

**MODERNIZING THE STATE DEPARTMENT  
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

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**HEARING**

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE  
DEPARTMENT AND USAID  
MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL  
OPERATIONS, AND BILATERAL  
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

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# **MODERNIZING THE STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

**TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021**

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE DEPARTMENT AND USAID  
MANAGEMENT, INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, AND  
BILATERAL INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ben Cardin, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Present: Senators Cardin [presiding], Kaine, Murphy, Markey, Hagerty, Paul, Cruz, Schatz, Johnson, and Rubio.

## **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND**

Senator CARDIN. Welcome to the first hearing of the subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations on the State Department and USAID management, international operations, and bilateral international development. This is our first hearing. First, I want to thank our ranking member Hagerty, for his cooperation and help in putting together this hearing. We are going to rely very heavily on our ranking member considering his experience as a former ambassador to Japan, and his private sector experience. So, Mr. Ranking Member, I am looking forward to working with you and thank you very much for your help and cooperation and the work of this subcommittee.

We have a very important responsibility in this subcommittee, and I want to thank both Senator Menendez and Senator Risch for recognizing the importance of this subcommittee and encouraging us to hold oversight hearings in regards to the areas of our responsibility, which include the State Department, USAID, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, Peace Corps, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. So our responsibility is oversight their important issues such as diversity, recruitment, retention, economics and security dealing with our workforce that we need to be knowledgeable and see the current status and what we can do better. We have to work in a way to build the foundation for the reauthorization of the State Department's law.

It used to be a regular process for this committee, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to recommend to the full Senate a reauthorization bill for the State Department. We have not done that for a number of years. I know our leadership on this com-

mittee would like to see that process reinstated. I hope that this subcommittee can provide some of the foundation for the reauthorization of the State Department itself.

We need to address U.S. diplomacy in the 21st Century. President Biden has made it very clear that our foreign policy will be grounded in our values; democratic institutions, good governance, anti-corruption, and advancement of human rights. This is our first hearing and our topic could not be more-timely; modernizing the State Department for the 21st Century. We have a great panel of witnesses that can really help us get started on this task.

We need a strong and high performing State Department to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. We have serious challenges on the rise of authoritarianism and the decline of Free States. We have the challenge in supporting American businesses globally on a fair playing field. We have the issues of climate change, we have negotiating ends of conflicts and preventing conflicts from occurring. We are and need to be the leader in the global response to the pandemic. We must assist American citizens throughout the world, and this goes on and on and on, the important work of the State Department in the 21st Century.

The challenges within the State Department include diversity, inclusion, flexibility, efficiency, and accountability of our workforce. I think we have gotten off to a good start under the Biden administration, in the budget that he has submitted to us. It would be, if passed by Congress, the largest increase in personnel in over a decade.

I will conclude my opening comments by quoting from the President what he said when he was a candidate, "Vow to rebuild a modern, agile U.S. Department of State, investing, and re-empowering the finest diplomatic core in the world, and leveraging the full talent and richness of America's diversity." He then stated that he pledged in his speech to the State Department to restore the health and morale of our foreign policy institutions. So I think we are off to a good start, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. First, let me yield to the ranking member, Senator Hagerty.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BILL HAGERTY,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE**

Senator HAGERTY. Well, Chairman Cardin, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and I want to thank you so much for inviting me to participate today. I would be remiss if I did not take this wonderful opportunity the first time I have had to do it publicly to thank you for voting to confirm me about a little more than 4 years ago to serve as a diplomat here in this very body. It was the greatest honor of a lifetime to represent our great Nation overseas. We were fortunate to have several people the rank of ambassador with us today, and I think they share that same sense of honor.

I also would like to complement you, Mr. Chairman, on your support for me when I served as an American diplomat. It was particularly meaningful to have your help convening the resources I needed to be effective in my job as ambassador. As I think about the effort that you helped me undertake when we were trying to fix an important process that advances America's interest overseas with respect to foreign military sales, your team came together and

helped me put the resources in place and helped to build a modernization infrastructure to fix a very important process within our State Department, within our Federal Government. I particularly appreciate that engagement and that insight as a foundation for what we are trying to accomplish today, so thank you very much.

To the topic of modernizing the State Department for the 21st Century, I could not ask for a better leader and colleague to work on this. I would also like to recognize our three witnesses, who have graciously agreed to join us today, and I want to thank each of you for your service. We certainly look forward to hearing from you. As former ambassador of Japan, I had the privilege to serve alongside some of the brightest and the most capable men and women of the State Department. Because of their work and sacrifice, the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains the cornerstone of peace and prosperity throughout the Asia Pacific region.

I remember within weeks of arriving in Tokyo, the North Korean regime tested the resolve of the United States and the entire world by launching multiple ballistic missiles over Japan. Then Deputy Secretary Bing was very active in dealing with that from here in Washington, and it was an interesting perspective for me and my family to be there as intercontinental ballistic missiles are being launched overhead.

At that point when I arrived my very first day I asked the team at Mission Japan to remember the reasons they joined the United States Department of State, to bring their very best performance to bear because our Nation needed their service. Our Nation needed our talents and our very best performance, and I would say our team pulled together and delivered just that. I could not have been more proud to see my team step up when our country needed them, when our Nation needed them, and when I need them to deliver. So I am deeply appreciative of what the men and women of the State Department are capable of doing and I have seen it in action.

What we are here to discuss today is not about the commitment of the people of the State Department, rather the task at hand is to identify the aspects of the State Department that require urgent reform, and determine the best way forward to achieve that goal. We should be bold in re-imagining the State Department, and this should be guided by some very basic foundational questions. To name just a few, what is the purpose of embassies in the 21st century? How can the State Department attract, retain, and train the best talent? What kind of infrastructure does the State Department need at home and abroad in the 21st Century?

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can re-imagine American diplomat for the 21st century. These are big issues that will not be resolved overnight, but we need to ask these big questions. I look forward to working with Senator Cardin in a constructive manner to identify and take concrete tangible steps towards creating a new and modern State Department. I see three critical milestones that we should strive towards.

First, Congress as the ultimate objective should pass new legislation to modernize the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Forty-one years have passed since the last major restructuring of the State Department, and we should seek to update and enhance the State Department for the 21st Century. Second, as part of that effort to pass

new legislation, Congress should form a bipartisan commission to examine every aspect of American diplomacy, drawing on the expertise of a wide group of people with relevant experience and insight to advise our subcommittee. Third, this committee should continue to hold a series of hearings on this subject.

I look forward today to hearing from the witnesses, their ideas as to what Congress and the executive branch can undertake as we modernize the State Department for the 21st century. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you for your opening statement. I will just point out it was my pleasure to support your nomination, but Senator Alexander insisted that I support you—and I can never say no to Senator Alexander.

Senator HAGERTY. I understand.

Senator CARDIN. You have a good friend in our former colleague.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. We are very fortunate to have three real experts on the State Department, and we thank you all. Two are here in person, one is here by Webex. I will introduce you in the order that we asked you to give your presentations. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and you will be able to proceed as you wish. First is Stephen Biegun.

It is good to have you back. Mr. Biegun has had three decades of international affairs experience, most recently elevating to the Deputy Secretary of State. He worked very closely with our committee, and I appreciated the conversations we had when you were Deputy Secretary of State. I always found them to be very candid and very informative. Mr. Biegun also has experience on the Hill in the foreign policy specialist for Chief of Staff, and for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and as a national security advisor for Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist.

Our second witness will be Marcie Ries. Ambassador Ries, who was Chief Admission at Pristina in 2003 and 2004, Albania 2004–2007, Bulgaria 2012 through 2015. So she has been, you have been Chief Admission in three locations. That is quite an accomplishment. I just got back from a visit to Bulgaria and I could see firsthand the fruits of your work while you were ambassador. I think we have made progress and we had a very productive meeting under the umbrella of the OSCE.

Ambassador Ries was also on the negotiating team that negotiated the 2010 START Treaty with Russia. She was a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasia Affairs 2008 through 2009, was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee as staff chair, and senior fellow Future of Diplomacy Project at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. That is a long title. She co-authored a U.S. diplomatic service for the 21st century, which is very timely for our discussions today.

Our third witness will be coming to us via the internet, and that is Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter. She is the CEO of New America, Director of Policy Planning at the State Department from 2009 to 2011, and received a very prestigious Secretary's Distinguished Service Award for her diplomacy and work.

So we have three very distinguished panelists, and we will start with Mr. Biegun.

**STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN BIEGUN, FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FROM WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Chairman Cardin, and Ranking Member Hagerty, and distinguished members of the committee. It is a great honor to be here with you today to talk about this important topic.

One week from today will mark the 232nd anniversary of the founding of the State Department, an important institution which has played a central role in shaping the policies of our Nation, and shaping the outcome of events in the world. The organization and structure of the State Department, much less its role in the affairs of our country, has never been set in stone.

Our founding fathers contended with this important topic in the early days of the republic. Congress required Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, our eighth Secretary of State, in addition to his work leading the diplomatic corps to also oversee the census and the patent office, to monitor laws of various states of the union, and to produce a report on the viability of national standards for weights and measures. John Quincy Adams did all of this with a staff of 10.

Adams would eventually install a management structure and a system that would be adapted and revamped and changed on the margins over the years, and would serve the State Department all the way through the 21st Century. For the Department, its greatest asset has always been its people; their intelligence, commitment, and when called upon their bravery in the service of the American people. It is my great honor to have worked alongside those talented individuals at the State Department over the past 3 years.

