[Senate Hearing 117-66]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-66
STRENGTH THROUGH PARTNERSHIP:
BUILDING THE U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 17, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
45-484 PDF WASHINGTON : 2021
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,
AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut TED CRUZ, Texas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Markey, Hon. Edward, U.S. Senator From Massachusetts............. 1
Romney, Hon. Mitt, U.S. Senator From Utah........................ 3
Fritz, Jonathan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for China, Mongolia,
and Taiwan Coordination, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC.............. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 5
Barks-Ruggles, Hon. Erica, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 7
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Jonathan Fritz to Questions Submitted by Senator
Edward J. Markey............................................... 24
Responses of Mr. Jonathan Fritz to Questions Submitted by Senator
Jeff Merkley................................................... 26
(iii)
STRENGTH THROUGH PARTNERSHIP: BUILDING
THE U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on East Asia, The Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SD-419, Hon. Edward Markey, chairman of the subcommittee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Markey [presiding], Coons, Romney, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. This hearing of the Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and
International Cybersecurity Policy, will come to order.
It is a pleasure to chair our second sole hearing of the
East Asia Subcommittee on ``Strength Through Partnership
Building: The U.S.-Taiwan Relationship.''
America's bond with Taiwan's vibrant democracy of nearly 24
million people continues to grow. Taiwan's democracy serves as
a model in the Indo-Pacific.
As authoritarianism deepens its hold in the region, Taiwan
serves as a powerful counter example proving that reports of
democracy's demise are unfounded.
That Taiwan continues to flourish just 100 miles away from
Mainland China is a testament to the enduring strength of its
people and the strength of the universal values that we share
with the people of Taiwan.
The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, three joint communiques,
and six assurances have underpinned this fragile peace in the
Taiwan Strait, insulating Taiwan's democracy and economic
system from serious interference.
We have seen elections which have worked to prove democracy
works in that country, despite widespread Chinese Government
meddling and attempts to spread disinformation, and it served
as a referendum on the Chinese Government's long-standing
efforts to adopt a one country/two systems model for Taiwan.
As Taiwan was preparing to vote, Beijing had begun to strip
away the right to vote in Hong Kong, denying its people the
high degree of autonomy guaranteed by the 1984 Sino-British
declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong.
In the past year, the Chinese military's incursions across
the median line and into Taiwan's air defense identification
zone have increased to their highest level in a generation.
Beyond the Strait, Beijing has turned to the use of force
to assert territorial claims on its border with India, and it
has sought to rewrite maps in the South China Sea, challenging
the international rules-based system.
All of these provocative actions towards Taiwan,
particularly against the backdrop of the PRC's violation of
their agreements regarding Hong Kong, have contributed to great
concern about the PRC's future intentions towards Taiwan.
This hearing offers a chance to discuss ways we can bolster
Taiwan's defenses to avert armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
This hearing also allows us to examine how the United
States can better support Taiwan's standing in the world and
help it build relationships with the international community so
it can withstand Beijing's efforts to deny it access to
diplomatic and economic partners overseas.
We know how China views Taiwan. We should focus our
attention on how the world views Taiwan as a reliable partner.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a preview of what the world has to
gain by giving Taiwan a larger place on the international
stage.
Even in the face of a recent uptick in infections, the
Taiwan model, characterized by early detection, contact
tracing, and universal acceptance of mask wearing, spared
Taiwan the worst ravages of the pandemic.
Just as Taiwan stepped up in providing PPE to our hospitals
at the height of the pandemic in the United States, we must
return the favor by expediting the delivery and increase in the
number of vaccines to our friend and partner, Taiwan.
Senator Romney and I agree upon this issue. The World
Health Organization could have been a forum for Taiwan to share
its remarkable success and best practices with the global
community.
Beijing has used the One China policy as a bludgeon to shut
out Taipei from the World Health Assembly, and Senator Romney
and I, and other members of this subcommittee, campaigned to
allow for Taiwan's meaningful participation.
The Biden administration must use its vote, its voice, and
influence to unlock the doors of the WHA and other
international organizations to Taiwan.
In order to build upon our already strong bilateral
relationship with Taiwan, we have to literally show up. Towards
that end, I was proud that Senator Rubio's Taiwan Fellowship
Act was recently passed by the Senate. The bill will send U.S.
Government officials to Taiwan to learn, to study, and to work
for up to 2 years.
The Indo-Pacific is key to the United States' alliances and
relationships, home to 60 percent of the world's inhabitants,
and this legislation will ensure that more of our civil
servants throughout the United States continue to be able to go
to that region.
So with that, I just want to welcome our witnesses. Thank
you so much for your willingness to be with us today, and turn
to recognize the ranking member, the senator from Utah.
STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
convening this hearing on this extraordinarily important topic.
Thank you also to our witnesses, Mr. Fritz and Ambassador
Barks-Ruggles. I appreciate the commitment you have to this
region, to this people, to the interests of the United States
of America, and your willingness to testify here today and your
ongoing work.
I am going to be very brief this morning. The United States
of America believes that the people of Taiwan should be allowed
to determine their own destiny. This is an inescapable aspect
of having respect for the dignity of humankind.
The Chinese Communist Party, on the other hand, believes
that it should be free to usurp the will of the people of
Taiwan.
Taiwan is not some small outpost. It is comprised, as the
chairman indicated, of almost 25 million people. It is one of
the largest 20 global economies and leads the world in a number
of cutting-edge technologies. It has its own government and its
own military.
The Chinese Communist Party attempts to cut it off from
global association and choke its economy, and it threatens
invasion by military incursion and incendiary language.
The question today is how America, a nation that believes
in the dignity of humanity, can aid the millions of people of
Taiwan to remain free to make their own decisions, to determine
their own course, and to raise their children in the way of
their own choosing.
Quite simply, it is a matter of believing that the people
of Taiwan should be free to make their own choice, or whether
instead the Communist Chinese Party should take that choice
away from them and oppress them.
So I look forward to our chance to hear from our witnesses
and to be able to ask questions on these topics.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey. Thank you so much, and let me then
introduce our first witness.
Our first witness, Mr. Fritz, is the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Bureau. Jonathan Fritz is a career member of the Foreign
Service. He has primary responsibility at the State Department
for China, Mongolia, and Taiwan.
Prior to his current post, he was the director for
bilateral and regional affairs in the State Department's Office
of International Communications and Information Policy.
He has previously also been posted to the U.S. Embassy in
Beijing. Of note, Mr. Fritz also served as an advisor to the
U.S. Trade Representative.
Welcome, Mr. Fritz. Whenever you are comfortable, please
begin.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN FRITZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
CHINA, MONGOLIA, AND TAIWAN COORDINATION, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity to be here
today to speak to you about our partnership with Taiwan and our
efforts to coordinate with like-minded partners to promote
Taiwan's international space and deter conflict in the Taiwan
Strait.
Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the
PRC has endeavored to unilaterally alter the status quo in
cross-strait relations and isolate Taiwan from the
international community.
The PRC's increasingly aggressive behavior toward Taiwan
endangers the very stability that has allowed this region to
peacefully prosper. Despite President Tsai's determination to
maintain the status quo across the strait, Beijing has been
unwilling to engage with her.
Instead, the PRC has continued to apply military,
diplomatic, and economic pressure. To counter Beijing's
attempts to intimidate Taiwan, we will continue to make
available to it the defense articles and services necessary for
Taiwan self-defense.
Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China
policy, the United States has notified more than $32 billion
worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009. Arms sales alone cannot
ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
Our expanding security cooperation encourages Taiwan to
prioritize capabilities that complicate PRC planning for an
invasion, including small mobile cost-effective systems like
coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as reserve force
reform to strengthen Taiwan society's ability to resist in a
conflict.
Beijing has also executed a campaign to entice Taiwan's few
remaining diplomatic partners to discontinue official ties in
favor of the PRC. It has pressured countries to deny permission
for Taiwan representative offices that would conduct unofficial
relations, and it has continued to pressure U.N. agencies to
prevent Taiwan from meaningfully participating in their work.
Strong U.S. support for Taiwan is paramount in light of
this coercive behavior. Today, Taiwan has just 15 diplomatic
partners after losing seven since President Tsai's inauguration
in 2016.
