[Senate Hearing 117-26]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-26
OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES
CAPITOL POLICE FOLLOWING THE
JANUARY 6TH ATTACK ON THE CAPITOL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 16, 2021
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
44-913 WASHINGTON : 2021
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COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION
FIRST SESSION
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota, Chairwoman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROY BLUNT, Missouri
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
MARK R. WARNER, Virginia RICHARD SHELBY, Alabama
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont TED CRUZ, Texas
ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon Virginia
ALEX PADILLA, California ROGER WICKER, Mississippi
JON OSSOFF, Georgia DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Elizabeth Peluso, Staff Director
Rachelle Schroeder, Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Pages
Opening Statement of:
Hon. Amy Klobuchar, Chairwoman, a United States Senator from the
State of Minnesota............................................. 1
Hon. Roy Blunt, a United States Senator from the State of
Missouri....................................................... 3
Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol
Police, Washington, DC......................................... 5
Prepared Statement of:
Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States Capitol
Police, Washington, DC......................................... 28
Questions Submitted for the Record:
Hon. Amy Klobuchar, a United States Senator from the State of
Minnesota to Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United
States Capitol Police, Washington, DC.......................... 45
Hon. Roy Blunt, a United States Senator from the State of
Missouri to Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United States
Capitol Police, Washington, DC................................. 45
Hon. Roger Wicker, a United States Senator from the State of
Mississippi to Michael A. Bolton, Inspector General, United
States Capitol Police, Washington, DC.......................... 48
OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE FOLLOWING THE JANUARY 6TH
ATTACK ON THE CAPITOL
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 2021
United States Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:19 p.m., in
Room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Amy Klobuchar,
Chairwoman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Klobuchar, Blunt, Warner, Merkley,
Padilla, Ossoff, Cruz, Capito, Wicker, Fischer, Hyde-Smith, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HONORABLE AMY KLOBUCHAR, CHAIRWOMAN, A
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Good afternoon. I call to order this
hearing of the Rules and Administration Committee on
``Oversight of the United States Capitol Police Following the
January 6th Attack on the Capitol.'' I would like to thank
Ranking Member Blunt, and our colleagues, and, of course, our
witness, the Inspector General for the Capitol Police, Mr.
Michael Bolton. Thank you for being here, and we appreciate the
recommendations and the work that you have done in this area as
well.
We are here today just over a week after releasing our
bipartisan joint report with the Homeland Security Committee
that focuses on the security, planning, and response failures
related to the violent and unprecedented insurrection at the
Capitol on January 6th. We all remember the haunting words of
an officer on the radio that day asking, ``Does anyone have a
plan? Does anyone have a plan?'' The answer, sadly, that day
was ``no.'' Our report lays out not only key findings, but
important recommendations with needed changes to prevent
anything similar from happening again, and to ensure that in
the future, there is a plan.
I continue to support a January 6th independent 9/11-style
commission to look at the larger causes of the insurrection as
well as the rise of domestic extremism. These issues greatly
contributed and caused what happened at the Capitol that day,
but the focus of this committee, combined with the Homeland
Security Committee, which actually allowed us to extend our
jurisdiction and look at more things even outside of the
Capitol Police because we did it with Homeland Security, which
included looking at the role of the Defense Department
decisions, as well as the FBI, and Homeland Security, and the
like, our focus was on what happened that day and what we can
do to make sure it does not happen again.
We believe that we should not wait to implement changes
that can be made immediately, and today's hearing on oversight
of Capitol Police practices and procedures is an important step
as we look at reforms that should be put in place without
delay. Toward that end, we are glad that Mr. Bolton is here to
discuss his work and perspective on the major issues facing the
Department. Since January 6th, Mr. Bolton has issued four flash
reports looking into the breakdowns and failures in the lead-up
to and on that day. These inspector general reports, which
cover topics including intelligence, operational planning, the
Civil Disturbance Unit, and threat assessment, have expanded
our understanding of what happened that day. These reports also
identified changes that are needed with the practices and
procedures of Capitol Police leadership, especially as the
confidence of rank-and-file officers has been seriously
undermined. Many of Mr. Bolton's recommendations identify
reforms, and we also put those reforms together as part of our
joint report. Based on what we have found, I want to focus
today on the major changes facing the Department as well as the
changes that are needed both to restore trust and ensure the
security of the Capitol Complex.
First are the intelligence failures which greatly
contributed to the breakdowns we saw on January 6th and left
frontline officers unprepared for what they faced that day. We
know that the three intelligence-related units within the
Capitol Police knew about social media posts calling for
violence at the Capitol, but that the full scope of these
warnings never made it to the Capitol Police leadership, rank-
and-file officers, or law enforcement partners. There were also
conflicting reports on the threats. One Capitol Police
intelligence assessment on January 3rd warned that the Capitol
could be a target, but a January 6th daily intelligence report
called the likelihood of violence ``remote'' to ``improbable.''
Second, we know that there was a major issue with the lack of
equipment. Seventy-five percent--75 percent--of the officers on
duty that day were forced to defend the Capitol in their
regular uniforms. Some of the equipment issued that day was old
or had degraded due to improper storage, as was the case with
some of the protective shields distributed that had been stored
at the wrong temperature, making them shatter on impact. Just
imagine being a police officer. You are given a shield and it
shatters on impact. In another instance, officers could not
access the gear that they needed because it was locked on a
bus.
Third, we know that there was an issue with training, that
less than 10 percent of the officers responding that day had
advanced civil disturbance training, and many officers had not
received any civil disturbance training since their initial
recruit officer class training. Fourth, we know that there was
no comprehensive department-wide operational plan from
leadership in advance of January 6th, which resulted in
confusion and a lack of communication that placed frontline
officers in peril. We know that incident commanders, who could
have provided better communication to officers, ended up being
unavailable as they fought with rioters themselves because
there had not been better preparation.
We know that there was no plan to deploy the National Guard
if things escalated to a point where they were needed, and
there was a delay in getting the required approval from members
of the Capitol Police Board to request immediate National Guard
support, an issue that I am introducing legislation to address
with Ranking Member Blunt, and we will do it--be doing that
very soon. These failures resulted in an unnecessary delay in
the arrival of National Guard troops to assist in defending the
Capitol from an armed insurrection. The Guard should have been,
of course, called in before this started as the intelligence
was gathered, and there should have been a plan to use the
Guard. But even that day, they could have been called in
sooner.
There is a lot to get through today, and, Mr. Bolton, I
look forward to hearing your testimony. With that, I want to
recognize Ranking Member Blunt for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HONORABLE ROY BLUNT, A UNITED STATES
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairwoman, and thanks for
holding this hearing. It is the third hearing of our Committee
of Rules and Administration. Two of them we did, as the
Chairwoman mentioned, with the Homeland Security Committee, and
that did allow us to talk to more people, but, of course,
today, we are here with one of our principal responsibilities,
and that is the responsibility of working with and helping, and
assisting those people who protect us every day: The Capitol
Police.
Last week, our colleagues at Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, along with this committee, issued a
comprehensive, bipartisan report of security failures on
January 6th and made a series of detailed recommendations, I
think thoughtful recommendations, directed at the Capitol
Police, the Capitol Police Board, both the House and Senate
Sergeants at Arms, the Federal intelligence agencies, the
Department of Defense, and local law enforcement. Today, we
want to focus our efforts where your efforts have been: On the
Capitol Police.
Our bipartisan report made it clear that the Capitol Police
officers were the true heroes that day, defending the Capitol
with courage and honor. Their inspiring efforts, along with the
immediate assistance of the Metropolitan DC Police, and the
assistance that followed later from other forces in the area as
they could get here, made an incredible difference. But their
inspiring efforts, while they thwarted the rioters' goal and
ensured that Congress would--could fulfill its constitutional
obligation, were in so many ways done at great risk to
themselves beyond what we think would be necessary with a force
that is better equipped, that is better trained, that is better
prepared to defend the Capitol. We owe that to the officers
that defended us that day. The breach of the Capitol must never
be repeated, and, in all cases, we want our officers to be
better prepared and better equipped.
