[Senate Hearing 117-281]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 117-281
 
               FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE: IMPROVING
  SECURITY, TRADE, AND TRAVEL FLOWS AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER PORTS OF 
                                 ENTRY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
              GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

                                 of the

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS


                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           NOVEMBER 17, 2021

                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
        
        
        
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        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
    Andrew Dockham, Minority Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk


      SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS AND BORDER MANAGEMENT

                   KRYSTEN SINEMA, Arizona, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  MITT ROMNEY, Utah
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                     Eric A. Bursch, Staff Director
            Amy Flickinger, National Security Agency Detail
  James D. Mann, Minority Staff Director and Regulatory Policy Counsel
            Jacob Stubbs, Minority Professional Staff Member
         Mallory B. Nersesian, Archivist and Subcommittee Clerk
         
                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Sinema...............................................     1
    Senator Lankford.............................................     2
    Senator Carper...............................................    16
    Senator Padilla..............................................    19
    Senator Portman..............................................    23
Prepared statements:
    Senator Sinema...............................................    35
    Senator Lankford.............................................    39

                               WITNESSES
                      Wednesday, November 17, 2021

Diane Sabatino, Deputy Executive Assistant Commissioner, Office 
  of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection........     5
Joe Jeronimo, Deputy Assistant Director, Transnational Organized 
  Crime Division, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. 
  Immigration and Customs Enforcement............................     7
Stuart Burns, Assistant Commissioner, Public Buildings Service, 
  Portfolio Management and Customer Engagement, General Services 
  Administration.................................................     9

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Burns, Stuart:
    Testimony....................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    66
Jeronimo, Joe:
    Testimony....................................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................    55
Sabatino, Diane:
    Testimony....................................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................    44
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
    Ms. Sabatino.................................................    71
    Mr. Jeronimo.................................................   102
    Mr. Burns....................................................   110


                    FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE:

                 IMPROVING SECURITY, TRADE, AND TRAVEL

              FLOWS AT THE SOUTHWEST BORDER PORTS OF ENTRY

                              ----------                              


                      WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2021

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                      Subcommittee on Government Operations
                                     and Border Management,
                    of the Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. via 
Webex and in room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. 
Krysten Sinema, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Sinema, Carper, Padilla, Ossoff, 
Lankford, Portman, Johnson, and Hawley.

             OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA\1\

    Senator Sinema. I call today's hearing to order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Sinema appears in the 
Appendix on page 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I welcome Ranking Member Lankford, Members of the 
Subcommittee, and our witnesses to today's discussion on 
southwest border land ports of entry (LPOE).
    Having grown up in southern Arizona I know the importance 
of cross-border security, trade, and travel for my State and 
the entire nation. Our ports along the Southwest Border play a 
critical role in facilitating trade and ensuring the safety, 
prosperity, and economic security of the American people.
    The United States shares strong economic and cultural ties 
with Mexico, and any disruption to this relationship has 
adverse effects on investment, employment, productivity, and 
competitiveness. The Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic has certainly created new challenges, and the 20-month 
closure of the border to non-essential travel seriously hurt 
local border communities.
    Our ports are also the key link to securing our border. 
Most seizures of illicit drugs at our border happen at ports of 
entry (POE). It is critical that we ensure we are making the 
right security investment at our ports of entry, both now and 
in the future. Our nation must slow the flow of illegal goods 
and drugs through our ports of entry while also maintaining the 
efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel.
    I was proud to lead bipartisan efforts in the Senate that 
produced the bipartisan infrastructure package that was signed 
into law on Monday by the President. This historic legislation 
included $3.85 billion to modernize land ports of entry 
throughout the Nation, including two ports in Arizona. This 
investment takes an important step in ensuring that our ports 
have the right infrastructure footprint to meet our nation's 
needs.
    But there are other initiatives beyond infrastructure we 
need to consider at our ports of entry. New technology, 
including Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII), plays a critical role 
in any effort to improve security at our ports of entry. It is 
critical to understand what technology is needed right now, 
both to detect and deter shipments of illegal drugs but also to 
facilitate the flow of legitimate trade and travel.
    As always, the key part of improved border security is a 
strong border workforce. Our port officers have worked the past 
year in challenging circumstances in the midst of a global 
pandemic, and I honor their efforts.
    I hope today's hearing can help us focus our border 
security discussions back toward ports of entry. I want to 
continue gathering an understanding of the current challenges 
at our Southwest Border ports and discuss the appropriate 
technology, infrastructure, and personnel investments needed to 
ensure our ports can be secure and fully operational today, 
tomorrow, and years into the future.
    I am pleased to have a strong panel of government leaders 
on our witness panel today who will bring important expertise 
on workforce, trade, and security issues. With that I would 
like to recognize our Subcommittee Ranking Member, Senator 
James Lankford, for his opening statement.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD\1\

    Senator Lankford. Senator Sinema, thank you very much for 
this and for holding this hearing. At our last hearing on this 
issue on the ports of entry along the Southwest Border that we 
held in June we had encountered about a 20-year high in the 
number of migrants that had attempted to cross the Southwest 
Border. We were, at that time, also seeing a significant surge 
in the amount of fentanyl that U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) was interdicting along the Southwest Border. 
Unfortunately, since June, these problems have only continued 
to compound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Lankford appears in the 
Apendix on page 39.
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    We recently concluded fiscal year (FY) 2021, where we saw 
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection encountered over 1.7 
million migrants. That is the highest number of encounters in 
American history. During that same window of time, CBP 
interdicted over 10,000 pounds of fentanyl, the highest amount 
in our recorded history, a tenfold growth from when the 
government first encountered fentanyl in 2016.
    These two data points only capture what we interdict, not 
the totality of the picture, though. Outside experts and 
officials in the government are all aware that we have more 
got-away immigrants who had crossed the border this year 
illegally and significantly more drugs than were interdicted 
that flow through our port of entry.
    This crisis is significantly straining the Federal 
Government's resources. It has invited active harm into our 
communities. Stories about fentanyl overdoses, heroin 
overdoses, violence endemic to the narcotic trade are all too 
common now.
    In 2020, Oklahoma reported 629 methamphetamine-related 
deaths. Unfortunately, in this past year, we have just crossed 
the highest number of overdose deaths due to opioids, fentanyl 
in all that we have had ever. One hundred thousand people died 
between April 2020 and April 2021. It is the first time that 
drug-related deaths have reached six figures in any 12-month 
period.
    Over the last 5 years, the Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics has 
seen the vast majority of meth and fentanyl in Oklahoma are 
items that had been smuggled through Mexico over the Southwest 
Border. We are becoming more and more aware of the humanitarian 
and national security implications ongoing surge at the 
Southwest Border. We hear stories about unaccompanied minors 
being victimized for labor trafficking.
    Around the same time, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) began reopening to fully vaccinated, nonessential 
travelers.
    CBP announced that it has formally ended the policy of 
metering, which allowed CBP to control the flow of migrants 
during large surges by metering or creating a waiting list for 
the migrants to enter the United States and claim asylum. The 
Obama Administration instituted metering in 2016, to ensure 
that CBP could fully meet its obligations to facilitate a 
secure and lawful trade and traffic at our ports while dealing 
with the surge of migrants.
    Career staff who served in the Obama and Trump 
administrations have stated the metering policy was useful as 
CBP navigated increasing flows of migrants. Rescinding the 
metering tool, I fear, will open up our ports to increased risk 
by allowing cartels to be able to surge migrants at the ports 
and overwhelm them to distract CBP while they move fentanyl and 
hard narcotics across the border.
    As our country reopens to travel, we have not seen how DHS 
will manage the increased demand for lawful trade and travel 
across our Southwest Border, which is essential to our economy. 
However, the rescission of the metering policy will force CBP 
to make tough decisions about how to balance responding to a 
surge of migrants while fulfilling its mission of facilitating 
lawful trade and travel.
    Our port facilities in the Southwest Border further 
compound these problems. They are not designed to hold 
individuals in detention, which is why CBP has historically 
relied on metering. These facilities are also becoming 
increasingly strained and facing difficulties meeting our trade 
obligations or handling an increase in travelers.
    The General Services Administration (GSA), told Congress in 
a report that steady global and regional growth has funneled 
more people and goods through our nation's aging land port of 
entry infrastructure than it is able to handle. Two-thirds of 
our land ports of entry have not had capital improvements in 
over a decade.
    Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, we have heard about 
disrupted supply chains and long wait times for ship goods. We 
face significant difficulties obtaining the analogs and 
components our country needs for basic manufacturing. As our 
seaports continue to face crisis levels of congestion, it is 
likely that our aging land ports will face increased strains as 
they struggle to keep up with the demand for goods.
    Unfortunately, many of our ports along the Southwest Border 
were built before the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) 
and they have not been touched since these two agreements went 
into effect. Even worse, our ports have not been able to keep 
up with the evolving threat landscape over the last few 
decades.
    China has recently begun exploiting our aging ports at the 
Southwest Border by shipping fentanyl and synthetic opioid 
analogs to Mexico and then working with the cartels to be able 
to smuggle them across our ports. According to the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), cartels transport bulk 
quantity polydrug loads via commercial and passenger vehicles, 
and they do so by exploiting major highway routes for 
transportation. The DEA notes the most common method of drug 
smuggling in the United States involves smuggling illicit drugs 
through the U.S. ports of entry in passenger vehicles with 
concealed compartments or comingled with legitimate goods on 
tractor trailers.
    Over the coming weeks and months we will see the strain on 
our aging ports as we work to reopen our country even more. 
Unless the Administration takes action to get the border crisis 
under control, we will also likely see the ongoing migrant 
surge continue to take away from CBP's efforts to stop illicit 
narcotics, counterfeit goods, and other threats that undermine 
our public safety and national security.
    I am grateful for our witnesses that they are here today, 
that we can get a chance to be able to talk through some of 
these issues while all of us are in the same room to be able to 
discuss this. I am very aware some folks are joining us online 
in that dialogue and some folks will be coming in and out of 
the room, but we are very grateful for your testimony and for 
us putting this on the record today.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Ranking Member Lankford.
    Now it is the practice of this Committee to swear in 
witnesses, so if you will please stand and raise your right 
hand.
    Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this 
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth, so help you, God?
    Ms. Sabatino. I do.
    Mr. Jeromino. I do.
    Mr. Burns. I do.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. You may be seated.
    Now I will introduce our witnesses so they may present 
their opening statements. I ask each of our witnesses to keep 
their opening statements to 5 minutes, and your full written 
statements will be submitted for the record.
    Our first witness is Diane Sabatino, who has been serving 
as the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection's Office of Field Operations (OFO) since July 2020. 
In this position, Ms. Sabatino oversees operations at over 330 
ports of entry to support the national security, immigration, 
customs, and commercial trade-related missions of CBP.
    Mrs. Sabatino, we are honored to have you join us today, 
and you are now recognized for your opening statement.

