[Senate Hearing 117-113]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-113
U.S. POLICY ON TURKEY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
46-375 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Washington, DC........................................ 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 7
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Robert Menendez........................................ 26
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator James E. Risch......................................... 26
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Benjamin L. Cardin..................................... 31
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Edward J. Markey....................................... 33
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by
Senator Ted Cruz............................................... 34
(iii)
U.S. POLICY ON TURKEY
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:20 a.m. in
room SD-G50, Hon. Bob Menendez, chairman of the committee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Coons,
Murphy, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Romney, Young,
Barrasso, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come
to order.
Let us start with the very recent developments from the
region. Yesterday, President Erdogan visited illegally-occupied
Cyprus and announced a plan to develop the seaside town of
Varosha.
Over the years, I have met with Greek Cypriots who had to
evacuate Varosha in 1974, fleeing the invading Turkish army for
safety. Many of them ended up emigrating to the United States.
Forty-seven years following the invasion, their stories
remain harrowing, a daily reminder of those terrible days in
1974. For years, many in the international community, including
President Biden himself, have supported a peace process which
would establish a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the
island. Erdogan's visit cast these efforts aside, as well as
long-standing U.N. resolutions on Varosha.
His goal is to advance a separate state on the island of
Cyprus. Simply put, this violation of international law is
unacceptable, and I expect to hear from the undersecretary
today a plan on how the Biden administration will respond.
I led a letter with several members on this committee to
the President last week. Erdogan's actions are not simply about
Cyprus, but mark a crucial test for the U.N. system and the
U.S. response.
We need to see a strong statement from the U.N. Security
Council today condemning this move.
Unfortunately, this pattern of Turkish aggression across
the region has become the norm. Last summer, Erdogan provided
military support to Azerbaijani strikes against ethnic
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. He also facilitated the passage
of militants from Syria to fight on the side of Azerbaijan.
Yet, these actions elicited no penalty from the Trump
administration, no concrete reaction from the international
community, no sanction.
This is unacceptable, and I expect more from this
administration than I did the last and I look forward to
understanding how the department views Turkey's role in last
year's war and what measures can be taken in response.
I appreciate the excellent work done by the Biden
administration in reestablishing our rock-solid bond with NATO.
It is the most powerful alliance in the history of the world
and an absolutely essential pillar of U.S. national security.
So when Turkey, as a NATO member, introduces a Russian S-
400 air defense system into its territory, it poses a
significant threat to NATO. It poses a significant threat to
U.S. pilots. It poses a significant threat to our partners.
Under no circumstances will I support the lifting of CAATSA
sanctions if the S-400 remains in Turkey, nor would I support
Turkey rejoining the F-35 program.
I am proud of the role played by Congress to advance these
sanctions and ensure their implementation. The message should
be clear. Any effort to weaken NATO from within or outside will
be met by a robust response by the United States.
In Syria, the United States and Turkey remain at cross
purposes through multiple military interventions, some of which
were directly green lighted by the previous administration.
Turkey has created several zones of control in northern
Syria that encompass 4,000 square miles, roughly, the size of
Lebanon, and contain 4 million people, equivalent to the
population of Croatia.
While these areas provide safe haven for millions of
Syrians displaced from government-controlled areas, they have
done so at a horrific cost to the local Kurdish population, who
have endured forced displacement and kidnappings, unlawful
detention and torture, illegal property seizures and numerous
other human rights violations at the hands of Turkish-backed
opposition forces.
Beyond the considerable human rights concerns, these
actions directly undermine the United States' counterterrorism
partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces in our shared
fight against the Islamic State. This is also unacceptable.
President Erdogan has publicly asked President Biden for
greater cooperation with Turkey and Syria. It is paramount that
the administration provide the committee with greater clarity
concerning how it is addressing Turkey's role in the numerous
human rights violations committed in northern Syria, and the
conditions it will apply to any enhanced cooperation with
Ankara in this regard.
In Libya, despite the successful creation of a unity
government after years of conflict, Turkey continues to
maintain thousands of Syrian mercenaries, the presence of
which, along with Russian-backed foreign fighters, threatens
both the country's upcoming elections as well as its fragile
peace.
Turkey has capitalized with the vulnerability of Libya's
previous Government to extract a maritime border agreement that
is in direct conflict with U.S. interests in the eastern
Mediterranean, and violates Greece and Cyprus' internationally
recognized maritime boundaries and rights.
These are not the actions of a constructive partner, let
alone a NATO ally. Erdogan sees his country as on par with the
great powers of the world. It is not.
President Erdogan has, tragically, shredded its democratic
institutions, imprisoned journalists. He has targeted his
political opposition for arrest and sought to silence
university professors.
To say that more lawyers and journalists are arrested and
in jail in Turkey than in any other place in the world is
saying something, considering some of those other places in the
world.
These are the actions of a weak government, not a world
power, and we should treat it as such. This treatment extends
to United States embassy and consulate staff in the country. To
this day, several individuals remain in prison on trumped up
charges. It is disgraceful.
The under secretary, I am sure, will agree that the U.S.
embassy staff should never be treated this way anywhere,
especially by a so-called ally. So I look forward to hearing an
update on their status in our efforts to secure their freedom.
We all hope for a day when Turkey embodies a high standard
of democratic values and respect for human rights expected from
a NATO member. The region and the world needs a stable and
democratic Turkey. Under Erdogan, such a future is but a dim
hope.
I look forward to the undersecretary's views on these and
other issues and we appreciate your appearance before the
committee.
With that, let me recognize the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Risch, for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the clear takeaways from this hearing is going to be
that there is bipartisan agreement on the many issues that we
have with Turkey.
Turkey is a center of a complex and important geopolitical
crossroads. It is where Europe, Asia, and the Middle East meet
and it borders the increasingly important Mediterranean and
Black Seas.
First and foremost in this hearing we must discuss the
direct bilateral relationship between the United States and
Turkey, which, of course, the chairman has already done, I am
going to add to, and at a deeper level, the role our
relationship plays in the eastern Mediterranean and across the
region. Turkey is deeply interconnected and, of course, we must
deal with them.
Before delving into the problems, I have to say how painful
this is. Turkey has been a long-time ally of the United States
and of our European partners. Obviously, they are a NATO ally,
even though they are not acting like a NATO ally at this time.
Nonetheless, they are in the NATO alliance, and it is very
painful to see the country deteriorate as it has deteriorated
and left the commitments that we, all of the NATO partners,
have had to the values and things that we value in NATO.
The most pressing aspect of our relationship is Turkey's
acquisition and continued use of the Russian S-400 missile
system. This issue remains at an impasse and has now grown to
define the most significant part of our relationship, and it is
deeply troubling.
It is unacceptable that Turkey believes it can reap the
benefits of NATO membership while refusing to commit to the
basic principle of a cohesive interoperable alliance.
They seem to have forgotten that NATO was formed
specifically to push back against Russian aggression. Dealing
with them on military purchases like this is just simply
unacceptable.
This is an issue I raise with Turkish leaders at every
opportunity. Indeed, I had a very clear discussion with
President Erdogan in person, face to face, where I laid out the
precise nature of the problems created and caused by the
presence of Russian-made S-400s on the soil of a NATO ally.
He understood, but persisted. This issue will not go away,
and it greatly affects our overall relationship on several
fronts when it comes to NATO matters, including the F-35s.
Speaking of the F-35s, after our conversation he understood
clearly that even though they have paid for five of them, the
five have been completed and are sitting here in the United
States. Those F-35s will not be delivered to Turkey so long as
there are S-400 missiles on Turkish soil.
The same with the construction of parts for the F-35. There
were 900 parts for the F-35 being produced in Turkey. That is
down to a very minimal amount right now, and will eventually be
completely phased out.
Ending on a positive note, first of all, Erdogan has
appointed a new ambassador to the United States. This
ambassador is very engaging and says, and I believe, that he
wants to do his best to attempt to repair what is, obviously, a
deteriorating relationship.
I hope he is successful in that regard.
Turkey's recent agreement to withdraw its mercenaries from
Libya also shows it has the capacity for responsible
stabilization through diplomacy. It remains to be seen whether
they follow through on this commitment and it is important that
we ensure that they do.
Likewise, Turkey deserves international recognition for
hosting millions of Syrian refugees for the past several years.
We must take a clear-eyed look at our relationship with
Turkey. We can appreciate and encourage the good while clearly
condemning the bad. I expect our discussions today will help us
define these matters and develop a better understanding of how
to address them in this emerging era.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will now turn to the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Victoria Nuland. We welcome you back to the
committee. We look forward to hearing the administration's
views on our policy vis-a-vis Turkey, moving forward.
I would ask that you summarize your remarks in about 5
minutes or so to allow time for a dialogue with you. Without
objection, your full statement will be included in the record,
and you are now recognized.
Madam Secretary.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, distinguished members of this committee for the
invitation to come before you to discuss U.S.-Turkey relations
today.
As the committee knows well, and as you have both stated,
the United States has a multifaceted and complex relationship
with Turkey, a NATO ally for over 68 years.
There are areas where we are firmly aligned in policy and
outlook and working well together. There are areas where we do
not see eye to eye and are working to close those gaps and
there are areas where we have profound disagreements with the
Turkish Government, including with regard to Cyprus yesterday.
In these last two categories, President Biden and all of us
who work for him are frank with our Turkish counterparts when
we disagree, as are Turkish officials with us.
To start with the areas of strong cooperation, Turkey makes
crucial contributions to NATO missions around the world, and
our partnership with Turkey, which has the second largest
standing military in NATO, enables us to project power in the
region and defend NATO's eastern and southern flanks.
We also have an important economic relationship with
Turkey, one that generates upwards of $20 billion in annual
bilateral trade, including an increasing energy and LNG
relationship.
Washington and Ankara share priorities in countering
terrorism, deterring Russian and Iranian malign influence in
the Middle East, and Turkey is a staunch supporter of Ukraine
and Georgia's territorial integrity and vocally supports their
accession to NATO.
In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in
supporting the Libyan-led U.N.-facilitated political process
including the prospect of elections on December 24 of this
year, and we are now discussing how to reduce the presence of
foreign fighters and mercenaries before the election.
In Syria, as both of you have mentioned, Turkey's presence
in the northwest protects some 4 million Syrians from
indiscriminate targeting by the Assad regime.
New attacks there would be both a humanitarian catastrophe
and likely launch a new wave of refugees into Turkey and
Europe.
We are also grateful for Turkey's ongoing efforts to
support 4 million refugees inside Turkey, making Turkey the
largest refugee-hosting country in the world. Most recently,
Turkey has expressed interest in maintaining a robust force at
Kabul's airport, as the U.S. and NATO military missions in
Afghanistan come to an end.
This contribution, as you all know, is vital to ensuring
that we and our allies and partners can maintain a strong
diplomatic presence in Kabul after our troops withdraw.
Even as we work closely on these issues, President Biden
has been clear with President Erdogan when we disagree, as have
all of us.
We continue to object to Turkey's purchase and deployment
of the Russian S-400 air defense system and have made clear
that any new major arms purchases from Russia will trigger
additional CAATSA sanctions. As you both said, the sale and co-
production of the F-35 will remain suspended.
We also press Turkey to avoid entanglements and regional
conflicts that threaten long-term stability. The role played by
third parties, including Turkey, in last year's fighting in
Nagorno-Karabakh exacerbated regional tensions, and we have
pressed Turkey to press Baku to release all detainees
immediately, to support a ceasefire, and to help the sides work
towards a sustainable long-term political solution.
