[Senate Hearing 117-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 
       DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2023

                              ----------                              


                         THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2022

                                       U.S. Senate,
           Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen 
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Tester (chairman) presiding.
    Present: Senators Tester, Baldwin, Shelby, Collins, Graham, 
Blunt, Moran, and Hoeven.

                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                         Department of the Navy

                        Office of the Secretary

STATEMENT OF THE HON. CARLOS DEL TORO, SECRETARY


                opening statement of senator jon tester


    Senator Tester. Good morning. We will call this committee 
to order. Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses. Secretary 
Del Toro, this is your first appearance before our 
subcommittee, and I look forward to working with you.
    Admiral Gilday and General Berger, you were both here last 
year, so welcome back to you both. We appreciate your 
leadership of our Nation's Navy and Marine Corps and look 
forward to discussing your fiscal 2023 budget priorities with 
you. Let's be clear, despite Russia's ongoing war with Ukraine, 
China remains the pacing threat, and that pace is a run, if not 
a full on sprint. So the question we are asking as we work on 
next year's budget is, how do we increase our pace of 
modernization to keep up with this threat?
    For the Marine Corps, reshaping the force for the future is 
absolutely the key. General Berger, we look forward to getting 
an update from you about the implementation of Force Design 
2030, and any challenges or opportunities you are finding as 
you modernize today's Marine Corps.
    For the Navy, Secretary Del Toro and Admiral Gilday, you 
are faced with the balancing act between substantial costs of 
building and maintaining a fleet of nearly 300 ships, and the 
additional costs of modernizing Navy capabilities across the 
board to meet the threats of the future. To be frank, despite 
record high investments, the Navy's planned future force 
structure is not clear.
    And I understand there are ongoing studies to determine the 
size and makeup of the fleet of tomorrow. We urge you to 
communicate those plans with us sooner rather than later. I 
would add that no matter the desired outcome, holding people 
accountable, whether it be Government or civilian, for delays 
in ship construction or cost growth in our modernization 
programs has to be a part of the modernization strategy. 
Accepting cost overruns and schedule delays as a matter of 
course simply is not acceptable.
    The committee is eager to work with you on solutions that 
enable us to find the right balance between modernizing and 
maintaining the force we have and looks forward to hearing from 
you on where we have made progress and the challenges that 
still remain. Once again, it is a pleasure to have all three of 
you in front of the committee today, and we look forward to 
your testimony. Senator Shelby.


                 statement of senator richard c. shelby


    Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Del 
Toro, Admiral Gilday, General Berger, again, welcome to the 
committee. I too look forward to hearing more about the budget 
request for the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps for 
2023. The Department of Navy has played and will continue to 
play a critical role in the defense of our Nation.
    The capabilities that it has and the future capabilities 
that it pursues communicates our resolve to both our 
adversaries and to our allies. While it is important that the 
Navy continue to man, train, and equip a ready force, we must 
also prioritize, as we have talked, key modernization 
priorities.
    These priorities include hypersonic weapons and 
recapitalization of the Navy's nuclear arsenal, all while 
keeping a sharp watch on our adversaries today. China and 
Russia, as the Chairman said, continue to make unprecedented 
expenditures in advanced weapons, demonstrating new 
capabilities and their commitment to increase capacity.
    And while the U.S. seeks to maintain military superiority, 
it is concerning to all of us that the total funding requested 
for the Department of the Navy and Marine Corps does not even 
keep pace with inflation. I am concerned about this--what this 
communicates to both our allies and our adversaries.
    Therefore, I look forward to hearing how the fiscal 2023 
budget request proposes to meet the needs of the Navy and the 
Marine Corps while preserving our current and our future 
advantages. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Shelby. Secretary Del 
Toro, the floor is yours.


               summary statement of hon. carlos del toro


    Secretary Del Toro. Good morning, Chairman Tester, Vice 
Chairman Shelby, distinguished members. It is an honor to be 
here alongside General Berger and Admiral Gilday to discuss the 
posture of the Department of the Navy. I look forward to 
working with you to ensure that our sailors and Marines are 
equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our abilities so 
that they can fulfill our vital role to provide combat ready 
forces in support of the Joint Force. The United States 
requires a strong Navy and a strong Marine Corps.
    Our global economy and the self-determination of free 
nations everywhere depends on sea power. Our National Security 
depends on sea power. That is particularly true in the Indo-
Pacific, where Beijing's aggression threatens the rules based 
international order that protects us all. To answer that 
challenge, your Navy and Marine Corps must have the power to 
maintain credible, integrated deterrence by campaigning 
forward, forward from the sea, on the shore, and in the air.
    Thanks to the leadership of President Biden, Secretary 
Austin, this budget does provide the right balance for 
capacity, lethality, modernization, and readiness we need to 
execute the national defense strategy. We will invest these 
resources through the execution of a concise, clear, and 
transparent strategy rooted in three guiding principles. First, 
maintain and strengthen our maritime dominance that we can 
deter potential adversaries and fight and win decisively.
    Second, empower our sailors and Marines by fostering a 
culture of warfighting excellence founded on strong leadership, 
dignity, and respect for each other. And third, strengthen our 
strategic partnerships across the Joint Force, industry, and 
our international partners around the globe. We are executing 
this strategy through the integrated visions of the Marine 
Corps Force Design 2030 and the Navy Navigation Plan.
    I strongly support these visions and committed to fielding 
the ready, capable, and modernized force required to ensure 
their success. To maintain and strengthen maritime dominance, 
we have to be serious about fielding and maintaining the right 
capabilities to win wars.
    That is why our budget strongly invests in a nimble 
networks and survivable Navy with platforms like Columbia, DDG 
Flight III, and enhanced cyber and autonomous capabilities that 
enable our fleets' campaign forward in a distributed manner. 
This budget invests in a truly expeditionary and persistent 
Marine Corps, with the mobility and the readiness to respond in 
force wherever and whenever needed.
    We are advancing cybersecurity and resilience efforts 
across the department with investments to expand cyber mission 
force teams, harden networks, and leverage artificial 
intelligence and machine learning to defend information 
infrastructure. To ensure the combat readiness of our 
platforms, we are more than doubling SIOP (Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Program) investments over the 
previous budget.
    This budget invests in the climate resiliency of our force 
and facilities, while continuing efforts to substantially 
reduce our impact on climate change. We are investing in 
facilities that promote the quality of life of our personnel 
and their families. As I discussed on my recent visit to the 
USS George Washington last week, we are prioritizing access to 
mental health and eliminating barriers to seeking that help.
    We owe it to our military families to ensure their safety 
and well-being. And when we do fall short, we will look our 
problems square in the eye, and we will take necessary action 
to correct them. We are investing in our efforts to recruit, 
retain, train, and promote the best from all of America, and we 
are increasing funding for naval and cyber education and 
enhanced shipboard training so our sailors and Marines can 
build their careers wherever the service takes them.
    We appreciate this committee's interest ensuring our forces 
have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, including 
the potential expansion of the Fallon Training Range Complex. 
We also appreciate the committee's efforts to include new tools 
within the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) to deter 
destructive behavior and prosecute sexual assault, domestic 
violence, and other offenses. At every level of leadership, we 
are determined to prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, 
hold offenders accountable, and create a safer, stronger, more 
inclusive Navy Marine Corps team.
    I want to close by noting the importance of strategic 
partnerships for the Joint Force and our industrial base to our 
allies and partners around the world. I have personally seen 
our partnerships and alliances in action, from F-35b operations 
in the Indo-Pacific to NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) exercises in Norway and the Mediterranean. But 
our most important partnership is indeed with the American 
people.
