[Senate Hearing 117-162]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 117-162
                        U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
                           IN THE MIDDLE EAST

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST,
                       SOUTH ASIA, CENTRAL ASIA,
                          AND COUNTERTERRORISM
                          
                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                            AUGUST 10, 2021

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov

                                __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
      
                  COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Jessica Lewis, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        


             SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA,        
               CENTRAL ASIA, AND COUNTERTERRORISM        

           CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut, Chairman        
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        TODD YOUNG, Indiana
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MITT ROMNEY, Utah
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee

                              (ii)        


                        C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

Murphy, Hon. Christopher, U.S. Senator From Connecticut..........     1

Young, Hon. Todd, U.S. Senator From Indiana......................     3

Mira Resnick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Affairs, 
  Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
  Washington, DC.................................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

Dana Stroul, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle 
  East, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of 
  Defense, 
  Washington, DC.................................................    10
    Prepared Statement...........................................    11

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of Mira Resnick to Questions Submitted by Senator James 
  E. Risch.......................................................    29

Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd 
  Young..........................................................    31

Responses of Mira Resnick to Questions Submitted by Senator Cory 
  Booker.........................................................    32

Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions Submitted by Senator Cory 
  Booker.........................................................    33

Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions Submitted by Senator Mike 
  Rounds.........................................................    34

                                 (iii)
 
                       U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE 
                           IN THE MIDDLE EAST

                              ----------                              


                        TUESDAY, AUGUST 10, 2021

                           U.S. Senate,    
             Subcommittee on Near East, South Asia,
                Central Asia, and Counterterrorism,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in 
room SD-419, Hon. Christopher Murphy, chairman of the 
subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Murphy [presiding], Shaheen, Van Hollen, 
and Young.

         OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, 
                 U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

    Senator Murphy. Good morning, everyone. I am pleased to 
bring this subcommittee together today for a hearing on a very 
important and timely topic, U.S. security assistance in the 
Middle East.
    We have votes at around 11 o'clock today. I imagine the 
first vote will be held open for a while and so we will 
continue this hearing through the beginning of votes. Other 
colleagues, I believe, will be joining us.
    Over the last 75 years, the majority of U.S. arms sales 
worldwide have gone to the Middle East, totaling more than $379 
billion in sales. That is a lot of weapons into a very 
combustible part of the world.
    Arms sales and other forms of security assistance are an 
important foreign policy tool for the United States to use to 
exercise its influence abroad, and as with any foreign policy 
tool, it is important to continually reevaluate whether that 
tool is actually achieving its desired policy goals.
    When the Cold War began as a means to counteract Soviet 
expansion, we got into the business of supporting authoritarian 
regimes all over the world. In the Middle East, we often relied 
on arms sales to cement these relationships.
    We also needed access to Middle East oil and this drove our 
security policy there as well. We wanted oil from the region, 
many of those nations wanted our weapons.
    It is not the 1970's any longer. The Soviets and the Arab 
nationalists are gone. Back then, the United States imported 29 
percent of its oil from the Gulf. Today, that number is 12 
percent and declining.
    Yet, even as the foundations of our interests have changed 
in the Middle East, our security assistance continues to flow 
unabated into a region that is increasingly unstable, and the 
post-9/11 global war on terror has dramatically expanded 
security assistance programs around the world, including the 
Middle East, with relatively little debate or oversight.
    Now, there are plenty of good reasons, as I said, to have 
robust security partnerships in the Middle East, including 
supporting our ally Israel and countering legitimate threats 
from Iran, its proxies, and nonstate actors.
    There is always enormous pressure from both our partners in 
the region and the defense industrial complex in Washington to 
do more without any corresponding pressure to examine whether 
these sales are actually advancing our interests or actually 
making Americans safer.
    So today, I would like to more closely examine some basic 
assumptions with our witnesses. The first assumption is this: 
Security assistance makes U.S. partners better able to protect 
U.S. interests in the Middle East.
    Has it? We have invested more than $50 billion in Egypt's 
army over the past 40 years. They did provide support to us in 
the Gulf War in 1991. But recently, that army has been focused 
more on internal repression than on regional security.
    Saudi Arabia and the UAE are capable of projecting military 
power beyond their border in a way that they were not decades 
ago. They often do so in ways that are contrary to U.S. 
interests, as we have seen in Yemen and Libya.
    The second assumption: If we do not sell them weapons they 
will turn to China or Russia. Well, the U.S. is the partner of 
choice not only because so much of our equipment is just far 
superior to anything the Chinese or the Russians can sell but 
also for long-term training, maintenance, and security 
cooperation that comes with those sales.
    It is time to ask whether the threat that less arms from 
the U.S. will cause our partners to simply abandon us and turn 
to Russia or China, whether that threat is real or whether it 
is just a red herring.
    Finally, the third assumption: Close military relationships 
with these countries bring them into ``the club.'' It helps 
professionalize them, incentivizes these nations to become more 
respectful of international norms like civilian control of the 
military and respect for human rights.
    As we know, by and large, this has not happened. Bahrain is 
more repressive than it was 10 years ago. The Saudi regime's 
crackdown on political speech is getting worse, not better. 
Egypt has 60,000 political prisoners in its jails.
    Now, I am not arguing for a bright line. I never have. I do 
not think the U.S. should pull out of our security 
relationships in the region. It can be a really effective tool.
    Our aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces has been vital in its 
significant political and economic turmoil in that country.
    The UAE Special Forces are valuable counterterrorism 
partners. Aid to Jordan helped secure the country's borders 
with Syria and Iraq when the ISIS caliphate was at its peak.
    Some of the resources that we provide to the region today 
are, I would argue, mismatched to our national security 
interests and, hopefully, that is what we will talk about 
today.
    I would also make the argument that the weight we put on 
security interests and security assistance crowds out our 
ability to offer other, often much more effective aid.
    As I said, I support continued funding for the Lebanese 
army. Honestly, that country is suffering from an economic and 
political crisis right now, not a security crisis. The bulk of 
the things that we have to offer Lebanon are more weapons.
    So, again, the purpose of the hearing today is to have an 
honest conversation and a realistic assessment of today's 
security threats in the Middle East and how we need to update 
our security assistance posture to best meet those threats.
    With that, let me turn to the ranking member for his 
opening remarks.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. TODD YOUNG, 
                   U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

    Senator Young. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 
this subcommittee hearing.
    First off, I want to thank members of our teams for working 
together to help get this hearing scheduled. We have had to 
battle a moving Senate calendar, and I appreciate your team's 
commitment to getting this nailed down.
    I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the 
importance of our security partnerships in the Middle East 
outside of a time of crisis.
    Too often, this committee only does the hard work of 
examining the parameters of our security assistance when things 
go wrong or during moments of congressional executive 
disagreement.
    The chairman and I worked together when there have been 
efforts to circumvent congressional prerogatives in pursuit of 
an arms sale agenda that was perhaps too permissive.
    Now I am concerned that the pendulum may be swinging too 
far in the other direction where assistance may be too 
restrictive just as the United States is withdrawing our true 
presence from the region.
    As in most exercises of foreign policy, it is crucial that 
the porridge be the right temperature. So this hearing, as I 
think about it, really comes down to a question of under what 
conditions the U.S. security assistance enhances regional and 
U.S. security, and to what extent and at what cost.
    The Senate Foreign Relations Committee must remain 
committed to the idea that the United States is engaging in a 
new great power competition with strategic rivals like China 
and Russia.
    Acknowledging that fact and taking appropriate steps to 
calibrate accordingly is essential. This process requires a 
reevaluation of our global commitments and presence, especially 
in the Middle East.
    The historic Abraham Accords provide an opportunity for 
such reflect and action. As the United States reduces its own 
presence, our role in the region must change from the leader to 
an active supporter.
    For this strategy to be successful, we will have to rely 
upon the governments of the partners and allies we have, not 
the ones we necessarily wish we had.
    In the last year, we have seen our partners and allies make 
peace and normalize relations with our ally, Israel, and those 
in Egypt were critical at helping stop the violent rocket 
attacks from Hamas into Israel.
    At the same time, we have seen Iran and its proxies, such 
as Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others, rain unguided 
rockets down on urban centers and attack civilian ships in 
international waters with sophisticated drones.
    This complex security environment is one which the United 
States can and must continue to shape for the sake of global 
energy and economic markets, for the sake of our enduring 
counterterrorism mission, and for the sake of regional 
stability, while denying the Middle East as an area of Russian 
and Chinese influence.
    All of this is to say that this committee will not be 
serving the national security interests of the American people 
if we act as a roadblock to security assistance and arms sales 
to the Middle East.
    Security assistance is a highly imperfect tool and it 
carries its own degree of risk. Removing it from the table or 
conditioning it in a way that creates insurmountable barriers 
or creating false choices between defensive and offensive 
systems undermines our ability to exert our influence in the 
region and provides excuses to those who will seek new sources 
of security assistance, sources like Russia, China, Turkey, or 
Iran, which do not possess our values or possess our ability 
and willingness to influence how arms are used.
    In today's hearing and going forward, we cannot put all of 
our regional partners and allies into the same box. We may have 
a strategic and diplomatic requirement to be ambiguous about 
some of our relations with allies around the world, but we must 
be crystal clear with our support for others, such as Israel.
    So in today's hearing, I am looking forward to a proactive 
dialogue and I hope to hear our witnesses expand upon the Biden 
administration's policies on the urgent requirements of Israel, 
how the Administration's recent conventional arms transfer 
policy will affect assistance to the Middle East, how the 
Administration intends to shape the use and provision of 
emerging and advanced technologies to the region, how the 
Departments of State and Defense can best work together to 
ensure America's foreign policy is being conducted holistically 
and in accordance with all our interests in mind, and the level 
of importance the Administration is placing on support for our 
partners and allies during this critical moment of rebalancing 
United States presence away from the Middle East.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
    It is now my privilege to welcome to the subcommittee both 
Ms. Mira Resnick, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional 
Affairs in the Bureau of Political Military Affairs at the 
State Department.
    Ms. Resnick previously served as the Senior Professional 
Staff Member covering the Middle East and North Africa for the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, and also worked at the State 
Department's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
    We also have testifying today Ms. Dana Stroul, the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East. Previously, 
she was a Fellow at the Washington Institute and Senior 
Professional Staff Member on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee.
    I do not know which order you want to do this in but the 
floor is yours, to be followed by questions.

