[Senate Hearing 117-480]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-480
EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 18, 2021
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-998 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan, Chairman
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MAGGIE HASSAN, New Hampshire RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
KYRSTEN SINEMA, Arizona RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma
ALEX PADILLA, California MITT ROMNEY, Utah
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RICK SCOTT, Florida
JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
David M. Weinberg, Staff Director
Zachary I. Schram, Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Mulkins, Director of Homeland Security
Roy S. Awabdeh, Senior Counsel
Pamela Thiessen, Minority Staff Director
Andrew Dockham, Minority Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
Kirsten D. Madison, Minority Director of Homeland Security
Erin E. Kuhls, Minority Investigative Counsel
Shani M. Rosenstock, Minority Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Thomas J. Spino, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Peters............................................... 1
Senator Portman.............................................. 3
Senator Hassan............................................... 18
Senator Rosen................................................ 20
Senator Johnson.............................................. 23
Senator Ossoff............................................... 25
Senator Sinema............................................... 27
Prepared statements:
Senator Peters............................................... 33
Senator Portman.............................................. 35
WITNESSES
Tuesday, May 18, 2021
Hon. Francis X. Taylor, Former Under Secretary, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 5
Patricia F.S. Cogswell, Former Deputy Administrator,
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Mike Sena, President, National Fusion Center Association......... 9
Faiza Patel, Co-Director, Liberty & National Security Program,
Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law.. 11
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Cosgwell, Patricia F.S.:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Patel, Faiza:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Sena, Mike:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Taylor, Hon. Francis X.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 39
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Sena..................................................... 76
Ms. Patel.................................................... 80
EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
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TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
via Webex and in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Hon. Gary C. Peters, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Peters, Hassan, Sinema, Rosen, Ossoff,
Portman, Johnson, Romney, Scott, and Hawley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETERS\1\
Chairman Peters. The Committee will come to order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Peters appear in the Appendix
on page 33.
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Today we will hear from former homeland security
intelligence officials, as well as national security and civil
rights experts, on their views of the appropriate roles,
responsibilities, and authorities for the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS
I&A).
I would like to thank each of our witnesses for joining us
today and for their work in the public and private sectors to
protect the American people.
Today's testimony will give the Committee critical insight
into how the Office of Intelligence and Analysis operates and
what role it should play in providing threat assessments and
domestic terrorism intelligence to Department of Homeland
Security leadership, State and local law enforcement partners,
and other private entities.
We will also hear testimony on how to ensure citizens'
fundamental civil rights and civil liberties are safeguarded as
we work to better tackle a rising domestic terrorism threat.
Earlier this year, the Committee heard about how systemic
breakdowns in planning and preparation led to the deadly attack
on the U.S. Capitol, the heart of our democracy.
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, along with other
intelligence and counterterrorism agencies, failed to
effectively identify the threat on January 6th.
We need to understand the factors that led to that failure
and what concrete steps can be taken to better understand the
current threats that we face and ensure the Department of
Homeland Security is effectively sharing information with local
and State law enforcement.
I appreciate the hard work and the ongoing dedication of
the national security experts in the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, and I recognize they have faced challenges that they
must address. However, it is apparent that the office must also
do more to effectively counter the rising threats posed by
white supremacist and anti-government violence that threaten
communities all across our country.
One of the greatest challenges the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis has faced is the pressure to politicize domestic
terrorism threats. Under the previous administration, the
office reportedly downplayed the threat posed by white
supremacist and anti-government violence and reportedly
censored some intelligence information under pressure from
President Trump.
At times, this political pressure led to problematic and
inaccurate analysis related to peaceful protest movements,
overstating the roles of certain groups, and even reportedly
developing intelligence on American journalists.
Our national security and the safety of Americans cannot
depend on political whims or individual leaders' biases.
That is why Congress must work to ensure that analysis
conducted by the intelligence community (IC) is separated from
the political environment and based in facts and in data that
accurately assess security threats.
The office also struggles with employee morale, a challenge
identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports and employee surveys, possibly because of a lack of
consistent leadership and direction.
Since this office was first created 19 years ago, it has
had more than a dozen different leaders. Only three of those
individuals, including one of our witnesses today, led the
office for more than two years.
These obstacles, and other challenges, must be addressed
quickly. Our Nation faces very real and deadly domestic
terrorism threats, and our national security agencies must
ensure that our counterterrorism efforts and resources align
with those threats.
A recent, long-delayed joint report from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) and DHS identified racially or
ethnically motivated extremists, primarily white supremacists,
as the most significant national security threat based on data
from recent years.
While I appreciate the initial steps the Biden
administration has taken to begin addressing the alarming rise
of these threats, it is clear that there is so much more work
to be done. American lives are at risk, and we must ensure that
we are taking all appropriate action to safeguard the American
people and protect their most fundamental rights as well.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, who bring
unique perspectives on how we can improve the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis to meet our security goals.
I have no doubt that this Committee can work in a
nonpartisan way to strengthen our homeland security and protect
Americans from all threats, both foreign and domestic.
With that, I turn it over to Ranking Member Portman for
your opening comments.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN\1\
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. It is important and timely for us to
learn more about what Homeland Security's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis does and how to ensure that they are
doing their job better.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Portman appears in the
Appendix on page 35.
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DHS is responsible for protecting the homeland, and I
believe its intelligence and analysis capabilities are
absolutely essential to that effort. So let me start by saying
I think the role that is being played is critical, and I look
forward to discussing how to best equip the Department and its
partners with critical, timely, and actionable intelligence to
keep us safe from both foreign and domestic adversaries.
There are plenty of challenges right now. The events of
January 6th have just been talked about. Domestic terrorism,
recent attacks on Federal facilities and law enforcement,
Mexican and other foreign cartel networks that are now
operating much more so, as I understand it, within our cities,
the ongoing threat, of course, posed by foreign terrorists--all
this underscores the need for ongoing intelligence and analysis
focused on identifying and mitigating threats to our country.
Since its inception, DHS has had an intelligence office to
support its mission, understandably. Congress underscored the
importance of intelligence and information sharing in the
Implementing Recommendations from the 9/11 Commission. This was
back in 2007, and that formally established the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis.
While it is one of the smaller entities within the
intelligence community, I&A is the only IC member charged with
delivering intelligence to our State, local, tribal,
territorial (SLTT), and our private sector partners and
developing intelligence from these important partners for the
Department and for the intelligence community. To put it
simply, I&A is intended to facilitate a key layer of
communication and domestic coordination required, in my view,
to help support the effort at DHS to protect the homeland.
In my home State of Ohio, we have three fusion centers that
have benefited greatly from the partnership with I&A. I visited
one of them a couple of times, the Cincinnati fusion center,
where I have seen the importance of the support and the
partnership that I&A provides. For example, I recently learned
that an I&A intelligence officer at one of our fusion centers,
in Columbus, Ohio, provided critical information on a suspect
who had a plot to cause mass violence at large music concert
venue in Columbus. By leveraging I&A's capabilities, the
Columbus fusion center was able to quickly work with law
enforcement to locate that suspect and place this individual on
the Transportation Security Administration (TSAs) no-fly list.
The suspect was then intercepted while attempting to board a
flight on his way to Columbus to carry out the attack. That is
one example, but there are many like that, where I&A has played
a critical role.
The Committee learned from our oversight investigation into
the January 6th attack on the Capitol that I&A fell short in
reporting on the potential threat. They were not the only ones,
but they did fall short, in my view. Security officials have
cited the lack of intelligence and information sharing from I&A
and other intelligence agencies as a reason law enforcement was
not better prepared to respond. In our investigation, the then-
Acting Under Secretary of I&A revealed weaknesses in how I&A
distributes information, collects intelligence from social
media platforms, and leverages its relationships with State,
local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to
learn of new, evolving threats. And that will be part of the
report that we will be issuing here in the next few weeks.
Notably, I&A has an important role to play in combating
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)--including those
responsible for drug trafficking, violence, human smuggling,
child exploitation, and a host of other criminal activities. As
I said earlier, TCOs are increasingly present here in this
country. They are always evolving, they are always adapting to
maximize their profits as they did as Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) reshaped supply chains and transport patterns. In
fact, according to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
once they adjusted to the initial disruption of COVID, Mexican
cartels ``reinforced supplies of precursor materials, increased
production and are sending larger fentanyl and methamphetamine
loads into the United States.'' We certainly see that at the
Mexican border.
It seems more important than ever for Federal and local
partners to be in close coordination to understand and combat
these dynamic threats. And, while these challenges are
national, they have hit local communities, including many in my
home State of Ohio, particularly hard.
There are a number of issues I hope we are able to explore
today. There are differing opinions on what I&A's role is with
regard to intelligence collection, production, and
dissemination. In my view, having timely, quality intelligence
is an essential component, again, to keep our communities safe.