I am pleased to be on a panel with two distinguished colleagues. Professor Slaughter's leadership in launching the State Department's first Quadrennial Diplomacy Review, the QDDR, while she served as Director of Policy and Planning, was particularly important in highlighting the growing role of our embassies as platforms for inner agency cooperation. In Ambassador Ries recent report which you referenced, Mr. Chairman, done with Ambassador Nick Burns and Mark Grossman on the future of the foreign service is an important contribution to charting away ahead for the diplomatic core by some of our most distinguished alumni from the State Department.

Throughout my time in the Department, we strove together to make the world more free, more prosperous, and more democratic. As I told the Department's 76,000 person workforce, Foreign Service, civil service, and locally employed staff in my first communication as Deputy Secretary of State, America's greatest strength has always been what the late Senator John McCain described as its hopeful vision of human progress.

Change is needed, desperately and urgently so, if the Department is going to continue to reflect the interest of the United States of America and the interests of the people in the employ of the Department of State. For my part, I have approached this ques-

tion on how to design and create a modern State Department from the lessons I have learned about people, process, and policy during more than three decades in government, the private sector, and the non-governmental community.

I have seen the State Department most recently from within as State Department Secretary of State, but I have also seen it from the vantage point of the White House National Security Council from the perspective of a major global cooperation working for the State Department in markets around the world, from the perspective of several non-governmental organizations that have been engaged in advancing U.S. values overseas. Most importantly from here, from the oversight perspective in the Congress as a staff member of this committee.

My call for reform is not intended to be a criticism of the people working at the Department. There is no question in my mind that the American people owe a deep gratitude for the myriad acts of sacrifice by State Department personnel. During my recent tenure at state, I witnessed how officers in Washington and around the world helped repatriate more than 100,000 American citizens, who are trapped abroad in COVID-19 hotspots.

I saw brave men and women who stayed at their posts in desperate conditions during this terrible pandemic. Who took assignments in war zones like Iraq where all too frequent attacks on our embassy buildings served as a constant risk to our diplomats. I have seen our teams deployed to South America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Korean Peninsula in attempt to end conflicts or limit the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I have seen our people lead and show the best of America in globally aiding against famine and disease, and helping refugees and those who live under dictatorships. There is much in the efforts of the State Department team for our government and our people to be proud of, but these same able public servants, if they were with us today, would likely be the most demanding among the voices calling for modernization and reforms of the Department.

This need for reform is seen in the stultifying effect of layers of bureaucracy that suffocate and discourage our diplomats. While immense improvements have been made in infrastructure of the Department, it is in my view too costly, too slow to be executed, and still incapable of protecting our electronic communications. The footprint of the Department leads close scrutiny as well. How do we perform at our most agile? Do we need fortress-like embassies, sometimes from which our diplomats cannot even venture in the face of local threats? Finally, how can the Department partner with other instruments of American power and influence in the world as a force multiplier, including civil society groups and the enormous reach of the U.S. private sector?

So, Mr. Chairman, Senator Hagerty, for a number of reasons which I will be pleased to elaborate further in our questions and answers, I strongly believe that the leadership needs to come from here, the United States Congress, in order to provoke and promote the kind of change that needs to occur. There are many worthy areas of review to ensure the 21st century State Department is fit, agile, and prepared to serve its critical role in the world. I looked forward to discussing this further with you today. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Biegun follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Mr. Stephen E. Biegun**

Chairman Cardin, Ranking Member Hagerty, and distinguished members of this Subcommittee: I am honored to appear before you today to discuss the important topic of modernizing the State Department for the 21st Century.

One week from today will mark the 232nd anniversary of the founding of this historic institution, which has played a central role in shaping the policies of our Nation, and shaping the outcome of world events. The organization and structure of the State Department, much less its role in the affairs of the country, has never been set in stone. Our Founding Fathers contended with this important topic in the early days of the Republic. Congress required Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, our eighth Secretary of State, to—in addition to leading the diplomatic corps—also oversee the census and the Patent Office, monitor the laws of various states on the Union, and produce a report on the viability of national standards for weights and measures. All with a staff of ten! Adams would eventually install a management structure and system that would be adapted and revamped over the years, and would serve the State Department into the 21st century. I find confidence in knowing that our institutions are capable of evolving and improving over time.

For the State Department, its greatest asset has always been its people—their intelligence, commitment, and when called upon, their bravery, in the service of the American people. It was my great honor to work alongside those talented and dedicated public servants of the State Department. I am also honored to be on this panel with my two distinguished colleagues. Professor Slaughter's leadership in launching the State Department's first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review or QDDR while she served as the Director of Policy Planning was particularly important in highlighting the growing role of our embassies as platforms for interagency coordination. And Ambassador Ries's recent report with Nick Burns and Marc Grossman on The Future of the Foreign Service is an important contribution to charting a way ahead for our diplomatic corps by some of its most distinguished alumni. Throughout my time in the Department we strove, together, to make the world more free, more prosperous, and more democratic. As I told the Department's 76,000-person workforce—Foreign Service, Civil Service, and locally employed staff—in my first communication as Deputy Secretary of State, America's greatest strength has always been its hopeful vision of human progress.

But change is desperately, urgently needed if the Department is to continue to serve the interests of the United States of America, and the interests of the people in the employ of the Department of State. For my part, I approach the question of how to design and create a modern State Department from the lessons I have learned about people, process, and policy during my more than three decades in government, the private sector, and the non-governmental community. I have seen the Department most recently from within, as the Deputy Secretary of State, but also from the vantage of the White House National Security Council, from the perspective of a major, global, American corporation that worked closely with markets around the world, from the perspective of several non-governmental entities engaged in advancing U.S. values overseas, and most importantly, from the oversight perspective of the Congress—to include as a staff member on this Committee.

My call for reform is not intended to be a criticism of the people working at the Department. There is no question in my mind that the American people owe a deep gratitude for myriad acts of sacrifice by State Department personnel. During my recent tenure at State, I witnessed how officers in Washington and around the world helped more than 100,000 Americans return home from COVID-19 hotspots, and the expertise and stamina they brought to bear in relentless negotiations to bring peace to conflicts. I saw brave men and women who stayed at their posts in desperate conditions during this terrible pandemic, who took assignments in warzones like Iraq, where all too frequent attacks on our Embassy served as a constant risk to our diplomats. I have seen our teams deploy to South America, Africa, the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula in attempt to end conflicts or limit the spread of dangerous weapons of mass destruction. And I have seen our people lead and show the best of our Nation in globally aiding against famine and disease, helping refugees, and those who live under dictatorships. There is much in the efforts of the State Department team for our government and our people to be proud. But, those same, able public servants, if they were with us today, would likely be the most demanding of the voices calling for the modernization and reform of the Department.

This need for reform is seen in the stultifying effect of layers of bureaucracy that suffocate and discourage our diplomats. While immense improvements have been

made in the infrastructure of the Department, it is in my view too costly, too slow to be executed, and still incapable of protecting the security of our electronic communications. The footprint of the Department needs close scrutiny as well. How do we perform at our most agile? Do we need fortress-like Embassies—sometimes from which our diplomats cannot even venture in the face of local threats? And finally, how can the Department partner with the other instruments of American power and influence in the world as a force multiplier, including civil society groups and the enormous reach of the U.S. private sector? All of these are among the many worthy areas of review to ensure the Department is fit, agile and prepared to serve its critical role in the world. And that review needs to come from here, the United States Congress.

In the post-World War II era, Congress led the way in supporting several important organizational reforms of the State Department, particularly in the 1980's and 90's, relating to embassy security; post-Cold War integration of U.S. Information Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and integrating USAID more closely into the Department's organization; the creation of several additional bureaus and offices focused on transnational challenges like the environment, trafficking in persons, and religious freedom; and the creation of a State Department-led campaign against HIV, Malaria and Tuberculosis that turned the global tide on the AIDS epidemic. But these structural changes to the State Department have tended to be additive or around the margins and not part of a comprehensive in-depth review of the Department's mission and role in today's world. Much has changed since adoption of the 1980 Foreign Service Act, the last time major restructuring of the State Department's diplomatic corps took place. Not everything should be tossed aside, but a zero-based review should have a broad mandate to look at every element of the Department from its mission to its budget and structure to its management and personnel practices.

There is much that functions well at the State Department, and it is important to state at the outset that these aspects must not be lost as you set out to modernize the State Department. Our diplomats deserve to have the tools, skills, and resources to work on our behalf to advocate for American values and interests in today's world. But I hope you agree, Senators, that simply adding resources without a thoughtful review of the Department's mission, organization, personnel systems, and effectiveness will not meet the moment. As President Biden accurately states in the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, our world is at an inflection point. Global dynamics have shifted, and new emerging challenges demand our immediate attention. We see authoritarianism on the march in some corners of the world, and increased strategic competition that will shape the next century and our Nation's prosperity.

For this reason, I believe that Congress should move now to form a bipartisan commission to formally examine ways to modernize the State Department for the 21st century. In a Foreign Affairs article last year, Ambassadors Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Bill Burns wrote about the transformation of diplomacy and acknowledged that many of the reforms that are necessary for the State Department were considered too hard when they were in the position to lead. Their admission reflects the reality that institutional and cultural change is difficult and often set aside when confronted with pressing policy challenges or when those in the senior leadership positions have benefitted from the system they are asked to review and reform. A high-level commission should examine every aspect of U.S. diplomacy, not shying away from dealing with challenges, to include a review of:

- Our State Department organization in Washington,
- Our overseas organization and presence,
- The structure and qualities of our diplomatic corps,
- Civil service recruitment and retention,
- Barriers to recruitment, promotion, and retention of a diverse and inclusive workforce,
- Investment in the professional development of the Department's personnel,
- The role of security of our embassies and people on the diplomatic mission,
- Infrastructure in all its forms to include information technology, transportation, and the Department's sprawling global real estate,
- Diplomacy's inextricable links with defense, development, commercial, health, law enforcement, and other core American interests,
- Core legislation that authorize U.S. diplomacy: the State Department Basic Authorities Act, the Foreign Service Act of 1980, and

- Treaties that impact our overseas presence: Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and other important frameworks developed largely in the 1960s.