   STATEMENT OF MIRA RESNICK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR 
 REGIONAL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, U.S. 
              DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Resnick. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 
Young, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an 
honor to appear before you and with DASD Stroul to discuss U.S. 
security assistance to the Middle East. I ask that my full 
statement be placed in the record.
    Let me start by saying, as Secretary Blinken has repeatedly 
said, that the State Department is fully committed to 
partnering with Congress on these issues and we welcome the 
opportunity to engage.
    At a time when strategic competition with the People's 
Republic of China is our foremost foreign policy challenge and 
in an era with so many of the problems we face are global in 
scope, our engagement in the Middle East is all the more 
important.
    Increasingly complex global challenges demand strong 
partnerships because we cannot act alone, because we face 
global problems whose consequences shape security at a regional 
level and because America's leadership matters.
    Our security assistance and arms transfers to the Middle 
East, as to any part of the world, are a function of our 
foreign policy, which is why Congress has placed these 
authorities with the Department of State.
    Through security cooperation, we seek to disrupt al-Qaeda 
and related terrorist networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence, 
address humanitarian crises, and redouble our efforts to 
resolve the complex armed conflicts that threaten regional 
stability, including deterring Iranian aggression and 
supporting our partners and allies' territorial defense.
    The United States continues to maintain our ironclad 
commitment to Israel's security, helping to maintain its 
qualitative military edge in the region consistent with U.S. 
legal requirements and policy.
    Nearby in Jordan, our foreign military financing helps 
increase cooperation on border and maritime security, 
cybersecurity and counterterrorism, allowing Jordan to 
contribute to U.S. operations that advance regional security.
    We are recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia, 
aligning it with the Administration's approach to security 
assistance. The President has made clear that our interests 
cannot be separated from our values.
    At the same time, we remain committed to helping the 
kingdom defend itself from continuing cross-border attacks from 
the Houthis in Yemen supported by Iran.
    From day one this Administration has worked to end the 
conflict in Yemen, and the first step we took toward doing so 
was to suspend two munitions sales that the previous 
Administration had notified to Congress. Those sales remain 
suspended under a policy of ending U.S. support to offensive 
operations of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
    The Biden/Harris administration is also committed to 
security cooperation with the UAE, including through the 
transfers of some of our most important technology.
    While the projected delivery dates on these sales would be 
several years into the future, we anticipate a robust and 
sustained dialogue with the UAE to ensure that any defense 
transfers meet our mutual strategic objectives to build a 
stronger, interoperable, and more capable security partnership 
that will protect the security of our technology and that will 
comport with our values.
    Just as our assistance can contribute to the national 
stability of partners, it can also, if not properly managed, 
imperil human security.
    A key part of arms transfer decisions is our efforts to 
ensure that U.S.-origin equipment is not used to perpetuate 
human rights violations and to minimize the risk of civilian 
casualties by our partners.
    As part of the arms transfer decision analysis, we closely 
scrutinize the human rights track record of recipients and 
consider whether supplemental civilian harm mitigation measures 
should be required as a component of an arms sale or whether 
the transfer should take place at all.
    When U.S.-origin assistance or equipment is used contrary 
to these goals or when potential violations occur, we will 
evaluate the full range of consequences.
    For example, I believe decisions about our support to 
Egypt's security must be informed, framed, and bound by our 
values.
    We have deep concerns regarding human rights violations in 
Egypt and we will continue to raise these concerns with 
Egyptian officials at the senior most levels as we work with 
Egypt to improve their ability to advance shared security 
interests, including counterterrorism and border and maritime 
security.
    Let me stress that the fundamental importance of human 
rights are and will remain an essential element of any arms 
transfer decision to Egypt, to the Middle East, and globally.
    Let me end with this. Partners are aware that security 
assistance and sales from the United States come with high 
expectations, that the U.S. review process takes time.
    Why is that? It is because we press and hold accountable 
our allies and partners to reduce civilian casualties, to 
adhere to the laws of armed conflict, to respect human rights, 
to enhance their security sector governance processes, to 
understand when there is no military solution to a conflict, to 
prevent military technologies from falling into the hands of 
bad actors.
    These are not strings attached, Mr. Chairman. These are the 
values we believe are inseparable from our national security 
and that have underpinned our own stability and prosperity, and 
which we believe will strengthen our partnerships to build 
peace and security in the region over the long term.
    America is unique in that respect. No other nation's 
assistance is designed as intentionally to address the root 
causes of challenges facing the region. We also realize that 
these values help make us safer and make our partners safer.
    We see these roots in our values as a benefit, not a 
hindrance, for our foreign policy and for our security 
assistance.
    Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions.
    [Prepared statement of Ms. Resnick follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Mira Resnick

    Good morning Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. It's an honor to appear 
before you with DASD Stroul to discuss U.S. Security Assistance to the 
Middle East. Let me make it clear at the start, as Secretary Blinken 
has repeatedly said, that the State Department is fully committed to 
partnering with Congress on these issues, and we welcome the 
opportunity to engage today.
    At a time when our strategic competition with the People's Republic 
of China is our foremost foreign policy challenge, and in an era when 
so many of the problems we face--problems like climate change and the 
COVID pandemic--are global in scope, our engagement in the Middle East 
is all the more important. Increasingly complex global challenges 
demand strong partnerships because we cannot act alone. Because we face 
global problems whose consequences shape security at a regional level. 
And because America's leadership matters.
               security assistance as a tool of diplomacy
    The Department of State leads America's foreign policy through 
diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance, by advancing the interests of the 
American people, their safety and prosperity. Our goal is to find 
diplomatic solutions to conflict, and we have started by reinvigorating 
and reinvesting in our alliances and partnerships around the world. 
President Biden has pledged to lead with diplomacy, because it's the 
best way to deal with today's challenges, and security cooperation and 
security assistance are among the many different tools we can use to 
advance diplomacy. Security cooperation improves partner countries' 
interoperability with U.S. forces and enhances their ability to meet 
their own legitimate defense needs, thereby contributing to regional 
security.
    By equipping and empowering our partners to address shared security 
concerns, we can help share the burden of addressing today's crises, 
while promoting resilience, innovation, and shared prosperity for the 
future.
    Our security assistance and arms transfers to the Middle East, as 
to any part of the world are a function of our foreign policy, which is 
why Congress has placed these authorities with the Department of State. 
In applying the security cooperation toolkit, the State Department's 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs seeks to build the capacity of 
allies and partners to contribute to regional stability and security 
and advance human rights and democracy, which in turn contributes to 
American security--and which also carry vital humanitarian implications 
in the region.
strengthening and standing behind our allies, working with like-minded 
    partners, and pooling our collective strength to advance shared 
                   interests and deter common threats
    In the Middle East, we are working to disrupt international 
terrorist networks, deter Iranian aggression, and support our partners' 
and allies' territorial defense.
    The United States continues to maintain our ironclad commitment to 
Israel's security, helping to maintain its qualitative military edge in 
the region consistent with U.S. legal requirements and long-standing 
policy. At the same time, we will continue efforts to advance relations 
between Israel and its neighbors, and we underscore our strong 
commitment to a negotiated two-state solution as the best path to reach 
a just and lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
    Jordan's stability and security are priorities for the United 
States, and we have provided Jordan with assistance for more than 50 
years. We have supported the Jordan Border Security Program, an 
integrated border security surveillance, detection, and interdiction 
system since 2009. All of these funds support provision of equipment 
and other assistance Jordan urgently needed to respond to transnational 
threats along its border and participate in Global Coalition 
operations. Jordan is the third largest global recipient of Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), and these funds support provision of 
equipment and other assistance Jordan urgently needs to rapidly respond 
to transnational threats along its border and participate in Global 
Coalition operations against al-Qa'ida, ISIS, and their regional and 
global affiliates. The provided FMF helps Jordan increase cooperation 
on border and maritime security, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism. 
The financing has allowed Jordan to also contribute to U.S. operations, 
and this interoperability with our forces is critical to our national 
security and ensures that we don't risk the lives of U.S. men and 
women.
    We are recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia, as the 
President has directed, to make clear that our interests cannot be 
separated from our values, and we also remain committed to helping the 
Kingdom defend itself from continuing cross-border attacks from the 
Houthis in Yemen, supported by Iran. Alongside our important work with 
Saudi Arabia on regional security and counterterrorism, the President 
has been clear that the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership must reflect 
the values and interests the United States brings to that partnership, 
and we are prioritizing human rights in our bilateral engagements. When 
this Administration came to office, we found some of our partners in 
the region entrenched in a years-long war in Yemen. From day one, this 
Administration has worked to end the conflict in Yemen, and the first 
step we took towards doing so was to suspend two munitions sales that 
the previous Administration had notified to Congress. Those sales 
remain suspended under a policy of ending U.S. support to offensive 
operations of the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen. At the same time, this 
Administration recognizes that Saudi Arabia faces significant threats 
to its territory, and we are committed to working together to help 
Riyadh strengthen its defenses. More broadly, the Secretary appointed a 
special envoy to focus U.S. diplomatic energies on bringing the war to 
a close, through aligned efforts with the U.N. envoy and regional 
states, including the Saudi Government. Thus the Administration's 
efforts on Yemen include but also extend above and beyond ending 
weapons sales for use in offensive operations.
   as we sharpen our focus on our strategic competition with prc and 
  russia, we will need partners in the middle east to work with us to 
                     ensure stability in the region
    When the United States looks at the region today, we see 
substantial opportunities to advance our objectives. Our presence and 
relationships with Middle East partners help prevent efforts by Russia 
and China to extend their influence into the region. The PRC, in 
particular, has rapidly become more assertive. It is the only 
competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, 
military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a 
stable and open international system. Russia remains determined to 
enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world 
stage. Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant 
to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and 
allies around the world. Regional actors like Iran continue to pursue 
game-changing capabilities and technologies, even as they threaten U.S. 
allies and partners and challenge regional stability. We need to focus 
on shoring up America's core strengths--our people, our economy, our 
national defense, and our democracy--to meet the strategic competition 
with China and Russia that is going to shape our future.
    We will work with our regional partners to deter Iranian aggression 
and threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity; disrupt al-Qaeda 
and related terrorist networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence; address 
humanitarian crises; and redouble our efforts to resolve the complex 
armed conflicts that threaten regional stability. But we do not believe 
that military force is the answer to the region's challenges; the use 
of military force should be a last resort. Diplomacy, development, and 
economic statecraft should be the leading instruments of American 
foreign policy.
    I want to reiterate that we are committed to advancing the security 
of our partners across the Middle East. Security cooperation--including 
security agreements, Foreign Military Sales (FMS), exercises, training, 
and exchanges--are integral components to the overall U.S. regional 
strategy that improve interoperability with the U.S. partner nations' 
forces to meet their legitimate external defense needs and deter 
regional threats. However, I also want to assure that we constantly 
closely scrutinize every part of our security cooperation 
relationships, and will also not hesitate to adjust or recalibrate them 
to better serve our national security interests.
addressing the crises of today while promoting resilience, innovation, 
      competitiveness, and truly shared prosperity for the future
    We also see, in the Middle East, a region transforming--petrostates 
becoming diversified economies, boycotts becoming partnerships. One 
such example is the United Arab Emirates.
    The UAE makes significant contributions to promote regional 
security and de-escalation across the Middle East and is an outstanding 
counterterrorism partner to the United States.
    The Biden-Harris administration is committed to security 
cooperation with the UAE, including through transfers of some of our 
most important technology. While the projected delivery dates on these 
sales would be several years in the future, we anticipate a robust and 
sustained dialogue with the UAE to ensure that any defense transfers 
meet our mutual strategic objectives to build a stronger, 
interoperable, and more capable security partnership, that will protect 
the security of our technology and that will comport with our values.
    As you know, in recent years, the UAE has come under intense 
scrutiny about their compliance with end use requirements, to include 
deployments that impact areas of conflict, and alleged unauthorized 
retransfers. The Department continues to work closely with the UAE, to 
include seeking additional reassurances to establishing effective joint 
procedures of operation and oversight to address these concerns. The 
UAE has demonstrated its willingness to open dialogue and cooperation 
with the USG and we continue to assess that they can be a reliable 
partner. And, again, we stress the importance of interoperability and 
burden sharing so that our men and women in uniform do not have to 
carry the risk of every load. And, again, we stress the importance of 
interoperability and burden sharing so that our military forces always 
have the advantage of operating as part of a coalition.
        human rights/rule of law as a national security priority
    Just as our assistance can contribute to the national stability of 
partners, it can also, if not properly managed, imperil human security. 
A key part of arms transfer decisions is our efforts to ensure U.S. 
origin equipment is not used to perpetrate human rights violations and 
to minimize the risk of civilian casualties by our partners. As part of 
the arms transfer decision analysis, we closely scrutinize the human 
rights track record of recipients and consider whether supplemental 
civilian harm mitigation measures, such as training, advising, or other 
supporting capabilities, should be required as a component of an arms 
sale, or whether the transfer should take place at all. We insist that 
our partners take steps to comply with international law, including the 
laws of armed conflict. When U.S. origin assistance or equipment is 
used contrary to these goals or when potential violations occur, we 
will evaluate the full range of consequences. Our aim is to de-escalate 
regional tensions and create space for people throughout the Middle 
East to realize their aspirations while still providing critical 
defensive capabilities. Region-wide, we are continuously examining and 
prioritizing how we can ensure our security cooperation relationships 
are consistent with our values, including a reinvigorated focus on 
civilian harm mitigation efforts. The United States consistently urges 
our partners to comply with their obligations under international law, 
to implement measures to reduce the risk of harm to civilians, to take 
appropriate measures when such casualties occur, and to draw lessons 
from operations to reduce the risk of harm to civilians. The Department 
also remains committed to the principles of the Leahy Law, as a tool to 
promote accountability in foreign security forces and to ensure that 
security assistance goals are in-line with our values.
    For example, I believe decisions about our support to Egypt's 
security must be informed, framed, and bounded by our values. We have 
deep concerns regarding human rights violations in Egypt, and we will 
continue to raise these concerns with Egyptian officials at the senior-
most levels. This is a key element of strengthening our strategic 
partnership with Egypt. We will continue to work with Egypt to improve 
their ability to advance shared security interests, including 
counterterrorism, and border and maritime security. At the same time 
this Administration consistently raises concerns about policies 
challenging democratic governance, the need to protect a robust and 
independent civil society, and the fundamental importance of human 
rights which are, and will remain, an essential element of any arms 
transfer decision to Egypt, and I would note that Egypt has taken steps 
to work on practical ways to conduct military operations that mitigate 
the risk of civilian harm.
 it is the goal of this administration to create policies informed by 
               american interests, including human rights
    And finally, on that last cause I identified: promotion of an open 
international order that reflects our values and advances our 
interests. Partners are aware that security assistance and sales from 
the United States come with high expectations--and that the U.S. review 
process takes time. Why? It is because we press and hold accountable 
our allies and partners to reduce civilian casualties. To adhere to the 
laws of armed conflict. To respect human rights. To enhance their 
security sector governance processes. To understand when there is no 
military solution to a conflict. To prevent military technologies from 
falling into the hands of bad actors. To build transnational 
connections that enhance peace. These are not ``strings attached,'' Mr. 
Chairman, these are the values we believe are inseparable from our 
national security and that have underpinned our own stability and 
prosperity, and which we believe will strengthen our partnerships to 
build peace and security in the region over the long-term. And yes, we 
are unique in that respect--no other nation's assistance is designed as 
intentionally to address the root causes of challenges facing the 
region. But we also realize that these values also help make us safer 
and make our partners safer. We see those roots in our values as a 
benefit, not a hindrance, for our foreign policy and for our security 
assistance.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