I hope today that we can talk about how DHS can appropriately
provide these capabilities at a time when we face some threats
that are home grown.
The threats we face are dynamic and becoming more complex
every day. And they are not all focused on Washington, D.C.
Considering the current environment, how can I&A best leverage
those fusion centers we talked about and its partnerships with
State, local, and private sector partners to meet the needs of
the Department charged with securing our homeland?
Finally, over the years, I&A has faced challenges in
recruiting qualified talent and has experienced consistently
low morale and high rates of attrition. This is a deep concern
of mine. I hope our witnesses can help us understand what can
be done to address these longstanding personnel issues.
General Taylor, Ms. Cogswell, Mr. Sena, and Ms. Patel, I am
looking forward to your testimony and some answers to those
questions we pose today.
Thank you.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ranking Member Portman, for
your opening comments.
It is the practice of the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) to swear in witnesses,
so if our witnesses will please stand and raise your right
hand? And our witnesses who are in video, raise your right hand
so we can see you on the video. Do you swear that the testimony
you will give before this Committee will be the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
General Taylor. I do.
Ms. Cogswell. I do.
Mr. Sena. I do.
Ms. Patel. I do.
Chairman Peters. The witnesses may be seated.
Our first witness today is General Francis Taylor, the
former Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the
Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his assignment at DHS
I&A, General Taylor was vice president and chief security
officer (CSO) for the General Electric Company. General Taylor
has also served as the Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security and Director of the Office of Foreign
Missions (OFM) with the rank of Ambassador. General Taylor also
previously served as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and
Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the Department of State
from July 2001 to November 2002. Prior to that, General Taylor
accumulated 31 years' military experience, rising to the rank
of Brigadier General.
Mr. Taylor, former General, General Taylor, welcome to the
Committee. You are recognized for your five minute opening
remarks.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE FRANCIS X. TAYLOR, FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS (2014-17), U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
General Taylor. Chairman Peters, Ranking Member Portman,
and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to talk about the DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. I have submitted written testimony
and would ask that that be entered into the record,\1\ and I
will try to summarize that in my five minutes this morning.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Taylor appears in the Appendix on
page 39.
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Chairman Peters. So ordered.
General Taylor. I&A's mission is integral to DHS, the
intelligence community, and to the security of our Nation. It
is the only U.S. intelligence agency that is specifically
chartered to provide intelligence support to State, local,
tribal, territorial, and private sector partners to improve the
flow and quality of information sharing across our Nation. As
the intelligence arm of DHS, I&A has a responsibility to
support the intelligence needs of the senior leadership of the
Department, to ensure that relevant intelligence from the IC is
shared systematically with our State, local, tribal,
territorial, and private sector partners, and that relevant
information from those partners becomes intelligence that is
shared more broadly with the IC.
As the Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the
Department, the Under Secretary of I&A coordinates and
deconflicts the efforts of the DHS intelligence enterprise to
meet the intelligence needs of the Department and our IC
partners. Additionally, the Under Secretary's responsibility to
lead information sharing and safeguarding for the Department
provides a unique opportunity to use the myriad of data
generated by DHS and to turn that data into effective
information to share with our SLTT, Federal, and international
partners.
There are several initiatives that I believe I&A leadership
must focus on.
First, restoring trust. I&A leaders will need to focus on
rebuilding trust with key stakeholders within and across DHS
and the Intelligence Enterprise (IE), as well as externally,
with the broader IC and Congress. Controversies surrounding I&A
activities and the use of intelligence authorities in recent
years have undermined its reputation and raised questions about
the integrity and objectivity of the information it provides to
stakeholders. In order to rebuild stakeholder and public trust,
I&A will need to focus on advancing its core mission and
demonstrating that it brings invaluable mission expertise to
its customers.
Second, focus on SLTT and private sector partners. Moving
forward, I&A should focus on effective prioritization of its
information-sharing activities, ensuring that they meet the
needs of State and local law enforcement and yield intelligence
information that could be useful to the broader IC, as a
complement, not as a competitor, of the FBI. Likewise, I&A
should continue to engage its partners in private industry to
gain perspectives on the national and homeland security
challenges facing their sector and ways to facilitate public-
private partnerships.
Third, reinvent intelligence analysis for DHS and the IC.
I&A leaders should focus the office's intelligence analysis
activities on the creation of intelligence products that draw
on unique DHS data sets and data science, within a robust
framework for privacy and civil liberties. I&A can be a leading
player in government focusing on data science to create unique
insights and produce clearly differentiated intelligence
products. With access to special data sets and a focused set of
priorities, I&A can lead the IC in reinventing does
intelligence.
I believe the mission center concept that was established
by the most recent Under Secretary is a great idea and needs to
be further developed within I&A and within the DHS IE. I&A
should create a budget, annual strategy, metrics, and fully
resource each mission center to appropriately support the needs
of the intelligence enterprise components, the Department
leadership, and the broader IC. Finally, I&A should lead in
data analytics using the unique data generated by the
Department.
DHS generates a tremendous amount of relevant information
in its daily mission activities. When I was there, that
information sat in more than 900 mutually independent
databases. That needs to change.
Finally, as Senator Portman and Senator Peters mentioned,
we need to invest in our workforce, and I would be happy to
talk about that and morale during your questions.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, General Taylor, for your
testimony.
Our second witness today is Patricia Cogswell, former
Deputy Administrator of the Transportation Security
Administration. Ms. Cogswell is currently a senior strategic
adviser for Guidehouse National Security. Prior to serving as
Deputy TSA Administrator, Ms. Cogswell had a long and
distinguished career in public service, including leading
programs at the White House, Department of Homeland Security,
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) related to intelligence,
information sharing, border security, screening and
watchlisting, and aviation, maritime, and surface
transportation.
Ms. Cogswell, welcome to the Committee. You are recognized
for your opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA F.S. COGSWELL,\1\ FORMER DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR (2018-20), TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you, sir. Chairman Peters, Ranking
Member Portman, and distinguished Members of the Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning as you examine the role of DHS' Office of Intelligence
and Analysis. My comments for the Committee today are in formed
by my more than 24 years of career Federal civilian and from
the various capacities in which I have both led and worked with
DHS I&A.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Cogswell appears in the Appendix
on page 43.
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During my tenure, I served in multiple DHS leadership
roles, including with three different headquarters elements and
three different DHS component agencies, as well as a 3-year
tour at the National Security Council (NSC).
When I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Screening Coordination, as Special Assistant to the President
for Transborder Security at the National Security Council, and,
most recently, as the Deputy Administrator for TSA, I was a
consumer of DHS I&A's intelligence products. While at DHS
Policy, another headquarters office, I partnered with DHS I&A
to lead development of interagency strategic and policy
initiatives, collaborated on reports for the Secretary and
other DHS leaders, and to lead DHS governance processes.
As the Assistant Director for Intelligence at Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE), I was a member of the Homeland
Security Intelligence Council (HSIC), working with DHS I&A to
inform strategic direction, policy, priorities, requirements,
and production. Finally, I led DHS I&A serving as the Acting
Under Secretary while the nominee was undergoing confirmation.
During my time I found the highest value roles for DHS I&A
to be:
Supporting the Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise;
the Under Secretary, as the Chief Intelligence Officer, in
collaboration with the HSIC, should lead development of
strategy, policy, and an integrated set of priorities,
including training and budget;
Advocating for the DHS mission to the intelligence
community and through associated budget processes. DHS I&A
should advocate on behalf of operators and policy personnel for
prioritization of intelligence collection, access to IC
information, use of IC information-sharing platforms and tools,
and associated resources;
Providing the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and headquarters
organizations with intelligence services, ensuring that
headquarters offices and the Secretary have access to the same
high-quality intelligence at their counterparts do,
particularly in advance of interagency and policy meetings;
Coordinating production of ``sense of community'' analyses
to support DHS and homeland security-unique needs in
coordination with the HSIC. In addition to products like the
Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HTA), the CINT should
support development of ``sense of community'' products to
support policy and operational decisions. Development of
individual products should be by the DHS entity best positioned
to speak on behalf of the entirety of the information,
including not only traditional intelligence and law enforcement
information, but also analysis developed by DHS in support of
its ongoing programs, and other knowledgeable stakeholders,
including academia and associations, and that the products are
scoped to answer relevant questions for the conversations;
Engaging the fusion centers. DHS I&A should support State,
local, territorial, and tribal partners with training,
information, and all source analysis that helps those partners,
based on the partner needs;
And collaborating with other DHS entities to enable an
effective information-sharing environment. DHS I&A should
support the design and funding of technical architectures and
multi-use tools that enhance DHS's ability to match and
exchange information, where appropriate, to achieve their
missions, in collaboration with the operating components and
other headquarters offices. DHS I&A should work to ensure it
can perform effectively across these functions with variance in
approach based on the needs and capabilities of its partners.