To date, the inspector general has issued, as Senator
Klobuchar pointed out, four flash reports, and while the
reports were done quickly, they were done, in my view, with
great thoroughness and 65 significant separate recommendations.
Both our committee and the Homeland Security Committee, in the
report we issued last week, commented favorably on those
recommendations in our joint report. I understand that you will
have more reports in the future. We look forward to reviewing
those new recommendations with you as well.
Today, we will hear more about the inspector general's
current recommendations to improve the operational readiness of
the Capitol Police. The recommendations and the bipartisan
joint committee report, including the inspector general's
recommendations, can be and should be implemented quickly. Many
of these recommendations do not require congressional approval
or Capitol Police Board approval, nor do they require, in many
cases, additional appropriations. They just require quick
action now that we know the problems that were inherent in the
system as it related to preparation, and equipment, and
training. This also marks the first time that the Capitol
Police inspector general has testified before the Rules
Committee in a public hearing, and we look forward to hearing
further from the inspector general and the Capitol Police in
future oversight hearings.
As I have mentioned before, Chairwoman Klobuchar and I have
a long history of working together to ensure not only the
smooth daily operations of the Capitol but on a number of other
legislative areas outside this committee where we have been
able to work together. We can--we will continue to do that on
this important topic. As she just mentioned, we will be
introducing legislation in the very near future to provide the
chief of the Capitol Police with additional authority to seek
external assistance in the event of an emergency. I look
forward to hearing from Mr. Bolton today and working with his
office as the investigation into the events surrounding January
6th continues.
Thank you, Chairwoman Klobuchar, for holding this hearing
and what you have done so far to move this information quickly
to make it available to people, and to try to find quick
answers to the problems that we know we need to solve.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you. Thank you very much,
Senator Blunt. I would now like to introduce our witness for
today's hearing, Michael A. Bolton, the Inspector General for
the United States Capitol Police.
Mr. Bolton has served in the Capitol Police Office of
Inspector General, also known as ``OIG,'' for nearly 15 years,
and he was appointed as inspector general on January 20, 2019.
Mr. Bolton previously served as the acting inspector general
beginning in March 2018, and before that, he served as the
Department's first assistant inspector general for
investigations beginning in August 2006. In that capacity, he
played an active role in developing policies and procedures for
the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Capitol
Police Board. Prior to joining the OIG, Mr. Bolton served for
four years as special-agent-in-charge of the Office of
Investigations for the United States Department of Treasury.
There, he worked on cases of procurement fraud and on complex
criminal, administrative, and civil investigations. Before his
time at Treasury, Mr. Bolton served for 21 years with the
United States Secret Service where he held numerous roles,
including as a member of the Presidential Protection Division.
Mr. Bolton holds a degree in criminal justice from the
University of Maryland.
Thank you for being here today, Mr. Bolton, and if you
would please stand and raise your right hand so I could
administer the oath.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you. You may be seated. You are
now recognized for your testimony for five minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. BOLTON, INSPECTOR GENERAL,
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bolton. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chair Klobuchar,
Ranking Member Blunt, and distinguished members of the
committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you,
the Committee of Senate Rules and Administration, to discuss
our review of events in regards to the Department's operation,
programs, and policies that were in effect during January 6,
2021. I would like to extend my appreciation to the committee
for holding this hearing. As I have stated previously in my
other hearings, but I do believe that this bears repeating, I
am addressing not only the committee members exercising their
constitutional role of oversight but I am testifying to
witnesses as well as survivors, who are affected by the events
of January 6th.
On January 6th, a physical security breach in the United
States Capitol building occurred during a joint session of
Congress to certify the electoral college vote. My goal is to
provide each of you a better understanding on how the events of
January 6th occurred in relation to the preparation and
response of the Department. Other factors were involved and
other entities are reviewing those aspects outside of the
Capitol Police Department. I will discuss the non-law-
enforcement-sensitive findings detailed in my four flash
reports. Any law-enforcement-sensitive questions can be
answered in a closed-door setting.
Shortly after the January 6th events, I notified the
Department Board and the committees that my office would be
suspending all future projects listed in our annual plan for
2021 to allow my entire staff to conduct a full review of these
events. In order to accomplish this goal, both Audits and
Investigations would combine their collective talents to
achieve a complete review of the Department. In addition to my
staff, I brought on two additional contractors with expertise
and knowledge to assist my office, a retired deputy assistant
director of the United States Secret Service and a retired
senior special agent chief of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Our reports are not designed nor intended to cast blame on
anyone individual or group. These reports are intended to be an
independent, objective review of the Department's programs and
operations to better protect the Capitol Complex, members,
staff, visitors, and the rank-and-file officers who have shown
their commitment and bravery each day by keeping us all safe. A
collective effort must be undertaken to ensure that each and
every officer when their shift is over, gets to go home to
their families, as well as the safety of those who work and
visit the first branch of government.
Our objective for this review is to: Determine if the
Department established adequate measures for ensuring the
safety and security of Members of Congress, their staff, and
the Capitol Complex; established adequate internal controls and
processes that complied with Department policies and
procedures; and complied with the applicable laws and
regulations. The scope included reviewing the controls,
processes, and operations surrounding the security measures
prior to the planned demonstrations and the response during the
takeover of the Capitol Building. Our recommendations are made
by conducting interviews, document reviews, the combined
knowledge and expertise of my staff, and following best
practices throughout the Federal Government of those relevant
agencies with similar functions of the Department. We are
currently providing the Department, Board, and the committees a
series of flash reports every 30 days, reviewing each element
within the Department and noting any areas for improvement. We
are providing any corresponding recommendations to compel the
Department to move toward a protective agency as opposed to a
police agency.
At the time of this hearing, my office has completed four
flash reports. The first report was a review of the operational
planning for January 6th, including a review of intelligence-
gathering processes required for an operational plan that
related to January 6th. Our second flash report focused on the
Civil Disturbance Unit and the Intelligence Division as a
whole. Our third flash report focused on threat assessment and
countersurveillance, and, finally, our fourth flash report
focused on the Containment Emergency Response Team and First
Responders Unit. We anticipate our comprehensive review will
extend for the remainder of fiscal year 2021. Currently, my
office is reviewing the Command and Coordination Bureau, and we
anticipate issuing that report by the end of July.
As of today, we have made 65 recommendations detailing
areas for improvement. Along with your report with additional
recommendations and findings that I completely concur with, we
have provided the Department with a roadmap to achieve the
ultimate goal of providing security to the Capitol Complex for
a safe and open environment for members, staff, and visitors,
and the rank-and-file officers. As our work continues, my
office sees continuing areas in our findings that need to be
addressed. Those areas are intelligence, training to include
leadership training, operational planning, and a cultural
change. In regards to a cultural change, we see that the
Department needs to move away from the thought process as a
traditional police department and move to the posture as a
protective agency. Whereas, a protective agency is posture to
being proactive in preventing events such as January 6th.
In conclusion, the Department is comprised of extraordinary
men and women who are dedicated to protecting our democracy,
putting their own lives in harm's way in order for Congress to
exercise their constitutional duties in a safe and open manner.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
will be very happy to answer any questions the committee may
have at this time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton was submitted for the
record.]
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Inspector
General. When supporters of President Trump stormed the Capitol
after his speech and after months of his false claims about the
outcome of the election, we saw the results of that. We issued
a joint report that focused on the issue of what went wrong at
the Capitol leading into and during that day. Do you want to
comment on our report and what you thought of the report?