STATEMENT OF DANA STROUL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
 FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. 
             DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Stroul. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and 
members of the committee, it is an honor to testify before you 
today alongside DAS Resnick to discuss the Department of 
Defense, or DoD, role in U.S. security cooperation in the 
Middle East.
    The committee has my full opening statement submitted for 
the record. So in my 5 minutes, I would like to emphasize some 
key points regarding DoD's role in security cooperation.
    First, strategy drives programming and resource allocation. 
The interim national security strategy released earlier this 
year set out the broad parameters for how the United States 
will engage abroad to protect Americans at home.
    In particular, it calls for doubling down on building 
partnerships throughout the world, because our strength is 
multiplied when we combine efforts to address common 
challenges, share costs, and widen the circle of cooperation. 
DoD's security cooperation activities are nested within this 
guidance.
    Second, the State Department is in the lead. Diplomacy is 
in the lead. DoD programs fall within a whole-of-government 
approach to the region. We utilize security cooperation 
authorities and programs to expand the capabilities of willing 
partners, respond to urgent security needs, and invest in the 
institutional growth of partner forces to share the 
responsibility for regional security.
    Over time, our goal is to partner with self-reliant, 
capable, and accountable partner forces who will work alongside 
the United States to achieve mutual objectives based on shared 
threats and shared interests.
    This is a long-term proposition. Security cooperation 
programs are also designed to ensure that the U.S. maintains 
access to key areas and facilities to support the defense of 
our partners, respond to potential contingencies, and to 
protect U.S. personnel.
    Third, security cooperation encompasses more than military 
sales and funding. For DoD, security cooperation activities 
include exercises, education and training, operational 
planning, institutional capacity development efforts such as 
security sector reform, strategic planning and doctrine 
development, human resource management, defense budgeting, 
training and advising, as well as the transfer of defense 
articles and services.
    Within each of these categories there are opportunities and 
requirements for the department to demonstrate and impart U.S. 
values such as support for a rules-based international order, 
respect for the rule of law, and civilian control of the 
military and commitment to fundamental freedoms and human 
rights.
    Fourth, security cooperation activities reinforce broader 
U.S. objectives.
    Examples: Normalization. As Israel moves into the U.S. 
Central Command, or USCENTCOM, area of responsibility, we can 
use military exercises and U.S.-convened professional education 
programs to provide opportunities to facilitate normalization 
and build upon it by encouraging relationship building between 
Israel and Arab militaries.
    Cooperation to counter the threat of attack by unmanned 
aerial vehicles, or UAVs, drones. Given the shared regional 
threat of the Iran-supported UAV network across the region, we 
can use security cooperation programs to advance shared 
regional defense.
    Burden sharing. While the U.S. seeks to remain the security 
partner of choice in the Middle East, improved integrated 
regional security among partners is key as the United States 
right-sizes its posture in the region.
    Strategic competition. In the Middle East, building the 
capacity of partners is critical to reducing their 
vulnerabilities to aggression and coercion, and improving their 
ability to defend their sovereignty, their interests, and a 
free and open international order.
    A critical tool in countering U.S. competitors like China 
and Russia is to provide superior training and equipment to 
meet partners' needs.
    My fifth and final point, congressional consultation and 
oversight is critical. Thank you for congressional bipartisan 
support for security cooperation authorities, programs, and 
funding for the Middle East, and in exercising robust and 
necessary oversight and monitoring to ensure that security 
cooperation resources remain aligned with U.S. objectives and 
continue to be in the interest of the American people.
    I look forward to your questions. Thank you again.
    [Prepared statement of Ms. Stroul follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Ms. Dana Stroul

    Thank you Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member Young, and Members of the 
Committee. It is an honor to testify before you today, alongside my 
State Department colleague, to discuss the Department of Defense (DoD) 
role in U.S. security cooperation in the Middle East.
    The interim National Security Strategy (NSS) released earlier this 
year set out the broad parameters for how the United States will engage 
abroad to protect Americans at home. In particular, it calls for 
``doubling down on building partnerships throughout the world, because 
our strength is multiplied when we combine efforts to address common 
challenges, share costs, and widen the circle of cooperation.''
    In the Middle East, the interim NSS calls for working with U.S. 
partners to deter Iranian aggressive actions and threats to sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, disrupt al-Qaeda and related terrorist 
networks and prevent an ISIS resurgence, address humanitarian crises, 
and for a redoubling of efforts to resolve complex armed conflicts that 
threaten regional stability. Finally, the NSS specifically makes clear 
that military force is not the solution for the region's perpetual 
instability and lack of security.
    Consistent with the interim NSS, the Department of Defense is 
working to ensure that the full suite of security cooperation 
authorities, programs, and resources provided by Congress are 
implemented as part of a whole-of-government approach in which the 
State Department is in the lead for U.S. policy in the Middle East. 
Security cooperation programs and activities are a critical pillar in 
the Administration's focus on partnership, based on the acknowledgement 
that the U.S. cannot achieve its objectives unilaterally. DoD programs 
reinforce diplomacy, and the U.S. emphasis on dialogue and political 
processes--coordinated with partners--to wind down conflicts. DoD 
utilizes security cooperation authorities and programs to expand the 
capabilities of willing U.S. security partners, respond to urgent 
security needs, and invest in the institutional growth of partner 
forces to share the responsibility for reinforcing regional security.
    Over time, the U.S. goal is to partner with self-reliant, capable, 
and accountable partner forces who work alongside the United States to 
achieve mutual objectives, based on a shared view of the threats to 
regional stability and security. U.S. support through security 
cooperation to partners is also designed to ensure that the U.S. 
maintains access to key areas and facilities, both to support the 
defense of our partners and also to respond to potential contingencies.
    For the Department, security cooperation includes several 
categories of activities, to include: transfer of defense articles and 
services; military exercises; military education and training; and 
institutional capacity development efforts such as security sector 
reform. Within each of these categories, there are opportunities and 
requirements for the Department to demonstrate and impart core U.S. 
values such as support for a rules-based international order, respect 
for the rule of law and civilian control of the military, and 
commitment to fundamental freedoms.
    The Department conducts assessment, monitoring, and evaluation 
(AM&E) of its security cooperation initiatives to inform decisions 
about security cooperation strategy, policy, programs, and resources. 
The Department is building its capacity and processes to design, 
develop, and implement AM&E to track progress through the development 
of front-end assessments and performance monitoring of security 
cooperation initiatives. In addition, the Department conducts 
independent strategic evaluations to analyze the efficiency and 
effectiveness of SC programming.
    Global U.S. security assistance, including in the Middle East, is 
subject to the Leahy law vetting procedures. Screening for compliance 
with human rights standards is integral to the Department's review and 
prioritization of International Security Cooperation Program (ISCP) 
funding recipients. In addition, DoD offers courses via the Institute 
for Security Governance (ISG) to build institutional capacity such as 
Defense Governance, Civil-Military Relations, and Civilian Harm 
Mitigation. Additionally, courses are offered by the Defense Institute 
of International Legal Studies (DIILS) include Military Justice, 
Defense Support of Civilian Authorities, and Human Right and Law of 
Armed Conflict.
    In the Middle East, security cooperation activities and programs 
provide critical opportunities for the United States to advance long-
term objectives for the region. As Israel moves into U.S. Central 
Command, military exercises and U.S.-convened professional education 
programs provide opportunities for the United States to expand on last 
year's normalization agreements by encouraging relationship-building 
between the Israeli and Arab militaries. Given the shared regional 
threat of Iran-supported unmanned aerial systems across the region, 
U.S. security cooperation programs can be used to encourage shared 
regional defense initiatives. While the U.S. seeks to remain the 
security partner of choice in the Middle East, improved integrated 
regional security among partners is key as the United States right-
sizes its posture in the region and seeks to counter the influence and 
appeal of strategic competitors.
    Security cooperation programs are a key element of competition with 
Russia and China. In the Middle East, building the capacity of U.S. is 
critical to reducing their vulnerabilities to aggression and coercion--
and improving their ability to defend their sovereignty, their 
interests, and the free and open international order. One critical tool 
in countering U.S. competitors is to provide security cooperation and 
assistance, such as superior training and equipment, which meets 
partners' security needs. As the U.S. works alongside partners to 
address violent extremism, maritime threats, and more, we nurture 
strong relationships that serve as an effective counter to China and 
Russia. This includes professional military education, coordinated with 
the Department of State, which helps develop these relationships with 
young military leaders in the United States and the Middle East.
    In the Middle East, many security cooperation programs are focused 
on maritime and border security, air and missile defense, 
counterterrorism, and institutional capacity building. In the Levant, 
the primary border security and terrorist threats emanate from Syria 
and Iraq. The robust partnership between the United States and the 
Kingdom of Jordan is an example of what sustained security cooperation 
can achieve with a reliable partner. Jordan is today an important 
counter-terrorism partner and key contributor to the Global Coalition 
to Defeat ISIS, in large part due to efforts by the United States to 
build Jordan's defense capabilities and to promote interoperability 
with the United States over many years.
    In the Gulf region, DoD supports the Department of State's efforts 
to secure a peaceful settlement to the war in Yemen. Additionally, the 
Department of Defense utilizes security cooperation authorities to 
bolster Saudi Arabia's air defenses in the face of ongoing cross-border 
attacks from Yemen. U.S. security cooperation is designed to support 
the defense of Saudi Arabian territory through the provision of 
training, equipment, and early warning intelligence. In Oman, State and 
DoD's security cooperation collaboration is bolstering Oman's border 
security, maritime security, and counterterrorism capabilities. In 
Bahrain, U.S. security assistance programs are assisting Bahrain to 
increase its maritime security capabilities.
    In Iraq, U.S. security assistance strengthens Iraq's counter-
terrorism capabilities and bolsters Iraqi forces as they work to 
maintain a secure, stable, and sovereign Iraq. Programs focus on 
professionalization of Iraqi forces, border security, and increasing 
interoperability with the United States and NATO.
    Cooperation with Congress is critical in authorizing security 
cooperation programs, and in maintaining effective oversight. Thank you 
for Congressional bipartisan leadership in supporting the U.S. security 
partnerships in the Middle East region, and in exercising robust and 
necessary oversight and monitoring to ensure that how we use security 
cooperation resources remains aligned with U.S. objectives and 
continues to be in the interest of the American people. I look forward 
to working with Congress as the Department takes up the continued and 
important cause of strengthening U.S. partner forces to mitigate 
threats to U.S., Coalition, and regional interests in the region.

