[Senate Hearing 117-113]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                        S. Hrg. 117-113

                         U.S. POLICY ON TURKEY

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                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              JULY 21, 2021

                               __________


       Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
       
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                  Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
                  
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
46-375 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2021                     
          
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                 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS        

             ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman        
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland         JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire        MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware       RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut      MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia                  ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts      RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey           JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii                 TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland           MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
                                     BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
                 Jessica Lewis, Staff Director        
        Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director        
                    John Dutton, Chief Clerk        



                              (ii)        

  
                         C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S

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                                                                   Page

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey..............     1

Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho....................     3

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political 
  Affairs, Washington, DC........................................     5
    Prepared Statement...........................................     7

              Additional Material Submitted for the Record

Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Robert Menendez........................................    26

Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator James E. Risch.........................................    26

Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Benjamin L. Cardin.....................................    31

Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Edward J. Markey.......................................    33

Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by 
  Senator Ted Cruz...............................................    34

                                 (iii)

  
 
                       U.S. POLICY ON TURKEY

                              ----------                              


                                        WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:20 a.m. in 
room SD-G50, Hon. Bob Menendez, chairman of the committee, 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Coons, 
Murphy, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young, 
Barrasso, Cruz, and Hagerty.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 
                  U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

    The Chairman. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come 
to order.
    Let us start with the very recent developments from the 
region. Yesterday, President Erdogan visited illegally-occupied 
Cyprus and announced a plan to develop the seaside town of 
Varosha.
    Over the years, I have met with Greek Cypriots who had to 
evacuate Varosha in 1974, fleeing the invading Turkish army for 
safety. Many of them ended up emigrating to the United States.
    Forty-seven years following the invasion, their stories 
remain harrowing, a daily reminder of those terrible days in 
1974. For years, many in the international community, including 
President Biden himself, have supported a peace process which 
would establish a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the 
island. Erdogan's visit cast these efforts aside, as well as 
long-standing U.N. resolutions on Varosha.
    His goal is to advance a separate state on the island of 
Cyprus. Simply put, this violation of international law is 
unacceptable, and I expect to hear from the undersecretary 
today a plan on how the Biden administration will respond.
    I led a letter with several members on this committee to 
the President last week. Erdogan's actions are not simply about 
Cyprus, but mark a crucial test for the U.N. system and the 
U.S. response.
    We need to see a strong statement from the U.N. Security 
Council today condemning this move.
    Unfortunately, this pattern of Turkish aggression across 
the region has become the norm. Last summer, Erdogan provided 
military support to Azerbaijani strikes against ethnic 
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. He also facilitated the passage 
of militants from Syria to fight on the side of Azerbaijan.
    Yet, these actions elicited no penalty from the Trump 
administration, no concrete reaction from the international 
community, no sanction.
    This is unacceptable, and I expect more from this 
administration than I did the last and I look forward to 
understanding how the department views Turkey's role in last 
year's war and what measures can be taken in response.
    I appreciate the excellent work done by the Biden 
administration in reestablishing our rock-solid bond with NATO. 
It is the most powerful alliance in the history of the world 
and an absolutely essential pillar of U.S. national security.
    So when Turkey, as a NATO member, introduces a Russian S-
400 air defense system into its territory, it poses a 
significant threat to NATO. It poses a significant threat to 
U.S. pilots. It poses a significant threat to our partners.
    Under no circumstances will I support the lifting of CAATSA 
sanctions if the S-400 remains in Turkey, nor would I support 
Turkey rejoining the F-35 program.
    I am proud of the role played by Congress to advance these 
sanctions and ensure their implementation. The message should 
be clear. Any effort to weaken NATO from within or outside will 
be met by a robust response by the United States.
    In Syria, the United States and Turkey remain at cross 
purposes through multiple military interventions, some of which 
were directly green lighted by the previous administration.
    Turkey has created several zones of control in northern 
Syria that encompass 4,000 square miles, roughly, the size of 
Lebanon, and contain 4 million people, equivalent to the 
population of Croatia.
    While these areas provide safe haven for millions of 
Syrians displaced from government-controlled areas, they have 
done so at a horrific cost to the local Kurdish population, who 
have endured forced displacement and kidnappings, unlawful 
detention and torture, illegal property seizures and numerous 
other human rights violations at the hands of Turkish-backed 
opposition forces.
    Beyond the considerable human rights concerns, these 
actions directly undermine the United States' counterterrorism 
partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces in our shared 
fight against the Islamic State. This is also unacceptable.
    President Erdogan has publicly asked President Biden for 
greater cooperation with Turkey and Syria. It is paramount that 
the administration provide the committee with greater clarity 
concerning how it is addressing Turkey's role in the numerous 
human rights violations committed in northern Syria, and the 
conditions it will apply to any enhanced cooperation with 
Ankara in this regard.
    In Libya, despite the successful creation of a unity 
government after years of conflict, Turkey continues to 
maintain thousands of Syrian mercenaries, the presence of 
which, along with Russian-backed foreign fighters, threatens 
both the country's upcoming elections as well as its fragile 
peace.
    Turkey has capitalized with the vulnerability of Libya's 
previous Government to extract a maritime border agreement that 
is in direct conflict with U.S. interests in the eastern 
Mediterranean, and violates Greece and Cyprus' internationally 
recognized maritime boundaries and rights.
    These are not the actions of a constructive partner, let 
alone a NATO ally. Erdogan sees his country as on par with the 
great powers of the world. It is not.
    President Erdogan has, tragically, shredded its democratic 
institutions, imprisoned journalists. He has targeted his 
political opposition for arrest and sought to silence 
university professors.
    To say that more lawyers and journalists are arrested and 
in jail in Turkey than in any other place in the world is 
saying something, considering some of those other places in the 
world.
    These are the actions of a weak government, not a world 
power, and we should treat it as such. This treatment extends 
to United States embassy and consulate staff in the country. To 
this day, several individuals remain in prison on trumped up 
charges. It is disgraceful.
    The under secretary, I am sure, will agree that the U.S. 
embassy staff should never be treated this way anywhere, 
especially by a so-called ally. So I look forward to hearing an 
update on their status in our efforts to secure their freedom.
    We all hope for a day when Turkey embodies a high standard 
of democratic values and respect for human rights expected from 
a NATO member. The region and the world needs a stable and 
democratic Turkey. Under Erdogan, such a future is but a dim 
hope.
    I look forward to the undersecretary's views on these and 
other issues and we appreciate your appearance before the 
committee.
    With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking 
member, Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.

               STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, 
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    One of the clear takeaways from this hearing is going to be 
that there is bipartisan agreement on the many issues that we 
have with Turkey.
    Turkey is a center of a complex and important geopolitical 
crossroads. It is where Europe, Asia, and the Middle East meet 
and it borders the increasingly important Mediterranean and 
Black Seas.
    First and foremost in this hearing we must discuss the 
direct bilateral relationship between the United States and 
Turkey, which, of course, the chairman has already done, I am 
going to add to, and at a deeper level, the role our 
relationship plays in the eastern Mediterranean and across the 
region. Turkey is deeply interconnected and, of course, we must 
deal with them.
    Before delving into the problems, I have to say how painful 
this is. Turkey has been a long-time ally of the United States 
and of our European partners. Obviously, they are a NATO ally, 
even though they are not acting like a NATO ally at this time.
    Nonetheless, they are in the NATO alliance, and it is very 
painful to see the country deteriorate as it has deteriorated 
and left the commitments that we, all of the NATO partners, 
have had to the values and things that we value in NATO.
    The most pressing aspect of our relationship is Turkey's 
acquisition and continued use of the Russian S-400 missile 
system. This issue remains at an impasse and has now grown to 
define the most significant part of our relationship, and it is 
deeply troubling.
    It is unacceptable that Turkey believes it can reap the 
benefits of NATO membership while refusing to commit to the 
basic principle of a cohesive interoperable alliance.
    They seem to have forgotten that NATO was formed 
specifically to push back against Russian aggression. Dealing 
with them on military purchases like this is just simply 
unacceptable.
    This is an issue I raise with Turkish leaders at every 
opportunity. Indeed, I had a very clear discussion with 
President Erdogan in person, face to face, where I laid out the 
precise nature of the problems created and caused by the 
presence of Russian-made S-400s on the soil of a NATO ally.
    He understood, but persisted. This issue will not go away, 
and it greatly affects our overall relationship on several 
fronts when it comes to NATO matters, including the F-35s.
    Speaking of the F-35s, after our conversation he understood 
clearly that even though they have paid for five of them, the 
five have been completed and are sitting here in the United 
States. Those F-35s will not be delivered to Turkey so long as 
there are S-400 missiles on Turkish soil.
    The same with the construction of parts for the F-35. There 
were 900 parts for the F-35 being produced in Turkey. That is 
down to a very minimal amount right now, and will eventually be 
completely phased out.
    Ending on a positive note, first of all, Erdogan has 
appointed a new ambassador to the United States. This 
ambassador is very engaging and says, and I believe, that he 
wants to do his best to attempt to repair what is, obviously, a 
deteriorating relationship.
    I hope he is successful in that regard.
    Turkey's recent agreement to withdraw its mercenaries from 
Libya also shows it has the capacity for responsible 
stabilization through diplomacy. It remains to be seen whether 
they follow through on this commitment and it is important that 
we ensure that they do.
    Likewise, Turkey deserves international recognition for 
hosting millions of Syrian refugees for the past several years.
    We must take a clear-eyed look at our relationship with 
Turkey. We can appreciate and encourage the good while clearly 
condemning the bad. I expect our discussions today will help us 
define these matters and develop a better understanding of how 
to address them in this emerging era.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
    We will now turn to the Under Secretary of State for 
Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland. We welcome you back to the 
committee. We look forward to hearing the administration's 
views on our policy vis-a-vis Turkey, moving forward.
    I would ask that you summarize your remarks in about 5 
minutes or so to allow time for a dialogue with you. Without 
objection, your full statement will be included in the record, 
and you are now recognized.
    Madam Secretary.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
          STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC

    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 
Risch, distinguished members of this committee for the 
invitation to come before you to discuss U.S.-Turkey relations 
today.
    As the committee knows well, and as you have both stated, 
the United States has a multifaceted and complex relationship 
with Turkey, a NATO ally for over 68 years.
    There are areas where we are firmly aligned in policy and 
outlook and working well together. There are areas where we do 
not see eye to eye and are working to close those gaps and 
there are areas where we have profound disagreements with the 
Turkish Government, including with regard to Cyprus yesterday.
    In these last two categories, President Biden and all of us 
who work for him are frank with our Turkish counterparts when 
we disagree, as are Turkish officials with us.
    To start with the areas of strong cooperation, Turkey makes 
crucial contributions to NATO missions around the world, and 
our partnership with Turkey, which has the second largest 
standing military in NATO, enables us to project power in the 
region and defend NATO's eastern and southern flanks.
    We also have an important economic relationship with 
Turkey, one that generates upwards of $20 billion in annual 
bilateral trade, including an increasing energy and LNG 
relationship.
    Washington and Ankara share priorities in countering 
terrorism, deterring Russian and Iranian malign influence in 
the Middle East, and Turkey is a staunch supporter of Ukraine 
and Georgia's territorial integrity and vocally supports their 
accession to NATO.
    In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in 
supporting the Libyan-led U.N.-facilitated political process 
including the prospect of elections on December 24 of this 
year, and we are now discussing how to reduce the presence of 
foreign fighters and mercenaries before the election.
    In Syria, as both of you have mentioned, Turkey's presence 
in the northwest protects some 4 million Syrians from 
indiscriminate targeting by the Assad regime.
    New attacks there would be both a humanitarian catastrophe 
and likely launch a new wave of refugees into Turkey and 
Europe.
    We are also grateful for Turkey's ongoing efforts to 
support 4 million refugees inside Turkey, making Turkey the 
largest refugee-hosting country in the world. Most recently, 
Turkey has expressed interest in maintaining a robust force at 
Kabul's airport, as the U.S. and NATO military missions in 
Afghanistan come to an end.
    This contribution, as you all know, is vital to ensuring 
that we and our allies and partners can maintain a strong 
diplomatic presence in Kabul after our troops withdraw.
    Even as we work closely on these issues, President Biden 
has been clear with President Erdogan when we disagree, as have 
all of us.
    We continue to object to Turkey's purchase and deployment 
of the Russian S-400 air defense system and have made clear 
that any new major arms purchases from Russia will trigger 
additional CAATSA sanctions. As you both said, the sale and co-
production of the F-35 will remain suspended.
    We also press Turkey to avoid entanglements and regional 
conflicts that threaten long-term stability. The role played by 
third parties, including Turkey, in last year's fighting in 
Nagorno-Karabakh exacerbated regional tensions, and we have 
pressed Turkey to press Baku to release all detainees 
immediately, to support a ceasefire, and to help the sides work 
towards a sustainable long-term political solution.
    We also urge Turkey's leaders to address disagreements in 
the region through diplomacy rather than through provocative 
action or rhetoric. We condemn yesterday's announcement by 
Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and Turkish President Erdogan, 
which would allow Turkish Cypriots to take control of parts of 
Varosha.
    This move is inconsistent with U.N. Security Council 
Resolutions 550 and 7089, which explicitly call for Varosha to 
be administered by the United Nations.
    The United States views this action as provocative, 
unacceptable, and detrimental to the prospects for the 
resumption of settlement talks.
    We are urging a reversal of this decision, including in a 
phone call that I made to Ankara this morning, and we are 
working with like-minded partners in the U.N. Security Council.
    A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the 
island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is the only path 
to lasting peace and stability.
    President Biden has also made clear that supporting 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is central to his 
administration, and protecting those freedoms is critical for 
Turkey to be a stable and democratic and reliable ally and 
partner.
    We have been clear at all levels with the Turkish 
Government and in the department's annual Human Rights Report 
about our specific concerns, and we will continue to engage the 
Turkish Government on individual human rights cases, media 
freedom, freedom of expression, assembly, and association, 
judicial independence, and fair trial guarantees.
    In this regard, as you said, Mr. Chairman, a top concern 
remains the release of local employees of U.S. Mission Turkey 
who have been unjustly detained.
    Overall, we are working to try to resolve these concerns 
and advance our agenda through robust and regular engagement at 
all levels with Turkish counterparts, and with candor and 
clarity in those discussions.
    I would like to make one final point, if I may, before 
taking your questions.
    I know that this committee is exploring how to expedite 
consideration of more than 20 State Department senior political 
appointees and ambassadors in the weeks before the August 
recess, and you have recently noticed some additional hearings.
    We are very grateful for this effort, and I just want to 
underscore that the strength of American diplomacy and the 
department's role in the policy process will be greatly 
enhanced by moving these nominees expeditiously to full Senate 
confirmation before the recess.
    Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Victoria Nuland

    Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of 
the Committee, thank you for the invitation to discuss the U.S.-Turkish 
relationship. We welcome the Committee's engagement on Turkey and the 
Eastern Mediterranean, and we want to work together to advance U.S. 
interests and values in this region and beyond.
    As this Committee knows well, the United States has a multi-faceted 
and complex relationship with Turkey, a NATO Ally for over 68 years. 
There are areas where we are firmly aligned in policy and outlook and 
working well together; there are areas where we don't see eye-to-eye 
and we are working to close the gaps; and there are areas where we have 
profound disagreements with the Turkish Government, including with 
regard to Cyprus yesterday. In these last two categories, President 
Biden and all of us who work for him are frank with our Turkish 
counterparts when we disagree, as are Turkish officials with us.
    To start with areas of strong cooperation, Turkey makes crucial 
contributions to NATO missions around the world. Our partnership with 
Turkey--which has the second largest standing military in NATO--enables 
us to project power in the region and defend NATO's eastern and 
southern flanks.
    The United States also has an important economic relationship with 
Turkey, one that generates upwards of $20 billion in annual bilateral 
trade. Roughly 1,700 U.S. companies operate in Turkey and 60 firms 
maintain regional headquarters in the country. U.S. liquified natural 
gas exports to Turkey increased 305 percent between 2019 and 2020, a 
trend that if continued, will diversify Turkey's sources of natural gas 
supply and reduce reliance on pipeline gas from Russia and Iran. Since 
January, Turkey and Greece have also resumed exploratory talks on 
energy and other issues. Resource development in the Eastern 
Mediterranean should promote cooperation and provide a foundation for 
durable energy security and economic prosperity throughout the region.
    Washington and Ankara share priorities in countering terrorism and 
deterring Russian and Iranian malign influence in the Middle East. 
Turkey is a staunch supporter of Ukraine's and Georgia's territorial 
integrity and vocally supports their accession to NATO.
    In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in supporting 
the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process, including elections 
on December 24 this year. And we are discussing how to reduce the 
presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before the 
elections.
    In Syria, Turkey's presence in the northwest protects some 4 
million Syrians from indiscriminate targeting by the Assad regime; new 
attacks there would be both a humanitarian catastrophe and likely 
launch a new wave of refugees into Turkey and Europe. We are also 
grateful for Turkey's ongoing efforts to support the 4 million 
refugees, including 3.6 million Syrians, making Turkey the largest 
refugee-hosting country in the world.
    Most recently, Turkey has expressed interest in maintaining a 
robust force at Kabul's airport as the U.S. and NATO military missions 
in Afghanistan come to an end. This contribution is vital to ensuring 
we and our Allies and partners can maintain a strong diplomatic 
presence in Kabul after our troops withdraw. Following discussions 
between Presidents Biden and Erdogan at the NATO summit last month, 
technical teams on both sides are working together to finalize this 
critical arrangement.
    Even as we work closely with Ankara on these issues, President 
Biden has been clear with President Erdogan when we disagree, as have 
all members of our team with their counterparts. We continue to object 
to Turkey's purchase and deployment of the Russian S-400 air defense 
system and have made clear that any new major arms purchases from 
Russia risk triggering additional CAATSA sanctions. Sale and co-
production of the F-35 will remain suspended.
    We also press Turkey to avoid entanglements in regional conflicts 
that threaten long-term stability. The role played by third parties, 
including Turkey, in last year's fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict exacerbated regional tensions. We have pressed Turkey to urge 
Baku to release all detainees immediately, to support the ceasefire 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and to help the sides work towards a 
sustainable, long-term political solution to the conflict.
    We also urge Turkey's leader to address disagreements in the region 
through diplomacy, rather than through provocative actions or rhetoric. 
We condemn yesterday's announcement by Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and 
Turkish President Erdogan to allow Turkish Cypriots to take control of 
parts of Varosha. This move is inconsistent with U.N. Security Council 
resolutions 550 and 789, which explicitly call for Varosha to be 
administered by the United Nations. The United States views this action 
as provocative, unacceptable, and detrimental to the prospects for the 
resumption of settlement talks. We are urging a reversal of this 
decision and are working with like-minded partners in the U.N. Security 
Council. A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the island 
as a bizonal, bicommunal federation is the only path to lasting peace 
and stability.
    President Biden has also made clear that supporting democracy, 
human rights, and the rule of law is a central priority for his 
administration. Protecting these freedoms is critical for Turkey to be 
a stable, democratic, and reliable Ally and partner. We have been clear 
with all levels of the Turkish Government, and in the Department's 
annual Human Rights Report, about our specific concerns. The President 
expressed his disappointment over Turkey's recent withdrawal from the 
Istanbul Convention on preventing violence against women, and the 
administration has continued to urge the Turkish Government to support 
gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. We will 
continue to engage the Turkish Government on individual human rights 
cases; media freedom; freedom of expression, assembly, and association; 
and judicial independence and fair trial guarantees. In this regard a 
top concern remains the release of local employees of U.S. Mission 
Turkey who have been unjustly detained.
    We believe the best way to resolve these concerns and advance our 
agenda is through robust and regular engagement at all levels, and by 
candor and clarity with our Turkish counterparts. The administration 
welcomes the opportunity to stay in close coordination with this 
Committee and others in Congress on all these issues. We would also 
welcome regular direct engagement by Members with Turkish leaders and 
Congressional visits to Ankara, as conditions allow.
    I would like to make one final point about the national security 
imperative of having our Senate-confirmed team of Department senior 
leaders and Ambassadors in place as soon as possible. I was pleased to 
see the President's announcement of your former colleague, Senator 
Flake, as the nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, and look forward 
to the Committee's consideration of him. I know the Committee is 
exploring how to expedite consideration of more than 20 other nominees 
in the weeks ahead of the August recess. We are grateful for this 
effort, and I just want to underscore that the strength of American 
diplomacy and the Department's role in the policy process will be 
greatly enhanced by moving these nominees expeditiously to full Senate 
confirmation before the recess.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