To do so, DHS I&A needs to examine staffing and morale,
including in particular stabilizing its organizational
structure, mission, and role. The workforce needs consistency
and continuity, something that lasts beyond the tenure of a
single Under Secretary, as well as a mission that is unique and
valued where they can be recognized as having subject matter
experts and are seen as partners;
Enhancing career development opportunities. DHS I&A
leadership should invest in changes that will provide
supervisors incentives to positively coach and mentor their
personnel and career paths that enable staff to grow, including
mobility to DHS agencies, increasing their opportunities and
exposure to the wider homeland security mission;
Depoliticizing products, and career staff. DHS I&A should
enhance its strategic communications with its customers and
stakeholders, providing the opportunity for input into I&A's
analytic product selection process, methodology, data used, how
it is assessed, and ensure that it seeks out support from
partners and oversight, including this Committee, for efforts
in areas that may become controversial.
As this Committee examines DHS I&A's role, I would
encourage you to consider how to develop changes in a way that
will support the organization for years to come.
Organizational, transformational, and cultural change take
investment in time, developing talent, a willingness to measure
impact and modify activity based on those results, and in
commitment to strategic communications.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before you
today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Cogswell.
Our next witness is Mike Sena. Mr. Sena serves as the
president of the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA),
which represents State and major urban area fusion centers.
These centers work to enhance public safety and encourage
effective, efficient, ethical, lawful, and professional
intelligence and information sharing and prevent and reduce the
harmful effects of crime and terrorism on victims and
communities. In addition to his leadership positions, Mr. Sena
serves on law enforcement and homeland security advisory
committees for the members of the President's Cabinet, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Attorney General (AG) of the United
States.
Mr. Sena, welcome to the hearing. You may proceed with your
opening comments.
TESTIMONY OF MIKE SENA,\1\ PRESIDENT, NATIONAL FUSION CENTER
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Sena. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the
invitation to be with you today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sena appears in the Appendix on
page 48.
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My name is Mike Sena, and I am the Director of the Northern
California Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC), and the
president of the National Fusion Center Association. The NFCA
represents the interests of 80 State and locally owned and
managed fusion centers, with over 3,000 public safety
employees. We refer to all 80 centers together as the
``National Network of Fusion Centers.''
Fusion centers assist in the identification, prevention,
mitigation, response, and recovery of terrorist acts and other
major criminal threats. We depend on DHS I&A as the only U.S.
intelligence community element that is statutorily charged with
supporting our network. A locally integrated and engaged I&A is
critical to enhancing capacity among fusion centers and our
partners to analyze and share threat-related information that
is relevant and timely.
We are offering several concrete recommendations that would
help ensure I&A is able to maximize its potential capacity to
protect the homeland. I&A must increase the forward deployment
of well-trained and experienced personnel to fusion centers.
They must offer high-quality training on analytics tradecraft
and on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. They must
invest in modernizing information-sharing systems and
technologies. They must also ensure reliable access to critical
data, including criminal justice information and classified
data. Finally, they must be empowered to have direct
coordination authority of DHS resources that are allocated to
support fusion centers. Having I&A's partner engagement
function, which is routinely coordinating with us, and having
them report directly to the I&A Under Secretary and Principal
Deputy would be helpful in facilitating this.
Some fusion centers do not have any I&A presence, and some
others have part-time I&A personnel. Currently, I&A only has a
little more than 100 personnel deployed across the Nation. From
our perspective, that is simply not sufficient. We strongly
encourage Congress to support increased funding for I&A to
ensure that it can hire, train, and deploy an adequate number
of personnel across the Nation.
More than two-thirds of all the funding that supports
fusion centers comes from State and local budgets. DHS grant
funding is another critical source of support that primarily
comes through our Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) and
State Homeland Security Grant Programs (SHSGP). Some centers
are almost entirely grant funded, and some receive almost no
grant funding. Some fusion centers provide operational support
at the request of public safety partners, including the FBI's
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), but in some cases the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has limited or
denied the ability for fusion centers to use grant funds to
provide that support. We must find better ways to reduce
bureaucracy and improve efficient authorization of grant
funding in a timely manner.
I&A should be empowered to coordinate with FEMA's grant
personnel to ensure that grant guidance and funding are more
closely aligned with the needs of Federal, State, territorial,
and local public safety partners.
Access to information systems is critical to the successful
operations of our fusion centers, but some centers still lack
access to critical databases, like the FBI's criminal justice
services and Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
system. The National Data Exchange (N-DEx), brings together
over 7,700 agencies' records systems, but we have over 18,000
agencies in America. Most agencies are not connected to this
critical resource, and some fusion centers do not have access.
Fusion centers should be equipped to help protect everyone
in America, regardless of where they are. I&A can play a
supportive role by working with their Federal partners to
ensure appropriate access to Federal systems by State and local
partners.
I&A should continue to support the development and
enhancement of existing systems, including the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN), and work with us to
identify and deploy more advanced technology. The HSIN
Platforms are essential and trusted fusion center tools. The
NFCA established the HSIN SitRoom for sharing information on
physical threats, and the Cyber Intelligence Network (CIN)--
room supports cyber threat collaboration for over 500 cyber
analysts across the country. I&A should continue to support
fusion center cyber capabilities by providing access to
critical cyber analysis tools and increasing training
opportunities.
Right now, fusion centers, the Regional Information Sharing
Systems (RISS)--Western States Information Network (WSIN), and
the FBI's National Threat Operations Center (NTOC) are
analyzing data and sharing information on reported threats to
life through HSIN, the FBI's eGuardian System, and directly
with local and public safety agencies.
The Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) and
Global Advisory Committee are also writing recommendations for
managing tips, leads, and threat-to-life reporting. We need DHS
I&A resources to support this effort to mitigate the immediate
threats to our communities.
In summary, strengthening I&A's capabilities to support the
network and the Nation will require them to reorient their
focus. Their focus must be on the H in DHS and the State,
local, tribal, and territorial partners that are the heart of
protecting our homeland. The recommendations I mentioned a
minute ago would help DHS I&A support the national network in
ways that are most relevant and helpful to our members and our
partners across the Nation.
On behalf of the NFCA, I would like to thank you for the
invitation to testify, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Mr. Sena, for your testimony.
Our final witness today is Faiza Patel, director of the
Liberty & National Security Program at New York University
School of Law's Brennan Center for Justice. Ms. Patel has
previously testified before Congress regarding the government's
surveillance of Muslim and Arab Americans following the
September 11th attacks and has organized advocacy efforts
against discriminatory State laws. She also helped establish an
independent Inspector General (IG) for the New York Police
Department (NYPD), and prior to joining the Brennan Center, Ms.
Patel worked as a senior policy officer at the Organization for
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague and clerked for
the judge at the International Criminal Tribunal in the former
Yugoslavia.
Welcome, Ms. Patel. You are recognized for your five minute
opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF FAIZA PATEL,\1\ CO-DIRECTOR, LIBERTY & NATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW
Ms. Patel. Thank you, Chairman Peters, Ranking Member
Portman, and Members of the Committee. I am really happy to be
here testifying today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Patel appears in the Appendix on
page 58.
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As our country faces up to the persistent problem of white
supremacist and far-right violence, as well as a range of other
threats, I&A has the potential to play a constructive role in
providing accurate and unbiased intelligence to help guide the
response. The office has great influence because it sits at the
center of a web of intelligence and law enforcement agencies
spread throughout the country.
In light of its influence, it is critically important that
I&A's output and advice meet the highest standards of respect
for Americans' civil rights and civil liberties. This is
especially true when it comes to domestic intelligence, which
presents unique threats because of its obvious overlap with
protected political speech and organizing.
I&A is, of course, prohibited from collecting or
disseminating information based solely on First Amendment-
protected activities, but it has in the past targeted Muslim
Americans for little apparent reason other than their religion,
as well as protesters.
Last summer, as racial justice demonstrations triggered by
the killing of George Floyd broke out across the country, I&A
led the expansion of intelligence activities under the guise of
protecting Federal courthouses. I&A staff were directed to
collect information both about matters that can be reasonably
considered threats to homeland security, but also matters that
are traditionally handled by local authorities as part of their
public safety mandate.
According to the Washington Post, I&A even had access to
protesters' communications on telegram, which is not allowed by
its guidelines, and these were written up in an intelligence
report disseminated to its network. The office circulated three
intelligence reports summarizing tweets written by the editor
of a legal blog and a reporter for the New York Times.
It is particularly critical that I&A gets its house in
order as DHS pivots to confront the threat of domestic
terrorism. Secretary Mayorkas has designated domestic violent
extremism (DVE) as a priority area and has created a team
within I&A to focus on this threat.
