[Senate Hearing 117-480]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




                                                        S. Hrg. 117-480

                  EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT
       OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                              COMMITTEE ON
               HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS


                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              MAY 18, 2021

                               __________

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                       Printed for the use of the
        Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs





                [GRAPHIC) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




                                 ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

45-998 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2022













        COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                   GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire         RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona              RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada                  JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California             MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RICK SCOTT, Florida
                                     JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri

                   David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
                    Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
         Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
                     Roy S. Awabdeh, Senior Counsel
                Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
    Andrew Dockham, Minority Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
       Kirsten D. Madison, Minority Director of Homeland Security
             Erin E. Kuhls, Minority Investigative Counsel
        Shani M. Rosenstock, Minority Professional Staff Member
                     Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                     Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk







                            C O N T E N T S

                                 ------                                
Opening statements:
                                                                   Page
    Senator Peters...............................................     1
    Senator Portman..............................................     3
    Senator Hassan...............................................    18
    Senator Rosen................................................    20
    Senator Johnson..............................................    23
    Senator Ossoff...............................................    25
    Senator Sinema...............................................    27
Prepared statements:
    Senator Peters...............................................    33
    Senator Portman..............................................    35

                               WITNESSES
                         Tuesday, May 18, 2021

Hon. Francis X. Taylor, Former Under Secretary, Office of 
  Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security     5
Patricia F.S. Cogswell, Former Deputy Administrator, 
  Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of 
  Homeland Security..............................................     7
Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association.........     9
Faiza Patel, Co-Director, Liberty & National Security Program, 
  Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law..    11

                     Alphabetical List of Witnesses

Cosgwell, Patricia F.S.:
    Testimony....................................................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................    43
Patel, Faiza:
    Testimony....................................................    11
    Prepared statement...........................................    58
Sena, Mike:
    Testimony....................................................     9
    Prepared statement...........................................    48
Taylor, Hon. Francis X.:
    Testimony....................................................     5
    Prepared statement...........................................    39

                                APPENDIX

Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
    Mr. Sena.....................................................    76
    Ms. Patel....................................................    80







 
                  EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT
       OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2021

                                     U.S. Senate,  
                           Committee on Homeland Security  
                                  and Governmental Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m., 
via Webex and in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, 
Hon. Gary C. Peters, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Peters, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen, Ossoff, 
Portman, Johnson, Romney, Scott, and Hawley.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\

    Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appear in the Appendix 
on page 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Today we will hear from former homeland security 
intelligence officials, as well as national security and civil 
rights experts, on their views of the appropriate roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities for the Department of 
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS 
I&A).
    I would like to thank each of our witnesses for joining us 
today and for their work in the public and private sectors to 
protect the American people.
    Today's testimony will give the Committee critical insight 
into how the Office of Intelligence and Analysis operates and 
what role it should play in providing threat assessments and 
domestic terrorism intelligence to Department of Homeland 
Security leadership, State and local law enforcement partners, 
and other private entities.
    We will also hear testimony on how to ensure citizens' 
fundamental civil rights and civil liberties are safeguarded as 
we work to better tackle a rising domestic terrorism threat.
    Earlier this year, the Committee heard about how systemic 
breakdowns in planning and preparation led to the deadly attack 
on the U.S. Capitol, the heart of our democracy.
    The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, along with other 
intelligence and counterterrorism agencies, failed to 
effectively identify the threat on January 6th.
    We need to understand the factors that led to that failure 
and what concrete steps can be taken to better understand the 
current threats that we face and ensure the Department of 
Homeland Security is effectively sharing information with local 
and State law enforcement.
    I appreciate the hard work and the ongoing dedication of 
the national security experts in the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, and I recognize they have faced challenges that they 
must address. However, it is apparent that the office must also 
do more to effectively counter the rising threats posed by 
white supremacist and anti-government violence that threaten 
communities all across our country.
    One of the greatest challenges the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis has faced is the pressure to politicize domestic 
terrorism threats. Under the previous administration, the 
office reportedly downplayed the threat posed by white 
supremacist and anti-government violence and reportedly 
censored some intelligence information under pressure from 
President Trump.
    At times, this political pressure led to problematic and 
inaccurate analysis related to peaceful protest movements, 
overstating the roles of certain groups, and even reportedly 
developing intelligence on American journalists.
    Our national security and the safety of Americans cannot 
depend on political whims or individual leaders' biases.
    That is why Congress must work to ensure that analysis 
conducted by the intelligence community (IC) is separated from 
the political environment and based in facts and in data that 
accurately assess security threats.
    The office also struggles with employee morale, a challenge 
identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports and employee surveys, possibly because of a lack of 
consistent leadership and direction.
    Since this office was first created 19 years ago, it has 
had more than a dozen different leaders. Only three of those 
individuals, including one of our witnesses today, led the 
office for more than two years.
    These obstacles, and other challenges, must be addressed 
quickly. Our Nation faces very real and deadly domestic 
terrorism threats, and our national security agencies must 
ensure that our counterterrorism efforts and resources align 
with those threats.
    A recent, long-delayed joint report from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) and DHS identified racially or 
ethnically motivated extremists, primarily white supremacists, 
as the most significant national security threat based on data 
from recent years.
    While I appreciate the initial steps the Biden 
administration has taken to begin addressing the alarming rise 
of these threats, it is clear that there is so much more work 
to be done. American lives are at risk, and we must ensure that 
we are taking all appropriate action to safeguard the American 
people and protect their most fundamental rights as well.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, who bring 
unique perspectives on how we can improve the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis to meet our security goals.
    I have no doubt that this Committee can work in a 
nonpartisan way to strengthen our homeland security and protect 
Americans from all threats, both foreign and domestic.
    With that, I turn it over to Ranking Member Portman for 
your opening comments.

            OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\

    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing. It is important and timely for us to 
learn more about what Homeland Security's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis does and how to ensure that they are 
doing their job better.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the 
Appendix on page 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    DHS is responsible for protecting the homeland, and I 
believe its intelligence and analysis capabilities are 
absolutely essential to that effort. So let me start by saying 
I think the role that is being played is critical, and I look 
forward to discussing how to best equip the Department and its 
partners with critical, timely, and actionable intelligence to 
keep us safe from both foreign and domestic adversaries.
    There are plenty of challenges right now. The events of 
January 6th have just been talked about. Domestic terrorism, 
recent attacks on Federal facilities and law enforcement, 
Mexican and other foreign cartel networks that are now 
operating much more so, as I understand it, within our cities, 
the ongoing threat, of course, posed by foreign terrorists--all 
this underscores the need for ongoing intelligence and analysis 
focused on identifying and mitigating threats to our country.
    Since its inception, DHS has had an intelligence office to 
support its mission, understandably. Congress underscored the 
importance of intelligence and information sharing in the 
Implementing Recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. This was 
back in 2007, and that formally established the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis.
    While it is one of the smaller entities within the 
intelligence community, I&A is the only IC member charged with 
delivering intelligence to our State, local, tribal, 
territorial (SLTT), and our private sector partners and 
developing intelligence from these important partners for the 
Department and for the intelligence community. To put it 
simply, I&A is intended to facilitate a key layer of 
communication and domestic coordination required, in my view, 
to help support the effort at DHS to protect the homeland.
    In my home State of Ohio, we have three fusion centers that 
have benefited greatly from the partnership with I&A. I visited 
one of them a couple of times, the Cincinnati fusion center, 
where I have seen the importance of the support and the 
partnership that I&A provides. For example, I recently learned 
that an I&A intelligence officer at one of our fusion centers, 
in Columbus, Ohio, provided critical information on a suspect 
who had a plot to cause mass violence at large music concert 
venue in Columbus. By leveraging I&A's capabilities, the 
Columbus fusion center was able to quickly work with law 
enforcement to locate that suspect and place this individual on 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSAs) no-fly list. 
The suspect was then intercepted while attempting to board a 
flight on his way to Columbus to carry out the attack. That is 
one example, but there are many like that, where I&A has played 
a critical role.
    The Committee learned from our oversight investigation into 
the January 6th attack on the Capitol that I&A fell short in 
reporting on the potential threat. They were not the only ones, 
but they did fall short, in my view. Security officials have 
cited the lack of intelligence and information sharing from I&A 
and other intelligence agencies as a reason law enforcement was 
not better prepared to respond. In our investigation, the then-
Acting Under Secretary of I&A revealed weaknesses in how I&A 
distributes information, collects intelligence from social 
media platforms, and leverages its relationships with State, 
local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to 
learn of new, evolving threats. And that will be part of the 
report that we will be issuing here in the next few weeks.
    Notably, I&A has an important role to play in combating 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)--including those 
responsible for drug trafficking, violence, human smuggling, 
child exploitation, and a host of other criminal activities. As 
I said earlier, TCOs are increasingly present here in this 
country. They are always evolving, they are always adapting to 
maximize their profits as they did as Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19) reshaped supply chains and transport patterns. In 
fact, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 
once they adjusted to the initial disruption of COVID, Mexican 
cartels ``reinforced supplies of precursor materials, increased 
production and are sending larger fentanyl and methamphetamine 
loads into the United States.'' We certainly see that at the 
Mexican border.
    It seems more important than ever for Federal and local 
partners to be in close coordination to understand and combat 
these dynamic threats. And, while these challenges are 
national, they have hit local communities, including many in my 
home State of Ohio, particularly hard.
    There are a number of issues I hope we are able to explore 
today. There are differing opinions on what I&A's role is with 
regard to intelligence collection, production, and 
dissemination. In my view, having timely, quality intelligence 
is an essential component, again, to keep our communities safe. 
I hope today that we can talk about how DHS can appropriately 
provide these capabilities at a time when we face some threats 
that are home grown.
    The threats we face are dynamic and becoming more complex 
every day. And they are not all focused on Washington, D.C. 
Considering the current environment, how can I&A best leverage 
those fusion centers we talked about and its partnerships with 
State, local, and private sector partners to meet the needs of 
the Department charged with securing our homeland?
    Finally, over the years, I&A has faced challenges in 
recruiting qualified talent and has experienced consistently 
low morale and high rates of attrition. This is a deep concern 
of mine. I hope our witnesses can help us understand what can 
be done to address these longstanding personnel issues.
    General Taylor, Ms. Cogswell, Mr. Sena, and Ms. Patel, I am 
looking forward to your testimony and some answers to those 
questions we pose today.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman, for 
your opening comments.
    It is the practice of the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses, 
so if our witnesses will please stand and raise your right 
hand? And our witnesses who are in video, raise your right hand 
so we can see you on the video. Do you swear that the testimony 
you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
    General Taylor. I do.
    Ms. Cogswell. I do.
    Mr. Sena. I do.
    Ms. Patel. I do.
    Chairman Peters. The witnesses may be seated.
    Our first witness today is General Francis Taylor, the 
former Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the 
Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his assignment at DHS 
I&A, General Taylor was vice president and chief security 
officer (CSO) for the General Electric Company. General Taylor 
has also served as the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign 
Missions (OFM) with the rank of Ambassador. General Taylor also 
previously served as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State 
from July 2001 to November 2002. Prior to that, General Taylor 
accumulated 31 years' military experience, rising to the rank 
of Brigadier General.
    Mr. Taylor, former General, General Taylor, welcome to the 
Committee. You are recognized for your five minute opening 
remarks.

  TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, FORMER UNDER 
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (2014-17), U.S. 
                DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    General Taylor. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman, 
and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
appear before you today to talk about the DHS Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis. I have submitted written testimony 
and would ask that that be entered into the record,\1\ and I 
will try to summarize that in my five minutes this morning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the Appendix on 
page 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Chairman Peters. So ordered.
    General Taylor. I&A's mission is integral to DHS, the 
intelligence community, and to the security of our Nation. It 
is the only U.S. intelligence agency that is specifically 
chartered to provide intelligence support to State, local, 
tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to improve the 
flow and quality of information sharing across our Nation. As 
the intelligence arm of DHS, I&A has a responsibility to 
support the intelligence needs of the senior leadership of the 
Department, to ensure that relevant intelligence from the IC is 
shared systematically with our State, local, tribal, 
territorial, and private sector partners, and that relevant 
information from those partners becomes intelligence that is 
shared more broadly with the IC.
    As the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the 
Department, the Under Secretary of I&A coordinates and 
deconflicts the efforts of the DHS intelligence enterprise to 
meet the intelligence needs of the Department and our IC 
partners. Additionally, the Under Secretary's responsibility to 
lead information sharing and safeguarding for the Department 
provides a unique opportunity to use the myriad of data 
generated by DHS and to turn that data into effective 
information to share with our SLTT, Federal, and international 
partners.
    There are several initiatives that I believe I&A leadership 
must focus on.
    First, restoring trust. I&A leaders will need to focus on 
rebuilding trust with key stakeholders within and across DHS 
and the Intelligence Enterprise (IE), as well as externally, 
with the broader IC and Congress. Controversies surrounding I&A 
activities and the use of intelligence authorities in recent 
years have undermined its reputation and raised questions about 
the integrity and objectivity of the information it provides to 
stakeholders. In order to rebuild stakeholder and public trust, 
I&A will need to focus on advancing its core mission and 
demonstrating that it brings invaluable mission expertise to 
its customers.
    Second, focus on SLTT and private sector partners. Moving 
forward, I&A should focus on effective prioritization of its 
information-sharing activities, ensuring that they meet the 
needs of State and local law enforcement and yield intelligence 
information that could be useful to the broader IC, as a 
complement, not as a competitor, of the FBI. Likewise, I&A 
should continue to engage its partners in private industry to 
gain perspectives on the national and homeland security 
challenges facing their sector and ways to facilitate public-
private partnerships.
    Third, reinvent intelligence analysis for DHS and the IC. 
I&A leaders should focus the office's intelligence analysis 
activities on the creation of intelligence products that draw 
on unique DHS data sets and data science, within a robust 
framework for privacy and civil liberties. I&A can be a leading 
player in government focusing on data science to create unique 
insights and produce clearly differentiated intelligence 
products. With access to special data sets and a focused set of 
priorities, I&A can lead the IC in reinventing does 
intelligence.
    I believe the mission center concept that was established 
by the most recent Under Secretary is a great idea and needs to 
be further developed within I&A and within the DHS IE. I&A 
should create a budget, annual strategy, metrics, and fully 
resource each mission center to appropriately support the needs 
of the intelligence enterprise components, the Department 
leadership, and the broader IC. Finally, I&A should lead in 
data analytics using the unique data generated by the 
Department.
    DHS generates a tremendous amount of relevant information 
in its daily mission activities. When I was there, that 
information sat in more than 900 mutually independent 
databases. That needs to change.
    Finally, as Senator Portman and Senator Peters mentioned, 
we need to invest in our workforce, and I would be happy to 
talk about that and morale during your questions.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, General Taylor, for your 
testimony.
    Our second witness today is Patricia Cogswell, former 
Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security 
Administration. Ms. Cogswell is currently a senior strategic 
adviser for Guidehouse National Security. Prior to serving as 
Deputy TSA Administrator, Ms. Cogswell had a long and 
distinguished career in public service, including leading 
programs at the White House, Department of Homeland Security, 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) related to intelligence, 
information sharing, border security, screening and 
watchlisting, and aviation, maritime, and surface 
transportation.
    Ms. Cogswell, welcome to the Committee. You are recognized 
for your opening statement.

     TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA F.S. COGSWELL,\1\ FORMER DEPUTY 
       ADMINISTRATOR (2018-20), TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 
      ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you, sir. Chairman Peters, Ranking 
Member Portman, and distinguished Members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this 
morning as you examine the role of DHS' Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis. My comments for the Committee today are in formed 
by my more than 24 years of career Federal civilian and from 
the various capacities in which I have both led and worked with 
DHS I&A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell appears in the Appendix 
on page 43.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    During my tenure, I served in multiple DHS leadership 
roles, including with three different headquarters elements and 
three different DHS component agencies, as well as a 3-year 
tour at the National Security Council (NSC).
    When I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Screening Coordination, as Special Assistant to the President 
for Transborder Security at the National Security Council, and, 
most recently, as the Deputy Administrator for TSA, I was a 
consumer of DHS I&A's intelligence products. While at DHS 
Policy, another headquarters office, I partnered with DHS I&A 
to lead development of interagency strategic and policy 
initiatives, collaborated on reports for the Secretary and 
other DHS leaders, and to lead DHS governance processes.
    As the Assistant Director for Intelligence at Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), I was a member of the Homeland 
Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), working with DHS I&A to 
inform strategic direction, policy, priorities, requirements, 
and production. Finally, I led DHS I&A serving as the Acting 
Under Secretary while the nominee was undergoing confirmation.
    During my time I found the highest value roles for DHS I&A 
to be:
    Supporting the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise; 
the Under Secretary, as the Chief Intelligence Officer, in 
collaboration with the HSIC, should lead development of 
strategy, policy, and an integrated set of priorities, 
including training and budget;
    Advocating for the DHS mission to the intelligence 
community and through associated budget processes. DHS I&A 
should advocate on behalf of operators and policy personnel for 
prioritization of intelligence collection, access to IC 
information, use of IC information-sharing platforms and tools, 
and associated resources;
    Providing the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and headquarters 
organizations with intelligence services, ensuring that 
headquarters offices and the Secretary have access to the same 
high-quality intelligence at their counterparts do, 
particularly in advance of interagency and policy meetings;
    Coordinating production of ``sense of community'' analyses 
to support DHS and homeland security-unique needs in 
coordination with the HSIC. In addition to products like the 
Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HTA), the CINT should 
support development of ``sense of community'' products to 
support policy and operational decisions. Development of 
individual products should be by the DHS entity best positioned 
to speak on behalf of the entirety of the information, 
including not only traditional intelligence and law enforcement 
information, but also analysis developed by DHS in support of 
its ongoing programs, and other knowledgeable stakeholders, 
including academia and associations, and that the products are 
scoped to answer relevant questions for the conversations;
    Engaging the fusion centers. DHS I&A should support State, 
local, territorial, and tribal partners with training, 
information, and all source analysis that helps those partners, 
based on the partner needs;
    And collaborating with other DHS entities to enable an 
effective information-sharing environment. DHS I&A should 
support the design and funding of technical architectures and 
multi-use tools that enhance DHS's ability to match and 
exchange information, where appropriate, to achieve their 
missions, in collaboration with the operating components and 
other headquarters offices. DHS I&A should work to ensure it 
can perform effectively across these functions with variance in 
approach based on the needs and capabilities of its partners. 
To do so, DHS I&A needs to examine staffing and morale, 
including in particular stabilizing its organizational 
structure, mission, and role. The workforce needs consistency 
and continuity, something that lasts beyond the tenure of a 
single Under Secretary, as well as a mission that is unique and 
valued where they can be recognized as having subject matter 
experts and are seen as partners;
    Enhancing career development opportunities. DHS I&A 
leadership should invest in changes that will provide 
supervisors incentives to positively coach and mentor their 
personnel and career paths that enable staff to grow, including 
mobility to DHS agencies, increasing their opportunities and 
exposure to the wider homeland security mission;
    Depoliticizing products, and career staff. DHS I&A should 
enhance its strategic communications with its customers and 
stakeholders, providing the opportunity for input into I&A's 
analytic product selection process, methodology, data used, how 
it is assessed, and ensure that it seeks out support from 
partners and oversight, including this Committee, for efforts 
in areas that may become controversial.
    As this Committee examines DHS I&A's role, I would 
encourage you to consider how to develop changes in a way that 
will support the organization for years to come. 
Organizational, transformational, and cultural change take 
investment in time, developing talent, a willingness to measure 
impact and modify activity based on those results, and in 
commitment to strategic communications.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you 
today. I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Cogswell.
    Our next witness is Mike Sena. Mr. Sena serves as the 
president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA), 
which represents State and major urban area fusion centers. 
These centers work to enhance public safety and encourage 
effective, efficient, ethical, lawful, and professional 
intelligence and information sharing and prevent and reduce the 
harmful effects of crime and terrorism on victims and 
communities. In addition to his leadership positions, Mr. Sena 
serves on law enforcement and homeland security advisory 
committees for the members of the President's Cabinet, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Attorney General (AG) of the United 
States.
    Mr. Sena, welcome to the hearing. You may proceed with your 
opening comments.