As you can see from this list, the task is too complex, and in some case has too many vested interests and fixed viewpoints, to come from within. At the same time, previous efforts have failed when detached from the institution and its realities. Such a commission must rely in part on the individuals who have worked from within and have experience with the daily work of diplomacy and living and serving our country overseas. As the Deputy Secretary I engaged our workforce and thought about my work in three general lines of effort around people, policy, and process. I talked regularly with affinity groups representing diverse elements of the Department's workforce. When I traveled overseas, I tried to meet with officers on their way up to hear what they were thinking about and the changes they sought. I also talked routinely with the leaders of American Foreign Service Association and of course with management. To a person, these professionals talked about change in the context of an institution they loved and sought to improve.

Let me close by sharing just a few of the thoughts I heard while listening to the mid-career officers—those closer to the day they entered the Department than to the day they will receive their retirement from the Department. These officers talked to me about: the pace of rotations, the flexibilities for remote work for partners and spouses, the transparency of opportunities, barriers to diversity and inclusion, the promotion of Department internships overseas to more diverse (less wealthy) students, increased access to the Department's oral entrance exams, accountability for bad-behaving managers, the attrition of parents as the challenges of their career and family became more challenging to balance, an overhaul of the community liaison offices overseas that had origins as a program for a trailing homemaker wife but now must serve dual-income couples and partners, improved flexibilities for family member careers that can be hindered by local tax and security rules, nationwide recruitment of Foreign Service Officers outside non-traditional schools, the Department's antiquated rules on security restrictions.

This small snapshot speaks to a need to also review and adapt the Department to support today's modern workforce. If the global pandemic has taught us something positive, it is that we can adapt and create flexibilities and reimagine our workforce. I am pleased to be part of that discussion today, and hope this is the start of an in-depth, serious, and results oriented approach.

Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much for your testimony. We will now hear from Ambassador Ries.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARCIE RIES, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF ALBANIA FROM WASHINGTON, DC**

Ms. RIES. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hagerty, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify this afternoon. This subcommittee's inquiry into modernizing the State Department is a welcome initiative, and I am honored to have been invited to participate.

In November 2020, the Kennedy School's Belfer Center issued a report entitled, "A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century." I was one of three retired Foreign Service co-authors. The impetus for the project was our concern that the Foreign Service was facing a profound crisis that had developed over years and multiple administrations. Our career diplomats lacked the support, funding, training, career flexibility, and leadership development opportunities they needed. Worse, this was happening at the very time the United States was facing complex challenges globally requiring vigorous, sophisticated diplomacy. To develop our ideas, we sought the advice of a wide cross section of serving and former officials, members of Congress from both parties, staff, outside experts, and concerned Americans.

Our conclusion was just as the Nation invested time and resources in an ambitious program of reform for both its military and intelligence agencies in recent years, a serious reform program was now urgently needed for the Foreign Service. In our report, we suggest the President and the Congress launch the initiative by defining a new mission and mandate aimed at restoring the State Department's lead role in executing foreign policy and re-affirming ambassador's roles as the President's personal representatives. Second, we recommend that Congress pass a new Foreign Service act. In discussions with Pentagon leaders, they counseled significant changes be included in legislation as was done for the military in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Third, we acknowledge deep reform will require the active participation and support of the Foreign Service, including by critically examining their own culture, to find ways to incentive innovation, responsible risk taking, inclusive management, and visionary leadership. Much has been written about the chronic failure to improve diversity and inclusion in the Service despite efforts over decades. Our report recommends radical change in the way the United States recruits, educates, assigns, and promotes members of the Foreign Service. Our proposal for an ROTC-like program to expand recruitment of minorities and other members of underserved communities as well as our call for regular publication of personnel statistics are two of our ideas in which Congress would play a key role.

We also recommend expanding education and training to a career-long process, as is the case for other competent diplomatic services and for our own military. Our Foreign Service Institute has made a start on a sequence of required courses. This should be expanded to significant blocks of training lasting several months at career thresholds. For such a stepped program of professionalizations to succeed, we concluded a 15 percent personnel training float would be needed, another area for potential congressional action. We also recommended an overhaul of the personnel system to make it more flexible, transparent, and oriented to family needs.

Two of our specific ideas were eliminating the division of Foreign Service officers into functional cones, and a rigorous examination of overseas staffing with a view to better alignment of positions with current needs. To retain the best officers and prepare them for leadership, we must give them the opportunity to serve at progressively senior levels. The thought is not to eliminate political appointee ambassadors, many of whom have served with distinction. Rather, we propose to bolster non-partisanship and strengthen the service by increasing the proportion of career professionals and leadership positions in Washington, and filling a greater number of ambassadorships with career diplomats.

We also offered two ideas aimed at giving our diplomacy added agility, both of which would require congressional support. The first would be a limited and well-defined mid-level entry program designed to address the need for new skills or knowledge areas. The second, a diplomatic reserve corps, would be aimed at giving the State Department the ability to surge to respond to unforeseen contingencies such as natural disasters. Finally, we suggest that

giving this service a new modern name would send a powerful signal of transformation. Our suggestion is the United States Diplomatic Service because it puts the United States first, it correctly labels all employees diplomats, and it describes what our diplomats contribute, service to our Nation.

Thank you of your attention, and I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Ries follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Ambassador (Ret.) Marcie Ries**

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagerty, thank you for the invitation to testify today. This subcommittee's inquiry into "Modernizing the State Department for the 21st century" is a welcome initiative, and I am honored to have been invited to participate.

In November 2020, the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs published a report entitled "A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century," for which I was one of three co-authors. Let me begin by recounting a little of the background to the project.

Going back to 2019, several retired members of the Foreign Service who together had almost a century of service got together to discuss the state of the Foreign Service and the need for far-reaching reforms. Finding a commonality of purpose, we decided to solicit ideas from a broad spectrum of practitioners, stakeholders, and representatives of other foreign affairs agencies on what should be done to reform and rebuild the Foreign Service.

An element in our thinking was that both the military and the intelligence community have undertaken major reforms in recent years, whereas the last major piece of legislation governing the Foreign Service was 40 years ago in the form of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

Initially the project, which was located at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, was to consist of a handful of conferences in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the West Coast and elsewhere in the United States to gather information and ideas. However, the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic compelled us to rethink our plans. Instead of in-person conferences, we switched to virtual meetings. The imperative for virtual gatherings probably enabled us to interact with more people and gather a wider range of opinions and viewpoints.

Ultimately, we held 40 meetings with over 200 participants, including current and former Foreign Service officers, former officials in partner agencies, as well as from the National Security Council, the intelligence community and uniformed military and civilian leadership at the Pentagon. We held sessions with serving officials of the Trump administration, members of the Biden transition team, and Members of Congress and staff of both parties. We also had discussions with former top leaders, including former Secretaries of State, two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and leaders of the intelligence community. Finally, we solicited ideas from the interested public via virtual meetings with think tanks, business people, academics, and with World Affairs Councils both at a national meeting and with individual chapters in Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas; Peoria, Illinois; Nashville, Tennessee; Cleveland, Ohio; and Boston, Massachusetts, for a total of 800 interested Americans.

Our conclusion was that the Foreign Service was facing a crisis that has been developing over multiple years and through successive administrations. Specifically, we assessed our career diplomats lacked the support, funding, training, flexibility, and leadership development opportunities they needed to be as effective as they should be in policy development at home and in representing and assisting the American people abroad.

More concerning, this is happening at the same time the United States is facing especially complex challenges that require vigorous diplomacy to address.

Morale in the Foreign Service was low, we were told. The failure of the State Department to make progress on recruiting, retaining, and promoting a diverse workforce, despite years of effort to do so, was a contributing factor.

After a period of reflection and analysis, we concluded that just as the Nation invested time and resources in ambitious programs to renew both its military and intelligence agencies in recent years, the same should be done for our Foreign Service. A non-partisan initiative should be launched immediately by the President and the Congress to revive, reform, rebuild, and reimagine the Foreign Service of the United States.

Our report includes 10 specific actions that we considered were key to giving the Nation the diplomatic capability it will need to successfully navigate the foreign policy challenges of the next decades.

*Our first recommendation* is that the President and the Congress redefine the Foreign Service's mission and mandate. Specifically, we proposed formally designating the State Department as the lead U.S. Government agency in executing relations with every country and international organization on the full range of diplomatic, political, security and other issues.

Underlying this recommendation was the idea that the State Department should have a major, designated role in formulating U.S. foreign policy along with other Cabinet agencies and the National Security Council but take the lead role in implementing those policies.

In addition, the President should reaffirm and reinforce the role of all Ambassadors as his personal representatives. This is essential to the proper and successful functioning of our embassies abroad, which often have representatives of many government agencies.

At the beginning of his or her mission, all ambassadors receive a letter from the President describing their responsibilities and authorities over U.S. policies and personnel. Our embassies work very well when the role of the Ambassador is well understood and respected by all under their authority. Confusion in this regard can lead to internal disarray or, worse, confusing signals to foreign counterparts.

*Our second recommendation*, closely related to the first, is to suggest that Congress pass a new Foreign Service Act. In our discussions with Pentagon leaders, they strongly recommended that significant changes be included in legislation as was done for the military in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 and for the intelligence community in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.