Based on testimony and reports in the press, it seems that
I&A will be looking at Americans' social media postings to
identify narratives and grievances to gauge their prevalence
and to see if they may influence acts of violence. I am
concerned that this focus is likely to be both ineffective and
invasive, sweeping in reams of information, including about
constitutionally protected activities.
Targeting what people say online is unlikely to be
effective in identifying violent actors. The reason is pretty
simple: Large numbers of people believe in the types of
narratives that DHS has already identified as drivers of
violence in its January 27th bulletin. Anti-immigrant sentiment
has a long history in the United States; many people believe
that measures taken to control COVID-19 infringe on their
freedoms; many Americans dispute the results of the 2020
elections; and police use of force against African Americans
triggered demonstrations across the country.
We can argue about whether the people who hold these views
are right or wrong, but they are hardly a way of distinguishing
potentially violent actors. In technical terms, this method is
highly sensitive, but it is not specific to the threat of
violence.
The Acting Under Secretary of I&A recently acknowledged
this fact, noting that it is difficult to discern actual intent
to carry out violence from angry and hyperbolic speech on the
Internet. This is supported by years of research which show the
difficulty of interpreting social media posts without context
or knowledge of the conventions in particular communities or
platforms.
DHS of all agencies should know the limits of social media
to find threats. According to its own internal documents,
social media monitoring pilot programs for visa vetting did not
help in finding security threats. The people charged with
running these programs said that they were not able to reliably
match accounts to people, and even when they were, they were
not able to determine the context and reliability of what they
saw.
To address the concerns I have outlined, I think it is
critical to strengthen I&A's civil rights and civil liberties
safeguards and oversight over its functions. I have four
recommendations.
First, given social media's centrality to political
discourse and the difficulty of identifying threats online, I&A
should reconsider its plans to monitor these platforms for
``narratives'' and ``grievances.'' At a minimum, it should
explain how it intends to ensure that it is focused on
identifying violent actors rather than simply keeping tabs on
what Americans say on the Internet.
Second, oversight needs to be strengthened. This hearing
obviously is a great example. But DHS also has a dedicated
Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and a Privacy
Office. Their role in clearing I&A analyses was eliminated last
year and should be restored. Congress should consider
mechanisms for ensuring that these types of critical oversight
functions cannot be so easily sidelined in the future. Regular
audits can also help ensure that leadership has a holistic
view.
Last, we need to pay attention to the enormous amount of
information on Americans that is contained in DHS databases.
Former DHS officials have said that this level of information
raises privacy and due process concerns that dwarf those
arising out of the National Security Agency (NSA) programs.
This would be an appropriate topic of inquiry for the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, in my opinion.
Thank you again for the opportunity. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Ms. Patel, for your opening
statement.
General Taylor, in last year's Homeland Threat Assessment,
DHS stated that domestic violent extremism, specifically white
supremacist extremists, are the most persistent and lethal
homeland security threat. That is a finding that both myself
and Ranking Member Portman have been saying for some time now,
and it is clear that this threat is real, and it is clear that
we need to combat it.
So my question to you is: Beyond establishing the Domestic
Terrorism Branch, which is certainly, I think we all agree, a
step in the right direction, are there other changes to I&A's
organization or authorities that you believe would help them
address this threat?
General Taylor. It is my view that I&A has the requisite
authorities to address this threat if it prioritizes that
threat. In the last administration, it is my understanding that
domestic terrorism was not considered a priority for I&A. In
fact, the I&A leadership kind of deferred to the FBI on that. I
think the authority exists. It is a focus on what the outcome
is that I&A is trying to achieve and how they do that
consistent with privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
going forward.
Chairman Peters. So your testimony is that it just was not
prioritized. They have the authorities to do it. Perhaps we can
drill down on that a little bit, if we could, General. What do
you see as the added value that I&A provides to the broader
Federal intelligence community and partners in combating this?
What is the specific value that they could bring if
sufficiently prioritized?
General Taylor. Much of the work against violent extremists
occurs in the 18,000 police departments across our country.
Local law enforcement confronts these individuals, investigates
these folks because they are committing acts in communities
that those officers are sworn to protect.
It is my view that through the fusion centers I&A and its
intelligence officers can bring better perspective to the
national level of what these 18,000 police organizations are
seeing trend-wise and tactics, techniques, and procedure-wise
in their communities. The FBI plays an extraordinarily
important role in its JTTF, but as Director Wray has testified,
there needs to be a definitive act of violence for the FBI to
get involved. I think that is the gap that I&A can help cover
with its collection and production in the field.
Chairman Peters. Very good. Ms. Patel, I guess this
question is for you. As I&A continues to come to better
understand and analyze the real threat posed by domestic
terrorism, could you share with the Committee some of the
concerns that communities of color in particular are facing
with this effort to combat domestic terrorism?
Ms. Patel. Thank you for that question. So for communities
of color, when you have broad, open intelligence-gathering
authorities and programs, there is a risk that they will be the
target of those programs. We have seen this sort of
systematically over the last two decades where Muslim Americans
have been targeted for surveillance often on the basis of
nothing other than their religion. We have seen this with
African American communities being targeted. We have see the
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement being targeted, and this is a
pretty well known phenomenon in the United States.
I think the overall concern is that domestic terrorism is
discussed sort of almost a stand-in for white supremacist
violence, but covers a much broader range of issues, as we have
seen from DHS and FBI documents. So the concern is that these
kinds of broad, open surveillance programs will actually be
used to target communities of color, as has been the case in
the past.
Chairman Peters. Very good. General Taylor, last year you
authored an op-ed noting your significant concern with I&A's
reportedly problematic intelligence operations in Portland and
the publishing of intelligence on journalists specifically.
More recently, this Committee has found that I&A warned
generally about the potential for election-related violence,
but failed to issue a warning specific to the risk facing the
Capitol on January 6th. In both examples, I&A clearly did not
serve its customers or the American people in that respect.
My question to you is: In your opinion, what are the key
reasons for I&A's failures over this past year?
General Taylor. It is hard for me, Senator, to kind of
focus in on the key reasons for failure because I was not in
the decision cycle. But I think organizations like I&A fail to
meet their mission if they are not organized in a way that
ensures consistency of production, consistency of focus. And it
is my understanding that those processes and procedures that at
least existed when I was there were no longer being used from
an execution point of view. I think solid leadership and solid
management will save the day.
By the way, I am a product of the Church Commission and the
follow-on from Counter INTELPRO. I have been on the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Commission for President Bush. Privacy and
civil rights and civil liberties are fundamental to how we
should think about domestic intelligence, and for whatever
reason, that was not the case during the last year.
Chairman Peters. So you talk about stability and
continuity. I would assume the fact that we have had a lack of
stability when it comes to I&A leadership over the years, that
has contributed to the problem that you see?
General Taylor. I do. As you mentioned in your opening
statement, 12 different I&A leaders over 19 years really does
not give you a lot of confidence about continuity. And during
my tenure, it has been my experience in the military that when
you take over an organization, you try to organize it to focus
on the mission. Much of what we put in place was dismantled
after we left office in 2017.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, General.
Ranking Member Portman, you are recognized for your
questions.
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start, if I could, with General Taylor and Ms.
Cogswell. A fundamental question here. Both of you have a broad
national security background, including having at one time had
the role of managing I&A. Do we need I&A at DHS? Yes or no.
General Taylor. Yes.
Ms. Cogswell. I agree as well.
Senator Portman. OK. I think there is some fundamental
rethinking going on right now, and I think it is important, in
my view that we have this intelligence-gathering capability,
particularly, as both of you commented on, because our State,
local, tribal, and private sector coordination and
communication goes through I&A. Nobody else has that
responsibility. Is that correct?
General Taylor. That is correct.
Senator Portman. One of my big concerns has been the growth
of these so-called TCOs. They are responsible for a lot of
criminal activity, as you know, but one that is particularly
pernicious right now is the movement of drugs into our
communities, particularly fentanyl and the other synthetic
opioids, which, unfortunately, killed more people last year,
from everything we know, than ever in our history. And they
seem to be working their way into the system more. In other
words, they are more vertically integrated in our communities
themselves, not just bringing things across the border as they
are certainly doing.
What are we doing with regard to I&A and that issue? Are we
thinking expansively enough when it comes to combating these
TCOs that have these tentacles into communities around the
country? What is your view, General Taylor?
General Taylor. Senator Portman, I think that this is a
problem for the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. The
organization Ms. Cogswell led in ICE has a very important role
to play in helping State and local law enforcement as well as
other Federal partners gather the intelligence that is
necessary to disrupt these TOC organizations going forward. I
do not think it is just I&A, but it is how the intelligence
enterprise is organized to support the investigation and field
work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), of ICE, of
DEA across the country, is the important role that I&A plays in
trying to coordinate that effort.
Senator Portman. How about the coordination with those
18,000 police forces around the country? Isn't that a key role?
