[Senate Hearing 117-679]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                                       S. Hrg. 117-679

                             OPEN HEARING:
                  ON THE NOMINATION OF AVRIL D. HAINES
                TO BE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

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                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                            JANUARY 19, 2021

                               __________

      Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
      
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]      


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                    SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

           [Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.]

                 MARCO RUBIO, Florida, Acting Chairman
                MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
SUSAN COLLINS, Maine                 MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  ANGUS KING, Maine
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KAMALA HARRIS, California
JOHN CORNYN, Texas                   MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                 MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
                  CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio
                   JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma, Ex Officio
                  JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio

                              ----------                              
                      Chris Joyner, Staff Director
                 Michael Casey, Minority Staff Director
                   Kelsey Stroud Bailey, Chief Clerk
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                            JANUARY 19, 2021

                           OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                   Page
Rubio, Hon. Marco, a U.S. Senator from Florida...................     1
Warner, Hon. Mark R., a U.S. Senator from Virginia...............     3

                               WITNESSES

Coats, Dan, Former Director of National Intelligence.............     5
Haines, Avril D., nominee to be Director of National Intelligence     7
    Prepared Statement for the Record............................    10

 
 OPEN HEARING: ON THE NOMINATION OF AVRIL D. HAINES TO BE DIRECTOR OF 
                         NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

                              ----------                              


                       TUESDAY, JANUARY 19, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
                          Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in 
Room SD-215, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Marco Rubio, 
Acting Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
    Present: Senators Rubio (presiding), Warner, Collins, 
Blunt, Cornyn, Sasse, Feinstein, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Bennet, 
and Reed (ex officio).

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            FLORIDA

    Chairman Rubio. Our hearing will come to order.
    I want to welcome our witnesses today. Avril Haines is 
President-elect Biden's nominee to be the next Director of 
National Intelligence.
    Congratulations on your nomination.
    It goes without saying, we are meeting today under unique 
circumstances, not just because of a pandemic, obviously. I 
want to thank our staff on both sides of the aisle who worked 
incredibly hard on the logistics of pulling this off. I want to 
thank our Members. And I want to thank our witnesses for their 
cooperation to navigate through all of this real estate, which 
is at a premium in this building in terms of finding even a 
room to meet. And so they did some excellent work to make that 
happen, and our Members as well have been very accommodating, 
and I thank everyone.
    As I think you saw from our public statement, and I think 
you can tell from our actions, that the Vice Chairman and I 
strongly agree that we need to proceed, to move forward with 
the process to ensure that the full Senate gets the opportunity 
to consider these critical national security positions as early 
in the new Administration as possible. For our enemies, our 
adversaries, for those that seek to do us harm--this is no 
transition period. They are ongoing. At 12:01 p.m. tomorrow 
they will be just as intent on harming us as they were at 11:59 
a.m. So it is important that we move as quickly as possible on 
issues of national security.
    Following the conclusion of this open hearing, we're going 
to reconvene in our normal hearing room, which we have not seen 
much of in almost a year now, for a closed session so we can 
discuss items that we can't talk about here.
    Ms. Haines has a Bachelor's degree in something I never 
even took as a course, which is physics, from the University of 
Chicago, and then went to law school and graduated from 
Georgetown University Law Center. Just reading through her 
professional background, it's an array of experiences. Deputy 
Director of the CIA. Deputy National Security Advisor. On the 
staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At the Office 
of White House Counsel. At the U.S. Department Office of Legal 
Advisors. Clerk for the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. And, she 
studied judo in Japan and won the Baltimore City Paper award 
for best independent bookstore. So, I'm not sure what else you 
are going to do the rest of your life after all that, and this 
new position, but it's an impressive array of varied 
accomplishments and experiences. And, since leaving government 
last, she's held multiple roles at multiple academic 
institutions and think tanks, most recently and principally as 
a senior research scholar at Columbia University.
    Ms. Haines, you've been asked to lead the Intelligence 
Community through the Office of Director of National 
Intelligence, which was founded after the painful lessons of 
September 11th, 2001. In essence, the mandate of the ODNI is to 
integrate and coordinate the activities of our numerous 
intelligence agencies and the entire Intelligence Community, 
and then specifically to focus on areas of cybersecurity, which 
are more important than ever: counterintelligence, 
counterterrorism, and counter-proliferation. And as we've seen 
all too many times since the inception of the Agency, not one 
among that list is anything less than no-fail-mission.
    For my part, I want to seek your commitment that if you are 
confirmed as DNI you will orient the Intelligence Community to 
comprehensively address the multi-faceted, unprecedented 
national security and counterintelligence challenges and 
threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party. So I hope we can 
hear a little bit today about your goals, your ideas about how 
we can continue to refine and improve on that.
    I think it's important to note for everyone that the 
current tensions in our relationship with China is not because 
we as a Nation have done something wrong. It is because we had 
a flawed bi-partisan consensus for almost two decades, and that 
China once they got rich and prosperous, would become like us--
or more like us. And then we woke up to the reality that they 
steal our trade secrets and intellectual property; they used 
students at our universities to spy on us and steal research; 
that they've made massive and impressive military gains, some 
of it through technology they've stolen from us, and frankly 
some of it funded by American investors through the stock 
market.
    They obviously cheat on trade and on commerce. Their 
businesses want to operate freely here, but they restrict what 
our businesses can do there. And then, to top it all off, they 
put Muslims into detention camps where they re-educate them 
away from their identity. Their horrific treatment of Tibet--
the lack of any religious liberty, and the like. And their 
support of elements around the world that are a danger and a 
threat to peace and freedom.
    A particular area of interest for me is the Western 
Hemisphere and Latin America, and so I hope that we can get 
your commitment to sustain and enhance the focus and the 
collection priorities on the threats and challenges that we 
face, primarily from authoritarian regimes in our hemisphere in 
Cuba and Nicaragua and Venezuela. These countries openly 
welcome cooperation in intelligence and military matters with 
adversaries of our country, including Russia, China, and Iran. 
And they allow their territory to be used to collect against us 
and our interests.
    The Committee may also be interested in your time as the 
Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to President Obama, 
and your role in some of these consequential policy decisions 
made under that Administration. This job is not a policy-making 
position, but your judgment and the role and insights that you 
gain, the role you play and the insights you have in 
formulating policies I imagine will be of interest and concern 
to this Committee and ultimately to the Senate.
    I also want to make a point that to satisfy and meet this 
Committee's oversight obligations requires transparency and 
responsiveness from your office at all times. And we will ask 
difficult questions of you and your staff, and we expect 
honest, complete, and timely answers. It's the only way we can 
do our job and frankly it improves your ability to do your job. 
And so I hope you will at the same time understand this is a 
very unique Committee. It does most of its work without 
cameras, and therefore there isn't the need for some of the 
preening and posturing that becomes all-too-typical in American 
politics today. It is a Committee that all of us who are part 
of it are very proud of the work product and the way we 
operate. And so, I hope you view us not just as overseers, but 
also as partners and an asset. And, as such, we expect you will 
feel free to come to the Committee with situations that you 
believe warrant our partnership.
    With that, I do want to thank you, all of you, for your 
patience in getting us here to this point today. Also, for your 
years of service to our country and for your willingness to 
resume that service. You certainly had other options, and we 
appreciate your willingness to come back into the service of 
our country.
    Mr. Vice Chairman.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
                            VIRGINIA

    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank 
you very much for being willing to move this hearing quickly 
and efficiently, and I want to thank all my colleagues for 
their cooperation as well. It's really important.
    Welcome, Miss Haines. It's good to see you again. We would 
normally welcome your family members, but since we are 
operating under slightly different circumstances, we're going 
to allow Dan Coats to step in and serve as your surrogate 
family today. He's a good friend of this Committee, and it's 
always good to see you Dan.
    Congratulations on your nomination to be the next Director 
of National Intelligence, a position of great responsibility 
for the national security of the United States. And echoing 
what the Chairman said, I thank you again for agreeing to serve 
our country.
    You'll have a lot on your plate, and if confirmed--and I 
believe you will be--I know you will hit the ground running. I 
believe the top of the list will be to reinforce the prime 
imperative for our Nation's Intelligence Community: to find the 
truth and to speak truth to power, without fear of political 
retribution. The dedicated men and women of the Intelligence 
Community have been through a lot over the last four years. Our 
intelligence professionals have been unfairly maligned; their 
expertise, knowledge, and analysis has often been ignored or 
even sometimes ridiculed by a President who seems oftentimes 
uninterested in facts. Those who bravely spoke the truth were 
vilified, reassigned, fired, or retaliated against.
    Miss Haines, it will be your task to ensure the IC recovers 
from this period. As the Chairman mentioned, the DNI was 
created after the horrific events of 9/11. Congress gave the 
DNI three principle missions:
    To serve as the President's principal intelligence advisor.
    To lead the Intelligence Community.
    And to develop, determine, and execute the National 
Intelligence Program.
    We need to return to those basic principles. You will need 
to inspire a workforce that has unfortunately been hollowed out 
by years of firings, and remind them that their mission is 
critical--and still noble. You'll need to exercise leadership 
of the IC's now 18 different agencies. I have to acknowledge 
that during my first few years on this Committee, I didn't even 
know we had at that point 17 agencies that made up the IC. Now, 
with the Space Command, 18. And to make sure those 18 agencies 
work together so that their whole is greater than the sum of 
their parts, you'll need to demonstrate to the American people 
that the Intelligence Community deserves their utmost 
confidence as a source of truth and insight. You'll need to 
assure allied intelligence services around the world that 
America is a reliable partner in our shared cause to promote 
democracy, advance human rights, fight terrorism and extremism, 
and resist authoritarian movements.
    This is going to be no small task. But we will be your 
partner in this endeavor. One of the first things you can do--
at this hearing, even--is to make a strong statement of support 
for professionalism in the IC and pledge that you will not 
tolerate politics influencing the analytical process.
    With all this said, we also need to discuss the kind of 
world in which we find ourselves in 2021 and the threats that 
you see on the horizon. We're still in the midst of a global 
pandemic, one that I believe could have and should have been 
taken more seriously, that has taken thousands of lives and 
literally the livelihoods of millions of Americans. Terrorism 
remains a real and major threat, especially as violent 
extremists groups, whether Islamists, ANTIFA, or white 
nationalism, are increasingly mutating, fracturing, regrouping, 
and radicalizing on the internet and through social media.
    An emboldened Russia has harnessed the inexpensive 
asymmetric tools of cyber-attacks and disinformation. To reach 
out and touch us in ways that have gone around much of our 
multi-million dollar defense industry. And echoing what the 
Chairman has said, perhaps the greatest challenge facing you as 
the DNI will be a rising China that is committed to surpassing 
and eclipsing the U.S. militarily, economically, and 
technologically. I think it's important, at least for me, that 
we constantly make clear that our beef with China is with the 
Communist Party and Xi Jinping, not with the Chinese people, or 
especially not with Chinese-Americans.
    Miss Haines, you will not have an easy job, but I know that 
you know this, and I commend you for signing up for it. I look 
forward to discussing these and other issues with you today.
    My understanding is that your husband is here, and I didn't 
get a chance to meet him, so David, I look forward to getting 
to know you as well. I know Avril will correct my mistake, 
though it's still alright to have Coats as part of your 
surrogate family up there.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you, and likewise to your husband: 
thank you. We know these things take tremendous support from 
family to be able to assume a role such as this.
    I also understand that, as has already been mentioned, one 
of our former Senate colleagues, a Member of this Committee, 
and a respected predecessor of yours as Director of National 
Intelligence, is here to introduce you. The Honorable Dan Coats 
will be speaking. It says here ``remotely'' but he came in 
person. Somehow he found an Uber ride that delivered him here. 
Anyway, thank you. It's great to see you. And why don't you go 
ahead and proceed.