These partners are important for Taiwan in a variety of
manners, not least of which is they advocate for Taiwan's
participation in international organizations.
Through our diplomatic and commercial engagements, we seek
to highlight to these countries the benefits of having a
reliable partner like Taiwan. To support Taiwan's unofficial
bilateral relationships, U.S. missions throughout the world
engage with Taiwan's local representatives.
U.S. leadership and expanding our own engagement with
Taiwan encourages other governments to do the same. Our newly
liberalized guidelines for engagement with Taiwan
representatives were warmly welcomed by Taiwan, probably for
this very reason.
Another way we support Taiwan's international space is
through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, or GCTF.
The GCTF, facilitated by the American Institute in Taiwan and
co-sponsored by allied partners like Japan and Australia,
provides training and technical assistance to third-country
participants, demonstrating the value of Taiwan's expertise and
participation on the global stage.
Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured dozens
of workshops that have provided training to over a thousand
participants. The specifically appropriated $3 million in
funding to support GCTF for the first time this year will
significantly expand that program's reach.
To build Taiwan's resiliency against PRC economic coercion,
we are deepening trade investment and other economic ties. In
November of last year, we established the economic prosperity
partnership dialogue with Taiwan to discuss key economic issues
such as supply chain security, investment screening, and
science and technology collaboration.
Such efforts advance U.S. interests and help diversify
Taiwan's economy away from over reliance on the PRC. High-level
visits that advance our substantive interests are another
important way to show our support.
In April, President Biden sent an unofficial delegation,
led by former Senator Chris Dodd, to mark the 42nd anniversary
of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act and sent a clear
signal about the ongoing U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its
democracy.
Last week, the Biden/Harris administration announced a plan
for international vaccine donations, including to Taiwan. We
were grateful for Senators Duckworth, Sullivan, and Coons
visiting Taiwan to announce that donation and underscore our
deep appreciation for Taiwan's assistance to the United States
in the dark days of the early period of the pandemic. Moving
forward, we will seek and consider opportunities for more such
visits.
Congressional support for Taiwan has been paramount in the
successful and consistent application and articulation of our
long-standing One China policy. Moving forward, we will
continue to rely on your support to achieve shared objectives,
including through appropriations related to implementing the
CHIPS Act to secure U.S. supply chains in advanced
semiconductors.
Now, I would like to give the floor to my colleague,
Ambassador Barks-Ruggles, who will further discuss our efforts
to support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international
organizations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fritz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Jonathan Fritz
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members of the Subcommittee: Thank
you for the opportunity to be here today. It is my honor to speak with
you about our partnership with Taiwan and our efforts to coordinate
with like-minded partners to promote Taiwan's international space and
deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
Since the election of President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the People's
Republic of China (PRC) has endeavored to unilaterally alter the status
quo in cross-Strait relations and isolate Taiwan from the international
community. The PRC's increasing pressure and aggressive behavior toward
Taiwan endanger the very stability that has allowed the region to
peacefully prosper.
Despite President Tsai's determination to maintain the status quo
across the Taiwan Strait, Beijing has been unwilling to engage with
her. The PRC has continued to apply military, diplomatic, and economic
pressure on Taiwan, a democratic partner with whom we share common
values and a common vision for a prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific
region.
To counter Beijing's attempt to intimidate Taiwan and alter the
status quo, we will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense
articles and services necessary for Taiwan's self-defense capability,
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our ``One China'' policy.
The United States notified more than $32 billion worth of arms to
Taiwan since 2009, but arms sale alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability
to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation seeks to encourage
Taiwan to prioritize capabilities that complicate PRC planning for an
invasion, including small, mobile, cost-effective systems like coastal
defense cruise missiles and reserve force reform to strengthen Taiwan
society's ability to resist in a conflict.
Beijing has also executed a concerted campaign to entice Taiwan's
few remaining diplomatic partners to discontinue official ties in favor
of the PRC, has pressured countries to deny permission for new Taiwan
representative offices that would conduct unofficial relations, and has
continued to pressure U.N. agencies to prevent Taiwan from meaningfully
participating in these agencies' work.
Strong U.S. support for Taiwan's international space is paramount
in light of this coercive behavior. Today, Taiwan has just 15
diplomatic partners after losing seven since President Tsai's
inauguration in 2016. These partners are a crucial source of support
for Taiwan, and they advocate publicly and privately for Taiwan's
membership or meaningful participation in international organizations.
To support Taiwan's unofficial relationships, U.S. missions
throughout the world engage with Taiwan's local representative offices.
U.S. leadership in expanding our engagement with Taiwan representatives
encourages other governments to do the same despite PRC objections. Our
newly liberalized guidelines for engagement with Taiwan representatives
were warmly welcomed by our Taiwan counterparts, including
Representative Bi-khim Hsiao of the Taipei Economic and Cultural
Representative Office in the United States.
Facilitated by the American Institute in Taiwan, the United States
supports Taiwan's international space through the Global Cooperation
and Training Framework. The GCTF provides training and technical
assistance to third-country participants, building support for Taiwan
around the world and demonstrating the value of Taiwan's participation
on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, the GCTF has featured
dozens of workshops that have provided training to over a thousand
participants. The specifically appropriated $3 million in funding to
support GCTF for the first time this year will significantly expand the
program's reach.
Additionally, the State Department's Office of Global Partnerships
(GP), in coordination with AIT and TECRO, held three virtual
Partnership Opportunity Delegations to facilitate exchange between the
public and private sectors of the United States and Taiwan in Paraguay,
Eswatini, and St. Lucia.
To build resiliency in Taiwan against economic coercion from
Beijing, we are committed to deepening trade, investment, and other
economic ties with Taiwan. In November 2020, we established the
Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue with Taiwan to discuss key
economic issues, such as supply chain security, investment screening,
and science & technology. Such efforts advance U.S. interests and help
diversify Taiwan's economy away from being overly reliant on the PRC.
We will continue to strengthen U.S. economic ties with Taiwan as an
important priority.
While challenges remain, we will continue deepening our ties with
Taiwan in the face of PRC efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan and its
partners. In April, President Biden continued those efforts by sending
an unofficial delegation of retired U.S. officials to Taiwan, led by
former Senator Chris Dodd. The delegation marked the 42nd anniversary
of the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act and sent an important signal
about the lasting U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its democracy. Last
week the Biden-Harris administration announced a plan for sharing
vaccine donations internationally, including with Taiwan. We were
grateful for Senators Duckworth, Sullivan, and Coons' visit to Taiwan
to announce our vaccine donation and underscore our appreciation for
Taiwan's assistance to the United States in the earliest days of the
pandemic.
Moving forward, we will seek and consider opportunities for visits
to Washington and Taipei that advance our unofficial relationship and
enable substantive exchanges on issues of mutual concern.
Bipartisan Congressional support for our unofficial relationship
with Taiwan has been paramount in the successful and consistent
articulation of our longstanding ``One China'' policy. Moving forward,
we will rely on Congressional support to facilitate shared objectives,
including through appropriations related to implementing the CHIPS Act,
which could help to secure American supply chains in advanced
semiconductors and diversify Taiwan's production base.
Now, I would like to give the floor to my colleague, Ambassador
Barks-Ruggles, who will further explain our efforts to support Taiwan's
meaningful participation in international organizations.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Thank you so much, and let me give you a
more formal introduction, Ambassador.
Ambassador Erica Barks-Ruggles was appointed in January
this year as Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of
International Organization Affairs.
Prior to her current post, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles was a
senior diplomatic scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and was
the acting Chancellor of the College of International Strategic
Affairs at the National Defense University. She also has served
as the Ambassador from the United States to the Republic of
Rwanda.
So we welcome you, Ambassador. Whenever you are ready,
please begin.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERICA BARKS-RUGGLES, SENIOR BUREAU
OFFICIAL, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank
you, Ranking Member Romney, and all distinguished members of
the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here today.
I am appearing before you as the Senior Bureau Official for
the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. I am pleased
that Ambassador Michele Sison, who has been nominated to lead
the bureau, had her hearing before this committee last month.
I want to echo my colleague, Jonathan Fritz's, words about
the importance we place on Taiwan's meaningful participation in
the U.N. and its related bodies, and share some details about
my bureau's work on this important issue.