We also urge Turkey's leaders to address disagreements in
the region through diplomacy rather than through provocative
action or rhetoric. We condemn yesterday's announcement by
Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and Turkish President Erdogan,
which would allow Turkish Cypriots to take control of parts of
Varosha.
This move is inconsistent with U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 550 and 7089, which explicitly call for Varosha to
be administered by the United Nations.
The United States views this action as provocative,
unacceptable, and detrimental to the prospects for the
resumption of settlement talks.
We are urging a reversal of this decision, including in a
phone call that I made to Ankara this morning, and we are
working with like-minded partners in the U.N. Security Council.
A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the
island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is the only path
to lasting peace and stability.
President Biden has also made clear that supporting
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law is central to his
administration, and protecting those freedoms is critical for
Turkey to be a stable and democratic and reliable ally and
partner.
We have been clear at all levels with the Turkish
Government and in the department's annual Human Rights Report
about our specific concerns, and we will continue to engage the
Turkish Government on individual human rights cases, media
freedom, freedom of expression, assembly, and association,
judicial independence, and fair trial guarantees.
In this regard, as you said, Mr. Chairman, a top concern
remains the release of local employees of U.S. Mission Turkey
who have been unjustly detained.
Overall, we are working to try to resolve these concerns
and advance our agenda through robust and regular engagement at
all levels with Turkish counterparts, and with candor and
clarity in those discussions.
I would like to make one final point, if I may, before
taking your questions.
I know that this committee is exploring how to expedite
consideration of more than 20 State Department senior political
appointees and ambassadors in the weeks before the August
recess, and you have recently noticed some additional hearings.
We are very grateful for this effort, and I just want to
underscore that the strength of American diplomacy and the
department's role in the policy process will be greatly
enhanced by moving these nominees expeditiously to full Senate
confirmation before the recess.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Victoria Nuland
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of
the Committee, thank you for the invitation to discuss the U.S.-Turkish
relationship. We welcome the Committee's engagement on Turkey and the
Eastern Mediterranean, and we want to work together to advance U.S.
interests and values in this region and beyond.
As this Committee knows well, the United States has a multi-faceted
and complex relationship with Turkey, a NATO Ally for over 68 years.
There are areas where we are firmly aligned in policy and outlook and
working well together; there are areas where we don't see eye-to-eye
and we are working to close the gaps; and there are areas where we have
profound disagreements with the Turkish Government, including with
regard to Cyprus yesterday. In these last two categories, President
Biden and all of us who work for him are frank with our Turkish
counterparts when we disagree, as are Turkish officials with us.
To start with areas of strong cooperation, Turkey makes crucial
contributions to NATO missions around the world. Our partnership with
Turkey--which has the second largest standing military in NATO--enables
us to project power in the region and defend NATO's eastern and
southern flanks.
The United States also has an important economic relationship with
Turkey, one that generates upwards of $20 billion in annual bilateral
trade. Roughly 1,700 U.S. companies operate in Turkey and 60 firms
maintain regional headquarters in the country. U.S. liquified natural
gas exports to Turkey increased 305 percent between 2019 and 2020, a
trend that if continued, will diversify Turkey's sources of natural gas
supply and reduce reliance on pipeline gas from Russia and Iran. Since
January, Turkey and Greece have also resumed exploratory talks on
energy and other issues. Resource development in the Eastern
Mediterranean should promote cooperation and provide a foundation for
durable energy security and economic prosperity throughout the region.
Washington and Ankara share priorities in countering terrorism and
deterring Russian and Iranian malign influence in the Middle East.
Turkey is a staunch supporter of Ukraine's and Georgia's territorial
integrity and vocally supports their accession to NATO.
In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in supporting
the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process, including elections
on December 24 this year. And we are discussing how to reduce the
presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before the
elections.
In Syria, Turkey's presence in the northwest protects some 4
million Syrians from indiscriminate targeting by the Assad regime; new
attacks there would be both a humanitarian catastrophe and likely
launch a new wave of refugees into Turkey and Europe. We are also
grateful for Turkey's ongoing efforts to support the 4 million
refugees, including 3.6 million Syrians, making Turkey the largest
refugee-hosting country in the world.
Most recently, Turkey has expressed interest in maintaining a
robust force at Kabul's airport as the U.S. and NATO military missions
in Afghanistan come to an end. This contribution is vital to ensuring
we and our Allies and partners can maintain a strong diplomatic
presence in Kabul after our troops withdraw. Following discussions
between Presidents Biden and Erdogan at the NATO summit last month,
technical teams on both sides are working together to finalize this
critical arrangement.
Even as we work closely with Ankara on these issues, President
Biden has been clear with President Erdogan when we disagree, as have
all members of our team with their counterparts. We continue to object
to Turkey's purchase and deployment of the Russian S-400 air defense
system and have made clear that any new major arms purchases from
Russia risk triggering additional CAATSA sanctions. Sale and co-
production of the F-35 will remain suspended.
We also press Turkey to avoid entanglements in regional conflicts
that threaten long-term stability. The role played by third parties,
including Turkey, in last year's fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict exacerbated regional tensions. We have pressed Turkey to urge
Baku to release all detainees immediately, to support the ceasefire
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and to help the sides work towards a
sustainable, long-term political solution to the conflict.
We also urge Turkey's leader to address disagreements in the region
through diplomacy, rather than through provocative actions or rhetoric.
We condemn yesterday's announcement by Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and
Turkish President Erdogan to allow Turkish Cypriots to take control of
parts of Varosha. This move is inconsistent with U.N. Security Council
resolutions 550 and 789, which explicitly call for Varosha to be
administered by the United Nations. The United States views this action
as provocative, unacceptable, and detrimental to the prospects for the
resumption of settlement talks. We are urging a reversal of this
decision and are working with like-minded partners in the U.N. Security
Council. A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the island
as a bizonal, bicommunal federation is the only path to lasting peace
and stability.
President Biden has also made clear that supporting democracy,
human rights, and the rule of law is a central priority for his
administration. Protecting these freedoms is critical for Turkey to be
a stable, democratic, and reliable Ally and partner. We have been clear
with all levels of the Turkish Government, and in the Department's
annual Human Rights Report, about our specific concerns. The President
expressed his disappointment over Turkey's recent withdrawal from the
Istanbul Convention on preventing violence against women, and the
administration has continued to urge the Turkish Government to support
gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. We will
continue to engage the Turkish Government on individual human rights
cases; media freedom; freedom of expression, assembly, and association;
and judicial independence and fair trial guarantees. In this regard a
top concern remains the release of local employees of U.S. Mission
Turkey who have been unjustly detained.
We believe the best way to resolve these concerns and advance our
agenda is through robust and regular engagement at all levels, and by
candor and clarity with our Turkish counterparts. The administration
welcomes the opportunity to stay in close coordination with this
Committee and others in Congress on all these issues. We would also
welcome regular direct engagement by Members with Turkish leaders and
Congressional visits to Ankara, as conditions allow.
I would like to make one final point about the national security
imperative of having our Senate-confirmed team of Department senior
leaders and Ambassadors in place as soon as possible. I was pleased to
see the President's announcement of your former colleague, Senator
Flake, as the nominee to be U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, and look forward
to the Committee's consideration of him. I know the Committee is
exploring how to expedite consideration of more than 20 other nominees
in the weeks ahead of the August recess. We are grateful for this
effort, and I just want to underscore that the strength of American
diplomacy and the Department's role in the policy process will be
greatly enhanced by moving these nominees expeditiously to full Senate
confirmation before the recess.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you.
We will start a round of 5 minutes of questions, and I will
just say on your last point, I totally embrace that. We are
marching forward rather aggressively. We had a panel of three
under-secretaries yesterday and have more. Senator Risch and I
have just agreed on some for next week.
I think the administration's challenge is on the Senate
floor, not before this committee, and I know that Senator Cruz
has taken the view that he is going to hold up nominees over
the Nord Stream pipeline issue, and I respect both his
prerogatives as well as the question of Nord Stream.
I just think it is detrimental to the United States not to
have its people on the ground in order to make the case and
promote U.S. interests, and we hope we can come to a resolution
in that regard.
So let me start. Do I have your commitment that CAATSA
sanctions will remain in place on Turkey if it continues to
possess the Russian S-400 air defenses?
Ms. Nuland. You do, Mr. Chairman, and not only my
commitment, but the President.
The Chairman. Does the administration maintain a commitment
to full implementation of Section 231 of CAATSA not only in
Turkey but for that fact around the world?
Ms. Nuland. We do.
The Chairman. Can I get your commitment to brief me if
there is any effort within the interagency to weaken or in any
way diminish the use of CAATSA 231 in Turkey or anywhere else?
Ms. Nuland. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Now, as mentioned, Turkey now insists on a two-state
solution in Cyprus. While our Government has rejected the
notion at the highest level, I have seen some lower level
officials at the State Department have been quoted talking
about Turkish Cypriot ``sovereignty.''
Can you affirm that the United States rejects the notion of
two states?
Ms. Nuland. Absolutely. As I said in my statement, we think
only a Cypriot-led process bi-zonal bi-communal will bring
peace and stability in Cyprus.
The Chairman. Are we working to ensure that there will be a
U.N. resolution on Varosha?
Ms. Nuland. We are, and we had consultations yesterday in
the U.N., and those will continue until we have a product.
The Chairman. Is Turkey establishing a drone base in
occupied Cyprus?
Ms. Nuland. Sir, I am personally not aware of that, but I
will take a look at it.
The Chairman. I would like you to. My information is that
they are. Then the question of if they are then what are the
implications of such a move for the Republic of Cyprus, which
is part of the European Union, but others in the region, like
Israel and Egypt, for example.
Ms. Nuland. It would, obviously, be destabilizing? So let
me take that for review.
The Chairman. We are agreed.
Over the past year, Turkey has violated Greek airspace and
acted aggressively in the Cypriot-exclusive economic zone. This
has been happening in two EU member states. Last year, Brussels
considered sanctions in response to this behavior, but,
ultimately, decided against strong measures.
Are you familiar with what role the United States played in
the European sanctions debate?
Ms. Nuland. I am not familiar with how we would have played
inside the EU conversation. I am familiar with the fact that we
encouraged both Greece and Turkey to have bilateral talks.
We also encouraged the Secretary General of NATO to become
involved in trying to mediate this dispute, as has been the
case over many decades, and that the situation has calmed
somewhat.
The Chairman. Are you aware of U.S. efforts to dissuade the
EU from imposing sanctions?
Ms. Nuland. I am not familiar with that. That does not
sound right to me.
The Chairman. So let me just say, and I just heard your
response to the question before. I appreciate--we call on, in
many cases, both countries to act appropriately.
The problem with that is when both countries are doing
something wrong, I get it. When only one country is doing
something wrong, it is a little disingenuous. As far as I know,
Greece is not making incursions into Turkish airspace.
The Turks are doing that to Greece. They do it in the
territorial waters of Greece. They seek to drill in the
territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus.
So we cannot be calling on both sides to, ultimately, try
to negotiate in good faith when one is the aggressor, and I
think we make a huge mistake when we do not acknowledge who is
the aggressor in a certain set of actions.
Let me ask you, are you familiar with Turkey facilitating
the transfer of fighters from Syria to Azerbaijan during the
2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh?
Ms. Nuland. I think it would be appropriate on that last
point to discuss it in a separate session, if that is
acceptable to you, Mr. Chairman, in another setting.