    REMARKS BY HON. DAN COATS, FORMER DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                          INTELLIGENCE

    Director Coats. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman and 
former colleagues, it's an honor for me and a privilege to be 
asked by Avril Haines to introduce her to this Committee, as 
President-elect Biden's choice for the Director of National 
Intelligence. And it's also an honor for me to be back with 
former colleagues, having had the opportunity to serve with 
you, and recognizing the challenges ahead that I know you will 
be addressing.
    As a former Member of this Committee, and with your 
support, and as a former Director of National Intelligence, I'm 
well aware of the weight of responsibility of this position 
that Avril will be inheriting. It is a consuming job, and a 
daunting challenge that she will inherit if confirmed. After 
several conversations and personal meetings with Avril, there 
is no doubt in my mind that President-elect Biden has chosen 
someone who has all the capabilities, qualities, experience, 
and leadership to be the next Director of National 
Intelligence.
    Avril's resume and career defines a remarkable individual. 
Allow me to name just a few of her unique and impressive 
achievements, some of which were mentioned by the Chairman.
    After graduating from high school, Avril spent a year in 
Japan at what has been called the elite Kodokan Judo Institute. 
I liked to use as DNI a model that said: seek the truth and 
speak the truth. Among the many mottos that could be used to 
define Avril, perhaps the best one would be: Don't mess with 
Avril.
    Avril received her B.A. degree from the University of 
Chicago, where she studied theoretical physics, a highly-
competitive department. And if confirmed, Avril will 
significantly boost the DNI brain pool.
    In addition to her studies at the UC, she worked in an 
automobile repair shop--a little difference there between that 
and theoretical physics. I'll let her describe that difference. 
She bought a used Cessna plane and learned to fly. She loved 
rebuilding cars. And she took that Cessna plane with her flight 
instructor and, putting together a rebuilding of the avionics 
by Avril, set out to fly across the Atlantic Ocean. The flight 
ended in an emergency landing on the coast of Newfoundland, but 
the best result of all of that was her flight instructor is now 
her husband.
    Moving on, Avril then received, as was mentioned, a Juris 
Doctorate from Georgetown School of Law, and began her work in 
government. And I was going to mention some of her government 
service engagements, but in the interest of time, the Chairman 
has already noted the extensive experience she has had in a 
number of major government roles. And in addition to her 
government service resume, Avril has engaged in numerous 
private service activities, too many for me to identify given 
the interest of time.
    Mr. Chairman and Committee Members, given the recent state 
of affairs in regard to the role and integrity of the 
Intelligence Community, Avril has a clear recommendation and 
recognition of the most needed responsibilities for the next 
Director of National Intelligence, which she will address in 
her testimony today.
    But most important to me, as a former DNI, is her 
commitment to bringing non-politicized truth to power in 
restoring trust and confidence in the Intelligence Community 
and the American public.
    Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to provide an 
introduction to this exceptional choice for the next Director, 
if confirmed, of National Intelligence.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you very much for that. Ms. Haines, 
let's begin by my swearing you in as a witness. Would you 
please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witness stands.]
    Do you solemnly swear to give this Committee the truth, the 
full truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
    Ms. Haines. I do.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Please be seated.
    Before I move to your statement, I want to ask you the five 
standard questions that the Committee poses to each nominee who 
appears before us, and they require simple yes or no answers, 
for the record, if you so choose.
    Number one: Do you agree to appear before the Committee 
here or in other venues when invited?
    Ms. Haines. I do.
    Chairman Rubio. If confirmed, do you agree to send 
officials from your office to appear before the Committee and 
designated staff when invited?
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Chairman Rubio. Do you agree to provide documents or any 
other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to 
carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, I do.
    Chairman Rubio. Will you ensure that your office and your 
staff provide such material to the Committee when requested?
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Chairman Rubio. And finally, do you agree to inform and 
fully brief to the fullest extent possible all Members of the 
Committee, of the intelligence activities and covert actions 
rather than just only the Chairman and Vice Chairman?
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you very much. We'll now proceed to 
your opening statement, and then after that, I'll recognize 
Members by seniority for up to five minutes each.
    The floor is yours.

  STATEMENT OF AVRIL D. HAINES, NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE 
                OFFICE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

