[Senate Hearing 117-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2023
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 25, 2022
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 2:00 p.m., in room SR-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen (Chair) presiding.
Present: Senators Shaheen, Leahy, Moran, Collins, Graham,
Boozman, Moore Capito, Kennedy, Hagerty, and Braun.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
opening statement of senator jeanne shaheen
Senator Shaheen. The Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,
Science, and Related Agencies, will now come to order.
Good afternoon, everyone. Welcome to today's hearing, to
review the President's fiscal year 2023 funding request for the
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Our witness today is FBI Director, Christopher Wray.
Director Wray it is very nice to have you before the Committee
again.
I must admit, however, that I rewrote my opening statement
for today's hearing, based on the tragic events in Texas. But I
want to begin by recognizing the more than 36,000 employees of
the FBI who protect our country from violent criminals,
terrorists, and others who would mean us great harm. And I want
to thank everyone at the FBI for their dedication and service
to the country.
The FBI remains on standby to jump into action to assist
their State, local, and Tribal partners with investigating
criminal activity. And the most recent example of this was
assisting in the horrific aftermath of the shooting at Robb
Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, yesterday, a shooting that
has so far claimed 21 lives, 19 of them children.
As a mother and grandmother I can only--really I can't
begin to imagine the pain that these families are going
through. I want to thank the FBI for sending the agents in and
other key staff so quickly, to what I know has been a very
difficult crime scene.
I understand that the FBI has also made Victim Specialists
available as part of the response, and I hope they are able to
remain in this community as long as they are needed. And if
this Committee can provide resources to help make that happen,
please let us know.
I know that we don't know yet what motivated this killer. I
do know that several of our colleagues have already called for
better mental health screening, from enforcing laws that keep
guns out of the hands of felons, and for hardening schools.
I would agree with all of those recommendations, but I also
think Congress needs to act to strengthen background checks,
and to stop allowing the sale of weapons of war.
As, my colleague, Senator Murphy rightly pointed out
yesterday, mental illness is not unique to the United States,
but the devastating rate of gun violence is. We can't accept
this status quo, the lives of Americans, of our children depend
on Congress being willing to enact meaningful policies to
address the scope of this crisis and to keep people safe.
Weapons of war enable mass shootings like the one at Robb
Elementary, where we don't know the motive. And others like the
shooting at Tops market, where we know the motive all too well.
People who are simply going about their everyday lives, whether
it is attending religious services in Pittsburg, in Charleston,
shopping at Walmart in El Paso, dancing at a night club in
Orlando, or getting groceries in Buffalo. They were all
murdered by individuals motivated by hate.
The FBI's budget request of $10.8 billion includes
additional resources for combating domestic terrorism, and mass
violence. We have discussed this topic before here, in this
Committee, yet again, and again, we have witnessed White
supremacist targeting others based on their gender, sexual
orientation, or faith.
Now, we are fortunate that technological progress has given
us advances in medicine, science, and manufacturing, as well as
improving the ease of how we can communicate with others. But
unfortunately, new technologies have also allowed the rapid
spread of hate, conspiracy theories, and disinformation to
wider audience, and they have allowed those with extremist
views to find a community. I hesitate to call it a
``community'', because I think of community as something
positive. To find others who share those extremist views.
While we should be able to freely express our ideas, it
should not come at the expense of someone's life or wellbeing.
We clearly need to find better solutions and actions to stem
future violence, and I know that the FBI will be part of those
solutions.
Just as the FBI rapidly responds to crisis situations, I
believe Congress needs to also find a way to more quickly and
appropriately respond to the issue of mass violence, including
those committed with firearms and domestic terrorism.
I am certainly ready to work on common-sense legislation
that I think the majority of Americans can support, and I am
sure that many of my colleagues on this Committee who will join
me as well.
So, Director Wray, I look forward to your testimony, and to
the discussion today.
With that, I would like to recognize the CJS Subcommittee
Vice Chair, Senator Moran, for his opening remarks.
opening statement of senator jerry moran
Senator Moran. Chairman Shaheen, thank you very much, thank
you for convening this hearing.
Director Wray, welcome back to the subcommittee.
I, too, before considering the budget request, would like
to make a brief word on yesterday's senseless act of violence
that stole the lives of nineteen children and two teachers.
My wife and I have had this conversation. It is
heartbreaking. The murder of these innocent children is
horrific. In a small town, tight-knit community like Uvalde, it
is the size of a town I grew up in, I know there will not be a
single member of the community who is not touched by this
tragedy.
Director Wray, I am confident that you will bring the full
investigative powers of the FBI to bear, in determining the
motives, the warnings, and how, and why. I am also confident
there will be an introspection, examining whether all laws,
NICS Section policies were properly followed, and we await your
findings.
The FBI is requesting $10.7 billion for salaries and
expenses in 2023. That amount is 605 million, or 6 percent
above the fiscal year 2022 enacted. But as we have demonstrated
in Texas, and in Buffalo, and nearly every city across the
country violent crime, including murders, assault and robberies
is on the rise.
I can give this Committee statistics, percentages on the
rise of crime, but no one here, especially after yesterday's
tragic shooting, doubts that violent crime is a growing problem
in our country. We have also seen a dramatic increase in
violent attacks on law enforcement officers.
This is a matter that I know, you, Director Wray, care
about deeply. I have seen it in your conversations, I have
heard it in your testimony. I experience it on our telephone
all yesterday, and I appreciate your efforts, your care, and
concern, and your efforts to raise awareness about the violent
crime occurring across our country.
While I note the Bureau is working to keep us safe here at
home, we also face ever-evolving threats from foreign
adversaries as well. I recognize your job is really endless,
you know, there is never enough that can be done. You have
repeatedly warned that nothing presents a broader, more severe
threat to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security
than the Chinese Government.
I understand that as of January of this year, the FBI is
investigating more than 2,000 cases of Chinese Government
trying to steal our information in technology, and the FBI is
opening a new counterintelligence case every 12 hours.
I am interested to learn about the FBI's efforts to address
cyber crime, and ransomware. The Bureau made transformational
changes after 9/11, and these changes help keep our nation safe
from acts of terrorism.
Today, changes of a similar magnitude may be needed to
combat cyber threats, including threats from both criminal
organizations, and state actors.
I appreciated your comments to the students of the
University of Kansas when we were there together this past
March, where you emphasized how important it will be for them
to bring their talents to the frontline of the cybersecurity
workforce.
Director Wray, I look forward to hearing today about the
Bureau's budget, your budget request. And I hope to be able to
help you and the FBI address all of the challenges that we face
in this country, related to law enforcement. The challenges are
tremendous, the ones that we saw, reminded of again yesterday,
are at the forefront, that the world is a dangerous place,
every place we turn.
I welcome you to the Subcommittee, and I look forward to a
somber and sober discussion of the circumstances we find
ourselves in.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Moran. At this time the
Chair of the Full Appropriations Committee, Senator Leahy would
like to make a statement.
opening statement of senator patrick leahy
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Chair Shaheen, and Vice Chair
Moran for your comments.
Director Wray, we have known each other for a number of
years, and I will just tell you some of my concerns. Twenty-one
victims; that is 21 families waking up this morning with broken
hearts. Those of us who have had, whether we have had children
or not, but those who have had children and grandchildren, we
think 19 children, murdered.
Gun violence is an epidemic. It can't be ignored, it can't
be overstated, it can't be hidden behind the guise of an
unassailable Second Amendment argument.
And I don't want to politicize or overreact, I am just, I
am angry, I am extremely angry that 19 more children, and two
adults who were fighting to protect them have been murdered,
murdered. Murdered!
I am angry that today too many in Congress are just willing
to accept these mass shootings as another breaking news story,
as just another part of our daily lives. Oh, we are praying for
the victims. Of course we are praying for the victims, but what
the hell are we doing to stop further victims?
I have owned firearms responsibly my entire life. I support
a strong Second Amendment. I spent 8 years in law enforcement,
but simple common sense and what should be our shared humanity,
compel us to not simply quietly acknowledge the crisis. We all
know that it is a crisis, but we need to do something about it.
Nearly 10 years ago, a murderer took the lives of 26
people, including 20 children, at Sandy Hook. I led the Senate
Judiciary Committee's action to advance legislation to help
address the epidemic of gun violence. And over 2 years ago, as
then Vice Chairman of the Appropriations Committee, I worked to
break through the years long refusal to provide the CDC and the
NIH with resources to simply study the roots of gun violence.
The gun lobby had blocked those resources for years, even
just having a study of gun violence, but now we need more! And
we have got to stop saying, well, next week, next month, next
year, we have to do it now. How many more people will die
before this country says, enough is enough? I will say it
today. It is enough.
So Director Wray, thank you for being here today, as the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation you have a
critically important job. You have to protect our country from
threats of terrorism, and crimes, both foreign and domestic,
and, while you are doing it, you have to uphold the rights and
values that make this a great democracy.
I don't envy that task. I respect that task, but the
heinous mass shooting in Buffalo, New York, earlier this month
is a stark reminder that domestic terrorism is still very much
present in the United States. It is also a somber reminder that
the majority of domestic terrorism perpetrated against innocent
Americans is driven by those espousing white supremacists and
racist ideologies.
Now, that is not a controversial statement, it is a simple
fact. And that is what makes this moment so dangerous. When
facts are distorted into untruths, and parroted by those with a
pulpit to do so, we tread dangerously far from the core tenets
of our democracy.
If we can't clearly and unequivocally condemn the actions
of white supremacists, or simply acknowledge the January 6,
2021, attack on our Capitol for what it was, an insurrection,
we fan the flames of hatred and violence, and we allow them to
grow. It is alarming to me. It should be to every American. It
is in my State of Vermont, whether you are Republicans, or
Democrats, Independents, it is alarming.
But I will also further highlight the importance of the
work of the dedicated men and women of the Bureau, and your
leadership there, Director Wray. Each year this Appropriations
Committee wrestles with how best to dedicate valuable taxpayer
dollars. Next week I am going to have binders about this thick
at my home in Vermont where it is nice and quiet, reading
through all these budget requests. But in exchange, of course,
for the money, we said we expect the FBI to confront
forcefully, head on, the threat of domestic terrorism. We
expect you to faithfully and fully adhere to the rule of law to
investigate whatever crime is committed, to work with the
Department of Justice and State and local law enforcement to
hold the perpetrators of any crime accountable.
I stand ready to support you. But I also want you to
respond when we have questions, either Republicans or
Democrats, on this Committee.
So I can say a lot more. I won't. I would rather hear the
Director, Chair Shaheen. But thank you for the courtesy.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
Director Wray, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Wray. Well, thank you. Good afternoon, Chair Shaheen,
Ranking Member Moran, Chair Leahy, Members of the Subcommittee.
I know, of course, that we are here to talk about the FBI's
budget, but like all of you, I want to begin with what is on
everybody's hearts and minds.
Yesterday we got the news that we all dread, including
those of us in law enforcement, we do this work for the
victims, both the actual victims, and the victims we are trying
to prevent from being victims, and there is no category of
victims that more motivates the men and women of law
enforcement, including the men and women of the FBI, than
children.
And parents got calls yesterday that are too devastating to
even fathom, and a community, really a whole Nation, was shaken
by another horrific mass shooting, this time, once again, at an
elementary school, full of young kids just days, days away from
finishing their school year, and my heart goes out to the
families of the victims, and to the entire community of Uvalde.
I know that you are experiencing unimaginable pain and
trauma, and the entire FBI family feels your heartbreak and
stands with you.
There will certainly be more that we are going to learn
about this heinous attack in the days ahead, and I know the
American people, and especially the people of Uvalde, are
looking for answers. I do want to acknowledge the heroism of
all law enforcement who responded immediately to the scene.
For our part, the FBI will continue to work around the
clock with the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Uvalde
Police Department, and our other State, local, and Federal
partners, to assist in any way we can. We are dedicating the
full resources of the FBI San Antonio Field Office, and a whole
host of other FBI divisions to helping the Texas DPS, and the
Uvalde Police, who have the lead in the investigation.
On top of that we are devoting significant national
resources, including investigative and analytical resources, in
evidence response, and laboratory personnel, Victim Services
professionals to assist the families of the victims, crisis
management and behavioral analysis units.
So bottom line, we are absolutely heartbroken about
yesterday's tragic events, and committed to doing our part to
support our partners in the investigation and the community of
Uvalde, as we begin to try to move forward.
Of course the range of criminal cyber and
counterintelligence threats we face as a Nation has never been
greater, or more diverse, and the demands and expectations
placed on the FBI have never been higher.
And before I take your questions, I want to spend just a
few minutes talking about the FBI's efforts in some of those
areas, namely, our efforts to combat terrorism both domestic
and international, and our efforts to help tackle the rise in
violent crime.