    Senator Murphy. Thank you both for your testimony. I am 
going to turn to Senator Shaheen for the opening round of 
questions.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you to both of our witnesses for being here today.
    There are those who argue that with the threat from great 
power competition that we ought to be reducing our interests in 
the Middle East and Afghanistan. There are those that argue 
that one reason to withdraw troops from Afghanistan was so we 
could better focus on the threat from China and Russia and the 
future great power competition and refocus on Asia.
    You addressed this a little bit in your opening statement, 
Ms. Resnick, but can you make the case for why it is important 
for us to continue to be engaged in the Middle East and that 
security cooperation is one of the important aspects of that?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for your question, Senator.
    As I said in my opening statement, we are clear eyed about 
what strategic competition means and we understand that China 
is the pacing threat, but China is looking to undercut our 
security relationships throughout the world, and we are only as 
strong as the strength of our partners and alliances.
    We are facing global challenges, including COVID, including 
climate change, including risks of terrorism, and we need 
partners to be able to confront those challenges.
    The U.S. remains the partner of choice in the region, and 
with our partners we are looking to reinforce the rules-based 
international order. China does not provide them that kind of 
security.
    So we will continue to look to build partnerships and 
alliances in the Middle East to make sure that we can respond 
to these global challenges with our partners and allies.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
    Ms. Stroul, one of the places where we have seen the proxy 
war playing out is in Syria. I very much appreciated your 
leadership as co-chair of the Syria Study Group. As someone who 
worked on that legislation, I was really hopeful that the 
recommendations that the group came up with could make a 
difference in Syria.
    Can you talk about what, if any, of those recommendations 
have been implemented by the Biden administration and what you 
see, going forward, to address Syria?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    First of all, one of the key recommendations of the Syria 
Study Group was that we should retain our U.S. military 
presence in northeast Syria both because ISIS is not defeated, 
because we made commitments to the Syrian Democratic Forces, 
that they continue to fight ISIS but cannot do that without our 
support, training, and advice, and because there are tens of 
thousands of ISIS detainees still under SDF custody as well as 
families of ISIS fighters at the Al-Hol IDP camp.
    We provide, through security cooperation authorities and 
funding, support and training so that there is a humane and 
humanitarian approach to the families and children while we 
facilitate relocation to the countries of origin of those 
foreign fighters, and facilitate long-term solutions to the 
Syrian and Iraqi detainees.
    First of all, for retaining U.S. military presence, the 
Biden administration is committed to retaining U.S. military 
presence in northeast Syria. It is also committing to 
addressing the humanitarian crisis. That is another priority 
that the Syria Study Group sought to shine light on is the 
humanitarian crisis.
    With the Biden administration, we have not only increased 
our humanitarian aid to not just northeast Syria but the rest 
of Syrian civilians in need, and we have restored stabilization 
assistance.
    So areas that were liberated from ISIS had the opportunity 
to rebuild and are no longer vulnerable to ISIS influence.
    Senator Shaheen. Ms. Stroul, I would encourage you to 
engage with the Syrian diaspora in this country, which have 
very definite ideas about what might be helpful in Syria and 
still have a lot of connections and relatives there.
    Also, has there been a detainee coordinator appointed yet? 
It is one of the things that we prescribed in the NDAA several 
years ago, as you know, and to my knowledge, it was never done 
under the previous Administration.
    Ms. Stroul. It is a critical question. With respect to the 
coordinator for the detainee issue, right now the lead for that 
is the Counterterrorism Bureau in the State Department, and 
this reflects back on what both DAS Resnick and I talked about, 
which is a whole-of-government approach. When it comes to 
either security assistance or security cooperation, DoD does 
not operate in a vacuum nor does the State Department.
    In terms of engagement with the Syrian diaspora community, 
she and I both are in constant contact with our colleagues in 
the NEA Bureau across the State Department, others within the 
Department of Defense as well as the National Security Council.
    I am confident that that engagement is taking place, but I 
will take that recommendation back.
    When it comes to the detainee coordinator, right now we 
have not only flagged your interest in this and the fact that 
there is pending legislation, right now the lead for that is in 
the Counterterrorism Bureau and they are actively involved in 
the diplomacy of getting countries of origin to take back both 
their fighters and the families, and DoD facilitates that when 
requested to do so.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, the legislation is not actually 
pending. It has been passed. So I would hope that that 
coordinator gets appointed to help with that issue, which is a 
very real issue now.
    Mr. Chairman, can I ask one more question?
    The chairman mentioned in his opening comments the Lebanese 
Armed Forces and the situation in Lebanon, which is, sadly, 
close to a failed state at this point.
    One of the things that we know we need to do is continue to 
support the Lebanese Armed Forces. I was very distressed 
recently to hear from someone in the Middle East that, in fact, 
they are having trouble getting food in the LAF that they need, 
given the current crisis.
    So can you talk about why it is important for us to 
continue to support them, even though I would agree with the 
chairman that security may not be their number-one challenge at 
this point but, certainly making sure that the institution of 
the LAF remains strong is really critical for the future of the 
country?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you, Senator, for the question and for 
your leadership on this issue. The LAF is one of our most 
capable partners in the Middle East. Our support for the LAF 
supports our broader policy on pushing back on ISIS and 
promoting stability.
    Lebanon has faced multiple crises in the last year, as we 
all have, but it is particularly acute in Lebanon between 
COVID, political paralysis, economic collapse, societal 
distress, of course, the port explosion which exacerbated 
everything.
    The LAF is really the sole legitimate defender of Lebanese 
sovereignty, the sole legitimate defender of the Lebanese 
people, and they serve as an institutional counterweight to 
Hezbollah, which continues to put Israelis and Lebanese at risk 
with their irresponsible rocket attacks, which we condemn 
wholeheartedly.
    Hezbollah continues to jeopardize Lebanese stability and 
sovereignty. Without the LAF, Hezbollah fills the void and that 
is exactly the opposite of what we would like to see in 
Lebanon.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you both very much. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman, for the additional time.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    So as the United States reduces its troop presence in the 
Middle East and we re-posture, focusing more on the Indo-
Pacific, it is really important that we continue, Ms. Resnick, 
to evaluate the security dynamics on a regular basis. I know 
you agree with that. This, in turn, will inform how we provide 
security assistance to partners in the region.
    Can you speak to how the interagency evaluates our 
partners' security requirements? The methodology and then how 
those conclusions are then operationalized?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for your question, Senator.
    We are always looking to make sure that we can provide 
advanced capabilities for our partners to be able to defend 
themselves, to be able to enhance regional stability, and at 
the same time, we are looking to make sure that our partners 
will protect civilians and advance human rights.
    We look at everything on a case-by-case basis. We will 
cooperate with allies and partners where our priorities align 
and we will not shy away from defending U.S. interests and 
American values where they do not.
    We continue to consult with Congress closely on transfers 
and on security cooperation. We--again, we welcome your input 
as the Secretary----
    Senator Young. So----
    Ms. Resnick. --as Secretary Blinken has said, at the 
takeoff and not at the landing.
    Senator Young. Sure. So, respectfully, it is not 
particularly formulaic, right? There is multiple factors that 
have to be looked at and multiple dynamics and so forth.
    Based on your current analysis, are there any current 
security needs of our Gulf partners that are not being met and 
that need to be addressed?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for that question.
    I am happy to speak to that more in a different 
environment. We are constantly surveying the landscape there 
and making sure that our partners do have what they need, and 
we want to make sure that they are able to defend themselves.
    Senator Young. I will accept that invitation to discuss 
that in a different environment if, indeed, that conversation 
will actually result in some rich material, and I think my 
colleagues can identify with that.
    So, Ms. Resnick, can you speak to whether the department 
has all the authorities it requires to increase IMET to 
partners and allies and how this will benefit the 
professionalism and reduce civilian risks during time of 
conflict?
    Ms. Resnick. Yes. We do implement the IMET program and we 
are always looking to make sure that our partners can learn 
from our military, be able to take the lessons back to their 
home countries and implement them.
    To my knowledge, we have all of the authorities we need, 
although I will take that back. I do understand that there has 
been a special congressional interest in making sure that women 
are trained through our IMET program, and we continue to 
implement that as a priority of the State Department as well.
    Senator Young. I see I have, roughly, 90 seconds left.
    Ms. Stroul, you touched on both the UAE and Yemen, and I 
will be asking questions about it. I will just begin with UAE.
    Of course, last year, there was a sale of the F-35 fighters 
after some discussion up here on the Hill and within the 
Administration.
    This was the first of its kind in the Middle East to any 
partner other than Israel, and I thought it was an encouraging 
step forward with respect to having future interoperability 
capabilities and trying to ensure that some of our partners did 
not look elsewhere for their armaments.
    It also brings up the point that our advanced technologies 
have to be provided in some manner that ensures there is 
security around those technologies.
    So what steps does the department take to ensure that these 
advanced technologies and cutting-edge platforms remain secure 
when they are in their hands of our trusted partners?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that critical question, Senator.
    With respect to the UAE, the agreement to sell the F-35 
system is an opportunity to enhance the interoperability with 
the Emirati military for one of our most capable military 
partners in the region.
    With the agreement to sell the F-35 platform comes the 
expectation that the UAE Government will protect the sensitive 
defense technology.
    There are both security requirements within the paperwork 
that we complete between the two governments when we agreed to 
the transfer. There are ongoing dialogues throughout any year 
with the Emirati military where we will discuss issues and it 
is also part of the broader relationship.
    So one thing that I would like to highlight here, since we 
were talking about strategic competition before, this is not 
unique to the UAE, with any partner globally but specifically 
in the Middle East, because it is a theater for competition, 
great power competition and strategic competition.
    What we discuss with our partners is we understand that 
there will be an economic or trade relationship with China just 
like the United States has.
    There are certain categories of activities or engagement 
that our partners may be considering with China that if they do 
will pose a risk to U.S. defense technology, other kinds of 
technology, and, ultimately, force protection. Force protection 
is the highest priority of the entire U.S. Government.
    So we have an ongoing consultation. It is not specific to 