    Ms. Haines. Thank you Chairman Rubio, Vice Chairman Warner, 
and Members of the Committee. It's an honor to be here before 
you today as the President-elect's nominee to be Director of 
National Intelligence.
    I particularly appreciate your holding this hearing today 
in the light of the searing events of the last two weeks. The 
fact that you have not allowed those events to interrupt the 
work of the Committee on behalf of the American people and that 
you continue to operate on a bipartisan basis--something this 
Committee I know is known for--is a testament to all of you and 
an example I profoundly admire.
    I am also very grateful to Senator Coats for his kind 
introduction, for his extraordinary service, and for his wise 
counsel during this period, and for standing with me in support 
of an institution and a community that we both love.
    And finally, I want to say how eternally grateful I am to 
my husband, David, who is with me today--for his love, his 
support, his wisdom, his patience, and perhaps most of all, his 
sense of humor for the last 29 years we've been together.
    If I have the honor of being confirmed, I look forward to 
leading the Intelligence Community on behalf of the American 
people, to safeguarding their interests, advancing their 
security and prosperity, and to defending our Democracy, our 
freedom, and our values. This role comes with clear 
responsibilities:
    Advising the President and his senior advisors to inform 
their consideration of critical national security issues.
    Synchronizing and prioritizing collection, analysis, and 
counterintelligence efforts across the Intelligence Community.
    Ensuring that our intelligence work is effectively 
integrated and focused on the threats of today and tomorrow.
    Responsibly stewarding and allocating our resources.
    Promoting strong national security relationships with both 
our allies abroad and with our partners here at home.
    And engaging directly and regularly with the Senate and 
House Intelligence Committees on each of these priorities.
    All of these responsibilities are essential to a strong and 
effective national intelligence program. But perhaps the 
greatest challenge to be faced by the next DNI internally and 
externally--including with the workforce, this Committee, and 
the public--is building the trust and confidence necessary to 
protect the American people. To be effective, the DNI must 
never shy away from speaking truth to power, even--especially--
when doing so may be inconvenient or difficult. To safeguard 
the integrity of our Intelligence Community, the DNI must 
insist that when it comes to intelligence, there is simply no 
place for politics--ever.
    The DNI must prioritize transparency, accountability, 
analytic rigor, facilitating oversight, and diverse thinking--
not as afterthoughts, but as strategic imperatives that bolster 
our work and our institutions. And to be trusted, the DNI must 
uphold our Democratic values and ensure that the work of the 
Intelligence Community, mostly done in secret, is ethical, is 
wise, is lawful, and effective.
    And I commit to you, if confirmed, that I will live in 
accordance with these principles and the ethos they represent, 
with the aim of restoring trust and confidence--both within the 
Intelligence Community and among those we serve and protect.
    I will also seek to support and elevate the workforce and 
the mission. The Intelligence Community is made up of people 
with unparalleled dedication and expertise. Public servants who 
are mission-focused and who play an indispensable role in 
protecting the country from the most dangerous threats, without 
fanfare or fame but simply through diligence.
    I've had the great honor to work with them before, to see 
their extraordinary skill, bravery, and patriotism up close, 
and it would be the honor of a lifetime to lead them. My 
intention would be to sustain and build on the tremendous work 
of intelligence professionals by recruiting and retaining 
diverse talent, promoting innovation in every aspect of our 
work, and fostering a culture that is ethical, nonpartisan, 
accountable, and aligned with the values we share as a country.
    The DNI must also, in my view, set a strategic vision for 
the work of the Intelligence Community that looks beyond the 
immediate horizon to ensure we are well postured to address 
developing threats and take advantage of new opportunities as 
they arise: promoting national resilience, innovation, 
competitiveness, and shared prosperity.
    This means ensuring that the Intelligence Community has the 
capacity to understand, warn, protect, and defend the United 
States against the threats we face. This includes threats from 
traditional state actors as well as evolving and critical 
transnational threats, including climate change, cyber-attacks, 
terrorism, global organized crime and corruption, 
disinformation campaigns, and more. Our capabilities must be 
aligned, strategically prioritized, and integrated to be 
effective. For instance, we should provide the necessary 
intelligence to support long-term bipartisan efforts to out-
compete China: gaining and sharing insight into China's 
intentions and capabilities, while also supporting more 
immediate efforts to counter Beijing's unfair, illegal, 
aggressive, and coercive actions, as well as its human rights 
violations, whenever we can.
    And at the same time, the DNI should see to it that the 
Intelligence Community's unique capabilities are brought to 
bear on the global COVID-19 crisis around the world, while also 
addressing the long-term challenge of future biological crises, 
enabling U.S. global health leadership and positioning us to 
defend and detect future outbreaks before they become 
pandemics.
    And here at home, we must strengthen our cybersecurity, 
safeguard our critical infrastructure, and turn the ongoing 
technological revolution from a threat to an advantage by 
integrating new technologies to improve the capacity and 
superiority of our intelligence into the future.
    And of course, none of these aims can be achieved without a 
foundation of trust, which requires accountability--including 
through support of the Inspector General function, the 
protection of whistleblowers, and transparency.
    I believe deeply that the American people should know as 
much as possible about what their intelligence agencies are 
doing to protect them, consistent with the need to safeguard 
sensitive sources and methods. And if I am confirmed, I will 
strive to achieve that.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee: 
If afforded the opportunity to serve as the Director of 
National Intelligence, I vow to be a true partner to you, to 
respect your critical oversight role, and to cultivate a 
relationship of trust. It is a promise that I extend not only 
to this Committee and your colleagues, but also to the American 
public--to the American people--every one of whom deserves a 
Government worthy of their trust.
    And I look forward to earning that trust, and to answering 
your questions today.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Haines follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you. Let me just begin with something 
that's important to address at the outset. From the public 
financial disclosure report, obviously you served as a 
principal or a consultant at the WestExec Advisors. And so did 
you ever consult on behalf of any foreign entities?
    Ms. Haines. No, not through WestExec. I was on the advisory 
board of a French private company, but not of any foreign 
governments.
    Chairman Rubio. To the best of your knowledge, have you 
ever consulted for any company that's done business in Xinjiang 
or has taken a position against the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act or the Hong Kong Autonomy Act?
    Ms. Haines. No, I have not.
    Chairman Rubio. Have you consulted for any company on the 
Department of Defense's list of Chinese communist military 
companies?
    Ms. Haines. No, Senator.
    Chairman Rubio. Have you ever consulted for a company under 
the Department of Commerce's entity list? Or export controls?
    Ms. Haines. No, Senator.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. You touched on this first. Let me just ask 
you this because it's important I think for our Members to get 
back to the regular course of business.
    Can we get a commitment from you to testify annually at 
this Committee's worldwide threats hearing?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Chairman.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you. And if this Committee requests 
your assistance in de-classifying for public release any future 
reports or studies that we do, can we also get a commitment 
from you to aid in the expeditious production of de-classified 
Committee products?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Chairman. I absolutely commit to working 
with you to de-classify information. Obviously I'm mindful of 
sensitive sources and methods that we need to protect. But 
otherwise, working with you to----
    Chairman Rubio. Where it comes into play is when we do a 
report and then we ask for a de-classification review so we 
know which parts have to be compartmented, classified, or 
public----
    Ms. Haines. I see.
    Chairman Rubio. And obviously the faster that process 
moves, the quicker--the decision as to what to leave classified 
is obviously up to the Intelligence Community, but our ability 
to produce those products is dependent on those decisions.
    There is so much going on, but one of the areas that we've 
talked about in our conversation is the Chinese Communist 
Party. And as we've seen, it's a multi-faceted challenge 
without, I think, precedent. Given, it touches virtually every 
aspect of American life: commerce, trade, academia, 
immigration, obviously military, finance sector, and the like. 
But one of the areas that's of concern is they are developing 
longstanding and increasingly-robust influence operations to 
target American political figures for cultivation, from the 
local level all the way up. They are very patient in that 
effort. They'll view someone who might be a mayor or even a 
council member that one day might be a Member of a Committee. 
But in essence, what they are trying to do is create a stable 
of American policy makers and influencers who share or will 
promote China's narrative of events around the world. And some 
of these touch into areas frankly that because they are 
domestic--are not entirely within the Intelligence Community 
purview. And other cases--the Vice Chairman, Senator Burr, and 
myself and others participated in a series of road show type 
events with different sectors of our country to create a level 
of awareness about this that I think in many cases was lacking. 
And I think that was quite productive.
    Have you thought about or what do you view in light of 
that, in the light of those influence efforts--have you given 
thought to what the Intelligence Community's role can be in 
providing counterintelligence support such as awareness 
training to state and local governments and other sectors of 
our country, so that people sort of understand that when you 
are being approached by someone who does business in China or 
is here under the guise of academia or the like, they are not 
James Bond? But they operate in a way that is trying to 
influence you toward narratives that are favorable to China 
that ultimately will influence public policy?
    So have you given some thought to what the Intelligence 
Community's roles would be in countering and confronting that 
sort of threat?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you so much.
    Obviously the counterintelligence challenge with China is a 
very important one, and a priority and something that I will 
need to focus on. And I haven't had a chance to get the kind of 
in-depth classified briefing that I'd like to on these issues, 
to provide you with a more considered opinion. But I absolutely 
agree with your overall view that we need to do more training 
in this space, and I noted obviously in the work that the 
Committee has done on Russia that one of your recommendations 
relates to more training in respect to counterintelligence. I 
think that makes sense in the context of China as well, and 
something that we should focus on. And I know that prior 
Directors of National Intelligence have emphasized the 
importance of having those partnerships with local and state 
actors, and I think that's a space where I would like to 
further engage with you on this issue. But I think having a 
plan for how we can increase training and education of various 
leaders in state and local authorities so they understand the 
threat that is facing them would be perfectly sensible.
    Chairman Rubio. And somewhat in line with that, but on a 
broader--if you look at recent events in this country, we know 
that one of the goals of our adversaries is to sow division, 
dissent within the country, to sow preexisting challenges in 
our country, and because they obviously--it's very difficult 
for a house divided to stand, and they understand this. And 
obviously that poses a real challenge--and I'm making no claims 
here about recent events, other than to say that common sense 
would tell you that these are times that lend themselves 
perfectly to foreign adversary efforts to stoke fires and drive 
divisions and/or to take advantage. But it's difficult because 
often those efforts become domestic efforts, and therefore they 
begin to touch on Americans, U.S. citizens, at which point the 
lines of the Intelligence Community become more blurred--
domestic versus foreign target.
    Have you also given some thought to this challenge that we 
now face where I don't think any of us expect these efforts to 
continue to get us to fight with each other--not that we don't 
do a pretty good job of it on our own--but none of us expects 
that these efforts to get us to fight against each other beyond 
the normal is not going to continue for the foreseeable future, 
and what the IC's role would be in that?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. Obviously I absolutely 
agree with you in terms of the concern about efforts from 
foreign adversaries to ultimately exacerbate divisions that 
exist in the United States, and that one of the key issues that 
we are going to have to be facing as a country is the malign 
influence of such actors and how that is working into our 
system. It is obviously a whole-of-government activity and 
something that I hope the Intelligence Community can 
appropriately support, particularly in terms of the link and 
the understanding of the foreign influence that is being 
conducted.
    I know that in a recent law that has been passed that there 
was the direction to establish a Foreign Malign Influence 
Center within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, and I look forward to working on that. I think 
that could be part of the support that would be useful in this 
context.
    Chairman Rubio. Great. Thank you very much. The Vice 
Chairman.
    Vice Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want 
to start building off of what the Chairman said in his opening 
comments. That, I would argue, for a number of decades, we had 
a bipartisan consensus about China--that the more they came 
into the world order, the closer they would move to some level 
