[Senate Hearing 117-81]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                         S. Hrg. 117-81

                             OPEN HEARING:
                      WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
                   OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2021

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
      
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        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
45-487 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2021                     
          
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                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

           [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]

                   MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Chairman
                  MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Vice Chairman

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
RON WYDEN, Oregon                    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico          SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
ANGUS KING, Maine                    ROY BLUNT, Missouri
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado          TOM COTTON, Arkansas
BOB CASEY, Pennsylvania              JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York      BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                  CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                 MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                  JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio
                   JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
                              ----------                              
                     Michael Casey, Staff Director
                  Brian Walsh, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                             APRIL 14, 2021

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page

Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia...............     1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida...................     3

                               WITNESSES

Haines, Avril, Director of National Intelligence, ODNI; 
  Accompanied by: Burns, William J., Director, Central 
  Intelligence Agency; Wray, Christopher, Director, Federal 
  Bureau of Investigation; Nakasone, Gen. Paul, Director, 
  National Security Agency; Berrier, Lt. Gen. Scott D., Director, 
  Defense Intelligence Agency....................................     6
    Prepared statement...........................................    11

                         SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

Report of Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
  Community......................................................    46

 
                             OPEN HEARING:
                      WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT
                   OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

                              ----------                              


                       WEDNESDAY, APRIL 14, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in 
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark R. Warner 
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
    Present: Senators Warner, Rubio, Feinstein, Wyden, 
Heinrich, King (via WebEx), Bennet, Casey, Gillibrand (via 
WebEx), Burr, Risch, Collins, Blunt, Cotton, Cornyn, and Sasse.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            VIRGINIA

    Chairman Warner. Good morning. I call this hearing to 
order, and a welcome to our witnesses:
    Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines; Director 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, Bill Burns; Director of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chris Wray; Director of 
National Security Agency, General Paul Nakasone; and Director 
of Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Scott 
Berrier.
    Thank you for being here this morning and for representing 
the thousands of dedicated men and women of America's 
Intelligence Community.
    Every year since 1994, the Senate Intelligence Committee 
has held an open, unclassified worldwide threats hearing, so 
that the American people can hear directly from the heads of 
the intelligence agencies about the various threats to our 
peace and prosperity. It is important that this hearing be 
conducted publicly and openly to ensure that Americans have a 
good understanding from a trusted, objective source of the 
challenges and also the opportunities we face as a Nation.
    I was dismayed last year when the Director of National 
Intelligence refused to appear in public before our Committee 
for this hearing. And I am pleased that we are resuming this 
tradition, and look forward to continuing on an annual basis.
    We look to our intelligence agencies to provide their best 
and most objective analytic judgments to our policymakers, 
regardless of which party happens to be in power. Intelligence 
is the eyes and ears we rely upon to provide warnings of both 
immediate and longer-range threats. And we must be sure that 
the intelligence and analysis is free of bias and not shaded in 
any way to fit a particular policy or agenda.
    We are still in the grips of a global pandemic, though 
increasingly rapid deployment of effective vaccines is bringing 
it to bay. In addition to addressing the challenges to national 
security you see from the pandemic, I'd also like for each of 
you to address how your agencies and the IC as a whole have 
dealt with this challenge.
    While some agencies have been able to exercise the 
flexibility of a remote workforce, intelligence is often a 
profession that relies on in-person attendance due to its 
classified nature. Some agencies have done very well in 
vaccinating their personnel. Others have lagged, frankly, far 
behind, and I'd like to hear how each of your agencies plans to 
speed up these vital vaccinations to keep the workforce healthy 
and safe.
    As this hearing will no doubt illustrate, the work of the 
IC is more important than ever. The threat assessment goes into 
wide detail on a variety of challenges that we face, but I have 
some issues in particular I'd like to address: cybersecurity, 
election security, the rise in domestic violent extremism, and 
obviously the rise of China and particularly the Chinese 
Communist Party.
    On that final point, I want to be extremely clear about 
something. As we grapple with the challenges posed by a rising 
China, our problem is with the Chinese Communist Party, not 
with the Chinese people or the Chinese Diaspora globally. And 
certainly not with Asian-Americans here in the United States. I 
want to caution our fellow Americans that false equivalence 
only breeds submission, division, and hate, and plays right 
into Beijing's hands.
    As China grows in power and stature, the CCP has sought to 
undercut the United States as the world's leading technological 
power. We see this in the reliance on both strategic 
investments and traditional espionage to acquire intellectual 
property; their use and export of surveillance technology to 
authoritarian regimes; and their modernization of traditional 
and asymmetric military capabilities, including in the space 
and cyber domains.
    When we look at development, for example, of 5G technology, 
we've seen the CCP act aggressively to influence international 
standard-setting bodies and invest in a national champion, 
Huawei, that threatens to dominate the worldwide 
telecommunications market. I fear that the CCP will develop a 
similar strategy to dominate the development of other emerging 
technologies, including AI, quantum computing, and BAU 
technology. In many ways, the IC is the only part of our 
overall enterprise that sees across all domains in this field, 
and I think we must be clear-eyed in assessing the threats 
posed by the CCP.
    In the cyber domain, Russia was responsible for an 
incredibly sophisticated hack of government and private-sector 
systems, using software updates from what appeared to be a 
trusted provider in SolarWinds. Other adversaries also have the 
capability to undertake destructive attacks of critical 
infrastructure. We've also seen major hacks, such as the 
Hafnium attack on Microsoft Exchange users, producing serious 
consequences for United States networks.
    In order to deter these intrusions, we will need to 
accurately and quickly attribute them and hold our adversaries 
accountable. The SolarWinds hack offered a stark reminder that 
if there is no requirement to report breaches of critical 
infrastructure--if FireEye, for example, had not come forward--
we might still be in the dark today. And I think when we had 
our hearing on the subject, there was uniform, bipartisan 
agreement that we needed to move forward.
    And we also want to develop new international norms where 
certain types of attacks, whether it be on updates or other 
areas, or frankly viewed on an international basis or 
prohibited or banned, just as use of chemical or bioweapons is 
banned in other domains.
    Also related is the ongoing threat of misinformation and 
disinformation, especially when it targets America's free and 
democratic elections. As the IC noted in its recent assessment, 
Russia undertook a sophisticated disinformation campaign in 
2020 to undercut our current President and to bolster the 
candidacy of the former one. We need to make clear that those 
who perpetrated this hostile interference will again pay a 
price.
    The technologies that have made misinformation and 
disinformation so effective have also been used to great effect 
by the types of people and groups who attempted an insurrection 
against our country. But domestic violent extremists were 
around long before January 6, and they'll continue to pose a 
significant threat long after we put that incident to rest.
    Many of our allies have also identified anti-government 
extremists as an increasing challenge in their countries. I'd 
like your thoughts on how the Intelligence Community can or 
should play a greater role in providing warning of attacks by 
violent domestic groups, and especially if any of these groups 
have ties or support for our adversaries overseas.
    Lastly, we know the President is going to make an 
announcement today. We're going to need to discuss the 
situation in Afghanistan. We went to Afghanistan 20 years ago 
after the deadly attacks on 9/11 to take away the Taliban's 
safe haven, and we've worked with our Afghan partners and NATO 
allies toward that end. As you note in your statement for the 
record, the Al-Qaeda senior leadership has suffered severe 
losses in the past few years.
    I know on the Committee, we'll have a variety of views 
about the steps forward. But, speaking at least as Chair, I 
think any withdrawal that takes place in that country must be 
conducted in a manner that is coordinated among our military, 
diplomatic, and intelligence partners, and in close 
consultation with our NATO allies. We should continue to 
support the Afghan government, and we must ensure the safety of 
those dedicated Afghans who have worked closely with the United 
States over the last 20 years.
    I know there are a multitude of other threats that I 
haven't addressed, but I don't want to steal your thunder, and 
I look forward to today's very important discussion.
    And I'll turn it over to my friend, the Vice Chairman, to 
make a statement.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            FLORIDA

    Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, 
want to welcome all of you for being a part of this hearing 
this morning to hear of the threats--the assessment of the 
threats--that confront our country and our interests around the 
world. You know, what makes this hearing very unique, it's the 
one time of year when we've had it--and we haven't had them in 
a couple years--but it's the one time of year where the 
American public and the Members of Congress here in the Senate 
get an unvarnished presentation by an apolitical Intelligence 
Community of the real national security threats that our 
country faces.
    But I think it's also a good opportunity to remind the men 
and women of our Nation who we work for and everyone watching 
what intelligence is. There's a lot of TV shows about 
intelligence. There's a lot of movies. You may have seen a 
miniseries and everything else. And there's a lot of media 
reports, some accurate, some not, about the work that occurs in 
the Intelligence Community.
    At its core, the Intelligence Community and our 
intelligence functions are about three things: gathering 
information, especially information that adversaries are 
producing that they don't want us to have--foreign adversaries; 
analyzing that information to understand what it means, what it 
could mean, why they're doing it; and then third, using all of 
that to help inform policymakers in making policy decisions and 
inform the actions that we take. Those are the three cores of 
what intelligence work is all about.
    It sounds simplistic, but it is incredibly important when 
it works. When it's working well, our country is spared all 
kinds of horribles that people never learn about. When it 
doesn't work, we face sometimes catastrophe and terrible 
outcomes, and everyone knows about it, and we spend a long time 
analyzing it.
    Our job here on this side of the room is to provide 
oversight into how you're doing that job, how well you're doing 
these things, and also to provide you the resources and the 
authorities and otherwise other things that you might need in 
order to do those things well. And it's that view that I hope 
we can hear about what it is we can do to be helpful in that 
endeavor. Obviously, in the closed session especially, but here 
in the open one as well.
    As far as the threats are concerned, again, not to be 
overly simplistic, but I would venture to guess that 90-
something percent, if not more, of our threats can be tracked 
to one of five things: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, or 
global terrorism. Those five sources comprise a substantial 
percentage of all the challenges we face in our foreign policy, 
sometimes in our domestic policy, and certainly in our 
economics and geopolitics.
    A rapidly-evolving technology has helped our country 
tremendously. It's helped the work you do; it's helped the work 
we do in public policy. But it's also advantaged our 
adversaries, none of whom, by the way, are constrained by laws 
or the sorts of commitments we've made to things like the rule 
of law or a moral compass and principles when it comes to 
utilizing things like deepfakes, advanced data analytics, 
disinformation, misinformation, artificial intelligence, and 
more. They are completely unrestrained from any of the things 
that we are restrained by, both in law and morality.
    The cyber threat that the Chairman spoke about a moment ago 
is real, both in our government networks and U.S. critical 
infrastructure. As a government, we need to, I believe, have a 
more explicit cyber-deterrence policy that will clearly set 
expectations for accepted cyber behavior and delineate very 
clear responses when those lines are crossed.
    Today's technology environment allows adversaries to wreak 
havoc, and they often do so at a minimal cost. The SolarWinds 
hack illustrates how easily U.S. infrastructure can be 
compromised. It's not hard to imagine how much destruction 
could be levied if our adversaries were determine to conduct 
such an attack beyond espionage on things like the power grid 
or our water supply. These are 21st-century threats, 
unimaginable just two decades ago.
    The theft of our innovation, often funded innovation that 
was funded at its basic level by the U.S. taxpayer. That 
threatens our economic competitiveness. It comes at the expense 
of our economy, American jobs, American industrial capability. 
China, for example, as part of its military-civil fusion 
strategy, has proven itself adept at finding ways for its 
agents to extract that sort of information from private 
corporations. It takes full advantage of the robust U.N. 
scientific research and development industry that capitalism 
has fostered by sending their agents and, frankly, by 
threatening and forcing students who study at our laboratories 
and universities to steal the research and give it to them to 
benefit the Communist Party. So I look forward to hearing from 
the FBI in particular as to the work that we're doing to 
confront the massive threat that this poses.
    The insights of the Intelligence Community on the top 
threats confronting us this year are also critical to better 
shape our foreign policy, helping us to execute it and 
understanding whether or not we are achieving our national 
goals and furthering our national interest. In that regard, as 
the Chairman already pointed to, is the situation in 
Afghanistan. It was a decision that was begun under the 
previous administration and is being brought to its conclusion 
under the current one. And irrespective of how anyone may feel 
about it, no one can deny it's going to have serious security 
implications for our country for years to come.
    There's no doubt the Nation is weary of over 20 years of 
war and certainly the counterterrorism fight. I think it's 
important to acknowledge two things. The first is that there's 
a very real possibility that in the very near future, sadly, 
tragically, in a heartbreaking way, the Taliban will regain 
control of all or substantial portions of Afghanistan. And that 
means terrible things for all those people living in that 
country, but particularly for women and girls.
    But the second thing we need to acknowledge is that if they 
do, there's also a very high likelihood that--in fact, if they 
do, I think it's almost certain that Al-Qaeda will return to 
Afghanistan, will use it as a safe haven, and will use it as a 
launchpad for terrorist attacks against our country, our 
people--even potentially here in the homeland. And so, I think 
it's important for us to say, if you look at this year's annual 
threat assessment, you collectively say, despite leadership 
losses, terrorist groups have shown great resiliency and are 
taking advantage of ungoverned areas to rebuild. And that is 
now, given the status quo today. Imagine when that sustained 
pressure is no longer in place.
    You go on to assess that ISIS and Al-Qaeda remain the 
greatest Sunni terrorist threats to U.S. interests overseas, 
that they also seek to conduct attacks inside the United 
States, although sustained U.S. and allied counterterrorism 
pressure has broadly degraded their capability to do so. I 
think it's important, obviously, in the closed session, but 
here in the public session to the extent possible, to hear not 
just about the risk that the lack of sustained pressure now 
poses to our future, but what it would mean in particular to 
potential attacks on the homeland.
    The Intelligence Community can't afford to be complacent 
for even one minute, which, of course, makes your jobs 
collectively and individually, and the jobs of the men and 
women who work for you under you and who you represent here 
today, a very difficult job. The stakes--this is not an 
exaggeration--are often literally life and death. And it's not 
often that you get to appear in public so the American people 
can get a sense of how important your work is, even though 
because of the nature of their work, most people will never 
fully understand how dangerous and important that work can be.
    As I said at the outset, the Intelligence Community and the 
work of our intelligence agencies is depicted in all kinds of 
ways in the popular culture, in the media, in the darkest 
recesses of the Internet. But the Intelligence Community that I 
have come to know through my now ten and a half years on the 
Committee is one that's made up of patriotic, dedicated 
professionals, some of the finest men and women who serve in 
our government and who measure their success and their failure 
in terms of how many Americans they've kept safe. Many of those 
Americans who are kept safe do not even know they've been kept 
safe and what they've been kept safe from because of the nature 
of the work that you do. And I hope we will all remember that. 
I know everyone on the Committee does.
    So again, I thank you. I know we have a lot of ground to 
cover today. And I thank you for your time and your willingness 
to come here today. It's good to do these hearings once again.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
    I'd remind Members that after the open hearing, we will 
have a closed hearing. So any of the questions that stray into 
the classified sector, I'd urge you to reserve those for the 
closed hearing. And to remind Members today, we will do five-
minute rounds based on seniority.
    And will that, Director Haines, the floor's yours.