Unfortunately this tragedy, as well as the recent tragedy
in Buffalo, and way too many before, reinforce what we in the
FBI have been so concerned about for so long, and that is the
threat of lone actors who look to attack regular, everyday
people going about their regular, everyday lives. And in fact
it is that threat that we continue to be most concerned about
here in the homeland.
And while it is too soon to be commenting on the motivation
behind yesterday's tragedy, and I don't want to get out ahead
of Texas DPS which has the lead on that, as the horrific attack
a little over a week ago in Buffalo shows, we have got to
continue to stay laser focused on our efforts to counter
violence motivated by hate and extremism.
Even on the international terrorism side we are seeing
home-grown violent extremists, inspired by groups like ISIS,
like al-Qaeda, acting alone or in small groups, and leaving
fewer dots to connect, and less time in which to connect them,
and countering fast-moving threats like these requires a team
approach, so we have requested an enhancement not just for
additional investigators but also support personnel to help us
perform the important outreach, and partnership building that
is so essential to countering this threat.
The scourge of violent crime, of course, extends beyond
mass shootings, and beyond crimes motivated by extremist
ideology. In fact, rising violence is the number one concern I
hear about from chiefs and sheriffs all across the country with
whom I speak just about every week.
With those partners we are leading hundreds of task forces
to get the worst of the worst off the streets. We are sharing
intelligence to focus our collective efforts, and we are
providing technical resources and expertise to bring more
violent criminals to justice.
Last fiscal year those task forces focused on violent
crime, made more than 17,000 arrests, seized more than 8,000
illegally possessed firearms, and dismantled nearly 300 gangs
and criminal enterprises across the country. And that is all
separate and apart, and in addition to all of our Joint
Terrorism Task Force work on the counterterrorism side,
domestic terrorism, international terrorism.
I should add that with this hearing falling 2 years to the
day, after the murder of George Floyd, I do want to emphasize
that we and our State and local partners are also focused on
improving interactions between law enforcement and the
communities we all serve, to ensure equal justice for all.
Of course these are just a few of the threats we are
tackling. The FBI's budget request this year reflects the
breadth, depth, and complexity of those threats. In addition to
the things I have already mentioned each and every day our
folks are also dealing with an ever-expanding array of threats
on the cyber front from ransomware, and the theft of trade
secrets, and personal information, to malign and influence
campaigns, to intrusions targeting our critical infrastructure.
And that includes working with our private sector,
government, and foreign partners to meet the danger from
Russian cyber actors during this time of Russia's unprovoked
aggression in the Ukraine.
We are also taking on the Chinese Government's broad-scale
economic espionage campaign that targets our innovation, our
ideas, our economic security. And today, as we mark the 40th
National Missing Children's Day, it is important to highlight
the work of our 400 FBI personnel and nearly 800 additional
officers who serve on our Child Exploitation and Human
Trafficking Task Forces, that we have dedicated to
investigating crimes against children, and to identifying and
locating child victims.
Our fellow citizens look to us to protect the United States
from all those threats, and a whole bunch more, and I am proud
to see the men and women of the FBI step up and rise to meet
those challenges every day.
I would like to again thank this subcommittee for all the
support you have provided the men and women of the FBI over the
years.
And to the community of Uvalde, we will provide whatever
resources we can, we will support you however we can, and we
will stand with you in our thoughts, and our prayers.
And thank you. I am happy to take your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Good afternoon, Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, and
Members of the Subcommittee. Today, I appear before you on behalf of
the men and women of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (``FBI''), who
tackle some of the most complex threats every day with perseverance,
professionalism, and integrity--sometimes at the greatest of costs. I
am extremely proud of their service and commitment to the FBI's mission
and to ensuring the safety and security of communities throughout our
nation. On their behalf, I would like to express my appreciation for
the support you have given them in the past, ask for your continued
support in the future, and pledge to be the best possible stewards of
the resources you provide. I would like to begin by providing a brief
overview of the President's fiscal year 2023 budget request for the
FBI, and then follow with a short discussion of key threats and
challenges that we face, both as a nation and as an organization.
fiscal year 2023 budget overview
The fiscal year 2023 budget request proposes a total of $10.8
billion in direct budget authority to carry out the FBI's national
security, intelligence, criminal law enforcement, and criminal justice
services missions. The request includes a total of $10.7 billion for
Salaries and Expenses, which will support 36,945 positions (13,616
Special Agents, 3,287 Intelligence Analysts, and 20,042 professional
staff), and $61.9 million for Construction. The request includes eleven
program enhancements totaling $324.6 million. These enhancements are
proposed to meet critical requirements and close gaps in operational
capabilities, including $52.0 million to enhance cyber investigative
capabilities, $48.8 million for additional personnel and tools to
investigate and counter acts of mass violence and address threats to
public safety, $34.1 million to mitigate threats from foreign
intelligence services, $20.6 million to combat crime and corruption,
$17.8 million to address the increase in civil rights investigations,
$36.9 million to enhance the FBI's cybersecurity posture and protect
internal networks, $25.0 million to address data analytics/technical
tool development and technical surveillance, $27.4 million to support
infrastructure needs related to the use of Body Worn Cameras, $39.4
million for operations and maintenance of FBI-owned facilities, and
$22.5 million to support the expansion of Federal jurisdiction for
crimes committed on Tribal lands in response to the McGirt Supreme
Court decision. When compared against the fiscal year 2022 President's
Budget, the fiscal year 2023 request level represents a total increase
of $527.8 million, all of which falls in the Salaries and Expenses
account.
key threats and challenges
Our nation continues to face a multitude of serious and evolving
threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists to hostile foreign
intelligence services and operatives, from sophisticated cyber-based
attacks to Internet facilitated sexual exploitation of children, from
violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay
current with constantly evolving technologies. Our adversaries--
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--take
advantage of modern technology, including the Internet and social
media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage
terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, to spread misinformation,
and to disperse information on building improvised explosive devices
and other means to attack the U.S. The breadth of these threats and
challenges are as complex as any time in our history. And the
consequences of not responding to and countering threats and challenges
have never been greater.
The support of this Committee in helping the FBI do its part in
thwarting these threats and facing these challenges is greatly
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong
capabilities and capacities to assess threats, share intelligence,
leverage key technologies, and--in some respects, most importantly--
hire some of the best to serve as Special Agents, Intelligence
Analysts, and professional staff. We have built, and are continuously
enhancing, a workforce that possesses the skills and knowledge to deal
with the complex threats and challenges we face today--and tomorrow. We
are building a leadership cadre that views change and transformation as
a positive tool for keeping the FBI focused on the key threats facing
our nation.
Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our
nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and
criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and indeed our
communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and
breadth of the FBI's mission: to protect the American people and uphold
the Constitution of the United States.
national security
Top Terrorism Threats
Preventing terrorist attacks, from any place, by any actor, remains
the FBI's top priority. The nature of the threat posed by terrorism--
both international terrorism (``IT'') and domestic terrorism (``DT'')--
continues to evolve.
The greatest terrorism threat to our Homeland is posed by lone
actors or small cells who typically radicalize online and look to
attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. We see these
threats manifested within both Domestic Violent Extremists (``DVEs'')
and Homegrown Violent Extremists (``HVEs''), two distinct threats, both
of which are located primarily in the United States and typically
radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. Individuals who
commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of social or political
goals stemming from domestic influences--some of which include racial
or ethnic bias, or anti- government or anti-authority sentiments--are
described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals who are inspired
primarily by global jihad but are not receiving individualized
direction from Foreign Terrorist Organizations (``FTOs'').
Domestic and Homegrown Violent Extremists are often motivated and
inspired by a mix of socio-political, ideological, and personal
grievances against their targets, and more recently have focused on
accessible targets to include civilians, law enforcement and the
military, symbols or members of the U.S. Government, houses of worship,
retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Selecting these types of
soft targets, in addition to the insular nature of their radicalization
and mobilization to violence and limited discussions with others
regarding their plans, increases the challenge faced by law enforcement
to detect and disrupt the activities of lone actors before they occur.
The top threat we face from DVEs continues to be from those we
categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists
(``RMVEs''), including those who advocate for the superiority of the
white race, who were the primary source of lethal attacks perpetrated
by DVEs in 2018 and 2019. It is important to note that we have also
recently seen an increase in fatal DVE attacks perpetrated by Anti-
Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists, specifically Militia
Violent Extremists and Anarchist Violent Extremists. Anti-Government or
Anti-Authority Violent Extremists were responsible for three of the
four lethal DVE attacks in 2020. Also, in 2020, we saw the first lethal
attack committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20 years.
These Anti-Government/Anti-Authority Violent Extremists have
specifically targeted law enforcement and the military as well as
institutions or members of the U.S. Government.
The number of FBI investigations of suspected domestic violent
extremists has more than doubled since the spring of 2020. A few months
ago, we marked the 1 year anniversary of the January 6 assault on the
U.S. Capitol, which has led to unprecedented efforts by the Department
of Justice, including the FBI, to investigate and hold accountable all
who engaged in violence, destruction of property, and other criminal
activity on that day. To date, the department has arrested and charged
nearly 800 individuals who took part in the Capitol assault.
The FBI uses all tools available at its disposal to combat domestic
terrorism. These efforts represent a critical part of the first-ever
National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, which was released
in June 2021, and which sets forth, for the first time, a
comprehensive, whole of government policy to address the many facets of
the domestic terrorism threat.
The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest, most immediate
international terrorism (``IT'') threat to the Homeland. As I have
described, HVEs are people located and radicalized primarily in the
United States, who are not receiving individualized direction from
global jihad-inspired FTOs but are inspired largely by the Islamic
State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS'') and al-Qa'ida to commit violence.
An HVE's lack of a direct connection with an FTO, ability to rapidly
mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted communications pose
significant challenges to our ability to proactively identify and
disrupt it.
The FBI remains concerned that FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida,
intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United
States. Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS
remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the United
States and our partners--both here at home and overseas. To this day,
ISIS continues to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric and
attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct
attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. ISIS'
successful use of social media and messaging applications to attract
individuals seeking a sense of belonging is of continued concern to us.
Like other foreign terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender
attacks in the United States and Western countries via videos and other
English language propaganda that have, at times, specifically advocated
for attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement and
intelligence community personnel.
Al-Qa'ida maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded
some of the group's senior leadership, we assess that, in the near
term, al-Qa'ida is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable
attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Over the past year,
propaganda from al-Qa'ida leaders continued to seek to inspire
individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other
Western nations.
Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'')
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and
terrorist organizations. Iran also continues to support Lebanese
Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Lebanese Hizballah has sent
operatives to build terrorist infrastructures worldwide. The arrests of
individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Lebanese
Hizballah's main overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence
collection and procurement efforts, demonstrate Lebanese Hizballah's
interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in the
Homeland. Lebanese Hizballah Secretary- General Hasan Nasrallah also
has threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem
Soleimani.
As an organization, we continually adapt and rely heavily on the
strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the
United States and our interests. To that end, we use all available
lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats
while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning
the threat posed by violent extremists, in all their forms, who desire
to harm Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share
information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous
partners via our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and
our Legal Attache offices around the world. The fiscal year 2023
Request includes an additional 208 positions (including 55 Special
Agents, 18 Intelligence Analysts, and 135 professional staff) and $48.8
million to counter terrorism and the increasing acts of domestic
terrorism, including acts of mass violence and threats to public
safety, occurring across the United States.
Cyber
Over the past 2 years, nation-state and criminal cyber actors took
advantage of people and networks made more vulnerable by the sudden
shift of our personal and professional lives online due to the COVID-19
pandemic, targeting those searching for personal protective equipment,
worried about stimulus checks, and conducting vaccine research.
Throughout these last 2 years, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever
range of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and
confidence in our digitally connected world. But these threats will not
disappear when the pandemic ends. Cyber-criminal syndicates and nation-
states keep innovating ways to compromise our networks and maximize the
reach and impact of their operations, such as by selling malware as a
service or by targeting vendors as a way to access scores of victims by
hacking just one provider.
These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise
our networks, steal our property, and hold our critical infrastructure
at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last few years,
we have seen--and have publicly called out--China, North Korea, and
Russia for using cyber operations to target U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and
research. We have seen the far-reaching disruptive impact a serious
supply-chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds intrusions,
conducted by the Russian SVR. We have seen China working to obtain
controlled defense technology and developing the ability to use cyber
means to complement any future real-world conflict. We have seen Iran
use cyber means to try to sow divisions and undermine our elections,
targeting voters before elections and threatening election officials
after. As these adversaries become more sophisticated, we are
increasingly concerned about our ability to detect and warn about
specific cyber operations against U.S. organizations. One of the most
worrisome facets is their focus on compromising U.S. critical
infrastructure, especially during a crisis.