    The Chairman. Well, thank you.
    We will start a round of 5 minutes of questions, and I will 
just say on your last point, I totally embrace that. We are 
marching forward rather aggressively. We had a panel of three 
under-secretaries yesterday and have more. Senator Risch and I 
have just agreed on some for next week.
    I think the administration's challenge is on the Senate 
floor, not before this committee, and I know that Senator Cruz 
has taken the view that he is going to hold up nominees over 
the Nord Stream pipeline issue, and I respect both his 
prerogatives as well as the question of Nord Stream.
    I just think it is detrimental to the United States not to 
have its people on the ground in order to make the case and 
promote U.S. interests, and we hope we can come to a resolution 
in that regard.
    So let me start. Do I have your commitment that CAATSA 
sanctions will remain in place on Turkey if it continues to 
possess the Russian S-400 air defenses?
    Ms. Nuland. You do, Mr. Chairman, and not only my 
commitment, but the President.
    The Chairman. Does the administration maintain a commitment 
to full implementation of Section 231 of CAATSA not only in 
Turkey but for that fact around the world?
    Ms. Nuland. We do.
    The Chairman. Can I get your commitment to brief me if 
there is any effort within the interagency to weaken or in any 
way diminish the use of CAATSA 231 in Turkey or anywhere else?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Now, as mentioned, Turkey now insists on a two-state 
solution in Cyprus. While our Government has rejected the 
notion at the highest level, I have seen some lower level 
officials at the State Department have been quoted talking 
about Turkish Cypriot ``sovereignty.''
    Can you affirm that the United States rejects the notion of 
two states?
    Ms. Nuland. Absolutely. As I said in my statement, we think 
only a Cypriot-led process bi-zonal bi-communal will bring 
peace and stability in Cyprus.
    The Chairman. Are we working to ensure that there will be a 
U.N. resolution on Varosha?
    Ms. Nuland. We are, and we had consultations yesterday in 
the U.N., and those will continue until we have a product.
    The Chairman. Is Turkey establishing a drone base in 
occupied Cyprus?
    Ms. Nuland. Sir, I am personally not aware of that, but I 
will take a look at it.
    The Chairman. I would like you to. My information is that 
they are. Then the question of if they are then what are the 
implications of such a move for the Republic of Cyprus, which 
is part of the European Union, but others in the region, like 
Israel and Egypt, for example.
    Ms. Nuland. It would, obviously, be destabilizing? So let 
me take that for review.
    The Chairman. We are agreed.
    Over the past year, Turkey has violated Greek airspace and 
acted aggressively in the Cypriot-exclusive economic zone. This 
has been happening in two EU member states. Last year, Brussels 
considered sanctions in response to this behavior, but, 
ultimately, decided against strong measures.
    Are you familiar with what role the United States played in 
the European sanctions debate?
    Ms. Nuland. I am not familiar with how we would have played 
inside the EU conversation. I am familiar with the fact that we 
encouraged both Greece and Turkey to have bilateral talks.
    We also encouraged the Secretary General of NATO to become 
involved in trying to mediate this dispute, as has been the 
case over many decades, and that the situation has calmed 
somewhat.
    The Chairman. Are you aware of U.S. efforts to dissuade the 
EU from imposing sanctions?
    Ms. Nuland. I am not familiar with that. That does not 
sound right to me.
    The Chairman. So let me just say, and I just heard your 
response to the question before. I appreciate--we call on, in 
many cases, both countries to act appropriately.
    The problem with that is when both countries are doing 
something wrong, I get it. When only one country is doing 
something wrong, it is a little disingenuous. As far as I know, 
Greece is not making incursions into Turkish airspace.
    The Turks are doing that to Greece. They do it in the 
territorial waters of Greece. They seek to drill in the 
territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus.
    So we cannot be calling on both sides to, ultimately, try 
to negotiate in good faith when one is the aggressor, and I 
think we make a huge mistake when we do not acknowledge who is 
the aggressor in a certain set of actions.
    Let me ask you, are you familiar with Turkey facilitating 
the transfer of fighters from Syria to Azerbaijan during the 
2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh?
    Ms. Nuland. I think it would be appropriate on that last 
point to discuss it in a separate session, if that is 
acceptable to you, Mr. Chairman, in another setting.
    The Chairman. All right. Well, as part of that, I will be 
looking forward to hearing from the department on whether you 
investigated any of the Turkish drones used by Azerbaijan in 
the war last summer that included U.S.-produced component 
parts, which I find totally unacceptable.
    Do you support full--do you meaning the department, of 
course--support full implementation of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, the law that 
I helped write with Senator Rubio and members of this 
committee, for the establishment of a regional energy center to 
help deepen energy cooperation in the region and to deal both 
on security and renewable technologies?
    Ms. Nuland. We do, and we have been engaged with the 
individual parties to try to encourage more coordination in 
that regard. It is one of the success stories of recent period.
    The Chairman. Finally, because I want to go to other 
colleagues, the Council of Europe judicial arm of the European 
Court of Human Rights ordered Turkey to immediately release 
civil society leader Osman Kavala and Kurdish politician 
Selahattin Demirtas from prison. What is the administration 
doing to advocate for both of the individuals' release?
    Ms. Nuland. We have advocated directly for their release as 
well as other political prisoners and as well as appropriate 
treatment of media and other unjustly prosecuted individuals in 
Turkey, and we will continue to do so and we do that at every 
level.
    The Chairman. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    How does State assess Turkey's continued commitment to the 
S-400? I think a lot of us have been incredibly clear with them 
of the consequences, and my sense is they did not really think 
we would follow through on things like CAATSA.
    My sense also is that they have come to the realization 
that we are serious about this and that it is not going to go 
away. Do you share that assessment, and what other thoughts 
might you have in that regard?
    Ms. Nuland. As I said, Mr. Ranking Member, when I came up 
for my confirmation hearing, it is incomprehensible to me, 
personally, and to most of us why a NATO ally would want to 
acquire a Russian system and put at risk all of the things that 
have been put at risk, including co-production of the F-35, 
which was not only a security benefit but it was also of 
economic benefit to Turkey.
    So I think that you may have your finger on it, that they 
walked into this or were romanced into this by the seller 
without expecting that the costs would be as high as they have 
been, and it is uncomfortable for them that they are as high as 
they have been.
    We continue to offer them various ways and off ramps out of 
this, including in our most recent highest level encounter, and 
we will continue to have that conversation. As we said, there 
are many things we cannot do together that we would like to do 
together while this goes forward.
    Senator Risch. Well, as you and I have discussed a number 
of times, it is mind boggling that they have gone down the road 
they have gone down, and particularly when they have been 
offered the clear off ramps that they have been offered, which, 
obviously, we cannot talk about publicly completely.
    This is really disconcerting, and the good news is, is I 
think that one of the things, I think, might have pushed it 
over the edge is the fact that I do not think that they thought 
we would take away those 900 parts that they were co-producing 
for the F-35.
    We have done so and I think that is a very significant 
economic matter for them, and it is totally in their hands that 
that happened.
    Turning for a minute to the agreement that we all know 
about the mess that is going on in Libya, and Turkey and Russia 
have both played a part in making it messier.
    They now have announced that they have reached this 
tentative agreement to withdraw the foreign troops and 
mercenaries from Libya. What is State's assessment, your 
assessment, as to whether or not that will actually come to 
fruition? These agreements are easy to make, hard to execute. 
What are your thoughts?
    Ms. Nuland. You are not wrong about that, Senator Risch. 
Both Turkey at the highest level and Russia at the highest 
level have said that they are willing to support the withdrawal 
of mercenary forces, but they want to do it in tandem with each 
other.
    We are working with the current U.N. envoy, Mr. Kubish, on 
how that might work, a synchronized withdrawal, and we are 
hopeful for progress on that well before the election at the 
end of the year.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. I am going to yield back since we 
have got a vote going on and others want to ask questions.
    The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, 
for holding this important hearing.
    I want to thank you, Under Secretary Nuland, not only for 
your service now and your presence and testimony here, but for 
your long service to our nation. I very much appreciate it.
    Under Secretary, you cited the very complex relationship 
that exists with Turkey. I think both the chairman and the 
ranking member have also done a great job of highlighting some 
of the issues that are associated with our critical strategic 
relationship with this nation.
    We have an alliance that has existed for many, many years 
between Turkey and United States, and Turkey plays a critical 
role in NATO, one that we need to continue to preserve and 
support.
    There are serious problems, as have been noted, in many 
dimensions in terms of Turkey's current behavior. If you think 
about the arrest of U.S. Government local employees in Turkey, 
the S-400 program that both the ranking member and the chairman 
have been so articulate about.
    Turkey's purchase of Russian assets like that are very 
disturbing, as you know, to all of us, their crackdown on 
journalists and the friction that exists when their forces 
collide with our activity in Syria to fight against ISIS. It is 
a complex relationship, as you say.
    I share the ranking member's optimism that our new 
ambassador from Turkey will take a new approach. I had the 
privilege of serving in Japan with him when I served as U.S. 
ambassador to Japan.
    So I share the optimism that Ranking Member Risch noted 
with our new Turkish ambassador to the United States. I hope 
you will have a good working relationship with him as well.
    I would be very curious, and this is a process question 
really, curious as to your approach in terms of having a 
structured strategic dialogue with Turkey, trying to preserve 
the good and important strategic aspects of what needs to 
happen there while pressing hard against Ankara on those issues 
where we will certainly differ and need to be strong against. I 
would appreciate just your perspective a bit, Under Secretary, 
on how you will approach that.
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Hagerty.
    Well, I think we approach this very much as President Biden 
approaches all of our strategic relationships, which is to 
engage, engage, engage at every level, and to work together on 
as many things as we can but to be absolutely frank when we 
disagree, and I think you saw that when he and President 
Erdogan met on the margins of the NATO summit about a month 
ago.
    Prior to that, we had had Deputy Secretary Sherman in 
Ankara, one of her first overseas trips, to engage at all 
levels. I am now speaking probably every 2 weeks with my 
Turkish counterpart.
    We have the excellent David Satterfield as our ambassador 
on the ground and the Honorable Senator Flake in the chute to 
succeed him, Senate willing, in the future.
    Our process here is to talk about every single issue with 
as much frequency and as much candor as we can and try to close 
the gaps, and when we cannot close the gaps to be clear that we 
will call it as we see it, as we did yesterday on Varosha. I 
think you saw that pretty tough statement.
    Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that approach and that 
perspective, and to the extent that this committee can be 
helpful to you in any aspect of that, know that, certainly, I 
stand ready to be supportive.
    I would like to pick up on something that Chairman Menendez 
also mentioned, too, and that is the role--again, a process 
question--but the role that you feel we could play in helping 
address disputes like that that exists between Turkey and 
Greece.
    If you think about their entire posture in the eastern 
Mediterranean, what role do you think the United States can 
play in a constructive manner to help address that with our 
allies?
    Ms. Nuland. Well, the good news, Senator, is that Greece 
and Turkey have been back in talks, particularly on the 
maritime situation, since January, and they are meeting with 
pretty regular frequency. So we have encouraged those and we 
support them from our platforms in both Athens and Ankara.
    We also have encouraged the secretary general of NATO, as I 
said earlier, to be active with both Greece and Turkey to 
provide them a safe space to work through their issues and, 
particularly, as the chairman said, when there are incursions 
into airspace that are unacceptable.
    One thing I cut out of my statement for length, but it is 
in the longer statement, we do encourage, as you all get back 
into the travel business, to consider stops in Ankara and 
Athens, ideally in a bipartisan way to talk frankly about both 
what is going well and the issues where we have to do better.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you for your leadership, Under 
Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murphy [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
    In Senator Menendez's absence, I will recognize myself as 
next in line for questioning.
    Good to see you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for joining us 
today. I wanted to dig a little bit deeper into the dangerous 
slide away from democracy in Turkey.
    In June, Turkey's Constitutional Court ordered that the 
country's main pro-Kurdish party, the HDP, go on trial over 
alleged links to Kurdish fighters.
    Now, the Kurds are Turkey's largest ethnic minority and the 
HDP has grown sort of so successful and so popular that it 
briefly helped end Erdogan's ruling AKP parliamentary majority 
for the first time in over a decade.
    The State Department has said that these attempts to, 
essentially, eradicate the HDP from Turkey's political 
infrastructure would ``further undermine'' democracy.
    Can you talk a little bit more about whether the State 
Department has directly engaged with the Turkish Government on 
this issue and what steps can we take, both the executive and 
legislative branch, to try to make sure that the upcoming 
elections in 2023 are fair and that there is a robust multi-
party system that is not undermined to the point of futility 
between now and those elections?
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
    We share your concerns about the treatment of the HDP. I 
know that there are members of this committee who have 
relationships with some of those members.
    Obviously, it is important and it goes to the conversation 
we had with Senator Hagerty about the value that we see in 
members of this committee and other leaders in the Congress 
making regular trips to Ankara and showing support for 
political leaders across the spectrum, particularly those who 
are under particular pressure.
    This issue is very much part of our larger concern about 
the human rights situation in Turkey, which we are very frank 
about from the highest level onward, that respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, upholding fair trial guarantees, 
judicial independence, freedom of association, freedom of 
political practice, are central to any thriving democracy.
    Our view is very much the same as yours, that Turkey 
weakens itself when it does not uphold these fundamental 
freedoms, and particularly in the area of political pluralism.
    Senator Murphy. Let me maybe ask this civic question. What 
would be the impact of banning the largest Kurdish political 
party?
    What would be the impact on the upcoming elections, and is 
there any justification on our mind for such a sweeping measure 
as necessary to continue what is a legitimate interest that the 
Turkish Government has on cracking down on Kurdish-affiliated 
terrorism that still does pose a legitimate threat to the 
security of the country?
    Ms. Nuland. When legitimate terrorism cases can be made in 
a free and transparent manner with access to independent 
judicial process and all of that, obviously, it is in our 
interest and Turkey's interest to take action.
    That is a far different matter than using a terrorism 
excuse to eradicate political pluralism or ban an individual 
party. As you know, there is a significant Kurdish population 
in Turkey which supports the HDP and which risks being 
disenfranchised were such a party to be banned.
    As you know, the majority party has also made quite an 