Taiwan's transparent and democratic management of the
COVID-19 pandemic is a model for the region and for the world.
As you know, this virus knows no politics and knows no
boundary, and we need to ensure that we are hearing from
everyone with a role to play in the fight against COVID-19,
especially those that have been, largely, successful in
protecting their populations from the worst ravages of this
pandemic.
At the U.N. Security Council on May 7th, Secretary Blinken
called for modernization of the coalitions we include in
diplomacy and development efforts, including forging
nontraditional partnerships with civil society and the private
sector.
It is no coincidence that on the very same day he also
called on the World Health Organization to allow Taiwan to
participate as an observer in the World Health Assembly.
Taiwan's public health experts, who have worked to protect
the 24-plus million people on the island, are a prime example
of the key actors with important information to share.
They deserve a voice in the room in institutions like the
World Health Organization. Shutting them out of last month's
World Health Assembly under pressure from the People's Republic
of China weakened us all.
I am proud of the work my team did to advocate for Taiwan's
participation and equally proud of our efforts to work closely
with partners to address and broaden the coalition of countries
that share the objective of having Taiwan's voice heard.
There is, clearly, much more work to be done. In that vein,
for more than a decade the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs has convened biannual talks to address these concerns.
Over time, we have continued to expand the scope and
breadth of these discussions with Taiwan. I had the honor of
convening our twice yearly talks with Taiwan virtually on March
30 of this year.
Key U.S. Government officials and subject matter experts
from the Department of State, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the American Institute of Taiwan engaged
with their Taiwan counterparts to build support among like-
minded countries and incorporate more stakeholders in this
effort.
It is important to note that these talks included a robust
discussion of Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N.
agencies as well as other international organizations and
multi-stakeholder initiatives.
Moving forward, the United States intends to focus on
several priority areas to demonstrate the added value that
Taiwan brings to the international system in tackling regional
and global challenges.
First, working with like-minded nations to advocate for
Taiwan's role in global health efforts, such as COVID relief,
as well as cancer research and other research efforts in the
WHO and its subsidiary organizations, including the
International Agency for Research on Cancer, known as IARC in
diplo-speak.
Second, advocating for opportunities for Taiwan to attend
the International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO, and
Interpol meetings, and exchange key aviation safety and law
enforcement data to promote safer air travel and combat
transnational crime.
Third, including Taiwan in the Biden administration's
renewed efforts to tackle global climate change, partnering
with Taiwan under the auspices of AIT and TECRO to address
critical needs and critical technology related to climate
change.
From halting the spread of deadly disease to ensuring safe
and secure aviation to stopping global criminal networks, the
24 million people of Taiwan can make an important and
constructive contribution in the international system.
In the face of unprecedented global challenges, we will
continue to work assiduously to secure Taiwan's vital voice in
the room.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Barks-Ruggles
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Erica J. Barks-Ruggles
Thank you, Subcommittee Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Romney, and
distinguished Members of the Subcommittee.
I am honored to appear before you as the Senior Bureau Official for
the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Ambassador Michele
Sison, who has been nominated to lead the bureau, had her hearing with
the Committee last month.
I want to echo my colleague Jonathan Fritz's words about the
importance we place on Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N.
and its related bodies, and share some details about my Bureau's work
on this important issue.
Taiwan's transparent and democratic management of the COVID-19
pandemic is a model for the region and the world. This virus knows no
politics and no borders, and we need to ensure we are hearing from
everyone with a role to play in the fight against COVID-19.
At the U.N. Security Council on May 7, Secretary Blinken called for
the modernization of the coalitions we include in diplomacy and
development efforts, including forging non-traditional partnerships
with civil society and private sector actors.
It is no coincidence that on the same day, he also called on the
World Health Organization to allow Taiwan to participate as an observer
in the World Health Assembly. Taiwan's public health experts, who have
worked to protect the 24 million people on the island, are a prime
example of key actors with important information to share. They deserve
a voice in the room in institutions like the World Health Organization.
Shutting them out of last month's World Health Assembly under
pressure from the People's Republic of China weakened us all. I am
proud of the work my team did to advocate for Taiwan's participation,
and equally proud of our efforts to work closely with partners to
broaden the coalition of countries that share such objectives. But
there is clearly much more work to be done.
In that vein, for more than a decade the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs has convened biannual talks to address these
concerns. Over time, we continue to expand the scope and breadth of our
discussions. I had the honor of convening our twice-yearly talks with
Taiwan virtually on March 30.
Key U.S. Government officials and subject matter experts from the
Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and
the American Institute in Taiwan engaged with their Taiwanese
counterparts to build support among likeminded countries and
incorporate more stakeholders.
It is important to note that these talks included a robust
discussion on Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N. agencies as
well as other international organizations and multi-stakeholder
initiatives.
Moving forward, the United States intends to focus on several
priority areas to demonstrate the added value that Taiwan brings in the
international system to tackling regional and global challenges:
First, working with like-minded nations to advocate for
Taiwan's role in global health efforts, such as COVID-19 relief
and cancer research with the WHO and International Agency for
Research on Cancer (IARC);
Second, advocating for opportunities for Taiwan to attend
International Civil Aviation Organization and INTERPOL
meetings, and exchange key aviation safety and law enforcement
data to promote safer air travel and combat transnational
crime; and
Third, including Taiwan in the Biden administration's
renewed efforts to tackle the global climate crisis, partnering
with Taiwan under the auspices of AIT and TECRO to address
critical needs related to climate change.
From halting the spread of deadly disease, to ensuring safe and
secure aviation, to stopping global crime networks, the 24 million
people of Taiwan can make important and constructive contributions in
the international system.
In the face of unprecedented global challenges, we will continue to
work assiduously to secure Taiwan's vital voice in the room.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome
your questions.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Ambassador, so much. Thanks to
the both of you. So we will begin questions from the
subcommittee.
Let me ask you this. Looking back at the Taiwan Relations
Act, the three communiques, and the six assurances which have
guided our very delicate relationship with Taiwan, are there
any plans to alter that framework at all that those
foundational documents have established?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you very much for the question, Mr.
Chairman.
The United States believes that we have been very effective
in stewarding the unofficial relationship between ourselves and
Taiwan since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, and we
have a commitment to maintaining a consistent approach to our
One China policy based on that legislation, and the three joint
communiques as well as the six assurances.
Senator Markey. So nothing is going to change it?
Mr. Fritz. Mr. Chairman, I would say that we are committed
to being consistent in terms of our One China policy.
Within the bounds of that One China policy, certainly, we
are always seeking to strengthen our unofficial ties with
Taiwan, not only because Taiwan on its own merits is becoming a
better partner in many different aspects, but because of the
increasing threat from the other side of the Strait.
Again, I would reiterate that that would take place within
the context of the long-standing U.S. One China policy.
Senator Markey. All right. Let me ask about the vaccines.
What is the schedule for those 750,000 vaccines--the doses to
get to the people of Taiwan?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for that question.
First of all, I would like to reiterate our thanks to your
colleagues for their trip to Taiwan to announce that donation.
I think it is fair to say the reaction on the island was
nothing short of ecstatic.
With regards to actually getting those on airplanes and
flying them, I do not have a set date that I can provide, Mr.
Chairman.
What I can tell you is that Taiwan regulators are working
super intensively with their USG counterparts to make sure that
we have met all of the requirements of the Taiwan regulatory
system.
In very short order, we do expect to have those vaccines on
their way to Taiwan and, hopefully, into people's arms shortly
thereafter.
Senator Markey. You are saying within weeks they will be
there. Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Fritz. I would hope, perhaps, even sooner than that,
sir. I am not able to give a detailed time line for exactly
when. We do have a few more hoops we have to get through to
make sure that we have met all of the regulatory requirements
of our Taiwan friends.
Senator Markey. Okay. Are there plans to partner with
Taiwan to manufacture and distribute vaccines?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Chairman.
As you know, President Biden has made it clear that America
wants to work together with its friends and partners to become
an arsenal of vaccines.
Taiwan does have capacity in this regard, and there are
talks underway to see how we can cooperate with Taiwan, amongst
many others, to get the entire world vaccinated to end this
pandemic.
As both you and the ranking member mentioned in your
remarks, Taiwan was incredibly generous and showed great
flexibility in upping its production of personal protective
equipment in the early days of the crisis.
