[Senate Hearing 117-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




 
  COMMERCE, JUSTICE, SCIENCE, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 
                            FISCAL YEAR 2022

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 23, 2021

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
                                                    

    The subcommittee met at 2:06 p.m., in room 192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeanne Shaheen (Chairman) 
presiding.
    Present: Senators Shaheen, Leahy, Feinstein, Reed, Coons, 
Moran, Graham, Boozman, Capito, Kennedy, Hagerty, and Braun.

                    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

              OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

    Senator Shaheen. Good afternoon. I apologize again for 
being late. I am delighted to open this Commerce, Justice and 
Science Appropriations subcommittee hearing with FBI Director 
Christopher Wray. We are very pleased to have you here and look 
forward to our conversation. I will just point out before we go 
into the hearing that we are going to take Members and anybody 
who arrives after the gavel in order of arrival and that 
everyone is appearing in person, we are not having anybody 
appear remotely. So thank you all very much for joining us this 
afternoon and we will begin.
    Director Wray, the FBI continues to be the gold standard 
for law enforcement agencies worldwide. We count on the more 
than 35,000 men and women of the FBI to protect our country 
from violent criminals, terrorists, and foreign agents who mean 
us great harm. I want to thank them, and of course you as their 
leader for their dedication and service to the Nation, and in 
particular for their response to the attack on the Capitol on 
January 6 and their ongoing investigations into this 
insurrection attempt.
    The work of the FBI as we will hear today is vast, but it 
is critical. It covers key investigations into 
counterterrorism, intelligence, child exploitation, and 
financial and health care fraud, as well as the operation of 
the National Instant Criminal Background Check System, the 
system that checks available records to ensure people 
purchasing firearms can legally own them. This year's budget is 
a request of $10.3 billion, and it reflects the need to support 
the important missions of the FBI. For the FBI salaries and 
expenses, this request is an increase of $465 million above 
fiscal year 2021 enacted.
    And I would just--it struck me as I was going through the 
briefing on the budget that your request calls for hiring over 
150 new personnel. And I am going to be interested in hearing 
if you have any concerns about actually finding people, given 
some of the other challenges that I know we are having with 
workforce in other parts of the country. But, of course, the 
FBI faces newer challenges almost daily. We all saw one of 
those challenges, ransomware, front and center in the news last 
month as the Colonial Pipeline shutdown. That was followed by 
an attack on the systems of meat processor, JBS. Now, 
thankfully, both companies were able to get their systems back 
online and the FBI even helped to track down and return nearly 
half of the ransom Colonial Pipeline pay. So congratulations to 
you and all the agents who are involved in that effort, of 
course.
    Unfortunately, not everyone has success with unlocking 
their IT systems. And it is not just large companies that are 
being targeted by hackers. It is also smaller hospital and 
education systems, small businesses, and even police 
departments as we saw recently with the Metro D.C. Police 
Department. The New Hampshire Insurance Department has just 
issued a warning to insurers on June 11 of possible ransomware 
attacks with a few best practices to protect IT infrastructure 
and data. So I am interested in hearing your thoughts on this 
problem, how the FBI can help, and how we can try to get better 
reporting on these kinds of crimes.
    I have also been deeply concerned, as I know the other 
Members of this subcommittee are, by the reported directed 
energy attacks in Cuba, China, and other locations on our 
Government personnel. These attacks have left American public 
servants and their families suffering alone for years with 
mysterious brain injuries, without full transparency or 
guarantee of treatment. Fortunately, we are seeing improvement 
in that area. And I was pleased that the Senate passed the 
Havana Act on June 7.
    I hope the House also quickly acts to pass in. This bill 
would allow the CIA Director, the Secretary of State, and 
leadership at other Federal agencies to provide injured 
employees with additional financial support for brain injuries. 
I will have some questions for you today on the FBI's ongoing 
investigation into these attacks and how you are working with 
other agencies within the Government.
    So I look forward to your testimony today, Director Wray, 
as I know we all do, and to our discussion. With that, I would 
like to now turn to subcommittee Ranking Member Senator Moran 
for his remarks.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JERRY MORAN

    Senator Moran. Chair Shaheen, thank you for convening this 
hearing. And Senator Shaheen convened a classified hearing with 
the Director in March of this year. However Director, this is 
the first hearing with you in the CJS subcommittee since May of 
2019, so welcome back. Before turning to the FBI budget, the 
FBI's budget request for this fiscal year, I want to express my 
condolences at the loss of agents Laura Schwartzenberger and 
Daniel Alfin in February of this year. Shortly after their 
deaths just a few days, I met with special agents and staff of 
the FBI Miami's field office, and it was apparent to me that 
both of those individuals were highly regarded. They were 
considered friends and family.
    And so I expressed my deepest sympathies to the entire FBI 
bureau family. Laura and Daniel are heroes, and our country 
should always remember them as such. In regard to the budget 
that is before us Director, the FBI is requesting $10.2 billion 
for salaries and expenses in fiscal year 2022. This amount is 
$465 million, or about 4.8 percent above the fiscal year 2021 
that was enacted. However, more than two thirds of that amount 
is for inflationary costs. Perhaps I am making a statement that 
you want known. It includes employee benefits and rental space.
    The FBI is only requesting $151 million in programing 
increases. These are for initiatives that will actually bolster 
the FBI's capacity to execute its mission. And while employees 
and staff and space are important, there are a lot of 
initiatives that I think the FBI needs to be fully engaged in. 
In the news, we--the FBI's efforts to protect the United States 
from terrorist attacks, from counterintelligence threats, from 
Governments like China, to neutralize threats from cyber 
criminals, ransomware gangs, they are apparent. However, the 
FBI budget also supports critical law enforcement, public 
safety matters, including $492 million to combat international 
drug cartels and violent gangs, $62 million to investigate and 
prevent human trafficking, and $223 million to address crimes 
against children.
    Kansans, like most Americans, are deeply committed to 
public safety and strongly support law enforcement. This 
hearing is an opportunity for you, Director, for the Bureau, to 
explain how it is putting taxpayer dollars to good use, to 
benefit the good use to benefit the safety of our public.
    And I look forward to working with you, and Senator 
Shaheen, and Members of this subcommittee, the subcommittee, as 
we work to craft the fiscal year 2022 appropriations bill for 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thank you. Thank you, 
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Director.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Moran. Director Wray.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER WRAY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL 
            BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
    Director Wray. Well, good afternoon, Chairwoman Shaheen, 
Ranking Member Moran, Members of the subcommittee. I want to 
first thank you all for the support that you have provided to 
the FBI in the past and for inviting me here today to talk 
about the Bureau's fiscal year 2022 budget request. In many 
ways, the men and women of the bureau are busier today than we 
have ever been. In fact, I will tell you that hardly a day goes 
by when I am not struck by some inspiring demonstration of 
courage and sacrifice on the part of our workforce for the 
American people. You know, the depth and the breadth of their 
impact on a remarkable volume of threats is just extraordinary.
    I mean, just within the past couple of years, we have 
thwarted potential terrorist attacks in places like Las Vegas, 
Tampa, New York, Cleveland, Kansas City, Miami, and elsewhere. 
In a single month recently, we arrested over 600 violent gang 
members. That is 1 month. Every 10 to 12 hours, we are opening 
a new China counterintelligence investigation. You all both 
mentioned ransomware. We are now investigating over 100 
different types of ransomware, and each of those types has 
scores and scores of victims. We have opened hundreds and 
hundreds of COVID fraud investigations.
    We performed a record high last year, 40 million NICS 
firearms background checks. Every single day, every single day, 
we receive thousands of tips to our national threat operations 
center, our NTOC, many of which involve imminent threats to 
life that require swift action by our field offices and our 
partners. And many of those threats involve harm to children. 
And just over the last year or so, our folks arrested over 
1,400 of the worst child predators, saving hundreds of kids 
from sexual exploitation. And the list goes on and on. Now, 
keep in mind, this work happened right in the teeth of the 
global pandemic because, of course, the FBI kept coming to work 
every single day. And it is also happening despite the 
troubling upsurge in attacks against law enforcement officers 
throughout the country.
    So far this year, the number of officers murdered on the 
job is far surpassing last year's pace, and it is about two 
officers murdered per week. Tragically, that includes the loss 
of two members of the FBI family, as Senator Moran mentioned, 
special agents Laura Schwartzenberger and Daniel Alfin, both 
shot and killed down near Miami in February. And we honor Dan 
and Laura's memory every day through our work, work which has 
unfortunately not gotten any easier given the diverse array of 
threats we face as a country.
    And that is why I appreciated having a candid conversation 
with all of you during the classified roundtable back in March. 
And I wish that I could tell you that we have got all the 
resources we need to carry out our mission to protect the 
American people and uphold the Constitution. But the funds that 
we are requesting will go a long way towards doing just that. 
And before we turn to your questions, I do want to spend a few 
minutes talking about some of the enhancements that we are 
requesting. So first, terrorism, terrorism remains the FBI's 
top priority, as you know.
    With our partners, the FBI has already made over 500 
arrests in connection with the Capitol attack to date, which is 
an extraordinary undertaking, and there is more work and more 
charges sure to come. Unfortunately, January 6 was not an 
isolated event. Domestic terrorism has been and continues to be 
a top concern for the FBI. So much so, so much so that over the 
past 3 years, we doubled our domestic terrorism investigations 
and arrests. And that is in no small part because of the rise 
in racially and ethnically motivated violent extremists, which 
I elevated to our highest threat priority level back in 2019.
    And because of the rise in violence from a whole range of 
anti-Government, anti-authority actors over the past year, 
including last summer and in different ways, of course, on 
January 6 itself. I have repeatedly highlighted the severity of 
the threat more than a dozen times in testimony since starting 
in this job, and it is why we are requesting a $45 million 
enhancement for additional personnel and tools to investigate 
the domestic terrorism threat and more easily share information 
with our partners.
    Second, cyber, cyber is another of our top priorities, and 
it is easy to see why with intrusions like the Colonial 
Pipeline, and Solar Winds hacks, and the Hafnium compromise of 
Microsoft Exchange servers becoming all too common. While 
dealing with those, we are also contending with hundreds of 
other cyber threats from Nation, state, and criminal actors 
alike. And our $40 million enhancement request is an important 
step towards ensuring that we have got the right people and 
tools in place to address the evolving threats by some very 
sophisticated cyber adversaries. We are also asking for an 
enhancement of a little over $15 million to improve our own 
cyber security. Those funds will help us secure our 
infrastructure and limit vulnerabilities that threaten the 
FBI's mission.
    And we are requesting funding to address our dramatically 
expanded jurisdiction over crimes committed on Tribal land 
following the Supreme Court's McGirt decision. That $25.5 
million enhancement will fund our increased operational needs 
in the State of Oklahoma while Federal, State, and Tribal 
authorities work on a more long term solution. Of course, these 
things that I just listed off are far from our only challenges.
    On top of all these things, we also face an unrelenting 
counterintelligence threat from China, Russia, Iran, and North 
Korea, and the full spectrum of criminal threats from hate 
crimes and other civil rights abuses to violent crime spikes in 
a whole bunch of cities across this country, to human 
trafficking and crimes against children, just to name a few.
    The funding you provide will help us address all these 
areas. So thank you again for making sure the FBI has the 
resources we need to stay ahead of our adversaries and keep the 
American people safe. I look forward to your questions.