What makes things more difficult is that there is no bright line
where nation-state activity ends and cybercriminal activity begins.
Some cybercriminals contract or sell services to nation-states; some
nation-state actors moonlight as cybercriminals to fund personal
activities; and nation-states are increasingly using tools typically
used by criminal actors, like ransomware.
So, as dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of
focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen
cybercriminals target hospitals, medical centers, and educational
institutions for theft or ransomware. Such incidents affecting medical
centers have led to the interruption of computer networks and systems
that put patients' lives at an increased risk at a time when America
faces its most dire public health crisis in generations. And we have
seen criminal groups targeting critical infrastructure for ransom,
causing massive disruption to our daily lives.
We are also seeing dark web vendors who sell capabilities in
exchange for cryptocurrency increase the difficulty of stopping what
would once have been less dangerous offenders. What were once
unsophisticated criminals now have the tools to paralyze entire
hospitals, police departments, and businesses with ransomware. It is
not that individual hackers alone have necessarily become much more
sophisticated, but--unlike previously--they are able to rent
sophisticated capabilities.
We must make it harder and more painful for hackers and criminals
to do what they are doing. The FBI, using its role as the lead Federal
agency with law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities, works
seamlessly with domestic and international partners to defend their
networks, attribute malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take
the fight to our adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on
cyber adversaries and use our collective law enforcement and
intelligence capabilities to do so through joint and enabled operations
sequenced for maximum impact. And we must continue to work with the
Department of State and other key agencies to ensure that our foreign
partners are able and willing to cooperate in our efforts to bring the
perpetrators of cybercrime to justice.
An example of this approach is the international seizure in April
2022 of Hydra Market--the world's largest and longest-running darknet
market. Hydra was an online criminal marketplace that enabled users in
mainly Russian-speaking countries to buy and sell illicit goods and
services, including illegal drugs, stolen financial information,
fraudulent identification documents, and money laundering and mixing
services, anonymously and outside the reach of law enforcement.
Transactions on Hydra were conducted in cryptocurrency and Hydra's
operators charged a commission for every transaction conducted on
Hydra. In 2021, Hydra accounted for an estimated 80 percent of all
darknet market-related cryptocurrency transactions, and since 2015, the
marketplace has received approximately $5.2 billion in cryptocurrency.
The seizure of the Hydra servers and cryptocurrency wallets containing
$25 million worth of bitcoin was made in Germany by the German Federal
Criminal Police (the Bundeskriminalamt), in coordination with the FBI
and our other Federal partners in the Drug Enforcement Administration,
the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and
Homeland Security Investigations. The FBI used sophisticated
techniques, our unique legal authorities, and, most importantly, our
worldwide partnerships to significantly disrupt this illegal
marketplace.
Last year, cybersecurity companies including Microsoft disclosed
that hackers were using previously unknown vulnerabilities related to
Microsoft Exchange software to access email servers that companies
physically keep on their premises rather than in the cloud. These
``zero day'' vulnerabilities allowed the actors to potentially exploit
victim networks, engaging in activities such as grabbing login
credentials, installing malicious programs to send commands to the
victim network, and stealing emails in bulk. The FBI issued a joint
advisory in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security's
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (``CISA'') to give
network defenders the technical information they needed to mitigate the
vulnerability. However, while many infected system owners successfully
removed the web shells, others were not able to do so. That left many
systems vulnerable to adversaries who could continue to steal
information, encrypt data for ransom, or potentially even execute a
destructive attack. In response, through a court-authorized operation
in partnership with the private sector, we were able to copy and remove
malicious web shells from hundreds of vulnerable computers in the U.S.
running Microsoft Exchange Server software. This is another example of
how the FBI used its unique authorities, in this case, court-issued
legal process, and its partnerships with the private sector to have
tangible, real-world impact on the problem.
We took over 1,100 actions against cyber adversaries last year,
including arrests, criminal charges, convictions, dismantlements, and
disruptions, and enabled many more actions through our dedicated
partnerships with the private sector, foreign partners, and at the
Federal, State, and local entities. We also provided thousands of
individualized threat warnings and disseminated more than 100 public
threat advisories by way of Joint Cybersecurity Advisories, FBI Liaison
Alert System (``FLASH'') reports, Private Industry Notifications
(``PINs''), and Public Service Announcements (``PSAs'')--many of which
were jointly authored with other U.S. agencies and international
partners.
We have been putting a lot of energy and resources into all of
those partnerships, especially with the private sector. We are working
hard to push important threat information to network defenders, but we
have also been making it as easy as possible for the private sector to
share important information with us. For example, we are emphasizing to
the private sector how we keep our presence unobtrusive in the wake of
a breach; how we protect information that companies, and universities
share with us. We are also committed to providing useful feedback and
improving coordination with our government partners so that we are
speaking with one voice. But we need the private sector to do its part,
too. We need the private sector to come forward to warn us--and warn us
quickly--when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the
private sector to work with us when we warn them that they are being
targeted. The recent examples of significant cyber incidents--
SolarWinds, HAFNIUM, the pipeline incident-- only emphasize what I have
been saying for a long time: The Government cannot protect against
cyber threats on its own. We need a whole-of-society approach that
matches the scope of the danger. There is really no other option for
defending a country where nearly all of our critical infrastructure,
personal data, intellectual property, and network infrastructure sits
in private hands.
In summary, the FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat
cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information
sharing inside and outside of the government to developing and
retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and
defeat these threats. We take all potential threats to public and
private sector systems seriously and will continue to investigate and
hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace. The fiscal year
2023 Request includes an additional 137 positions (including 38 Special
Agents, 15 Intelligence Analysts, and 84 Professional Staff) and $52.0
million to enhance cyber information-sharing abilities and increase
cyber tools and capacities. The Request also includes 9 positions and
$36.9 million to help protect internal FBI networks.
Foreign Influence
Our nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to
both influence our national policies and public opinion, and cause harm
to our national dialogue and debate. The FBI and our interagency
partners remain concerned about, and focused on, foreign malign
influence operations--which include subversive, undeclared, coercive,
and criminal actions used by foreign governments in their attempts to
sway U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies,
increase discord in the United States, and undermine the American
people's confidence in our democratic institutions and processes.
Foreign malign influence is not a new problem, but the
interconnectedness of the modern world, combined with the anonymity of
the Internet, have changed the nature of the threat and how the FBI and
its partners must address it. Foreign malign influence operations have
taken many forms and used many tactics over the years. Most widely
reported these days are attempts by adversaries--hoping to reach a wide
swath of Americans covertly from outside the United States--to amplify
existing stories on social media in an attempt to discredit U.S.
individuals and institutions.
The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating
foreign malign influence threats. Several years ago, we established the
Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and counteract
foreign malign influence operations targeting the United States. The
FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and is comprised of
agents, analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence,
Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative Divisions. It is
specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign malign
influence operations targeting democratic institutions and values
inside the United States. In all instances, the FITF strives to protect
democratic institutions; develop a common operating picture; raise
adversaries' costs; and reduce their overall asymmetric advantage.
The FITF brings the FBI's national security and traditional
criminal investigative expertise under one umbrella to prevent foreign
influence in our elections. This better enables us to frame the threat,
to identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the
technology sector, we had several instances where we were able to
quickly relay threat indicators that those companies used to take swift
action, blocking budding abuse of their platforms.
Following the 2018 midterm elections, we reviewed the threat and
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our
efforts to combat malign foreign influence focused solely on the threat
posed by Russia. Utilizing lessons learned since 2018, the FITF widened
its aperture to confront malign foreign operations of China, Iran, and
other global adversaries. To address this expanding focus and wider set
of adversaries and influence efforts, we have also added resources to
maintain permanent ``surge'' capability on election and foreign
influence threats.
These additional resources were also devoted to working with U.S.
Government partners on two documents regarding the U.S. Government's
analysis of foreign efforts to influence or interfere with the 2020
Election. The main takeaway from both reports is there is no evidence--
not through intelligence collection on the foreign actors themselves,
not through physical security and cybersecurity monitoring of voting
systems across the country, not through post- election audits, and not
through any other means--that a foreign government or other actors
compromised election infrastructure to manipulate election results.
The FBI will continue to investigate this threat leading up to the
fiscal year 2022 mid-term election and will not stop working with our
partners to impose costs on adversaries who have or are seeking to
influence or interfere in our elections.
In addition, the domestic CI environment is more complex than ever,
posing a continuous threat to U.S. national security and its economy by
targeting strategic technologies, industries, sectors, and critical
infrastructures. Historically, asymmetric CI threats involved foreign
intelligence service officers seeking U.S. Government and U.S.
Intelligence Community information. The FBI has observed foreign
adversaries employing a wide range of nontraditional collection
techniques, including the use of human collectors not affiliated with
intelligence services, foreign investment in critical U.S. sectors, and
infiltration of U.S. supply chains. The FBI continues to adjust its CI
priorities and posture to address the evolving and multifaceted threat.
The fiscal year 2023 request includes an additional 88 positions
(including 14 Special Agents, 35 Intelligence Analysts, and 39
Professional Staff) and $34.1 million to help combat the threats posed
by foreign, and potentially hostile, intelligence services and other
foreign government actors.
criminal threats
We face many criminal threats, from complex white-collar fraud in
the financial, healthcare, and housing sectors to transnational and
regional organized criminal enterprises to violent crime and public
corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and international--and
individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to our
security and safety in communities across the Nation.
Violent Crime
Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well
organized and use violence to control neighborhoods, and boost their
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with
Federal, State, local, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task
forces and individual investigations.
Like the FBI's work combatting gangs, the FBI also investigates the
most serious crimes in Indian Country--such as murder, child sexual and
physical abuse, violent assaults, drug trafficking, public corruption,
financial crimes, and Indian gaming violations. As you are aware, there
are almost 600 federally recognized American Indian Tribes in the
United States, and the FBI has Federal law enforcement responsibility
on nearly 200 Indian reservations. This Federal jurisdiction is shared
concurrently with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (``BIA''), Office of
Justice Services; the FBI works very closely with BIA and other
Federal, State, and Tribal partners across the United States on crimes
in Indian Country.
Over the past year, the FBI's work in Indian Country increased
significantly due to the July 9, 2020, Supreme Court ruling in McGirt
v. Oklahoma, which determined that the territorial boundaries of the
Muscogee Creek Nation (``MCN'') would fall under Federal Indian Country
jurisdiction, expanding the FBI's responsibility for investigating
felony offenses committed by or victimizing a Tribal member. The
principles of the McGirt decision also apply to the status of the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Seminole, and Quapaw Tribal territories
in Oklahoma. Combined, all six reservation territories encompass
approximately 32,000 square miles, or 45 percent of the state of
Oklahoma. The total population within the combined borders is roughly
1.9 million, of which approximately 420,000 are enrolled Tribal
members.
This drastic increase in FBI jurisdiction poses significant and
long-term operational and public safety risks given the challenges
associated with the increased number of violent criminal cases now
under Federal jurisdiction within Oklahoma's Indian Country territory.
Since this decision, the FBI's Oklahoma City Field Office (``OC'') has
seen a drastic increase in the total number of Indian Country
investigations and now has the FBI's largest investigative
responsibility. Since the Federal court ruling in the McGirt case, the
FBI's Oklahoma City field office, which previously investigated
approximately 50 criminal cases a year involving Native Americans, has
managed thousands of Indian Country cases, prioritizing cases involving
the most violent offenders who pose the most serious risk to the
public.
To effectively conduct these investigations, the FBI has conducted
temporary duty (``TDY'') rotations of Special Agents, Intelligence
Analysts, Victim Specialists and other professional staff to the
Muskogee and Tulsa RAs, the offices most impacted by the decision. The
FBI has also expanded State, local, and Tribal participation on task
forces to assist with response and investigative efforts. The U.S.
Attorney's Offices in the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the Northern
District of Oklahoma also increased their staffing. To support the U.S.
Attorney's effective prosecution of these crimes, the FBI must have the
capability to sustain an enhanced presence in FBI OC. As such, the
fiscal year 2023 request includes an additional 76 positions (including
45 Special Agents, 1 Intelligence Analyst, and 30 professional staff)
and $22.5 million to support the surge in personnel. In addition, the
fiscal year 2023 Request includes 15 positions (including 10 Special
Agents and 5 professional staff) and $5.3 million to investigate
violence against women, specifically missing or murdered indigenous
persons in the U.S. The Request also includes $27.4 million to fulfill
the Department of Justice's policy and launch a Body Worn Cameras
program for FBI Special Agents across all FBI field offices.