Forty years on from the Foreign Service Act of 1980, the United States faces many new challenges that call for highly sophisticated and complex diplomacy, including great power rivalry with China and Russia, the global pandemic, the continuing threat of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the systems to deliver them, and all of this in an era of instant communication and much disinformation. There are also an array of challenges brought on by new developments in science and technology including cyber, biotech, artificial intelligence, internet commerce and data flows, and social media. The globalized economy has benefitted some and left others behind in tandem with huge changes in technology, fueling political challenges in the world.

We used to train our diplomats to focus on observing geo-political developments, advocating for U.S. interests, and reporting back to Washington. But in our increasingly complex world, they need an ever-evolving knowledge set and new tools and partners to address these new challenges with the strongest possible hand.

Not everyone agrees that a new Foreign Service Act is needed. Indeed, our report emphasizes that a new Act should preserve what was positive and remains fundamental in the previous Acts, including the vital leadership role of Ambassadors, the requirement that the Service be based on merit principles with admission through impartial and rigorous examination, ratings and rank orderings by peer promotion boards, worldwide availability, and the separation of those who do not meet standards of performance. The report argues for preserving provisions related to distinctive pay and benefits for those willing to meet the demands and risks of serving their country overseas, a separate and fully funded retirement system; and recognition of the role of the American Foreign Service Association in the employee-management system.

Another important piece of advice we heard from leaders in the private sector—as well as our government colleagues—is that transformational change cannot be achieved without vigorous internal self-examination.

This led us to *our third recommendation* which was the need to change our own Foreign Service culture.

There is much to commend about Foreign Service culture, including a deep, patriotic commitment to country and to service to that country, even if it involves, at times, personal risk. Our partners and families, too, often must make sacrifices in their personal lives and livelihoods. Foreign Service officers are committed to upholding their oath and the best diplomats are extremely hard-working and highly professional.

Yet, there are some aspects of the culture that can make our diplomats lives more difficult and the changes we propose challenging to achieve. These include, for instance, a belief that additional training and professional education are dispensable and a costly diversion from career advancement, coupled with a conviction the “learn by doing” model is sufficient. There is insufficient value attached to strategic

thinking and to technical and scientific expertise, to planning, and to program management.

A more fundamental problem is the debilitating lack of diversity and the absence of an institutional culture of inclusion in the Foreign Service. *Our fourth recommendation* is that this problem be addressed urgently and as a matter of priority by Department leadership.

The issue that came up most frequently in our meetings and roundtables was the problems engendered by the lack of a diverse work force and failure to provide an atmosphere of inclusion for differences in race, gender, identity, and different kinds of skills and thought. Business leaders pointed to the wealth of research showing that a diverse workforce is likely to be more productive and more efficient. This would seem to be especially true in the Foreign Service where people of diverse backgrounds can make an important contribution to our understanding of the cultures with whom our diplomats must interact to be successful.

Clearly the high-performing, reformed, and rebuilt Foreign Service we are aiming for cannot succeed without a vigorous plan to make the Service more diverse and inclusive.

The former and current State Department leadership have made a start by convening discussions of the problem, including consulting the very active “affinity groups” and appointing a Chief Diversity Officer who reports to the Secretary. Amongst the nominees for high-level positions in the Department and as ambassadors there appears to be a commendable commitment to increasing diversity.

However, much more needs to be done at every level, including recruitment, retention, assignments, and promotion. Our report provides many specific recommendations for each. For example, in the area of recruitment, our interlocutors commended the Payne, Rangel and Pickering fellowships but thought more needed to be done, including much broader and deeper outreach to institutions and students from around the country, starting even at the high school level.

This led to our proposal for an ROTC-like program for the Foreign Service similar to the programs the military has at multiple colleges and universities to attract recruits and give them a head start on their service. We also suggested creating paid internships in order to extend the opportunity to preview a foreign service career to those who cannot afford to pay their own way, much less forgo a summer job while also paying for education.

Based on our discussions of the problem of retention, we strongly recommend that measures be taken to make leaders at every level accountable for creating an inclusive environment in their work units from the smallest to the Department as a whole. This means inculcating in our managers from their first time supervising the notion that part of their responsibility is recruiting, carefully managing, mentoring, and preparing for higher levels of responsibility a diverse work force and that in appraising their performance, their success will be measured.

As we said in our report, “Good intentions are no longer sufficient. Tangible action by each officer must now be the norm.”

We also mentioned the importance of transparency. Publishing statistics for all to see will both encourage progress and serve as a concrete indicator of whether there has been real improvement.

*Our fifth recommendation* is that professional education and training should be viewed as a career-long commitment. Having a diplomatic service that is at the top of its game is a necessity for the United States in a world of increasingly complex challenges, new technologies, and new frontiers such as the arctic and space. We were reminded by a military colleague that the Foreign Service does not have tanks, ships, or fighter aircraft: its most valuable assets and the source of its greatest strength are the people who seek to serve as America’s diplomats. They need and deserve professional education and training to thoroughly equip them for the breadth of management and policy challenges they face in conducting America’s diplomacy and leading American embassies abroad.

Currently, there are few opportunities for study at outside academic institutions or to earn degrees. We noted in our report that the Harvard Kennedy School last year had over 50 military and intelligence officers enrolled and just two foreign service officers.

Both the American military and diplomats in other, friendly, or rival, diplomatic services receive significantly more training upon entry and throughout their careers than American diplomats. Chinese junior diplomats, for example, receive 6 months training upon entry focused on learning about their Ministry and Chinese diplomacy. About 10 years ago, the French introduced significant mid-career training which mixes leadership and management with current broad issue-areas. Former Secretary Powell told us that he spent about 7 years total in training, while most Foreign Service Officers, even including language training, have had far less.

Our Foreign Service Institute has made a significant start on providing a sequence of required courses at intervals throughout a career. This should be expanded so that all officers receive significant blocks of training lasting several months at four points in their careers—upon entry, before promotion to mid-level, at the level at which they choose to become a senior officer or retire, and when they become senior officers. These should include leadership and management skills, but such training should also address current and emergent policy issues and strategic thinking, diplomatic skills, and tradecraft.

For such a program to succeed, there would need to be a significant change both in service culture to one that sees education as a stepping-stone to advancement and by management to weigh more heavily knowledge and technical skills, including strong language skills, in assignments and promotions.

There would also need to be more resources devoted to education, and more officers for the Service.

For career-long education to succeed, it would have to be supported by a “training float” to provide job coverage while officers are in training or transitioning. Once authorized and funded, it would be critical to “protect” these positions for the educational purpose described, and not allow them to be usurped to fill ordinary personnel vacancies. To avoid this outcome, we suggested a simultaneous objective look at staffing worldwide, including persistent and projected vacancies. Our supposition was that an additional plus-up would be needed to fill those positions.

*Our sixth recommendation* is to undertake a determined effort to make the personnel system more modern and flexible.

A first step should be making a serious, global assessment of staffing, with the presumption that the majority of foreign service officers and specialists should be overseas and that the mega-embassies associated with the land wars of the 2000’s and other enormous outposts of U.S. Government presence abroad should be reduced in size.

More priority should be put on family needs, including spousal and partner employment.

The perception that the assignment and promotion processes still rely on an “old boys’ network” must be addressed and processes put into place that are perceived as valuing professionalism and transparent and fair for all.

The underlying assumption of these proposals is that effective diplomacy requires a cadre of practitioners who have been rigorously selected, developed deep knowledge and professional skills via years as practicing diplomats and are committed to a full career of worldwide service.

Nonetheless, it is a reality that the Service needs the means to acquire specific expertise in new scientific and technical fields such as cyber, artificial intelligence, data analytics and financial technologies.

This led to *our seventh recommendation*: a mid-level entry program with very specific and rigorous requirements for entry.

In fact, previous legislation, including both the Foreign Service Acts of 1946 and of 1980 have included provisions for mid-level entry. The former was used in the 1950s to bring more women into the Service.

In exchanges with currently serving officers, the concept of mid-level entry came in for considerable criticism on the grounds that promotion was currently slow in the mid-levels and that adding a new cohort to the mix would exacerbate the problem. These concerns argue for a program that is clearly defined, introduced slowly and which is used only for the purposes for which it was designed.

*Our eighth recommendation* is to establish a diplomatic reserve corps which would augment Foreign Service capabilities. A diplomatic reserve corps would allow the Foreign Service and the State Department to surge to meet unexpected requirements for additional personnel to respond to natural disasters, pandemics, or conflict situations. Like military reservists, diplomatic reservists would have regular service obligations aimed at maintaining or developing specific skills and would be prepared to be deployed on short notice.

In normal times the Diplomatic Reserve Corps, like its military counterparts, would provide people to fill specific needs that the regular organization might be unable to meet, including at the State Department in Washington, DC.

Having a Reserve Corps would have the additional advantage of giving more Americans the opportunity to serve and would forge a direct connection to citizens and communities who might not otherwise be aware of the activities of United States diplomats.

We cannot hope to cultivate and retain the best officers if we do not give them the opportunity to serve at progressively senior levels.

*Our ninth recommendation* is that the State Department and the Foreign Service would be stronger and more non-partisan if the number of senior Washington and

ambassadorial assignments for career professionals were expanded. At the time our report was written there were more political appointees serving at State than in any other cabinet department. To bring the State Department more in line with other cabinet agencies, we proposed setting goals for the numbers of career professionals in the top leadership positions in Washington and appointing career professionals to 90 percent of all ambassadorial positions by 2025.

This approach would bring the Foreign Service in line with the military, the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency in terms of the ratio of non-career to career employees at senior levels.

Finally, *our 10th recommendation* is to give to the Foreign Service a new, more modern name. Most of our project participants agreed it would be appropriate and it would give a strong signal of significant transformation.

We propose “The United States Diplomatic Service” as it puts the United States first, it correctly labels all employees diplomats, and it describes what all are engaged in—service to their country.