  TESTIMONY OF DIANE SABATINO,\1\ DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 
  COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND 
                       BORDER PROTECTION

    Ms. Sabatino. Chairwoman Sinema, Ranking Member Lankford, 
and Members of the Subcommittee, it is my honor to appear 
before you today on behalf of the men and women of CBP's Office 
of Field Operations to discuss ports of entry along the 
Southwest Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Sabatino appears in the Appendix 
on page 44.
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    The nation's ports of entry are vital gateways for cross-
border commerce and travel, critical sectors that drive 
economic growth and opportunities for American businesses and 
consumers. We manage complex processes to facilitate safe and 
lawful travel, inspect goods for possible hazards and unfair 
trade practices, and stop threats at the border.
    The recent years and months reaffirm that our land ports of 
entry must be prepared to respond and adapt to fluctuations in 
travel, trade, migration flows, as well as unprecedented events 
such as the COVID-19 pandemic. CBP was ready to accommodate the 
increased traffic following the eased restrictions on 
nonessential travel at our land ports of entry for travelers 
fully vaccinated against COVID-19, and we anticipate increased 
private and commercial traffic as we approach the holidays.
    Some challenges facing our ports are persistent, such 
threats as terrorist groups, drug traffickers, smugglers, and 
other adversaries, but those threats are never static nor are 
they wholly predictable. These adversaries constantly change 
their methodologies to avoid detection.
    Many of our inspection facilities were not built to support 
present-day security and operational missions. However, CBP 
continues to work with our partners to modernize these ports of 
entry while also actively implementing innovative technology 
and business solutions to effectively interdict contraband and 
other threats without impeding legitimate traffic.
    We pursue advanced technology to identify high-risk 
shipments and individuals before they reach our borders, 
including digital solutions that, combined with enhanced 
infrastructure and other integrated technology, streamlines our 
processes. At the ports, license plate readers and dedicated 
lanes for travelers using Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID)-enabled documents provide officers a valuable extra time 
to identify a threat and to speed the process to determine the 
admissibility of vehicle occupants.
    We have deployed Simplified Arrival to all of our 
pedestrian crossings at the Southwest Border and most of the 
crossings on the Northern Border, and we are currently testing 
Simplified Arrival at the Port of Anzalduas, Texas, in select 
vehicle lanes. Simplified Arrival incorporates facial biometric 
comparison technology to alleviate the administrative burden 
from our frontline officers and afford them more time to engage 
with travelers to determine intent.
    Since the initial deployments of our Simplified Arrival 
program across all of our port environments we have identified 
over 950 imposters attempting to use identities on genuine 
travel documents, and over 600 of those imposters were 
identified along the Southwest Border this year alone.
    We operate more than 350 large-scale, non-intrusive 
inspection, systems at land ports and seaports of entry to scan 
conveyances for anomalies. In fiscal year 2020, these 
inspections resulted in the interdiction of more than 470,000 
pounds of narcotics and $11.5 million of unreported currency.
    Approximately 90 percent of the NII-attributable seizures 
resulted from scanning less than 2 percent of primary passenger 
vehicles and 15 percent of commercial vehicles crossing the 
Southwest Border. By fiscal year 2023, we expect to increase 
NII scans of those vehicles to 40 percent and at least 72 
percent, respectively.
    But we leverage our partnerships with the private sector, 
local governments in border communities. For example, and 
thanks to the great support of Congress, the Donations 
Acceptance Program (DAP) also continues to be a key mechanism 
to address port-specific infrastructure and resource 
challenges. We invest in our personnel, our most critical 
asset, and use sophisticated workload staffing models to 
identify staffing needs and analyze trends to anticipate future 
requirements.
    We coordinate with our Federal partners, including GSA and 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as well as 
others from infrastructure modernization projects to 
information sharing and intelligence analysis at the National 
Targeting Center (NTC). Our Federal partnerships are all 
essential to our port of entry operations.
    We actively pursue new capabilities and initiatives, such 
as the future of travel and inspection and Port of the Future 
concepts, to draw together experts, frontline personnel, and 
stakeholders from all levels to improve our processing 
workflows.
    Despite the challenges we face, we continue to make 
progress toward upgrading facilities, incorporating effective 
technology, and implementing innovative solutions for the ever-
evolving challenges and threats, both at and beyond our 
borders.
    Again, thank you so much for the opportunity to appear 
before you today, and I look forward to your questions.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Our second witness is Joe 
Jeronimo, the Deputy Assistant Director for ICE's Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI) Transnational Organized Crime 
Division. HSI is the principal investigative component of the 
Department of Homeland Security, responsible for investigating 
transnational crime and threats that exploit the infrastructure 
through which international trade, travel, and finance move.
    Mr. Jeronimo, thank you for your work and for joining us 
today, and you are recognized for your opening statement.

   TESTIMONY OF JOE JERONIMO,\1\ DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, 
   TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME DIVISION, HOMELAND SECURITY 
    INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT

    Mr. Jeronimo. Chairwoman Sinema, Ranking Member Lankford, 
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on Government 
Operations and Border Management, thank you for the opportunity 
to appear before you today to discuss the efforts of homeland 
security investigations to secure the United States from 
transnational crimes and threats.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jeronimo appears in the Appendix 
on page 55.
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    As the principal investigative component DHS, HSI is the 
premier global law enforcement organization responsible for 
conducting Federal criminal investigations at every critical 
location in the cycle--internationally, in cooperation with 
foreign counterparts, where transnational criminal and 
terrorist organizations operate, at our nation's physical 
border and ports of entry, in coordination with CBP, where 
illicit smuggling cells attempt to exploit America's legitimate 
trade, travel, and transportation systems, and in cities 
throughout the United States where criminal organizations earn 
substantial profits off their illicit activities.
    The missions of HSI and CBP are connected and 
complementary. Neither agency can fully succeed in its efforts 
to secure the homeland without an unwavering commitment and 
support from the other, nor can HSI and CBP maximize their 
collective contributions to homeland security without 
coordinating and deconflicting law enforcement responses and 
actions.
    In collaboration with its strategic partners in the United 
States and abroad, HSI special agents gather evidence used to 
identify and build criminal cases against transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs), terrorist networks and 
facilitators, and other criminal elements that threaten the 
homeland. HSI works with prosecutors to indict and arrest 
violators, execute criminal search warrants, seize criminal-
derived money and assets, and take other actions designed to 
disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations operating around 
the world. These efforts protect the national security and 
public safety of the United States.
    Conducting criminal investigations and prosecution 
resulting from arrests associated with CBP seizures is 
necessary for ensuring rule of law. However, HSI's mandate is 
to use multi-defendant, multi-jurisdictional, complex 
investigations to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. The impressive 
narcotics seizures at our border ports of entry clearly 
demonstrate CBP's diligence in protecting America's border, but 
also the ability of TCOs to absorb substantial losses while 
continuing to function.
    Land border contraband seizures are necessary but cannot 
degrade TCO capabilities or imprison TCO leadership without 
HSI's investigations. HSI aims to push out the U.S. borders and 
stem illegal activity targeting the homeland while still 
abroad, as HSI authorities do not start or stop at ports of 
entry or along the borders but rather are extended to 
international domains and into the interior of the United 
States.
    With the largest international investigative presence in 
DHS, comprised of 80 offices in order 50 countries, HSI focuses 
on expanding the borders out, remaining forward-leaning in our 
approach to identify and mitigate threats before they reach our 
borders. This multi-tiered, multi-pronged strategy is one which 
spans international boundaries and crosses all investigative 
program areas and authorities that HSI enforces.
    To complement its international focus, HSI's efforts 
continue at the border and within our field offices throughout 
the United States where HSI special agents respond to and 
investigate schemes that are encountered or identified at the 
U.S. border. At ports of entry along the southwest land border, 
smugglers use a wide variety of tactics and techniques for 
concealing illicit contraband. Our special agents work every 
day with CBP officers to identify, seize, and investigate TCOs 
that attempt to exploit ports of entry to introduce illicit 
contraband into the United States.
    As such, HSI focuses on disrupting and dismantling TCOs by 
working with CBP on collecting, examining, and exploiting 
information gathered from interdictions by CBP and other law 
enforcement partners in furthering new or ongoing 
investigations as well as execute enforcement actions that will 
disrupt and dismantle the criminal activity of TCOs and their 
operations.
    The multi-faceted, complex transnational nature of crimes 
surrounding illicit activity requires an equally robust and 
layered investigative response, which HSI implements on 
multiple fronts. This starts abroad and continues domestically 
where HSI special agents and criminal analysts assigned to over 
220 offices across the United States respond to and pursue 
investigations into illicit smuggling and trafficking.
    HSI's comprehensive strategy to conduct complex, large-
scale investigations represents one of DHS's best weapons for 
dismantling TCOs in a manner not possible solely through border 
interdiction efforts.
    United in our partnership with CBP at the border and ports 
of entry as well as our efforts within the interior of the 
United States, HSI uses the full breadth of its authorities and 
expertise to pursue investigations and attack all aspects of 
TCOs.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today and for your continued support of HSI and the critical 
investigative role it plays in investigating TCOs. HSI remains 
committed to its mission to secure the homeland from 
transnational crime and threats and to uphold the national 
security and public safety of the United States. I look forward 
to your questions.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Our final witness is Stuart 
Burns, the Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Portfolio 
Management and Customer Engagement for the General Services 
Administration's Public Buildings Service (PBS). PBS, amongst 
other things, acquires space through new construction and 
leasing and maintains Federal properties nationwide. This 
includes over 100 land ports of entry.
    Mr. Burns, thank you for joining us today, and you are 
recognized for your opening statement.

