rights of all Afghans, including women,
    girls, and members of minority groups.

        Question. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesperson, has said the
    rights of women and girls in Afghanistan will be respected ``in
    accordance with the respect of the principles of Islam'' and ``within
    the margins that we have.'' What does this mean?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions
    with respect to the human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and
    girls. We will monitor closely how any government respects the human
    rights and fundamental freedoms that have been recognized as an
    integral part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the
    last 20 years.

        Question. Have the Taliban's verbal commitments to respect the
    rights of women and girls ``within the margins'' provided the
    Administration with assurances that the Taliban's rule will be
    ``durable and just'' in regards to women?

        Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
    the international community to support the gains that recognized the
    human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women
    and girls. As seen in the joint statement issued by the United States
    and more than 60 other countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in
    August, the international community is deeply worried about Afghan
    women and girls, particularly their rights to education, work, freedom
    of movement, and peaceful assembly. We will continue to press the
    Taliban on the need to respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan
    women and girls in terms of their meaningful participation in political
    processes and public life, as well as access to education, health care,
    and employment.

        Question. How will you protect the gains of the past 20 years as
    ``a high priority for the Biden-Harris administration'' under Taliban
    rule?

        Answer. The Taliban can only earn legitimacy gradually through a
    sustained pattern of action that demonstrates a genuine commitment to
    core expectations, such as respect for the human rights of all Afghans,
    including women and girls. We are working with the international
    community to remain unified in holding the Taliban accountable for
    these expectations. In our communications to the Taliban, we have been
    clear that the international community is watching closely, and that
    any future relationship will be shaped by the Taliban's own actions. We
    have stressed that legitimacy cannot be earned quickly or by words
    alone; it must be demonstrated through concrete action.

        Question. Women in Afghanistan made great progress over the last 20
    years, but due to the erratic U.S. military withdrawal and subsequent
    diplomatic evacuation, now face an untenable future. Women will be
    segregated in schools and forced to cease activities they previously
    enjoyed. This is a monstrous step backwards. How do you respond to
    criticism that the United States turned its back on Afghan women and
    children? Did our withdrawal create an environment that will set Afghan
    women back even farther?

        Answer. We stand by our ongoing commitment to supporting the
    aspirations of Afghan women and girls, and we are encouraged that our
    bilateral and multilateral partners stand with us and do the same. We
    will continue to closely monitor how any government in Afghanistan
    respects the human rights and freedoms that have become an integral
    part of the life of women and girls in Afghanistan during the last 20
    years. We remain committed to providing robust humanitarian assistance,
    which provides vulnerable Afghans with critically needed food, health
    care, nutrition, medical supplies, hygiene supplies, and other urgently
    needed relief. It also addresses the protection concerns of women,
    children, and minorities.

        Question. How do you plan to continue to promote women and girls'
    rights in Afghanistan without a U.S. diplomatic presence on the ground?

        Answer. We are committed to use every tool at our disposal--through
    our diplomacy and humanitarian efforts--to support, in coordination
    with many other countries, women, girls, and minorities in Afghanistan.
    Embassy Kabul's operations have been transitioned to Doha and, together
    with the Special Representative for Afghanistan, these entities
    communicate to the Taliban on issues of vital national interest. Given
    the important and complex nature of coordinate support for the rights
    of Afghan women and girls, the Secretary will be naming a Senior
    Official for Afghan Women and Girls at the State Department to focus
    entirely on the ongoing effort both from the United States Government
    and in coordination with other countries.

        Question. Throughout the period before final withdrawal, non-
    governmental organizations including the Committee to Protect
    Journalists regularly shared with various State Department entities
    lists of at-risk journalists and Afghans who needed evacuation from the
    country including their biographical and contact information. How many
    of these individuals were contacted by the State Department?

        Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
    task and the U.S. Government understands the need to coordinate across
    agencies, as we have done. We also appreciate the desire of NGOs and
    private citizens to assist and have identified a greater need for
    coordination there.
        The State Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator
    for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies
    and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental organizations, and others.
    The team is working closely across the interagency and with other
    partners to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
    Afghans allies and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority
    was and is on supporting departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs and their
    immediate families. We are also facilitating the ongoing departure of
    Afghans who worked with and for the U.S. Government and Special
    Immigrant Visa holders. We are not in a position to detail our
    involvement with any specific groups at this time.

        Question. Was this list ever shared with other governments who
    offered to help?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
    interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement
    for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens,
    Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies and vulnerable
    and at-risk Afghans. The initial priority was and is on supporting
    departures of U.S. citizens and LPRs, and their immediate families. We
    are also facilitating the ongoing departure of Afghans who worked with
    and for the U.S. Government, and Special Immigrant Visa holders. We are
    not in a position to detail our involvement with any specific groups at
    this time.

        Question. How many of these individuals were evacuated by the
    United States?

        Answer. During operations in Afghanistan in August 2021, the U.S.
    Government facilitated the departure of 124,000 individuals on U.S.
    military aircraft, foreign military aircraft, and charter aircraft
    organized by private groups. Not all of these travelers went to the
    United States as their final destination.

        Question. Given the Taliban's lack of adherence to fundamental
    human rights, like the freedom of religion, what dangers remain for
    religious minorities, including Christians, Hazara Shia Muslims,
    Hindus, and Sikhs?

        Answer. We have seen reports of harassment and violence targeted
    against members of religious minority groups. As the State Department's
    2020 Religious Freedom Report stated, both the Taliban and ISIS-K, an
    affiliate of ISIS and a U.S.-designated terrorist organization,
    targeted and killed members of minority religious communities and
    individuals because of their religious beliefs. We have no reason to
    believe these dangers have decreased; we will judge the Taliban by
    their actions, not their words.

        Question. The United States evacuated Afghan nationals to various
    military bases around the world, including some in the continental
    United States. How long will refugees be housed on U.S. Bases?

        Answer. Individuals relocated from Afghanistan were temporarily
    hosted at military bases outside the United States. Over 50,000 moved
    on to the United States before a measles outbreak required a
    vaccination campaign. Because the MMR (measles, mumps, and rubella)
    vaccine requires 21 days post vaccination to become fully effective,
    the Centers for Disease Control ordered a 21-day post vaccination hold
    for all individuals relocated from Afghanistan to U.S. military bases,
    both in the United States and outside the United States. During that
    period, other resettlement processes continued for those already on the
    U.S. safe haven bases. As travelers complete the conditions established
    for their parole, the Department is coordinating with the International
    Organization for Migration, the Department of Health and Human
    Services, and Department of Defense to resettle individuals relocated
    from Afghanistan to their final destinations as quickly as possible
    within limits of local resettlement agency capacities. Those on bases
    overseas are being moved to the United States as soon as possible to
    complete their processing.

        Question. Has the United States entered into any agreements with
    foreign governments to host Afghan nationals?

        Answer. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the
    process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens,
    Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many
    countries have transited Afghans through their territories and many
    other countries made generous offers of support. Many countries have
    committed to permanently resettle Afghans.

        Question. What percentage of those evacuated to the United States
    were admitted on parole alone? To what benefits will humanitarian
    parolees in the United States have access? What about those on U.S.
    bases overseas?

        Answer. The decision on an individual's status in the United
    States, including whether they are paroled into the United States or
    admitted as a U.S. citizen, Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR), Special
    Immigrant (SI), or other category, including Afghans who were relocated
    from overseas as a part of Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), resides with
    the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and
    Immigration Services and Customs and Border Protection. DHS, working
    with its representatives located at the various military safe havens,
    continues to process information on Afghans at the safe havens and
    ultimately will be in the best position to provide the most accurate
    breakdown of the various categories of individuals relocated to the
    United States as a part of OAW. The individuals at safe havens overseas
    still waiting to travel to the United States are being fully supported,
    including with MMR and varicella vaccines, prior to transport to the
    United States.

        Question. What vetting procedures are in place to move refugees and
    their families expeditiously?

        Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
    arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
    Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
    vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
    eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
    includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
    professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
    other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
    and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
    national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
    with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
    primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
    inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
    process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
    and national security.

        Question. What happens to refugees if they fail vetting procedures
    at any step of the process?

        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the
    screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to
    the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.

        Question. What entails ``failing''?

        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security has the lead on the
    screening and vetting requirements for all applicants for admission to
    the United States. Please contact DHS for more information.

        Question. Under what authorities and with what funding are State/
    USAID operating the refugee intake centers at the Dulles Expo Center
    and in Philadelphia? What other agencies are contributing funding?

        Answer. The Department of State provided support for individuals
    relocated from Afghanistan at the Dulles Expo Center under section
    2(c)(1) of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 (MRAA) (22
    U.S.C. 2601(c)(1)), which authorizes the President, when he determines
    it to be important to the national interest, to furnish assistance to
    meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, and establishes the
    Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA) Fund to carry out
    these purposes. The intake center at Philadelphia is operated by the
    Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as lead agency for Operation
    Allies Welcome. State is providing funding for services to individuals
    relocated from Afghanistan at the Philadelphia intake center, including
    interpreters, [certain] medical care, and meals, under section 2(c) of
    the MRAA and Presidential determinations identified above. Other
    agencies supporting this effort including USAID, DoD, DHS, HHS, and
    Peace Corps are also relying on funding and authorities that may be
    available to these agencies for this purpose, including, as necessary,
    the drawdown directed under section 506(a)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
    Act of 1961.

        Question. Why were State and USAID, who do not handle domestic
    immigration or law enforcement, in charge of a domestic intake facility
    for Afghans attempting to immigrate to the United States as refugees or
    visa holders?

        Answer. The August 2021 relocation of individuals from Afghanistan
    required a comprehensive government approach involving a coordinated
    interagency effort. Individuals who arrived at the Dulles Expo Center
    had already been admitted to the United States by Customs and Border
    Protection Officers at Dulles Airport in accordance with U.S.
    immigration laws. Department of State, with support from USAID, with
    local staffing in the area, were able to quickly stand up the Dulles
    Expo center, with 24/7 staffing levels to meet the demands of the
    thousands of Afghans who needed to be onward processed to domestic
    military safe havens for additional resettlement processing.

        Question. When did the Department start keeping track of Afghans
    who left the Dulles facility upon arrival? How many Afghans are
    believed to have left the Dulles facility without authorization? How
    long did it take the Department to clarify the guidance governing
    whether Afghans were free to leave the facility or not?

        Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border
    Protection establishes conditions of parole and I refer you to it for
    full information in this regard.

        Question. Did the Department possess sufficient biometric equipment
    to collect the samples necessary for vetting the Afghans transiting
    through the ports of entry in Dulles and Philadelphia? If not, what
    steps were taken to rectify the situation and ensure sufficient data
    was collected for vetting?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
    information on biometric data collection required for vetting and
    admittance into the United States.

        Question. Approximately how many of the Afghans processed through
    Dulles/Philadelphia have no identifiable connection to the U.S.
    Government?

        Answer. Many individuals were admitted to the United States under
    humanitarian parole but may have been in the processing stage for a
    Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or been employed by the U.S. Government
    but not yet qualified for an SIV. We estimate that 40-50 percent of
    evacuees are potentially eligible to apply for the SIV program.
    Additionally, some individuals may have a U.S. tie as the family member
    of a U.S. citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident. DHS, as the lead agency
    for Operation Allies Welcome, in coordination with the Department of
    Defense at eight locations throughout the United States, continues to
    document individuals relocated from Afghanistan.

        Question. What documentation providing proof of identity did the
    Department deem was sufficient for Afghan refugees transiting into the
    United States?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
    information on identity requirements for admittance into the United
    States.

        Question. Without a resumption in international assistance--which
    previously accounted for around 40 percent of GDP--Afghanistan will
    face further economic instability. As long as Afghanistan's economy
    continues to deteriorate, humanitarian needs will remain high and new
    waves of refugees will seek refugee outside the country. How do you
    plan to work with USAID to address these needs, barring a full-scale
    resumption in U.S. assistance? How do you expect third countries to
    respond to fresh waves of Afghan refugees?

        Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to providing humanitarian
    assistance to the Afghan people directly through the United Nations and
    NGO partners. The United States remains the single largest humanitarian
    donor to the Afghan response and provided nearly $330 million in
    humanitarian assistance in fiscal year 2021. Immediate priorities are
    the safety and security of our partners; ensuring aid is delivered in
    accordance with internationally recognized humanitarian principles; and
    responsibly scaling up humanitarian assistance. State and USAID are
    monitoring the situation very closely, staying in daily contact with
    our partners, and assessing and adjusting to meet these priorities. We
    are also working closely with the international community to respond to
    the humanitarian crisis and worsening economic crisis.

        Question. The hasty U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, and its
    failure to provide adequate safeguards for thousands of at risk
    Afghans, has bolstered the position of our adversaries, including Iran.
    With the arrival of fresh waves of Afghan refugees, how do you
    anticipate this will impact Iran's Fatemiyoun Brigade, and specifically
    its ability to undermine U.S. national security interests both in
    Afghanistan and beyond?

        Answer. Iran has for years recruited Afghan Shia militants from
    within Afghanistan and from among Afghan emigres to Iran to fight on
    its behalf in Syria in so-called ``Fatemiyoun Brigades.'' Iran will
    likely continue this practice in an attempt to avoid committing its own
    troops in Syria and potentially engage in similar practices in
    Afghanistan. The Administration will remain vigilant to developments in
    this regard and is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
    forces, personnel, and vital interests with all appropriate means.
        Regarding the issue of refugees, our priority is the safety and
    welfare of refugees and other individuals at risk as a result of the
    situation in Afghanistan. We are working within the United Nations and
    other international organizations to ensure the safety and welfare of
    refugees and other individuals at risk. We expect all states to uphold
    their obligations under international law, including applicable human
    rights and refugee law obligations, and to respect the principle of
    non-refoulement.

        Question. Please elaborate on the Department's plans for the
    maintaining a diplomatic presence as relates to Afghanistan. Will the
    decision to re-establish a presence in Kabul be contingent upon
    diplomatic recognition of the Taliban?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan suspended operations on
    August 31, 2021. For the time being, the U.S. Government is managing
    our diplomacy with Afghanistan out of Doha, Qatar, to include consular
    affairs, administering humanitarian assistance, and working with
    allies, partners, and regional and international stakeholders. To
    resume operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, the Department will
    need to complete a deliberative planning process. A decision to resume
    operations at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul would be made based on an
    assessment of U.S. national security interests and the security
    situation on the ground.

        Question. What, if any, other factors will be considered?

        Answer. Resuming operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul will be subject
    to Congressional notification procedures and Department planning
    processes. The decision-making process will consider a variety of
    factors to include, but not limited to foreign policy priorities;
    representation maintained by other governments in the locality; and
    security requirements and policies necessary to mitigate identified
    threats, including to but not limited to those stemming from terrorism,
    political violence, crime, and Afghanistan's ability to provide
    security in accordance with its international obligations.

        Question. Can you commit to consulting with the Chair and Ranking
    Member before finalizing any decision to establish a U.S. presence in
    Kabul?

        Answer. Yes, the Department will work with Congress and comply with
    applicable laws on any resumption of operations at Embassy Kabul.

        Question. How does the Department plan to uphold U.S. policy
    priories in the absence of a formal presence?

        Answer. We continue to communicate with the Taliban on a pragmatic,
    operational basis on our vital national interests. We have moved our
    diplomatic operations from Kabul to Doha, where our new Afghan affairs
    team is hard at work. We continue to facilitate departures for U.S.
    citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
    vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, if they choose to depart. We are
    focused on monitoring and mitigating the threat of terrorist activity
    emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the Taliban to its
    commitment to prevent any group or individual from using the territory
    of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States or that of
    our allies. We also continue to support humanitarian assistance to the
    Afghan people and continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights
    of all Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive
    government with broad support.

        Question. What are the Department of State's priorities as relates
    to Afghanistan?

        Answer. First, the Department has continued its relentless effort
    to help any remaining U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans, leave Afghanistan
    if they so choose. Second, we intend to monitor and mitigate the threat
    of terrorist activity emanating from Afghanistan and we will hold the
    Taliban accountable for preventing terrorist groups, such as al Qaida
    and ISIS-K, from using Afghanistan as a base for external operations
    that could threaten the United States or our allies. Third, we will
    continue to support humanitarian assistance to the Afghanistan people.
    Fourth, we continue to press the Taliban to respect the rights of all
    Afghans, including women and girls, and to form an inclusive government
    with broad support.

        Question. Where do human rights and counterterrorism fall on the
    spectrum?

        Answer. The United States is committed to respect for human rights
    in all countries. We are deeply concerned about restrictions limiting
    women's participation in public life, including access to education,
    employment, and freedom of movement, and continue to press the Taliban
    to uphold the rights of all Afghans. We are disappointed in the
    composition of the interim ``caretaker'' cabinet announced by the
    Taliban which does not include women and only minimal numbers of
    members of minority groups.

        Question. How do you plan to operationalize these objectives?

        Answer. In all our communications to the Taliban, we have made
    clear that its relationship with the international community will be
    shaped by its own actions, including on counterterrorism, safe passage,
    unhindered humanitarian access, and respect for the human rights of all
    Afghans. We work closely with international partners to maintain unity
    in our approach and to make clear that any legitimacy, which the
    Taliban assert they want, will have to be earned through sustained
    action on these priorities. Mere assurances are not enough. We have
    made clear to the Taliban that the international community is watching
    closely.
        On counterterrorism, we are coordinating closely with the
    Department of Defense, partners, and allies to retain and continue to
    build our counterterrorism capabilities to prevent, detect, and disrupt
    terrorist threats.

        Question. Based on the State Department's most recent report to
    Congress on Chief of Mission staffing levels in Afghanistan
    (transmitted on July 13, 2021), there were 645 locally employed staff
    (LES) members working for the United States in Afghanistan. However, it
    was recently announced that the Department had evacuated 2,800 LES
    members from Afghanistan. Can you confirm all U.S. Embassy Kabul staff,
    including locally employed staff and their families, were safely
    evacuated? If not, why not and what plans are in place to ensure they
    are able to depart Afghanistan? Can you explain the discrepancy between
    these two numbers? Do the 2,800 evacuees include formerly employed LES
    members?

        Answer. During the evacuation and relocation operations in August,
    locally employed staff members working for the United States in
    Afghanistan were evacuated with eligible family members. The figures
    noted represent the number of locally employed staff and the total
    number of people (i.e., locally employed staff and their eligible
    family members) who were safely evacuated.

        Question. What is the total number of Afghans who have worked under
    U.S. Chief of Mission authority in Afghanistan (both currently and
    formerly employed)?

        Answer. The number of Afghans who have been employed by Embassy
    Kabul and worked under U.S. Chief of Mission authority is estimated to
    be approximately 14,000 in the years since Embassy Kabul was re-
    established in 2001.

        Question. How many of those individuals have been evacuated from
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
    there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of
    the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to
    evacuate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel
    on August 30, of which 7 have requested assistance to depart
    Afghanistan.

        Question. How many of those individuals have successfully acquired
    SIV status? How many are still in the application stages?