General Taylor. Absolutely, and that is a part of
understanding what is going on on the ground, what those
priorities are, and sharing that information more broadly with
Federal partners, not just I&A but with ICE and CBP, so we have
a fuller picture of what is actually happening and how it can
be----
Senator Portman. Ms. Cogswell, do you have thoughts on
TCOs?
Ms. Cogswell. I do. Thank you very much. As you noted, a
critically important topic for us. I would like to give one
example to General Taylor's point from when I was actually
still there. We were extremely fortunate as the National
Security Council began examining the transnational organized
crime issue that they said we want to look to have a law
enforcement organization lead a whole-of-community effort to
assess the threat across all the different dimensions that will
help set the stage for us to have the right policy debate about
how the U.S. Government can take better and broader action.
I was extremely fortunate that my team, my chief of staff
at the time, was selected to lead the effort for the entire
community with support of DHS I&A, as well as other members of
DHS, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence community.
I think that is a fantastic example of how the community comes
together through these mechanisms to provide valuable
intelligence that helps set direction for policy, whether
additional legislation may be needed, where the resourcing is
allocated.
Senator Portman. From what you know--and, again, we do not
have the Acting Under Secretary here with us because we are not
mixing the public and private panels, but from what you all
know, and those who are joining us virtually, speak up as well,
do you think that the current administration is focused enough
on the TCO threat?
Ms. Cogswell. I know it is, in fact, a priority for them
and that there is work underway, and in particular, I am aware
of some very good discussions underway between DHS I&A, the
Office of Policy, and the operating components of DHS.
Senator Portman. General.
General Taylor. I agree. But, Senator Portman, one of the
challenges at I&A, there are 700 people in the entire
organization. There are directorates of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
that have twice as many people. I think I&A is trying to
satisfy as many customers as it can, but it does not have the
resources to spread itself as wide as it needs to.
One of the things I think we should focus on is where
should those priorities come from, where should those
investments be made, and resources to prioritize----
Senator Portman. I think that is a good point. That is one
reason I am asking you about this, because we talked about
domestic terrorism, and we all agree that is important. But I
think these TCOs, from what we know from open-source
information as well as others, it is growing as a threat and,
again, working its way, its tentacles into our communities.
You talked about the relatively small number of people
compared to others in the IC community. We have a real problem
with attrition, too, and morale. And both of you have been
consumers of the intelligence. You have also been there working
with the individuals, and I want to hear from our own
colleagues, too, who are on virtually.
But, Ms. Cogswell, let me start with you quickly. What do
you think I&A can do to deal with the consistently low morale
and the lack of leadership? I would hope that the
administration, by the way, would nominate somebody for that
Under Secretary slot right away and that we could get somebody
in there who is willing to stick around for a while to provide
some leadership. But I would love to hear your comments on
that.
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much. I agree with you that
consistency and leadership that will be there for a period of
time is critically important. I would also say that assuming
that this Committee proceeds forward with some recommended
changes--I know DHS will be considering them as well--I am
hopeful that those are built in a way that will pass the test
of time, will frankly last for a period of years. Much like the
reviews after 9/11 where you looked at how various activities
occurred in the intelligence community, I would hope similar
activities would play themselves out at DHS I&A and, frankly,
across the homeland security enterprise.
Senator Portman. I think our report that I mentioned
earlier is going to be helpful in that regard as well.
Let me quickly end with one really comment, and it is a
question but we do not have time to get into it. I see a
contradiction, Ms. Patel, in some of the things you are
advocating and what others are advocating. We want more focus
on domestic terrorism. We certainly have seen with regard to
January 6th we did not have the information needed. It was
online. There were plenty of threats of violence that were
actually followed through on. And yet, Ms. Patel, you seem to
be saying we should not rely on online information, it is
unreliable, it is free speech, and that violence that is
threatened online does not necessarily mean it is really
violence. But that seems contradictory to what our experience
is. So can you comment on that quickly? And to the extent we do
not have time, maybe we could get into that in a second round.
Ms. Patel. Thank you. Thank you for the question. I think
we have to apply what we are looking for online. I am not
saying by any means that we can never tell that violence is
going to occur or criminal activity is going to occur online. I
think there are probably ways that we can figure that out.
What I am saying, though, is that we should start with the
violence rather than focusing on different narratives and
grievances which are widely shared. So it is really a question
of whether you go broad to narrow or whether you start with
actual threats of violence, criminal activity, and then fan out
from there to find other people who might be involved.
Senator Portman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Just for the record, for our folks who are online, Senator
Portman started with a fundamental question which I think is
important: Do we need I&A given all of the rest of the
intelligence community? We heard yes from the two witnesses
that were here. I did not hear from the two witnesses. Ms.
Patel, yes or no? Mr. Sena, yes or no?
Ms. Patel. I think I&A plays a useful role in terms of its
sharing of information in the networking with State, local,
tribal, and territorial. I guess I would say, that does not
necessarily mean that that role could not be played by somebody
else, and we know that the FBI, for example, does have JTTFs
which perform kind of a similar role in an investigative
capacity. While I recognize the importance of the role, I guess
I am not as committed to it necessarily being in I&A per se as
the other commentators are.
Chairman Peters. OK. We can pursue that further.
Mr. Sena, yes or no? Preferable?
Mr. Sena. A strong yes.
Chairman Peters. A strong yes. Very good.
Senator Hassan, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HASSAN
Senator Hassan. Thank you, Chair Peters and Ranking Member
Portman, for this hearing. Thank you to all of our witnesses
for being here today and for the service you have provided in
multiple arenas.
Quickly, General Taylor, I wanted to give you a chance to
comment on something that Senator Portman and Ms. Cogswell
discussed. Would it help overall employee morale in I&A if
there was a nominee to head the office?
General Taylor. Absolutely, and I would also say, Senator,
that I&A's morale was in the dumps when I took over with
Secretary Johnson, and we were able to improve morale by
focusing on kind of basic taking care of people, the things I
have learned over 40 years in the military, and to get people
focused on mission. So it is not an impossible task, but
leadership needs to focus on it and make it a priority.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
I also want to follow up. Senator Portman talked with both
of you, General Taylor and Ms. Cogswell, about the role that
I&A plays in particularly combating TCOs, but I would like you
to expand a little bit on it. The Office of Intelligence and
Analysis is one of 17 entities within the larger intelligence
community. So please take this opportunity to briefly talk
about how I&A is suited to take advantage of its authorities
and relationships to inform its own activities and the
activities of the intelligence community as a whole. And how is
its relationship with State, local, and tribal authorities
different from other agencies? Why don't we start with you,
General Taylor, and then to Ms. Cogswell.
General Taylor. As I said in my opening comments, I&A is
the only intelligence agency specifically chartered to provide
intelligence support to our State, local, tribal, and
territorial partners, really as a result of 9/11, and the fact
that we had people in this country who were about to commit a
terrorist act, and there was no way to loop in the 18,000
police organizations and 800,000 cops to understand what the
nature of that threat is. And that is what I&A and DHS has
worked on over the years. So that is what makes it unique.
Most of the IC cannot do work in the homeland. The FBI can
from an investigative perspective and counterintelligence
perspective, and DHS I&A. But the rest of the IC is precluded
from the kind of specific work, intelligence work, that I&A
does in the homeland.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Ms. Cogswell.
Ms. Cogswell. I agree with everything that General Taylor
said. I would add it is also uniquely situated within DHS, so
it is partnered up with other elements who directly have
mission responsibility to enact programs specifically to
counter threats. In addition to the threat and intelligence
picture, the ability to wrap in policy and operational entities
to help formulate direction, and then work with counterparts,
including at the State and local level to exercise them,
critically important.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
General Taylor, I want to turn to the issue of
cybersecurity for a minute. We have seen a recent series of
high-profile cybersecurity breaches and attacks against the
Federal Government and critical infrastructure, and we do not
expect that these threats are going to diminish. How can the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis work with the Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), to help prevent
these attacks from happening?
General Taylor. I think the most important part is I&A is
already at CISA with about 30 of its analysts working directly
with CISA and the Computer Security Division to produce
intelligence coming out of the EINSTEIN system. I believe CISA
should have its own dedicated intelligence organization to
assist not only I&A but its Director in formulating
intelligence that is specific to the data that is collected by
CISA. I also think that that would allow them a much more
robust relationship with the National Security Agency. While
NSA cannot actually do domestic intelligence collection, its
analytical capability, I think, is important to our
understanding of what the cybersecurity risk is and informing
our partners in the Federal Government and State and local and
private sector what actions they need to take to address those
issue.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Now I want to turn to the issue of terrorism threats, and
we have talked a little bit about it this morning. But, General
Taylor, I am pleased that the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis recently announced a new effort dedicated to analyzing
the threat from domestic terrorism. I also remain concerned
about the threats posed by international terrorists and
homegrown violent extremists (HVE).