Transnational Organized Crime (``TOC'')
More than a decade ago, organized crime was characterized by
hierarchical organizations, or families, that exerted influence over
criminal activities in neighborhoods, cities, or States. But organized
crime has changed dramatically. Today, international criminal
enterprises run multi-national, multi-billion-dollar schemes from start
to finish. Modern-day criminal enterprises are flat, fluid networks
with global reach. While still engaged in many of the ``traditional''
organized crime activities of loan-sharking, extortion, and murder,
modern criminal enterprises are targeting stock market fraud and
manipulation, cyber-facilitated bank fraud and embezzlement, drug
trafficking, identity theft, human trafficking, money laundering, alien
smuggling, public corruption, weapons trafficking, extortion,
kidnapping, and other illegal activities. TOC networks exploit
legitimate institutions for critical financial and business services
that enable the storage or transfer of illicit proceeds. Preventing and
combating transnational organized crime demands a concentrated effort
by the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partners.
While the FBI continues to share intelligence about criminal groups
with our partners and combines resources and expertise to gain a full
understanding of each group, the threat of transnational crime remains
a significant and growing threat to national and international security
with implications for public safety, public health, democratic
institutions, and economic stability across the globe. TOC groups
increasingly exploit jurisdictional boundaries to conduct their
criminal activities overseas. Furthermore, they are expanding their use
of emerging technology to traffic illicit drugs and contraband across
international borders and into the U.S. To combat these efforts, the
FBI's fiscal year 2023 Request includes an additional 3 Special Agent
positions and $5.5 million.
Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking
It is unthinkable, but every year, thousands of children become
victims of crimes, whether it is through kidnappings, violent attacks,
sexual abuse, human trafficking, or online predators. The FBI is
uniquely positioned to provide a rapid, proactive, and comprehensive
response; identify, locate, and recover child victims; and strengthen
relationships between the FBI and Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international law enforcement partners to identify, prioritize,
investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from
exploiting children.
But the FBI's ability to learn about and investigate child sexual
exploitation is being threatened by the spread of lawless spaces
online. For example, currently, there are at least 30 child pornography
sites operating openly and notoriously on the Darknet, including the
Tor network. Some of these child pornography sites are exclusively
dedicated to the sexual abuse of infants and toddlers. The sites often
expand rapidly, with one site obtaining 200,000 new members within its
first four weeks of operation.
The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost
National Initiative, Innocent Images National Initiative, Operation
Cross Country, Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams, Victim Services,
80 Child Exploitation Task Forces, 53 International Violent Crimes
Against Children Task Force Officers, as well as numerous community
outreach programs to educate parents and children about safety measures
they can follow.
The FBI combats this pernicious crime problem through
investigations such as Operation Pacifier, which targeted the
administrators and users of a highly sophisticated, Tor- based global
enterprise dedicated to the sexual exploitation of children. This
multi-year operation has led to the arrest of over 348 individuals
based in the United States, the prosecution of 25 American child
pornography producers and 51 American hands-on abusers, the rescue or
identification of 55 American children, the arrest of 548 international
individuals, and the identification or rescue of 296 children abroad.
Child Abduction Rapid Deployment Teams are ready response teams
stationed across the country to quickly respond to abductions.
Investigators bring to this issue the full array of forensic tools such
as DNA analysis, trace evidence, impression evidence, and digital
forensics. Through improved communications, law enforcement also has
the ability to quickly share information with partners throughout the
world, and these outreach programs play an integral role in prevention.
In addition to programs to combat child exploitation, the FBI also
focuses efforts to stop human trafficking--a modern form of slavery.
The majority of human trafficking victims recovered during FBI
investigations are United States citizens, but traffickers are
opportunists who will exploit any victim with a vulnerability. Victims
of human trafficking are subjected to forced labor or sex trafficking,
and the FBI is working hard with its partners to combat both forms.
The FBI works collaboratively with law enforcement partners to
investigate and arrest human traffickers through Human Trafficking Task
Forces nationwide. We take a victim- centered, trauma-informed approach
to investigating these cases and strive to ensure the needs of victims
are fully addressed at all stages. To accomplish this, the FBI works in
conjunction with other law enforcement agencies and victim specialists
on the local, State, Tribal, and Federal levels, as well as with a
variety of vetted non-governmental organizations. Even after the arrest
and conviction of human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work
with partner agencies and organizations to assist victims in moving
beyond their exploitation.
The FBI commends the committee's dedication to these efforts and
appreciates the resources provided to combat these horrific acts. The
fiscal year 2023 Request includes an additional 4 positions (2 Special
Agents and 2 professional staff) and $6.1 million to develop
sophisticated tools to combat technology that allows child sex
offenders to operate on the Dark Web, shielded from law enforcement
action.
Civil Rights
The FBI remains dedicated to protecting the cherished freedoms of
all Americans. Civil rights crimes are among the most egregious
violations of Federal law--they include color of law violations, hate
crimes, Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (``FACE'') Act
violations, and voter suppression. These crimes cause long-term,
enduring damage to communities and economic infrastructure, compromise
law enforcement and judicial system capabilities, and provoke
widespread fear and trauma. We also support the work and cases of our
local and State partners, as needed.
The investigation of hate crimes is the number one priority within
the FBI's civil rights program due to the devastating effect these
types of crimes can have not just on the victims and their families,
but also on entire communities. A hate crime is a criminal offense
against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by the
individual's bias against a race, religion, disability, ethnic/national
origin, sexual orientation, gender, or gender identity. While the First
Amendment to the Constitution allows for the free expression of both
offensive and hateful speech, this protection does not extend to
criminal acts, even those done to express an idea or belief. The First
Amendment also does not protect someone who issues a true threat to
inflict physical harm on individuals or groups, or who intentionally
solicits others to commit unlawful acts of violence on his or her
behalf. The FBI remains dedicated to investigating these types of
crimes. In fact, the number of FBI hate crime investigations increased
63 percent between fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020.
Beyond investigative work, the FBI recognizes proper and thorough
handling of civil rights crimes does not begin the moment they are
reported--it begins before they occur, with a solid and trusting
relationship between the community and law enforcement. Each FBI field
office will be taking specific actions to combat civil rights crimes in
their area of responsibility (``AOR'') to encourage systemic change.
These actions include identifying appropriate partner agencies and
local groups to develop outreach relationships at all levels,
especially those that will spark institutional change; increasing civil
rights-focused working groups and task forces with State, local,
private, public, and non-profit partners; and providing increased
training for State and local agencies and community groups centered on
color of law investigations and hate crimes statutes to provide
education about civil rights violations, promote increased reporting of
hate crimes, and rebuild community trust in law enforcement.
Furthermore, we are focused on working with our State and local
partners to collectively do a better job of tracking and reporting hate
crime and color of law violations to fully understand what is happening
in our communities and how to stop it. Our ability to address
significant national issues, such as the use of force and officer-
involved shootings and jurisdictional increases in violent crime,
depends on fuller statistical understanding of the underlying facts and
circumstances. Some jurisdictions fail to report hate crime statistics,
while others claim there are no hate crimes in their community--a fact
that would be welcome, if true. We are dedicated to working vigorously
with our State and local counterparts in every jurisdiction to better
track and report hate crimes, in an accurate, timely, and publicly
transparent manner.
The fiscal year 2023 request includes an additional 92 positions
(including 33 Special Agents and 59 professional staff) and $17.8
million to effectively address the recent increase in civil rights
violations and proactively mitigate future incidents before they occur.
key cross-cutting capabilities and capacities
Data Analytics and Technical Tools
As criminal and terrorist threats become more diverse and
dangerous, the role of technology becomes increasingly important to our
efforts. We are using technology to improve the way we collect,
analyze, and share information. We have seen significant improvement in
capabilities and capacities over the past decade; but keeping pace with
technology remains a key concern for the future.
The volume of data collected during investigations continues to
rapidly expand. For example, in the case of the 2017 Las Vegas
shooting, the FBI recovered one petabyte of data. Insufficient network
bandwidth and tools necessitated the need for 260 FBI personnel to work
over 10 days to manually review 21,500 hours of video footage. These
bandwidth and data challenges are not limited to major cases or large
offices. It is not uncommon for FBI investigations to generate more
than one terabyte of data per day, an amount that could normally take
two days to transit FBI networks at current bandwidth levels. As a
result, the FBI has made dedicated efforts to upgrade and transform its
information technology platforms to meet the demands of current and
future investigations. We have upgraded hundreds of circuits and have
been able to significantly reduce the time it takes to send large data
files. To keep pace in an era where investigations and analysis will
increasingly be conducted at the petabyte scale, the FBI needs to
continue to build networks that can move bulk data, modernize
investigative data analysis, and reduce reliance on stand-alone, ad-hoc
systems.
In fiscal year 2019, this Committee was instrumental in helping the
FBI begin an IT modernization effort that included investing in network
infrastructure, core data management for advanced analytics, and
cybersecurity. Through this initiative, we have made significant
progress in reducing current IT limitations hindering operational
capacity and diminishing substantial security risks. However, more must
be done.
FBI special agents and intelligence analysts need the best
technological tools available to be responsive to the advanced and
evolving threats that face our nation. Enterprise information
technology must be designed so that it provides information to
operational employees rather than forcing employees to conform to the
tools available. IT equipment must be reliable and accessible, thus
decreasing the time between information collection and dissemination.
Therefore, the fiscal year 2023 Request includes an additional $17
million to ensure the FBI is sufficiently investing in its enterprise
infrastructure to access, manage, transport, protect, and evaluate
information to ensure mission-essential intelligence is reaching FBI
investigators and key partners in sufficient time to comprehensively
and strategically address threats.
conclusion
Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The
threats we face as a nation have never been greater or more diverse and
the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow
citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all of those
threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet and exceed
those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated
service.
Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am
happy to answer any questions you might have.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Director.
Let me just announce at the beginning that we will have 5-
minute questioning rounds. I will call on people in order of
arrival, and all of the questioners will be in person, we will
not have anyone on WebEx.
I will begin the questions. And I know it is very recent,
but are there any updates that you can give us from Uvalde for
what we have found out about the shooter's motivation? I know
the reports have been that he acted alone, as you pointed out,
but is there any other information that you can share with this
Committee?
Mr. Wray. There is really, unfortunately, it is such a
fluid situation right now, and I do really want to respect the
fact that the Texas DPS has the lead on the investigation, so I
don't want to get out in front of them right now. My experience
teaches me that in these incidents the facts change as we
understand them, often quite rapidly in the first few days.
So with respect, there is not much I can add right now,
beyond what has already been reported in the press.
Senator Shaheen. You said in your testimony that one of the
biggest threats is--and concerns is the threat of lone actors
who attack people they don't know indiscriminately. Do we
have--are there statistics over the years that show that there
is been an increasing percentage of those kinds of crimes? And
do we have any idea, any research into what is motivating those
kinds of lone individuals?
Mr. Wray. So on the first part, on the statistical side, I
don't know that I could quote you statistics right here, but I
can definitely tell you that we at the FBI, and I know I, from
my first few months as FBI Director, have been highlighting
this threat, the lone actors, or effectively lone actors using
readily accessible weapons, attacking what is often referred to
as soft targets, which are essentially, as I said in my
opening, regular, everyday people wherever they are doing their
lives.
As to what motivates them, that is all over the map. I mean
it is everything from the racially motivated violent
extremists, to different sorts of anarchists, and militia
violent extremists, to home-grown violent extremists, which is
a term we use to sort of distinguish people who are here
already in the U.S. but who are inspired by foreign terrorist
organizations, like ISIS, like al-Qaeda.
And then increasingly we are seeing people with this kind
of weird, hodgepodge blend of ideologies. The old-school world
of kind of people with some purity of radical ideology then
turning to violence is often giving way to people who have kind
of a jumble of mixed up ideas. And you know, we have seen cases
where somebody, 1 month is saying they are an ISIS supporter,
and then the next month they say they are a white supremacist.
We had a case in Minneapolis where a bunch of guys that
described themselves as Boogaloo Boys, then ended up deciding
to provide material support to Hamas.
I look at the El Paso shooter in the Walmart there, and if
you look at his so-called manifesto, it is all over the place.
So we are having more and more challenges trying to unpack what
are often sort of incoherent belief systems, combined with kind
of personal grievances.
Senator Shaheen. And there is no doubt, as you pointed out,
that violent crime is increasing. I see that in my Home State
of New Hampshire, and it seems like over the last couple of
years it has been a reaction to COVID, to the opioid epidemic,
to factors obviously, the availability of weapons is another
factor. Are there other things that we are thinking have
happened over the last couple of years that have really
contributed to the violent crime that we are seeing today?