effort to, how should we say, recruit HDP members into their 
fold. To the extent that party changes occur, that needs to be 
effectuated with free will and without any coercion also.
    Senator Murphy. Finally, and I am not asking for an 
extensive answer on this question, given limited time, but I am 
interested to know whether the department is pursuing Interpol 
reforms after the 2016 coup attempt.
    The Turkish Government issued approximately 30,000 red 
notices on the Interpol system and, of course, some of the 
actions that Turkey has taken are consistent with the ways in 
which other nations have begun to compromise the Interpol 
system.
    You also have, obviously, increasing news of extradition 
attempts and attempts to target dissidents abroad. Are we 
concerned at all about the overuse of the red notice system and 
is this something that we are looking into with respect to a 
future reform agenda?
    Ms. Nuland. I am going to take the question on what we are 
doing on Interpol reform, per se. I will say that you are not 
wrong that when the Interpol system is flooded with cases that 
do not meet the standard, it sucks up time, energy, and money 
that should appropriately be applied to cases that do meet the 
standard. So it is an issue of concern.
    Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
    Senator Romney.
    Senator Romney. Thank you, Chairman Murphy. Thank you, 
Under Secretary Nuland. It is good to see you and appreciate 
your expertise and perspectives with regards to our strategy in 
Turkey.
    I just wanted to follow up on a line of questioning that 
Senator Risch began with regards to the production of some 900 
parts for the F-35.
    Has that production ended or is it in the process of 
ending, and do we have any sense of what the economic impact 
will be in Turkey of that production ending?
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Romney.
    Yes, we are in the phase-out part, as you know, after we 
ended the F-35 engagement. There were supply chain reasons to 
phase out the spare parts, including the need to ramp up 
production elsewhere so that we did not hurt the line globally.
    My understanding is that it--I am going to ask you to go to 
DoD on the precise phase down, but I think we are within the 
year, if not sooner, of being finished there.
    Overall, Turkey took a significant hit, not just in terms 
of security, but, as I said, in terms of its economy from the 
suspension of the program, both jobs and the potential to 
export and be part of the export chain in the future, so and 
particularly at a time when the Turkish economy is hurting in 
other areas. It was an interesting decision by the Government. 
Let us put it that way.
    Senator Romney. There was some speculation earlier about 
whether this was something that Erdogan had actually considered 
and may have misjudged what America's response might be.
    Is there also the possibility that this was calculated by 
Mr. Erdogan in a desire to draw closer to Russia?
    Can you characterize the relationship that you are seeing 
building between Erdogan and Putin? Is it close? Is it 
collaborative? Is he hoping to play the EU and the U.S. off 
against Russia or is he actually moving pretty strong in that 
direction?
    Ms. Nuland. Well, let me start by saying that our interest 
here is clear, which is in cementing Turkey as much as we can 
and the Turkish people with us in the transatlantic and NATO 
family and discouraging deepening cooperation or dependence in 
particular on Russia, whether it is in the field of security, 
whether it is in the field of energy or anything else for that 
matter.
    Without overanalyzing in this open hearing, I would simply 
say that what I see, as a longtime watcher of Russia, is that 
in the past administration, there was quite a deepening of the 
Turkish-Russian relationship. It began in Syria and then 
expanded to other areas.
    I think there may, and I will not speak for the Turks, but 
I do sense some buyer's remorse--let us put it that way--in 
Ankara with regard to that relationship. It has not necessarily 
paid out in Ankara's interest and has caused some of the 
problems that we have talked about already this morning and 
sort of culminated in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that we saw 
last summer, which was not only tragic for people there but 
also further frayed the engagement and Turkey and Russia being 
on opposite sides in Libya, et cetera, et cetera.
    So I think we have an opportunity here if we continue 
engaging with our Turkish allies to bring them back closer to 
us. There is a lot of work to do.
    Senator Romney. Let me ask you to speculate a bit on your 
perspective as to what Erdogan may have been thinking and his 
purposes behind supporting the safety of the Kabul airport as 
we withdraw from the region or from the country and as we hope 
to bring interpreters and others from Afghanistan into the U.S.
    He has allowed his military or directed his military to 
play a role in securing that airport. Any sense as to why he is 
doing that?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Romney, I would just repeat what I said 
in the opening, which is this decision by Turkey is extremely 
welcome and absolutely vital to all of us who want to continue 
to maintain robust diplomatic presence in Afghanistan to 
support the people of Afghanistan as we withdraw our military 
forces. So we very much appreciate Turkey taking on that role.
    As you know, Turkey has historically played a strong role 
during the NATO mission at the airport, so they are 
constructive partners there. They know what the mission is and 
they are experienced at it.
    They also have a unique and special relationship both with 
the Afghan people but with other actors in the region, which 
makes them a partner who is more likely to be welcome there 
over the longer term, if that makes sense.
    With regard to President Erdogan's decision making, I never 
like to get in the head of another leader. My sense from 
joining the President's meeting with President Erdogan was that 
he appreciated how vital it was to have a strong NATO military 
do that mission if we want to stay engaged diplomatically with 
Afghanistan, and was willing to take it on.
    Senator Romney. Thank you.
    The Chairman [Presiding.] Thank you.
    Senator Cardin.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Nuland, thank you very much for your service. I 
listened very carefully to you defining the differing buckets 
of interests between the United States and Turkey--those that 
we can agree, those we are making progress, and those where we 
disagree--and you have a very strong reputation of being very 
direct and clear in your bilateral conversations.
    So I am certain that you are very clear with the Turks in 
regards to the areas that we disagree.
    Having said that, President Biden rightly said that our 
foreign policy is going to be embedded in our values. So my 
question to you is, how do you deal with Turkey today and still 
hold true to American values that the President is talking 
about when under the Erdogan regime we see reporters randomly 
imprisoned, citizens taken off the streets and imprisoned, the 
human rights record is horrible, and then a dimension on top of 
that, as we have already talked about, the Cyprus issue and the 
S-400s, et cetera, which looks more like a country like Russia 
rather than Turkey?
    So how do you reconcile how you deal with Turkey and live 
up to President Biden's commitment that our foreign policy 
engagements are always going to be embedded with our values?
    Ms. Nuland. Well, Senator Cardin, as the member of this 
committee who knows our President probably best of all, we do 
it the Biden way. He speaks truth to his interlocutors about 
human rights concerns.
    I have seen him do it with leaders all around the world, 
whether they are NATO allies or whether they are President 
Putin, when he has concerns.
    As he said not too long ago, it is a matter of his DNA, but 
it is also a matter of our national DNA.
    We have been very clear with Turkey that we think this 
weakens their democracy, and it is also important, as you know, 
to stand with those Turks who are facing incarceration, 
repression, unfair judicial targeting, press pressure, et 
cetera, as we do with those who face human rights abuses around 
the world.
    So speaking out privately is important, but speaking out 
publicly is important as well, and he leads all of us in that 
direction and I do not think that is going to change as long as 
he is President.
    Senator Cardin. So you have talked about the potential of 
buyer remorse in regards to some of the decisions made by 
Turkey.
    So my question to you, in order to be effective we have to 
work with our partners in a multilateral manner. Considering 
Turkey's actions, particularly with the S-400, which is against 
NATO protocols, and its other activities, what success are you 
having with our traditional partners in working with us to put 
maximum disappointment and pressure on Turkey for its 
decisions?
    Ms. Nuland. Well, first of all, with regard to the human 
rights issues that we just talked about, I think we share these 
concerns with other partners in NATO and with the European 
Union, and they make their views clear.
    The European Union, I think you know, is back in dialogue 
with Turkey on the prospect for a better economic relationship. 
These issues are front and center with Turkey.
    Every time the NATO Secretary General and other NATO 
partners go to Ankara, the issue of the S-400 comes up as well 
as our disappointment, those of us who are F-35 nations, that 
Turkey is not part of this extremely important program both in 
security and economic terms.
    So we continue to make those points and we have had, as I 
have discussed here, to impose costs on Ankara for these 
decisions that they have made. We try to do it as a community 
of nations and not standing alone.
    Senator Cardin. Impose a cost but it would be more 
effective if that cost was supported by at least our NATO 
allies, but our other allies as well. Have we been successful 
in getting them to take action--I hear their language, but to 
take action?
    Ms. Nuland. I think, as I mentioned, the EU-Turkey dialogue 
has been ongoing for decades, and because of some of the 
internal issues in Turkey has not progressed in the direction 
that either the EU or President Erdogan hoped.
    They are back in discussion again, but I think the rigorous 
EU standards come to bear here and, particularly, with regard 
to the decision made on Varosha yesterday. The EU has made its 
voice clear on that as well, yesterday.
    There was a statement by Mr. Borrell and we have said to 
Turkey that we worry that with moves like this, they put at 
risk the bigger game, which is the potential for a customs 
union or something else with the EU.
    So I do think that the allies and partners play an 
important role here, but, obviously, the United States has this 
long and deep and rich relationship, including our economic 
relationship, which is, perhaps the biggest card.
    Senator Cardin. I think there is room for improvement with 
our allies.
    Ms. Nuland. I hear you.
    Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Madam Secretary, nice to see you again. I want to talk 
about Nord Stream 2. It is something we have discussed 
previously.
    There is strong bipartisan opposition to the President's 
deliberate failure to abide by U.S. law and sanction all of the 
entities involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline.
    Now we see news reports that the United States and Germany 
came to a deal on the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, front 
page of today's Wall Street Journal.
    The President appears to have made this deal with a 
government that will change leadership in just a few months in 
Germany. Secretary Blinken has repeatedly pledged to work with 
Congress, as he said, on the takeoff and not just the landing, 
and he has, clearly, failed to keep his word on this.
    This new deal, I believe, is a grave mistake. The President 
is giving Russia a new geopolitical weapon. Russia uses energy 
as a geopolitical weapon to coerce, to manipulate. Paving the 
way for Russia and Germany to complete this pipeline, I think, 
puts just a stranglehold on Europe.
    I was in Germany a week or so ago, talking to people, 
leaders in Europe, who are opposed to what is happening through 
NATO. Protecting this Russian trap is not in our national 
security interest. It doubles Europe's reliance on Russian 
energy.
    It funnels more money to Russia at a time with increased 
malign activities from Russia. It eliminates barriers for 
additional Russian military actions in Ukrainian territory. 
There are also reports of the administration now attempting to 
silence the Ukrainians from even raising concerns about this 
new deal.
    Congress is the only one really willing to impose 
meaningful costs on Russian malign projects and support our 
allies facing the Russian aggression.
    It is clear that Congress and the American people cannot 
count on the administration to do the right thing with regard 
to this.
    Why do you believe it is acceptable to deal this way with 
the Ukrainians and trying to silence them over this terrible 
deal with the Germans?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator Barrasso, let me start by saying we 
agree with you the Nord Stream pipeline is a bad deal. As we 
have said, it increases dependence on Russia and increases 
dependence on hydrocarbons.
    I worked, as you know, because you and I worked on it 
together in my last government gig, very hard, particularly 
with the EU to make those points, to slow it and all of those 
things.
    With regard to the PEESA sanctions, we did, as you know, 
impose in May a significant number of new sanctions, 19 new 
entities. We also imposed sanctions on the company and its 
officers.
    However, we waived them in the interest of seeing whether 
we could get Germany to work with us and work with the 
Ukrainians and Poland to deal with the consequences and the 
vulnerabilities that this pipeline creates for Ukraine.
    We have not--I want to repeat that here--we have taken zero 
action to silence Ukraine. Ukraine is a sovereign nation and 
will speak out itself with regard to this.
    Later this afternoon, we will make public the agreement 
that we have with the German Government. I can give you a 
couple of the highlights here, which you will--in a minute.
    What I would like to say is throughout this process, we 
have engaged in intensive consultations with the Ukrainians, 
including when Secretary Blinken was there, when the President 
talked to President Zelensky, my own conversations on almost a 
twice monthly basis with senior Ukrainian leaders on their 
requirements and on their vulnerabilities.
    As we worked on this agreement with the Germans, my 
colleague, Counselor Derek Chollet, has been in Ukraine 
yesterday and the day before, including to solidify President 
Zelensky's visit to Washington later this afternoon.
    I, as a longtime friend and supporter of Ukraine, believe 
that if we had not had this agreement with the pipeline 90 
percent complete, Ukraine would be at considerably more risk.
    Let me just give you a couple of the highlights which will 
become fully public later this afternoon, if I may. It is in 
tiny print, and I am getting old here.
    Among other things, Germany has committed in this agreement 
with us that should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or 
commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will 
take actions at the national level and press for effective 
measures at the European level, including sanctions, to limit 
Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy sector. 
That is one aspect of this agreement.
    The other aspect of this agreement is support for an 
extension of the transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine. 
As you know, it comes to an end in 2024. We will seek and press 
for and use full leverage to try to seek an additional 10 years 
for Ukraine.
    More broadly, we need to work together to reduce Ukrainian 
dependence, both its economic dependence on transit, but its 
own dependence on Russian gas.
    So I think you will see when this is released a 
considerable effort by both the U.S. and Germany to help 
diversify energy supply and energy source for Ukraine with 
concrete dollar figures, Euro figures, attached to it.
    So, look, this is a bad situation and a bad pipeline, but 
we need to help protect Ukraine and I feel that we have made 
some significant steps in that direction with this agreement.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam.
    Mr. Chairman, I have one question on Afghanistan. My time 
has gone. It has to do with Afghanistan remaining one of the 
most dangerous countries in the world.
    With the Taliban's increasing aggressive military actions, 
Afghanistan has experienced increasing levels of violence. The 
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan is going to 
impact mobility of our personnel and the effectiveness of U.S. 
civilian--the mission there.
    The question is, could you give a brief update on the 
status of negotiations with Turkey to provide forces to protect 
the airport?
    Are we planning to downsize the diplomatic mission--close 
programs, reduce embassy staff--having been there a number of 
times and understanding the security risk of trying to protect 
the people in the personnel compound there?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, as I said, we are very gratified that 
Turkey has agreed to provide a significant force to protect the 
airport, and without that, we would not--neither we nor our 