        Answer. The Department is currently assessing how many Afghans who
    were relocated had outstanding Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    applications. Many of the Afghans relocated had submitted an SIV
    application that was moving through the multi-stage SIV process. Others
    had not yet begun the process or were in the first stages. The number
    of SIV applications in the pipeline changes daily as new applications
    are filed and others completed. We defer to the Department of Homeland
    Security on any questions regarding admission categories and adjustment
    of status.

        Question. Is the United States considering recognizing any
    government of Afghanistan that is under the direction or control of the
    Taliban or members of the Taliban? If so, what conditions would need to
    be met before the United States gave such recognition?

        Answer. As a general matter there is no requirement under
    international law to make a formal statement on recognition of
    governments. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
    Government is one we and the international community can work with. We
    have also made clear, as have our international partners, that any
    steps toward legitimacy and recognition must be earned. Assurances
    alone are not enough.

        Question. Who is the rightful leader of the Government of
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. Our focus in Afghanistan is on whether any Afghan
    Government is one we and the international community can work with. We
    continue to press the Taliban and Afghan leaders to form an inclusive
    government that respects the rights and dignity of all Afghans.

        Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to
    U.N. sanctions?

        Answer. There are 135 individuals and five entities associated with
    the Taliban that are currently designated under the UNSC's 1988 (2011)
    Taliban sanctions regime.

        Question. How many members of the Taliban are currently subject to
    United States sanctions?

        Answer. The Taliban organization was designated as a Specially
    Designated Global Terrorist by President George W. Bush in July 2002
    upon issuance of E.O. 13268, which amended E.O. 13224 by adding the
    Taliban to the annex of certain designated individuals and entities. We
    defer to the Department of the Treasury on specifics regarding numbers
    of individuals and entities designated.

        Question. Has the United States Government, any of its agencies, or
    any of its employees or agents (including contractors or any other
    persons working on behalf of the United States) given or donated any
    money or anything else of value to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or
    any member of the Taliban or Haqqani Network since April 14, 2021? If
    so, please specify the amounts of money or other items of value, the
    persons who provided the money or items of value, and the recipients of
    the money or items of value.

        Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
    Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
    Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We
    have accounted and will account for that, ensuring that all our actions
    are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

        Question. Is the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or any member of the
    Taliban or Haqqani Network requesting any payments of money or other
    items of value in exchange for permitting U.S. citizens, U.S. permanent
    legal residents, or SIV applicants to leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
    Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
    Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity. We
    have accounted and will continue to account for that, ensuring that all
    our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

        Question. In your testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
    Committee on September 14, 2021, you indicated, as a result of the
    February 29 Agreement brokered by the Trump administration, President
    Biden ``faced the choice between ending the war or escalating it.''
    Were any other options available that would have allowed the United
    States and its NATO allies to maintain existing levels of support to
    the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces?

        Answer. As I testified, the choice confronting President Biden was
    either to go forward with the commitments his predecessor had made to
    withdraw forces by May 1, or escalate, not end, the war with the
    Taliban. After the signing of the Doha Agreement, the Taliban refrained
    from any direct attack on U.S. and international forces. Had we
    maintained a military presence indefinitely, the Taliban made clear
    they would have resumed attacks against U.S. and NATO troops. We did
    not believe there was a middle ground where we could safely maintain
    the same number of troops.

        Question. Did military commanders on the ground indicate that they
    could adequately protect U.S. counterterrorism interest, prevent the
    collapse of the government, and protect Americans from Taliban and IS-K
    attacks?

        Answer. I defer questions about military assessments, planning, and
    preparedness to the Department of Defense.

        Question. What is the current status of Afghan military aircraft
    and personnel that fled to Uzbekistan?

        Answer. Following relocation of all 494 Afghan military
    servicemembers and their families out of Termez, Uzbekistan, to the UAE
    on September 13, these individuals are in the pipeline for further
    processing. Embassy Tashkent sought and has received assurances from
    the Government of Uzbekistan that the aircraft will not be returned to
    Afghanistan and Taliban control. The 46 air frames remain under the
    control of Uzbekistan. State defers to the Department of Defense on
    additional details regarding the status of Afghanistan aircraft
    currently located outside of Afghanistan.

        Question. Are there any concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan
    will actively allow the Russian Federation or People's Republic of
    China to gain access to the U.S.-origin military equipment,
    communications gear, or other sensitive technologies that escaping
    Afghan military personnel brought to Uzbekistan?

        Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
    ensuring that the U.S. military equipment that the Department of
    Defense (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and
    transferred to the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
    do not fall into the wrong hands. The Department defers all risk
    assessments related to this military equipment to the DoD.

        Question. Are there concerns that the Government of Uzbekistan is
    unable to properly guard this equipment until it can be retrieved?

        Answer. Embassy Tashkent submitted a diplomatic note to
    Uzbekistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs that affirmed U.S.
    responsibility for the aircraft that arrived in Uzbekistan in August
    via the Afghan Air Force. The diplomatic note further requested that
    the Government of Uzbekistan safeguard the aircraft, associated
    equipment and parts, and associated technical information; limit access
    to only officials of Uzbekistan and the U.S.; not operate the aircraft;
    and not transfer the aircraft, associated equipment, or technical
    information and data. Senior Government of Uzbekistan officials have
    confirmed that they will honor this U.S. request and have granted
    Embassy Tashkent officers access to inspect the aircraft.

        Question. Do you believe that the Government of Uzbekistan will
    return this equipment to Afghanistan and the Taliban?

        Answer. No. Senior Department officials have formally asked the
    Government of Uzbekistan not to return these aircraft to the Taliban.
    The Department has received high-level assurances that Uzbekistan will
    honor this request.

        Question. Did the United States inform NATO of its decision to
    begin a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) of U.S. citizens and
    at-risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on
    August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the NATO command and leadership
    did the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO,
    and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Albania of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Albania did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Belgium of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Belgium did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Bulgaria of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Bulgaria did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Canada of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Croatia of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Croatia did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform the Czech Republic of its
    decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
    announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
    whom within the Government of the Czech Republic did the United States
    communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
    date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Denmark of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Denmark did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Estonia of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Canada did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform France of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of France did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Germany of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Germany did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Greece of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Greece did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Hungary of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Hungary did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Iceland of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Italy of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Italy did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Latvia of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Latvia did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Lithuania of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Lithuania did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Luxembourg of its decision
    to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Luxembourg did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Montenegro of its decision
    to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Montenegro did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform the Kingdom of the
    Netherlands of its decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-
    risk Afghans, before announcing and undertaking that action on August
    14, 2021? If yes, to whom within the Government of the Netherlands did
    the United States communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and
    when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform North Macedonia of its
    decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
    announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
    whom within the Government of North Macedonia did the United States
    communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
    date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Norway of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Norway did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Poland of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Poland did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Portugal of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Portugal did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Romania of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Romania did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Slovakia of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Slovakia did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Slovenia of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Slovenia did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Spain of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Spain did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform Turkey of its decision to
    begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before announcing
    and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to whom within
    the Government of Turkey did the United States communicate its
    intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Did the United States inform the United Kingdom of its
    decision to begin an NEO of U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghans, before
    announcing and undertaking that action on August 14, 2021? If yes, to
    whom within the Government of the United Kingdom did the United States
    communicate its intentions to initiate the NEO, and when and on what
    date?

        Answer. Senior Department officials as well as embassies around the
    world were in close contact with our partners and allies prior to,
    throughout, and after the non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) in
    August. The Department of State redoubled its efforts to consult with
    international partners to inform counterparts of our series of ordered
    departures, beginning on April 27. USNATO briefed Allies August 12, and
    at several North Atlantic Council and committee meetings over the
    following days and weeks, on the U.S. drawdown and evacuations.
    Beginning on August 22, Deputy Secretary Sherman began a series of
    calls with partners and allies to discuss the NEO and U.S. policy in
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Putin has been strengthening Russia's security position
    In Central Asia in recent years, and, in August 2021, held military
    exercises on the border with Afghanistan. How worried are you about
    Russia and China strengthening their respective positions in Central
    Asia?

        Answer. The United States remains committed to close cooperation
    and strong engagement with the countries of Central Asia. We continue
    to engage productively with the region in the C5+1 format, through mil-
    mil cooperation, and by other means. While Russia has used the
    situation in Afghanistan to press its Central Asian neighbors for
    increased cooperation, the countries of Central Asia have made clear
    they have no desire to become dependent on any one country.

        Question. What do stronger Russian and Chinese presence in this
    region mean for the Biden administration's strategic pivot to focusing
    on great power competition with Russia and China?

        Answer. Russia and China have a stake in preventing global
    terrorism and regional instability. To the extent that their presence
    and influence supports these shared objectives, we are prepared to
    cooperate. Where their actions and preferences negatively affect our
    interests and those of our partners, we will push back forcefully. Our
    withdrawal from Afghanistan will free up significant resources and
    senior level attention to focus on strategic competition, which is one
    of the central challenges that will define the 21st century.

        Question. Moscow has been engaging the Taliban since at least 2014,
    and since 2018 hosted them for several rounds of peace talks. Russian
    officials also routinely met with the Taliban in Qatar over the years.
    They did so while simultaneously cultivating ties with the
    internationally-recognized Afghan Government in an attempt to position
    Russia as a peacemaker. Since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, it seems
    the Russian Government has concluded that the Taliban are a reality
    that they have to deal with, if not empower. Russia's presidential
    envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has called for unfreezing the
    Afghan Government's reserves or risk a spike in illegal narcotics and
    arms traffic. Russia, like China, abstained from the most recent U.N.
    resolution that merely called on the Taliban to live up to its
    commitments is one recent example. How do you see Russia's role in
    Afghanistan going forward?

        Answer. Russia has indeed sought to position itself as a peacemaker
    and will likely continue to do so. This role is motivated to a
    considerable extent by Russia's desire to assert itself as a global
    power. Russia also has serious concerns about Afghanistan's possible
    role as a haven for international terrorism, especially with respect to
    ISIS-K, and thus may be a useful partner for us in pressing the Taliban
    to adhere to the counterterrorism commitments of the U.S.-Taliban
    Agreement. Russia is unlikely to develop significant economic ties with
    Afghanistan.

        Question. Are you concerned about Russia empowering the Taliban and
    by extension possibly other terrorist groups/activities? What do you
    intend to do to prevent Russia from engaging in malign behavior in
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. Though Russia maintains its embassy in Kabul, the Taliban
    remain designated as a terrorist organization by Moscow, and senior
    Russian officials have repeatedly stated that they have no plans to
    recognize the Taliban Government. Russia has sought to strengthen ties
    with Afghanistan's neighbors in recent months more so than with the
    Taliban itself. We continue to engage with Russia to reiterate that we
    will not tolerate destabilizing behavior anywhere in the world.

        Question. How will Afghanistan impact the bilateral U.S.-Russia
    relationship? Will Afghanistan be a point of tension or cooperation?
    How important will this issue be within the U.S.-Russia relationship?

        Answer. Despite the tension in the broader U.S.-Russia relationship
    in recent years, Afghanistan has consistently been an area in which
    productive conversation is possible. Though our motives and preferred
    methods differ, there remains significant overlap in terms of several
    key goals, with counterterrorism and counternarcotic efforts chief
    among them. Afghanistan is likely to remain somewhat set aside from our
    various bilateral issues.

        Question. The 2019 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report
    notes a decline in opiate trafficking from Afghanistan along the so-
    called ``northern'' route, through Central Asia to Russia. While the
    threat posed by narco-trafficking to Russia appears to be on the
    decline, the threat posed to Western Europe appears to have increased
    significantly. Since Putin aims to weaken the West, how might Putin
    further capitalize on a scenario where more drugs are coming into
    Western Europe after U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan? What can be done
    now to prevent more drugs flowing into Western Europe?

        Answer. UNODC has reported declining seizures on the Northern Route
    since 2015. However, due to the inherent difficulties in researching
    illicit activities, a reduction in reported seizures does not
    necessarily correlate to a reduction in trafficking. In 2019 and 2020,
    there were major seizures of heroin in Kazakhstan and Eastern Europe
    that transited from Iran across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia and
    Russia. The Afghan drug trade is dynamic, and it is likely too soon to
    state with confidence that there has been a significant diminution of
    flow through Russia. With Russia suffering a massive increase in drug
    overdose deaths since the onset of the pandemic and instituting
    increasingly harsh drug-related laws in recent years, the Kremlin has
    significant reason to try to keep narco-trafficking out of Russia and
    Afghanistan. The Department of State's Bureau of International
    Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) works to strengthen our
    European partners' ability to combat organized crime and corruption
    which are key enablers of smugglers. INL seeks to strengthen law
    enforcement capacity to detect and interdict narcotics and other
    contraband smuggling along known trafficking routes, including the
    Balkans Route. Additionally, INL is increasing its efforts to
    strengthen the rule of law and law enforcement along Europe's
    periphery, which will help authorities to combat narcotics and other
    smuggling.

        Question. There has been much discussion about how our withdrawal
    from Afghanistan allows the U.S. to shift focus to other pressing
    foreign policy priorities, such as strategic competition with China.
    How do you view U.S. foreign policy priorities post-Afghanistan
    withdrawal, and what resources that had previously been focused on
    Afghanistan will be made available for those priorities?

        Answer. We are focused on strengthening our alliances and
    partnerships to address the issues that have greatest impact on the
    safety and well-being of Americans, including COVID-19, the climate
    crisis, cyber security, and the China challenge. We will continue to
    work with our partners to address enduring threats such as terrorism
    and nuclear proliferation and will remain engaged in holding the
    Taliban to its public commitments, including on counterterrorism, safe
    passage, and human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Department is
    currently reviewing all non-humanitarian programs and funding for
    Afghanistan. This review will inform decisions on what non-humanitarian
    assistance to the Afghan people should continue or be reprogrammed. We
    are assessing how much Diplomatic Engagement funding needs to be
    retained for Afghanistan policy and support, and what remainder could
    be available for other priorities, working with Congress.

        Question. Does the Administration believe that the United States
    and China share similar goals with respect to Afghanistan? Are there
    areas with respect to Afghanistan where the interests of the United
    States and the interests of China are different?

        Answer. We continue to engage with countries that border
    Afghanistan and countries in the region, including the People's
    Republic of China (PRC), on the importance of the international
    community holding the Taliban accountable for its public commitments
    and obligations. The PRC is an important regional stakeholder. There
    are certainly areas where our interests are aligned with the PRC
    regarding Afghanistan. The entire international community has a stake
    in ensuring the Taliban live up to their public commitments and
    obligations, not just on safe passage but also respecting the human
    rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls,
    and members of minority groups; upholding their commitments on
    counterterrorism; not carrying out reprisal violence against those who
    choose to stay in Afghanistan; and forming an inclusive government that
    can meet the needs and reflect the aspirations of the Afghan people.
    The world is united in what they expect the Taliban to do, and Beijing
    has to decide where it is in that effort.

        Question. What is your assessment of the implications should China
    be in a position to secure access to Afghanistan's mineral resources?

        Answer. Increased corruption in countries with major development
    projects backed by the People's Republic of China (PRC), including
    under the Belt and Road Initiative, is a serious problem. Corruption
    erodes economic benefits for local economies and populations,
    undermines the rule of law, fails to adhere to international
    environmental and social best practices, and at times prevents U.S.
    firms from competing. Corruption serves as a gateway to other
    criminality, such as money laundering; labor abuses; bribery; and
    trafficking in minerals, precious metals, and gemstones back to the
    PRC.

        Question. How do you expect India's security concerns and security
    environment to change in light of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan?
    How will U.S.-India collaboration change to account for these changes?
    What are Administration priorities for further deepening security
    collaboration with India, both related to developments in Afghanistan
    but also to ensure that the U.S.-India partnership maintains its focus
    on advancing shared goals in the Indo-Pacific?

        Answer. India has longstanding concerns about regional terrorism
    and instability in South Asia, which have grown more acute in light of
    the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. As noted in the recent leaders'
    joint statement between President Biden and Prime Minister Modi, the
    United States will continue to deepen counterterrorism cooperation with
    India and coordinate closely on developments in Afghanistan. U.S.-India
    security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific and beyond remains robust and
    we expect it to expand further in the foreseeable future.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                    Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

        Question. No one group has made more significant strides since 2001
    than Afghan women. In terms of the economy, women have come a long way
    since the fall of the Taliban regime. They returned to work by the
    hundreds of thousands, and many became business owners and
    entrepreneurs. Afghanistan rebuilt an education system that had
    basically stopped functioning. In 2001, only 900,000 students were in
    primary school--all of them male. Prior to the fall of Afghanistan,
    more than 9 million students were in school, with nearly 40 percent of
    them girls. How can the Administration hold the Taliban and Afghan
    Government to account in preserving the rights and gains of Afghan
    women without the support the U.S. military provided to Afghan forces
    and the check it served on the Taliban?

        Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
    the international community to support the gains that recognized the
    human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women
    and girls, over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint statement
    issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries at the
    U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community is
    deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their rights
    to education, work, freedom of movement, and assembly. We continue to
    expect the Taliban meet its public commitments to respect the rights
    and dignity of all Afghans, including women and girls, in terms of
    their meaningful participation in political processes and public life,
    as well as access to education and employment.

        Question. What is the U.S. planning to do to preserve the rights
    and gains of Afghan women and girls?

        Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
    the international community to support the gains made by women, girls,
    and members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the
    joint statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other
    countries at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international
    community is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly
    their rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of
    assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to
    respect the rights and dignity of all Afghan women and girls in terms
    of their meaningful participation in political processes and public
    life, as well as access to education and employment.

        Question. What is the Administration doing to ensure that any
    agreement with the Taliban preserves and respects the human rights of
    Afghan women and girls, as well as diverse religious and ethnic
    minority groups and other marginalized communities?

        Answer. We have been clear about our intention to work alongside
    the international community to support the gains that recognized the
    rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls, journalists, human
    rights defenders, persons with disabilities, LGBTQI+ persons, and
    members of minority groups over the past 20 years. As seen in the joint
    statement issued by the United States and more than 60 other countries
    at the U.N. Human Rights Council in August, the international community
    is deeply worried about Afghan women and girls, particularly their
    rights to education, work, freedom of movement, and freedom of
    assembly. We will continue to communicate to the Taliban the need to
    respect the rights and dignity of all Afghans, including women and
    girls, in terms of their meaningful participation in political
    processes and public life, as well as access to education and
    employment.

        Question. I remain concerned about specific groups that have worked
    closely with the U.S. Government, such as the U.S. Agency for Global
    Media (USAGM) employees and their families who are still in
    Afghanistan--comprised of more than 100 Voice of America and Radio Free
    Europe/Radio Liberty employees and their families who have not been
    evacuated. I am also concerned about the many women judges and court
    personnel who have been trained by American and international experts,
    such as the American judges affiliated with the National Association of
    Women Judges (NAWJ) here in the United States. And, I remain concerned
    about the employees of the Lincoln Learning Centers (LLCs) and their
    families, many who are still in Afghanistan. The LLCs comprised a
    network of 27 American Spaces, affiliated with the U.S. Embassy, which
    extended across Afghanistan and was managed through a cooperative
    agreement with an Afghan NGO, the Social Development and Research
    Organization for Afghans (SDROA). Part of a network of 600 American
    Spaces worldwide, LLCs served as locations where Afghans can learn the
    truth about the United States and our stance on the importance of
    democratic values like human rights and anticorruption. What steps are
    being taken to facilitate the safe passage of these Afghans at-risk,
    including the USAGM employees and their families, the women judges, and
    the LLC employees and their families?