Mr. Wray. Well I would agree with the first, the several
that you listed, I would add to that that we are seeing, for a
variety of reasons, in some places way too many of repeat
offenders, or dangerous offenders ending up back out on the
street, certain prosecution practices or sentences that don't
adequately keep somebody behind bars when they really need to
be.
And I would say that a lot of police departments in this
country, if you talk to most chiefs and sheriffs, which I as I
said, I am doing just about every week, most of them are really
struggling with recruiting and retention, and that certainly
doesn't help. So we need to support the men and women of law
enforcement because that is who stands between us and the
violent criminal element.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you.
Director Wray, this subcommittee has invested hundreds of
millions of dollars in Stop School Violence Act since its
enactment in 2018. As you would know these programs support
school resource officers, hardening of our schools, anonymous
reporting hotlines, threat assessment programs, and training
for school personnel.
Your team at the FBI has some of the best minds in the
world when it comes to emergency situations. Have you heard
from your experts? What have you heard from your experts about
the most effective ways to prevent and respond to these
terrible events?
Mr. Wray. So I think what I would say is, we are doing a
number of things on this front to try to help harden, if you
will, and I hate the fact that we even have to talk about
hardening our schools, but it is a reality that they have
become targets. So we, in addition to all of our investigative
work, our bread and butter, you know, the cases we are bringing
of different sorts, violent crime, terrorism crime, gang crime,
et cetera, we provide all sorts of support through training,
and capacity building.
So we have trained I think something like 110,000 different
law enforcement officers on active shooter response, we have
put out a whole bunch of different PSAs, and instructional
videos, to schools, to school resource officers, to school
administrators, to houses of worship, to communities, as well
as to law enforcement, to help them better defend. And there is
a host of information in there.
In addition to that we are, obviously, providing forensic
support through our lab, we are doing shooting incident
reconstruction, I mentioned in my opening statement. In Uvalde
we have Evidence Response. That is often one of the things that
we are quickly asked to provide by our State and local
partners. But that is of course after the fact. And what we are
trying to do is figure out how to better get in front of it.
Senator Moran. We would welcome your advice and
suggestions. Last year in this room you and I spoke at least
briefly about counterintelligence threats along the southern
border. Two weeks earlier I had the opportunity to question the
Attorney General about the cartels' activities there.
The purpose of those questions a year ago were to address
what I had learned on my visits to McClelland, Texas, that last
year, just previous to those hearings, which is while
immigration dominates the conversation about the southern
border, there are also grave national security threats there.
This was confirmed just yesterday when an FBI search
warrant unsealed in Ohio, revealed that an assassination plot
against former President George W. Bush included plans to
smuggle assassins into the United States from Mexico.
According to press reports the suspect, an ISIS operative
was recording--was recorded claiming to have just smuggled two
individuals associated with Hezbollah, into the United States.
Yesterday's events compel me to start again on this topic
that we discussed last year: What is the FBI's assessment of
our national security threats along our border, southern border
in particular, but borders generally? And what can you tell us
in this setting about the number of known or suspected
terrorists, or special interest aliens who have crossed into
the United States from Mexico?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly border security is a major, major
challenge that cuts across a whole host of the programs that we
serve, and the national security piece of it that you are
highlighting is one part of it. Obviously, I am very proud of
the work that our folks did on the Ohio case that you
mentioned. We obviously worked closely with Secret Service on
that to coordinate that, to make sure that it was all done in a
way that prevented any true threat from coming to fruition.
Certainly any porous point of entry is a potential
vulnerability that bad actors, of all sorts, including national
security threats, can seek to exploit. And I have been down to
all of our field offices that have border crossings as part of
their area of responsibility, I have had CBP folks show me
around so I can see firsthand what they are dealing with, and
they have a heck of a challenge on their hands.
And we, through our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, in
particular, work very closely with our DHS partners to try to
bring the counterterrorism dimension to the threat. I think
that is probably all I would be able to say about it in an open
hearing, but certainly you are right to be focused on it as an
issue of concern.
Senator Moran. Perhaps we will have the chance to have a
closed session as well.
Chair, thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you Senator Moran. Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Mr. Director, I remember when you were
nominated and confirmed, boy, was I glad to see you. I believe
then and I believe now that you are not a politician, I think
your predecessor was. And he and others did immeasurable damage
to one of the most important institutions in American
Government.
Because I believe, as you do, that in addition to the DEA,
the FBI is probably the premiere law enforcement agency in all
of human history, and it should be above politics. For the
record who is Michael Sussman?
Mr. Wray. Well, Michael Sussman is a lawyer who is
currently involved in a trial by the Durham Special Counsel
Team.
Senator Kennedy. His law firm, Perkins Coie, was counsel to
Secretary Hillary Clinton's campaign, right?
Mr. Wray. Senator, I am mindful, as I think you would
expect me to be, that the case is currently in the middle of
trial.
Senator Kennedy. I know----
Mr. Wray. And I am--well we have agents, and I have
assigned agents to work on the Durham Team. I want to be
really, really careful about not getting into a discussion
about a case that is currently in front of a very independent
and strong-willed Federal judge, and a jury right now, so.
Senator Kennedy. Well, Mr. Sussman was counsel to Secretary
Clinton's campaign, and we also know that he was the source of
the information provided to the FBI that the Trump campaign had
a back channel communication to Russia, which we now know
wasn't true.
Is it true that Michael Sussman, a partner at Perkins Coie,
counsel to the Hillary Clinton campaign, and the source of this
information about the allegations regarding the Trump campaign;
is it true that he had a special--he had a badge that gave--an
FBI headquarters badge that gave him special privileges in
entering the FBI Building?
Senator Kennedy. Well, Senator, what I would say to you is
much in keeping with the gracious comments you made at the
beginning about my commitment to trying to make sure I do this
job the right way, that includes making sure that with a case
that is currently in the middle of trial and an investigation
being run by Mr. Durham, that we are actively helping him with,
I just--I don't think I can really get into a discussion of
those topics at the moment.
Senator Kennedy. When the FBI opened the file, to
investigate Mr. Sussman's allegations; is it true that the FBI
concealed Mr. Sussman's identity?
Mr. Wray. Again, I completely understand your interest in
the question, and then I respect it, and I am just hope you
will respect the fact that because I have got agents working
with Mr. Durham on the case, and they are in the middle of
trial right now I just don't think I can get into a discussion
of that here.
Senator Kennedy. When the FBI opened its file to
investigate the allegations that Mr. Sussman, on behalf of the
Clinton campaign made, now known to be untrue, about these back
channel communications between the Trump campaign and Russia.
When the FBI opened the file is it true that the file said the
source of this information was not Mr. Sussman but the
Department of Justice?
Mr. Wray. Again, the same response. These are the very
kinds of questions that are being litigated in front of the
jury and Judge Cooper, right now.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Kennedy, I would just urge you to
follow a separate line of questioning, as Director Wray has
said he is not going to answer questions----
Senator Kennedy. I appreciate that, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen [continuing]. Relative to this case that is
being litigated.
Senator Kennedy. I appreciate that Madam Chair, and, you
know, how much I respect you. I want my time back by the way.
Senator Shaheen. You can have those 3 seconds that I have.
Senator Kennedy. No. You talked for about 10 seconds.
Senator Shaheen. I am happy to give you those 10 seconds.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I appreciate
your help with my questions, but I can handle it myself.
Chris, at some point you are going to have to address this.
And I understand you don't want to address it in the middle of
a prosecution, but there are millions of Americans that look at
this and think, I am not saying they are correct, that the FBI
has become a political organization. And at some point you are
going to have to address that.
The institution is just too important, and some of my
colleagues may not want to talk about this, but we are going to
have to talk about it at some point.
Mr. Wray. Well, so first off, I totally appreciate your
concern about our institution. And I will tell you that what I
can speak to now is that I have implemented all sorts of
reforms that I have spoken about quite publicly, over 40-plus
corrective measures that deal with a lot of the same issues
that are at the heart of the underlying investigation.
I completely turned over the entire leadership team in the
FBI. We have taken disciplinary action where we could, but we
have also been in close cooperation and coordination with Mr.
Durham, who is the special counsel, and I think that is the
best thing I can do to help address the concerns you are
talking about.
As to the FBI's reputation, I will tell you, having been to
all 56 of our field offices, now almost all of them twice.
Having been New Orleans just earlier this month, and Baton
Rouge just shortly before that, that what I find in talking to
Americans out in the field, law enforcement partners, business
leaders, community leaders, victims, prosecutors, families, is
a widespread, even resounding appreciation, and respect for the
men and women of the FBI.
And you will be, I hope, relieved to know that in Louisiana
over the last 3 years, the last 2\1/2\ years, the number of
people in Louisiana applying to be special agents of the FBI
has doubled what it was in the first few years when I took
over. And so I think that speaks very well of the good citizens
of Louisiana and their appreciation and view of the FBI's
credibility again----
Senator Kennedy. And I thank you for coming, Chris. And I
thank you for all the hard work you have done, but I am going
to stand by my comments. I think at the right time you are
going to have to address this. And assure the American people.
Senator Shaheen. Senator Hagerty.
Senator Kennedy. That the rot is gone. Thank you. Thanks
for being here, Chris.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chair Shaheen.
And Director Wray, it is good to see you here again. I
would like to turn my comments to something very disturbing
that is happening right now with respect to the Supreme Court
justices, and what we have seen in recent weeks are protests at
the homes of Supreme Court justices and their families,
something that I think that should be completely out of bounds.
It also may be illegal.
Federal law prohibits protesting at the residence of a
judge with the intent of influencing the judge, and many of the
protesters are doing just that. Protesting outside judges'
homes, attempting to intimidate them, I think, and to changing
their ruling on the Dobbs case.
So Director Wray, is the FBI in any way investigating these
protesters as a potential crime?
Mr. Wray. So I don't want to get into any particular
predicated assessment or investigation that we may have ongoing
right now. I will say that we are working very closely with the
U.S. Marshals, who, as you may know, are now providing round-
the-clock security at the justices homes, and with the Supreme
Court Marshal and Supreme Court Police, together, they have
responsibility for protection of the judges themselves and
their facilities.
But I will tell you this, my view, and my instructions to
the FBI are: That there is a right way and a wrong way in our
system, and under the Constitution, to express what you are
upset about, and who you are upset with. And violence and
threats of violence, no matter what you are upset about, or who
you are upset with, is not the way to go.
Senator Hagerty. I couldn't agree with you more.
Mr. Wray. We will pursue all lawful and predicated
investigations we can to ensure that.
Senator Hagerty. The U.S. Supreme Court Police recently
reported, I am going to use their quote, ``A significant
increase in violent threats'', to your concern, against Supreme
Court justices and the Supreme Court building. And as FBI
Director it sounds, and I just want you to confirm, that you
have received information that the Supreme Court's members are
facing elevated threats that do warrant increased security,
intelligence, and intelligence resources.
Mr. Wray. As I have said, we are in close contact with
them, receiving tips and leads, and things like that from them,
and without, again, weighing in on what in the way of
assessments and investigations we have open. But my charge to
our people is that we are going to aggressively pursue violence
and threats of violence against public officials, including
against judges.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate that, Director Wray, and I
think I share your concerns, and I think that many on our
Committee I am working here on our side to make certain that,
along with the extra help that the U.S. Marshals are providing
right now, that if there is any shortfall in monetary resources
needed, particularly in the very near term, to make certain
that the justices and their families are properly protected,
that we address that, because heaven forbid, these threats turn
into, or manifest themselves into the violence, that I think
concerns us both.
I would like to turn to another issue now, and that is at
our southern border. Specifically the case of a Colombian
national named, Isnardo Garcia-Amado, who recently crossed our
southern border and who was flagged by the FBI Terrorist
Screening Center. He was released by Border Patrol agents into
the United States on April the 18.
Then on April the 21, 3 days after his release, the FBI
alerted the Department of Homeland Security that this man was
on the terrorist watch list. You would think that DHS would
have then immediately arrested this person, yet, despite
knowing that a suspected terrorist had been released in the
United States, the leadership of the Department of Homeland
Security didn't even authorize ICE to arrest him until two
weeks later. He was in Florida by that time.
So this Colombian national was caught by DHS, and then
released into the United States before the FBI determined that
he is on the terrorist watch list. Is that your understanding
as well?
Mr. Wray. I will confess, Senator, that I am not sure I am
familiar with this specific case. It has a vague ring of
familiarity from something I got briefed on, but I think I
would have to circle back to you, which I am happy to do.