    [The statement follows:]
             Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher A. Wray
    Good morning, Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, and Members 
of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here, representing the men and 
women of the FBI. Our people--nearly 37,000 of them--are the heart of 
the Bureau. I am proud of their service and their commitment to our 
mission. Every day, they tackle their jobs with perseverance, 
professionalism, and integrity--sometimes at the greatest of costs.
    Earlier this year, two of our agents made the ultimate sacrifice in 
the line of duty. Special Agents Dan Alfin and Laura Schwartzenberger 
left home to carry out the mission they signed up for--to keep the 
American people safe. They were executing a Federal court-ordered 
search warrant in a violent crimes against children investigation in 
Sunrise, Florida, when they were shot and killed. Three other agents 
were also wounded that day. We'll be forever grateful for their 
commitment and their dedication--for their last full measure of 
devotion to the people they served and defended. We will always honor 
their sacrifice.
    Despite the many challenges our FBI workforce has faced, I am 
immensely proud of their dedication to protecting the American people 
and upholding the Constitution. Our country has faced unimaginable 
challenges this past year. Yet, through it all, whether it was coming 
to the aid of our partners during the Capitol siege and committing all 
of our resources to ensuring that those involved in that brutal assault 
on our Democracy are brought to justice, the proliferation of terrorist 
violence moving at the speed of social media, abhorrent hate crimes, 
COVID-19 related fraud and misinformation, the increasing threat of 
cyber intrusions and state-sponsored economic espionage, malign foreign 
influence and interference, the scourge of opioid trafficking and 
abuse, or human trafficking and crimes against children, the women and 
men of the FBI have unwaveringly stood at the ready and taken it upon 
themselves to tackle any and all challenges thrown their way.
    Today, I appear before you on behalf of the men and women who 
tackle these threats and challenges every day. I am extremely proud of 
their service and commitment to the FBI's mission and to ensuring the 
safety and security of communities throughout our Nation. On their 
behalf, I would like to express my appreciation for the support you 
have given them in the past, ask for your continued support in the 
future, and pledge to be the best possible stewards of the resources 
you provide. I would like to begin by providing a brief overview of the 
FBI's fiscal year 2022 budget request, and then follow with a short 
discussion of key threats and challenges that we face, both as a Nation 
and as an organization.
                    fiscal year 2022 budget overview
    The fiscal year 2022 budget request proposes a total of $10.28 
billion in direct budget authority to carry out the FBI's national 
security, criminal law enforcement, and criminal justice services 
missions. The request includes a total of $10.21 billion for Salaries 
and Expenses, which will support 36,149 positions (13,414 Special 
Agents, 3,216 Intelligence Analysts, and 19,519 professional staff), 
and $61.9 million for Construction. The request includes six program 
enhancements totaling $160.73 million. These enhancements are proposed 
to meet critical requirements and close gaps in operational 
capabilities, including: $45.0 million for additional personnel and 
tools to investigate the threat posed by Domestic Violent Extremists 
(``DVEs''), receive and process tips from the public, and perform 
watchlisting and screening activities; $40.0 million to enhance cyber 
investigative capabilities; $18.8 million to mitigate threats from 
foreign intelligence services; $25.5 million to support the expansion 
of Federal jurisdiction for crimes committed on Tribal lands in 
response to the McGirt Supreme Court case; $6.2 million to support 
infrastructure needs related to Federal Task Force Officer (``TFO'') 
use of Body Worn Cameras; $15.23 million to enhance the FBI's 
cybersecurity posture and protect internal networks; and $10.0 million 
to maintain facilities on the FBI's Quantico campus.
                       key threats and challenges
    This Committee has provided critical resources for the FBI to 
become what it is today--a threat-focused, intelligence-driven 
organization. Our Nation continues to face a multitude of serious and 
evolving threats ranging from homegrown violent extremists to hostile 
foreign intelligence services and operatives; from sophisticated cyber-
based attacks to Internet-facilitated sexual exploitation of children; 
from violent gangs and criminal organizations to public corruption and 
corporate fraud. Keeping pace with these threats is a significant 
challenge for the FBI. As an organization, we must be able to stay 
current with constantly evolving technologies. Our adversaries--
terrorists, foreign intelligence services, and criminals--take 
advantage of modern technology, including the Internet and social 
media, to facilitate illegal activities, recruit followers, encourage 
terrorist attacks and other illicit actions, and to disperse 
information on building improvised explosive devices and other means to 
attack the U.S. The breadth of these threats and challenges are as 
complex as any time in our history. And the consequences of not 
responding to and countering threats and challenges have never been 
greater.
    The support of this Committee in helping the FBI do its part in 
facing and thwarting these threats and challenges is greatly 
appreciated. That support is allowing us to establish strong 
capabilities and capacities for assessing threats, sharing 
intelligence, leveraging key technologies, and--in some respects, most 
importantly--hiring some of the best to serve as Special Agents, 
Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff. We have built and are 
continuously enhancing a workforce that possesses the skills and 
knowledge to deal with the complex threats and challenges we face 
today--and tomorrow. We are building a leadership cadre that views 
change and transformation as a positive tool for keeping the FBI 
focused on the key threats facing our Nation.
    Today's FBI is a national security and law enforcement organization 
that uses, collects, and shares intelligence in everything we do. Each 
FBI employee understands that, to defeat the key threats facing our 
Nation, we must constantly strive to be more efficient and more 
effective. Just as our adversaries continue to evolve, so, too, must 
the FBI. We live in a time of acute and persistent terrorist and 
criminal threats to our national security, our economy, and indeed our 
communities. These diverse threats underscore the complexity and 
breadth of the FBI's mission: to protect the American people and uphold 
the Constitution of the United States.
                           national security
Capitol Violence
    First and foremost, I want to assure you, your staff, and the 
American people that the FBI has deployed our full investigative 
resources and is working closely with our Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, and territorial partners to aggressively pursue those involved 
in criminal activity during the events of January 6, 2021. We are 
working closely with our Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
partners, as well as private sector partners, to identify those 
responsible for the violence and destruction of property at the U.S. 
Capitol building who showed blatant and appalling disregard for our 
institutions of government and the orderly administration of the 
democratic process.
    FBI Special Agents, Intelligence Analysts, and professional staff 
have been hard at work gathering evidence, sharing intelligence, and 
working with Federal prosecutors to bring charges against the 
individuals involved. As we have said consistently, we do not and will 
not tolerate violent extremists who use the guise of First Amendment-
protected activity to engage in violent criminal activity. Thus far, 
the FBI has arrested hundreds of individuals with regards to rioting, 
assault on a Federal officer, property crimes violations, and 
conspiracy charges, and the work continues.
    Overall, the FBI assesses that the January 6th siege of the Capitol 
Complex demonstrates a willingness by some to use violence against the 
government in furtherance of their political and social goals. This 
ideologically motivated violence underscores the symbolic nature of the 
National Capital Region and the willingness of some Domestic Violent 
Extremists to travel to events in this area and violently engage law 
enforcement and their perceived adversaries. The American people should 
rest assured that we will continue to work to hold accountable those 
individuals who participated in the violent breach of the Capitol on 
January 6, and any others who attempt to use violence to intimidate, 
coerce, or influence the American people or affect the conduct of our 
government.
Top Terrorism Threats
    As has been stated multiple times in the past, preventing terrorist 
attacks, from any place, by any actor, remains the FBI's top priority. 
The nature of the threat posed by terrorism--both international 
terrorism (``IT'') and domestic terrorism (``DT'')--continues to 
evolve.
    The greatest terrorism threat to our Homeland is posed by lone 
actors or small cells who typically radicalize online and look to 
attack soft targets with easily accessible weapons. We see these 
threats manifested within both Domestic Violent Extremists (``DVEs'') 
and Homegrown Violent Extremists (``HVEs''), two distinct threats, both 
of which are located primarily in the United States and typically 
radicalize and mobilize to violence on their own. Individuals who 
commit violent criminal acts in furtherance of social or political 
goals stemming from domestic influences--some of which include racial 
or ethnic bias, or anti-government or anti-authority sentiments--are 
described as DVEs, whereas HVEs are individuals who are inspired 
primarily by global jihad but are not receiving individualized 
direction from Foreign Terrorist Organizations (``FTOs'').
    Domestic and Homegrown Violent Extremists are often motivated and 
inspired by a mix of socio-political, ideological, and personal 
grievances against their targets, and more recently have focused on 
accessible targets to include civilians, law enforcement and the 
military, symbols or members of the U.S. Government, houses of worship, 
retail locations, and mass public gatherings. Selecting these types of 
soft targets, in addition to the insular nature of their radicalization 
and mobilization to violence and limited discussions with others 
regarding their plans, increases the challenge faced by law enforcement 
to detect and disrupt the activities of lone actors before they occur.
    The top threat we face from DVEs continues to be from those we 
categorize as Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists 
(``RMVEs''), largely those who advocate for the superiority of the 
white race, who were the primary source of lethal attacks perpetrated 
by DVEs in 2018 and 2019. It is important to note that we have also 
recently seen an increase in fatal DVE attacks perpetrated by Anti-
Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists, specifically Militia 
Violent Extremists and Anarchist Violent Extremists. Anti-Government or 
Anti-Authority Violent Extremists were responsible for three of the 
four lethal DVE attacks in 2020. Also, in 2020, we saw the first lethal 
attack committed by an Anarchist Violent Extremist in over 20 years.
    Consistent with our mission, the FBI does not investigate First 
Amendment-protected speech or association, peaceful protests, or 
political activity. The FBI holds sacred the rights of individuals to 
peacefully exercise their First Amendment freedoms. Non-violent 
protests are signs of a healthy democracy, not an ailing one. 
Regardless of their specific ideology, the FBI will aggressively pursue 
those who seek to hijack legitimate First Amendment-protected activity 
by engaging in violent criminal activity such as the destruction of 
property and violent assaults on law enforcement officers that we 
witnessed on January 6th and during protests throughout the U.S. during 
the summer of 2020 and beyond. In other words, we will actively pursue 
the opening of FBI investigations when an individual uses--or threatens 
the use of--force, violence, or coercion, in violation of Federal law 
and in the furtherance of social or political goals.
    The FBI assesses HVEs are the greatest, most immediate IT threat to 
the Homeland. As I have described, HVEs are located in and radicalized 
primarily in the United States, who are not receiving individualized 
direction from global jihad-inspired FTOs but are inspired largely by 
the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (``ISIS'') and al-Qa'ida to 
commit violence. An HVE's lack of a direct connection with an FTO, 
ability to rapidly mobilize without detection, and use of encrypted 
communications pose significant challenges to our ability to 
proactively identify and disrupt them.
    The FBI remains concerned that FTOs, such as ISIS and al-Qa'ida, 
intend to carry out or inspire large-scale attacks in the United 
States. Despite its loss of physical territory in Iraq and Syria, ISIS 
remains relentless in its campaign of violence against the United 
States and our partners--both here at home and overseas. To this day, 
ISIS continues to aggressively promote its hate-fueled rhetoric and 
attract like-minded violent extremists with a willingness to conduct 
attacks against the United States and our interests abroad. ISIS' 
successful use of social media and messaging applications to attract 
individuals seeking a sense of belonging is of continued concern to us. 
Like other foreign terrorist groups, ISIS advocates for lone offender 
attacks in the United States and Western countries via videos and other 
English language propaganda that have at times specifically advocated 
for attacks against civilians, the military, law enforcement and 
intelligence community personnel.
    Al-Qa'ida maintains its desire to both conduct and inspire large-
scale, spectacular attacks. Because continued pressure has degraded 
some of the group's senior leadership, in the near term, we assess al-
Qa'ida is more likely to continue to focus on cultivating its 
international affiliates and supporting small-scale, readily achievable 
attacks in regions such as East and West Africa. Over the past year, 
propaganda from al-Qa'ida leaders continued to seek to inspire 
individuals to conduct their own attacks in the United States and other 
Western nations.
    Iran and its global proxies and partners, including Iraqi Shia 
militant groups, continue to attack and plot against the United States 
and our allies throughout the Middle East in response to U.S. pressure. 
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (``IRGC-QF'') 
continues to provide support to militant resistance groups and 
terrorist organizations. Iran also continues to support Lebanese 
Hizballah and other terrorist groups. Lebanese Hizballah has sent 
operatives to build terrorist infrastructures worldwide. The arrests of 
individuals in the United States allegedly linked to Lebanese 
Hizballah's main overseas terrorist arm, and their intelligence 
collection and procurement efforts, demonstrate Lebanese Hizballah's 
interest in long-term contingency planning activities here in the 
Homeland. Lebanese Hizballah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah also has 
threatened retaliation for the death of IRGC-QF Commander Qassem 
Soleimani.
    As an organization, we continually adapt and rely heavily on the 
strength of our Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and 
international partnerships to combat all terrorist threats to the 
United States and our interests. To that end, we use all available 
lawful investigative techniques and methods to combat these threats 
while continuing to collect, analyze, and share intelligence concerning 
the threat posed by violent extremists, in all their forms, who desire 
to harm Americans and U.S. interests. We will continue to share 
information and encourage the sharing of information among our numerous 
partners via our Joint Terrorism Task Forces across the country, and 
our Legal Attache offices around the world. The FBI's fiscal year 2022 
request includes 179 positions (including 80 Special Agents, 43 
Intelligence Analysts, and 56 professional staff) and $45.0 million to 
counter terrorism and the increasing acts of domestic terrorism 
occurring across the United States.
Lawful Access
    The problems caused by law enforcement agencies' inability to 
access electronic evidence continue to grow. Increasingly, commercial 
device manufacturers have employed encryption in such a manner that 
only the device users can access the content of the devices. This is 
commonly referred to as ``user-only-access'' device encryption. 
Similarly, more and more communications service providers are designing 
their platforms and apps such that only the parties to the 
communication can access the content. This is generally known as ``end-
to-end'' encryption. The proliferation of end-to-end and user-only-
access encryption is a serious issue that increasingly limits law 
enforcement's ability, even after obtaining a lawful warrant or court 
order, to access critical evidence and information needed to disrupt 
threats, protect the public, and bring perpetrators to justice.
    The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and consistent use 
of responsibly-managed encryption--encryption that providers can 
decrypt and provide to law enforcement when served with a legal order. 
Protecting data and privacy in a digitally connected world is a top 
priority for the FBI and the U.S. Government, and we believe that 
promoting encryption is a vital part of that mission. But we have seen 
that the broad application of end-to-end and user-only-access 
encryption adds negligible security advantages. It does have a negative 
effect on law enforcement's ability to protect the public. What we mean 
when we talk about lawful access is putting providers who manage 
encrypted data in a position to decrypt it and provide it to us in 
response to legal process. We are not asking for, and do not want, any 
``backdoor,'' that is, for encryption to be weakened or compromised so 
that it can be defeated from the outside by law enforcement or anyone 
else. Unfortunately, too much of the debate over lawful access has 
revolved around discussions of this ``backdoor'' straw man instead of 
what we really want and need.
    We are deeply concerned with the threat end-to-end and user-only-
access encryption pose to our ability to fulfill the FBI's duty of 
protecting the American people from every manner of Federal crime, from 
cyber-attacks and violence against children to drug trafficking and 
organized crime. We believe Americans deserve security in every walk of 
life--in their data, their streets, their businesses, and their 
communities.
    End-to-end and user-only-access encryption erode that security 
against every danger the FBI combats. For example, even with our 
substantial resources, accessing the content of known or suspected 
terrorists' data pursuant to court-authorized legal process is 
increasingly difficult. The often-online nature of the terrorist 
radicalization process, along with the insular nature of most of 
today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for investigators to connect 
in time to stop an attack--and end-to-end and user-only-access 
encryption increasingly hide even those often precious few and fleeting 
dots.
    In one instance, while planning and right up until the eve of the 
December 6, 2019, shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola that killed 
three U.S. sailors and severely wounded eight other Americans, deceased 
terrorist Mohammed Saeed Al-Shamrani communicated undetected with 
overseas al-Qa'ida terrorists using an end-to-end encrypted app. Then, 
after the attack, user-only-access encryption prevented the FBI from 
accessing information contained in his phones for several months. As a 
result, during the critical time period immediately following the 
shooting and despite obtaining search warrants for the deceased 
killer's devices, the FBI could not access the information on those 
phones to identify co-conspirators or determine whether they may have 
been plotting additional attacks.
    This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats. 
Like Al-Shamrani, the plotters who sought to kidnap the Governor of 
Michigan late last year used end-to-end encrypted apps to hide their 
communications from law enforcement. Their plot was only disrupted by 
well-timed human source reporting and the resulting undercover 
operation. Subjects of our investigation into the January 6 Capitol 
siege used end-to-end encrypted communications as well.
    We face the same problem in protecting children against violent 
sexual exploitation. End-to-end and user-only-access encryption 
frequently prevent us from discovering and searching for victims. In 
particular, providers can send us vital tips that can lead to the 
rescue of a child only when those providers themselves are able to 
detect and report child exploitation being facilitated on their 
platforms and services. They cannot do that when their platforms are 
end-to-end encrypted. For example, while Facebook Messenger and Apple 
iMessage each boasts over one billion users, in 2020, the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (``NCMEC'') received over 20 
million tips from Facebook,\1\ compared to 265 tips from Apple, 
according to NCMEC data and publicly available information. Apple's use 
of end-to-end encryption, which blinds it to child sexual abuse 
material being transmitted through its services, likely plays a role in 
the disparities in reporting between the two companies. We do not know 
how many children are being harmed across the country as a result of 
this under-reporting by Apple and other end-to-end providers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Facebook is planning to move its Facebook Messenger platform to 
end-to-end encryption as a default in the near future. This will result 
in the loss of most of these tips.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    When we are able to open investigations, end-to-end and user-only-
access encryption makes it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to 
justice. Much evidence of crimes against children, just like many other 
kinds of crime today, exists primarily in electronic form. If we cannot 
obtain that critical electronic evidence, our efforts are frequently 
hamstrung.
    This problem is not just limited to Federal investigations. Our 
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently 
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end 
and user-only-access encryption challenges, which are now being felt 
across the full range of State and local criminal law enforcement. Many 
report that even relatively unsophisticated criminal groups, like 
street gangs, are frequently using user-only-access encrypted 
smartphones and end-to-end encrypted communications apps to shield 
their activities from detection or disruption. As this problem becomes 
more and more acute for State and local law enforcement, the advanced 
technical resources needed to address even a single investigation 
involving end-to-end and user-only-access encryption will continue to 
diminish and ultimately overwhelm State and local capacity to 
investigate even common crimes.
Cyber
    In 2020, nation-state and criminal cyber actors took advantage of 
people and networks made more vulnerable by the sudden shift of our 
personal and professional lives online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
targeting those searching for personal protective equipment, worried 
about stimulus checks, and conducting vaccine research.
    Throughout the last year, the FBI has seen a wider-than-ever range 
of cyber actors threaten Americans' safety, security, and confidence in 
our digitally connected world. But these threats will not disappear 
when the pandemic ends. Cyber-criminal syndicates and nation-states 
keep innovating ways to compromise our networks and maximize the reach 
and impact of their operations, such as by selling malware as a service 
or by targeting vendors as a way to access scores of victims by hacking 
just one provider.
    These criminals and nation-states believe that they can compromise 
our networks, steal our property, and hold our critical infrastructure 
at risk without incurring any risk themselves. In the last year alone, 
we have seen--and have publicly called out--China, North Korea, and 
Russia for using cyber operations to target U.S. COVID-19 vaccines and 
research. We have seen the far-reaching disruptive impact a serious 
supply-chain compromise can have through the SolarWinds intrusions, 
conducted by the Russian SVR. We have seen China working to obtain 
controlled defense technology and developing the ability to use cyber 
means to complement any future real-world conflict. We have seen Iran 
use cyber means to try to sow divisions and undermine our elections, 
targeting voters before the November election and threatening election 
officials after.
    As dangerous as nation-states are, we do not have the luxury of 
focusing on them alone. In the past year, we also have seen cyber 
criminals target hospitals, medical centers, and educational 
institutions for theft or ransomware. Such incidents affecting medical 
centers have led to the interruption of computer networks and systems 
that put patients' lives at an increased risk at a time when America 
faces its most dire public health crisis in generations. And we have 
seen criminal groups targeting critical infrastructure for ransom, 
causing massive disruption to our daily lives.
    We are also seeing dark web vendors who sell capabilities in 
exchange for cryptocurrency increase the difficulty of stopping what 
would once have been less dangerous offenders. What was once a ring of 
unsophisticated criminals now has the tools to paralyze entire 
hospitals, police departments, and businesses with ransomware. It is 
not that individual hackers alone have necessarily become much more 
sophisticated, but--unlike previously--they are able to rent 
sophisticated capabilities.
    We have to make it harder and more painful for hackers and 
criminals to do what they are doing. That is why I announced a new FBI 
cyber strategy last year, using the FBI's role as the lead Federal 
agency with law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities to not 
only pursue our own actions, but to work seamlessly with our domestic 
and international partners to defend their networks, attribute 
malicious activity, sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our 
adversaries overseas. We must impose consequences on cyber adversaries 
and use our collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to 
do so through joint and enabled operations sequenced for maximum 
impact. And we must continue to work with the Department of State and 
other key agencies to ensure that our foreign partners are able and 
willing to cooperate in our efforts to bring the perpetrators of 
cybercrime to justice.
    An example of this approach is the international takedown in 
January 2021 of the Emotet botnet, which enabled a network of cyber 
criminals to cause hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to 
government, educational, and corporate networks. The FBI used 
sophisticated techniques, our unique legal authorities, and, most 
importantly, our worldwide partnerships to significantly disrupt the 
malware.
    A few months ago, cybersecurity companies including Microsoft 
disclosed that hackers were using previously unknown vulnerabilities 
related to Microsoft Exchange software to access email servers that 
companies physically keep on their premises rather than in the cloud. 
These ``zero day'' vulnerabilities allowed the actors to potentially 
exploit victim networks, engaging in activities such as grabbing login 
credentials, installing malicious programs to send commands to the 
victim network, and stealing emails in bulk. The FBI first put out a 
joint advisory in partnership with the Department of Homeland 
Security's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (``CISA'') 
to give network defenders the technical information they needed to 
mitigate the vulnerability. However, while many infected system owners 
successfully removed the web shells others were not able to do so. That 
left many systems vulnerable to adversaries who could continue to steal 
information, encrypt data for ransom, or potentially even execute a 
destructive attack. In response, through a court-authorized operation 
in partnership with the private sector, we were able to copy and remove 
malicious web shells from hundreds of vulnerable computers in the U.S. 
running Microsoft Exchange Server software. This is another example of 
how the FBI used its unique authorities, in this case, court-issued 
legal process, and its partnerships with the private sector to have 
tangible, real-world impact on the problem.
    We took upwards of 1,100 actions against cyber adversaries last 
year, including arrests, criminal charges, convictions, dismantlements, 
and disruptions, and enabled many more actions through our dedicated 
partnerships with the private sector, foreign partners, and at the 
Federal, State, and local entities.
    We have been putting a lot of energy and resources into all of 
those partnerships, especially with the private sector. We are working 
hard to push important threat information to network defenders, but we 
have also been making it as easy as possible for the private sector to 
share important information with us. For example, we are emphasizing to 
the private sector how we keep our presence unobtrusive in the wake of 
a breach; how we protect information that companies, and universities 
share with us, and commit to providing useful feedback; and how we 
coordinate with our government partners so that we are speaking with 
one voice. But we need the private sector to do its part, too. We need 
the private sector to come forward to warn us--and warn us quickly--
when they see malicious cyber activity. We also need the private sector 
to work with us when we warn them that they are being targeted. The 
recent examples of significant cyber incident--SolarWinds, HAFNIUM, the 
pipeline incident--only emphasize what I have been saying for a long 
time: The government cannot protect against cyber threats on its own. 
We need a whole-of-society approach that matches the scope of the 
danger. There is really no other option for defending a country where 
nearly all of our critical infrastructure, personal data, intellectual 
property, and network infrastructure sits in private hands.
    In summary, the FBI is engaged in a myriad of efforts to combat 
cyber threats, from improving threat identification and information 
sharing inside and outside of the government to developing and 
retaining new talent, to examining the way we operate to disrupt and 
defeat these threats. We take all potential threats to public and 
private sector systems seriously and will continue to investigate and 
hold accountable those who pose a threat in cyberspace. The fiscal year 
2022 request includes 155 positions (including 52 Special Agents, 57 
Intelligence Analysts, and 46 Professional Staff) and $40.0 million to 
enhance cyber information-sharing abilities and increase cyber tools 
and capacities. The Request also includes 22 positions and $15.23 
million to help protect internal FBI networks.
Foreign Influence
    Our Nation is confronting multifaceted foreign threats seeking to 
both influence our national policies and public opinion, and cause harm 
to our national dialogue. The FBI and our interagency partners remain 
concerned about, and focused on, the covert and overt influence 
measures used by certain adversaries in their attempts to sway U.S. 
voters' preferences and perspectives, shift U.S. policies, increase 
discord in the United States, and undermine the American people's 
confidence in our democratic processes.
    Foreign influence operations--which include subversive, undeclared, 
coercive, and criminal actions by foreign governments to influence U.S. 
political sentiment or public discourse or interfere in our processes 
themselves--are not a new problem. But the interconnectedness of the 
modern world, combined with the anonymity of the Internet, have changed 
the nature of the threat and how the FBI and its partners must address 
it. Foreign influence operations have taken many forms and used many 
tactics over the years. Most widely reported these days are attempts by 
adversaries--hoping to reach a wide swath of Americans covertly from 
outside the United States--to use false personas and fabricated stories 
on social media platforms to discredit U.S. individuals and 
institutions.
    The FBI is the lead Federal agency responsible for investigating 
foreign influence operations. In the fall of 2017, we established the 
Foreign Influence Task Force (``FITF'') to identify and counteract 
malign foreign influence operations targeting the United States. The 
FITF is led by the Counterintelligence Division and is comprised of 
agents, analysts, and professional staff from the Counterintelligence, 
Cyber, Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative Divisions. It is 
specifically charged with identifying and combating foreign influence 
operations targeting democratic institutions and values inside the 
United States. In all instances, the FITF strives to protect democratic 
institutions; develop a common operating picture; raise adversaries' 
costs; and reduce their overall asymmetric advantage.
    The FITF brings the FBI's national security and traditional 
criminal investigative expertise under one umbrella to prevent foreign 
influence in our elections. This better enables us to frame the threat, 
to identify connections across programs, to aggressively investigate as 
appropriate, and--importantly--to be more agile. Coordinating closely 
with our partners and leveraging relationships we have developed in the 
technology sector, we had several instances where we were able to 
quickly relay threat indicators that those companies used to take swift 
action, blocking budding abuse of their platforms.
    Following the 2018 midterm elections, we reviewed the threat and 
the effectiveness of our coordination and outreach. As a result of this 
review, we further expanded the scope of the FITF. Previously, our 
efforts to combat malign foreign influence focused solely on the threat 
posed by Russia. Utilizing lessons learned since 2018, the FITF widened 
its aperture to confront malign foreign operations of China, Iran, and 
other global adversaries. To address this expanding focus and wider set 
of adversaries and influence efforts, we have also added resources to 
maintain permanent ``surge'' capability on election and foreign 
influence threats.
    These additional resources were also devoted to working with U.S. 
Government partners on two documents regarding the U.S. Government's 
analysis of foreign efforts to influence or interfere with the 2020 
Election. The reports are separate but complementary. The first 
report--referred to as the 1a report and authored by the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence--outlines the intentions of foreign 
adversaries with regard to influencing and interfering in the election 
but does not evaluate impact. The second report--referred to as the 1b 
report and authored by the Department of Justice, including the FBI, 
and Department of Homeland Security, including the CISA--evaluates the 
impact of foreign government activity on the security or integrity of 
election infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to political 
organizations, candidates, or campaigns.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ These reports are required by sections 1(a) and 1(b) of 
Executive Order 13,848.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The main takeaway from both reports is there is no evidence--not 
through intelligence collection on the foreign actors themselves, not 
through physical security and cybersecurity monitoring of voting 
systems across the country, not through post-election audits, and not 
through any other means--that a foreign government or other actors 
compromised election infrastructure to manipulate election results.
    While the 2020 election is over, the FBI will not stop working with 
our partners to impose costs on adversaries who have or are seeking to 
influence or interfere in our elections.
    The fiscal year 2022 request includes 28 positions (including 7 
Special Agents, 4 Intelligence Analysts, and 17 Professional Staff) and 
$18.8 million to help combat the threats posed by foreign, and 
potentially hostile, intelligence services and other foreign government 
actors.
                            criminal threats
    We face many criminal threats, from complex white-collar fraud in 
the financial, healthcare, and housing sectors to transnational and 
regional organized criminal enterprises to violent crime and public 
corruption. Criminal organizations--domestic and international--and 
individual criminal activity represent a significant threat to our 
security and safety in communities across the Nation.
Violent Crime
    Violent crimes and gang activities exact a high toll on individuals 
and communities. Many of today's gangs are sophisticated and well 
organized, and use violence to control neighborhoods and boost their 
illegal money-making activities, which include robbery, drug and gun 
trafficking, fraud, extortion, and prostitution rings. These gangs do 
not limit their illegal activities to single jurisdictions or 
communities. The FBI is able to work across such lines, which is vital 
to the fight against violent crime in big cities and small towns across 
the Nation. Every day, FBI special agents work in partnership with 
Federal, State, local, and Tribal officers and deputies on joint task 
forces and individual investigations.
    Similar to the FBI's work combatting gangs, the FBI also 
investigates the most serious crimes in Indian Country--such as murder, 
child sexual and physical abuse, violent assaults, drug trafficking, 
public corruption, financial crimes, and Indian gaming violations. As 
you are aware, there are 574 federally recognized American Indian 
Tribes in the United States, and the FBI has Federal law enforcement 
responsibility on nearly 200 Indian reservations. This Federal 
jurisdiction is shared concurrently with the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(``BIA''), Office of Justice Services; the FBI works very closely with 
BIA and other Federal, State, and Tribal partners across the United 
States on crimes in Indian Country.
    Recently, the FBI's work in Indian Country in Oklahoma increased 
significantly due to the July 9, 2020, Supreme Court ruling in McGirt 
v. Oklahoma, which determined that the territorial boundaries of the 
Muscogee Creek Nation (``MCN'') fall under Federal Indian Country 
jurisdiction, making the FBI the responsible law enforcement agency for 
offenses committed by or victimizing a Tribal member. The principles of 
the McGirt decision also apply to the status of the Cherokee, 
Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Seminole Tribal territories in Oklahoma. 
Combined, all five reservation territories encompass approximately 
32,000 square miles, or 45 percent of the State of Oklahoma. The total 
population within the combined borders is roughly 1.9 million, of which 
approximately 420,000 are enrolled Tribal members.
    This increase in FBI jurisdiction poses significant and long-term 
operational and public safety risks given the challenges associated 
with the increased number of violent criminal cases now under Federal 
jurisdiction within Oklahoma's IC territory. Since this decision, the 
FBI's Oklahoma City Field Office (``OC'') has seen a drastic increase 
in the total number of Indian Country investigations and now has the 
FBI's largest investigative responsibility. From July 9, 2020 to March 
23, 2021, FBI OC opened nearly 1,000 Indian Country investigations 
(most of them adopted from previous State actions), prioritizing cases 
involving the most violent offenders who pose the most serious risk to 
the public. As a point of comparison, the FBI's other 55 Field Offices 
opened a combined total of 1,255 IC investigations during the same 
period, with FBI Minneapolis, the next largest Indian Country office 
behind FBI OC, opening over 300 cases. This workload data primarily 
represents the cases from the MCN reservation alone; this workload is 
expected to increase substantially given the additions of the Cherokee 
and Chickasaw reservations in mid-March and the Choctaw and Seminole 
reservations in April. The FBI is anticipating 2,500 new cases next 
year and approximately 5,000 adopted cases from previously adjudicated 
in Oklahoma State courts which were overturned either by McGirt or 
subsequent Oklahoma court decisions applying McGirt.
    To effectively conduct these investigations, the FBI has conducted 
temporary duty (``TDY'') rotations of 140 Special Agents, Investigative 
Analysts, Victims Specialists and other professional staff to the 
Muskogee and Tulsa RAs, the offices most impacted by the decision. The 
FBI has also expanded State, local, and Tribal participation on task 
forces to 230 Task Force Officers from 32 agencies to assist with 
initial response and investigative efforts. The U.S. Attorney's Offices 
in the Eastern District of Oklahoma and the Northern District of 
Oklahoma also increased their staffing. In order to support the U.S. 
Attorneys' effective prosecution of these crimes, the FBI must have the 
capability to sustain an enhanced presence in FBI OC. As such, the 
fiscal year 2022 request includes $25.5 million to support the surge in 
personnel to meet the immediate need, as the situation on the ground 
continues to evolve. In addition, the fiscal year 2022 request includes 
$6.2 million to fulfill the Department of Justice's October 2020, 
policy on Use of Body-Worn Cameras by federally Deputized Task Force 
Officers.
                               conclusion
    Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The 
threats we face as a nation have never been greater or more diverse and 
the expectations placed on the FBI have never been higher. Our fellow 
citizens look to the FBI to protect the United States from all of those 
threats, and the men and women of the FBI continue to meet and exceed 
those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their dedicated 
service.
    Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking Member Moran, and Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am 
happy to answer any questions you might have.

    Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. You pointed out 
that both Senator Moran and I raised the ransomware attacks in 
our opening remarks. It wasn't clear to me, looking at your 
budget request, exactly where that was covered and whether you 
feel like you have the resources that you need in order to 
address this kind of activity. Can you just be specific about 
where you are looking to get the resources and what you are 
going to need?
    Director Wray. Right. So our budget request, the 
enhancements we requested include 155 positions and $40 million 
for cyber. And a huge part of that will be going very much to 
the ransomware campaign that we are working on. We did about 
1,100 different kinds of disruption actions against cyber 
adversaries last year, talking about arrests, criminal charges, 
convictions, dismantlement, and disruptions. And I think on the 
ransomware piece specifically, our strategy is to go after the 
entire criminal ecosystem that exists there.
    So not just the people demanding the ransomware, but all 
the people who helped facilitate it. You know, the--we are 
trying to go after the actors. We are trying to go after the 
helpers. We are trying to go after their infrastructure. We are 
trying to go after the money. You mentioned our efforts to 
recover the cryptocurrency that was paid in ransom, so things 
like that, but it has to be a cross the Government effort. Our 
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force brings together 
about 30 different agencies, all co-located together with an 
effort to try to have more joint sequenced operations to 
maximize impact.
    We have got to take a little bit of our page out of the 
counterterrorism strategy book, everybody working together, 
focusing on prevention and disruption. And that is what we are 
trying to do.
    Senator Shaheen. Well, two related questions. There are 
some people who suggest that we should outlaw payment for 
ransomware attacks. Do you agree with that? And second, how do 
we go after groups like in the Colonial Pipeline case where we 
think they are operating out of Russia with full knowledge of 
the Putin administration in Russia?
    Director Wray. So our guidance to industry is not to pay 
the ransom. And there is a whole host of reasons for that, but 
the most important thing, the most important thing, because I 
understand it is a difficult decision for victims to make. The 
most important thing is that they reach out and connect with 
law enforcement, with us as quickly and transparently as 
possible. It is a little bit like the example--you know, we 
encourage people when there is kidnappings of humans not to pay 
the ransom. But you want to have, in effect, the cyber 
equivalent of the FBI agent sitting there with the person 
talking to the hostage taker, because there is all kinds of 
things we can do to help ensure a happy ending to the 
investigation if we are engaged early and transparently.
    So that is the most important thing. But in general, we 
would discourage paying the ransom because it encourages more 
of these attacks, and frankly, there is no guarantee whatsoever 
that you are going to get your data back, among other things.
    Senator Shaheen. So do we need to think about changes, 
legislative changes to address authorities for law enforcement 
and the FBI on hacking incidents and ransomware incidents? I 
remember several years ago we had proposed legislation that 
never went anywhere that would have required reporting by 
companies. Should we be looking at something like that again?
    Director Wray. Well, I obviously don't want to get out in 
front in terms of a specific legislative proposal. But I will 
say that if we don't solve the riddle of how to get the private 
sector promptly and transparently working with us, and more and 
more companies, I should say, are doing that all the time. But 
if we don't make that sort of the norm, we are going to have a 
heck of a time winning this conflict, if you will. And so 
anything that helps provide more incentive for that to happen, 
I think is a step in the right direction.
    Senator Shaheen. Good. I mentioned in my opening comments, 
and we have discussed this before, what has been called the 
Havana's syndrome. How involved is the FBI in the cooperative 
effort in the administration to take a look at what's happening 
with these attacks? Do you think--can these be classified as a 
crime? And if so, how do we go after either the perpetrators or 
allow victims to get restitution for what they have suffered?
    Director Wray. So we are very much involved. We are working 
closely under the auspices of the NSC with our interagency 
partners, especially the CIA, DOD, the State Department and 
others, and bringing what we can bring to the table. Our 
highest priority, of course, is the protection and well-being, 
the health and well-being of U.S. Government personnel.
    We are making progress for sure, but we are not yet at a 
point where we know the cause of the incidents and whether it 
was an attack and if so, who did it, etcetera. I will tell you 
that we are trying to be aggressive, and we are viewing all of 
the U.S. Government personnel who have these symptoms, from our 
perspective, they are victims. And we want to treat them as 
potential victims. And they are our colleagues in the Federal 
Government, so we care deeply about them.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Chairman, thank you. Director, I recently 
visited McAllen, Texas, where I met with your special agent in 
charge of the San Antonio field office. He was able to brief me 
on the counterintelligence threats to the area, specifically to 
mainstream companies with a National Security or innovation 
focus such as SpaceX. What I heard was disturbing, terribly 
threatening, in my view, to the well-being of Americans and to 
our economy. Director Wray, are you aware of those threats? And 
what can you tell us in this unclassified setting about this 
topic?
    Director Wray. Well, I am very pleased that you were able 
to meet with SCC Combs. It is a very high performing office 
down there and they are dealing with some very challenging and 
complex threats. And, of course, I have spoken in the past 
about the very serious counterintelligence threats that I think 
we face from our adversaries. And we have been very focused on 
working with the private sector, specifically on the 
counterintelligence front.
    And as the U.S. moves more and more towards the private 
sector in terms of space exploration, we need to support those 
companies in much the same way, for example, we would support 
NASA. And I think beyond that, it would probably be better for 
me to arrange, you know, some kind of classified briefing for 
you because I can't get in a whole lot more detail in an open 
setting.
    Senator Moran. Perhaps if it is okay with you, I will look 
for a time for me to come to see you.
    Director Wray. Okay, great. Thank you.
    Senator Moran. Over the last two weeks, Axios has 
extensively reported on massive fraud within the unemployment 
insurance programs. The numbers are staggering. Experts suggest 
that criminals may have stolen as much as half of the 
unemployment benefits distributed over the last year, 
fraudulent claims could reach $400 billion.
    Alarmingly, the bulk of these funds appear to have been 
stolen by foreign criminal syndicates, making this, Axios 
observes, not just theft, but a matter of National Security. 
Director, what is the FBI's best assessment of the extent of 
unemployment insurance fraud over the last year, and how much 
is believed to have been stolen by foreign criminal 
organizations?
    Director Wray. So we obviously share your concern. We have 
seen a huge spike, huge spike in unemployment fraud cases and 
investigations from COVID. By last count, and this is a rough 
number, but by last count, I think we had about 800 
unemployment fraud investigations and the vast majority of 
those have some tie to the pandemic. As far as foreign criminal 
involvement, we certainly are aware of a number of schemes and 
scams, but I don't know that I have any kind of estimate of how 
much of the overall loss comes from those kinds of actors. But 
it is something that we are keenly attuned to.
    And, of course, we are trying to take advantage of both all 
56 of our field offices here, but also working with our legal 
offices overseas, because they may be able to work with foreign 
partners to help us pursue, you know, bad actors elsewhere and 
their involvement.
    Senator Moran. Director, thank you. I hope to have maybe 
additional conversation in this regard as well. In September, 
the FBI will release its annual data set on violent crimes in 
the United States. That report will show what you have already 
acknowledged publicly, a spike in serious violent crime in a 
number of American cities, including significant increases in 
murder and aggravated assaults. Kansas, unfortunately, has not 
been immune.
    The city of Wichita reported 59 homicides in 2020, the 
highest total since 1993, and about one every 6 days. According 
to Wichita Police Chief Gordon Ramsay, this trend has continued 
into 2021. In your speech to the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police last year, you acknowledge the FBI can play a 
critical role in reducing that violent crime, including by 
surging agents and other FBI resources to affected cities by 
working together with State and local partners.
    Director Wray, what is the FBI doing to address these 
serious spikes in violent crime? And would you consider further 
surges of personnel and resources to those affected 
communities?
    Director Wray. So we absolutely are concerned about the 
rise in violent crime, specifically the most dangerous type of 
violent crime, namely the homicide rate all over the country. 
And key to that is partnership. We are bringing our resources 
to bear through our 170 or so safe streets task forces, our 50 
or so violent crime task forces. So you are talking about 500, 
give or take, you know, FBI agents plus task force officers. 
You know, I think we did 6,500 violent crime arrests amidst the 
worst of the pandemic.
    So you are talking about 14 a day. You know, we are also 
trying to contribute in other ways through NICS, making sure 
that guns don't get in the hands of the people legally 
prohibited from having them. Our tip line, our lab supporting 
State and locals. And we have, to your point about surging 
resources, we have recently created a new violent crime rapid 
deployment team, at headquarters, the purpose of which--run out 
of headquarters, I should say, the purpose of which is to be 
able to surge to sort of crisis situations.
    I know that in Kansas City in that--I don't mean Kansas 
City, the city, but the division, we had 140 gang arrests and 
200 something violent crime arrests last year. And I remember I 
think we spoke once about the, in Wichita, there was a gang, 
the junior boy violent gang that, you know, that one takedown 
largely dismantled a long running a gang in Wichita, you know, 
20, say 25 arrests, seizing guns, drugs, money and so forth. So 
we are going to be trying to do more and more of that wherever 
we can.
    Senator Moran. Director, I thank you and the Kansas City 
FBI bureau for their attention to Kansas communities, Kansas 
City and Wichita in particular. My time has expired. I would 
just say to the Director, I also am the Ranking Member of the 
Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs. It is meeting at the same 
time. My absence from time to time today will not be a 
reflection on my lack of interest in what you have to say.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Moran. Senator 
Feinstein.
    Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. I 
watched the CNN show Sunday night on January 6, and it has been 
nearly 6 months since the capital was attacked, and I think we 
still lack a clear picture of the FBI's understanding of the 
threat in the days leading up to the attack. The Post reported 
in January that dozens of individuals listed in the terrorist 
screening database traveled to Washington before the Capitol 
attack. The FBI's Washington field office, I understand, stated 
that the bureau disrupted the travel of a number of individuals 
who were planning to travel to D.C., ``with intentions to cause 
violence.''
    It is my understanding that you testified last week to the 
House Oversight Committee that, ``none of those people had 
indicated an intention to attack the Capitol.'' As you look at 
this now in perspective, Director Wray, could you clarify for 
us what the FBI knew and what it didn't know before the attack 
took place?
    Director Wray. Well, I guess the first thing I would say 
about the facts leading up to January 6 is because of all the 
investigations we are doing right now, we are continuing to 
learn all sorts of things post January 6. And sometimes there 
gets to be a little bit of conflation about information that we 
are developing through those hundreds of cases with information 
that we had before. So I just want to put that out there in 
front, because I am sure there will be, continue to be news 
coverage of different sorts as we move forward. I think what I 
would say is that before January 6, we were, to my knowledge, 
aware that there would be large numbers of individuals coming 
to D.C. to participate in protests, protests, and that we had 
some information that gave us concerns about the potential for 
violence more generally. There is, of course, this Norfolk 
report, which has gotten a lot of attention, which was a one 
piece of information that was raw and unverified and 
unattributed.
    And we passed that three different ways as quickly as 
possible shortly after getting it. What we did not have, to my 
knowledge at least, is intelligence indicating that hundreds 
and hundreds of people were going to breach the Capitol 
complex. That to my knowledge, we did not have that. You 
mentioned these individuals that we interviewed or disrupted 
before January 6. I think there is a little bit of garble in 
maybe some of the news reporting. So I can't speak to the 
specific article that you were citing, but just in general, 
what we are talking about there are a handful of small number 
of individuals who were previously predicated subjects of 
investigations who were approached in one way or another, 
interviewed or in some other way disrupted from traveling.
    I want to be clear, though, there is a big difference 
between people indicating that they might travel to D.C. and 
people indicating they might travel to D.C. to commit a violent 
attack, much less a violent attack against the Capitol, which 
is not my understanding of what those individuals revealed 
beforehand.
    Senator Feinstein. I think many of us are trying to 
understand and not to criticize as much as to be able to 
correct our systems. The number of people, and if you watch the 
CNN show Sunday night, which went on and was very graphic, 
there was no question when you really had pictures of who was 
there and what they were doing, that people came with an intent 
to do what they did. And I have never really been able to get a 
clear picture of what is--what was known and what wasn't known, 
because what I saw on television Sunday night was something I 
have never seen before in this country like that. And it was 
shocking.
    Director Wray. Well, we consider the whole event shocking 
and appalling, and we are absolutely determined to make sure 
that we do our part to make sure it never happens again. So I 
want to be crystal clear on that. I think you know something--
one thing that gets a little bit lost sometimes is that even 
though we have had hundreds and hundreds of domestic terrorism 
investigations ongoing, actually very, very few, almost none of 
the people who we have arrested since January 6, for January 6 
were people----
    Senator Feinstein. How many people did you arrest--have 
been arrested?
    Director Wray. I think we have got around well, I think it 
is a little over 500 arrests now, once you include, and there 
are a few that have been done by some of our partners as well. 
So the FBI's arrests are close to 500. And then when you add in 
the partners, it is a little over 500. And I want to be clear, 
we have got hundreds more investigations still ongoing.
    And we expect in many cases we will have even more serious 
charges against some of the people we already have charged. So 
this is far from over. And with each arrest and each case we 
bring, not only are we driving towards accountability for the 
attack, but we are also learning more about what was out there 
beforehand so that we can use that to get better going forward.
    Senator Feinstein. Well, it was pretty clear from the 
footage I saw Sunday night that a lot was out there. They came 
with intent now proving it is another story, but this was an 
eye opener for me as I watched that show, and I think it is 
really important that we understand not to criticize it is 
over, but to know what to do to prevent that from ever 
happening again.
    Director Wray. Well, I agree that absolutely we want to do 
our part and I haven't seen the particular CNN show that you 
are talking about, but certainly we are looking at things like 
how can we develop better sources? How can we get better with 
data analytics for the volumes of information that we get? How 
can we deal with the encryption issue, which I know is 
something you and I have spoken about in the past? And that is 
very much a phenomenon with this threat, because a lot of the 
most significant and revealing communications between these 
actors, and we saw it related to the January 6 people now that 
we are investigating, and we saw it over the summer with some 
of the attackers in those events, it is through encrypted 
messaging communications. And we have got to figure out a 
solution to that.
    Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Senator 
Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you, Directory Wray. And please pass 
on all of our respect for what you and your agents and support 
personnel do. It seems to me you got a pretty full plate. Is 
that fair to say?
    Director Wray. It certainly feels full.
    Senator Graham. Okay. If Senator Moran is right, which I am 
sure he is, when you look at personnel cost increases and 
generally cost of doing business, most of the increases 
requested about 65 percent go to that and $150 million left for 
new programs. Do you agree with that, new capabilities?
    Director Wray. Well, I think sometimes I have a little bit 
of a hard time in this format tracking all the numbers. I think 
one of the, one of the challenges is that last year's budget 
had a significant number of enhancements, but at the same time, 
also a bunch of reductions to the base. So it is like giveth 
with one hand, taketh away with the other.
    Senator Graham. If the subcommittee decided to say increase 
by $100 million your budget, could you spend it wisely?
    Director Wray. I can assure you that any money that this 
subcommittee thinks sees fit to give, I promise it will be put 
to good use.
    Senator Graham. Good. I believe you. So there is a record 
number, in certain jurisdictions and really a trend all over 
the country, of retirements by police officers and recruiting 
problems. Are you familiar with this?
    Director Wray. Very much so.
    Senator Graham. What do you think is causing this?
    Director Wray. I think this is a very, very challenging 
time for the law enforcement.
    Senator Graham. Have you ever known a more challenging time 
since you have been in the business?
    Director Wray. I have not.
    Senator Graham. Okay, what can we do to deal with it?
    Director Wray. I think it starts with a recognition that it 
takes an incredibly special person to get up in the morning and 
put his or her life on the line for a total stranger. And then 
when you stop and think about how few people are willing to do 
that, think about how many people are willing to do that every 
single day for an entire career. And so I think it starts with 
a level of gratitude and respect for those people.
    Senator Graham. Is this a fair statement that police 
reform, I think, is necessary, better training, better 
standards, more exposure to departments for the conduct of the 
officers legally, but at the same time a deeper appreciation 
for the job that police officers do? Do you agree that those 
two things are not inconsistent?
    Director Wray. I would. I would agree with that.
    Senator Graham. Okay. And I hope we can deliver there. In 
terms of the crime wave that we are facing, increase in murders 
particularly, the administration is going to announce a five 
point program today to deal with the rise in crime. Were you 
consulted by the administration in that program?
    Director Wray. Well, we--yes, we are working with the 
Justice Department through our piece of it. I am not--I haven't 
seen the announcement itself, but the----
    Senator Graham. Do you know what the five point plan is?
    Director Wray. I don't--I know our part.
    Senator Graham. Okay. What is your part?
    Director Wray. So we are working with the Department on 
something called Project Safe Neighborhoods, which is a revival 
of an effort that you may remember from the Bush 
administration, frankly. And it is a multipoint plan geared 
towards attacking gun violence all across the country. And so 
the FBI working with all of our partners on that.
    Senator Graham. Do you believe that one of the reasons 
crime is on the rise is that certain jurisdictions have 
basically eliminated bail? You catch them on Monday morning, 
and they are out on the streets Monday afternoon?