Thank you, and I would be pleased to respond to your questions.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Madam Ambassador. We will now hear from, on the internet, Dr. Slaughter.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF NEW AMERICA FROM WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagerty and members of the committee, I am honored to be able to testify before you today, even if it is long distance and virtual and I do not have the little thing to tell me when my 5 minutes are up, so I will pay attention to my own clock.

I am very pleased to be able to talk about such an important subject. I want to take Senator Hagerty’s invitation to be bold and to start by asking you to imagine what a core of representatives really bringing the best of our country together could look like in representing us around the world. Imagine these representatives trained and sworn to advance U.S. interests around the world, staffing embassies and missions, or trade and cultural offices, who reflect the world and speak the world’s languages fluently.

So imagine African Americans in Africa, Asians seeing Asian Americans, Latin Americans seeing Hispanic Americans just as Europeans have long seen European Americans, and Anglo-Saxons having seen Anglo-Saxon Americans; people who look and often sound like themselves but were unmistakably American. This is not simply about identity being destined, that you come from a certain country and you should be sent to that region. Quite the contrary, we need many more African Americans who are fluent in Mandarin posted all over China, Arab Americans speaking Russian posted from Moscow to Vladivostok, or indeed Hispanic Americans speaking Swahili or Swedish posted to Africa or Europe.

We are becoming a plurality country, a country that can reflect and connect the world. If you look at the deepest ties between nations, the biggest flows of trade and investment and cultural exchanges, they are between the United States and Europe. That is because most of us came from Europe for a long time, but we can now have those relations around the world. That diversity is a huge advantage in our competition with other nations.

Note that I keep talking about representatives rather than diplomats. I am so pleased to be able to testify next to two public servants whom I deeply respect, and I have enormous regard for diplomats. I think actually we need more than diplomats. We need people from business, from the civic sector, from education, from

sports, from the arts, from religion. We need the full range of American talent representing us abroad. As I think we all agree, the current Foreign Service was created in 1925 as a merger of the consular service and the diplomatic service, and although it has been reformed several times over the 20th century, we are all talking about a new Foreign Service Act.

I would go further than that. I would ask this committee to consider an overhaul of Foreign Service that instead creates a new global service open to anyone who is interested in serving the country as an official representative abroad. Anyone who is willing to sign up for a 7 to 10 year tour, or possibly a 5 year renewable tour at any point in their career as opposed to the current assumption that you sign up for 30 years, making your way up a very steep ladder in a trajectory that honestly our young people just do not even recognize in any profession anymore.

At best they think of 5- to 10-year chunks of time. So we could be bringing people to represent us abroad from every different sector, many of who already bring linguistic skills and tremendous cultural knowledge as well as knowledge from many different sectors. I think such a service would indeed allow us to recruit the very best from across the country and to look like the country. But also, again, it should bring together the skillset needed to put together important public, private, and civic partnerships, which is how we are going to solve problems in this century.

We would still of course have rigorous selection criteria into this global service, and we would overhaul the Foreign Service examination or global service examination and training. Again, what we would focus on is how to empower this range of global representatives to represent us but also to work not only with the diplomats of other nations but the very big sectors of other nations as well.

I know these are grand schemes. You wanted the bold suggestions. I think we should really think about what we would create if we were starting from scratch in this century and how we can best harness the tremendous talent in our country. How do we get this done?

Senator Hagerty, you anticipated me. There is a well-established playbook here, which is the playbook that was followed for the Goldwater-Nichols Commission and then the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Congress needs to appoint a commission, a bipartisan commission empowered certainly to work with the Foreign Service and the Foreign Service union, but also to think much more broadly and boldly about where we need to go.

I would also conclude by encouraging this committee to hold hearings but to work as fast as possible. The Administration's foreign policy team has many pressing challenges, and this kind of structural reform is often at the bottom of the list. Indeed, as former deputy Secretary Biegun said, in the end our most important asset is our people. We need to be able to attract the best people, promote the best people, and again reflect the country we are and we are becoming. I hope every much that this subcommittee will be able to recommend some really bold changes to create a global service that will include diplomats, but also development experts and people who are knowledgeable in the business sector, the

civic sector, and many other sectors as well. I look forward to answering your questions and I thank you for your time.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Slaughter follows:]

**Prepared Statement of Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter**

Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Hagerty, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am pleased and honored to be able to talk to you about "Modernizing the State Department for the 21st century."

Let us begin by looking forward. Imagine how America could be in the world. Imagine a corps of official representatives, trained and sworn to advance U.S. interests around the globe, staffing embassies, missions, trade and cultural offices of all kinds, who reflect the world and speak the world's languages fluently. Imagine Africans seeing African-Americans, Asians seeing Asian-Americans, Latin Americans seeing Latinx Americans, just as Europeans have long seen European Americans and Anglo-Saxon countries have seen Anglo-Saxon Americans: as people who look and often sound like themselves but who are unmistakably American.

Can we really doubt that the "special relationship" between the United States and Great Britain is based in part on our close genetic, linguistic, and cultural kinship? Is it an accident that the "Five Eyes," the three countries in addition to Britain that we are most willing to share intelligence with, are Canada, Australia, and New Zealand? All branches from the same mother tree?

Equally important, however, is to demonstrate that identity is not destiny. We need far more African-Americans speaking fluent Mandarin posted all over China; Arab-Americans speaking Russian posted from Moscow to Vladivostok; Hispanic Americans speaking Swahili or Swedish posted in Africa and Europe. We are becoming a plurality country that will reflect and can connect the world.

The identity of our official representatives abroad is no small thing. It is not a matter of wanting diversity and inclusion because those are good things to have and the zeitgeist demands it. The United States could do few things more important for its future security and prosperity (another is to fund universal early education) than ensure that the people who represent America in the world actually look like America. Genetic, linguistic, and cultural kinship is obviously not all it takes to create enduring bonds between nations. Political systems, geography, natural resources, and national values all play key roles. Moreover, even countries that appear very similar on the surface, such as the U.S. and Canada or Australia, still have plenty of cultural, ethical, and political differences. Still, if U.S. representatives abroad truly reflected the demography of the United States, we would have far greater cultural, linguistic, and historic channels of connection with the peoples of other nations.

Note that I keep referring to representatives rather than diplomats. I have great respect for diplomats both personally and professionally: their trade is to avert, smooth over, and sometimes even to resolve arguments, to advance difficult negotiations, and to steer without being seen to steer. We need only to look to CIA Director William Burns to see a master of the trade and to appreciate the value of a diplomatic corps to the country in many situations. Still, diplomatic abilities are only one part of the skillset that the Nation needs in our relations with other nations in the decades to come.

**A FOREIGN SERVICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY**

The current Foreign Service was created in 1925, through a merger of the Consular Service and the Diplomatic Service, and reformed several times during the 20th century, although its form and the basic assumption that diplomacy is a 30-year career with a carefully prescribed progression from bottom to top were never changed.<sup>1</sup> The world has moved on, however; young people today typically think about their careers in 5 to 10 year chunks. Moreover, it is possible to have a global career, in the sense of traveling and living abroad, in many different sectors. And the number of Americans who grow up speaking their parents' natal language as well as English has steadily increased over the last century, changing the recruiting pool for Americans who can represent the government abroad.

A Congressionally mandated overhaul of the Foreign Service could create a new Global Service open to anyone interested in serving the country as an official representative abroad who is willing to sign up for a 7 to 10 year tour, or perhaps a 5 year renewable tour, at any stage in their career. Early, mid, or later career individuals could bring a tremendous range of skills to the job, as well as languages, cultural expertise, and contacts that they developed in other jobs. Members of the

Global Service could have backgrounds in business, technology, civic organizations, education, science, sports, arts, and religion.<sup>2</sup>

Such a service would be far more likely actually to represent the actual population of the United States than the Foreign Service. It would be possible to recruit people from many different careers at different stages in their careers, without requiring them to make a 30-year commitment to a life of 3-year tours hopscotching between foreign countries and Washington. To take only one example, individuals working in state or municipal governments in large, medium, and even smaller cities could be eligible, particularly those who handling trade, climate, security, and other matters that require regional and global contacts.

We would still need rigorous selection criteria, of course, but the Foreign Service examination could certainly be overhauled, as could training for postings abroad. It might well be that the U.S. approach to diplomacy could reduce the endless details of diplomatic protocol over time, but we would likely find other countries quickly following suit. Much of that protocol is better suited to the 18th century than the 21st.

A great advantage of such a Global Service would be the ability to mobilize different kinds of public-private-civic-philanthropic partnerships that are now and will increasingly be necessary to tackle global problems. These partnerships can also advantage the U.S. in great power competition or other foreign policy initiatives. To take only one example, when President Obama announced a “new beginning with the Muslim world” in 2009, he could not offer a governmental Marshall Plan. He could, however, have mobilized tremendous resources with the systematic ability to work across sectors in at home and in every Muslim-majority country.

#### GETTING IT DONE

These are grand schemes, perhaps more appropriate for a university seminar than a Congressional hearing. Yet they are no grander than the reorganization of the U.S. Department of Defense in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, strengthening civilian control over the military and substantially reducing inter-service rivalry. It took a number of years, but it got done.

The playbook for making major change in Washington is well-established: appoint a commission. In 1985 the Reagan administration appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission led by former Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard to investigate Department of Defense procurement and other managerial practices. Years earlier, however, members of Congress serving on both the House and the Senate Armed Services Committees also sought to investigate a series of botched or mismanaged military operations and responses. Both committees launched multi-year reviews, supported by work that Senator Sam Nunn commissioned from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These processes ultimately converged in the set of reforms that were passed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Congress could come together now and appoint a commission to investigate how best to equip the United States for the multi-stakeholder diplomacy and development needs of the 21st century, requiring a report with proposed legislation by the end of 2021. Congress could then act on that report in the first half of 2022.