        Answer. The United States will work vigorously with the
    international community to explore all options to support vulnerable
    populations in Afghanistan, including--but not limited to--women,
    children, persons with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community,
    members of minority groups, journalists and other at-risk populations.
    We are continuing to examine all available avenues for protection for
    this population. The State Department has established a team, led by
    the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
    interagency, including with USAGM regarding USAGM, RFE/RL, and VOA
    staff, and with other partners to facilitate freedom of movement for
    those who wish to leave Afghanistan including U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans.

        Question. Two weeks ago, I joined my colleagues in sending a letter
    to President Biden asking for assurances that vulnerable Afghans are
    paroled into the United States and not left in third countries awaiting
    processing and asks the Administration to create a designated parole
    category for certain Afghan women and children, activists, human rights
    defenders, parliamentarians, journalists, and others who are in danger.
    The general parole that Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
    announced last week only allows Afghans coming into the country,
    without any benefits or work authorization. Is the Administration
    looking into providing Afghans coming in under the parole program be
    allowed to received benefits and/or ability to work?

        Answer. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
    is the agency that adjudicates and grants parole. The Department of
    State does not grant parole and does not set policy related to parole.
    At the federally funded Department of Defense facilities, Afghan
    nationals are provided with housing and meals at no cost. They receive
    assistance in applying for a work authorization, are enrolled in
    temporary medical insurance, and receive additional medical care, if
    needed. Many evacuees are eligible to apply to adjust status under the
    Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program or other legal immigration
    pathway available to them. Afghans who adjust status under the Afghan
    SIV program will be eligible to receive the same benefits as any Afghan
    SIV visa holder admitted to the United States.
        On September 30, President Biden signed into law the continuing
    resolution to fund the government through early December. Among other
    items, the continuing resolution provides funds to help resettle Afghan
    allies in the United States and makes Afghan nationals eligible for
    expedited asylum processing, resettlement assistance, entitlement
    programs, child welfare support, and drivers' licenses if they passed
    background checks and were paroled into the United States by September
    30, 2022.

        Question. What commitments has the Administration secured from
    third countries to host Afghans for a sufficient duration to allow the
    Administration to process their SIV, P-1, P-2 visas, or humanitarian
    parole requests? What happens when someone is unable to secure a U.S.
    visa? Is asylum still a possibility in those countries?

        Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
    in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa
    (SIV) applications, including by transferring cases that are at the
    interview stage to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world
    where applicants are able to appear. We recognize that it is currently
    extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
    find a way to enter a third country. The U.S. Government is pressing
    the Taliban to provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their
    families, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with travel
    documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
    neighboring countries and Qatar (among others) to allow Afghans to
    enter. Afghan SIV applicants who are able to leave Afghanistan and
    whose SIV case is ready for interview may transfer their cases to any
    immigrant visa processing post. The Department of State has worked with
    various countries to host Afghans long enough to process their
    outstanding applications or transit to countries that will permit this.
    Asylum protections have been offered in certain countries, but the
    possibility for asylum as well as the outcome of any individual asylum
    requests will depend on third country asylum laws and policy as well as
    other factors. Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the
    process of relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens,
    Lawful Permanent Residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many
    countries have permitted Afghans to transit through their territories
    and many other countries made generous offers of support. Many
    countries have committed to permanently resettle Afghans. The United
    States has concluded international agreements with several countries to
    facilitate these activities, and the Department of State continues to
    follow its normal procedure for transmitting the texts of these
    international agreements to Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                      Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen

        Question. I understand the State Department is still working to
    determine the number of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants who
    remain in Afghanistan. These individuals and their families are in
    direct and imminent danger from the Taliban because of their service to
    their country and the U.S. mission. I also understand that State
    continues to process these applications, though it is unclear where and
    how. What steps is the Department taking, in partnership with the
    Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, to continue the
    processing of SIV applications for those who remain in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department of State continues to process outstanding
    Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications at all processing
    stages controlled by the Department, including the Chief of Mission
    approval process and administrative processing for those who have been
    interviewed. These stages of the process were conducted outside of
    Afghanistan even before we suspended operations in Kabul. I defer to
    the Department of Homeland Security for updates on its processing of
    the I-360 petition for special immigrant status. While it is difficult
    for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country, we are developing
    processing alternatives so we can continue to deliver these important
    consular services for the people of Afghanistan. Applicants in
    Afghanistan should continue to monitor their email for updates on their
    case statuses.

        Question. Does the Department of State have the capacity to
    continue all steps in the application process, including those that
    were previously done in Kabul?

        Answer. The Department of State continues to prioritize the
    processing of Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications,
    including by quintupling the number of people assigned to review cases
    at the Chief of Mission approval stage since May. The Department also
    continues to coordinate with the government contractor at the National
    Visa Center to increase efficiencies and reduce delays, including
    increasing the number of staff processing Afghan SIVs by seven-fold.
    The Department has established a team, led by the Coordinator for
    Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across government agencies and
    facilitate the freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

        Question. How quickly can those applications be processed?

        Answer. The Department of State is expediting the stages of the
    Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) application process within its control as
    much as feasible. The Department has supplemented staffing at the Chief
    of Mission approval stage of the process to ensure the cases are
    processed expeditiously. In addition, the Department has coordinated
    with the contractor at the National Visa Center to devote additional
    resources to expeditiously handle SIV pre-processing. We continue to
    prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV applicants. Although
    applicants will not be able to complete the visa interview portion in
    Afghanistan, we are expediting continued SIV processing at all other
    stages of the process outside of Afghanistan. We are prioritizing this
    effort, and our commitment to continue to provide services has no
    expiration date.

        Question. How is the State Department communicating with those
    applicants still in country to let them know of their options if they
    are able to secure safe passage out of Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department of State has added additional information to
    the Department's website to ensure applicants have the appropriate
    information to transfer their cases to another immigrant visa
    processing post.

        Question. I appreciate that the Administration is conducting a
    much-needed review of the Afghan SIV program. When can we expect the
    report on the process?

        Answer. Due to the exigent circumstances in Afghanistan, the
    Department of State and other interagency partners requested an
    extension of the deadline on the report required by E.O. 14013.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, can I receive your commitment that the
    State Department will brief Congressional offices on a weekly basis on
    the SIV process and broader resettlement efforts?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team looks forward to more regular
    engagements with partners in Congress. We appreciate the commitment of
    members of Congress to these issues and acknowledge an opportunity for
    more coordination moving forward.

        Question. In my recent conversation with NATO member ambassadors,
    many expressed a need for NATO to address regional stability following
    our withdrawal from Afghanistan, as well as ensuring that the Taliban
    does not once again harbor terrorists groups like Al-Qaeda and others,
    nor provide financial or logistical support to these groups. What can
    the United States and the Alliance do to ensure that Afghanistan does
    not become a haven for terrorists?

        Answer. Discussions with our NATO Allies are underway to determine
    how best to continue the Alliance's work in the current context to
    monitor, prevent, and potentially counter terrorist activity emanating
    from Afghanistan. NATO played an absolutely critical role in leading
    the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan until its termination in
    September, and we will continue to work with NATO Allies to address our
    shared interests.

        Question. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the decision to
    withdraw from Afghanistan and the hastened withdrawal has damaged the
    strength of the NATO alliance?

        Answer. The Alliance and U.S. standing within NATO remain strong.
    The June Summit that followed NATO's collective decision to withdraw
    troops showed the Alliance is unified and forward-looking. After 20
    years and a reassessment of where to position our militaries based on
    today's global threat picture, Allies agreed to end our military
    engagement in Afghanistan. NATO is the foundation of Euro-Atlantic
    collective defense. The Alliance has overcome divisive issues in the
    past because of the strength of our approach based on consultation and
    consensus.

        Question. What resources is the Department of State planning to
    mobilize in order to support our allies who are hosting Afghan refugees
    while visa processing is underway?

        Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
    partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
    Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
    resettlement. The United States coordinates closely with and provides
    funding to UNHCR to support its efforts to provide third-country
    resettlement to refugees around the world. We are in discussion with
    UNHCR which works with many other countries to resettle refugees,
    including those from Afghanistan. We commend countries who have already
    started to accept Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. And we
    strongly encourage countries in the region and those that border
    Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate with
    international organizations and other humanitarian partners to provide
    humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need. We also urge states to
    uphold their respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or
    asylum seekers to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle
    of non-refoulement.

        Question. After U.S. withdrawal completed, thousands at-risk
    individuals remain in Afghanistan at great personal risk. Charter
    aircraft have been ready to fly them to safety for weeks but the
    Taliban now refuses to allow their departure. How is the State
    Department engaging with the Taliban to allow the departure of charter
    planes, including from Mazar-E-Sharif?

        Answer. We are aware that some private entities have arranged for
    private charter flights out of Afghanistan. In many cases, the State
    Department does not have full visibility on the composition of the
    flight manifests for these private charters. We have been evaluating
    requests for assistance on a case-by-case basis to support privately
    organized flights. This support involves reviewing the passenger
    manifest provided to us by the private group or groups organizing these
    flights to see which proposed passengers, if any, are potentially
    eligible for permanent resettlement in the United States. We are also
    continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
    of free passage for those who wish to leave the country.

        Question. The people of Afghanistan face a humanitarian catastrophe
    with limited access to basic necessities. How is the State Department
    vetting non-government recipients of U.S. assistance inside Afghanistan
    to ensure that they are not under the coercion of the Taliban regime
    and are safeguarded from having their assets and operations seized by
    Taliban-controlled ministries?

        Answer. The U.S. Government has put multiple measures in place to
    help ensure ongoing humanitarian assistance does not support any
    individual or entity that is or has been engaged in, or supportive of,
    terrorist activities or other activities inconsistent with U.S.
    national security and foreign policy interests. This may include
    vetting, pre-award risk assessments, ongoing risk analysis processes
    that mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse, and carefully
    monitoring progress toward award objectives and achievement of expected
    results.

        Question. In cases where primary funding recipients are sub-
    contracting with other local entities, how does the State Department
    monitor funding to ensure it gets to the Afghan people in need rather
    than exploited by malign actors?

        Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
    humanitarians programs, the operating environment, and potential issues
    to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are planning for how they
    will make adjustments to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of
    continuing programs from outside Afghanistan, including through
    existing third parties, given the current footprint. Additionally,
    bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk that our programs
    could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This may include
    mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific program
    design to reduce those risks.

        Question. Noting that decades of evidence has demonstrated that in
    order to effectively address the needs of women and girls, the safety
    and security of female aid workers is critical--how is the
    Administration working right now to ensure that female humanitarian
    staff at every level are able to safely operate, including work
    directly consulting with Afghan women and girls on their priorities and
    needs, producing rapid humanitarian needs assessments, and designing
    and implementing humanitarian interventions?

        Answer. We are working with the international community to set
    clear, unified expectations for a united, inclusive, and representative
    government with the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women;
    for parties to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms; and for
    immediate, safe, and unhindered access for humanitarian actors. Our
    humanitarian partners are working with staff on the ground,
    particularly women staff, to identify the safest ways to reach women
    and girls with life-saving humanitarian assistance. Our humanitarian
    programs are designed to be flexible, and we are supporting partners to
    adapt to the new environment in line with the recommendations of the
    women most impacted.

        Question. Improving access to quality education, especially for
    girls, has been a key objective for U.S. foreign assistance in
    Afghanistan over the past two decades, and our investment has
    contributed to significant progress for Afghan children and youth. From
    2001 to 2021, the number of children enrolled in general education
    (grades 1-12) in Afghanistan rose from 0.9 million (with almost no
    girls) to 9.2 million (39 percent girls). The number of schools has
    also increased from 3,400 to 16,400.

      1.  Will the United States continue to support education in
            Afghanistan to protect these gains and prevent backsliding,
            especially for Afghan women and girls?

      2.  If so, how will the Administration ensure that aid does not end
            up in the hands of the Taliban?

        Answer. The United States is committing to supporting the Afghan
    people, especially women, girls, and members of minority groups. As I
    have said, humanitarian will continue to be provided in Afghanistan,
    including to women, girls, and members of minority groups. We will be
    very focused on monitoring this humanitarian assistance to help ensure
    it is not diverted and reaches those most in need. In addition, as I
    noted in my testimony, the Department of State will be appointing a
    senior official who will coordinate the U.S. Government's effort to
    support women in Afghanistan. At the same time, we are engaged
    diplomatically and coordinating with the international community to
    hold the Taliban accountable for respecting the human rights of women
    and girls.

        Question. Furthermore, will the Administration expand the license
    to operate humanitarian programs in Afghanistan to allow for continued
    education assistance?

        Answer. The Administration has been clear about its intention to
    continue to provide humanitarian assistance in support of the Afghan
    people. As part of an ongoing review of our assistance to support the
    Afghan people, the Department is determining whether community basic
    education programs that promote U.S. national interests and provide
    equal education opportunities for girls and boys should continue to the
    extent possible in support of the Afghan people. Prohibited
    transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to such
    activities are authorized by a specific license the Department of the
    Treasury updated on September 21.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                         Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine

        Question. On August 30, 2021, the Federal Aviation Administration
    (FAA) announced that, ``due to both the lack of air traffic services
    and a functional civil aviation authority in Afghanistan, as well as
    ongoing security concerns, U.S. civil operators, pilots, and U.S.-
    registered civil aircraft are prohibited from operating at any altitude
    over much of Afghanistan.'' Additional concerns have been brought to my
    staff that all International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
    certified Afghan national air traffic controllers departed the country
    during the evacuation. Qatar and Turkey are working to restore
    commercial flights at Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA), but
    these are dependent on negotiations with the Taliban-led government.
    Can you please update me on the Department of State's efforts to ensure
    air traffic control and management of Afghan airspace? Do Qatar and
    Turkey have the experience and equipment needed to facilitate the
    reopening of HKIA to commercial air travel and its safe operation over
    the long term? What, if any, assistance does the Department or the FAA
    anticipate providing to Qatar and Turkey in this regard?

        Answer. We recognize the need for Kabul International Airport (KIA)
    to resume normal operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously
    with the Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly,
    but also safely and securely. Qatar and Turkey share our view that
    there is an urgent need for humanitarian aid and safe travel. The
    Department of State will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve
    any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people
    valid with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have
    reiterated this point to the Taliban.

        Question. Will Qatar and Turkey's activities in support of Hamid
    Karzai International Airport (HKIA) operations--and that of any
    potential American contracting companies working with them--be
    considered activity subject to existing sanctions on the Taliban?

        Answer. Our top priorities are to minimize the disruption to
    humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, while still denying assets to the
    Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and other sanctioned entities and
    individuals. The international community needs to quickly coordinate on
    identifying both an international funding mechanism and civil aviation
    partners who can assist in creating the conditions necessary for
    aircraft insurance and safe flight operations, including cargo. For any
    further questions on sanctions, I refer you to the Department of the
    Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                     Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

        Question. Impartial international humanitarian organizations have
    raised serious concerns regarding their ability to continue assistance
    operations in Afghanistan given the Taliban are listed by the Treasury
    Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group. In
    order avoid unwanted negative impacts for Afghan civilians the U.S.
    Treasury must provide a broad OFAC general license covering all
    humanitarian activities. Will you commit to supporting such a license,
    perhaps modeled on the general license OFAC issued for Ansarallah in
    Yemen prior to the designation revocation, and work in close
    collaboration with the humanitarian community to ensure a license is
    issued quickly?

        Answer. On September 24, OFAC issued two general licenses
    authorizing the U.S. Government, certain international organizations
    (including the U.N. and its specialized agencies, such as the World
    Bank) and NGOs, and those acting on their behalf, to continue
    humanitarian assistance and other activities that support basic human
    needs in Afghanistan as well as the export to Afghanistan of critical
    food and medicine. These licenses and corresponding FAQs facilitate
    U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons--including NGOs and foreign financial
    institutions--to continue to support critical and life-saving
    activities like the delivery of food, shelter, medicine, and public
    health and medical services (including COVID-19-assistance) to the
    Afghan people. This follows past precedent in which the U.S. Government
    has taken steps to address urgent humanitarian needs in areas where
    sanctioned entities and individuals are active, such as in Yemen. The
    State Department fully supports continued humanitarian assistance and
    other activities that support basic human needs in Afghanistan as well
    as the export to Afghanistan of critical food and medicine.

        Question. Thousands of U.S. citizens, green card holders, and
    vulnerable Afghans were not evacuated prior to the departure of U.S.
    troops from Afghanistan. It is reassuring that efforts to evacuate
    vulnerable categories of individuals from Afghanistan have continued
    via negotiated evacuation flights and land crossings. Will you commit
    to continuing to process all requests and applications received by the
    Afghanistan Taskforce to secure safe haven for those who were not able
    to depart Afghanistan prior to the final withdrawal of U.S. troops? And
    specifically, will you clarify that P-2 category of the U.S. Refugee
    Admissions Program (USRAP) will be among those prioritized?

        Answer. The Department of State continues to receive and process P-
    2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). Once
    outside of Afghanistan, an individual can begin processing through the
    USRAP.
        We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
    to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
    country, and like many refugees, they may face significant challenges
    fleeing to safety. We are continuing to review the situation on the
    ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
    continue to evolve. We strongly encourage countries in the region and
    those that border Afghanistan to allow entry for Afghans and coordinate
    with international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to
    Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
    respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers
    to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
    refoulement.

        Question. Refugee Council USA and its nine national refugee
    resettlement agency members have advocated for the need to raise the
    U.S. refugee acceptance cap from 125,000 to no less than 200,000 for
    fiscal year 2022. Will you commit to working closely with President
    Biden to answer their call to raise the cap? If the cap is not raised
    above 125,000, how would the Administration provide for the needs of
    Afghans who do not receive refugee status either through new
    legislative action or pursuant to the 1980 Refugee Act?

        Answer. The President affirmed the United States' commitment to
    welcoming refugees by issuing the Presidential Determination (PD) on
    Refugee Admissions that raises the refugee admissions ceiling to
    125,000 for FY 2022. The State Department's Bureau of Population,
    Refugees, and Migration has engaged in listening sessions and worked in
    close coordination with U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)
    partners, including resettlement agencies, RCUSA, and federal and state
    partners. We are incorporating feedback into our efforts to rebuild the
    program and will continue to partner closely with them going forward.
    Persons admitted with Special Immigrant Visas or who have been paroled
    into the United States do not count against the refugee ceiling. We
    anticipate admitting significant numbers of Afghan refugees through
    USRAP in FY 2022, with a regional allocation for refugees from the Near
    East/South Asia (including Afghanistan) of 35,000 under the new PD. On
    September 30, President Biden signed into law the Afghanistan
    Supplemental Appropriations Act, which allows for certain Afghan
    nationals paroled into the United States to receive domestic refugee
    benefits in the United States and contains a provision requiring USCIS
    to expeditiously adjudicate asylum applications filed by certain Afghan
    nationals described in the Act.

