[Senate Hearing 117-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



 
  COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2023

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met at 9:34 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen (Chair) presiding.
    Present: Senators Shaheen, Feinstein, Reed, Coons, Manchin, 
Van Hollen, Moran, Murkowski, Collins, Hagerty, and Braun.


            OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE


                opening statement of hon. jeanne shaheen


    Senator Shaheen. Good morning. Welcome to today's Commerce, 
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Subcommittee Hearing, to 
review the activities in fiscal year 2023 funding request of 
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
    We will recognize members in order of appearance, and there 
will be 5 minutes for questions.
    Our witness today is Ambassador Katherine Tai, the United 
States Trade Representative. Welcome, Ambassador Tai. We are 
glad you are here, and it is nice to see you again.
    As this committee knows, the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative is responsible for developing and coordinating 
U.S. international trade, commodity, and direct investment 
policy, and overseeing negotiations with other countries. As 
the U.S. Trade Representative, Ambassador Tai, is the 
administration's principal trade advisor, negotiator, and 
spokesperson on U.S. trade policy.
    In order for USTR to succeed this subcommittee must ensure 
it has sufficient resources to carry out its important mission. 
To that end, the fiscal year 2022 Omnibus Spending Bill 
included $71 million for the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, for fiscal year 2023 the administration 
requests $76.54 million for USTR.
    So we look forward to hearing how you plan to use that 
money and what your priorities are, Ambassador.
    While we consider these priorities it is important to also 
consider the most pressing trade issues confronting our 
country. One of those issues is Russia, following Vladimir 
Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, the United States led a 
broad coalition of allies to swiftly punish Putin and his 
cronies with crippling sanctions. During today's hearing I 
would be interested in learning more about your efforts to 
counter Russia's aggression, especially in light of the 
recently signed law revoking Russia's permanent normal trade 
relations status.
    Another issue is our trade relationship with China. As you 
know, China has failed to fulfill obligations outlined in the 
Phase One Agreement, particularly its purchase commitments 
under that deal. China also, serially, violates human rights 
and workers rights despite its assertions to the contrary.
    I am interested to hear about the administration's efforts 
to ensure China lives up to its end of the deal, and your view 
of the future of the U.S.-China trade relationship. I would 
also like to learn more about how the administration's recent 
launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity 
fits into that relationship.
    Another related issue is the tariffs imposed on goods from 
China under Section 301 of the Trade Act. In fiscal year 2022 
Omnibus Spending Bill passed in March, Congress directed USTR 
to establish and administer an exclusion process for these 
tariffs.
    Now, I can speak to many New Hampshire businesses that 
can't source goods from outside of China, who are 
understandably seeking some real relief from tariffs. We look 
forward to hearing how USTR is working to comply with this 
congressional directive.
    And I just want to close by commending you on your 
achievements in your first year as U.S. Trade Representative, 
through your work the United States ended a decades-long civil 
aircraft trade dispute resulting in lifted tariffs on billions 
of dollars worth of U.S. exports, ranging from products like 
cheese to distilled spirits. We also reached deals with the 
United Kingdom, the European Union, and Japan to remove 
existing tariffs on steel and aluminum.
    And moreover, under the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, 
USMCA, USTR has employed the Rapid Response Mechanism to defend 
workers' rights. I think that is proved that when done right, 
trade agreements can really foster positive movement on labor 
and environmental rights, rather than negative ones.
    Ambassador Tai, we have a lot to discuss. I thank you for 
appearing before us today.
    And with that, our Ranking Member is just right on cue, for 
his remarks. But while he is getting ready let me just say I 
have a statement that I will submit for the record, and that 
includes some additional comments that I left out; so I will do 
that, without objection.
    Senator Shaheen. And if the Ranking Member is ready, I will 
call on him.


                opening statement of senator jerry moran


    Senator Moran. Chair Shaheen, thank you very much. And 
please know that my tardiness was not related to the moment in 
which you concluded your opening remarks.
    Senator Shaheen. And that is okay. I told everybody where 
you were. So they knew you weren't just playing hooky.
    Senator Moran. Thank you very much. Thanks for covering for 
me. I appreciate you convening this hearing, and I appreciate 
you accepting, honoring my request that we have a hearing 
focused on trade, and have the Trade Ambassador before us. And 
so, thank you very much.
    And Ambassador Tai, welcome. I appreciate you coming to 
testify before our subcommittee.
    At last year's hearing I stated that you were stepping into 
your role at USTR at a time in which trade policy and trade 
enforcement has arguably never been more important. I believe 
that statement is even more true today, when you consider 
record-high inflation impacting Americans at the pump, the 
grocery store, and the pharmacy; supply chain disruptions that 
continue to ripple through the economy; and China's continued 
effort to steal American intellectual property, and always be 
our adversary.
    Ambassador, due to inflation the American people are 
struggling to meet. You have a critical role in helping lead us 
out of this economic environment, and helping Americans get 
back on their feet. I am very interested in the enforcement of 
USMCA, and the Phase One China Trade Deal, as both have 
significant impacts on my Home State of Kansas.
    Kansans benefit from exporting goods and services in a fair 
trade environment. Given that Mexico, China, and Canada are 
consistently the top markets for Kansas exports, we must ensure 
that these trading partners live up to their commitments in 
USMCA, and in the Phase One Agreement.
    I am eager to receive an update from you about the current 
compliance with these agreements, I support efforts to crack 
down on unfair trade practices.
    I also want to further understand how you are managing a 
full slate of Section 301 investigations. Congress has directed 
USTR to ``Immediately establish and administer an exclusion 
process for U.S. businesses'', and the inaction of the 
administration is putting extra burdens on American businesses, 
and upon their workers.
    I look forward to hearing from you how USTR plans to 
execute an exclusion process, and how you are reviewing expired 
exclusions to make certain that businesses have the opportunity 
to petition their government for relief.
    As we consider USTR's funding needs for fiscal year 2023, I 
am looking forward to learning more about President Biden's 
trade strategy, and priorities, and also better understanding 
what level of resources USTR requires to perform these growing 
responsibilities.
    I believe the administration's policies have been unclear 
thus far, and I hope today that you will provide some clarity 
on trade strategies you are pursuing to benefit Kansas, and all 
the people of America.
    Finally, I am concerned about this administration's failure 
to pursue and secure new trade agreements. Other countries are 
securing market opening trade agreements and our absence from 
large, bilateral, multilateral trade agreements is putting the 
U.S. at a disadvantage. This includes seeing little or no 
progress on an agreement with the United Kingdom, and continued 
unwillingness to join an agreement with our Indo-Pacific 
partners, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-
Pacific Partnership.
    My view is we can't afford to remain on the sidelines as 
other countries enhance their market access and set rules that 
may disadvantage U.S. companies and our workers.
    Ambassador, thank you. Again, I recognize the challenging 
circumstances you find yourself in. And I look forward to 
hearing your testimony today, and hope that we can work 
productively together to promote free and fair global trade 
policies that benefit America, its economy, our workers, and 
our families. Thank you, Ma'am.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Moran.
    Ambassador Tai, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF KATHERINE TAI, AMBASSADOR, U.S. TRADE 
            REPRESENTATIVE
    Ambassador Tai. Well, thank you so much Chair Shaheen, and 
Ranking Member Moran. It is an honor to be here with you, and 
the Members of the Subcommittee today.
    Thank you for inviting me to discuss President Biden's 
fiscal year 2023 budget request for the Office of The United 
States Trade Representative.
    Today, I would like to highlight our progress in 
implementing a worker-centered trade policy that increases 
American competitiveness abroad, advances the rights of 
workers, and establishes the United States as a leader in 
shaping a more resilient form of globalization.
    Before I begin, I want to be clear that Congress is our 
constitutional partner on trade and close collaboration is 
critical to developing successful American trade policy.
    The President's budget request for fiscal year 2023 
provides $76.54 million for USTR. This includes $61.54 million 
available directly to USTR, and $15 million allocated through 
the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund.
    This request will help the agency enforce our existing 
trade agreements, strengthen ties with allies, and advance a 
trade agenda that supports the middle class, improves labor and 
environmental standards, and creates an inclusive prosperity.
    Enforcement is a critical component of our administration's 
trade agenda. Manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers do not 
always get the full benefits of our trade agreements. Workers 
and communities suffer due to unfairly traded imports. This 
creates a trust gap with the public, which is why enforcement 
is needed as part of our worker-centric trade policy.
    For example, using the Rapid Response Mechanism in the 
U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, we asked the Government of Mexico 
to review whether workers at four facilities in Mexico were 
denied the rights of free association and collective 
bargaining. Thanks to the operation of this mechanism, workers 
at the General Motors facility in Silao, Mexico, voted for a 
new union that negotiated a better contract, which will provide 
higher wages, and that is good for American workers.
    Our enforcement efforts also helped to protect the 
environment. We initiated consultations with Mexico to prevent 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. We also reached 
an agreement with Vietnam to keep, illegally harvested or 
traded timber out of the global supply chain.
    Finally, we are pressing Canada to fulfill its commitment 
to U.S. dairy farmers and producers, and recently initiated a 
second set of dispute settlement consultations over Canada's 
tariff-rate quota restrictions. Canada's actions continue to 
prevent U.S. dairy producers from receiving the benefits 
promised in the USMCA. We will not give up until our farmers 
see those promises delivered.
    The next major component of our trade agenda is the 
realignment of the U.S.-its commitments under the Phase One 
Agreement. Several rounds of difficult discussions made clear 
the limits of the PRC's interest in delivering on those 
obligations.
    And that is why it is time for us to turn the page on the 
old playbook. The PRC's non-market industrial policies unfairly 
target U.S. workers, businesses, and key sectors. We have to 
use all available tools, and develop new tools, to defend our 
economic interests and values.
    President Biden recognizes market economies must act in 
concert to confront policies that are fundamentally at odds 
with the modern trading system. And that is why we have also 
brought a renewed focus to engagement with our partners and 
allies, who also are negatively impacted by the PRC's unfair 
trade and economic practices.
    Beyond this cooperation, we are deepening our engagement 
with key trading partners through new and existing bilateral 
and multilateral agreements and arrangements.
    Last month, I joined President Biden to launch the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. We are developing 
high-standard commitments for the digital economy, labor, 
environment, agriculture, and trade facilitation that promotes 
resilience and facilitates sustainable economic growth for our 
workers and for our planet.
    We also announced the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-
Century Trade in June. Under the auspices of the American 
Institute in Taiwan, and the Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Representative Office, we are developing concrete ways to 
strengthen this bilateral trade and investment relationship.
    And beyond the Indo-Pacific region, we have stepped up our 
trade engagement in many other areas, most recently, at the 
World Trade Organization. During the WTO's 12th Ministerial 
Conference last week, the United States helped produce 
breakthroughs on key issues, including: A multilateral 
agreement to prohibit subsidies for those engaged in illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing; an extension of a 
moratorium on customs duties, on electronic transmissions, a 
modification of intellectual property protections for COVID 
vaccines, for the COVID pandemic, and a ministerial declaration 
on food insecurity, and a commitment to examine how we can, 
together, facilitate safe agricultural trade to feed a growing 
global population.
    We are also building on our bilateral engagement with our 
transatlantic partners. Last year we reached an understanding 
in the Boeing-Airbus dispute and adopted a framework to resolve 
the Section 232 steel and aluminum trade disputes that removed 
or avoided more than $20 billion in tariffs, all without 
surrendering our principles and our interests.
    Lowering those tensions helped us begin negotiations on a 
global arrangement with the European Union. This will be the 
world's first sectoral arrangement on steel and aluminum trade 
to tackle emissions and non-market excess capacity. We also 
regained access to the EU market for American shellfish for the 
first time in a decade, and recently concluded the Second 
Ministerial Meeting of the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology 
Council.
    Our work to use trade as a collective policy tool to raise 
standards in the world economy extends to our efforts directed 
at eliminating the use of forced labor in global supply chains.
    On June 21, which was yesterday, the Forced Labor 
Enforcement Task Force launched its enforcement strategy of the 
Uyghurs Forced Labor Prevention Act to prohibit the importation 
of goods produced entirely, or partially, in the Xinxiang 
Autonomous Region of the PRC, or produced by certain entities.
    As you can see, we have an ambitious and important agenda. 
I look forward to working with the subcommittee to enact our 
fiscal year 2023 budget request, so that USTR can fulfill this 
agenda on behalf of the American people. Thank you.