The Chairman. All right. Well, as part of that, I will be
looking forward to hearing from the department on whether you
investigated any of the Turkish drones used by Azerbaijan in
the war last summer that included U.S.-produced component
parts, which I find totally unacceptable.
Do you support full--do you meaning the department, of
course--support full implementation of the Eastern
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, the law that
I helped write with Senator Rubio and members of this
committee, for the establishment of a regional energy center to
help deepen energy cooperation in the region and to deal both
on security and renewable technologies?
Ms. Nuland. We do, and we have been engaged with the
individual parties to try to encourage more coordination in
that regard. It is one of the success stories of recent period.
The Chairman. Finally, because I want to go to other
colleagues, the Council of Europe judicial arm of the European
Court of Human Rights ordered Turkey to immediately release
civil society leader Osman Kavala and Kurdish politician
Selahattin Demirtas from prison. What is the administration
doing to advocate for both of the individuals' release?
Ms. Nuland. We have advocated directly for their release as
well as other political prisoners and as well as appropriate
treatment of media and other unjustly prosecuted individuals in
Turkey, and we will continue to do so and we do that at every
level.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How does State assess Turkey's continued commitment to the
S-400? I think a lot of us have been incredibly clear with them
of the consequences, and my sense is they did not really think
we would follow through on things like CAATSA.
My sense also is that they have come to the realization
that we are serious about this and that it is not going to go
away. Do you share that assessment, and what other thoughts
might you have in that regard?
Ms. Nuland. As I said, Mr. Ranking Member, when I came up
for my confirmation hearing, it is incomprehensible to me,
personally, and to most of us why a NATO ally would want to
acquire a Russian system and put at risk all of the things that
have been put at risk, including co-production of the F-35,
which was not only a security benefit but it was also of
economic benefit to Turkey.
So I think that you may have your finger on it, that they
walked into this or were romanced into this by the seller
without expecting that the costs would be as high as they have
been, and it is uncomfortable for them that they are as high as
they have been.
We continue to offer them various ways and off ramps out of
this, including in our most recent highest level encounter, and
we will continue to have that conversation. As we said, there
are many things we cannot do together that we would like to do
together while this goes forward.
Senator Risch. Well, as you and I have discussed a number
of times, it is mind boggling that they have gone down the road
they have gone down, and particularly when they have been
offered the clear off ramps that they have been offered, which,
obviously, we cannot talk about publicly completely.
This is really disconcerting, and the good news is, is I
think that one of the things, I think, might have pushed it
over the edge is the fact that I do not think that they thought
we would take away those 900 parts that they were co-producing
for the F-35.
We have done so and I think that is a very significant
economic matter for them, and it is totally in their hands that
that happened.
Turning for a minute to the agreement that we all know
about the mess that is going on in Libya, and Turkey and Russia
have both played a part in making it messier.
They now have announced that they have reached this
tentative agreement to withdraw the foreign troops and
mercenaries from Libya. What is State's assessment, your
assessment, as to whether or not that will actually come to
fruition? These agreements are easy to make, hard to execute.
What are your thoughts?
Ms. Nuland. You are not wrong about that, Senator Risch.
Both Turkey at the highest level and Russia at the highest
level have said that they are willing to support the withdrawal
of mercenary forces, but they want to do it in tandem with each
other.
We are working with the current U.N. envoy, Mr. Kubish, on
how that might work, a synchronized withdrawal, and we are
hopeful for progress on that well before the election at the
end of the year.
Senator Risch. Thank you. I am going to yield back since we
have got a vote going on and others want to ask questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
for holding this important hearing.
I want to thank you, Under Secretary Nuland, not only for
your service now and your presence and testimony here, but for
your long service to our nation. I very much appreciate it.
Under Secretary, you cited the very complex relationship
that exists with Turkey. I think both the chairman and the
ranking member have also done a great job of highlighting some
of the issues that are associated with our critical strategic
relationship with this nation.
We have an alliance that has existed for many, many years
between Turkey and United States, and Turkey plays a critical
role in NATO, one that we need to continue to preserve and
support.
There are serious problems, as have been noted, in many
dimensions in terms of Turkey's current behavior. If you think
about the arrest of U.S. Government local employees in Turkey,
the S-400 program that both the ranking member and the chairman
have been so articulate about.
Turkey's purchase of Russian assets like that are very
disturbing, as you know, to all of us, their crackdown on
journalists and the friction that exists when their forces
collide with our activity in Syria to fight against ISIS. It is
a complex relationship, as you say.
I share the ranking member's optimism that our new
ambassador from Turkey will take a new approach. I had the
privilege of serving in Japan with him when I served as U.S.
ambassador to Japan.
So I share the optimism that Ranking Member Risch noted
with our new Turkish ambassador to the United States. I hope
you will have a good working relationship with him as well.
I would be very curious, and this is a process question
really, curious as to your approach in terms of having a
structured strategic dialogue with Turkey, trying to preserve
the good and important strategic aspects of what needs to
happen there while pressing hard against Ankara on those issues
where we will certainly differ and need to be strong against. I
would appreciate just your perspective a bit, Under Secretary,
on how you will approach that.
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Hagerty.
Well, I think we approach this very much as President Biden
approaches all of our strategic relationships, which is to
engage, engage, engage at every level, and to work together on
as many things as we can but to be absolutely frank when we
disagree, and I think you saw that when he and President
Erdogan met on the margins of the NATO summit about a month
ago.
Prior to that, we had had Deputy Secretary Sherman in
Ankara, one of her first overseas trips, to engage at all
levels. I am now speaking probably every 2 weeks with my
Turkish counterpart.
We have the excellent David Satterfield as our ambassador
on the ground and the Honorable Senator Flake in the chute to
succeed him, Senate willing, in the future.
Our process here is to talk about every single issue with
as much frequency and as much candor as we can and try to close
the gaps, and when we cannot close the gaps to be clear that we
will call it as we see it, as we did yesterday on Varosha. I
think you saw that pretty tough statement.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that approach and that
perspective, and to the extent that this committee can be
helpful to you in any aspect of that, know that, certainly, I
stand ready to be supportive.
I would like to pick up on something that Chairman Menendez
also mentioned, too, and that is the role--again, a process
question--but the role that you feel we could play in helping
address disputes like that that exists between Turkey and
Greece.
If you think about their entire posture in the eastern
Mediterranean, what role do you think the United States can
play in a constructive manner to help address that with our
allies?
Ms. Nuland. Well, the good news, Senator, is that Greece
and Turkey have been back in talks, particularly on the
maritime situation, since January, and they are meeting with
pretty regular frequency. So we have encouraged those and we
support them from our platforms in both Athens and Ankara.
We also have encouraged the secretary general of NATO, as I
said earlier, to be active with both Greece and Turkey to
provide them a safe space to work through their issues and,
particularly, as the chairman said, when there are incursions
into airspace that are unacceptable.
One thing I cut out of my statement for length, but it is
in the longer statement, we do encourage, as you all get back
into the travel business, to consider stops in Ankara and
Athens, ideally in a bipartisan way to talk frankly about both
what is going well and the issues where we have to do better.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you for your leadership, Under
Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murphy [Presiding.] Thank you very much.
In Senator Menendez's absence, I will recognize myself as
next in line for questioning.
Good to see you, Madam Secretary. Thank you for joining us
today. I wanted to dig a little bit deeper into the dangerous
slide away from democracy in Turkey.
In June, Turkey's Constitutional Court ordered that the
country's main pro-Kurdish party, the HDP, go on trial over
alleged links to Kurdish fighters.
Now, the Kurds are Turkey's largest ethnic minority and the
HDP has grown sort of so successful and so popular that it
briefly helped end Erdogan's ruling AKP parliamentary majority
for the first time in over a decade.
The State Department has said that these attempts to,
essentially, eradicate the HDP from Turkey's political
infrastructure would ``further undermine'' democracy.
Can you talk a little bit more about whether the State
Department has directly engaged with the Turkish Government on
this issue and what steps can we take, both the executive and
legislative branch, to try to make sure that the upcoming
elections in 2023 are fair and that there is a robust multi-
party system that is not undermined to the point of futility
between now and those elections?
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Senator Murphy.
We share your concerns about the treatment of the HDP. I
know that there are members of this committee who have
relationships with some of those members.
Obviously, it is important and it goes to the conversation
we had with Senator Hagerty about the value that we see in
members of this committee and other leaders in the Congress
making regular trips to Ankara and showing support for
political leaders across the spectrum, particularly those who
are under particular pressure.
This issue is very much part of our larger concern about
the human rights situation in Turkey, which we are very frank
about from the highest level onward, that respect for human
rights, fundamental freedoms, upholding fair trial guarantees,
judicial independence, freedom of association, freedom of
political practice, are central to any thriving democracy.
Our view is very much the same as yours, that Turkey
weakens itself when it does not uphold these fundamental
freedoms, and particularly in the area of political pluralism.
Senator Murphy. Let me maybe ask this civic question. What
would be the impact of banning the largest Kurdish political
party?
What would be the impact on the upcoming elections, and is
there any justification on our mind for such a sweeping measure
as necessary to continue what is a legitimate interest that the
Turkish Government has on cracking down on Kurdish-affiliated
terrorism that still does pose a legitimate threat to the
security of the country?
Ms. Nuland. When legitimate terrorism cases can be made in
a free and transparent manner with access to independent
judicial process and all of that, obviously, it is in our
interest and Turkey's interest to take action.
That is a far different matter than using a terrorism
excuse to eradicate political pluralism or ban an individual
party. As you know, there is a significant Kurdish population
in Turkey which supports the HDP and which risks being
disenfranchised were such a party to be banned.
As you know, the majority party has also made quite an
effort to, how should we say, recruit HDP members into their
fold. To the extent that party changes occur, that needs to be
effectuated with free will and without any coercion also.
Senator Murphy. Finally, and I am not asking for an
extensive answer on this question, given limited time, but I am
interested to know whether the department is pursuing Interpol
reforms after the 2016 coup attempt.
The Turkish Government issued approximately 30,000 red
notices on the Interpol system and, of course, some of the
actions that Turkey has taken are consistent with the ways in
which other nations have begun to compromise the Interpol
system.
You also have, obviously, increasing news of extradition
attempts and attempts to target dissidents abroad. Are we
concerned at all about the overuse of the red notice system and
is this something that we are looking into with respect to a
future reform agenda?
Ms. Nuland. I am going to take the question on what we are
doing on Interpol reform, per se. I will say that you are not
wrong that when the Interpol system is flooded with cases that
do not meet the standard, it sucks up time, energy, and money
that should appropriately be applied to cases that do meet the
standard. So it is an issue of concern.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much.
Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Chairman Murphy. Thank you,
Under Secretary Nuland. It is good to see you and appreciate
your expertise and perspectives with regards to our strategy in
Turkey.
I just wanted to follow up on a line of questioning that
Senator Risch began with regards to the production of some 900
parts for the F-35.
Has that production ended or is it in the process of
ending, and do we have any sense of what the economic impact
will be in Turkey of that production ending?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Romney.
Yes, we are in the phase-out part, as you know, after we
ended the F-35 engagement. There were supply chain reasons to
phase out the spare parts, including the need to ramp up
production elsewhere so that we did not hurt the line globally.
My understanding is that it--I am going to ask you to go to
DoD on the precise phase down, but I think we are within the
year, if not sooner, of being finished there.
Overall, Turkey took a significant hit, not just in terms
of security, but, as I said, in terms of its economy from the
suspension of the program, both jobs and the potential to
export and be part of the export chain in the future, so and
particularly at a time when the Turkish economy is hurting in
other areas. It was an interesting decision by the Government.