#### WHY NOW

Congressional action is needed urgently. In 2009, the Obama administration had a chance to work with Congress to overhaul the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make a host of structural and other changes. Senator Levin’s office was ready and willing to work with the executive branch to get it done. Internal frictions and lack of leadership meant that we missed what turned out to be only a 2-year window before the midterm elections of 2010. This Congress and this Administration should not make that mistake again.

The Administration’s foreign policy team has a host of immediate and medium-term challenges. Yet the single most important thing the United States can do for decades to come is to ensure that we attract the very best talent from across every part of the American population to represent us in the world, with the skills and connections necessary to engage in new approaches to global problem-solving. As every business knows, in times of continual change, plans and policies are far less important than people. The workforce in every sector must be composed of people who can adapt and respond to new circumstances quickly, effectively, and continually.

The current Foreign Service was created nearly a century ago. It is time to take bold action to create a Global Service that will meet U.S. needs for the next century, and to create the capabilities that will truly give us equal strength and depth in diplomacy, defense, and development. The diversity and innovative capacity of the

American people, reflecting immigration over centuries from the entire world, is our greatest strength. It is time we applied that strength to managing U.S. relationships with other countries and tackling the problems that endanger us all without regard for borders.

Thank you for your time.

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Notes

<sup>1</sup>For an account of the origins of the current Foreign Service, see “The Rogers Act—Short History—Department History—Office of the Historian,” accessed May 12, 2020, <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/rogers>.

<sup>2</sup>For a more detailed explication of this proposal, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Reinventing the State Department,” *Democracy Journal*, <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/reinventing-the-state-department/>.

Senator CARDIN. Well, let me, Dr. Slaughter, thank you for your testimony and let me thank all three of our witnesses. You have given us some really bold suggestions and ways in which we can try to improve our diplomacy around the world. We will start 5-minute rounds with Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Senator Hagerty and what a good hearing. Three great witnesses. The Belfer Center report has a lot of intriguing suggestions in it. I think the U.S. diplomatic corps rather than Foreign Service to put U.S. first, put diplomats first or U.S. global corps or global serves. Professor Slaughter mentioned there is intriguing aspects there. There are other things about the report that I would dig into, but with only 5 minutes, I think I will just ask one question and see if all three of you might address it.

Figuring out the right structure and role for the State Department and its great employees in the 21st Century right now and going forward, you have to analyze other pieces of the puzzle. Another significant one is the National Security Council, my observation during the time that I have been here. I think it is a trend that maybe pre-dated my coming in 2013. I certainly heard Senator McCain talk about this a lot, is as the NSC has grown, it has often sort of maybe sucked some of the expertise power, decision-making authority from State Department more into the White House.

Senator McCain leveled the same critique about it pulling some of the decision-making power from the Pentagon into the White House. He was sort of a critique of a large NSC, not because of just sheer size but I think he wanted the DoD and State to be very empowered both in the secretaries, but in everybody in those two important parts of the Executive Branch to do the missions assigned to it. You worry about it growing NSC as sort of centering power in the White House and sort of neutering to some degree state and DoD.

So if each of the witnesses could address sort of NSC state balance as we think about this going forward, I would appreciate hearing your thoughts about it.

Mr. BIEGUN. I will take a shot at that first, Senator Kaine, thank you. I have had the opportunity to view this dynamic both as poacher and gamekeeper. I served as a senior NSC staffer for President Bush and his Deputy Secretary in the Trump administration. Some of these, some of the phenomenon you describe seem to be endemic and eternal but it does not mean they should not be taken on. You are absolutely right, and Senator McCain was absolutely right, that the agencies should be expected to be the lead ex-

ecutors of policy, and that Congress should expect that as well because the agencies are answerable to the oversight of this committee, unlike the White House.

So the Congress and the executive departments have a shared interest in this. Some of it is personality driven, and it depends on who the national security advisor is, who the secretary is, and who are the President's preferences are. Structurally, a NSC of limited size and of a well-defined role as a coordinating body rather than as a policy making body do in my view produce the best outcome for government.

We have had national security advisors who have felt that way. Brent Scowcroft is famously the example I think almost every national security advisor when they ascent to that honorable position attest to wanting to live up to the legacy of General Scowcroft but few do. The press of events, the parties of the President, the intermingling of politics and policy over time can erode the authorities of the State Department and draw those decisions to the NSC. This is a process reform. I mentioned in my testimony, Senator Kaine, I look at it as people, process, and policy are the three likes of the stool and getting the process right is incredibly important to having that empowered foreign service that Ambassador Ries and Dr. Slaughter have discussed.

Senator Kaine. Great. Ambassador Ries.

Ms. Ries. Thank you. First, I agree with Steve Biegun that the National Security Council, when it functions as a coordinating body works extremely well. The example that he gave would have been the one that I would have given as well. I think that the partnership between the National Security Council and the State Department is very important. One way of strengthening the partnership, which we suggested in our report, would be when the National Security Council sets up various committees to discuss problems and proposals, to have the State Department chair them. That would seem to be a formula for the partnership to work very well.

Moreover, there is the point that much of the staff of the National Security Council come from the State Department. This is what I would describe as a force multiplier. That aspect of the cooperative working relationship works well and should be continued.

Senator Kaine. I am over my time, Mr. Chair. Could we ask Dr. Slaughter if she would want to weigh in just for a second? Thank you.

Senator Cardin. Certainly.

Dr. Slaughter. Thank you, Senator Kaine. It is good to see you. So I agree that when the National Security Council is too big, then they think they have the capacity to actually drive things rather than to coordinate, and that is a problem. They really should be appointing lead agencies. I think what Ambassador Ries suggested in their report made sense, but I would say, the NSC should be learner. It should appoint lead agencies, but not automatically turn to the State Department to chair. Part of what it has to do is also allow USAID or other agencies that really often have tremendous knowledge also to be able to lead at time.

Senator Cardin. Senator Hagerty.

Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Cardin. Senator Kaine, I want to thank you very much for that insightful question. I would

just like to add one thing because your time did not run over but I think I would love to continue this conversation. I took a hard look at this when I served on a volunteer basis helping the transition process in government. Back when the 41st presidency when General Scowcroft was running the NAC, the size of the NAC staff, and Steve you will help me with this, was about 50–70 people. I looked at it again in 2016, it was about 450. So that is a massive expansion just if you look at the numbers alone.

So I think that we ought to constantly think about this and the scope of our thought process here as we envision and reimagining I guess our diplomacy going into the 21st Century because the coordinating function, I agree with Dr. Slaughter, certainly runs a great risk of being overwhelmed with the driving function when you get an entity of that size. So thank you for raising that, and I would encourage us to keep that in mind as we move forward. I would like to open with a question for Secretary Biegun. You know, inertia is the most powerful force in the universe, and you mentioned in your testimony the fact that opinions can be long held, interests can be vested.

Change is challenging. You have had the experience in the corporate world and a deep experience here in government dealing with the challenge of effecting change. I would like to ask you first, over 41 years since the last time this act was redone, much has happened. In that context, what would you perceive is the risk if we do not affect change at this point in time.

Mr. BIEGUN. Yes. Thank you, Senator. Forty-one years is much too long. Just nearest and dearest to me one of the most pressing issues I confronted as the Deputy Secretary of State was the COVID–19 pandemic. It was the second global pandemic since 1980 that the United States has endured. The HIV/AIDS pandemic took the lives of 700,000 Americans. It is largely believed that that virus was originated in Africa. The COVID–19, which is largely believed to have originated in China has taken the lives of 600,000 Americans. Yet, in 2020 when it came time to respond to that pandemic, we had to build it on the fly. We were building the plane as we were flying it.

Now, the State Department and it is incredible talent can overcome a lot of obstacles. Still, something like a retired diplomatic core like Ambassador Ries recommended would have been of enormous benefit to us, especially if people had experience in these things. We need our diplomats out there at the front lines of where issues like global pandemics, right? That is just one issue of dozens of issues that the Nation has left exposed if we do not have a more agile and responsive diplomacy. So I was sobered by my experience as deputy, and I think that this kind of thoughtful reform and restructuring, the Department gave us tools to respond to the crisis of the future in a much better way.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you. I would just like to follow up with another point to both yourself, Secretary Biegun, and to Dr. Slaughter. You both have spoken about the need to form a commission. I would love to get your input. We may not have enough time today to do this but both in terms of the process and the composition of that commission, I agree with the notion to be bold. Dr. Slaughter, you refer to the roadmap already being in place from

the Goldwater-Nichols Act. I think that we would benefit greatly from the learning and the experience that you all have studied as we think about a commission going forward. I would love to get your comments. I will start with you, Secretary Biegun.

Mr. BIEGUN. Thank you, Senator. So a commission can be a very useful way to do this, and I was here for the Goldwater-Nichols process and saw the enormous impact that it had on the structure of our defense Department. It was and is a lasting improvement in our defense and probably helped us prevail in the Cold War because of its effectiveness. We do need a similar thing. That wasn't done outside of the work of the Armed Services Committee was done with the Armed Services Committee. My only appeal would be that this committee maintain its leadership role and its counterpart in the house in trying to effect that kind of change.

You can rely upon that broad set of expertise, and I agree completely with Dr. Slaughter. This is not something that the State Department or the State Department career officials alone can resolve this. It has to have outside perspective from every dimension of American society. This committee has to play a leading role if that is going to be a successful effort.

Senator HAGERTY. Well put. I agree with that. Dr. Slaughter, we are running at the end of time but a quick comment would be most appreciated.