 TESTIMONY OF MIKE SENA,\1\ PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FUSION CENTER 
                          ASSOCIATION

    Mr. Sena. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member 
Portman, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the 
invitation to be with you today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sena appears in the Appendix on 
page 48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    My name is Mike Sena, and I am the Director of the Northern 
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), and the 
president of the National Fusion Center Association. The NFCA 
represents the interests of 80 State and locally owned and 
managed fusion centers, with over 3,000 public safety 
employees. We refer to all 80 centers together as the 
``National Network of Fusion Centers.''
    Fusion centers assist in the identification, prevention, 
mitigation, response, and recovery of terrorist acts and other 
major criminal threats. We depend on DHS I&A as the only U.S. 
intelligence community element that is statutorily charged with 
supporting our network. A locally integrated and engaged I&A is 
critical to enhancing capacity among fusion centers and our 
partners to analyze and share threat-related information that 
is relevant and timely.
    We are offering several concrete recommendations that would 
help ensure I&A is able to maximize its potential capacity to 
protect the homeland. I&A must increase the forward deployment 
of well-trained and experienced personnel to fusion centers. 
They must offer high-quality training on analytics tradecraft 
and on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. They must 
invest in modernizing information-sharing systems and 
technologies. They must also ensure reliable access to critical 
data, including criminal justice information and classified 
data. Finally, they must be empowered to have direct 
coordination authority of DHS resources that are allocated to 
support fusion centers. Having I&A's partner engagement 
function, which is routinely coordinating with us, and having 
them report directly to the I&A Under Secretary and Principal 
Deputy would be helpful in facilitating this.
    Some fusion centers do not have any I&A presence, and some 
others have part-time I&A personnel. Currently, I&A only has a 
little more than 100 personnel deployed across the Nation. From 
our perspective, that is simply not sufficient. We strongly 
encourage Congress to support increased funding for I&A to 
ensure that it can hire, train, and deploy an adequate number 
of personnel across the Nation.
    More than two-thirds of all the funding that supports 
fusion centers comes from State and local budgets. DHS grant 
funding is another critical source of support that primarily 
comes through our Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and 
State Homeland Security Grant Programs (SHSGP). Some centers 
are almost entirely grant funded, and some receive almost no 
grant funding. Some fusion centers provide operational support 
at the request of public safety partners, including the FBI's 
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), but in some cases the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has limited or 
denied the ability for fusion centers to use grant funds to 
provide that support. We must find better ways to reduce 
bureaucracy and improve efficient authorization of grant 
funding in a timely manner.
    I&A should be empowered to coordinate with FEMA's grant 
personnel to ensure that grant guidance and funding are more 
closely aligned with the needs of Federal, State, territorial, 
and local public safety partners.
    Access to information systems is critical to the successful 
operations of our fusion centers, but some centers still lack 
access to critical databases, like the FBI's criminal justice 
services and Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
system. The National Data Exchange (N-DEx), brings together 
over 7,700 agencies' records systems, but we have over 18,000 
agencies in America. Most agencies are not connected to this 
critical resource, and some fusion centers do not have access.
    Fusion centers should be equipped to help protect everyone 
in America, regardless of where they are. I&A can play a 
supportive role by working with their Federal partners to 
ensure appropriate access to Federal systems by State and local 
partners.
    I&A should continue to support the development and 
enhancement of existing systems, including the Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN), and work with us to 
identify and deploy more advanced technology. The HSIN 
Platforms are essential and trusted fusion center tools. The 
NFCA established the HSIN SitRoom for sharing information on 
physical threats, and the Cyber Intelligence Network (CIN)--
room supports cyber threat collaboration for over 500 cyber 
analysts across the country. I&A should continue to support 
fusion center cyber capabilities by providing access to 
critical cyber analysis tools and increasing training 
opportunities.
    Right now, fusion centers, the Regional Information Sharing 
Systems (RISS)--Western States Information Network (WSIN), and 
the FBI's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) are 
analyzing data and sharing information on reported threats to 
life through HSIN, the FBI's eGuardian System, and directly 
with local and public safety agencies.
    The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) and 
Global Advisory Committee are also writing recommendations for 
managing tips, leads, and threat-to-life reporting. We need DHS 
I&A resources to support this effort to mitigate the immediate 
threats to our communities.
    In summary, strengthening I&A's capabilities to support the 
network and the Nation will require them to reorient their 
focus. Their focus must be on the H in DHS and the State, 
local, tribal, and territorial partners that are the heart of 
protecting our homeland. The recommendations I mentioned a 
minute ago would help DHS I&A support the national network in 
ways that are most relevant and helpful to our members and our 
partners across the Nation.
    On behalf of the NFCA, I would like to thank you for the 
invitation to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Sena, for your testimony.
    Our final witness today is Faiza Patel, director of the 
Liberty & National Security Program at New York University 
School of Law's Brennan Center for Justice. Ms. Patel has 
previously testified before Congress regarding the government's 
surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans following the 
September 11th attacks and has organized advocacy efforts 
against discriminatory State laws. She also helped establish an 
independent Inspector General (IG) for the New York Police 
Department (NYPD), and prior to joining the Brennan Center, Ms. 
Patel worked as a senior policy officer at the Organization for 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague and clerked for 
the judge at the International Criminal Tribunal in the former 
Yugoslavia.
    Welcome, Ms. Patel. You are recognized for your five minute 
opening statement.

 TESTIMONY OF FAIZA PATEL,\1\ CO-DIRECTOR, LIBERTY & NATIONAL 
    SECURITY PROGRAM, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK 
                    UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