        Question. What additional funds would be needed outside of the $6.4
    billion supplemental request to help resettle Afghans and other
    refugees to meet a 200,000 Presidential Determination in 2022?

        Answer. Congress appropriated $976.1 million in Emergency Refugee
    and Migration Assistance funds in the Afghanistan Supplemental
    Appropriations Act, 2022 for support for Operation Allies Welcome and
    related efforts by the Department of State, including additional
    relocations of individuals at risk as a result of the situation in
    Afghanistan and related expenses. Given the size, scope, and scale of
    this operation, the Department will continue to evaluate the
    requirements and may require additional funds to support urgent refugee
    and migration needs.
        The FY 2022 President's Budget requested sufficient funding to
    support the goal of up to 125,000 refugee admissions in FY 2022. On
    October 8, President Biden issued the Presidential Determination on
    Refugee Admissions for FY 2022, which raises the refugee admissions
    target to 125,000. If the President determines to increase the
    admissions target over this 125,000 target, the Department would need
    to consult with Congress and then reassess funding needs and may
    require additional funds.

        Question. Our NATO allies worked hand-in-hand with Afghan allies as
    part of the International Security Assistance Force mission. With the
    end of the mission the need to resettle vulnerable Afghans remains
    high. What commitments have other NATO allies given to accept
    vulnerable Afghans and refugees post drawdown of troops, and what
    diplomatic efforts are ongoing to ensure all NATO members, and other
    countries who committed to the mission, do their fair share to provide
    safe refuge to those in need?

        Answer. The United States consulted with Allies and partners
    throughout the process of ending NATO's military presence in
    Afghanistan, including on the resettlement of Afghans at risk due to
    their association with Allied countries or NATO. Many governments have
    already stepped up, accepting thousands of vulnerable Afghans into
    their countries. The process is ongoing, and deliberations continue at
    NATO and bilaterally with our NATO partners on how to support Afghans
    in need of protection and those who still wish to leave Afghanistan.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Cory Booker

        Question. On Monday, August 23, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst
    (JBMDL) was officially tasked by the DoD to serve as one of four
    military installations that will house Afghan Refugees as part of
    Operation Allies Welcome. JBMDL is currently housing 9,000 refugees,
    with the capacity to house a total of 13,000. I understand that JBMDL,
    in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and the
    Department of State, is providing all refuges with COVID-19 testing and
    offering vaccines, as well as full medical screening and other health
    services. What is the plan for these individuals and how long do you
    foresee them staying there?

        Answer. Afghan nationals who are paroled will be required to stay
    at a DoD facility until a tuberculosis screening has occurred, and
    vaccinations have been received followed by a 21-day quarantine period.
    At federally-funded facilities, Afghan nationals will be provided
    housing and meals at no cost. They will be able to apply for work
    authorization, be enrolled in temporary medical insurance, and receive
    additional medical care, if needed. They are matched with a
    resettlement agency affiliate in the United States and assisted with
    travel plans once that affiliate has indicated it is ready to receive
    the family at their final destination.
        We are already helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
    communities across the United States and expect to increase these
    movements significantly in the coming weeks. However, we do not have a
    timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who
    arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

        Question. Is the plan to eventually resettle them to civilian
    facilities while they await either the processing of SIVs or P visas or
    refugee status determinations?

        Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
    communities across the United States and expect to increase these
    movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to
    relocate Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they
    arrive in their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do
    not have a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for
    those who arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

        Question. If so, what plans are in place or being put in place for
    such a transition?

        Answer. We are helping Afghan arrivals move into welcoming
    communities across the United States and expect to increase these
    movements significantly in the coming weeks. We do not expect to move
    Afghan arrivals into another temporary facility before they arrive in
    their new homes in U.S. communities across the country. We do not have
    a timeline right now for the completion of all travel for those who
    arrived and are staying in DoD facilities.

        Question. As each military base currently participating in
    Operation Allies Welcome has a set capacity for housing Afghan
    Refugees, does the Department of State have plans to continue sending
    refugees to these installations as others are resettled? Or, will each
    installation's population diminish as they begin the resettlement
    process?

        Answer. We are already helping Afghans move into welcoming
    communities across the United States and expect to increase these
    movements significantly in the coming weeks. As these newcomers reach
    their final U.S. destination, there will be some new Afghan arrivals
    from those overseas military installations that were transit points in
    Operation Allies Refuge. Those new arrivals will go through the same
    medical, health, and work authorization processes for all arriving
    Afghans.
        As some individuals move to their new communities, and others
    arrive from overseas to domestic DoD facilities, the population at each
    facility will change. However, we do not have a timeline right now for
    the completion of all travel for those who arrived and are staying in
    DoD facilities.

        Question. Outside of resettlement, are there any plans to increase
    the number of translators, specifically female translators, at each
    military installation?

        Answer. We are working closely with the Departments of Defense and
    Homeland Security in ensuring that Afghan arrivals have safe conditions
    and are able to complete medical and immigration processing swiftly at
    each of the DoD facilities where they are being processed. For more
    information on interpretation, including any plans to increase the
    number of female interpreters, I defer to the United Coordination Group
    within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead for Operation
    Allies Welcome.

        Question. Are there any plans to utilize SIV translators currently
    housed at each base as official translators in partnership with NGOs?

        Answer. For more information on interpretation, including any plans
    to utilize Special Immigrant Visa interpreters, I defer to the United
    Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead
    for Operation Allies Welcome.

        Question. Does the Department of State have any plans to meet the
    increased demand for health care services--specifically women's health
    services--at military installations without robust local health care
    offerings?

        Answer. We are inviting all arrivals to take advantage of the
    services offered on military bases, such as applying for work
    authorizations and health care services. For Afghans who need
    specialized assistance, we are making a range of services available
    including basic family medicine; pediatric care; obstetric care;
    emergency medicine; basic laboratory, radiology, and pharmacy services;
    basic dental care; and psychosocial support and mental health services.
        For more information on the demand for health services and women's
    health care services at DoD facilities, I defer to the United
    Coordination Group within the Department of Homeland Security, the lead
    for Operation Allies Welcome.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio

        Question. In his speech to the American people on August 26,
    President Biden admitted that ``it could very well have happened'' that
    the U.S. military provided a list or multiple lists of names of
    American citizens, SIV holders and other vulnerable Afghans to the
    Taliban. Since then, members of the Biden Administration, including
    you, have issued confusing denials. On ``Meet the Press'' I believe you
    said that ``the idea that we shared lists of Americans or others with
    the Taliban is simply wrong,'' but then later on you said that there
    were instances where you shared ``names on a list of people on the
    bus'' with the Taliban. I sent a letter to President Biden on August 27
    asking for clarity on this. At any point during the evacuation of
    American citizens and vulnerable Afghans from Afghanistan, were the
    Taliban provided lists or names of any potential evacuees?

        Answer. We are also continuing to press the Taliban to live up to
    their public commitment of free passage for those who wish to leave the
    country. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic operational
    communications to the Taliban and in tandem with our allies and
    partners around the world. The Department of State did not provide
    names of any potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at
    any point during evacuation and relocation operations.

        Question. Who authorized sharing lists of potential evacuees with
    the Taliban?

        Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any
    potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point
    during evacuation and relocation operations.

        Question. Can you confirm that every person whose name was on such
    as list was safely evacuated?

        Answer. The Department of State did not provide names of any
    potential evacuees or relocated persons to the Taliban at any point
    during evacuation and relocation operations. As of September 1,
    approximately 124,000 people were relocated out of Afghanistan with
    U.S. support. Of these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who
    evacuated on or before August 31; between September 1 and November 9,
    we have assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful
    Permanent Residents.

        Question. Do you commit to rescuing those included on a list, but
    who wasn't evacuated?

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
    risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
    if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to
    facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave
    Afghanistan.
        We also recognize the need for international flights to resume
    regular operations and urge the Taliban to work expeditiously with the
    Qatari and Turkish authorities to ensure this is done quickly, but also
    safely and securely. We will continue to engage diplomatically to
    resolve any issues and to hold the Taliban to their public commitment
    to let people with travel documents freely depart Afghanistan. We have
    reiterated this point to the Taliban.
        We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
    to obtain a passport or a visa to a third country or find a way to
    enter a third country, and like many refugees, may face significant
    challenges fleeing to safety. The United States is working closely with
    allies and partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting
    vulnerable Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
    resettlement.

        Question. Do you commit to informing every individual that was
    included on a list of the potential threat they or their family members
    in Afghanistan may face?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August
    31, 2021, and a team at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, is supporting
    these functions. While the U.S. Government has withdrawn its personnel
    from Kabul, we will continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families
    in Afghanistan. Our team in Doha is managing our diplomacy with
    Afghanistan, including consular affairs, administering humanitarian
    assistance, and working with allies, partners, and regional and
    international stakeholders to coordinate our messaging to the Taliban.
        U.S. citizens are encouraged to register their presence through the
    Smart Traveler Enrollment Program to receive security alerts and
    updated information on travel in Afghanistan.

        Question. Over the long term, one of the most significant
    implications from this disaster will be our policy toward the Chinese
    Communist Party. In justifying the withdrawal of troops from
    Afghanistan, you personally made the case that it was in our national
    interest because our strategic competitors would like nothing more than
    to see the United States remain in Afghanistan. Do you still believe
    the Chinese Communist Party is committing genocide?

        Answer. I continue to believe that the Government of the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) is committing genocide and crimes against
    humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of
    other ethnic and religious minority groups in Xinjiang. These
    atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with serious
    consequences. I support using all appropriate tools, including those
    provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC
    to end these atrocities and to promote justice and accountability for
    the victims.
        Our strategic competitors like China and Russia--or adversaries
    like Iran and North Korea--would have liked nothing more than for the
    United States to continue to funnel billions of dollars in resources
    and attention into stabilizing Afghanistan indefinitely. We have
    significant vital interests in the world that we cannot afford to
    ignore.

        Question. Do you believe the Chinese Communist Party will enlist
    the Taliban in its efforts to wipe out Uyghurs and other Turkic
    Muslims?

        Answer. We continue to monitor relations between the People's
    Republic of China (PRC) and Afghanistan. Uyghurs and members of other
    religious and ethnic minority groups in Xinjiang have suffered
    unspeakable oppression, including genocide and crimes against humanity,
    at the hands of the PRC's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged
    in human rights violations and abuses that shock the conscience and
    must be met with serious consequences. The United States must speak out
    consistently and jointly with allies and partners, impose costs and
    sanctions on those responsible, and help those fleeing persecution.

        Question. Do you believe Beijing when it says that it is not
    interested in occupying Bagram Air Force base?

        Answer. We are aware of reports that Beijing claims it is not
    interested in occupying Bagram Air Base.

        Question. Do you trust the Chinese Communist Party to keep its word
    in any future climate negotiations?

        Answer. The United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not
    its words. We know that addressing the climate crisis will require
    significant additional action by the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    We conduct results-oriented diplomacy with the PRC in climate
    negotiations. Current climate commitments by the PRC are not sufficient
    to hold the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C. We and others
    in the international community continue to press for the PRC to
    increase its emission reductions in this critical decade to get on a
    Paris-aligned trajectory.

        Question. When will the Biden administration's China policy review
    be complete?

        Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will address the China
    challenge from a position of strength in which we work closely with our
    allies and partners. There is no doubt that China poses the most
    significant challenge of any nation to the United States in terms of
    our interests and the interests of the American people. The Biden-
    Harris administration approaches China through the lens of competition
    and recognizes that there are adversarial and cooperative aspects to
    the U.S.-China relationship.

        Question. Since the start of the evacuation, the Biden
    administration, and you, have consistently spoken of the need to work
    with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens and vulnerable Afghans
    out of the country. In your speeches with the Foreign Minister of Qatar
    and with Heiko Maas last week, you repeatedly referred to our
    ``engagement with the Taliban.'' It's puzzling to me that the State
    Department is now engaging with the Taliban, when just a few short
    weeks ago, U.S. Embassy officials in Kabul were shredding passports and
    visas in their possession, so that they're not being used for kill
    lists. At what point did the State Department's approach towards the
    Taliban change from worrying about it forming kill lists to target
    American citizens and vulnerable Afghans to now considering the Taliban
    essential is evacuating those same people?

        Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban concerning our
    vital national interests, including safe passage for U.S. citizens and
    others with valid travel documents. However, the legitimacy and support
    the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend on their
    adherence to their commitments on ensuring freedom of travel; to making
    good on their counterterrorism commitments; upholding the human rights
    and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans, including women, girls, and
    members of minority groups; naming a broadly representative permanent
    government; and forswearing retaliation.

        Question. In public statements, the State Department has described
    the al-Qaida-aligned Haqqani Network as somewhat independent of the
    Taliban. In fact, the Haqqani Network is indeed a critical part of the
    Taliban. Sirajuddin Haqqani has been the deputy leader of the Taliban
    since at least 2015 and has been named as the ``Acting Interior
    Minister,'' of the Taliban regime while Khalil Haqqani is the acting
    minister for refugees. The Haqqani Network, as you know, is a
    designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. When the State Department
    cooperated with the Taliban to evacuate American citizens, did State
    Department officials ever coordinate with members of the Haqqani
    Network?

        Answer. The Haqqani Network and the Taliban are distinct entities,
    but they are affiliated. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global
    Terrorist Entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign
    Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
    Entity. We have accounted for and will account for that, ensuring that
    all our actions are consistent with U.S. law and policy.

        Question. Looking to the future, as the Biden Administration
    considers the provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, how will
    you ensure that such aid does not benefit the Haqqani Network or other
    terrorist groups?

        Answer. State and USAID Bureaus are assessing their non-
    humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
    potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that process, bureaus
    are planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen the
    monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from outside
    Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given the
    current footprint. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard
    against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their
    supporters. These steps may include mitigation measures such as name
    check vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.

        Question. When the last American C-17 left Kabul on August 31,
    there were at least several hundred American citizens left in
    Afghanistan. My office, and I know other Senate offices as well, have
    received reports from U.S. citizens claiming that the Taliban are not
    allowing them to enter airports, either for lack of travel documents or
    in some instances, not being accompanied by a male guardian. This
    Administration, writ large, has made excuses for the decision to leave
    these Americans behind by claiming that many of these Americans have
    decided not to leave Afghanistan, because they are dual nationals
    wishing to stay with their families or because they just have responded
    to State Department emails coordinating their evacuation. What makes
    you so confident that these Americans truly do not, or did not, want to
    leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and
    their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies,
    and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping
    them depart Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. When the
    Department of State suspended Embassy operations in Kabul on August 31,
    2021, we were specifically aware at that time of approximately 100 U.S.
    citizens who still wanted to depart but due to the security situation,
    could not do so. The Department has made every effort to contact U.S.
    citizens who are interested in leaving Afghanistan, and our commitment
    to help them depart remains steadfast. Several U.S. citizens have told
    us on calls that they are not yet ready to depart for family or other
    reasons. As we have said, our mission to assist U.S. citizens and their
    families to depart Afghanistan has no expiration date, and we continue
    to assist U.S. citizens and their families in Afghanistan who wish to
    depart. We continue to assist U.S. citizens and their families with
    departing from Afghanistan. Between September 1 and November 9, we have
    assisted in the departure of 385 U.S. citizens.

        Question. Is it likely that some, if not all, want to leave but are
    being prevented from leaving?

        Answer. We will be relentless in our efforts to assist U.S.
    citizens and their families, Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans to depart
    Afghanistan, if and when they choose to do so. The U.S. Government is
    pressing the Taliban keep its public commitment to provide safe passage
    to U.S. citizens and their families, LPRs, and Afghans with travel
    documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
    countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.
        We are prepared to assist U.S. citizens and their families to
    depart Afghanistan when they are ready to do so, whether it is today,
    tomorrow, a year from now or longer. Interactions with some U.S.
    citizens and their family members currently in Afghanistan have
    indicated that they are not ready to depart at this time. While some
    have stated they consider Afghanistan their home and do not wish to
    leave, others are working to get their affairs in order before seeking
    to depart. Others have indicated hesitancy, as they do not want to
    leave extended family behind.

        Question. Is there the possibility that these dual nationals could
    be women whose more conservative family members are pressuring them
    into staying?

        Answer. The decision for an individual to remain in or leave
    Afghanistan is incredibly complex and personal. The Department of State
    is working closely with interagency partners and others to facilitate
    the departure of those who wish to leave Afghanistan.

        Question. In his first speech to the American people on August 16,
    President Biden had proudly announced that the U.S. Government had
    assisted in the evacuation of New York Times and Washington Post
    journalists from Afghanistan. Media reports have indicated that as many
    as 550 journalists of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of
    America and their families remain in Afghanistan. These are entities
    funded by American taxpayers through the U.S. Agency for Global Media.
    Why did this Administration prioritize the evacuation of New York Times
    and Washington Post journalists from Afghanistan, but not those
    journalists on the Government's payroll?

        Answer. We supported the movement of more than 124,000 people out
    of Afghanistan between August 14 and August 31. Among those were U.S.
    Government employees, Embassy employees, U.S. citizens, and many
    others, including journalists. Since August 31, we have worked closely
    with the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to evacuate USAGM-
    affiliated employees and family members. Many have already been
    relocated and we remain in close contact with USAGM regarding USAGM,
    RFE/RL, and VOA staff who remain in Afghanistan. Our USAGM colleagues
    will not be forgotten and continuing to relocate them is among our top
    priorities.

        Question. In the last few days before the evacuation ended on
    August 31, I believe the State Department had designated these
    journalists and their families as locally employed staff of Embassy
    Kabul so that they could be included in the final evacuation flights.
    Is this true?

        Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
    relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. support. At the time of the
    August evacuation, these Afghans included people who worked as staff of
    the U.S. embassy in Kabul and their families, those who served as
    translators and interpreters for our government, and other Afghans at
    risk.

        Question. If this is true, why were they not evacuated?

        Answer. A small number of embassy local employees chose not to be
    evacuated, for a variety of reasons. We remain in close contact with
    them to provide ongoing support.

        Question. How many other U.S. Government employed staff were not
    evacuated?

        Answer. During the evacuation operations in August, locally
    employed staff members working for the United States in Afghanistan
    were evacuated with eligible family members. A small number chose not
    to be evacuated and we remain in close contact with them to provide
    ongoing support.

        Question. What steps will you take to guarantee that the RFE/RL and
    VOA journalists will be evacuated?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation
    efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups,
    nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely
    across the interagency, including with USAGM, and with other partners
    to facilitate freedom of movement for those who wish to leave
    Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

        Question. In addition to American citizens, there are thousands of
    Afghans who worked alongside American service members, soldiers,
    diplomats and other staff that now face a real threat of death, because
    of their association with our nation. What is the status of the
    Priority 2 refugees' admissions program for journalists and those who
    worked for U.S.-funded humanitarian projects? Is the system at
    capacity?

        Answer. The Department continues to receive and process P-2
    referrals from U.S. Government employers and qualifying media and non-
    governmental organizations. After the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    has received a referral from a U.S. Government agency, a U.S.-based
    non-governmental organization, or a U.S.-based media organization, and
    the individual has relocated to a country where refugee processing can
    occur, the referred individual may contact PRM to begin processing
    their case. Individuals should follow the guidelines on wrapsnet.org to
    contact PRM. At that point, PRM will assign the case to a PRM-funded
    overseas Resettlement Support Center for processing.