of international norms. I'll be the first to acknowledge I was 
part of that that consensus, and I think I was wrong. This 
Committee over the years under both the Obama Administration 
and the Trump Administration has seen China move 
extraordinarily aggressively. The Chairman made reference to 
their efforts to influence American policy makers. We've seen 
the move aggressively militarily. We've seen them move 
aggressively economically. I've been particularly concerned 
about their efforts to dominate new technologies. And we've 
seen them use tools from stealing intellectual property to 
treating their own people extraordinarily poorly, whether they 
be Uighurs or the people of Hong Kong.
    So I think it is important that we are clear-eyed about 
China. I do think it's important as well to recognize that our 
beef is not with the Chinese people but with the Chinese 
Communist Party. So I'm just going to ask you straight up: Ms. 
Haines, is China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party? 
An adversary of the United States?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Vice Chairman. I couldn't agree more 
with the priority you are attaching to China and the need, I 
think, for the Intelligence Community to focus on this issue. I 
think in the context of China--China is adversarial on some 
issues, and in other issues we try to cooperate with them, 
whether in the context of climate change or other things. And 
ultimately the frame that the President-elect has identified 
for thinking about this is as a global competitor.
    But I think that doesn't, to your point, in any way 
mitigate the fact that when it comes to espionage or a variety 
of areas that I'll be focused on if I'm confirmed in the 
Director of National Intelligence position. They are an 
adversary and we have to work on those issues, in particular 
countering their illegal, unfair, aggressive actions in these 
spaces.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you.
    I'm going to hit a couple of different topics. On January 
6th, as we all know--and we're living with the effects of it--
this Capitol was stormed by insurrectionists, which included a 
whole series of violent right-wing extremist groups: Proud 
Boys, Oath Keepers, Three Percenters, and other so-called 
``omilitia groupso'' who were trying to overthrow the results 
of a national election in our country. We know this is not a 
problem that is unique to America. We've seen similar right-
wing groups spring up across many European nations, and some 
level of networking between what's happening in Europe and 
what's happening in this country.
    What role do you believe the IC should play in addressing 
violent threats originating from extremist groups such as the 
Proud Boys and other groups operating within the United States?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. And I just want to say how 
eerie it was even coming here today to see the National Guard 
out across Washington and in these halls. And my first reaction 
in watching the events was really concern and obviously empathy 
for all of you for friends and colleagues who worked in the 
Senate and in the House and across the Capitol and how truly 
disturbing it was to see what was done to these sacred halls, 
frankly, and the heart of our democracy. And how proud I was to 
be part of a country where I saw all of you not let it affect 
your work. Not let you miss a beat. And come back in and do the 
work of the American people in that context. Truly, remarkable.
    In any event, if I am confirmed as Director of National 
Intelligence, obviously the Intelligence Community is not in 
the lead in managing these events. It's the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security. But the Intelligence Community 
I hope will have an important role in supporting their work, 
and ultimately in particular looking at any connections there 
are between folks in the United States and externally abroad or 
connections or influence that might have been appropriately 
identified as a context of the Intelligence Community.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Thank you. I want to get you--and I 
think you addressed this in your opening statement--but I think 
one of the most important jobs you are going to have is to 
restore both the morale within the IC, and the public trust and 
confidence that the IC will provide honest, non-biased policy 
analysis.
    Can you speak to that for the record?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, absolutely.
    I think this is fundamental to the work of the Intelligence 
Community. That we provide objective analysis, that we don't 
let politics play a role in our work, is critical, and it has 
been my experience that that is what the institution is 
designed to do and intended to do, and it's fundamental to good 
policy decision-making. Because if policy makers like yourself 
and others throughout the Government don't have that 
unvarnished analysis, they don't have sufficient information, 
they don't have the best information that we can provide them 
in order for them to make the decisions they need to make in 
order to protect the country and pursue our interests.
    So, I am absolutely committed to this, and I know many of 
you have spoken on this issue with eloquence and passion and I 
am grateful for that, frankly, and it is something I intend to 
focus on coming into the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, if I am confirmed.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Haines, I am one of the four principle authors of the 
2004 law that created the Director of National Intelligence. 
Your endorsement by former DNI Director Dan Coats means a great 
deal to me because he was the model of how that office should 
be run in a completely nonpartisan, professional way. So let me 
follow up on the questions that you've just been asked by the 
Vice Chairman.
    As you know, there are some Members of this Committee and 
this Senate who viewed Director Ratcliffe as being too 
political in his approach. Others felt that former CIA Director 
Brennan was too partisan in his approach to the job. You are 
going to be responsible for determining what goes into the 
President's daily brief.
    Do you commit to publishing analytic products in the 
President's daily brief even if those products do not match the 
views or the policy positions of this incoming Administration?
    Ms. Haines. I do, absolutely, Senator. And thank you for 
the question.
    I think, frankly, it's incredibly important to do that. 
I've seen that in the past. It's fundamental. It's what the 
President-elect, I believe, will expect from us because he will 
want to know what information we have that actually conflicts 
with his policy positions.
    Senator Collins. Thank you. I want to switch to another 
issue, and that is the Iranian nuclear deal, commonly referred 
to as the JCPOA. Many in the Senate, myself included, did not 
support this agreement because it did not provide for anytime/
anywhere inspections. It did not sufficiently constrain the 
development of ballistic missiles, and it would leave Iran in a 
stronger, wealthier position because of all the sunsets that 
were included in the agreement. President-elect Biden has 
indicated his intention to rejoin the JCPOA.
    I would like to know whether you have any reservations 
about your strong support for the agreement and how the threat 
of the Iranian's developing nuclear weapons fits in with your 
priorities.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    So it's true, obviously, the President-elect has indicated 
that if Iran were to come back into compliance, that he would 
direct that we do so as well. I think, frankly, we're a long 
ways from that, and I think there is going to be an opportunity 
to consult with Congress and with Members like yourself on 
these issues as we look at that. But the President-elect has 
also indicated--and I agree with this--that in doing so, we 
have to also look at the ballistic missile issues that you've 
identified, and there are other obviously destabilizing 
activities that Iran engages in.
    If I am confirmed to be the Director of National 
Intelligence, my hope and my role, I think, would be to provide 
all of you with the best possible information about the status, 
for example, of Iran's program, about their activities. Give 
you information that would allow you to make the best judgment 
under the circumstances for what is the appropriate act to be 
taken.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman have mentioned 
China, and I want to chime in, as well, that China clearly is a 
key geopolitical adversary and poses a threat to our interests 
in terms of the theft of intellectual property and also 
potential spying through its telecommunications companies.
    Do you have any concerns about how the Obama Administration 
approached China when you served in your capacity in that 
Administration?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I think our approach to China has to evolve and essentially 
meet the reality of the particularly assertive and aggressive 
China that we see today. China is a challenge to our security, 
to our prosperity, to our values across a range of issues, and 
I do support an aggressive stance, in a sense, to deal with the 
challenge that we're facing. So I think that's the place that 
we are now, and one that is more assertive than where we had 
been in the Obama-Biden Administration. And if I'm confirmed, I 
think frankly the Intelligence Community can do a lot to help 
in that respect.
    I think keeping our focus, putting our resources and effort 
into making sure that we understand the intentions and 
capabilities of China, but also that we are actually 
recognizing and holding them to account, in effect, by 
identifying where they are taking actions that are inconsistent 
with our interests will be part of what I hope to focus on.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Heinrich.
    Senator Heinrich. Ms. Haines, as we witnessed, and many of 
us--frankly, firsthand on January 6--the most serious threat to 
our democracy came from within. We've seen the current 
President as he has done his utmost to stoke some of those 
grievances, those divisions, that really fueled this threat, 
but his departure from office tomorrow is certainly not going 
to eliminate it.
    On December 8, I wrote a letter along with a number of 
other Senators, to FBI Director Wray and also the Acting 
Director of DHS's Intelligence and Analysis Office, simply 
asking for a public written assessment of the threat that QAnon 
poses to our country. We have not received a response to that 
letter. I just wanted to ask you that, if confirmed, if you 
would commit to simply working with the FBI and the DHS 
intelligence and analysis office to provide us with a written 
assessment as requested?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator.
    Thank you very much. I have seen the letter and I 
absolutely if confirmed would work with the FBI and the 
Department of Homeland Security to get you an answer to that 
question. I know in particular you asked about foreign 
influence operations and how those are affecting QAnon and--and 
how they are exacerbating, you know, the message that is being 
provided and the misinformation.
    So I will.
    Senator Heinrich. Would you expound a little bit on the 
question that Senator Warner asked you about the particular 
role of the IC with respect to domestic radicalized groups in 
the United States? For example, we have a very specific process 
internationally through the State Department to designate 
foreign terrorist organizations. We don't have any sort of 
process for domestic terrorist organizations.
    What are your thoughts on the proper role of the 
Intelligence Community in supporting law enforcement, the FBI 
in particular, Department of Homeland Security, with respect to 
threats to the homeland?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    So obviously, the Intelligence Community is focused on 
foreign intelligence and on foreign threats, in effect, but 
there is I think a critical role that it can play, and does 
play, in supporting the work that is done by others--led by 
others--in the Government. So the FBI and the Department of 
Homeland Security, obviously, are critical and in the lead on 
much of this.
    But there are ways in which we can support, both by 
identifying where there are connections to international 
organizations, for example, and threats, to domestic threats, 
and also in just providing information about lessons learned 
for how organizations work internationally and to the FBI and 
to the Department of Homeland Security. And of course, through 
the National Counterterrorism Center established in law. You 
gave it, in effect, a mandate that allows it to pull from 
domestic intelligence information holdings, as well as foreign 
intelligence information holdings, in order to be able to 
provide trends and reviews of issues that cross the seam in 
effect and make sure that those who are in the lead such as the 
FBI and the Department of Homeland Security have that 
information as they pursue these issues.
    Senator Heinrich. I suspect I'm probably going to run out 
of time before I have a chance to get to the bottom of all of 
these things, but you and I have spoken quite a bit about the 
Committee's Detention and Interrogation Report and the 
aftermath of all of that. You wrote in your prehearing 
responses to questions about interrogation methods that, even 
if a technique involving cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
were determined to be effective, I would not endorse its use. 
Those are your words.
    I also wanted to go a step further and just ask you to be 
very specific on whether you agree that the specific techniques 
that were used in that program--waterboarding, a number of 
other so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, were not 
effective. Do you understand the distinction I'm asking?
    Ms. Haines. I think so, Sir.
    So, I believe that waterboarding is in fact torture--
constitutes torture under the law. And I do believe that all of 
those techniques, including techniques that involve cruel and 
human-degrading treatment, are unlawful from both domestic and 
international perspective and should not be engaged in 
regardless, as I said, of whether or not they are effective.
    Senator Heinrich. One of the outcomes of our report was we 
found that these were not--in addition to being unlawful under 
current law--they weren't effective because people were so 
desperate to make things stop that they would tell us almost 
anything. Do you agree that those techniques were not effective 
in their----
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator, I think that your report does an 
excellent job, essentially, of identifying how there are 
actually better alternative methods to get true, accurate 
information and that that is a reality. My point was only to 
say that even if they were effective, from my perspective, I 
would not allow them to be engaged in.
    Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Blunt needs to run for the 
inauguration--so I'm going to recognize you. I apologize to 
Senator Feinstein. I skipped her. She's going to go right after 
you.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ms. Haines, you and I have had a chance to talk already 