Senator Hagerty. I would appreciate that. You can see my
concern though. And I guess my broader question is, in your
view, if this were to happen does that jeopardize American
safety to catch and release border crosses before the FBI has
had the opportunity to make that determination, as to whether
or not they are terrorists?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly I think we need to have close
lash up between FBI agents on the Joint Terrorism Task Forces,
especially in the border States, with their DHS counterparts,
who have a very tough job. Those folks, CBP folks down on the
line there that I have met with, and they usually have people
designated on our task forces which is designed, in part, to
prevent some of the slippage that might----
Senator Hagerty. Now, I would say the slippage is a great
concern. And even further concerning is DHS taking 2 weeks,
after receiving information from the FBI, to actually notify to
arrest a person. I mean does that concern you as well; is a
slippage that could, again, endanger American safety?
Mr. Wray. Well, I certainly understand the concern. I think
I would need to kind of drill in further on the facts to make
sure I have got the full context.
Senator Hagerty. Okay. I would appreciate that. And also
when you come back to me if you could let me know how many
border crossers have been apprehended, that are on the national
terrorist list. I am deeply concerned about this.
When I went to the border myself, a couple of--about 6
weeks ago, I was informed that 157 different nationalities have
been apprehended at our southern border in the past year. That
is a deep, deep national security concern, and I would very
much appreciate your following up with me in terms of, what is
known, and also if you have any estimates on what is not known,
because I think that is an even greater concern, are those
people that are coming here using the border, as Senator Moran
talked about, for some very nefarious purposes. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.
Senator Capito.
Senator Moore Capito. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank
you, Director, for being with us today. We are going to be
asked to consider legislation, I believe, tomorrow, regarding
domestic terrorism, and much of your statement, written
statement was devoted to the topic of domestic terrorism. The
DOJ has a unit dedicated to anti-domestic terrorism efforts
presently, and you testified last year that your agency has
significantly boosted resources directed towards these
initiatives.
Can you elaborate on the FBI's existing initiatives on
domestic violence or domestic terrorism prevention and
investigation? And how you are already working with existing
agencies and departments? And I would say that one of the fears
that I would have with this legislation before us, is that we
are creating more stovepipes of information that, in reality,
could slow the flow of information, and accuracy of that. So I
would like to hear your comments on that, please.
Mr. Wray. Well, I would probably decline to weigh in on the
legislation itself, as is our usual practice.
Senator Moore Capito. I figured that. Okay.
Mr. Wray. But as to--you are right, that we are doing a
whole lot on domestic terrorism already. We have, I think, over
the last few years, and this really started, I would say in
summer of 2019, and kind of, has just continued since then.
We have, I think, more than doubled our domestic terrorism
caseload, we have--I think we are now up to about 2,700
domestic terrorism investigations they cover the waterfront of
different types. We have also created a Domestic Terrorism-Hate
Crimes Fusion Cell to bring both those kinds of expertise
together. We have had some very significant plots disrupted
using those efforts, we have our Joint Terrorism Task Forces in
all 56 field offices.
Senator Moore Capito. Right.
Mr. Wray. That is about 4,400, or so, investigators, they
are working on it. But I will also say, in our budget request
before the subcommittee, we are asking for more resources for
domestic terrorism. That is separate apart from any legislative
effort, just in our fiscal year 2023 request.
Senator Moore Capito. Where would you say those extra
dollars, which parts of your investigative domestic terrorism
arm would you see need to be increased, budgetarily? Or is it
just an overall?
Mr. Wray. Well, I would say it is two things. It is
investigators and tools, technical tools, you know,
increasingly in the domestic terrorism space, much like in
other criminal arenas, the terrorists are reverting to use of
technology that makes it harder and harder to connect the dots.
And so that is a part of it.
But the other thing is we have, in the short run, had to
sort of surge resources to handle that domestic terrorism
caseload, and as I mentioned in my opening statement, I do not
think we are in a position where any of these other threats,
the traditional violent crime threat that I hear about from
chiefs and sheriffs all the time, the international terrorism
threat, that has absolutely not gone away.
Senator Moore Capito. Right.
Mr. Wray. That had slightly abated during COVID, the
foreign terrorist threat, but especially in the wake of the
withdrawal in Afghanistan, I think we, the FBI, are going to
have a bigger and bigger role on the foreign terrorist threat.
So partly, our budget request is designed to make sure that
the sort of duct tape approach that we have been using for the
last 18 months to 2 years, is not the way we have to continue
going forward. So we can have a longer standing commitment to
the domestic terrorism load.
Senator Moore Capito. So a more robust and wider reach.
Mr. Wray. Right.
Senator Moore Capito. And that soon you are taking from
something else to----
Mr. Wray. Correct.
Senator Moore Capito [continuing]. To put that into your--I
am curious to know. I think the American public would like to
know. I have no idea what the answer to this question is, I
don't--I think I know. The tragedy in Texas, what role does the
FBI play in this? Or do you play a role in this?
Mr. Wray. So we are in a support role, we are--so Texas
DPS, the Texas State Law Enforcement Agency, which is a
terrific partner of ours; and the Uvalde Police Department,
they have the lead, we are in support role. Now, our support
takes all sorts of forms so we have investigative resources,
analytical resources, we have lab personnel doing evidence
response.
Senator Moore Capito. Right; mm-hmm.
Director Wray: We have other kinds of forensic response, we
have Victim Services professionals, as I mentioned to the
Chair, who are helping the families of the victims. We have
crisis management teams, behavioral analysis teams, so we have
a whole host of things down there, but we--and so while it is a
formidable footprint and engine, it is, at the end of the day,
in support of our great State and local partners.
Senator Moore Capito. Right. Well, thank you for that, and
thank you for those agents that are working in that support.
This is very difficult I am sure, for them as well.
And I would just like to add just very briefly the local
offices that that I hear from my Charleston, West Virginia
folks, I just want to thank them, and you, because they are
very tied to us. I am sure all of us have heard from our local
offices in this time of sort of uneasiness, and I just really
appreciate the efforts at which they go to, to include me, and
my family, and others that might be in precarious situation
from time to time. So please extend my great gratitude for
that.
Mr. Wray. Thank you.
Senator Moore Capito. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Capito.
I am going to turn the gavel over to Senator Collins, to
ask her questions while I go vote, and either Senator Moran or
I will be back shortly.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. You know
how much I like having the gavel.
[Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Director Wray, thank you first of all for
being here today. Your agency is so important in so many areas,
and so many ways. All of us are clearly horrified by the
vicious killings that occurred yesterday.
And I want to ask you about one approach that has been
taken, and get your judgment about it. The State of Maine is
among some States that have enacted statutes that we call
either a red- or yellow-flag law.
And the law in Maine which was developed in consultation
with a wide range of groups; essentially allows the court to
have the police temporarily confiscate firearms from someone
who is deemed to be a danger to either him or herself, or to
others.
Importantly, the Maine law includes due process rights, and
a medical assessment. So it can't be just some neighbor's
opinion, or even a family member's opinion, there has to be a
medical assessment as well. And that is to ensure that the
concerns are well founded, and that Second Amendment rights for
law-abiding citizens are protected.
In your experience, how successful have these relatively
new red-flag and yellow-flag laws been?
Mr. Wray. It is a very good question. I would say, I am not
sure that I have seen any kind of rigorous assessment, overall,
of the effectiveness of the so-called red-flag laws. There are
other names for it, as you alluded to. I know that DOJ has
recently published a model statute for States to consider.
I think what I could say to you is that it has been our
experience that with a whole wide variety of shooter
situations, whether it is a terrorist type situation, or more
traditional violent criminal situation, most of the time you
see that there was someone who knew the person, or came into
contact with the person, who saw some change in behavior that
alarmed them. And in the situations where law enforcement has
been successful at preventing an attack it is almost always
thanks to somebody like that coming forward.
And whether it is done through a protective order of the
sort--a protection order of the sort, you are describing, or
whether it is just because they contacted law enforcement, and
law enforcement was able to act, that is the key. And the ones
that haven't been prevented an awful lot of the time, it turns
out there was somebody who maybe didn't know to contact law
enforcement, or was afraid to contact law enforcement, for one
reason or another.
And you hear all the time the saying, ``If you see
something, say something.'' And most people when they hear
that, they picture the unattended backpack, you know, in the
greyhound bus terminal, or something. But what we really need
right now in this country is, if you see something about
somebody, people to say something.
And if they do, whether it is through statutes like the one
in Maine, or through some other mechanism, that can be quite
effective, and certainly, if more States were to adopt these
laws we would, on our end, through NICS and NCIC have to, you
know, make arrangements to be able to then have that
information in the relevant databases to be able to help
prevent them from getting their hands on a weapon. But
certainly it is something we could look at.
Senator Collins. Thank you. Another proposal that I have
long supported would strengthen Federal law by making it easier
for prosecutors to go after gun traffickers and straw
purchasers. And let me describe what I have seen and heard
about in the State of Maine from law enforcement officers.
Gangs and drug dealers target addicts who have clean records,
so they then ask them to purchase guns for them, and they swap
heroin or other drugs for the guns. These guns are then used to
commit horrific crimes in our communities.
Often, far from Maine, there was a gang in Connecticut that
was known for coming to Maine enlisting addicts to buy guns for
them, because the addicts had clean records and could pass the
background check. So this Congress, I once again joined my
colleague, Senator Leahy, in reintroducing the Stop Illegal
Trafficking in Firearms Act, and we would create a new criminal
offense for straw purchasing.
Right now, it is essentially treated as a paperwork
violation, a slap on the wrist. Instead, we would make these
crimes punishable by time behind bars.
What is your opinion of closing that straw purchase, or
loophole that allows for criminal gangs to access guns when
they could not buy them themselves, because of their own
criminal records?
Mr. Wray. Well, I think I would have to study the
legislation more closely to give you a more informed assessment
of that. I will tell you that even back to when I was a line
prosecutor I used to prosecute a lot of these same straw
purchaser cases and typically, as you say, they are prosecuted
as false statements cases, you know, when somebody essentially
lies on the 4473 Form.
And just as you say, what you see over and overall, is
violent gang members who enlist people who are down on their
luck, for one reason or another, either they are, as you say,
they are addicts, or they are financially in distress and so
that the money that comes with it, when they get paid to be the
straw purchaser, they take advantage of people who are down
their luck that way.
I think there might be a difference in the culpability
level for the straw purchaser, versus the gang member who
enlists them, and that is when we--when I tried those cases,
and prosecuted those cases, that was sort of the approach we
took.
But I think you are right to be focused on the straw
purchaser issue as an important ingredient to preventing guns
from getting in the hands of people who are, after all,
prohibited under existing law from having them.
Senator Collins. Right. I actually feel bad for many of the
straw purchasers, because they frequently have serious
substance abuse problems, and they are being manipulated, and
used by these gang members. But that--that is a real problem.
Let me follow up on the drug issue, and as we know America
has set a terrible new record in the number of drug overdoses
in the past year. It is 104,000 Americans died of drug
overdoses. In Maine, an estimated 636 people died of drug
overdoses in 2021. That is a 23 percent increase from the
previous year. But what, to me, is even--or equally chilling,
is the fact that that is actually only a small portion of the
number of overdoses.
The number of overdoses in Maine that we know about was
nearly 9,000. Fortunately, the rest of them were saved. I
talked to Attorney General Garland about this issue, and he
pointed out that the FBI, along with other DOJ components, is
playing an important role in fighting the large-scale drug
trafficking organizations that are bringing drugs into this
country.
I am concerned about what is happening at the southern
border, based on my discussion with Border Control agents. Has
the government's inability to secure the southern border led to
more drugs entering the United States?
Mr. Wray. Well, certainly the influx of drugs across the
southern border is a very important fuel, not just to addiction
in this country, but to violence in this country; and that is
one of the parts that the FBI plays a pretty big role in. You
have transnational criminal organizations in Mexico enlisting
the help of gangs, and other organizations here in the U.S., to
distribute the drugs, and there is violence over turf, over
distribution routes, et cetera.
I know that when I have been down to the border and talked
to the CBP folks there, and to our field offices that have
responsibility in that area, the quantity of the seizures that
they routinely are engaged in make the seizures in other parts
of the country look really quite small by comparison. I mean it
is just another day in the life for a lot of them. And so it is
striking.
And I think you are correct that the overdose death
statistic or the overdose statistic itself, in some ways
underestimates the scope of the problem, in part, because
Narcan, happily, has become so much more widely available, but
that, in turn, ends up almost masking the problem.
Senator Collins. Exactly.
Mr. Wray. So the effectiveness of first response, which is
a good thing, is actually maybe misleading some into thinking
that the problem is not as bad as it really is. And it is
really an epidemic.
Senator Collins. And finally just a quick question. You
were talking about domestic terrorism with Senator Capito.
Would you agree that the sources of domestic terrorism include
groups and ideologies on the left, on the right, from overseas,
such as ISIS? In other words, there is not just one ideological
source of domestic terrorism; is there?