        Question. We have received reports that the State Department is
    reluctant to allow P2 applicants to enter the U.S. processing system
    due to delays and its limited capacity. Is this true?

        Answer. This is not true. The Department is still receiving P-2
    referrals from U.S. Government employers, including the Department of
    Defense, and qualifying media and non-governmental organizations. It is
    not currently possible for the U.S. Government to process refugee
    referrals inside Afghanistan, so Afghan nationals who are referred for
    resettlement will be processed once they leave the country. While we
    are working expeditiously, there is no specific timeline nor a specific
    number of Afghan P-2 referrals that the Department expects to process
    in the next year.

        Question. If P2 applicants are not provided with direct entry into
    the refugee processing system, where do you expect them to go while
    their applications are pending given that they are being told it could
    take 1-2 years for their applications to be adjudicated?

        Answer. Individuals with urgent protection needs should follow
    procedures to register for international protection and assistance with
    the government of the country they are in. They may also register and
    seek assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
    (UNHCR). We are working with international humanitarian partners and
    other governments to seek ways to ensure those with protection concerns
    are able to receive the support they need while they await U.S. Refugee
    Admissions Program processing.

        Question. We have received reports of P2 applicants who are
    stranded outside of Afghanistan in countries that will not allow them
    to stay for more than a limited period. What is the Department doing to
    assist P2 applicants facing such a situation?

        Answer. For individuals who are in a third country and have
    contacted PRM, their case will be assigned to a PRM-funded Resettlement
    Support Center (RSC) for refugee processing based on the individual's
    location. The Administration has sought to increase the capacity of
    these RSCs to handle the anticipated surge in new cases as part of an
    overall larger USRAP program. Please note that most of PRM's RSCs work
    regionally and can process cases in some countries even if there is not
    a physical RSC presence. While we are working expeditiously, there is
    no specific timeline nor a specific number of Afghan P-2 referrals that
    the Department expects to process in the next year. In general, it
    takes approximately 12 to 14 months to process a refugee resettlement
    case from start to finish including pre-screening, the U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services interview, and rigorous security vetting.

        Question. It is my understanding that U.S. allies and partners in
    the region, such as Qatar, have provided critical support for the
    evacuation. Going forward, what is the Administration's plan to
    coordinate with these regional partners to ensure that U.S. citizens
    and vulnerable Afghans who have been left stranded in Afghanistan can
    be evacuated now that the U.S. has withdrawn?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate relocation
    efforts across government agencies and with advocacy groups,
    nongovernmental organizations, and others. The team is working closely
    across the interagency and with other partners to facilitate freedom of
    movement for those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S.
    citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and
    vulnerable and at-risk Afghans.

        Question. On September 2, the State Department said in the press
    briefing that 77 percent of those evacuated from Afghanistan are ``at-
    risk Afghans.'' More specifically, the State Department said that these
    are ``those Afghans to whom we have a special commitment.'' I assume
    that these include SIV and P2 status holders, but can you clarify which
    Afghans are included in this group?

        Answer. At the time of the August evacuation, these Afghans
    included people who worked as staff of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and
    their families, those who served as translators and interpreters for
    our government, and other Afghans at risk. This group includes a broad
    range of individuals who were at risk due to their association with the
    U.S. Government or support for our goals.

        Question. Does it include USAGM journalists?

        Answer. Yes.

        Question. Does it include Afghan women who are students at the
    American University of Afghanistan?

        Answer. While U.S. Government evacuation flights out of Afghanistan
    have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents
    (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans remains
    steadfast. We have no deadline for supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
    at-risk groups in Afghanistan such as the students, faculty, and staff
    of the American University of Afghanistan. The United States is
    committed to supporting equal access to education in Afghanistan. The
    Department continues to explore options for those who wish to depart,
    and we continue to advocate for the full resumption of commercial
    flights out of the airport in Kabul.

        Question. Does it include the former contractors and staff employed
    by the USAID programs?

        Answer. This group of evacuees includes a broad range of
    individuals who were at risk due to their association with the U.S.
    Government or support for our goals. While U.S. Government evacuation
    flights out of Afghanistan have ended, our commitment to U.S. citizens,
    Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable
    and at-risk Afghans remains steadfast. We have no deadline for
    supporting U.S. citizens, LPRs, and at-risk groups in Afghanistan, such
    as the staff and contractors employed to oversee and implement USAID
    programs. The United States continues to support humanitarian
    assistance in Afghanistan. The Department continues to explore options
    for those who wish to depart, and we continue to advocate for the full
    resumption of commercial flights out of the airport in Kabul.

        Question. Does it include Afghans who converted to religions other
    than Islam?

        Answer. The United States continues to advocate for the protection
    of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Afghans. The
    situation for so many Afghans is stark, and the needs remain great. We
    will continue to support the Afghan people through diplomacy,
    international influence, and humanitarian aid.
        We understand that the Taliban have targeted certain populations
    among Afghan civilians in the past and denied access to services for
    members of vulnerable populations. The United States will work
    vigorously with the international community to explore all options to
    support members of vulnerable populations in Afghanistan including--but
    not limited to--women, children, journalists, persons with
    disabilities, LGBTQI+ individuals, and members of the ethnic and
    religious minority groups. We also continue to call on the Taliban to
    protect freedom of movement for all Afghans and allow the departure of
    those who seek to leave Afghanistan.

        Question. With regard to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan,
    you personally justified the decision as being in the national interest
    of the United States. You even stated that our strategic competitors
    would like nothing more than to see the United States remain in
    Afghanistan. While I have long argued that the United States must focus
    on addressing the threat posed by authoritarians around the world, it's
    clear to me that the execution of this withdrawal has dramatically
    undermined the credibility we need to address the threat posed by these
    dictators. Already the Kremlin has used the withdrawal to call into
    question the American commitment to protect Ukraine. What is the State
    Department doing to reassure our allies and partners abroad of American
    defensive commitments?

        Answer. The Department and our interagency colleagues are deeply
    engaged globally in strengthening and broadening security cooperation
    with U.S. forces. In addition to our close cooperation with NATO, the
    recently concluded Special Measures Agreement with Korea, negotiated by
    the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, is evidence of the value our
    allies and partners place our cooperation. The United States is firmly
    committed to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and it
    remains the top security assistance recipient in Europe. In FY 2021,
    the U.S. Government provided $393 million in security assistance to
    Ukraine. Our values and commitment to international norms set us apart
    from Russia in reassuring our allies and partners.

        Question. Afghanistan was a major non-NATO ally, to whom we had
    made commitment to support and defend. Having abandoned Afghanistan,
    how will we assure allies and partners, like Ukraine, that also face
    significant military threats from authoritarian states?

        Answer. The State Department is committed to building enduring
    security ties with allies and partners around the world to advance our
    national security. As I have said, there is nothing that our
    competitors and adversaries would have liked more than for the United
    States to re-up a 20-year war and remain bogged down in Afghanistan for
    another decade. Regarding Ukraine specifically, the United States is
    firmly committed to Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and
    territorial integrity, and it remains our top security assistance
    recipient in Europe. In FY 2021, the U.S. Government provided $393
    million in security assistance to Ukraine, including an additional $60
    million in equipment and services via Presidential Drawdown Authority,
    highlighted during President Zelensky's September 1 White House visit
    as a symbol of our deepening strategic partnership and support for
    Ukraine in the face of ongoing Russian aggression. Further, the
    President's FY 2022 budget request continues to reflect Ukraine as the
    top priority within Europe for out-year resources. We appreciate the
    robust Congressional appropriations that have allowed us to support
    Ukraine as a foreign policy priority.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Ron Johnson

        Question. Secretary Blinken, on August 27, 2021, I sent a letter to
    you and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin regarding a reported incident
    on August 26, 2021, in which it has been alleged over 400 individuals,
    including U.S. citizens, were turned away from the evacuation site at
    Hamid Karzai International Airport. The letter (attached) included four
    questions related to the alleged event, which I will repeat here.
    Please answer the following: Is the Department of Defense and/or the
    Department of State aware of this alleged incident? If so, is there an
    open investigation into this matter?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
    related to the security of and access to the airport.

        Question. It is hard to believe that any U.S. military official
    would deny Americans the ability to evacuate Afghanistan. If this did
    in fact occur on August 26 (or any other date), what generalized or
    specific order was given to the commander that caused him to take such
    action?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
    related to security of or access to the airport.

        Question. Who gave the order to this commander? Please provide that
    individual's name, title, and department/agency. Where did this order
    ultimately originate?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense for all questions
    related to security of or access to the airport.

        Question. What actions are being taken to locate and evacuate the
    American citizens that were allegedly turned away?

        Answer. Our mission to assist U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan
    has no deadline, and we are continuing to assist U.S. citizens and
    their families in Afghanistan who wish to depart. I defer to the
    Department of Defense for all questions related to security of or
    access to the airport.

        Question. Please describe in detail the vetting process for
    evacuees from Afghanistan.

        Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
    arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
    Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
    vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
    eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
    includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
    professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
    other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
    and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
    national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
    with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
    primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
    inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
    process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
    and national security.

        Question. During the hearing, you stated that there was a round of
    vetting in third countries and another round once individuals arrived
    in the United States. Please explain each stage in detail, including
    what vetting was performed in Afghanistan before individuals were
    allowed to board planes, in third countries, and after arrival in the
    U.S.

        Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
    arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
    Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
    vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
    eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
    includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
    professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
    other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
    and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
    national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
    with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghan evacuees undergo a
    primary inspection when they arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary
    inspection is conducted as the circumstances require. The vetting
    process is ongoing to ensure the continued protection of public safety
    and national security.

        Question. Please explain how we are verifying the identities of
    evacuees and establishing the identities of those without
    identification papers.

        Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
    community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
    Border Protection, who are responsible for recording the arrival and
    processing the parole into the United States of evacuees.

        Question. Are we asking U.S. service members to participate in the
    identification process?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information
    relating what role its personnel may play in this process.

        Question. Are we seeking personal confirmations or recommendations
    from U.S. service members?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Defense for information on
    what role its personnel may play in this process.

        Question. What databases are we comparing identification
    information against?

        Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
    community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
    Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.

        Question. How confident are you that the databases being used
    contain sufficient information to detect matches?

        Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
    community, including the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and
    Border Protection, who are responsible for performing this work.

        Question. Are we conducting biometric screening on each evacuee,
    and if so what does this entail?

        Answer. I refer you to the interagency screening and vetting
    community, including the Department of Homeland Security/Customs and
    Border Protection, which is responsible for performing this work.

        Question. Has the Department of Defense kept accurate and up-to-
    date records of individuals who have worked for the U.S. in
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. I defer all questions regarding employment with the
    Department of Defense to the Department of Defense.

        Question. What gaps do you believe exist in the information
    available for identification?

        Answer. The Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program is open to
    individuals who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government,
    including U.S. Government contractors, and individuals who worked for
    the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) or its successor
    mission. Applicants must provide proof that they meet the statutory
    requirements for this visa program including proof of identity and
    nationality, length of employment, letters of recommendation from a
    direct supervisor or senior official, and other information. In many
    circumstances applicants are unable to provide all of the required
    documents. U.S. Government contracting files often do not contain
    information on the individuals who worked for specific contractors or
    the period of time an individual was employed for a contractor under a
    specific contract. To confirm this information, the Afghan SIV unit
    must review information from the individual contractor, if they can
    locate them, to confirm the applicant's eligibility. This information
    is then reviewed by the Chief of Mission (COM) in determining whether
    to grant an applicant COM approval.

        Question. Please provide the number of evacuees that do not have
    identification.

        Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for
    recording the arrival and processing the parole of all Afghan evacuees
    into the U.S. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding
    identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently
    in the United States.

        Question. Are there individuals whose identities remain
    unconfirmed, and if so how many?

        Answer. I defer to Department of Homeland Security regarding
    identification procedures conducted among relocated Afghans presently
    in the United States.

        Question. What security measures are in place for individuals
    without confirmed identities?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security for more
    information on security measures and requirements for admittance or
    parole into the United States.

        Question. How many of the individuals among the Afghan evacuees are
    believed to be criminals or possible threats to U.S. national security?

        Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered
    screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States
    and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This
    process includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
    professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
    other Intelligence Community partners. I defer to the Department of
    Homeland Security for more information regarding any such identified
    individuals.

        Question. Are there individuals among the Afghan evacuees who have
    been specifically identified as taking up arms against the United
    States or our allies, or providing assistance to our enemies?

        Answer. Our Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered
    screening and vetting process before they can enter the United States
    and are eligible to resettle in communities across our country. For
    further information, I defer to the Department of Homeland Security.

        Question. What is being done with those individuals when found? Are
    we detaining those individuals, deporting them, etc.?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as its
    component entities coordinate the interagency screening process, make
    final decisions on clearance for travel, parole, and related issues,
    and would take any action on detention or removal of a foreign national
    from the United States.

        Question. Please provide the number of Afghan evacuees that have
    been denied entry into the United States due to vetting.

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which
    has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who relocate.

        Question. Please provide the reason(s) for denial (ties to
    terrorism, evidence of taking up arms against the United States,
    criminal background, etc.).

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, which
    has responsibility for the vetting of Afghans who are relocated.

        Question. Are you confident that the process in place is sufficient
    to keep out individuals seeking to harm the United States?

        Answer. Yes. The Department of State is a part of the whole-of-
    government effort to appropriately screen and vet all potential
    travelers to the United States. We and other U.S. Government agencies
    have decades of experience working together to perform this critical
    work not just for these evacuees but for every traveler to the U.S.

        Question. Has the U.S. Government identified any evacuees that were
    previously detained or incarcerated by U.S. forces in Afghanistan or
    elsewhere?

        Answer. I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, as
    Customs and Border Protection coordinates the interagency screening and
    vetting process and makes final decisions on clearance for travel,
    parole, and related issues.

        Question. How many Afghan evacuees have been identified as
    Unaccompanied Alien Children?

        Answer. As of October 15, our partners conducted over 300 best
    interest assessments for identified unaccompanied children outside the
    United States. Prior to arrival in the United States, the Department of
    State supports international organization partners to conduct best
    interest assessments for known unaccompanied children when possible.
    All unaccompanied children are referred to HHS's Office of Refugee
    Resettlement upon arrival in the United States. The Department of State
    works closely with HHS to facilitate reunification of children with
    their caregivers.

        Question. There are reports of male evacuees at Ft. McCoy and
    elsewhere that have presented much younger, underage females as their
    wives. Can you confirm these cases and whether any of these individuals
    have made it into the United States?

        Answer. We are aware of these reports and are working closely with
    the Department of Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on any
    protection-related concerns at the safe havens. We have provided
    guidance, developed in consultation with the Department of Health and
    Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), to staff to
    help them look out for such cases and provide appropriate referrals for
    protective services. Any children arriving without a parent or legal
    guardian are referred to the Department of Health and Human Services
    (HHS) Office of Refugee Resettlement (HHS/ORR), including married
    minors.

        Question. How many cases of possible underage marriages have been
    reported?

        Answer. The State Department does not independently track these
    figures. We understand cases have been reported. Any children arriving
    without a parent or legal guardian are referred to HHS/ORR, including
    married minors. I defer to HHS/ORR for specific figures.

        Question. What guidance has been given regarding child brides and
    forced marriage?

        Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child and forced
    ``marriages'' very seriously and has worked closely with interagency
    partners to identify and respond to any cases that have been uncovered.
    HHS/ORR is notified regarding any children arriving without a parent or
    legal guardian, including married minors. The Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) is now the lead agency on protection of vulnerable
    populations at the CONUS safe havens. I refer you to DHS for further
    information on child brides and forced marriages, including guidance.
    At the OCONUS lily pads, the Department of State is supporting
    international organizations to help identify cases involving child and
    forced ``marriages'' and refer them to appropriate services, when
    possible.

        Question. Is the first stage of vetting in third countries failing
    to identify and address these alleged incidents?

        Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to
    staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. There have not
    been many cases, but when staff identified them, appropriate action was
    taken in accordance with humanitarian standards and relevant
    immigration laws and practices.

        Question. What is being done when possible cases of forced
    marriage, underage marriage, and polygamy are detected?

        Answer. We are aware of these reports. We have provided guidance to
    staff to help them be on the lookout for such cases. When staff
    identified them, appropriate action was taken in accordance with
    humanitarian standards and relevant immigration laws and practices.

        Question. There are also reports of child brides being sexually
    abused and assaulted by older male evacuees. Where have these alleged
    assaults occurred?

        Answer. The Department of State takes instances of child
    ``marriage'' and abuse very seriously and has worked closely with
    interagency partners to identify and respond to any cases that have
    been uncovered. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is now the
    lead agency on protection of vulnerable populations at the CONUS safe
    havens. I refer you to DHS for further information on gender and child
    protection services. Regarding incidents involving abuse, since these
    are open law enforcement matters, I refer you to the Department of
    Justice for further information. Afghan parolees are expected to abide
    by the laws of the United States, both while in Department of Defense
    (DoD) installations and as resettled members of local communities.
    Incidents of criminal behavior on DoD installations are not tolerated
    and will be referred to law enforcement for appropriate action.

        Question. What guidance, if any, has been issued to National
    Guardsmen or other U.S. officials in the United Arab Emirates and
    elsewhere for when they witness such abuse or assaults or receive a
    report of such?

        Answer. All U.S. officials are encouraged to report abuse or
    assault when they witness it or receive reports of it, and some U.S.
    officials are required to do so, including reporting certain instances
    of child abuse pursuant to 34 U.S.C.  20341. Protection of vulnerable
    persons, including those fleeing Afghanistan, is a top priority. U.S.
    partner organizations similarly work under strict codes of conduct
    meant to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.

        Question. We have all seen photos and video footage of what appears
    to be fully functioning U.S. equipment in Taliban hands. Please
    describe in detail what U.S. military equipment was left behind after
    the withdrawal.

        Answer. The vast majority of equipment transferred to the Afghan
    military was provided through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, a
    Department of Defense (DoD)-managed fund under its Title 10 authority.
    DoD is responsible for monitoring and tracking the types and quantities
    of equipment transferred to a foreign government under Title 10
    authorities or U.S. security assistance and security cooperation
    programs. I defer to DoD for this information.

        Question. White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan was
    quoted in the press as saying, ``We don't have a complete picture,
    obviously, of where every article of defense materials has gone, but
    certainly a fair amount of it has fallen into the hands of the
    Taliban.'' Please detail what was not destroyed or made inoperable.

        Answer. The Department of Defense (DoD) determined which pieces of
    equipment to destroy or render inoperable by unauthorized users. I
    defer to DoD to provide this information.

        Question. During the hearing, you stated that some of this
    equipment will become inoperable because the Taliban will not be able
    to maintain it. Is there an assessment of if and how much of the
    equipment you referenced can be maintained with assistance from foreign
    sources, e.g., China, Russia, etc.?

        Answer. We are not aware of any offers Russia or China have made to
    the Taliban regarding the sustainment of U.S.-origin equipment. DoD or
    the intelligence community will be better positioned to assess the
    Taliban's level of technical expertise and its ability to maintain the
    equipment, with or without assistance from foreign sources.