    [The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Katherine Tai, the United States Trade 
                             Representative
    Good morning, Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of 
the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to discuss President 
Biden's fiscal year 2023 budget request to support the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR).
    Before I begin, I want to be clear that Congress is our 
constitutional partner on trade and close collaboration is critical to 
developing successful trade policy.
    The President's budget request for fiscal year 2023 features $76.54 
million for USTR. This includes $61.54 million available directly to 
USTR and $15 million allocated through the Trade Enforcement Fund.
    This request will help the agency enforce our existing trade 
agreements, strengthen ties with allies and partners, and advance 
President Biden's new approach to trade policy that supports the middle 
class, improves labor and environmental standards and creates inclusive 
prosperity and new opportunities for our workers, farmers and 
businesses.
Enforcement
    Our Administration is committed to enforcement as a critical 
component of our trade agenda. Manufacturers, farmers and ranchers do 
not always get the full benefits of access to new markets and too many 
workers and communities suffer due to unfairly traded imports. This has 
created a trust gap with the public and is why enforcement is a key 
component of our worker-centered trade policy.
    For example, using the Rapid Response Mechanism in the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, we asked the Government of Mexico to 
review whether workers at four facilities in Mexico were denied the 
rights of free association and collective bargaining. Thanks to the 
operation of this mechanism, workers at the Silao GM facility voted for 
a new union that negotiated a better contract, which will pay workers a 
higher wage.
    Our enforcement efforts have also helped protect the environment. 
We initiated consultations with Mexico designed to prevent illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing. We also reached an agreement with 
Vietnam to keep illegally harvested or traded timber out of the global 
supply chain.
    Finally, we continue to press Canada to fulfill its commitment to 
U.S. dairy farmers and producers, and recently initiated a second set 
of dispute settlement consultations over its tariff-rate quota 
restrictions. Canada's actions are preventing U.S. dairy producers from 
receiving the market access benefits promised in the USMCA and we will 
not let up.
China
    The next major component of our trade agenda is the realignment of 
the U.S.-China trade relationship.
    In October, I announced a new strategy to re-align our engagement 
with the PRC, which would begin with direct discussions with its 
leaders.
    We pressed the PRC to live up to its commitments under the ``Phase 
One Agreement.'' Several rounds of difficult discussions made clear the 
limits of the PRC's interest in delivering fully on those obligations.
    This has become part of a pattern. The United States has repeatedly 
sought and obtained commitments from China, only to find that lasting 
change remains elusive.
    That is why we need to turn the page on the old playbook. The PRC's 
non-market industrial policies unfairly target U.S. workers, 
businesses, and key sectors. We have to use all available tools, and 
develop new tools, to defend our economic interests and values.
    President Biden also recognizes that our ability to defend against 
unfair PRC economic practices requires that market economies act in 
concert to confront policies and practices that are fundamentally at 
odds with the modern global trading system. That is why we have also 
brought a renewed focus to engagement with our partners and allies, who 
also are negatively impacted by the PRC's unfair trade and economic 
practices.
Strengthening and Deepening our Trade Relationships
    Beyond this cooperation, we are deepening our engagement with key 
trading partners through new and existing bilateral, plurilateral and 
multilateral agreements and arrangements.
    Look no further than our renewed engagement with the Indo-Pacific.
    I was proud to join President Biden last month to launch the Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) for Prosperity. USTR is leading the 
discussions on IPEF's trade pillar
    I recently held a productive meeting with our 13 partners in Paris 
to discuss our vision and priorities for this pillar. We are beginning 
to develop high-standard commitments across several areas including the 
digital economy, labor, environment, agriculture, and trade 
facilitation that support our larger goals of promoting resilience and 
facilitating sustainable and inclusive economic growth that benefits 
our workers and our planet.
    We also announced the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade 
earlier this month, under the auspices of the American Institute in 
Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office 
(TECRO), to develop concrete ways to strengthen our trade and 
investment relationship with Taiwan and advance our mutual economic 
priorities.
    Beyond the Indo-Pacific region, we have stepped up our bilateral 
and multilateral engagement at the G7, G20, OECD, Summit of the 
Americas, and, most recently, at the World Trade Organization.
    We also continue to build on our bilateral engagement with our 
Transatlantic partners. In the last year, we reached an understanding 
in the Boeing-Airbus dispute and adopted a framework to resolve the 
Section 232 steel and aluminum trade disputes that removed or avoided 
more than $20 billion in tariffs--without surrendering our principles 
and interests.
    Lowering those tensions helped pave the way for us to begin 
negotiations on a global arrangement with the EU. While our discussions 
are still ongoing, this will be the world's first sectoral arrangement 
on steel and aluminum trade to tackle both emissions and non-market 
excess capacity. We also regained access to the EU market for American 
shellfish for the first time in a decade, and just recently concluded 
the second ministerial meeting of the US-EU Trade and Technology 
Council.
    Our work to use trade as a collective policy tool to raise 
standards in the world economy extends to our efforts directed at 
eliminating the use of forced labor in global supply chains. We are 
doing our own part to set the pace of this important work. On June 21, 
the Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force launched its enforcement 
strategy of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in order to prohibit 
the importation of goods produced entirely or partially in the Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region of the PRC or produced by certain entities.
    The U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in coordination with USTR, 
has issued withhold release orders in 35 instances over the years that 
flag products coming from the PRC produced partially or entirely with 
forced labor. This includes 11 active WROs on products from Xinjiang.
    I look forward to working with this subcommittee to enact our 
fiscal year 2023 budget request so that USTR can fulfill this agenda on 
behalf of the American people.