    Director Wray. Well, I do think there are a lot of causes, 
but I think one of the causes of the violent crime spike are 
certain kinds of prosecution practices----
    Senator Graham. We are not prosecuting enough people and we 
are sending a signal that maybe you can rob or loot a store and 
get away with it and it sort of escalates. Is that fair to say?
    Director Wray. Well, I guess I would put it this way. I 
think there is nothing more disheartening to a law enforcement 
officer to see somebody that you worked hard to arrest promptly 
back out, committing a crime again. There is enough people to 
go after the first time, without the same person over and over 
again.
    Senator Graham. I totally agree. That is the problem. I 
hope we will deal with it. When it comes to Russia, Dark Side 
is supposedly responsible for the Colonial Pipeline attack and 
Revil--Ravil, the attack on JBS meat processing attack. Both 
these are Russian speaking criminal organizations. Do you 
believe it is possible that they could operate in Russia 
without Putin's Government knowing about it?
    Director Wray. So many things I would like to say.
    [Laughter.]
    Senator Graham. This is the chance to say it.
    Director Wray. Yes, well--well, let me say this. You 
mentioned Darkside. The other organization you are talking 
about is, goes by the name are R-Evil.
    Senator Graham. Yes, I am sorry.
    Director Wray. Aptly named. I think what I would say is 
this, over and over again----
    Senator Graham. We are policy makers, I know my time is up, 
we have got to make a decision eventually, how to respond to 
Russia. We have had to cyber terrorism attacks emanating from 
Russian speaking criminal enterprises. I think all of us 
believe it is impossible for these people to operate in Russia 
without some acknowledgment by the--some support by the 
Government or at least a lack of action on their part. We got 
to make a decision. Would we be irresponsible in assuming that 
Putin is giving cover these groups and the only way things will 
change is for him to pay a price for giving that cover? Or is 
that illogical on our part?
    Director Wray. I think the Russian government has a lot of 
room for improvement on this subject. Let me just leave it at 
that.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Graham. Very 
diplomatic, Director Wray. Senator Reed.
    Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and 
thank you, Director, for your service and the service and 
sacrifice of so many of your men and women in the FBI. January 
6 was a disheartening moment. And I am wildly understating 
that. There was an ad hoc response which relied a great deal on 
the National Guard and other police elements. We are looking 
forward now, as we should, to a more coherent response if the 
situation occurs again.
    And as an alternative to the National Guard, I think and I 
like your comments, if we could put together a Federal, State, 
local law enforcement group that is trained as integrated, is 
compensated, and is coordinated for such an event with the 
participation of the Bureau in key areas, would that be more 
effective than summoning the Guard from everywhere?
    Director Wray. Well, I certainly would say it this way. I 
certainly understand the attraction of having a law enforcement 
kind of ready to deploy type of force. We have worked very well 
with the National Guard, but there are challenges that they 
face, you know, in their ability to deploy. Not on the FBI 
side, just to be clear. You know, we don't and really never 
have in our 113 year history really done crowd control or 
static defense or things like that. So we don't really have the 
skills, the training, and the equipment to do that part of it. 
What we do have are overseen by our critical incident response 
group.
    We have things like our hostage rescue team which can 
deploy in certain situations. We have crisis negotiators. We 
have aerial surveillance in certain instances, you know, things 
like that that we can lend to the effort. But I think most of 
what you are talking about would ultimately be more on the 
shoulders of other agencies. I want to be careful not to speak 
for them.
    Senator Reed. No, but I think you have critical elements 
that you could engage, and they would have to rehearse, 
practice, etcetera. So I don't--I think one of the lessons is, 
ad hoc is not that good when you are facing a mob of folks. The 
other aspect here too is, just for the record, the National 
Guard still waiting to get paid hundreds of millions of 
dollars, which could affect their training this summer. So for 
all my colleagues, if you could urge everyone to pay the 
National Guard that would be useful. One of the most difficult 
issues that you face in your intelligence capacity is trying to 
recognize, respect First Amendment rights to communicate freely 
with your responsibility to monitor what is going on the web. 
Can you give us an idea of how you make that call? I presume 
you have active--well, let me not presume, do you have active 
sort of intelligence agents that are going through the web and 
trying to identify?
    Director Wray. So this is a complicated topic. I will try 
to do my best to give sort of a shorthand version. But there 
may be nuances that get lost in the description. So what we--
there are long standing policies that go back, you know, 10, 15 
plus years, the Attorney General guidelines, as implemented by 
something called the DIAG, which are all designed to tell us 
what we can and cannot do, especially when it implicates civil 
liberties and so forth, and that--there is parts of it that 
deal with social media.
    And so what we can do depends on whether or not we have 
got--what level of predication we have and whether we have got 
an authorized purpose. We do get all kinds of tips and leads 
from the public, from partners of all shapes and sizes, some of 
which include things on social media. And we pursue those in 
whatever way we can under those policies. What we don't do, and 
some people, I think are confused about this, what we don't do 
is just have people sitting there, at least without proper 
predication and an authorized purpose, just kind of monitoring 
somebody's, you know, Internet traffic and trying to see if 
there is something there just in case. That we don't currently 
do.
    Now, in theory, somebody could look at the policies and 
decide that the balance needs to be struck a little 
differently. There is all kinds of considerations that go into 
that. But to give a really fulsome answer to your question 
would probably require a much longer discussion.
    Senator Reed. I think it probably would require a law 
review article at least. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Senator Reed. Senator Hagerty.
    Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Madam Chair. Director Wray, I 
want to thank you for your long service to our Nation. Very 
much appreciate it. The first topic I would like to cover with 
you has to do with the morale of the FBI. I had the great honor 
of serving and working with a great FBI team in my previous 
position as ambassador to Japan. Your rank and file are 
patriotic and honorable men and women who I am certain wake up 
every day looking at how they can best serve the United States 
of America. But over the past 5 years, I think the reputation 
of the FBI has really come under challenge. We have seen a 
presidential candidate spied upon in 2016. We have seen 
headquarter investigators using blatant political bias as they 
pursue investigations.
    And I think that really has called into question America's 
confidence in the agency. I know it is disheartening to the men 
and women that serve at the FBI who came to serve their Nation, 
not to pick sides in a presidential battle. I am interested in, 
and I know you are working hard on this, but what are you 
doing, what are you undertaking to restore America's confidence 
and the confidence of the men and women that work for you in 
the agency as a nonpartisan, and an unbiased, nonpolitical 
institution?
    Director Wray. So I have a lot to say on this subject. 
First, I will stack our workforce up against any workforce, 
anywhere, any time. A lot of the press coverage and discussion 
has been based on essentially two investigations over about an 
18 month period involving a small number of people. And we are 
an organization of 37,000 people. It has been around for 113 
years doing thousands and thousands of investigations every 
year. And what I see, what I hear from the American people 
themselves is a resounding, even consistent appreciation and 
respect for what our folks do. The hundreds of--we speak, 
through our work, to hundreds of kids we have saved, the 
terrorist attacks we have disrupted, the scores of violent 
gangs, COVID fraudsters, Chinese spies, etcetera. And I say 
that from having visited all 56 of our field offices, most of 
them more than once, met with law enforcement partners from all 
50 States and over 50 countries, spoken with judges, 
prosecutors, private sector leaders, community leaders, 
victims, and their families. And the refrain I get is very 
different from what is in a lot of the news coverage.
    Now, I will give you a bright spot, because I know you care 
about our workforce. Our attrition rate is 0.4 percent. And you 
would be hard pressed to find an organization out there, public 
or private, with an attrition rate that low. Second, our 
recruiting, that is the number of Americans all across this 
country, including every State represented in this 
subcommittee, applying to be special agents, so expressing 
their view of the FBI through their feet by trying to sign up 
and put their lives on the line, working with us for an entire 
career has tripled, triple what it was when I started this 
show.
    Senator Hagerty. That is very encouraging.
    Director Wray. And that is through the pandemic. And to me, 
that speaks volumes about what Americans everywhere actually 
think about the FBI.
    Senator Hagerty. And I think, you know, that this 
subcommittee stands behind you as well. And we want to see this 
budget deployed in a way that continues to support the morale 
and the patriotic men and women that work for you. And I think 
that speaks volumes, the statistics that you went through. And 
like you, I have a lot to say and feel about this as well, 
because I think it is a great agency that you run. And I want 
to see the pristine image of the agency restored once again and 
appreciate your leadership in that direction. If I could turn 
right now to another area, this is having to do with a 
significant increase in crime that we saw in 2020. And again, 
another surge in crime that is underway right now. Homicide 
rates up 30 percent last year, another 25 percent this year. 
Back in 2020, Operation Legend was put into play.
    Sadly, Operation Legend was named for a 4 year old boy who 
was killed by a stray bullet in Kansas City. That operation led 
to the arrest of some 6,000 criminals, the confiscation of 17 
kilos of fentanyl that are killing our kids every day. In light 
of the surge that is underway yet again in crime, why is it 
that Operation Legend was brought to an end in December of 
2020?
    Director Wray. I can't--you know, Operation Legend was 
something that was run by the Justice Department, so I probably 
would leave that part to the Justice Department. Certainly I 
agree with you that I think it was a big success. It probably 
was not a sustainable effort, you know, in perpetuity, given 
the way in which we were all--such a surging resources from all 
over. We are I mentioned, I think, in response to Senator 
Moran's question, that on our end, we have recently created 
this violent crime rapid deployment team, which is an effort to 
take a little bit of the idea behind Legend and make that 
available.
    But that is really--that is not going to be a complete 
answer in its own right. And I think you are exactly right that 
this is a topic that cannot be overlooked in the middle of 
everything else that is going on, because I think most 
Americans right now, the security threat they are most 
concerned about is violent crime.
    Senator Hagerty. Yes. Well, thank you for leadership in 
that direction, Director Wray. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Leahy, and Chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee.
    Senator Leahy. Thank you very much. Director, always good 
to see you. And thank you for being here. I think we could all 
talk about how much we appreciate what the men and women of the 
FBI do and truly mean it. Several of your predecessors worked 
with me and worked with the FBI both in Vermont and down here, 
and I do appreciate their skill and dedication. With all these 
wild conspiracy theories going on about the insurrection on 
January 6, all of which have tried to portray the attack on the 
Capitol as anything but a violent assault by domestic 
extremists on the heart of democracy, even though everybody who 
was here saw that is exactly what it was. You have debunked 
some of these theories when we last spoke in March when you 
testified in the Judiciary Committee.
    It seems a new crop of excuses and conspiracy theories have 
come up since you testified before the House Oversight 
Committee. So let me give you another opportunity to discredit 
the dangerously bogus claims have been floating around about 
the January 6 attack, particularly those that are relating to 
the FBI's involvement in the attack.
    Let me just ask you directly, did anyone in the Trump White 
House ever encourage or direct you or anyone in your staff to 
downplay the potential threat of violence in January 6, when 
Congress was scheduled to take our constitutionally mandated 
presidential vote count?
    Director Wray. No.
    Senator Leahy. I will take that elaborate answer as a no, 
and I appreciate it. The FBI is responsible for investigating 
Federal election crimes such as voter suppression that 
intentionally target minority protected classes.
    The growing wave of voter suppression laws in dozens of 
States raise serious concerns. What are you doing with the FBI 
to prepare for the upcoming elections in which many of us 
expect to see unprecedented level of voter suppression?
    Director Wray. So we are doing a few different things. We 
have election crime coordinators in every field office, and of 
course they focus on the full manner of types of election 
crimes. And they are all well connected with each other and 
through our criminal investigative division. Voter suppression 
specifically when we get involved is more through our civil 
rights program. And so we work closely with the Justice 
Department, both the Civil Rights Division and the U.S. 
Attorney Offices on that. In addition, you may remember from 
our past engagements that we created, I created the Foreign 
Influence Task Force early on in my tenure. And although that 
is focused on foreign influence, of course, we are concerned 
about foreign influence, malign foreign influence that could in 
turn have a sort of surreptitious effect on voter suppression. 
So we are coming out at that piece of it as well.
    Senator Leahy. And as you know, I supported you when you 
formed that. Do you need further resources? Now here is your 
chance. It is not only--asking you, I am asking you as Chairman 
of the Committee, do you need further resources in this area?
    Director Wray. We are busier than we ever have been. And I 
can assure you that if the Congress sees fit to send us more 
resources on this, I can--I am quite confident that it will be 
put to good use.
    Senator Leahy. I thought that was probably so. My last 
question is on NICS, the national incident criminal background 
check. Last year, you processed nearly 40 million firearm 
background checks, only about 20 million so far this year. 
Congress provided you $179 million in emergency funding to help 
address the increased workload of gun background checks. How is 
that been utilized? Is it enough?
    Director Wray. So we have been able to put it to use and we 
are very grateful for it. Because of the uptick in the 
operational tempo out there to hire more personnel and to make 
system improvements, that funding was, as I recall, essentially 
a 2 year funding, which explains why we didn't have more of 
that in this budget request. But make no mistake, the pace that 
we are on, we will be needing more of that in the future for 
sure, because right now we are having to pull personnel from 
other critical functions to help out and do things like pay 
mandatory overtime just to be able to kind of triage the 
situation. So long term, we are absolutely going to need more 
resources, both for personnel out there and for systems 
improvements.
    Senator Leahy. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Capito.
    Senator Capito. Thank you. Thank you, Director Wray. And 
thank you to all of your--those in the FBI. We thank them from 
the bottom our hearts for everything that they do every day. 
And I want to thank Chairman Leahy for teeing me up for this, 
because when you said out there, out there is in Clarksburg, 
West Virginia, where they run the background checks at--on the 
NICS system. And one of the statistics, Senator Leahy, said 
almost 20 million already this year, but we had the highest May 
ever of 3,222,105 background checks, which is an amazing--so I 
am happy to hear, and I want to be as supportive as we possibly 
can be through this Committee to help you with the resources 
that you need.
    So I am going to ask a different question rather than tout 
what a great job they do out in Clarksburg, because we both 
know that. And we have heard about the rise in crime over the 
last 2 years, particularly this summer, seems to be 
particularly troublesome. What do you--do you correlate any of 
that with the rising number of firearm purchases? What--how do 
you all analyze that at the FBI, the rising number of 
background checks that are being performed in terms of 
purchases?
    Director Wray. Well, I don't know that we have been able 
to--settle on one specific factor, but certainly there have 
been a number of factors that drive, I think, the spike in 
violent crime. So COVID had a huge impact. You are talking 
about everything from trial backlogs, early releases, you know, 
unemployment, et cetera.
    We have more juveniles committing violent crime and there 
is all kinds of challenges in our legal system for dealing with 
them. I mentioned response to, I think, Senator Graham's 
question, certain prosecution practices and decrease sentences. 
I think that has an effect. The prevalence of firearms in the 
wrong hands is certainly an issue as well, especially gun 
trafficking across State lines. And things like--these are all 
things that I think collectively contribute to the problem.
    Senator Capito. Yes, I mean, I think the rise also is 
obviously, if you are going to legally purchase and go through 
a background check, it is probably in response to a rising 
criminal element for a defense. I mean, more people are feeling 
defenseless, more people are home more and feel like there may 
be making those purchases to protect them and their families. 
So I thank you for making sure those are getting safely into 
those hands. I want to talk about cyber-attacks. I asked the 
same question to Secretary Blinken and Attorney General Garland 
about ransomware. It is a particularly interesting to me 
because it is a semi-new phenomenon and none of it is--it is 
every article you read, it is not really sure or know how to 
handle it and what to do, and that it is a global issue as 
well.
    And so I am interested to know if you are working with your 
global partners on how to address ransomware. And then you read 
from time to time what the different advice is. Pay the ransom, 
don't pay the ransom. Are you--how are you all addressing that? 
I mean, is that something that you--I don't know that you give 
advice, but you would, you know, for a large breach like the 
Colonial Pipeline, certainly have to be involved with that. And 
how you are seeing ransomware. We know it is going to get 
worse. And so I suppose that is why the cyber part of your 
budget is going to be increased, and that would be the area 
that you would look at the ransomware issue. Am I correct in 
assuming that?
    Director Wray. Certainly the part of the cyber enhancement 
request, ransomware, is a huge component of that. It is going 
to go to all the different kinds of cyber intrusions, or 
certain nations. You know, something like Solar Winds would 
also be the kind of thing that would be addressed through that 
enhancement. But ransomware, I think, has become particularly 
challenging because we have seen the total volume of money 
paid, I think triple, you know, over the last year or so. 
Higher and higher ransoms, more sophisticated attacks.
    We are talking about ransomware as a service, which the 
Colonial Pipeline case illustrated, where sophisticated 
developers of ransomware then basically outsource it to less 
sophisticated actors, which just expands the problem and the 
availability of the technique. And they are also now more and 
more engaging in sort of a mix of both the locking up of the 
system and the exfiltration and leaking or extortion that way 
as well. As far as guidance to victims, our guidance is, don't 
pay the ransom. But let me say this, I understand that it is a 
hard decision for a company or a municipal Government or 
whatever it happens to be the make. And the one thing that I 
think is most important by far is that whether they pay or 
don't pay, they get in touch with us right away early on. 
Because when they do, there is all kinds of things that we can 