 TESTIMONY OF STUART BURNS,\1\ ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC 
     BUILDINGS SERVICE, PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT AND CUSTOMER 
          ENGAGEMENT, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

    Mr. Burns. Good afternoon Chairwoman Sinema, Ranking Member 
Lankford, and Members of the Subcommittee. I would like to 
thank you for inviting me to testify at the hearing on 
improving security, trade, and travel flows at the southwest 
border ports of entry.
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    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Burns appear in the Appendix on 
page 66.
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    GSA's mission is to deliver the best value in real estate, 
acquisition, and technology services to the government and the 
American people. To meet the Federal Government's real estate 
and technology needs along the borders, GSA maintains a close 
partnership with Department of Homeland Security's Customs and 
Border Protection, the other Federal inspection agencies like 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration.
    As you know, CBP is our primary partner among the many 
Federal inspection agencies stationed along the American land 
borders, and it is essential that they have modern facilities 
to perform their critical mission of safeguarding our borders 
and enhancing the Nation's economic prosperity. Investment in 
new and existing land ports of entry strengthens trade, 
tourism, and commerce, creates jobs, and bolsters our Nation's 
security.
    I would like to thank Chairwoman Sinema and other Members 
of the Subcommittee for their work to include these land ports 
in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act which you 
mentioned was signed into law on Monday. Now that the 
legislation is enacted, GSA will work with CBP and our other 
partners to construct new and modernize existing land ports of 
entry at dozens of border stations across the Northern and 
Southern Border.
    Additionally, GSA will undertake paving projects to improve 
road infrastructure leading to and from and also within the 
ports. These critical investments will provide modern and 
energy-efficient facilities for Federal inspection agencies, 
and benefit our State, local and private partners. The $3.4 
billion provided to GSA and $400 million provided to CBP will 
address critical infrastructure priorities for our country, and 
eliminate a substantial backlog of outstanding projects.
    GSA is well positioned to undertake and deliver on this 
LPOE program. We have a consistent track record of delivering 
capital projects on time and on budget. Our successes are the 
result of leveraging project resources and subject matter 
experts across GSA. This approach results in the application of 
industry best practices in site acquisition, environmental 
analysis, design, construction, and delivery of these 
facilities. This collaborative team approach has contributed to 
the success of many projects.
    As you mentioned, there are 167 land ports of entry across 
nearly 7,500 miles of the United States borders, and GSA 
manages 123. GSA's land ports of entry serve diverse mission 
needs at a diverse set of locations that include urban 
communities like San Diego, California; El Paso, Texas; and 
Detroit, Michigan; as well as remote localities like Douglas, 
Arizona; Van Buren, Maine; and Alcan, Alaska.
    Safe, secure, and modern land ports along our borders are 
critical to ensuring an efficient flow of commerce and people 
that supports jobs and economic growth. However, the average 
LPOE in GSA's portfolio was designed and constructed more than 
40 years ago. As a result, many of these facilities are 
functionally obsolete for the 21st Century. This, in turn, has 
a negative effect on American trade, tourism, commerce, jobs, 
and national security.
    To inform and facilitate investment in the land ports of 
entry, GSA coordinates and assists CBP in evaluating and 
prioritizing the facilities for investment. Over the past 5 
years, this process has resulted in significant investments in 
the land ports at Calexico and San Ysidro in California; 
Columbus, New Mexico; Tornillo and Laredo in Texas; and 
Alexandria Bay, New York.
    GSA works closely with CBP to ensure that their priority 
projects are integrated into GSA's larger, multi-year priority 
plan. As part of that plan, GSA consults with CBP and other 
stakeholder agencies, such as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, at the onset of project planning, and we 
continue that relationship throughout the lifecycle of project 
delivery.
    An example of this partnership in practice was the 
expansion and modernization of the San Ysidro land port of 
entry in California. GSA incorporated each of those agencies' 
programs of requirements into one modernized facility.
    Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about 
GSA's ongoing partnership with CBP and others to deliver on the 
land ports' modernization program at the Northern and Southern 
Border, and the historic opportunity that the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act presents to bring these critical 
facilities into the 21st Century. I welcome the opportunity to 
discuss GSA's commitment to strategic investment in our 
Nation's land ports of entry, and am happy to answer any 
questions that you have.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Burns.
    Now we will begin the question portion of the hearing. Each 
Senator will receive 7 minutes for questions. I will recognize 
myself first for 7 minutes.
    My first question is for Ms. Sabatino and Mr. Burns. With 
the recent passage of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs 
Act Congress provided a significant investment in improving our 
ports of entry. This investment will help provide more security 
and more efficient trade and travel, but security is a 
constantly evolving challenge and Congress and the 
Administration should always be planning for the future.
    Looking at ports of entry, what steps should Congress take 
now so that our nation has the infrastructure it needs 10 years 
from now? Ms. Sabatino, I will ask you to address this first, 
as I am curious to learn more about how this will fit with 
CBP's Port of the Future concept of operation that seeks to 
transform port workflow and technology processes.
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. CBP 
made significant investments in research and development (R&D) 
for new technology to enhance our current infrastructure on the 
port, and it is complemented by our investments in prioritizing 
land ports of entry for infrastructure investments when the 
opportunity presents itself. I certainly thank you for your 
support in the infrastructure bill. We look forward to being 
able to complete 16 of the priority projects on the 5-year 
capital investment plan, but in addition to that, another 10 
potentially covered for modernization efforts.
    With the Port of the Future concept focusing on the cargo 
operations and streamlining workflows, we have been making 
investments in building out technology that is going to 
integrate information for our CBP officers and agriculture 
specialists into an integrated, newer platform. That is taking 
all of the information as the NII technology is deployed, the 
information from the RFID, the information, once we have the 
simplified arrival program rolled out into a common viewer so 
that we can give our officers the best tools and information to 
make decisions quickly and essentially automate every part of 
the process that we can, again, giving them the time to invest 
in the interviews with individuals or the time to look further 
at the actual commodities and do what they do best.
    With the future travel initiatives we have been looking at, 
comprehensively, across all of our travel environments where we 
can leverage new technology, and again, automate processes to 
remove the administrative burden from our frontline personnel. 
That includes the facial biometric comparison technology but 
also affording travelers the opportunity to apply for I-94s in 
advance, that they could do previously already through our 
website and now through a mobile application in the CBP One 
portal.
    But all of these individual investments that we look at to 
refine legitimate travel and trade helping us provide the 
officers the tools and the time to address the significant 
challenge and identify those threats that cross the border on a 
daily basis.
    Senator Sinema. Mr. Burns.
    Mr. Burns. Thank you, Chairman. We rely extensively on CBP 
and the other inspection agencies at those land ports to define 
what the requirements are and what the projected flows are 
through those land ports of entry. That is why we have a heavy 
coordination effort in our capital planning and our request to 
Congress for funding for the land ports of entry, moving 
forward.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. My question is for Ms. Sabatino. 
I want to discuss the role of ports of entry in the flow of 
migrants across the border. The Administration recently 
announced an end to the practice of metering of asylum seekers 
at ports of the entry, and the comment period of the new asylum 
rule recently closed. Now I have visited ports of entry in 
Arizona and I have seen firsthand the limited facilities to 
fairly and humanely process migrants and asylum seekers at 
ports of entry.
    So what steps is OFO taking to ensure that ports of entry 
are prepared to deal with the potential for increased numbers 
of migrants seeking asylum and other forms of relief? I would 
especially like to know how OFO is ensuring this need is taken 
into consideration when modernizing our ports of entry.
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question. Regarding the 
steps with respect to the ability to manage the flow, it is an 
absolutely critical strategy that we have to employ to ensure 
that as migrants present themselves at ports of entry to 
request asylum--some are not even requesting asylum. Some are 
processed through other cases. However, these individuals, as 
they present themselves, as mentioned earlier, the ports are 
not designed to detain people for extended periods of time.
    One of the steps that we have been pursuing is working with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in particular 
international organizations south of the border, to help 
provide us advanced information through the CBP One app so that 
we can make decisions, not necessarily decisions on the 
determination of the inspection in advance but that we can 
assess and determine who is coming toward us, do all of the 
administrative work in advance of individuals arriving at the 
ports of entry, and then, certainly put them through a 
streamlined process as they arrive, and make a final 
determination on the inspection.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. My next question is also for 
you, and I wanted to focus on technology. At times I worry the 
border security technology discussion focuses too much on the 
regions between ports of entry and not enough on the ports 
themselves. Yet we know that criminal networks are constantly 
targeting our ports. So what gets in the way of CBP being able 
to deploy the right technology at our ports of entry to allow 
our officers to keep pace with criminals who are continually 
adapting their tactics in response to U.S. capabilities?
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you, Chairwoman. Certainly it is a 
challenge that persists, that as soon as new technology is 
deployed our adversaries are well underway at how to overcome 
the strategies and the technologies that we employ. But 
certainly we look as comprehensively as possible at all of the 
opportunities and the investments, certainly, in the non-
intrusive technology deployments that are going to occur over 