about the challenge of this job. When we put the job together, 
we talked a lot about stove piping and the importance of having 
somebody in the Government whose job it was to be sure that 
information was shared as effectively and quickly as it could 
be.
    I think one of the challenges here, and I'm sure Director 
Coats understands this better than anybody in the room, is the 
person in your job having confidence in the material you're 
sharing--but also, needing to share that material quickly when 
you do have confidence in it.
    Would you talk about that a little bit, where we don't 
allow this job to become a job where everybody else's job is 
redone before it can be shared with others?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator.
    I think, this is obviously a critical issue with the 
national security communities and I think there is--there is a 
number of aspects to it. I would relish engaging with you 
further on this issue, too, to see if there are ways we could 
break this down.
    I think, in part, we have to ensure that we actually have 
the ability to share information across the Intelligence 
Community so that we can all take advantage of it and leverage 
it appropriately, and that we're not recreating the wheel in 
each of our different elements, as you've identified.
    I also think that there are opportunities with technology 
to actually promote mechanisms that allow us to use each 
other's work so that we don't have to do it ourselves in some 
spaces, and I think that's an important piece of it. But I 
think, as you also mentioned to me in our discussions, I think 
there is a concern--and I've heard this from other Members as 
well--that the Director of National Intelligence and that the 
Office does not replicate work that's being done in elements. 
That it itself is supposed to coordinate and to synchronize but 
not to do it itself in a sense. And I think that's a very fair 
concern. And obviously, I have to, if confirmed, get into the 
job and understand how we're structured and whether or not we 
are, in fact, well-allocated in effect to do what our mission 
is--without replicating.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you. I think the replication process, 
while some of that is almost always going to have to be done, 
could be the moment when things are slowed up just enough that 
the whole purpose for the job failed because you're trying to 
figure out: Okay, can we verify this information from the CIA 
or whoever? My sense is that's not your job.
    I think a job that we also talked about that I believe was 
not done in December with the cyber-attack, the SolarWinds 
attack, I don't think anybody in this Committee was ever 
notified by anybody in the Community. I don't think we had a 
report from the CIA or a report from the NSA or anyone else who 
would have known.
    At what point do you think the Director of National 
Intelligence needs to be sure that information is being shared?
    Your principle client is clearly the President. You're 
nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate. The 
President's your client. You work for the President but you 
report to the Congress. I think that's clearly the structure 
that was set up in the early '70s--why this Committee is in 
place.
    In that reporting process, how do you ensure that somebody 
who should be reporting to us has, in fact, reported to this 
Committee and others in the Congress that they're required to 
report to?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, thank you, Senator.
    Obviously, a major part of the job as I've indicated is, in 
fact, working with all of you and this Committee and the House 
Intelligence Committee, as well, and making sure that you're 
fully informed of significant intelligence activities and 
certainly of events such as SolarWinds as they come on our 
radar.
    What I would hope to do in working with you is to really 
establish regular channels of communication and to ensure that 
we are providing you with the information that you need for 
oversight responsibilities and to ensure that we have somebody 
who is on point, so to speak, in making sure that as part of my 
senior leadership team and reporting to you on the issues that 
are coming up as we are experiencing them and recognizing how 
significant they are.
    Senator Blunt. Well, I do think every opportunity you have 
to share--every opportunity you're asked to come in--really 
creates credibility for that moment when we all need it. 
Director Coats went to the job with a lot of credibility on 
this Committee, where he and I sat side by side for several 
years. But every time you can find a time to share--even if you 
almost have to look for that to be part--and I think should 
look for that--to be part of your regular schedule, that's 
helpful.
    I have one other question. The Secretary of the Treasury's 
also at a hearing right now. You know, we have in the Treasury 
Department a financial intelligence unit. The question I'd ask, 
is your commitment and your idea of being sure that that unit 
is properly funded, and how you think it fits into our overall 
intelligence effort as we keep track of our adversaries?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I think frankly the Treasury unit is critical because I 
believe that illicit financing is one of the critical 
transnational organized crime issues that we need to face. And 
it obviously affects not just that, but terrorism, a variety of 
other transnational threats that are relevant and we need to 
work with that part of the Department of Treasury to make sure 
that we're actually following that effectively. I think we 
haven't necessarily invested as many resources in that as we 
need to. And that's something that I would make a focus.
    Senator Blunt. Thank you, Ms. Haines. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Feinstein, I apologize. Let's give 
her six minutes. It's like a gift card. (Laughter.)
    I apologize for skipping you.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I've asked previous nominees 
for DNI, something I've been very concerned about and tried to 
address for years. We made a big push when I was Chairman to 
ensure that all government functions of the IC were performed 
by government employees and not contractors. And it's my 
understanding that that effort continues today--that we have 
made substantial progress over the decades.
    Could you comment on your view of the use of contractors as 
the DNI?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. Thank you very much, and it's 
very nice to see you.
    So yes, I know this has been an issue that you've shown 
leadership on, and there have been a number of communications 
between Congress, obviously, and the Executive Branch on this 
issue. I believe it is critical to ensure that contractors are 
not performing inherently governmental functions. And that is 
something that we need to manage obviously in the context of 
our work. We obviously also rely on contractors for a lot of 
important work and expertise in the Intelligence Community. But 
it is a balance and we have to ensure that they are fulfilling 
an appropriate role, as you identify.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. And I'd appreciate being kept 
advised. It's an issue I've long been interested in and I've 
seen the growth figures change. And it's, I think, been 
beneficial for the Agency's concern. So I appreciate that.
    The world has seen firsthand the radicalization of 
significant numbers of Americans who now believe that the 
election was rigged. And some have sought to reverse its 
legitimate results by force. I, for one, am concerned about the 
threat in D.C. and across the country.
    How would you, if confirmed, approach the issue of right-
wing domestic terrorism?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I recognize that this is a major issue for the country. The 
Intelligence Community, of course, would not be in the lead on 
an issue such as solely domestic terrorism. This is something 
that I would expect the FBI and the Department of Homeland 
Security to be focused on. But the Intelligence Community I 
think can provide them with support on these issues--critical 
support, I hope.
    Support both in terms of identifying connections between 
domestic terrorist actors and international terrorist actors. 
And in the context of white nationalism, for example, as you 
pointed out, we have seen--as I understand it--some 
connections. I need, if confirmed, to get in the job and 
actually get better informed based on classified information 
that's available on these questions, I think. But I do 
understand that there are some international connections and 
that this is an issue that we can provide some support to them 
on.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you for that.
    I believe it was a mistake to pull the U.S. out 
unilaterally of the JCPOA with Iran. At the same time, Iran 
remains a threat in the region--and especially now that it has 
increased its civilian nuclear program.
    How will you approach the threat from Iran, especially in 
the wake of the killings of the IRGC commander Soleimani a year 
ago and the founder of Iran's nuclear program this year?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    So, I absolutely agree that Iran is a threat and a 
destabilizing actor in the region. And I think that this is an 
issue that we need to focus in on. From the Intelligence 
Community perspective, if I'm confirmed, what I would hope to 
do is provide the best, most accurate intelligence that we have 
on the threat being posed and allow policy makers, therefore, 
to have that information as they make decisions about what 
actions to pursue with respect to Iran in the future.
    Senator Feinstein. Final question.
    What priorities do you assume for the agencies that you 
will provide oversight on? And how strong a Director do you see 
yourself being?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I see myself as a strong Director, I hope, in the future. 
Look, I think in order to set the priorities which I know is 
part of the vision for what the Director of National 
Intelligence does, I both have to consult with my policy 
leaders, in a sense, and work through a framework that's 
aligned with what the policy priorities are. But also work with 
my partners essentially across the Intelligence Community, and 
the different elements of the Intelligence Community, to ensure 
that we have things correctly prioritized.
    But I agree that prioritization is necessary. And although 
I think we can do more than one thing at a time, in a sense, I 
think we do have to make some choices about how we allocate our 
resources. And that's going to be part of the hard job that I 
see being performed by the Director of National Intelligence.
    Senator Feinstein. Quickly, could you just give me your top 
three priorities again?
    Ms. Haines. Sure.
    To be honest, my priorities are institutional at this 
moment for the Office of Director of National Intelligence. And 
the way that I would describe the top three are basically 
strengthening the institution, the workforce, and ensuring that 
we have promoted trust and credibility throughout. That is a 
first priority. And I believe that involves many of the things 
that we've already talked about in the context of analytic 
objectivity; in actually promoting workforce retention and 
recruitment and talent; and in promoting transparency, in many 
respects, both with the Committee and with the American people 
on these issues.
    A second priority is really in aligning our work, our 
efforts, our resources in the Intelligence Community to the 
major threats that we're facing today--and also the ones that 
we expect to be facing tomorrow. And that involves, as 
indicated, really focusing in on some of the traditional 
threats that we've identified such as China, but also 
identifying the transnational threats being there to work on 
things like public health, and transnational organized crime, 
and corruption, and disinformation, and issues along those 
lines.
    And then I'd say the third priority, in effect, is in 
building the partnerships that are so critical to the 
Intelligence Community. And that's partnerships with the 
Committee, but it's also partnerships with academia, with the 
private sector, with state and local actors, and a variety of 
partnerships around the world--obviously our foreign liaison 
partnerships. And all of those I think are crucial to making us 
effective.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Just one request. I might ask you to report periodically to 
us on the progress on the three priorities that you mentioned. 
I think they were significant and important and I'd be most 
interested in your progress in that area.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Haines. I'd welcome that, Senator. Thank you.
    Senator Feinstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Rubio. Thank you.
    Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Ms. Haines. Congratulations on 
your nomination.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you.
    Senator Cornyn. I know you support the re-entry of the 
United States into the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.
    Do you believe Iran should ever be allowed to get nuclear 
weapons?
    Ms. Haines. No, Senator. I don't believe that Iran should 
ever be allowed to get a nuclear weapon. Thank you.
    Senator Cornyn. And I think Senator Feinstein was asking 
about right-wing extremist groups. There's a story reported 
today by STRATFOR that describes Russia's experience in 
tradecraft in terms of encouraging right and left-wing 
extremist groups to create problems for democracies like the 
United States.
    Do you acknowledge that is an aspect of Russian, in 
particular, tradecraft?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator.
    I've certainly seen Russia's use of active measures and a 
variety of influence campaigns in order to exacerbate some of 
the divisions in this country and to promote extremism, in a 
sense.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, I, for one, am going to ask the FBI 
Director to brief us on any foreign intelligence or other 
actors that may have been involved in the January 6th events 
that we were all a witness to and look forward to hearing what 
he has to say. Of course as DNI you will be working very 
closely with the FBI. Maybe that's a subject we can revisit at 
a later time.
    You and I discussed the Foreign Agent Registration Act and 
the Lobbyist Disclosure Act--the LDA and FARA--and I expressed 
to you my concern that it's possible under the current state of 
the law for foreign governments to hire Americans to help 
influence Congress and other domestic policy makers.
    Is that a concern that you share?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    We did discuss this and I think I understand why you'd be 
concerned in certain circumstances. I am of the view that there 
are certain circumstances in which it may be appropriate and 
even useful to the United States to have former government 
officials work with other foreign governments and companies. 
But I recognize the concern that you have.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, shouldn't that be disclosed?
    Ms. Haines. Absolutely, Senator. I believe in disclosing 