do. In the Colonial Pipeline case, for example, we were, as has 
been reported, able to essentially seize and confiscate some of 
the ransom, a lot of the ransom and to hit the bad guys right 
where it hurts.
    In other cases, it is not all the time, but it does happen, 
sometimes through other work we have done, we might have the 
decryption key and be able to help the company unlock their 
data without having to pay the ransom. Best of both worlds. So 
there is a lot of things we can do. But we can't do as much if 
we are not coordinated with early.
    But our strategy has to be whole of Government working with 
the private sector, working with foreign partners, as you 
mentioned, because invariably these actors are overseas. Going 
after the actors, going after their helpers, going after their 
infrastructure, going after their money. So it is a 
comprehensive type of approach.
    Senator Capito. Well, we want to be, again, as supportive 
as we can because this is a growing problem. Thank you.
    Director Wray. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Senator Capito. Before I call 
on Senator Braun, we just had a vote called. My intent, unless 
someone else shows up for the subcommittee, is to go ahead and 
ask Senator Braun and Senator Kennedy for their questioning and 
then to end the hearing. So just so everybody understands where 
we are going. Senator Braun.
    Senator Braun. Thank you, Madam Chair. In court 
submissions, the FBI has noted that it had--trouble. That is 
Okay. FBI had prior knowledge that there were going to--might 
be trouble on that day, and some of it was pretty stark. My 
question is, was there any plan that you were going to 
implement based upon that information being out there prior to 
what occurred on the 6? Was there a plan in place that you had 
ready to go should things unfurl the wrong way?
    Director Wray. Well, we had a couple of things. We had 
prepositioned tactical response unit, SWAT teams from the 
national capital region to be available, if called upon by our 
partners who are responsible for the security of the Capitol 
complex, or attacks elsewhere in the national capital region. 
Because we didn't have, as I said before, intelligence to my 
knowledge that indicated that they were going to be hundreds 
and hundreds of people trying to storm and siege the Capitol. 
So we had prepositioned tactical resources. We had command 
posts that we stood up both in the Washington field office and 
at headquarters in our SIOC that we were running the day before 
to--and the purpose of those, the reason those are important 
because you have got all these other agencies and partners with 
people there too, and the idea is to make sure that everybody 
is getting the same information, you know, as quickly as 
possible, and that is the goal of that.
    So those are some of the things that we were doing 
beforehand. And we, of course, had put out different kinds of 
intelligence products, essentially bulletins and things like 
that over the course of the year leading up to January 6. So 
those are a few of the things that we were doing.
    Senator Braun. Did you share all that information with the 
Capitol Police along the way and especially leading up to when 
you started to see more traffic online?
    Director Wray. Well, I am not aware of any pertinent 
information we didn't share, but I know that we--these 
intelligence products I was listing, of course, those would 
have gone not just to the Capitol Police, but to MPD and all 
the other partners as well. The--to the extent that we had sort 
of late breaking raw information, there has been a lot of 
discussion about this information from our Norfolk Field 
office, that was something that we passed on to our partners, 
including and in particular the Capitol Police, in three 
different ways. Now, that was raw, unverified information.
    But in the abundance of caution, we thought we would better 
get it to people as quickly as possible. And then this command 
post part of it is so important because that is where having 
been in these command posts, you know, every 30 minutes there 
is a briefing where every agency is quickly going through, here 
is what we are hearing, and here is what we are seeing. And 
they are all there and it is all being shared. And that is the 
point of it, to be able to do it in a nimble, agile, 
transparent way.
    Senator Braun. And in retrospect, would you have done 
anything differently?
    Director Wray. Well, certainly we have now arrested, you 
know, close to 500, little over 500, if you include our 
partners, people. And so if we had known that those people were 
going to do what they did, there is all kinds of things we 
would have done differently. We are more broadly trying to look 
at, can we develop better sources to anticipate things like 
this? Can we develop better data analytics to deal with the 
deluge, the terabytes and terabytes of information to separate 
the wheat from the chaff, as it were? We are looking at the 
encryption issue because a lot of the communications between 
the domestic terrorists are happening through encrypted 
platforms that we don't have a ready-made lawful access 
solution to. And of course, we are going to be looking at how 
we review and evaluate open source information, you know, 
social media, that kind of thing.
    Senator Braun. So does that mean you think it was maybe 
more spontaneous than planned? Or would you have--if it had 
been that obvious in terms of the planning of it, probably 
would have done more?
    Director Wray. Well, I think it is a little complicated to 
answer. The reason I say that is because you--in terms of the 
people committing crimes on January 6, you kind of have two 
buckets of people. You have one group of people who clearly 
committed crimes, including violence and destruction, in a more 
spontaneous way. But you also had some other people that we now 
know, we now know from investigative work we are doing after 
January 6, that were particularly bad actors who had 
infiltrated and were more organized among themselves. That is a 
smaller group. But they you know, they are the most dangerous 
ones.
    Senator Braun. One final question. Capitol surrounded by a 
non-scalable fence. To me, in being here, obviously, ever 
since--day since then, hadn't seen any credible threats. You 
may know of more. Do you think that fence needs to remain up or 
can we take it down? Because to me, I think there needs to be a 
good argument that something is impending or likely or either 
it needs to come down not only for the look, but for the cost 
of it to boot. What is your recommendation?
    Director Wray. Yes, I am not sure I could really weigh in 
on that. I mean, we as I mentioned in response to one of the 
earlier questions, we really don't have expertise in static 
defense and physical security in that sense. So that is a 
question really better directed to the people who have that.
    Senator Braun. And have you gotten any cues for any other 
impending incidents that might require you to keep it up? I 
mean, does the intel show that there is an imminent threat of 
anything, or does it show the opposite?
    Director Wray. Well, again, without reference to any 
fencing issue, I don't think, at least to my knowledge, we are 
not tracking any specific or credible threats to the Capitol.
    Senator Braun. Sounds like a good reason to take the fence 
down. Thank you.
    Senator Shaheen. Senator Coons.
    Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairwoman Shaheen, Ranking 
Member Moran. FBI Director Wray, it is great to be with you 
again. And I just want to thank you and the 37,000 men and 
women of the FBI who do the hard and difficult and demanding 
work of keeping us safe each and every day. I am mindful always 
of the sacrifices of law enforcement at the Federal, State, and 
local level. And I join you in grieving the loss, the line of 
duty, death of special agent Daniel Alfin and Laura 
Schwartzenberger earlier this year. I am always conscious of 
the ways in which the safety of the men and women in law 
enforcement is one of the paramount concerns you carry day in 
and day out.
    We also have an obligation to make sure that law 
enforcement is conducting itself in a way that is transparent 
and respectful and appropriate. And I am enthusiastic about the 
president's commitment to have Federal law enforcement now 
deployed with body worn cameras and look forward to hearing 
from you as that is implemented going forward. Back in March, 
when I think I last saw you, I asked for an assurance that the 
FBI as an organization would be as responsive as possible to 
requests from Members of the Judiciary Committee regarding 
outstanding requests for information.
    Senator Whitehouse just spoke to this earlier this week. 
And he and I have requests that are now 2 years old and have 
gone without any response. Will you commit to working with us 
to get appropriate and responsive answers for these outstanding 
questions now from the last Congress?
    Director Wray. I am not tracking the specific piece of 
correspondence, but certainly I will have my staff follow up 
with yours and see how we can be more timely and helpful.
    Senator Coons. Please, because it is something that, you 
know, I think has significantly agitated Senator Whitehouse and 
a number of other Members of the Judiciary Committee about 
responsiveness and transparency. And I would love to work with 
you to get this resolved. We have seen a spike in violent crime 
in a lot of places around the country. My hometown of 
Wilmington is one of them. The President speaking to this 
today.
    And I think we need to ensure that Federal, State, and 
local law enforcement work collaboratively to address this 
uptick. The FBI can be particularly helpful by providing 
training and resources. The county police was associated with 
for a decade, nothing was more desired than a period at the FBI 
Academy, both as a professionalization tool and to build out a 
network of professional colleagues. How does the FBI plan to 
continue to strengthen partnerships with State and local law 
enforcement in cities like Wilmington and in counties like New 
Castle, Delaware?
    Director Wray. So I completely agree that partnerships are 
critical really across everything we do, but especially on 
violent crime. And in fact, one of my four pillars for the 
organization has been partnerships. And my message to our folks 
has been, we want every partner to be able to say there is no 
better partner than the FBI. Now, you mentioned a couple of 
ways in which we do that. The National Academy at Quantico, 
where we train sort of the stars of the future and sort of 
middle, upper middle management in State and local police 
departments that was something we are very proud of. It has 
been around for decades. It was stalled somewhat during the 
pandemic for obvious reasons.
    But I am very excited that it is starting back up again 
soon, and we expect to be all in on that. Now, locally, we try 
to do it through task forces where we try to have our two, the 
FBI's two plus our partners to equal more than four, make it 
five, six, seven. And there have been some great examples of 
that, including in Wilmington. I know there was a gang, I think 
it was like the g-shine gang or something like that, where I 
think there were close to 40 arrests. But what was interesting, 
the reason I bring that one up is that during the pandemic, 
Federal grand juries were largely on hold in a lot of places, 
including in Delaware.
    But our folks were able to basically take our investigative 
work, working with our State and local partners. And so most of 
the arrests ended up being local arrests, but with an FBI 
investigation to support them. So it is a great example of the 
point you are making.
    Senator Coons. Well, I look forward to that continued 
partnership and to strengthening and deepening it. On the body 
worn cameras, the directive that they be deployed, ATF, FBI, 
DEA, marshals, I support--does your budget fully support that 
deployment and implementation or do you need additional funding 
to fully implement that?
    Director Wray. It is a good question. We will need--right 
now the budget request that we have is geared not towards the 
FBI agents and body worn cameras, but towards our task force 
officers. And again, not the cameras themselves, but through 
all the pretty significant expense associated with the storage 
of the footage. On the FBI side we are--as you referenced, 
there is a phased in plan that includes a pilot in a couple of 
field offices for us. And then it will go from there. And we 
will certainly need, you know, potentially quite significant 
resources to be able to cover the costs for all of our 
personnel if not just the storage, but from their case, the 
cameras themselves.
    Senator Coons. Well, I look forward to getting an updated 
request from you in that regard. When it comes to NICS 
background checks, last year there was a 40 percent increase in 
NICS background check requests compared to the previous year. 
That pace may simply increase again this year. And given the 
current rules, if the NICS system doesn't return a result 
within 3 days, buyers are permitted to proceed. Has the NICS 
been able to keep pace with this steadily increasing workload 
or are there more guns now being sold after a background check 
wasn't completed within that 3 day window? And are you planning 
to request increase resources for NICS?
    Director Wray. So the good news is that our workforce at 
NICS is extraordinary and very hard working. And even with the 
40 million record breaking number of checks we had last year, 
they were still able to process 95 and 96 percent of the 
requests within the 3 days. But as you mentioned, the pace is 
increasing even this year. As far as whether we have enough 
resources for it, the supplemental that we got covered us for 
essentially 2 years in terms of increases, which is why we--you 
didn't see more of it in the 2022 budget request. But, but we 
absolutely will need more resources for NICS following that, 
because otherwise it is just a short term fix.
    Senator Coons. My last question, Mr. Temporary----
    Senator Moran. Well, this is a question for Senator 
Kennedy, who was cut--was held the exact time in the other 
subcommittee. May I continue to recognize Senator Coons and 
then recognize you, Senator Kennedy?
    Senator Coons. Last question with forbearance of Senator 
Kennedy. Deeply appreciated. I think all of us are concerned 
about steadily increasing efforts by China in espionage, in 
trade secret theft, and some of the ways in which we have seen 
both state, non-state actors recently engaged in a variety of 
expensive, complex, and difficult attacks. Does the FBI need 
additional resources to protect the private entities who lack 
the resources to resist sophisticated State sponsored cyber-
attacks?
    Director Wray. Well, we are essentially asking for more 
resources, a lot of it which would be going to that mission 
both through the counterintelligence enhancement that we 
requested and through our cyber enhancement. But there is no 
question that there is no counterintelligence threat greater 
than the threat posed by China, and we are opening a new, as I 
mentioned in my opening new investigation, every 12 hours, 10 
to 12 hours. And it is about a 13 percent economic espionage 
investigation increase over the last decade. And so this is a 
challenge that dwarfs in many ways the resources we have. So 
anything that the Congress can send our way to help with this 
will be put very much too good use.
    Senator Coons. Well, thank you very much, Director. And 
thank you for your forbearance, Senator Moran and Senator 
Kennedy.
    Senator Moran. Senator Kennedy is recognized.
    Senator Kennedy. I am going to follow up, Mr. Director, on 
a point made by Senator Leahy. He talked about the massive 
voter suppression that he is expecting in 2022. Do your 
intelligence reports show they are going to be--there is going 
to be massive voter suppression in 2022?
    Director Wray. I don't believe I characterized the voter 
suppression threat as massive, and I am not aware of any 
intelligence assessment we have done that quantifies it. 
Certainly, voter suppression is a concern. It is something we 
investigate, something we pursue.
    Senator Kennedy. Okay. On the NICS database, where do you 
get--where do you get the information for?
    Director Wray. For the NICS database? So a lot of sources, 
but most of the information is coming from State and local law 
enforcement.
    Senator Kennedy. Are they all sending in all the 
information they are supposed to?
    Director Wray. We are continuing to improve that. The Fix 
NICS Act that Congress put in place has been a big help in that 
regard. And every year we are increasing the completeness of 
the NICS database. But there is still room for improvement.
    Senator Kennedy. But there is still a lot of holes in it, 
aren't there?
    Director Wray. There are, yes.
    Senator Kennedy. Yes. And the truth is, I mean, for some I 
don't want to paint with too broad a brush, but my 
understanding is that for some at the State and local level, it 
is just not a priority. It is not that they are sitting around 
watching Netflix. They just have got--they are busy doing other 
stuff. Would that be a fair statement?
    Director Wray. Well, I understand why you would describe it 
that way. I have got to be a little bit careful to characterize 
our partners as, you know, distracted. But I will say that, I 
mean, I have gone out to NICS and put on the headset and sat 
there with the operator, listen to the calls and see how it 
works. And, you know, some of these things, especially when you 
start getting into, you know, misdemeanor, domestic violence 
offenses, and things like that, it can get kind of complicated.
    And if the records out in whatever jurisdiction aren't 
ready at hand or clear, it can become a real challenge. And 
that was magnified during the pandemic, you know, because a lot 
of departments, local departments, you know, were not at work. 
And so that----
    Senator Kennedy. Well, I just--I hear--I read about the 
President and others saying, well, the problem is we need to 
expand background checks. And it just seems to me that a big 
part of our problem, nothing is perfect, of course, but a big 
part of our problem is that the current system we have is only 
as good as the information inputted and all the information 
isn't being inputted. It is just not. And I think Fix NICS did 
help. And I think it is better, but I don't think it is well. 
And it would seem to me that that would be a logical place to 
start. Is my thinking faulty?
    Director Wray. I don't think your thinking is faulty. I 
think we all share the goal of keeping guns out of the hands of 
those illegally prohibited from having them, which should be 
the table stakes in this endeavor. And that is what the NICS 
system is designed to do. To the extent that the holes that you 
identified are holes in different agencies and departments, you 
know, a patchwork around the country, you know, I would be 
remiss if I didn't point out that some of them may need, you 
know, grant funding or resources to help them because it may be 
a resource issue for them.
    Senator Kennedy. I am not suggesting they are just sitting 
around watching Netflix. They are working. They have been 
'cussed and discussed and accused of everything in the world, 
and their budgets has been cut. And then we wonder why crime 
goes up. So I am not criticizing them. I am just pointing out 
that it seems to me that the system is only good as the data 
that is been put into it. Let me ask you a final question. I 
just want your opinion on this. Why do you think Chicago has 
become the largest outdoor shooting range in the world?
    Director Wray. Well, I mean, I think I have referenced a 
lot of the factors from a national perspective. I don't know 
that I can sit here right now give you a Chicago specific 
explanation, but certainly some of the same trends that I 
described nationally would undoubtedly be at play in Chicago. I 
know that, you know, over the past year, we have had, you 
know--this is just the FBI now, you know, 270 gang arrests in 
Chicago, 150 maybe violent crime arrests. And that is just in 
the past year or so. And I know that our partners there. We 
have some great partners in Chicago, you know, police 
department, among other agencies, and they are all stretched 
pretty thin.
    Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Director.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Moran. Senator Kennedy, thank you. If there is no 
further questions to be asked this afternoon, Senators have 
until June the 29 to submit additional questions for the 
subcommittee's official hearing record. We request that the FBI 
respond within 30 days. The subcommittee stands in recess.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 
response subsequent to the hearing:]
              Questions Submitted to Hon. Christopher Wray
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
    Question 1. Last fall, Vermont was the first State to pass a bill 
that prohibits police from using facial recognition technology without 
the express consent of the legislature. I am proud of Vermont for 
leading the way on guarding Vermonters' civil liberties against this 
often inaccurate technology. Body worn cameras with facial recognition 
technology create such a significant risk of misidentification that 
even body camera vendors are shifting away from this technology. The 
FBI's fiscal year 2022 budget includes $6.2 million to provide software 
and video storage for body worn cameras of federally deputized Task 
Force Officers.