the next 18 to 24 months since the execution of the contracts. 
It is going to be critical to ensuring that our officers have 
the best information available to make the decisions quickly--
drive-through scanning systems, again, tying that information, 
I think where we have a vulnerability and need to work toward 
is advanced information for travelers over the land border.
    That is really the next step for us in, closing the gaps 
and vulnerabilities so that we can, again, continue to 
streamline travel. The vast majority of people that cross our 
ports of entry are legitimate travelers and it is legitimate 
commerce. But that streamlined information will help us 
illuminate those bad actors, and again, give our resources, our 
frontline personnel, the time to invest in making the decision 
to spend more time to determine intent and actually surge the 
commodities.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. I would like to recognize 
Senator Lankford for his 7 minutes of questions.
    Senator Lankford. Thank you. Ms. Sabatino, I want to 
continue this conversation that you had raised in your opening 
statement as well about individuals who had false documents 
when they crossed the border at the land ports of entry. So 
there are really two things that are connected here. One is the 
ability to be able to identify false documents. I would assume 
that is dealing with the document plus facial recognition, when 
we will be at a point where all of our land ports of entry can 
actually do facial recognition to be able to line up and to 
compare that with the document that is being handled.
    The second thing is you mentioned that 950 of these 
fraudulent documents came across last year in all ports, and 
600 of those of the Southwest Border. I want to make sure I 
heard that number correct, that last year we had 600 false 
documents, or documents that came across but it was not 
actually the person that was holding the card. Is that correct?
    Ms. Sabatino. Yes. Since the deployment of the facial 
biometric technology, in all of our port environments--air, 
maritime, and land--the deployments were Simplified Arrival in 
our pedestrian lanes, really started in Tucson about a year and 
a half ago, but more significantly since January of this year. 
Over 600--I have the exact number and I can certainly follow 
up--but of the 950 it was over 600 that have been identified at 
our Southwest Border ports of entry.
    Senator Lankford. Were these legitimate cards, just not the 
person that was actually holding it?
    Ms. Sabatino. Imposters to genuine documents.
    Senator Lankford. OK. So then the question is, what 
happened to those legitimate documents then? It is a border 
crossing card or a passport, I assume, one of those. Are those 
being held? Is there a need for those to be able to go back to 
individuals? If you are going to get another border crossing 
card for that individual, some kind of process where they can 
re-request it so we know what happened and how this ended up in 
their hands?
    Ms. Sabatino. Certainly through the interview process in 
trying to obtain the information from the individuals that we 
encounter, with individuals who present themselves as imposters 
we can make referrals for Federal prosecution for false claims, 
certainly in the scenario if they are presenting themselves as 
an impostor to U.S. citizenship.
    But with respect to the documents themselves they are not 
returned to individuals. They are retained, and we dispose of 
them, consistent with the policy with respect to the individual 
documents, which agency they could be returned to.
    Senator Lankford. So you can actually prosecute those 
individuals that are imposters, that are showing legitimate 
documents, just not the right person. How often do we?
    Ms. Sabatino. In the last fiscal year we presented, and 
there were just under 500 cases of fraudulent documents 
accepted for prosecution. That is a national number. It is not 
specific to the Southwest Border.
    Senator Lankford. OK. We will follow up on that, to get a 
specific number to know how we are prosecuting those.
    The non-intrusive inspection, Senator Sinema and I both 
have talked about that already, both in opening statements and 
in questions. From a staff briefing that we had in September, 
we have learned that some of the money that had been allocated 
for non-intrusive inspections in other areas, in other ports, 
have actually been shifted to the Southwest Border for other 
purposes other than non-intrusive inspections. Are you aware of 
that, and how much was dedicated non-intrusive inspections has 
actually been moved to other purposes?
    Ms. Sabatino. With respect to reprogramming funding in 
response to user fee shortfalls and covering salaries, the 
specifics about where the funding and to what it was allocated 
I can certainly follow up.
    Senator Lankford. OK. Let's do. Obviously, that has been a 
high priority on both sides of the aisle on non-intrusive 
inspections, both for drug interdictions and other contraband, 
and obviously facial recognition, to be able to line up 
documents to see if they are actually accurate. We want to be 
able to see that continue and not be reprogrammed into other 
areas.
    Can I ask a question? As we are trying to track this we are 
getting very close to some deadlines here for CBP. Do you know 
what percentage of the CBP employees have been vaccinated or 
are facing possible issues for the vaccine mandate that has 
been laid down right now?
    Ms. Sabatino. The numbers continue to grow. I do not have 
exact data. We do have until the November 22nd deadline----
    Senator Lankford. That is a week, yes.
    Ms. Sabatino [continuing]. Yes, and we are very optimistic 
about the numbers coming in.
    Senator Lankford. Do you have a guess on that percentage? 
Obviously we are a week away. I would assume you would have 
some idea of how many people have not turned in their status on 
vaccination, when we are just a week away.
    Ms. Sabatino. I do not have a good number for you today, 
sir. We will follow up.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Jeronimo, do you have a good number 
for that, at HSI, at ICE?
    Mr. Jeronimo. I do not, sir.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Burns, are you aware of that for GSA?
    Mr. Burns. I am not aware of the number. That is not in my 
area.
    Senator Lankford. OK. We will follow up in the next week, 
obviously. That should be known. I would tell you it is 
interesting to me the number of agencies that I have talked to 
that do not know that answer. We have reached out to multiple 
agencies. We deal with the Federal workforce issues as well as 
national security issues, and if we have a large number of 
individuals that are not vaccinated that will go through the 
process of removal over the holiday period, that they are going 
to suddenly be removed from their jobs, it is a very expensive 
process to be able to hire, train, and equip and be able to 
reach out to bring on additional folks.
    I assume, Ms. Sabatino, you do not have too many employees 
at this point right now. The last I saw that you all had a 
backlog of staff that you needed to hire. Is that still true?
    Ms. Sabatino. We have a robust pipeline of individuals for 
the CBP officer position, and with respect to the vaccine 
mandate, there is also a population of individuals that can and 
have requested reasonable accommodations. So the process is 
expected to be over several months. We have been very engaged 
with our stakeholders as well, ensuring that they understand 
what the timeline is for any impact, and we will forecast for 
them as soon as we see any even remote potential for that.
    Senator Lankford. So your timeline for the accommodation 
and the answers to get back to the individuals that are asking 
for accommodation is when? Whether that be medical, personal, 
or religious accommodations.
    Ms. Sabatino. For religious and medical, and it is an 
established process to go through to request reasonable 
accommodations. It is not new for the vaccination mandate. It 
is going to be contingent on the volume that we do have.
    Senator Lankford. But you expect that to take how long?
    Ms. Sabatino. That could take several months.
    Senator Lankford. All right. Mr. Jeronimo, we continue to 
deal with obviously a large flow of methamphetamines coming 
into the country from Mexico. This has been an ongoing issue 
for quite a while. What are you seeing as far as trend lines 
and what you are seeing for transnational criminal 
organizations moving, and have some of the techniques changed, 
and what do we need to accommodate for, for technology or other 
staffing?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Sir, thank you for your question. I will 
start with the technology piece. Because cartels and TCOs are 
ever-changing and ever-evolving, we need to do the same. A 
couple of items that I would bring to your attention, from a 
technology perspective, is implementing mobile drug labs along 
the Southwest Border, due to the fact that we are not 
necessarily dealing with just marijuana and cocaine anymore. We 
are dealing with synthetic narcotics, and again, it is 
difficult sometimes to determine what those substances are. So 
having a mobile drug lab platform along the Southwest Border 
would be welcomed.
    Pollen testing. If you are not familiar with it, pollen 
testing gives you the ability to provide, with some certainty, 
the geographical origin of where fentanyl and meth are being 
made. For example, it can tell you that this fentanyl is being 
produced in Guadalajara or Michoacan area, or it has been made 
in some province in China.
    I would also talk about using drones for offensive and 
defensive purposes, using drones for countering surveillance 
and for operational needs as well as the ability to counter the 
use of drones by TCOs who are using them for bringing 
narcotics. Obviously you saw recently in Iran the fact that 
these can be used for other means.
    As far as inflow, from a perspective that if I was a cartel 
I would not waste my time with marijuana and I would get out of 
the cocaine business, because at the end of the day, with 
synthetic opiates and drugs of that nature you are purchasing 
dual-use chemicals that are legal in most cases. You need a 
warehouse and a chemist. At the end of the day this is not 
going to go away. This continues to be an issue.
    From an HSI perspective, we have been on the front lines 
since day one of the opiate crisis. We have taken our border 
enforcement and security task force, our best pre-stat, from a 
traditional border perspective, and moved that and increased 
our presence at international mail facilities (IMF), 
consignment hubs, seaports, and nontraditional locations like 
Ohio and Michigan, for example, to put Border Security Task 
Force (BEST) in.
    We have operations like Die Another Day, which is a 
partnership with CBP, U.S. Postal Service (USPS), DEA, focusing 
on pill presses that are being imported into the United States 
to be used to make illicit substances.
    When it comes to precursors, HSI and CBP are leading the 
way, by far leading the way in that. In the last 18 months, we 
have seized over 500 kilograms of precursors destined to TCOs. 
That is 1 million pounds of precursors to be used for meth and 
fentanyl.
    The other thing is partnerships. We are in tune with our 
Federal and State and local partners--CBP, DEA, U.S. Postal, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). There is not a place 
where we are not working collectively together as a whole-of-
government approach. I understand your frustration in this, but 
it is not from a lack of effort on behalf of the men and women 
within HSI and CBP working the front lines, sir.
    Senator Lankford. Thank you.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Senator Lankford. Next I will 
recognize Senator Carper for 7 minutes.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

    Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chair, and to you and the 
Ranking Member thanks for holding this important hearing, and 
to our witnesses, thank you very much for joining us.
    I think I might have time for two questions. The first 
would deal with supply chain issues and the second would focus 
on Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) related 
issues. I will start off with the first one with respect to 
supply chain. I am going to direct this question to Deputy 
Assistant Commissioner (DAC) Diane Sabatino.
    I said in my notes here it says, ``DAC Sabatino.'' Is that 
a first name? What is D-A-C? Is that your name?
    Ms. Sabatino. No. It is Deputy Executive Assistant 
Commissioner (DEAC).
    Senator Carper. OK. All right. Fair enough. I serve as 
Chair on the Subcommittee on International Trade, on Customs 
and Global Competitiveness on the Finance Committee. As I am 
sure you know well, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a host of 
supply chain issues over the availability of goods, ranging 
from consumer products to vehicles to canned goods.
    My question is this. Given CBP's mission to dislocate 
lawful international trade and travel, could you just talk with 
us for a bit about any lessons learned from the pandemic and 
how CBP adapted to address a change in any trade patterns?
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question, Senator. I think 
from a perspective not unique to CBP, certainly leveraging 
virtual technology across the field operations enterprise in a 
number of different areas, leveraging the expertise of our 
personnel across all of our ports of entry on a daily and 
recurring basis, now that we have the ability to engage with 
them as frequently through Microsoft Teams and other endeavors.
    So certainly moving to a virtual environment, virtual 
engagements with all of our stakeholders, allowing us to reach 
more individuals with a timely message, simultaneously, instead 
of multiple gaps, between stakeholders, and ensuring that we 
have a consistent message, again not unique certainly to CBP.
    But leveraging the virtual environment as well for things 
like renewals of Global Entry applicant programs, freeing up 
2,300 interviews per week to ensure that we tackle the volume 
that built up while the Global Entry enrollment centers were 
closed during the pandemic.
    From a trade perspective, as I mentioned, tapping into the 
expertise of our individuals across the country and really 
leveraging them in national dialogue with large stakeholder 
forums. I think from the C-TPAT perspective, also working with 
our international partners and companies overseas. Again, 
virtual engagements and validations, things that we had 
traditionally relied on, costly travel, costly paperwork. I 
think really taking advantage of the technology is a lesson 
learned for CBP, and not losing sight of our opportunities to 
continue to leverage that while we are moving out of the 
significant travel restrictions and challenges. But really 
moving in the trade environment to as paperless a process as 
possible.
    Innovating in our seized property process, in our vaults, 
leveraging biometric technology, again, creating friction-less 
and touch-less environments, not just in the traveler space but 
also in our own workspaces. Frankly looking at our footprints 
across all of our offices, to ensure that we are truly 
leveraging the space that we need and, reallocating resources, 
from costly investments that clearly have demonstrated we can 
use toward other programs and tackling other threats.
    Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. I think I have time for 
another question. Let me just get this one in, if I can, also 
Ms. Sabatino.
    Senator Cornyn and I, we are the co-leads on a trade 
subcommittee in Finance Committee. We have introduced 
legislation. It is called the Customs-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism Pilot Program Act of 2021 or C-TPAT Pilot Program Act 
of 2021. I do not know if you are familiar with it. But a pilot 
program act which recently passed out of our Committee on 
Finance by voice vote, our bill would expand this successful 
program within CBP that allows trusted merchants to voluntarily 
submit themselves to enhanced screening and information 
sharing, in exchange for a fast-track customs clearance process 
for imported goods. Ultimately, we believe it will strengthen 
our national security while creating jobs and expedite the 
movement of goods.
    Since you mentioned the benefit of the current C-TPAT 
program in use at CBP in your testimony, I hope to continue 
work on this issue with you and your colleagues at the agency. 
My question would be, Commissioner Sabatino, what other steps 
should Congress consider to modernize and improve the security 
of the imported goods at our ports of entry?
    Ms. Sabatino. We certainly look forward to working with you 
on the legislation. The C-TPAT program is a very important 
program to us because we rely very heavily on the companies 
that are invested in the program to also help illuminate those 
bad actors that we can identify in the supply chain. We rely on 
them, certainly to trust in us to do our mission and receive 
the benefits of the program.
    With respect to the future of the C-TPAT program, the work 
that we are doing in engaging with other similar programs, 
international programs, where we can--I think Business Alliance 
for Secure Commerce (BASC) is a good example of that, and 
having recently signed an agreement with the BASC organization 
to help collaborate on some of these investments in identifying 
the good actors in the trade space but also help us illuminate 
the vulnerabilities and the bad actors as well as the networks 
tied to those bad actors.
    Senator Carper. All right. Great. Thank you so much for 
those responses. Good to see you. Thanks for joining us today. 
Thanks for your service.
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Sinema. I believe we are waiting for Senator 
Padilla to join, and while we are waiting I will continue to 
ask some questions until he arrives.
    My next question is for Mr. Jeronimo. I know that HSI is 
focused on transnational criminal organizations, but what does 
Congress and the public need to be aware of about TCOs in their 
exploiting of security gaps at our ports of entry? Are there 
technology investments needed at our ports that could assist in 
HSI investigations to allow us to more effectively disrupt and 
counter these criminal groups?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Thank you for your question, ma'am. First of 
all, I applaud the Committee and Legislative Affairs for their 
efforts in passing the recent bill which gives CBP the ability 
to upgrade the ports of entry. The reason I say that is every 
time CBP makes an interdiction it gives HSI an opportunity to 
take that interdiction and turn it into a criminal 
investigation, and then turn in that criminal investigation and 
furthering that hopefully to identify and build out networks 
and identify the TCOs and for disruption, dismantlement, and 
potential prosecution. Some of the areas with that, as 
interdictions increase because of this NII process, that would 
result in HSI being resourced in order to respond to those.
    Currently, 20 percent of our work hours, total work hours, 
are specific to CBP's port of entry seizures. That is 20 
percent. That is fairly significant. Every time there is an 
interdiction by CBP, HSI spends, at a minimum, 95 hours to 
handle that interdiction, from cradle to grave, 95 hours. That 
is 12 business days. So again, that is significant in nature 
and that is a huge commitment.
    I am a knuckle-dragger by nature, so I try to dumb things 
down for myself. But the point here is if you have a port of 
entry where there are 1,000 cars that go through it, and CBP 
inspects 10 percent of that, they are inspecting 100 cars. If 
their hit rate is 10 percent, there are 10 cars with illegal 
substances in them. HSI is mandated and is nondiscretionary and 
has to respond to them.
    So as NII continues to improve and CBP now inspects 500 
cars, and their hit rate is still 10 percent, that is 50 cars 
with narcotics that we are going to have to. So that is us 
responding to those and trying to build out those seizures and 
interdictions into long-term investigations and building out 
those networks.
    I will say, resource-wise, continue to deal with encrypted 
communication. That has been a sore subject for us as far as 
continuing to keep up with cartels and TCOs in regard to 
encrypted communication, and dealing with that. Approving the 
Shadow Wolves Enhancement Act would be a plus. That would help 
close the gap, especially in the Tribal lands as far TCOs 
taking advantage of that.
    A more collaborative approach. I look at things in four 
buckets, ma'am. I look at things from an interdiction 
perspective--excuse me, intelligence perspective, interdiction, 
investigation, and prosecution. The goal is to move from one 
bucket to another bucket as seamlessly as possible. Sometimes, 
unfortunately, somebody thinks their bucket is more important. 
I think when we are able to work collectively together, it all 
means something, because intelligence is good but if you cannot 
operationalize it, it does not mean anything. You can interdict 
things all day long, but that is not going to change anything. 
You can work the best case ever, but if you cannot get a 
prosecution or arrest somebody and put them in jail, it really 
does not mean much. So working collectively together across 
those avenues is vital.
    In totality, again, I appreciate everybody's support in 
regard to HSI's efforts for combating TCOs.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Mr. Jeronimo, and thank you for 
mentioning the Shadow Wolves bill. That is a bill I have 
offered, and we passed this Committee and we are working to 
pass it through this entire Congress, so I appreciate that.
    Senator Padilla, you are recognized for 7 minutes of 
questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PADILLA