    And that is why I am grateful for the oversight and 
interest of this committee, and I look forward to continuing 
with you in the years ahead.
    [The statement follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Carlos Del Toro
    Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, Members of the Committee, it 
is an honor to appear before you alongside General Berger and Admiral 
Gilday to discuss the posture of the Department of the Navy (DON). I 
look forward to working with you to ensure that our Sailors and Marines 
are equipped, trained, and prepared to the best of our ability, so they 
can fulfill their vital role in support of the Joint Force, protecting 
our national security interests.
    The United States requires a strong Navy and Marine Corps. The 
global economy, and the self-determination of free nations everywhere, 
depends on sea power. Thirty-one million American jobs and $5.4 
trillion in annual commerce rely on the sea lanes, and one third of all 
international commerce transits the South China Sea. Without a ready, 
and capable Navy and Marine Corps protecting the sea lanes and lines of 
communications, the global economy could easily halt.
    The national and economic security of our Nation depends on free 
and open access to the sea. And the rules-based international order 
that benefits us all requires a strong maritime force, campaigning 
forward alongside allies and partners to provide the sea control and 
integrated deterrence we need to counter strategic competitors, from 
Beijing, Moscow, and beyond.
    As Secretary Austin stated in his testimony before this Committee, 
``Integrated deterrence means combining our strengths across all the 
warfighting domains to maximum effect to ward off potential conflict.'' 
The Navy and Marine Corps Team offers forward maneuverable strengths in 
every domain that serve as a force multiplier within the Joint Force 
and alongside our allies and international partners. We are determined 
to ensure the integrated all domain force required to ensure maximum 
effect for civilian and military leadership, across the range of 
military options.
    Thanks to the leadership of President Biden and Secretary Austin, 
PB23 provides the right balance of capacity, lethality, modernization, 
and readiness needed to field the globally engaged and dominant naval 
force required by the National Defense Strategy. This budget will 
maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of each dollar entrusted to 
us by the American taxpayer, ensuring sufficient resources for today's 
challenges, while building future overmatch.
    We will invest these resources through a concise, clear, and 
transparent strategy centered on three primary lines of effort:
  --Strengthen Maritime Dominance.
  --Empower Our People.
  --Expand Strategic Partnerships.
    Admiral Gilday, General Berger, and I are executing these lines of 
effort as one fully integrated DON. The Navy Navigation Plan and Marine 
Corps Force Design 2030 are complementary visions working together to 
ensure the distributed capacity, long range fires, amphibious mobility, 
and network of allies and partners our Sailors and Marines need to make 
mission.
    Together, we are committed to working with you to ensure these 
plans are fully resourced, with vigorous oversight, to deliver maximum 
value to the American taxpayer, and to fulfill our sacred oath to 
protect the American people.
                     strengthen maritime dominance
    The security and freedom of the seas, and the resulting prosperity 
and security of our nation, did not happen on its own. It required 
significant investment and foresight by generations of legislative and 
executive leaders.
    Two hundred and twenty-five years ago, Congressional funding led to 
the commissioning of USS Constitution. One hundred years ago, the Navy 
launched our country's first aircraft carrier, USS Langley. Eighty 
years ago, the Marine Corps began purchasing Higgins Boats. And seventy 
years ago, President Truman laid the keel for USS Nautilus, the first 
nuclear submarine.
    Each of these investments yielded exponential returns, fueling the 
remarkable growth and global leadership of the United States during 
centuries of conflict and change. We stand at a similar inflection 
point today, where our national and economic security depend on the 
investments we make today to build and maintain our maritime dominance.
    Just as our first frigates defended American shipping from foreign 
aggression, tomorrow's networked frigates and destroyers will define 
the future of sea control. Just as our early aircraft carriers provided 
the critical edge at Midway, Ford-class carriers will transform the 
forward posture of our Nation in the conflicts ahead.
    Tomorrow's amphibious platforms will maintain our defense 
credibility throughout the Indo-Pacific. And just as our undersea fleet 
maintained the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad for the last 
seven decades, our strategic future depends on delivering Columbia-
class submarines, our top acquisition priority.
    Sea power has always required foresight and investment, and the 
future of our Nation will be defined by the strategic choices we make 
today. The posture and availability of naval forces must always reflect 
the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the 
President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge.
    The DON fiscal year 2023 budget request delivers these forces 
through sustained investment and performance improvement, developing 
more lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely integrated 
between the services and with our Joint Force and government partners, 
as well as our allies and international partners.
Fleet Investments
    The CNO's Navigation Plan refocuses our integrated all-domain naval 
power on the core functions of sea control and power projection through 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO). DMO places a high priority on 
the long range fires and advanced connectivity that will result in a 
resilient, networked, and dispersed fleet, providing decision advantage 
and unified action in contested environments.
    PB23 will invest in both manned and unmanned platforms to meet the 
strategic and operational demands of DMO, and will invest in the 
industrial capacity and capability to meet availability and maintenance 
demands as required to defend the Nation. PB23 focuses on delivery and 
maintaining platforms that will provide the greatest combat 
capabilities and readiness across the fleet, while divesting in 
platforms that have less relevance in contested maritime environments 
where adversaries have advanced weapon systems. This budget provides 
funding for nine battle force ships in the coming year, including two 
Virginia-class attack submarines and two Arleigh Burke Flight III 
Destroyers, and also continues funding for the Columbia-class and Ford-
class programs.
    PB23 increases innovation and modernization efforts in Research and 
Development by 9 percent for the Navy and 6 percent for the Marine 
Corps. A $2.7 billion investment in long range fires and hypersonic 
technologies will extend the lethality and capability of our platforms, 
and ensure maximum reach, survivability and decision space for our 
Sailors and Marines. With an increase of $81 million for Operation 
Overmatch in fiscal year 2023, the Navy will field a resilient, 
networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through the Naval Operational 
Architecture and Project Overmatch to provide decision advantage in 
contested environments. PB23 also commits $1.2 billion of Research and 
Development funding to recapitalization of all portions of the undersea 
leg of the triad including the submarines, TACAMO, Trident D5, and our 
Nuclear Command, Control and Communications network.
    Underpinning the capabilities required to strengthen and maintain 
our maritime dominance is our continued need to advance cyber security, 
cyber resiliency, and cyberspace efforts across the Department. The 
Department's fiscal year-23 budget submission continues strong 
investments to expand our Cyber Mission Force teams, harden our 
networks and computing systems, and leverages artificial intelligence 
and machine learning tools to enable rapid decisionmaking to better 
defend the information infrastructure.
    To increase availability, improve maintenance, and maximize 
throughput for our warships, PB23 continues targeted shore investments 
designed to increase fleet readiness. I was honored to break ground on 
a new drydock facility at our public shipyard in Portsmouth last fall, 
and have visited each of the Navy's four public shipyards as Secretary. 
Each of these facilities provides critical contributions to the 
availability and maintenance of our fleet, and each has modernization 
imperatives which are being addressed.
    In order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these 
facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure 
Optimization Program (SIOP), more than doubling SIOP investments over 
the previous budget, with over $1.7 billion in funding for dry dock 
recapitalization, facility optimization, and capital equipment and 
modernization.