        a.  Does the FBI utilize body worn cameras with built-in facial 
        recognition technology? What concrete steps will the FBI take 
        to protect Americans' civil liberties from widely known risks 
        of misidentification by facial recognition technology?

    Answer. The FBI's body worn cameras, currently implemented in one 
field office, do not have any facial recognition technology.

        b.  How does the FBI plan to safeguard stored body camera 
        footage from improper access and use?

    Answer. The storage environment for BWC metadata and recordings 
will be encrypted in transition and at rest. The FBI's storage 
environment will be governed and validated automatically by the 
Sentinel case authentication services REST Application Programming 
Interface. Files will contain a refence to the unique hash value of the 
contents for every recording. The Department of Justice will soon 
release additional information and guidance regarding the use of body 
worn cameras.

    Question 2. When I asked you whether additional resources from 
Congress to combat voter suppression and other Federal election crimes 
would be helpful, you responded that ``we're busier than we ever have 
been'' and that ``if Congress sees fit to send us more resources on 
this . . . I'm quite confident that it will be put to good use.''

        a.  What is your assessment for why the FBI is busier than it 
        has ever been with respect to combatting Federal election 
        crimes? Has there been a significant uptick in alleged Federal 
        election crimes? Is there a discernible pattern regarding who 
        exactly are allegedly committing these crimes--for example, 
        State level officials?

    Answer. The FBI is the primary agency responsible for investigating 
illegal cyber activity against election infrastructure, malign foreign 
influence operations, and election-related crimes, like voter fraud and 
voter suppression or intimidation. At the FBI, we work closely with our 
intelligence community partners, as well as other Federal, State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial partners, to share information, bolster 
security, and identify and disrupt any threats.
    Because of the expanded foreign influence operations we have 
witnessed, we broadened and significantly added resources to our 
Foreign Intelligence Task Force (FITF) and not just to efforts related 
to Russia, but also to add China and Iran, because those countries are 
looking for different ways to take a page out of the malign foreign 
influence playbook that they've seen elsewhere.
    At the State and local level, the FBI has Election Crimes 
Coordinators (ECCs) in each field office to assess allegations of voter 
fraud, civil rights violations, campaign finance crimes, and other 
potential threats to primaries and general elections. The FBI worked 
closely throughout the 2020 electoral process with local and State 
officials, public representatives, and USIC partners to educate, 
prepare, and facilitate a whole-of-society response to any and all 
election-related matters.

        b.  If Congress is able to provide you with additional 
        resources to combat Federal election crimes, what exactly would 
        those resources be utilized for? Please list the key areas of 
        the FBI's efforts combatting Federal election crimes that could 
        be bolstered or expanded given additional resources from 
        Congress.

    Answer. The FBI, along with its Federal, State, local, Tribal, 
territorial, non-governmental and private-sector partners nationwide, 
work together in unprecedented ways to combat foreign interference 
efforts and support election officials, political organizations, 
campaigns, and candidates in safeguarding their infrastructure. 
Certainly, additional resources would support these efforts.
    In an effort to increase the FBI's ability to identify, initiate, 
and investigate election crime matters, the FBI established the 
Campaign Finance and Ballot Fraud Initiative. This initiative 
designated Special Agents as Election Crimes Coordinators in each FBI 
field office and also assigned intelligence personnel to support 
efforts to combat these crimes. These personnel are the points of 
contact for all election-related issues within the agency, including 
those related to public corruption, civil rights, cyber crimes, and 
terrorism incidents, and they liaise as necessary with State and local 
election officials, State/local law enforcement agencies, and the U.S. 
Attorney's Offices.
    As performed in the lead-up to the 2020 election, the FBI 
investigates so-called ``dark money'' schemes, through which donors to 
political spending or campaign contributions by groups are not 
disclosed and the source of the contributions are unknown. Many times, 
these dark money groups are used to mask illegal activities such as 
foreign contributions, bribes, or quid pro quo arrangements. The FBI 
will also continue to investigate instances of voter and ballot fraud, 
voter intimidation/suppression, cyber hacks, and PAC/Super PAC 
violations.
    In addition, in the fall of 2017, the FBI established the Foreign 
Influence Task Force (FITF) to identify and counteract malign foreign 
influence operations targeting the U.S. The FITF is led by the 
Counterintelligence Division and is comprised of agents, analysts, and 
professional staff from the Counterintelligence, Cyber, 
Counterterrorism, and Criminal Investigative Divisions. This cross-
programmatic approach allows the FBI to identify connections across 
programs, to aggressively investigate as appropriate and--importantly--
to be more agile. Coordinating closely with our partners and leveraging 
relationships we have developed in the technology sector, we regularly 
relay threat indicators that those companies use to take swift action, 
blocking budding abuse of their online platforms. Following the 2018 
midterm elections, we reviewed the threat and the effectiveness of our 
coordination and outreach. As a result of this review, we further 
expanded the scope of the FITF to confront foreign malign operations 
not only of Russia, but also of the People's Republic of China (PRC), 
Iran, and other global adversaries.

    Question 3. We are fewer than 3 months away from the 20th 
Anniversary of the September 11 attacks, and yet there is still hidden 
information about that horrific day that the American people deserve to 
know. Appearing before the House Judiciary Committee two weeks ago, you 
committed to working with the Director of National Intelligence to 
ensure greater declassification of documents related to Saudi Arabia's 
involvement in the September 11 attacks.

        a.  Is that conversation ongoing? When can we expect to see a 
        full declassification review of all aspects of the FBI's 
        investigation into Saudi Arabia's role in 9/11?

    Answer. The FBI recognizes the public importance of documents 
related to 9/11 and we have worked diligently to produce over 10,000 
pages of related records.
    The FBI, Department of Justice, and other agencies continue to work 
to satisfy the requirements of Executive Order 14040. Pursuant to the 
Executive Order, since September 11, 2021, the FBI has released newly 
declassified documents related to the attacks, including releases on 
September 11, 2021, November 3, 2021, December 30, 2021, and March 2, 
2022.

    Question 4. During previous appearances before Congress, you 
mentioned that end-to-end encryption across devices and social media 
platforms threatens the FBI's ability to manage threats, particularly 
when it comes to domestic terrorism. You suggested that you believed 
that this was a policy judgement Congress should make but that instead 
it was being made by private companies.

        a.  Please describe, as specifically as possible, the biggest 
        issues related to end-to-end encryption from the FBI's 
        perspective that you believe this Committee should be aware of 
        when considering the balancing of civil liberties with law 
        enforcement surveillance.