STATEMENT OF AVRIL HAINES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF 
   NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ACCOMPANIED BY: WILLIAM J. BURNS, 
   DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; CHRISTOPHER WRAY, 
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; GEN. PAUL NAKASONE, 
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY; LT. GEN. SCOTT D. BERRIER, 
             DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Director Haines. Thank you so much.
    Chairman Warner, Vice Chairman Rubio, Members of the 
Committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to offer the 
Intelligence Community's 2021 assessment of worldwide threats 
to U.S. national security.
    On behalf of the entire Intelligence Community, I want to 
express how much we appreciate your support and your 
partnership. I would also like to thank the men and women of 
the Intelligence Community. Their efforts rarely receive public 
accolades because of the nature of their work. But they help to 
keep us safe, often at a great personal sacrifice. And we 
remain committed to providing them with the resources our 
mission requires and the support we owe them. It's my honor to 
serve alongside these dedicated officers, including the 
extraordinary leaders seated next to me, and to represent their 
work to you.
    Our goal today is to convey to you and the public we serve 
and protect the threat environment as we perceive it and to do 
our best to answer questions about the challenges that we face. 
I'll only highlight a few points and provide some context in my 
opening statement. For a more detailed threat picture, I refer 
you to the annual threat assessment we issued yesterday, which 
is a reflection of the collective insights of the Intelligence 
Community.
    Broadly speaking, the Intelligence Community is focused on 
traditional categories of issues that we've been discussing for 
years: adversaries and competitors, critical transnational 
threats, and conflicts and instability. And I'll summarize our 
views on these.
    But first, I want to take note of the shifting landscape 
that we're facing today and its implications for our work.
    The trends underlying and intersecting these issues are 
increasing the pace, the complexity, and the impact of these 
threats in ways that require us to evolve. During the past 
year, the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the inherent risks of 
high levels of interdependence. And in coming years, as 
reflected in our recently issued Global Trends report, we 
assess the world will face more intense and cascading global 
challenges, ranging from disease to climate change to 
disruptions from new technologies and financial crises. And as 
we note in that report, these challenges will repeatedly test 
the resilience and adaptability of communities, states, and the 
international system, often exceeding the capacity of existing 
systems and models.
    This looming disequilibrium between existing and future 
challenges, and the ability of institutions and systems to 
respond, is likely to grow and produce greater contestation at 
every level. And for the Intelligence Community, this insight 
compels us to broaden our definition of national security, 
develop and integrate new and emerging expertise into our work, 
deepen and strengthen our partnerships, and learn to focus on 
the long-term strategic threats while simultaneously addressing 
urgent crises. In short, at no point has it been more important 
to invest in our norms and institutions, our workforce, and the 
integration of our work.
    Doing so provides us with the opportunity to meet the 
challenges we face, to pull together as a society, and to 
promote resilience and innovation. And as we evolve, you will 
see our efforts to more effectively integrate longer-term 
destabilizing trends into our daily work, thereby promoting 
strategic foresight and a deeper understanding of the threats 
we face, which we hope will help the policy community 
effectively prioritize their work to address the issues that we 
seek to present.
    Against this backdrop, the annual threat assessment 
describes an array of threats we are facing in the coming year, 
beginning with those emanating from key state actors and 
starting with China, which is an unparalleled priority for the 
Intelligence Community. But we also look at Russia, Iran, and 
North Korea in that context.
    China increasingly is a near-peer competitor, challenging 
the United States in multiple areas while pushing to revise 
global norms in ways that favor the authoritarian Chinese 
system. China is employing a comprehensive approach to 
demonstrate its growing strength and compel regional neighbors 
to acquiesce to Beijing's preferences, including its claims 
over disputed territory and assertions of sovereignty over 
Taiwan. It also has substantial cyber-capabilities that, if 
deployed at a minimum, can cause localized temporary 
disruptions to critical infrastructure inside the United 
States. And while China poses an increasingly formidable 
challenge to the U.S. role in global affairs, it is worth 
noting that its economic, environmental, and demographic 
vulnerabilities all threaten to complicate its ability to 
manage the transition to the dominant role it aspires in the 
decades ahead.
    And next, with respect to Russia, we assess that Moscow 
will continue to employ a variety of tactics to undermine U.S. 
influence and erode Western alliances. While Russia does not 
want to conflict with the United States, Russian officials have 
long believed that Washington is seeking to weaken Russia. And 
Moscow will use a range of tools to pursue its objectives, 
including mercenary operations, assassinations, and arms sales.
    It will also employ, as we've reported publicly, new 
weapons and cyber-capabilities to threaten the United States 
and its allies and seeks to use malign influence campaigns, 
including in the context of U.S. elections, to undermine our 
global standing, sow discord, and influence U.S. decision-
making. Russia is becoming increasingly adept at leveraging its 
technical prowess to develop asymmetric options in both the 
military and cyber spheres in order to give itself the ability 
to push back and force the United States to accommodate its 
interests.
    And turning to Iran, Tehran is seeking to project power in 
neighboring states, deflect international pressure, minimize 
threats to regional stability. Iraq will be a key battleground 
for Iranian influence in the coming year. But Tehran will also 
continue to pursue a permanent military presence in Syria, 
destabilize Yemen, and threaten Israel.
    And for its part, North Korea may take aggressive and 
potentially destabilizing actions to reshape its security 
environment and will seek to drive wedges between the United 
States and its allies. These efforts could include the 
resumption of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic 
missile testing.
    When it comes to transnational threats, the assessment 
focuses on key issues that really intersect with the state-
actor threats that I've just outlined, starting with COVID-19. 
The effect of the current pandemic will obviously continue to 
strain governments and societies over the coming year, fueling 
humanitarian and economic crises, political unrest, and 
geopolitical competition as countries build influence--sorry, 
as countries such as China and Russia seek advantage through 
vaccine diplomacy to build influence and, in some cases, demand 
accessions from other governments.
    Countries with high debts or that depend on oil exports, 
tourism, or remittances face particularly challenging 
recoveries, while others will turn inward or be distracted by 
other challenges. And the critical impact of this pandemic has 
also served to highlight the importance of public health to 
national security. And ecological degradation and a changing 
climate will continue to fuel disease outbreaks, threaten food 
and water security, exacerbate political instability and 
humanitarian crises. And although much of the effect of a 
changing climate on U.S. security will play out indirectly in a 
broader political and economic context, warmer weather can 
generate direct, immediate impacts, for example, through more 
intense, frequent, and variable extreme weather events, in 
addition to driving conflicts over scarce natural resources. 
And the changing climate conflict and economic deprivation will 
drive vulnerable populations from their homes, heightening 
humanitarian needs, and increasing the risk of political 
upheaval.
    The scourge of illicit drugs and transnational organized 
crime will continue to take its toll on American lives, 
prosperity, and safety. And major narcotics trafficking groups 
and other transnational criminal organizations will continue to 
drive threats while also being used by adversaries employing 
cyber-tools to steal from U.S. and foreign businesses and use 
complex financial schemes to launder illicit proceeds, 
undermining confidence in financial institutions.
    Emerging and disrupting technologies, as well as the 
proliferation and permeation of technology in all aspects of 
our lives, pose unique challenges. Cyber-capabilities to 
illustrate are demonstrably intertwined with threats from our 
infrastructure and to foreign malign influence threats against 
our democracy. And we need, as you have all stressed to us, to 
focus on the competition in critical technical areas such as 
high-performance computing, microelectronics, biotechnology, 
artificial intelligence, quantum computing, fiber optics, and 
metamaterials.
    So with regard to global terrorism, ISIS and Al-Qaeda 
remain the most pressing threats to U.S. interests overseas, as 
was noted. These groups seek to conduct attacks inside the 
United States, but sustained counterterrorism pressure has 
broadly degraded their capabilities. Domestically, lone actors 
and small cells with a broad range of ideological motivations 
pose a greater immediate threat. We see this threat manifest 
itself in individuals who are inspired by Al-Qaeda and ISIS, 
often called ``homegrown violent extremism'' and those who 
commit terrorist acts for ideological goals stemming from other 
influences, such as racial bias and anti-governmental 
sentiment, which we refer to as Domestic Violent Extremism, or 
DVE.
    And DVE is an increasingly complex threat that is growing 
in the United States. These extremists often see themselves as 
part of a broader global environment and movement. And in fact, 
a number of other countries are experiencing a rise in DVE. For 
example, Australia, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom 
consider white, racially- or ethnically-motivated violent 
extremists, including neo-Nazi groups, to be the fastest-
growing terrorist threat they face.
    And, of course, regional conflicts continue to fuel 
humanitarian crises, undermine stability, and threaten U.S. 
persons and interests. The fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria has a direct implication for U.S. forces, while tensions 
between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan remain a concern for 
the world. The iterate of violence between Israel and Iran, the 
activity of foreign powers in Libya, and conflicts in other 
areas, including Africa and the Middle East, have the potential 
to escalate or spread. Asia has periodic upheavals, such as the 
Burmese military seizure of power in February. Latin America 
has contested elections. Violent popular protests are likely to 
continue to produce volatility. And Africa will continue to see 
ongoing marginalization of some communities, ethnic conflict, 
and contentious elections.
    In closing, we face a broad array of longstanding and 
emerging threats, whose intersection is raising the potential 
for cascading crises. Our increasingly interconnected and 
mobile world offers enormous opportunities, but at the same 
time it multiplies our challenges, calling us to even greater 
vigilance as we seek to protect our vital national interests, 
promote resilience, and invest in our institutions and our 
people, who will be the only and best answer to addressing 
these challenges. We have to take care of our people.
    And so, I would be remiss not to note a final threat we are 
tracking: anomalous health incidents that have affected a 
number of our personnel. The Intelligence Community is taking 
these incidents very seriously, and it is committed to 
investigating the source of these incidents, preventing them 
from continuing, and caring for those affected. We appreciate 
the support that many of you have shown for our personnel on 
this issue, as with everything else we work on around the 
globe. And we look forward to answering your questions about 
these and other worldwide threats today.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Director Haines follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Warner. Well, Director Haines, that was a list of 
about as many awful things in 10 minutes as I may have heard in 
recent times. Enormous, enormous set of challenges.
    I want to drill down on a couple of issues. One, I think in 
many ways, this Committee, particularly under the leadership of 
Senator Burr, was one of the first to really raise the flag 
around the challenges on 5G, where I believe--my personal 
belief is--that the United States and the west writ large was a 
little bit asleep at the switch, where suddenly we have a rise 
in China, not only having a national champion in the case of 
Huawei, but literally being involved at the standard setting, 
rule setting, protocol setting in a way that I think, again, we 
had not seen in the past.
    My question is this: the idea that the IC has to become 
kind of that ability to look into where China is rising in a 
series of areas of technology development. How do we have that 
kind of appropriate oversight? I'd like you and maybe Director 
Burns to address this question. In many ways, this Committee, 
by default, has become a little bit of the technology committee 
for the Senate. And again, I want to commend folks like Senator 
Cornyn, and Senator Sasse, and Senator Rubio on things like 
semiconductors, where we're taking a lead. We're also trying to 
look into AI. We're looking into quantum. We're looking into 
all this list of rising technology areas. But how does the IC 
buildup that expertise of being able to monitor China's rise in 
a variety of technology areas?
    If both you and Director Burns--if anybody else--wants to 
jump in as well, I'd appreciate it.
    Director Haines. Absolutely. So, thank you, Chairman. I 
think I'll start, and hand it over, obviously. This is an area, 
obviously, that you've had a lot of interest in, and I know the 
Committee has really helped us think through, in a sense. But 
it is absolutely true that we are focused on this issue. We 
think it's incredibly important, as you've indicated. And as 
you note, it's not just about 5G, which obviously is one piece 
of the puzzle, but it's across a whole series of technology 
sectors where China is increasingly catching up to us, in 
effect, and where we see that they're contesting our 
leadership, in effect, in these areas.
    And the implications are the things that I think we can 
help to supply to the policy community, both the pace at which 
they are moving, but also, what are the implications for 