Expeditionary Capabilities
    PB23 continues planning and design for the future Light Amphibious 
Warship (LAW). This budget provides for one Amphibious Transport Dock 
(LPD) and one Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA). Amphibious warships like 
the LHA and LPD are vital for the organic mobility and expeditionary 
persistence of our Marine Corps, and remain in high demand as a ``Swiss 
Army Knife'' for the Joint Force, meeting varying needs in dynamic 
situations. These ships provide the sealift necessary to deploy Marines 
for crisis response, contingency missions, humanitarian assistance, and 
integrated deterrence, supporting Marine Corps Aviation as well as 
diverse capabilities such as ISR/sensing, long range fires, and decoys.
    The Joint Force needs a truly expeditionary and persistent Marine 
Corps--armed, agile, and postured--capable of operating persistently 
inside actively contested environments, and ready to respond in force 
at the speed of relevance. To answer these needs, the Marine Corps has 
put into motion an aggressive modernization of the Service through 
Force Design 2030, a transformational effort rooted in the anticipated 
challenges of the future operating environment. I thank the Congress 
for its support of this transformation in the fiscal year 2021 and 
fiscal year 2022 authorization and appropriation bills. Your support is 
critical to the future readiness and lethality of the Marine Corps. 
Building on the cooperative efforts of all of our sea Services, the 
Marine Corps is reinvigorating the Fleet Marine principle to execute 
expeditionary warfighting concepts including Expeditionary Advanced 
Basing Operations (EABO) and Littoral Operations in a Contested 
Environment (LOCE).
    Agile, smaller combined-arms warfighting units, such as the Marine 
Littoral Regiment (MLR), Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) are the 9-1-1 force for our Combatant 
Commanders in the most dynamic and volatile situations. For example, 
during the evacuation efforts at Kabul International Airport last 
August, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was first on the ground, 
keeping the aviation lifeline open.
    The ARG/MEU is able to support a variety of mission sets, from 
humanitarian assistance, to coordinated operations with our allies and 
partners, to agile and lethal response in the combat zone. All of this 
requires investment in organic mobility, from the fleet, to the field, 
to the air.
    Accordingly, PB23 prioritizes and fully funds Marine Expeditionary 
Forces, and will advance the expeditionary vision of Force Design 2030 
through aircraft like the CH-53K King Stallion, with rotary heavy lift 
capability unmatched across the Joint Force. Platforms like CH-53K and 
C-130J will play a key role in the rapid deployment of Marines and 
equipment wherever and whenever needed.
Air Wing of the Future
    As we mark the centennial of American carrier aviation, naval 
aviators from both the Navy and Marine Corps are achieving exceptional 
results in the operational deployment of the F-35 Lightning.
    From the short takeoff and nimble capabilities of the F-35B, to our 
unmatched, carrier-based, precision strike F-35C, the Joint Strike 
Fighter is having a transformational effect on the reach and capability 
of naval aviation. In the coming years, a combination of F-35 and Next 
Generation Air Dominance systems will provide even greater power 
projection from our carrier force. PB23 will procure additional F-35C 
and F-35B aircraft, and will also invest in the Navy's MQ-25 unmanned 
aerial refueling system and MQ-9 Reaper, a crucial enabler for the 
effectiveness, visibility, and maneuverability of Marines in the field.
    We are taking a comprehensive approach to modernizing the Navy's 
Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs), which conduct depot level maintenance, 
repair, and overhaul of U.S. Navy aircraft, engines, components and 
support equipment. To build on the positive trend lines we have 
achieved in operational availability and readiness, PB23 includes an 11 
percent increase in airframe, engine depot, and component funding. We 
continue to see positive results in aircraft availability, sustaining a 
mission-capable rate of 80 percent for F/A-18E/F Super Hornets for 
three consecutive fiscal years, and five additional airframes achieving 
80 percent mission capability over the last 18 months.
    Through the Performance to Plan (P2P) initiative we're using data-
driven decisionmaking across the Navy to identify the root causes of 
maintenance delays and operational mishaps. This data-driven 
decisionmaking is integral to a ``Get Real, Get Better'' approach being 
applied across the Navy, demanding rigorous self-assessment, detailed 
analysis characterizing current performance, and providing opportunity 
to implement improvements. And in order to ensure every dollar is 
maximized to equip and prepare the warfighter, we are building on our 
financial statement audit success to improve our business systems, 
account for every asset, and leverage data as a strategic asset.
Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
    Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a 
critical warfighting priority for the DON. As an information age naval 
force, every Navy and Marine Corps warfighting function and mission 
area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform 
decisionmaking throughout the entire competition to conflict continuum. 
We are using data driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings 
while consistently working to become more effective and more efficient. 
For example, the Marine Corps has implemented Artificial Intelligence-
enabled counter-intrusion systems aboard bases, and we will continue to 
explore the use of information technology to harden defenses and enable 
capabilities.
    Effective use and management of data is key to our digital 
transformation, and will change how we will fight and win at every 
level. We are exploring the warfighting enabling capabilities of 5G 
expansion, and seeking additional ways to leverage new technology for 
distributed warfighting and unified command and control. Leaders in 
every functional unit and discipline have been directed to set business 
systems modernization on an integrated path that is sufficiently 
resourced and supported across the DON.
Climate Readiness
    The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of 
global climate change and the need to prepare for its short and long 
term effects on operational capability, as well as our responsibility 
to mitigate our environmental impact.
    To make our shore infrastructure more resilient to a changing 
climate, the Department is incorporating sea level rise modeling and 
modern facility standards into our new building designs. Navy and 
Marine Corps installations are adding a resilience component to their 
master plans and taking steps to ensure critical-mission infrastructure 
has access to reliable energy sources.
    Reducing fuel consumption also reduces overall costs, not only 
related to end-point consumption, but also costs associated with 
transporting fuel and resources to protect those assets. New 
technologies are reducing fuel consumption, including hybridization for 
newer platforms. In addition, advanced batteries and synthetic fuels 
are the starting point for platforms that are smaller, more lethal, and 
more integrated into future battlefield networks.
    PB23 resources $719 million for climate-cognizant solutions 
including hybrid vehicles and propulsion system efficiencies. Reducing 
energy demand and fuel consumption through advanced technology will 
enable warfighters to remain forward and self-sufficient for a longer 
period of time while also contributing to climate change goals.
    Especially noteworthy are the regional challenges facing Naval 
forces in the Arctic, from the changing physical environment and 
greater access to sea routes and resources, to increased military 
activities by Arctic states, such as Russia, and non-Arctic states and 
their attempts to alter Arctic governance. Harsh operating conditions 
in the Arctic affect our meteorological forecast capability, 
hydrographic surveys, modeling, and sensors have the potential to 
impact sea lines of communications.
    I have therefore directed a review of our current strategic 
document for the Arctic, the Arctic Blueprint, to ensure we are 
adequately preparing our forces for climate change within and through 
the region. The Navy is also engaging with our Arctic partners and 
allies through programs such as the Denmark Newport Arctic Scholars 
Initiative recently co-hosted by the President of the U.S. Naval War 
College and Commandant of the Royal Danish Defense College.
                         empowering our people
    Everywhere I've gone as Secretary of the Navy, I have been 
impressed with the professional dedication of every Sailor, Marine, and 
Civilian executing the many missions of the DON. Admiral Gilday, 
General Berger, and I are determined to ensure opportunities for every 
Sailor, Marine and civilian to advance and grow without barriers or 
discrimination. It all starts with a culture of warfighting excellence, 
where all are treated with dignity and respect.
Building the Future Force
    To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term 
strategic competition, we must continue to evaluate and improve our 
capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse 
workforce. We face an intensely competitive job market for talented 
workers, and a rapidly evolving tactical and technical landscape, 
driving us to modernize and enhance our entire talent management 
approach in order to succeed.