    Answer. The FBI remains a strong advocate for the wide and 
consistent use of responsibly-managed encryption--encryption that 
providers can decrypt and provide to law enforcement when served with a 
legal order. Protecting data and privacy in a digitally connected world 
is a top priority for the FBI and the U.S. Government, and we believe 
that promoting encryption is a vital part of that mission. But we have 
seen that the broad application of end-to-end and user-only-access 
encryption adds negligible security advantages. What we mean when we 
talk about lawful access is putting providers who manage encrypted data 
in a position to decrypt it and provide it to us in response to legal 
process. We are not asking for, and do not want, any ``backdoor,'' that 
is, for encryption to be weakened or compromised so that it can be 
defeated from the outside by law enforcement or anyone else. 
Unfortunately, too much of the debate over lawful access has revolved 
around discussions of this ``backdoor'' straw man instead of what we 
really want and need.
    The FBI is deeply concerned with the threat that end-to-end 
encryption (E2EE) and user-only-access encryption pose to our ability 
to fulfill the FBI's duty of protecting the American people from every 
manner of Federal crime, from cyber-attacks and violence against 
children to drug trafficking and organized crime. Even with our 
substantial resources, accessing the content of known or suspected 
terrorists' data pursuant to court-authorized legal process is 
increasingly difficult. The often-online nature of the terrorist 
radicalization process, along with the insular nature of most of 
today's attack plotters, leaves fewer dots for investigators to connect 
in time to stop an attack--and end-to-end and user-only-access 
encryption increasingly hide even those often precious few and fleeting 
dots.
    This problem spans international and domestic terrorism threats. We 
face the same problem in protecting children against violent sexual 
exploitation. End-to-end and user-only-access encryption frequently 
prevent us from discovering and searching for victims. When we are able 
to open investigations, end-to-end and user-only-access encryption 
makes it much more difficult to bring perpetrators to justice. If we 
cannot obtain that critical electronic evidence, our efforts are 
frequently hamstrung.
    This problem is not limited just to Federal investigations. Our 
State and local law enforcement partners have been consistently 
advising the FBI that they, too, are experiencing similar end-to-end 
and user-only-access encryption challenges, which are now being felt 
across the full range of State and local criminal law enforcement. As 
this problem becomes more and more acute for State and local law 
enforcement, the advanced technical resources needed to address even a 
single investigation involving end-to-end and user-only-access 
encryption will continue to diminish and ultimately overwhelm State and 
local capacity to investigate even common crimes.

    Question 5. In 2020, the National Center for Missing and Exploited 
Children's (NCMEC) CyberTipline received more than 21.7 million reports 
regarding online exploitation of children--almost 4 million more 
reports than in 2019. NCMEC also received almost twice as many reports 
in 2020 of online enticement of children than it did in 2019.

        a.  Please describe, in as much detail as possible, the steps 
        the FBI is taking to combat this disturbing rise in the 
        exploitation of children online, particularly on social media 
        and online gaming platforms.

    Answer. The FBI's Crimes Against Children and Human Trafficking 
program provides rapid, proactive, and intelligence driven 
investigative response to the abuse to, and exploitation of, children 
when those crimes fall under the authority of the FBI. Currently, the 
FBI leads 86 Child Exploitation and Human Trafficking Task Forces 
across the Nation, which focus on investigating and prosecuting crimes 
against children in partnership with Federal, State, local, and Tribal 
counterparts. The FBI also works with non-governmental entities such as 
Thorn and NCMEC to identify emerging technologies used by child sex 
offenders.
    Over the past 2 years, the FBI has remained focused on protecting 
children from exploitation and abuse in all forms, from interactions on 
a social media platform to hands-on abuse by a trusted adult. In fiscal 
year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, the FBI arrested over 4,100 child sex 
offenders (over 1,650 of whom were contact offenders) and located over 
320 missing or abducted children. The FBI also partnered with 
international law enforcement, including INTERPOL and EUROPOL, to 
identify child predators around the world and bring them to justice.

        b.  Please describe the resources the FBI is providing to 
        educate parents about the issue and to help prevent their 
        children from online exploitation, particularly with more 
        children online during the pandemic.

    Answer. The FBI collaborates with domestic and foreign law 
enforcement agency partners, as well as several non-governmental 
organizations, to identify and address the effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic on child sexual exploitation tradecraft and online 
victimization. For example, since December 2019, the FBI's Criminal 
Investigative Division (CID) has released five public service 
announcements (PSAs) to warn parents, educators, caregivers, and 
children about the dangers of online CSE and the signs of child abuse. 
Specifically, the PSAs included recommendations on how to safeguard 
children from sexual exploitation the dangers of sextortion and online 
extortion, the risks posed by online video games, and how to report 
victimization. The FBI also provides information about online risks and 
resources to parents and children, such as the Safe Online Surfing 
Internet Challenge (https://www.fbi.gov/fbi-kids) and the information 
available at https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/protecting-your-kids.

        c.  Does the FBI have all of the resources it needs as part of 
        this program to meet this growing challenge?

    Answer. As the Committee is aware, every year, thousands of 
children become victims of crimes--whether it is through online 
predators, sexual abuse, violent attacks, human trafficking, or 
kidnappings. The FBI is uniquely positioned to work with Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, and international law enforcement partners to 
identify, investigate, and deter individuals and criminal networks from 
exploiting children. These partnerships are essential because the 
number of violent crimes against children is far greater than what the 
FBI is resourced to address on its own.
    The FBI has several programs in place to arrest child predators and 
to recover missing and endangered children. To this end, the FBI funds 
or participates in a variety of endeavors, including our Innocence Lost 
National Initiative, the Innocent Images National Initiative, the 85 
Child Exploitation Task Forces, and the Violent Crimes Against Children 
International Task Force, which comprises 69 officers from 48 
countries. The FBI also works with non-governmental organizations like 
Thorn and NCMEC, as well as numerous community outreach programs, to 
educate parents and children about safety measures they can follow.
    Finally, the FBI also leverages the Child Abduction Rapid 
Deployment (CARD) Teams, which are rapid-response teams stationed 
across the country to quickly respond to abductions (including 
abductions where the victim met their abductor online). Investigators 
bring to this issue the full array of forensic tools, such as call data 
and cell tower data analysis, behavior analysis, cellular DNA analysis, 
trace evidence, impression evidence, and digital forensics. Through 
improved communications, law enforcement also has the ability to 
quickly share information with partners throughout the world, and these 
outreach programs play an integral role in prevention.
    Employing these tools is expensive but successful. The FBI makes 
every effort to ensure that resources are used efficiently, while 
safeguarding endangered children. The FBI commends the committee's 
dedication to these efforts and appreciates the resources provided to 
combat these horrific acts.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Chris Van Hollen
    Question 1. Will you share the specific duties and responsibilities 
of the FBI's Chief Diversity Officer with my office?

    Answer. In April 2021, Director Wray formally appointed Scott 
McMillion as the FBI's first-ever Chief Diversity Officer. Mr. 
McMillion leads the Office of Diversity and Inclusion (ODI), which the 
FBI established in 2012. As part of its mission, ODI oversees our nine 
Diversity Advisory Committees, which advocate for underrepresented 
groups within the workforce. The efforts of these groups have 
culminated in policy changes, innovative projects, and a deeper sense 
of community for minorities, women, and others within the FBI. ODI also 
works to ensure that diversity, equity, and inclusion are key 
components in recruitment, hiring, retention, and promotion efforts as 
well as other processes and programs within the FBI.

    Question 2. Is there a reason the Chief Diversity Officer does not 
report to you directly but reports to an executive two levels below 
you?

    Answer. Director Wray has named Building a High-Performing, 
Diverse, and Inclusive Workforce as one of his three Director's 
Priority Initiatives and, as referenced above, Director Wray formally 
appointed the FBI's first-ever Chief Diversity Officer. The CDO 
position is among the FBI's senior leadership, which provides direction 
and support to all 56 field offices, about 350 resident agencies, 
several specialized field installations, and more than 60 legal 
attaches in other countries.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
    Question 1. We know from the little data available, that Alaska has 
one of the highest rates of human trafficking in the country, 
specifically affecting our homeless youth and Alaska Native population. 
I am grateful to the phenomenal agents at the FBI field office in 
Anchorage who have been providing training and outreach on this issue 
in Alaska. However, throughout the State there is still a great need 
for comprehensive training and resources on human trafficking in our 
communities. The FBI is an ideal stakeholder with the correct expertise 
to provide this training.

        a.  What additional funding has the Department of Justice 
        proposed for the FBI to increase access to training for rural 
        communities on human trafficking?

    Answer. The FBI defers to the Department of Justice on proposed 
funding increases; however, the FBI has realigned existing resources 
specifically to address human trafficking and missing and murdered 
indigenous persons (MMIP) in Alaska. In addition, the FBI provides 
between 12-24 training venues on human trafficking and MMIP. The FBI 
also offers access to several national-level conferences, including the 
DOJ-sponsored National Law Enforcement Training on Child Exploitation 
and the Dallas Crimes Against Children Conference, and access to 
virtual webinars covering topics related to human trafficking. In 
addition, in 2020, the U.S. Attorney's Office stood up the Alaska MMIP 
Working Group to address the complexities that arise in these types of 
cases in Alaska. The group is a multi-disciplinary team involving the 
collaboration and coordination of Tribal representatives, Federal, 
State, local and Tribal law enforcement, and social and victim service 
providers.
    In January 2022, the Department of Justice issued its National 
Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking. This document is available online 
at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1467431/download. The 
strategy is a Department-wide effort that lays out a multi-year plan to 
combat all forms of human trafficking. Chapter I of the strategy 
identifies strategies for detecting human trafficking crimes and 
identifying victims and survivors. Additional chapters address topics 
like protection, prosecution, and prevention. Each chapter identifies 
numerous concrete actions intended to be executed within approximately 
1 year. Training is a key part of the strategy, and it includes 
training efforts in rural and Tribal communities.
    The FBI has been very open to surging resources to various parts of 
the country to address emerging threats and will continue to do so.

        b.  We know that survivors of human trafficking need 
        specialized services to enter recovery. What additional funding 
        has the Department of Justice proposed to support victim 
        specialists within the FBI, who are able to connect survivors 
        of human trafficking to vital services in the community?

    Answer. The FBI defers to the Department of Justice on specific 
funding requests; however, the FBI takes a victim-centered, trauma-
informed approach to investigating these cases and strives to ensure 
that the needs of victims are fully addressed at all stages. To 
accomplish this, the FBI works in conjunction with other law 
enforcement agencies and victim specialists on the local, State, 
Tribal, and Federal levels, as well as with a variety of vetted non-
governmental organizations. Even after the arrest and conviction of 
human traffickers, the FBI often continues to work with partner 
agencies and organizations to assist victims in moving beyond their 
exploitation.

    Question 2. In April 2021, the FBI executed a search warrant on the 
home and business of a couple living in Homer, Alaska. This search 
warrant was related to investigations surrounding January 6. We know 
that the wife was identified using pictures and tips. The couple is 
adamant that this was a case of mistaken identity. I think it is 
important that we get all of the answers about what happened on January 
6, and I am supportive of the FBI in their efforts. At the same time, 
we are also in a moment where public trust in law enforcement is 
fragile and under heavy scrutiny.

        a.  How is the FBI working to ensure that investigations 
        respect the constitutional rights of Americans?

    Answer. The FBI has the dual mission of protecting the American 
people and upholding the Constitution. The FBI is committed to 
protecting Constitutional rights, including the First Amendment's 
freedoms of association and assembly. The Attorney General's Guidelines 
for Domestic FBI Activities (AGG-DOM) establish a set of basic 
principles that serve as the foundation for all FBI mission-related 
activities.
    As described in the relevant, unsealed, and redacted search warrant 
affidavit, the search that took place in Homer, Alaska, is related to 
one or more of the hundreds of investigations related to the January 6, 
2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. Although the search warrant affidavit 
has been unsealed, pursuant to longstanding Department of Justice and 
FBI policy and practice, the FBI cannot provide further information or 
discuss an open investigation. This policy, which has been applied 
across administrations, is designed to preserve the integrity of all 
FBI investigations and the privacy of individuals or entities 
potentially involved in an investigation.

        b.  What efforts has the FBI taken to ensure that that public 
        trust in law enforcement is maintained during the course of the 
        investigations into the events of January 6?

    Answer. The FBI has deployed our full investigative resources and 
is working closely with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial partners to aggressively pursue those involved in criminal 
activity during the events of January 6, 2021. FBI special agents, 
intelligence analysts, and professional staff have been hard at work 
gathering evidence, sharing intelligence, and working with Federal 
prosecutors to bring charges against the individuals involved.
    We used tip lines and web resources for members of the public to 
provide information to assist in identifying individuals who were 
involved in the violence and other criminal activity. These resources 
allowed the public to submit any images, videos, or other multimedia 
files related to possible violations of Federal law. The FBI has 
arrested hundreds of individuals with regards to rioting, assault on a 
Federal officer, property crimes violations, conspiracy, and other 
charges.
    The FBI has the dual mission of protecting the American people and 
upholding the Constitution. It is important to emphasize that we 
investigate and prosecute individuals for their criminal acts, not for 
their beliefs or based on their associations. We respect the 
Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, association, and assembly 
of all Americans. We open cases based on suspected criminal violations, 
not ideologies, and hold sacred the rights of individuals to peacefully 
exercise their First Amendment freedoms. The FBI may not, and does not, 
open investigations solely on the basis of First Amendment-protected 
activity.

    Question 3. In recent weeks, there has been a dramatic increase in 
the number of reported anti-Semitic incidents across the United States. 
The Anti-Defamation Leagues' Center on Extremism reported that the 
number of anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. for the month of May 
increased by 115 percent over the number of reports for May of last 
year. These reported incidents varied from assault to vandalism. The 
Alaska Jewish Museum in Anchorage, Alaska was also vandalized in late 
May. A man was reported placing swastika stickers which said the words 
``We are everywhere'' in bold, black letters. There is absolutely zero 
place for this kind of hatred in Alaska or anywhere else in the United 
States. The FBI has reported that one of the greatest threats to the 
Homeland today is from domestic violent extremists (DVEs) and homegrown 
violent extremists (HVEs). We know that DVEs and HVEs have and likely 
will continue to pose a very real threat to the Jewish Community.

        a.  What efforts is the FBI taking to address the rise in 
        antisemitism?

    Answer. To address the intersection of the FBI counterterrorism and 
criminal investigative missions to combat domestic terrorism, and to 
provide justice to those who are victims of hate crimes, the FBI 
formally created the Domestic Terrorism-Hate Crimes Fusion Cell in 
April 2019. This Fusion Cell creates more opportunities for 
investigative creativity, provides multi-program coordination, helps 
ensure seamless information-sharing, and enhances investigative 
resources to combine the domestic terrorism (DT) threat. The Fusion 
Cell has already been helpful in the FBI's efforts to address the rise 
in antisemitism. For example, in November 2019, the work of the Fusion 
Cell resulted in the arrest of Richard Holzer, a Colorado man who 
ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to over 19 years in prison 
for Federal hate crime and explosives charges for plotting to blow up a 
synagogue in Pueblo, Colorado.

        b.  How does the FBI's fiscal year 2022 budget address these 
        and other hate crimes, such as the ones perpetrated against 
        Asian Americans?

    Answer. The FBI's fiscal year 2022 request includes resources to 
help counter the increasing acts of domestic terrorism occurring across 
the United States. To do this, the FBI has developed advanced methods 
to detect, prevent, and disrupt threats using human resources, 
information, and technology. Specifically, resources requested in the 
fiscal year 2022 budget will be used to: increase the FBI's 
investigative capacity to combat domestic terrorism threats; implement 
technical tools to better screen and analyze threats; and enhance the 
National Threat Operations Center's ability to intake threats from the 
public. These capabilities will help the FBI protect against all 
domestic terrorism threats, including those perpetrated against the 
Jewish and Asian American communities.
    With respect to civil rights and hate crimes, the fiscal year 2022 
request sustains FBI resources, including the Domestic Terrorism Hate 
Crimes Fusion Cell. During fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021, the 
FBI conducted training and liaison events for the Asian American 
Pacific Islander (AAPI) community and plans to continue to communicate 
potential threats and encourage reporting of potential hate crimes.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin, III
    Question 1. We have spoken several times regarding the FBI police, 
and I would like to touch on this again to demonstrate the importance 
of it to my State. First, I want to highlight the exemplary work of the 
75 police officers assigned to the site in Clarksburg, West Virginia 
and the 173 other officers serving at sites in Washington, DC, 
Quantico, VA, and New York City. As you know, because of an inadvertent 
error committed while drafting the legislation, the FBI police force 
are not receiving the pay and benefits in which they are entitled. As a 
result, turnover is high, as officers tend to leave the force for other 
better-paying jobs with other agencies once they receive the proper 
training and security clearances. I know the FBI is has started a 
working group to address the issue, but I would like to, once again, 
receive your commitment to working on this in a timely manner as more 
and more FBI Police leave the force due to pay and benefit 
deficiencies.

        a.  Can you give me a status update on the work of the working 
        group on the FBI Police pay and benefit issue?
        b.  When do you believe the working group's work on the issue 
        will be completed?