national security, and what should they be focused on and 
prioritizing, as well as understanding, in a sense, what the 
implications are for supply chain and for resilience, and how 
we can actually address these issues satisfactorily.
    But I think as your question implies, it means that we need 
to be as smart about technology as any other part of the U.S. 
Government and our society. And I think that is something that 
we have been working on, and bringing in the expertise that we 
need to the Intelligence Community. It's a workforce issue. 
It's also retaining that expertise and making sure that we have 
expertise to do that. But it's also exchanging and deepening 
our partnership with the private sector and with other parts of 
the government. And in many respects, that's a major push that 
we're involved in, where we now have legislation, thanks to 
you, about public-private partnerships, other mechanisms that 
we can use to try to ensure that we're doing exchanges that are 
deeper than just having a meeting and a discussion, but 
actually having people go in and out. And I think that's going 
to be a big part of us ensuring that we understand the 
implications of this, as well as sharing information with the 
private sector in appropriate ways, and obviously lawful and 
respectful of privacy and civil liberties. But nevertheless, 
critical for us to understand their perspective and for us to 
share our own perspective in certain ways, so that we can 
actually manage this and help the public and the policy 
community in particular understand those issues.
    Chairman Warner. Director Burns, do you want to--?
    Director Burns. Yes, Sir. I would just add very briefly 
that I absolutely agree with you that competition in technology 
is right at the core of our rivalry with an increasingly 
adversarial Chinese Communist Party and Chinese leadership in 
the coming years. That requires us at CIA working with our 
partners across the Intelligence Community to do two things, at 
least, strengthen our own abilities, which we've worked very 
hard on in recent years. Two of the five CIA directorates on 
Digital Innovation and Science and Technology are focused 
primarily on tech and cyber issues right now. Nearly one-third 
of our officers of our entire workforce are focused primarily 
on the technology and cyber mission today. So, that's a 
reflection of the priority that we need to continue to attach. 
Partnerships are equally important, not just across the 
Intelligence Community, and with the private sector, as 
Director Haines stressed, but also with foreign partners as 
well. And as you know, we've had some success over the last few 
years in working with foreign partners to help highlight the 
risk on 5G technology that critical dependencies on Huawei can 
provide, working with them to try to highlight ways in which we 
can become more resilient, including on semiconductors as well.
    Chairman Warner. I think we're going to need to make sure 
we draw upon all parts of the government: the Commerce 
Department, OSTP, others, our friends on the DOD side of the 
house. I don't feel like we have that one centralized place to 
make those assessments about China. And the vast majority of 
Members of the Committee have joined in bipartisan legislation 
to try to create, in a sense, technology alliances amongst 
democracies around the world. I think we're going to need that 
coordinated effort to take on this extraordinarily challenging 
issue with China.
    Senator Rubio.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. Thank you. So, about a year and a half 
ago, a bat virus infected human beings, and transferred into 
something that infected human beings. I don't need to tell 
everybody what's happened since then. The official answer for 
why it's happened, when it is a possible answer, is that this 
was a new zoonotic transmission--that it crossed over from an 
animal into a human. But there's another hypothesis, which is 
plausible. And that is one that there was an accident in a 
laboratory, that ended up impacting the world the way we've 
seen.
    And there's reason to believe that's plausible.
    Number one, researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology 
have demonstrated from their publication record that they were 
skilled at techniques in which they genetically modified bat 
coronaviruses in order to create new man-made viruses that were 
highly capable of creating disease in human beings. Second, 
there have been several lab leaks documented that have occurred 
in China, including ones involving the original SARS virus. And 
third, U.S. diplomats who visited the Wuhan Institute of 
Virology in 2018 warned of the risks of the subpar safety 
standards that they observed.
    I think this is really a two-part question, and I'll start 
with you, Director Haines, but I think Director Burns or 
General Nakasone can weigh in. We can't conclude definitively 
that the virus that causes COVID-19 emerged naturally until 
there's a transmission chain that's been identified--how the 
virus evolved and transmitted between species. And to date, no 
such path of zoonotic transmission has been definitively 
identified.
    Are those two things accurate?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
    So, it is absolutely accurate. The Intelligence Community 
does not know exactly where, when, or how COVID-19 virus was 
transmitted initially. And basically, components have coalesced 
around two alternative theories. These scenarios are: it 
emerged naturally from human contact with infected animals; or 
it was a laboratory accident, as you identified. And that is 
where we are right now, but we're continuing to work on this 
issue and collect information, and to the best we can, 
essentially, to give you greater confidence in what the 
scenario is. But I'll leave it to my colleagues, if there's 
anything that they want to add.
    Director Burns. No, Sir, Mr. Vice Chairman. I agree with 
what Avril said. I mean, the one thing that's clear to us and 
to our analysts is that the Chinese leadership has not been 
fully forthcoming or fully transparent in working with the WHO, 
or in providing the kind of original complete data that would 
help answer those questions. So we're doing everything we can, 
using all the sources available to all of us on this panel, to 
try to get to the bottom of it.
    General Nakasone. I would just add, Vice Chairman, that to 
your parlance, we continue to gather and to analyze and form 
series of pieces that we're looking at, working very, very 
closely--partnered with obviously the IC here--but also with a 
number of other partners in the interagency and in academia as 
well.
    Vice Chairman Rubio. The second topic I wanted to touch 
with you is, it's really based on your assessment. This is a 
quote from it:
    ``Beijing has been intensifying efforts to shape the 
political environment in the United States to promote its 
policy preferences, to mold public discourse, to pressure 
political figures whom Beijing believes oppose its interests, 
and muffle criticism of China on such issues as religious 
freedom and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong.''
    We're all at this point, I think, well aware of Chinese--of 
Russian influence and disinformation efforts. But I think we 
make a mistake to not focus on both China's capabilities and on 
its growing and intensifying efforts to involve and engage 
itself in our political environment here in the United States. 
Different aims perhaps, different tactics in some ways, but 
certainly they have every capability that the Russians do, and 
more in many cases. And they are certainly interested in 
molding public discourse and creating pressure on political 
figures who they don't like here in the United States.
    I was hoping you could further elaborate on that for the 
benefit of the American public.
    Director Haines. Thank you, Vice Chairman.
    I'll start, and I have a feeling that others will have 
things to say on this, in particular Director Wray. He 
obviously spends time on this issue a lot.
    I couldn't agree with you more that this is an issue with 
both China and Russia that we are working to try to ensure, 
frankly, that we can educate the American public on these 
issues.
    We have, within the ODNI, I'll just speak to that for a 
moment, a National Counterintelligence and Security Center that 
focuses on this issue, and has done enormous amounts of 
outreach to the private sector. I know we have worked, 
obviously, with your Committee to try to have engagements that 
help to bring this to various sectors, to help them understand 
the degree to which China is trying to influence, and also, the 
degree to which they are engaging in counterintelligence 
activities. It's a top priority for the Intelligence Community, 
but let me hand it over to Director Wray.
    Director Wray. So, I've testified previously that I don't 
think there is any country that presents a more severe threat 
to our innovation, our economic security, and our democratic 
ideas. And the tools in their toolbox to influence our 
businesses, our academic institutions, our governments at all 
levels are deep and wide and persistent. In addition to some of 
the things that have mentioned in the threat assessment, I'll 
just highlight one, which illustrates the diversity of their 
tactics.
    We had an indictment that we announced I think last fall, 
that relates to the Chinese Operation Fox Hunt, which is 
essentially them conducting uncoordinated, illegal law 
enforcement activity here on U.S. soil as a means to threaten, 
intimidate, harass, blackmail members of the same Diaspora that 
Chairman Warner mentioned in his opening comments. And it's an 
indication and illustration of just how challenging and diverse 
this particular threat is. We have now over 2,000 
investigations that tie back to the Chinese government. And on 
the economic espionage investigation side alone, it's about a 
1,300 percent increase over the last several years. We're 
opening a new investigation into China every ten hours. And I 
can assure the Committee, that's not because our folks don't 
have anything to do with their time.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
    You note in your statement for the record that China, 
Russia, Iran, and North Korea have the ability, right now, to 
conduct cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and cause 
temporary disruptions. Additionally, in 2019 you provided 
examples, including China's ability to disrupt natural gas 
pipelines for a day to weeks, and Russia's ability to disrupt 
our electrical distribution networks for hours.
    So here's the question: is this problem getting better or 
worse? Are our adversaries more capable of threatening our 
critical infrastructure today than they were two years ago?
    General Nakasone. Senator, thank you very much.
    In terms of our critical infrastructure, our 17 sectors of 
critical infrastructure, to bluntly answer your question, our 
adversaries continue to get better at what they're doing. I 
would also tell you, though, that we are also working very, 
very holistically across our government to improve two things: 
our ability to have resilience in that infrastructure, and our 
ability to respond. And we have made progress there. But there 
is, as we've seen over the past two intrusions, the scope, 
scale, and sophistication of our adversaries today. That makes 
us take notice. And we, as a Nation, must take notice of what 
our adversaries are doing.
    And so cybersecurity for us is national, and we continue to 
work at it every single day.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    What would you tell the chief executive officers and chief 
security officers at our critical infrastructure companies? 
What actions should they take? What type of investments do they 
need to make now?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I think the first thing is the 
threat is real. And I don't think I have to say that very often 
because the chief executive officers and the CISOs know that 
today.
    But I think the second piece is that there is no one 
industry nor one sector of our government that's going to be 
able to provide us the defense that's necessary for our Nation. 
This is a team sport, and so this has to be done public and 
private. This has to be done between the Intelligence 
Community, obviously, DHS, DOJ, DEA, FBI, and Justice. This is 
really the key piece of our way forward, which is teamwork.
    And I would say that we've learned that from our elections 
as well. And I would offer, Director Wray, your thoughts on it.
    Director Wray. So I think you've put your finger, Senator, 
on the key element of the challenge. The private sector is 
central to this. Ninety percent of the country's critical 
infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. And it's 
important to think of cybersecurity, not as a single event, but 
as a campaign. These are no longer a question of if an 
institution is going to be compromised, but when. And so the 
more important question if I were talking--and I often am 
talking--to CEOs and CISOs, is to focus their cybersecurity 
more than they have in the past inwardly. The key is how fast 
you detect the compromise and how fast you remediate it.
    And then secondly, the importance of reaching out and 
coordinating with government. Public-private partnership is at 
a premium because we often use, in the threat context, the 
expression ``left of boom.'' You know, we know we all want to 
get left of boom. Well, in the cyber arena, one company's right 
of boom is left of everybody else in the same industry's boom.
    And so we need that first company--and someday you're going 
to be the first company if you're a CEO, someday you're going 
to be the second or third or fourth company--we need in every 
instance those companies to be stepping forward, promptly 
reaching out to government so that we can prevent the threat 
from metastasizing across the rest of the industry.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, let me ask this follow-up: what 
investments does the IC need to make, what steps do you need to 
take, in order to change this status quo?
    Director Wray. Well, I think we're working more and more 
closely than ever across the IC on the issue and so that level 
of partnership and integration is going well and continues to 
improve and is important. But I think the bigger piece is more 
and more public-private engagement between the IC and the 
private sector.
    And I know that there has been discussion about different 
ways to incentivize the private sector to come forward more 
quickly and promptly and fulsomely. And I think those are our 
key to our future on this issue.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. And I would simply add, very briefly, that 
one of the things I think you both made, General Nakasone and 
Director Wray, very clear: that while some of these attacks 
have only exfiltrated information they could have turned into 
denial of service and really wreaked enormous havoc with our 
whole economy.
    Senator Burr.
    Senator Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all 
of our witnesses. I think of all the partnerships that exist in 
Washington, the one between the Committee and these agencies is 
the single most important one that we have.