        Question. Has the U.S. seen evidence of any of that equipment being
    sold to, transferred to, or inspected by Iran or other foreign nations?
    Please provide as much unclassified information as possible.

        Answer. The State Department has not received any verifiable
    reports of equipment that is being sold to, transferred to, or
    inspected by Iran. The Department of State continues monitoring
    reports, including for any information that may indicate that such
    transactions are taking place, at which point we would work with the
    DoD to determine how to respond. There are some assets that were out of
    the country when the Taliban took control of Kabul, and others were
    flown out of the country by Afghan Air Force personnel. The State
    Department is working with the interagency to safeguard and determine
    the disposition of these assets together with the partner nations where
    they reside.

        Question. Secretary Blinken, you stated that approximately 124,000
    people were evacuated from Afghanistan. Please break down that figure
    according to U.S. citizens, citizens of NATO allies, SIV applicants and
    their families, Afghans with valid visas, P2 applicants, and other
    relevant categories.

        Answer. Of the approximately 124,000 people evacuated or relocated
    from August 14 to August 31, approximately 60,000 were brought to the
    United States as of September 14. Of those 60,000, approximately, seven
    percent are U.S. citizens, six percent are Lawful Permanent Residents,
    three percent hold Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs), and the rest are
    individuals either referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    through the P-1/P-2 program or otherwise vulnerable Afghans, the
    majority of whom worked with the United States. We believe
    approximately 50 percent of these may be eligible for SIVs.

        Question. Please explain the differences in the vetting process for
    Afghans in these particular categories, if applicable.

        Answer. Before visa issuance, Afghan Special Immigrant Visa
    applicants are reviewed at several stages of the application process.
    First, they are reviewed by the Chief of Mission for eligibility for
    the program. Subsequently, the Department of Homeland Security conducts
    a TECS search during the I-360 petition for special immigrant status
    approval process. At the visa interview, the consular officer will take
    biometric fingerprints for security vetting and review Department of
    State systems to determine whether an applicant requires additional
    security processing before the visa can be issued.
        We will also continue to assist Afghans who may be eligible for
    referral to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Afghans eligible and
    referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) must be outside
    of Afghanistan in a third country for their cases to be processed.
    Afghan applicants in the USRAP pipeline are subject to the same vetting
    process as all refugee applicants. They undergo an interagency security
    vetting process and the Department of Homeland Security's U.S.
    Citizenship and Immigration Services (DHS/USCIS) officers conduce
    extensive in-person interviews overseas to verify identity, establish
    eligibility, and identify information that could render an applicant
    inadmissible. DHS/USCI makes the final security determination and only
    DHS has the legal authority to grant a refugee admission to the United
    States.

        Question. Please estimate how many SIV applicants and P2 referred
    applicants remain in Afghanistan and what is being done to assist their
    evacuation post-U.S. withdrawal.

        Answer. We do not have estimates of how many Special Immigrant Visa
    applicants or P2-referred applicants remain in Afghanistan. We continue
    to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
    and when they choose to do so.

        Question. Given that applicants do not currently hold U.S. visas,
    are they able to leave?

        Answer. We are consistently and diligently working with our
    partners in the region, across U.S. government agencies, and with
    partners in the private sector to explore all options to assist in the
    ongoing relocation of U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. We will continue to engage diplomatically to resolve any
    issues and to hold the Taliban to their public pledge to let people
    with travel authorization, including U.S. citizens and their families,
    freely depart Afghanistan. We have reiterated this point to the
    Taliban.

        Question. Please describe your strategy and options available for
    preventing the Taliban from blocking SIV applicants from leaving the
    country or detaining and mistreating them due to their service to the
    United States.

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
    risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
    if and when they choose to do so. We will continue our efforts to
    facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, and
    Afghans to whom we have a commitment and who wish to leave Afghanistan.
    Because there is an ongoing terrorist threat to operations of this
    nature, we will not be sharing details of these efforts before people
    are safely out of the country.
        We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
    transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
    world where applicants are able to appear. We know it is currently
    extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
    to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing
    processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
    important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. We are also
    continuing to press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment
    of free passage for those who wish to leave the country including
    Afghans at risk. We are doing this in our direct and pragmatic
    operational communications with the Taliban and in tandem with our
    allies and partners around the world.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney

        Question. My office has heard multiple reports--including from
    Special Forces veterans and NGOs working to evacuate the SIV holders,
    SIV applicants, and at-risk Afghans whom they've worked with for
    years--indicating that the State Department has been recommending third
    countries not accept them. Is this accurate? Please explain in detail.
    If so, what is the State Department's plan to resolve these concerns
    and ensure that at-risk Afghans--especially those already vetted SIV
    holders--are able to evacuate before being further subjected to
    brutality at the hands of the Taliban?

        Answer. The State Department has established a team, led by the
    Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts, to coordinate across
    government agencies and with advocacy groups, nongovernmental
    organizations, and others. The team is working closely across the
    interagency and with other partners to facilitate for the departure of
    those who wish to leave Afghanistan, including U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans.

        Question. Will the change of the U.S. intelligence posture in
    Afghanistan make it more difficult to review SIV applications, and
    specifically do you expect the withdrawal to lengthen the already
    oftentimes years-long timeframe it takes to review and make a decision
    on an application?

        Answer. The Department of State does not anticipate the U.S.
    intelligence posture will impact Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    processing timelines. Most aspects of SIV application processing
    occurred outside of Afghanistan even before the U.S. withdrawal from
    the country. The Department is expediting SIV processing at all stages
    within our control. Currently, the main impediment to issuing Special
    Immigrant Visas for Afghans who have completed the Chief of Mission
    approval process is the suspension of operations at the U.S. embassy in
    Kabul. While we are currently unable to provide consular services in
    Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at all points
    of the process, including by assisting to transfer cases to other U.S.
    embassies and consulates around the world where applicants are able to
    appear. We recognize it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans to
    obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
    country. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide safe
    passage to U.S. citizens, Lawful Permanent Residents, and Afghans with
    travel documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
    countries in the region, like Qatar, and those that border Afghanistan
    to allow Afghans to enter.

        Question. What is the State Department plan for people who safely
    made it to third countries, but subsequently fail the vetting process?

        Answer. Intelligence, law enforcement, and security professionals
    are conducting screening and security vetting, using biographic and
    biometric data, for all Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants and
    other vulnerable Afghans before they are allowed into the United
    States. If someone does not pass these checks while they are still
    overseas, the State Department will work with partners and allies
    around the world to identify countries that will accept Afghans for
    relocation.

        Question. Which U.S. allies and partners have agreed to permanently
    take at-risk Afghans?

        Answer. The United States is working closely with allies and
    partners on our shared objective of quickly assisting vulnerable
    Afghans including by providing humanitarian aid and refugee
    resettlement.
        The United States coordinates closely with and provides funding to
    UNHCR to support their efforts to provide third-country resettlement to
    refugees around the world. We are in discussion with UNHCR who works
    with many other countries to resettle refugees, including those from
    Afghanistan.
        We commend other countries who have already started to accept
    Afghan refugees who are in need of protection. We strongly encourage
    countries in the region and those that border Afghanistan to allow
    entry for Afghans and coordinate with international organizations and
    other humanitarian partners to provide humanitarian assistance to
    Afghans in need. We also particularly urge states to uphold their
    respective obligations to not return Afghan refugees or asylum seekers
    to persecution or torture, and to respect the principle of non-
    refoulement.

        Question. What is the state of negotiations for third countries
    that are taking SIVs during processing?

        Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
    in Afghanistan, we will continue to process Special Immigrant Visa
    (SIV) applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
    transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
    world where applicants are able to appear.
        We recognize that it is currently extremely difficult for Afghans
    to obtain a visa to a third country or find a way to enter a third
    country. We are developing processing alternatives so that we can
    continue to deliver these important consular services for the people of
    Afghanistan. This effort is of utmost importance to the U.S.
    Government.
        Partners around the globe have been instrumental in the process of
    relocating Afghan nationals, as well as U.S. citizens, lawful permanent
    residents, and personnel from partner nations. Many countries have
    transited Afghans through their territories and many other countries
    made generous offers of support. Many countries have committed to
    permanently resettle Afghans. The United States has concluded
    international agreements with several countries to facilitate these
    activities, and the Department of State continues to follow its normal
    procedure for transmitting the texts of these international agreements
    to the Congress, consistent with 1 U.S.C. 112b.

        Question. The State Department, through its Rewards for Justice
    Program, is offering a reward of $10 million for information that leads
    to Sirajuddin Haqqani's arrest. He's wanted in connection with the
    Serena Hotel suicide bombing attack in Kabul in 2008 that killed
    American Thor Hesla, as well as five others, including a number of
    Norwegians. He tried to assassinate Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He
    oversaw the day-to-day operations of the Haqqani network, infamous for
    their brutality and attacks such as a 2017 car bomb that massacred 170
    people and wounded hundreds. This is a man who has directed brutal
    indiscriminate killing. This is the man who was just named Acting
    Interior Minister by the Taliban. Does the State department plan on
    maintaining the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin Haqqani (who was
    recently named Acting Interior Minister)?

        Answer. The Taliban is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist
    entity, and the Haqqani Network is a designated Foreign Terrorist
    Organization; and we have and will account for that, ensuring that all
    we do is consistent with U.S. law and policy. No decision has been made
    yet on whether to maintain the $10 million bounty on Sirajuddin
    Haqqani. The Department will consult with our interagency partners on
    this issue and make a determination that is based on the best interests
    of the United States. The State Department does not comment on such
    deliberations.

        Question. What exactly does the Acting Interior Minister do, and
    does he have a role in allowing or disallowing people to leave the
    country?

        Answer. The Ministry of Interior has traditionally had
    responsibility for Afghanistan's police force and some aspects of the
    country's internal security. Ministry of Interior personnel will likely
    have some influence on individuals' ability to travel freely in
    Afghanistan, including their ability to leave the country. The
    Department is watching the Taliban's actions closely.

        Question. How many Americans left on the ground in Afghanistan are
    now subject to Haqqani's control/jurisdiction?

        Answer. The United States does not require U.S. citizens to notify
    us of their location, and, consequently, the Department is unable to
    speak to the number of U.S. citizens residing in areas of Afghanistan
    where the Haqqani Network is present. The Department has made every
    effort to contact U.S. citizens who are interested in leaving
    Afghanistan, however, and our commitment to helping those who wish to
    leave remains steadfast.

        Question. Does the U.S. still consider the Haqqani Network a
    terrorist organization?

        Answer. The Haqqani Network is designated as a Foreign Terrorist
    Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
    and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under E.O. 13224.

        Question. Given the known terrorist in the Taliban leadership, will
    you commit not to recognize the Taliban Government?

        Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy, albeit with
    several exceptions over the years, to avoid formal statements on
    recognition in cases of changes of governments. Our policy has not
    changed. The legitimacy and support the Taliban seek from the
    international community will depend on their adherence to their
    commitments on human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom
    of passage, preventing terrorist groups from posing a threat to the
    United States from Afghanistan, allowing unimpeded humanitarian access,
    and forming an inclusive government. The United States maintains a wide
    range of tools to ensure the Taliban uphold these public commitments,
    including sanctions and economic assistance.

        Question. Did the U.S. make any agreements with the Taliban in
    order to maintain access to the Kabul airport for evacuation
    operations? If so, please detail the terms of the agreement.

        Answer. The United States engaged in dialogue with the Taliban on
    matters of important U.S. interests, including the evacuation of U.S.
    citizens and lawful permanent residents from Afghanistan. As a result
    of these discussions, the Taliban took steps to moderate their actions
    in ways that allowed us to complete our evacuation mission. I remain
    committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement
    with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban
    Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or
    arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac)
    Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
    (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the
    purview of the State Department.

        Question. Additionally, will you commit to provide a copy of the
    agreements to Congress?

        Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
    agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
    29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
    agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
    William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
    is under the purview of the State Department.

        Question. In the Panjshir province, the National Resistance Front
    has mobilized against the Taliban. This group includes the Vice
    President of the Afghan Government (Amrullah Saleh). What is the
    position of the U.S. Government on the National Resistance Front and
    militia efforts to prevent Taliban control over territory?

        Answer. The Department is not aware of Amrullah Saleh's current
    whereabouts.

        Question. Are the Taliban and surrounding countries allowing
    American citizens, green card holders, and other at-risk Afghans across
    borders?

        Answer. We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents, our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk
    Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan, if
    and when they choose to do so. Travelers do not require a letter from
    the State Department or any other U.S. Government entity to leave
    Afghanistan. If they have made their own arrangements with their onward
    destination country and any transit countries, individuals do not
    require permission from the United States. We are also continuing to
    press the Taliban to live up to their public commitment of free passage
    for those who wish to leave the country.

        Question. In the few short weeks since they took control, what
    restrictions have already been put in place by the Taliban on women and
    girls?

        Answer. We are deeply concerned about the Taliban's restrictions
    regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms for women and girls.
    Taliban political leaders have stated women have a right to education
    while also communicating adjustments must be made to make access
    consistent with Islam and Afghan culture. According to public,
    international news sources, public universities will be segregated by
    gender and include potential new dress codes for female students.
    Female professors will teach female students while male professors may
    teach female students from behind a curtain. In some cases, women have
    been asked to stay away from work, though exceptions are being made for
    women in the public health sector.

        Question. How does State plan to balance getting aid to needy
    Afghans while making sure that aid does not get in the hands of Taliban
    terrorists?

        Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their non-
    humanitarian assistance programs, the operating environment, and other
    potential issues to mitigate risks. As part of that, bureaus are
    planning for how they will make adjustments to strengthen monitoring
    and evaluation of continuing programs from outside Afghanistan,
    including through existing third parties, given the current footprint.
    Both agencies have years of experience in successfully managing
    projects remotely and through third party monitors from inside and
    outside of Afghanistan. Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard
    against the risk that our programs could benefit terrorists or their
    supporters. This may include mitigation measures such as name check
    vetting and specific program design to reduce those risks.
        The U.S. Government takes seriously its duty as a steward of U.S.
    taxpayer funding and holds our implementing partners to the highest
    standards to ensure that taxpayer funds are used effectively and for
    their intended purpose. We require our partners to have proper
    safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place to help ensure that
    humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. Our partners are
    required to take steps to mitigate against diversion, fraud, waste, and
    abuse, including any such incidents involving the Taliban and Haqqani
    Network.

        Question. Will you commit to working with this committee on
    developing a strategy for aid moving forward?

        Answer. Apart from humanitarian assistance, which will continue,
    the Department is continuing to review its non-humanitarian assistance
    programs and funding. We look forward to working closely with Congress
    as we consider our non-humanitarian assistance posture in Afghanistan.

        Question. For the past few months, the Administration has told the
    Senate that withdrawal of forces will not negatively impact
    counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan. These briefings continued
    even as the Administration chose to withdraw without conditions, given
    that the Taliban did not, as it agreed in February 2020, cut ties with
    Al Qaeda. Will the Taliban prevent terrorists from organizing on Afghan
    soil?

        Answer. We continue to communicate to the Taliban regarding these
    public counterterrorism commitments, including that they will not host
    terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. The Taliban are aware that we are
    closely monitoring their actions to counter terrorist activity and that
    we remain ready to take unilateral actions as needed to address U.S.
    national security concerns.

        Question. Will the U.S. have to increase its diplomatic or military
    resources devoted to counterterrorism operations as a result of Taliban
    control of Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department continues to evaluate what resources will be
    needed to effectively address terrorism challenges in Afghanistan and
    the region without a counterterrorism presence in Afghanistan. Part of
    that effort entails intensified diplomatic engagement on issues of
    shared concern with countries in the region and that border
    Afghanistan. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding any shifts
    in military resources.

        Question. How does the collapse of the Afghan Security Forces
    impact our ability to do intelligence gathering on the ground?

        Answer. As President Biden has articulated, it is critical for the
    United States to retain over the horizon counterterrorism capabilities
    to prevent, detect, and disrupt terrorism threats. I defer to the
    Intelligence Community for questions on intelligence collection
    capabilities for Afghanistan.

        Question. How far away is the closest U.S. military base or
    installation from which we can conduct over-the-horizon strikes in
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. The United States maintains defense agreements and
    arrangements with allies and partners worldwide to enable our military
    to operate on a global scale.
        I defer to the Department of Defense regarding the specific
    deployment of any assets at overseas installations or naval deployments
    in maritime locations.

        Question. Roundtrip, how much time would it take to conduct an
    operation at the farthest away point in Afghanistan?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Defense regarding planning
    timelines associated with any potential military operations.

        Question. Have Russia or other adversaries tried to intervene to
    prevent new installations?

        Answer. We take seriously any Russian or other interference in our
    security cooperation with allies and partners around the world as we
    continue to deepen relationships that enable our military to respond to
    threats to our homeland, no matter where those threats may emanate
    from. As President Biden has said, ``We will not hesitate to raise the
    cost on Russia and defend our vital interests and our people.'' Further
    information would need to be provided in a different setting.

        Question. How many at-risk Afghans have been killed or brutalized
    since the U.S. withdrawal announcement in March?

        Answer. The Department of State does not have specific figures;
    however, we have seen troubling footage of injuries suffered by
    journalists in Taliban detention as well as violence against
    protesters. The United States condemns in the strongest terms reports
    of Taliban kidnappings, beatings, intimidation, and killings of Afghan
    civilians. We stand firm with the international community in our
    commitment to hold perpetrators of these abuses accountable.

        Question. Some of our allies have been extremely critical of the
    U.S. for not consulting with them on the withdrawal plan. This is
    contrary to the Administration's messaging on the need to work closely
    with allies. What plans does the Administration have moving forward for
    coordination with our allies and partners on Afghan refugees,
    counterterrorism, and other issues that are arising from the
    withdrawal?

        Answer. Along with other senior Department officials, I have
    convened or taken part in a series of bilateral and multilateral
    engagements to coordinate with our allies and partners about what we
    need to see from the Taliban and from any Government of Afghanistan. As
    President Biden has made clear, the United States will maintain robust
    counterterrorism capabilities in the region to neutralize any threats,
    and we will not hesitate to use those capabilities if we have to do so.
    I have noted that the legitimacy and support that the Taliban seek from
    the international community will depend on their conduct, including
    respecting human rights.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Rob Portman

        Question. As I mentioned earlier, I am concerned about the close
    relationship between the Taliban and the Haqqani network. Your
    spokesman said the two are ``separate entities,'' but the head of that
    network is now the Interior Minister. So, it is pretty clear that they
    are not separate entities, but a closely combined organization. With
    known terrorists now part of the Taliban Government, what confidence do
    you have that they will not harbor terrorist training camps in
    Afghanistan and plot against us and our allies?