In your view, do you believe that the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis has the capacity to adequately
monitor the various terrorist threats?
General Taylor. Absolutely, in conjunction with NCTC and
the FBI. It does not stand alone. This is a partnership between
the intelligence community, the FBI, and DHS and understanding
the nature of the phenomenon we are seeing both in the homeland
and overseas. And the international threat is not diminished.
The Islamic State of Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda continue to
threaten the United States, and we need to keep a very clear
eye on that threat as well as what we are seeing in the
homeland as it has unfolded over the course of the last two or
three years.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Ms. Cogswell, you testified today about the importance of
depoliticizing the intelligence process. What specific steps
can the Office of Intelligence and Analysis take to accomplish
this goal? And how can Congress assist?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you so much, Senator, for the question.
In particular, as I thought about this type of particular
issue, I very much liken it to right after 9/11 where we had a
whole-of-country kind of rethink about why we did not see that
coming. What was our failure of imagination in that front?
We put in place a number of activities, different processes
post that threat, and part of it was starting with how we did
the intelligence analysis itself; the ability to have different
entities look at the problem from multiple different
viewpoints, a diversity of viewpoint; the ability to have war
gamings that looked at both the most likely scenario and the
worst-case scenario; the ability to have a community that knew
how to receive that information and then take action based on
the fact that there is a variety of potential options. Even if
they did not think the worst case was likely, they at least had
discussed it and prepared for it.
I think there is real opportunity in this space to take
some of those lessons learned and practices and apply them
here.
Senator Hassan. Thank you.
Mr. Chair, would it be all right if I asked General Taylor
to quickly comment on that same issue, how we can assist in
depoliticizing the process?
Chairman Peters. Absolutely. Proceed.
General Taylor. Politics has no place in intelligence. It
is the anathema in my view of solid intelligence collection,
analysis, and reporting. And so during my tenure or, actually,
during my 50 years of doing this, speaking truth to power is
what intelligence officials are supposed to do, and despite
politics, that is our job, and we need to do it and do it
effectively.
Senator Hassan. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Hassan.
Senator Rosen, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROSEN
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chair Peters, Ranking Member
Portman. I appreciate the good questions and testimony already
given today and for everyone's service to our Nation.
General Taylor, I want to move over to white supremacist
extremists that we have. As Chairman Peters has previously
noted, ahead of January 6th, DHS did not issue a threat
assessment or a joint intelligence bulletin specific to the
event. On March 3rd, Acting Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence, Melissa Smislova, told the
Committee, and I quote, ``More should have been done to
understand the correlation between the information and the
threat of violence and what actions were warranted as a
result.''
Elizabeth Neumann, a former high-ranking DHS official,
stated, and I quote again, ``But for reasons of fear''--``the
Department did not issue a formal report.''
General Taylor, can you speak to whether there is a current
fear to report, either specifically toward domestic violent
extremism as it turns into white supremacy, and/or broadly to
other pertinent threats that you might be assessing?
General Taylor. Thank you for that question, Senator. I was
not there and, therefore, I cannot get into the mind of the
leadership of I&A. What I would say is we have a process in
this country around major events of producing threat
assessments culminating from the information that we have
collected across the country. That did not happen. Why it did
not happen, I cannot say what is in the mind of the leadership
that was in charge at the time, but I find it difficult to
accept the fact that that process was not applied to this
event, as with all other events in our threat analysis process.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Like you said earlier,
intelligence should be nonpolitical, because we know that the
rise in anti-Semitism is closely correlated with the spread of
extremist ideologies. The audit of anti-Semitic incidents
(ADLs) recorded 331 anti-Semitic incidents in 2020 attributed
to extremists.
So how do you think that DHS intelligence could better
account, is there something that you might recommend for us to
work with them to better account for this growing threat?
General Taylor. DHS has partnerships across the country in
State and local law enforcement and think tanks and all sorts
of organizations that are monitoring this type of activity. I
think continuing to coordinate with those organizations and
entities to get a better picture consistently of what is going
on on the ground and what tactics, techniques, and procedures
law enforcement can use, as well as the private sector. We have
relationships with religious organizations that we give
information to about what these trends are and how they can
protect themselves. So sustaining those relationships with up-
to-date information about the nature of how the threat is
unfolding I think is the best prescription for success in
defending those communities that are targeted.
Senator Rosen. I think you are right, and we do have good
partnerships, especially when it comes to our national fusion
centers (NFCA). I would like to ask Mr. Sena about the role
that fusion centers really play in protecting Americans from
terrorism. In my home State of Nevada, our fusion center has
been at the forefront of tracking the domestic violent
extremist threat specifically emanating from militias. The
Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also played an
important role in addressing the October 1st shooting back in
2017, the deadliest mass shooting in modern American history.
So on behalf of all of Nevadans, I want to thank our fusion
center for their tremendous service to our State and our
community.
But, Mr. Sena, you stated you were surprised that fusion
centers did not receive any specific information ahead of
January 6th. Why do you think that is that no specific threat
information was shared? Again, maybe you might speak to see if
there is a fear to report across the Department?
Mr. Sena. Thank you very much, Senator, for that question.
When we look at the National Network of Fusion Centers and our
coordination effort with I&A, especially on events that, as was
said earlier, information is online, so there are a lot of
restrictions on how information is collected and analyzed. And,
back in 2017, the National Network of Fusion Centers, in
conjunction with the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating
Council, developed a real-time, open-source analysis, guidance
and recommendations. But within those roles and
responsibilities, just because it is hate speech does not mean
it is extremist violence speech.
So being able to collect the information is one key element
to this. Having the personnel that can report on it and make it
part of the reporting requirements is a key issue that we still
continue to have. Prior to January 6th, we as a network, a
National Network of Fusion Centers, held a call on the Monday
before the event because we were concerned, we were worried,
and that call was directly related to a request from the
Director of the fusion center in Washington, D.C. We did have
DHS I&A personnel on that call who did say that they would have
personnel onsite at the fusion center because there is not
always personnel that are available to help them. We tried to
build that network to share that information, and I was
surprised that there was not anything developed at that time.
But we were communicating in real time with them.
So, those that need to talk about the threat, need to share
the information about the threat, we were actively working with
the Washington, D.C., fusion center to share information in
real time. The Washington, D.C., fusion center had personnel
with the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP) to try to make sure that
information was shared in real time.
There are some issues with that real-time information
sharing. One of the issues that we have is that, DHS I&A is a
Title 50 agency, an intelligence community agency, but they do
not have the law enforcement authorities that other
organizations have, such as the FBI.
And the Washington, D.C., fusion center at the time was not
considered a law enforcement agency. So they were restricted
from having that law enforcement information, which hindered
our ability to share information at times.
So moving forward, though, and how do we look at this, I
believe that using that real-time, open-source analysis
guidance, expanding the roles within our privacy, civil rights,
and civil liberties policies that every fusion center has,
along with the policies that I&A have, they need to have that
law enforcement authority, but they also need to have the
capacity to access that data online to address those threats
and to push information out in a timely manner to every agency
that needs it to address specific terrorism, domestic violent
extremists, and whatever major criminal threat is coming that
we are seeing as a pre-indicator online.
Senator Rosen. Thank you for that answer. I am going to
look forward to following up with you on some things that we
can do to enhance the communication and collaboration you are
already doing, but make it a little bit more robust so that we
can stop any of these violent attacks before they start.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Johnson, you are recognized for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Taylor, when you look at the title of the agency
you once headed, it is ``Intelligence and Analysis.'' From my
standpoint, the analysis is really all about gathering all that
information and then trying to prioritize it so we can
adequately address the threats that face this Nation.
I thought Ms. Patel had a pretty good suggestion, that you
start with the violence, a pretty good way of prioritizing
things. What is the greatest threat magnitude? How many people
could lose their lives? How much damage can be done?
I have always thought it was a little strange. The Chairman
is focusing on white supremacists. Listen, I do not condone
them. I condemn white supremacists. I condemn any act of
violence. I do not categorize it whether it is right-wing,
left-wing. I condemn violence. But the fact of the matter is we
lose 70,000 people a year on drug overdoses.
General Taylor, do you have any idea how many deaths, how
many murders occur from drug violence, gangs?
General Taylor. I have no numbers, sir, but it is an
epidemic across----
Senator Johnson. It is thousands, isn't it?
General Taylor. It is, across the country.
Senator Johnson. It is thousands. I do not know what is the
current level of white supremacist killings, but I think it is
in the hundreds. Again, I condemn it completely, but we are
talking about thousands of drug-related murders every years,
tens of thousands of drug-related overdoses, and now we are
supposed to concentrate on domestic terrorism as the greatest
threat? Again, it is not.