    We are expanding opportunities for civilians with prior military 
service to contribute their unique experiences to our force through the 
Targeted Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel 
to learn, operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector, 
across the Joint Force, and alongside our allies.
    We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to 
develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal 
opportunity in every aspect of our force. For example, the Marine Corps 
Talent Management 2030 is focused on identifying the individual 
strengths of every Marine and matching these talents to the needs of 
the Corps.
    Our mission demands leaders who possess the highest intellectual 
and warfighting capabilities to confront the many dangers of a complex 
world. We value critical thinking, creativity, communication, 
collaboration, and problem solving. The institutions of our naval 
education enterprise are developing leaders with the warfighting rigor, 
intellectual dynamism, and innovation to hold our strategic advantage 
against competitors and global adversaries. We are creating a continuum 
of learning through ready, relevant education, attuned to the battle 
rhythm of active duty service.
    PB23 invests $425 million in our naval education institutions, 
including the U.S. Naval Academy, Naval Postgraduate School, Naval War 
College, and Marine Corps University. This funding will expand access 
to the Naval Community College ensuring that all of our personnel have 
access to a high quality college education, no matter where their 
service takes them. We are investing in distance learning, cyber 
education, and increasing shipboard training and certification 
opportunities, while expanding opportunities for personnel to work and 
research alongside our industrial and academic partners.
    We appreciate the Congress's interest in ensuring our naval forces 
have the right facilities to train, fight, and win. Specifically, we 
are grateful for the Congress's continued attention to the urgent need 
to expand the Fallon Training Range Complex, which is necessary to the 
readiness of every naval aviator and Navy SEAL. I have personally met 
with Tribal and local community leaders, as well as my counterparts 
across the Federal Government, and I am committed to finding a 
favorable solution for everyone involved.
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
    In order to meet the challenges of a complex world, we must 
continue to recruit, retain, train, and promote the best from all of 
America. We need a diverse force, so every child in America can see 
themselves wearing the uniform or working in our civilian ranks 
tomorrow, and every viewpoint is represented in our operations today, 
so that we can draw talent from all of America to build our warfighting 
advantage. This is a national security imperative, and a critical 
aspect of the DON's Diversity, Equity and Inclusion initiatives.
    We have been reaching out across the Department, through efforts 
like Task Force One Navy, the Executive Diversity Advisory Council, the 
USMC Diversity Review Board and the Navy DEI Council to understand what 
is working, and where we fall short. We are looking at areas of under-
representation in military and civilian occupations, and finding ways 
to build diversity, equity and inclusion efforts into our Navy and 
Marine Corps culture.
    We are expanding recruitment efforts like our Junior Officer 
Diversity Outreach Program, to build recruitment networks in diverse 
and underrepresented communities. We are expanding and increasing 
awareness of career development and mentorship opportunities to help 
cultivate the next generation of diverse leadership through the ranks. 
And in accordance with the 2017 Women, Peace and Security Act, we are 
working with partner nations to expand the meaningful participation of 
women in defense around the world.
    We continue to expand gender integration in Marine Corps recruit 
training and operational units, strengthening our entire force. Out in 
the fleet, women are leading as never before. In December, I 
commissioned USS Daniel Inouye, under the command of Commander DonAnn 
Gilmore. In January, USS Abraham Lincoln Captain Amy Bauernschmidt 
became the first woman to command an aircraft carrier at sea. And in 
February, I was honored to preside over the change of command at USS 
Constitution, as Commander Billie Farrell became the first woman to 
command our Nation's flagship.
    And many more outstanding women are on their way up the ranks. This 
semester at the U.S. Naval Academy, five of the six people chosen 
through a competitive process to serve on the staff of the Brigade 
Commander, the highest ranking midshipman, are women, including the 
Brigade Commander, herself.
    From the E-Ring to the Air Wing, the deckplates to the field, our 
force is stronger today because of the many women and minorities in our 
ranks and leadership. But there is still more work to be done. We are 
working to reduce under-representation by examining our accession and 
promotion pipelines to recognize and value the service of all our 
enlisted and commissioned personnel. And our office of Diversity, 
Equity and Inclusion continues to identify areas for improvement and 
action. We look forward to working with the Committee to continue 
expanding opportunities for all Americans to serve and lead.
Destructive Behaviors
    Leaders at all levels are expected to set the tone for a healthy 
climate and culture where destructive behaviors are never tolerated. 
Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist ideologies are 
a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy and 
Marine Corps.
    Throughout 2021, DON representatives participated in the Secretary 
of Defense's Countering Extremist Activity Working Group to develop 
recommendations to address extremism in the ranks. Specific focus areas 
included military justice and policy, training and enhancing the 
insider threat program.
    This budget requests $240 million for Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response activities--an 84 percent increase over fiscal year 2022. We 
have focused our efforts on recognizing and preventing harmful 
behaviors in the first instance, and ensuring that leaders at every 
level have the training, skills, and tools available to ensure 
offenders are held appropriately accountable.
    I appreciate the work of this Committee to include new tools within 
the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to deter 
misconduct and prosecute sexual assault, domestic violence, and other 
covered offenses. The Department of Navy is moving forward to create 
Offices of Special Trial Counsel, as required by the NDAA, and we 
welcome the meaningful change these offices will help enable. Trained 
and independent military prosecutors will capably oversee sensitive 
investigations of covered offenses and independently determine, based 
on the evidence, which cases are referred to trial by court-martial. 
They will be led by a senior judge advocate who will report directly to 
me.
    DON leaders have circulated the ``Watch List'' throughout the 
force. This prevention tool details warning signs that increase the 
risk of sexual assault within a command, including sexual harassment, 
gender discrimination, lack of responsibility and intervention, 
workplace hostility, and lack of respect and unit cohesion. In 
conjunction with this training tool, we encourage leaders at every 
level to speak up and take action when they see these or other 
behaviors on the continuum of harm.
    This fiscal year, we will begin hiring an integrated prevention 
workforce across the force to redouble our focus on early 
identification and prevention of harmful and destructive behaviors. I 
have also directed the DON to expedite the implementation of five 
recommendations of the Secretary of Defense's Independent Review 
Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. These five accelerated 
recommendations focus on developing, educating, and promoting leaders 
dedicated to fostering command climates in which all individuals are 
treated with dignity and respect.
    These changes will improve our ability to prevent sexual assault 
and sexual harassment, hold offenders accountable, and create a safer, 
stronger and more inclusive Navy-Marine Corps team. I am releasing the 
DON ``No Wrong Door'' policy, ensuring victims receive professional 
care to the fullest extent practicable, regardless of where they 
initially seek support. This new policy will also serve to supplement 
existing efforts to further professionalize our workforce, prioritize 
the prevention of sexual harassment and eliminate collateral duty 
personnel with full time personnel. This ``No Wrong Door'' policy also 
recognizes that sexual assault, sexual harassment, and domestic abuse 
exist on a continuum of harm. The DON's implementation efforts, led by 
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, 
are already underway.
Take Care of Our People
    The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being 
for all members within our military community. We are reforming 
operating procedures and promotion practices to reward initiative, 
applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at every level. A top 
priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the needs and 
challenges of military families, particularly to ensure our policies 
respect the needs of single parent and dual service families.