    A couple of observations. The U.S. Government's technology 
policy, whether development or deployment, if it exists at all, 
it's stupid. I'm not speaking to the five agencies that you 
represent, because you internally do process new technologies 
in a totally different way than the whole of government. But 
that doesn't work when it's limited just to the Intelligence 
Community, which has to do it for their job.
    And dovetailing on Senator Warner's 5G comment, just a 
personal observation. I've never seen an issue that came before 
this Congress or this country that deserved a response from 
Five Eye partners more than 5G. And I think we've always looked 
through a tunnel and said: Five Eyes is an intelligence-sharing 
structure and it's limited to that.
    When we talk about things that are outside of the norm, and 
the future is going to be all outside the norm, why don't we 
leverage the relationships that we have and realize that all 
smart people don't exist here? If they did, we wouldn't have a 
problem with China. So it's not just the cost, it's the power 
of the intellectual capacity that's out there that Five Eyes 
brings to a solution for the 5G problem.
    Having said that, I'm going to start with to the right, my 
right, with Director Wray. Just give me an approximate 
percentage of your workforce, both domestically and 
internationally, that are vaccinated today.
    Director Wray. I'm not sure that I can give you an 
approximate percentage, because with us, unlike some of the 
other agencies, our folks are vaccinated in individual states 
based heavily on those states' pace of roll-out of the 
vaccination. So we have some field offices where we're close to 
100 percent and we have some field offices where we're quite a 
bit lower. So it's uneven, but it's on a good trajectory.
    Senator Burr. Director Burns.
    Director Burns. Senator Burr, about 80 percent of our 
workforce across the world is fully vaccinated today; and 
another 10 percent has received the first shot, the first 
vaccine shot. But what I've been most focused on is: are my 
colleagues in the field, and 100 percent of them today have the 
vaccine available to them.
    Senator Burr. Director Haines?
    Director Haines. Senator Burr, 86 percent, I believe, of 
our workforce has received the first shot at least, and a fair 
percentage of that has been vaccinated twice.
    Senator Burr. General, Nakasone.
    General Nakasone. Senator, I don't know if I can give you 
an exact percentage, based upon the fact that outside of Fort 
Meade we have, obviously, had a focus with the Department of 
Defense and Department of State to vaccinate our personnel. 
Within Fort Meade, we have focused on setting up our own 
vaccination site, and so both being a military and civilian 
community, we have an opportunity to not only get the vaccine 
off reservation but also at Fort Meade.
    Senator Burr. General Berrier.
    General Berrier. Senator, approximately 40 to 50 percent of 
the DIA workforce has had at least one of the two shots, and 
that's exponentially increasing. Starting from last week to 
this week on Andrews Air Force Base and Joint Base Anacostia 
Bolling, thousands of vaccinations have come in and we're 
taking advantage of that.
    Senator Burr. Thank you for that, General.
    Observation, there are only three members of the U.S. 
Congress that served on the Intelligence Committee on 9/11. All 
three of them sit on this Committee: Senator Wyden, Senator 
Feinstein, and myself.
    The foreword to the Worldwide Threat Report says, ``ISIS, 
Al-Qaeda and its militant allies continue to plot terrorist 
attacks against U.S. persons and interests.''
    Director Haines, were you at the table when the decision 
was made to exit Afghanistan?
    Director Haines. I was at the table for a number of 
discussions leading up to the decision. I'm not sure that the 
decision was made in a specific meeting.
    Senator Burr. I'll explore additional questions in the 
closed session as it relates to Afghanistan.
    General Nakasone, we are all focused on this cyber hack. Do 
you believe that new authorities are needed for you or other 
agencies to address the defensive mechanisms we need today and 
in the future? And Director Wray, do you believe that there are 
legal changes that need to be made that facilitate either 
government or the private sector being able to get ahead of 
what we've seen with SolarWinds and with Microsoft?
    General Nakasone.
    General Nakasone. Senator, I'm not seeking legal 
authorities either for NSA or for U.S. Cyber Command. My intent 
in my discussions has always been, though, is to state that 
with an adversary that has increased its scope, scale, and 
sophistication, we have to understand that there are blind 
spots in our Nation today.
    And one of the blind spots that our adversaries are using 
is the fact that they are utilizing U.S. infrastructure in a 
means upon which we cannot surveil that, whether or not in the 
Intelligence Community or in the law enforcement community, to 
be able to react quick enough to what they're doing.
    The second piece is to what the Chairman had mentioned in 
his opening statement. We are troubled in terms of being able 
to understand the depth and breadth of an intrusion based upon 
the fact that for a number of good reasons, some of them, 
obviously, legal, that much of the private sector does not 
share this information readily. And so, while there is no one 
solution to what's going on, I think we have to understand the 
program in totality.
    Director Wray. I agree with General Nakasone, and I would 
just add a few points.
    I've referenced before the importance of the private sector 
piece of this. And I think to the extent that there's a need 
for a significant change, that's one of the places where the 
most significant progress could be achieved.
    The reality is that adversaries try to use U.S. 
infrastructure for a variety of reasons, and one of them is to 
try to blend in with legitimate traffic that exists there. And 
the private sector, which controls 90 percent of critical 
infrastructure and an even higher percentage of our PII and our 
innovation, has the key dots as part of the overall connecting-
of-the-dots phenomenon.
    So I know, for example, the Cyber Solarium Commission took 
a hard look and recommended a mandatory breach notification 
law. That's a possibility. Things like that which further 
strengthen the glue between the private sector and the 
Intelligence Community and the rest of the government, I think, 
have ultimately got to be the key ingredient to any long-term 
solution.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Wyden.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you all for being here.
    A couple of quick questions. We told you, Director Haines 
and Director Burns, I'd be touching on these this morning. And 
I'm asking, really, because I was very encouraged by some of 
your initial comments with respect to transparency. And I think 
there's an opportunity now to usher in a new set of rules that 
give Americans information about the basic rules under which 
the government conducts its operations.
    So two quick yes or no answers.
    For you, Ms. Haines. Senator Heinrich and I sent you a 
letter explaining why information related to a CIA program 
needs to be declassified. The information is contained in a 
report from the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, 
and those reports are required to be made public to the 
greatest extent possible.
    Will you get back to us within 30 days about whether you 
intend to declassify the information, Director Haines?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator Wyden.
    We just received the letter and absolutely intend to look 
at it. I'm happy to get back to you within 30 days to let you 
know our views on that. I defer to Director Burns, if he has 
anything further.
    Director Burns. No, I agree, we'll get back to you very 
quickly.
    Senator Wyden. Very good.
    And along the same lines, Director Haines. I sent you all a 
letter explaining why certain information about FISA needs to 
be declassified. Again, my request would be to get an answer 
within 30 days.
    Director Haines. Understood. Thank you, Senator.
    Senator Wyden. Great.
    Director Haines. Absolutely.
    Senator Wyden. I appreciate that.
    Now, I do want to turn to this question of SolarWinds, and 
I want to start with you, General Nakasone, if I might.
    My concern is that the government's response to this 
extraordinary hack is just going to be to throw a bunch more 
money at the same companies that sold the government insecure 
products that the hackers exploited. And, really, what we're 
talking about with that approach is cyber-pork.
    Now, I also believe that security and liberty aren't 
mutually exclusive--we can have both. And so, I was concerned 
about a recent suggestion you made that the government's 
ability to detect and stop the SolarWinds campaign was hampered 
by the need to get a warrant before conducting surveillance of 
the domestic Internet. Now, my understanding is that the 
government has the ability now to watch every bit of data going 
in and out of a Federal network, including the SolarWinds 
malware. And yet, the hacking of nine Federal agencies somehow 
went unnoticed.
    So what I'd like to see is if we can all agree before 
seeking new powers to surveil the domestic Internet, we all 
ought to be working together--you, DHS, all of the agencies--so 
that more can be done to detect hacking that's going on in our 
own networks.
    What is your thinking on that?
    General Nakasone. Senator, I think you point out really the 
important piece here, is that there is no one answer to this 
question. And so as I've talked about, we need the Intelligence 
Community being able to see what's going on outside of our 
borders. We need, obviously, our law enforcement capabilities 
to be able to understand what's going on, obviously, within the 
United States. We need government to be resilient upon which 
these intrusions are taking place.
    The challenge we have right now, though, Senator, is what 
our adversaries are doing is not spear phishing. It's not 
guessing passwords. It's utilizing supply chain operations. 
It's using zero-day vulnerabilities--those vulnerabilities that 
a provider doesn't even know about. We call that ``above best 
practices.'' And when they do that, we need this total entire 
capability to bring to that.
    So again, I think as we take a look at our capabilities--as 
adversaries move into U.S. infrastructure--to make sure that we 
can identify them and be able to alert what's going on is going 
to have to be looked at, Sir.
    Senator Wyden. My point is only, General, let's look at 
ways to shore up our own house first before we start talking 
about approaches that could unravel some of these sacred 
Constitutional rights that Americans feel so strongly about. 
And I'll follow-up with you on this when we're offline.
    Director Wray, a question for you.
    In July, I sent you a number of questions related to FBI 
operations in Portland last summer. I asked for responses that 
I could share with my fellow Oregonians who want to know what 
happened in our State. I'd like to ask you now, can I have 
those responses within two weeks?
    Director Wray. We'd be happy to try to get a response back 
to you in two weeks. I'll have to take a closer look at the 
specific items.
    Senator Wyden. Great. One last question if I might, and I 
think this would be appropriate for Director Haines.
    You and I have been talking about this question of privacy 
being at the mercy of unscrupulous data brokers. One of part of 
the solution is making sure that when the government wants 
Americans' records, it goes through a legal process. The other 
is making sure our adversaries can't buy up this data, which 
includes the private records of U.S. Government officials.
    During your confirmation process, you agreed that this 
could harm national security. Would you support legislation, 
work with us, to keep all of this data out of the hands of our 
adversaries?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    So I think we had a conversation, absolutely correct, on 
commercially-acquired information and how it is that the 
Intelligence Community deals with it. And I think I absolutely 
agree with you that we need to establish a framework that is 
clear and that has privacy and civil liberties at its heart, 
and also addresses the functionality of it for the Intelligence 
Community.
    So I think that is one issue. And I believe in trying to 
produce that framework in a way that allows the American public 
to see what the framework is, essentially, even if they don't 
have visibility into the particular transactions or what we are 
doing to push for that. And so that's one piece.
    I think on the second piece, I agree with you that there's 
a concern about foreign adversaries getting commercially-
acquired information as well, and am absolutely committed to 
trying to do everything we can to reduce that possibility in 
the national security arena.
    Senator Wyden. I'll follow-up with you promptly. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Risch.
    Senator Risch. Thank you, Chairman Warner.
    My first question is for Director Burns, based on your long 
history of dealing with issues in the Middle East. One of the 
things I found missing from this report, and obviously, it's 
always easy to criticize something--a product you didn't help 
produce. But there's an absolute dearth of reference here to 
the Abraham Accords, which seems to me to change dramatically 
what's going on in the Middle East.
    And obviously, it's a threat assessment, but it seems to me 
whether a threat is increased or decreased ought to be 
mentioned in here.
    Could you give me your thoughts on what effect the Abraham 
Accords are having? I think most of us know, but I'd like to 
get on the record your thoughts of what affect the Abraham 
Accords is having, inasmuch as it's not included in the 
assessment?
    Director Burns. Yes, Sir.
    Well, I believe the Abraham Accords, as I mentioned I think 
in my confirmation hearing, were a very positive step for the 
United States, for Israel, and for the wider interest of 
stability and security in a region in which stability and 
security are often in short supply.
    I know it's the intention of this Administration to try to 
build on the Abraham Accords and expand the number of countries 
who are willing to engage and normalize with Israel. It's never 
an easy task, but I think it's a very important one.
    Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate your thoughts on 
that.
    Next one is for Director Haines. Your office is prominently 
on the front page. So again, I'm going to talk about something 
I think that needs more than what--for consumption by the 
American public. On page 20, you talk about the cyber threat. 
Back in the day when this annual threat assessment was done 
every year, it was a lot easier when we were talking about 
symmetric kind of threats that we face.
    Today, we live in an asymmetric world. And with all due 
respect, I really think that the cyber provision here should 
have been expanded. And I think the threat should have been 
underscored more than it was, particularly in light of the fact 