        Answer. Speaking to the BBC on September 29, Taliban spokesman
    Zabihullah Mujahid noted that the group had ``given guarantees to the
    world that there will not be any threat against any country including
    the United States from Afghan soil.'' ``We are committed to the
    agreement which has been signed in Doha between the Islamic Emirate of
    Afghanistan and the United States,'' he continued. Such statements and
    the Taliban's cooperation seeking to prevent an ISIS-K attack at Kabul
    International Airport reflect the Taliban's aim of demonstrating they
    are adhering to their counterterrorism commitments under the U.S.-
    Taliban Agreement. The United States continues to call on the Taliban
    to fulfill their commitments, which include preventing terrorist groups
    or individuals from training, fundraising, and recruiting, and not
    hosting them.

        Question. How does this fact influence your decision to resume U.S.
    aid to Afghanistan? Will any of this aid be passed to the United
    Nations or any other multi-lateral implementing partners? How much of
    the recently announced $64 million will be implemented through USAID
    rather than State?

        Answer. The United States delivers humanitarian aid through non-
    government partners, international organizations, and third parties
    according to the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and
    independence.
        On September 13, the United States announced nearly $64 million in
    additional humanitarian assistance for Afghans. Of this amount, nearly
    $40 million was provided through USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian
    Assistance and nearly $24 million through State's Bureau of Population,
    Refugees, and Migration. This assistance went to independent
    humanitarian organizations, including the United Nations High
    Commissioner for Refugees and the World Health Organization to provide
    lifesaving protection, shelter, livelihood support, essential health
    care, emergency food aid, water, sanitation, and hygiene services to
    respond to the needs generated by recent conflict and compounded by the
    severe drought and other natural disasters, as well as the ongoing
    COVID-19 pandemic.

        Question. Recently, I sent a letter with Senator Rubio to Secretary
    Yellen to use all means necessary to keep internationally held reserve
    assets out of the hands of the Taliban. I am very concerned that these
    funds would not be used to help the people of Afghanistan, but rather
    to promote suppression and terror. What is the State Department's
    position on recognizing the Taliban in Afghanistan? What coordination
    and talks have you had with the Treasury Department on leveraging
    sanctions to decrease the Taliban's capability to sponsor international
    terrorism?

        Answer. The United States has a long-standing policy to avoid, in
    most cases, formal statements on recognition in cases of changes of
    governments. Our policy has not changed. We will continue to
    communicate to the Taliban to advance our interests in Afghanistan. The
    Taliban will be judged on their actions, specifically with regard to
    meeting counterterrorism commitments and respecting the human rights of
    those in Afghanistan. The Department of State's understanding is that
    the Taliban does not have access to internationally held Afghan Central
    Bank reserve assets. The Taliban is designated as a Specially
    Designated Global Terrorist under E.O. 13224, as amended. The
    Department of State coordinates closely with the Department of the
    Treasury on sanctions policy and implementation.

        Question. What is the State Department's assessment of future
    civil-society support for foreign aid and programming in Afghanistan?
    If possible, what safeguards will you use to ensure that this support
    does not end up in the hands of the Taliban? Will we also ask our
    allies to follow suit with those same safeguards?

        Answer. The Department is continuing to review all non-humanitarian
    assistance programs in Afghanistan. The outcomes of this review will
    inform our decisions regarding what non-humanitarian assistance to the
    Afghan people should continue and what programs will be stopped.
        As part of this review, State and USAID bureaus are assessing their
    programs, the operating environment, and other issues to mitigate
    risks. Bureaus are planning for how they may make adjustments to
    monitor and evaluate continuing programs from outside Afghanistan,
    including through third parties, given that the operations of the U.S.
    Embassy in Kabul are suspended. State and USAID and our implementers
    have experience using similar mechanisms, such as in Syria, in addition
    to some bureaus with historical experience successfully managing
    programs from outside of Afghanistan.
        Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
    that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This
    may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
    program design to reduce those risks.

        Question. It is clear that at some level, we coordinated with the
    Taliban to conduct the evacuation. However, the State Department, or
    any Agency of Department for that matter, has not been able to detail
    what assurances we gave or received from the Taliban. Are you able to
    explain the assurances that were exchanged between the Taliban and the
    United States during the evacuation effort? The reporting of such
    agreements to Congress in mandated in section 1217 of the FY21 NDAA.

        Answer. The United States will continue to press the Taliban to
    ensure that all who wish to leave Afghanistan are able to, and will
    monitor the Taliban's adherence to their commitments closely. I remain
    committed to keeping Congress informed of any agreement or arrangement
    with the Taliban subsequent to the February 29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban
    Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such agreement or
    arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the William M. (Mac)
    Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
    (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and is under the
    purview of the State Department.

        Question. The United States has spent close to $780 million over 20
    years to support a future of Afghan women. There are reports of
    peaceful protests by women in Afghanistan being broken up with gunshots
    and violence. With our withdrawal and the collapse of the Government we
    are looking at a whole generation of Afghan women who are now at risk
    of losing the gains they have made in regards of education and
    inclusion in the Government. What is the United States strategy to
    support women in Afghanistan and protect the progress we have made?

        Answer. The United States will continue to support Afghan women and
    girls through our diplomatic engagement and robust humanitarian
    assistance. No society can succeed if half of its population is left
    out. Afghanistan can have neither security nor prosperity if its women
    and girls are not afforded opportunities to fully participate in
    society, including educational opportunities at all levels. We will
    monitor closely how any government respects the human rights and
    freedoms that have become an integral part of the life of women and
    girls in Afghanistan during the last 20 years.

        Question. The number reported in the media is that we only
    evacuated 705 SIV applicants out of Afghanistan. The Department of
    State and other agencies have said this number is incorrect, however,
    they have refused to provide a different number. What is the final
    number of SIV applicants that were evacuated out of Afghanistan by the
    August 31 deadline?

        Answer. Many of the individuals who were relocated out of
    Afghanistan were at various stages of Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    processing. The Department of State is currently assessing how many of
    these individuals had outstanding SIV applications.
        We continue to prioritize processing for qualified Afghan SIV
    applicants. Although SIV applicants will not be able to complete a visa
    interview or other visa processing in Afghanistan, we are expediting
    continuing SIV processing at all other stages of the process outside of
    Afghanistan. We continue to prioritize this effort and our commitment
    to continue to provide services has no expiration date.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                        Submitted by Senator Todd Young

        Question. What is your strategy for effectively providing consular
    services from Doha, Qatar to U.S. citizens, legal residents, and valid
    visa holders currently in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The U.S. Government continues to expect the Taliban to
    provide safe passage to U.S. citizens and their families, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), and Afghans with valid travel documentation
    who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging countries in the
    region and those that border Afghanistan to allow Afghans to enter. The
    Department of State relocated consular staff from Kabul and added
    temporary duty personnel to Doha to assist with the increased volume of
    casework. We are first focusing on U.S. citizens and immediate family
    members who are ready to depart and have travel documents including
    passports, LPR cards, or visas for non-U.S. citizen family members. We
    are exploring options for the subset of U.S. citizens with immediate
    family members for whom documentation has been an issue to identify
    ways to assist them, but this poses challenges.

        Question. How will you seek to assist Afghan nationals who remain
    in Afghanistan and need to complete the application process to receive
    a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) or Priority 2 (P-2) refugee designation?

        Answer. While we are currently unable to provide consular services
    for immigrant visa applicants, including Special Immigrant Visas
    (SIVs), in Afghanistan, we will continue to process SIV applications at
    every stage of the SIV process, including by transferring cases to
    other U.S. embassies and consulates around the world where applicants
    are able to appear. As operations at U.S. Embassy Kabul have been
    suspended, Afghans eligible and referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
    Program must be outside of Afghanistan in a third country for their
    cases to be processed. We are continuing to review the situation on the
    ground and consider all available options, and our planning will
    continue to evolve.

        Question. Is the SIV or P-2 determination process for those who
    have been evacuated from Afghanistan, regardless of their current
    location or plans to bring them to the United States, still being
    expedited?

        Answer. We are continuing to process SIV applications, including by
    transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
    world where applicants are able to appear. We know that it is currently
    extremely difficult for Afghans to obtain a visa to a third country or
    to find a way to enter a third country, but we are developing
    processing alternatives so that we can continue to deliver these
    important consular services for the people of Afghanistan. The
    interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) to identify individuals and associate them with their SIV
    applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,
    and other categories of eligibility as they continue the relocation
    process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to the U.S.
    Refugee Admissions Program; these are not visas and are not linked to
    any status. For additional information, we refer you to DHS.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                       Submitted by Senator John Barrasso

        Question. How many individuals did the United States evacuate
    between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021 as part of the military
    assisted evacuation from Afghanistan? Please provide the total number
    and a breakdown of the number based on the citizenship of those
    individuals.

        Answer. As of September 1, we estimated that 124,000 individuals
    had been relocated from Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of
    these, approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens. Also included were
    individuals who worked for us or supported us in our two-decade mission
    in Afghanistan.
        The interagency continues to work with the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS) to survey relocated individuals and identify if they
    have or are eligible for Special Immigrant status, P-1/P-2 referrals to
    the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and other categories of
    eligibility as they continue the relocation process. For additional
    information, we refer you to DHS.

        Question. How many of the individuals evacuated by the United
    States were not U.S. citizens, special immigrant visa holders, P1 visa
    holders, or P2 visa holders?

        Answer. As of September 1, approximately 124,000 people were
    relocated out of Afghanistan with U.S. and partner support. Of these,
    approximately 6,000 were U.S. citizens who evacuated on or before
    August 31; between September 1 and November 9, the Department assisted
    385 U.S. citizens and 285 Lawful Permanent Residents to depart.
        We are continuing to process Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
    applications at every stage of the SIV process, including by
    transferring cases to other U.S. embassies and consulates around the
    world where applicants are able to appear. The interagency continues to
    work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to identify
    individuals and associate them with their existing or newly created SIV
    applications, P-1/P-2 referrals to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
    (USRAP), and other categories of eligibility as they continue the
    relocation process. P-1/P-2 referrals are designations for access to
    the USRAP; these are not visas and are not linked to any immigration
    status. For additional information, I refer you to DHS.

        Question. What percentage of the Afghan citizens that left
    Afghanistan as part of the U.S. evacuation efforts were vetted before
    they got on the airplane?

        Answer. For full information on the screening and vetting of Afghan
    arrivals, I refer you to the Department of Homeland Security. Our
    Afghan allies complete a rigorous and multi-layered screening and
    vetting process before they can enter the United States and are
    eligible to resettle in communities across our country. This process
    includes intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism
    professionals from the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security,
    Federal Bureau of Investigation, National Counterterrorism Center, and
    other Intelligence Community partners reviewing fingerprints, photos,
    and other biometric and biographic data for every single Afghan
    national before they are cleared to travel to the United States. As
    with other arrivals at U.S. ports of entry, Afghans who have been
    relocated out of Afghanistan undergo a primary inspection when they
    arrive at a U.S. airport, and a secondary inspection is conducted as
    the circumstances require. The vetting process is ongoing to ensure the
    continued protection of public safety and national security.

        Question. It was reported that no U.S. citizens made it to the
    airport to depart on any of the last five planes that departed as part
    of the U.S. evacuation on August 30, 2021. When did the last U.S.
    evacuation flight containing a U.S. citizen leave Afghanistan?

        Answer. The last U.S. flight to leave Afghanistan transporting
    private U.S. citizens was August 30, 2021.
        We continue to fulfill our pledge to U.S. citizens, Lawful
    Permanent Residents (LPRs), our Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-
    risk Afghans. We will be relentless in helping them depart Afghanistan,
    if and when they choose to do so. And we will continue our efforts to
    facilitate the safe and orderly travel of U.S. citizens, LPRs, our
    Afghans allies, and vulnerable and at-risk Afghans who wish to leave
    Afghanistan. The U.S. Government is pressing the Taliban to provide
    safe passage to U.S. citizens, LPRs, and Afghans with travel
    documentation who wish to leave Afghanistan, while encouraging
    countries like Qatar to allow Afghans to enter.

        Question. How many U.S. citizens were evacuated by the United
    States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. There were approximately 6,000 U.S. citizens evacuated
    between August 12 and August 30, 2021.

        Question. How many legal permanent residents were evacuated by the
    United States between August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. The Department of State cannot definitively state the
    number of Lawful Permanent Residents (LPRs) relocated by the U.S. prior
    to August 31. Like U.S. citizens, LPRs are not required to register
    their location with the Department. As a result, we are unable to
    determine the number of LPRs in Afghanistan or any other given country
    at any particular time.

        Question. How many locally employed staff were at the U.S. Embassy
    in Kabul prior to the evacuation? How many were evacuated by August 30,
    2021?

        Answer. At the time of the August 2021 evacuation of Embassy Kabul,
    there were 689 locally employed staff on the Embassy rolls. Sixteen of
    the Embassy locally employed staff remain in Kabul. Five declined to
    relocate and remained in Kabul by choice and 11 were unable to travel
    on August 30, of which seven have requested assistance to depart
    Afghanistan.

        Question. How many U.S. citizens was the State Department aware of
    that were seeking to leave Afghanistan as of August 30, 2021?

        Answer. The Department of State believes there were about 100 U.S.
    citizens seeking to depart immediately after we suspended operations on
    August 31, 2021. However, this number has fluctuated as additional U.S.
    citizens seek to depart and others change their decision to stay or to
    depart.

        Question. With no U.S. diplomatic or military presence on the
    ground, what mechanisms are being used by the Administration to ensure
    the safe evacuation of the Americans the Biden administration left
    behind in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department of State is in constant contact with U.S.
    citizens in Afghanistan who have told us they wish to leave. We
    continue to look for options for U.S. citizens to depart Afghanistan.
    We are working with bordering countries to allow U.S. citizens to enter
    via border crossings or other means of transportation and will continue
    to press the Taliban to keep their public promise that all U.S.
    citizens who want to leave will be able to depart.

        Question. During your testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
    Foreign Relations, you stated, ``There had not been a single SIV
    applicant interview in Kabul in 9 months, going back to March of 2020.
    The program was basically in a stall.'' How many Afghan Special
    Immigrant Visas (SIVs) were issued between March 2020 and the end of
    December 2020?

        Answer. While the U.S. embassy in Kabul was not conducting
    interviews for any visa categories (including SIVs) from March 2020
    until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan,
    the consular section continued to process applications that were past
    the interview stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from
    applicants who were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add
    newborn children to their cases. Also, a small number of cases were
    processed at consular posts outside of Afghanistan.
        In all, the Department of State issued 643 Afghan SIV for principal
    applicants from March 2020 until December 2020.

        Question. Were visa applications of individuals who had already
    been interviewed still being processed between March 2020 through the
    end of December 2020?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for
    any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020
    until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan.
    They continued processing applications that were past the interview
    stage. In addition, they continued taking oaths from applicants who
    were ready to have a visa issued but needed only to add newborn
    children or take other actions to their existing cases. Also, a small
    number of cases were processed at consular posts outside of
    Afghanistan.

        Question. On December 31, 2020, how many Afghan Special Immigrant
    Visas (SIVs) and family members were pending scheduling for visa
    interviews?

        Answer. On December 31, 2020, there were 622 principal applicants
    pending scheduling for visa interviews.

        Question. What was the reason interviews were stopped between March
    2020 through the end of December 2020?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul was not conducting interviews for
    any visa categories (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020
    until February 2021 due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan in
    order to protect the health of visa applicants and its staff. The
    Country Team in Kabul assessed all factors and determined it was not
    safe for embassy staff or visa applicants to conduct interviews,
    especially given the lack of adequate medical care in Afghanistan.

        Question. What impact did the coronavirus pandemic have on the
    ability to hold in person interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant Visas
    (SIVs) in Kabul?

        Answer. Due to the prevalence of COVID-19 in Afghanistan, U.S.
    Embassy Kabul did not conduct interviews for any visa categories
    (including Special Immigrant Visas) from March 2020 until February
    2021. From June 13 to July 5, 2021, a COVID-19 outbreak at the embassy
    again forced a 3-week suspension of visa interviews. During those
    periods, however the embassy continued to process existing SIV
    applications that did not require close contact with applicants, such
    as reviewing documents, printing visas, and returning passports.

        Question. Were in person interviews mandated by law as part of the
    Afghan Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) process?

        Answer. Although the Afghan Allies Protection Act does not
    specifically mandate interviews, U.S. law and Department of State
    regulations require immigrant visa applicants appear personally before
    a consular officer to sign their application and verify their
    application by oath and, at that time, provide fingerprints.
    Fingerprints are required for security vetting.

        Question. When did the in-person interviews at the U.S. Embassy in
    Kabul resume for Afghan special immigrant visas?

        Answer. In-person visa interviews for Afghan Special Immigrant
    Visas and other immigrant visas at Embassy Kabul resumed in February
    2021 after it was deemed safe for both visa applicants and Embassy
    staff. COVID-19 spikes later forced the embassy to suspend in-person
    visa services from June 15 to July 3.

        Question. During your testimony you stated, ``On February 4, one of
    the first executive orders issued by President Biden directed us to
    immediately review the SIV program to identify causes of undue delay
    and find ways to process SIV applications more quickly.'' When was the
    review completed and what were the findings?

        Answer. The Department of State remains engaged with the
    interagency in reviewing the SIV program and finding ways to improve
    the efficiency of SIV processing, including with respect to the topics
    addressed in E.O. 14013.

        Question. During the hearing, you stated, ``This spring, I directed
    significant additional resources to the program, expanding the team of
    people in Washington processing applications from 10 to 50, doubling
    the number of SIV adjudicators in Kabul and our embassy there.'' Based
    on the analysis you did to determine what additional resources were
    needed, how many Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans did you
    estimate could be reviewed and completed per month with the additional
    resource you provided?

        Answer. The U.S. Embassy in Kabul estimated that with the
    additional adjudicators, the consular section would be able to
    interview approximately 850 Afghan SIV cases per month and with
    additional staff, the Afghan SIV Unit could process up to 1000 or more
    Chief of Mission approval applications per month. Each Afghan SIV case
    includes the principal applicant, plus their immediate family members
    (spouse and minor children). While the number of family members varied
    per case, Embassy Kabul processed many more than 850 individuals each
    month when including SIV family members.

        Question. When did the additional SIV adjudicators arrive in Kabul?

        Answer. The additional Special Immigrant Visa adjudicators arrived
    on April 1, 2021.

        Question. From January 20, 2021 through August 12, 2021, how many
    SIV special immigrant visas for Afghans were approved? How many
    individuals were denied?

        Answer. From January 20 until August 12, 2021, the Department of
    State issued 1,527 Afghan Special Immigrant Visa principal applicants
    and 5,076 derivative applicants. Individuals may be denied an immigrant
    visa for a variety of reasons but most often for lacking required
    documentation or pending administrative processing. Such refusals can
    be overcome once additional documentation is submitted or
    administrative processing is completed. From January 20 through August
    12, 2021, the Department of State refused 1,154 principal applicants
    and 4,140 derivative applicants. However, 99 percent of those refusals
    were due to additional documentation required or administrative
    processing (which can be overcome) and only one percent were related to
    other ineligibilities. Since the SIV program's inception, less than one
    percent of all SIV applicants (including family members) receive final
    refusals that cannot be overcome and are not ultimately issued visas.

        Question. The State Department issued a statement on August 24,
    2021 that ``all immigrant visa appointments, including Special
    Immigrant Visas (SIVs), at the Embassy have been canceled.'' How many
    Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Afghans were still pending review on
    August 24, 2021?