allies and partners would be able to maintain a robust 
presence.
    Obviously, some of the size of the embassy had to do with 
our security relationship with Afghan forces. We will now do 
most of that from an over horizon platform so that allows us to 
make some appropriate reductions.
    It is the President's intention, it is our intention, to 
continue to if not redouble our diplomatic efforts, our 
assistance efforts, and particularly in the areas that 
Afghanistan needs most, including the protection of women and 
human rights and judicial independence, et cetera.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. The senator got extra time because it is his 
birthday today. So----
    Ms. Nuland. All right. Happy birthday.
    The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, 
Madam Secretary, for your leadership.
    Chairman Menendez raised a litany of issues where President 
Erdogan's Turkey has violated its obligations as a NATO 
partner, violated international law, undermined our interests 
in the region.
    We talked about the S-400. I was pleased to hear you 
underscore the fact that the CAATSA sanctions will remain in 
place so long as that continues and that they will not be able 
to participate in the F-35 program.
    Turkey is regularly violating the territorial waters in the 
exclusive economic zone of Cyprus and Greece, and there is a 
real risk that some incident there could spiral out of control 
if they continue those provocative actions.
    You referenced Turkey's malign actions with respect to 
Armenia. It is true that Turkey is shouldering the burden of 
millions of refugees from Syria.
    It is also important that we remember that for years Turkey 
downplayed the ISIS threat, allowed ISIS fighters to transit 
through Turkey, and they continue to attack the Syrian Kurds, 
which have been the tip of the spear in our fight against ISIS.
    I want to turn now to yesterday's actions in Cyprus and 
President Erdogan's statements regarding Varosha and the 
efforts to reach a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, which, of 
course, he undermined entirely.
    On Varosha, he is, as the administration has indicated, 
violating U.N. Security Council's resolutions in international 
law.
    Here is what Erdogan said in response to people calling him 
out on these issues: ``We will listen to them, but we do not 
care what they say,'' and that has been Erdogan's attitude on a 
whole host of issues.
    The question is what are we going to actually do in 
response? So my question to you is, what are we going to do in 
concert with our NATO and EU partners?
    Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, and I wrote to the 
President last week, anticipating this action taken by Erdogan, 
and it is not going to be enough to simply make statements, as 
President Erdogan has indicated, ``We do not care what they 
say.''
    So my question is what are we going to actually do in 
partnership with our partners?
    Ms. Nuland. Well, thank you, Senator, and happy birthday.
    You saw, I think, as you referenced the strong statement 
from Secretary Blinken yesterday, that we, and as I also 
repeated in my opening statement before you came in, that we 
consider the move yesterday in Varosha to be inconsistent with 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789--provocative, 
unacceptable, incompatible with past commitments.
    I spoke to my Turkish counterpart this morning. I think 
there will be ongoing conversation with the Turkish Government. 
Before this happened, Ambassador Satterfield also spoke with 
key members in the palace, and Secretary Blinken talked to 
Foreign Minister Christodoulides of Cyprus this morning.
    The issue here is not only does this have a chilling effect 
on what we hoped might be a reigniting of the U.N. process to 
try to get to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, which the 
last time I was in government I worked intensively on 
personally along with then Vice President Biden.
    It also has a negative effect on the ongoing conversation 
that Turkey is having with the EU on what it has long wanted 
and what we had finally gotten them back into significant talks 
about some kind of a economic community.
    Frankly, that is the bigger game. That is of far more value 
for Turkey.
    Senator Van Hollen. If I may, Madam Secretary, just because 
of the time, I agree with you. I am just reading to you 
President Erdogan's words.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. He does not care what you say, what we 
say, what the EU says. So I think our experience indicates that 
Turkey will respond only when there is a price to be paid for 
their actions. Sometimes that does not move them either. 
Certainly, words alone will not.
    If I could just also turn to the HDP issue, because as you 
know, this is Turkey's third largest political party.
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    Senator Van Hollen. They locked up a number of their 
leaders under trumped-up charges. I mean, the European courts 
have looked at this. Totally trumped-up charges. Turkey has 
locked up lots of journalists.
    I met with Hisyar Ozsoy, who is one of the parliamentarians 
from HDP, who was visiting United States last week, and I 
guess, as has been indicated, we are really pleased to see the 
Biden administration return to a values-based foreign policy, 
talking about rule of law, democracy.
    This, obviously, violates every single one of those 
principles, to threaten to outlaw a political party and, beyond 
that, outlaw the individual members from participating in 
future elections under any kind of banner.
    So I will just close, really, where I began, which is we 
really look forward to a conversation with you and the 
President about what we are going to do because I think we have 
the answer from Erdogan as to what his response is going to be.
    He does not care what we say, and it is going to be up to 
us to take actions to defend the rule of law, to defend 
democracy, and to make sure that Turkey does not set an example 
to others with respect to being a unfaithful NATO ally.
    So thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Senator Cruz.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Nuland, good to see you.
    Ms. Nuland. Good to see you.
    Senator Cruz. You will not be surprised by the topic of my 
questioning.
    At your confirmation hearing, you told this committee that 
you believed if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and 
Germany were completed that it would have disastrous effects on 
U.S. national security, that it would have disastrous effects 
on European security by making them subject to economic and 
energy blackmail from Russia, and that it would enrich and 
empower Putin to carry out that blackmail.
    Do you continue to believe that?
    Ms. Nuland. I do, Senator.
    Senator Cruz. My understanding is that the State Department 
recommended that sanctions be imposed on the company that is 
building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and on the CEO, and that 
the State Department did so consistent with the sanctions that 
Congress passed into law that I authored, not one set of 
sanctions but two sets of sanctions that passed both houses of 
Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, nearly unanimous 
support.
    My understanding is the State Department recommended that 
those sanctions be imposed to try to stop the pipeline and that 
the Biden White House overrode that recommendation.
    Is that accurate?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think you will not be surprised that 
I am not going to discuss internal administration 
deliberations. I do not think you were here when I read out 
some of the actions that we have worked on with the German 
Government. I can repeat that here.
    Obviously, our intention here--and we did sanction the 
company and sanction its leadership--we chose to waive those 
sanctions to buy some time to see if we could work with Germany 
so that it could take responsibility for the pressure that this 
pipeline puts not only on Ukraine and on Poland and on Eastern 
Europe but on the advantages that it gives to Russia both in 
security and economic terms.
    We will later this afternoon release the results of those 
negotiations, a U.S.-German joint statement, which includes a 
number of elements, and since I have already read it out to 
your colleagues I will not waste the committee's time. I can 
share it with you after this.
    One point in particular, which I think is very important 
for Ukraine and for our collective response, is that Germany 
has committed to take action, that should Russia attempt to use 
energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against 
Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and 
press for effective measures at the European Union level, 
including sanctions to limit Russian export capabilities to 
Europe in the energy sector, including gas and other 
economically relevant sectors.
    So we can talk about how we are doing here. Our effort 
right now is to continue to protect Ukraine and others.
    Senator Cruz. So as promises go, that promise from Angela 
Merkel is, on its face, incredibly weak and the deal that is 
going to be announced today, conveniently at 9:00 p.m. German 
time so, presumably, to mitigate the pushback from the Greens 
in Germany, is, in my view, a complete and total capitulation 
by President Biden to Putin. He has given Putin everything he 
wants. He has surrendered on the pipeline, the pipeline that we 
had stopped, that we had successfully stopped until Biden 
surrendered.
    I believe this is a generational geopolitical mistake that 
decades from now future Russian dictators will be reaping 
billions of dollars of benefits annually from Joe Biden's 
mistake and will be using that pipeline to exert economic 
blackmail on Europe decades from now.
    Let me ask just a straightforward question. Do our 
Ukrainian allies agree that this is a good deal?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, with respect and in the spirit of 
candor with which we have always dealt with each other, I 
believe that we were, in 2016, on our way to stopping the 
pipeline, as you and I discussed.
    When the Biden administration came into office 4 years 
later, that pipeline was 90 percent plus complete. So----
    Senator Cruz. Ms. Nuland, I understand that talking point 
that the Biden State Department has been using. It was 95 
percent complete in December of 2019 when we passed the 
sanctions and we stopped it, and a 95 percent complete pipeline 
is zero percent complete.
    We saw for a year it remained a hunk of metal at the bottom 
of the ocean until Joe Biden got elected and began signaling he 
would be soft on Russia.
    So let me ask my question again because my time is 
expiring. Do our Ukrainian allies agree this is a good deal and 
is it correct, as it has been widely reported, that the Biden 
White House has been pressuring Ukraine, demanding that they 
not criticize the deal and threatening economic support, 
military support, and threatening President Zelensky directly 
to cancel the White House meeting with the President unless 
they bite their tongues and not say what is obvious, which is 
that this is a disastrous deal that benefits Putin and hurts 
Ukraine badly?
    Ms. Nuland. That is categorically incorrect, Senator. None 
of us has been pressuring Ukraine and, in fact, an invitation 
to President Zelensky is going to be issued publicly later 
today and we have been in deep consultations with the 
Ukrainians on every aspect of this arrangement.
    I will leave it to the Ukrainians to speak for themselves 
on how they react to this. Do they, like all of us, wish this 
pipeline could be stopped and want it stopped? Of course.
    Does this deal give them more than they had yesterday? I 
believe that it does, and I have been in intense consultation 
with them myself as has Derek Chollet, who is on the ground, 
the President, Secretary Blinken.
    They will speak for themselves about this arrangement. I 
will not speak for them. They are a sovereign state.
    Senator Cruz. If I could ask one final question to clarify. 
Is it your testimony, Ambassador, under oath to this committee, 
that nobody in the Biden administration has been pressuring the 
Ukrainians not to criticize this deal? I find that astonishing 
testimony. Is that what you are telling this committee?
    Ms. Nuland. I know of nobody in the administration who has 
told them how to feel or how to speak about this. What we have 
tried to do is have consultation with them throughout on what 
their major concerns are.
    They have security concerns but they also have energy 
concerns, and we have worked hard to try to address the 
concerns that they have raised with us, including in 
consultations we had before this consultation with the Germans 
even began.
    Senator Cruz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
    I just have one or two final questions. We have a vote 
going on.
    Two years are left until Turkey's next presidential and 
parliamentary elections. The Turkish Government's attempt to 
ban the country's second largest opposition party, the HDP, 
would represent a significant threat to the integrity of those 
elections.
    What steps are we taking to support fair and democratic 
elections in Turkey in 2023?
    Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Chairman. We spoke about this a little 
bit when Senator Murphy was occupying your large chair there.
    We have been very clear with the Turkish Government about 
our concerns about the banning of political parties. I think 
the support that members of this committee and that Congress as 
a whole have provided to individual members of the HDP is very 
welcome.
    Obviously, this party represents a large body of citizens 
of Turkey and so banning the representatives of those voices 
raises questions about the integrity of elections.
    So we will continue to make those points, going forward.
    The Chairman. I will, since I am not bound by the 
diplomatic speak, it would be an incredible action by Erdogan 
to ban the second largest party and in doing so those elections 
could not have validity, at the end of the day.
    That is like if President Biden banned the Republican Party 
for participating. Come on. Who in this country would believe 
that that is a fair election?
    In January, the State Department affirmed the 
administration's intent to continue counterterrorism 
cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which include 
Syrian Kurd--the YPG, despite Erdogan's continuing opposition 
to the group.
    In our bilateral discussions with Turkey on Syria, what 
proposals has the administration put forward to address this 
fundamental difference of opinion around the role of the YPG?
    Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think primarily at this stage we 
have just agreed to disagree. Syrian Democratic Forces have 
more than proved their value in the security situation in Syria 
and with regard to the fight against ISIS.
    The Chairman. We agree to disagree, which means we are 
continuing to pursue our view and our engagement with the 
Syrian Kurds, including the YPG?
    Ms. Nuland. Yes.
    The Chairman. Then, lastly, the maritime border agreement 
between Turkey and the Government of National Accord, the 
direct predecessor of Libya's current unity government, was 
based on the flawed understanding of international maritime law 
that ignores the valid claims of Turkey's Mediterranean 
neighbors, including Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.
    What is the administration's messaging on this agreement?
    Ms. Nuland. With regard to the specific maritime border 
with Libya, I am going to take that question because I have not 
personally looked at the Libya situation.
    As you know, we have a lot of work to do together on Libya 
to get to an election and to get to, ideally, a legitimate 
government that can then take up its own interests in terms of 
maritime boundaries, et cetera.
    So that is something we work on with Greece, something we 
work on with Turkey, and will continue to do that.
    The Chairman. Yes. I would just say it is rather obvious 
that this agreement with an entity that really is questionable 
to be able to engage the Government of Libya was drawn in such 
a way that it is in violation of every international norm of 
Law of the Sea--the essence of what is recognized as 
territorial Exclusive Economic Zones. It is provocative, once 
again.
    So my problem with the past administration, and I hope is 
not going to be a problem with this administration, is that we 
continue to have the aspirations of what we wanted from 
Turkey--the bridge between East and West, the strong NATO ally, 
a more secular government committed on a path to democracy and 
a respect for human rights and the rule of law.
    Under Erdogan, that is just not the reality. So I sometimes 
get concerned that we are unwilling to call out that which is 
pretty obvious. That which is in the gray zone, okay.
    What is pretty obvious is pretty obvious. When we fail to 
recognize it as such, I think we do our nation a disservice and 
we muddle our message across the globe beyond Turkey, that we 
are willing to look the other way because there are some other 
interests involved.
    So I can assure you that the committee will be pursuing 
this with vigor as we continue.
    We appreciate your testimony before the committee. This 
record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow.
    With the thanks to the committee, this hearing is 
adjourned.
    Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, committee.
    [Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
                              ----------                              