Let us put it that way.
Senator Romney. There was some speculation earlier about
whether this was something that Erdogan had actually considered
and may have misjudged what America's response might be.
Is there also the possibility that this was calculated by
Mr. Erdogan in a desire to draw closer to Russia?
Can you characterize the relationship that you are seeing
building between Erdogan and Putin? Is it close? Is it
collaborative? Is he hoping to play the EU and the U.S. off
against Russia or is he actually moving pretty strong in that
direction?
Ms. Nuland. Well, let me start by saying that our interest
here is clear, which is in cementing Turkey as much as we can
and the Turkish people with us in the transatlantic and NATO
family and discouraging deepening cooperation or dependence in
particular on Russia, whether it is in the field of security,
whether it is in the field of energy or anything else for that
matter.
Without overanalyzing in this open hearing, I would simply
say that what I see, as a longtime watcher of Russia, is that
in the past administration, there was quite a deepening of the
Turkish-Russian relationship. It began in Syria and then
expanded to other areas.
I think there may, and I will not speak for the Turks, but
I do sense some buyer's remorse--let us put it that way--in
Ankara with regard to that relationship. It has not necessarily
paid out in Ankara's interest and has caused some of the
problems that we have talked about already this morning and
sort of culminated in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that we saw
last summer, which was not only tragic for people there but
also further frayed the engagement and Turkey and Russia being
on opposite sides in Libya, et cetera, et cetera.
So I think we have an opportunity here if we continue
engaging with our Turkish allies to bring them back closer to
us. There is a lot of work to do.
Senator Romney. Let me ask you to speculate a bit on your
perspective as to what Erdogan may have been thinking and his
purposes behind supporting the safety of the Kabul airport as
we withdraw from the region or from the country and as we hope
to bring interpreters and others from Afghanistan into the U.S.
He has allowed his military or directed his military to
play a role in securing that airport. Any sense as to why he is
doing that?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Romney, I would just repeat what I said
in the opening, which is this decision by Turkey is extremely
welcome and absolutely vital to all of us who want to continue
to maintain robust diplomatic presence in Afghanistan to
support the people of Afghanistan as we withdraw our military
forces. So we very much appreciate Turkey taking on that role.
As you know, Turkey has historically played a strong role
during the NATO mission at the airport, so they are
constructive partners there. They know what the mission is and
they are experienced at it.
They also have a unique and special relationship both with
the Afghan people but with other actors in the region, which
makes them a partner who is more likely to be welcome there
over the longer term, if that makes sense.
With regard to President Erdogan's decision making, I never
like to get in the head of another leader. My sense from
joining the President's meeting with President Erdogan was that
he appreciated how vital it was to have a strong NATO military
do that mission if we want to stay engaged diplomatically with
Afghanistan, and was willing to take it on.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
The Chairman [Presiding.] Thank you.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Nuland, thank you very much for your service. I
listened very carefully to you defining the differing buckets
of interests between the United States and Turkey--those that
we can agree, those we are making progress, and those where we
disagree--and you have a very strong reputation of being very
direct and clear in your bilateral conversations.
So I am certain that you are very clear with the Turks in
regards to the areas that we disagree.
Having said that, President Biden rightly said that our
foreign policy is going to be embedded in our values. So my
question to you is, how do you deal with Turkey today and still
hold true to American values that the President is talking
about when under the Erdogan regime we see reporters randomly
imprisoned, citizens taken off the streets and imprisoned, the
human rights record is horrible, and then a dimension on top of
that, as we have already talked about, the Cyprus issue and the
S-400s, et cetera, which looks more like a country like Russia
rather than Turkey?
So how do you reconcile how you deal with Turkey and live
up to President Biden's commitment that our foreign policy
engagements are always going to be embedded with our values?
Ms. Nuland. Well, Senator Cardin, as the member of this
committee who knows our President probably best of all, we do
it the Biden way. He speaks truth to his interlocutors about
human rights concerns.
I have seen him do it with leaders all around the world,
whether they are NATO allies or whether they are President
Putin, when he has concerns.
As he said not too long ago, it is a matter of his DNA, but
it is also a matter of our national DNA.
We have been very clear with Turkey that we think this
weakens their democracy, and it is also important, as you know,
to stand with those Turks who are facing incarceration,
repression, unfair judicial targeting, press pressure, et
cetera, as we do with those who face human rights abuses around
the world.
So speaking out privately is important, but speaking out
publicly is important as well, and he leads all of us in that
direction and I do not think that is going to change as long as
he is President.
Senator Cardin. So you have talked about the potential of
buyer remorse in regards to some of the decisions made by
Turkey.
So my question to you, in order to be effective we have to
work with our partners in a multilateral manner. Considering
Turkey's actions, particularly with the S-400, which is against
NATO protocols, and its other activities, what success are you
having with our traditional partners in working with us to put
maximum disappointment and pressure on Turkey for its
decisions?
Ms. Nuland. Well, first of all, with regard to the human
rights issues that we just talked about, I think we share these
concerns with other partners in NATO and with the European
Union, and they make their views clear.
The European Union, I think you know, is back in dialogue
with Turkey on the prospect for a better economic relationship.
These issues are front and center with Turkey.
Every time the NATO Secretary General and other NATO
partners go to Ankara, the issue of the S-400 comes up as well
as our disappointment, those of us who are F-35 nations, that
Turkey is not part of this extremely important program both in
security and economic terms.
So we continue to make those points and we have had, as I
have discussed here, to impose costs on Ankara for these
decisions that they have made. We try to do it as a community
of nations and not standing alone.
Senator Cardin. Impose a cost but it would be more
effective if that cost was supported by at least our NATO
allies, but our other allies as well. Have we been successful
in getting them to take action--I hear their language, but to
take action?
Ms. Nuland. I think, as I mentioned, the EU-Turkey dialogue
has been ongoing for decades, and because of some of the
internal issues in Turkey has not progressed in the direction
that either the EU or President Erdogan hoped.
They are back in discussion again, but I think the rigorous
EU standards come to bear here and, particularly, with regard
to the decision made on Varosha yesterday. The EU has made its
voice clear on that as well, yesterday.
There was a statement by Mr. Borrell and we have said to
Turkey that we worry that with moves like this, they put at
risk the bigger game, which is the potential for a customs
union or something else with the EU.
So I do think that the allies and partners play an
important role here, but, obviously, the United States has this
long and deep and rich relationship, including our economic
relationship, which is, perhaps the biggest card.
Senator Cardin. I think there is room for improvement with
our allies.
Ms. Nuland. I hear you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, nice to see you again. I want to talk
about Nord Stream 2. It is something we have discussed
previously.
There is strong bipartisan opposition to the President's
deliberate failure to abide by U.S. law and sanction all of the
entities involved in the construction of the Nord Stream 2
pipeline.
Now we see news reports that the United States and Germany
came to a deal on the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline, front
page of today's Wall Street Journal.
The President appears to have made this deal with a
government that will change leadership in just a few months in
Germany. Secretary Blinken has repeatedly pledged to work with
Congress, as he said, on the takeoff and not just the landing,
and he has, clearly, failed to keep his word on this.
This new deal, I believe, is a grave mistake. The President
is giving Russia a new geopolitical weapon. Russia uses energy
as a geopolitical weapon to coerce, to manipulate. Paving the
way for Russia and Germany to complete this pipeline, I think,
puts just a stranglehold on Europe.
I was in Germany a week or so ago, talking to people,
leaders in Europe, who are opposed to what is happening through
NATO. Protecting this Russian trap is not in our national
security interest. It doubles Europe's reliance on Russian
energy.
It funnels more money to Russia at a time with increased
malign activities from Russia. It eliminates barriers for
additional Russian military actions in Ukrainian territory.
There are also reports of the administration now attempting to
silence the Ukrainians from even raising concerns about this
new deal.
Congress is the only one really willing to impose
meaningful costs on Russian malign projects and support our
allies facing the Russian aggression.
It is clear that Congress and the American people cannot
count on the administration to do the right thing with regard
to this.
Why do you believe it is acceptable to deal this way with
the Ukrainians and trying to silence them over this terrible
deal with the Germans?
Ms. Nuland. Senator Barrasso, let me start by saying we
agree with you the Nord Stream pipeline is a bad deal. As we
have said, it increases dependence on Russia and increases
dependence on hydrocarbons.
I worked, as you know, because you and I worked on it
together in my last government gig, very hard, particularly
with the EU to make those points, to slow it and all of those
things.
With regard to the PEESA sanctions, we did, as you know,
impose in May a significant number of new sanctions, 19 new
entities. We also imposed sanctions on the company and its
officers.
However, we waived them in the interest of seeing whether
we could get Germany to work with us and work with the
Ukrainians and Poland to deal with the consequences and the
vulnerabilities that this pipeline creates for Ukraine.
We have not--I want to repeat that here--we have taken zero
action to silence Ukraine. Ukraine is a sovereign nation and
will speak out itself with regard to this.
Later this afternoon, we will make public the agreement
that we have with the German Government. I can give you a
couple of the highlights here, which you will--in a minute.
What I would like to say is throughout this process, we
have engaged in intensive consultations with the Ukrainians,
including when Secretary Blinken was there, when the President
talked to President Zelensky, my own conversations on almost a
twice monthly basis with senior Ukrainian leaders on their
requirements and on their vulnerabilities.
As we worked on this agreement with the Germans, my
colleague, Counselor Derek Chollet, has been in Ukraine
yesterday and the day before, including to solidify President
Zelensky's visit to Washington later this afternoon.
I, as a longtime friend and supporter of Ukraine, believe
that if we had not had this agreement with the pipeline 90
percent complete, Ukraine would be at considerably more risk.
Let me just give you a couple of the highlights which will
become fully public later this afternoon, if I may. It is in
tiny print, and I am getting old here.
Among other things, Germany has committed in this agreement
with us that should Russia attempt to use energy as a weapon or
commit further aggressive acts against Ukraine, Germany will
take actions at the national level and press for effective
measures at the European level, including sanctions, to limit
Russian export capabilities to Europe in the energy sector.
That is one aspect of this agreement.
The other aspect of this agreement is support for an
extension of the transit agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
As you know, it comes to an end in 2024. We will seek and press
for and use full leverage to try to seek an additional 10 years
for Ukraine.
More broadly, we need to work together to reduce Ukrainian
dependence, both its economic dependence on transit, but its
own dependence on Russian gas.
So I think you will see when this is released a
considerable effort by both the U.S. and Germany to help
diversify energy supply and energy source for Ukraine with
concrete dollar figures, Euro figures, attached to it.
So, look, this is a bad situation and a bad pipeline, but
we need to help protect Ukraine and I feel that we have made
some significant steps in that direction with this agreement.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam.
Mr. Chairman, I have one question on Afghanistan. My time
has gone. It has to do with Afghanistan remaining one of the
most dangerous countries in the world.
With the Taliban's increasing aggressive military actions,
Afghanistan has experienced increasing levels of violence. The
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan is going to
impact mobility of our personnel and the effectiveness of U.S.
civilian--the mission there.
The question is, could you give a brief update on the
status of negotiations with Turkey to provide forces to protect
the airport?
Are we planning to downsize the diplomatic mission--close
programs, reduce embassy staff--having been there a number of
times and understanding the security risk of trying to protect
the people in the personnel compound there?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, as I said, we are very gratified that
Turkey has agreed to provide a significant force to protect the
airport, and without that, we would not--neither we nor our
allies and partners would be able to maintain a robust
presence.