Mr. Bolton. I believe that your report, which, of course, I
have read, it was spot on. It was--hit the mark of exactly what
failed that day, the deficiencies within the Department and
highlighted it. It was very useful for my office as well to
review that report, and we appreciated that report as well, but
it certainly was a report that hit the mark. I completely
concur with all of your recommendations and findings.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Well, thank you. One reform that both
your report and our joint report called for is consolidating
Capitol Police intelligence operations into a single bureau as
opposed to the three offices that currently exist. Can you
briefly explain the problem with the current way that
intelligence is handled? I noticed one of the things was--that
you found is that public tips and other information received by
Capitol Police intelligence were not properly reviewed and
acted on.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you. You are exactly right, ma'am. The
problem when you have the different elements not coming on, it
is almost what they refer to as stovepiping. You have different
silos. That information is not being funneled up to the
individuals, either to the command staff or all the way down to
the officers where that information can be acted upon or
analyzed in formulating either an operational plan or a
different posture that you may have or call on additional
resources. You need to have, as your report noted, that if you
have a one--a bureau the way it is right now, it is not a
standalone bureau. When you have these other elements in there,
you are going to have a concerted effort in acquiring and
disseminating, and analyzing intelligence information in a
bureau-level setting.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. There was not--that aside as a major
problem, there also was not any kind of a department-wide plan
for even where people would be located that day, even though
they had officers there? Is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. That is correct, yes. The officers or different
units, even though they were mentioned in the Civil Disturbance
Unit operational plan, as it were, those units were not even
consulted or did not even have knowledge that they were
included in this plan.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. We recommend establishing the Civil
Disturbance Unit as a formal, permanent component of the
Capitol Police, making sure that those officers are trained and
that they have the right equipment. Do you believe that those
officers involved in protecting the Capitol when there is a
potential civil disturbance should be trained on a regular
basis?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, ma'am, absolutely. If you have a
standalone unit as opposed to as now as an ad hoc, you are not
getting the training, the equipment. You are not developing
that camaraderie that you would if they were a standalone unit
where they start working together, and you would start knowing
the individuals that you are working with, and you would be
able to--it is like a team, a sports team. The more that you
are there together and the more they practice, the better they
are going to perform on game day.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. There have been many--one of our
findings, as you know, was that 75 percent of the officers were
forced to defend the Capitol in their regular uniforms. Some
were locked outside of a bus. The bus contained their gear, and
they could not access it. There has also been public reporting
of officers' gear being stolen by supporters of President
Trump, by rioters. Is that something that you found as well?
How would the equipment, inventory, and storage procedure in
your most recent report help to prevent this decaying of the
equipment as well as the potential stealing of the equipment?
Mr. Bolton. In regards to maintaining the equipment, one of
our recommendations was tasking Property to start doing an
inventory--a continuous inventory to update and to properly
storage the--that equipment. You are correct that our First
Responders Unit, we had 12 helmets and 12 ballistic vests
stolen when they were--basically had to retreat. They were pre-
positioned. We need to make sure when we are doing the planning
stages, if we are going to pre-position, that that equipment is
secured so that it will not fall into the hands of the very
people who we are trying to stop from taking over or causing
trouble.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. During our first joint hearing on
January 6th, we heard how, while the House and Senate Sergeants
at Arms--the former House and Senate Sergeants at Arms were
concerned with the safety of their members, the former chief of
police was desperately trying to call them to get approval to
deploy the National Guard. Of course, it should have been done
ahead of time. A plan should have been in place. But even at
that moment, he was forced to call them to try to find them
while they were trying to guard the chamber. Do you agree that
the structure of the Capitol Police Board impacted the ability
of the chief to request assistance on January 6th, that day?
Mr. Bolton. That is a difficult one for me to speak to
considering, one, I answer to the Board.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Oh, I see.
Mr. Bolton. They are my bosses.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Oh, Okay.
Mr. Bolton. There are those who are looking into it.
Yesterday's hearing that I attended with the GAO has produced a
report in 2017 outlining changes for within the Board.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Right. Do you think that we should
consider reforms to the Board?
Mr. Bolton. Everything should be considered.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Alright. The Capitol Police Board is
now conducting a search for the next Capitol Police chief, who
will face the major task of responding to breakdowns that
occurred on January 6th and rebuilding trust in departmental
leadership among officers. Based on your work so far, what do
you think should be the top priorities for finding the next
Capitol police chief?
Mr. Bolton. I am not involved in the selection of the chief
obviously, so I will speak on a high level. It should be an
individual that not only is schooled in--within, you know, law
enforcement, but a high-level executive with the education and
the skill set, also has a protective--person with the knowledge
of protective agencies, ``force protection,'' if you want to
call it. Someone with that kind of level that is also very
aware in understanding how important training really is and not
to give lip service to training, and to coordinate and making
sure that whatever training--because training dollars obviously
are very--are very slim. They are difficult to fund, in a
sense. But if you--you have to make sure the training that you
are doing is linked to your mission, making sure that training
dollars that are very rare, that we can actually get to that
training and expend the funds appropriately.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Okay. Thank you. I do not want to--we
have many members here, so I will put some questions on the
record on your recent findings regarding the Department using a
contractor that displayed images with known connections to
white supremacist groups. If I have a moment, either I or
someone else will ask those questions as well.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record.]
Chairwoman Klobuchar. With that, I will turn it over to
Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairwoman. Again, Mr. Bolton,
thank you for being here. By my count, which may not be--you
may not have counted these this way, but by my count, around
50--my count says 50 of the 65 recommendations that you made
can be implemented by the Department without any legislative
changes or additional appropriations. Does that sound about
right to you?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir, that does sound about right because a
lot of my recommendations are to update or create policies and
procedures or to reinforce certain policies and procedures.
Those certainly do not require a legislative fix nor approval
by the Board.
Senator Blunt. I think the remaining 15 focus on
implementing proper training, acquiring necessary equipment,
bolstering the Department's intelligence unit. Is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Blunt. There may be some cost to that, but even in
those areas, not this hearing about cost, but those areas that
cost is a cost that clearly is manageable and easily
accessible, I believe, for the Capitol Police. What steps has
the Department taken to implement the 50 recommendations that
do not require legislative action or further appropriation?
Mr. Bolton. I just had a conversation with a member of the
Capitol Police Board. They have formed a Board work--what they
call Board working group that is going to be focusing on not
only my recommendations but also General Andre's
recommendations and your report, the Senate's report,
recommendations. They will be meeting. They think is just--they
have had two meetings so far. My discussion with the Board
members was that I will be included not so much in the
meetings, but the after-action to provide me with an update of
where the Department is heading to any kind of a timeline/
timeframe for when I would be able to start seeing some of the
closures of the recommendations and where they are at. The
Board has instituted a working group. It is up and running now
as we speak, so that is one, as well as we try to reach out to
the Department periodically to see where they are at with the
recommendations.
Senator Blunt. Good. On that issue, do you feel like you
have had the cooperation from the Department, including the
current leadership, that you needed for your flash reports?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. Absolutely. We have received full
cooperation, and they have made themselves available whenever
we have requested an interview and/or documents.
Senator Blunt. You have looked at our report. I appreciated
you saying that you completely concur with the recommendations
and findings. Let me ask you about a couple of things just
specifically to be sure where we are concurring in the same
area. One of our recommendations is to update the Department's
incident command system in order to designate who the incident
commanders would be ahead of a large event, ensure better
communication during the event, frontline and--better
communication during the event with frontline officers, and to
require senior leaders to take over communication
responsibilities if needed. Do you agree with that
recommendation?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. In fact, we are in the midst of
conducting our other flash report of the Command Coordination
Bureau, and I suspect that that will probably also be one of
our recommendations as well.
Senator Blunt. You believe the Department could implement
this now if they wanted to go through your oversight group that
is looking at it?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. Would I be right in assuming that now, can
the Department--can they move forward with any of these 50
recommendations, or do you think that now has to go through the
group that the Police Board has put together?