              Additional Material Submitted for the Record


          Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez

    Question. Human rights violations and other atrocities committed 
against Kurdish populations in northern Syria by Turkish-sponsored 
opposition groups are well-documented. The United States must not 
remain silent in face of extrajudicial killings, mass displacement, 
property seizures, and related crimes. To what extent is the 
administration actively raising these concerns with Ankara, and what is 
State specifically asking be done to rectify the situation?

    Answer. We remain concerned by reports that Syrian opposition 
groups reportedly violated the law of armed conflict and abused human 
rights in northeast Syria. We have repeatedly raised these concerns 
with the Turkish Government, the Syrian Interim Government, and the 
Syrian Opposition Coalition. On July 28, the United States imposed 
sanctions on the armed Syrian group Ahrar al-Sharqiya and two of its 
leaders for committing numerous serious human rights abuses across 
northern Syria. We are equally concerned by and engage on credible 
accusations against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SDF-aligned 
elements that Turkey believes have links to the Kurdistan Workers 
Party, a U.S. designated terrorist organization.

    Question. Following June's Berlin Conference [Second Berlin 
Conference on Libya], in which the foreign fighters issue featured 
prominently, what updates can the administration provide concerning 
progress on this topic, including a potential agreement between Turkey 
and Russia?

    Answer. At the June 23 Second Berlin Conference on Libya, issues 
surrounding military de-escalation were highlighted, and while still 
unresolved, the United States is in discussions with Allies, the 
interim Libyan Government, and others on how progress can be made 
towards the withdrawal of foreign forces, especially mercenary and 
proxy groups.

    Question. How would the U.S. ensure that any such agreement is 
fully and efficiently implemented? What is the State Department's 
messaging to Turkey on this topic, and how is this integrated into the 
administration's broader bilateral approach to Turkey?

    Answer. In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in 
supporting the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process, 
including elections on December 24 this year. The administration 
strongly supports the operationalization of UNSC resolution 2570 
(2021), which requests the U.N. Support Mission in Libya's continued 
support for the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring and security sector 
reform mechanisms, and the withdrawal of all mercenaries, proxy groups, 
and foreign forces. The United States and its Allies have been working 
with the U.N. Special Envoy for Libya to encourage more concrete 
discussions with Turkey and Russia on a withdrawal process, and pushed 
the issue with both countries bilaterally. A ceasefire monitoring 
mission will have an important role in verifying the departure of 
mercenaries and foreign forces.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                  Submitted by Senator James E. Risch

    Question. Does Turkey's non-compliant and difficult behavior change 
how we and our allies think about future NATO expansion? How do our 
NATO allies feel about Turkey's S-400s?

    Answer. Turkey joined NATO in 1952. It has NATO's second-largest 
military and is a key contributor to Allied missions, including in 
Afghanistan. Turkey helps constrain Russian influence in the region--
both through Ankara's support of Ukraine's and Georgia's sovereignty as 
well as through Turkey's role in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya. 
Turkey's 2019 acquisition and testing of S-400 surface-to-air missile 
systems from Russia undermines Allied interoperability and threatens 
Alliance systems. We and many of our NATO Allies continue to urge 
Turkey not to retain the S-400 and remind Ankara that any new major 
Russian arms purchase would risk triggering additional CAATSA 
sanctions.

    Question. What proposals and alternatives has the Biden 
administration put forth to the Turkish Government to induce them to 
give up the S-400s?

    Answer. Turkey knows exactly what it needs to do to secure relief 
from existing CAATSA sanctions. Ankara's acquisition and testing of S-
400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia undermines Allied 
interoperability and threatens Alliance systems. We continue to urge 
Turkey at every level not to retain the S-400 system and to refrain 
from purchasing any additional Russian materiel. As the Biden 
administration has made clear to Turkey, any major new Russian arms 
purchases would risk triggering CAATSA sanctions separate from and in 
addition to those imposed in December 2020.

    Question. In what ways, if any, have issues between the U.S. and 
Turkey spilled over into NATO relationships and discussions? Have 
Turkey's actions in Libya had an impact on its standing in NATO? If so, 
please detail how.

    Answer. The United States has a multi-faceted, complex relationship 
with Turkey, a NATO Ally for 68 years with the Alliance's second-
largest military and a significant contributor to NATO operations and 
missions. In the bilateral relationship, there are areas where we are 
firmly aligned and there are areas where we are working to close the 
gaps. Similarly, we seek cooperation with Turkey in NATO on common 
priorities and engage in dialogue to address disagreements. In Libya, 
Turkey joins the United States and others in supporting the Libyan-led, 
U.N.-facilitated political process, including elections on December 24. 
We and other Allies are also discussing with Turkey and Russia how to 
reduce the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before 
the elections.

    Question. To what extent have the tensions in the U.S.-Turkey 
relationship affected, either negatively or positively, the military 
relationship and cooperation between our two nations?

    Answer. As you know, Turkey's participation in the F-35 program was 
suspended, and it has faced CAATSA sanctions. That said, and despite 
the challenges in our relationship, U.S. strategic interests overlap 
with Turkey's in many ways, including countering terrorism, ending the 
conflict in Syria, and deterring destabilizing influence in the region. 
Turkey makes crucial contributions to NATO missions around the world, 
actively supports Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty, and works to 
prevent the Russian-backed Assad regime from precipitating additional 
humanitarian crises on Europe's doorstep. The United States has a 
strong interest in keeping Turkey broadly anchored to the Euro-Atlantic 
community.

    Question. Have the purges of the Turkish military since the 
attempted coup in 2016 in any way affected the U.S.-Turkey political-
military relationship? If so, in what way?

    Answer. The United States supports Turkish efforts to bring 
perpetrators of the attempted coup to justice. However, we also urge 
Turkey to uphold the highest standards of respect for judicial due 
process, human rights, fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions, 
and the rule of law. Turkey is a NATO Ally and makes crucial 
contributions to NATO missions around the world. U.S. strategic 
interests overlap with Turkey's in many ways, including countering 
terrorism, ending the conflict in Syria, and deterring destabilizing 
influence in the region.

    Question. In such a polarized political environment, and with such 
high levels of anti-Americanism, how has the Embassy in Ankara and our 
consulates throughout Turkey been able to continue productive 
engagement with ordinary Turks as well as with civil society? Please 
provide specific examples.

    Answer. Despite challenges, the U.S. Mission to Turkey is 
connecting with key Turkish audiences via: traditional and social media 
outreach; educational and cultural exchanges such as the 70-year-old 
Fulbright Commission; a variety of English language programs; cultural 
preservation efforts such as for the medieval synagogue of Izmir; 
public diplomacy grants to civil society partners; regular engagements 
with civil society leaders at the highest levels of Mission leadership; 
and four Education USA advising offices and two American Corners.

    Question. Turkey's Bayraktar Drones were proven to be quite 
effective in last year's Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey has now begun to 
sell them to others in the region, including Ukraine, and NATO allies 
like Poland have also expressed interest in purchasing them.
    What do you see as the impact of the success of the Bayraktar 
drones on Turkey's larger project to build out an indigenous arms 
industry?

    Answer. Turkey's TB-2 Bayraktar Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a 
highly effective platform. The Bayraktar is particularly effective 
against Russian and Soviet-origin surface-to-air missile systems, 
making it a sought-after capability for partners facing potential or 
actual Russian aggression. As Turkey is a relatively cost-effective 
supplier of advanced drone technology, it is not surprising that 
countries are increasingly seeking Turkish UAS solutions. Turkey is one 
of the top producers and exporters of drones in the world today.

    Question. Does the U.S. consider the Bayraktar drones to me NATO 
interoperable?

    Answer. Turkey's TB-2 Bayraktar drones are not currently enabled 
for NATO-standard data links. The Bayraktar platform is particularly 
effective against Russian and Soviet-origin surface-to-air missile 
systems. Bayraktar drones enabled for NATO interoperability would 
support defense and Allied deterrence in Eastern Europe.

    Question. In the Black Sea, Russia has increased its provocations 
and is increasingly turning it into a Russian lake. Yet despite its 
rather nationalistic Blue Homeland naval doctrine, Turkey has not 
seemed very worried about these developments.
    Please assess Turkey's attitudes towards growing Russian strength 
in the Black Sea?

    Answer. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO 
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in 
the Black Sea. Turkey pursues cooperation with Russia in some areas, 
reflecting Russian political and economic leverage over Turkey through 
natural gas, tourism, and agricultural revenue. At the same time, 
Turkey's approach toward countering Russian influence in Libya, Syria, 
the South Caucasus, and elsewhere largely aligns with our interests. 
Turkey's arms sales to Ukraine and staunch support for Ukrainian and 
Georgian sovereignty highlight Turkey's positive role in countering 
Russia's influence in the Black Sea region.

    Question. Do you believe Turkey is working well with fellow NATO 
allies and Black Sea littoral states Bulgaria and Romania to deter 
Russia's aggression in the Black Sea? Please provide details in your 
answer.

    Answer. We encourage all Allies--those bordering the Black Sea and 
all Allies at NATO headquarters--to support deeper NATO engagement in 
the Black Sea. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO 
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in 
the Black Sea. Turkey pursues cooperation with Russia in some areas, 
reflecting Russian political and economic leverage over Turkey. At the 
same time, Turkey's approach toward countering Russian influence in 
Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, and elsewhere largely aligns with our 
interests. Turkey's support for Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty 
highlight Turkey's positive role countering Russia's influence in the 
Black Sea region.

    Question. What more would the U.S. like to see Turkey do to push 
back on Russia in the Black Sea?

    Answer. Turkey is strengthening relations with countries bordering 
the Black Sea and taking other actions to counter Russia's influence in 
the region. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO 
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in 
the Black Sea. While Turkey sometimes limits the ambition of NATO 
initiatives in the region, it continues to manage access to the Black 
Sea per the Montreux Convention in a manner that is in line with its 
treaty obligations and supports many U.S. and Allied military 
operations. Turkey conducts significant activity on a national basis to 
support Black Sea deterrence and defense.