the F-35, but that is certainly part of it. If I may take the 
opportunity just to speak about IMET, it is incredible when I 
traveled throughout the region to meet officers in any partner 
government who remember fondly their years at our war college, 
at our different training institutes.
    We can always use more IMET. DAS Resnick is not going to 
ask for it. I think this is one of the most critical things we 
can do because we can demonstrate not just in words but through 
programs what is civilian control of the military, rule of law, 
doctrine development, human resource management, maintenance 
sustainment.
    We teach these skills and we build relationships that last 
over the long term because these partner militaries and 
officers are engaging with our officers. They go to dinner at 
our officers' houses. The families form relationships. It is 
absolutely critical as a tool not only for strategic 
competition but, ultimately, for regional security.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
    I will take my first round of questioning now.
    So if you believe that we are in and entering an era of 
great power competition, it is also an era in which the future 
of the world is going to depend on the outcome of the contest 
between American-style democracy and Russian and Chinese-
modeled autocracy, and so the world is going to be watching 
when it comes to the way in which we talk about democracy and 
human rights, and whether we are actually willing to back up 
that talk with action.
    So I appreciate, Ms. Resnick, your opening remarks with 
respect to Egypt. This is a country that is receiving 
significant U.S. aid, $1.3 billion a year, and in the midst of 
a dizzying crackdown on political dissent.
    Mohamed Soltan was a U.S. citizen who was locked up in an 
Egyptian jail for years. They would throw sick prisoners into 
his cell, dying sick prisoners, let them die there and let the 
corpse sit and rot inside his solitary confinement cell as a 
means to try to break him.
    That is the kind of behavior that we empower when we 
continue to send $1.3 billion to that regime. Not to say that 
there are not legitimate reasons why we should align ourselves 
from a security perspective with Egypt.
    Is not there a risk at some point that if there is no 
consequence for a country like Egypt to continuing this 
crackdown on political dissent and speech that it compromises 
our ability to lead the world when it comes to the advancement 
of democracy and human rights?
    I heard what you said in your opening remarks, but what do 
you have to say about the worry that, ultimately, our talk on 
human rights does not match up to our actions?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for this very important question, 
Senator.
    We share your concerns about Egypt, about civil society 
crackdown, about restrictions on expression, on the treatment 
of American citizens, on the risk of civilian harm during 
military operations, on recent allegations about what happened 
in the Sinai.
    We have raised these issues at the highest level and we 
continue to do so. We want them to understand. We want Egyptian 
officials to understand that this is a priority for the United 
States.
    The President himself has underscored the importance of a 
constructive dialogue on human rights with the Government of 
Egypt and we will continue to pursue this even as we pursue 
shared security goals on maritime security, on border security, 
on counterterrorism.
    We understand that Egypt remains an important security 
partner as evidenced by their leadership in achieving the 
ceasefire in Gaza. Their leadership and their partnership 
remains critical today.
    We will continue to raise human rights at the highest 
levels to make sure that the Egyptian Government understands 
that this is a priority.
    Senator Murphy. My opening comments were designed to sort 
of provoke this conversation about whether our assumptions 
about the reasons for our aid are matched to current realities.
    Either one of you can take this question, but let me ask 
that question relative to Egypt. Is our aid necessary today in 
order to continue to prompt Egypt to achieve a detente with 
Israel, or is it now in their own security interests--do they 
get something out of that relationship on its own, independent 
of our security assistance?
    Are they going to cut off our access to the canal if we 
withdraw a portion of our security assistance? Is not there a 
case to be made that some of the things we used to purchase 
with aid to Egypt, Egypt will do without that aid or without 
the exact amount of aid that we provide today? Have not 
circumstances changed since we began this $1.3 billion 
relationship in 1987?
    Ms. Stroul. I will take the question first, give DAS 
Resnick a break.
    So the bottom line for President Biden is that he values 
the relationship with Egypt. He believes they are an important 
security partner. He discussed in his phone call with President 
Sisi in May the U.S. intent for constructive dialogue on human 
rights.
    We also believe and support that Egypt has legitimate 
security concerns and believe that security assistance to Egypt 
is a critical tool in supporting those needs whether it is 
border security, maritime security.
    We did see early in the Administration when the Ever Given 
was stuck in the Suez international maritime traffic, both 
commercial and military, was stuck. Egypt matters, both for 
Suez transit, for U.S. military overflight, cooperation with 
Egypt for Red Sea security, maritime security.
    The current view of the Administration is that Egypt is 
playing a constructive role when it comes to border security, 
Libya, GERD, obviously, the conflict in Gaza, et cetera.
    In terms of the FMF, it remains an important tool for U.S. 
to work with Egypt in making sure that they have U.S.-origin 
defense articles oriented towards what we assess to be shared 
security threats, whether it is counterterrorism, maritime 
security, or border security.
    I would note here that Egypt is interested in continuing 
this relationship with us. They recently agreed to upgrade 
their Apache helicopter fleet by using blended financing--not 
just U.S. security assistance--but also Egyptian national 
funds.
    This is an indicator for us, and they believe this as well, 
after extensive negotiations between the two governments that 
they are interested in putting their resources to bear, not 
just U.S. forces, as they upgrade their U.S. defense articles.
    Senator Murphy. The question I am simply asking is for us 
to assess the cost of altering our relationship versus the cost 
of continuing it unmodified.
    The cost of continuing it unmodified is to send a signal of 
endorsement to this behavior. My question is we should really 
get our heads wrapped around what the cost of altering the 
relationship is.
    My case is that there would not be a significant alteration 
because the things that you just laid out are in Egypt's 
security interest separate and aside from the exact nature of 
our security relationship.
    I am interested in continuing this dialogue.
    One last question before I turn to Senator Van Hollen and 
that is on the issue of end-use monitoring. I know this is 
something the Administration cares deeply about.
    We, obviously, had some disturbing revelations during the 
last 4 years about the way in which the UAE was transferring 
some of our equipment to Salafist-aligned militias in Yemen.
    Admittedly, it is difficult to track how every single 
weapon is going to be ultimately used, but are there ways in 
which we can have a tougher and stricter end-use monitoring 
program that allows us to have more visibility than we do today 
on the ways that our equipment and weapons are used? Is there a 
better way to do this?
    Ms. Resnick. Thanks for your question. We take the issues 
of end-use monitoring very, very seriously. We take all 
credible allegations of any authorized transfer or end-uses of 
U.S.-origin equipment very seriously.
    We investigate them consistent with applicable law. When 
there is a violation, we have several different options that we 
can pursue to address misuse or end-use concerns. We want to 
make sure that every transfer advances our foreign policy.
    The way that we look at each transfer, we are looking at 
history of misuse. We are looking at history of end-use abuse. 
So we do understand that these issues are complicated, but we 
are always looking to do better.
    Senator Murphy. Great.
    Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of 
you for your testimony and for your service.
    I agree with the comments that have been made by my 
colleagues regarding the importance of security assistance to 
U.S. interests, national security interests, as well as that of 
our partners.
    In fact, back in the 1980s, I served a short stint, sort of 
an extended internship, at the Pentagon in what was then called 
the Defense Security Assistance Agency and my job was to write 
the justifications that came to Congress for various security 
assistance programs.
    So I understand the importance. I also, from that 
experience, realized that when I started for the next fiscal 
year justification, I just took the previous year justification 
and made some edits.
    So part of the lesson there, though, is something the 
chairman's bringing up, which is we get in these ruts. It is 
very easy just to continue in the same course that you are 
already on, and we do need to step back and reevaluate lots of 
these issues.
    You would both agree, I believe, that it is not in our 
security interest when a recipient of U.S. weapons or other 
form of security assistance uses them as a tool of repression 
or to crack down on human rights. Would you both agree with 
that?
    Ms. Resnick. Yes.
    Ms. Stroul. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. So to pick up on Senator Murphy's 
question on end-use and taking credible allegations of 
violations of end-use requirements seriously, can each of you 
give us a recent example of pursuing a credible report of the 
violation of what we thought was an end-use requirement?
    Ms. Resnick. So I think that there are two ways to look at 
this. There is a violation of end-use, meaning when the 
intended recipient is not the one who is doing it, and Senator 
Murphy mentioned one of those cases.
    Then there is the misuse of U.S.-origin equipment, and you 
will understand that that is the consideration that we used 
when we decided to suspend the two munitions sales to Saudi 
Arabia. We did a risk assessment and that is what we are 
implementing now.
    We are implementing risk assessments for each of these 
transfers on a case-by-case basis and our risk assessment told 
us that those munitions could more likely than not to be used 
to result in civilian harm and so that is why we suspended 
those two munitions sales.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
    Now, there is also the Leahy law, and that is a different 
set of requirements. Let me ask you this. When you get credible 
reports of violation of the Leahy laws, do you also investigate 
those?
    Ms. Resnick. Yes, we do that with our partners at the 
embassies. We also do that with the Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights, and Labor.
    Senator Van Hollen. The Defense Department oversees 
sometimes different sets of programs, but you also pursue 
credible reports of violations of Leahy law?
    Ms. Stroul. Absolutely. When I see them, whether it comes 
from outside communities, press, social media, or reports that 
come directly to me, I make a point of asking my staff to work 
with the different implementing agencies and in the field to 
investigate, raise it directly, and then I raise it myself.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay. Have either of you received 
credible reports of violation of Leahy laws since you have been 
in your positions?
    Ms. Resnick. We have several different threads that we are 
looking into. I do not think that we have made any 
determinations at this point. When we do or if we do, then we 
would come to Congress.
    Senator Van Hollen. So if you find there has been a 
violation of the Leahy law, you would inform the Congress. Is 
that right?
    Ms. Resnick. Yes, sir.
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, sir.
    Senator Van Hollen. Can you also provide the Congress with 
the results of your investigations into violations of the Leahy 
law, even if you do not make a determination?
    As you can imagine, there are going to be cases where 
different people could reach different conclusions. Would you 
have any objection with sharing your investigation in the 
credible reports of the Leahy law with the Congress?
    Ms. Resnick. We always make sure to engage with Congress on 
these issues.
    Senator Van Hollen. Okay.
    I would just ask in closing, Mr. Chairman, if you could 
provide us with any investigations of Leahy law violations that 
you have pursued within the last year--since January. Would 
that be okay?
    Ms. Resnick. Yes, sir.