Mr. Bolton. It is not so much that it has to go through the
Board for that process--that working group. That working group,
I think, is to assist the Department in moving forward in
whatever--if there are recommendations that they may need
assistance from the committees that the Board can assist them
in that. But I also believe that the Board is to kind of keep
them on track, keep them moving forward. It was just recently,
last week, that the Department requested, I think, closure of
six of our recommendations--about six recommendations for our
second flash report. We did close two on--relating to the first
flash report those had to deal with basically updating the
policies and procedures, so they are moving forward with our
recommendations, and I believe that this working group will
assist them in keeping that momentum going.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think momentum is important here,
and it has been our view, both Senator Klobuchar's and mine,
that so many of these things, we now clearly have a sense of
what we ought to do, and now we ought to be sure that we move
forward as quickly as we can to make the changes. Do you
believe the better--that better command planning and
communication on January 6th would have helped prevent the
breach of the Capitol?
Mr. Bolton. Certainly better planning, along with--there
are also a lot of elements with the training, proper equipment.
But certainly, the planning would have put the officers in a
better position to succeed.
Senator Blunt. One of the recommendations of the joint
report is for the Capitol Police to conduct joint training
exercises with Federal, state, and local partners on the
command and control process during an emergency. Do you agree
with that recommendation?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. When you are able to conduct joint
exercises, joint training not only with our Federal partners,
but one of our recommendations is that we need to be doing
joint exercises within our own Department, with our own
different elements. That way, everybody knows what they are
doing, and we are taking a concerted, coordinated effort into
whatever the situation or event calls for us to take action.
Senator Blunt. On the idea of an event, one of the
recommendations of the joint report is that a department-wide
operational plan be in place for special events, that that
would be required. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
Senator Blunt. It is important--do you think that plan like
that would have helped prevent the breach of the Capitol?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. I firmly believe having a coordinated
effort and plan would help and put the officers in a better
position.
Senator Blunt. It is my understanding that following
January 6th, the Command and Coordination Bureau will be
overseeing operational planning for special events. Have you
seen any new directives from this bureau that would require
department-wide operational plans for large events?
Mr. Bolton. I do not believe I have seen that. I may be
incorrect on the last--I am trying to remember the recent--most
recent request for closure recommendations. I can get back with
you, sir, just to certain make sure that I am correct on that
they--but I do know that they have started, since the event,
creating a--an operational plan more robust or thorough than
the previous one. It seems to be that they have moved toward
that area.
Senator Blunt. My last question this round would be, one of
our recommendations was that a civil disturbance unit be
established as a permanent component and have dedicated
officers as part of that unit. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. Chairwoman, thank you.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Blunt.
Next up, Senator Capito.
Senator Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you,
Inspector General, for being here. I want to begin by thanking
the Capitol Police for everything they do every day for us, for
their bravery on January the 6th. I think we certainly want
them to know that, I think, we all deeply respect them and are
very appreciative of their efforts. My first question is, you
mentioned that you want to go from--you think the Capitol
Police should go from being a police entity, police agency to a
protective agency. Where would the policing aspect of their
jobs now, where would that go? DC Metropolitan Police? How do
you envision that kind of coordination?
Mr. Bolton. Some of it, it is almost also a posture that
you are going--when I say ``move to a protective agency,'' it
is not that every officer then we will go into a suit and tie,
okay? But their focus would be less on minor crimes, like
around Union Station, those----
Senator Capito. Station, mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. that type of areas or simple
traffic violation.
Senator Capito. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. But your training is the important component of
all this. When you start training individuals into a protective
mode and thinking protection, much like the DPD or the Secret
Service, you are teaching your folks about protection and how
to go about it. Like even with the Secret Service, you have a
Uniformed Division who have police powers, but their focus is
on protection, whether it be the foreign embassies, or the
White House, or the Vice President. It is--it is also a
mindset.
Senator Capito. You are not really envisioning two
different agencies being here. You are just basically
repositioning the way the force actually thinks about it. We
call them the ``Capitol Police,'' so, you know, maybe that
would be a good place to start, maybe rebrand them or--at least
through their training, certainly. You mentioned, and this has
been mentioned in all the reports, that the training was not
there, both on--how to handle the situation or a situation
similar to that, but also training on weapons and the use of
certain types of weapons. I saw the CERT team did not have
training. I think it was only 10 percent were up to date on
their training for certain types of weapons. What was the
reason for that, that they were not trained?
Mr. Bolton. Maybe it is tenfold or several fold, but as far
as--training is near and dear to my heart because I came also
from officer training as a firearms instructor and the counter
assault team, so I understand the importance of training.
Senator Capito. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. There is no excuse for not getting your
training in. Even with the pandemic and COVID, they trained out
at Fort Meade. There is plenty of open air, open space that is
wide open that you can spread out and still get your requals
in. To me, the biggest failure is that because we have allowed
certain elements within the Capitol Police to be autonomous,
they conduct their own training.
Senator Capito. Okay.
Mr. Bolton. That is the issue, whereas if you have a
Training Services Bureau--and let us call it officer training--
that is fully incorporated, they handle all the training. They
conduct it. They make sure you get the training. They hold your
officials accountable. Your people did not get training? Guess
what? We are sending a letter to the chief, and they can no
longer work until they get requal'd, or what have you.
Senator Capito. It sounds a little bit like our
cybersecurity training. You make it mandatory, and if you do
not follow through with it, there are consequences. Let me ask
you this. Were there--and I do not know the answer to this
question. Were there any K-9's in and around--I know that K-9's
are trained to detect weapons or maybe even substances. I
actually, when I was the appropriator for the Capitol Police,
went out to their K-9 training centers, a kind of area of
interest for me. I know there is a shortage of fully trained K-
9's in all law enforcement, whether it is at the airport or
wherever it might be. What was the posture of those officers,
and are those dogs trained in a protective way rather than a
more anticipatory, if you understand what I am saying, more
aggressive--I guess more aggressive posture?
Mr. Bolton. Yes. Well, first off, we have not--we have not
looked specifically at K-9. Our plan for our continuing reviews
in August, we will be looking at K-9 and HMRT, specifically.
Senator Capito. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. But as we have done with our--because we are
also reaching out to individual officers for our--this report
that we are doing now, the Command and Control, to get their
officers and what commands are given. Some of the things that
we have received and spoken to us is that K-9's, at that point
they were tasked with basically supplementing CDU. There dogs
were then placed into kennels, into our Department kennels.
They were kenneled, and those officers, those handlers were put
on the front line.
Senator Capito. Oh, Okay.
Mr. Bolton. The problem when you do that is when you put a
dog in a kennel, one, it is stressful for the dog, and dogs can
only--our dogs, like any K-9 dogs, not us specifically, they do
need--require a certain amount of down time, and because they
are in a kennel, they are not getting that. Then when it was
called upon for them to go ahead and sweep the Capitol once the
insurrectionists were removed, you are wanting--you have to,
you know, be mindful that those dogs are tired now, and you are
tasking them to do very high-level work. Our dogs basically are
not attack dogs. They are not crowd control dogs. They are
sniffers, they would say, type dogs.
Senator Capito. Would that be a recommendation to amplify
the force to get more crowd control dogs?
Mr. Bolton. I would venture probably not crowd control
dogs. Most police departments have moved away from that concept
of crowd control dogs.
Senator Capito. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. There are some that still employ that, but then
again, that is something that, you know, needs to be really
considered.
Senator Capito. Yes. Okay. My last question is, you have
made a lot of recommendations, and the--and the report that
came from the committee made a lot of recommendations. You are
following up on those? You said you are going to be on this--
until the end of the year. Is part of that following up on the
recommendations to see in what stage they might be, or if they
are being implemented by the--by the Capitol Police?