Obviously, some of the size of the embassy had to do with
our security relationship with Afghan forces. We will now do
most of that from an over horizon platform so that allows us to
make some appropriate reductions.
It is the President's intention, it is our intention, to
continue to if not redouble our diplomatic efforts, our
assistance efforts, and particularly in the areas that
Afghanistan needs most, including the protection of women and
human rights and judicial independence, et cetera.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Madam Secretary. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The senator got extra time because it is his
birthday today. So----
Ms. Nuland. All right. Happy birthday.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Madam Secretary, for your leadership.
Chairman Menendez raised a litany of issues where President
Erdogan's Turkey has violated its obligations as a NATO
partner, violated international law, undermined our interests
in the region.
We talked about the S-400. I was pleased to hear you
underscore the fact that the CAATSA sanctions will remain in
place so long as that continues and that they will not be able
to participate in the F-35 program.
Turkey is regularly violating the territorial waters in the
exclusive economic zone of Cyprus and Greece, and there is a
real risk that some incident there could spiral out of control
if they continue those provocative actions.
You referenced Turkey's malign actions with respect to
Armenia. It is true that Turkey is shouldering the burden of
millions of refugees from Syria.
It is also important that we remember that for years Turkey
downplayed the ISIS threat, allowed ISIS fighters to transit
through Turkey, and they continue to attack the Syrian Kurds,
which have been the tip of the spear in our fight against ISIS.
I want to turn now to yesterday's actions in Cyprus and
President Erdogan's statements regarding Varosha and the
efforts to reach a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, which, of
course, he undermined entirely.
On Varosha, he is, as the administration has indicated,
violating U.N. Security Council's resolutions in international
law.
Here is what Erdogan said in response to people calling him
out on these issues: ``We will listen to them, but we do not
care what they say,'' and that has been Erdogan's attitude on a
whole host of issues.
The question is what are we going to actually do in
response? So my question to you is, what are we going to do in
concert with our NATO and EU partners?
Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, and I wrote to the
President last week, anticipating this action taken by Erdogan,
and it is not going to be enough to simply make statements, as
President Erdogan has indicated, ``We do not care what they
say.''
So my question is what are we going to actually do in
partnership with our partners?
Ms. Nuland. Well, thank you, Senator, and happy birthday.
You saw, I think, as you referenced the strong statement
from Secretary Blinken yesterday, that we, and as I also
repeated in my opening statement before you came in, that we
consider the move yesterday in Varosha to be inconsistent with
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789--provocative,
unacceptable, incompatible with past commitments.
I spoke to my Turkish counterpart this morning. I think
there will be ongoing conversation with the Turkish Government.
Before this happened, Ambassador Satterfield also spoke with
key members in the palace, and Secretary Blinken talked to
Foreign Minister Christodoulides of Cyprus this morning.
The issue here is not only does this have a chilling effect
on what we hoped might be a reigniting of the U.N. process to
try to get to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, which the
last time I was in government I worked intensively on
personally along with then Vice President Biden.
It also has a negative effect on the ongoing conversation
that Turkey is having with the EU on what it has long wanted
and what we had finally gotten them back into significant talks
about some kind of a economic community.
Frankly, that is the bigger game. That is of far more value
for Turkey.
Senator Van Hollen. If I may, Madam Secretary, just because
of the time, I agree with you. I am just reading to you
President Erdogan's words.
Ms. Nuland. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. He does not care what you say, what we
say, what the EU says. So I think our experience indicates that
Turkey will respond only when there is a price to be paid for
their actions. Sometimes that does not move them either.
Certainly, words alone will not.
If I could just also turn to the HDP issue, because as you
know, this is Turkey's third largest political party.
Ms. Nuland. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. They locked up a number of their
leaders under trumped-up charges. I mean, the European courts
have looked at this. Totally trumped-up charges. Turkey has
locked up lots of journalists.
I met with Hisyar Ozsoy, who is one of the parliamentarians
from HDP, who was visiting United States last week, and I
guess, as has been indicated, we are really pleased to see the
Biden administration return to a values-based foreign policy,
talking about rule of law, democracy.
This, obviously, violates every single one of those
principles, to threaten to outlaw a political party and, beyond
that, outlaw the individual members from participating in
future elections under any kind of banner.
So I will just close, really, where I began, which is we
really look forward to a conversation with you and the
President about what we are going to do because I think we have
the answer from Erdogan as to what his response is going to be.
He does not care what we say, and it is going to be up to
us to take actions to defend the rule of law, to defend
democracy, and to make sure that Turkey does not set an example
to others with respect to being a unfaithful NATO ally.
So thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Nuland, good to see you.
Ms. Nuland. Good to see you.
Senator Cruz. You will not be surprised by the topic of my
questioning.
At your confirmation hearing, you told this committee that
you believed if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline between Russia and
Germany were completed that it would have disastrous effects on
U.S. national security, that it would have disastrous effects
on European security by making them subject to economic and
energy blackmail from Russia, and that it would enrich and
empower Putin to carry out that blackmail.
Do you continue to believe that?
Ms. Nuland. I do, Senator.
Senator Cruz. My understanding is that the State Department
recommended that sanctions be imposed on the company that is
building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and on the CEO, and that
the State Department did so consistent with the sanctions that
Congress passed into law that I authored, not one set of
sanctions but two sets of sanctions that passed both houses of
Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support, nearly unanimous
support.
My understanding is the State Department recommended that
those sanctions be imposed to try to stop the pipeline and that
the Biden White House overrode that recommendation.
Is that accurate?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think you will not be surprised that
I am not going to discuss internal administration
deliberations. I do not think you were here when I read out
some of the actions that we have worked on with the German
Government. I can repeat that here.
Obviously, our intention here--and we did sanction the
company and sanction its leadership--we chose to waive those
sanctions to buy some time to see if we could work with Germany
so that it could take responsibility for the pressure that this
pipeline puts not only on Ukraine and on Poland and on Eastern
Europe but on the advantages that it gives to Russia both in
security and economic terms.
We will later this afternoon release the results of those
negotiations, a U.S.-German joint statement, which includes a
number of elements, and since I have already read it out to
your colleagues I will not waste the committee's time. I can
share it with you after this.
One point in particular, which I think is very important
for Ukraine and for our collective response, is that Germany
has committed to take action, that should Russia attempt to use
energy as a weapon or commit further aggressive acts against
Ukraine, Germany will take action at the national level and
press for effective measures at the European Union level,
including sanctions to limit Russian export capabilities to
Europe in the energy sector, including gas and other
economically relevant sectors.
So we can talk about how we are doing here. Our effort
right now is to continue to protect Ukraine and others.
Senator Cruz. So as promises go, that promise from Angela
Merkel is, on its face, incredibly weak and the deal that is
going to be announced today, conveniently at 9:00 p.m. German
time so, presumably, to mitigate the pushback from the Greens
in Germany, is, in my view, a complete and total capitulation
by President Biden to Putin. He has given Putin everything he
wants. He has surrendered on the pipeline, the pipeline that we
had stopped, that we had successfully stopped until Biden
surrendered.
I believe this is a generational geopolitical mistake that
decades from now future Russian dictators will be reaping
billions of dollars of benefits annually from Joe Biden's
mistake and will be using that pipeline to exert economic
blackmail on Europe decades from now.
Let me ask just a straightforward question. Do our
Ukrainian allies agree that this is a good deal?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, with respect and in the spirit of
candor with which we have always dealt with each other, I
believe that we were, in 2016, on our way to stopping the
pipeline, as you and I discussed.
When the Biden administration came into office 4 years
later, that pipeline was 90 percent plus complete. So----
Senator Cruz. Ms. Nuland, I understand that talking point
that the Biden State Department has been using. It was 95
percent complete in December of 2019 when we passed the
sanctions and we stopped it, and a 95 percent complete pipeline
is zero percent complete.
We saw for a year it remained a hunk of metal at the bottom
of the ocean until Joe Biden got elected and began signaling he
would be soft on Russia.
So let me ask my question again because my time is
expiring. Do our Ukrainian allies agree this is a good deal and
is it correct, as it has been widely reported, that the Biden
White House has been pressuring Ukraine, demanding that they
not criticize the deal and threatening economic support,
military support, and threatening President Zelensky directly
to cancel the White House meeting with the President unless
they bite their tongues and not say what is obvious, which is
that this is a disastrous deal that benefits Putin and hurts
Ukraine badly?
Ms. Nuland. That is categorically incorrect, Senator. None
of us has been pressuring Ukraine and, in fact, an invitation
to President Zelensky is going to be issued publicly later
today and we have been in deep consultations with the
Ukrainians on every aspect of this arrangement.
I will leave it to the Ukrainians to speak for themselves
on how they react to this. Do they, like all of us, wish this
pipeline could be stopped and want it stopped? Of course.
Does this deal give them more than they had yesterday? I
believe that it does, and I have been in intense consultation
with them myself as has Derek Chollet, who is on the ground,
the President, Secretary Blinken.
They will speak for themselves about this arrangement. I
will not speak for them. They are a sovereign state.
Senator Cruz. If I could ask one final question to clarify.
Is it your testimony, Ambassador, under oath to this committee,
that nobody in the Biden administration has been pressuring the
Ukrainians not to criticize this deal? I find that astonishing
testimony. Is that what you are telling this committee?
Ms. Nuland. I know of nobody in the administration who has
told them how to feel or how to speak about this. What we have
tried to do is have consultation with them throughout on what
their major concerns are.
They have security concerns but they also have energy
concerns, and we have worked hard to try to address the
concerns that they have raised with us, including in
consultations we had before this consultation with the Germans
even began.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
I just have one or two final questions. We have a vote
going on.
Two years are left until Turkey's next presidential and
parliamentary elections. The Turkish Government's attempt to
ban the country's second largest opposition party, the HDP,
would represent a significant threat to the integrity of those
elections.
What steps are we taking to support fair and democratic
elections in Turkey in 2023?
Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Chairman. We spoke about this a little
bit when Senator Murphy was occupying your large chair there.
We have been very clear with the Turkish Government about
our concerns about the banning of political parties. I think
the support that members of this committee and that Congress as
a whole have provided to individual members of the HDP is very
welcome.
Obviously, this party represents a large body of citizens
of Turkey and so banning the representatives of those voices
raises questions about the integrity of elections.
So we will continue to make those points, going forward.
The Chairman. I will, since I am not bound by the
diplomatic speak, it would be an incredible action by Erdogan
to ban the second largest party and in doing so those elections
could not have validity, at the end of the day.
That is like if President Biden banned the Republican Party
for participating. Come on. Who in this country would believe
that that is a fair election?
In January, the State Department affirmed the
administration's intent to continue counterterrorism
cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces, which include
Syrian Kurd--the YPG, despite Erdogan's continuing opposition
to the group.
In our bilateral discussions with Turkey on Syria, what
proposals has the administration put forward to address this
fundamental difference of opinion around the role of the YPG?
Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think primarily at this stage we
have just agreed to disagree. Syrian Democratic Forces have
more than proved their value in the security situation in Syria
and with regard to the fight against ISIS.
The Chairman. We agree to disagree, which means we are
continuing to pursue our view and our engagement with the
Syrian Kurds, including the YPG?
Ms. Nuland. Yes.
The Chairman. Then, lastly, the maritime border agreement
between Turkey and the Government of National Accord, the
direct predecessor of Libya's current unity government, was
based on the flawed understanding of international maritime law
that ignores the valid claims of Turkey's Mediterranean
neighbors, including Greece and the Republic of Cyprus.