They ramped up their production many, many multiples of
tenfold and, of course, the United States was one of the great
beneficiaries of their generosity. We will look to do the same
with them on vaccines.
Senator Markey. No, I think it makes a lot of sense, and it
would only deepen our relationship with them.
The United States has supplied 550,000 COVID-19 vaccines to
South Korean armed forces who serve alongside U.S. forces.
Given the consequences of a COVID-19 outbreak to the
operational readiness of Taiwan's armed forces, would the
Administration consider providing vaccines as an extension of
our commitment to Taiwan's self-defense?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, this first tranche we have set aside 750,000
doses of vaccine for the island, and this is, of course, only
the first of what we hope will be many tranches of donations.
I cannot speak to specific allocations that will happen in
the second and then, hopefully, third, and then future
tranches.
We will continue to take into consideration the needs of
our very close friends in Taiwan, keeping in mind not only
their security needs but also the fact that a number of very
critical industries, like semiconductors, for example, could
potentially be affected by an unchecked outbreak of COVID
there.
Senator Markey. Yes, and I recognize that our armed forces
do not serve alongside of the Taiwan armed forces the way our
forces do with the South Korean military.
I do believe that these vaccines can be as valuable if they
go directly to those troops as any weapons system, which we
sell to Taiwan. So I would recommend to the Administration that
they look at that.
So let me turn and recognize the ranking member, the
gentleman from Utah.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it may well be confusing to our public, generally,
and perhaps to people on the Hill to consider two things.
One is the term that says that we believe in the One China
policy and then at the same time to say that we believe the
people of Taiwan ought to be able to choose their own destiny.
Can you describe what the One China policy means and how
you square that with the principle that the people of Taiwan
should be able to choose their own course?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you very much, Ranking Member Romney. That
is a great question and, certainly, one that could use some
further public elucidation.
The One China policy refers to the fact that we have
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and,
of course, that has implications for who is seated in various
international organizations.
My colleague, Ambassador Ruggles, can speak to that. Under
our One China policy, even though our relationship with Taiwan
is now on an unofficial basis, we nonetheless have made clear
in both public statements with private demarches and otherwise
that we will continue to maintain and, in fact, even grow a
very, very close relationship with Taiwan in the security, in
the economic, in the cultural and many other spheres.
As you point out, Taiwan is a fellow democracy. It is
important to peace and stability in the Western Pacific and it
is absolutely in the U.S. interest to make sure that the 24
million people of Taiwan are able to make choices about their
own future free from coercion from across the Strait.
So we will continue to do everything we can to show that
rock-solid American support for Taiwan's democracy and for its
ability to choose its own future.
Senator Romney. My perception of how we are doing really
falls into sort of two buckets. One is associated with the
people of Taiwan.
My reading suggests that what the Communist Chinese Party
has done in Hong Kong has solidified in the mind of the
Taiwanese people that the idea of one country/two systems is
not real, and the most recent actions even today, where the
Chinese Communist Party has raided a newspaper and incarcerated
leaders of an independent newspaper in Hong Kong, this has got
to underscore in the minds of the people of Taiwan that China
has a very different intent than allowing them to operate on
their own if they were somehow combined with China.
On the other hand, my perception is that the nations of the
world, the geopolitical dynamics, have not been working in
favor of a strong and free to make its own choice Taiwan, that
instead the geopolitical dominoes have been falling in the
other direction in terms of them being excluded from more and
more international bodies, having recognition being shut off by
nations in the region. I wonder why it is.
If I am correct that China is, if you will, being more
effective in closing off Taiwan from international support, why
they are being successful at that and why we are being
unsuccessful at that, while they are winning and we are losing.
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Ranking Member Romney.
We are of one mind on your observations regarding Hong Kong
and how that applies to Taiwan. I, obviously, do not want to be
in the position of speaking for folks on Taiwan.
Clearly, PRC promises of high degree of autonomy for Hong
Kong and maintenance of Hong Kong civil liberties have been
completely and thoroughly discredited over the last year,
particularly since the unilateral enactment of the National
Security Law.
So it is no surprise that folks in Taiwan who might at one
point in the past have contemplated some consideration of a one
country/two systems formula would now find that to be an
altogether unappetizing prospect.
With regard to the geopolitical dynamics, certainly, there
are challenges. As you point out, the People's Republic of
China is extremely aggressive in pushing to constrain Taiwan's
political space.
I would point, however, to successes we have had both on
the multilateral front, and I will let Ambassador Barks-Ruggles
talk about that.
Even bilaterally, the Biden/Harris administration has been
quite successful in getting many of our closest friends and
partners and allies to publicly declare their support for peace
and stability in the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan's democracy.
The joint statement that resulted from the visit of the
Japanese Prime Minister, the joint statement that resulted from
the visit of the South Korean President, the G-7 ministerial
communique, the G-7 summit communique, the U.S.-EU summit
document--I cannot remember if it was a communique or joint
statement--in all of these, we have seen unprecedented public
statements in support of Taiwan and peace and stability across
the Strait.
So, again, Ranking Member Romney, I will not deny that the
PRC is applying a lot of pressure on folks around the world to
isolate Taiwan. There are, in fact, some antibodies at work,
and we are doing everything we can to strengthen those
antibodies.
Senator Romney. Thank you.
Senator Markey. The chair recognizes the Senator from
Delaware.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
Chairman Markey, Ranking Member Romney, thank you for
holding a hearing on this vitally important topic, and let me
thank both of our witnesses today. It is great to see you
again.
Ambassador Barks-Ruggles, I must say, as I look back over a
decade, our meeting in Rwanda is truly one of the most
memorable exchanges I have had, and I do not need to go into
details but it will long live in my memory as one of the most
challenging and difficult diplomatic moments we may have both
had together in our brief service to the people of the United
States.
I was so grateful for the opportunity, facilitated by the
Administration, to visit Taiwan with Senators Duckworth and
Sullivan to announce the delivery of vaccines to Taiwan.
We were also in South Korea and had an opportunity to be
there as a million doses were delivered to South Korea as well.
I thought it was an important opportunity for us to make
real our response to Taiwan's kindness to us in the early days
of the pandemic, as the United States was truly struggling with
the provision of PPE.
Taiwan sent 10 million masks to the people of the United
States. In fact, Senator Sullivan brought one of those masks
with him and was wearing it during our press conference when we
landed in Taipei.
So I think it was only fitting and appropriate that the
Administration come to Taiwan's aid with a safe and effective
vaccine, as they have experienced a modest increase in COVID-19
cases but still profoundly concerning to the people of Taiwan.
I think we are all watching conditions in the Taiwan Strait
closely, and this week's entry of 28 Chinese military aircraft
into Taiwan's air defense identification zone.
I would be interested in both of you speaking, if you
could, to the question do you agree that escalating
provocations by the PRC toward Taiwan are failing to create the
appropriate incentives for Taiwan to work towards peaceful
unification?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you very much, Senator Coons.
Let me start off by reiterating my gratitude to you and
your colleagues for making the trip to Taiwan. As you know full
well, at that time the Taiwan authorities were under a fairly
extensive disinformation campaign trying to draw divisions not
only on the island but also between Taiwan and the United
States.
I know it had a very galvanizing effect on the morale of
the entire island. I have a picture from TECRO representative
of the lit-up Grand Hotel with the giant U.S.A. emblazoned on
it.
I think you struck a great blow for Taiwan's democracy and
against attempts by the PRC to undermine that democracy and sow
discord. So thank you again for that.
With regards to your question about recent PLA incursions,
whether its naval forces or its air forces, into the airspace
and waters around Taiwan, you are absolutely right. This is,
unfortunately, part of an ongoing pattern of increasing
military pressure that the PRC is bringing to bear on Taiwan.
The Administration has been very clear in calling this out,
condemning China's attempts to intimidate its neighbors in the
region to include Taiwan, of course, and instead urging that
Beijing engage in dialogue with the Taiwan authorities.
In addition to that, Senator, of course, we are also taking
steps to make sure that Taiwan is able to defend itself. That
is not just a reference to our ongoing arms sales to the
island, but also to our ever-strengthening security cooperation
which is aimed at getting Taiwan's defense approach, if you
will, to more approximate that of a porcupine, so that they
will more faithfully and expeditiously implement their overall
defense concept, moving towards a more dispersed, mobile, and
cost-efficient platforms, training their reserves for a sort of
defense in depth sort of approach--anything that would,
basically, complicate the efforts of the PLA to plan for any
potential invasion of the island.