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Well, it will be quick because I completely agree on two things. One, Congress absolutely has to stay actively involved. Goldwater-Nichols had the Center for Strategic and International Studies do a part of the preparatory work, but the committees drove it. Two, yes, it will only work if this is a Congressional commission that then turns into legislation and not yet another report that gets read but not implemented.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. It is very interesting that the diplomacy is there to try to prevent conflict as one of its major responsibilities. If they are not successful, we have defense that can come to our rescue and provide the military might to deal with conflict. In the Defense Department, in defense budget, we have built redundancies so that we can surge and take care of contingencies that could occur that is in our national security interest to defend against. At state, we really do not have that capacity to surge. I think we have missed opportunities where there were opportunities for us to make major advancements in building democratic states to prevent conflict. We in some cases acted just too slowly. Also, it is a challenge to get the international community to work in a unified manner.

So I am interested in drilling down a little more on the concept of the diplomatic reserve corps and global service. It seems like these two are somewhat aimed at a similar problem, and how that would conform to the Foreign Service Act and the challenges that it might be presented under the Foreign Service Act in order to have this type of a corps available to serve diplomacy, particularly if we wish to surge in a particular area. So perhaps I will start with Ambassador Ries because I think you had suggested the diplomatic corp. And Then perhaps Dr. Slaughter on the global service.

Ms. RIES. Thank you, Senator Cardin. Actually, I am an example of what happens when a surge is needed. I was a sitting ambas-

sador in Albania and I left my post in order to go to Iraq to be the political military counselor there. The others who were in the leadership team all had been pulled from other posts. So the idea that we would have a reserve corps, which could be our surge capacity, I think, is something that is really needed. When you look at what the military reserves include, we could employ the same basic framework of regular service, of a willingness to be deployed worldwide. This would provide the Service with a bank of skills and perhaps language capabilities to draw upon.

They would have once a month service responsibility the way as the military reserve corps does. Retired Foreign Service officers could be members, and family members could also participate. There are a lot of interesting ways that this kind of a corps could be put together. I think it is very much needed. As you mentioned, we do not have a reserve capacity of any sort and this would be a way to do it.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Slaughter.

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I strongly agree that we need more reserve capacity. Again, the idea of the Global Services is that you go beyond diplomatic capacity. You also have development expertise. I am reading a wonderful book right now by Fatema Sumar, who served under Senator Kerry when he chaired the SFRC, talking about being a development diplomat needing both those skills. Again, we also need business skills, working with civil society.

My father served in the Navy on active duty only for 3 years, but he was in the naval reserve for decades. So I would encourage us to think about connecting the idea of a reserve corps to the idea of shorter stints of service in a Global Service, instead of having to work your way up from the bottom. I want us to be able to see a leading NGO leader, or a top business person, or a university professor who then says, "You know, I want to serve my country for a tour of duty that could be 7 to 10 years, or 5 years renewable. I will do the training, but I am not going to follow this traditional ladder. I will get my experience in other sectors." Then allow all those folks to be part of our reserve.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Each one of you have mentioned the issue of our workforce and diversity, and I want to drill down a little bit on the workforce diversity issue. We obviously want our workforce to reflect diversity of our Nation but also the diversity of the global community, and that is not an easy assignment. Historically, there have been challenges in the diversity at this State Department. When I look at our, the resources that we are spending, I see that in training we spend about 50 percent of the funds for language training. Yet, we find that we have in at least one out of every four assignments that require language skills, the minimum standards are not being met.

Then lastly, there is the issue of diversity as it relates to the assignment that may be not as welcomed by the host country, and there could be safety issues. Should that even be a consideration in our assignments at the State Department. I welcome your thoughts as to how we deal holistically with this diversity issue to make sure that our workforce has the best diversity to carry out the mission that we have in diplomacy.

Mr. BIEGUN. Mr. Chairman, that was an issue that I spent an enormous amount of time over the past year tackling, working very closely with different focus groups inside the Department, including mid-career people, to try to get a sounding often anecdotal but nonetheless a large number on what were driving their choices at the middle of their career in the State Department. Also, the State Department has a tremendous asset in a number of affinity groups, which can help communicate with leadership on the interests of different parts of the Department.

I found it is simplest to break this down into three particular areas. One is recruitment, the second is development, and the third is retention. Within that, all three have to be right. The State Department actually is doing better than it has in the past in recruitment. The funnel has opened much more wider to Americans to join the Department in the A-100 classes, the entry level classes, that I saw during my tenure were impressively diverse and full of just the most amazing young and not-so-young talent because we recruit people from all ages as well, but we are definitely having a problem in the middle mid-career level.

There is something that is happening in the State Department career cycle that is affecting our employees, and particularly our people of color. Because the numbers start to shift when you get to about tenures in the Department. I think it has a lot to do with our training and development, it has a lot to do with our promotional processes in the Department, and both of those deserve very close scrutiny. Training somebody to advance inside the organization is the best way to signal to them that there is a figure for them in the organization. When you do not invest in training them, and if the leadership isn't there to recruit them for promotional opportunities, it is very easy for them to interpret that as a signal that they are not wanted in the Department. Because the State Department is still able to track the best talent in this country, they are also at risk.

The State Department has to offer a better value proposition for every employee 10 years in or we will lose them to the private sector, or to NGOs or non-profits. Or they will simply choose to stay home with their families where they may make a better work-life balance than they get in the Department.

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Ries.

Ms. RIES. I agree that the mid-level is the problem area. One of the things that we heard a great deal from people with whom we spoke was that first-time managers were the ones that really needed training on how to create an atmosphere of inclusiveness. In our proposal, we suggest that there ought to be significant periods of training at the various levels of the Foreign Service, but training for first-time managers in particular would be very important. The second point that I would make is we have to have accountability at every level. We need to hold all officers accountable for promoting diversity and inclusion in the service. That means whether it be in promotion or in assignments whether that officer has shown themselves to be a person who promotes an atmosphere of inclusion in his or her work unit should be taken into account.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Slaughter, in answering this question, it is clear we need leadership at the State Department to implement the

type of recommendations that we just heard from. Is there a role that Congress can play in advancing these priorities on diversity?

Dr. SLAUGHTER. I think so. We have a huge number of Americans now who grow up bilingual in many, many languages, far more than a couple of decades ago. So we have a lot of our talent already out there. One of the things that Congress can do again is to overhaul the way we think about these tours of duties to attract more folks, but the other is to revisit the idea of the 3-year tour in a country, after which you are sent not only to another country, but to another region of the world. You might spend 3 years in Vietnam and master Vietnamese then you might be sent to Peru. You are not likely to be sent to Japan in part because of fears that you will “go native,” if you spend too much time in one region.

Other foreign services do not do that, right? You know one Asian language and then you learn another, and another as you move around a region. There is a lot of room there I think for recruiting differently. Yes, training and management always very important, but also looking at what are our rules about mid-career hiring, allowing people to bring in expertise and then to build on it from their post?

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Senator Hagerty.

Senator HAGERTY. If you will indulge me, Senator Cardin, I might just carry forward a few further questions that this conversation has sparked.

Senator CARDIN. Sure.

Senator HAGERTY. I was particularly intrigued by Dr. Slaughter’s perspective on bringing in new types of people making the system more diverse, allowing us access to new types of talent pools. It struck me at the same time, Ambassador Ries, you participated in the Harvard study on reimagining the American diplomacy in our foreign service. Something that came from that study, the Harvard study was talking about the need for change in the culture of the Department. The study talked about an internal caste system.

I think about the idea that Dr. Slaughter brings to bear, which I find quite attractive, but at the same time acknowledging the reality that I saw when I served as an ambassador myself within the State Department. Here, I am talking about the difference in treatment between a Foreign Service officer and a civil servant. I would think, and again my private experience that merit should be the primary driver of how a person is promoted, how a person is treated within the Department. There very much is a sense that there is an internal caste system within the State Department today. We are talking about ways to reimagine that, I know, but I think it is a very real concern. I think that a system that puts a priority on personnel category, on tenure rather than merit, is something that seriously needs to be reexamined.

I think we all know the case, I will not mention the name, of a civil servant that was recruited by an ambassador to be a DCM, a Deputy Chief of Mission, the Chief Operating Officer, because that ambassador felt that the person had the management talent I presume that they wanted to see. Yet, we had the Foreign Service Grievance Board ruled that that individual had to return to Washington. They filed a complaint, the union filed a complaint, to not

allow that to happen. It required Secretary Albright to intervene to change that situation.

That sends a very troubling message to the folks at the State Department. It reinforces this caste system sort of perspective, and it is something that I hope that we will tackle. Ambassador Ries, I would like to get your perspective on how we would go about addressing the way that the American Foreign Service Association looks at the building there. How we go about including our civil servants more in a greater fashion. How we send the right sort of message as we help think through how the State Department determines assignments.

Ms. RIES. Thank you, Senator. I think that we are seeing a kind of a transformation of how do we approach the policy issues that we deal with in the State Department. Dr. Slaughter has mentioned in her own writings that today we are facing a lot of problems related to science and technical matters, and global issues such as climate change.

Because civil servants are experts, for whom I have great respect, are deep experts in many subjects, they tend to be serving in those functional bureaus that deal with these global issues. As we start to deal with these issues, there is going to be a lot more emphasis on civil servants' talents in dealing with these very serious issues. A clear example is the Arms Control Bureau, which I served.

Senator CARDIN. I have been told your mic is not on. If you could turn that on and answer it.

Ms. RIES. My apologies.

Senator HAGERTY. Yes. It is on now.

Ms. RIES. Thank you. As we deal with these global problems, we will see that we are relying more and more on civil servants. If I could clarify the reference to a "caste system." Our use of the term in our report referred to the division of Foreign Service Officers into cones and our recommendation that we abolish them. This would eliminate cones as a means of "racking and stacking" Foreign Service Officers. We should consider all of our officers to be multifunctional, and therefore expect them to be competent in all of the different areas.