that in my judgment, I think our most urgent threats are 
asymmetric rather than symmetric. And cyber is obviously right 
in the heart of that.
    Could you give me your thoughts on that, please?
    Director Haines. Absolutely.
    Senator, I think there's nobody that would disagree with 
you in my experience in the Intelligence Community that cyber 
is a major threat and that our asymmetric threats are critical. 
The debate really centered on whether or not, in a sense, to 
emphasize it more in this section or to do so as we have done 
in the state actor threat piece, where you'll see that we've 
identified the cyber threats that are associated with many of 
the state actors that are our greatest adversaries in this 
space.
    And so it is not intended to reflect a lack of 
prioritization or emphasis on it, but rather the fact that it 
really imbues the entire threat assessment in many respects. 
Sort of pulling on it in different categories is critical.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. And we know that over the 
years, the threat when it comes to cyber was mainly non-state 
actors. But a worrisome trend is more and more we're seeing 
state actors involved in cyber activity that threatens us. And 
I think probably the reason is, is there doesn't seem to be 
that much of a price that they pay for this. And it seems to me 
that that should be underscored more in the report. Your 
thoughts?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. I mean, I think you're 
right to indicate that we have as a country--and I think from a 
policy perspective--we've seen policymakers struggle with how 
to effectively deter these types of attacks, whether from non-
state actors or state actors and how to address that issue. And 
a lot of time and effort has been spent on that, and I know 
you're well aware of it.
    I think in the context of transnational organized crime, in 
effect, there is work that is being done to try to deter it 
through a variety of means. But whether it's effective, I think 
it's fair to say that it's not as effective as we'd like it to 
be. I think General Nakasone may have more views on this, and 
defer to him as well if you're willing.
    Senator Risch. My time is almost up, but glad to hear your 
thoughts.
    General Nakasone. Senator, I think as the Director pointed 
out, this is an instrument of national power now by many 
countries. And so, one of the things that I think our Nation 
has done over the past years is really realize that we must be 
continually involved in this domain in cyberspace. This is what 
we've learned over the past two elections. We will continually 
be involved well into the future as we take a look at what our 
adversaries want to do.
    Senator Risch. I appreciate that. I have other questions, 
but will save it for the closed session. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. I think Senator Risch makes a good point, 
and I think it raises the issue again of attribution and doing 
that in a timely manner.
    Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Chairman. As we witnessed on 
January 6, the most serious threat to our democracy sometimes 
comes from within. Last December, over four months ago now, I 
wrote a letter to FBI Director Wray and the acting director of 
the DHS Intelligence and Analysis Office, asking for a public 
written assessment of the threat that QAnon poses to our 
country.
    Director Haines, I want to thank you for following up on 
your commitment to ensure that we received a response to that 
letter. On February 11, I did receive a response, but 
unfortunately it was designated for official use only. That 
means it's not classified, but it still cannot be made public. 
And so I've spent the last two months working with the FBI to 
get this assessment downgraded into the public realm, with no 
success.
    Now, the Constitution protects the advocacy of all kinds of 
beliefs and views, even those that philosophically embrace 
violent tactics. But the public deserves to know how the 
government assesses the threat to our country from those who 
would act violently on such beliefs. And that's the public 
assessment that I asked for.
    So Director Wray, why is it that you cannot or won't tell 
the American people directly about the threat that adherents to 
the QAnon conspiracy theory presents?
    Director Wray. So, Senator, I appreciate your question.
    First, let me say that I think in our effort to get you 
information about what is in many cases ongoing law enforcement 
investigations, we were trying to give you as much information 
as we could in an unclassified way. I recognize the FOUO 
dimension complicated things. And my understanding is that my 
staff is working with yours, and we should be able to get you a 
fully unclassified version very shortly.
    In the meantime, let me say this. You know, we focus on the 
violence and the Federal criminal activity, regardless of the 
inspiration. We understand QAnon to be more of a reference to a 
complex conspiracy theory or set of complex conspiracy theories 
largely promoted online, which has morphed into more of a 
movement. And like a lot of other conspiracy theories, the 
effects of COVID--anxiety, social insulation, social isolation, 
financial hardship, et cetera--all exacerbate people's 
vulnerability to those theories. And we are concerned about the 
potential that those things can lead to violence.
    And where it is an inspiration for a Federal crime, we're 
going to aggressively pursue it. And in fact, we have arrested 
at least five self-identified QAnon adherents related to the 
January 6 attack specifically.
    Senator Heinrich. Director, let me follow-up a little bit 
on that. You're no doubt familiar with some of the public 
speculation that Q is really Ron Watkins, the administrator of 
the Internet image board 8kun, formerly known as 8chan. Whether 
or not Watkins is Q, he and his father clearly are responsible 
for hosting these sites and co-opting further in the QAnon 
conspiracy phenomenon.
    Given the prominent role that QAnon did play in the January 
6 attack on the Capitol, what are the potential legal 
repercussions for those who might be primarily responsible for 
propagating these sorts of dangerous and in some cases violent 
messages in these forums?
    Director Wray. Well, I think your question starts to raise 
different legal theories. We obviously, again, have to be 
careful to be focused on violence, threats of violence, and 
things that violate Federal criminal law. That doesn't mean 
that rhetoric isn't a societal problem that doesn't need to be 
addressed. But from the FBI's perspective, from a law 
enforcement perspective, we try to be very careful to focus on 
violence, threats of violence, and associated Federal criminal 
activity.
    There may be certain instances where language becomes part 
of a conspiracy, for example. And there are instances where 
there are other Federal statutes which may be violated. But 
again, those are complicated questions which I would refer to 
the lawyers over at the Justice Department.
    Senator Heinrich. So for any of you, as a follow-up, I 
think a few years ago as a Nation, we really put enormous 
effort into understanding the mechanisms by which violent 
extremists and groups like the Islamic state, for example, 
became radicalized in chat rooms and online forums.
    Are we applying that rigor to the DVE radicalization 
problem?
    Director Wray. So we are using our joint terrorism task 
forces, of which we have over 200 all around the country, to 
investigate not just the homegrown violent extremists, the 
Jihadist-inspired terrorists, but also the domestic violent 
extremists. And certainly in both cases, there are a lot of 
parallels. You have individuals largely able to connect online. 
It provides a greater decentralized connectivity. And as I have 
said before, terrorism today--and that includes domestic 
violent extremism--moves at the speed of social media. And so 
that means recruitment. That means planning, training, 
dissemination of propaganda, et cetera. All those things that 
apply and that happen on the Jihadist-inspired side in many 
cases are also happening on the domestic violent extremist 
side. Obviously, there are on the domestic extremist side, 
Constitutional protections, and chronic and legal challenges 
that we have to be mindful of, especially given some of the 
history in this country clearly.
    Senator Heinrich. Yes, clearly.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Director Burns, let me take this opportunity to thank you 
publicly for your focus on the medical injuries suffered by CIA 
and other personnel that are commonly referred to as the 
``Havana Syndrome.'' I'm going to have a question for you on 
that when we're in closed session, but I did want to publicly 
thank you and acknowledge your efforts.
    I want to turn to Afghanistan, Director Burns. Our country 
has already sharply reduce its footprint in this country. 
There's no doubt that Americans are tired of our endless wars 
in Afghanistan. But there are many experts who are warning of 
the adverse consequences of President Biden completely 
withdrawing our troops and our presence in Afghanistan. If, as 
many experts predict, the Taliban will make significant 
territorial gains once U.S. forces are gone. What would be the 
implications for U.S. interests both regionally, here at home, 
and globally?
    And if I've directed it to the wrong person, feel free 
to--.
    Director Burns. Well, Senator Collins, thank you very much 
for the question and thank you for your earlier kind comments.
    I promised in my confirmation hearing that I take very 
seriously ensuring that our colleagues at the CIA, but also 
working with my partners on this panel, receive the care that 
they deserve, and that we get to the bottom of the question of 
what caused these incidents and who might have been 
responsible. And I look forward to staying in close touch with 
you on that. I know my colleagues at CIA deeply appreciate your 
personal commitment on this issue.
    With regard to Afghanistan, I'll begin and then turn to 
Director Haines.
    I guess what I would say at the start is that I think we 
have to be clear-eyed about the reality, looking at the 
potential terrorism challenge, that both Al-Qaeda and ISIS in 
Afghanistan remain intent on recovering the ability to attack 
U.S. targets, whether it's in the region, in the West, or 
ultimately in the homeland. After years of sustained 
counterterrorism pressure, the reality is that neither of them 
have that capacity today and that there are terrorist groups, 
whether it's Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or in other 
parts of the world, who represent much more serious threats 
today.
    I think it is also clear that our ability to keep that 
threat in Afghanistan in check from either Al-Qaeda or ISIS in 
Afghanistan has benefited greatly from the presence of U.S. and 
coalition militaries on the ground and in the air, fueled by 
intelligence provided by the CIA and our other intelligence 
partners. When the time comes for the U.S. military to 
withdraw, the U.S. Government's ability to collect and act on 
threats will diminish. That's simply a fact.
    It is also a fact, however, that after withdrawal, whenever 
that time comes, the CIA and all of our partners in the U.S. 
Government will retain a suite of capabilities, some of them 
remaining in place, some of them that will generate, that can 
help us to anticipate and contest any rebuilding effort. And 
further, it's a fact that there are a number of other 
variables, I think, involved on that question of rebuilding. 
It's the role the Taliban themselves play. They've been 
fighting against ISIS in Afghanistan for many years, whom they 
view as a very potent ideological rival. They have an 
obligation to ensure that Al-Qaeda is never again able to use 
Afghanistan as a platform for external plotting.
    There's the question of the continuing capacity of the 
government of Afghanistan with our support to fight terrorists. 
And there's the question of whether or not Al-Qaeda or ISIS in 
Afghanistan or ISIS, in general, seeks to relocate fighters and 
leaders to Afghanistan as well. There's the question of the 
role that neighbors play who also have a concern about 
spillover from Afghanistan.
    So all of that, to be honest, means that there is a 
significant risk once the U.S. military and the coalition 
militaries withdraw. But we will work very hard at CIA and with 
all of our partners to try to provide the kind of strategic 
warning to others in the U.S. Government that enables them and 
us to address that threat if it starts to materialize.
    But, over to you.
    Director Haines. No, Senator, I think I fully agree with 
Director Burns' analysis, and that is the Intelligence 
Community's perspective on this issue.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Senator King, I believe, online on WebEx.
    Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to start with an issue that has been touched upon, 
and that is the gap in intelligence coverage between our 
foreign-facing agencies and domestic agencies. I think Director 
Wray referred to it as a blind spot. How do we deal with this? 
Director Haines, this SolarWinds is a perfect example. It was 
Russian motivated, Russian instituted. They did the work, but 
it was implemented through servers and infrastructure within 
the United States. So they went through this blind spot, if you 
will.
    What are your suggestions of how we deal with this, bearing 
in mind the obligations of the Fourth Amendment and the 
protection of privacy of American citizens?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator King.
    I think it's an excellent question, and it's one obviously 
that we're struggling within a series of areas in our 
discussion of DVE, in our discussion of cyber, in areas like 
malign influence, and so on. And I think, from at least my 
perspective, we are working through each of these issues very 
carefully to ensure that we're complying with the law; that 
we're within our authorities; that we're doing what we should 
be doing. And taking into account privacy and civil liberties 
and the questions that are so critical to anytime that we are 
collecting intelligence along these lines and trying to 
combine, in effect, domestic and intelligence sources.
    And in that space, trying to then also provide analysis 
that gives people the full picture. But I think, as General 
Nakasone noted, there are some real challenges that we're 
facing in this area. And I think--.
    Senator King. Well, let me ask a specific follow-up, 
perhaps to General Nakasone.
    If you see activity of this kind in your work overseas, are 
you allowed to tip the FBI and say, we think this is happening, 
you should follow-up?
    General Nakasone. Certainly, we are allowed to do that. We 
do that quite frequently, regularly with Director Wray's folks, 
and they do a very good job.
    Senator, if I can just lay this out just a bit, because I 
think it's important to understand the whole spectrum of it. So 
it does begin overseas, understanding what our adversaries are 
doing outside the United States. To Director Wray's point, in 
the United States, it is the public-private partnership. We 
need to be able to understand that when adversaries come into 