Senator Coons. I have two more questions, if I might. I
will ask them both and then let you both decide which is the
more appropriate to answer.
Last year in the State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee, I worked to include more robust
funding for the Global Cooperation Training Framework.
This is a way to allow the world to learn more about the
capabilities of the people of Taiwan and for them to be able to
participate in international issues of development,
cybersecurity, engagement, and I think it has been a useful
tool for helping preserve Taiwan's international space.
I would be interested in hearing more about what the
Administration has planned for the GCTF for this year and
future years.
I noted that USTR Ambassador Tai recently had a
conversation with her counterpart, and I would be interested in
what either of you could say about our plans moving forward in
terms of trade talks.
Thank you.
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Senator. I will take a swing at both
of those.
With regards to the Global Cooperation and Training
Framework, thank you and thank your colleagues for the
appropriation of $3 million. That is going to really allow us
to expand that program.
I agree 100 percent, Senator, that has been a very
effective platform for, basically, advertising the Taiwan
brand, if you will.
I think we have something like more than a thousand folks
from around the world who have participated in the various
seminars the GCTF has helped put together.
Another thing that we are doing, the State Department now
has sort of China experts deployed not just in the People's
Republic of China and Taiwan and Hong Kong, but also in
regional hubs around the world, and we are giving those
regional China officers some authorship and some ownership of
the GCTF.
So in the future, it will not just be headquarters folks
plotting and planning those GCTF programs and seminars. We will
have folks actually in, you know, Francophone Africa, for
example, or the Caribbean, who will be able to tailor these to
specific audiences in the parts of the world they are
responsible for.
So I could not agree with you more on the effectiveness of
that, and again, thanks for the appropriation that will really
help us expand that.
With regards to the meeting that Ambassador Tai had with
her counterpart, Minister Deng, obviously, I would defer to
USTR on the details. I will point out that Ambassador Tai and
Minister Deng did commit to restarting our Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement talks.
We have not had a round of TIFA council meetings, I think,
for something like 4 or 5 years now. I do believe the USTR is
planning to hold one of those in the very near future.
There is, obviously, a broad range of issues to go into
great detail with Taiwan, given they are our ninth largest
trading partner and home to many industries of very strategic
importance, whether that is in the health sector or
semiconductors.
I think it is probably safest for me to defer to my
colleagues on 17th Street there, Senator. Thank you.
Senator Markey. As much of cross-strait relations are mired
in strategic ambiguity on both sides, it may become more
difficult to distinguish between actions that fall below the
threshold of conflict with those that risk leading to an
escalation.
We know from the U.S.-China summit in Anchorage, Alaska,
that China's leaders are not shy about referring to Taiwan as a
redline issue or part of its core interests, the implication
being that it is willing to go to war over Taiwan.
I believe that we need to have ongoing dialogues to ensure
that a military exercise or an incident at sea does not become
a prelude to a conflict. As the Singaporean Prime Minister
recently said of the stakes of a U.S.-China war, everything is
to be lost.
Mr. Fritz, do you agree that it is in the interest of all
sides to avoid a war over Taiwan, which would lead to
catastrophic consequences for all parties involved?
Mr. Fritz. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely agree with that, and
I would like to point out that along the lines of what you just
mentioned, in Anchorage and elsewhere our top leadership,
including Secretary Blinken, have made it extremely clear to
our PRC counterparts that it would be a very serious mistake
for them to resort to anything other than peaceful means to
resolve cross-strait differences.
I think in both word and deed we have made it crystal clear
to our friends in Taiwan, to the leaders in Beijing, and to
folks around the world how important peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait is.
Senator Markey. Now, some observers say that China is
unlikely to move to forcefully attempt to unify Taiwan barring
a push for independence by Taiwan. Others note that their
calculus is driven by the moment when it believes it is most
militarily advantageous for them to do so.
Regardless of what motivates Beijing, our policy approach
should be the same. Do you agree that it is important to signal
that any disruption to the status quo, be it through forcible
unification or independence, is unacceptable?
Mr. Fritz. Mr. Chairman, I agree with that statement.
Senator Markey. So I do not believe that we are entering a
new cold war with China, but we can draw upon lessons from
U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russia transparency and confidence-
building steps and formal agreements that help prevent the cold
war from going hot.
I am concerned that we do not have an active crisis hotline
between our militaries and I am also concerned that Secretary
of State Blinken indicated following the Anchorage summit that
we would not be seeking a follow-on strategic dialogue with
China.
It is in our interest to ensure that a conflict of the
strait or the South China Sea does not escalate between the
United States and China, both of whom are nuclear armed.
It is still the position of the State Department that it
does not seek an additional strategic stability dialogue with
Beijing to negotiate measures that reduce the risk of
hostilities?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You raise a very, very
important series of issues there.
I would point out that this Administration, while it is not
interested in dialogue for dialogue's sake, is still very much
committed to maintaining open lines of communication with
Beijing so that sensitive issues like Taiwan, amongst many
others, are not able to cause misunderstandings that could lead
to some unfortunate consequences.
As you pointed out, and, obviously, it is quite in the
public eye, we have already had the Secretary and National
Security Advisor Sullivan meeting with their counterparts in
Anchorage.
I can assure you that the Secretary and the Deputy
Secretary of State have had additional interactions with their
counterparts since then. We expect those to continue, going
forward.
The issue of communications in a crisis is, indeed, a very
important one. That is something that is very high on our
agenda. We have no desire for misunderstandings that could
potentially lead to unfortunate consequences.
So that will, indeed, be something that will factor very
high on the agenda both at the State Department and other
agencies around the executive branch as well.
Senator Markey. Okay. Well, the Chinese military's
incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone and
amphibious assault exercises have increased to their highest
levels in 25 years.
These actions have raised concerns about a looming conflict
over Taiwan.
However, we also know that a protracted conflict over
Taiwan is not likely in China's interest, that their military
does not seem to have the appropriate military capabilities for
such a confrontation and that Beijing has responded in a
similar provocative way to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in the
past and in response to shifts in Taiwanese politics.
Mr. Fritz, to what do you assign recent provocative moves
by Beijing in the Taiwan Strait?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman.
There is some debate about that. Beijing's leadership is
notoriously opaque, and so it would be somewhat difficult for
me to opine with any sort of authoritativeness on what is
motivating the PRC to take an ever more aggressive approach to
intimidating Taiwan.
Certainly, much of it has to do, I believe, with the fact
that the PRC is very upset with the results of the two most
recent presidential elections on the island. That, obviously,
has factored into their calculations quite severely.
The U.S. Government's view is that as Beijing seeks to
disrupt the status quo by upping the pressure, it is incumbent
upon us to further reinforce our support for Taiwan.
In addition to the United States doing that, Mr. Chairman,
I would also point out that another very important factor, we
think, in deterring Beijing aggression is to make this more of
a multilateral issue, and that is why we have worked so hard
with our friends and allies--the Japanese, the South Koreans,
our Five Eyes partners, the G-7, the Europeans--to get them to
come out in public and also voice their support for Taiwan's
democracy and for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Senator Markey. Well, let me just finish up by saying that
Taiwan has taken important steps to increase its defense
budget.
However, it has averaged 1.8 to 2.1 percent of GDP over the
last 5 years, short of the 3 percent target that U.S. and
Taiwan policymakers have made.
My hope is that the Biden administration supports the
effort to get Taiwan to move closer to that 3 percent target.
It is a wealthy country. Is that the goal of the Biden
administration?
Mr. Fritz. Yes, that is, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.
Let me turn, recognize the Senator from Utah, Mr. Romney.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are going to
give Mr. Hagerty a chance to speak in just a minute but he said
let me go first, so I will do that.
There are many fronts on which we would like China to take
a different course. This is, obviously, one of them. Their
ambition to dominate the people of Taiwan, but their treatment
of the Uighurs and minorities, of religions, their predatory
actions in the world economic marketplace, there are so many
dimensions where we would like China to change course.
That raises the question about what we can do and what the
Administration's strategy is with regards to convincing the
Chinese Communist Party to allow Taiwan to determine its own
destiny and not to invade or dominate the people of Taiwan.