Mr. Bolton. Basically, right now, our plan is that once we
have completed our reviews of the different elements within the
Department, we are going to produce a report on all the
recommendations----
Senator Capito. Okay.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. to give a report to the committees
and to the Board of the status of all the recommendations.
Senator Capito. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Bolton. Great.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Capito.
Senator Ossoff? He is on remotely.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for your
continued leadership, and thanks to your staff as well as the
Ranking Member staff for their work preparing this report. Mr.
Bolton, thank you for joining us today.
On February 22d, during this committee's first hearing on
the events of January 6th, I asked a simple question of the
panel: Who is in charge? Who is ultimately responsible for the
security of the United States Capitol Complex? Nearly 4 months
and many studies and ongoing investigations later, I want to
ask the same question of you. Who today, which individual, is
ultimately responsible for the security of the United States
Capitol?
Mr. Bolton. That is a difficult question to answer in a
sense that, yes, you have a chief of police who runs the day-
to-day operations for the Capitol Police, but then you have a
Capitol Police Board, an entity that also is--basically has
oversight of the Capitol Police. The chief, they have the
authority to hire or terminate the chief, so that would be a
difficult question. But if you--to try to pin it down the best,
I would say probably the Capitol Police Board has probably the
ultimate authority.
Senator Ossoff. Mr. Bolton, would you agree with me that
when a question, like who is in charge, which individual is
accountable, is difficult to answer, that suggests, especially
when the stakes are so high--this is a national security
issue--the need for reform to establish clear lines of
accountability, a clear chain of command, and one individual
who is ultimately accountable for the security of the United
States Capitol?
Mr. Bolton. I would agree with you, sir, that if it takes--
that if it is hard to distinguish who is actually in charge,
then it certainly raises issues and questions.
Senator Ossoff. Has there not been any capacity for the
Board and those who are currently entrusted with and empowered
to secure the United States Capitol to streamline and make
clear who is in charge? Does that require statute? Does that
require action by Congress? What could the United States
Capitol Police, the Sergeants at Arms, and the Board do now to
clarify which individual is in charge? Because I have to say it
is--it is not reassuring to hear that there remains this basic
ambiguity about responsibility, command, and accountability.
Mr. Bolton. Sir, I think the best individuals to ask that
question would actually be the Board as opposed to myself.
Senator Ossoff. Okay. Mr. Bolton, we will put that in
writing to the Board immediately.
Senator Ossoff. I want to ask you about cybersecurity, and
I know that this is not principally the responsibility of
United States Capitol Police, but would nevertheless appreciate
your view on the matter. The Senate Sergeant at Arms recently
said that what keeps her up at night is actually not the threat
of another violent, riotous invasion of the United States
Capitol, but, instead, a cyberattack on the Capitol or on
congressional information technology. Maintaining physical
security over computers and over devices is an essential aspect
of cybersecurity. I want to ask you if there is a plan, to your
knowledge, to handle the extensive fallout that would result if
congressional networks were compromised, and who, to your
knowledge, is ultimately accountable for the cybersecurity of
the United States Capitol? I ask that question in the same
spirit: Basic principle of management. If no one is in charge,
then no one is in charge and no one can be held accountable. To
your knowledge at this moment, with which individual rests
responsibility for cybersecurity in the United States Congress?
Mr. Bolton. Well, sir, I believe if you are looking at the
cybersecurity, the Senate Sergeant at Arms would have overall
security for cybersecurity for the Senate, the House Sergeant
of Arms would have it for the House obviously, and the
Architect of the Capitol would be for the Architect of the
Capitol, that entity. Those--but there is one singular
individual overall for the Capitol Complex.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. Do you believe it
would be appropriate to consolidate the disparate Capitol
Police units responsible for intelligence gathering and
analysis into a single bureau led by a civilian director of
intelligence to increase the focus of Capitol Police
intelligence gathering and analysis, improve the timely sharing
of relevant intelligence, and improve coordination within the
agency and its law enforcement partners?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. I believe that that would be the most
efficient way of going about the gathering and dissemination of
intelligence.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. A final question
with my remaining time, if you will indulge me, Madam Chair.
Under the--under existing authorities, the Capitol Police Chief
lacks unilateral authority to even request assistance from the
National Guard and must first obtain an emergency declaration
from the Capitol Police Board. Do you agree with this
committee's report and its conclusion that the Capitol Police
Chief's lack of such authority to request National Guard
assistance unilaterally hindered his ability to respond quickly
during the attack on January 6th?
Mr. Bolton. Certainly, sir, I think the results of what
occurred on January 6th bear that out to be correct.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Bolton. Thank you, Madam
Chair.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Ossoff.
Next up, I believe, is Senator Hyde-Smith, and the first one to
arrive. Thank you.
Senator Hyde-Smith. Thank you, Chairwoman Klobuchar and
Ranking Member Blunt, for today's hearing, and I certainly
commend both of you on such a wonderful example of
bipartisanship, working together, and, along with your
counterparts on the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, to complete the investigative report that
was released.
You know, ensuring our Capitol Police have the intelligence
and resources they need is very important to everyone sitting
up here, and, Mr. Bolton, your office has proposed numerous
ways to improve the intelligence, training, equipment, and
operations for our Capitol Police. All of those are very
important. However, I am concerned that without an adequate
number of officers on the force, that all of this would be
pointless. I continue to hear about the unprecedented
resignations and retirements among the Capitol Police officers
since the event on January the 6th, and I have also heard how
the officers remaining on the force are working unsustainable
schedules, including many overtime shifts, which you mentioned
briefly in your testimony. How is your office now approaching
recruitment, the retention issues, to ensure that we can always
have an adequate number of officers on the force?
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, ma'am. Well, first, my office is not
involved within the recruitment or retention of the officers.
That is going to be handled by the Department. Human resources
would be handling that. The type of job that we have done is we
have looked at what kind--how they constituted their
recruitment office and how they are going about that. But as
far as individually recruiting or being involved in it, that is
not something within our role, or responsibility, or our
purview of the actual physically going out there and
recruiting. We will look at are they being effective in
recruiting, and we would bump that out with either GAO best
practices or other departments' best practices on how they go
about--go about recruiting, but not the actual recruitment of
officers.
Senator Hyde-Smith. Do you have any recommendations on how
we can improve the morale of the officers?
Mr. Bolton. I think the best way you are going to improve
the morale of officers is to give them good leadership that
they can trust, and provide them with a clear mission, and
train them to be able to accomplish that, and give them the
tools to do their job, and that will increase your morale.
Senator Hyde-Smith. Repeatedly throughout many of the flash
reports that I have seen published by your office, you
mentioned the difficulty in separating credible threats of
violence in the First-Amendment-protected activities. Walking
this line is key to ensuring that we keep our Capitol Complex
safe and prevent unlawful activity, but also preserving the
area to continue to serve as a public forum for the First
Amendment activity. Are there best practices that you have
identified for how to ensure First Amendment rights are
protected while also taking seriously the potential
intelligence about that violence and other unlawful activity?
Mr. Bolton. Well, that is something you can circle back to.
Having an intelligence agency or bureau with trained analysts
to disseminate that information, provide it to the officers,
your rank and file, one, that is going to give them the
confidence of what they may be going to experience, be prepared
for it, and understand that, most important, is our first--the
First Amendment rights for people to exercise those rights when
they come up here to the People's House. The understanding is,
I have heard many times, that they did not receive any direct
threat or substantiated threat before January 6th. If they are
waiting for that mystical letter to show up on their desk
saying you are going to have people who are going to grab your
shields, and break glass, and storm the Capitol, and such as
that, you are never going to receive that. Intelligence is like
a piece of a puzzle, and you have to have the trained analysts
to be able to put those pieces together to give the Department
a picture of what to expect and to be prepared for, also making
sure to allow for First Amendment activity in a lawful manner.