    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much Ambassador Tai.
    I would like to begin with the 301 Tariffs and the 
exclusion process. I was pleased to have the chance to talk 
with you a little bit about this on the phone this week, and I 
think this hearing gives us an opportunity to explore what USTR 
is thinking with respect to the exclusion process, and how this 
process is going to move forward.
    So, I want to--as I referenced in my opening statement, the 
2022 Omnibus Appropriations Bill included a directive for USTR 
to what I am quoting here, ``Immediately establish and 
administer an exclusion process for U.S. businesses seeking 
relief from section 301 Tariffs that are active as of the date 
of enactment of this act.'' End quote.
    So more than 3 months have passed, and it is not clear what 
process has been established, and again, as we discussed this 
is a process that is essential for many of our New Hampshire 
businesses. I am sure everybody on this subcommittee has 
examples in their own States of how businesses are affected.
    So, can you update us on how USTR is planning to comply 
with this congressional directive?
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you for that question, Senator 
Shaheen. I appreciate the attention that you and the 
subcommittee have paid to the tariff exclusion process, and I 
know the particular leadership that this subcommittee has 
played in the history of the tariff exclusion process. The 
purpose of the Section 301 investigation, and associated tariff 
action is to address China's unfair trade practices.
    The existing tariffs are there to address China's IP rights 
abuses, and also forced tech transfer practices. At the same 
time, we are committed to ensuring that the 301 tariffs support 
the Biden-Harris administration's deliberative long-term vision 
for realigning the U.S. China trade relationship with our 
priorities.
    So let me just say this, I think that you and, in general, 
our Members of Congress have been extremely articulate and 
effective in advocating for your constituents in terms of--as 
Senator Moran mentioned--very challenging economic 
circumstances that we have all found ourselves in over these 
past several years.
    What I would like to let you know, is that at my office, 
USTR, we are taking into consideration in the design of the 
tariff exclusion processes that we have implemented, and the 
ones that we are looking to implement in the future, all the 
feedback that we have gained from Congress and our stakeholders 
including the results of a GAO Report addressing the past 
administration of the 301 exclusion process.
    So, what I would like to convey to you is that we, in the 
Biden administration, are moving forward with respect to the 
entire China trade relationship, including the tariffs and the 
requests for an exclusion process, with a deliberativeness to 
ensure that any exclusion processes that we implement, and have 
implemented are fair, transparent, administrable, and give our 
stakeholders the opportunity to make their case for relief at a 
very challenging time in our economy, and the world economy.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate there are a 
lot of considerations when it comes to tariffs, particularly 
when we are looking at the actions of China. But you called 
what Congress is asking ``a request'', it is not a request, 
Ambassador Tai, it is a directive. And I wonder if you will 
commit to us and the subcommittee that you are going to comply 
with this directive, and give us some sort of a timeframe on 
when you expect that to happen?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Shaheen, on this one I think I 
would direct you to the President's comments over the weekend, 
that with respect to China tariffs, and next steps on actions, 
they are pending with him right now.
    Senator Shaheen. So, are you suggesting that the 
subcommittee needs to refer this issue to the President and ask 
him when USTR is planning to comply?
    Ambassador Tai. I think what I am saying to you, Chair 
Shaheen, is that these issues are under consideration for a 
decision as we speak right now.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Senator Shaheen, thank you for your 
highlighting the directive nature of what Congress has told the 
USTR Ambassador to do. And while it may take a short amount of 
time in order to accomplish that, we have seen no evidence that 
the requirement, the directive is being followed.
    Ambassador, the pinch of input costs is soaring and very 
damaging to American agriculture producers. The invasion of 
Ukraine has only heightened the demand for food production, but 
tariffs on fertilizer represent an opportunity for you to 
relieve some of the pressure on the agricultural community. 
Many of these duties are put in place by the Department of 
Commerce. Yet USTR can and should play a role, certainly in 
expanding markets.
    But what can you do? I am talking about phosphates from 
Morocco. This administration placed countervailing duties on 
fertilizer ingredients coming from Trinidad and Tobago. What 
can you do to help lower the cost of imported fertilizer 
components?
    Ambassador Tai. Ranking Member Moran, I know how important 
agricultural production is to the U.S. economy, but also how 
important our agricultural production is to the world economy, 
and to food security, frankly. And I am also keenly aware of 
the exacerbations on global trade and supply that Russia's 
decision to invade Ukraine has inflicted on all of us.
    With respect to fertilizer trade and supply, and what USTR 
can do about it, let me say this: I consider Secretary Vilsack, 
our agriculture secretary, to be one of my most important 
partners in the administration, and frankly one of my closest 
friends, personally. We have been working together very closely 
on food security issues, writ large, but also specifically on 
the fertilizer pinch that we are all in.
    We have been working closely with USDA, both between myself 
and the Secretary, and also our teams, to encourage feedback 
from a variety of our stakeholders on USDA's American-made 
fertilizer initiative, that provides a $250 million grant for 
domestic production of fertilizer.
    USTR is also working with the inter-agency to encourage 
multilateral development banks, the FAO, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development to finance projects to expand 
fertilizer production, as well as increase the efficient use of 
fertilizer and precision agriculture.
    Both areas where American farmers are, frankly, at the 
leading and cutting edge of practice in the world, and we will 
continue to work internally within the administration, and with 
our allies and partners to find additional ways to mitigate the 
global fertilizer shortage, and prevent similar shocks in the 
future.
    The additional thought that I would offer you in your 
description of the pinch that we are in is--and I think that 
this is an issue that presents itself across the board in many 
different areas, and I will be glad to highlight them--is one 
of the biggest challenges that we have right now is how to 
responsibly and effectively react to, respond to the current 
economic challenges and shocks that we have, but with an eye to 
ensuring that we are building towards a future system that is 
more resilient, that does not throw us back into the crisis 
that we are encountering today.
    Senator Moran. Ambassador I know Secretary Vilsack well, 
myself, and I have encouraged him to be a voice for 
agriculture, for agricultural producers throughout this 
administration, so I appreciate that you are consulting and 
working with him, and he is working with you.
    But your answer, it seemed to me, was a list of things that 
we are attempting to do but did not include anything on that 
list about actually eliminating the tariffs or the 
countervailing duties that have been imposed on the phosphates, 
and other fertilizer components that come into the United 
States.
    Ambassador Tai. If I may respond to that specifically, the 
anti-dumping countervailing duty programs are run out of 
Commerce. And your specific question is: ``What can we do at 
USTR'', and that was the filter through which I was responding.
    Senator Moran. And so is the answer that you have nothing 
to do with eliminating those countervailing tariffs and duties 
at the Department of Commerce?
    Ambassador Tai. They are not my programs, but I am happy 
[speak] with Secretary Vilsack to have those conversations with 
the Commerce Secretary.
    Senator Moran. Please do. I have had those conversations 
with the Secretary, myself.
    Madam Chair, I don't think I have the time for another 
question.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chair Shaheen, Ranking Member 
Moran.
    Great to be with you, again, Katherine. U.S. Trade 
Representative Tai, I appreciate your time before our 
subcommittee, and look forward to working with the Chair to 
pursue our directives to the administration, and our 
prerogatives.
    I am grateful for the work that you are doing, and your 
accomplishments. I am particularly encouraged to hear the 
progress on IUU fishing, your openness to working together on 
promoting Delaware's chicken exports, our favorite protein, 
which for those who have other proteins they really care about, 
I am happy to go to bat with anyone about why chicken is the 
low-fat, high protein, low cost, low environmental impact 
protein that the world needs today.
    Senator Shaheen. No commercials here; come on.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Moran. Your reputation for bipartisanship, you are 
exceeding your capabilities here.
    Senator Coons. Thank you for what I think was a marathon 
WTO Ministerial in Geneva, and for your work there. And you 
know, frankly I have just two quick questions. But I would love 
to hear what you see as the path forward in our trade relations 
with China, and in trying to make the WTO relevant and 
effective in some way.
    China, my understanding, has agreed to exclude itself from 
the TRIPS waiver for COVID vaccines. Is that an enforceable 
commitment in any way?
    Ambassador Tai. We see it as a legally binding commitment 
that they have made at the WTO, yes.
    Senator Coons. And I would be interested in what you see as 
the path forward for plurilateral and bilateral negotiations. I 
have a bill with Senator Portman, the Trading System 
Preservation Act, which would authorize the President to 
negotiate sector-specific agreements with like-minded partners 
within the WTO system, an area that I think may be fruitful for 
work.
    And we are introducing today, the Special Relationship Act, 
Senator Portman and I; that would authorize a bilateral FTA 
negotiation with the U.K. I understand that market access isn't 
on the table, in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, but I am 
encouraged that the IPF has been launched. Should we be 
negotiating to open foreign markets to U.S. producers? And what 
are your priorities for these negotiations?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Coons, that was a number of issues.
    Senator Coons. It was.
    Ambassador Tai. Well, I am going to work backwards, because 
your last question is the one that is freshest in my mind. On 
the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework it is true that market 
access is not on the table in these negotiations.
    What I would like to say on that is, when we talk about 
market access in trade terms and trade terminology, we are 
talking specifically about tariff liberalization, and that is 
what is not on the table. Nevertheless, in our trade 
agreements, and our trade arrangements, and everything that we 
do in trade it is about markets, and it is about how we work 
together.
    So, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework is about market 
access. What I would say though is that it is not about tariff 
liberalization. It is about ensuring and building partnerships, 
and confidence in each other's markets, through our regulators, 
through these conversations, and looking at assuring the 
quality of the access that we have granted to each other, 
through existing rules on tariffs, but also looking at new sets 
of rules that frankly go beyond goods trade.
    Digital economy issues have not that much to do with 
tariffs. What is crossing borders, bits and bytes, but also 
what is crossing borders is a set of values, and a desire to 
build confidence in how we connect, how we are interconnected 
in today's economy. So, I think that this is one of the most 
important initiatives that we have ongoing, and also incredibly 
important that we are doing it with our partners in the Indo-
Pacific region.
    Senator Coons. And what do you think might be our path 
forward in U.S.-China trade negotiations?
    Ambassador Tai. That is a question about which I, 
personally, and my agency spends a lot of our time thinking 
about, and working on. What I would like to say is that the 
public debate recently has been very, very fixated on the issue 
of the tariffs.
    What does it mean to remove the tariffs? What does it mean 
for our leverage? Let me say this, there are a set of 
challenges that we are facing right now, collectively, in our 
global economy. We need to look at the tools that we can use to 
address that. And I know this Committee has spoken with respect 
to tariff exclusions, and the tariff exclusion process.
    I just want to be clear, and put this in context, tariff 
exclusion is a temporary and targeted relief from existing 
tariffs, it does not remove the existing tariffs. That is an 
important distinction that has been lost in the public debate.
    But also the other piece of what has been lost in the 
public debate is, whatever we need to do for ourselves, in this 
relationship, around the world to get through the set of 
challenges that we are facing today, we will one day find 
ourselves on the other side of these challenges, and I think it 
is very important that what we do now, not undermine the need 
that we have to make ourselves more competitive, and to defend 
our economic interests in a global system that, for the past 
several decades, has eroded our leadership in many, many 
different areas in the economy.
    Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you Senator Coons. Senator Collins.
    Senator Collins. Thank you. Good morning, Ambassador. In 
2018 China imposed a 25 percent retaliatory tariff on U.S. 
lobsters, which obviously affects the State of Maine more than 
any other State in the Nation. Before the tariff China was the 
second-largest importer of American lobster in the world. 
During the first month under the new tariffs, however, live 
lobster exports to China declined by 64 percent.
    Now the 2020 Phase One Trade Deal required China to 
purchase more than $500 billion of U.S. exports in 2020, and 
2021. I worked very closely with your predecessor to make sure 
that lobster was specifically included in that agreement. 
According to reports, however, China purchased only $289 
billion worth of exports, nowhere near the $500 billion figure 
that was committed to.
    Now, what is frustrating to me, is I raise this exact issue 
with you when you appeared before this subcommittee last April. 
Then in February of this year I sent you a letter asking you to 
hold China accountable for the purchase commitments it made 
under the Phase One Trade Agreement. You did not even respond 
to my February letter.
    So I am going to try for the third time to get answers from 
you. What actions are you taking to hold China accountable to 
fulfill its U.S. lobster purchase commitments?
    And more broadly, what specific actions are you taking to 
respond to China's dismal purchasing record, its overall 
performance under the Phase One Trade Agreement?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Collins, let me begin by saying, I 
am very sorry if I have not responded yet to your February 
letter. I will go home, back to my office, and rectify that 
immediately and let you know that we will do better. And you 
have my commitment with respect to correspondence with you, 
your office, and with the Congress in general.
    On China's Phase One commitments, specifically with respect 
to lobster, which I know is very important to you and your 
constituents in the State of Maine; let me, if you will allow 
me, put that in the larger context of China's purchase 
commitments in Phase One, because those are the most public-
facing of the commitments that they made in the Phase One 
Agreement, and the ones that are most easily checked, and 
visible to everyone who has access to public trade data.
    It has been very clear to us that China did not hit its 
targets in a number of areas, including with respect to 
lobsters in the Phase One commitments that they made to the 
United States Government.
    We have spent several months, starting in October, having 
discussions with China around how they are going to fulfill 
those commitments now that we see that the numbers do not match 
up. I thought it was well worth having that conversation with 
China, because I have always perceived, and seen, in my 
experience with China, that China does care about its 
international credibility.
    What we have seen, however, through these conversations, is 
that that has not been enough to motivate China to make good on 
these purchase commitments in particular. That is what is 
leading us to conclude that it is time to turn the page on the 
old playbook. We do need to enforce our rights with respect to 
China, and we do need to defend the interests of our entire 
economy including our lobster people, lobster men, and lobster 
women, our manufacturers, our workers, our ranchers, our 
producers.
    And I feel very strongly that we need to take a new and 
more comprehensive look at enforcing those rights, and 
defending those interests with respect to China. And that is 
what we are doing right now at USTR.
    Senator Collins. I look forward to getting more specificity 
from you, in writing.
    Madam Chair, I know my time has expired, so I would ask 
unanimous consent that additional questions that I have, one 
supporting the point that both you and the Ranking Member made 
on 301 tariffs exclusions, and the other on Softwood Lumber 
Agreement which is very important, be submitted for the record, 
and I hope I will get answers.
    Senator Shaheen. Without objection.
    Senator Collins. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chair Shaheen, and Ranking 
Member Moran for holding this hearing. Ambassador Tai, it is 
good to see you today. I would like to talk with you about the 
China tariffs that were put in place by the previous 
administration, and specifically, I would like to talk about 
the negotiating leverage that those tariffs provide.
    I can tell you from personal experience that when those 
tariffs were imposed on China that it was felt around the 
world. It demonstrated, particularly to Japan, the third 
largest economy in the world, that we were serious about 
leveling the playing field for American producers. It helped us 
open significant new markets for American agriculture, and 
importantly, it allowed us to establish a very high standard 
digital trade agreement.
    Ambassador Tai, I understand that China is not living up to 
the commitments that it has made under Phase One, you have 
talked about that at length. My question for you is: Wouldn't 
removing these tariffs simply encourage more bad behavior? What 
kind of message would it send to China?
    Ambassador Tai. I appreciate that question very much, 
Senator Hagerty, because at USTR we are responsible for the 
formulation of American trade policy, and guiding the U.S. 
economy through challenges, and opportunities that are 
presented today, but really to set up the American economy for 
success in the future. The China tariffs are, in my view, a 
significant piece of leverage, and a trade negotiator never 
walks away from leverage.
    The question for us, and this is something that we have 
done in the Biden administration, with respect to a number of 
different Section 301 investigations, and tariff actions is: 
How do you convert this leverage into a strategic program that 
will strengthen American competitiveness and defend our 
interests in a global economy in which China will continue to 
play?
    We need to use our tools more effectively. We need new 
tools. We need to bring an entirely new approach. And I think 
that all of those things are built on the back of the tools 
that we have in our hands right now.
    Senator Hagerty. I certainly think sustaining leverage from 
the standpoint of a business person, which I have been on my 
life, is a critical factor here. I hear the argument that it 
will have an impact on inflation. Look, inflation didn't take 
off when the tariffs were imposed it stayed, you know, at or 
below 2 percent when the tariffs were originally imposed. So I 
think that is a false argument. And I appreciate the fact that 
you appreciate the leverage that you have, and encourage you to 
use it.
    I would like to turn now to the Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework, the so-called ``IPEF''. You have met with 
representatives from the 13 countries that participate in the 
Indo-Pacific Framework, and many experts have argued that the 
IPEF is too vague, it lacks substance, and perhaps that was the 
price of convincing more countries to join the framework.
    But as you focus on making IPEF more substantive, I urge 
you to build on the successes of our Nation's prior engagements 
in Asia. And specifically, I would like to talk about my 
experience when I was U.S. Ambassador to Japan, as we 
negotiated the U.S. Japan Digital Trade Agreement. It is 
comprehensive, it is a high standard agreement that addresses 
digital barriers, and I think it holds great potential.
    So Ambassador Tai, I would like to ask you your thoughts on 
whether you have considered looking at the U.S.-Japan Digital 
Trade Agreement, and perhaps using its provisions, parts 
thereof, that have been fully negotiated, as a standalone 
sector-specific trade agreement in the region?
    Ambassador Tai. Well, Senator Hagerty, thank you so much 
for sharing your experiences. I think that in this 
administration we are picking up on those relationships, and I 
do agree that there is a lot of energy in this region, and also 
worldwide, for trade conversations and trade work to be done 
with respect to the digital economy, how we can work together, 
how we can formulate rules, how we can establish common 
understanding to facilitate the growth in this part of our 
economy.
    So, that is absolutely a part of the Indo-Pacific Economic 
Framework that we are working on. I think what I would like to 
say with respect to the standalone sectoral approach, however, 
is that we are actually much more ambitious about what we can 
accomplish, and what we should accomplish, with respect to our 
partners in this region.
    And so, while digital will be an integral part of what we 
are bringing to the negotiations and the conversation in the 
Indo-Pacific, it will not be the only one because digital 
itself implicates so many aspects of our economy, so many of 
our stakeholders. It needs to be, itself, a comprehensive and 
robust approach to digital economic and trade relations.
    Senator Hagerty. I think it will present a good example.
    Ambassador Tai. And also be part of a larger package.
    Senator Hagerty. And I look forward to working with you on 
that. But one last point, I would like to discuss a very 
worrying development that is occurring in Mexico. And Mexico is 
one of the United States most important international partners, 
and it is our closest neighbor to the south. There are many 
difficult issues that we are trying to deal with Mexico, but 
our robust economic relationship should provide a firm 
foundation to strengthen and stabilize our efforts with an eye 
toward our future relationship there.
    But actions over the past year by the government of the 
current President, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, have weakened 
that bond, and are threatening the economic ties of our two 
nations.
    Last month, nine of my colleagues joined me to send a 
letter to President Biden to address the Mexican Government's 
aggression toward U.S. companies, particularly the arbitrary 
and punitive actions recently taken against Vulcan Materials. 
Vulcan Materials is a strategic supplier, particularly to the 
southeast part of the United States because of how we build our 
infrastructure.
    So Ambassador Tai, we have yet to hear back from President 
Biden. I know you have weighed in on this topic with the 
Minister of Economy in Mexico. We can't tolerate our nearest 
neighbor to the south, basically, nationalizing American 
companies' assets. It is extremely damaging to our Nation's 
working relationship. And I hope that you will commit to taking 