    The DON offers a variety of mental health and counseling resources, 
encouraging positive help-seeking behaviors and eliminating the stigma 
around mental healthcare among service members. The importance of this 
issue and the continued emphasis on suicide prevention has been 
highlighted in recent weeks as we mourn the loss of young Sailors 
aboard USS George Washington. We continue to emphasize suicide 
prevention efforts, breaking the silence, and increasing visibility and 
access to critical resources.
    Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and 
customer service programs, we are responding to the needs of our 
warfighters and their families. For example, this budget increases 
Child and Youth Services funding by 38 percent, including $56 million 
for a new Child Development Center at Point Loma, childcare data 
management system upgrades, and full funding for the Fee Assistance 
Program.
    PB23 also includes significant funding for construction and 
oversight of family housing, including $249 million for new family 
housing at Joint Region Marianas--Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and 
$75 million for construction improvements to family housing in 
Yokosuka, Japan. PB23 also includes the funding necessary for DON to 
sustain our increased oversight as necessary to ensure Military Housing 
Privatization Initiative (MHPI) projects on Navy and Marine Corps bases 
provide quality housing and a positive living experience for Sailors, 
Marines and their families.
    As demonstrated by recent quality issues at barracks buildings in 
Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bethesda in Maryland, the DON must also 
ensure that our unaccompanied housing is properly maintained and 
consistent with modern living standards. I have recently visited the 
barracks at NSA Bethesda to confirm that these quality issues have been 
appropriately addressed, and I am committed to improving our 
unaccompanied housing facilities and preventing future problems. PB23 
also includes significant investment in unaccompanied housing, 
including $101 million for phase II of a Navy barracks project at 
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, and $101 million for a Marine Corps Barracks 
Complex at Kadena, Japan.
    Finally, I fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to 
defuel and permanently close the Red Hill facility, and I take very 
seriously the DON's responsibility to make things right after fuel 
releases contaminated the drinking water system at Joint Base Pearl 
Harbor-Hickam. I will continue to work closely with our Federal 
interagency partners and the Hawaii Department of Health to protect the 
environment and support the military families and residents who have 
been impacted by fuel-contaminated water on Oahu, Hawaii.
COVID-19
    With consistent personal and fleet discipline, vaccine 
distribution, and refinement of best practices, we have ensured a 
robust, proactive, and coordinated COVID-19 response across the DON. I 
particularly want to note the contributions of the 265,000 civilian 
employees in the DON, whose faithful service throughout the pandemic 
enabled mission accomplishment.
    Guided by Health Protection Condition (HPCON) determinations and 
mission requirements, we continue to implement flexibilities that help 
minimize risk to our people and their families while remaining 
responsive to an evolving national security landscape. We are well 
positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has forced us 
to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel support, 
as well as shipyard operations, deployment schedules, and headquarters 
management, with efficiencies and technology application that will 
benefit our combat readiness long after COVID-19 is in our wake.
                   strengthen strategic partnerships
    Our partnerships provide an unmatched and irreplaceable advantage 
over every potential adversary. From our fellow Joint Force and 
government personnel, to our vital industrial base, to our global 
network of allies and partners, we will sustain, expand, and strengthen 
strategic partnerships by building seamless integration, communication, 
and collaboration with each of our partners at the same time that we 
cultivate new relationships.
Joint Force and Government
    Across both services and throughout the DON, PB23 will invest in 
the readiness of integration- ready platforms to ensure continued 
freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from amphibious and 
ground element equipment, to agile warships and submarines, to dominant 
aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful implementation of the 
concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will be 
pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.
    But our fully integrated naval force is only part of the formidable 
Joint Force team that stands united in the protection of the American 
people. Collaboration between Departments, from the Pentagon to the 
operational front line unit, is critical to the defense of the United 
States. We are constantly seeking opportunities to maximize the 
combined efficiency and effectiveness of our force in cooperation with 
the Army, Air Force, and Space Force. For example, we continue to work 
with our fellow services on critical advanced research programs 
including hypersonic weapons. And worldwide, the Joint Strike Fighter 
program is yielding unprecedented reach and agility for the entire 
Joint Force.
    We are also proud to serve alongside our fellow sea service, the 
United States Coast Guard. Building on Advantage at Sea, our Tri 
Service Maritime Strategy, we are continually seeking ways to leverage 
our combined capabilities, from ice breakers to coastal facilities to 
embarked personnel. For example, last year USS Tulsa and USS Charleston 
conducted missions with embarked Coast Guard detachments as part of the 
Oceania Maritime Security Initiative. This joint effort improves our 
maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific to reduce illicit 
fishing, combat transnational crimes, and enhance regional security. 
PB23 will build on cooperative efforts like this to safeguard every 
part of the maritime domain.
    We continue to work with the United States Strategic Command, the 
National Security Council and the United States Air Force to support 
the Strategic Deterrent Forces. We work closely with our Joint Force 
partners to ensure DON is fully integrated into the national command 
authority, and ensure the Navy's sea based strategic deterrent is ready 
at a moment's notice to defend our Nation. We will continue to work 
closely with the Department of Energy and our National Laboratories, to 
ensure Navy is forward leaning with modernization and sustainment as we 
continue to invest in the future deterrent through programs like 
Columbia and TACAMO.
Community Partnerships
    Across the United States and around the world, Navy and Marines 
Corps installations partner with the local communities that host us to 
pursue joint opportunities, collaborate on shared challenges and 
develop regional plans that enable military readiness while supporting 
community priorities.
    Installation commanding officers are successfully using 
Intergovernmental Support Agreements to partner with a state or local 
governments to obtain installation support services, often at a 
considerable cost savings. Initiatives like the Defense Community 
Infrastructure Pilot program provide construction funds to states and 
communities to address deficiencies in community infrastructure that 
support military installations. And under the Readiness and 
Environmental Protection Integration (REPI) program, the DON is 
partnering with local governments and organizations and combining 
resources to enhance and preserve mission readiness and achieve 
mutually beneficial, sustainable communities near our installations and 
ranges.
Industry Partnerships
    From the skilled shipwrights who transformed live southern oak into 
USS Constitution's ``iron sides'', to the over 2,000 suppliers and 
contractors contributing to the Ford class today, our industrial base 
has fueled the strength of our Navy and Marine Corps. The innovative 
platforms and technologies that are so essential to the Joint 
Warfighting Concept would not exist without the private sector's 
involvement.
    Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our 
efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the 
warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design 
to production to maintenance. A robust, resilient, and nimble 
industrial base and supply chain is critical to the long term strength 
of our Navy and Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term 
planning are key elements in ensuring the efficiency of our 
acquisitions and maintenance processes in partnership with a supply 
chain calibrated to deliver maximum value to the taxpayer and 
warfighter.
    In order to ensure a strong and stable industrial base to meet our 
national security requirements, we must be clear and transparent as to 
our future needs and resource constraints, and fight requirements creep 
whenever possible. In turn, our partners must be transparent with us as 
well, managing costs, strengthening the workforce, and delivering 
platforms on-time and on-budget. Together, we must be good stewards of 
the taxpayer's money.
    PB23 will strengthen our industrial base through targeted 
investments in supplier development, shipbuilder infrastructure, 
strategic outsourcing, and workforce development. This budget adds $543 
million for submarine industrial base investment and funds for a 
predictable build plan of two SSNs and two DDGs per year. It maintains 
a public shipyard workforce at 37,000 full time equivalent workers, and 
funds 45 private ship maintenance availabilities.