    Ms. Patel. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member 
Portman, and Members of the Committee. I am really happy to be 
here testifying today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Patel appears in the Appendix on 
page 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As our country faces up to the persistent problem of white 
supremacist and far-right violence, as well as a range of other 
threats, I&A has the potential to play a constructive role in 
providing accurate and unbiased intelligence to help guide the 
response. The office has great influence because it sits at the 
center of a web of intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
spread throughout the country.
    In light of its influence, it is critically important that 
I&A's output and advice meet the highest standards of respect 
for Americans' civil rights and civil liberties. This is 
especially true when it comes to domestic intelligence, which 
presents unique threats because of its obvious overlap with 
protected political speech and organizing.
    I&A is, of course, prohibited from collecting or 
disseminating information based solely on First Amendment-
protected activities, but it has in the past targeted Muslim 
Americans for little apparent reason other than their religion, 
as well as protesters.
    Last summer, as racial justice demonstrations triggered by 
the killing of George Floyd broke out across the country, I&A 
led the expansion of intelligence activities under the guise of 
protecting Federal courthouses. I&A staff were directed to 
collect information both about matters that can be reasonably 
considered threats to homeland security, but also matters that 
are traditionally handled by local authorities as part of their 
public safety mandate.
    According to the Washington Post, I&A even had access to 
protesters' communications on telegram, which is not allowed by 
its guidelines, and these were written up in an intelligence 
report disseminated to its network. The office circulated three 
intelligence reports summarizing tweets written by the editor 
of a legal blog and a reporter for the New York Times.
    It is particularly critical that I&A gets its house in 
order as DHS pivots to confront the threat of domestic 
terrorism. Secretary Mayorkas has designated domestic violent 
extremism (DVE) as a priority area and has created a team 
within I&A to focus on this threat.
    Based on testimony and reports in the press, it seems that 
I&A will be looking at Americans' social media postings to 
identify narratives and grievances to gauge their prevalence 
and to see if they may influence acts of violence. I am 
concerned that this focus is likely to be both ineffective and 
invasive, sweeping in reams of information, including about 
constitutionally protected activities.
    Targeting what people say online is unlikely to be 
effective in identifying violent actors. The reason is pretty 
simple: Large numbers of people believe in the types of 
narratives that DHS has already identified as drivers of 
violence in its January 27th bulletin. Anti-immigrant sentiment 
has a long history in the United States; many people believe 
that measures taken to control COVID-19 infringe on their 
freedoms; many Americans dispute the results of the 2020 
elections; and police use of force against African Americans 
triggered demonstrations across the country.
    We can argue about whether the people who hold these views 
are right or wrong, but they are hardly a way of distinguishing 
potentially violent actors. In technical terms, this method is 
highly sensitive, but it is not specific to the threat of 
violence.
    The Acting Under Secretary of I&A recently acknowledged 
this fact, noting that it is difficult to discern actual intent 
to carry out violence from angry and hyperbolic speech on the 
Internet. This is supported by years of research which show the 
difficulty of interpreting social media posts without context 
or knowledge of the conventions in particular communities or 
platforms.
    DHS of all agencies should know the limits of social media 
to find threats. According to its own internal documents, 
social media monitoring pilot programs for visa vetting did not 
help in finding security threats. The people charged with 
running these programs said that they were not able to reliably 
match accounts to people, and even when they were, they were 
not able to determine the context and reliability of what they 
saw.
    To address the concerns I have outlined, I think it is 
critical to strengthen I&A's civil rights and civil liberties 
safeguards and oversight over its functions. I have four 
recommendations.
    First, given social media's centrality to political 
discourse and the difficulty of identifying threats online, I&A 
should reconsider its plans to monitor these platforms for 
``narratives'' and ``grievances.'' At a minimum, it should 
explain how it intends to ensure that it is focused on 
identifying violent actors rather than simply keeping tabs on 
what Americans say on the Internet.
    Second, oversight needs to be strengthened. This hearing 
obviously is a great example. But DHS also has a dedicated 
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and a Privacy 
Office. Their role in clearing I&A analyses was eliminated last 
year and should be restored. Congress should consider 
mechanisms for ensuring that these types of critical oversight 
functions cannot be so easily sidelined in the future. Regular 
audits can also help ensure that leadership has a holistic 
view.
    Last, we need to pay attention to the enormous amount of 
information on Americans that is contained in DHS databases. 
Former DHS officials have said that this level of information 
raises privacy and due process concerns that dwarf those 
arising out of the National Security Agency (NSA) programs. 
This would be an appropriate topic of inquiry for the Privacy 
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in my opinion.
    Thank you again for the opportunity. I look forward to 
answering any questions you may have.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Patel, for your opening 
statement.
    General Taylor, in last year's Homeland Threat Assessment, 
DHS stated that domestic violent extremism, specifically white 
supremacist extremists, are the most persistent and lethal 
homeland security threat. That is a finding that both myself 
and Ranking Member Portman have been saying for some time now, 
and it is clear that this threat is real, and it is clear that 
we need to combat it.
    So my question to you is: Beyond establishing the Domestic 
Terrorism Branch, which is certainly, I think we all agree, a 
step in the right direction, are there other changes to I&A's 
organization or authorities that you believe would help them 
address this threat?
    General Taylor. It is my view that I&A has the requisite 
authorities to address this threat if it prioritizes that 
threat. In the last administration, it is my understanding that 
domestic terrorism was not considered a priority for I&A. In 
fact, the I&A leadership kind of deferred to the FBI on that. I 
think the authority exists. It is a focus on what the outcome 
is that I&A is trying to achieve and how they do that 
consistent with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties 
going forward.
    Chairman Peters. So your testimony is that it just was not 
prioritized. They have the authorities to do it. Perhaps we can 
drill down on that a little bit, if we could, General. What do 
you see as the added value that I&A provides to the broader 
Federal intelligence community and partners in combating this? 
What is the specific value that they could bring if 
sufficiently prioritized?
    General Taylor. Much of the work against violent extremists 
occurs in the 18,000 police departments across our country. 
Local law enforcement confronts these individuals, investigates 
these folks because they are committing acts in communities 
that those officers are sworn to protect.
    It is my view that through the fusion centers I&A and its 
intelligence officers can bring better perspective to the 
national level of what these 18,000 police organizations are 
seeing trend-wise and tactics, techniques, and procedure-wise 
in their communities. The FBI plays an extraordinarily 
important role in its JTTF, but as Director Wray has testified, 
there needs to be a definitive act of violence for the FBI to 
get involved. I think that is the gap that I&A can help cover 
with its collection and production in the field.
    Chairman Peters. Very good. Ms. Patel, I guess this 
question is for you. As I&A continues to come to better 
understand and analyze the real threat posed by domestic 
terrorism, could you share with the Committee some of the 
concerns that communities of color in particular are facing 
with this effort to combat domestic terrorism?
    Ms. Patel. Thank you for that question. So for communities 
of color, when you have broad, open intelligence-gathering 
authorities and programs, there is a risk that they will be the 
target of those programs. We have seen this sort of 
systematically over the last two decades where Muslim Americans 
have been targeted for surveillance often on the basis of 
nothing other than their religion. We have seen this with 
African American communities being targeted. We have see the 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement being targeted, and this is a 
pretty well known phenomenon in the United States.
    I think the overall concern is that domestic terrorism is 
discussed sort of almost a stand-in for white supremacist 
violence, but covers a much broader range of issues, as we have 
seen from DHS and FBI documents. So the concern is that these 
kinds of broad, open surveillance programs will actually be 
used to target communities of color, as has been the case in 
the past.
    Chairman Peters. Very good. General Taylor, last year you 
authored an op-ed noting your significant concern with I&A's 
reportedly problematic intelligence operations in Portland and 
the publishing of intelligence on journalists specifically. 
More recently, this Committee has found that I&A warned 
generally about the potential for election-related violence, 
but failed to issue a warning specific to the risk facing the 
Capitol on January 6th. In both examples, I&A clearly did not 
serve its customers or the American people in that respect.
    My question to you is: In your opinion, what are the key 
reasons for I&A's failures over this past year?
    General Taylor. It is hard for me, Senator, to kind of 
focus in on the key reasons for failure because I was not in 
the decision cycle. But I think organizations like I&A fail to 
meet their mission if they are not organized in a way that 
ensures consistency of production, consistency of focus. And it 
is my understanding that those processes and procedures that at 
least existed when I was there were no longer being used from 
an execution point of view. I think solid leadership and solid 
management will save the day.
    By the way, I am a product of the Church Commission and the 
follow-on from Counter INTELPRO. I have been on the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Commission for President Bush. Privacy and 
civil rights and civil liberties are fundamental to how we 
should think about domestic intelligence, and for whatever 
reason, that was not the case during the last year.
    Chairman Peters. So you talk about stability and 
continuity. I would assume the fact that we have had a lack of 
stability when it comes to I&A leadership over the years, that 
has contributed to the problem that you see?
    General Taylor. I do. As you mentioned in your opening 
statement, 12 different I&A leaders over 19 years really does 
not give you a lot of confidence about continuity. And during 
my tenure, it has been my experience in the military that when 
you take over an organization, you try to organize it to focus 
on the mission. Much of what we put in place was dismantled 
after we left office in 2017.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, General.
    Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your 
questions.
    Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me start, if I could, with General Taylor and Ms. 
Cogswell. A fundamental question here. Both of you have a broad 
national security background, including having at one time had 
the role of managing I&A. Do we need I&A at DHS? Yes or no.
    General Taylor. Yes.
    Ms. Cogswell. I agree as well.
    Senator Portman. OK. I think there is some fundamental 
rethinking going on right now, and I think it is important, in 
my view that we have this intelligence-gathering capability, 
particularly, as both of you commented on, because our State, 
local, tribal, and private sector coordination and 
communication goes through I&A. Nobody else has that 
responsibility. Is that correct?
    General Taylor. That is correct.
    Senator Portman. One of my big concerns has been the growth 
of these so-called TCOs. They are responsible for a lot of 
criminal activity, as you know, but one that is particularly 
pernicious right now is the movement of drugs into our 
communities, particularly fentanyl and the other synthetic 
opioids, which, unfortunately, killed more people last year, 
from everything we know, than ever in our history. And they 
seem to be working their way into the system more. In other 
words, they are more vertically integrated in our communities 
themselves, not just bringing things across the border as they 
are certainly doing.
    What are we doing with regard to I&A and that issue? Are we 
thinking expansively enough when it comes to combating these 
TCOs that have these tentacles into communities around the 
country? What is your view, General Taylor?
    General Taylor. Senator Portman, I think that this is a 
problem for the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. The 
organization Ms. Cogswell led in ICE has a very important role 
to play in helping State and local law enforcement as well as 
other Federal partners gather the intelligence that is 
necessary to disrupt these TOC organizations going forward. I 
do not think it is just I&A, but it is how the intelligence 
enterprise is organized to support the investigation and field 
work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of ICE, of 
DEA across the country, is the important role that I&A plays in 
trying to coordinate that effort.
    Senator Portman. How about the coordination with those 
18,000 police forces around the country? Isn't that a key role?
    General Taylor. Absolutely, and that is a part of 
understanding what is going on on the ground, what those 
priorities are, and sharing that information more broadly with 
Federal partners, not just I&A but with ICE and CBP, so we have 
a fuller picture of what is actually happening and how it can 
be----
    Senator Portman. Ms. Cogswell, do you have thoughts on 
TCOs?
    Ms. Cogswell. I do. Thank you very much. As you noted, a 
critically important topic for us. I would like to give one 
example to General Taylor's point from when I was actually 
still there. We were extremely fortunate as the National 
Security Council began examining the transnational organized 
crime issue that they said we want to look to have a law 
enforcement organization lead a whole-of-community effort to 
assess the threat across all the different dimensions that will 
help set the stage for us to have the right policy debate about 
how the U.S. Government can take better and broader action.
    I was extremely fortunate that my team, my chief of staff 
at the time, was selected to lead the effort for the entire 
community with support of DHS I&A, as well as other members of 
DHS, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence community. 
I think that is a fantastic example of how the community comes 
together through these mechanisms to provide valuable 
intelligence that helps set direction for policy, whether 
additional legislation may be needed, where the resourcing is 
allocated.
    Senator Portman. From what you know--and, again, we do not 
have the Acting Under Secretary here with us because we are not 
mixing the public and private panels, but from what you all 
know, and those who are joining us virtually, speak up as well, 
do you think that the current administration is focused enough 
on the TCO threat?
    Ms. Cogswell. I know it is, in fact, a priority for them 
and that there is work underway, and in particular, I am aware 
of some very good discussions underway between DHS I&A, the 
Office of Policy, and the operating components of DHS.
    Senator Portman. General.
    General Taylor. I agree. But, Senator Portman, one of the 
challenges at I&A, there are 700 people in the entire 
organization. There are directorates of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
that have twice as many people. I think I&A is trying to 
satisfy as many customers as it can, but it does not have the 
resources to spread itself as wide as it needs to.
    One of the things I think we should focus on is where 
should those priorities come from, where should those 
investments be made, and resources to prioritize----
    Senator Portman. I think that is a good point. That is one 
reason I am asking you about this, because we talked about 
domestic terrorism, and we all agree that is important. But I 
think these TCOs, from what we know from open-source 
information as well as others, it is growing as a threat and, 
again, working its way, its tentacles into our communities.
    You talked about the relatively small number of people 
compared to others in the IC community. We have a real problem 
with attrition, too, and morale. And both of you have been 
consumers of the intelligence. You have also been there working 
with the individuals, and I want to hear from our own 
colleagues, too, who are on virtually.
    But, Ms. Cogswell, let me start with you quickly. What do 
you think I&A can do to deal with the consistently low morale 
and the lack of leadership? I would hope that the 
administration, by the way, would nominate somebody for that 
Under Secretary slot right away and that we could get somebody 
in there who is willing to stick around for a while to provide 
some leadership. But I would love to hear your comments on 
that.
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much. I agree with you that 
consistency and leadership that will be there for a period of 
time is critically important. I would also say that assuming 
that this Committee proceeds forward with some recommended 
changes--I know DHS will be considering them as well--I am 
hopeful that those are built in a way that will pass the test 
of time, will frankly last for a period of years. Much like the 
reviews after 9/11 where you looked at how various activities 
occurred in the intelligence community, I would hope similar 
activities would play themselves out at DHS I&A and, frankly, 
across the homeland security enterprise.
    Senator Portman. I think our report that I mentioned 
earlier is going to be helpful in that regard as well.
    Let me quickly end with one really comment, and it is a 
question but we do not have time to get into it. I see a 
contradiction, Ms. Patel, in some of the things you are 
advocating and what others are advocating. We want more focus 
on domestic terrorism. We certainly have seen with regard to 
January 6th we did not have the information needed. It was 
online. There were plenty of threats of violence that were 
actually followed through on. And yet, Ms. Patel, you seem to 
be saying we should not rely on online information, it is 
unreliable, it is free speech, and that violence that is 
threatened online does not necessarily mean it is really 
violence. But that seems contradictory to what our experience 
is. So can you comment on that quickly? And to the extent we do 
not have time, maybe we could get into that in a second round.
    Ms. Patel. Thank you. Thank you for the question. I think 
we have to apply what we are looking for online. I am not 
saying by any means that we can never tell that violence is 
going to occur or criminal activity is going to occur online. I 
think there are probably ways that we can figure that out.
    What I am saying, though, is that we should start with the 
violence rather than focusing on different narratives and 
grievances which are widely shared. So it is really a question 
of whether you go broad to narrow or whether you start with 
actual threats of violence, criminal activity, and then fan out 
from there to find other people who might be involved.
    Senator Portman. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Portman.
    Just for the record, for our folks who are online, Senator 
Portman started with a fundamental question which I think is 
important: Do we need I&A given all of the rest of the 
intelligence community? We heard yes from the two witnesses 
that were here. I did not hear from the two witnesses. Ms. 
Patel, yes or no? Mr. Sena, yes or no?
    Ms. Patel. I think I&A plays a useful role in terms of its 
sharing of information in the networking with State, local, 
tribal, and territorial. I guess I would say, that does not 
necessarily mean that that role could not be played by somebody 
else, and we know that the FBI, for example, does have JTTFs 
which perform kind of a similar role in an investigative 
capacity. While I recognize the importance of the role, I guess 
I am not as committed to it necessarily being in I&A per se as 
the other commentators are.
    Chairman Peters. OK. We can pursue that further.
    Mr. Sena, yes or no? Preferable?
    Mr. Sena. A strong yes.
    Chairman Peters. A strong yes. Very good.
    Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN

    Senator Hassan. Thank you, Chair Peters and Ranking Member 
Portman, for this hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses 
for being here today and for the service you have provided in 
multiple arenas.
    Quickly, General Taylor, I wanted to give you a chance to 
comment on something that Senator Portman and Ms. Cogswell 
discussed. Would it help overall employee morale in I&A if 
there was a nominee to head the office?
    General Taylor. Absolutely, and I would also say, Senator, 
that I&A's morale was in the dumps when I took over with 
Secretary Johnson, and we were able to improve morale by 
focusing on kind of basic taking care of people, the things I 
have learned over 40 years in the military, and to get people 
focused on mission. So it is not an impossible task, but 
leadership needs to focus on it and make it a priority.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    I also want to follow up. Senator Portman talked with both 
of you, General Taylor and Ms. Cogswell, about the role that 
I&A plays in particularly combating TCOs, but I would like you 
to expand a little bit on it. The Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis is one of 17 entities within the larger intelligence 
community. So please take this opportunity to briefly talk 
about how I&A is suited to take advantage of its authorities 
and relationships to inform its own activities and the 
activities of the intelligence community as a whole. And how is 
its relationship with State, local, and tribal authorities 
different from other agencies? Why don't we start with you, 
General Taylor, and then to Ms. Cogswell.
    General Taylor. As I said in my opening comments, I&A is 
the only intelligence agency specifically chartered to provide 
intelligence support to our State, local, tribal, and 
territorial partners, really as a result of 9/11, and the fact 
that we had people in this country who were about to commit a 
terrorist act, and there was no way to loop in the 18,000 
police organizations and 800,000 cops to understand what the 
nature of that threat is. And that is what I&A and DHS has 
worked on over the years. So that is what makes it unique.
    Most of the IC cannot do work in the homeland. The FBI can 
from an investigative perspective and counterintelligence 
perspective, and DHS I&A. But the rest of the IC is precluded 
from the kind of specific work, intelligence work, that I&A 
does in the homeland.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    Ms. Cogswell.
    Ms. Cogswell. I agree with everything that General Taylor 
said. I would add it is also uniquely situated within DHS, so 
it is partnered up with other elements who directly have 
mission responsibility to enact programs specifically to 
counter threats. In addition to the threat and intelligence 
picture, the ability to wrap in policy and operational entities 
to help formulate direction, and then work with counterparts, 
including at the State and local level to exercise them, 
critically important.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    General Taylor, I want to turn to the issue of 
cybersecurity for a minute. We have seen a recent series of 
high-profile cybersecurity breaches and attacks against the 
Federal Government and critical infrastructure, and we do not 
expect that these threats are going to diminish. How can the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis work with the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to help prevent 
these attacks from happening?
    General Taylor. I think the most important part is I&A is 
already at CISA with about 30 of its analysts working directly 
with CISA and the Computer Security Division to produce 
intelligence coming out of the EINSTEIN system. I believe CISA 
should have its own dedicated intelligence organization to 
assist not only I&A but its Director in formulating 
intelligence that is specific to the data that is collected by 
CISA. I also think that that would allow them a much more 
robust relationship with the National Security Agency. While 
NSA cannot actually do domestic intelligence collection, its 
analytical capability, I think, is important to our 
understanding of what the cybersecurity risk is and informing 
our partners in the Federal Government and State and local and 
private sector what actions they need to take to address those 
issue.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    Now I want to turn to the issue of terrorism threats, and 
we have talked a little bit about it this morning. But, General 
Taylor, I am pleased that the Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis recently announced a new effort dedicated to analyzing 
the threat from domestic terrorism. I also remain concerned 
about the threats posed by international terrorists and 
homegrown violent extremists (HVE).
    In your view, do you believe that the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis has the capacity to adequately 
monitor the various terrorist threats?
    General Taylor. Absolutely, in conjunction with NCTC and 
the FBI. It does not stand alone. This is a partnership between 
the intelligence community, the FBI, and DHS and understanding 
the nature of the phenomenon we are seeing both in the homeland 
and overseas. And the international threat is not diminished. 
The Islamic State of Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda continue to 
threaten the United States, and we need to keep a very clear 
eye on that threat as well as what we are seeing in the 
homeland as it has unfolded over the course of the last two or 
three years.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    Ms. Cogswell, you testified today about the importance of 
depoliticizing the intelligence process. What specific steps 
can the Office of Intelligence and Analysis take to accomplish 
this goal? And how can Congress assist?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you so much, Senator, for the question. 
In particular, as I thought about this type of particular 
issue, I very much liken it to right after 9/11 where we had a 
whole-of-country kind of rethink about why we did not see that 
coming. What was our failure of imagination in that front?
    We put in place a number of activities, different processes 
post that threat, and part of it was starting with how we did 
the intelligence analysis itself; the ability to have different 
entities look at the problem from multiple different 
viewpoints, a diversity of viewpoint; the ability to have war 
gamings that looked at both the most likely scenario and the 
worst-case scenario; the ability to have a community that knew 
how to receive that information and then take action based on 
the fact that there is a variety of potential options. Even if 
they did not think the worst case was likely, they at least had 
discussed it and prepared for it.
    I think there is real opportunity in this space to take 
some of those lessons learned and practices and apply them 
here.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, would it be all right if I asked General Taylor 
to quickly comment on that same issue, how we can assist in 
depoliticizing the process?
    Chairman Peters. Absolutely. Proceed.
    General Taylor. Politics has no place in intelligence. It 
is the anathema in my view of solid intelligence collection, 
analysis, and reporting. And so during my tenure or, actually, 
during my 50 years of doing this, speaking truth to power is 
what intelligence officials are supposed to do, and despite 
politics, that is our job, and we need to do it and do it 
effectively.
    Senator Hassan. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
    Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN

    Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Peters, Ranking Member 
Portman. I appreciate the good questions and testimony already 
given today and for everyone's service to our Nation.
    General Taylor, I want to move over to white supremacist 
extremists that we have. As Chairman Peters has previously 
noted, ahead of January 6th, DHS did not issue a threat 
assessment or a joint intelligence bulletin specific to the 
event. On March 3rd, Acting Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for Intelligence, Melissa Smislova, told the 
Committee, and I quote, ``More should have been done to 
understand the correlation between the information and the 
threat of violence and what actions were warranted as a 
result.''
    Elizabeth Neumann, a former high-ranking DHS official, 
stated, and I quote again, ``But for reasons of fear''--``the 
Department did not issue a formal report.''
    General Taylor, can you speak to whether there is a current 
fear to report, either specifically toward domestic violent 
extremism as it turns into white supremacy, and/or broadly to 
other pertinent threats that you might be assessing?
    General Taylor. Thank you for that question, Senator. I was 
not there and, therefore, I cannot get into the mind of the 
leadership of I&A. What I would say is we have a process in 
this country around major events of producing threat 
assessments culminating from the information that we have 
collected across the country. That did not happen. Why it did 
not happen, I cannot say what is in the mind of the leadership 
that was in charge at the time, but I find it difficult to 
accept the fact that that process was not applied to this 
event, as with all other events in our threat analysis process.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you. Like you said earlier, 
intelligence should be nonpolitical, because we know that the 
rise in anti-Semitism is closely correlated with the spread of 
extremist ideologies. The audit of anti-Semitic incidents 
(ADLs) recorded 331 anti-Semitic incidents in 2020 attributed 
to extremists.
    So how do you think that DHS intelligence could better 
account, is there something that you might recommend for us to 
work with them to better account for this growing threat?
    General Taylor. DHS has partnerships across the country in 
State and local law enforcement and think tanks and all sorts 
of organizations that are monitoring this type of activity. I 
think continuing to coordinate with those organizations and 
entities to get a better picture consistently of what is going 
on on the ground and what tactics, techniques, and procedures 
law enforcement can use, as well as the private sector. We have 
relationships with religious organizations that we give 
information to about what these trends are and how they can 
protect themselves. So sustaining those relationships with up-
to-date information about the nature of how the threat is 
unfolding I think is the best prescription for success in 
defending those communities that are targeted.
    Senator Rosen. I think you are right, and we do have good 
partnerships, especially when it comes to our national fusion 
centers (NFCA). I would like to ask Mr. Sena about the role 
that fusion centers really play in protecting Americans from 
terrorism. In my home State of Nevada, our fusion center has 
been at the forefront of tracking the domestic violent 
extremist threat specifically emanating from militias. The 
Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also played an 
important role in addressing the October 1st shooting back in 
2017, the deadliest mass shooting in modern American history. 
So on behalf of all of Nevadans, I want to thank our fusion 
center for their tremendous service to our State and our 
community.
    But, Mr. Sena, you stated you were surprised that fusion 
centers did not receive any specific information ahead of 
January 6th. Why do you think that is that no specific threat 
information was shared? Again, maybe you might speak to see if 
there is a fear to report across the Department?
    Mr. Sena. Thank you very much, Senator, for that question. 
When we look at the National Network of Fusion Centers and our 
coordination effort with I&A, especially on events that, as was 
said earlier, information is online, so there are a lot of 
restrictions on how information is collected and analyzed. And, 
back in 2017, the National Network of Fusion Centers, in 
conjunction with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 
Council, developed a real-time, open-source analysis, guidance 
and recommendations. But within those roles and 
responsibilities, just because it is hate speech does not mean 
it is extremist violence speech.
    So being able to collect the information is one key element 
to this. Having the personnel that can report on it and make it 
part of the reporting requirements is a key issue that we still 
continue to have. Prior to January 6th, we as a network, a 
National Network of Fusion Centers, held a call on the Monday 
before the event because we were concerned, we were worried, 
and that call was directly related to a request from the 
Director of the fusion center in Washington, D.C. We did have 
DHS I&A personnel on that call who did say that they would have 
personnel onsite at the fusion center because there is not 
always personnel that are available to help them. We tried to 
build that network to share that information, and I was 
surprised that there was not anything developed at that time. 
But we were communicating in real time with them.
    So, those that need to talk about the threat, need to share 
the information about the threat, we were actively working with 
the Washington, D.C., fusion center to share information in 
real time. The Washington, D.C., fusion center had personnel 
with the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) to try to make sure that 
information was shared in real time.
    There are some issues with that real-time information 
sharing. One of the issues that we have is that, DHS I&A is a 
Title 50 agency, an intelligence community agency, but they do 
not have the law enforcement authorities that other 
organizations have, such as the FBI.
    And the Washington, D.C., fusion center at the time was not 
considered a law enforcement agency. So they were restricted 
from having that law enforcement information, which hindered 
our ability to share information at times.
    So moving forward, though, and how do we look at this, I 
believe that using that real-time, open-source analysis 
guidance, expanding the roles within our privacy, civil rights, 
and civil liberties policies that every fusion center has, 
along with the policies that I&A have, they need to have that 
law enforcement authority, but they also need to have the 
capacity to access that data online to address those threats 
and to push information out in a timely manner to every agency 
that needs it to address specific terrorism, domestic violent 
extremists, and whatever major criminal threat is coming that 
we are seeing as a pre-indicator online.
    Senator Rosen. Thank you for that answer. I am going to 
look forward to following up with you on some things that we 
can do to enhance the communication and collaboration you are 
already doing, but make it a little bit more robust so that we 
can stop any of these violent attacks before they start.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
    Senator Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON

    Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Taylor, when you look at the title of the agency 
you once headed, it is ``Intelligence and Analysis.'' From my 
standpoint, the analysis is really all about gathering all that 
information and then trying to prioritize it so we can 
adequately address the threats that face this Nation.
    I thought Ms. Patel had a pretty good suggestion, that you 
start with the violence, a pretty good way of prioritizing 
things. What is the greatest threat magnitude? How many people 
could lose their lives? How much damage can be done?
    I have always thought it was a little strange. The Chairman 
is focusing on white supremacists. Listen, I do not condone 
them. I condemn white supremacists. I condemn any act of 
violence. I do not categorize it whether it is right-wing, 
left-wing. I condemn violence. But the fact of the matter is we 
lose 70,000 people a year on drug overdoses.
    General Taylor, do you have any idea how many deaths, how 
many murders occur from drug violence, gangs?
    General Taylor. I have no numbers, sir, but it is an 
epidemic across----
    Senator Johnson. It is thousands, isn't it?
    General Taylor. It is, across the country.
    Senator Johnson. It is thousands. I do not know what is the 
current level of white supremacist killings, but I think it is 
in the hundreds. Again, I condemn it completely, but we are 
talking about thousands of drug-related murders every years, 
tens of thousands of drug-related overdoses, and now we are 
supposed to concentrate on domestic terrorism as the greatest 
threat? Again, it is not.
    Right now, the New York Times reported 160 different 
nationalities of people being picked up on the Southern Border 
over the last couple months. Ms. Cogswell, would you believe 
that is somewhat of a threat?
    Ms. Cogswell. I think that we have to continue to look at 
the processes by which people are showing up at the border. It 
is always possible that these networks and routes can be used 
for those who intend to do us harm.
    Senator Johnson. When we are clogging up our system with 
close to 6,000 apprehensions a day. General Taylor, when you 
were in the administration, we had a humanitarian crisis, 
according to President Obama, of 2,000 people being apprehended 
a day. During 2018 to 2019, it was a little over 4,000. The 
last couple months it has been 6,000 people per day on average, 
almost. Six thousand people. What happens to our system when it 
is clogged up with 6,000 people? Doesn't that open up the 
border to additional drug trafficking? Doesn't that create 
opportunities for transnational criminal organizations to 
exploit it? Doesn't that open it up to other human trafficking 
of, let us call it, ``higher-value targets'' to get in here 
that could create acts of violence? Last week it was surreal in 
this Committee room. Secretary Mayorkas, first of all, blaming 
the previous administration for the crisis they created, and, 
quite honestly, Senator Peters talking about, oh, the numbers 
are coming down, we are getting this under control.
    No. Six thousand people per day, and it is really not being 
abated at all. Isn't that a threat? Isn't that an enormous 
threat?
    General Taylor. Absolutely, and it is a threat that we have 
to face along with the other threats that come at us from 
across the globe, from not just our international partners but 
international adversaries. Look, in my view, the myriad of 
threats facing this country are significant and broad and not 
just for the Department of Homeland Security but for our State 
and local law enforcement organizations, for the FBI, for the 
Department of Justice, in a coordinated effort to address----
    Senator Johnson. Again, my point being is we really ought 
to concentrate on the numbers and the magnitude of the threat. 
Listen, I condemned what happened here on January 6th, but I 
condemn as well the more than 500 riots that occurred during 
the summer, including in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Two dozen people 
murdered, 700 law enforcement officers injured, $2 billion 
worth of property damaged, yet we all just want to move beyond 
that and let us just focus on January 6th.
    Another thing that really concerns me is we just saw the 
Colonial Pipeline cyber attack. I do not know if that is a shot 
across the bow, whether that is a criminal organization getting 
a little out of control of the Russian handlers and maybe going 
too far. I do not know what that is. But I do know that no 
administration, as long as I have been serving here, has taken 
literally the vulnerability of our electrical grid seriously, 
not when it comes to potential electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or 
geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) or cyber attack. We have seen 
what has happened now in terms of the vulnerability of the 
electrical grid to some of this green energy in Texas.
    In your time, both of you, Ms. Cogswell and General Taylor, 
was DHS I&A looking at the vulnerability we are introducing 
into our infrastructure, like our electrical grid, with some of 
these green energy ideas? Ms. Cogswell, we will start with you.
    Ms. Cogswell. I would say that both during my time with DHS 
I&A and my time at TSA, which, as you know, has responsibility 
with relation to pipeline security, cyber was of considerable 
interest to us. We were focused on what we saw as the greatest 
potential threats, where the vulnerabilities were, how to work 
with the owners and operators to conduct assessments and help 
them improve their basic security pipeline. We did not select 
one opportunity threat over the other, but looking at it 
holistically across the board.
    Senator Johnson. General Taylor?.
    General Taylor. Sir, critical infrastructure is critically 
important to the security of our country. Eighty-five percent 
of the critical infrastructure in this country sits in private 
sector hands that makes the decisions about how to protect 
themselves. The Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) that DHS has 
established over the course of the last 15 years have done 
yeoman's work in working with those----
    Senator Johnson. We have not made any move whatsoever, for 
example, to purchase and put in place large power transformers 
that are incredibly vulnerable to either EMP attack or 
potentially a GMD event. We have not done it. We are literally 
spending trillions of dollars and proposing spending trillions 
more, and nobody is talking about doing something that 
prophylactic, that sensible in terms of protecting our 
infrastructure, because, I am sorry, I am afraid we are 
focusing on, domestic terrorism that might kill a couple 
hundred people a year versus something that could really 
represent an existential threat.
    Again, my only point is I think we have politicized the 
threats we face, and we are not keeping our eye on the ball on 
the things that really represent a real threat to this Nation, 
which right now border security is probably the number one, and 
we are ignoring that and denying reality.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
    Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your question.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF

    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
our panel.
    General Taylor, where is there overlap based on your 
experience in government between the role of I&A and its 
responsibilities and the role and responsibilities of FBI's 
Intelligence Branch?
    General Taylor. I think that they are inextricably tied 
together. Because of the nature of the FBI's authorities and 
the nature of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INAs) 
authorities, we cannot do our job effectively without the FBI, 
and the FBI relies on us to work with State and local partners 
on a consistent basis outside of the JTTFs to ensure that that 
intelligence becomes a part of the overall intelligence that is 
available to the homeland for decisionmaking going forward.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. You 
wrote an article last August, I believe, on the Lawfare blog 
and noted, ``I&A has differentiated itself by informing 
audiences not usually served by the intelligence community,'' 
but you also noted that I&A's mission overlaps with that of 
other agencies.
    Where is there redundancy in the roles and responsibilities 
of the agencies that have mission overlap with I&A that could 
lead to inefficiency or a lack of clarity about who has 
principal responsibility for critical missions?
    General Taylor. I think when I wrote that article about 
mission overlap, it is complementary, not competitive. There 
are agencies that collect information that is of value to I&A 
and to I&A's customers, and rather than I&A going out trying to 
collect information independently, they should collaborate with 
those agencies to make sure that that information is available.
    I do not see a whole lot of overlap as long as we are 
leveraged the rest of the IC and our law enforcement partners 
to ensure we are not duplicating work that is already being 
effective done by our partners.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General Taylor. How do you think 
I&A and the IC more broadly can do a better job of ensuring 
that there is not duplicative or conflicting effort?
    General Taylor. I think that is through governance of the 
intelligence community, governance of the Department of 
Homeland Security, continual cooperation or collaboration with 
our partners in the FBI, and certainly getting feedback from 
our State, local, tribal, and territorial customers of what 
they need and where those gaps are and addressing those gaps.
    Senator Ossoff. How would you describe the breakdown of 
responsibility? And let me ask the question this way: Which 
agency has principal responsibility for developing and 
analyzing intelligence with respect to cybersecurity threats 
that both public and private sector enemies face? Which agency 
is principally responsible for that? Whose job is it above all 
others to develop intelligence with respect to cybersecurity 
threats, please, General?
    General Taylor. I think DHS has the primary responsibility 
in the homeland. That partnership is with CISA and I&A. But I 
also believe that there is a strong need for a close and 
collaborative relationship with the National Security Agency 
and the Cybersecurity Directorate of our intelligence 
organizations to strengthen the analytical capability that 
informs our domestic intelligence efforts.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Patel, you mentioned in your testimony the need for I&A 
to adhere to ``the highest standards'' when it comes to the 
protection of civil rights and civil liberties. Given the 
central role that I&A plays sharing information not just with 
the Federal Government but also with State and local officials 
and private sector actors, you mention in your testimony 
instances during both Democratic and Republican administrations 
when, in your view, I&A improperly collected or shared 
information about U.S. persons. I would like you to comment, 
please, on why you think there may be a tendency for I&A to 
cross this line, in your view, and how Congress might better 
define or constrain I&A's roles, responsibilities, and 
authorities to ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties 
of Americans are protected.
    Ms. Patel. So it is not just I&A. Most intelligence 
agencies run into this problem, and we have certainly seen this 
starting with the Church Committee onwards that there is always 
a temptation, there is mission creep, and bias always plays a 
role as well in intelligence collection. These things are 
really quite challenging to solve, and I think the best way 
really is to really strengthen the civil rights and civil 
liberties mechanisms that are within DHS and to strengthen 
congressional oversight.
    There are a lot of different ways that you can do it. I 
suggested a few in my testimony, including having DHS CRCL 
actually clear I&A's analytical products, as well as increasing 
audits of I&A products by DHS for CRCL purposes. But there are 
additional ways in which that office can broadly be 
strengthened, which have been proposed, especially by people 
who previously worked in that office, such as direct reporting 
lines to Congress, greater congressional attention to the 
things that CRCL produces, insisting on really specific 
reporting about CRCL problems in DHS as opposed to very generic 
stuff, which is what we have seen in a lot of the reporting. I 
think these are some of the ways in which I&A can be more 
respectful of civil rights and civil liberties.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Ms. Patel.
    With my remaining time, General Taylor, would you like to 
comment in any way on Ms. Patel's analysis there?
    General Taylor. I think Ms. Patel's analysis is correct in 
the sense that strong civil rights, civil liberties oversight 
is key to effective intelligence collection and analysis in the 
homeland. I am not sure I would agree that I need CRCL to clear 
intelligence products. I would see that as the responsibility 
of the intelligence officer who produced it. But to ensure that 
that product does not violate civil rights, civil liberties, or 
the policies of the Department would be my way of stating it.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General. Thank you, Ms. Patel.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. I yield.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
    The Chair recognizes Senator Sinema for your questions.