information that is of relevance, obviously, to the ethics.
    Senator Cornyn. Right now, under the current state of the 
law it is possible to use a law firm or some other cutout to 
obscure the relationship between a foreign government and 
people lobbying Congress to make policy unbeknownst to 
Congress. Isn't that true?
    Ms. Haines. Senator, I take your word for it. I just I 
don't know the law well enough in this area.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, I know you're a smart lawyer. That's 
a topic that I hope you will work with us on because when we 
passed the Justice for State Sponsors of Terrorism Act, the 
JSSTA Act, I became aware of the fact that the Saudi Arabians 
were hiring lobbyists on K Street to try to get Congress to not 
pass that change in sovereign immunity law to allow the 9/11 
families to get justice in American courts for any action by a 
foreign government to finance that terrorist attack. And, of 
course, that ended up passing unanimously in the Senate. We 
passed it over President Obama's veto.
    But as you and I talked about, I'm very--was very--
disturbed by that, and it demonstrated a real opportunity, 
unbeknownst to Members of Congress, to advance the interests of 
foreign governments--not the U.S. Government, not the American 
people--but foreign governments in the halls of Congress. And 
that's something that I'm absolutely committed to trying to 
close those loopholes, and I hope you'll work with us on that.
    Finally, for now, you and I discussed your role at West 
Executive Advisors, West Ex, however you pronounce that. How do 
you pronounce it?
    Ms. Haines. WestExec.
    Senator Cornyn. WestExec Advisors.
    Ms. Haines. Well done.
    Senator Cornyn. And I noticed in your disclosures that at 
one point, you mentioned that you were a contractor, and in 
another place you mentioned you were a principal. To me, those 
are very different. Do you recall why you made that disclosure?
    Ms. Haines. Yes. So my title was ``Principal,'' but I was a 
consultant, which is under contract, essentially, for the 
entire time that I was with WestExec.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, if you're a Principal, then 
presumably you would have access to the client lists of 
WestExec, and you would receive income and report that income 
on your tax returns as wages. But if you were a contractor, 
presumably you would report that on your tax returns 
differently, on a 1099 where the FICA and withholding would not 
be taken out of your check. That to me is an important 
difference between the role as a principal versus a contractor.
    Can you explain that?
    Ms. Haines. Sure.
    So Senator, I worked for WestExec less than a day a month 
on average during the entire time I was with them, and I was as 
a consultant. I realize that the title of principal may sound 
as if it's more involved than it is, but that was my entire 
relationship with them, and--sorry.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, I think the term principal has legal 
significance, don't you?
    Ms. Haines. No, Sir. It was just a title.
    Senator Cornyn. You don't? Just a title? And you, if 
necessary to resolve any questions, you have offered in your 
written responses to make your last three years of tax returns 
available, correct?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Sir.
    Senator Cornyn. I appreciate that.
    Ms. Haines. No, of course.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you for now.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Wyden.
    Senator Wyden. Hey, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Haines, welcome, and as interested as I am in your 
former bookstore ownership, I'm going to save those questions 
for another day.
    Ms. Haines. Excellent, Senator.
    Senator Wyden. Let me start with the fact that you'll have 
an opportunity, if confirmed, to immediately turn the page on 
the excessive secrecy and lawlessness of the outgoing 
Administration. The Congress, as you know, passed a law 
requiring the DNI to submit to the Congress an unclassified 
report on who was responsible for the brutal murder of Jamal 
Khashoggi.
    If you are confirmed, will you submit to the Congress the 
unclassified report required by the law?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. I absolutely will follow the law.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you.
    Back in 2014 the CIA accessed the shared drives of this 
Committee that we were using to write the torture report, and 
even read Committee emails.
    Do you acknowledge that this was wrong?
    Ms. Haines. I do, Sir. I believe that it was wrong that the 
Intelligence Community had access to SSCI staff emails, and I 
know Director Brennan apologized for it, and I agreed with that 
apology.
    Senator Wyden. All right.
    In 2013, after reviewing the Committee's torture report, 
the CIA acknowledged significant shortcomings with regard to 
accountability, including management failures. CIA recommended 
that accountability reviews should be broadened to include 
systemic failures and accountability for individuals who were 
responsible for the failures.
    Do you agree with this recommendation, and if you're 
confirmed, would you seek to apply it to the Intelligence 
Community?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. I agree with the 2013 
recommendation that the Central Intelligence Agency indicated 
and to broaden the approach of Accountability Review Boards, as 
you identified.
    Senator Wyden. Good.
    Now I want to ask a question with respect to transparency--
I thought our conversation was helpful--and get into the issue 
of surveillance--Senator Heinrich and I have been very involved 
in this--and I'm particularly troubled by the Intelligence 
Community's purchases of Americans' private data. It's almost 
like getting around the whole question of people's privacy 
rights. And so transparency is crucial.
    And my question here is if you are confirmed, would you 
agree to inform Americans about any circumstances in which the 
Intelligence Community purchases their data, and the legal 
basis for doing it?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I know I'm not up to date at this point but would be, if 
confirmed obviously, on the degree to which we are purchasing 
commercially-available information. But I would seek to try to 
publicize essentially a framework that helps people understand 
the circumstances under which we do that and the legal basis 
that we do that under. I think that's part of what's critical 
to promoting transparency generally so the people have an 
understanding of the guidelines in which the Intelligence 
Community operates.
    Senator Wyden. I want to work with you on that. The abuses 
here take your breath away, and it really is a dodge on all the 
legal protections Americans have. So we're going to follow that 
up with you quickly, if confirmed.
    Let's go now to the whistleblower issue where you and I 
talked, I thought constructively, about what the challenge is.
    Now when the Intelligence Community Inspector General 
determines that a whistleblower complaint is an urgent concern, 
the law is clear. The DNI shall send that complaint to the 
Congress. The Trump Administration violated this all the time, 
specifically by withholding the Ukraine whistleblower 
complaint.
    Do you agree, one, that the law is clear? And if confirmed, 
you would send those whistleblower cases, to the Congress?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I agree that the DNI must 
transmit credible whistleblower complaints on matters of urgent 
concern to the Congress, and I commit that I would do so.
    Senator Wyden. Good.
    Finally, we've had a hearing on this. The classification 
system is just broken. It is a broken mess, and it's gotten to 
the point where members of the community, the IC, apparently 
spend so much time carrying it out, some days they practically 
have to pack a lunch to just go from agency to agency getting 
sign off. Senator Moran and I have introduced bipartisan 
legislation to authorize the DNI to finally fix this 
dysfunctional mess.
    Do you agree that a serious problem exists and that DNI 
should fix it?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator.
    Over-classification and the classification system generally 
has been a perennial issue I have found in government in my 
experience, and one that does require some work. And I commit 
to you, if confirmed, that I would have an opportunity to try 
to come up with a plan and to engage with you further on these 
issues and to see whether or not technology, for example, might 
not help us in some aspects of this problem. But I recognize it 
is a broader issue than just technology.
    Senator Wyden. Thank you, Ms. Haines.
    Chairman Rubio, I have had almost as much time as Senator 
Cornyn, our friend, and I'm going to stop. I do want to make 
clear to the Chair and the Ranking Members, I'm going to need a 
bit of time to discuss this nomination on the floor, and Ms. 
Haines knows that to discuss some of the other issues that are 
pending, but that will be appropriate for now.
    Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Sasse.
    Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ms. Haines, thank you for your willingness to serve again. 
Congratulations on your nomination, and I appreciate the time 
that you have taken with me and with other Members en route to 
this open hearing. And you know there are number of things that 
I want to talk about in our closed hearing. So I will follow 
the precedent of the last two Members and stick to time here. 
But just admitting that this is more of a preview for where 
we're headed in the closed session.
    I want to talk about China policy and I want to flag the 
important. I think many times, people throw around the word 
``bipartisan'' here. But what I think what you heard from 
Chairman Rubio and from Vice Chairman Warner was really singing 
off the exact same song sheet: that the American people 
shouldn't view China policy and the need to upgrade the China 
policy of the IC as a partisan cudgel. There were bipartisan 
failures for a decade and a half and there's been nearly 
bipartisan agreement for pushing half a decade on the fact that 
dealing with the Chinese Communist Party is the number one 
issue the national security community faces.
    The National Security Strategy of 2017 that this 
Administration wrote was very good and it builds on things that 
the Obama Administration had been saying going all the way back 
to 2012 about the need to pivot to Asia. And I think Mark 
Warner also said--and I'm sure Chairman Rubio, would agree--we 
need the American people to understand that our opponent is not 
the Chinese people. Our opponent is not Chinese Americans. But 
our opponent is the Chinese Communist Party. And when you do 
the around-the-world tour of national security threats that we 
face and that the IC and the DOD and the larger national 
security bureaucracies and infrastructure need to be focused 
on, we always talk about China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and 
a grab bag of Jihadis. There are five big threats around the 
world.
    And yet, if we look at the resources of the Intelligence 
Community, it still doesn't show a primary focus on China that 
I think is the bipartisan consensus in this Committee. So I 
would love to have you--and again, this is not blaming anybody 
in a previous Administration two ago or the one that ends 
tomorrow--but the reality is the IC is still way too slow to 
pivot toward the primary focus that we need to have in the 
community on China.
    Can you help us understand why the slowness persists and 
what you're going to do about it?
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    And I know we talked about this and you've obviously 
demonstrated quite a bit of leadership on this. And I heard 
from a number of Members a concern over this issue. And, if 
confirmed, I will absolutely make it a priority from my 
perspective to ensure that we are allocating the right 
resources and addressing this issue, because I think it's 
critical to us actually having then the information on which we 
can base a policy that will actually effectively address the 
questions that you have raised.
    In terms of why it would, obviously, I prefer to answer 
that after I have had a chance to get in and to hear from 
folks. But we talked together a little bit about some of the 
things that I had seen previously that were challenges in 
trying to actually affect the kind of rebalance of Asia policy 
that the Obama-Biden Administration engaged in. And I think it 
is true that there is a natural focus on issues that the 
Intelligence Community has been focusing on for some time, by 
career folks who have spent a lot of time working on those 
issues.
    And if you are in the senior leadership of the Intelligence 
Community, most of you have spent time on counterterrorism, on 
some of the war zones that we have been in, and on Middle East 
issues and a variety of things in those spaces. But there isn't 
the same level of experience across the Intelligence Community 
with respect to Asia. And so that's another aspect of how 
sometimes it is challenging to get folks to focus on new issues 
and to actually make sure that they are being prioritized in 
the way that we all believe that they should be. And I agree 
that I have seen it on a bipartisan basis, and I think that 
gives us an opportunity to really address this, hopefully, in 
the most effective way possible.
    Sorry, Sir.
    Senator Sasse. No, that's good. I didn't mean to cut you 
off but I do want to nitpick a little bit about our articles. 
It isn't a policy priority; it needs to be the policy priority. 
And it seems to me that we need to change the IC's perspective 
from a burden of proof for the status quo, or the assumption 
that the status quo is normal and the burden of proof is on 
those who want to change. The policy should be--inertia of 
motion--should be toward ramping up our hiring pipeline of 
Mandarin speakers and it should be the burden of proof put on 
those who would say: No, how we are doing it works. Because how 
we are doing it doesn't work.
    We have said year-over-year--I have been here for, I guess, 
just now ticking six years--and every year we hear our leaders 
tell us we are going to pivot toward Asia, but it isn't 
actually playing out in our hiring policy. It isn't playing out 
in the sort of senior briefings we are getting. There isn't a 
mind share shift toward Asia.
    So I guess I would ask you as I am at-time precisely, could 
you commit to us that by June 30 you would report back to the 
SSCI with a strategic plan toward actually increasing the 
hiring pipeline, particularly of Mandarin speakers, and that we 
would get to a place where in the IC we would see a majority--
or that we would see a larger number of officers and analysts 
focused on China than on CT.
    Counterterrorism simply is not as great a threat as our 
long-term China issues are, and so I think a number of us in 
this Committee would love to know that by six months into the 
job, or however long it takes post-confirmation, that you could 
give us a strategic plan of how China actually becomes in 
reality, not merely in rhetoric, the number one priority of our 
IC.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator.