    Senator Padilla. Thank you, Madam Chair. Colleagues, 
California's land ports of entry are the busiest border 
crossings in the western hemisphere, which creates considerable 
opportunities for bilateral trade and economic cooperation. 
Unfortunately, a recent study found that delays at land ports 
of entry, in 2016, caused nearly $1.6 billion in lost economic 
output and more than 12,000 unrealized jobs in California 
alone. Without capacity enhancements, the adverse impacts of 
delays for both personal trips as well as freight movements at 
these ports of entry will continue to grow and intensify.
    The San Diego Association of Governments and the California 
Department of Transportation, in coordination with State and 
Federal partners in the United States and Mexico are carrying 
out the State Route 11/Otay Mesa East Port of Entry project in 
order to create a new, multimodal land port of entry. Now this 
project seeks to leverage technology, including interchangeable 
passenger and commercial vehicle primary inspection lanes to 
better manage traffic demand and decrease wait times across all 
ports of entry in the region.
    Questions for Ms. Sabatino. I appreciate that CBP is 
constructively engaging with the project sponsors to identify 
the staffing requirements for the Otay Mesa East facility. What 
steps or assurances can the Administration provide to State and 
local governments with respect to staffing for this project so 
that we are prepared when it is time to open?
    Ms. Sabatino. Senator, thank you for the question, and we 
are always excited about the prospect of newly designed 
infrastructure for our ports of entry and the ability to 
incorporate the technology that we are working to identify and 
implement today at the onset and development.
    Regarding the Otay Mesa East port of entry, with any new 
project we leverage our workload staffing model and we 
incorporate those new projects, and with this particular 
project I think the next steps are engaging with the respective 
program offices in the National Capital Region (NCR) here, and 
they have been very engaged both with the San Diego field 
office and the local leadership, which we greatly appreciate.
    But we do have additional steps to work on, validating the 
information and modeling the project, to really identify what 
those staffing needs could be. But then we also use our 
workload staffing model as a decision tool for the allocation 
of the resources that we have authorized on board.
    Senator Padilla. All right. In anticipation of the staffing 
needs come 2023, a two-part question. Will resources for 
sufficient staffing be part of the budget for 2023, and part 
two of the question is, given how long it takes to fill 
staffing pipelines, what steps are we taking now to ensure that 
there will be adequate staffing when it opens, potentially as 
early as 2024?
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you, Senator. I am very pleased to be 
able to say that we do have a robust pipeline. It is an 
investment going back over 10 years, and ensuring that we have 
a cadre of people ready to onboard and our staffing numbers 
have reflected that. We have really been limited, frankly, by 
training seats available at times versus not having the 
individuals to place into the positions.
    We will certainly continue to work with you and your staff 
on the needs for the particular ports in Southern California, 
and again, leveraging and briefing with the information 
available through the workload staffing model which, again, is 
our best resource, and we continue to refine that resource.
    The workload staffing model, certainly impacted by the 
travel downturn, still reflected a need for officers as well as 
our agriculture model, because when the travel decreased we 
reallocated resources to other areas and certainly demonstrated 
a need and a workload in things like our outbound environment, 
mail and express consignment facilities. So as travel comes 
back and that gets layered in we do expect to see changes in 
increases in what the staffing models reflect as well, to 
include new locations.
    Senator Padilla. Thank you. Next question, on the same 
project, for Mr. Burns. I understand that one option under 
consideration is for GSA to take possession of the Otay Mesa 
East facility once it is built and then to enter an agreement 
with CBP to equip it and to staff it. So, one, is that 
accurate, and two, if that is a scenario that does play out 
what other responsibilities accompany taking possession of a 
facility like that?
    Mr. Burns. Thank you for the question. I am familiar with 
the project. Since the funding would be coming from the project 
sponsor, I have not seen the final funding proposal for it 
becoming fully functional. But certainly we would be prepared 
to take that into our inventory and begin to service it and 
maintain that facility.
    Senator Padilla. OK. We will look forward to a continuing 
conversation about this in the year or two ahead.
    A question more broadly about land ports of entry. I know 
in California delays and the resulting vehicle idling has had a 
considerable impact on air quality in the surrounding regions, 
including significant increase in emissions. These delays 
resulted in an average release of 457 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide emissions alone per day in 2016. A recent study also 
highlighted how reducing delays would lower the emissions of 
pollutants like carbon monoxide and particulate matters.
    Back to you, Ms. Sabatino. How can reducing delays at land 
ports of entry reduce not just environmental impacts but health 
impacts, and what plans are in place to attempt to achieve 
these reductions?
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you for the question, and I do 
apologize, and I think also, in part, answers the question that 
Senator Lankford mentioned earlier with respect to the timeline 
for simplified arrival in vehicle lanes. That is our facial 
biometric comparison technology. We are currently testing that 
in the port of Anzalduas in select lanes and really working 
with both the industry as well as our Office of Information 
Technology.
    We rolled out Simplified Arrival in the air environment, in 
the maritime environment. It did move very quickly in the 
pedestrian environment. The vehicle environment, because of the 
environmental challenges that we have, it really is going to be 
a larger hurdle than the other deployments, but we look forward 
to keeping you apprised of the deployment schedule as we see it 
rolling out.
    I believe we are going to expand to an additional pilot 
location in another location in Texas, but San Ysidro, in 
particular, is one location that we are targeting, once we have 
the right technology identified to leverage, because of the 
volume that comes through that particular port. We have been 
engaged with the local leadership on the ground from CBP to 
talk about identifying amenable populations for even lanes 
where we could potentially pilot that in the next phase.
    Senator Padilla. OK. Thank you for your work. I look 
forward to the ongoing collaboration. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Senator Padilla. We have time to 
start a second round of questions, so I will start with another 
round of questions, first to Ms. Sabatino.
    As part of the fiscal year 2021 appropriations package, 
Congress improved important bipartisan language regarding the 
creation of a pilot program that would expand the border 
crossing card program in Arizona and allow vetted Mexican 
travelers with an I-94 to travel throughout Arizona. This is an 
important initiative for my State that has the potential to 
make border crossing more efficient for travel and trade.
    Can you provide the Subcommittee an update on CBP's 
progress in implementing this expansion, what hurdles you might 
have experienced, and the plans you have to overcome those 
challenges?
    Ms. Sabatino. Thank you, Chairwoman, and I do not, 
unfortunately, have a good answer for you on the particular 
pilot program. Because of the challenges with the travel 
restrictions, that project did not develop as it could have, 
had we not encountered the COVID pandemic. However, we are 
looking at the opportunities to implement that pilot program 
and actually see it as a short-term solution and gap-filler for 
things that I had mentioned earlier. When we were talking about 
advanced information and more comprehensively looking at the 
traffic coming across the border, individuals applying for and 
receiving the provisional I-94s in advance and being able to 
issue those right at primary.
    A number of efforts underway, that a short term, and we 
will follow up with you on the developments and what a timeline 
could be for that project.
    Senator Sinema. I appreciate that. Another question for 
you. In Arizona and other border States we have had a recurring 
problem of understaffing at our ports of entry, as I am sure 
you are aware. Office of Field Operations workforce staffing 
models for ports in areas such as Nogales indicate that the 
hiring has improved somewhat. But I do always worry about 
retaining experienced officers who understand the challenges 
unique to the U.S.-Mexico border.
    What are the key concerns that OFO leadership hears from 
port officers that get in the way of them successfully doing 
their job, and what steps are you all taking to improve these 
workforce morale and retention challenges?
    Ms. Sabatino. And very important to CBP, in particular, the 
Office of Field Operations for our frontline personnel and all 
of our personnel who have been so significantly impacted, along 
with the rest of the country, by the pandemic.
    We do have a number of investments that cover a spectrum of 
target areas. I think first and foremost the investments at the 
Office of Field Operations has made in peer support teams and 
investments in the chaplain program, where we have resources 
right on the ground for employees, certainly to engage with 
employees should they identify any challenges, but a resource 
if they do not want to pick up a phone and reach out through 
the Employee Assistance Program (EAP), that they have someone 
that they can talk to, that they know, and that they are 
comfortable with. We message that aggressively with our 
personnel.
    There is also the Employee Assistance Program where there 
is a variety of services available to our workforce should they 
need anything with respect to challenges--assistance managing 
finances, mental health resources for them. These are all 
different opportunities, given the comfort level of the 
individual, to who they would like to speak to.
    I think the agency has also made a significant investment 
in bringing on clinicians to help us guide these programs and 
enhance them. We also have the Workforce and Resiliency 
Division in the National Capital Region that looks at 
opportunities to engage employees in morale-building and team-
building programs that we deploy out to the field.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Mr. Jeronimo, the same basic 
question for you. Can you speak to the challenges impacting HSI 
personnel and agency efforts to improve morale and retention?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Thank you for your question, Chairwoman. I 
will say that HSI always recruits very well. We have 
announcements for 1811 special agent positions. We have a 
robust applicant pool. We also even do female-only 
announcements. So we have never had an issue in the recruiting 
process, and I believe the reason for that is we are not a 
single-scope mission agency. We are able to attack criminal 
organizations or TCOs from multiple fronts, and I think that is 
important when we are looking for new recruits.
    I will also point out that HSI might be relatively new in 
name but HSI and CBP have a legacy that goes back to 1789, with 
the creation of U.S. Customs. We have a very long tradition, 
and who would not want to be a part of that, is what I would 
put out there.
    I will also say if there is one thing that does bring 
morale down for HSI is our inability to work with some 
jurisdictions, because we are under the umbrella of ICE. It is 
well documented that certain jurisdictions will not work with 
HSI because of that fact alone, and it is a bit frustrating for 
HSI and its employees, because the only thing we are looking to 
do is work with these jurisdictions to enforce narcotics 
investigations, child exploitation, cyber, gang enforcement, 
money laundering, human smuggling, human trafficking. At the 
end of the day we are only focusing on the safety and well-
being of those particular citizens in those jurisdictions and 
the Nation as a whole. So that is a frustrating point for us in 
that regard, ma'am.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Senator Portman, I see you have 
joined the Committee. I would like to recognize you for 7 
minutes of questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN

    Senator Portman. Great. Thank you very much, Senator 
Sinema, one for having this hearing. You and Senator Lankford 
are to be commended for that. There is so much going on at the 
border and so much need for oversight. Obviously, we have had 
some terrible statistics recently. We look at the month of 
October and we had, we are told, the highest number of 
encounters with illegal immigrants in any October in the 
history of our country. So we are breaking records, it seems, 
every month. There is clearly a crisis at the border.
    I would ask quickly, if I could, and perhaps Ms. Sabatino, 
you are the right one to answer this, how many people got away? 
In other words, the so-called getaway number. If you have, say, 
164,000 people who have been apprehended or encounters, how 
many people do you think you are not finding who are coming 
across the border illegally?
    Ms. Sabatino. I do not have that number, sir. That is 
something I will have to follow up and certainly get from our 
colleagues in the Border Patrol. We do work closely with our 
colleagues in the Border Patrol to assist them with resources 
as they are available and as needed.
    Senator Portman. The estimate that they have given me is 
that they think somewhere between 15 and 20 percent on top of 
that, but I would be interested in any data you could provide 
us on that.
    Along with that, of course we had terrible numbers this 
week with regard to this issue of overdoses of people in the 
United States who are taking opioids, and when we look more 
closely at it, it turns out almost all of these opioids are 
connected to fentanyl in some way or another. Sometimes it 
might be another drug, even heroin or a non-opioid like 
cocaine, but fentanyl mixed in with it, or mixed in with a 
pill. This fentanyl is killing more and more of our American 
citizens. One hundred thousand people died of overdoses between 
April 2020 and April 2021, we were just told in the last couple 
of days.
    That number, 100,000, has never been reached before. It is 
a terrible record, and it indicates that so many Americans are 
succumbing to this fentanyl that is so deadly, that comes in 
primarily across the Mexican border. For a while it was coming 
mostly from China, and now we know it is coming mostly from 
Mexico.
    I looked at those numbers and it turns out in October we 
had a 42 percent increase in fentanyl seizures coming in over 
the border. I know that you are perhaps more focused on that, 
in some respects, because much of this comes through the ports 
of entry, actually, but a 42 percent increase in the deadliest 
drugs coming in over the Southern Border. It seems to me we 
have a national emergency here.
    Can you give us a sense of what you think the amount of 
drugs are that are coming in that are not being seized? If it 
is 42 percent increase in seizures, what is it overall?
    Ms. Sabatino. I would have to do math on the fly, sir, and 
I apologize. I am not equipped to do that. We can certainly 
follow up with estimates. We did seize, in the last fiscal 
year, over 10,000 pounds of fentanyl coming across to our ports 
of entry. Over 9,000 pounds was, in particular, at the 
Southwest Border.
    I think with the investments that we are making in 
technology, in particular the NII deployments that we are going 
to be doing over the next 18 to 24 months--and frankly not 
quick enough--it is going to help us certainly in that endeavor 
to tackle that challenge. But we also work very closely with 
our partners in HSI and other Federal Government partners, 
because the best, we can do certainly is identify these 
networks that are bringing this to our ports of entry, in deep 
concealments, in either commodities or in private vehicles 
coming across the border.
    But the continued investment in resources like canine 
assets, but also our intelligence units that we are building 
out, in conjunction with our Office of Intelligence in the 
National Capital Region to make sure that we are providing our 
frontline staff with the best available information about these 
networks, how to identify these threats, and, recent 
concealment methods.
    But I would also defer to my colleague with HSI as well, 
with respect to the investigative effort related to fentanyl.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, and look, I appreciate what you 
are doing. We have to provide more resources for technology and 
for people, and we should, and it sounds like in the next 
couple of years we will have better technology. We saw some of 
this on the border earlier this year when some of us toured.
    The technology is good but the one thing I would emphasize 
is that by allowing more of these drugs to come in across our 
Southern Border, the more drugs that are getting on the 
streets, in our communities, at a lower price. In other words, 
the increased supply is decreasing the price and making it 
easier for people to be able to afford these deadly drugs.
    So I am, for one, someone who believes strongly in dealing 
with the demand side of this, that our prevention efforts, more 
treatment. We were making progress in that, a longer-term 
recovery. We were making progress there. But unfortunately in 
the last year and a half we have seen this huge increase, and I 
think some of it is attributable to the fact that the volume is 
so high now, and the price is so relatively depressed because 
of that, that it is creating more of a problem.
    Mr. Jeronimo, do you have an answer to this question about 
if we have a 42 percent increase, if we are finding 9,000 
pounds of this stuff--which, by the way, is enough to kill 
every man, woman, and child in my home State of Ohio. It is an 
enormous amount of fentanyl, 9,000 pounds. But do you, Mr. 
Jeronimo, have a sense as to what we are missing? In other 
words, how much of these deadly substances are coming in across 
our border and not being detected?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Sir, I do not have the answer to that 
particular question, but I will tell you HSI's efforts, along 
with our partners. Last year alone, HSI seized over 40,000 
pounds of fentanyl opiates to address this issue. It starts 
internationally, and we do have a vast presence overseas, 86 
offices in 55 countries. But more importantly, we have our 
partnerships with our foreign counterparts through our 
Transnational Criminal Investigative Units (TCIUs). They are 
vetted units. That allows us to operationalize information as 
they come in.
    I mentioned earlier, to Senator Lankford, that in the last 
18 months, HSI, in partnership with CBP and DEA, we seized over 
500 kilograms of precursor chemicals coming into Mexico to be 
used by TCOs. That is 1 million pounds of precursor chemicals.
    Senator Portman. Mr. Jeronimo, were those precursors coming 
from China?
    Mr. Jeronimo. In most cases, yes, sir.
    Senator Portman. Do you have an office in China?
    Mr. Jeronimo. We do have an attach? there, sir.
    Senator Portman. Do you have an office there?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Yes, sir. We do have an attach there.
    So again, 1 million pounds of precursors. The other efforts 
that we made domestically, and I mentioned this earlier, was in 
expanding our BESTs into the mail facilities, international 
mail facilities, as well as the airports and into what I would 
consider interior States, like the State of Ohio. Our BESTs, 
our Border Security Task Force, have been traditionally along 
the Southwest Border, but we have expanded that at the 
inception of the opiate crisis, as well as focusing on the 
mechanisms for producing these pill presses.
    We have an operation called Die Another Day, which, again, 
is in partnership with CBP, DEA, and U.S. Postal Service, where 
we are focusing on the importation of pill presses that are 
being used for illicit substances and production.
    Senator Portman. Look, my time is expiring here, and again, 
I thank you for what your officers are doing on the ground and 
in foreign countries. I would just make the obvious point, you 
said that there are all sorts of precursors coming from China 
into Mexico, so China is still very involved in this, even 
though there is less coming directly from China, thanks, I 
think in large measure, to the Synthetics Trafficking and 
Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act, which this Committee passed.
    But I think we need to make a point that this poison is 
coming in in record numbers, despite all of your good efforts. 
So what do we need to do differently to be able to address this 
issue, both on the supply side and the demand side? Again, I 
thank you for what you are doing. You, by finding 9,000 pounds, 
are saving lives. There is no question about it. But we need to 
do better.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Senator Portman. I would like to 
return back to Senator Lankford for his second round of 
questions.
    Senator Lankford. Thank you. It is rare for us to have CBP 
and GSA sitting at the same table together so I want to have 
some dialogue between the three of us, if I can do that.
    There are 101 land ports of entry that GSA has custody of 
and 40 that CBP has custody of. They are in all different 
conditions, all different ages. The challenge becomes how do we 
maintain this, and why do we have ownership sometimes in GSA 
and sometimes in CBP? The last report that we got back in is if 
there are going to be major changes in a facility or a new 
facility it is about a 7-year process to be able to get in line 
to go through the process to be able to do that. If it is a 
project over $100,000 in one of those facilities, CBP cannot do 
that. GSA has to be able to do that. We have some unique 
dynamics here on how that works as a person, entity that is 
leasing or that is owning, and sometimes owning and trying to 
be able to manage that.
    My question on this is, why does the jurisdictional split, 
why is that happening, has happened? Has that just kind of 
organically grown up over the years? Is there a better way to 
be able to handle this.
    Let me just start with you, Mr. Burns. Let's start from the 
GSA perspective.
    Mr. Burns. Thank you for that question. My understanding is 
the roughly 40 buildings, facilities that are in CBP's control 
and custody are legacy. They were initially part of the group 
that CBP is, and they remained in their inventory when GSA was 
created. They are generally much smaller facilities and 
generally singular in focus, and by that I mean it is not a 
multi-tenanted facility. It does not have multiple inspection 
agencies.
    I think where GSA creates the value in the ownership is 
when we are balancing the needs of the Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration, with FDA, and with CBP, to balance all 
those needs and create a facility that suits all of their 
purposes.
    Senator Lankford. So your assumption is, at this point, if 
we have multiple agencies that come through, and obviously our 
land ports of entries do, CBP not being the owner, GSA being a 
third-party owner is a better model for that.
    Mr. Burns. I believe that is the case, yes.
    Senator Lankford. OK. Ms. Sabatino, talk to me a little bit 
about the maintenance and the upkeep and expansion, adding 
additional facilities, or just operation. How do we make this 
better?
    Ms. Sabatino. Certainly working very closely with our 
Office of Facilities and Asset Management and GSA, we can 
shorten that timeline. We are working with them to process-map 
the individual projects, to find efficiencies and set better 
deadlines. I think, some of the challenges that we face 
together is all of the other stakeholders that we have to 
engage with throughout the process, from the local, State, and 
Federal entities that are involved in some way, shape, or form 
of the upkeep or management, potentially, of a facility.
    I think from a CBP perspective, in the facilities that we 
manage and the last investments that we had back in 2009, we 
were able to do some significant modernization efforts because 
of the support of Congress for those particular locations.
    Again, continued to work, sometimes on a very case-by-case 
basis, as challenges come up, I think certainly having the 
resources to make the investments, either from GSA or from CBP 
remains a challenge. But that is why through the 5-year LPOE 
plan, where we prioritize those needs, there has been some 
delegations of authority for limited amounts that CBP can 
address challenges ourselves.
    Senator Lankford. That is the $100,000 amount?
    Ms. Sabatino. I believe that is the number, sir. It might 
be lower than that. I would have to get back to you on the 
actual amount. But those have been added value.
    I think with also the opportunities through the Donation 
Acceptance Program and our Reimbursable Services Program, the 
public-private partnership and the Donation Acceptance Program, 
in coordination with GSA, has really been a phenomenal resource 
for us as, travel and commerce growth exceeds both potentially 
GSA and CBP's resource availability to make the investments and 
grow with the pace of the private sector.
    We do have, and we appreciate your support, the Donation 
Acceptance Program. There is a sunset as of December 16th for 
the real property donations, that we are looking and hopefully 
will have addressed before that date. That is going to be very 
important to us to maintain the ability to do that as well. But 
it is an ongoing dialogue and not just at the national level, 
at the regional level and the local level on all of our 
projects.
    We do have a full assessment ongoing of all of the 167 
ports of entry that will continue through fiscal year 2023, and 
we expect to be able to provide you a completely prioritized 
portfolio of all of those ports of entry, that we are going to 
continue to work with GSA on, as well as our individually owned 
ports of entry.
    Senator Lankford. When will get that inventory?
    Ms. Sabatino. The full prioritization? We are going to be 
doing the assessments through fiscal year 2023, but certainly 
the LPOE, 5-year plan that we submit every year, captures our 
highest priorities.
    Senator Lankford. So let me tell you what I hear, because I 
have visited, over the last 7 years, a lot of different land 
ports of entry. I have had the opportunity to be able to visit 
with a lot of different folks from CBP. But what I hear 
consistently is, ``I want to do a project. There is something 
that''--whether it is plumbing, air conditioning, repainting, 
whatever it may be, they want to do it, and they turn it in to 
GSA, and GSA gets it into the list, and it takes forever to be 
able to get done, because they have a ton of other things to be 
able to get done, and it ends up being something they work 
around.
    The CBP folks will tell me, ``We would go get that done. We 
could hire a local contractor to do it if we owned the 
facilities, but we can't actually do that.'' With the $100,000 
limit they are able to do some things now to be able to get it 
done, but it ends up costing more, taking longer than what they 
want it to be able to take if CBP were able to make the 
decision to be able to manage the funds on that.
    Now that may be fair or unfair for GSA, and I want to hear 
your response on that. But I have heard that over and over and 
over again, and trying to be able to balance that out.
    Now I understand CBP is not the only entity that is in that 
facility, but it is a challenge, both with dollars that GSA has 
got to be able to manage, and very remote facilities that are 
very unique facilities. They are not office space. They are 
very unique facilities for this.
    How do we start to solve that length of time, flexibility? 
I had mentioned I think it is $100,000. You said it may be even 
less than that. I may have that number wrong, but I thought it 
was right at $100,000 of repairs that could be done. What would 