Right now, the New York Times reported 160 different
nationalities of people being picked up on the Southern Border
over the last couple months. Ms. Cogswell, would you believe
that is somewhat of a threat?
Ms. Cogswell. I think that we have to continue to look at
the processes by which people are showing up at the border. It
is always possible that these networks and routes can be used
for those who intend to do us harm.
Senator Johnson. When we are clogging up our system with
close to 6,000 apprehensions a day. General Taylor, when you
were in the administration, we had a humanitarian crisis,
according to President Obama, of 2,000 people being apprehended
a day. During 2018 to 2019, it was a little over 4,000. The
last couple months it has been 6,000 people per day on average,
almost. Six thousand people. What happens to our system when it
is clogged up with 6,000 people? Doesn't that open up the
border to additional drug trafficking? Doesn't that create
opportunities for transnational criminal organizations to
exploit it? Doesn't that open it up to other human trafficking
of, let us call it, ``higher-value targets'' to get in here
that could create acts of violence? Last week it was surreal in
this Committee room. Secretary Mayorkas, first of all, blaming
the previous administration for the crisis they created, and,
quite honestly, Senator Peters talking about, oh, the numbers
are coming down, we are getting this under control.
No. Six thousand people per day, and it is really not being
abated at all. Isn't that a threat? Isn't that an enormous
threat?
General Taylor. Absolutely, and it is a threat that we have
to face along with the other threats that come at us from
across the globe, from not just our international partners but
international adversaries. Look, in my view, the myriad of
threats facing this country are significant and broad and not
just for the Department of Homeland Security but for our State
and local law enforcement organizations, for the FBI, for the
Department of Justice, in a coordinated effort to address----
Senator Johnson. Again, my point being is we really ought
to concentrate on the numbers and the magnitude of the threat.
Listen, I condemned what happened here on January 6th, but I
condemn as well the more than 500 riots that occurred during
the summer, including in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Two dozen people
murdered, 700 law enforcement officers injured, $2 billion
worth of property damaged, yet we all just want to move beyond
that and let us just focus on January 6th.
Another thing that really concerns me is we just saw the
Colonial Pipeline cyber attack. I do not know if that is a shot
across the bow, whether that is a criminal organization getting
a little out of control of the Russian handlers and maybe going
too far. I do not know what that is. But I do know that no
administration, as long as I have been serving here, has taken
literally the vulnerability of our electrical grid seriously,
not when it comes to potential electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or
geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) or cyber attack. We have seen
what has happened now in terms of the vulnerability of the
electrical grid to some of this green energy in Texas.
In your time, both of you, Ms. Cogswell and General Taylor,
was DHS I&A looking at the vulnerability we are introducing
into our infrastructure, like our electrical grid, with some of
these green energy ideas? Ms. Cogswell, we will start with you.
Ms. Cogswell. I would say that both during my time with DHS
I&A and my time at TSA, which, as you know, has responsibility
with relation to pipeline security, cyber was of considerable
interest to us. We were focused on what we saw as the greatest
potential threats, where the vulnerabilities were, how to work
with the owners and operators to conduct assessments and help
them improve their basic security pipeline. We did not select
one opportunity threat over the other, but looking at it
holistically across the board.
Senator Johnson. General Taylor?.
General Taylor. Sir, critical infrastructure is critically
important to the security of our country. Eighty-five percent
of the critical infrastructure in this country sits in private
sector hands that makes the decisions about how to protect
themselves. The Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) that DHS has
established over the course of the last 15 years have done
yeoman's work in working with those----
Senator Johnson. We have not made any move whatsoever, for
example, to purchase and put in place large power transformers
that are incredibly vulnerable to either EMP attack or
potentially a GMD event. We have not done it. We are literally
spending trillions of dollars and proposing spending trillions
more, and nobody is talking about doing something that
prophylactic, that sensible in terms of protecting our
infrastructure, because, I am sorry, I am afraid we are
focusing on, domestic terrorism that might kill a couple
hundred people a year versus something that could really
represent an existential threat.
Again, my only point is I think we have politicized the
threats we face, and we are not keeping our eye on the ball on
the things that really represent a real threat to this Nation,
which right now border security is probably the number one, and
we are ignoring that and denying reality.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Johnson.
Senator Ossoff, you are recognized for your question.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR OSSOFF
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our panel.
General Taylor, where is there overlap based on your
experience in government between the role of I&A and its
responsibilities and the role and responsibilities of FBI's
Intelligence Branch?
General Taylor. I think that they are inextricably tied
together. Because of the nature of the FBI's authorities and
the nature of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INAs)
authorities, we cannot do our job effectively without the FBI,
and the FBI relies on us to work with State and local partners
on a consistent basis outside of the JTTFs to ensure that that
intelligence becomes a part of the overall intelligence that is
available to the homeland for decisionmaking going forward.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. You
wrote an article last August, I believe, on the Lawfare blog
and noted, ``I&A has differentiated itself by informing
audiences not usually served by the intelligence community,''
but you also noted that I&A's mission overlaps with that of
other agencies.
Where is there redundancy in the roles and responsibilities
of the agencies that have mission overlap with I&A that could
lead to inefficiency or a lack of clarity about who has
principal responsibility for critical missions?
General Taylor. I think when I wrote that article about
mission overlap, it is complementary, not competitive. There
are agencies that collect information that is of value to I&A
and to I&A's customers, and rather than I&A going out trying to
collect information independently, they should collaborate with
those agencies to make sure that that information is available.
I do not see a whole lot of overlap as long as we are
leveraged the rest of the IC and our law enforcement partners
to ensure we are not duplicating work that is already being
effective done by our partners.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General Taylor. How do you think
I&A and the IC more broadly can do a better job of ensuring
that there is not duplicative or conflicting effort?
General Taylor. I think that is through governance of the
intelligence community, governance of the Department of
Homeland Security, continual cooperation or collaboration with
our partners in the FBI, and certainly getting feedback from
our State, local, tribal, and territorial customers of what
they need and where those gaps are and addressing those gaps.
Senator Ossoff. How would you describe the breakdown of
responsibility? And let me ask the question this way: Which
agency has principal responsibility for developing and
analyzing intelligence with respect to cybersecurity threats
that both public and private sector enemies face? Which agency
is principally responsible for that? Whose job is it above all
others to develop intelligence with respect to cybersecurity
threats, please, General?
General Taylor. I think DHS has the primary responsibility
in the homeland. That partnership is with CISA and I&A. But I
also believe that there is a strong need for a close and
collaborative relationship with the National Security Agency
and the Cybersecurity Directorate of our intelligence
organizations to strengthen the analytical capability that
informs our domestic intelligence efforts.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you very much.
Ms. Patel, you mentioned in your testimony the need for I&A
to adhere to ``the highest standards'' when it comes to the
protection of civil rights and civil liberties. Given the
central role that I&A plays sharing information not just with
the Federal Government but also with State and local officials
and private sector actors, you mention in your testimony
instances during both Democratic and Republican administrations
when, in your view, I&A improperly collected or shared
information about U.S. persons. I would like you to comment,
please, on why you think there may be a tendency for I&A to
cross this line, in your view, and how Congress might better
define or constrain I&A's roles, responsibilities, and
authorities to ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties
of Americans are protected.
Ms. Patel. So it is not just I&A. Most intelligence
agencies run into this problem, and we have certainly seen this
starting with the Church Committee onwards that there is always
a temptation, there is mission creep, and bias always plays a
role as well in intelligence collection. These things are
really quite challenging to solve, and I think the best way
really is to really strengthen the civil rights and civil
liberties mechanisms that are within DHS and to strengthen
congressional oversight.
There are a lot of different ways that you can do it. I
suggested a few in my testimony, including having DHS CRCL
actually clear I&A's analytical products, as well as increasing
audits of I&A products by DHS for CRCL purposes. But there are
additional ways in which that office can broadly be
strengthened, which have been proposed, especially by people
who previously worked in that office, such as direct reporting
lines to Congress, greater congressional attention to the
things that CRCL produces, insisting on really specific
reporting about CRCL problems in DHS as opposed to very generic
stuff, which is what we have seen in a lot of the reporting. I
think these are some of the ways in which I&A can be more
respectful of civil rights and civil liberties.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Ms. Patel.
With my remaining time, General Taylor, would you like to
comment in any way on Ms. Patel's analysis there?
General Taylor. I think Ms. Patel's analysis is correct in
the sense that strong civil rights, civil liberties oversight
is key to effective intelligence collection and analysis in the
homeland. I am not sure I would agree that I need CRCL to clear
intelligence products. I would see that as the responsibility
of the intelligence officer who produced it. But to ensure that
that product does not violate civil rights, civil liberties, or
the policies of the Department would be my way of stating it.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, General. Thank you, Ms. Patel.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. I yield.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Ossoff.