    I absolutely am happy to commit to you that within six 
months of being confirmed that I come back to this Committee on 
this issue. And I think if you will allow me I would work with 
you on what are the right metrics by which to think that 
through and to demonstrate that we have correctly prioritized 
it. But I take your point both on the articles and on the fact 
that we should be looking at the kind of metrics that you 
describe. So, I will endeavor to do so.
    Senator Sasse. Thank you.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. All right. Senator King, virtual?
    Senator King. Yes, Sir.
    Mr. Chairman thank you very much.
    Chairman Rubio. Are you in the space station? It sounds--
there he is. Look at that. There you go. (Laughter.)
    International space station.
    Senator King. I am----
    Chairman Rubio. I told him to get rid of that Huawei but--
--.
    Angus, are you there?
    Senator King. [Inaudible.]
    Chairman Rubio. I think you said you saved a bunch of money 
by switching to Geico, but I couldn't----
    (Laughter.)
    Senator King. But I am not driving. Okay.
    Chairman Rubio. There it is.
    Senator King. Ms. Haines, my first quick question is when 
you took off on that purported transatlantic flight, where in 
Maine did you depart from? I just have to know.
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator. Bangor, Maine. Bangor, sorry.
    Senator King. You took off from Bangor.
    Ms. Haines. Senator Collins corrected me.
    Senator King. When I heard you had left from Maine, I had 
to have the answer.
    More seriously, you have talked extensively today about 
your concern about the politicization of intelligence, and I 
wholeheartedly agree with you.
    What do you believe should be done structurally to ensure 
the integrity of the analytic process? In other words, just 
saying it's going to be non-compromised needs to be buttressed 
by structural and institutional supports, it seems to me, like 
additional support for the Ombudsman Program in the CIA and 
throughout the community.
    Can you talk to me about how to put into practice your 
concern about the politicization of intelligence?
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator, thank you and fully appreciate 
also your leadership on these issues.
    I don't have specific structural recommendations at this 
stage. I do think it is reasonable to consider whether or not 
the ombudsman has sufficient support. I think that one of the 
first things I would like to do is send the clear message to 
the Intelligence Community that we are expected to produce 
apolitical, unvarnished intelligence to the President-elect, to 
his senior advisors, and that the President himself expects 
that and will expect the Intelligence Community to provide 
information regardless of whether or not he wants to hear it. 
And that initial message is only a piece of it, as you've 
identified.
    I think we also need to ensure that we have an ombudsman in 
place that is capable of doing the kind of reviews that are 
necessary, would want to make sure that they are fully 
resourced. I also think it may be useful for us to do a climate 
survey coming in, in order to really understand what is the 
experience of analysts that is being had right now? What are 
the challenges and the pressures that they are experiencing?
    I obviously read the recent ombudsman's report and I have a 
number of questions that were raised by that report and want to 
fully understand the various types of politicization that may 
be occurring within the analytic community in order to try to 
support them. But I would commit, Sir, to come back to you on 
these issues once I've had an opportunity, if confirmed, to dig 
in, in a sense. And also to get your advice on these questions.
    Senator King. Has the President-elect ordered you to tell 
him the truth?
    Ms. Haines. The President-elect has just about done that. 
I'm not sure he is--he hasn't put it in writing that way, but 
he has made it absolutely clear that he expects that the 
Intelligence Community will provide him with a political truth-
to-power analysis, and truly has been adamant about this 
because I think he really understands and recognizes the 
importance of that to the health of the decision-making process 
within Government.
    Senator King. Well, I think the danger--the good news is 
you have a long and positive relationship with the President-
elect. You have his confidence, obviously. The bad news is that 
that long relationship could create a kind of friendship that 
would inadvertently or unconsciously skew your advice. Not that 
you wouldn't tell him something he needs to hear, but you might 
not want to tell him something he doesn't want to hear. So I 
hope that you will continue to maintain a positive, confident 
relationship, but at the same time be prepared because there 
are going to be moments when you--in your analysis--your 
agency's analysis is going to differ from the policy 
proclivities of the Administration.
    Another question is how do you overcome, or how do you go 
about, overcoming the parochialism of the agencies which you 
are called upon to lead? I'm not sure the community has ever 
fully embraced or accepted the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
    Do you view that as an ongoing project and a priority?
    Ms. Haines. I do, Sir.
    So, on both questions, I think they're ones I've thought a 
lot about. On the first one, on the relationship piece, I 
absolutely take your point and I do think it's one of those 
things where I am going to have to absorb and ensure that I'm 
projecting and living the fact that the relationship that the 
President should have with his Director of National 
Intelligence is quite different than the relationship he should 
have with, for example, his National Security Advisor. And I 
intend to try to live essentially what I believe to be the 
right role institutionally for the Director of National 
Intelligence--to be in a sense at arm's length in that way so 
that it is absolutely clear that my intention there is to 
provide analysis, regardless of whether it's what he wants to 
hear or not.
    The second point that you make, I also agree with. One of 
the great challenges is helping the Intelligence Community to 
see the value of the Office of Director of National 
Intelligence. And I believe that the way to promote a less--
what's the right word--sort of tribal approach to each of these 
institutions is to demonstrate how through synchronization, 
coordination, and through the vision in effect that the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence can promote--that 
every element is going to benefit. In a sense, all of us are 
going to be stronger together than we are apart. And if we can 
work together, we can actually help each other to be the best 
that we can be from each of these elements, points. I realize 
that's a lot easier to say than to do, but I intend to try--and 
I believe it, for what it's worth.
    Senator King. Well, don't forget the basic purpose was that 
we realized we had really good stovepipes, but they were still 
stovepipes. So, that's your mission.
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Senator King. One final comment, not a question. I know I'm 
almost out of time. And, that is I hope you'll bring some 
attention to the question of cultural intelligence of 
understanding our adversaries in a long-term cultural, 
economic, and strategic way as opposed to just the tactical, 
what are they likely to do next week?
    I often feel that we make mistakes in foreign policy by not 
understanding the long history of our adversaries and expecting 
them to think and act just as we would.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I will endeavor to do so. 
That makes an awful lot of sense to me and something I've seen 
the value of in the past.
    Chairman Rubio. All right, thank you, Senator King. So, we 
have Senator Bennet, Senator Reed, and then I think our 
intention is, after we finish, is to do, like, a 30 to 40-
minute, 30-minute, transition over to the closed hearing. 30, 
29-minute transition over to the other space.
    Senator Collins. Are you providing lunch?
    Chairman Rubio. No. No, we can't even get food in here. You 
kidding me? We're waiting for some sort of food drop. I guess 
they're going to fly over.
    All right, Senator Bennet.
    Senator Bennet. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you very much for lunch. We all appreciate it.
    Senator Coats, I want to thank you for being here today, 
and it's a great sign, I think, of things to come and maybe 
what this Committee can do.
    Ms. Haines, thank you very much for your willingness to 
serve. Can you hear me okay?
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Senator Bennet. Democracy is a tough, tough business even 
when it's working well. I would argue that ours is not working 
very well and it is--at the moment. And that's why I so much 
appreciate Senator Coats being here, because we've got--we have 
to figure this out.
    And, it's leaving us exposed on the one hand to anti-
democratic forces in our own country that are using social 
media in ways that they were not when you were last serving in 
Government, but are today in a way that's really, I think, 
threatening to corrode our democracy in very, very fundamental 
ways. This is not just one more technology. This is not just 
radio. It's something else and we need to figure this out. And 
we need to figure it out with a through-line that goes from 
Republican Administrations to Democratic Administrations to 
Republican Administrations.
    The same is true, in my view, for China. I know others have 
talked about that here today, but when you and I had a chance 
to talk earlier in the last couple weeks, I mentioned one of my 
real concerns about China, which is that they benefit from 
having a system that can look out 20 years and 25 years and 50 
years. And, we're lucky if we can get through a single 24-hour 
cycle on cable television and still be thinking about the same 
thing we were thinking about yesterday.
    And, so my first question to you is to ask you whether 
you've given any thought to how we think about--as the 
Intelligence Community in this country and you as being the 
leader here--a way of thinking out in 20 year terms, in 30 year 
terms, not that we're not going to change our approach, but 
that we can create a discipline, a way of thinking about these 
challenges, and China in particular, as a challenge so that 
we're not just collateral damage in their wake.
    I wonder if you've given that some thought.
    Ms. Haines. Yes, Senator, thank you very much.
    I know, first of all, on your first point about social 
media, that the Committee's done quite a bit of work in this 
area and has been thinking about it and I look forward, if 
confirmed, to digging in on these questions and----
    Senator Bennet. Unfortunately, we haven't yet figured out 
any of the answers.
    Ms. Haines. Fair enough. I think you're not alone in this.
    It is an area where I agree we need to focus and I 
understand that the Foreign Malign Influence Center that you 
have established in law and that we're responsible, I think, 
for promoting if I'm confirmed and establishing--is maybe a 
place where we can start to think through how the Intelligence 
Community can support some of those efforts, which I think will 
have to be whole-of-government efforts, obviously, because it's 
not just in the Intelligence Community that we'll need to work 
on this. So I completely agree with that and would look forward 
to working with you further on these issues.
    The second one about China, I also very much agree with and 
I see this in--China is oddly, I think, capable and focused on 
a very long-term horizon, where the United States frequently is 
not, and that this is an asymmetry that challenges us. And I've 
seen the challenge even within government, that I know many of 
you experience, which is that the urgent tends to crowd out the 
important; and that it's very hard to manage the inbox and to 
actually do the kind of strategic thinking and analysis that's 
critical to actually addressing the challenges that we're 
facing in the future.
    And, that there's sort of no place else other than the 
Intelligence Community, in a way, that is well positioned to 
even begin to do this for the President and his advisors. If 
confirmed, I would very much hope to do this. And I know the 
National Intelligence Council is obviously a place where that 
has generally been an area of focus, in a sense. But I think 
that there is now a recognition--at least, I recognize the 
President-elect talks about the need to think about these 
challenges strategically--to have these kind of whole-of-
government and long-term plans and to promote them in a way 
that allows them to be sustainable through different political 
Administrations. And I believe the Intelligence Community can 
be part of that.
    I definitely don't have all the answers at this point, but 
I absolutely agree with you on the challenge and I hope to work 
on it, and I welcome your advice on these questions.
    Senator Bennet. I appreciate that and I think that it's 
likely to require some sort of structural change in the way we 
approach it. It probably has implications for our oversight as 
well. You know, I think we ought to work together to make sure 
we're upholding our end of the bargain, too.
    The last point I just wanted to address: I know it may 
sound parochial because Colorado is the epicenter for space in 
our national defense. But we do know the threat has become more 
and more real in the time that you've been out of government, 
and I just want to hear you talk a little bit about how you 
view threats in space, how you assess it, how much of a 
priority will this be for the Biden Administration? To their 
credit, I've almost never said anything good about the Trump 
Administration, but they made space a priority, and it's my 
hope that that's only going to be more so in this new 
Administration.
    Ms. Haines. Yes. Thank you, Senator.
    I think space is an absolutely critical issue that we need 
to focus on. It's obviously an entire domain, but it also is an 
area where I think we have the potential to be at asymmetric 
risk, in a sense. And you know, we have obviously very high-
value assets that can be held at-risk at relatively low cost at 
times from adversaries in these areas.
    And it's an area where I think at least during my time in 
the Obama-Biden Administration, we sort of increasingly 
recognized the importance and also the changes that were 
occurring in space, the increasing private sector development 
and potential in those areas, and how that interacted with our 
national security interests. And trying to develop the kind of 
norms that are necessary in order to promote what is in our 
interest more generally was--began to be a focus--and I think 
is even more so now.
    And if confirmed, I would in the Intelligence Community 
expect to facilitate that work, to promote this issue, to 
really try to understand it as best we can. And I think with 
the addition of the Space Force element, obviously the 
Intelligence Community will have an opportunity to do so even 
more so than before.
    Senator Bennett. Thank you.
    Thanks, I apologize to my colleagues for going over. Sorry, 
Jack.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me congratulate 