Senator HAGERTY. I certainly saw that conal hierarchy as well in my embassy, but I was thinking particularly, it at least brought that that term brought to mind the difference in perspective of great civil service staff that we have in the State Department with long institutional knowledge. I think we have a lot of opportunity there. Secretary Biegun, I know you have spent time on this issue too. I would love to get your thoughts.

Mr. BIEGUN. It was not easy to manage the multifaceted Department of State because competition for assignments and the frequency of rotations led to a constant reward and constant disappointment by the people who were seeking advancement in the building. I tried a couple of times to weigh it in, to manage expectations, and I think hand-fist to the—this requires a very deep rethink. Ambassador Ries does mention that the largest proportion of civil service employees are in functional bureaus, but that is not the entirety of it.

We do have blends of civil service and Foreign Service, including in the embassies and including up to the ranks of ambassador. That blurred line between the two invites all sorts of misperception, including the perception that there is a cast system. That not to mention the compensation levels and the personnel practices and the legal structures are all different, and yet these people are co-existing within the same Department of State is a challenge to manage.

We also have a third set of employees, which are locally employed staff, at least the line is there a little bit more clear. Those are non-U.S. citizens working in support of the Department's mission abroad. Then we have contractors as well who come in. I think there is an opportunity here for a complete rethink of how we manage that blended workforce, and how we lead that blended workforce to ensure we do not have this kind of perception, that there are different casts inside the Department. That perception is a real one and exists. I know it.

Senator HAGERTY. On a final note, I would just like to underscore a point that you made about training. As a business person, when I came into my role as ambassador, and I keep focusing back on the past, but that is, it is a very recent experience for me, I was shocked at the lack of relevant training. There is a tremendous amount of language training that goes on. If you look at the budget, we spend a lot of money and a lot of time and a lot of hours on training people on languages, and they count that as training in the way they capture it.

There is a lot of times spent on orientation. I went through it myself for a month going through an orientation process. If you look at functional training, at geographic area training, the types of things that Ambassador Ries talked about, there is a real dearth of training there. That was certainly my perception. Now, we rely on experience and hopefully assigning a junior person to a more senior person that has experience in the area, but you know how the rotation system works.

Mr. BIEGUN. Yes.

Senator HAGERTY. A lot of times, that falls through.

Mr. BIEGUN. Well, I want to amplify what Ambassador Ries said because it was in slightly tactical language and maybe it did not register. She said 15 percent of the State Department's workforce should be basically in training at any given time. That does not happen today, and in fact oftentimes with both the pace of our rotation and the pressing needs to get new personnel out to post, supervisors will press people to start their assignment and to forego training. The Pentagon would never do that. The United States military will never take somebody off of deployment and put them on to a new deployment, and maybe in the most critical needs of the country.

Senator HAGERTY. South Africa.

Mr. BIEGUN. As a routine matter, it would be unforgivable. The way the Pentagon has a unit deployed is there is one trainee to go to deployment, there is one deployed, and then the one that was deployed is back in training again afterwards. State Department does not preserve that ability for our officers to do so, and we have to. Now, whether we shrink the mission, improve, increase the size

of the people, or just enforce it upon the existing organization as it is, we have to. It is not just management training, it is not just issues training, it is leadership training too.

I have a pet view that, pet theory, that a lot of our diversity issues are bad leadership. We just need to train people to not make hasty or biased decisions, but to reflect and make seasoned decisions. That is a responsibility of leadership because a diverse organization is a stronger organization for the United States of America, or for the private sector in a corporation. It starts with the leaders, and we have to train the leaders.

Senator HAGERTY. Thank you.

Senator CARDIN. I want to add one additional point to this diversity of assignments that we have in the State Department. You have already mentioned the potential challenge between those that are in functional bureaus and those that are in missions, and the coordination and perhaps bureaucracy, the responsibilities of the Chief Admission. Then we have special representatives that we have proliferated over a long period of time.

We tried to contract that in the last Congress, and I think we had some success in doing that. Are we creating too many additional lines of responsibility rather than trying to coordinate things better? Every time we have a change of Administration by party, we get all the confirmation hearings here in the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and I do not think we realized how many different bureaus we have, and how many different positions that have to get confirmed by United States Senate. A lot of these positions will not be confirmed for a long period of time because of the volume, sheer volume of this. As we look at doing things more efficiently, are we just creating a special person for every time we have an issue rather than trying to empower the structure itself to be more efficient?

Mr. BIEGUN. Again, gamekeeper and poacher here speaking. I have long advocated that we minimize, probably not eliminate, but minimize special representatives. There can be good reasons for them. It can be an issue that is of such priority that needs that focus. Both Congress as legislation and the Executive Branch's own decisions have created these positions. As a general rule, we should employ the bureaus in the State Department to have responsibility for the full set of issues.

I think that I am a, again, process is one of the three legs of the stool that I think we need to look at, and good process is a good flat organization that has clear lines of authority in the corporate world that that is what leaders aspire to, and then the Federal Government, it should be the same. There are good reasons for special representatives. At time, it is an issue so compelling, so urgent. Or, for example, the case in North Korea where we did not have, we do not have an embassy. Personnel in the country, at least the—there is a vacuum there that could be filled with a special representative.

It also can be an admission of failure that the—either the speed of confirmation for officials on the issue, which is another issue that the Department grapples with across administrations, or an absence of leadership inside the Department leads to the Congress mandating the creation of a special representative. I think we

should be very, very judicious. I do not want to take a blanket rule to it, but I think the special representatives should be the exception.

Senator CARDIN. Ambassador Ries, any comment on that?

Ms. RIES. I agree with Steve.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. Dr. Slaughter.

Dr. SLAUGHTER. Yes. I used to sit in my office in government and imagine "Google for Government." I used to think if I could take whatever problem came across my desk—diplomatic problem, a development problem and just Google everybody across government who has really specific expertise and put them together on a taskforce to address the problem and then dissolve it, it would be so valuable. More like the team model in consulting firms. Obviously, that cannot happen. The stove piping in these rigid vertical hierarchies means we do not tap a lot of our talent. So often what happens with these special representatives is they are the people who can crosscut.

I would suggest that if you change the nature of the people who serve, you will find that more of them have the kind outside stature, that special representatives often have. You are bringing people in, like a former senator or a former CEO, who has outside stature to corral all the different actors and report to the Present or the Secretary on a problem. If you change the folks who are in the service and you give them much more ability again to cut across different issues, also based on their outside experience, it may well be that we will have less perceived need to go outside.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you for that response.

Senator HAGERTY. Chairman Cardin, I would just add one comment to that very insightful question, and that is we should look at this in the scope of moving forward. I saw precisely the same thing, an embassy that was full of talent, a State Department that had tremendous talent, and the need for these sort of crosscutting skillsets and teams to function well together. Steve Biegun was a great example of somebody that we brought in I think in an appropriate role to serve as our special envoy for North Korea at the outset. At the same time, the system does not reward cutting across. The system is, I think, fairly rigid in many respects and it takes extra effort to do that. I think we need to look at the personnel system and create the opportunity and the environment to make that possible. So thank you.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Senator Hagerty. Let me just make an observation. You have all indicated we need to take a fresh look at this State Department and diplomacy for the 21st century, and that we have not done that for a long time. That the, any administration is so busy on so many different things that this is not going to be a high priority and therefore get sort of pushed to the back. So that we have a responsibility in Congress to figure out a way forward to deal with how we can get our input into having the most efficient effective diplomatic agency as we possibly can.

So we are going to continue to try to figure out the way forward, whether it is a commission or whether it is a work in this committee with it is judicial hearings, we are going to figure out a way to move forward. It seems to me that one area that came out of this hearing is training, that we could really drill down and try to

do something specific to deal with the training programs. It does appear to me that it is inadequate from that port of view of the resources that are being devoted to training. It seems to me that we are missing the opportunity to retain and promote a more diverse workforce by the use of training.

It seems to me that we have gaps because of how we do not train for certain areas and have concentrated on traditional training, which may not be the most important for the 21st century, and the needs that we have in the 21st century. So I think training does offer an opportunity for us to make some maybe immediate progress in looking at it this year.

I also think the recommendations for surge capacity, whether it is a reserve corps or whether it is global service or some form of utilizing talent that is out there to help backfill particular when key personnel are taken out of a mission in order to deal with a problem somewhere in the world is something that we need. I just came back from Bulgaria and which you could appreciate—or maybe it was Austria, it was us in Austria, where they backfilled with people that really were not at all familiar with the problems in the country. It does not mean that they are not handling our mission there but it is—it would be I think better if we had a broader pool that we could utilize to meet our diplomatic missions when we have vacancies for whatever reason.

In this case, we do not have confirmed ambassadors so we had, and our Chief of Mission had to go home for a specific reason. Deputy—DCM had to go home for a particular reason, so we had no one to actually be there, so we had to bring someone in who was a quick learn. That is fine. It seems to me there could be a better and more efficient way to deal with those types of problems. Then you mention just in passing the Foreign Service Act. I think it really is time for us to take a look at the Foreign Service Act working with the stakeholders to see whether we cannot update those laws.

So I think there is a lot of areas that we can advance. I think all three of you have really helped us in trying to focus on what we can do. This is our first hearing. This subcommittee was not terribly active in the last Congress. We intend to be a lot more active in this Congress, and again I thank Senator Hagerty for his commitment and interest and his background, which can really help us in dealing with these issues. I have been advised that the record will stay open until the end of the week in the event that any member has questions for the record. Again, I thank our witnesses for their participation in this hearing. With that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]