    I have held multiple town hall meetings with industry partners to 
hear about their challenges when doing business with the DON, and 
seeking greater transparency and cooperation to pursue greater 
efficiency, innovation and teamwork. I have also made it clear that I 
expect DON suppliers and contractors to meet their small business 
commitments, and expand diversity, equity and inclusion efforts in 
their hiring and subcontracting, in order to expand the innovative 
private sector universe available to the DON to benefit the taxpayer 
and the warfighter.
    Allies and Partners
    As strategic competitors pursue confrontation and coercion, we 
respond with alliances and partnerships, standing alongside a global 
community of nations in defense of our common values. I have witnessed 
the bonds between our Sailors and Marines working alongside their 
counterparts in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and elsewhere throughout 
the Indo-Pacific. I also saw the power of allied cooperation on recent 
trips to Europe, as I spoke with Marines preparing for Exercise COLD 
RESPONSE in Norway, and Sailors aboard USS Harry S. Truman carrying out 
tri-carrier maritime and air policing operations in the Mediterranean 
and North Aegean Sea alongside the Italian carrier Cavour and the 
French carrier Charles DeGaulle.
    These activities demonstrate the strength of our integrated 
deterrence, and the agility of our combined forces. Last year, USS 
Sullivans transited the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the 
Philippine Sea as part of the HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group, 
providing air defense and integrated operations alongside Royal Navy 
and Dutch destroyers, while also working with many allies and partners 
including Australia, France, Israel, Italy, New Zealand, Japan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and more.
    HMS Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group also featured United 
States Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 operating aboard the Royal 
Navy's flagship carrier. For 7 months, the ``Wake Island Avengers'' 
operated ten F-35B Lightnings alongside eight Royal Air Force F-35Bs 
from the decks of HMS Queen Elizabeth. Our Marine aviators have also 
operated the F-35B from the decks of Italy's Cavour and Japan's Izumo, 
proving the capability of this aircraft for true allied deck hopping, 
when paired with United States amphibious ships for aircraft 
maintenance and sustainment.
    PB23 will strengthen global alliances and partnerships with funding 
for joint operations and exercises around the world, including CARAT, 
MALABAR, and BALIKITAN in the Indo-Pacific, NATO operations in the 
Mediterranean, and exercises in our own hemisphere like UNITAS. We will 
continue to strengthen military-to-military relationships with existing 
allies, leverage specialized allied experience in regional operations, 
and expand and deepen our partnerships with like-minded nations around 
the world.
    We will continue to build opportunities for Sailors, Marines, and 
Civilians to train, learn, and operate side-by side with their 
counterparts in partner and allied forces, and operationally integrate 
with our allies and partners through shared warfighting concepts, 
continually campaigning forward to deter adversaries and protect the 
rules based international order.
    Our Sailors, Marines and civilian personnel are warrior-diplomats 
for our Nation. Their professionalism and dedication promotes the 
connections that strengthen our collective security and cultivate 
shared ideals that send the message that the United States is a friend 
worth having.
                               conclusion
    The most important partnership for our Navy and Marine Corps Team 
is with the American people. They entrust us with their hard earned tax 
dollars, as well as the lives and wellbeing of their sons and 
daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands and wives who serve in our 
ranks. We will not fail in our sacred responsibility to the American 
people, and all who serve in the cloth of our Nation.
    On behalf of each of the brave Sailors, Marines, Civilians, and the 
families that serve at their side, I once again thank the leadership 
and membership of this Committee for your oversight, interest, and 
ongoing commitment to the defense of the United States of America. It 
is an honor to work with each of you, and I look forward to your 
questions.

    Senator Tester. Thank you, Secretary Del Toro. Admiral 
Gilday.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL M. GILDAY, CHIEF OF NAVAL 
            OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY
    Admiral Gilday. Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, 
distinguished members of the committee, good morning and thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today with 
Secretary Del Toro and General Berger. Senator Shelby, I would 
just like to thank you up front for your service in the United 
States Senate, and for your Herculean efforts, much of it 
behind the scenes, to support the United States military and 
specifically our Navy and Marine Corps.
    For nearly eight decades, America's maritime superiority 
has guaranteed peace and prosperity across the world's oceans 
and has played a unique and predominant role in protecting our 
Nation's most vital national interests. Maintaining maritime 
superiority is fundamental to implementing our national defense 
strategy.
    Global competition is heating up, the pace of innovation is 
accelerating, and the environment that our naval forces are 
operating in every day is growing more transparent, more 
lethal, and more contested. Everybody in this room understands 
those trends, particularly China's massive investment in highly 
capable forces designed to deny our access to the seas.
    Our Navy's role has never been more consequential or more 
expansive. Right now, today, naval forces are postured forward, 
defending against simultaneous threats in every theater. As the 
Russian invasion of Ukraine tragically rages on, the Truman 
Strike Group and Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group are sailing 
alongside our NATO forces on point, demonstrating resolve and 
deterring escalation.
    Meanwhile, on the other side of the world, the USS Tripoli 
is on her maiden deployment, testing assault carrier concepts 
with her embarked F-35s and patrolling the Western Pacific 
alongside the USS Abraham Lincoln and the Ronald Reagan Carrier 
Strike Group.
    These flexible and resilient options enabled by our Navy 
Marine Corps team are undoubtedly the first line of deterrence 
against Chinese and Russian forces and can provide quick 
response options against any threats against our national 
interests. The global, consistent demand for naval assets 
serves as an unmistakable message, America needs a combat 
credible naval force that can protect our interests in peace 
and prevail in war, not just today but tomorrow and for the 
long term competition that lies ahead.
    Our budget submission reflects that imperative. It fully 
funds the Columbia Class submarine to ensure continuity for our 
Nation's most survivable strategic deterrent. It keeps our 
fighting--it keeps our fleet ready to fight tonight. It funds 
maintenance accounts. It fills magazines with weapons. It puts 
spare parts in storerooms. And it gives our sailors the 
steaming days and the flying hours that they need to hone their 
skills.
    It modernizes our fleet by investing in weapons with 
increased range and speed, as the Chairman indicated, is an 
imperative. And it integrates systems to improve fleet 
survivability with a resilient, cyber secure network 
infrastructure.
    And it invests in affordable, capable capacity, building 
towards the goal of a larger distributed hybrid fleet of manned 
and unmanned, and taking into account the insights we are 
gaining on a monthly basis from our fleet battle problems and 
exercises like large scale exercise 2021 and the international 
maritime exercise that we recently completed in the Middle 
East.
    These exercises and many others are helping us refine our 
warfighting concepts. They are helping us experiment with 
unmanned and cutting edge systems at the speed of innovation 
and grow the fighting power of our Navy Marine Corps team 
across all domains.
    The need to field a ready fleet today as we simultaneously 
modernize for the future has forced us to make difficult 
decisions, including the decommissioning of platforms that do 
not bring the needed lethality to a high end fight in contested 
areas. While we build capacity at the--while building capacity 
at the expense of readiness and modernization can sound like an 
attractive option, it is not one that I endorse.
    We have been there before, and we have seen the tragic 
results. I refuse to repeat it again. We cannot field a fleet 
larger than one that we can sustain. And at today's fiscal 
levels, quantity simply cannot substitute for quality, 
especially as our adversaries are building more advanced war 
fighting systems.
    Failing to modernize to meet those threats would erode 
America's maritime superiority at a time when command of the 
seas will decide the global strategic balance of power for the 
rest of this century. The stakes in this competition are 
extremely high and serious, which is why your sailors, active 
and reserve, uniform and civilian are committed to 
strengthening our naval power every single day.