The Chair recognizes Senator Sinema for your questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SINEMA
Senator Sinema. Thank you, Chairman, for holding today's
hearing, and I want to thank all of our witnesses for being
here.
It is critical that every decision the Department of
Homeland Security makes about protecting our Nation is backed
up by robust analysis. We cannot protect our communities and
secure our border without a strong Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, and that is especially true today when our Nation and
my State of Arizona are struggling to overcome a pandemic while
also dealing with a crisis at the border.
My first question is for General Taylor. The Office of
Intelligence and Analysis is unique in the intelligence
community with its task to coordinate with Federal as well as
State and local government and law enforcement entities to
protect our country from threats, including pandemics. The
COVID-19 pandemic created challenges for many. Based on your
prior experience, how would the situation with the pandemic
impact your recommendations to improve the overall
effectiveness and coordination through the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis with State and local governments and
law enforcement?
General Taylor. Senator, thank you for the question. I am
not sure I understand what you are asking me to comment on.
Could you clarify that a bit?
Senator Sinema. So now that we have a pandemic that we are
working through, would that impact any of your recommendations
to improve the overall effectiveness and coordination of the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis with State and local
governments and with local law enforcement?
General Taylor. Look, I think pandemics and other sorts of
disruptions occur every day. I do not think that changes the
nature of how I&A or our State and local partners approach
their business. Maybe there is isolation and that sort of
thing, but, threats continue during pandemics, and we have to
continue to focus our efforts on the collection and analysis of
those threats, even during a period of pandemic when people are
stuck at home and cannot get out. Our adversaries see that as a
potential and opportunity to be exploited.
Senator Sinema. Thank you.
My next question is for Ms. Cogswell. As was previously
discussed, transnational criminal organizations pose a
significant threat to our national security by facilitating
drug trafficking, human trafficking, and violence at our
Southwest Border. Our Nation is also dealing with a migration
challenge at the border with CBP reporting record numbers of
encounters, which, of course, diverts resources and focus.
So what steps can the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
take to more effectively respond to the ongoing TCO threats
that will better engage law enforcement, CBP, and ICE's limited
resources? The second question is: Does I&A have the resources
it needs to effectively address this threat?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you, Senator, for the question. With
respect to the first element, I think that one of the most
important elements that I&A, especially through the mission
center construct, can bring to this discussion is providing the
opportunity and floor for that strategic assessment, that sense
of community across all the actors to inform strategic
discussions, strategic policy decisions, strategic discussions
about resource allocation between various threats, as well as
helping to clarify in those discussions how best to look for
evidence about the impact their actions are taking and whether
or not those efforts have been successful.
With respect to your second point on resourcing, frankly I
think there is a very good question and discussion to be had
across a number of elements of the intelligence and operational
environment in which we are talking about to look at whether or
not the resources are commensurate to the threats we are
currently facing. I thank you very much and look forward to
further conversations by the Committee in that regard.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. Another question for you on this
same general topic. We see a diverse population of migrants
arrive at the Southwest Border in Arizona, including asylum
seekers who are coming from dozens of countries. Given your
past experience in this area, what unique challenges does this
migration influx present DHS from an intelligence and analysis
perspective? What steps should the office take to ensure that
criminals are not gaining entry into the United States?
Ms. Cogswell. Thank you very much for the question. So with
respect to the first element, the unique aspect, DHS I&A I
think very much is in a support role for the ongoing individual
elements, much more so a focus in assistance when we talk about
sort of that strategic picture and the dynamicism in terms of
priorities amongst a range of threats and characteristics.
With respect to the individual threats posed within the
migrant communities themselves and how to best assess and
screen, there is a robust screening architecture already in
place. The key here is ensuring that there is the time and
resources dedicated and available to ensure that screening
occurs.
One of the things I found most important over time is
looking at not only how tools can be an assistance to the
various entities performing these functions, but also some of
the analysis that goes along looking at the various encounters
themselves. What can we learn based on that in terms of routes,
trends, practices, tactics being used, funding, whether or not
they are using different types of travel documents that had not
been previously identified. These are some of the most
important things that help us better deploy our resources and
assets.
Senator Sinema. Thank you.
A follow-up on this question for Ms. Patel. Do you have
specific recommendations to help maintain the right balance
between security, privacy, and civil liberty concerns when it
comes to the work that I&A does to combat these TCOs and
identify broader challenges?
Ms. Patel. Thank you for the question, Senator. I think I
have tried to identify those which are basically that I think
it is important that we focus on violence. My concern is that
there is a tendency to really broaden the aperture through
which we look at threats so that we are looking across,
different narratives and grievances and social media in an
effort to winnow it down. What I would suggest is that instead
we identify violent actors, which we have done certainly over
the last several months as well, and then fan out from there in
an effort to really constrain I&A to focus its work on the most
dangerous people.
Senator Sinema. Thank you. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I do have another question for Mr. Sena, but
since my time has expired, I will submit it for the record.
I yield my time back, and I thank you for this hearing.
Chairman Peters. Thank you, Senator Sinema.
As we start wrapping up here, I have one more question here
actually for Mr. Sena. We have talked a great deal here at this
hearing about the unique aspect of I&A and how they share
information with State, local, tribal, territorial governments.
We hear work with fusion centers, of course, is the center of
all of that.
You mentioned in your opening testimony that you had some
specific actions that you would recommend to strengthen the
sharing of relevant, timely, actionable intelligence
information across those centers. If you could share with the
Committee some of those actionable ideas that we should
consider?
Mr. Sena. Absolutely. One of the biggest pieces is that
lack of the personnel resources that are on the ground. Whether
it is intelligence officers, collections managers, reports
officers, we have to have people in the local area, in the
local regions across the country that have the capacity to
share information in real time and to work closely with the FBI
Field Intelligence Company and the Joint Terrorism Task Force
and in that fusion center collocated environment. We need
technology. Right now the Homeland Security Information Network
is riding on technology that is, in some cases 18 years old. We
need that capacity to have tools and resources that are easily
accessible by all of our leaders out there, not just the folks
in the fusion centers, but all of our partners.
We also need folks that are on the ground to help support
the privacy, the civil rights, the civil liberties training,
and I&A can play a pivotal role in that capability. We also
need the capacity to have, personnel on the ground, that when
we run into whether it is bureaucratic or whatever the hurdles
may be, the fact that we have centers right now that cannot get
the critical data they need to prevent terrorist acts, to
prevent major criminal threats, it is abysmal. Here we are
almost 20 years later, and we do not have that capacity, so
having advocates there--I often say that I get more done by
having a DHS Regional Director three doors down from me than I
do with many of the calls that we have in Washington, D.C.,
because that is where the rubber meets the road. That is where
things get done. It is done at the local level because that is
where the threats are.
I see the formation of I&A pivoting what has happened over
the last number of years where the focus has been not as much
on the State, local, tribal, and territorial partners, who are
at the local level and looking at more of a larger intelligence
community framework. There are lots of folks in the
intelligence community that do a great job within their avenues
of what they do. But the real strength of DHS I&A is with their
State, local, tribal, and territorial partners. It really is,
because that is where the information is at. That is where the
threat is. That is where we are dealing with the opioid and
overdose epidemics. That is where we are dealing with
transnational criminal organizations. That is where we are
dealing with domestic violent extremists and every other
violent extremist and having the personnel there. We cannot do
this with a little over 100 people. We have to have more folks
in the field, and I agree the mission center idea is great, but
it needs to incorporate those State, local, tribal, and
territorial partners to be effective. And I&A in their unique
role has the ability to be our champion for that State, local,
tribal, and territorial community. I think that is where they
need to be uplifted to, but they need the resources from
Congress to make sure that they have capacity to achieve what
they should be and what they were designed to be after
September 11th. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Peters. Thank you. Thank you for that answer.
Thank you again to all of our witnesses here today for giving
us your time and your expertise this morning.
This hearing is a part of our Committee's bipartisan effort
to examine the security and intelligence failures on January
6th as well as to identify what reforms are needed to address
the rising threat of domestic terrorism generally across the
country.
Our witnesses today focused on the importance of I&A and
how it needs to provide DHS and its partners--State and local
governments, law enforcement, and the private sector--with more
actionable intelligence. We also discussed the unique position
of I&A as a domestic-focused intelligence agency and the need
to ensure that we protect the privacy, the civil rights, and
the civil liberties as they work to execute their mission.
I certainly look forward to working with my colleagues as
we continue to examine how to combat the rise of domestic
terrorism, including white nationalism and anti-government
violence. Certainly I&A is the member of the intelligence
community that is uniquely situated and suited to interact with
both State and local enforcement, focus on strategic issues
rather than specific law enforcement investigations, and
leverage its existing domestic authorities to help us address
that threat.
So, with that, the hearing record will remain open for 15
days, until June 2nd at 5 p.m., for the submission of
statements and questions for the record.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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