        Answer. There were approximately 18,000 Special Immigrant Visas at
    various stages of the pipeline on August 31, 2021. Almost 8,500 of
    these were at the initial stage of the process, where the National Visa
    Center has requested additional documentation before the application
    can be referred to the Chief of Mission for review. Approximately 540
    applicants had documentarily complete cases at the National Visa Center
    that were pending interview scheduling for the future and 400
    applicants had interviews scheduled that had to be canceled.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders from
    Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between August 12, 2021
    and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
    States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
    approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders,
    and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders' family
    members from Afghanistan were evacuated by the United States between
    August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
    States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
    approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus
    their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family
    size was five to six persons.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants were
    evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between August 12, 2021
    and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
    States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
    approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders,
    and approximately 50 percent were SIV eligible.

        Question. How many Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicant family
    members were evacuated from Afghanistan by the United States between
    August 12, 2021 and August 30, 2021?

        Answer. Approximately 60,000 people were brought into the United
    States from Afghanistan through Operation Allies Refuge, of those
    approximately three percent were Special Immigrant Visa holders, plus
    their eligible spouse and minor children. The average Afghan family
    size was five to six persons.

        Question. What affiliation if any does the Tehrik-e Taliban
    Pakistan (TTP) have with the Afghanistan Taliban?

        Answer. Though the TTP has a presence in Afghanistan, the group is
    a separate organization and perpetrates attacks against Pakistan
    independent of the Afghan Taliban. We do not have indications of
    Taliban support for TTP but believe large numbers of the group remain
    in Afghanistan.

        Question. Was the Government of Pakistan supportive of the
    Taliban's offensive takeover of Afghanistan?

        Answer. Various senior Pakistani leaders, including Prime Minister
    Khan, called repeatedly for a political solution to the conflict in
    Afghanistan prior to the Taliban taking control of Kabul on August 15.
    In a May interview, for example, Khan stated that if the Taliban
    attempted to overthrow the Afghan Government in Kabul by military force
    it would lead to a protracted civil war and an influx of refugees into
    Pakistan. Khan further claimed that Pakistan would use all the tools
    necessary to support peace in Afghanistan. Following August 15, senior
    Pakistani officials have continued to stress the need for an inclusive
    political settlement and the protection of women's educational rights
    in Afghanistan during multiple public events. Pakistan has made
    repeated public calls for the international community to directly
    engage with the Taliban to prevent further violence, avoid economic
    collapse, and avert a humanitarian disaster.

        Question. What support did the government and military in Pakistan
    provide the Taliban in taking over control of Afghanistan from the
    democratically elected government?

        Answer. Senior Pakistani Government officials supported Afghan
    peace talks, including by encouraging the Taliban to engage in
    negotiations. Various senior Pakistan officials also made repeated
    public calls for a political solution to the Afghan conflict and
    expressed concern an overthrow of Kabul by the Taliban would lead to a
    protracted civil war.

        Question. What efforts did the Biden administration take to curb
    Pakistan's support of the Taliban in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The State Department has engaged with the Pakistani
    Government at senior levels, including with my personal engagement and
    that of and Deputy Secretary Sherman, to urge close coordination and
    alignment with the international community on the way forward in
    Afghanistan. We have made it clear that a government in Kabul that is
    inclusive, protects the rights of women and minorities, adheres to its
    counterterrorism commitments, and ensures humanitarian access and safe
    passage for those who wish to leave Afghanistan would be in the best
    interests of all countries in the region, including Pakistan. We will
    continue to convey at the highest levels the importance the Biden
    administration places on Pakistan's constructive role moving forward.

        Question. Is the Government of Pakistan currently providing
    financial support, logistics, and weaponry to the Taliban? If so, what
    is it providing?

        Answer. Pakistan is providing limited humanitarian aid to the new
    Taliban Government and is encouraging other countries to pursue similar
    policies. Pakistan has not announced other assistance to the Taliban.

        Question. Do you support additional sanctions on Pakistan and
    Pakistani Government officials involved in support for the Taliban?

        Answer. U.S. sanctions designations are regularly reviewed and
    updated consistent with U.S. law and policy. Given Pakistan's critical
    cooperation, we do not support sanctions against the Government of
    Pakistan or its government officials.

        Question. What is the Biden administration's strategy to prevent
    terrorists from once again having a platform in Afghanistan to plan and
    launch attacks against the United States?

        Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe
    haven for terrorists remains our top priority and we continue to apply
    a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for
    Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use
    of sanctions regimes, engagement with the Taliban on our
    counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security
    sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering
    regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral over
    the horizon counterterrorism capabilities.

        Question. How has the counter-terrorism strategy changed since the
    fall of the Government of Afghanistan?

        Answer. Our counterterrorism objectives of ensuring Afghanistan is
    never again used as a safe-haven for terrorism have not changed, but
    our strategies necessarily evolve with the changing circumstances. We
    are seeking to bolster security partnerships and capabilities in the
    region, as well as continue to maintain our over-the-horizon
    capabilities. We continue to use a whole-of- government approach to
    address terrorist threats that may emanate from Afghanistan.

        Question. What specific agreements has the Biden administration
    made with the Taliban since the January 2021?

        Answer. I remain committed to keeping Congress informed of any
    agreement or arrangement with the Taliban subsequent to the February
    29, 2020 U.S.-Taliban Agreement, as well as materials relevant to such
    agreement or arrangement, consistent with section 1217(b)(2) of the
    William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for
    Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283) which the Department has identified and
    is under the purview of the State Department.

        Question. During the evacuation efforts in Afghanistan, what
    commitments or promises did the Biden administration make to the
    Taliban?

        Answer. The evacuation and relocation effort has been a monumental
    task. The Taliban publicly committed to allowing safe passage for U.S.
    and other foreign nationals as well as Afghans with travel documents.
    We continue to hold the Taliban to this public commitment on assuring
    safe passage.

        Question. What counter-terrorism commitments did the Taliban agree
    to with the United States and what is your assessment on whether the
    Taliban has upheld its commitments?

        Answer. The Taliban publicly committed to not allow individuals or
    groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use Afghanistan to threaten the
    security of the United States and its allies; to send a clear message
    that those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and
    its allies have no place in Afghanistan, and to instruct their members
    not to cooperate with such groups or individuals; to prevent them from
    recruiting, training, and fundraising and not host them; and not to
    provide visas, passports, travel permits, or other legal documents to
    those who pose a threat to the security of the United States and its
    allies to enter Afghanistan. The Taliban have taken some positive steps
    but have not fully upheld all these public commitments.

        Question. What tools does the United State have to ensure the
    Taliban upholds its commitments?

        Answer. The United States maintains a wide range of tools to ensure
    the Taliban upholds these public commitments, including diplomatic
    engagement, sanctions, and economic assistance. The legitimacy and
    support the Taliban seeks from the international community will depend
    on their actions, including preventing terrorist groups from posing a
    threat to the United States from Afghanistan, adherence to upholding
    human rights and fundamental freedoms, allowing freedom of passage for
    American citizens, third country nationals, and Afghans with proper
    documentation that desire to leave allowing unimpeded humanitarian
    access, and forming an inclusive government that includes women and
    members of minority groups.

        Question. Media reports indicate that members of the Afghan Air
    Force reportedly flew 46 aircrafts, including A-29 light attack planes,
    Cessna C-208 utility aircraft, and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, to
    Uzbekistan. What is the Administration doing to ensure these aircraft
    are never handed over to the Taliban?

        Answer. While this process falls under DoD authority because of the
    original source of funding, the Department of State continues to
    participate in our regional security engagements with the governments
    of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as the Department of Defense determines,
    in discussion with the interagency, the final disposition options for
    the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) funded aircraft as well as
    a variety of other ASFF-funded materiel that is outside Afghanistan. I
    defer to the Department of Defense on additional details for the status
    of Afghanistan aircraft currently located outside of Afghanistan.

        Question. Is the Administration negotiating to bring the aircraft
    to U.S. military bases in the Middle East?

        Answer. The Department of State shares Congress' interest in
    ensuring that the U.S. military aircraft that the Department of Defense
    (DoD) procured using the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund or other DoD
    authorities and then transferred to the Afghanistan Government do not
    fall into the wrong hands. As the aircraft were transferred under DoD
    authorities, the process of repossessing the aircraft fall under DoD
    authority as well. The Department of State participates in discussions
    with the interagency regarding the final disposition options for
    aircraft and other materiel that is outside Afghanistan. DoD may take
    the equipment back into its own stock, offer it to other USG entities,
    or consider transfer of the equipment to a foreign partner under
    section 333 authority with State concurrence. DoD may also declare the
    aircraft as Excess Defense Articles, at which point State authorities
    would govern any transfer to a foreign government. State defers to DoD
    on additional details for the status of Afghanistan aircraft currently
    located outside of Afghanistan.

        Question. During his testimony before the House Subcommittee on
    National Security, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
    Reconstruction stated, ``A reduced U.S. civilian and military presence
    in Afghanistan amid a deteriorating security environment could create
    new challenges for conducting effective oversight of U.S. funded
    programs, grants, and contracts for reconstruction work.'' Given the
    fact there is now no U.S. diplomatic or military presence in
    Afghanistan, how can the Administration ensure U.S. taxpayer resources
    will be used appropriately and go to the intended recipients?

        Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the
    operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks
    associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of
    that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
    strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from
    outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given
    that the operations of the U.S. embassy in Kabul are suspended. A
    number of bureaus have years of experience in successfully managing
    projects from outside of Afghanistan.
        Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
    that our programs could benefit to terrorists or their supporters. This
    may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
    program design to reduce those risks.

        Question. What is your plan to conduct effective oversight of U.S.
    funded programs and grants under the current security environment in
    Afghanistan?

        Answer. State and USAID bureaus are assessing their programs, the
    operating environment, and other potential issues to mitigate risks
    associated with ongoing humanitarian assistance programming. As part of
    that, bureaus are planning for how they will make adjustments to
    strengthen the monitoring and evaluation of continuing programs from
    outside Afghanistan, including through existing third parties, given
    the current footprint. A number of bureaus have years of experience in
    successfully managing projects from outside of Afghanistan.
        Additionally, bureaus undertake steps to guard against the risk
    that our programs could benefit terrorists or their supporters. This
    may include mitigation measures such as name check vetting and specific
    program design to reduce those risks.
        Our partners are required to take steps to mitigate against
    diversion, fraud, waste, and abuse.

        Question. How many implementing partners are still up and running
    on the ground in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The United States partners with a range of non-governmental
    organizations, international organizations, and third parties in
    Afghanistan to deliver vital humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
    people.
        To respond to humanitarian needs, State and USAID are currently
    working with 10 public international organizations including IFRC, FAO,
    WFP, UNICEF, WHO, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM, ILO, and UNFPA. In addition, USAID
    has nine non-governmental organization partners operating humanitarian
    programs in Afghanistan.
        The U.S. Government continues to be in communication with
    implementing partners in Afghanistan, both regarding security
    conditions on the ground and about their ability to continue their
    work.

        Question. How does the Biden administration intend to facilitate
    humanitarian access in Afghanistan?

        Answer. The Department can, and will, continue to provide
    humanitarian assistance to Afghans in need directly through the U.N.
    system, partners, and NGOs; and will do so in a way that is consistent
    with any sanctions that apply to Afghanistan. No humanitarian
    assistance will be provided to the Taliban.

        Question. Have you negotiated any deal with the Taliban regarding
    humanitarian assistance?

        Answer. The United States is working with the international
    community to ensure the Taliban follows through on their commitments to
    allow unhindered humanitarian access, freedom of movement for aid
    workers of all genders, safety and security of humanitarian staff, and
    safe passage for all those who wish to leave Afghanistan. This united
    effort is of utmost priority for leaders across the international
    community, U.N. agencies, and NGOs committed to providing assistance in
    Afghanistan. No humanitarian assistance will be provided directly to
    the Taliban.
                                     ______

       Responses of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken to Questions
                         Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

        Question. Terror Ties/Haqqani Network: There is an ongoing debate
    about the degree to which terrorist groups, including as especially Al
    Qaeda and ISIS, are likely to find safe-havens in Taliban-controlled
    Afghanistan. Part of that debate involves the degree to which such
    groups are supported by and entangled with the Taliban. You and other
    Administration officials have downplayed the Taliban's ties to the
    Haqqani Network and al-Qaeda, the President himself said al-Qaeda was
    ``gone from Afghanistan,'' and a State Department spokesman said last
    month that ``the Taliban and the Haqqani Network are separate
    entities.'' According to public reports, Undersecretary of Defense
    Colin Kahl even told Senators that that al-Qaeda in the region does not
    pose an ``imminent threat to the homeland.''
        There are public reports indicating that the intelligence community
    assesses al-Qaeda is rebuilding in Afghanistan and will have the
    ability to threaten the United States within the next 2 years. Do you
    agree with those assessments?

        Answer. Preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe-
    haven for terrorists remains our top priority, and we continue to apply
    a whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism efforts for
    Afghanistan. This consists of, but is not limited to, the continued use
    of sanctions regimes, communicating to the Taliban on our
    counterterrorism concerns, strengthening law enforcement and security
    sector assistance partnerships in regional countries, bolstering
    regional border security capabilities, and maintaining unilateral
    counterterrorism capabilities from ``over the horizon.'' The Taliban
    committed to not allow individuals or groups, including al-Qa'ida, to
    use Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its
    allies. The State Department is actively engaged throughout South and
    Central Asia to bolster our counterterrorism partnerships and efforts
    to prevent and counter terrorist threats from Afghanistan.

        Question. Siraj Haqqani is now the Interior Minister and Khalil
    Haqqani is the Minister of Refugee Affairs. Please describe the full
    extent to which you assess designated terrorists or officials
    affiliated with terrorist groups have significant influence inside the
    Afghan Government.

        Answer. We are concerned that Haqqani Network leadership has been
    appointed to these positions. The Haqqani Network is designated as a
    Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act and a SDGT under E.O. 13224. The Taliban itself is a
    Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and we have and will account for
    that, ensuring that our interactions are consistent with U.S. law and
    policy. Engagement with the Taliban is conducted consistent with U.S.
    law and to advance U.S. national security goals. At this time, the U.S.
    Government has not taken a position on whether the Taliban is the
    government of Afghanistan. Any future relationship between the Taliban
    and the international community will depend on the Taliban's actions.

        Question. On August 27, according to public reports, you
    distributed an internal document highlighting numerous incidents at
    intake centers of sexual abuse and situations in which much older
    Afghan men have presented young. How many cases have there been in
    which the State Department or other government girls to authorities as
    their ``wives.'' That document noted that the State Department had
    urgently requested guidance from across the Administration about what
    to do--but had not received it. According to public reports, a
    subsequent report by DHS concluded that the dynamic showed the
    ``desperation'' of families to get children out of Afghanistan: your
    process itself facilitated coercion and forced marriages of little
    girls. On September 14, you confirmed before the Senate Foreign
    Relations Committee that ``there have been a limited number of cases
    where we have separated people because we were concerned.''
        How many cases have there been in which the State Department or
    other government officials separated people due to such concerns?

        Answer. Protection of Afghans at-risk in U.S. safe havens is among
    our key objectives in relocating SIV holders, parolees, and their
    family members. This includes protection from gender-based violence,
    human trafficking, and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of
    Homeland Security as the lead federal agency at U.S. safe havens for
    the number of cases of forced marriage identified.

        Question. The State Department requested ``urgent guidance'' from
    other agencies after purported child brides were brought to intake
    centers and presented as ``wives.'' Have you received guidance? If yes,
    what was it?

        Answer. U.S. Government staff at overseas processing locations for
    Afghans are utilizing guidance from the State Department to screen for
    early and/or forced marriage and sexual exploitation. Through the
    Department's participation in the interagency Unified Coordination
    Group, we understand that the Departments of Homeland Security and
    Health and Human Services have screening tools, but I defer to these
    agencies for specific guidance they may have promulgated to address
    these and other protection concerns at U.S. safe havens.

        Question. What steps, if any, has the Department taken to address
    child exploitation, including forced marriages and other sexual
    exploitation, inside transit and intake centers in the United States?

        Answer. The Department of State is coordinating across the U.S.
    Government and with domestic and international partners to detect
    potential cases of forced marriage or other forms of abuse among
    vulnerable Afghans at relocation sites, as well as to prevent and
    investigate crimes and to protect any victims identified. U.S. funding
    to international organizations supports the deployment of expert
    protection staff to identify and assist Afghans with particular
    vulnerabilities at overseas processing locations, including those at
    risk of early and forced marriage. I defer to the Department of
    Homeland Security as the lead federal agency on steps taken at U.S.
    safe havens.

        Question. The State Department has been aware of child trafficking
    linked to the withdrawal for almost a month. Which agency or entity
    brought this situation to the attention of your office?

        Answer. My staff alerted me to the risks of trafficking in persons
    and forced marriage inherent in displacement contexts and particular to
    Afghan relocation operations. State Department staff with expertise in
    humanitarian response, international migration, child protection,
    gender-based violence prevention and response, and combatting human
    trafficking have advised on and taken actions to prevent these risks
    throughout Operation Allies Welcome.

        Question. What steps are being taken to ensure that each Afghan
    evacuee has been properly vetted, including screening to ensure that
    each Afghan evacuee has never raised arms against the United States or
    otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S. military personnel?

        Answer. Prior to entering the United States, all Afghan nationals
    undergo a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) led multi-layered
    screening and vetting process that includes national security and
    criminal record checks. Upon relocation from Afghanistan, individuals
    are brought to international transit points in Europe and the Middle
    East, which are known as lily pads. At these international transit
    points, DHS or the Department of Defense (DOD) collects biometric
    (e.g., facial image and fingerprints) and biographic information (e.g.,
    name, date of birth and ID number). Fingerprints are compared against
    DoD, DHS, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) repositories.
    Biographic information is vetted by the National Counterterrorism
    Center, FBI, and other Intelligence Community partners. DHS then
    consolidates biometric and biographic results.
        If these checks raise unresolved questions about an individual,
    that individual is not permitted to board a flight to the United
    States. Screening is ongoing, so even while individuals are continued
    to be processed at the safe havens, checks against the various national
    security and public safety databases continue in order to account for
    any new information identified.

        Question. Does/will the State Department and any/or Department of
    Homeland Security vetting process require each Afghan evacuee to
    provide a sworn statement under oath that he/she did not raise arms
    against the United States or otherwise engage in armed conflict against
    U.S. military personnel?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
    the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
    foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.

        Question. Please provide the committee with a complete sets of all
    forms being used in the process to vet Afghan evacuees.

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
    the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
    foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States.

        Question. Yes or No--Can you assure the American people, with 100
    percent confidence that the vetting process the Biden administration is
    using to vet Afghan evacuees will be completely effective to screen out
    and deny entry to every Afghan evacuee who raised arms against the
    United States or otherwise engaged in armed conflict against U.S.
    military personnel?

        Answer. I defer to the Department of Homeland Security, which is
    the lead federal agency on the security vetting and screening of
    foreign nationals requesting to enter the United States, and which
    holds the authority to admit foreign nationals into the United States
    if eligible.

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