Senator Hyde-Smith. I am quickly running out of time, but
you also mentioned in your testimony the need for additional
medical training for Capitol Police to ensure that the officers
receive quick access to emergency care. One of the things that
we have thought about is, have you considered whether there is
any role here that should be played by the Office of the
Attending Physician or any of nurses that we have stationed out
through the Office Health Units throughout the Capitol Complex?
Mr. Bolton. Maybe not in a direct manner because, again,
you are taking civilians and placing them in harm's way, but
having your officers, and they can coordinate that kind of
training with the Office of the Physician and the nurses, and
the type of training. Back in my day, we called it 5-minute
medicine. Every agent was provided training in what we call 5-
minute medicine, in case, to basically to stabilize an
individual, whether it be a sucking chest wound, broken bones,
compound fracture, that we would be able to at least get them
stabilized in order--until proper medical care came in there.
If every officer at least had basic medical training that they
can assist, whether it be civilians, innocent individuals, or
their own officers, or even members, to be able to provide them
with that immediate medical care for them.
Senator Hyde-Smith. Thank you, Mr. Bolton, and thank you,
Madam Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Senator Padilla?
Senator Padilla. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Bolton, thank
you for your participation today. Now, in your testimony, you
described a need to change the culture of the Capitol Police
from that of a police force to that of a protective agency.
First, I guess, a two-part question. First, in practice, what
does it mean to reshape the Capitol Police into a protective
agency? What would the practical and operational effects of
that be, number one. Number two, how long do you think such a
culture shift would take to implement? I mean, beyond just
changing the policies, right, the words on paper and procedures
on paper, what needs to be done in terms of training, and
tactics, and ethos to operationalize such a change?
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, sir. To best answer your question,
one, in the thought process of a protective agency, a
protective agency is more--is geared toward proactive, that you
are trying to anticipate as opposed to being reactive. Yes,
that is it--is not exactly a quick fix. Yes, you can--you can
put things--certain things down as directives or SOPs. The hard
part and the part that is actually going to require a lot of
funds is having a Training Services Bureau, an officers
training, that is geared now to teaching, and also do an in-
service training in that protective mode where now you are
changing--basically, the courses that you are teaching now are
regular police-type tactics or police procedures, that now you
are shifting. It is a fundamental shift, and it is not an easy
shift because it is going to require for us, one, to have a
larger footprint in Cheltenham, to utilize more of that space
there, and it is quite a bit of an infrastructure we are going
to be requesting or they would have to request from
appropriations, but as well as bring in subject matter experts,
those who have been brought up in that type of environment, in
that protective mode, and getting the Department up to speed to
where now they can do that training in there. They are going to
probably have to bring folks from the outside who are already
trained in that skill set, get us at level, the subject matter
experts.
Senator Padilla. Thank you. Next, I want to shift to the
topic of white supremacy. It is conversation we have had in the
Judiciary Committee with different nominees coming through for
confirmation as it pertains to rooting out white supremacy, not
just in Federal Departments and agencies, but in law
enforcement agencies, frankly, throughout the country, but
specific to this. Top of mind for me, particularly because of,
I will be blunt about it, the relationship that the Trump
Administration and President Trump himself had with some of
these fringe groups, which were, in large part, what led to
January 6th.
In the course of your investigation, you found that the
Capitol Police's Containment Emergency Response Team, the CERT
Team, contracted with privately owned entities to train its
personnel in firearm marksmanship and other tax exempt
facilities located outside the District of Columbia
metropolitan area. One of the contractors used by the Capitol
Police had, according to your report, ``questionable content on
their website.'' News reports have suggested that the
questionable content includes symbols associated with the white
supremacist movement. These reports are, of course, of serious
concern. Beyond identifying the fact of the contract and the
concerning website content of the contractor, have you
undertaken any deeper study into why or how this particular
contractor came to be selected? You know, more broadly, have
you already or do you plan to undertake any study of whether
the use of this contractor suggests a wider concern with white
supremacist ideologies within the force?
Mr. Bolton. At this time, sir, once we discovered that, we
conveyed our concerns, as you mentioned, within a--what we call
management advisory report to the Department, our concerns in
recommending that they seriously consider not utilizing that
particular company. We have not done any in-depth work on
investigating that company. I did refer our information in my
report over to the Department of Justice for action as they
deem appropriate. It is more appropriate for them to look at it
as opposed to me. That would be somewhat outside of my
jurisdiction unless they were--we could show that there was
contract fraud that would keep it within my purview. But as to
investigating that kind of an entity, that is not within my
jurisdiction, hence why I sent it over to the Department of
Justice. That is the more appropriate entity to look at that.
Senator Padilla. Madam Chair, just a follow-up question on
this topic. I appreciate you are engaging the Department of
Justice for what they and only they can do. I would suggest
that, along with this culture shift that we are talking about,
this is something that remains in your purview, and let me ask
an additional specific question to help. Given the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center and other non-contracted training
facilities are nearby, is there any justification for Capitol
Police relying on contractors to provide training to officers,
and have you done a comprehensive review to determine if
Capitol Police has entered into other similar contracts instead
of relying on available Federal resources to train other--that
are available to train other Federal law enforcement officers?
Mr. Bolton. There is really no reason for them not to use
other Federal agencies. My previous employer, the Secret
Service, when I was on the Counter Assault Team, we would
utilize obviously our own training facilities, which are a
little bit more extended than what Capitol Police have, but we
would also use DOD so we would not have those kind of things.
But it was approved training through the Office of Training to
fit our skills and abilities and needs to complete our mission.
We do plan on looking at for fiscal year 2021--I have
already started trying to work on my annual plan for 2022. One
of the things that we are going to look at, we are going to
look at all outside contractors for the appropriateness and
whether or not we would be able to use--you know, leverage some
Federal agencies to assist us and save money, and that is kind
of what our mandate is, the fraud, waste, and abuse, to weed
out those.
Senator Padilla. Well, the fraud, waste, and abuse is in
and of itself meritorious, but to the extent that it gives a
better ability to identify and root out dynamics such as white
supremacy, I would argue, bring some urgency to it. I do not
want to put words in your mouth, but the first part of your
answer to that final question sure sounded like there does not
seem to be any reason or justification for using non-Federal
resources already available in officer training. Therefore, the
use of contractors to provide that training does not make
sense.
Mr. Bolton. That would be correct, sir.
Senator Padilla. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Senator Padilla.
Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chair Klobuchar, Ranking Member
Blunt. I appreciate your having this hearing. Mr. Bolton, thank
you for being here, and I want to also reiterate what my
colleagues have said, how much we appreciate what the United
States Capitol Police does for us every day to keep all of us
safe and protected. I know they have been working long hours,
and we very much appreciate their efforts.
I would like to start my question with you to highlight the
critical role of local, state, and Federal law enforcement
agencies in the effort that took place all around the region,
coming together on January the 6th. I would like to highlight
the recent bipartisan report by this committee and the Senate
Homeland Security Committee, which notes that at 1:51 p.m. on
January the 6th, the Capitol Police activated its mutual aid
agreement with regional law enforcement agencies, and that led
to a quick response by local, state, and Federal law
enforcement agencies, who helped Capitol Police and Metro
police secure the Capitol building by 4:28 p.m., which was
fully an hour before the DC National Guard arrived.
So, Mr. Bolton, and I would like to focus on how we can
assure that Capitol Police officers have the leadership, the
training, and the tools that they deserve.
Your recent interview identified intelligence-related
deficiencies in the Department's organizational structure, the
Department's training, its professional standards, its internal
controls, and the collection and dissemination of information,
as well as a failure with intelligence evaluations in
connection with January the 6th. These intelligence
shortcomings were known before January 6th, in fact, identified
in two previous IG reports. Similarly, the bipartisan Rules and
Homeland Security report found that ``important intelligence
information received by internal United States Capitol Police
components was not appropriately shared among USCP's distinct
intelligence-related components.'' I would like to ask you, Mr.