Mr. Wray. Certainly, when we look at domestic terrorism, we
focus on the violence, and the violence--and we are sort of
ideology agnostic, if you will. And the terrorism, the domestic
terrorism threat we see covers the waterfront from people--we
don't use terms like ``left'' and ``right'', but we see the
racially motivated violent extremists, we see militia violence,
and anarchist violence, we see people with this kind of salad
bar of ideologies that don't fit into any category.
And then of course on the--we tend to bucket it under the
international terrorism side, the ISIS-inspired folks who are
here, they are not sent here by ISIS, but they are here, and
they are radicalized online. That is a huge category, and the
plot that we disrupted, that was talked about earlier,
involving the attempt to kill former President Bush is a good
example of that threat.
So I think--I understand the focus on ideology, but for us
the focus has to be on the violence to make sure that we are
not getting--we are not missing something in that regard.
Senator Collins. And that is where it should be. Thank you
very much.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Collins. Senator Braun.
Senator Braun. Thank you Madam Chair.
I can't remember the last time we have had the chance to
speak, but good to have you back again.
I want to go back to, and I think I asked Mr. Garland--or
you know, somebody else this question, but when you go back to
2020, the summer of it, there was a lot of crime in our cities,
and of course what I have been hearing mostly about, and it
would be the arrests that we made associated with January 6.
So can you give me some kind of accounting in terms of all
the various incidents that occurred across our big cities that
had, you know, the crime in the streets, where I think we
actually ended up with more people killed, you know, lots of
downtown businesses, you know, burned and damaged.
Have we been as diligent there, as we have on the January 6
issue, and just give me a general accounting where I know that
we have arrested over 700 individuals associated with it. What
have we accomplished from what was, you know, something maybe
even broader in scope in terms of damage and lives lost?
Mr. Wray. So I don't have exact numbers for you here, but
what I will tell you is that the violence amid all this--amidst
all the civil unrest over the summer of 2020, we used all 56 of
our field offices, we used our Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and
all 56 of our field offices there were hundreds of
investigations, hundreds of arrests.
Now, I should pause on that last part, because often there
is as you know, no domestic terrorism offense, Federal domestic
terrorism offense, so a lot of times what we on our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, which have State and local officers
assigned to them, part of the reason for that is that sometimes
the most effective charge is a State charge.
So a lot of times the Federal investigations from some of
the activity over the summer resulted ultimately in some State
charge, but we had any number of cases involving Molotov
cocktails, you know, burning and firebombing, you know, police
cars, things like that, and we continue--they don't get a lot
of attention in the press--but we continue to develop cases and
bring charges still from some of the activity back then. So we
have not taken our foot off the gas on those cases.
Senator Braun. You know, I didn't know if you have that
information. I would like to know with a little more
specificity, and get back to the office later, in terms of what
that kind of comparison would be in terms of arrests, and
convictions, based on January 6, versus the whole spectrum of
what occurred back in the summer of 2020, if you would.
Mr. Wray. I will see what we can get you on that.
Senator Braun. Okay.
Mr. Wray. Thank you.
Senator Braun. You know, tragically we have had another
shooting occur. I am interested in that mental health
component. I am interested in whether it is racially motivated,
whether it is just somebody that is out to create havoc, like
just occurred. What are we doing that takes information that in
many cases is broadcast, as aggressively as being in a
manifesto?
Maybe not that direct, but your--we pick up always after
the fact that there has been some telegraphing of what might
happen. So are we doing what you think needs to be done to kind
of figure out what might occur when we find out after the fact
that there has generally been information out there from as
obvious as a manifesto, to maybe a lot of indications that this
could happen? Are you happy with what law enforcement is doing
across the board, especially the FBI?
Mr. Wray. Well, I am very proud of the hard work of the men
and women of law enforcement, not just the FBI, but our State
and local partners, who bear the primary burden for a lot of
what you are talking about. I will say that there is no
shortage of hateful information out there, on the Internet, in
social media in different forms, and we, the FBI, don't just go
out and kind of monitor social media sort of passively looking
for stuff, we rely on proper predication, and then pursue it.
So what that really gets back to, is the exchange that I
had with Senator Collins, about the importance of having the
public come forward. You know, I use the saying that used to be
applied in a different context, ``if you see something say
something''. What we need, what law enforcement needs, is the
public, neighbors, school teachers, relatives, friends,
classmates, whoever, the people who are likely to see
somebody's behavior online, and see it change from just being
somebody just blowing off steam to taking a bit of a turn.
And that is often the same person who would know: This
person has not only just taken a really dark turn, but this
person I know, you know, this member of the public, has weapons
in his or her home.
Senator Braun. Yes.
Director Wray: And calling law enforcement. And when that
happens, that is when we are most effective. And we need to try
to encourage more and more of that, which is why our NTOC, our
public access line, if you will, gets millions of tips a year,
and we are frantically trying to push those out, when we get
them before----
Senator Braun. I think whatever observation tools you use,
whatever algorithms might be in place but, it seems it is kind
of disappointing that so often we hear that that might have--
that was there, and we just needed to do a better job of
ferreting it out.
May I have just another few seconds for a quick question?
Senator Shaheen. Go ahead.
Senator Braun. I was on a School Board for 10 years. I
could not get in my school as a School Board member because we
had a security system in place that had to allow you in. And I
think we had a resource officer there in Texas at that school.
What is the FBI's viewpoint on taking soft targets, like a
school, to where seemingly we rotate into a tragedy too often,
to where having that in place? Why don't we have more of it?
And we had this in place in Indiana in my own school
district back 10 to 12 years ago? Why aren't we doing more
there?
Mr. Wray. Well I think that a lot of those are judgments by
individual school systems, and School Boards that may be based
on resources, other things. I do know that we, on the FBI side,
have tried to help heighten the awareness of things that they
can do to better harden the schools. We have put out PSAs,
videos about--to better harden the school environment.
There is a lot of thinking that has improved in law
enforcement and security over the last 10 or 15 years, about
the best way to protect an otherwise soft target, like a
school. And so we are really trying to get the word out so that
they can--they have the information they need to take some of
those actions. And so as to why an individual school may or may
not have chosen a particular security measure; that probably
depends on the school system.
Senator Braun. Thank you.
Mr. Wray. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Braun. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Director, very much for coming.
The budget request is how much percent over last year?
Mr. Wray. I don't have the percentage for you right now. I
know that we didn't get quite what we had hoped for last year--
--
Senator Graham. Ms. Chair, what is that number? Do we know?
Madam Chair?
Senator Shaheen. 6 percent.
Senator Graham. Okay. Plus inflation, too high, more than
six percent; I think so.
Mr. Wray. Yes, think so.
Senator Graham. So what I want the American people to know,
is that the budget request for the FBI is below inflation. Do
you agree with that?
Mr. Wray. I am sorry? I couldn't hear you very well.
Senator Graham. The budget request for the FBI is below
inflation.
Mr. Wray. It sounds like it.
Senator Graham. Yes. After listening to you, and everything
you say is a legitimate concern, you have a lot to do. Do you
think the Committee should look at increasing your budget?
Mr. Wray. Well, first let me say, I appreciate the
question.
Senator Graham. And it is not a hard question.
Mr. Wray. I would say that any additional resources the
Committee would see fit to send our way I can absolutely assure
you and the rest of the subcommittee they will be put to good
use.
Senator Graham. Okay, great. I want to ask you to comment
on ongoing investigation, but apparently there was an effort,
some plot maybe to kill President Bush 43. Have you read about
it? Are you familiar with it?
Mr. Wray. I am familiar with it.
Senator Graham. Okay. Let us just make this comment. Is it
fair to say that al-Qaeda and ISIS still exist?
Mr. Wray. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. Is it fair to say there are people thinking
every day about how to get into America to kill a bunch of us
from those organizations?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Graham. And the FBI is integral in stopping those
plots before they start?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Graham. So would you say that after Afghanistan the
threat to the homeland has gone up or down?
Mr. Wray. Well, let me say this about the threat. We are
concerned, very concerned about what the threat landscape looks
like in the wake of the withdrawal of Afghanistan for a number
of reasons. One, we are concerned about the loss of sources and
collection over there which means----
Senator Graham. There are no FBI agents in Afghanistan?
Mr. Wray. Not anymore.
Senator Graham. Yes.
Mr. Wray. Or at least not that I can----
Senator Graham. Yes, of course.
Director Wray [continuing]. I am allowed, or not, for their
safety and--so we are concerned about less source coverage,
over time. And I think Director Burns has testified, you know,
just as a matter of fact, that we will lose collection of----
Senator Graham. Just put a fine point on it, because I
don't have much time. Our withdrawal has made us a lot less
aware of the threat coming from Afghanistan than before we
withdrew. That is fair statement, right?
Mr. Wray. I think so, yes.
Senator Graham. And it is a fair statement that al-Qaeda
and ISIS still are present in Afghanistan, and maybe their
influence is growing?
Mr. Wray. Are certainly present, and I think we are
concerned about them growing.
Senator Graham. Yes?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. So let us look at domestic terrorism.
Is there any law that you need, that you don't have, when it
comes to investigating domestic terrorism?
Mr. Wray. Well, we always welcome more tools in the
toolbox, but we, I think, have been very effective with the
tools that we do have.
Senator Graham. Okay.
Mr. Wray. Not just Federal charges, but as I said to
Senator Braun, using State charges when appropriate. We have
gotten creative in using hate crime charges, and things like
that, as well. What we really need are more resources more than
anything else.
Senator Graham. Okay. Well, count me in for more resources
to help you deal with this threat as well as other threats. Gun
control, do you know of any system--apparently the fact pattern
is as, we understand it now, that the person in Texas who did
this horrible thing had no criminal record. How would the
system deal with somebody who has never been charged with a
crime, never even investigated for a crime, went out and bought
a gun, what kind of law would stop that?
Mr. Wray. Well, we don't know all the facts yet, as far as
that----
Senator Graham. Yes. But let us just assume that fact
there.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. but these are, depending on the
individual, there are other prohibitors in 922 besides the
Felon----
Senator Graham. Here is the point. If there is something we
can do to deal with this particular situation that we are not
doing, can you get back with us?
Mr. Wray. I would be happy to work with the Committee.
Senator Graham. Okay, great.
Mr. Wray. I think that there is just no one, simple, single
answer to that all.
Senator Graham. Yes. Okay. Well, I am open-minded to ideas.
So finally, from the FBI's point of view, you have been
following the Sussman trial, I would assume?
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Graham. Okay. Well, he is in trial. But let me just
ask you this question. A lot of Americans are concerned with
the fact that a campaign lawyer for the Clinton campaign could
go to the FBI, and provide information to the FBI that led to
an investigation of the opposite party. And it seems to not
have held much water.
Can you understand why people would be concerned about
that?
Mr. Wray. I certainly understand why people are concerned.
Senator Graham. And the Horowitz Review, of the Crossfire
Hurricane. You are familiar with his findings, the Inspector
General.
Mr. Wray. Yes.
Senator Graham. This is your chance to tell the American
people that you are going to make sure that never happens
again, and you are dedicated to making sure that, for whatever
reason, there are no more Carter Pages investigations that seem
to have gotten completely off the rails?
Mr. Wray. So I will I will put the Sussman case to the side
for the moment, because I don't to comment on a case----
Senator Graham. Okay. Sure.
Mr. Wray [continuing]. That is in front of the jury right
now. But let me say this. The conduct that is described in the
Inspector General's Report, I consider to be utterly
unacceptable, and also unrepresentative of the FBI that I see
every day. And my firm instructions to our people, are that we
need to make sure that that never happens again. And we have
implemented over 40 corrective measures that go directly to the
things that are described in that report.
We have made changes of the entire leadership team in the
FBI. And the FBI that I see today, in 2022, is very different
from what is described in that report.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Graham.
I have another round of questions. I assume you do as well
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. I do; right.
Senator Shaheen. I want to talk about something that we
talked--discussed a little bit on the phone this week, and that
is the whole Task Force KleptoCapture, and what we might do to
address, not just Russian officials and oligarchs,
circumvention of sanctions, and export restrictions, but also
what needs to happen to address the ability of transnational
crime organizations, corrupt officials in places like Russia,
from being able to park their money in our financial system in
the United States, and the West? And what we need to do to
prevent that?
And I want to start with the fact that we provided the FBI
with over $43 million in supplemental funding for the KLEPTO--
for the Task Force KleptoCapture, as part of the 2022 Omnibus.
Can you talk a little bit about how you are using that funding,
and what else we ought to be thinking about, as we are looking
at how we address the ability of criminals to use our financial
system for their own benefit?
Mr. Wray. Well, first let me say that those who have been
profiting from corruption in Russia, and treating the world
like it is their playground, by evading sanctions, are people
we are coming after. I am working closely with partners, not
just across the Federal government, but also with a whole host
of foreign partners.