be a recommendation from GSA to either raise that threshold, 
give more flexibility? The donation program is very important 
to be able to pick up additional land and real property that 
are around it, but sometimes a redesign is going to be required 
long term, and it is a much bigger project. From GSA's 
perspective, how do we solve both the time and the flexibility 
issue for properties that are very unique in the GSA portfolio?
    Mr. Burns. I appreciate the question and the comment there. 
I do agree with you that I believe it is $100,000. I believe 
that is established in statute, that our delegation authority 
goes up to $100,000.
    When you get to projects larger than that, the ones you 
mentioned--plumbing, et cetera--generally do not have a larger 
impact on the portfolio of building that is in that facility. I 
am happy to take that back and discuss with my team how we 
might be able to expedite some of those smaller projects.
    When you get into the larger projects and larger dollar 
thresholds, sometimes those affect systems that CBP may not 
even be aware of that are part of the overall facility. That is 
why we would like to have a voice into that process.
    Also we have expertise in the other issues that need to be 
taken care of in some of those larger projects. I would point 
to environmental reviews, coordinating with historic 
preservation requirements. We have the skill and the expertise 
to handle those. I certainly appreciate your point that some of 
these smaller projects that you are hearing about--and I have 
been to the ports as well and talked with port directors so I 
am aware of that pain point and I am happy to look into that.
    Senator Lankford. I would love to be able to maintain this 
conversation, to be able to keep this going, because this is 
one that needs to be resolved. Because we cannot have a 
situation where it takes 7 years to be able to move things 
through the study phase when we have tremendous needs, and many 
of these facilities are decades and decades old and very out of 
date.
    Ms. Sabatino, for detention space at your CBP facilities, 
what is the largest area you have for detention space, for 
instance, in those locations? The maximum number of what, and 
what location might that be?
    Ms. Sabatino. Off the top of my head, sir, I do not have a 
specific, but we can provide you kind of a breakdown, I think, 
where we are challenged with capacity to hold individuals, 
because we do not have true detention.
    Senator Lankford. Yes. It is not set up for that.
    Ms. Sabatino. But to hold individuals is really driven by 
the demographic of what is in the port during the day. One or 
two family members at certain ports could fill the capacity 
that we have available. If we had all single adult males, 
certainly we could have more in a port of entry. So it is a 
number for us that fluctuates.
    Senator Lankford. But it is well below capacity from what 
real-life situation is now versus what it was 50 years ago when 
it was constructed.
    Ms. Sabatino. The current ports of entry, right. They are 
not designed for the operational needs that we have today, no.
    Senator Lankford. Even in a lot of facilities where we have 
the traffic lanes, and you have individuals that are waiting in 
line, get tired of waiting in line and they run right through 
the traffic lanes, we are not set up to be able to secure those 
traffic lanes to be able to shut down foot traffic even running 
into the middle of the cars, which is a safety issue as well as 
a security issue. Correct or not correct?
    Ms. Sabatino. That is a challenge that we have experienced, 
in particular, in the Port of San Ysidro on a recurring basis. 
But we do have measures that we take, including putting our 
officers in the primary vehicle lanes to prevent things like 
that from happening. But it also occurs in our outbound lanes.
    Senator Lankford. There are serious issues that we have to 
be able to resolve there, and I would like to have an ongoing 
dialogue, maybe off camera, at some point, to be able to help 
determine how we actually get this resolved, what the 
recommendations would be from CBP and from GSA, to try to get 
this resolved. I know the $100,000 threshold is way too low to 
be able to do a lot of different projects, to be able to 
accelerate things that are not going to be significant but do 
need to be addressed and do not need to get into a long 
queueing process to actually get done.
    But also we are going to have to deal with long-term how do 
we actually deal with the ownership issues in other places. CBP 
also has some older facilities, and they were described as 
legacy facilities, that are not just legacy facilities, they 
are falling apart. They are in very remote areas and they have 
to have some attention to them as well. And trying to figure 
out for the individuals that are working in very remote areas, 
it is very difficult for them and their families to also have 
facilities that are also well-maintained there.
    I know that is an allocation of priorities, and it is 
always going to be great if Congress will give us a little more 
money, then we can fix all of these. I understand that. But it 
is trying to be able to set those priorities. This 2023 list 
that we have coming will be very important to us in the days 
ahead as well.
    Let me ask a question about the Otay Mesa II project that 
is coming through. Do we know that Mexico is fulfilling its 
part of its responsibility at this point? There is a lot that 
is happening in the northern part of the border, but are they 
fulfilling what they have on the southern part of the border to 
also fulfill the access points coming into that new planned 
port of entry?
    Ms. Sabatino. We work very closely with our Mexican 
counterparts, and there are a number of groups that we leverage 
to ensure that the pace is kept both on the southern side of 
the border with the northern side of the border. It does not 
always come to fruition. I think with respect to the Otay East 
project, I am certainly happy to provide follow-up, regarding 
what the status and developments are on the southern side of 
the border.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Burns, do you have any other comments 
on that?
    Mr. Burns. I think that is covered. Thank you.
    Senator Lankford. OK. That would be helpful to get an 
update. The last that I saw for that particular land port of 
entry, Mexico was way behind schedule on getting this going. If 
we have everything on our side of the border ready to go and 
Mexico does not have their portion ready to go, that is not 
going to matter, and on the approach it is not going to 
actually help us in that process to be able to have everything 
ready to go north and northing is ready to go south.
    Are there other ports of entry that you are concerned about 
as far as the relationship between Mexico and the United 
States? I understand in most of our ports of entry that has 
been a very good working relationship.
    Ms. Sabatino. Certainly at the local level with our 
counterparts on the southern side of the border we do enjoy 
solid working relationships. An example, the Unified Cargo 
Processing (UCP), where we actually have employees from 
Mexico's Tax Administration Service (SAT) sitting in primary 
booths with our CBP officers, doing joint cargo processing. It 
is a phenomenal example of the coordination that we have with 
Mexico and looking for opportunities to expand because, it has 
a positive impact on the throughput that we have on both sides 
of the border.
    With respect to the different forums, we engage in a number 
of different forums, many led by the Department of State, with 
a host of other government agencies as well as all of our 
Mexican counterparts, including the Binational Bridge and 
Border Crossings committee, the Joint Working Committee on 
Transportation Planning, all different engagements that we have 
with our international partners to prioritize. Also the border 
management strategy, we are working on, I think, an updated 
plan on what the priorities are on both sides of the border, 
where we want the investments to be made.
    Those are also things that we consider in our 
decisionmaking about investments in infrastructure as well, but 
that is all the stakeholders on both sides of the border 
meeting on a regular and recurring basis.
    Senator Lankford. That is great. Madam Chair, I have one 
more question. Are you OK?
    Senator Sinema. Yes.
    Senator Lankford. Mr. Jeronimo, we deal a lot with 
transnational criminal organizations moving drugs. We have 
talked about that quite a bit. But there is also quite a bit of 
money that is being made moving people by transnational 
criminal organizations. Can you bring some clarity--I want to 
ask you a couple of questions on this--on how the coyotes, as 
they are moving individuals through Central America, up through 
Mexico, relate to transnational criminal organizations? Are 
these the same groups that are also smuggling drugs or is it 
different groups?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Sir, thank you, and it is a very good 
question. Different groups. We have some things in place 
downrange in order to address this. I think our first effort is 
from what I would call a legal entry, and that is our Visa 
Security Program (VSP), and that is in 28 countries and 41 
issuing posts. In the last 3 years we have vetted 4.6 million 
individuals through the Visa Security Program, and nearly 9,500 
of those individuals were denied access or entry into the 
United States due to terrorism nexus. So that, to me, is the 
front line pushing the border out.
    Our second effort is our biometric collection system, 
Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program 
(BITMAP). It is a partnership with the Department of Defense 
(DOD), CBP, as well as FBI. We have BITMAP locations in 18 
countries, and what that does is it gives us an opportunity to 
enroll individuals as they come into the western hemisphere and 
make their way up through South America, into Latin America, 
and into Mexico, from Sao Paulo to Macau, and that is 5,000 
miles. Once somebody enters into the western hemisphere I can 
pretty much tell you, with certainty, when that individual 
arrives and where they are going to travel through before they 
reach the Southwest Border.
    What that does is it gives us an opportunity to know in 
advance who we are dealing with, especially individuals that we 
consider known suspected terrorists (KSTs) or individuals of 
interest to the United States before they reach the Southwest 
Border. The BITMAP program, last year, enrolled 35,000 
individuals, and about 80 percent of those do make it to the 
Southwest Border.
    I had mentioned earlier our TCIUs are vetted units. That 
gives us an opportunity to operationalize or put into play 
things as far as information sharing. The vetted units have 
oversight of those BITMAP locations, so those have been very 
effective in giving some insight on who is coming up.
    Our Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) 
program is a partnership with the Department of Justice (DOJ), 
the intel community, as well as CBP. The ECT program focuses on 
human smuggling organizations that cater specifically to KSTs 
or what we call special interest citizens (SICs). Those 
organizations, again, are what we consider high level, and we 
have been very successful with that program. We have been able 
to move beyond the U.S. border and operationalize takedowns 
internationally. We have been able to effect arrests in 
different countries with the help of DOJ. So the ECT program 
has been very successful.
    In the last 2 years we have initiated over 5,000 cases and 
nearly 8,000 arrests specifically to human smuggling 
organizations.
    Senator Lankford. Eight thousand arrests in the United 
States or outside the United States?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Combined.
    Senator Lankford. OK.
    Mr. Jeronimo. So 8,000 arrests.
    Senator Lankford. Were the majority of those inside or 
outside the United States?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Inside. Outside, as well.
    The last effort is recent, and that is Joint Task Force 
Alpha, and that is with DOJ. DOJ initiated an initiative 
focusing on the Northern Triangle--El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Guatemala--specific to that. That, again, is a partnership with 
CBP and DOJ focusing again on organizations that are catering 
to that particular problem set. DOJ has identified about 25 HSI 
cases that they have considered top priority for that.
    So again, we are fighting the good fight in regard to human 
smuggling and trafficking, sir.
    Senator Lankford. What is the current going rate for 
coyotes in moving a person or a family?
    Mr. Jeronimo. It depends on location. If you are coming 
from Asia it could be anywhere from $50,000 to $75,000. If you 
are coming from Brazil it could be $10,000 to $15,000. If you 
are coming from Latin America, Mexico, anywhere from $5,000 to 
$10,000.
    Senator Lankford. Are you picking up any other trends on 
the trafficking of individuals coming in and from the coyotes 
as they are moving? Anything that is changing? I know it is 
always changing, but any new trends?
    Mr. Jeronimo. Nothing, sir, to report.
    Senator Lankford. We have seen before, with areas like when 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was announced, 
the coyotes used that moment to be able to work families in 
Central America and say, ``If you get your kids to America they 
are going to become citizens right now.'' That was not what was 
announced by the Obama Administration but that is what the 
coyotes told people. And so we had that enormous surge that 
came during that time period.
    We had another enormous surge, which has not really slowed, 
during the Biden administration, with individuals that have 
been told who knows what from Central America and other 
countries as they are being told by coyotes. When there is an 
announcement that individuals may be paid up to $450,000 if 
they were separated from the border, do you have reports yet of 
coyotes using that kind of information, from where there is 
leaked information now that there could be payments from the 
Federal Government to individuals that were illegally crossing 
in the last 4 years of $450,000, though I understand the Biden 
administration has argued with that number. They have not 
argued with that policy or denied that that policy is actually. 
They just said that number is not there. I am not going to ask 
you to verify that number. You would not know.
    But are you getting reports of people actually using that, 
saying if you come now and you are separated you may get a 
payment?
    Mr. Jeronimo. No, sir. We have not received any type of 
intelligence specific to that.
    Senator Lankford. Terrific. I hope we never do. But we will 
see a lot of other incentives and a lot of things that have 
been twisted around in the past on this.
    Madam Chair, thank you for the additional time to be able 
to pummel them with some additional questions on this. I 
appreciate that very much.
    Senator Sinema. They appear to have done just fine.
    Thank you, Senator Lankford, and thank you to our 
witnesses. With that we have reached the end of today's 
hearing, and I appreciate all of you for your time and your 
testimony. I want to thank all of my colleagues for their 
participation. This is an important subject, and I look forward 
to working with my colleagues to improves security, travel, and 
trade at our ports of entry.
    Today's hearing record will remain open for 2 weeks, until 
December 2, 2021, and that is when questions for the record are 
also due.
    Thanks again. We are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

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