    Question. Turkish President Erdogan has increasingly been vocal 
about his dislike of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, the treaty that 
governs the international use of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits 
that control access into and out of the Black Sea.
    Does the U.S. have any concern that President Erdogan may try to 
change the rules surrounding transit through the straits? If so, please 
enumerate those concerns.

    Answer. Turkey continues to manage access to the Black Sea as per 
the Montreux Convention in a manner that is in line with its treaty 
obligations and adequately supports U.S. and Allied military 
operations. In April, President Erdogan reaffirmed Turkey's commitment 
to the Montreux Convention. Any attempt to change the rules surrounding 
transit through the straits would be provocative and unwelcome.

    Question. Please list all arms and technology transfers from the 
U.S. to Turkey over last 2 years that fall below congressional 
threshold notification requirements found in the Arms Export Control 
Act.

    Answer. The Department is committed to complying with the 
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). As you 
are aware, on December 14, 2020, the Secretary of State, pursuant to 
Section 231 of CAATSA and in consultation with the Secretary of the 
Treasury, imposed sanctions on the Turkish Presidency of Defense 
Industries (SSB), a Turkish Government entity that purchases defense 
equipment and has responsibilities for defense industrial development 
for Turkey, as well as four SSB officials.
    The Department has continued to approve cases that are in the U.S. 
national security and foreign policy interests and consistent with the 
Arms Export Control Act and the Conventional Arms Transfer policy. I 
pledge to work with you to ensure that transfers to Turkey continue to 
adhere to these standards, and I would welcome the opportunity to 
provide you with a more fulsome briefing about these matters.

    Question. Since undersea gas deposits were discovered in the 
Eastern Mediterranean, coastal nations have been developing strategies 
to extract and export it. Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Forum, (consisting of Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Jordan, and a Palestinian representative) have emerged as competitors 
over the future economic development of the zone.
    How is the U.S. engaging with parties to ensure that economic 
development is executed in a safe, stable, and fair way?

    Answer. The United States supports regional cooperation to bring 
durable energy security to the region, create new markets, and provide 
economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden 
administration is committed to ensuring stability in the Eastern 
Mediterranean by encouraging peaceful and diplomatic resolutions to 
disagreements which respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of all countries. In addition to our regular and continuous bilateral 
engagements across the region, we participate in the ``3+1'' format, 
which includes Greece, Israel, the ROC, and the United States, and in 
the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which Egypt hosts and in which the 
United States is an observer.

    Question. What are the challenges and threats we face surrounding 
the issue? What are the security implications?

    Answer. Recent offshore gas discoveries in Israel, Egypt, and the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC), some in disputed waters, have redefined 
regional relationships and led to political tensions. At the same time, 
collaborative work in the region in planning for a shared energy future 
could contribute to improving economic and political cooperation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean. Effective collaboration can also increase 
regional energy security through diversification of fuel types and 
routes for European and Middle Eastern partners, thus reducing regional 
reliance on Russian and Iranian energy supplies. We continue to promote 
collaboration toward these ends.

    Question. President Biden and his administration have repeatedly 
made commitments to upholding universal rights at home and abroad. In 
Turkey, authorities are abusing people's human rights and attacking 
peaceful dissidents at an alarming scale.
    Having promised a rights-centered foreign policy, how is the Biden 
administration prioritizing human rights in Turkey?

    Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human 
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. We 
publicly and privately urge Turkey to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, peaceful 
assembly and association and the right to a fair trial, which are 
important to any healthy democracy. The Department reinforces at the 
highest levels of the Turkish Government that addressing democratic 
backsliding could have a positive impact on our bilateral relationship. 
The Department works with international partners to defend fundamental 
freedoms and provides foreign assistance to promote human rights, rule 
of law, media freedom, and freedom of expression in Turkey.

    Question. How is Turkey's declining human rights record impacting 
its relationship with the United States?

    Answer. The Biden administration shares your concerns about the 
Turkish Government's repression of judicial independence, political 
pluralism, and the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful 
assembly. Such repression erodes the foundations of democratic society 
and stifles growth. It is in our interest to keep Turkey anchored to 
the transatlantic community. We will continue to press the Turkish 
Government to do more to protect judicial independence, respect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, bolster rule of law, uphold the rules-
based international order, and stand united with Western allies in 
addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and the People's 
Republic of China.

    Question. To what extent were human rights part of President 
Biden's meeting with President Erdogan in June?

    Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human 
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The 
administration will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of 
expression, peaceful assembly, and association, and the right to a fair 
trial, which are important to any healthy democracy. I refer you to the 
White House for details on President Biden's June meeting with 
President Erdogan.

    Question. Did President Biden express concern about specific rights 
issues?

    Answer. I refer you to the White House for details on President 
Biden's June meeting with President Erdogan.

    Question. Did President Biden raise any specific cases of unjustly 
detained individuals, such as U.S. locally-employed staff members Metin 
Topuz, Hamza Ulucay, and Mete Canturk, or civil society leader Osman 
Kavala?

    Answer. President Biden has made it clear that his administration 
will be focused on promoting democracy and human rights and the rule of 
law--and Turkey is no exception. The Department regularly raises the 
cases of our wrongfully prosecuted and detained Locally Employed Staff 
with the highest levels of the Turkish Government. More broadly, the 
administration will continue to advocate for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, including the right to a fair trial, in Turkey 
and other countries. For details about President Biden's June meeting 
with President Erdogan, I refer you to the White House.

    Question. In the event the Turkey-Syria border crossings close, 
what alternatives do we have to get aid to the Syrian people? How can 
we pressure the Assad regime (and Russia) to provide aid in our stead?

    Answer. Following a successful diplomatic campaign to overcome 
Russian opposition, on July 9 the U.N. Security Council unanimously 
adopted resolution 2585, which reauthorized humanitarian access into 
Syria via the Bab al-Hawa crossing from Turkey for the next 12 months. 
Crossline assistance alone cannot meet existing needs, which is why 
extending the cross-border mandate at Bab al-Hawa for another year was 
so important. We also continue to encourage all parties to engage 
constructively to find ways to enable crossline deliveries. Meeting the 
Syrian people's needs over the long term requires a political solution. 
We remain engaged with the U.N., our allies, and our international 
partners to encourage all possible efforts to advance this track.

    Question. Turkey and Russia reportedly reached an understanding to 
advance the incremental withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya, 
beginning with the initial withdrawal of 300 Syrian mercenaries from 
each side.
    To what extent does State consider the withdrawal of Russian and 
Turkish backed foreign forces from Libya a priority?

    Answer. The United States is increasing its diplomatic focus on 
supporting progress in Libya, including through the work of U.S. 
Special Envoy Richard Norland. The administration strongly supports the 
operationalization of UNSC resolution 2570 (2021) and full 
implementation of the October 23 ceasefire, including the withdrawal of 
all foreign military forces, proxy groups, and mercenaries. The 
administration continues to engage parties on all sides of the conflict 
to advance a political solution facilitated by the U.N. that reinforces 
the sovereignty of the Libyan people and protects the shared interests 
of the United States, our allies, and partners.

    Question. What, if any, leverage does the U.S. have over Russia and 
Turkey to ensure continued progress on this front? To what extent is 
the U.S. prepared to use this leverage?

    Answer. In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in 
supporting the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process, 
including elections on December 24 this year. And we are discussing 
with Russia, Turkey, and other NATO Allies and U.N. officials how to 
reduce the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before 
the elections.

    Question. The imminent U.S. and NATO military withdrawal appears to 
be fueling violence across Afghanistan. As the Taliban continues to 
rapidly gain ground, seizing control over key district centers and 
border crossing points, there are growing concerns over the country's 
future. In order to sustain the gains we've made over the past 20 
years, we will need to continue diplomatic focus.
    Earlier this summer, Turkey proposed to operate and provide 
security for Afghanistan's main international airport, provided the 
U.S. is willing to provide supplemental financial, political and 
logistical support in exchange.
    What is the status of U.S.-Turkish engagement on the security of 
the airport?

    Answer. Following discussions between President Biden and President 
Erdogan in Brussels, the U.S. and Turkish delegations held technical 
talks and made progress toward the possible continuation of Turkey's 
security support at Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai International Airport. 
Turkey maintaining its security presence at Kabul's airport after 
NATO's Resolute Support Mission ends would enable the United States and 
international partners to maintain a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan 
and sustain international assistance. Technical teams on both sides are 
working together to finalize this critical arrangement. We remain in 
close coordination with the Department of Defense, which is leading 
those technical negotiations.

    Question. To what extent is Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-
400 shaping the discussion?

    Answer. Turkey maintaining its security presence at Hamid Karzai 
International Airport after NATO's Resolute Support Mission ends would 
enable a long-term U.S. and international diplomatic presence in 
Afghanistan. Technical teams on both sides are working together to 
finalize this arrangement. We remain in close coordination with the 
Department of Defense, which is leading those technical negotiations. 
Separate from those technical negotiations, we also continue to urge 
Turkey at every level not to retain the S-400 system and remind Ankara 
that any new major Russian purchase risks additional CAATSA sanctions 
separate from and in addition to those imposed in December 2020.

    Question. Should talks with Turkey fall through, what steps is the 
administration willing to take to ensure Hamid Karzai International 
Airport remains open and continues to operate?

    Answer. A major component of sustaining a robust diplomatic 
presence in Kabul is to maintain a functioning and secure airport in 
Kabul. We are working with our international partners to identify and 
dedicate security resources to secure the international zone and secure 
HKIA, the international airport in Kabul for our diplomats, our 
personnel, and our continued support to the Government of Afghanistan. 
We are finalizing discussions with Turkey about a security presence at 
HKIA now. In the event Turkey instead decides to depart, we are also 
considering a range of alternative scenarios to secure the airport, 
including working with other international partners.

    Question. If the airport closes, how does the U.S. plan to ensure 
foreign embassies remain and humanitarian aid is distributed, 
particularly as the Taliban continues to expand its control over key 
border crossings?

    Answer. The safety and security of our personnel is a top priority 
for the Department. A major component of sustaining a robust diplomatic 
presence and providing humanitarian assistance in Kabul is to maintain 
a functioning and secure airport in Kabul. We are working with our 
international partners to identify and dedicate resources to ensure 
security for the international zone and the Hamid Karzai International 
Airport (HKIA), protect our diplomats and personnel, and maintain 
continued support to the people of Afghanistan. Both the Department and 
USAID have developed scenario-based contingency plans to adjust U.S. 
assistance programming as the operating environment warrants.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin

    Question. Democracy Backsliding: As a NATO ally, we expect Turkey 
to advance democracy and human rights and yet it is moving in the 
opposite direction. I am very concerned about Turkey's current 
trajectory. Turkey's abrupt withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, 
enshrining commitments to improve the status of women, is deeply 
concerning.
    Beyond the White House statement that Turkey and others ``should be 
working to strengthen and renew their commitments to ending violence 
against women, not rejecting international treaties designed to protect 
women and hold abusers accountable,'' what other actions have been 
taken by the administration? Did President Biden raise any of these 
issues during his one-on-one meeting with Erdogan at the NATO summit?

    Answer. The administration shares your concerns about democratic 
backsliding in Turkey. The United States has expressed publicly and 
privately to Turkey at the highest levels that countries should be 
working to strengthen and renew their commitments to preventing and 
responding to all forms of gender-based violence, not rejecting 
international treaties designed to protect women and hold abusers 
accountable. The administration will continue publicly and privately to 
urge Turkey to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
women's rights.

    Question. Have we engaged our Allies and partners to increase the 
pressure on Erdogan?

    Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human 
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The 
administration will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of 
expression, peaceful assembly, and association, and the right to a fair 
trial, which are important to any healthy democracy. We also regularly 
engage and coordinate with our Allies and partners to urge Turkey to 
support human rights and fundamental freedoms and to honor its 
international commitments.

    Question. Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP): Banning the political 
party HDP, which speaks for the Kurdish minority among many others, the 
country's third largest, would be a major step backwards for Turkish 
democracy that would severely damage prospects for a peaceful and 
enduring resolution to Turkey's Kurdish conflict.
    What is the latest situation on the treatment of the Kurdish-led 
Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)? How has the administration engaged 
Turkey on this issue?