an immediate action to help address these illegal actions.
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Hagerty, are you speaking with 
respect to Mexico's energy policies specifically, or across the 
board?
    Senator Hagerty. No. I am speaking to the fact that Mexico 
has nationalized a piece of a mining operation that is 
responsible for sending aggregate into the Gulf of Mexico, and 
basically we are dependent on it, not only in Florida, but all 
the way through the southeast.
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you for that clarification. Let me 
assure you that one message that I hope is conveyed very, very 
clearly through my participation in this hearing, is the 
commitment of the USTR to the enforcement of all of our trading 
rights. And I want to assure you that my team is working on all 
aspects of these issues.
    And I can assure you that we will not rest. Enforcement is 
a critical piece, and we are working on the challenges that we 
have in Mexico.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes. I appreciate. Yes, I appreciate your 
diligence there.
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you.
    Senator Hagerty. I have heard it also strongly from the 
energy community as well, that this is also an issue for them.
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you, Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Senator Feinstein would be next, but this 
is her birthday, so we are going to give her plenty of time to 
settle in, and get ready, and go to Senator Braun.
    Senator Braun. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    One of the great successes of the Trump administration I 
think was reorienting Washington's focus on national security, 
economic threats posed by the Communist--China Communist Party.
    The way I look at, in the geopolitical landscape, they are 
playing with a chessboard, and we seem to be very reactive. 
Everything I see that they are doing is incrementally building 
up their military capabilities, but I really think they intend 
to win economically. Day-by-day, month-by-month, year-by-year, 
to where when that day comes, when they probably will 
inevitably be a larger economy than ours, they have certainly 
become skilled state capitalists, will wonder: Did we make the 
right moves along the way?
    I am concerned that they have the ability, they are 
patient, I view them as a saving, and investing country, their 
Road and Belt Program tells you that. I think they are hedging 
their bets there, as they increasingly do things that make them 
less than a handshake business partner. I won't repeat all of 
it, but the intellectual property issue that they seem to go 
after with impunity, they way over produce, look at our steel 
industry, they have got half the world's capacity, dump the 
gluts on the market.
    We have got to be careful. Ideally, in a world that works 
right you have the ability to have free trade, in places where 
it is not fair and free, we had better be careful.
    President Trump's 301 tariffs were successful in bringing 
the CCP to the table, put real pressure on the Chinese 
Government. Moving forward, I think they help us reduce 
reliance on the Chinese market, and by the way, they are a 
trading economy. We are not, but we accommodate them mostly for 
our propensity to import, consume, and spend.
    All kind of abstract considerations that, to me, they are 
getting the winning end of the bargain at this point. That is 
why I am concerned about the one tool, to limit USTR's 
flexibility with restrictions on 301, that tool there, we can't 
do that.
    Do you agree that the USTR must have the flexibility to 
design an exclusion process that also maintains sufficient 
economic pressure to go along with it?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Braun, I absolutely agree with 
that.
    Senator Braun. Well, that is great because I think the 
proof will be in how we practice it. Would you care to 
elaborate in some detail how you see our relationship with 
China evolve over the next half-a-decade to a decade, and what 
your main concerns are, about how they are playing the game, 
versus how we are reacting to it?
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you so much for this opportunity, 
because I think that this is absolutely the question that we 
need to focus on with respect to positioning the American 
economy today for the future, and for future success.
    Let me begin by saying this, unless we define the problem 
there is not going to be a good way for us to assess whether or 
not we are solving it, whether or not we are being effective. I 
think that----
    Senator Braun. Are you doing well at defining it now?
    Ambassador Tai. Well, the Section 301 investigation that 
was launched by the Trump administration that you referenced 
addressed a very legitimate and deep problem that we have had 
with Chinese economic practices, which is with respect to 
intellectual property rights and forced tech transfer 
practices.
    But that is not the sum total of the challenge that we 
have, and I think that in your comments you have started 
getting at the contours of the challenge that we have, which is 
a fundamental economic incompatibility between a very, very 
market-based economy that we have here in the United States and 
very strict division between the State and the private sector, 
and a Chinese economy through which the Chinese State's 
interests and control and direction extend.
    To your point about, you know, it would be great if we 
could have free trade?
    Senator Braun. Mm-hmm.
    Ambassador Tai. But you have to know who you are competing 
against. I always come back to the David Ricardo, ``Econ 101'', 
where you have comparative advantage. And if you have got, you 
know, two islands, both of them producing bananas and making 
boats, but one of them has the conditions for producing 
bananas, and the other one, say, has more engineers. The logic 
is that, you know, you should have one focus on making boats, 
and the other one make bananas. They can trade and everybody is 
better off.
    The problem is that that is not the world that we live in, 
and especially if you expand out that economic model and you 
say it is not just two products that our economies make, but 
let us say there are 25 products that our economies make, and 
then you look at the theory of comparative advantage, and then 
you realize the advantages are not always natural.
    When you are--when you are working with another economy, 
even in the simplistic model, where that economy is not--is a 
state capitalist model, that economy is going to be able to 
target and take over entire industries and create advantages 
that the market-based economy doesn't have.
    That is the fundamental challenge that we have, and unless 
we start focusing on identifying that as the problem, and 
thinking through how we address it, I think that we condemn 
ourselves to repeating cycles of experiences that we have had 
from steel and aluminum, to solar. Right now, the Chinese 
Government, the PRC, is looking very closely at semiconductors, 
and a number of other strategic industrial areas that are going 
to be critical for our future, and our future competitiveness.
    And so, from me to you, my answer is, we need to be keeping 
our eye on the ball on this bigger picture, and with respect to 
all of the economic challenges and the pinches that we and 
Americans are experiencing right now, it is our responsibility 
to do what we can to provide that relief.
    But I will just be very, very clear, with respect to 
tariffs and trade tools, we can impact the design of our 
competition, and we can impact the competitiveness of our 
economy in the medium and the long term. With respect to short-
term challenges, there is a limit to what we can do with 
respect to, especially inflation.
    Senator Braun. I agree. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Braun.
    Senator Braun. The long run is always the bigger 
consideration, and it is tough to navigate correctly through 
the short run. But it sounds like you got a handle on it. Thank 
you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Braun. Senator 
Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I am really 
delighted to welcome you here. And I wanted to talk a little 
bit about China and China trade. When I became Mayor of San 
Francisco one of the first things I did was develop what was 
called a ``sister city relationship'' with Shanghai.
    And over the years we had some 50 different trade efforts, 
ongoing, leading from San Francisco and other areas in 
California, and I think, particularly when Jan Zeman (ph.) 
became President that was sort of a heyday for us.
    So the relationship has always been a very positive and 
good one. You have said that the United States must enforce 
terms of the Phase One Agreement, and you have outlined 
principles for a multilateral trade approach to China, and the 
discussions with China are taking place.
    It would be really helpful for me to hear more of the 
detail about what concrete steps are being taken to move this 
relationship forward. I say this as a Californian. We believe 
it is the Century of the Pacific, and that these relationships 
are extraordinarily important.
    Ambassador Tai. Thank you so much, Senator Feinstein. And 
let me add my congratulations to Chair Shaheen, on the occasion 
of your birthday.
    Again, the U.S.-China relationship, as I have said before, 
because it is true, is one of profound consequence. We are the 
two largest economies in the world, and how we relate to each 
other affects----
    Senator Shaheen. Ambassador Tai.
    Ambassador Tai. Yes.
    Senator Shaheen. Can we ask you to put the mic a little 
closer. Thank you.
    Ambassador Tai. Absolutely. How we relate to each other 
affects not just workers and businesses, communities, 
businesses large and small in our own economies, but how we 
relate to each other impacts the entire world. And that is 
very, very clear for all of us to see.
    And so, in terms of the realignment that we talk about in 
the Biden administration that we know that the United States 
needs to have with China in trade and economics, it means that 
the status quo and the way things have been cannot--cannot 
continue.
    In order to be able to compete, in order for our workers 
and our businesses to have an opportunity to thrive, we need to 
fundamentally adjust how we relate to each other, and we need 
to expand the set of tools that we use, we need to expand the 
way that we use our tools----
    Senator Feinstein. May I be so rude as to interrupt you. 
How would you do this? That is the question. And what parts of 
the government? Because it has seemed to me that over the years 
that China works very differently than the United States does; 
and you really start with personal relationships, and then you 
build them into business relationships, which is sort of 
contrary to how we trade. But that is what I have learned in my 
interaction as Mayor of San Francisco and trying to build trade 
for California.
    Ambassador Tai. You are absolutely correct. Personal 
relationships, whether they are in the U.S. Congress or they 
are in international economic relations, do define possibility. 
I will share with you that over the course of the past, almost 
year-and-a-half of my time in my position, that I think that 
the U.S.-China relationship has really suffered from the COVID 
pandemic, and policies that the Chinese Government has taken 
with respect to managing COVID.
    There have been very, very few in-person interactions 
between members of our administration, and the members of the 
Chinese government. I think that those conversations are very, 
very important, but what I also want to make clear is that in 
those conversations we, as the United States, have to be 
extremely clear and extremely clear-eyed, and unrelenting about 
our interests.
    We do not need to get emotional about the challenges that 
we have, but it is absolutely incumbent upon us to be as tough 
as we need to be in order to navigate a future where the United 
States, and China are economies in this world that need to be 
able to compete on fair terms.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Senator 
Murkowski?
    Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ambassador Tai, welcome, good to see you. I am looking 
forward to your visit to Alaska next week. And in that vein, I 
wanted to broaden the discussion here, obviously a great deal 
of focus on China, where we are with the Section 301 tariffs. 
Our reality, though, is that China is now importing 50 percent 
more seafood than it did in 2017.
    Unfortunately, China is sourcing this seafood from other 
nations. Our producers are not fairly able to access the 
growing market due to tariffs--you understand, above everyone, 
the background on this.
    In 2020 and 2021, China's seafood purchases of U.S. seafood 
product were down--44 and 38 percent respectively, relative to 
the 2017 baseline. So you are going to be North next week, you 
are going to be talking with folks in the resource sector, but 
particularly those in the seafood sector. You will have an 
opportunity to go out and be on the ground, and see what it 
really means to these local and regional economies.
    So the question that I would ask you this morning is, what 
are you going to share with them, in terms of what efforts this 
administration is making to help address these tariffs that 
have been so, so harmful to the U.S. seafood industry, and more 
specifically, to the Alaska industry?
    And as you respond to this question, recognize that beyond 
China the reduction of trade barriers to seafood markets in 
Japan, the European Union, and the U.K., these are all also 
priorities for us. So can you speak to the Alaska seafood 
issues, and the tariffs that that folks have been operating 
under for far too long?
    Ambassador Tai. Well, thank you Senator Murkowski. And I am 
also looking forward to the trip to Alaska, which follows on 
the invitation you extended me at this hearing last year. I 
have never been to Alaska before. But even more, the reason why 
I am looking forward to this is precisely to have the types of 
conversations that you have just outlined are awaiting me in 
your home State. Every time I travel out into the United 
States, especially places I have never been before, and have 
these conversations, I learned something new.
    And I will just share with you. In mid-April, I made a trip 
out to Oregon and the Oregon Coast and met with some fishermen 
at Senator Wyden's invitation. Senator Merkley was there as 
well. Those conversations really helped to inform me, with 
respect to the real world, the real impact on real members of 
our communities, in the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations 
that we just had last week, and how important it is to engage 
in establishing rules for ensuring that in fisheries, that we 
have a sustainable approach, and we have fair parameters for 
the world's fishermen to engage in.
    Senator Murkowski. Let me let me go ahead and interrupt, 
because I have one more question that I want to ask. You will 
get an earful. You will get an earful, and you will see it for 
yourself, and our hope and the reason for the invitation, not 
only for myself, but Senator Sullivan, is so that we can see 
action in this area.
    I wanted to shift just very briefly here with regards to 
Arctic, and our friends in the Arctic, most notably Iceland. 
Iceland is a great friend of ours. We have got good strong 
relationships through Arctic strategy, and transatlantic 
relations. U.S. is the fifth largest import and export market 
for Iceland.
    Iceland has made tremendous gains in its renewable energy 
sector, we have got a--we have got a great relationship again. 
China, a non-arctic Nation on the other side of the globe, has 
recently signed a free trade agreement with Iceland. The people 
in Iceland are saying: Why not us? Why not us? You run risks I 
think when we discourage countries from doing business with 
autocracies, whether it is China and Russia. But then we don't 
offer them any viable alternatives.
    We say we will be there for you, but we are not going to 
enter into the free trade agreement. Your comments to why this 
has not been addressed, at least in a significant way. I know 
the ask has been out there for some time because I have been 
part of those discussions, so any update that you might have on 
an Iceland Free Trade Agreement?
    Ambassador Tai. So unquestionably, Iceland is an important 
trading partner. In fact, I met my Icelandic counterpart in 
Geneva last week at the WTO. I think that all the reasons that 
you have raised in terms of enhancing our collaboration with 
Iceland economically are entirely valid. And Iceland, is an FTA 
country, so with respect to our build and rebuild of our 
relationship with the EU, that those do have positive 
implications for our relationship with Iceland as well.
    I am ready and willing to show up and to engage with all of 
our partners. I take your point on the strategic aspects. I 
guess what I would say with respect to what you have just 
presented to me, is that the fact that Iceland has just signed 
a free trade agreement with China will make us thoughtful about 
how we--the parameters of the kinds of collaborations that we 
build with Iceland, to ensure that.
    And I think this is very true in terms of our approach the 
Indo-Pacific as well, to ensure that what we are doing is 
providing our partners with choice, with more choices. It is 
providing us with more choices as well, but it is not 
entangling us further into a version of globalized supply 
chains that is going to undermine our ability to build for more 
resilience.
    And I think that with respect to China and the Chinese 
market, and this goes back to your fishermen as well, we have 
seen China use its leverage, with respect to its market, to 
push countries on politically--political and sovereign 
decisions that China has found that it doesn't like. We are a 
very, very large economy, and we experience it differently, but 
this is the version of that coercion that we experience. It is 
not coercive, but it is very painful.
    I think that this is absolutely something that we are 
focused on addressing in the U.S.-China relationship, which is 
the reliability and confidence that we have in each other, and 
to the extent that we don't have it, all of the collaborations 
that we need to have with our other partners and allies to 
ensure that we provide each other with resilience.
    Senator Feinstein. I appreciate that. I know that it would 
mean a great deal to Iceland, and it doesn't take much from us. 
So I look forward to exploring these conversations further.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Murkowski. Senator 
Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    I know you will enjoy Alaska because I have been to Alaska 
with Senator Murkowski, and it was terrific. I just want to 
warn you though, the way they measure things in Alaska, it is 
how many times bigger it is than Rhode Island. So just be 
prepared for that, okay.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Reed. I just came from the Banking Committee 
Hearing with Chairman Powell, the Federal Reserve. You know, we 
are facing an issue of inflation which is significant with 
multiple causes, but one that everyone admits to is the supply 
chain, and normally with a task force in place. Can you tell us 
what progress we are making on rearranging our supply chain?
    And just one other comment is that we build and took for 
granted a global supply chain built on efficiency and speed 
without sustainability, or the ability to reconnect quickly. 
With the pandemic, that has been broken, and I don't know if 
that will be put together again. But what are you doing in the 
task force on supply chain?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Reed, thank you for this question. 
I wish that I also were able to visit Chairman Powell's 
hearing, because I know how much inflation is impacting our 
economy, and our people, and how concerning it really is. And I 
agree with you.
    I think that with respect to supply chains, the 
bottlenecks, the disruptions that we have had these last couple 
years that they have been a significant disrupter in our 
economies. And significantly eroded our confidence, and 
``our'', I mean collectively, our American and worldwide 
confidence in the global economic system, which is why working 
towards a version of globalization that is built for beyond 
efficiency, resilience and sustainability is our guiding 
principle in terms of our engagements with all of our partners 
in our initiatives that are ongoing right now.
    Let me say this on supply chains in particular. I had a 
really eye-opening conversation with a CEO and Chairman earlier 
at the early parts of this year, who is in the banking 
industry, and we were talking supply chains, and he said to me, 
``You know, as I have been looking at the supply chain 
challenges, what strikes me is that I would never have designed 
these supply chains to look like this.'' And at the time I 
didn't quite understand what he meant by that, and I thought 
about it through the lens of a banker, and what has struck me 
is, what I think is an important perspective, which is our 
supply chains have not taken into account risk.
    They have been all about efficiency, and in terms of what 
we can contribute from trade, to building supply chains that 
are more resilient I think a key part of this is incorporating 
into our work on trade beyond tariff liberalization, is how we 
can incentivize countries and more specifically, our firms to 
calculate in the risk of their supply chain design, as they 
make their business decisions.
    And this is one of the key issue areas that we are raising 
with our trading partners and all the initiatives we have going 
on right now.
    Senator Reed. I think that is a sensible approach. Can you 
give us any sense of tangible progress in this regard, of 
rationalizing the supply chains, as you say, make it more 
robust and resilient?
    Ambassador Tai. USTR is tasked with heading the supply 
chain task force on an inter-agency basis. We have a list of 
all the work that we have done over the course of the last 
year, which I won't go into, and I will refer you to our 
website and let you know that it is there. But I think that the 
most important work is yet to come and has really got to be on 
an international basis.
    How do we connect our economies together, and how do we, in 
a very, very clear-eyed way, identify the things that we have 
to do to correct for a set of supply chains and a version of 
globalization that is built only for efficiency right now? And 
so just let you know that whether it is in the Indo-Pacific, 
whether it is our initiative with Taiwan, the initiative that--
on the future of Atlantic Trade that we have going on with the 
United Kingdom, the EU Trade And Technology Council, and all of 
these different arrangements, we are laser-focused on this 
issue of our supply chain resilience.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you Senator Reed. Senator Van 
Hollen.
    Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you Madam Chair. And 
it is great to see you Ambassador Tai.
    I want to turn to the recently announced U.S.-Taiwan 
Initiative on 21st Century Trade. If you could just quickly 
identify the top priorities that you expect to come out of that 
agreement, and tangible changes in terms of trade with Taiwan 
that you hope to see?
    Ambassador Tai. Certainly. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. 
And I appreciate your interest in this particular relationship 
and this issue.
    In our announcement kicking off this particular initiative 
we identified 11 areas where our initiative will be focused, 
seven of those areas are the same or similar to the ones that 
we have announced in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Those 
go to the digital economy, and digital trade, labor, 
environment, trade facilitation, science-based and evidence-
based regulatory practices, when it comes to trade for 
agricultural products. In the category of the additional areas 
where we will be focused with Taiwan in our initiative, I think 
that they are a very interesting set of conversations around 
non-market economy challenges that we share, State-owned 
enterprises. And the other two, I am going to have to look at 
my notes, but they are also on our website.
    But I think that they are particularly relevant and 
consistent with what I just said to Senator Reed. They are 
looking at how we can work together with our partners on 
building resilience, sustainability, and then the other piece 
that is really critical to us is inclusiveness as we build out 
into an economic recovery. How do we bring as many in the world 
in our own communities as we can into prosperity?