I am not talking about military action. Clearly, there is a
military component that figures very significantly into any
effort to dissuade China from invasion or the like.
Putting aside military deterrent, what things can we do
that would have the potential of convincing China, let us not
focus on making Taiwan a vassal state? If we look back, we
walked away from the TPP.
Many people thought that the agreement that we might have
in the region economically would be able to strengthen our hand
relative to China and create a stronger neighborhood.
The Quad, obviously, has potential with regards to that
effort. I am interested in your view and the Administration's
view about what actions we can take. Oftentimes, when people do
bad things we place sanctions on them.
The challenge with sanctions, of course, is what we do
after they have done the bad thing and we would like to prevent
the bad thing from happening.
What is our strategy with regards to convincing the Chinese
not to play a heavy hand with regards to Taiwan?
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Ranking Member Romney. That is a
fabulous question.
First, we point out to our PRC counterparts often that few
countries have benefited from peace and stability in that part
of the world as much as the People's Republic of China has.
Second, we make it clear that this is not just a bilateral
concern. As I pointed out, we have been hard at work making
sure that major partners of ours around the world are speaking
up and demonstrating their support for Taiwan, and again, not
necessarily in a military fashion. Diplomatically,
economically, parliamentary exchanges--there are a number of
ways for that to be manifested.
Third, we have also been very, very clear, as I mentioned
earlier, with the PRC in terms of--I guess I would be best
suited to just quote Secretary Blinken.
He said it would be a very serious mistake for anyone to
resort to anything other than peaceful means to resolve cross-
strait differences, and I am very confident that the PRC
leaders in Beijing are crystal clear that if they were to
decide to use some coercive manner to unify Taiwan, they would
face grave consequences.
As you pointed out, Ranking Member Romney, those would not
necessarily be confined to the military arena either.
Reputational, economic--there be any number of areas in which,
I think, they would have to think very, very long and hard
about making a momentous choice like that.
Senator Romney. I would just note my own personal view that
the more specific we might be in advance with not only our own
communications but also with communications of our friends and
allies around the world about the economic consequence of China
using coercive means to impose its will on Taiwan would,
potentially, be helpful in dissuading them from using such
means, and that it would be helpful for us to be
extraordinarily explicit and for our friends and allies around
the world to combine and speak about this specifically so that
China would have a good sense of what we are talking about.
Because, frankly, China and Russia, for that matter, have
done a lot of bad things over the past couple of decades, and
we have told them of the terrible consequences that would be
rained upon them for the things they did.
Somehow they are getting along just fine, and the
consequence was not as great as they might have once feared.
I think we need to be more specific as we deal with China
and its potential aggressiveness with regards to Taiwan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey. Great.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Markey, Ranking Member
Romney. Thank you very much for the time here today for having
this hearing. To our witnesses, thank you.
Ambassador, I would like to start with you, if I might. It
is a point that has been a concern of mine for some time
regarding international organizations and that is the fact that
American funding of these organizations is far disproportionate
to the American employees that are present at those
organizations.
We are far underrepresented, in my perspective, and I look
at how other countries accomplish disproportionate
overrepresentation. They take advantage of a series of
programs: the U.N. Junior Professional Officer program, the
World Bank donor-funded staffing program, and the U.N. Special
Assistant to the Regional Coordinating program.
In particular, China has done a big job at doing this and
in doing so achieving a disproportionate representation,
disproportionately high representation in these organizations.
It also is evident to me that the United States takes very
little advantage of these organizations, and it puts us at a
numeric disadvantage when you look at how we project our
influence in these organizations, how we make American thought
and American perspective heard, particularly in light of the
fact that these other countries that do not pay as much on a
percentage basis are over represented.
So I would like to know how many of these positions, these
three programs that I just mentioned, does the department
currently fund, and do we intend to continue funding those?
I would like to get an accounting of that.
Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. Thank you, Senator, for your
question, and I appreciate your interest in this important
issue.
We have been examining this as part of our efforts
supported very generously by the Senate and we appreciate your
support for that, as we have set up our new Office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, which we are now in the
process of getting authorization for and hope to be staffing in
the next several weeks here.
Because this is an important issue, how do we take best
advantage of those programs throughout the U.N. system and
throughout the other international organization systems to make
sure that we are placing the next generation of American
professionals in those organizations to ensure their integrity,
their strength, their efficacy, and also their accountability,
because we do provide a lot of funding for those organizations.
I do not have the exact figures of the number of JPOs that
we pay for in the system. That number, I know, is increasing,
again, in part due to the support we have received from this
committee and from the Senate.
We appreciate very much that effort and we are in the
process of preparing our regular reports on these programs,
where we will have the numbers and we are happy to share those
with you.
We are looking at how do we increase, not only in the JPO
programs but also in the mid ranks and in the senior ranks, and
making sure that we have, if not Americans, like-minded
partners and allies that share our values who are in those
positions, because it is important not only in the senior
leadership positions but all the way down that you have people
who are going to be independent minded, that are going to
reinforce the values and the foundational strengths of the
international system so that we can fight back against this
bullying that has been happening.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I would look forward to hearing from
your organization. If you could provide a timeline of how these
numbers have moved over time.
I am encouraged to hear that they are increasing. At least,
that is your sense of it. I would also like to understand what
measures you are taking, particularly at the financial
organizations and the standard setting organizations, how you
are strategizing a way to move forward in this, and in
particular, the HR policies that may be discriminatory toward
Americans.
My understanding is that if a person has dual citizenship
that they are counted as an American rather than whatever the
other citizenship might be, again, making the numbers harder
for us to accomplish.
I am particularly concerned with respect to World Bank IMF
roles there in terms of us being underrepresented, and it has
become even more obvious to me in recent years that standard-
setting bodies, particularly with respect to 5G, are an area
where we need to be deeply concerned and deeply focused on
being properly represented there.
So I appreciate a report back at your earliest convenience
on that.
Mr. Fritz, if I could turn to you, please. I appreciate the
fact that in April, the department has issued new guidelines
for how we interact as the United States Government with
Taiwanese counterparts.
I certainly support the fact that we are going to be more
focused on and taking a greater perspective on having our
United States diplomats engage with Taiwanese counterparts in
that regard.
I want to particularly commend my former DCM, Joe Young,
who is now the charge or was most recently the charge
d'affaires in Japan for hosting his counterparts at the Taiwan
Economic and Cultural Office there in Japan at the U.S.
Ambassador's residence. I think that sends a very strong
message.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Fritz, I wanted you to provide
any further updates that you might have on these guidelines,
how we are making progress on this and how you see it
unfolding.
Mr. Fritz. Thank you very much for that question, Senator.
I can tell you that these new guidelines are, indeed, the
most liberal that we have had since, basically, 1980 when we
first started issuing these at the State Department.
There are a number of restrictions that were part of
earlier versions that have been lifted, allowing for more easy
contacts, meetings in U.S. office buildings, at the offices of
the Taipei Economic Cultural Representative Office, without
going into specifics of any of these specific meetings, I can
tell you we are taking full advantage of these, and our Taiwan
friends are noting this and are quite appreciative.
I would point out that the new contact guidelines have had
been welcomed in public from President Tsai's office down
through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to TECRO here in
Washington, DC, and you really can see the uptick in
interactions between U.S. Government officials and their Taiwan
counterparts.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I would just note this, and I
appreciate the time, but the meeting between Charge d'Affaires
Young and his counterpart at the Ambassador's residence in
Japan got press all over the Japanese media and all over Asia.
So this can make a real mark. It could send a real message.
So I appreciate you are expanding this policy as much as
possible.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Senator Coons, do you have any additional
questions? No.
Back to you, Senator Romney.
Senator Romney. Just a couple of questions and comments.
My understanding is that China has used its vaccines as a
key part of diplomacy at the same time it has used this
opportunity to suggest that America is not a very helpful ally
of the people of Taiwan.
Taiwan's Ambassador indicated that she had actually
received indication of texts coming from the Chinese Communist
Party saying that Americans have so much vaccine that we are
vaccinating our pets, and that we think more of our dogs than
we think of the people of Taiwan.
This kind of misinformation spreads throughout Taiwan, and,
therefore, I want to underscore something that others have
raised, which is the urgency for getting vaccines to the people
of Taiwan.