What is the administration's messaging on this agreement?
Ms. Nuland. With regard to the specific maritime border
with Libya, I am going to take that question because I have not
personally looked at the Libya situation.
As you know, we have a lot of work to do together on Libya
to get to an election and to get to, ideally, a legitimate
government that can then take up its own interests in terms of
maritime boundaries, et cetera.
So that is something we work on with Greece, something we
work on with Turkey, and will continue to do that.
The Chairman. Yes. I would just say it is rather obvious
that this agreement with an entity that really is questionable
to be able to engage the Government of Libya was drawn in such
a way that it is in violation of every international norm of
Law of the Sea--the essence of what is recognized as
territorial Exclusive Economic Zones. It is provocative, once
again.
So my problem with the past administration, and I hope is
not going to be a problem with this administration, is that we
continue to have the aspirations of what we wanted from
Turkey--the bridge between East and West, the strong NATO ally,
a more secular government committed on a path to democracy and
a respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Under Erdogan, that is just not the reality. So I sometimes
get concerned that we are unwilling to call out that which is
pretty obvious. That which is in the gray zone, okay.
What is pretty obvious is pretty obvious. When we fail to
recognize it as such, I think we do our nation a disservice and
we muddle our message across the globe beyond Turkey, that we
are willing to look the other way because there are some other
interests involved.
So I can assure you that the committee will be pursuing
this with vigor as we continue.
We appreciate your testimony before the committee. This
record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow.
With the thanks to the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
Ms. Nuland. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, committee.
[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Human rights violations and other atrocities committed
against Kurdish populations in northern Syria by Turkish-sponsored
opposition groups are well-documented. The United States must not
remain silent in face of extrajudicial killings, mass displacement,
property seizures, and related crimes. To what extent is the
administration actively raising these concerns with Ankara, and what is
State specifically asking be done to rectify the situation?
Answer. We remain concerned by reports that Syrian opposition
groups reportedly violated the law of armed conflict and abused human
rights in northeast Syria. We have repeatedly raised these concerns
with the Turkish Government, the Syrian Interim Government, and the
Syrian Opposition Coalition. On July 28, the United States imposed
sanctions on the armed Syrian group Ahrar al-Sharqiya and two of its
leaders for committing numerous serious human rights abuses across
northern Syria. We are equally concerned by and engage on credible
accusations against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and SDF-aligned
elements that Turkey believes have links to the Kurdistan Workers
Party, a U.S. designated terrorist organization.
Question. Following June's Berlin Conference [Second Berlin
Conference on Libya], in which the foreign fighters issue featured
prominently, what updates can the administration provide concerning
progress on this topic, including a potential agreement between Turkey
and Russia?
Answer. At the June 23 Second Berlin Conference on Libya, issues
surrounding military de-escalation were highlighted, and while still
unresolved, the United States is in discussions with Allies, the
interim Libyan Government, and others on how progress can be made
towards the withdrawal of foreign forces, especially mercenary and
proxy groups.
Question. How would the U.S. ensure that any such agreement is
fully and efficiently implemented? What is the State Department's
messaging to Turkey on this topic, and how is this integrated into the
administration's broader bilateral approach to Turkey?
Answer. In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in
supporting the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process,
including elections on December 24 this year. The administration
strongly supports the operationalization of UNSC resolution 2570
(2021), which requests the U.N. Support Mission in Libya's continued
support for the Libyan-led ceasefire monitoring and security sector
reform mechanisms, and the withdrawal of all mercenaries, proxy groups,
and foreign forces. The United States and its Allies have been working
with the U.N. Special Envoy for Libya to encourage more concrete
discussions with Turkey and Russia on a withdrawal process, and pushed
the issue with both countries bilaterally. A ceasefire monitoring
mission will have an important role in verifying the departure of
mercenaries and foreign forces.
______
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Does Turkey's non-compliant and difficult behavior change
how we and our allies think about future NATO expansion? How do our
NATO allies feel about Turkey's S-400s?
Answer. Turkey joined NATO in 1952. It has NATO's second-largest
military and is a key contributor to Allied missions, including in
Afghanistan. Turkey helps constrain Russian influence in the region--
both through Ankara's support of Ukraine's and Georgia's sovereignty as
well as through Turkey's role in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya.
Turkey's 2019 acquisition and testing of S-400 surface-to-air missile
systems from Russia undermines Allied interoperability and threatens
Alliance systems. We and many of our NATO Allies continue to urge
Turkey not to retain the S-400 and remind Ankara that any new major
Russian arms purchase would risk triggering additional CAATSA
sanctions.
Question. What proposals and alternatives has the Biden
administration put forth to the Turkish Government to induce them to
give up the S-400s?
Answer. Turkey knows exactly what it needs to do to secure relief
from existing CAATSA sanctions. Ankara's acquisition and testing of S-
400 surface-to-air missile systems from Russia undermines Allied
interoperability and threatens Alliance systems. We continue to urge
Turkey at every level not to retain the S-400 system and to refrain
from purchasing any additional Russian materiel. As the Biden
administration has made clear to Turkey, any major new Russian arms
purchases would risk triggering CAATSA sanctions separate from and in
addition to those imposed in December 2020.
Question. In what ways, if any, have issues between the U.S. and
Turkey spilled over into NATO relationships and discussions? Have
Turkey's actions in Libya had an impact on its standing in NATO? If so,
please detail how.
Answer. The United States has a multi-faceted, complex relationship
with Turkey, a NATO Ally for 68 years with the Alliance's second-
largest military and a significant contributor to NATO operations and
missions. In the bilateral relationship, there are areas where we are
firmly aligned and there are areas where we are working to close the
gaps. Similarly, we seek cooperation with Turkey in NATO on common
priorities and engage in dialogue to address disagreements. In Libya,
Turkey joins the United States and others in supporting the Libyan-led,
U.N.-facilitated political process, including elections on December 24.
We and other Allies are also discussing with Turkey and Russia how to
reduce the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before
the elections.
Question. To what extent have the tensions in the U.S.-Turkey
relationship affected, either negatively or positively, the military
relationship and cooperation between our two nations?
Answer. As you know, Turkey's participation in the F-35 program was
suspended, and it has faced CAATSA sanctions. That said, and despite
the challenges in our relationship, U.S. strategic interests overlap
with Turkey's in many ways, including countering terrorism, ending the
conflict in Syria, and deterring destabilizing influence in the region.
Turkey makes crucial contributions to NATO missions around the world,
actively supports Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty, and works to
prevent the Russian-backed Assad regime from precipitating additional
humanitarian crises on Europe's doorstep. The United States has a
strong interest in keeping Turkey broadly anchored to the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Question. Have the purges of the Turkish military since the
attempted coup in 2016 in any way affected the U.S.-Turkey political-
military relationship? If so, in what way?
Answer. The United States supports Turkish efforts to bring
perpetrators of the attempted coup to justice. However, we also urge
Turkey to uphold the highest standards of respect for judicial due
process, human rights, fundamental freedoms, democratic institutions,
and the rule of law. Turkey is a NATO Ally and makes crucial
contributions to NATO missions around the world. U.S. strategic
interests overlap with Turkey's in many ways, including countering
terrorism, ending the conflict in Syria, and deterring destabilizing
influence in the region.
Question. In such a polarized political environment, and with such
high levels of anti-Americanism, how has the Embassy in Ankara and our
consulates throughout Turkey been able to continue productive
engagement with ordinary Turks as well as with civil society? Please
provide specific examples.
Answer. Despite challenges, the U.S. Mission to Turkey is
connecting with key Turkish audiences via: traditional and social media
outreach; educational and cultural exchanges such as the 70-year-old
Fulbright Commission; a variety of English language programs; cultural
preservation efforts such as for the medieval synagogue of Izmir;
public diplomacy grants to civil society partners; regular engagements
with civil society leaders at the highest levels of Mission leadership;
and four Education USA advising offices and two American Corners.
Question. Turkey's Bayraktar Drones were proven to be quite
effective in last year's Nagorno-Karabakh war. Turkey has now begun to
sell them to others in the region, including Ukraine, and NATO allies
like Poland have also expressed interest in purchasing them.
What do you see as the impact of the success of the Bayraktar
drones on Turkey's larger project to build out an indigenous arms
industry?
Answer. Turkey's TB-2 Bayraktar Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) is a
highly effective platform. The Bayraktar is particularly effective
against Russian and Soviet-origin surface-to-air missile systems,
making it a sought-after capability for partners facing potential or
actual Russian aggression. As Turkey is a relatively cost-effective
supplier of advanced drone technology, it is not surprising that
countries are increasingly seeking Turkish UAS solutions. Turkey is one
of the top producers and exporters of drones in the world today.
Question. Does the U.S. consider the Bayraktar drones to me NATO
interoperable?
Answer. Turkey's TB-2 Bayraktar drones are not currently enabled
for NATO-standard data links. The Bayraktar platform is particularly
effective against Russian and Soviet-origin surface-to-air missile
systems. Bayraktar drones enabled for NATO interoperability would
support defense and Allied deterrence in Eastern Europe.
Question. In the Black Sea, Russia has increased its provocations
and is increasingly turning it into a Russian lake. Yet despite its
rather nationalistic Blue Homeland naval doctrine, Turkey has not
seemed very worried about these developments.
Please assess Turkey's attitudes towards growing Russian strength
in the Black Sea?
Answer. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in
the Black Sea. Turkey pursues cooperation with Russia in some areas,
reflecting Russian political and economic leverage over Turkey through
natural gas, tourism, and agricultural revenue. At the same time,
Turkey's approach toward countering Russian influence in Libya, Syria,
the South Caucasus, and elsewhere largely aligns with our interests.
Turkey's arms sales to Ukraine and staunch support for Ukrainian and
Georgian sovereignty highlight Turkey's positive role in countering
Russia's influence in the Black Sea region.
Question. Do you believe Turkey is working well with fellow NATO
allies and Black Sea littoral states Bulgaria and Romania to deter
Russia's aggression in the Black Sea? Please provide details in your
answer.
Answer. We encourage all Allies--those bordering the Black Sea and
all Allies at NATO headquarters--to support deeper NATO engagement in
the Black Sea. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in
the Black Sea. Turkey pursues cooperation with Russia in some areas,
reflecting Russian political and economic leverage over Turkey. At the
same time, Turkey's approach toward countering Russian influence in
Libya, Syria, the Caucasus, and elsewhere largely aligns with our
interests. Turkey's support for Ukrainian and Georgian sovereignty
highlight Turkey's positive role countering Russia's influence in the
Black Sea region.
Question. What more would the U.S. like to see Turkey do to push
back on Russia in the Black Sea?
Answer. Turkey is strengthening relations with countries bordering
the Black Sea and taking other actions to counter Russia's influence in
the region. Turkey regularly contributes forces and aircraft to NATO
air patrol missions, Standing Maritime Groups, and NATO exercises in
the Black Sea. While Turkey sometimes limits the ambition of NATO
initiatives in the region, it continues to manage access to the Black
Sea per the Montreux Convention in a manner that is in line with its
treaty obligations and supports many U.S. and Allied military
operations. Turkey conducts significant activity on a national basis to
support Black Sea deterrence and defense.
Question. Turkish President Erdogan has increasingly been vocal
about his dislike of the 1936 Montreaux Convention, the treaty that
governs the international use of the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits
that control access into and out of the Black Sea.
Does the U.S. have any concern that President Erdogan may try to
change the rules surrounding transit through the straits? If so, please
enumerate those concerns.