[Editor's note.--Ms. Resnick's and Ms. Stroul's response to 
Senator Van Hollen's request contained classified information 
and was redacted from this hearing record.]

    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Murphy. Great.
    Senator Young.
    Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to go a bit 
off script. I know we are discussing foreign arms sales right 
now, but I would like to discuss the arms that are finding 
their way from Iran into the Houthis' hands in Yemen. Of 
course, we have a real interest, our partners and allies have 
an interest in ensuring that key weapons and technology do not 
continue to flow there in a manner that further destabilizes 
the country and perpetuates the civil war.
    It has been reported that the recent attack on the Mercer 
Street tanker in the Gulf of Oman originated from Yemen with 
Iranian-produced drones.
    Can you confirm those public reports?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you very much for that question, Senator.
    Yes, I can confirm the reports and a few comments, if you 
would allow me to.
    First of all, last Friday, U.S. Central Command released 
its assessment based on the exploitation of the wreckage and 
what we were able to recover from the Mercer Street, and what 
U.S. Central Command did in cooperation with the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and NAVCENT is look at 
the different components that we recovered, compare them to 
other known Iranian-supported UAVs that we have exploited, and 
were able to match and see similarities, which is why CENTCOM 
was able to conclude and put out its press release that yes, 
this was an Iran-backed, one-way drone attack on the Mercer 
Street.
    Secondly, in addition to that DoD investigation, there was 
also a multilateral G-7 statement where we worked diplomacy 
first to work with the members of the G-7 to put out a 
statement condemning Iran for the one-way attack UAV on the 
Mercer Street.
    Senator Young. Okay. That is incredibly helpful and 
answered some of my next question, which is whether you can 
shed some light on how you determine, by working with partners 
in the region, how you might interdict the trafficking of arms 
out of Iran into the hands of the Houthis or other militant 
groups?
    Ms. Stroul. Absolutely. You have seen the Administration do 
some of this. A good example is a few months ago there was the 
interdiction of the Monterey Ship, which also was carrying a 
lot of weapons, which we assessed were Iranian supplied, for 
the Houthis.
    Let me take a step back. What we see across the region is 
Iranian arming, training, and funding of terrorist groups, 
nonstate actors, and militias across the region, all of which 
aim to undermine the governments and the partners that we want 
to work with, terrorize civilians, and prevent them from 
achieving stability.
    In the Yemen context, we have seen more attacks from the 
Houthis launched at Saudi Arabia in the first half of this year 
than we have for several prior years.
    Iran is increasing the lethality and complexity of both the 
equipment and the knowledge it transfers to the Houthis so that 
they can attack Saudi territory, Saudi civilians, and there is 
also a very sizable U.S. population in Saudi Arabia that is 
under risk because of the Iran-backed Houthi attacks.
    U.S. forces are experiencing the Iran-backed UAV network 
and the force protection issues we are experiencing in Iraq, 
and even Israel has publicly spoken about the drones from Iran 
that it has downed in defense of its own territory.
    This is a regional wide threat. All of our partners are 
concerned about it, and this is actually where security 
cooperation programs can be very effective.
    Senator Young. Thank you. I look forward to continued 
vigilance on that front and I get the sense that that is a real 
point of emphasis. So that is great.
    During the recent attacks from Hamas, Israel used the Iron 
Dome rocket defense system to defend itself and save countless 
lives from indiscriminate rocket fire.
    President Biden has committed to resupplying Israel with 
the Iron Dome interceptors that were expended over the course 
of that fighting.
    Despite the legitimate security needs, more than a dozen 
Democratic members of Congress sought to block such a resupply 
and even introduced a resolution in both chambers to do so, to 
block this resupply. This resupply is crucial.
    So, Ms. Stroul, what is the status of the Administration's 
efforts to fulfill the President's commitment and assist 
Israel's resupply of the Iron Dome?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you so much for that question.
    President Biden was clear in his statement of support for 
replenishing the Iron Dome defense system. Secretary Austin 
also, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
affirmed his support for replenishing and expanding the Iron 
Dome defense system.
    We agree with your assessment that it was notably effective 
in responding to the attacks from Gaza.
    Senator Young. I am sorry. My time is over. What is the 
status of it?
    Ms. Stroul. We have unequivocally stated our support for 
emergency or for supplemental appropriations in support of 
replenishing and expanding the system. We have consulted 
extensively with Congress and provided information, paperwork, 
to you all to support how you choose to proceed in funding the 
request.
    Senator Young. So you need a supplemental emergency 
appropriations? That is the only route to achieve that 
objective?
    Ms. Stroul. The----
    Senator Young. Is that accurate?
    Ms. Stroul. Yes, the missile defense funding that we 
provide to Israel, $500 million a year in an MOU. What Israel 
assesses it needs is beyond that $500 million a year.
    We support their request for supplemental appropriations 
and have provided information to Congress in support of that 
request.
    Senator Young. Thank you.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you, Senator Young.
    Just continuing on that line of inquiry, Ms. Stroul, I have 
heard some people sort of question whether, going forward, the 
Iron Dome, as it is currently constituted, will provide 
significant enough security against rocket attacks emanating 
from Hamas. Understanding it is still an incredibly effective 
system, are we also in dialogue with the Israelis as to 
enhancements or as to other protective measures that we can 
engage in with them to protect them from future attacks?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
    Yes, we are. We are in constant and consistent dialogue 
with the Israelis on a variety of issues related to their 
security needs, including the Iron Dome defense system.
    Their assessment and our assessment is that it was 
exceptionally effective in protecting Israeli civilians during 
Operation Guardian of the Walls.
    They are seeking this supplemental funding because they 
support and believe that it saves lives. We also have a variety 
of other missile defense programs as well as other programs to 
support Israel's security needs.
    Senator Murphy. Let me turn to the question of China 
because I do want to make sure we right-size China's ambitions 
in the region.
    There is no doubt China has an intent to grow their 
security partnerships in the region, but I also think that they 
benefit from a world in which the United States has the primary 
security obligation for a region that right now is much more 
essential to the delivery of oil to China than to the United 
States.
    So I would love for one of you to talk a little bit more 
about what China's real interests in the region are, whether 
they are actually willing to sort of take over from the United 
States as the primary security guarantor for especially Gulf 
nations that export oil to the world, or whether they are sort 
of looking to use their security assistance as a means to grow 
political partnerships with countries that are well, frankly, 
hoping to maintain a U.S. security umbrella under which they 
live and benefit.
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for that question.
    It truly is the question of the day. China has shown no 
interest in, nor a capability, to contribute to regional 
security and stability, and we asked our partners to consider 
that.
    We know that China and our Middle Eastern partners will 
have a commercial relationship. We have a commercial 
relationship with China.
    Secretary Blinken has said our relationship with China will 
be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, 
and adversarial when it must be.
    The common denominator here is that we need to engage China 
from a position of strength, and security cooperation will 
undoubtedly play a role there in our response to strategic 
competition in the Middle East, but also beyond the Middle East 
globally.
    It requires us to work with allies and partners, not 
denigrate them, because our combined weight is much harder for 
China to ignore.
    So as DAS Stroul mentioned, there are certain categories of 
cooperation with the PRC that we cannot live with and we have 
made that clear.
    Senator Murphy. Well, towards that end, according to The 
Wall Street Journal, some Defense officials say they believe 
China hopes to build a base in the Middle East, perhaps in the 
UAE.
    On a scale of 1 to 10, how problematic would it be if China 
were to establish a base in a country like the United Arab 
Emirates that is about to get some of our most sensitive 
defense equipment?
    Ms. Stroul. Thank you for that question.
    The current assessment is that China has a global strategy 
of pursuing military installations all over, including in the 
Middle East.
    It seeks to build installations, and the Middle East is one 
example, so that, ultimately, it can serve its own interests, 
not provide or enhance regional stability and security.
    So in any country with which we have a deep partnership we 
talk about the risks to U.S. defense technology, to U.S. 
forces, of a Chinese military installation.
    I will just add, in terms of whether or not China seeks to 
take over for the U.S. as the security guarantor of choice, 
what we actually view in a demonstrated pattern of how China 
engages with countries across the world and we warn and discuss 
with our partners in the Middle East, that, ultimately, Chinese 
engagement in certain categories will violate their 
sovereignty, which they prioritize.
    Then I would note, when we were talking before about the 
Iran-supported UAV network or the Mercer Street, China was 
silent both at the Security Council and in signing on to any 
statement.
    This is not a country, Beijing, that is going to support 
our partners and their legitimate security and defense concerns 
and needs and we remind them of that.
    Senator Murphy. I hope our partners noticed that silence.
    Final two questions. First, on the Missile Technology 
Control Regime, this is a voluntary agreement but one that we 
perceive to be very important to our global security interests.
    Prior to the Trump administration, we had interpreted that 
agreement as preventing us from selling certain armed drone 
technology to countries sort of outside our very closest 
partners.
    Thus far, the Biden administration has not reversed the 
Trump administration's reinterpretation of that treaty and, as 
you said at the outset, are pursuing the sale of Reaper drones 
to the United Arab Emirates.
    Do you expect other members of the MTCR to issue their own 
reinterpretations and are we concerned about the proliferation 
of advanced armed drones to the Middle East?
    It sort of feels like we have just sort of given up on this 
one, we have just said there is so many countries selling so 
many advanced drones that we might as well just be in the 
business as well.
    I am not convinced that that is the right argument here. We 
still are a moral pacesetter around the world. So a minute or 
two on sort of how you perceive the health of MTCR today and 
what you perceive to be the ways in which we can still try to 
lead a global conversation about the danger of the 
proliferation of armed drones.
    I think we have, frankly, lost a lot of our moral authority 
through the reinterpretation of that regime.
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for that question, Senator.
    The Biden/Harris administration conducted a review of our 
UAS export policy, determined that we would maintain the 
decision to invoke national discretion on the implementation of 
our commitment to the MTCR, but that does not mean that the 
United States will automatically approve a UAS export. We will 
still conduct a case-by-case review.
    The nonproliferation factors that are identified in MTCR 
guidelines will continue to play a really important role, will 
consider the transfer's effect on U.S. national security 
interests, including human rights and other foreign policy 
objectives, as well as the recipient countries' capability and 
their willingness to effectively responsibly use this 
technology and, of course, to safeguard U.S.-origin technology.
    Senator Murphy. Finally, just a question on the sort of 
merits of escalatory versus de-escalatory policy. This town 
loves military escalation. Makes a lot of people rich here. De-
escalation is not as lucrative.
    I, over the years of meeting with the Iranian foreign 
ministry--I am one of the few here that does take everything 
they say with a giant shaker of salt, but I think there is some 
truth to one of the things they consistently say, which is that 
our missiles are primarily pointed at the Saudis, and every 
time you sell them more, every time you give them and the 
Emiratis more equipment and more lethality, more capability, we 
invest more in our own.
    What is our sort of overall thinking about--if our interest 
is in, ultimately, getting the Iranians to give up their 
ballistic missile program, how do we defend a continued buildup 
of arms on the other side of that contest for regional 
hegemony? What is our sort of current thinking on the benefits 
of arms escalation versus arms de-escalation?
    Ms. Resnick. Thank you for that question. It gives us an 
opportunity to reflect, as does the entire hearing, on some of 
the bigger picture issues.
    Security cooperation plays a really important role in our 
Middle East partnerships, but it is not the only answer. So I 
would stress that our arms transfers and our security 
cooperation are not going to be the answer, the magic bullet 
to--as you said, to Saudi insecurity.
    They are not going to be the answer to instability in the 
region. That will come through diplomacy and through a 
political solution to the region's, unfortunately, many 
military conflicts.
    As I said in my opening statement, we rely on our partners 
to understand when there is no military solution to a conflict, 
and we will continue to stress that to them.
    That is why you saw in the first days of the Biden/Harris 
administration that the President made sure to reinvigorate our 
diplomacy with Yemen, to appoint a special envoy, Tim 
Lenderking, to be able to reinvest in our diplomatic efforts.
    Senator Murphy. Okay.
    Senator Young. Ms. Resnick, I am going to follow up, with 
the chairman's indulgence, on his line of questioning.
    So it seems as though what we are seeking to do is to 
establish or reestablish deterrence, and that should be the 
objective. I am being normative here. You tell me if the Biden/
Harris administration disagrees.
    So we want to reestablish deterrence. We do not currently 
have that. We have these Iranian proxies throughout the Middle 
East.
    We have the enrichment of uranium. We have the bombing of 
tankers in the Gulf of Oman through functionaries that have 
provided weaponry to these proxies.
    So all manner of development of sophisticated missiles. So 
we need to reestablish deterrence and foreign arms sales can be 
one tool that assists in that overall endeavor.
    We are not seeking overmatch. That could, indeed, be 
provocative and I think catalyze the Iranians to seek 
deterrence on their own part.
    What say you about my line of analysis?
    Ms. Resnick. Of course, and that is why I opened with my 
answer saying that security cooperation plays a critical role. 
It is not the only answer to our relationships in the Middle 
East.
    Ms. Stroul. If I may, Senator, I would respond also that 
the U.S. military does have conventional overmatch vis-a-vis 
Iran, which is why you see Iran investing in other kinds of 
capabilities, not its conventional military capabilities.
    This is why we have seen or we can--why you see Iran 
investing in support for regional terrorism networks, one-way 
attack UAVs, and its ballistic missile program because it views 
those as its way to threaten the United States and our partners 
because of that convention.
    Senator Young. So the United States has overmatch?
    Ms. Stroul. Conventional overmatch.
    Senator Young. Conventional overmatch. Is it our objective 
for our partners in the region to have conventional overmatch 
vis-a-vis Iran?
    Ms. Stroul. Our objective for partners in the region is to 
ensure that they have the capabilities and resources to defend 
themselves while we invest in diplomacy and political processes 
to wind down conflicts, because there is no military solution 
to the conflicts of the region nor to Iranian aggression.
    Senator Young. That sounds like deterrence in parallel with 
diplomatic efforts.
    Ms. Stroul. When the Biden administration came into office, 
it inherited an aggressive Iranian strategy throughout the 
region in reaction to a maximum pressure campaign that did not 
bring Iran back to the negotiating table nor did it tamp down 
or deter Iranian aggression.
    Our forces are experiencing that Iranian aggression every 
day----
    Senator Young. Yes.
    Ms. Stroul. --through Iran-backed militias in Iraq. Saudis 
are experiencing it every day from Iran-backed Houthis, as are 
other partners who are concerned both about the air defense 
threat and the proliferation of armed UAVs which are going to 
nonstate actors across the Middle East.
    What we are seeking to do while we invest in diplomacy and 
political processes is respond to our partners' legitimate 
defense needs.
    Much of that derives from Iranian fingerprints of terror, 
training, arming, and funding of groups all over the region, as 
well as guidance and direction to them to attack U.S. forces 
and U.S. partners to sow division and tensions between the U.S. 
and its partners while we are working to reassure partners that 
we will have their back in confronting Iranian aggression.
    Senator Young. Very good. Thank you.
    If I could, I have got one final line of inquiry and it 
pertains to the expiration last October of the U.N. 
conventional arms embargo against Iran against the strenuous 
objections and extensive efforts of the Trump administration.
    Two primary sources of arms, Russia and China, succeeded in 
ensuring that the regime in Tehran had access to some of the 
most sophisticated weapons, and I just am looking--I think, Ms. 
Resnick, perhaps you can speak to how Iran has capitalized on 
both the import and export dynamics of the embargo, which is 
lapsing, especially as it concerns Russia and China.
    Ms. Stroul. If I may, Senator.
    What we have seen is China sign a 20-year strategic 
partnership agreement with Iran. We have seen the Russians work 
to negotiate arms transfer agreements with Iran as well.
    It is yet another reason why our partners need to be 
reminded that the U.S. is the security partner of choice who 
will responsibly work with them to respond to their legitimate 
defensive needs, and turning toward China or Russia will not 
support their security or stability, especially when both of 
those governments are looking to embolden and enhance Tehran's 
conventional military capabilities.
    Senator Young. Has the winding down of the embargo, helped 
facilitate some of this transfer of arms from Russia and China 
into Iran?
    Ms. Stroul. We have certainly seen reinvigorated interest 
by Beijing and Moscow after the end of the embargo and working 
on deals for weapons transfers and sales to Tehran.
    We, of course, have other tools at our disposal in the U.S. 
Government, whether it is sanctions, our alliances and 
partnerships, our transatlantic partnerships, and our security 
partnerships in the Middle East, which can reinforce our 
security and attempt to push back on those weapons sales.
    Certainly, it puts us in a position we are going to have to 
double down on both our diplomacy, our security partnerships, 
and explore other tools to make sure that Tehran does not gain 
conventional military capabilities, especially when it is 
outside of the JCPOA, making advances on its nuclear program 
and ramping up its regional aggression.
    Senator Young. So it sounds like it has really aggravated 
the situation. Would I be right to infer that this receipt of 
conventional arms from Russia and China in Iran has aggravated 
the situation with respect to the vast network of Iranian 
proxies as they continue to provide conventional arms to these 
Iranian proxies?
    Ms. Stroul. Let me respond by saying I certainly do not see 
any actions, whether diplomacy or otherwise, from Moscow or 
Beijing to impress upon Iran that continuing to support 
militias and terrorist organizations across the region is not 
in their interest, that it somehow undermines Russian or 
Chinese security.
    These are not governments that are pushing Iran to take 
steps that would restore regional security and stability, wind 
down conflicts, or move towards political processes.
    Senator Young. There is no doubt in my mind that there are 
Houthis or members of Hezbollah carrying around Russian and 
Chinese conventional armaments that they have received from the 
Iranians as that embargo has been wound down. So, thank you.
    Ms. Stroul. It is another reason why we need to remind our 
partners that these are not governments in Beijing or Moscow 
that are actually working to do things that are in their 
security interests.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you. One final question that occurs 
to me just to sort of cap off the dialogue we were having and 
that Senator Young continued on the effect of escalation and 
de-escalation on deterrence.
    The JCPOA did not nor was intended to solve all of our 
outstanding issues with Iran, but as a mechanism to discuss and 
promote the ways that you can affect Iranian behavior other 
than through the sale of arms to their competitors, during the 
time the JCPOA was in effect we did not see the level of 
attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq from Iranian proxies as we have 
since the JCPOA expired.
    Is that correct?
    Ms. Stroul. That is correct.
    Senator Murphy. So the question for this committee is 
whether that is coincidental or whether having an ability to 
have a diplomatic conversation with an enemy actually does 
affect their behavior vis-a-vis our security interests in the 
region.
    I want to thank you both for your testimony today. We 
appreciate your recommendations and your insight. I look 
forward to continuing this conversation.
    For any members of the committee wishing to submit 
questions for the record, the hearing is going to remain open 
until the close of business on Friday, which happens to be 
Friday the 13th.
    And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