the United States and use our infrastructure, whether or not as 
servers or Cloud providers, that there is coverage on that.
    It's also this idea that we understand what an intrusion 
may have taken place. So this idea of being able to understand 
the data that may be lost and be shared is really important.
    And then the last point is, is that we need, obviously, the 
public and the private industry to have the most resilience 
possible. And so there is a complete responsibility there. But 
I would offer--.
    Senator King. I've got limited time, Director, so let me 
follow-up on a different question. But I think this is 
something that bears a lot of discussion. And I hope you all 
will share with us your thinking of whether we need to change 
authorities or how we fill in this blind spot, maintaining our 
protection of privacy in our country.
    General Nakasone, four or five years ago, I asked one of 
your predecessors a simple question. Do our adversaries fear 
our response in cyberspace? Are they deterred to the point of 
changing their calculus as to whether or not to launch a cyber-
intrusion or an attack against us? I want to ask you the same 
question.
    Is there an adequate deterrent or is this something we 
still need to establish more clearly as a matter of policy?
    General Nakasone. So Senator, I'm not sure in terms of 
whether or not our adversaries fell that or are necessary, but 
here's what I know that our adversaries understand that's 
different today than it was several years ago: that we are not 
going to be standing by the sidelines, not being involved in 
terms of what's going on with cyberspace and cybersecurity. 
Over the past several years, whether or not it's been defending 
our elections or being able to provide quicker attribution, 
this is our focus. And this has been the focus of the Agency in 
the IC and across our government.
    Senator King. Thank you.
    And I know that I'm out of time. Director Burns, one 
question for the record, please. If you could provide an 
estimate of climate refugees over the next decade or 15 years 
or so, I think that's going to be a very significant national 
security challenge. How many refugees does your agency estimate 
will be on the move because of the inhospitable climate in 
their region? That's something you can give me for the record. 
I'd appreciate it.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    Senator Blunt.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
    And Director Haines, Director Burns, and General Berrier, I 
think this is the first time the three of you have appeared at 
this particular hearing. And certainly, we're glad and grateful 
to have all of you here.
    Director Haines, let's talk a little bit. You and I have 
talked about the overhead architecture issues. Part of the 
development of how you use AI is how much information you have 
to continually train on. We may talk about that later this 
afternoon. But for right now, the Chinese have announced public 
plans for 138 satellite commercial constellations that can 
image around the globe every ten minutes. How big a risk is 
that for us? And what can we do to enhance our own diversity by 
expanding the number and the diversity of the satellites we 
have up there, providing constant information, commercial and 
non-commercial?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I think it may be useful to have a further discussion about 
this in closed session, but I think there's just no question as 
a general matter, that China is focused on achieving leadership 
in space, in effect, as compared to the United States and has 
been working hard on a variety of different efforts in this 
area to try to contest what has been presumed our leadership in 
these areas. And I think for the details, let's discuss in 
closed session.
    Senator Blunt. Well, I think we'd want to do that and look 
at both the diversity of what we have up there and how it 
competes with what they'll have.
    On a really different question, Director Burns, you have 
extensive personal knowledge and experience with Putin. How do 
you assess what he's doing right now near and in the eastern 
Ukraine and the impact that that may have? Is this an actual 
movement? Do we think it's a bluff to try to get concessions? A 
little of both? What do you think about the Putin actions right 
now as it relates to Ukraine?
    Director Burns. Well, Senator, thanks for the question.
    I think, as I said in my confirmation hearing, most of my 
white hair came from serving in Russia and dealing with Putin's 
Russia over the years. So, one thing I've learned is not to 
underestimate the ways in which President Putin and the Russian 
leadership can throw its weight around.
    I think--and I'll turn to General Berrier about this in a 
moment--but I think, obviously, the Russian military buildup in 
Crimea and alongside the border of the Donbas is a serious 
concern. I think it could be a combination of the things that 
you mentioned, signaling a way of trying to intimidate the 
Ukrainian leadership. Signals to the United States. But also 
that buildup has reached the point where it also could provide 
the basis for limited military incursions as well.
    And so it's something not only the United States, but also 
our allies have to take very seriously. And I know Director 
Haines and I and others have been involved and a number of 
briefings and conversations with our allies as well, so that 
we're sharing information and they share that same concern. I 
think, that we have as well. And that was part of the purpose 
of the President's call yesterday to President Putin was to 
register very clearly the seriousness of our concern.
    Senator Blunt. Good. We could probably talk about that more 
later, too.
    General Berrier, what's your sense of what's happening 
there and the concerns we should have about it?
    General Berrier. Senator, working with our partners in 
Joint Staff J2, European Command, NATO, and our key Five Eyes 
partners, the Russians have positioned themselves to give 
themselves options. So as we've watched that buildup of forces, 
they could actually be going into a series of exercises 
starting any time, or they could, if they chose to perhaps do a 
limited objective attack. They may take that option. We don't 
know what the intent is right now. I agree with Director Burns 
and his assessment of that. And we can go into more detail in 
the close session, Sir.
    Senator Blunt. OK. Let me see if I can get one more 
question in, General Berrier. We know that our adversaries, and 
no matter what level of involvement they had in the pandemic, 
we can see now the impact that has on a big open free society 
like ours. But they also can see the impact it has on the 
military, like what happened on the ``USS Theodore Roosevelt'' 
and in other places.
    What are we thinking about as a potential way we'd respond 
to similar circumstances from a defense point of view?
    General Berrier. Senator, the pandemic has given us 
insights on how we can do our jobs better, should this happen 
again. In terms of readiness of our key adversaries that we 
watch, I think initially it did have an impact on the readiness 
of those forces, although they seem to have overcome that. As 
an example is what we're seeing with the Russians in the 
Ukraine and the Crimea right now does not appear to be impacted 
by COVID, and so, we continue to watch that very carefully 
across the spectrum of foreign military intelligence.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. I think a number of us are very interested 
in Senator Blunt's questions about Ukraine. We look forward to 
that this afternoon.
    Senator Bennet.
    Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all 
for being here today. I really appreciate it. In the annual 
threat assessment, Director Haines, you wrote that, ``Beijing 
is working to match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space, to 
gain the military economic and prestige benefits that 
Washington has accrued from space leadership.'' You also wrote 
that, ``China has counter-space weapons capabilities intended 
to target U.S. and allied satellites.''
    In December 2020, U.S. Space Command said that Russia 
conducted a test of a direct descent anti-satellite missile, 
which if tested on actual satellite or used operationally would 
cause a large debris field that could endanger commercial 
satellites and pollute the space domain.
    Could you tell the American people what we are doing to 
maintain our superiority in space, and what the role of the 
private sector is in doing that?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I would say that--well, obviously, we'll have a further 
discussion in close session. But the private sector has just 
become increasingly important in our efforts to contest and to 
work, essentially, against contestations to our leadership in 
space. But what I can say is that we have been working very 
hard to ensure that the policy community understands, and that 
obviously we support Space Force in its work to promote, in 
effect, U.S. leadership in space. And it's been an area where 
we benefit, as we've indicated, economically, from a security 
perspective, from a communications perspective, and from the 
perspective of just understanding and intelligence perspective. 
And all of those things are areas where we want to ensure that 
we continue U.S. leadership in this area, and we'll get into 
further details after--.
    Senator Bennet. I look forward to our conversation later.
    Director Burns, according to Freedom House, democracy 
around the world has been in retreat for 15 years against 
authoritarianism. And we know that countries like China and 
Russia want nothing more to continue that for another 15 years, 
or maybe another 50 years. How do you assess the primary 
threats to democracy around the world, and which regions have 
we seen the most significant democratic retreats? Which regions 
do you consider most at risk, and how are our adversaries 
thinking about this?
    Director Burns. Thanks, Senator.
    Senator Bennet. I probably should have called you Secretary 
Burns when I asked you this question, but I couldn't resist.
    Director Burns. No, thanks, Senator, very much. Well, I 
think the problem of erosion of democracies, as Freedom House 
points out, is a very real one in many parts of the world, 
those that have established democracies and those where 
democratic governance is quite fragile. That has partly to do, 
I think, across the board with questions about the ability of 
democratic governance to deliver. I think you've seen some of 
that in our own country in recent years. We haven't been immune 
from that at all.
    So, the challenge, and I think President Biden has 
emphasized this, is working with other democracies, and I say 
this as an analytical judgment, to help restore that faith in 
the ability of democratic governance to deliver for people. 
That deprives authoritarian leaderships, whether it's the 
Chinese Communist Party or Vladimir Putin's Russia, of an 
argument that they use that somehow authoritarian systems are 
better able to deliver. The reality is that there's a great 
deal of resilience in democratic systems. But it's important 
for all of us that have democratic governments to demonstrate 
that, to renew ourselves. I think that's always found in--in 
many years in my previous incarnation serving overseas, that we 
get a lot further through the power of our example than we do 
through the power of our preaching. And I think that's true for 
any democratic government around the world.
    The last thing I'd say is we've talked earlier in this 
discussion about the role of technology. And I think that's 
also something to be very mindful of, because the proliferation 
of surveillance technologies, for example, are one tool that 
authoritarians use to strengthen their grip and make it more 
difficult for democratic governance to emerge in lots of 
fragile societies around the world.
    Senator Bennet. And in that context, Director Wray, of 
fragile societies and the risk that's posed to democracy, I 
wonder if you could share with the American people what you 
have learned about the intersection of social media platforms 
and domestic violent extremists, and what the American people 
can do to be more canny users of those platforms. What should 
they be on the lookout for?
    Director Wray. So, certainly, social media has become in 
many ways the key amplifier to domestic violent extremism, just 
as it has for malign foreign influence, which we've discussed 
at great length with the Committee as well. It proves a level 
of the same things that attract people to it for good reasons, 
are also capable of causing all kinds of harms that we're 
entrusted with trying to protect the American people against.
    So, it creates speed dissemination, efficiency, 
accessibility--I referred to before, a level of decentralized 
connectivity. I think I would say that both, with respect to 
malign foreign influence and with respect to domestic violent 
extremism, people need to understand better what the 
information is that they are reading. A greater level of 
discerning skepticism is a crucial ingredient not just to 
protect from foreign misinformation, but also of violent 
extremism.
    There is all sorts of stuff out there on the Internet that 
poses as fact, which just isn't. And there's all kinds of 
connectivity between like-minded individuals, which blocks out 
other voices, which creates a sort of echo chamber effect. And 
then especially with the isolation caused by COVID, increases 
our public susceptibility to some of the same kinds of ills 
that we've talked about at great length.
    So, social media can bring great good to society, but it is 
also a platform for all kinds of security challenges that we're 
trying to counter.
    Senator Bennet. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. General Nakasone, in the recent hearing we 
had on the SolarWinds hack, the issue of notification by 
victims of hacking was raised. And indeed, I believe Senator 
Collins has advocated for a long time in a piece of legislation 
that victims of cyberattacks notify the Federal Government in 
some manner to provide context and complete knowledge of what's 
out there. It seems to me that otherwise, we're looking through 
a soda straw at some of the threats. Do you think requiring 
victims of cyberattacks in the United States, requiring them to 
notify the Federal Government in some way, maybe 
confidentially, is a good idea?
    General Nakasone. Senator, as we were discussing this 
morning, I think to understand the depth and breadth of any 
intrusion in the United States, we're going to have to have 
some means upon which we understand what has taken place. And 
so, obviously the policymakers and yourselves, the legislators, 
will determine that, but I think that's a key component of it 
as well.
    Senator Cornyn. That would help you and the Cyber Command 
in NSA do a better job?
    General Nakasone. Well, certainly, within the United 
States, responsibility obviously rests with the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation.
    Senator Cornyn. Right. I beg your pardon. Director Wray, 
what do you say?
    Director Wray. So, we were very, I think, enthusiastic 
about the recommendation from the Cyber Solarium Commission 
that speaks to this issue. As I mentioned before, the private 