    Answer. The FBI continues to evaluate the needs of FBI Police and 
will continue to work with the Department of Justice, the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Office of Personnel Management, and Congress 
as it assesses possible actions to address identified needs. We 
appreciate Congress' shared interest in FBI Police human capital and 
resourcing needs.

    Question 2. Intelligence reports prior to the January 6 riot warned 
Capitol Police that supporters of President Trump were actively 
promoting violence and targeting Congress itself. The Department of 
Homeland Security specifically notified Capitol Police that they had 
identified a map of the Capitol's tunnel system in online messages 
between ``Stop the Steal'' supporters, and the FBI field office in 
Norfolk also warned the Capitol Police. However, the Capitol Police 
Inspector General also found a lack of consensus among key official 
about whether these reports indicated specific known threats. As you 
know it's impossible to prepare or respond to a threat without as much 
reliable information as possible, and we certainly saw what happens 
when threat information isn't handled effectively on January 6th. This 
brings up a larger issue that I've grown more concerned about during my 
time on the Cyber Subcommittee for Armed Services. Which is how 
potential threats, both physical and cyber, are shared within the 
Federal Government.

        a.  In your capacity, do you feel both your Bureau has been 
        sufficiently receiving and relaying threat information with 
        other Federal departments, and are you aware if that 
        information can then be shared with a specific private industry 
        partner if we identify a specific threat toward them?

    Answer. The FBI's intelligence operations span our field offices 
and Headquarters divisions, and we work closely with our partners in 
the intelligence, law enforcement, private sector, and academic 
communities through, for example, the JTTFs and the Domestic Terrorism-
Hate Crimes Fusion Cell, described above. In addition, the FBI's Office 
of Private Sector exists to enhance the FBI's understanding of the 
private sector's risks and needs, increases collaboration and 
information-sharing between the Bureau and the private sector, and 
mitigates threats through longstanding, mutually beneficial 
partnerships between the private sector and the FBI.
    Throughout 2020, the FBI authored approximately 12 intelligence 
products for our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial law 
enforcement partners disseminating trends we saw in threat reporting 
and criminal activity involving domestic violent extremism. Over the 
preceding year, we observed activity that led us to assess that there 
was potential for increased violent extremist activity at lawful 
protests taking place in communities across the United States. 
Accordingly, in June 2020, we, with our partners at the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), issued two separate joint intelligence 
bulletins highlighting the potential for increased violent extremist 
activity at such demonstrations and noting that likely targets would 
include law enforcement and government personnel. More recently, in 
late August 2020, we published an analytical report informing our 
partners that DVEs with partisan political grievances likely posed an 
increased threat related to the 2020 election. In that product, we 
noted that DVE responses to the election outcome might not occur until 
after the election and could be based on potential or anticipated 
policy changes. In December 2020, we contributed to a DHS Intelligence 
In-Depth product, which advised our partners that the threat posed by 
the diverse DVE landscape would probably persist due to enduring 
grievances.
    In the weeks and months leading up to electoral certification, the 
FBI collected and shared intelligence; coordinated and communicated 
among Federal, State, and local law enforcement partners; and 
positioned Federal resources for potential deployment. Through these 
measures, the FBI worked in close coordination with the U.S. Capitol 
Police, the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington D.C., and 
other law enforcement partners leading up to the Joint Session of 
Congress and the planned demonstrations scheduled for January 6, 2021. 
The FBI and our Federal, State, and local partners collected and shared 
intelligence and relevant public safety-related information in 
preparation for the various planned events.

        b.  In your own opinion how do we increase the coordination 
        within the Federal Government to respond more quickly and in a 
        uniformed way no matter the threat?

    Answer. As a member of both the law enforcement and intelligence 
communities, with domestic and international reach, the FBI is focusing 
our unique authorities, and our ability to engage with international 
law enforcement, domestic victims, and key technology service 
providers, to identify and disrupt cyber adversaries before they 
compromise U.S. networks, and hold them accountable when they do.
    Key to the FBI's strategy is using the information and insight we 
develop through our investigations to support our full range of public 
and private-sector partners. There are many countries, companies, and 
agencies that play roles in defending networks, sanctioning 
destabilizing behavior, collecting cyber threat intelligence, and 
conducting cyber effects operations. We seek to work with all of them, 
in the belief that our collective actions to combat cyber threats are 
most impactful when they are planned jointly and sequenced for maximum 
impact.
    The National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) is 
comprised of over 30 partnering agencies--from across law enforcement, 
the intelligence community, and the Department of Defense--and has the 
primary responsibility to coordinate, integrate, and share information 
in support of cyber threat investigations; supply and support 
intelligence analysis for community decision-makers; and provide value 
to other ongoing efforts in the fight against cyber threats to the 
Nation. In coordination with our partners, the FBI has successfully 
disrupted numerous cybercriminal enterprises, including those deploying 
ransomware, but lasting impact will require joint, sequenced operations 
with our U.S. counterparts and foreign allies as well as a removal of 
the sense of impunity many of these actors currently feel.
    On the front lines of our efforts to investigate and prosecute 
domestic and international terrorism are the FBI-led Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs) and the department's 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices. 
JTTFs provide an essential hub for cooperating on both international 
and domestic terrorism matters across all levels of government 
nationwide. The FBI has established JTTFs across all 56 FBI field 
offices, which leverage enduring partnerships with Federal and State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial agencies to detect, identify, and 
disrupt terrorist threats. Each U.S. attorney's office also coordinates 
a group of Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial officials in 
each district, referred to as an Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
(ATAC). The ATACs work in close partnership with corresponding JTTFs to 
promote training and information sharing among Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, territorial, and private sector partners in both international 
and domestic terrorism matters. This training and information sharing 
is critical because there are many more State, local, Tribal, and 
territorial law enforcement officers on the ground than there are 
Federal agents, and they may be the first to come across individuals 
planning terrorist acts within their communities. Federal and State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial officials often evaluate these threats 
together, including assessing whether Federal or State charges are 
available to disrupt them, with the goal of preventing terrorist 
attacks before they occur.

    Question 3. I've heard from numerous government officials at the 
Department of Defense, DHS, and even at the FBI and they all have said 
that Cyber criminals are getting smarter and using more and more 
elaborate scheme to steal information to steal and extort millions of 
dollars from individuals and companies. In fact, the FBI's 2020 
Internet Crime Report includes information from 791,790 complaints of 
suspected Internet crime--an increase of more than 300,000 complaints 
from 2019--and reported losses exceeding $4.2 billion. As you know, 
Russia in the SolarWinds hack and China in the Microsoft hack, both 
launched their attacks from, and infiltrated stolen data through 
servers rented from U.S. cloud providers. In May, Colonial Pipeline was 
the victim of a ransomware attack that placed large parts of its 
infrastructure out of operation. Colonial Pipeline paid a ransom demand 
for approximately 75 bitcoins. Fortunately, the Department of Justice 
just announced that it had seized 63.7 bitcoins, valued at 
approximately $2.3 million, which represented a portion of the ransom 
payment made by Colonial Pipeline to individuals in a group known as 
DarkSide. There is no doubt that these types of cyberattacks and ransom 
demands will be the new normal going forward and I hope that we, as the 
U.S. Government, are prepared to put the right mechanisms in place to 
detect and pursue individuals, groups and nations that that strive to 
infiltrate and disrupt our Federal systems and critical infrastructure.

        a.  How extensive are cybercrimes here in the United States?

    Answer. Ransomware is a growing threat to the health and safety of 
the American people and our national and economic security. The 
individuals who conduct cyber intrusions and ransomware campaigns, and 
the officials who direct or harbor them, believe that they can 
compromise U.S. networks, steal our financial and intellectual 
property, and hold our critical infrastructure hostage for ransom, all 
without incurring significant risk themselves.
    In 2020, the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) statistics 
showed a 20 percent increase in reported ransomware incidents and a 225 
percent increase in ransom amounts. In 2019, the IC3 received 2,047 
ransomware complaints, with adjusted losses of more than $8.9 million-- 
though that is likely a small fraction of the true scope of the threat 
because it captures only those who individually reported to the IC3. 
These numbers represent a nearly 40 percent increase in ransomware 
complaints to the IC3, and more than double the adjusted losses 
reported in 2018. In 2020, the IC3 received 2,474 complaints identified 
as ransomware, with adjusted losses of over $29.1 million. 
Unfortunately, what is reported is only a fraction of the incidents 
that occur.
    Because this criminal activity has become more lucrative and 
enticing, it is our job to make it harder and more painful for hackers 
to do what they are doing. That is why we announced a new FBI cyber 
strategy last year, using our role as the lead Federal agency with law 
enforcement and intelligence responsibilities to not only pursue our 
own actions, but to work seamlessly with our domestic and international 
partners to defend their networks, attribute malicious activity, 
sanction bad behavior, and take the fight to our adversaries overseas.

        b.  What are some of the biggest challenges in investigating 
        and prosecuting cybercrimes?

    Answer. Cyber criminals focus on exploiting technical 
vulnerabilities, primarily for personal profit. Overall, the 
sophistication of cyber-crime has increased and has become more 
difficult to detect, more resilient, costly to disrupt, aggressive, and 
destructive. We know our most significant threats come from foreign 
actors using global infrastructure to compromise U.S. networks. By 
working with friendly foreign law enforcement agencies and intelligence 
partners, we make it harder for these actors to conceal their 
activities and whereabouts.
    Not every foreign nation helps us in this fight. While we seek to 
disrupt entire cybercriminal enterprises, the most impactful 
consequence we can impose on a malicious cyber actor is an arrest as 
part of a comprehensive disruption. If an actor is in a country like 
Russia or China, an arrest for purposes of facing U.S. charges is not a 
viable option. Neither country extradites its nationals. Even when an 
indicted cybercriminal is in another country, Russia in particular 
takes actions to interfere with our extraditions. To make things more 
difficult, the lines between nation-states and cybercriminal actors are 
sometimes blurred, and even though a foreign nation may not be 
directing a ransomware campaign, it may still be complicit by providing 
a safe haven to those malicious actors who are doing harm to the United 
States, our citizens, and our businesses.
    But our allies outnumber our foes, and in just the past few months, 
our work with foreign partners--supported by our legal attaches 
overseas--has led to impactful consequences against cybercriminals and 
sent a strong message that the reach of the U.S. Government extends 
beyond its borders.

        c.  Does the FBI have sufficient authorities and resources to 
        successfully pursue cybercrimes?

    Answer. There are several areas in which the FBI must invest now 
and continue to invest in the future to ensure we can keep pace with 
the terrorists, foreign intelligence officers, and criminals we face 
each day. One of these key areas of focus is cyber. The depth and 
breadth of the cyber threat has expanded exponentially in the past 
decade; this phenomenon will continue into the foreseeable future. The 
fiscal year 2022 request includes $55 million and over 175 positions to 
address cyber threats and cybersecurity risks.
    The FBI has been assigned an expanded role in the cyber arena--to 
maintain, on behalf of the entire U.S. Government, a knowledge base of 
cyber threat actors. To keep pace with these threats and to adequately 
address this new role, the FBI must make investments in both personnel 
to investigate state-sponsored hackers, hackers for hire, organized 
cyber syndicates, and terrorists, as well as in technology and tools to 
target these cyber actors. The FBI must equip each field office with 
the necessary investigative, analytical, technical, and administrative 
personnel to adequately address cyber threats. Every field office 
requires an appropriately staffed cyber squad--which we do not have 
today.
    Funding included in the request would also allow the FBI to invest 
in training and developing the cyber workforce. The FBI must have a 
skilled cadre of cyber experts to address the myriad of sophisticated 
attacks employed by our adversaries. Not only should cyber personnel 
have a baseline cyber skill level, but as technical gaps are 
identified, the FBI will need to have resources in place to train 
segments of its cyber workforce.
    The FBI must also continue to prioritize collaboration--with the 
private sector, with partners in the Intelligence Community and other 
Federal agencies, and with our international partners--as many cyber 
actors perpetrate their activities from an ocean away.
    The FBI must also invest in its own cybersecurity infrastructure. 
Internal FBI networks must be protected to ensure we do not become 
victims of the adversaries we investigate. Finally, we look forward to 
continuing to work with Congress, the Department of Justice, and our 
interagency partners regarding these important issues.

    Question 4. I want to turn our attention to a topic that you and I 
have discussed a number of times before--the opioid epidemic. As West 
Virginia has been ravaged by the opioid epidemic, I've supported the 
special agents in charge of the regional FBI office in their efforts to 
catch the largest distributors and try and stem the flow of drugs into 
the State. It's now well known that a single pharmacy in the West 
Virginia town of Kermit, with a population of less than 400 people, 
received shipments of roughly 9 million pain pills over just 2 years to 
a single pharmacy. These events take a toll on Americans not just in my 
State, but throughout the country. And unfortunately, for many of these 
men and women who are caught in this epidemic, more and more people 
face severely limited job opportunities after serving their time for 
crimes committed as a result of their addiction. To help fix this 
problem, I introduced a bill called the Clean Start Act last Congress 
and again this Congress, which seeks to help former addicts with 
criminal records seal those records if they complete a comprehensive 
addiction treatment program and show that they have turned their lives 
around. It is our job as public servants to help those who are unable 
to help themselves, and assisting those who have negatively impacted by 
the opioid epidemic is one of the most impactful things we can do.

        a.  How do you plan on curtailing the opioid crisis in the U.S?

    Answer. The opioid crisis is a serious epidemic that requires a 
multidisciplinary approach involving aggressive investigation and 
prosecution. The FBI is collaborating with partners in the healthcare, 
treatment, and education field to leverage our resources in the fight 
against this deadly epidemic plaguing our communities. We also continue 
to participate in high-level meetings with the Canadian and Mexican 
governments to address public health, public safety, and law 
enforcement opportunities and challenges inherent in countering the 
illegal drug trade overall, to include the current illicit opioid 
crisis.

        b.  How does the FBI plan to combat the accessibility and 
        convenience of the sale of opioids online?

    Answer. The FBI created the Joint Criminal Opioid and Darknet 
Enforcement (JCODE), in 2018, as a multi-agency initiative laser-
focused on combating the borderless, worldwide distribution of illegal 
drugs online. Since that time, JCODE has been relentless in finding and 
arresting drug dealers around the world who attempt to evade justice by 
operating on the darknet, as well as keeping dangerous drugs--
particularly counterfeit and contaminated drugs--off the streets and 
away from the thousands of people who fall victim every year. JCODE 
provides structure, intelligence, and ever-expanding technological 
capabilities toward disrupting the darknet criminal market place, 
neutralizing bad actors, and protecting our communities.

        c.  What additional authorities do you believe that the FBI 
        needs to effectively stop the flow of prescription opiates and 
        other illegal drugs into our country?

    Answer. The FBI defers to the Department of Justice on matters of 
legislation; however, as discussed above, the FBI leverages its 
existing authorities and partnerships to combat the illegal drug trade, 
including the illicit opioid crisis.

    Question 5. It is no secret that the talk of Congress right now is 
the possibility of an infrastructure package. However, in order for an 
infrastructure package to be passed, it goes without saying that we 
have to have a way to pay for it and pass some sort of tax reform. One 
of the components of tax reform that is being discussed is increasing 
resources available to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to improve 
internal security systems as well as increase enforcement activities. 
Approximately two weeks ago, a number of high profile and wealthy 
Americans had their confidential personal income and tax data leaked by 
a media outlet. The IRS has announced that the agency has opened an 
investigation into the leak of this data, and it has been reported that 
the IRS has recommended that your Bureau also open an investigation 
into this matter. It goes without saying that in lieu of these attacks, 
it would behoove Congress to increase the annual IRS budget so that 
proper systems may be implemented to protect against these types of 
leaks. However, in the interim, we need to ensure that the systems we 
do have in place are working as they were intended.

        a.  What steps has the FBI taken to assist the Department of 
        Treasury and the IRS to address these leaks?
        b.  When can we expect the FBI's investigation of the leak to 
        conclude? Can we expect the FBI to brief members of this 
        Committee following the conclusion of the FBI's investigation 
        on the results as well as steps that can be taken going forward 
        to prevent these occurrences from reoccurring?

    Answer. As you may be aware, the Secretary of the Treasury has 
testified that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is looking into the 
matter as is the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(TIGTA). She further stated that the matter had been referred to the 
Treasury Inspector General, as well as the Department of Justice.
    The Department is committed to taking investigative steps as 
appropriately predicated and authorized, carefully reviewing referrals 
we receive, and, as appropriate, considering relevant and admissible 
evidence in light of the Principles of Federal Prosecution. While we 
understand how important this issue is to you, longstanding Department 
policy will preclude us from providing your office with any information 
related to this matter outside the public record.

                         CONCLUSION OF HEARINGS

    [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., Wednesday, June 23, the hearings 
were concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene 
subject to the call of the Chair.]