                Responses of Mira Resnick to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. The vast bulk of State Department security assistance 
goes to the Middle East, but you noted that, ``our strategic 
competition with the People's Republic of China is our foremost foreign 
policy challenge.'' Should State be devoting more FMF and IMET to the 
Indo-Pacific?

    Answer. The FY 2021 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 
directed more than 94 percent of FMF and IMET funds--the vast majority 
to the Middle East--leaving only $291.7 million in discretionary FMF. 
When accounting for significant FMF constraints due to Congressional 
earmarks, particularly in the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific typically 
receives nearly half of the annual global discretionary FMF. 
Separately, the FY 2022 IMET request is sufficient to meet our 
professional military education goals in the Indo-Pacific, but the 
Department can always adjust in the year of appropriation should needs 
merit further increases.

    Question. The Department of Defense has been increasingly assertive 
in advocating for new authorities and resources for security 
cooperation. Is the State Department concerned that, if new 
restrictions and prohibitions become unduly onerous, this trend will 
accelerate?

    Answer. The Department of State must ensure that all security 
sector assistance (SSA) strategically advances U.S. diplomatic 
priorities and defense relationships within the parameters set by law. 
DoD has used the perceived inflexibility of State's security assistance 
programs to help justify expanded SSA authorities and resources with 
Congress in recent years. To preserve the value of SSA as a tool of 
foreign policy, and the primacy of State and its oversight committees 
over Title 22 SSA, it is critical that State and Congress continue to 
work together to maximize the effectiveness of these programs.

    Question. Is FMF to Egypt still relevant to the maintenance of the 
Camp David Accords?

    Answer. U.S. FMF provides Egypt with technical capabilities, 
training, and defense systems that help enable it to fulfill its treaty 
obligations to Israel. FMF increases regional stability and 
interoperability by facilitating security cooperation between Israel 
and Egypt, particularly in countering terrorism in the Sinai. FMF also 
helps improve Egypt's ability to support and protect the operations of 
the Multinational Forces and Observers, which is charged with verifying 
compliance with the treaty.

    Question. Do we need more IMET for the Middle East? Why or why not?

    Answer. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
account is one of the most impactful programs the Department has to 
promote professionalism, enhance interoperability, build invaluable 
relationships, and share technical and operational expertise with U.S. 
military partners. The Department evaluates IMET requirements annually 
for Middle Eastern partners to determine the appropriate level of IMET 
in the out years and considers each country's ability to absorb and 
execute these funds. State takes a country-based approach to determine 
whether to increase or decrease funding. In addition, select partners 
in the Middle East use Foreign Military Financing funds to supplement 
training received through IMET-funded courses.

    Question. Does the Administration support conditioning FMF to 
Israel?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris administration does not support 
conditioning assistance to Israel. As President Biden and Secretary 
Blinken have said, the Administration's commitment to Israel's security 
is unshakeable. Secretary Blinken has emphasized that the 
Administration will make sure that Israel has the means to defend 
itself, especially in the context of the recent escalation that 
included rocket attacks impacting Israeli civilians. At the same time, 
Secretary Blinken has underscored our expectation that Israel should do 
everything it possibly can to mitigate the risk of civilian casualties.

    Question. Please provide an update on the status of the sale of F-
35 aircraft and related items to UAE.

    Answer. The Administration is moving forward with implementing 
proposed defense sales to the UAE for F-35 aircraft, MQ-9 Unmanned 
Aerial Systems, and munitions. We continue consultations with Emirati 
partners to ensure that we have clear, mutual understandings with 
respect to Emirati end use and security obligations and actions before, 
during, and after delivery.

    Question. Please provide a more detailed description of the risk 
assessment process you highlighted regarding Saudi munitions.

    Answer. Consistent with the President's direction to end support 
for offensive operations in Yemen, we assessed the risk of potential 
types of transfers to Saudi Arabia, and we determined that the risk to 
civilians associated with some types of transfers--including the two 
suspended transfers of munitions to Saudi Arabia--was high. We continue 
support for other types of transfers to Saudi Arabia, including where 
capabilities contribute to Saudi Arabia's ability to defend itself. We 
would welcome the opportunity to provide more information at a 
classified level.

    Question. Please characterize China and Russia's ambitions 
regarding U.S. security partners in the region. What role does U.S. 
security assistance and arms sales play in countering these ambitions?

    Answer. Both the PRC and Russia seek to expand their security 
partnerships in and around the Middle East. Their methods vary: the PRC 
uses its economic footprint to open the door to a security presence, 
while Russia uses its security partnerships to further its influence, 
including economic ventures, in the Middle East and Africa. U.S. arms 
sales and security cooperation programs--including professional 
military education, training, provision of defense articles and 
services, and institutional capacity-building--constitute key foreign 
policy tools by which we advance our bilateral security relationships 
throughout the region and are essential elements in limiting our global 
competitors' influence in the Middle East.

    Question. Adversaries are sure to try to exploit the U.S. 
withdrawal from Afghanistan as another demonstration of American 
decline and unreliability. What is the Department doing to counter such 
narratives, and to re-assure allies? Has the Department heard allies 
and partners express such concerns in the wake of the withdrawal?

    Answer. We are clear with our allies and partners that we remain 
staunchly committed to their security and stability. Our ambassadors 
have been working assiduously to reinforce this message. We are closely 
coordinating with our international partners on the ground and around 
the globe regarding events in Afghanistan.

    Question. What is the status of Chinese efforts to establish a 
military base or bases in the Middle East?

    Answer. We assess the PRC Government seeks to establish a sustained 
military presence in the Persian Gulf and Mediterranean. The 
Administration is working closely with our partners to ensure they 
understand why a permanent PRC presence in the region is not in their 
interest. Any such facilities pose a risk to the security and 
sovereignty of the host nation; as with most assistance from the PRC, 
there are significant risks attached.

    Question. China has launched a strategic partnership with Iran. How 
do U.S. partners view that development, and why do some of them 
continue to engage China even as it supports Iran?