There is a need for about 2 million vaccinations. We have
agreed to 750,000. I would strongly encourage us to move as
soon as we can to the higher number and that we get these to
the people of Taiwan as urgently as we possibly can.
This is a nation, obviously, seeing a significant uptick in
infections, given the Delta variant, and it has humanitarian
implications, but also strategic implications that are very
important, given the disinformation campaign that the Chinese
are carrying out.
Is what I am saying consistent with your own understanding
of what is happening with regards to Chinese misinformation and
is that happening on various fronts around the world?
Mr. Fritz. Ranking Member Romney, you are absolutely right.
I think Taiwan is probably receiving, you know, the brunt of
PRC disinformation.
On the other hand, we have also seen Taiwan develop quite a
bit of resilience to this sort of thing. They are getting very
good at identifying and pushing back with media literacy,
social media literacy programs, transparency, basically, and we
have actually quite a lot to learn from them in terms of
combating disinformation.
Back to the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, a
platform that Senator Coons mentioned, we have been able to use
that platform to take some of Taiwan's expertise and share it
with others around the world who are also subjected to PRC
disinformation but also disinformation from other bad actors,
whether that be the Russians or others.
Senator Romney. One more question, and that is I would hate
for us, in our concern about China's interference in the region
with the people of Taiwan, to do something or say something as
a body or as individuals that would precipitate or give an
excuse to China to take action they might not otherwise take.
Do you have any warning or guidelines or suggestions to us?
Because a number of us feel like, you know, we want to make it
very clear that we stand with the free people of Taiwan, that
we abhor what the Communist Chinese Party has communicated in
its intent with regards to Taiwan.
Are there boundaries we should not cross for fear of
precipitating some type of a coercive action?
Mr. Fritz. That is a great question, Ranking Member Romney.
Thank you for that.
Of course, that is the entire premise of our One China
policy, to make sure that we abide by our diplomatic ties with
Beijing while at the same time within the parameters of our
unofficial relationship with Taiwan doing everything we can to
support them.
That includes stronger security cooperation, commercial
ties across the board, vaccine donations, visits from VIPs, et
cetera.
We also, as you point out, want to be very careful not to
engage in any symbolic sorts of provocations that will do
nothing other than merely raise the risk for Taiwan and,
perhaps, precipitate the very thing that we are trying to avoid
and deter, which is the PRC feeling compelled to take some sort
of coercive action against the island.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Again, we have been in a situation over the last several
months in our country where, on a bipartisan basis, Democrats
and Republicans are coming together to pass comprehensive
legislation in order to deal with the economic threat, the
strategic threat that China poses to our country, and part of
that is a bill that is going to be very large, a couple of $100
billion, looking at this issue and trying to unleash the
innovation inside of our country.
When you really peel it all back, we are looking at the
fact that semiconductors are now not made in the United States
in any substantial measure, and as a result, we are vulnerable
because our country runs on semiconductors.
We are a chip-driven country. That is who we are. We are
only 5 percent of the world's population but we are not an
honorary 5 percent and that is because we are an advanced
technological country.
Of course, underlying this is a realization that 50 percent
of all the chips in the world are made in Taiwan, and so it
only further reemphasizes how important Taiwan is to us, which,
I would say, brings us back again to vaccines, to look at the
$200 billion piece of legislation we are going to move to deal
with it.
Yet, over here we have an additional capacity to help, and
I would urge that we do that because I think it actually is
part of a larger story right now and we want to cement that
relationship and the great work of Senator Coons and other
members of the Senate, and visiting Taiwan is, obviously, very
important.
At the same time, the more we do is the less costly it
could be to us in the long term by welding the Taiwanese people
to the interests of the United States.
Let me ask you, Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. The United States
meets quarterly with Japan, Canada, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the EU to discuss ways to expand Taiwan's
participation in international organizations.
What does the world have to gain from a Taiwan that has an
elevated global profile?
Ambassador Barks-Ruggles. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
question on that.
The Taiwanese people, as you have pointed out, have
advanced industry and an advanced economy that has much to
offer on a number of fronts, including on the technological
front for combating climate change.
It also has a lot to offer, as you have noted repeatedly,
on health issues, spanning from COVID and their response to
COVID, to cancer research, where they have done some very
advanced research that we have worked with them on and our
research institutes have worked with them on.
We believe that they have a voice, they have expertise, and
they have experience that is valuable to the entire world in
combating these global issues.
They also have a lot to bring to the table in areas from
civil aviation safety, where they have an enormous experience
dealing with a very tough geography for their airport, and they
can bring that to the table at the Civil Aviation Organization,
and in law enforcement and combating international global
criminal networks, where we think that they can bring a lot
more to bear at Interpol and related agencies.
So 24 million people with an advanced economy should have a
voice at the table on all of these fronts, and we are committed
to trying to work with them to do so.
Senator Markey. Yeah, I agree with you when you talk about
civil aviation. It does not make any sense. China cannot,
obviously, want there to be mid-air aviation collisions. So
excluding Taiwan from the Civil Air Organization makes
absolutely no sense whatsoever.
Again, I just think it is important for us to press as hard
as we can for entrance.
Let me turn again to you, Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Markey.
I just want to follow on this point that you raised. I
would like to turn to Mr. Fritz, though.
This is something that, again, is of great concern and very
related to the last line of questions. It has to do with
Taiwan's diplomatic posture and the fact that since President
Tsai was inaugurated in 2016, Taiwan has lost seven. They are
down to 15 diplomatic partners right now.
I would like to get your read on the trend here, Mr. Fritz,
and what you think the United States might be able to do to
help Taiwan maintain its diplomatic presence. The Communist
Chinese Party pressure on this is enormous, as you know, and
they have been fairly effective since President Tsai took
office.
So I look forward to your thoughts on this trend. Thank
you.
Mr. Fritz. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.
Yes, you are absolutely right. The trend has been quite
bad. As you pointed out, seven of Taiwan's diplomatic partners
have been poached since Tsai Ing-wen won election in 2016.
As several of your colleagues have pointed out, the PRC has
been very aggressively using vaccine donations as a lever to
induce more of Taiwan's diplomatic partners to switch
recognition.
We do engage very intensively with Taiwan's remaining
diplomatic partners and point out to them the many benefits of
having a reliable partner that, in fact, does not use, whether
it is vaccines or investments or any other lever, as sort of a
tool of political coercion, if you will.
Also working with our Taiwan friends to help promote
investments and trade with those remaining diplomatic partners.
I would point out that in addition to those remaining
diplomatic partners, so those 15, we are also working very hard
on the rest of the world, all of those countries that do not
have diplomatic relations with Taiwan anymore, but can and
should have even stronger unofficial ties.
We are trying to set a good example of that ourselves with
recent actions, and we believe that whether that is folks in
Europe or Asia or elsewhere, are engaging within the bounds of
their own diplomatic versions of our One China policy.
Culturally, parliamentary exchanges, closer commercial
ties--all of that is to the good and I think over time is a
quite important strategic deterrent to the PRC when it sits
down and thinks about even the possibility of a non-peaceful
strategy for unifying the island.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
Senator Markey. I thank the senator.
We thank the witnesses for your great testimony today. I do
not see any other members who are seeking recognition at this
time.
So I want to thank all of you for your participation, and I
applaud the Biden administration for its work to strengthen our
partnership with Taiwan. The recent statements from U.S.-Japan,
U.S.-South Korea, and the G-7 summits in support of Taiwan are
just one indication of this Administration building back a
better foreign policy.
For the information of the members, the record will remain
open until the close of business on Monday, June 21st, for any
other members seeking to in writing submit questions to the
Administration.
So with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Mr. Jonathan Fritz to Questions
Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Taiwan recently applied to be a manufacturer of Moderna
vaccines which could enable it, as a leader in mRNA technology, to meet
domestic demand for vaccines and help it become an exporter of life
saving shots to the region and the world. What are the U.S. plans to
partner with Taiwan to manufacture and distribute vaccines?
Answer. We have had a close partnership with Taiwan on global
health issues and have been working together throughout the pandemic.