Bolton, is it accurate that you found numerous Capitol Police
intelligence-related shortcomings ahead of January 6th, at
least one of which has been raised in previous IG reports?
Mr. Bolton. That would be correct, sir, yes.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Leading up to January 6th, who
was in the role of assistant chief of the Protective and
Intelligence Operations, which oversees Capitol Police
intelligence components?
Mr. Bolton. That would be Acting Chief Pittman.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you for putting it on the record.
More general, the bipartisan Rules and Homeland Security
Committee found out that on January the 6th, Capitol Police
leadership did not adequately utilize available intelligence.
They did not adequately plan operationally. They did not
provide protective equipment for officers. They did not provide
civil disturbance training to officers, nor did they
communicate with officers during the violence. Mr. Bolton, your
written testimony quoted a 2014 IG report stating that, ``Only
when the right personnel for the job are on board and provided
the right training, tools, structure, incentives, and
responsibilities is operational success possible.'' My next
question, Mr. Bolton: Do you believe that Capitol Police
officers were given the training, the tools, the structure, the
incentives, and the responsibilities they needed to succeed
operationally on January the 6th?
Mr. Bolton. No, sir. I do not believe that they were given
those tools and the ability to be able to do--to be successful.
Some of the officers that I have spoken to just briefly, one
made a comment to me it is not so much that we had to fight
with one hand behind our back, but at times they felt like both
hands were tied behind their back.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you. Finally, Mr. Bolton, in
reviewing your recommendations, I was struck that many of your
recommendations focus on improving internal policies and
practices, on improving training regiments, on improving
organizational structures and emergency preparedness. Is it
your view that addressing these management issues that you have
identified would go a long way toward remedying the issues that
came up on January the 6th?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir. If you establish repeatable business
practices in doing what we need to do to complete our mission,
you are going to be successful.
Senator Hagerty. You concluded in your written testimony by
stating that, ``It is our duty to honor those officers who have
given their lives, but also ensuring the safety of all those
working and visiting the Capitol Complex by making hard changes
within the Department.'' I think that is very well said, and I
agree that we owe it to our Capitol Police officers, who put
their lives on the line every day, to make the changes
necessary to protect them, to give them the equipment, the
resources necessary for them to succeed in their job. Thank
you, Mr. Bolton.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Thank you very much. I just have a
few additional questions. A vote has been called, but Senator
Blunt and I just have a few additional questions. The Capitol
Police currently has personnel who are integrated in
intelligence task forces, including with the FBI and other
Federal law enforcement agencies. Part of our report, as I
mentioned earlier, was about recommending how the Capitol
Police better coordinate with the FBI, Homeland Security, and
other intelligence-gathering agencies. Can you briefly explain,
Mr. Bolton, the importance of these information-sharing roles,
and do you agree that the relationship between Capitol Police
and Federal intelligence agencies must be improved?
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, ma'am. Absolutely. That is going to
be your conduit in getting the intelligence. It is having and
forming these relationships with these other agencies. It is
important just to actually establish a working relationship,
meeting folks face-to-face, dealing with them on a daily basis,
providing and sharing the information. That is how you are
going to accomplish your goals, is by establishing these firm
relationships and also understanding how you can learn from
others. It is a--it is not that everybody has the right answer.
There are a lot of good answers out there.
The Department has been moving forward in strengthening
those. In today's Board meeting, which I attended, they were
outlining several of the new initiatives that the Capitol
Police are undertaking, and directly with involving and to
strengthening those relationships, putting--getting out into
their--the field offices, to establishing--also to help on
threat assessment cases, as well as they will be bringing eight
new analysts on board here shortly.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Mm-hmm. That is good to know. When
the two incident commanders ended up in the middle of the
violent insurrection, which was precipitated by President Trump
and his false claims, they were unable--these commanders were
unable to communicate. They were unable to communicate because
they were actually on the front lines fighting. Then no one
from Capitol Police leadership stepped in and directed
officers, and that was the haunting words of the officer,
``Does anyone have a plan?'' Our report recommended that the
Capitol Police update its incident command system to establish
communication priorities and contingency plans so officers are
not left listening to radio silence and pleas for help. Do you
agree that the Department's communication system should include
backup plans so a senior officer is always available on the
radio?
Mr. Bolton. Absolutely. Yes, ma'am. It should be one of
those things where you plan for the worst, hope for the best.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Very good. Can you briefly elaborate
on why some divisions, like the Containment and Emergency
Response Team, have separate training programs, and why all
Capitol Police training should be, instead, centralized under
the Training Services Bureau?
Mr. Bolton. As I outlined in my flash report, that is an
issue that has long plagued the Department in allowing these
individual entities to become almost autonomous in the
training, hence why we have been vocal--very vocal about need--
the need to centralize your training. We brought up in other
reports K-9. K-9 should not be conducting their own training.
You need to have that separation of duties. That is just best
practices. Any GAO report that you pull up on training are
going to tell you to have a separation of duties.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. These are not something that is new that we
are--just thought this was a great idea. These are longstanding
best practices. You have got to have centralized training. They
handle the training. When you run into--it is the old thing of
the tail wagging the dog. The Department should establish what
are--what is the mission goals. We will take CERT for instance.
What are our mission goals? What skill sets do we need then to
complete this goal? What are our expectations? What can and can
they not do? They should formulate that, and which that was one
of our recommendations. Do a study and formulate detailed
mission goals. Once you have done that, then you send it over
to the Office of Training. They develop the training. They
track the training. They bring in your subject matter experts.
They conduct and monitor and track all the training. The CERT
is there to--then they have a clear understanding of what their
mission is, and so does the Department.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Mm-hmm. Do you think the Department
needs a standalone counterintelligence entity?
Mr. Bolton. A countersurveillance unit?
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Bolton. Yes, ma'am, they certainly do, and it would be
very helpful. I know the Secret Service has that. They set that
up a number of years ago, and that is quite helpful in
conducting their day-to-day operations.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Last question. We have had--we know
there are a lot of organizational changes that need to be made.
We talked about the new police chief, legislation, those
things, but there has also been, even beyond January 6th, an
increasing number of threat assessment cases the Capitol Police
have had to handle. The Department--the police department has
tracked--tasked with tracking and investigating threats against
Members of Congress. Last month, the Capitol Police reported
that threats against members are up 107 percent compared to
this time last year. Does the Capitol Police have the resources
and specialists needed to keep up with these serious threats?
Mr. Bolton. They are ramping up in that very regard, like I
said about the eight new analysts to assist it. They will be
standing up here shortly, if they have not already, two field
offices with a plan of three additional field offices
throughout the country, basically regionalizing their functions
out there to take certain locations within the country for
those field officers to handle--start handling some of that
threat assessment, taking the load off here.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Okay. Very good. Senator Blunt?
Senator Blunt. General, the--your report indicated there
were a few longstanding recommendations, namely realigning the
Containment Emergency Response Team within the Department's
structure, requiring all officers to maintain a security
clearance, and elevating all intelligence components of the
Department into an intelligence bureau. Why do you think those
were not implemented?
Mr. Bolton. There may be--I think some of that relates back
to--going back to the cultural change. Once again, we
recommended, as you stated, that the CERT teams fall under the
Protective Services Bureau so they can better support the
dignitary protective as well as other operations within the
Department. Again, I think that was a reluctance to change
based on longstanding, long-term ways of doing business. There
are always going to be--people resist change.
Senator Blunt. Do you believe if these recommendations had
been implemented before January 6th, it would have made a
difference in how they responded?
Mr. Bolton. That would be very difficult--we do not have a
crystal ball, but I would certainly say it would have put us in
a better position to have succeeded that day.