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, Thank you Madam Ambassador. As 
you know, there was some concern including shared by many in 
the Senate that Taiwan was not part of the Indo-Pacific 
Economic Framework, but I am glad that you have developed this 
initiative, and look forward to working with you on both those 
fronts.
    So on another committee, the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, I chair the Subcommittee on Africa, and interested 
in what you, at USTR, are doing with respect to U.S. trade and 
investment in Africa, which in my view is good for U.S. 
businesses, good for U.S. workers, good for partners in the 
region. And I think it is worth noting that in the next 30 
years the population of the entire Continent is expected to 
double, and one-quarter of the world will live in Africa by the 
year 2050.
    So it seems to me that we need to really keep our eye on 
the ball here, and do better than we have. Obviously some of 
our chief adversaries and competitors like China are very much 
engaged in Africa. What are you doing at USTR? And are you 
working with the Prosper Africa Initiative folks to make sure 
that we combine our resources in a smart way?
    Ambassador Tai. Absolutely, USTR is an active participant 
in the Prosper Africa efforts within the administration. And I 
agree with everything you have said, Senator Van Hollen, about 
the opportunities, and frankly the necessity of the United 
States to amp up our engagement with Africa, for all the 
reasons you have listed. And also, I think one of the most 
interesting, and awesome, frankly, data points is also the 
number of young people that are in Africa.
    And that goes to the growing population that the youth of 
the world are largely in Africa, and this is really about our 
collective future. Let me say this with respect to U.S. Africa 
Trade. AGOA is a foundational trade program that we have had 
with the African Continent. It expires in 2025, and there have 
been a lot of conversations with my African counterparts around 
what is going to happen to AGOA after 2025. I know that there 
are a lot of leaders, thought leaders on this issue within the 
U.S. Congress, and I will let you know that USTR is engaging 
and stands ready to engage across the board, on what a vision 
is for AGOA going forward.
    But I will also let you know, it is my--it is my view that 
AGOA is not enough. AGOA has been around for a long time, and I 
think AGOA can do better. But also, I will just share with you 
in the context of the World Trade Organization, 12th 
Ministerial Conference that just concluded last week, that with 
respect to the Intellectual Property Rule changes that were 
made for COVID vaccines, for a limited period of time, to 
address the covid pandemic that I found most powerful.
    My African counterparts who asked the United States to lean 
in and get that effort across the finish line because it is 
going to, in their view, allow the African Continent a foothold 
into a very important supply chain, that they do not have 
access to. And I think that it is through new efforts, and new 
initiatives also, that we have got to push ourselves to think 
about how we can be a better partner to the entire African 
Continent.
    Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, madam Ambassador. I 
look forward to continuing the conversation about AGOA and 
updating it, upgrading it. As I am sure, you know, about 90 
percent of our non-energy imports under AGOA, in 2020, came 
from just five countries. And you know, clearly we have got to 
expand the benefits of AGOA, along with engaging with Africa on 
the African Continental Free Trade Area and see what kind of 
mutual benefits we can draw. So I look forward to continuing 
that conversation.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
    Ambassador Tai, I think I, and I think Senator Moran also, 
we have a couple more questions. So we would like to do another 
round with you.
    And I would like to go back to Russia. And I think that the 
actions that you and the President engaged in leading up to 
Russia's War in Ukraine have been very important in helping to 
unite the allies, and present a united front, and being able to 
put in place a series of sanctions that, while they are taking 
some time, they are having a real impact.
    In April, Congress passed a bill revoking Russia's 
permanent normal trade relations status. This law gives you 
additional authority to sanction Russia in other ways. I wonder 
if you can give us some insights into what you are thinking, 
and how you might be using this authority.
    Ambassador Tai. Chair Shaheen, I want to begin by thanking 
you and the entire U.S. Congress for speaking with such 
conviction, and resolution on the issue of Russia. Earlier this 
year, the United States Government being able to respond with 
one voice; was incredibly powerful, and enabled us to take a 
real leadership role in responding to Russia's aggression in 
Ukraine.
    As a result of the bill that Congress passed, and that the 
President signed into law earlier this spring, the United 
States has, with respect to trade, suspended permanent normal 
trade relations with Russia, and that means that we have 
imposed non-MFN tariffs on imports from Russia, and that action 
alone has increased tariff rates on over 75 percent of U.S. 
imports from Russia.
    We are continuing to engage in the administration through 
our conversations with other partners and allies to look at how 
we can use this new authority to impose additional consequences 
on imports from Russia. I think what I would really also like 
to note here that we have talked a lot about tariffs in the 
course of this particular hearing, and I just want to note that 
I think about tariffs a bit like--tariffs are like two-by-
fours, they can be used for lots of different purposes.
    With respect to Russia, these tariffs are punishment. We 
are using these two-by-fours as a kind of a weapon, but in 
other areas, right, our tariffs are used to build platforms. 
They are used as weapons to level the playing field. They are 
used as encouragement to create enforcement and incentivize 
compliance.
    So, in this particular area, you know, I also feel that it 
is important, from the USTR perspective, to note that these 
tariffs we are using in a particular way which is appropriate, 
and which is focused on changing Russia's behaviors.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I certainly agree with 
that, and agree with your sentiment that it has been very 
important for Congress to be united in responding to Russia's 
unprovoked war. And it has sent an important signal not just to 
Russia but to our other adversaries who are really looking 
closely at what we are doing here, and how we are responding.
    I want to--so just to follow up, so then I would urge you 
to think about every way possible, as you say; that we can 
penalize Russia for what they are doing. And if you see ways in 
which this subcommittee can be helpful with that, or that 
Congress can do more, I hope you will share that with us.
    You mentioned in your opening remarks the importance of the 
legislation that is currently in the Committee of Conference, 
whether it is America COMPETES, or the U.S. Innovation and 
Competition Act. So much of the discussion at this hearing has 
been about China, and the threat that China poses. Can you talk 
about--I mean, one of the motivating--the main motivator behind 
that legislation, I think, is to try and level the playing 
field for the United States with China.
    Can you talk about what it will mean if we are not able to 
bring that legislation across the finish line; and what kind of 
a disadvantage that will put the United States at against 
China?
    Ambassador Tai. I would be delighted to, Chair Shaheen. 
With respect to realigning our relationship with China, there 
is a set of--there is both defense and offense that we have to 
play, and frankly, when I look at tariffs, I see the tariffs 
mostly as defense. But if our goal, with respect to China--and 
frankly every other non-market economy that our businesses, and 
our workers have to compete with--defense isn't enough, we have 
also got to play offense.
    And I think that in terms of what is in the conversation 
around the Bipartisan Innovation Act--it goes by many names--it 
is a combination of defensive tools and offensive tools. And 
what I mean by ``offensive tools'' are those are the tools to 
really invest in ourselves to give our industry, and our 
workers the boost to take their talents, and resources, and 
assets, and allow them to shine in a competitive field, that we 
have not considered fair in a very long time, and which is 
really critical to our success in the future.
    So, the way I look at what is before our Members of 
Congress right now, in this conference, is really things that 
we need to do that are necessary, but by themselves not 
sufficient for putting the American economy on the strongest 
footing possible. And I think that there is a lot more work for 
us to be doing together, the administration and Congress. And I 
am committed to doing that work with all of you.
    General Scobee. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. And 
hope that all of the conferees will hear that statement today. 
Senator Manchin?
    Senator Manchin. Thank you. Thank you Madam Chair.
    And thank you for being here, and doing the job that you 
do, and we are very hopeful in your accomplishments.
    Let me just ask the question here. I have got two of them. 
The State-backed companies that are circumventing U.S. trade 
laws, by a variety of methods including transshipment and 
dumping. Transshipment of goods through third countries to 
evade anti-dumping duties undermines the integrity of our trade 
laws, and puts domestic manufacturers at risk from unfairly 
traded products; in a nutshell, what happens.
    And I was just at a little company in West Virginia that 
makes a lot of products for the solar industry, and they are 
now competing with dumping parts, and they know it is coming 
from China, but it is coming through different vessels, if you 
will.
    So I applaud yours, and Secretary Raimondo's inclusion of 
annual audits of steel producers owned by and operated by 
Chinese parent companies. And the recently struck trade 
agreement with the U.K. And I encourage you to continue to 
pursue the audits in any future trade agreements. So given its 
inclusion in the recent U.K. Trade Agreement, how likely is it 
that you all will pursue similar audit provisions, whether it 
be for steel or other products, and future trade deals?
    Ambassador Tai. Well Senator Manchin, I am always delighted 
to talk about U.S. manufacturing, and how we can make the 
American economy create more opportunities, and be a rosier 
place for our manufacturing.
    Senator Manchin. We are just asking for a level playing 
field.
    Ambassador Tai. A level playing field, absolutely. Your 
specific question goes to our interest in incorporating audit 
provisions in our arrangements with our trading partners, to 
ensure that the playing field remains level.
    Senator Manchin. I think basically----
    Ambassador Tai. I am very interested in this issue of 
audits. And I am interested in expanding it beyond anti-dumping 
and countervailing----
    Senator Manchin. When you have a U.S. company identifies 
that they know they are getting dumped on, and all they are 
asking for is an audit from the country--and look, just pick an 
Indonesian country anywhere, pick one, and we know it is being 
funneled through China, to have that audit show that they 
didn't--they don't have the production facilities, they can't 
do it there, so they have to be funneling from somewhere else. 
I think we could determine that pretty easily. And then 
classify them for anti-dumping.
    Ambassador Tai. I think that audits and verification go to 
the heart of the integrity of our trade tools. And I agree with 
you entirely.
    Senator Manchin. Okay. The other one is the relationship 
between U.S. and China, I know we have been talking a lot about 
that, has been tumultuous over the years. I think basically we 
probably had progress by 2019 having a trade deal with them, 
but then with COVID coming up and China failed on a number of 
their purchase agreements, and while it is important to note 
that the initial phase occurred during the pandemic, they have 
made no efforts to reassure the United States they are 
committed to making good on the terms that they agreed to.
    So given the 2020 Phase One Trade Agreement between us and 
China, ultimately did not produce its desired outcomes, what 
avenues are being explored right now to ensure that fairness, 
in any future trade agreements between China and ourselves?
    Ambassador Tai. This is absolutely one of the most 
important questions that we are grappling with right now, and 
one of the most important issues to determine what our economic 
future looks like in this globalized economy.
    Senator Manchin, I have talked quite a bit about China. 
Last October I gave a speech about the Biden administration's 
approach to the U.S.-China trade relationship. We spent several 
months focused on China's performance under the Phase One 
Agreement, and as we turned the corner into 2022, and we were 
able to look at full-year trade data for 2020 and 2021. We 
absolutely saw gaps between the purchase commitment levels, in 
particular, that China had committed to, and also where the 
purchases actually were.
    Let me just say this also. In the speech that I gave in 
October, we also reviewed our approach to the China Trade and 
Economic Relationship over the course of the past several 
administrations. And it is very, very clear certainly to me at 
this point that it is time for us to turn the page on the 
playbook that we have had with China, which has been a 
combination of negotiating agreements on one hand----
    Senator Manchin. Do you have enforcement mechanisms; any 
enforcement mechanisms available to you all to be used with 
this agreement?
    Ambassador Tai. Absolutely, we do.
    Senator Manchin. Are you all going to use them?
    Ambassador Tai. Yes.
    Senator Manchin. Okay. And let me ask you on the first 
question too, both of them. Is there something that we need to 
do to help you basically, you know, tighten down on some of 
this, because they are just running amok playing us, just 
playing us really. And it is a shame.
    We keep talking about, and I will tell you my biggest peeve 
right now is the whole thing with the EVs, the batteries, 
chips, and all the different things, rare earth minerals 
processing, anodes, cathodes everything that we need. And if we 
are ever going to get this industry up and running and be self-
sufficient in North America, then we have to make sure that 
they can't dump on us.
    And right now we are about ready to put our whole eggs in 
one basket, thinking EV is the way to go, and we are going to 
be absolutely so taken advantage of, to the point where we are 
going to be held hostage by the foreign supply chain that China 
has the grip on. I just, I just can't believe that we are even 
thinking about going down that path. And I am gonna do 
everything I can to stop it, because I think it is stupid, 
because we are not able to protect our investments in the 
country.
    Because if Jerry Moran in Kansas wants to start a new 
company, and he is up and running, and they start dumping, he 
can't compete. He can't go out and get financing, he has no--
you know, the markets aren't going to basically respond to him. 
And we just--we are just held at a disadvantage because of the 
economy that we have, and the way we administer our economy. 
But we depend on you all to crack hard and crack them down as 
tight as you can.
    We talk about border adjustment. I don't know if you have 
talked about that, Madam Chair; if you all talked about border 
adjustments. The reason that we have Democrats and Republicans 
talking about border adjustment, we think that is the only 
level playing field we might have. They are not paying 
attention to any of the agreements they sign, and we have no 
penalties to them.
    But at border adjustment we would have that product coming 
in and we proved it came from a country, but it really came 
from China, via other countries. So that is my frustration.
    I am sorry to vent. I thank you for giving me a chance to 
do that.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Manchin.
    Ambassador Tai, would you like to briefly respond to 
Senator Manchin?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Manchin, you began that by asking 
what you can do, and to help, and I think that what you have 
just conveyed is absolutely, I want to let you know, loud and 
clear, and well received by me sitting in this chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Chair, thank you.
    In this setting, and with the Secretary of Commerce, both 
the Chair and I, and other Members of the Committee have had 
ongoing conversations about lumber particularly as they relate 
to home building, home prices, we are still absent this 
agreement with Canada. Can you provide me an update on any 
progress that has been made in a long-term resolution of this 
issue with Canada on softwood lumber?
    Ambassador Tai. Yes. Senator Moran, I would be happy to 
provide you with an update. I talk lumber almost every single 
time I have seen my Canadian counterpart, and I have seen her 
quite a bit in these last several months. I have indicated that 
we are open and interested in addressing lumber through another 
agreement which we had in place several years ago, that 
requires the Canadian Government to be willing to address the 
fundamental challenges that we have with respect to an unlevel 
playing field for our industry, with respect to how they govern 
their harvesting and their industry, which has the impact of 
subsidies, for our competitors.
    When and if Canadian industry and the Canadian government 
are ready to address those issues, we stand ready and willing 
to enter into negotiations to see if we can, once again, come 
to some kind of an agreement with Canada.
    Senator Moran. Leverage has been a theme of the 
conversations this morning. Is there leverage with Canada in 
that regard to induce them to do so?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Moran, I like the way you think. 
And I would be happy to have a follow-up conversation with you 
around how we might examine that question.
    Senator Moran. All right, thank you. One of the more recent 
developments in home building, and in home ownership has 
developed as a result of the lack of grain-oriented electric 
steel needed to build transformers. And so there is a shortage 
in Kansas, and I assume the country in getting the transformer 
necessary to build a new home or to have a new home, have a 
connection with utilities.
    I know that we increased tariffs on imported steel, I know 
there was a Department of Commerce investigation that 
subsequently found no corresponding increase in domestic 
manufacturing to meet U.S. demand; this type of steel remains 
under Section 232 Tariffs. Any thoughts of what USTR can do to 
solve this problem of lack of transformers?
    Ambassador Tai. Senator Moran, let me go back to USTR and 
check the facts, because I have had two sets of conversations 
on grain-oriented electric steel of late. One is around the 
need to access more of them, or more of this type of steel for 
transformers. The other one goes to some of your colleagues 
here in the Senate, and then also in the house who represents 
States and districts where there is one lone producer in the 
United States left.
    Senator Moran. And producing the transformers----
    Ambassador Tai. And in my mind the fact is that GOES is not 
subject to 232. But let me come back to you with better facts.
    Senator Moran. Okay.
    Ambassador Tai. Let me just say this--these conversations 
really break my heart because, they are similar to the 
conversations we have on solar. We litigated several cases at 
the WTO against China on their approach to cornering the market 
on grain-oriented electric steel, and our loss of our own 
industry. And what I find time and time again, is whether it is 
with respect to GOES, or solar, that once we have lost the 
better part of our industry, we find ourselves totally over a 
barrel, domestically, and also with our other trading partners 
around how we can--how we can have reliable access to these 
types of industrial products, where we have confidence in their 
integrity.
    And so let me just say this bottom line is: let me go back 
to USTR and do some homework and follow up with you.
    Senator Moran. Finally, again, on this conversation of 
tariffs being utilized as leverage, it seems to me that if we 
are creating a circumstance in which we want and have leverage, 
the result would be that we would be negotiating additional 
trade agreements, bilateral, multilateral. But the 
administration has not requested trade promotion authority. 
That is one thing. What new agreements, trade agreements is the 
administration pursuing that then justifies the use of tariffs 
to be leveraged?
    Ambassador Tai. I think that in terms of the China tariffs, 
that is with respect to leverage vis-a-vis China.
    Senator Moran. Mm-hmm.
    Ambassador Tai. And it has been a very long time since we 
have looked at negotiating what I would call a traditional 
trade liberalizing agreement with China. I think the last 
effort that we had was the Bilateral Investment Treaty. And 
that was way back in 2015 and 2016, and I don't think this may 
be when they come out of the woodwork. I don't think anyone has 
asked me to re-engage with that particular issue.
    At USTR I had an agency that is built for two things, and 
it is on a spectrum. These two activities are not mutually 
exclusive. One is trade negotiations, and the other one is 
trade enforcement. And so, we have every interest, and we are 
actively pursuing negotiations every single day, and enforcing 
every single day.
    Your question about TPA, I am happy to engage in the 
conversation with Congress. And this is the larger issue around 
how we orient U.S. trade policies in negotiations separate from 
the enforcement side, to further our national interests. And I 
think that our focus right now really is on sustainability and 
resilience.
    That means a modification; and a course correction for the 
approach that we have taken in the past. In particular, around 
trade liberalization; and I think it is an important 
conversation to have, and I would like to let you know that I 
am happy to engage in it with the Congress.
    My main point being, however, that we have got to bring new 
thinking to how we think about trade agreements, and trade 
agreement negotiations. We have to take into effect the really 
painful experiences that we have had these couple of years, and 
figure out how we do things differently to remain connected 
with the rest of the world, in a way that is good for the 
American economy, and that is built for resilience in the long 
term.
    Senator Moran. I appreciate your answer. I am not going to 
ask more questions, Chair.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Moran. I appreciate your answer, and I would 
highlight, at least from my take, I like that you put on par 
with negotiations of agreements, enforcement of agreements, it 
seems to me for a long time we celebrate. We do the high five 
when the agreement is signed, but when the results don't occur 
there seems to be less than adequate follow-through. So I 
appreciate that.
    I also think that you were segmenting China and leverage in 
a different way than other trading, or potential trading 
partners, around the globe. And I think that is a--an 
appositive, and it is a necessary attitude to have with China.
    And finally, I would say that the WTO is broken, its 
appellate body, it seems to me, no longer really function--
membership so broad that agreements appear impossible. And I 
would just encourage the--trying to fix those problems but as 
equally important trying to find friendly countries around the 
world to institute smaller successes than appears to me we 
would get in work with WTO.
    Does that make sense? Did I say anything that doesn't make 
sense? That was a question.
    Senator Shaheen. No. No further questions, Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Well, I don't know that I want the answer, 
but----
    Ambassador Tai. All of it makes sense.
    Senator Shaheen. Oh. Thank you, Senator Moran. And actually 
you have made a very good argument for why we need to fund 
USTR's budget, right, Ambassador Tai.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Shaheen. If there are no further questions this 
morning, Senators have until June 29 to submit additional 
questions for the official hearing record, and we would request 
the agency's responses within 30 days.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]

            Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
      Questions Submitted to Ambassador Katherine Tai, U.S. Trade 
                             Representative
    Question 1. As you may know, I opposed the former president's 
escalatory trade wars. The costs of the tariffs we put into place on 
many countries have been paid almost exclusively by U.S. families and 
businesses. I also believe they strained our international 
relationships and were not part of a thoughtful strategy.
    I realize that the Biden Administration inherited these tariffs, 
and I thank you for having reduced them in some cases. I also recognize 
that imposing tariffs can be useful in certain cases. China, for 
instance, has engaged in numerous unfair trade practices and we should 
be serious about trying to change its behavior.

  --Ambassador Tai, when and how does the Administration believe 
        tariffs should be used, and when are other tools more 
        appropriate? What are we asking our trade partners to do in 
        exchange for reducing or eliminating current tariffs? How 
        specifically do you assess whether or not tariffs are achieving 
        our desired goals?

    Answer. Tariffs are a legitimate tool in the trade toolbox. The 
Biden-Harris Administration is continually reviewing the China Section 
301 tariffs; this process is a key part of the Administration's 
deliberative, long-term vision for realigning the U.S.-China trade 
relationship around our priorities and making trade work for American 
workers and businesses, which have been unfairly targeted by China's 
non-market policies and practices. As part of our review, we have 
initiated and completed two separate exclusion processes--one on COVID-
related products, and one addressed to over 500 previously-extended but 
expired exclusions. In the latter process, we reinstated exclusions 
where American workers, farmers, and domestic producers would benefit. 
The statutory 4-year review also provides an opportunity to assess the 
tariffs. Furthermore, we are continuing to consider additional 
modifications and exclusions processes, as warranted.

    Question 2. As you know, China is the world's second-largest 
economy and is likely to someday surpass U.S. GDP. While it is a 
lucrative market for many U.S. companies, China has also engaged in 
many unfair trade practices, including intellectual property theft, 
heavy subsidization of key industries, and preferential treatment for 
state-run businesses.
    The Biden Administration inherited numerous tariffs on imports from 
China, along with the ``Phase One'' trade agreement. China has not 
fulfilled its end of that agreement, including promised purchases of 
U.S. agricultural products, which of course are important to 
California. You have said that the U.S. must enforce the terms of the 
Phase One agreement and outlined principles for a multilateral approach 
to fair trade with China. You also have said that discussions with 
China are taking place, but it would be helpful to me to hear more 
details about what concrete steps are being taken to move this 
relationship forward.