    Thank you again for inviting me to testify, and I am 
grateful for the committee's support for our Navy and Marine 
Corps team. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The statement follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Admiral Michael M. Gilday
    Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, distinguished members of the 
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the 
posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our 
Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your 
continued leadership and support. With the funding authorized by 
Congress these last several years, we increased our readiness, 
modernized our capabilities, and kept our fleet deployed forward in the 
most critical regions of strategic competition.
    Since the founding of our Republic, the U.S. Navy has played a 
critical part in defending and advancing national policy by delivering 
sea power far from American shores. Our Navy's role--and consequently, 
its composition--has steadily evolved to ensure American security and 
defend our interests around the world. From our humble beginnings as a 
small maritime force, fending off pirates and protecting American 
shipping, we have become a globally postured fleet that underwrites 
world stability by deterring war, upholding international law, and 
assuring access to the maritime domain.
    Today, our Navy's mission has never been more consequential or 
expansive. We now face potential adversaries who are attempting to 
undermine the rules-based international order, aggressively modernizing 
their militaries, and fielding offensive warfighting capabilities at 
unprecedented speed and scale.
    This is a critical decade. Peaceful, free, and open oceans are 
vital to America's and our allies' security and prosperity in the 21st 
century. As global challengers rise, we must strengthen America's naval 
power to protect and defend our national interests.
            the maritime challenge to u.s. national security
    As a maritime nation, America's maritime superiority is a global 
imperative. Two expansive oceans connect us to our allies and trading 
partners. For all of us, our way of life depends upon free, open, and 
secure maritime areas. Sea control and power projection are essential 
to U.S. national security and long-term economic health. The People's 
Republic of China (PRC), our pacing threat, clearly recognizes this and 
has publically stated that it intends to grow its sphere of influence 
by challenging the United States' military access to the western 
Pacific.
    Over the past two decades, the PRC has built a comprehensive sea-
denial, anti-access system of sophisticated sensors and long-range 
precision weapons. Backed by a robust industrial base and the largest 
shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, the PRC has extensively 
modernized its military and tripled the size of the People's Liberation 
Army-Navy (PLAN). It is also building next-generation strategic missile 
submarines, erecting hundreds of new missile silos, and growing its 
cyber and space capabilities.
    Under the cover of this anti-access umbrella, the PRC has embraced 
the use of ``gray zone'' activities to turn incremental gains into 
long-term strategic advantages. Using a multi-layered fleet of naval 
ships, maritime militia, and coast guard, the PRC is undermining 
international norms by staking illegal maritime claims, militarizing 
geographic features in the South and East China Seas, and intimidating 
its neighbors regarding offshore resources. Additionally, the PRC is 
extending its global reach with its Belt and Road Initiative--
leveraging predatory lending practices, aggressive mercantilism backed, 
and hard military power--to access critical maritime terrain, ports, 
and waterways.
    Additional threats persist around the globe. Russia remains an 
acute threat, seeking to fracture NATO and reestablish its sphere of 
influence using a combination of diplomatic, economic, and military 
force. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has shattered the post-
Cold War peace in Europe. The support of like-minded nations for the 
brave citizens of Ukraine has reminded would-be aggressors of the 
global intensity of purpose to uphold a nation's inherent right to 
freedom. As the struggle continues, Russia is risking broader 
escalation with threats of nuclear attack, deployments of missile-
carrying submarines close to American and allied shores, and 
sophisticated cyber-attacks. North Korea continues to develop both 
nuclear and missile programs; Iran's missile program is also 
concerning. All the while, violent extremist organizations remain 
persistent threats.
    Other serious transboundary challenges, including climate change 
and emerging pathogens, are also increasing the complexity of the 
security environment. Strategic competitors and non-state actors are 
gaining access to cutting-edge commercial technologies and wielding 
them to disrupt America's interests and national security. Artificial 
intelligence, ubiquitous sensors, and long- range precision weapons are 
making contested spaces more transparent and more lethal, and these 
systems are proliferating globally at a rapid pace.
    These are several of the many considerations shaping the future 
strategic environment. When examined together, they illustrate the 
complexity of 21st century security challenges, particularly in the 
maritime domain. In a rapidly changing world, a formidable naval force 
is crucial to effectively implement the 2022 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS) and protect American security and prosperity. The Nation cannot 
afford to have its Navy to pull back and cede influence at a time of 
rising tensions and challenges to freedom of the seas. Nor can it 
afford our fleet to lose its warfighting advantage.
                         meeting the challenge
    Looking to the future, the U.S. Navy must continue to deploy our 
fleets forward to meet an unpredictable strategic environment. We must 
also modernize to field the most capable force possible against 
evolving threats. America needs a Navy capable of prevailing over any 
naval adversary to protect and sustain our interests worldwide and 
deter crises that could lead to war.
    Together with the U.S. Marine Corps and Coast Guard, we must 
deliver integrated all-domain naval power to the Joint Force: the 
lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive fleet 
that the NDS requires. Specifically, in support of NDS and Department 
of Defense requirements:
  --The Navy must defend the Homeland with an assured nuclear deterrent 
        from beneath the sea to deter all forms of strategic attack.
  --The Navy must be capable of controlling the seas to deter 
        aggression against our allies and partners, and project power 
        ashore as an integral part of the Joint Force.
  --The Navy must be able to distribute and mass effects, integrate 
        with the Joint Force across all domains, and defeat adversary 
        forces in conflict.
    To prevail in competition, crisis, and conflict, our naval forces 
must be combat-credible-- measured by our ability to deliver lethal 
effects in contested and persistently surveilled battlespaces. We will 
deliver these forces by aligning our planning, resources, and 
investments with national policy end-state objectives:
    Strengthening Integrated Deterrence. Integrated deterrence is 
backstopped by a safe, secure and effect nuclear deterrent. The Navy 
operates and maintains the most survivable leg of the nation's nuclear 
triad. Our strategic submarines represent approximately 70 percent of 
America's deployed nuclear arsenal. Synchronized with the retirement of 
Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, we must deliver Columbia-class 
submarines on time, as we continue to modernize our nuclear command, 
control, and communications systems and supporting infrastructure. 
These efforts are essential to ensure the United States can deter 
nuclear coercion or nuclear employment in any scenario.
    Deterrence also relies on forward-deployed, combat-credible 
conventional forces to control the seas and project power. These roles 
are central to integrated deterrence now and in the future. Employing a 
host of kinetic and non-kinetic effects launched from platforms on, 
under, and above the sea, conventional naval forces deploy globally to 
deter military aggression, support diplomacy, and give national leaders 
options to protect American interests across the spectrum of conflict. 
Should conflict arise, the Navy is consistently deployed forward to 
respond decisively, supporting the Joint Force to end hostilities on 
favorable U.S. terms.
    The Navy also provides the first physical line of U.S. Homeland 
Defense, preventing potential adversaries from using the oceans to 
directly threaten America or our allies and partners. No other element 
of national power can fulfill this role across every domain, from the 
seabed to space.
    Campaigning Forward. Naval forces across the globe provide the 
United States strategic advantages in power projection, diplomacy, 
influence, and flexibility, without over reliance on access to overseas 
land bases. Our enduring, forward posture in support of the Joint Force 
guarantees our Nation the ability to respond to crisis, blunt gray-zone 
incrementalism, and preserve a stable and secure global maritime order. 
The Navy's global maneuverability supports diplomacy, reassures our 
allies, and generates favorable influence in key regions.
    Our alliances and partnerships remain our key strategic advantage. 