Answer. Turkey continues to manage access to the Black Sea as per
the Montreux Convention in a manner that is in line with its treaty
obligations and adequately supports U.S. and Allied military
operations. In April, President Erdogan reaffirmed Turkey's commitment
to the Montreux Convention. Any attempt to change the rules surrounding
transit through the straits would be provocative and unwelcome.
Question. Please list all arms and technology transfers from the
U.S. to Turkey over last 2 years that fall below congressional
threshold notification requirements found in the Arms Export Control
Act.
Answer. The Department is committed to complying with the
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). As you
are aware, on December 14, 2020, the Secretary of State, pursuant to
Section 231 of CAATSA and in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury, imposed sanctions on the Turkish Presidency of Defense
Industries (SSB), a Turkish Government entity that purchases defense
equipment and has responsibilities for defense industrial development
for Turkey, as well as four SSB officials.
The Department has continued to approve cases that are in the U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests and consistent with the
Arms Export Control Act and the Conventional Arms Transfer policy. I
pledge to work with you to ensure that transfers to Turkey continue to
adhere to these standards, and I would welcome the opportunity to
provide you with a more fulsome briefing about these matters.
Question. Since undersea gas deposits were discovered in the
Eastern Mediterranean, coastal nations have been developing strategies
to extract and export it. Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas
Forum, (consisting of Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy,
Jordan, and a Palestinian representative) have emerged as competitors
over the future economic development of the zone.
How is the U.S. engaging with parties to ensure that economic
development is executed in a safe, stable, and fair way?
Answer. The United States supports regional cooperation to bring
durable energy security to the region, create new markets, and provide
economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden
administration is committed to ensuring stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean by encouraging peaceful and diplomatic resolutions to
disagreements which respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of all countries. In addition to our regular and continuous bilateral
engagements across the region, we participate in the ``3+1'' format,
which includes Greece, Israel, the ROC, and the United States, and in
the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which Egypt hosts and in which the
United States is an observer.
Question. What are the challenges and threats we face surrounding
the issue? What are the security implications?
Answer. Recent offshore gas discoveries in Israel, Egypt, and the
Republic of Cyprus (ROC), some in disputed waters, have redefined
regional relationships and led to political tensions. At the same time,
collaborative work in the region in planning for a shared energy future
could contribute to improving economic and political cooperation in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Effective collaboration can also increase
regional energy security through diversification of fuel types and
routes for European and Middle Eastern partners, thus reducing regional
reliance on Russian and Iranian energy supplies. We continue to promote
collaboration toward these ends.
Question. President Biden and his administration have repeatedly
made commitments to upholding universal rights at home and abroad. In
Turkey, authorities are abusing people's human rights and attacking
peaceful dissidents at an alarming scale.
Having promised a rights-centered foreign policy, how is the Biden
administration prioritizing human rights in Turkey?
Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. We
publicly and privately urge Turkey to respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, peaceful
assembly and association and the right to a fair trial, which are
important to any healthy democracy. The Department reinforces at the
highest levels of the Turkish Government that addressing democratic
backsliding could have a positive impact on our bilateral relationship.
The Department works with international partners to defend fundamental
freedoms and provides foreign assistance to promote human rights, rule
of law, media freedom, and freedom of expression in Turkey.
Question. How is Turkey's declining human rights record impacting
its relationship with the United States?
Answer. The Biden administration shares your concerns about the
Turkish Government's repression of judicial independence, political
pluralism, and the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful
assembly. Such repression erodes the foundations of democratic society
and stifles growth. It is in our interest to keep Turkey anchored to
the transatlantic community. We will continue to press the Turkish
Government to do more to protect judicial independence, respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, bolster rule of law, uphold the rules-
based international order, and stand united with Western allies in
addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and the People's
Republic of China.
Question. To what extent were human rights part of President
Biden's meeting with President Erdogan in June?
Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The
administration will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, and association, and the right to a fair
trial, which are important to any healthy democracy. I refer you to the
White House for details on President Biden's June meeting with
President Erdogan.
Question. Did President Biden express concern about specific rights
issues?
Answer. I refer you to the White House for details on President
Biden's June meeting with President Erdogan.
Question. Did President Biden raise any specific cases of unjustly
detained individuals, such as U.S. locally-employed staff members Metin
Topuz, Hamza Ulucay, and Mete Canturk, or civil society leader Osman
Kavala?
Answer. President Biden has made it clear that his administration
will be focused on promoting democracy and human rights and the rule of
law--and Turkey is no exception. The Department regularly raises the
cases of our wrongfully prosecuted and detained Locally Employed Staff
with the highest levels of the Turkish Government. More broadly, the
administration will continue to advocate for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the right to a fair trial, in Turkey
and other countries. For details about President Biden's June meeting
with President Erdogan, I refer you to the White House.
Question. In the event the Turkey-Syria border crossings close,
what alternatives do we have to get aid to the Syrian people? How can
we pressure the Assad regime (and Russia) to provide aid in our stead?
Answer. Following a successful diplomatic campaign to overcome
Russian opposition, on July 9 the U.N. Security Council unanimously
adopted resolution 2585, which reauthorized humanitarian access into
Syria via the Bab al-Hawa crossing from Turkey for the next 12 months.
Crossline assistance alone cannot meet existing needs, which is why
extending the cross-border mandate at Bab al-Hawa for another year was
so important. We also continue to encourage all parties to engage
constructively to find ways to enable crossline deliveries. Meeting the
Syrian people's needs over the long term requires a political solution.
We remain engaged with the U.N., our allies, and our international
partners to encourage all possible efforts to advance this track.
Question. Turkey and Russia reportedly reached an understanding to
advance the incremental withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya,
beginning with the initial withdrawal of 300 Syrian mercenaries from
each side.
To what extent does State consider the withdrawal of Russian and
Turkish backed foreign forces from Libya a priority?
Answer. The United States is increasing its diplomatic focus on
supporting progress in Libya, including through the work of U.S.
Special Envoy Richard Norland. The administration strongly supports the
operationalization of UNSC resolution 2570 (2021) and full
implementation of the October 23 ceasefire, including the withdrawal of
all foreign military forces, proxy groups, and mercenaries. The
administration continues to engage parties on all sides of the conflict
to advance a political solution facilitated by the U.N. that reinforces
the sovereignty of the Libyan people and protects the shared interests
of the United States, our allies, and partners.
Question. What, if any, leverage does the U.S. have over Russia and
Turkey to ensure continued progress on this front? To what extent is
the U.S. prepared to use this leverage?
Answer. In Libya, Turkey joins the United States and others in
supporting the Libyan-led, U.N.-facilitated political process,
including elections on December 24 this year. And we are discussing
with Russia, Turkey, and other NATO Allies and U.N. officials how to
reduce the presence of foreign fighters and mercenaries there before
the elections.
Question. The imminent U.S. and NATO military withdrawal appears to
be fueling violence across Afghanistan. As the Taliban continues to
rapidly gain ground, seizing control over key district centers and
border crossing points, there are growing concerns over the country's
future. In order to sustain the gains we've made over the past 20
years, we will need to continue diplomatic focus.
Earlier this summer, Turkey proposed to operate and provide
security for Afghanistan's main international airport, provided the
U.S. is willing to provide supplemental financial, political and
logistical support in exchange.
What is the status of U.S.-Turkish engagement on the security of
the airport?
Answer. Following discussions between President Biden and President
Erdogan in Brussels, the U.S. and Turkish delegations held technical
talks and made progress toward the possible continuation of Turkey's
security support at Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai International Airport.
Turkey maintaining its security presence at Kabul's airport after
NATO's Resolute Support Mission ends would enable the United States and
international partners to maintain a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan
and sustain international assistance. Technical teams on both sides are
working together to finalize this critical arrangement. We remain in
close coordination with the Department of Defense, which is leading
those technical negotiations.
Question. To what extent is Turkey's acquisition of the Russian S-
400 shaping the discussion?
Answer. Turkey maintaining its security presence at Hamid Karzai
International Airport after NATO's Resolute Support Mission ends would
enable a long-term U.S. and international diplomatic presence in
Afghanistan. Technical teams on both sides are working together to
finalize this arrangement. We remain in close coordination with the
Department of Defense, which is leading those technical negotiations.
Separate from those technical negotiations, we also continue to urge
Turkey at every level not to retain the S-400 system and remind Ankara
that any new major Russian purchase risks additional CAATSA sanctions
separate from and in addition to those imposed in December 2020.
Question. Should talks with Turkey fall through, what steps is the
administration willing to take to ensure Hamid Karzai International
Airport remains open and continues to operate?
Answer. A major component of sustaining a robust diplomatic
presence in Kabul is to maintain a functioning and secure airport in
Kabul. We are working with our international partners to identify and
dedicate security resources to secure the international zone and secure
HKIA, the international airport in Kabul for our diplomats, our
personnel, and our continued support to the Government of Afghanistan.
We are finalizing discussions with Turkey about a security presence at
HKIA now. In the event Turkey instead decides to depart, we are also
considering a range of alternative scenarios to secure the airport,
including working with other international partners.
Question. If the airport closes, how does the U.S. plan to ensure
foreign embassies remain and humanitarian aid is distributed,
particularly as the Taliban continues to expand its control over key
border crossings?
Answer. The safety and security of our personnel is a top priority
for the Department. A major component of sustaining a robust diplomatic
presence and providing humanitarian assistance in Kabul is to maintain
a functioning and secure airport in Kabul. We are working with our
international partners to identify and dedicate resources to ensure
security for the international zone and the Hamid Karzai International
Airport (HKIA), protect our diplomats and personnel, and maintain
continued support to the people of Afghanistan. Both the Department and
USAID have developed scenario-based contingency plans to adjust U.S.
assistance programming as the operating environment warrants.
______
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Democracy Backsliding: As a NATO ally, we expect Turkey
to advance democracy and human rights and yet it is moving in the
opposite direction. I am very concerned about Turkey's current
trajectory. Turkey's abrupt withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention,
enshrining commitments to improve the status of women, is deeply
concerning.
Beyond the White House statement that Turkey and others ``should be
working to strengthen and renew their commitments to ending violence
against women, not rejecting international treaties designed to protect
women and hold abusers accountable,'' what other actions have been
taken by the administration? Did President Biden raise any of these
issues during his one-on-one meeting with Erdogan at the NATO summit?
Answer. The administration shares your concerns about democratic
backsliding in Turkey. The United States has expressed publicly and
privately to Turkey at the highest levels that countries should be
working to strengthen and renew their commitments to preventing and
responding to all forms of gender-based violence, not rejecting
international treaties designed to protect women and hold abusers
accountable. The administration will continue publicly and privately to
urge Turkey to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
women's rights.
Question. Have we engaged our Allies and partners to increase the
pressure on Erdogan?
Answer. The Biden administration has elevated democracy, human
rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The
administration will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of
expression, peaceful assembly, and association, and the right to a fair
trial, which are important to any healthy democracy. We also regularly
engage and coordinate with our Allies and partners to urge Turkey to
support human rights and fundamental freedoms and to honor its
international commitments.
Question. Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP): Banning the political
party HDP, which speaks for the Kurdish minority among many others, the
country's third largest, would be a major step backwards for Turkish
democracy that would severely damage prospects for a peaceful and
enduring resolution to Turkey's Kurdish conflict.
What is the latest situation on the treatment of the Kurdish-led
Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)? How has the administration engaged
Turkey on this issue?