Taiwan was there to help the United States in the earliest days of the
pandemic, providing PPE and other life-saving materials. We remain
grateful for that generosity, and are proud that we are able to support
Taiwan in its moment of need with 2.5 million vaccine doses. You can
expect our strong partnership on COVID-19 and global health to
continue.
Question. Would the Departments of State and Defense consider
inviting Taiwan, provided Japan concurs, to participate in the U.S.-
Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) as an observer?
Answer. We welcome the recent joint statement from President Biden
and Prime Minister Suga in support of Taiwan. We will continue to work
with allies and partners to highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in
addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in
defending against threats to its democratic values.
U.S. policy has been to preserve cross-Strait stability and
maintain peace in the Indo-Pacific region; within this context, we will
continue our robust security cooperation with Taiwan in a manner
consistent with our ``One China'' policy guided by the Taiwan Relations
Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.
Question. The Taiwan Fellowship Act is included in the Innovation
and Competition Act, which passed the Senate, as well as the EAGLE Act
which is still under committee consideration in the House.
Specifically: What actions has the Department of State and/or the
American Institute in Taiwan taken to negotiate or pre-negotiate a
memorandum of understanding with Taiwan authorities that will permit
the earliest possible placement of Taiwan fellows? If those have not
occurred, when can we expect those formal discussions to begin?
Answer. We recognize Congressional support to facilitate shared
objectives, including through potential legislation like the Taiwan
Fellowship Act.
Congressional support for our unofficial relationship with Taiwan
has been paramount in ensuring that U.S. support for Taiwan will remain
strong, principled, and bipartisan, in line with longstanding American
commitments to the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques,
and the Six Assurances.
Question. Are Taiwan Authorities broadly supportive of an exchange
program that will send fellows, from the U.S. executive branch and
select legislative branch agencies, to Taiwan for intensive language
training and assignment to a government ministry?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How will the Taiwan Fellowship Program support the State
Department's revised contact guidelines that expand unofficial
interactions with Taiwan authorities?
Answer. The new guidance encourages U.S. Government officials'
interactions with their Taiwan counterparts in a manner consistent with
our unofficial relationship with Taiwan.
Fellowship programs could similarly contribute to deepening our
ties with Taiwan--a leading democracy and a critical economic and
security partner--and we look forward to continuing to work with
Congress as it considers legislation for such a program.
Question. What are the benefits of Track 1.5 and Track 2 dialogues
in building a sense of awareness around how other interested nations
think about cross-Strait security issues?
Answer. Such dialogues advance our unofficial relationship with
Taiwan and, by multilateralizing support for Taiwan, contribute to
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. America's commitment to
Taiwan will remain rock-solid. We will continue to work with allies and
partners to highlight the positive role Taiwan plays in addressing
global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending
against threats to its democratic values.
Question. What more could the Global Cooperation and Training
Framework (GCTF) workshops accomplish if the United States were to
increase its financial support of such workshops? For instance, if
additional workshops were held, could the number of issues explored be
increased, and/or would additional like-minded countries be able to
participate?
Answer. The GCTF is an essential tool for building support for
Taiwan around the world and demonstrating the value of Taiwan's
participation on the global stage. Since its inception in 2015, the
GCTF has featured dozens of workshops that have provided training to
over 2,000 participants, mostly either virtually or in Taipei. Funding
from the new $3 million directive will be essential to the success of
this initiative going forward. Additional funding would allow the
Department to use this structure to expand the program further,
reaching yet more audiences with positive messages on Taiwan's
constructive role on the world stage.
Question. How does the Department of State currently engage with
counterparts in the People's Republic of China on preventing
misunderstandings and miscalculations regarding regional security
interests, including around the Taiwan Strait?
Answer. We have sought to minimize miscalculations on both sides of
the Taiwan Strait, maximize our ability to broaden and deepen the
unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and ensure the future of Taiwan is
determined peacefully and free of PRC coercion.
The PRC has engaged in an ongoing pattern of attempts to intimidate
the region, including Taiwan. Beijing continues to exert military,
diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan, instead of engaging
in meaningful cross-Strait dialogue. We will continue to support a
peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues, consistent with the wishes
and best interests of the people on Taiwan.
Question. To what degree does the Department of State, through the
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or any other office, consult with
Taiwan authorities regarding which defense articles to purchase?
Answer. In response to the growing PRC threat, we will continue
deepening our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it
has sufficient capabilities to defend itself.
The United States has notified more than $32 billion worth of arms
to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure Taiwan's
ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation encourages
Taiwan to prioritize expenditures on relatively inexpensive, mobile,
survivable, defense weapons and reserve force reform. Often referred to
as an ``asymmetric'' defense posture, this shift in focus strengthens
deterrence, and with it, cross-Strait stability.
U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan is calibrated to meet the
threat from the PRC and is consistent with the U.S. ``One China''
policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. As part of that cooperation, we
encourage Taiwan to spend on defense an amount commensurate with the
growing threat it faces.
______
Responses of Mr. Jonathan Fritz to Questions
Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. Your testimony rightly noted that Taiwan faces intense
economic coercion from the Chinese Government. This is not just an
issue for Taiwan but for any government around the world that deviates
from the Chinese Government's party line regarding Taiwan, or even for
companies with individual employees that do so. What specifically are
we doing to help our partners diversify economically and boost supply
chain resilience so they're less vulnerable to this coercion?
Answer. We are committed to deepening trade, investment, and other
economic ties with Taiwan, a vibrant economy that is our ninth largest
trading partner. Trade with Taiwan advances U.S. interests and helps
create economic opportunity and prosperity in the United States.
As a close friend and important trading partner for a number of
critical products, we will continue to work with Taiwan to strengthen
supply chain resilience and diversification by addressing choke points,
particularly in the healthcare and semiconductor sectors.
Question. Last year, as mainland China became increasingly
inhospitable for journalists, more than 20 journalists moved to Taiwan
at the invitation of the Taiwanese Government. Many of them had
published articles highlighting the Chinese Government's horrific
abuses against Uyghurs or its handling of the coronavirus outbreak.
What is the State Department doing to support the freedom of expression
and defend Taiwan against any retaliation from the Chinese Government
for hosting these journalists?
Answer. The PRC has displayed an ongoing pattern of attempts to
intimidate the region, including through the suppression of free
speech. Additionally, Beijing continues to exert military, diplomatic,
and economic pressure against Taiwan instead of engaging in meaningful
dialogue with Taiwan.
Taiwan is a leading democracy, a vibrant economic partner, a
technology powerhouse, and a strong example of how an open society can
contain COVID-19 and contribute to global health. Taiwan has also
become a global leader in combating disinformation.
U.S. support for Taiwan is rock-solid, and we will continue to work
with allies and partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan
plays in addressing global challenges and encourage them to stand with
Taiwan in defending against threats to its democratic values, including
freedom of the press.
Question. International NGOs that have long aimed to do work in
mainland China or Hong Kong are seeing the space for civil society
rapidly constrict and we're increasingly seeing Taiwan be a safer space
for these NGOs to operate. What is the State Department doing to
support NGOs operating in Taiwan or elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific
region that work to support human rights and other important
programming in mainland China and Hong Kong?
Answer. Taiwan is a leading democracy, a vibrant economic partner,
a technology powerhouse, and a strong example of how an open society
can contain COVID-19 and contribute to global health.
We will continue to work with allies and partners to highlight the
positive role Taiwan plays in addressing global challenges and
encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending against threats to its
democratic values.
Despite the challenging operating environment for NGOs in China,
DRL programs conserve and expand space for an independent local civil
society to petition the Government on behalf of citizens' demands,
including through online initiatives. The Department will continue to
explore ways to support human rights programming in Hong Kong through
Taiwan-based partners.
Question. Taiwan citizen Lee Ming-cheh disappeared after traveling
in China in 2017 and is serving 5 years in a mainland Chinese prison
for alleged ``subversion of state power,'' apparently a reference to
his work volunteering for an NGO in Taiwan. Has the State Department
pushed for his release?
Answer. We are aware of Lee Ming-cheh's imprisonment in the PRC
since 2017. Lee's case has been included in the State Department's PRC
Country Report on Human Rights Practices, including the 2020 report.
The Biden-Harris administration has placed human rights at the center
of its China policy and has repeatedly called on Beijing to release all
those who have been jailed for exercising fundamental freedoms, such as
freedom of expression and of association.