sector controls so many of the dots on all manner of cyber 
threats. And it's important to think of the private sector not 
just in one broad category. There's two big groups that are 
relevant to this issue, and why they go straight to the heart 
of your question. I put them in two buckets. One, there's the 
providers; so, the cybersecurity industry, the IT industry, et 
cetera. They have unique visibility into how adversaries 
traverse U.S. networks. And so, making sure the glue is there 
is critical.
    But then there's also the victims. The reality is that most 
offenders are going to come back to victims again. So most 
cyber actors are coming back, and most victims are going to be 
popping up again. You've got repeat offenders and repeat 
victims. And so, their hard drives, their logs, their servers 
provide key technical dots to who's compromising them; how 
they're being compromised; and then, this is the key, who might 
be targeted next. And that gets back to my point from before, 
about why the private sector outreach is so important.
    One company reaching out to us promptly after they've been 
compromised means that all the rest of the companies that are 
likely to be the next ones hit, we might be able to get in 
front of it. And so, if you think about the scale of the dots 
that are in the private sector, that's why I think that's the 
piece of this--. It doesn't mean that there aren't other tweaks 
here and there in terms of authorities, administrative subpoena 
authority and things like that. But ultimately, for the United 
States, which doesn't have state-owned enterprises all over the 
place to protect against this problem, we really have to solve 
this public-private partnership issue.
    Senator Cornyn. Director Haines, the issue of supply chain 
vulnerability is high on Congress' agenda, and certainly on 
everybody's mind. But I don't really have a clear understanding 
of how good a handle the Intelligence Community has on what 
those supply chains that are critical to our national security 
look like. And we clearly need the help of the Intelligence 
Community, to help Congress, the policymakers, rack and stack 
what are the most urgent priorities. Semiconductors is 
certainly one that's on everybody's mind. But do you think the 
Intelligence Community has a good handle on those, so you could 
help Congress prioritize those so we could attack them from a 
policy perspective?
    Director Haines. Yes. I think, frankly, this is an area 
where we're doing a lot of work. And as you indicate, 
semiconductors are the obvious one, but there are a lot of 
others. And as we've been working through, for example, rare 
earth elements or other key areas where there may be a 
contestation in particular from other countries such as China, 
to our ability to get access to things that are critical to our 
national security, and where we need to promote an effort, in a 
sense, from the policy community to pay attention to it and to 
recognize where there are the vulnerabilities and how to 
address them over time.
    The piece that I find particularly interesting is, to your 
point, how do you prioritize? Because there's just an enormous 
amount of things that you could look at to say we need to have 
a resilient supply chain on, and take action in order to 
promote. And we have been working to try to provide the policy 
community with as much information as possible about what the 
possibilities are, in a sense. But ultimately, there are some 
decisions to be made from the policy community about, what are 
you prioritizing? Where do you want to focus, in a sense? And 
we have been building up an infrastructure that allows us to 
then focus to make sure that we can both track it but also 
provide options for where you might be able to pull, 
essentially, supplies from--that are not the ones that you are 
pulling--in order to have that kind of resilience built-in.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Casey.
    Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all 
three directors and the two generals who are with us today, and 
to commend you for your public service.
    I wanted to start with Director Haines, and probably most 
of my question or two would be directed at Director Haines. But 
certainly, others may have a view on the issues I'm raising.
    I want to talk in particular about supply chains, which 
we've heard a lot about this year, and this idea of outbound 
versus inbound investment by U.S. companies in that context.
    We know that on March 19th, the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission held a hearing to examine how U.S. 
capital investment props up the Chinese government's military-
civil fusion strategy, and ultimately compromises U.S. national 
security. Some witnesses made reference to the Committee known 
by the acronym CFIUS, the Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States, which for decades now has reviewed inbound 
investment but there's nothing comparable for outbound 
investment in terms of review as to the national security 
implications of foreign investments that are made overseas. So 
because we don't have that parallel mechanism in place to 
assess outsourcing by U.S. companies to countries of concern. 
We could have national security implications.
    I've been engaging with Senator Cornyn on this issue on 
developing a similar interagency committee to review outbound 
investment of what we call in the legislation I'm working on, 
critical capabilities to foreign adversaries or non-market 
economies like China.
    So Director Haines, maybe two initial questions. Currently, 
how does the IC work with its partners to assess and mitigate 
the activities of foreign intelligence services and other 
adversaries attempting to compromise U.S. supply chains?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    So it's a really important and interesting question and I 
think just to maybe take them in part.
    So on the issue of outbound and outsourcing how are we 
positioned? I think, from my perspective, I've had a number of 
calls now with my counterparts and kind of coming into the job. 
I think you would be surprised by how many of them in allies 
and partnership countries are interested in talking about this 
issue.
    And one of the things that we are doing throughout the 
Intelligence Community, and I think Director Burns may have 
some thoughts on this as well, is promoting conversations 
between our intelligence services in order to understand what 
they're seeing in this space as well and being able to provide 
that, therefore, to our policymakers as, ``Here is what we are 
seeing with respect to these particular issues that we know are 
critical for supply chain issues and here's where we're seeing 
outsourcing and outbound investments,'' and so on.
    The second thing that I think is interesting, and you may 
already know this, but we're certainly lifting it up in a 
sense, is how many other countries are starting to do CFIUS-
like processes. You'll see Canada has now got a law that 
effectively allows them to review investments or a variety of 
other countries that are starting to do this. And it's another 
reason for why I think our counterparts are talking to us about 
this issue because they're looking to figure out how does the 
Intelligence Community support our CFIUS process? Are there 
ways in which they can do the same?
    And I think that exchange of information can get to many of 
the issues that you're describing in the supply chain area, 
both on the inbound and outbound side of things. And let me see 
if Director Burns has anything.
    Director Burns. No, no, I absolutely agree. And I think 
there are plenty of models on the outbound side that have 
worked in decades past as well, where we can deepen our 
partnerships with other governments, who not only have 
insights, but also have a real stake in taking a very careful 
look at some of those outbound matters.
    Senator Casey. Thank you. That's helpful.
    And just, finally, the last question on this would be does 
the IC view the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist 
Party's civil-military fusion agenda, as a risk currently to 
U.S. supply chains?
    Director Haines. Senator, I think there is no question that 
the Chinese have an advantage in some respects through their 
civil-military fusion approach to things. They are capable, as 
a consequence of directing, in effect, their private sector in 
ways that we simply do not do. And I think that provides a 
short-term advantage, but I think it might be not a long-term 
advantage in the sense that I think that the way we structure 
ourselves actually makes us capable of having some flexibility 
that, over time, sustains our private market in ways that the 
Chinese don't have.
    Senator Casey. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. The vote has started, but we are going to 
try to get Senator Sasse and Senator Gillibrand on WebEx in 
before the end of the first vote. Senator Sasse.
    Senator Sasse. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thanks to the five of you for being here as well. The 
American people are blessed to have an IC that's as serious as 
ours is. We have a lot of--a gazillion patriots and some actual 
heroes in the community and the five of you care deeply about 
the mission and about leading those folks and celebrating them. 
So I just want to say, since most of our time in the Committee 
is spent in an oversight capacity, which is in private, we 
don't get the chance to say in front of the American people 
enough, thank you to the entire intelligence community, and 
particularly the five of you who are leaders.
    Director Haines, I also want to praise your statement. I 
think that your opening statement on behalf of the whole 
community today was incredibly strong. I want to highlight a 
couple of pieces. But I want to admit that in a way I'm just 
riffing on where Chairman Warner opened, that when you do an 
around-the-world threat assessment of what the challenges are 
that we face--and I think Marco, the Vice Chairman, said 
something very similar--I think his riff was more than 90 
percent of all the intelligence and national security 
challenges the American people and our troops face around the 
world, more than 90 percent of them originate in the five bad 
guy category of: long-term tech race with the Chinese Communist 
Party, Russia sowing disinformation and corruption and 
cyberattacks abroad, Iranian nukes and sponsorship of terrorism 
abroad, North Korean nukes, and a grab-bag of Jihadis. Those 
five things are the five big threats we face. There aren't two 
and there aren't really 20 that need to be on that top tier 
list. There are five.
    But one of the things that's new, I think, in the last four 
to six years, is a real consensus in your community and on this 
Committee in a bipartisan way that there is an unparalleled 
number one threat. The five things are not equal. The long-term 
technology race we face with China is the biggest existential 
national security threat we face.
    And I think Chairman Warner did a great job of 
distinguishing between Chairman Xi's command and control 
tyrannical system and his party. But that's not the same as the 
Chinese people. That's not the same as Chinese expats. That's 
not the same as Asian-Americans abroad. And we have to, 
together, the IC and the Committee in a bipartisan way, have to 
make sure we communicate again and again to the American people 
that there is one overarching national security threat we face. 
And it is not race-based, it is not Chinese Americans. It is 
Chairman Xi and his cronies and what they want to do to try to 
dominate the world and oppress people, most acutely the 
Uighurs, but lots and lots of people in their own country and 
abroad.
    And so I think it's important just to underscore some of 
the things, Director Haines, you said on behalf of the entire 
community. You said that, ``The threat we face from China is 
unparalleled. It's not the same as North Korea, as big a deal 
as that is. It's not the same as Russian and nefarious actions 
abroad. China is increasingly a near-peer competitor. China 
will maintain its major innovation in industrial policies 
because Chinese leaders see this strategy as necessary to 
reduce dependence on foreign technologies, enable military 
advances, and sustain economic growth, and thus ensure the CCP 
survival.''
    Chairman Xi is not about the good of his people. He's not 
about the good of 1.4 billion Chinese people. He's about the 
good of his party and the way they oppress their people. You 
also said that China is trying to promote new international 
norms for technology and human rights, emphasizing state 
sovereignty and political stability over individual rights. You 
said that China will remain the top threat to U.S. 
technological competitiveness as the CCP continues to target 
technology sectors, et cetera.
    So I think it was a very strong statement. And as a part of 
what happens, the majority of not just our Committee's work, 
but the majority of this hearing is in private today. But as 
far as something we put before the American people, that's an 
incredibly strong opening statement so I want to commend you 
and the whole interagency process that got it there.
    I'd like to follow-up on your response, though, to Senator 
Casey's comment about the fact that in--I'm putting a finer 
point on it--but in 2018, Congress passed a new law about 
export controls. And the goal is to be sure that we update what 
emerging and foundational technologies we regard as needing to 
be restricted to the CCP. Obviously, the CCP is also involved 
in a massive technology theft--IP theft--project.
    But just at the level of export controls, a law was passed 
in 2018 and it's largely unimplemented. And I think former 
Chairman Burr made the good point that in 5G we should view the 
Five Eyes as allies that we would use to build the technology 
base, whether it's a D10 or a D12, or whatever the strategy is, 
we need something like the TPP again that says freedom-loving 
Nations that believe in open navigation of the seaways, free 
trade, the rule of law, transparent contracts, human rights, et 
cetera--we need an alliance of freedom-loving peoples against 
the CCP's nefarious sponsorship of stuff like surveillance-
state tyranny abroad. But to do that, we have to have clarity 
about what those critical technologies are. So I would love to 
hear some public explanation for the American people of when 
will we have the 2018 law implemented, and probably more a 
30,000 foot view. More importantly, if we're going to build an 
alliance of freedom-loving Nations in this technology race, how 
can we do it? How can we lead allies if we don't have clarity 
for ourselves about what those critical technologies are?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator. Maybe I'll just start 
and welcome my colleagues joining on this.
    I think just to focus in on the intelligence relationships 
in particular and the Five Eye point that you and Senator Burr 
are making, I think it will not surprise you that technology is 
one of the things that we intend to talk to them about, that we 
are already talking to them about at different levels. And I 
think it is entirely right to be focused on the idea that among 
the Five Eyes we can actually do some good work together, in 