  --Ambassador Tai, what specific steps has the Administration has 
        asked China to take to improve trade relations with the U.S.? 
        What specific negotiations with China have taken place or are 
        planned? What has been China's response, and what is China 
        asking of us?

    Answer. In October 2021, we launched a direct dialogue with China 
regarding China's failure to fulfill the purchase commitments made in 
the U.S.-China Economic and Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as 
the ``Phase One Agreement.'' We are also engaging in technical level 
discussions with China regarding its incomplete implementation of its 
agriculture and intellectual property- related commitments. We also 
have been raising our concerns relating to China's harmful non- market 
policies and practices that were left unaddressed by the Phase One 
Agreement, particularly China's state-directed industrial targeting, 
which has had devastating impact on American workers and businesses as 
well as on our allies and partners.
    While we continue to keep the door open to conversations with 
China, including on its Phase One Agreement commitments, we also need 
to acknowledge the Phase One Agreement's limitations, which did not 
focus on some of China's most harmful practices, namely economic 
coercion and non-market practices. Going forward, our strategies will 
also include vigorously defending our values and economic interests 
from the negative impacts of China's unfair, non- market policies and 
practices. At the same time, we are not solely relying on bilateral 
engagement. We are actively reaching out to and enhancing our 
engagement with like-minded trading partners, both directly and through 
multilateral institutions, as we seek to develop and execute joint or 
coordinated strategies for addressing the unique challenges posed by 
China.
    As part of this effort, we are prepared to use whatever trade tools 
we have that may be necessary to protect U.S. interests. That includes 
working with Congress to develop new trade tools that take into account 
the realities of what trade looks like today.

    Question 3. Earlier this year, you said that while free trade 
agreements are in the U.S. toolbox for negotiating trade relations, 
they are ``a very 20th century tool.'' Since opening markets and the 
principle of free trade have been a central feature of U.S. trade 
policy for decades, I'd be interested in hearing a bit more from you on 
that issue.

  --Ambassador Tai, your earlier statement implies that free trade 
        agreements are in some way outdated. In what sense do you 
        believe they have become so? And given that you said that free 
        trade agreements should still be a tool in our toolbox, in 
        which circumstances do you think they would make sense?

    Answer. The Biden Administration is using our trade tools to create 
new opportunities for American agriculture, including using our 
existing Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) and Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
U.S. agricultural products. Last year, we secured a number of wins that 
will provide more certainty for U.S. farmers, ranchers, and food 
producers around the country, including: removal of retaliatory tariffs 
due to resolution of the EU aircraft dispute and a historic agreement 
on steel aluminum; removal or aversion of tariffs due to agreements 
with four European trading partners on Digital Services Taxes; new 
access to the Indian market for U.S. pork following the U.S. India 
Trade Policy Forum; favorable outcomes on products such as pork, beef, 
rice, wheat, corn and grape juice in negotiations with the United 
Kingdom and the EU on tariff rate quotas resulting from Brexit; 
Vietnam's approval of pending biotech events following TIFA engagement; 
MFN duty reductions in Vietnam for corn, wheat, and frozen pork; and 
regaining access to the EU market for our shellfish producers. We are 
also committed to strong enforcement of our agreements, as our recent 
win on Canada dairy illustrates, to promote predictability and level 
the playing field in agricultural trade.

    Question 4. As you know, Trade Promotion Authority, legislation 
that Congress has previously passed several times to make it easier for 
the Administration to negotiate trade agreements, expired on July 1, 
2021.
    A number of members of Congress have said that they would like to 
renew Trade Promotion Authority. You have said Congress should renew 
Trade Promotion Authority, but with an updated set of priorities. 
However, there has been little indication that the Administration 
considers renewing it to be a priority.

  --Ambassador Tai, do you believe that Congress should renew Trade 
        Promotion Authority? If so, how do you think it should look 
        different than previous Trade Promotion Authority that Congress 
        has passed? What actions has the Administration taken to move 
        forward on legislation to renew it? If you do not want to renew 
        Trade Promotion Authority, why not?

    Answer. There are strong views on both sides of the Trade Promotion 
Authority issue, and I look forward to working with Congress should you 
decide to advance TPA legislation.

    Question 5. In the past month, the Administration has introduced 
its frameworks for trade in the Pacific Rim and South Asia and for 
North and South America.
    I thank the Administration for moving forward with trade relations 
in these regions that are critical to California's economy. And, I 
agree with the principles that the Administration has enumerated, 
including clean energy and infrastructure, strengthening our supply 
chains, and fighting corruption.
    However, one principle notably missing from these frameworks is 
increasing access to markets, which is a priority for many U.S. 
producers to secure in other countries, and also what many countries 
want most from the United States.

  --Ambassador Tai, is the Administration willing to negotiate market 
        access with other countries despite it not being included in 
        its trade frameworks? If so, why was it not included as a 
        pillar in these frameworks?

    Answer. This Administration takes a strategic approach when 
engaging our partners worldwide. As each partner is different, we have 
and will continue utilizing all our trade policy tools to come up with 
innovative arrangements, whether in the context of a large trade 
arrangement or through other formats that would secure market access 
and provide the greatest economically meaningful outcomes for the 
United States.
    President Biden recently announced the launch of an Indo-Pacific 
Economic Framework (IPEF) to promote inclusive growth for U.S. workers 
and businesses and support our competitiveness going forward. USTR is 
leading IPEF's trade pillar, where we are pursuing high-standard 
commitments. While the Administration is not currently considering 
tariff liberalization, IPEF will enhance market access for American 
exporters by knocking down regulatory barriers and establishing rules 
that facilitate market access.

                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Christopher Coons
    Question 1. The WTO Ministerial decision on TRIPS states: ``No 
later than 6 months from the date of this Decision, Members will decide 
on its extension to cover the production and supply of COVID- 19 
diagnostics and therapeutics.'' In light of the Administration's 
position that any waiver should deal only with vaccines, will USTR 
engage in these negotiations?

    Answer. In the interest of achieving consensus across the 164 
Members of the WTO, Members focused on securing an outcome with respect 
to COVID-19 vaccines, with the potential to expand to COVID-19 
diagnostics and therapeutics within 6 months. We are starting our 
domestic consultations on whether to extend the Decision to cover the 
production and supply of COVID-19 diagnostics and therapeutics and look 
forward to continuing to engage with Congress and all relevant 
stakeholders on this topic.
    Question 2. In October, you announced a reengagement with the PRC 
on trade; in your testimony, you noted ``several rounds of difficult 
discussions'' with the PRC following that announcement and stated that 
the United States must ``turn the page on the old playbook'' with 
respect to its engagement with the PRC on trade issues. What will be 
USTR's strategy for engagement with the PRC on trade, going forward?
    Answer. In October 2021, we launched a direct dialogue with China 
regarding China's failure to fulfill the purchase commitments made in 
the U.S.-China Economic and Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as 
the ``Phase One Agreement.'' We also have been raising our concerns 
relating to China's harmful non-market policies and practices that were 
left unaddressed by the Phase One Agreement, particularly China's 
state-directed industrial targeting, which has had a devastating impact 
on American workers and businesses as well as on our allies and 
partners.
    While we continue to keep the door open to conversations with 
China, including on its Phase One Agreement commitments, we also need 
to acknowledge the Phase One Agreement's limitations, which did not 
focus on some of China's most harmful practices, namely economic 
coercion and non-market practices. Going forward, our strategies will 
also include vigorously defending our values and economic interests 
from the negative impacts of China's unfair, non- market policies and 
practices. At the same time, we are not solely relying on bilateral 
engagement. We are actively reaching out to and enhancing our 
engagement with like-minded trading partners, both directly and through 
multilateral institutions, as we seek to develop and execute joint or 
coordinated strategies for addressing the unique challenges posed by 
China.
    As part of this effort, we are prepared to use whatever trade tools 
we have that may be necessary to protect U.S. interests. That includes 
working with Congress to develop new trade tools that take into account 
the realities of what trade looks like today.

                                 ______
                                 
               Questions Submitted by Senator Jerry Moran
    Question 1. Given that current vaccine supply already exceeds 
demand, how will agreeing to waive US intellectual property lead to 
higher vaccination rates?

    Answer. The WTO Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS Agreement is one 
part of a holistic approach to getting as many safe and effective 
COVID-19 vaccines to as many people around the world as possible. The 
Biden-Harris Administration continues to work with the private sector 
and all possible partners to expand sustainable vaccine and critical 
medical supplies manufacturing and distribution around the world, an 
important component of strengthening our global health security. The 
uncertainty around the virus, including variants, means that the 
pandemic is not over. The goal of this Decision is to facilitate 
production among WTO Members who do not have that ability and to 
diversify vaccine production. The Decision could help some developing 
country Members, such as South Africa, on such efforts. Developing 
distributed manufacturing capacities will foster regional self-
sufficiency on vaccine production.

    Question 2. The United States has never in its history agreed to 
such a broad waiver of intellectual property. What does USTR see as the 
costs of this waiver and how did you weigh them in arriving at the 
decision to consent to the IP waiver?

    Answer. During a previous global health crisis--the HIV/AIDS crisis 
in 2002--WTO Members agreed to a waiver in connection with the 
implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
Public Health. The pandemic is another global health crisis that calls 
for WTO Members to respond. The Administration believes strongly in 
intellectual property protections, but in service of ending this 
pandemic, supported a waiver of those protections for COVID-19 
vaccines.

    Question 3. In agreeing to the TRIPS IP waiver, WTO agreed to 
consider in 6 months whether to extend the IP waiver to therapeutics 
used to treat COVID.

  --Will USTR support this broader waiver?
  --What factors will USTR weigh in reaching a decision?
  --Is USTR concerned that the prospect of a future waiver, even if 
        it's not enacted, could have a significant chilling effect on 
        investment into new COVID therapeutics that could potentially 
        save lives and improve health outcomes?

    Answer. We are starting our domestic consultations on whether to 
extend the Decision to cover the production and supply of COVID-19 
diagnostics and therapeutics and look forward to continuing to engage 
with Congress and all relevant stakeholders on this topic.

                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
    Question 1. Since the Softwood Lumber Agreement expired in 2015, 
the U.S. and Canada have been locked in a trade dispute that has 
resulted in the U.S. imposing both countervailing and antidumping 
duties on Canadian softwood lumber imports. These tariffs are very 
harmful to Maine businesses, many of which work closely with Canadian 
sawmills right across the border. High lumber prices also affect the 
availability of affordable housing for millions of Americans. We need 
long-term certainty and stability in the softwood lumber market, and 
particularly amid rampant inflation.
    In November 2017, Canada appealed the Commerce Department's 
original determination to impose duties on Canadian lumber. NAFTA rules 
that apply to this appeal require that a panel be established and reach 
a final decision within 315 days of the appeal being made. It has now 
been over four and a half years, or almost 1,700 days, since Canada 
requested this review and yet a panel has not been established.

  --Ambassador Tai, when will the panel be established so that it can 
        reach a decision, which is long overdue?
  --Do you plan to meet with your Canadian counterparts to negotiate a 
        new Softwood Lumber Agreement?

    Answer. USTR is engaged with our Canadian counterparts regarding 
the important task of composing panels. The United States has proposed 
candidates to complete NAFTA panel composition, but Canada has not 
acted on our proposals.
    I continue to discuss softwood lumber with my Canadian counterpart 
in every meeting. The United States is open to resolving our 
differences with Canada over softwood lumber, but it would require 
Canada to address its policies that create an uneven playing field for 
the U.S. industry. Unfortunately, to date, Canada has not been willing 
to address these concerns adequately.

    Question 2. As you know, Section 301 tariff exclusions for imports 
from China expired in December 2020. In March of this year, USTR 
announced that it would reinstate 352 exclusions that were previously 
granted, and that these reinstated product exclusions would apply 
retroactively to October 12, 2021 and extend through December 31, 2022.
    One Maine company, Hussey Seating, located in North Berwick, is a 
family-owned business that designs, manufactures, and sells spectator 
seating systems around the world. I appreciate that USTR granted all 
three of Hussey Seating's product exclusion requests, at my urging. 
Making these product exclusions permanent, however, would provide much 
more certainty to Hussey and other companies that rely on certain 
imports.

  --Has the USTR given any consideration to making these Section 301 
        product exclusions permanent, rather than going through the 
        lengthy and uncertain process of assessing and extending them 
        again?
  --I understand that the USTR does not currently have a process in 
        place to accept new exclusion requests. Is the USTR considering 
        restarting a process to permit businesses to apply for 
        exclusions?

    Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration is continually reviewing 
the China Section 301 tariffs; this process is a key part of the 
Administration's deliberative, long-term vision for realigning the 
U.S.-China trade relationship around our priorities and making trade 
work for American workers and businesses. The statutory 4-year review 
also provides an opportunity to assess the tariffs.
    In addition, we are continuing to consider additional modifications 
and exclusions processes, as warranted.