    Answer. In March 2021, the PRC and Iran signed a 25-year strategic 
cooperation agreement, called a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
agreement, building on a Joint Statement on Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership issued in 2016. The PRC also has Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership agreements with a number of other countries in the region, 
including U.S. partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. These U.S. 
partners have their own economic and strategic interests that drive 
engagement with the PRC. These interests remain despite the PRC's 
recently concluded agreement with Iran. We will continue to encourage 
our partners to be clear-eyed about relations with the PRC.

    Question. Please provide an update of the reported Su-35 sale to 
Egypt.

    Answer. We continue to caution Egyptian officials at the highest 
levels that taking delivery of these aircraft or any other major new 
Russian defense equipment would risk triggering sanctions under Section 
231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
(CAATSA). We have also warned the Government of Egypt that such a 
procurement could risk security assistance and security cooperation 
with the United States.
                                 ______
                                 

                 Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Todd Young

                                 egypt
    Question. During your testimony, you noted that President Biden 
``values the relationship with Egypt'' and Egypt has ``legitimate 
security concerns.'' You also provided general details on the mutually-
beneficial security relationship between the United States and Egypt. 
Those included: ``Suez transit, for U.S. military overflight, 
cooperation with Egypt for Red Sea security, maritime security . . . a 
constructive war role when it comes to border security, Libya, GERD, 
obviously the conflict in Gaza, et cetera.''
    Will you provide additional details--as specifically as you can in 
an unclassified format--about the security relationship between our two 
countries and how United States national security benefits from that 
relationship?

    Answer. Egypt is a strategic partner and maintains a strong defense 
relationship with the U.S. on regional counterterrorism and maritime 
and border security efforts. Egypt also provides access, overflight and 
Suez Canal transit for U.S. forces. Egypt was the first Arab country to 
sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, and more recently helped 
secure the May ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Egypt also plays a 
positive role facilitating trilateral cooperation with Jordan and Iraq 
on economic and security issues. The Biden administration seeks to work 
closely with Egypt to address a range of regional challenges--to 
include defeating ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP), addressing human 
rights and civilian casualty issues, securing the Suez Canal, finding a 
resolution to the conflict in Libya and related border security 
threats, and resolving tensions over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance 
Dam (GERD).
                                 ______
                                 

                Responses of Mira Resnick to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Cory Booker

    Question. Security Assistance to the West Bank/Gaza: The 
President's budget and the State Department Congressional Budget 
Justification proposed a cut for security assistance to the West Bank/
Gaza from $75 million in FY21 to just $33 million in FY22. Why were 
such cuts proposed?

    Answer. From 2007 to 2019, International Narcotics Control and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE) assistance was provided to support robust security 
and criminal justice assistance focusing on large-scale training, 
equipment, and construction projects that were appropriate for the 
needs at that time. Moving forward, INCLE-funded programming will seek 
to build on previous successes and start a new, targeted security 
assistance and criminal justice program that focuses on reforming and 
strengthening key institutions such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
Ministry of Interior, supporting key PA security forces at the 
operational and strategic levels, and undertaking targeted program 
interventions in the corrections and justice sectors with the goal of 
bringing them up to international standards over time. The new program 
will not focus heavily on train and equip-type programs or construction 
projects. Furthermore, INL has approximately $85 million in de-
obligated prior-year funds from the West Bank that will be used to 
support the new program.

    Question. What will the consequences be of an inadequately funded 
PASF?

    Answer. We will ensure that we request adequate funding to sustain 
the capabilities of the Palestinian Authority security forces and 
improve their ability to provide security and rule of law in the West 
Bank. Our assistance is designed to reinforce the development of a more 
capable and professional PA security and justice sector that 
Palestinians can trust and will be the bulwark that continues to help 
maintain security and order in the West Bank. Our funding requests 
consider that we largely accomplished our former objectives to stand up 
the security forces with extensive equipment, basic training, and 
infrastructure support they needed to take on security challenges more 
effectively. Our mission now is to advance these gains by focusing on 
less expensive capacity-building, sustainment projects. In addition, we 
will put more emphasis on the police, justice, and corrections sectors 
to help provide more responsive and impartial justice to the 
Palestinian people and bolster their respect for the rule of law.

    Question. One of the main reasons we give massive amounts of 
security assistance is to enable U.S. partners to be more capable. Yet 
Egypt's army provides little to no added advantage to our military 
campaigns in the region, despite a $50 billion investment since 1978; 
Egypt hasn't been deterred from buying weapons from Russia and China; 
Egypt keeps its peace treaty with Israel because doing so bolsters 
their own national security; and under Egyptian President al-Sisi, we 
have seen well-documented and systemic human rights abuses.
    And yet Egypt is the second largest recipient of American Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) worldwide at $1.3 billion annually--third in 
security aid overall.
    The Administration has until September 30 to waive Congress' 
existing human rights restriction of $300 million in security aid to 
Egypt. Considering rampant, only worsening violations--from torture to 
unlawful arrest and indefinite imprisonment of journalists, activists, 
human rights defenders, and LGBTQ+ Egyptians--Is the Biden 
administration reviewing whether it is justifiable to waive the human 
rights restrictions on this security assistance?

    Answer. The Secretary has yet to make a decision regarding the 
national security waiver for $300 million in FY 2020 Foreign Military 
Financing for Egypt. When a decision is made, the Department will 
ensure Congress is informed as to the reasoning for that decision. The 
Administration shares Congress' concerns about human rights in Egypt 
and has raised these concerns, and will continue to do so, at the 
highest levels. As I noted during this hearing, America's interests 
cannot be separated from her values.

    Question. What message do you believe it sends to both human rights 
advocates and the Sisi regime when the U.S. continues to waive these 
restrictions?

    Answer. I cannot speculate as to what decision Secretary Blinken 
will make. The Department shares Congress' concerns and will continue 
to press the Government of Egypt on its human rights record and 
practices. The Department has elevated the importance of human rights 
in the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship, and is using a variety of 
tools, both public and private, to engage with the Egyptian Government 
on improving respect for human rights. The President and the Secretary 
have been clear that human rights will be integral to U.S. foreign 
policy, to include our relationship with Egypt.

    Question. Do you believe it emboldens the Sisi regime to continue 
its crackdown on journalists and members of civil society?

    Answer. While I cannot prejudge what the Secretary's decision will 
be, the President and the Secretary have been clear that human rights 
is integral to U.S. foreign policy, to include our relationship with 
Egypt. This Administration has conveyed to Egypt that our relationship 
will be stronger if it respects human rights. We have pressed, and will 
continue to press, the Egyptian Government at the most senior levels to 
take meaningful steps to address democratic governance and human rights 
issues. We have also raised at the highest levels our deep concerns 
about the prosecution and harassment of civil society activists and 
journalists. The Department has elevated the role of human rights in 
the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship; and is using a variety of tools, 
both public and private, to engage with the Egyptian government on 
improving its human rights practices.
                                 ______
                                 

                 Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Cory Booker

    Question. Regional Cooperation: The normalization agreements 
between Israel and some of its Gulf neighbors, such as the United Arab 
Emirates, have created greater cooperation in a number of areas--one of 
which is regional security and containing Iranian ambitions in the 
region.
    To what extent does U.S. security assistance and coordination allow 
our regional partners to better coordinate with each other and remove 
some of the regional security burden that would otherwise fall more 
directly on American shoulders?

    Answer. U.S. security cooperation improves partner capabilities 
through interoperable equipment, shared experiences in bilateral and 
multilateral training, and education programs. Further, these 
activities strengthen our partners' capabilities and build lasting 
relationships. Security cooperation contributes to regional security by 
offering opportunities to advance U.S. objectives, such as 
normalization. Normalization of relations between Israel, the UAE, and 
Bahrain last year opened the door to expanded security cooperation to 
address shared threats, from air and missile defense to counter-
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). By facilitating deeper security 
cooperation with Israel and her neighbors in the region, the U.S. can 
share the burden of promoting regional stability and security, as well 
as push back on Iran's destabilizing activities.

    Question. UAE involvement in Libya: Last year, Senators Shaheen, 
Sanders and I wrote to then-Secretary Pompeo about the crisis in Libya 
and flagrant violations of the United Nations Arms Embargo. The United 
Nations repeatedly identified foreign financial and materiel support to 
rival Libyan factions as the most significant factor prolonging the 
conflict and limiting prospects for peace.
    Even after the imposition of an arms embargo and the passage of a 
U.N. Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire and 
enforcement of the arms embargo Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) continued to violate the arms embargo with impunity.
    Not only did the UAE reportedly dispatch more than 150 flights to 
bolster forces in areas under Haftar's control, it also reportedly 
provided more than 1,000 Sudanese mercenaries to Haftar's forces, and 
carried out a drone strike targeting civilians. This pernicious 
disregard for the arms embargo has killed and endangered civilians, 
destroyed vital civilian infrastructure, violated international 
humanitarian law, and obstructed peace negotiations.
    And yet, the UAE's role in having perpetuated the conflict and 
needless humanitarian did not preclude the sale of the F-35s to the 
UAE.
    What effect does a U.N. arms embargo have if the U.S. doesn't hold 
its violators accountable for its actions?

    Answer. As part of our diplomatic leadership to support Libya's 
political transition, we are speaking privately with foreign partners 
to underscore that any countries sending mercenaries and weapons, or 
facilitating these military activities, should recommit to the arms 
embargo and respect Libyan calls for a peaceful political transition.
    As part of its counterterrorism cooperation with Libyan 
authorities, the United States has lent its expertise to remove from 
the battlefield sophisticated weapons systems proliferated by malign 
actors in violation of the arms embargo and used to harm Libyan 
civilians.

    Question. Has the UAE's violations of the U.N. Arms Embargo on 
Libya played any role in the discussion of future assistance to the 
UAE?

    Answer. The Executive Branch takes into account all relevant 
information when making arms transfer decisions, including history of 
use of U.S. origin equipment. The United States insists on responsible 
use of U.S.-origin defense equipment by our allies and partners and 
considers appropriate responses if violations to the export agreements 
under which such articles are furnished occur. We have an established 
interagency process for working through the details of individual arms 
sales cases and investigating any credible allegations of misuse of 
U.S. origin equipment as we consider such arms sales.
                                 ______
                                 

                 Responses of Dana Stroul to Questions 
                    Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds

    Question. Ms. Stroul and Ms. Resnick: During the hearing, both of 
you noted the importance of the U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship. 
My Question for the Record concerns the U.S.-Egypt Bright Star combined 
training exercise that will take place in September after a 3-year 
hiatus.

  1.  What is your assessment of the inherent military value of this 
        exercise?

  2.  Does the Bright Star exercise foster the U.S.-Egypt defense 
        relationship and the U.S.-Egypt strategic relationship to 
        include shared regional interests and if yes, how so?

  3.  Egypt has, by far, the largest Arab military in the world, and 
        our biennial Bright Star exercise is one key tool in fostering 
        U.S. interoperability with an important regional partner. How 
        can both sides enhance this relationship to expand Bright Star 
        beyond its current size and scope?

    Answer. BRIGHT STAR 21 promotes readiness to respond to regional 
threats. It is a tangible manifestation of our mil-to-mil relationship. 
This exercise enables the United States and Egypt to train together and 
deepen operational relationships based on shared skill sets. Deepening 
cooperation through exercises enables the other important aspects of 
our defense relationship (International Military Education and Training 
(IMET), Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and professionalization of their 
military). It also builds trust and enhances participating partner 
capabilities as militaries train together in order to both deter 
adversaries and prepare to counter future threats collectively. The 
Department of Defense is continually revisiting how to make all of its 
exercises, to include BRIGHT STAR, more relevant to the changing 
regional security environment.

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