effect, in addressing this issue that none of us can do alone 
in a way. And that that's a place where we do need to focus.
    I think also it is true that the policy community is 
working, and I know the Administration is working, on a 
strategy on these issues that would include partners and would 
effectively focus on the kind of issues that you're describing. 
In addition, they are also looking at the technology sectors 
and how it is that you approach each of these to deal with 
whether or not de-linking in all of these different spaces is 
the right thing to do and how to do it, so that you don't 
actually have collateral impact that sometimes can have 
negative consequences in those areas.
    But why don't I leave it to others to comment?
    General Berrier. Senator, I would just say from a DIA 
perspective and the Department of Defense, our closest partners 
are Five Eyes teammates. I have deep personal relationships 
with every one of my counterparts. We talk on a weekly basis. 
And from a strategic competition perspective or an intelligence 
support aspect to strategic competition, they're all in. And so 
this conversation about identifying the technology and how we 
can collectively get after this threat with the CCP, I think 
they are ready for that conversation.
    Senator Sasse. Okay.
    General Nakasone. Yeah, I think Senator, I would just add 
from our competitive advantages think about what our 
competitive advantages for the Nation and for the Intelligence 
Community, whether that's artificial intelligence, big data, 
machine learning, space, all of these are critical capabilities 
that have far reaching implications, not only for our economy, 
but obviously, for the security of our Nation as we take a look 
at where we're going in the future as well.
    Chairman Warner. I mean, I'll just say the Chair and the 
Vice Chair want to complement Senator Sasse for agreeing with 
the Chair and the Vice Chair.
    [Laughter]
    Senator Sasse. It's always helpful. Yes.
    Chairman Warner. Anybody else want to--because we have--
we're kind of clocking down.
    Senator Sasse. Fair enough. In the classified session I 
want to follow-up on particularly some of the Taiwanese pieces.
    Chairman Warner. We're going to go to Senator Gillibrand on 
WebEx and then Senator Cotton.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Director Wray, as you are familiar, the families of the 
victims of the September 11th attacks have requested a number 
of FBI documents to be declassified. As we approach the 20th 
anniversary of the attacks, I'm trying to understand what 
information in those reports could still be so sensitive that 
it cannot be shared with the American people.
    For several months, I have been trying to get FBI to 
provide a classified copy of the documents to the Committee so 
that I can read them myself, but so far the FBI has refused. 
From an oversight perspective, this is deeply concerning. Why 
hasn't the FBI provided the requested documents to the 
Committee and will you commit to providing those documents to 
the Committee now?
    Director Wray. Well, Senator, I understand how important 
this issue is to you personally, and of course, also to the 
victims' families. And as somebody who grew up in New York and 
whose family still lives in New York that's personal to me as 
well. And meeting and engaging with the 9/11 victim families 
was a big part of my own inspiration from my last time in law 
enforcement to come back into service.
    We do have to be a little bit careful here because of 
certain sorts of method issues and grand jury issues. But I 
have instructed our subject matter experts to review to see if 
there's more that we can share and I'm happy to report that we 
have identified some additional documents that we will be able 
to make available for review very shortly. And my staff will 
work with the Committee's staff to facilitate review.
    Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Will you have those documents 
within the next two weeks?
    Director Wray. I'll have to get back with my staff on the 
exact timing but my definition of ``shortly'' is consistent 
with that rough timeframe.
    Senator Gillibrand. Okay, and if you're not going to 
provide the particular document that I have requested, I need a 
reason in writing to the Committee since I, as a member of the 
Committee, have every right to review that document.
    Director Wray. Certainly, Senator. I agree that an 
important part of our collaboration with the Committee is that 
even in those rare instances where we can't provide information 
we ought to be able to and have an obligation, I think, to 
explain to you why.
    Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
    To Director Haines and to General Nakasone, I'm very 
concerned about these blind spots, as we've already heard in 
testimony today, that our opponents are using the U.S. 
infrastructure and loopholes to penetrate our infrastructure, 
our companies, our data, in a way that really prohibits us from 
following through on our investigations in terrorist groups and 
other international risks.
    I understand there are legal reasons, and I've heard the 
testimony that we want to talk about how we can ask the private 
sector to perhaps consider having a required reporting law 
passed, and I think that's a reasonable approach. But I'd like 
a little more context and information from both of you on how 
you see these gaps and these blind spots.
    And, in fact, when we do have foreign terrorist attacks and 
undermining of our democracy, such as what Russia tried to do 
with the election, and undermined public confidence in our 
electoral process and exacerbated sociopolitical divisions in 
the U.S., these are serious, serious issues. And I don't like 
hearing that we have blind spots.
    So I'd like a little more analysis about if there are other 
authorities that are needed. And I've heard you all say you 
don't need other authorities, but I guess I'm not willing to 
accept that we are going to have blind spots. I think there has 
to be an appropriate way to give the tools that our 
Intelligence Community needs to be able to constantly protect 
against cyber threat, cyber terrorism, and cyberattack.
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I'll just start, and obviously I'll leave the bulk of the 
answer to General Nakasone, who will have more views on the 
specifics in this area. But I would say that--I think, really 
support the law that is currently being considered, which is 
basically something that would create, as I understand it, an 
obligation on companies to provide information when there are 
attacks, much like FireEye did in the context of SolarWinds. 
And that is something that I think would be useful.
    It is obviously one piece of the puzzle, and I think 
General Nakasone can speak with greater authority on what 
specifically the other issues are, and answering your further 
questions.
    General Nakasone. Senator, I share your concern with these 
blind spots, and this is something we shouldn't accept. Let me 
be a little bit more specific in terms of the blind spots. When 
an adversary decides that they're going to conduct an intrusion 
into a U.S. company, a U.S. Government agency, one of the 
things that they realize is the fact if they can come into the 
United States and use an Internet service provider in a period 
of time, they can quickly do that and conduct their operations 
and virtually not have any coverage in a timely manner from our 
ability to do surveillance in the United States. And that's 
obviously through a warrant, most likely done by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.
    They understand the timeline that it takes for a warrant to 
be done, and so they are being able to expose this gap. This is 
one of the areas that we have to understand our adversaries are 
using today. It's the way that they have structured their 
activities, and it's in a way that we as we go forward need to 
be able to address. Again, it's not that we are looking for 
authorities for the National Security Agency. It's let's make 
sure that we identify what's taking place, so the appropriate 
measures can be undertaken.
    Chairman Warner. Senator Cotton.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you all for your appearance here 
today. These hearings are always a welcome opportunity to 
highlight the work that you and all of the men and women do in 
your agencies and organizations to help keep our country safe. 
Most of the Committee's work, like most of your work, happens 
behind closed doors in a classified setting, so the American 
people don't appreciate the great work that you and the men and 
women you lead do for our country. So I'm glad that we have a 
chance to highlight this once a year or so.
    I also want to stress the importance of protecting all the 
information that your people collect. And Director Wray, part 
of the FBI's responsibility is to ensure that classified 
information is handled correctly, that it's not disclosed in a 
way that could pose a risk toward Americans' national security 
or intelligence or military operations. Is that correct?
    Director Wray. Yes, that's correct.
    Senator Cotton. And that applies to all persons, to include 
persons especially who are cleared to handle classified 
information as well.
    Director Wray. Well, it's a responsibility that we share 
with other agencies in that respect, but yes.
    Senator Cotton. And so you do investigate instances of 
alleged disclosure of classified information that was done 
wrongly?
    Director Wray. Absolutely. We have quite a number of such 
investigations.
    Senator Cotton. So I just want to take this opportunity to 
call your attention to a letter that Senator Hagerty and I and 
16 other Republican Senators sent to you yesterday, about what 
appears to have been a potentially serious breach of handling 
of classified information by Dr. Colin Kahl, the nominee to be 
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Could I get your 
commitment to provide a prompt response to that letter to the 
United States Senate, since this nomination could be pending 
just anytime now?
    Director Wray. Senator, I'm aware of the letter. I haven't 
had a chance to review it yet, but I'm happy to take it--.
    Senator Cotton. Thank you. I don't expect you to be fully 
apprised of the facts or have a conclusion about whether you 
should or should not, or will or will not, start an 
investigation. But I think it's very worrisome, and there are 
people sitting in Federal prison today for mishandling 
classified information. And if a GS employee is going to be 
sitting in Federal prison because they mishandled classified 
information, we should always insist that everyone handle it 
correctly, no matter how powerful they are or who they're 
connected to. So thank you for that commitment, Director Wray.
    Ms. Haines, I want to turn to a line from the annual threat 
assessment about the migration crisis we see on our southern 
border. It lists several potential factors, in terms of 
seasonal employment opportunities or the pandemic or what have 
you. One factor was perceived changes in U.S. immigration 
policy. Is it possible that a factor could also be actual 
changes to U.S. immigration policy?
    Director Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I think we were looking at the degree of folks coming, and 
so I don't think that there were, in fact, changes at the time 
that would've accounted for. In other words, it was perceived 
changes that they were looking at.
    Senator Cotton. So I know that you are not in charge of 
immigration policy and I don't expect you to be, but I'll give 
you three changes that actually have been made by the Biden 
administration since the first day.
    One, they created an exception to the pandemic exclusionary 
order for minors. Not shockingly, we have a surge of minors at 
the border.
    Two, they eliminated the Safe Third Country agreements with 
Central American countries, most notably Guatemala, the 
geographic chokepoint from Central America. And three, they 
eliminated the Remain in Mexico policy as well. So those are 
three actual policies on which word is out in Central America.
    And finally, I'll just give you this bit of open source 
intelligence that you can go back, Director Burns and Director 
Haines, and tell your analysts about. I was at the border a 
couple weeks ago. I had a chance to see the heartbreaking 
scenes of young mothers and fathers with their young kids under 
the bridge outside McAllen where they were being processed in, 
after having just crossed the river with the help of smugglers 
and traffickers.
    I grabbed a border patrol officer who spoke Spanish so he 
could interpret for me. I asked a couple dozen of them why they 
made the journey now, where they had come from, how long they'd 
been there. Not a single one of them made a comment about 
asylum, in terms of persecution based on race, ethnicity, sex, 
religion, political views, or anything else. The most common 
answers were: Joe Biden, I can get in now, and I want a job.
    I have some other issues I want to discuss, but as I said 
earlier, most of that we have to do in a classified setting, so 
I'll look forward to talking with you all again in a few 
minutes. Thank you.
    Chairman Warner. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator Rubio, 
any closing comments?
    Vice Chairman Rubio. No, I want to thank you guys. I think 
it's been important to get a lot of these things on the record. 
It's a rare opportunity for the American public to hear from 
each of you individually, and I'm glad we were able to do it 
again this year. And I look forward to our session this 
afternoon.
    Thank you all for being here.
    Chairman Warner. Well, let me before I just close, three 
quick things.
    One, I think you've heard this from virtually every member. 
A hearty thanks to not just you, but to literally thousands of 
men and women that work for you, and I hope you will take that 
message back to the workforce. I think Senator Burr mentioned 
we value very much this relationship we have with the IC and 
want to keep it open, and we always want to have your back.
    Two, I think, Director Haines, you've made mention of this. 
I think almost the majority of Members on the Committee are 
actively working on bipartisan legislation that would encourage 
around this idea of tech alliances; that we do this not only in 
a greater way with the private sector, but we also do it with--
even beyond our Five Eye partners.
    And three, as we have discussed again in a broadly 
bipartisan way, we've taken some of the lessons from our 
SolarWinds hearing, and I think we may have at least a partial 
response where, with appropriate liability protections, there 
would be some level of mid-incident reporting to an enterprise 
that would include public and private together. So that we 
could potentially close some of these gaps that Senator 
Gillibrand and others have raised in their questioning.
    Again, we thank you all. We've got a couple of votes.
    We will still reconvene in room SVC-217 at one o'clock. 
Have an enjoyable lunch.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon at 12:15 p.m. the hearing was recessed, subject 
to the call of the Chairman.]

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