                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator John Boozman
    Question 1. What is USTR doing to ensure the second dispute 
initiated under USMCA on Canada's dairy tariff rate quota 
administration will result in a different outcome than the first 
dispute, including measurable increases in US access?

    Answer. We are carefully considering next steps to ensure that the 
United States gets the full benefit of the market access for American 
dairy workers, farmers, and exporters that Canada committed to under 
the USMCA.

    Question 2. Are you aware, higher energy costs, supply chain 
disruptions, Russia's invasion of Ukraine along with other geopolitical 
tensions, and additional duties on imported fertilizers have resulted 
in significant price increases on fertilizer and other agricultural 
inputs for U.S. producers. A recent report by economists at the 
Agricultural and Food Policy Center (AFPC) at Texas A&M University 
found nitrogen prices alone have increased 133 percent in the last 
year. What actions have you taken to help alleviate the surging global 
prices for fertilizer and other agricultural inputs? What actions are 
you taking to engage China to restore its exports of phosphate and urea 
in the global marketplace?
    Answer. USTR has been working closely with USDA on various food 
security issues. USDA is making $500 million available through a new 
grant program this summer to support independent, innovative and 
sustainable American fertilizer production to supply American farmers. 
The new program will increase competition in a concentrated market; 
create good-paying jobs at home while reducing the reliance on 
potentially unstable or inconsistent foreign supplies; and improve upon 
fertilizer production methods to jump start the next generation of 
fertilizers produced here in the United States.
    USTR is also working with the interagency to encourage multilateral 
development banks, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development to finance projects to 
expand fertilizer production, as well as increase the efficient use of 
fertilizer and precision agriculture throughout the world to lessen the 
global dependence on Russia. We will continue to work internally within 
the administration and with our allies and partners to find additional 
ways to resolve the global fertilizer shortage and prevent similar 
shocks in the future.

    Question 3. The Phase 1 Economic and Trade Agreement requires the 
trajectory of Chinese imports of U.S. products to continue beyond 2021, 
what actions are you taking to ensure China continues to meet the 
purchasing goals set forth in the agreement?

    Answer. It is apparent that China did not fully implement its Phase 
One Agreement purchase commitments, and we have been discussing with 
our Chinese counterparts how China plans to rectify the purchase 
shortfalls. We continue to consult with China on this and other trade 
matters, and all options remain on the table in dealing with China's 
compliance failures. We also need to acknowledge the limitations of the 
Phase One Agreement and past approaches to dealing with China. We are 
prepared to use all available tools, and by exploring possible new 
tools as necessary, to defend our economic interests in the face of 
China's unfair policies and practices. We are also working more closely 
with like-minded trading partners on issues of shared concern and new 
potential strategies.

    Question 4. Thank you for your work in protecting U.S. farmers at 
the WTO-standing strong against India's ploys to expand their 
agricultural subsidies and public stockholding programs. As you know, 
rice is an important commodity in Arkansas and our farmers have been 
operating at a competitive disadvantage to India for years because of 
their trade distorting policies. Myself and 17 colleagues sent you a 
letter to this effect in December 2021. Can you commit to taking action 
to address India's behaviors and hold them accountable at the WTO?

    Answer. I share your concerns regarding India's domestic support 
policies and am committed to holding our trading partners accountable 
to their international trade commitments. I also appreciate the 
reference to your letter of December 2021, which highlights that U.S. 
agricultural producers and exporters, particularly in the rice and 
wheat industries, are disadvantaged as a result of Indian domestic 
support policies.
    India is a notable competitor for U.S. farmers, including Arkansas 
rice farmers, in third-country markets, and its agricultural policies 
impact our ability to export grains and other products both to India 
and globally. USTR and USDA staff are closely reviewing India's 
domestic support measures, and we are considering all options to ensure 
that U.S. exports can compete on a level playing field. In addition, 
the United States is working closely with a sizeable and growing 
coalition of World Trade Organization (WTO) Members in Geneva who share 
our concerns regarding India's domestic support policies. In May, the 
United States and other concerned WTO Members initiated technical 
consultations with India under the Bali Decision on Public Stockholding 
for Food Security Purposes.
    Additionally, at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
June, I am pleased that we were able to uphold important WTO 
commitments on agriculture by standing up to India's demands that its 
public stockholding programs be exempted permanently from WTO limits on 
trade- distorting agricultural subsidies.

    Question 5. Can you elaborate on USTR's China strategy? Does USTR 
plan any tariff relief, and will USTR initiate a new 301 investigation 
into Chinese subsidiaries?

    Answer. A major component of the Biden-Harris Administration's 
trade agenda is the realignment of the U.S.-China trade relationship. 
Since last year, we have launched a direct dialogue with China, and 
have pressed China to live up to its commitments under the Phase One 
Agreement. We have also raised concerns regarding China's state-
directed, non-market policies and practices that were not addressed in 
the Phase One Agreement. Several rounds of difficult discussions made 
clear the limits of China's interest in delivering on those 
obligations. And that is why it is time for us to turn the page on the 
old playbook. China's non-market policies and practices unfairly target 
U.S. workers, businesses and key sectors. We have to use all available 
tools and develop new tools to defend our economic interests and 
values. President Biden recognizes that market economies must act in 
concert to confront policies that are fundamentally at odds with the 
modern trading system. And that is why we have also brought a renewed 
focus to engagement with our partners and allies, who also are 
negatively impacted by China's unfair trade and economic practices.
    The Administration is continually reviewing the China Section 301 
tariffs, as a key part of our deliberative, long-term vision for 
realigning the U.S.-China trade relationship around our priorities. As 
part of this process, in March, we reinstated exclusions where American 
workers, farmers, and domestic producers would benefit. The statutory 
4-year review also provides an opportunity to assess the tariffs. We 
are continuing to consider additional exclusions processes and 
modifications, as warranted.

    Question 6. As you know, the Administration has launched a number 
of non-trade, trade agreements, including IPEF, TCC, and Latam. How 
does USTR intend to link these together? That is, if you are focusing 
on trade facilitation in all three, are there best practices that 
should be common to all three?

    Answer. We are developing a worker-centered trade policy that 
benefits U.S. workers and consumers, and ensures that U.S. companies 
can continue to innovate and create new economic opportunities both in 
the United States and abroad. Our initiatives are linked by a common 
goal of trade arrangements that include high standard commitments in 
the areas of labor, environmental sustainability, transparency and good 
regulatory practices, and trade facilitation. This Administration takes 
a strategic approach when engaging our partners worldwide. As each 
partner is different, we have and will continue utilizing all our trade 
policy tools to come up with innovative arrangements, whether in the 
context of a large trade arrangement or through other formats that 
would secure market access and provide the greatest economically 
meaningful outcomes for the United States. We look forward to continued 
close coordination with Congress on these initiatives.

                                 ______
                                 
          Questions Submitted by Senator Shelley Moore Capito
    Question 1. I brought up this question last year during the fiscal 
year 2022 hearing. However, I still have concerns surrounding Jingye 
Group, a Chinese steel and iron manufacturer, had purchased British 
Steel--a steel manufacturer with facilities across the UK and Europe. 
As we continue to place focus on China's trade practices, I worry that 
acquisitions such as these could lead to the circumvention of U.S. 
trade law. My staff has reached out to USTR more than a few times to 
get a better understanding how the quotas and auditing process will 
work under the new agreement without receiving a sufficient response.

  --Are the quotas in the Trade Rate Quotas (TRQs) with the EU and the 
        one being negotiated with the U.K. divided out by Harmonized 
        Tariff Schedule (HTS) code or is it just a lump sum of all 
        steel tonnage?
  --Can you elaborate on how the ``melted & poured'' requirement in the 
        EU deal will be policed? What penalties will be levied for 
        breaking the rules of the agreement?
  --Will the results of the annual audits under the U.S. and U.K. be 
        published for review?

    Answer. The U.S. announcement of actions on EU imports under 
Section 232 provides that the aggregate annual import volume under the 
steel TRQ is set at 3.3MMT under 54 product categories (HTS codes for 
these product categories are listed in Annex 1 of the U.S. announcement 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Statements/
US%20232%20EU%20Statement.pdf). This annual volume is allocated by 
product category on an EU member state basis in line with the 2015-2017 
historical period.
    The U.S. announcement of actions on UK imports under Section 232 
provides that the aggregate annual import volume under the steel TRQ is 
set at 0.5 MMT under 54 product categories (HTS codes for these product 
categories are listed in Annex 1 of the U.S. announcement https://
www.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/2022-03/UK232-US-Statement.pdf). 
This annual volume is allocated by product category in line with the 
2018-2019 historical period. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in 
consultation with the Department of Commerce, administers the TRQ.
    With regard to the annual audit, the U.S.-UK joint statement 
provides that, upon completion, the results of the annual audits will 
be made available to the United States. The statement also provides 
that the United States will protect any audit properly identified as 
containing proprietary information from public disclosure to the extent 
permitted by U.S. law.
    Additional information on the administration of the TRQ or the 
annual audit may best be obtained from the Department of Commerce.

    Question 2. As part of the Phase One Agreement with China, Chinese 
leaders committed to buying an additional $200 billion worth of 
American goods and services over 2017 levels by the end of 2021. 
However, analysis\1\ of the trade data published in March 2022 founds 
that China only bought 57 percent of the U.S. exports they committed to 
make by the end of 2021.

  --Do you anticipate whether there will be a phase two of the 
        agreement?
  --Will there be an effort taken by USTR to enforce China's compliance 
        with the energy provisions that are part of the Phase One 
        Agreement?

    Answer. It is apparent that China did not fully implement its Phase 
One Agreement purchase commitments, and we have been discussing with 
our Chinese counterparts how China plans to rectify the purchase 
shortfalls. We additionally continue to press China to implement other 
commitments of Phase One, including those relating to agriculture and 
intellectual property. We continue to consult with China on these and 
other trade matters, and all options remain on the table in dealing 
with China's compliance failures. We also need to acknowledge the 
limitations of the Phase One Agreement and past approaches to dealing 
with China. We are expanding our strategies beyond exclusively pressing 
China for change or for compliance with past commitments. We are 
prepared to use all available tools, and by exploring possible new 
tools as necessary, to defend our economic interests in the face of 
China's unfair policies and practices. We are also working more closely 
with like-minded trading partners on issues of shared concern and new 
potential strategies.

    Question 3. As a result of the pandemic and indefinite work from 
home policies, many Americans are considering the option to move to 
rural areas, like my state of West Virginia. However, lumber prices 
have more than tripled since last spring and are further increased by 
tariffs on Canadian softwood lumber.

  --Is your team working on a new softwood lumber agreement with 
        Canada?
  --Will you make this a priority?

    Answer. I understand your concerns about spikes in lumber prices 
over the past year and a half, which have been followed by a downward 
trend due to changes in supply and demand as our economy recovers from 
the pandemic.
    I continue to discuss softwood lumber with my Canadian counterpart 
in every meeting. The United States is open to resolving our 
differences with Canada over softwood lumber, but it would require 
Canada to address its policies that create an uneven playing field for 
the U.S. industry. Unfortunately, to date, Canada has not been willing 
to address these concerns adequately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/
china-bought-none-extra-200-
billion-us-exports-trumps-trade.

                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator John Kennedy
    Question 1. Thank you for your work in protecting U.S. farmers last 
week at the WTO--standing strong against India's ploys to expand their 
agricultural subsidies and public stockholding programs. As you know, 
rice is an important commodity in Louisiana and our farmers have been 
operating at a competitive disadvantage to India for years because of 
their trade distorting policies. Myself and 17 colleagues sent you a 
letter to this effect in December. Can you commit to taking action to 
address India's behaviors and hold them accountable at the WTO?

    Answer. I share your concerns regarding India's domestic support 
policies and am committed to holding our trading partners accountable 
to their international trade commitments. I also appreciate the 
reference to your letter of December 2021, which highlights that U.S. 
agricultural producers and exporters, particularly in the rice and 
wheat industries, are disadvantaged as a result of Indian domestic 
support policies.
    India is a notable competitor for U.S. farmers, including Louisiana 
rice farmers, in third-country markets, and its agricultural policies 
impact our ability to export grains and other products both to India 
and globally. USTR and USDA staff are closely reviewing India's 
domestic support measures, and we are considering all options to ensure 
that U.S. exports can compete on a level playing field. In addition, 
the United States is working closely with a sizeable and growing 
coalition of World Trade Organization (WTO) Members in Geneva who share 
our concerns regarding India's domestic support policies. In May, the 
United States and other concerned WTO Members initiated technical 
consultations with India under the Bali Decision on Public Stockholding 
for Food Security Purposes.
    Additionally, at the 12th Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
June, I am pleased that we were able to uphold important WTO 
commitments on agriculture by standing up to India's demands that its 
public stockholding programs be exempted permanently from WTO limits on 
trade- distorting agricultural subsidies.

                          SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

    Senator Shaheen. So thank you very much, Ambassador Tai. 
This hearing stands in--subcommittee stands in recess until the 
call of the Chair.
    [Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., Wednesday, June 22, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of 
the Chair.]