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA

    Senator Sinema. Thank you, Chairman, for holding today's 
hearing, and I want to thank all of our witnesses for being 
here.
    It is critical that every decision the Department of 
Homeland Security makes about protecting our Nation is backed 
up by robust analysis. We cannot protect our communities and 
secure our border without a strong Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis, and that is especially true today when our Nation and 
my State of Arizona are struggling to overcome a pandemic while 
also dealing with a crisis at the border.
    My first question is for General Taylor. The Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis is unique in the intelligence 
community with its task to coordinate with Federal as well as 
State and local government and law enforcement entities to 
protect our country from threats, including pandemics. The 
COVID-19 pandemic created challenges for many. Based on your 
prior experience, how would the situation with the pandemic 
impact your recommendations to improve the overall 
effectiveness and coordination through the Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis with State and local governments and 
law enforcement?
    General Taylor. Senator, thank you for the question. I am 
not sure I understand what you are asking me to comment on. 
Could you clarify that a bit?
    Senator Sinema. So now that we have a pandemic that we are 
working through, would that impact any of your recommendations 
to improve the overall effectiveness and coordination of the 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis with State and local 
governments and with local law enforcement?
    General Taylor. Look, I think pandemics and other sorts of 
disruptions occur every day. I do not think that changes the 
nature of how I&A or our State and local partners approach 
their business. Maybe there is isolation and that sort of 
thing, but, threats continue during pandemics, and we have to 
continue to focus our efforts on the collection and analysis of 
those threats, even during a period of pandemic when people are 
stuck at home and cannot get out. Our adversaries see that as a 
potential and opportunity to be exploited.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you.
    My next question is for Ms. Cogswell. As was previously 
discussed, transnational criminal organizations pose a 
significant threat to our national security by facilitating 
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and violence at our 
Southwest Border. Our Nation is also dealing with a migration 
challenge at the border with CBP reporting record numbers of 
encounters, which, of course, diverts resources and focus.
    So what steps can the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
take to more effectively respond to the ongoing TCO threats 
that will better engage law enforcement, CBP, and ICE's limited 
resources? The second question is: Does I&A have the resources 
it needs to effectively address this threat?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you, Senator, for the question. With 
respect to the first element, I think that one of the most 
important elements that I&A, especially through the mission 
center construct, can bring to this discussion is providing the 
opportunity and floor for that strategic assessment, that sense 
of community across all the actors to inform strategic 
discussions, strategic policy decisions, strategic discussions 
about resource allocation between various threats, as well as 
helping to clarify in those discussions how best to look for 
evidence about the impact their actions are taking and whether 
or not those efforts have been successful.
    With respect to your second point on resourcing, frankly I 
think there is a very good question and discussion to be had 
across a number of elements of the intelligence and operational 
environment in which we are talking about to look at whether or 
not the resources are commensurate to the threats we are 
currently facing. I thank you very much and look forward to 
further conversations by the Committee in that regard.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. Another question for you on this 
same general topic. We see a diverse population of migrants 
arrive at the Southwest Border in Arizona, including asylum 
seekers who are coming from dozens of countries. Given your 
past experience in this area, what unique challenges does this 
migration influx present DHS from an intelligence and analysis 
perspective? What steps should the office take to ensure that 
criminals are not gaining entry into the United States?
    Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question. So with 
respect to the first element, the unique aspect, DHS I&A I 
think very much is in a support role for the ongoing individual 
elements, much more so a focus in assistance when we talk about 
sort of that strategic picture and the dynamicism in terms of 
priorities amongst a range of threats and characteristics.
    With respect to the individual threats posed within the 
migrant communities themselves and how to best assess and 
screen, there is a robust screening architecture already in 
place. The key here is ensuring that there is the time and 
resources dedicated and available to ensure that screening 
occurs.
    One of the things I found most important over time is 
looking at not only how tools can be an assistance to the 
various entities performing these functions, but also some of 
the analysis that goes along looking at the various encounters 
themselves. What can we learn based on that in terms of routes, 
trends, practices, tactics being used, funding, whether or not 
they are using different types of travel documents that had not 
been previously identified. These are some of the most 
important things that help us better deploy our resources and 
assets.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you.
    A follow-up on this question for Ms. Patel. Do you have 
specific recommendations to help maintain the right balance 
between security, privacy, and civil liberty concerns when it 
comes to the work that I&A does to combat these TCOs and 
identify broader challenges?
    Ms. Patel. Thank you for the question, Senator. I think I 
have tried to identify those which are basically that I think 
it is important that we focus on violence. My concern is that 
there is a tendency to really broaden the aperture through 
which we look at threats so that we are looking across, 
different narratives and grievances and social media in an 
effort to winnow it down. What I would suggest is that instead 
we identify violent actors, which we have done certainly over 
the last several months as well, and then fan out from there in 
an effort to really constrain I&A to focus its work on the most 
dangerous people.
    Senator Sinema. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, I do have another question for Mr. Sena, but 
since my time has expired, I will submit it for the record.
    I yield my time back, and I thank you for this hearing.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Sinema.
    As we start wrapping up here, I have one more question here 
actually for Mr. Sena. We have talked a great deal here at this 
hearing about the unique aspect of I&A and how they share 
information with State, local, tribal, territorial governments. 
We hear work with fusion centers, of course, is the center of 
all of that.
    You mentioned in your opening testimony that you had some 
specific actions that you would recommend to strengthen the 
sharing of relevant, timely, actionable intelligence 
information across those centers. If you could share with the 
Committee some of those actionable ideas that we should 
consider?
    Mr. Sena. Absolutely. One of the biggest pieces is that 
lack of the personnel resources that are on the ground. Whether 
it is intelligence officers, collections managers, reports 
officers, we have to have people in the local area, in the 
local regions across the country that have the capacity to 
share information in real time and to work closely with the FBI 
Field Intelligence Company and the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
and in that fusion center collocated environment. We need 
technology. Right now the Homeland Security Information Network 
is riding on technology that is, in some cases 18 years old. We 
need that capacity to have tools and resources that are easily 
accessible by all of our leaders out there, not just the folks 
in the fusion centers, but all of our partners.
    We also need folks that are on the ground to help support 
the privacy, the civil rights, the civil liberties training, 
and I&A can play a pivotal role in that capability. We also 
need the capacity to have, personnel on the ground, that when 
we run into whether it is bureaucratic or whatever the hurdles 
may be, the fact that we have centers right now that cannot get 
the critical data they need to prevent terrorist acts, to 
prevent major criminal threats, it is abysmal. Here we are 
almost 20 years later, and we do not have that capacity, so 
having advocates there--I often say that I get more done by 
having a DHS Regional Director three doors down from me than I 
do with many of the calls that we have in Washington, D.C., 
because that is where the rubber meets the road. That is where 
things get done. It is done at the local level because that is 
where the threats are.
    I see the formation of I&A pivoting what has happened over 
the last number of years where the focus has been not as much 
on the State, local, tribal, and territorial partners, who are 
at the local level and looking at more of a larger intelligence 
community framework. There are lots of folks in the 
intelligence community that do a great job within their avenues 
of what they do. But the real strength of DHS I&A is with their 
State, local, tribal, and territorial partners. It really is, 
because that is where the information is at. That is where the 
threat is. That is where we are dealing with the opioid and 
overdose epidemics. That is where we are dealing with 
transnational criminal organizations. That is where we are 
dealing with domestic violent extremists and every other 
violent extremist and having the personnel there. We cannot do 
this with a little over 100 people. We have to have more folks 
in the field, and I agree the mission center idea is great, but 
it needs to incorporate those State, local, tribal, and 
territorial partners to be effective. And I&A in their unique 
role has the ability to be our champion for that State, local, 
tribal, and territorial community. I think that is where they 
need to be uplifted to, but they need the resources from 
Congress to make sure that they have capacity to achieve what 
they should be and what they were designed to be after 
September 11th. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman Peters. Thank you. Thank you for that answer. 
Thank you again to all of our witnesses here today for giving 
us your time and your expertise this morning.
    This hearing is a part of our Committee's bipartisan effort 
to examine the security and intelligence failures on January 
6th as well as to identify what reforms are needed to address 
the rising threat of domestic terrorism generally across the 
country.
    Our witnesses today focused on the importance of I&A and 
how it needs to provide DHS and its partners--State and local 
governments, law enforcement, and the private sector--with more 
actionable intelligence. We also discussed the unique position 
of I&A as a domestic-focused intelligence agency and the need 
to ensure that we protect the privacy, the civil rights, and 
the civil liberties as they work to execute their mission.
    I certainly look forward to working with my colleagues as 
we continue to examine how to combat the rise of domestic 
terrorism, including white nationalism and anti-government 
violence. Certainly I&A is the member of the intelligence 
community that is uniquely situated and suited to interact with 
both State and local enforcement, focus on strategic issues 
rather than specific law enforcement investigations, and 
leverage its existing domestic authorities to help us address 
that threat.
    So, with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 
days, until June 2nd at 5 p.m., for the submission of 
statements and questions for the record.
    This hearing is now adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              


[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                               [all]