Answer. Opposition pro-Kurdish civil society organizations and
political parties continue to experience problems exercising freedoms
of assembly and association. Hundreds of Kurdish organizations and
Kurdish-language media outlets were closed during the State of
Emergency in 2016 and 2017 and remain shut. The United States is
closely following efforts to dissolve the People's Democratic Party
(HDP) and impose political bans on many HDP members. We engage
continuously with the Turkish Government on our concerns, urging
respect for the democratic process as well as fundamental freedoms in
line with protections in the Turkish constitution and Turkey's
international obligations.
Question. S-400 and Russian Cooperation: Turkey's purchase of a
Russian S-400 surface-to-air defense system and its exploration of
possibly acquiring Russian fighter aircraft are very troubling. I was
disappointed that despite President Biden's efforts during his meeting
with Erdogan on the margins of the NATO Summit the issue remains at a
standstill.
How is the administration working to engage Turkey on this issue?
Answer. Turkey's acquisition and testing of S-400 surface-to-air
missile systems from Russia undermine Allied interoperability and
threaten Alliance systems. We continue to urge Turkey at every level
not to retain the S-400 system and to refrain from purchasing any
additional Russian materiel. As the Biden administration has made clear
to Turkey, any major new Russian arms purchases would risk triggering
additional CAATSA sanctions to those imposed in December 2020. Turkey
knows exactly what it needs to do to secure relief from existing CAATSA
sanctions.
Question. What steps does the administration plan to take in
response to Turkey's intransigence?
Answer. We continue to urge Turkey at every level not to retain the
S-400 system and to refrain from purchasing any additional Russian
materiel. As the Biden administration has made clear to Turkey, any
major new Russian arms purchases would risk triggering CAATSA sanctions
separate from and in addition to those imposed in December 2020. These
sanctions, as well as Turkey's removal from F-35 aircraft acquisition
and co-production, sent a clear message.
______
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. According to the Federation of American Scientists, the
United States hosts roughly 50 gravity nuclear bombs at Incirlik Air
Base in south Turkey. Turkey's government cut power to Incirlik during
the 2016 attempted coup. Given the recent rise of human rights
violations, frays in our alliance, and a heightened risk for political
turmoil, is the administration rethinking its decisions about the
placement of weapons and other assets in Turkey accordingly?
Answer. It is the longstanding policy of the United States to
neither confirm nor deny the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in any
particular country.
Separately on Turkey, it is a long-standing Ally, has NATO's
second-largest military, and is a key contributor to Allied missions,
including in Afghanistan. We seek cooperation with Turkey on common
priorities and engage in dialogue to address disagreements.
Question. President Erdogan recently spoke with President Xi
Jinping about the need for Uyghurs to live in peace and equality in
China. The hypocrisy of President Erdogan's statement is lost on no
one, but Turkey's pressure on China is welcome to continue shedding
light on the mass scale of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Has the
State Department engaged with our Turkish counterparts to align our
efforts in regards to the genocide being carried out against Uyghurs by
the Government of China?
Answer. The United States regularly engages with Turkey to advocate
for the protection of those fleeing Xinjiang and for the rights of
members of ethnic and religious minority groups inside China. Turkey
hosts between 30,000-60,000 Uyghurs, the largest Uyghur population
outside Xinjiang. Turkey has welcomed Uyghurs for more than two decades
under a variety of visa and immigration statuses. In a recent phone
call, President Erdogan reportedly told PRC President Xi that Uyghurs
should live in peace as equal citizens of China.
Question. The recently agreed upon extradition treaty between
Ankara and Beijing also presents a threat to Chinese Uyghurs in Turkey.
How are we engaging with Turkey to make clear that vulnerable Uyghurs
must not be sent back to be persecuted by the Chinese Government?
Answer. Embassy officials, including Ambassador Satterfield,
regularly meet with the Turkish Government to discuss Turkey's
continued support for Uyghurs in the face of Chinese pressure. Turkey
hosts between 30,000-60,000 Uyghurs, the largest Uyghur population
outside Xinjiang. Turkey has welcomed Uyghurs for more than two decades
under a variety of visa and immigration statuses. Senior Turkish
officials, including Foreign Minister Cavusoglu in December 2020,
continue to publicly assert that Turkey will not accede to PRC requests
to forcibly repatriate Uyghur Muslims from Turkey. In a recent phone
call, President Erdogan reportedly told PRC President Xi that Uyghurs
should live in peace as equal citizens of China.
Question. An area of potential cooperation with Turkey lies on
issues related to forward progress and stability in the Balkan
Peninsula--Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Serbia, and Kosovo. How are
we engaging Turkey to ensure they play a positive role in improving
stability in the Balkan region instead of stoking nationalist rhetoric?
Answer. The United States cooperates with Turkey where our
interests overlap, including on promoting political stability and
economic development. We encourage Turkey to play a constructive role
in helping the countries of the Balkans achieve their stated goals of
European integration and regional stability. Turkey has a history of
opposing Russian malign influence in the region. There are large
infrastructure needs throughout the Balkans. Investment is key to
unlocking higher growth rates in the region. Turkey can play a positive
role.
Question. If there is not significant improvement in the human
rights record of the Erdogan Government, which is documented in the
2020 State Department Human Rights Report for Turkey, would the
administration support targeted Magnitsky sanctions or visa
restrictions under the so-called ``Khashoggi Ban'' against individuals
responsible for such human rights violations and Turkey's democratic
backslide?
Answer. President Biden's administration has elevated democracy,
human rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. The
administration will look at all available tools to press Turkey to
respect human rights, protect judicial independence and rule of law,
support fundamental freedoms, and uphold the rules-based international
order. We will apply the Khashoggi Ban as appropriate to promote
accountability for serious, extraterritorial counter-dissident
activities that target journalists, activists, and perceived
dissidents, and their family members.
Question. Specifically, what is the United States strategy to end
Government of Turkey's abuse of Interpol ``red notices'' to detain
critics abroad, its abductions to include Orhan Inandi, Turkish-Kyrgyz
citizen, and its practice of transnational oppression whereby Turkish
citizens are targeted in third countries without regard to their due
process?
Answer. The Biden administration takes seriously the threat posed
by transnational repression. We will continue to encourage Turkey to
respect fundamental human rights and its international commitments, as
well as encourage third-country partners to resist pressure and follow
due process in cases where Turkey pursues politically-motivated
deportation. The United States is committed to strengthening
international efforts to deter the misuse of INTERPOL Notices by Member
States. This includes supporting reforms at INTERPOL and diplomatic
outreach.
______
Responses of the Hon. Victoria Nuland to Questions
Submitted by Senator Ted Cruz
In your testimony on July 21, 2021, you provided details about a
deal between the Biden administration and Germany to allow completion
of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
I asked you about reports that ``the Biden White House has been
pressuring Ukraine, demanding that they not criticize the deal, and
threatening economic support, military support, and threatening
President Zelensky directly to cancel the White House meeting with the
President, unless they bite their tongues'' and support the deal (in
June, President Biden had assured President Zelensky in June that he
would be invited for a White House meeting in July). You described
those reports as ``categorically incorrect'' and stated ``[n]one of us
has been pressuring Ukraine.''
I asked you again if it was ``your testimony . . . under oath in
this committee that nobody in the Biden administration has been
pressuring the Ukrainians not to criticize the deal?'' You revised what
had been your categorical denial: you instead said, ``I know of nobody
in the administration who has told them how to feel or how to speak
about this.''
Within hours of your testimony, Politico published a report
confirming and describing a campaign by the Biden administration to
pressure the Ukrainians. The report, which was headlined, ``Ukraine
hits back at pressure from Biden administration over gas pipeline,''
included confirmation of the pressure campaign from senior Ukrainian
Government officials and provided details about a trip to Kyiv by U.S.
State Department counselor Derek Chollet in which he imposed that
pressure. The report specifically confirmed that ``the pressure
campaign by the Biden administration . . . had included a refusal to
confirm a date for a visit to the White House'' by President Zelensky,
which had originally been planned for July.
At roughly the same time, the White House announced it had extended
an invitation to President Zelensky, and that the visit would occur on
August 30. The new date ensures that President Zelensky won't be able
to engage members of Congress, who on a bipartisan basis continue to
oppose the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Question. Is the July 21, 2021, Politico report describing the
pressure campaign by the Biden administration inaccurate? If it is
inaccurate, what parts are inaccurate?
Answer. As I stated in my testimony, we have taken zero action to
silence Ukraine, and I know of no one in the administration who has
told the Ukrainians how to feel or how to speak about this.
Question. Did Counselor Chollet participate in any engagements with
Ukrainian officials between June 7, 2021 and July 20, 2021, including
meetings or calls, in which he urged them to support the developing or
finalized U.S.-German deal?
Answer. Counselor Chollet consulted frequently with Ukrainian
officials throughout the negotiating process, to seek their input and
views on the developing package with Germany and to urge direct
Ukrainian-German consultations as well.
Question. Additionally, in any of those engagements, did Ukrainian
officials ask for Mr. Chollet to confirm a date for President Zelensky
to visit the White House, and he declined to provide a date?
Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to
visit the White House later this summer. The White House, which is
responsible for the President's schedule, confirmed the date of the
visit prior to the release of the joint statement, and Mr. Chollet
directly advised the Ukrainian Government of the date before it was
announced publicly.
Question. And if so, were you aware of the details of those
engagements?
Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to
visit the White House later this summer. I was aware that the
Ukrainians were eager to secure a date for the visit, and was glad to
see that the White House, which is responsible for the President's
schedule, was able to confirm the date of the visit prior to the
release of the joint statement.
Question. Did you personally participate in any engagements with
Ukrainian officials between June 7, 2021, and July 20, 2021, including
meetings or calls, in which you discussed the developing or finalized
U.S.-German deal?
Answer. Yes, we consulted regularly with Ukrainian officials
throughout the negotiation process. I discussed Ukrainian security and
energy security concerns with Presidential Advisor Yermak on several
occasions during this period, and with Foreign Minister Kuleba. I
encouraged both to share Kyiv's perspective on NS2 and actions Germany
could take to address Ukraine's energy vulnerabilities with us and
directly with the German Government.
Question. Additionally, in any of those engagements, did Ukrainian
officials ask for you to confirm a date for President Zelensky to visit
the White House, and you declined to provide a date?
Answer. In early June, the President invited President Zelenskyy to
visit the White House later this summer. The White House, which is
responsible for the President's schedule, confirmed the date of the
visit prior to the release of the joint statement. On several occasions
in the intervening period, Ukrainian officials pressed for a date, and
I passed those requests on to the White House.
Question. In your testimony, you described consultations with the
Ukrainians to provide assurances in response to their Nord Stream 2-
related security concerns that occurred ``before this consultation with
the Germans even began.''
When did ``this consultation with the Germans'' begin?
Answer. We have engaged with Germany at multiple levels since the
beginning of this administration, and intensively throughout the course
of our diplomatic efforts over the past 2 months on the U.S.-Germany
joint statement.
Question. When did those prior consultations with the Ukrainians
occur?
Answer. We have engaged with Ukraine at multiple levels since the
beginning of this administration, including during the Secretary's May
trip to Kyiv, and intensively throughout the course of our diplomatic
efforts over the past 2 months on the U.S.-Germany joint statement.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Ukrainians are
satisfied with the assurances that the Biden administration has
provided in these or other consultations.
Answer. We took note of the Ukraine-Poland joint statement and
anticipate continued consultations with Ukraine as we move forward with
implementation, and as we look forward to welcoming President Zelenskyy
to the White House on August 30 to discuss the full range of bilateral
issues.
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