    Answer. Opposition pro-Kurdish civil society organizations and 
political parties continue to experience problems exercising freedoms 
of assembly and association. Hundreds of Kurdish organizations and 
Kurdish-language media outlets were closed during the State of 
Emergency in 2016 and 2017 and remain shut. The United States is 
closely following efforts to dissolve the People's Democratic Party 
(HDP) and impose political bans on many HDP members. We engage 
continuously with the Turkish Government on our concerns, urging 
respect for the democratic process as well as fundamental freedoms in 
line with protections in the Turkish constitution and Turkey's 
international obligations.

    Question. S-400 and Russian Cooperation: Turkey's purchase of a 
Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system and its exploration of 
possibly acquiring Russian fighter aircraft are very troubling. I was 
disappointed that despite President Biden's efforts during his meeting 
with Erdogan on the margins of the NATO Summit the issue remains at a 
standstill.
    How is the administration working to engage Turkey on this issue?

    Answer. Turkey's acquisition and testing of S-400 surface-to-air 
missile systems from Russia undermine Allied interoperability and 
threaten Alliance systems. We continue to urge Turkey at every level 
not to retain the S-400 system and to refrain from purchasing any 
additional Russian materiel. As the Biden administration has made clear 
to Turkey, any major new Russian arms purchases would risk triggering 
additional CAATSA sanctions to those imposed in December 2020. Turkey 
knows exactly what it needs to do to secure relief from existing CAATSA 
sanctions.

    Question. What steps does the administration plan to take in 
response to Turkey's intransigence?

    Answer. We continue to urge Turkey at every level not to retain the 
S-400 system and to refrain from purchasing any additional Russian 
materiel. As the Biden administration has made clear to Turkey, any 
major new Russian arms purchases would risk triggering CAATSA sanctions 
separate from and in addition to those imposed in December 2020. These 
sanctions, as well as Turkey's removal from F-35 aircraft acquisition 
and co-production, sent a clear message.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                 Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey

    Question. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the 
United States hosts roughly 50 gravity nuclear bombs at Incirlik Air 
Base in south Turkey. Turkey's government cut power to Incirlik during 
the 2016 attempted coup. Given the recent rise of human rights 
violations, frays in our alliance, and a heightened risk for political 
turmoil, is the administration rethinking its decisions about the 
placement of weapons and other assets in Turkey accordingly?

    Answer. It is the longstanding policy of the United States to 
neither confirm nor deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in any 
particular country.
    Separately on Turkey, it is a long-standing Ally, has NATO's 
second-largest military, and is a key contributor to Allied missions, 
including in Afghanistan. We seek cooperation with Turkey on common 
priorities and engage in dialogue to address disagreements.

    Question. President Erdogan recently spoke with President Xi 
Jinping about the need for Uyghurs to live in peace and equality in 
China. The hypocrisy of President Erdogan's statement is lost on no 
one, but Turkey's pressure on China is welcome to continue shedding 
light on the mass scale of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Has the 
State Department engaged with our Turkish counterparts to align our 
efforts in regards to the genocide being carried out against Uyghurs by 
the Government of China?

    Answer. The United States regularly engages with Turkey to advocate 
for the protection of those fleeing Xinjiang and for the rights of 
members of ethnic and religious minority groups inside China. Turkey 
hosts between 30,000-60,000 Uyghurs, the largest Uyghur population 
outside Xinjiang. Turkey has welcomed Uyghurs for more than two decades 
under a variety of visa and immigration statuses. In a recent phone 
call, President Erdogan reportedly told PRC President Xi that Uyghurs 
should live in peace as equal citizens of China.

    Question. The recently agreed upon extradition treaty between 
Ankara and Beijing also presents a threat to Chinese Uyghurs in Turkey. 
How are we engaging with Turkey to make clear that vulnerable Uyghurs 
must not be sent back to be persecuted by the Chinese Government?

    Answer. Embassy officials, including Ambassador Satterfield, 
regularly meet with the Turkish Government to discuss Turkey's 
continued support for Uyghurs in the face of Chinese pressure. Turkey 
hosts between 30,000-60,000 Uyghurs, the largest Uyghur population 
outside Xinjiang. Turkey has welcomed Uyghurs for more than two decades 
under a variety of visa and immigration statuses. Senior Turkish 
officials, including Foreign Minister Cavusoglu in December 2020, 
continue to publicly assert that Turkey will not accede to PRC requests 
to forcibly repatriate Uyghur Muslims from Turkey. In a recent phone 
call, President Erdogan reportedly told PRC President Xi that Uyghurs 
should live in peace as equal citizens of China.

    Question. An area of potential cooperation with Turkey lies on 
issues related to forward progress and stability in the Balkan 
Peninsula--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia, and Kosovo. How are 
we engaging Turkey to ensure they play a positive role in improving 
stability in the Balkan region instead of stoking nationalist rhetoric?

    Answer. The United States cooperates with Turkey where our 
interests overlap, including on promoting political stability and 
economic development. We encourage Turkey to play a constructive role 
in helping the countries of the Balkans achieve their stated goals of 
European integration and regional stability. Turkey has a history of 
opposing Russian malign influence in the region. There are large 
infrastructure needs throughout the Balkans. Investment is key to 
unlocking higher growth rates in the region. Turkey can play a positive 
role.

    Question. If there is not significant improvement in the human 
rights record of the Erdogan Government, which is documented in the 
2020 State Department Human Rights Report for Turkey, would the 
administration support targeted Magnitsky sanctions or visa 
restrictions under the so-called ``Khashoggi Ban'' against individuals 
responsible for such human rights violations and Turkey's democratic 
backslide?

    Answer. President Biden's administration has elevated democracy, 
human rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The 
administration will look at all available tools to press Turkey to 
respect human rights, protect judicial independence and rule of law, 
support fundamental freedoms, and uphold the rules-based international 
order. We will apply the Khashoggi Ban as appropriate to promote 
accountability for serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident 
activities that target journalists, activists, and perceived 
dissidents, and their family members.

    Question. Specifically, what is the United States strategy to end 
Government of Turkey's abuse of Interpol ``red notices'' to detain 
critics abroad, its abductions to include Orhan Inandi, Turkish-Kyrgyz 
citizen, and its practice of transnational oppression whereby Turkish 
citizens are targeted in third countries without regard to their due 
process?

    Answer. The Biden administration takes seriously the threat posed 
by transnational repression. We will continue to encourage Turkey to 
respect fundamental human rights and its international commitments, as 
well as encourage third-country partners to resist pressure and follow 
due process in cases where Turkey pursues politically-motivated 
deportation. The United States is committed to strengthening 
international efforts to deter the misuse of INTERPOL Notices by Member 
States. This includes supporting reforms at INTERPOL and diplomatic 
outreach.
                                 ______
                                 

          Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions 
                     Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz

    In your testimony on July 21, 2021, you provided details about a 
deal between the Biden administration and Germany to allow completion 
of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
    I asked you about reports that ``the Biden White House has been 
pressuring Ukraine, demanding that they not criticize the deal, and 
threatening economic support, military support, and threatening 
President Zelensky directly to cancel the White House meeting with the 
President, unless they bite their tongues'' and support the deal (in 
June, President Biden had assured President Zelensky in June that he 
would be invited for a White House meeting in July). You described 
those reports as ``categorically incorrect'' and stated ``[n]one of us 
has been pressuring Ukraine.''
    I asked you again if it was ``your testimony . . . under oath in 
this committee that nobody in the Biden administration has been 
pressuring the Ukrainians not to criticize the deal?'' You revised what 
had been your categorical denial: you instead said, ``I know of nobody 
in the administration who has told them how to feel or how to speak 
about this.''
    Within hours of your testimony, Politico published a report 
confirming and describing a campaign by the Biden administration to 
pressure the Ukrainians. The report, which was headlined, ``Ukraine 
hits back at pressure from Biden administration over gas pipeline,'' 
included confirmation of the pressure campaign from senior Ukrainian 
Government officials and provided details about a trip to Kyiv by U.S. 
State Department counselor Derek Chollet in which he imposed that 
pressure. The report specifically confirmed that ``the pressure 
campaign by the Biden administration . . . had included a refusal to 
confirm a date for a visit to the White House'' by President Zelensky, 
which had originally been planned for July.
    At roughly the same time, the White House announced it had extended 
an invitation to President Zelensky, and that the visit would occur on 
August 30. The new date ensures that President Zelensky won't be able 
to engage members of Congress, who on a bipartisan basis continue to 
oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
    Question. Is the July 21, 2021, Politico report describing the 
pressure campaign by the Biden administration inaccurate? If it is 
inaccurate, what parts are inaccurate?

    Answer. As I stated in my testimony, we have taken zero action to 
silence Ukraine, and I know of no one in the administration who has 
told the Ukrainians how to feel or how to speak about this.

    Question. Did Counselor Chollet participate in any engagements with 
Ukrainian officials between June 7, 2021 and July 20, 2021, including 
meetings or calls, in which he urged them to support the developing or 
finalized U.S.-German deal?

    Answer. Counselor Chollet consulted frequently with Ukrainian 
officials throughout the negotiating process, to seek their input and 
views on the developing package with Germany and to urge direct 
Ukrainian-German consultations as well.

    Question. Additionally, in any of those engagements, did Ukrainian 
officials ask for Mr. Chollet to confirm a date for President Zelensky 
to visit the White House, and he declined to provide a date?

    Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to 
visit the White House later this summer. The White House, which is 
responsible for the President's schedule, confirmed the date of the 
visit prior to the release of the joint statement, and Mr. Chollet 
directly advised the Ukrainian Government of the date before it was 
announced publicly.

    Question. And if so, were you aware of the details of those 
engagements?

    Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to 
visit the White House later this summer. I was aware that the 
Ukrainians were eager to secure a date for the visit, and was glad to 
see that the White House, which is responsible for the President's 
schedule, was able to confirm the date of the visit prior to the 
release of the joint statement.

    Question. Did you personally participate in any engagements with 
Ukrainian officials between June 7, 2021, and July 20, 2021, including 
meetings or calls, in which you discussed the developing or finalized 
U.S.-German deal?

    Answer. Yes, we consulted regularly with Ukrainian officials 
throughout the negotiation process. I discussed Ukrainian security and 
energy security concerns with Presidential Advisor Yermak on several 
occasions during this period, and with Foreign Minister Kuleba. I 
encouraged both to share Kyiv's perspective on NS2 and actions Germany 
could take to address Ukraine's energy vulnerabilities with us and 
directly with the German Government.

    Question. Additionally, in any of those engagements, did Ukrainian 
officials ask for you to confirm a date for President Zelensky to visit 
the White House, and you declined to provide a date?

    Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to 
visit the White House later this summer. The White House, which is 
responsible for the President's schedule, confirmed the date of the 
visit prior to the release of the joint statement. On several occasions 
in the intervening period, Ukrainian officials pressed for a date, and 
I passed those requests on to the White House.

    Question. In your testimony, you described consultations with the 
Ukrainians to provide assurances in response to their Nord Stream 2-
related security concerns that occurred ``before this consultation with 
the Germans even began.''
    When did ``this consultation with the Germans'' begin?

    Answer. We have engaged with Germany at multiple levels since the 
beginning of this administration, and intensively throughout the course 
of our diplomatic efforts over the past 2 months on the U.S.-Germany 
joint statement.

    Question. When did those prior consultations with the Ukrainians 
occur?

    Answer. We have engaged with Ukraine at multiple levels since the 
beginning of this administration, including during the Secretary's May 
trip to Kyiv, and intensively throughout the course of our diplomatic 
efforts over the past 2 months on the U.S.-Germany joint statement.

    Question. Please assess the degree to which the Ukrainians are 
satisfied with the assurances that the Biden administration has 
provided in these or other consultations.

    Answer. We took note of the Ukraine-Poland joint statement and 
anticipate continued consultations with Ukraine as we move forward with 
implementation, and as we look forward to welcoming President Zelenskyy 
to the White House on August 30 to discuss the full range of bilateral 
issues.

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