you Ms. Haines for your nomination. I have every confidence in 
you. And let me also recognize Senator Coats for his 
extraordinary work at the DNI. Thank you, Dan.
    Recently, we witnessed the greatest cyber intrusion in the 
history, I think, perhaps of the world--by the Russians. I know 
you are still trying to evaluate--the Intelligence Community--
the effects, but it has sort of found its way off the front 
pages. But my feeling is this could be one of the most 
significant events that have transpired in the last several 
months, and we have to get our arms around it. Each day we find 
out more and more discouraging and demoralizing details of what 
they have done and what they may do in the future.
    Could you put this in context for us? Am I being too 
alarmist?
    Ms. Haines. You know, Senator, I agree with you. This is a 
major concern and my sense is consistent with what you have 
just said: obviously, I have a lot more to learn about what we 
know about this at this stage. I haven't had a full classified 
briefing on this at all. But I think the Department of Homeland 
Security already indicated publicly that this is a grave risk 
to our Government systems, to our critical infrastructure, to 
the private sector across a range of things. And it does seem 
to be quite extraordinary in its nature and its scope. I think 
this is an area where we obviously have to focus in order to 
protect the country.
    Senator Reed. Another issue is trying to discern their 
motivation and their intent to exploit this. Again, I presume 
since you haven't been fully briefed yet that you are not aware 
of it, but that is one issue you pursue dramatically.
    I think another aspect of this--and we are like a broken 
record here when you talk about stove piping--is the Russians 
learned a great deal from 2016 when they were buying web 
services with rubles, when they were having--we could fairly 
easily identify their servers in St. Petersburg, etc.
    As I understand this operation was launched from American 
servers, that that is why we didn't find out for many, many 
months; and in fact it wasn't our intelligence services, it was 
a private security firm.
    As a result it exposes once again the stove piping we have. 
CYBERCOM cannot, because of legal and Constitutional issues, be 
as open with their information to Homeland Security. We have 
FBI and we have the Congress. If we are trying to deal with a 
remedy to this situation, it would be this Committee, probably 
the Defense Committee, because of CYBERCOM. Also the Judiciary 
Committee, etc., etc., etc. But I think the challenge you are 
going to face is we need some type of more coherent, cohesive, 
integrated approach to deal with the threat that is much more 
sophisticated than four or five years ago.
    Ms. Haines. I absolutely share your concern that we make 
sure that we are actually able to detect these because that is 
obviously critical to us protecting against them and I think to 
your point, it was pretty alarming that we found out about it 
through a private company as opposed to our being able to 
detect it ourselves to begin with.
    Senator Reed. I think that is one of the major task you 
should face. And again the irony is this seems to have receded 
from public interest but it could be the most critical issue 
you face.
    Just one final question that is there has always been a 
debate about the responsibilities for kinetic operations 
between military special forces and, generally, the Central 
Intelligence Agency operatives. How would you define it? There 
are some people that urge that any kinetic operation be 
reserved for Special Forces. But it's a very, I think, 
complicated issue.
    Any thoughts? And I have just a minute left.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Senator. I think it's--as you say, 
it is a complicated issue and I'm not sure it's hard to talk 
about publicly in open session and it may be something that we 
can reserve for the closed session, if that's acceptable from 
your perspective.
    Senator Reed. Right no--no I completely understand. If you 
would like to defer--thank you.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you, Sir.
    Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Rubio. All right. Just for follow-up we have 
Senator Warner, Senator Cornyn and then we are going to break 
for about 30 minutes and reconvene in the closed session.
    Vice Chairman Warner. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two 
quick comments and one quick question.
    I want to echo what Senator Reed has said about the 
SolarWinds hack. I think it's been fairly stunning to me how 
one part of our Government doesn't seem to know what the other 
part is doing, and as you pointed out, we had to rely upon the 
good graces of a private sector company to even reveal this 
hack.
    I think also one of the things that has been clear from the 
Intelligence Community, every part of the Intelligence 
Community that I've talked to on SolarWinds, that we saw, 
unfortunately again, this White House underplay the attribution 
on Russia. And that is extraordinarily concerning to me and 
something I hope that you will correct.
    Second, I mentioned this to Senator Cornyn on the way out--
I'm not familiar with the structure of the firm that you worked 
with, but I would say I think in the consultant business the 
term ``principal'' is used fairly willy-nilly, not necessarily 
reflecting an equity stake. And I think it's been used by 
McKinsey. I think it's been used by DLA Piper, Ernst & Young--
and no reflection upon I think probably the great work you 
did--but it is a way to give someone an elevated status without 
necessarily the power that goes along with that terminology. 
But John and I mentioned the fact that sometimes truth in 
advertising out of the consulting world is a little gray.
    The question I want to raise, and I want to give again 
credit to our good friend Dan Coats--we've never had an 
introducer stay as long for testimony. Now the fact that he 
can't get off the Hill without your escort may be a part of 
that answer. But one of the things that Senator Coats worked 
with this Committee on, something the current Administration 
should get some credit on, was security clearance reform, and 
he and Sue Gordon did a great, great job at the beginning of 
Senator Coats's tenure.
    We had backlogs in security clearance that was above 
250,000. People were taking six months to a year--actually, I'm 
sorry, we had it above 750,000--and we were taking six months 
to a year to even longer getting clearance, and we were losing 
really good quality people.
    Under Dan's leadership, we brought that down to about 
200,000 today. There is still some challenges around 
adjudication, and you may not be fully familiar with, but the 
current Administration worked on this effort under the 
framework of Trusted Workforce 2.0, 2.0 Initiative.
    There was great consensus from the IC. Unfortunately, 
President Trump was never willing to sign the executive order 
to fully implement that. I think the work has all been done, 
and there was complete consensus from the IC. I'm not sure if 
you've had a chance to look at this, but security clearance 
reform, for bringing in good folks into the IC in governmental 
roles--as Senator Feinstein mentioned in terms of agencies like 
the CIA, but also in the contractor community--is really 
important. I'd like you to briefly speak to that.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you very much, Senator, and I know this 
is, Vice Chairman, something that you've exercised some 
leadership on, and you talked to me when we discussed privately 
about this question and noted the terrific work that Director 
Coats had done on this question, and I understand that it has 
stalled a bit in the last few years.
    This is something that I will absolutely prioritize in 
coming in. I recognize the importance of it, frankly, to 
getting talent into the Intelligence Community, the talent that 
we need at the time that we need it in the critical moments 
that we're facing. This is not a challenge that we should be 
dealing with.
    So absolutely would be committed to addressing this.
    Chairman Rubio. Senator Cornyn.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate Senator Reed's questions about cyber issues. 
Seems like we still haven't quite figured out how to deal with 
that domain and what the appropriate doctrine is.
    I guess George Kennan was given credit for coming up with 
the concept of containment of the Soviet Union, and 
particularly dealing with the nuclear threat that Russia posed 
and still poses to the United States and the rest of the world. 
And the concept of deterrence plays a very important role in 
that.
    What do you think the appropriate role of deterrence is in 
terms of constraining cyber actors like Russia and others who 
may be not as sophisticated as they are?
    It seems to me that we are sitting ducks from cyber-
attacks. Whether it's the Office of Personnel Management, the 
acquisition by the Chinese Government of all the personnel 
records of people including the ones who have security 
clearances. And now the latest one is deterrence. The 
objective--how would you define it?
    Ms. Haines. So, thank you, Senator.
    I think--obviously this is a critical issue and as you say 
we clearly have not solved it yet. And I think one of the great 
challenges that we face in the United States in particular is 
the asymmetry of the threat in cyber. I think it is relatively 
easy for adversaries to hold at-risk what are high value assets 
to the United States given how much we rely on cyber and 
digital work for our economy, for our security, for so many 
different issues, at relatively low risk to them in an 
unconventional way. And as you point out, deterrence has been 
discussed as a way to in a sense affect risk management in this 
space. I think Professor Nye has written some very interesting 
articles on this point that I found were very perceptive, and 
indicates a theory of deterrence and a way to approach this 
issue that I saw in government and that I think in some 
respects the Trump Administration has been trying to pursue.
    Which is that you approach it on a--through a different--
through a whole series of different tools, in a sense. So, one 
is the President-elect has indicated that there should be an 
imposition of costs, for example, with respect to SolarWinds. 
And when you have an imposition of cost, you can deter, 
obviously, actors from engaging further in that activity if the 
cost is sufficient--that it actually has an impact on them and 
their decision making in that context.
    I think that working with allies and partners in order to 
impose costs can actually raise the costs essentially and 
therefore help to promote deterrence and, again, push back. 
There's also obviously in the theory of deterrence the idea 
that if you build up resilience that you can also affect 
deterrence.
    So if we are better at protecting ourselves and defending 
ourselves from such attacks and breaches in the future, that it 
makes it less worthwhile in a sense for the adversary to engage 
in these issues.
    And I also think that in the context of work that would be 
well outside of the Intelligence Community, but in the policy 
community, and hopefully work that we could support if we are 
capable of building up norms and frameworks for managing this, 
and that if we do so with the private sector--which is 
absolutely critical obviously to these issues--that we have an 
opportunity to also promote deterrence more effectively.
    And you know, I think the private sector relationships--
something I know for years we have talked about the importance 
of them in this space--it hasn't obviously gotten any easier, 
and these partnerships are critical to us working together on 
these questions. I think it's something like 85 percent of our 
critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector in this 
area, and we need to work with them in order to ensure that we 
are all pushing in the same direction to promote the deterrence 
that we'd like to promote. But I wish I had all the answers, 
but I look forward to working on this, if confirmed, and trying 
to provide to you some answers.
    Senator Cornyn. Well, just like we negotiate treaties to 
hopefully curtail the availability of nuclear weapons, do you 
believe that there is an opportunity to negotiate treaties with 
other countries to establish international norms in cyber?
    Ms. Haines. So, Senator, I don't know that a treaty would 
be the most useful way to do it--at this stage, certainly. I 
think that it is possible to promote norms through a variety of 
means. So, for example, setting up activity that is 
sanctionable and identifying what activity is unacceptable, for 
example, and doing so with your partners and allies and 
therefore, being sort of aligned in what the response would be 
to such unacceptable activity. And giving notice, in effect, to 
adversaries as to what will happen, should they engage in that 
activity, is a way to promote a norm without a treaty, but 
nevertheless, to promote deterrence.
    So I think that's a way that I would support, for example, 
or have supported in the past, building out that work. But if 
confirmed, I mean, I think from the Director of National 
Intelligence perspective and the IC perspective, I think it's--
something we can do is promote the ability to detect when 
adversaries are engaging in such activities so as to then 
provide information about attribution, for example, and then 
hold adversaries to account through that.
    Senator Cornyn. One last question about WestExec Advisors.
    Ms. Haines. Yes.
    Senator Cornyn. Before July, the WestExec website touted 
its work helping major American universities court donations in 
China without jeopardizing Pentagon-funded research grants. 
That reference was eliminated after--sometime between July 26 
and August 2nd. The website continues to say it helps--the 
company helps--clients navigate China-related risks in an era 
of strategic competition.
    Did you, in the time you were affiliated with WestExec, 
ever--were you ever involved in a conversation about how the 
company would hold itself out or what the activities they might 
conduct relative to China?
    Ms. Haines. No, Sir. I'm not even aware of the reference on 
the website that you're describing. And I did no consulting 
activity vis-a-vis China at all and I don't--Yes. I mean, I 
suspect that the risk issue is more about companies that might 
have been interested in doing business in the global market, 
but I don't--I just don't have any knowledge of that work.
    Senator Cornyn. Thank you.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you.
    Chairman Rubio. All right, thank you. So we're going to 
break here for about 30 minutes. And I would say about--to 
reconvene for our closed hearing around 12:35.
    I just want to state this for the record, for planning 
purposes, if any Members of the Committee wish to submit 
questions for the record after today's hearing, they need to do 
so by the close of business on Thursday, January 21. We'll see 
you in a minute.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Haines. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m. the open portion of the hearing 
was adjourned.]

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