Senator Blunt. You said earlier that you report to the
Police Board, though we may want you to testify before our
committee more than we have in the past since it is your first
day here, and we have some responsibilities with the Capitol
Police. But when you reported to the Police Board, did you
report to them that these recommendations were not followed?
Mr. Bolton. Well, they do get--receive copies of whenever
we close our recommendations and they are briefed by the
Department on the status of their recommendations.
Senator Blunt. Are you aware that they ever encouraged the
police to--Capitol Police to move forward with your
recommendations?
Mr. Bolton. Sir, I am not aware of those--but those
discussions could very well have happened.
Senator Blunt. Alright.
Mr. Bolton. But I am not aware of them.
Senator Blunt. On January 6th, the heavier less-than-lethal
weapons, like sting balls, were never used. Do you know who
gave the order not to use those and why?
Mr. Bolton. My understanding is it was an assistant chief,
who is no longer with the Department, had those more heavier
munitions stand down and not to be utilized. Some of those
munitions, my understanding, too, through our report, that they
were also expired munitions, as well as individuals were not
fully--had not been fully trained and recertified to utilize
those munitions.
Senator Blunt. Well, so training, again, would have made a
difference in what could happen there.
Mr. Bolton. Yes, sir.
Senator Blunt. I have some more questions for the record,
but the only question I think I have today, in terms of
rethinking what the Capitol Police--how they--how they view
themselves, whether it is a security unit or a protective unit,
are there jobs in the Capitol Police now that are done by
uniformed officers that do not need to be done by uniformed
officers? If we set up this new intelligence unit, does
everybody we might recruit for that unit, for instance, have to
become a trained Capitol Police officer, or are they part of
the Capitol Police who focuses specifically on intelligence?
Have you given thought to that?
Mr. Bolton. Well, certainly, I think right now most of
the--your intelligence bureau, your analysts--excuse me--are
non-sworn officers. They are--they are civilian, so there are--
certainly a lot of those positions can--are, and also other
agencies, are civilianized. They are not--like, serve as
special agents. There certainly should be a study, at least a
look or discussion, of some of the duties that Capitol Police
undertake now could be, let us say just far as an instance,
like, think of it as more of a security officer as opposed to a
sworn officer.
Senator Blunt. Mm-hmm, or a parking officer or something
that would----
Mr. Bolton. Something similar, yes.
Senator Blunt. Well, I think we ought to be thinking about
that. We have just about worn out the Capitol Police force, and
I think we talk about adding more to the force. Our first big
challenge is to fill the jobs we have, and in every police
force in America that is a problem right now. We have got to be
thinking, I think, smarter of how we use the trained and sworn
officers we have. Thank you, Chairwoman. I have other questions
for the record, but none today.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record.]
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Very good. Thank you. Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Bolton, welcome.
Thank you for your work. Thank you for your examination of the
issues behind what occurred on January 6th. The men and women
of the Capitol Police and the other law enforcement officers
who defended the Capitol and defended Members of Congress were
heroic. They are heroes every day, but that day, in particular,
they demonstrated extraordinary courage and valor, and they no
doubt saved lives as a result of that bravery. Nonetheless,
anytime there is a violent attack, a terrorist attack, it is
important to engage in the careful retrospective of what steps
can be taken--law enforcement steps, intelligence steps can be
taken to prevent another incident from occurring.
Looking at your flash reports, looking at the joint report
that the Senate has put out, there have been a number of
failings--law enforcement and intelligence failings that have
been identified. In your judgment, what are the most
significant intelligence failures that led to the failure to be
adequately prepared for the violent attack on January 6th?
Mr. Bolton. In regards to the Capitol Police, since that
is--it is within my jurisdiction, I would say not having the
ability to analyze and then disseminate that information. That
particular Norfolk memo, or situational report, never made it
to the chief or to the upper level of the command. That cannot
happen. You have got to provide your commanders or your
management teams with all the information. Nothing can be
withheld from it because, again, as I talked about before,
intelligence is like a puzzle. Now we just took one of the
pieces and threw it away, and you cannot complete the picture
now.
Senator Cruz. What were the impediments that prevented it
from making it to the chief?
Mr. Bolton. I think part of that is the basic structure
that they had in place at that time whereas the intelligence
was not a standalone bureau. You did not have the trained
individuals there to analyze this information and to be able
to--with clear policies on how to disseminate it up the chain
of command.
Senator Cruz. What changes should the Capitol Police make
or should Congress consider making in terms of how the Capitol
Police is structured to prevent those intelligence failures in
the future?
Mr. Bolton. One of the biggest changes you can make is to
make the current intelligence a standalone bureau, elevated to
the level, beef it up; in other words, provide it with more
assets. Take some of the elements that are within the Capitol
Police, within that division, that are separate from them,
bring them over and make it that--a concerted effort and where
you have an individual that is schooled in the intelligence
field from the very beginning of their career to right now,
somebody that is well schooled and connected within the
intelligence community.
Senator Cruz. In hindsight, on January 6th, what
operational steps should the Capitol Police and other law
enforcement have taken to prevent the violent terrorist attack
from successfully breaching the Capitol? What could have been
done differently to prevent what occurred?
Mr. Bolton. I think the best way is--to answer that,
because hindsight, you know. Yes, that is what inspector
generals do. We sit there and we are Monday morning
quarterbacks. We are great at that. But I think just the
overall--if you look at every--each one of our flash reports as
well as your--the Senate's report, that is how we are going to
achieve what we need to achieve, and not so much the hindsight,
but here is what is before us. Here is the roadmap. Let us get
to work and let us do it.
Senator Cruz. Well, but in terms of what we can learn from
hindsight, would you say it is principally additional manpower,
both police officers and National Guard forces, that would have
made a difference on that day, or other steps that would have
made a difference to prevent the attackers from successfully
breaching the Capitol?
Mr. Bolton. I think by having a very detailed plan. If you
had the training, the equipment, the steps that you could have
taken to put you in a better position to succeed that day. They
are there in front of us, that if we had had those in place, we
would have been in a better position to succeed.
Senator Cruz. In terms of the significant failings on the
front end, you see the intelligence gathering and the failure
for that intelligence to go up the chain to the decisionmakers,
and then on the day of execution, the lack of an operational
plan to deal with a violent terrorist attack of that magnitude.
Is that right?
Mr. Bolton. That would be correct, sir.
Senator Cruz. Very good. Thank you.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you, sir.
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Well, thank you very much, Senator
Cruz. I want to thank Ranking Member Blunt, the members of this
committee, and especially you, Inspector General Bolton, not
only for appearing before us today but for all the work and
recommendations that you have made. Your experience comes into
play here in a big way. I know some of these recommendations
are being implemented as we speak, but there is much more to
do. In today's hearing, we heard more about measures that are
needed to restore trust and confidence in the United States
Capitol Police leadership. These reforms are wide ranging,
impacting nearly all parts of the Capitol Police, including
with respect to intelligence, training, equipment, and
operational planning.
As we have heard in today's hearing, it is clear that
changes are needed and that they should be implemented without
delay. It is why we got our report out as quickly as we could,
and our bipartisan report makes a number of recommendations,
several of which were discussed today, and you have made 65
recommendations yourself, Mr. Bolton, so far. While more must
be done in the aftermath of the insurrection, and while I
continue to feel very strongly that a 9/11-style report and
investigation on what happened on January 6th would be most
helpful because it would consolidate all the work that is being
done across many branches of government, and including in--over
in the House because it would be bicameral, I still think it is
really important that we implement these recommendations from
our bipartisan report and your work as soon as possible. Thank
you very much to our colleagues.
The hearing record will be held open for a week if you want
to add anything, Senator Blunt.
Senator Blunt. [Off audio.]
[The information referred to was submitted for the record.]
Chairwoman Klobuchar. Okay. We will go off to our vote and
look forward to working with you in the weeks and months to
come, Mr. Bolton.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED
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