And obviously the new KleptoCapture Task Force is an
integral, really at the heart of that effort. And we have had
some success already in freezing bank accounts, luxury yachts,
artwork, things like that, sometimes that is through enabling--
the FBI provides information to a foreign partner, and they are
able to take action to seize or freeze, and sometimes it is
through us using our own authorities.
We are also going after, and this is important, and it goes
to something I think that you and I talked about on the phone,
it goes to not just the--say, the oligarchs, the sanctioned
individuals themselves, but to the whole ecosystem or
infrastructure that they rely on, the people that they may have
on their payroll, the people that, otherwise, enable them to
engage in the corruption, and the sanctions evasion. And that
is an important part of it.
As to the funds, the $43 million that you referred to, for
which we are very grateful, we are using that in a variety of
ways. Yes, some of it is of course going to our cyber efforts,
and our counterintelligence efforts, related to the Russia,
Ukraine, conflict, but we are using it part for our agents and
personnel on the KleptoCapture Task Force, as well as--and this
is an important piece--our pursuit of the crypto currency,
because that is a an important ingredient for a lot of the bad
actors here, many of whom think that they can hide behind the
anonymization that exists with virtual currency.
And they are not as clever as they think they are; but we
have to continue to evolve our own technologies and tradecraft
to be able to go after them, and we have made some very
significant seizures of cryptocurrency lately, working with the
Department of Justice. And that is going to be an important,
increasingly, important part of this going forward.
Senator Shaheen. So what has been the biggest obstacle in
trying to address activity, particularly with respect to
Russia, and the war in Ukraine, and those sanctions?
Mr. Wray. I think I would say that the biggest challenge
that we face is a lot of these folks are pretty savvy about
relying on opaque other foreign jurisdictions. And so there are
ways in which, by taking advantage of some of those other
systems, they are able to make it more challenging for us to
follow the money, and get after the money.
Not necessarily impossible. And there is a role here for
diplomacy, State Department, Treasury Department, others, in
engaging with some of those foreign partners to work better
with us, to help make sure that we have clamped down on the
system.
Senator Shaheen. Any particular entities that you would
like to name?
Mr. Wray. I think the State Department would probably
appreciate it if I didn't name specific countries in an open
hearing, but.
Senator Shaheen. Although you pointed out we are
cooperating with the international community, and I have heard
from some of--some officials that there are entities that may
be part of other countries that--where countries have cracked
down in-country, but those entities where they still have
significant interest may not have provided the same kind of
crackdown. Is that--I mean I am being pretty opaque here in the
way I am describing it, but.
Mr. Wray. Right, no, ``opaque'' is the right word, both for
the way we have to talk about it, but also what is in some of
these countries. I will say there have been quite a number of
countries where we have gotten more cooperation than we might
have, you know, in years past. So I don't want to make it sound
too bleak. We have had a number of partners that have taken,
for them, more aggressive action than we would historically
have seen. And that is, I think, a measure of the international
community being so appalled by what Russia is up to in the
Ukraine.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Chair, thank you.
Let me talk again about the surging increase in violent
crime. I believe that two of the most effective ways to address
violent crime are through surging FBI resources to the most
affected communities, through Joint Federal Local Task Force,
such as Safe Streets Task Forces.
You and I heard the commentary from law enforcement, local
and State law enforcement when we were together in March in
Kansas, I understand that as of May, I think it is early May,
the FBI surged resources in six field offices, and it secured
significant arrests, and firearm seizures from violent
criminals.
Director Wray, is the FBI considering additional resource
surges over the coming year, or expanding its existing task
force network.
Mr. Wray. So on the surges, I think what you are referring
to is a new team that I created about 6 months, or so, ago,
which is called Our Violent Crime Rapid Deployment Teams, and
what that does is we have been sending it to particularly hard
hit hot spots or cities, at the embrace or request of the of
the--both the FBI field office and our local partners, to
assist.
And we have had very good luck in the six, or so, cities
where we have done that. I know in Buffalo for example, you
know, several months ago we had about a 50 percent decrease in
homicides during the surge. In Milwaukee I think we had a
pretty significant decrease.
But that is by its very nature, somewhat temporary. We
can't send those teams to just be there sort of in perpetuity,
so part of what we are trying to do is both achieve a short-
term, dramatic reduction by listening closely to the locals as
to what they most need, but then also trying to put in place
things that will have a more sustained, durable impact that
will outlive the team's deployment
We expect to continue that model, to keep sending that team
to different places, but ultimately, as you and I, I think,
discussed recently, this is a problem, ``this'' the violent
crime problem, that dominates every discussion I have with
chiefs and sheriffs all the time. You know, had a five--our
last nationwide data is a 5 percent increase in the violent
crime rate, which doesn't sound like much, maybe to some
Americans, until you stop and think: So that means 67,000
people, ``victims'' of violent crime, would not have been a
victim the year before. And the homicide rate went up 30
percent, which is, I think the highest in like 50 years,
increase.
So any resources, the committee--this subcommittee would be
able to send us on the violent crime problem, could immediately
be put to very effective use. And there will be a lot of State
and local partners who would be very grateful as well, because
one of the things we are really trying to do all across the
country, is lean in to see where we can take cases federally to
get some of the worst of the worst, and to dismantle some of
the most significant gangs, and keep them off the streets for a
much longer period of time.
Senator Moran. Director, let me explore just a minute
longer the idea of surging, and the point you make I think is a
good one. Certainly anyone whose life is saved, or property is
not stolen because of a surge, that is a valuable thing, but
what we need is longer term results from that surge.
So is there something that happens structurally? I mean
first of all I would say is we are getting more guns out of the
hands of people who are not entitled to have guns, I assume, in
that surge; and we are putting more criminals, who are likely
to commit violent crimes, to be incarcerated; those ought to
have some longer lasting effect rather than just the amount of
time that your additional resources are in the community?
Mr. Wray. You are exactly right. That there are two key
concepts here, partnership and intelligence; partnership
meaning, it has got to be a team effort, it has got to be, how
do we put the FBI's two together with the State local law
enforcement partners, and ATF, and DEA, and Marshals. Put one
agency's two, with another agency's two, and have it equal more
than four, right; how to get a synergy where the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts.
So partnership is key, and then the second piece,
intelligence, is when you hear ``intelligence'', really what
you should take away from that, what Americans should just take
away from that is, that is better understanding the problem in
order to prioritize going after the thing that is really
driving the violent crime, in order to have a longer lasting
impact.
So that might mean identifying particular gangs that are
wreaking havoc on a neighborhood. It could mean a particular
neighborhood that is disproportionately being fought over by
two gangs. It could be any number of things, but if you get
good intelligence, and then the partnership acts based on that
intelligence with a strategy, that is how you get an impact
that lasts longer, for example.
Senator Moran. I would be interested in knowing, Director,
if there is--any characteristics about the communities that
have the most significant increases in violent crime, the most
prevalent violent crime? When you focus your efforts on a
particular community, what is the common denominator among
those communities? And then perhaps we can try to deal with the
underlying reason that a community is experiencing that
increase.
Mr. Wray. You know, violent crime is, by its nature,
unfortunately, a little bit different everywhere. And that is
why we really have to take not a one-size-fits-all. And so what
I mean by that is, in one community it might be a particular
neighborhood gang that has just run amuck. And if you really
drill down you may find that the homicide rate is being
disproportionately driven by that one gang's activity.
In another community there could be a rampage of commercial
robberies, or carjackings, and that is what is really driving
it. In another place it could be a particular neighborhood, or
particular corridor on a highway that is part of a drug
trafficking route. In another place it could be, and this is
something we are seeing in a lot of places, too many repeat,
dangerous offenders who are either out on bail, or who have
been not serving very long sentences.
And the only thing more frustrating to law enforcement than
having to arrest somebody who should be behind bars; is having
to arrest the same person over, and over, and over, again.
Senator Moran. That is a good point for--that is something
that can that can be pursued. That is a concrete path that
could be advanced.
Let me--I told Senator Shaheen one more question, I meant
one more topic. And in September of last year you testified
before the Senate Judiciary Committee that the FBI's failure
for its mishandling of the Larry Nassar investigation was
quote, ``Inexcusable.'' ``It never should have happened, and we
are doing everything in our power to make sure it never happens
again.''
To that end you testified that the FBI had begun
implementing all four recommendations from the Inspector
General's Report. Could you please provide me with an update on
where those--where that implementation of those recommendations
stand?
Mr. Wray. I would be happy to provide it to you in writing,
maybe afterwards, if that would be helpful.
Senator Moran. Okay.
Mr. Wray. I mean--for the most part I think we have
implemented all of them quite a while ago, and certainly we
took disciplinary action against the one agent who was still
with the FBI, you know, once we--once we learned what had
happened.
And I just--it is hard for me to explain to you how angry
and upset I was when I learned what the FBI did and failed to
do back in 2015. But I am determined to make it right now that
I am here, and we are going to make sure that everybody in the
FBI learns the lessons from that, just a tragic experience.
Senator Moran. I appreciate that. Senator Blumenthal, and
I, and our subcommittee in the in the Commerce Committee spent
a-year-and-a-half exploring, investigating, and providing
recommendations for legislation that became law. And we have
had--we share that frustration, that anger, about how everyone
who should have done something, didn't do it well, or didn't do
anything.
And again as you, I think, would agree, we would expect the
FBI to be among the most--purest in their willingness, desire,
and capabilities to respond to somebody in need. So it is a
terribly sad circumstance, and we await the Department of
Justice making some decisions about what to do, if anything, in
regard to those individuals.
Mr. Wray. And just to be clear, on that part, you know, we
don't--that is really between the Inspector General and the
Department of Justice for that.
Senator Moran. All right. I wasn't suggesting it. It is a
question I asked the Attorney General.
Director Wray: Yes.
Senator Moran. But I wanted to highlight it for his,
perhaps, when he reviews your testimony, he will know that he
has been questioned, once again about this topic.
Thank you, Chair.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much for raising that
issue.
And Director Wray, if you do send the response to Senator
Moran, I hope Senator Moran; you will share it with the Members
of the Committee.
Senator Moran. I will do so.
Senator Shaheen. Because I know there are a lot of people
on the Committee who are concerned about it.
Your final exchange for that issue, raised a question for
me, because you were talking about the Federal crimes that you
are investigating. And as we know, the top law enforcement
official in our States when it comes to Federal crimes are,
U.S. attorneys, and I have been very troubled by the delay in
getting U.S. attorneys in place across this country.
And I just wondered if you could speak to what happens if
we don't have somebody in that role? If we have somebody who is
just acting? Or that that the U.S. Attorney has not been
officially put in place to take charge of those investigations,
and what kind of challenges that presents, as you are trying to
bring a case before court?
Mr. Wray. Well, what I--I want to be a little bit careful
here. What I would say is the acting U.S. attorneys around the
country, in my experience, are some of the most dedicated, most
seasoned, most capable prosecutors, Federal prosecutors that
that are out there. And I know a number of them personally, and
have enormous respect for them.
Having said that, it is helpful to a U.S. Attorney's
Office, and to the law enforcement community to have a Senate-
confirmed, presidentially appointed U.S. Attorney, because at
least in some districts that is what is required for important
initiatives to be pursued.
For sometimes, you know, important personnel changes to be
made in an office, having served in a U.S. Attorney's Office,
and having been assistant attorney general, dealing with all
the U.S. attorneys, you know, in my previous time in
government, I know that there is a level of ability to take
action on certain kinds of things, that I think it is a little
bit easier, certainly, for a permanent U.S. Attorney.
But I also want to be very clear that I think the acting
U.S. attorneys that are out there, are doing a terrific job,
and they are working really well with our field offices.
Senator Shaheen. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the
importance of reinforcing the job that those acting U.S.
attorneys are doing. But I would just argue that at this time
when we are facing a lot of challenges with respect to
increased criminal activity that having the top decision maker
in those offices is really critical.
And we need to urge the administration to move those people
if they haven't been nominated, and Members of the Senate to
approve them so that we can get people in place. So that we
have got everybody on the ground that we need in order to
address the challenges that we are facing when it comes to
crime.
Senator Moran. And may I make this bipartisan, please?
Senator Shaheen. Please do.
Senator Moran. I will join the Chair in making the request
of the administration. And I suppose the Senate, should they be
nominated, act expeditiously to get us our U.S. attorneys which
are absent in many places including my home State.
Senator Shaheen. Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much,
Director Wray.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senator Shaheen. If there are no further questions this
afternoon, Senators may submit additional questions for the
official hearing record. We request the FBI's responses in 30
days.
And the subcommittee stands in recess subject to the call
of the Chair. Thank you.
And with that, the subcommittee stands in recess.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., Wednesday, May 25, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]