They recognize U.S. naval forces as their on-scene partner for building 
combined maritime strength. Every day, the Navy operates forward 
alongside allies and partners through combined operations, theater 
security cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. These 
activities strengthen interoperability, increase information sharing, 
and build capacity for resilient, integrated logistics. Working 
together--particularly with interoperable, critical-capability allies--
we strengthen our ability to prevail in conflict and further bolster 
integrated deterrence by demonstrating a united front against potential 
adversaries.
    In September of last year, President Biden announced a trilateral 
security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States (known as AUKUS). The announcement launched an intensive 
18-month consultation period among the three governments to seek an 
optimal pathway for delivering a conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered 
submarine capability to Australia at the earliest achievable date. The 
Navy is playing a key leadership role in developing this plan to ensure 
that our Nation's preeminent expertise is applied to the nuclear-
powered submarine initiative. We are focused on ensuring Australia 
understands the full scope of capabilities necessary to design, build, 
operate, and maintain a nuclear navy. AUKUS represents a tremendous 
strategic opportunity for the United States to expand our cooperation 
and collaboration with two of our closest allies, and we are on pace to 
respond to the President's tasking.
    The Navy is also uniquely equipped to contest gray zone 
incrementalism by our adversaries. Gray zone aggression thrives with 
non-attribution. The best way to oppose these activities is to deny our 
adversaries anonymity with persistent domain awareness, the effective 
leveraging of intelligence, and the agile application of sea power. 
Together with whole-of-government partners, the Navy exposes malign 
behavior, imposes reputational costs, diminishes the effectiveness of 
propaganda, and galvanizes international resistance.
    Building Enduring Warfighting Advantages. Based on the PRC's 
current and long-term security challenge, the Navy must set a stable 
and sustainable trajectory to a larger and more capable force now. To 
ensure we remain adaptable and relevant, our future force design relies 
on six overarching imperatives to sustain our warfighting advantage, 
expand our options, and constrain those of our adversaries:
    Expand Distance. Long-range precision fires across all domains--and 
platforms with greater reach--enable naval forces to strike hostile 
targets while increasing our survivability.
    Leverage Deception. Deceptive measures--including stealth, 
concealment and maneuver, emissions control, and electronic warfare--
degrade enemy surveillance and increase adversary uncertainty, enabling 
naval forces to operate effectively in contested seas.
    Harden Defense. Integrating directed energy with hard-kill and 
soft-kill defensive systems disrupts attacks and keeps naval forces 
survivable when targeted by adversaries.
    Increase Distribution. Distributing naval forces geographically and 
in all domains enables them to threaten an adversary from multiple 
attack axes. Smaller, lethal, and less costly platforms--including 
manned, unmanned, and optionally-manned--further complicate threat 
targeting, generate confusion, and pose dilemmas for our adversaries.
    Ensure Delivery. Resilient logistics connecting the foundry to the 
fleet--enabled by secure communications and information technology--
refuel, rearm, resupply, repair, and revive distributed naval forces 
down to the last tactical mile.
    Generate Decision Advantage. Naval forces will out-sense, out-
decide, and out-fight any adversary by accelerating our decision cycles 
with secure, survivable, and resilient networks, accurate data, and 
artificial intelligence. Connecting sensors, weapons, and decision-
makers across all domains enables naval forces to mass firepower and 
influence without massing forces.
    These six force design imperatives enable Distributed Maritime 
Operations (DMO), the Navy's foundational operating concept of our 
team-centric Fleet construct. Today's priority investments are 
delivering on these imperatives. For example:
  --Investments in hypersonic weapons, space-based capabilities, 
        unmanned tanking, and long-range precision fires deliver 
        capabilities for effects at an expanded distance.
  --Investments in undersea platforms, weapons, and systems, next-
        generation aircraft and surface platforms, cyber capabilities, 
        counter-surveillance, and integrated weapons systems deliver 
        increased deception and defense.
  --Investments in smaller, lethal platforms, autonomous systems in all 
        domains, artificial intelligence, resilient logistics, and 
        integrated combat systems and networks enable a more 
        distributed fleet, the delivery to sustain it, and expand our 
        decision advantage against peer adversaries.
                accelerating america's advantage at sea
    The Navy is implementing the 2022 NDS, preparing for the challenges 
ahead of us, and accelerating America's enduring advantage at sea. 
Within the scope of the President's fiscal year 2023 Budget Request 
(PB-23), we are delivering a combat-credible Navy designed to deter 
conflict and help win our Nation's wars as we maintain a global posture 
to assure our prosperity. To do this, we remain focused on four 
priorities: Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and our Sailors.
    These four priorities are especially relevant because of today's 
fiscal environment. We face the simultaneous task of recapitalizing our 
strategic nuclear deterrent, our century-old dry dock facilities, and 
our strategic sealift capacity. These programs are all critical to our 
national defense. Meanwhile, Navy manpower, operations, and maintenance 
costs continue to grow above the rate of inflation. This means we must 
carefully invest in capabilities and capacity that offer the most 
significant payoff and warfighting value for strategic competition.
    Based on these priorities, I have consistently said that the Navy's 
size--our capacity--ultimately will be dictated by the budget's top 
line. We will not field a fleet larger than we can sustain. We also 
will not grow the Navy at the expense of building the Columbia--our top 
acquisition priority. Nor will we increase capacity by failing to 
modernize and sacrificing our combat credibility.
    The U.S. Navy cannot outpace an increasingly capable PRC by 
retaining platforms that are decreasingly relevant in modern naval 
warfare. While some of these platforms may have day-to-day utility in 
permissive environments, the Navy's first obligation is to deliver a 
ready, combat-credible fleet with the funding Congress appropriates. 
Simply maintaining the capabilities of today's fleet will be 
insufficient to both preserve our long-term interests and protect 
America. Quantity is not synonymous with quality. We must modernize to 
maintain our maritime edge.
    Therefore, our focus is on delivering capable capacity. America 
needs a modern strategic deterrent; greater numbers of undersea 
capabilities; more distributable surface combatants; a host of manned, 
unmanned, and optionally-manned platforms--under, on, and above the 
seas; and a resilient logistics enterprise to sustain our distributed 
naval force. Based on past and ongoing force structure analysis, it is 
my best military advice that the size of the Navy grows to a 500-ship 
hybrid fleet by 2045. Integrated with the Joint Force and interoperable 
with our allies and partners, this all-domain, hybrid fleet will ensure 
our maritime superiority.
    Our Navigation Plan Implementation Framework supports these 
priorities, implementing lines of effort to deliver measurable 
outcomes, driving a new Force Design process to improve our agility, 
and energizing a fleet-wide movement to strengthen our learning 
culture. Our Navy is addressing the challenges we face with clarity, 
determination, and urgency. We made significant progress over the past 
2 years, and we are continuing to press forward to deliver the 
readiness, the capabilities, the platforms, and the people necessary to 
protect the American people and our interests around the world.
                               readiness
    To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must prioritize 
readiness to keep combat-credible forces forward to deter conflict and 
protect the free and open system underpinning American security and 
prosperity. Our competitors are increasing their naval power every day, 
and their malign behavior and growing presence worldwide places an 
enormous demand on our forces. Moreover, the Russian invasion of 
Ukraine and ensuing global instability have provided a stark reminder 
of why the Navy must be ready to deploy globally in defense of U.S. 
interests. In fiscal year 21, the Navy-Marine Corps team executed more 
than 22,000 steaming days and more than one million flying hours. 
Because naval forces remain in high demand, PB-23 emphasizes critical 
aspects of our readiness.
    The Navy continues to make readiness gains with increased shipboard 
manning, better maintenance performance, increased weapon inventories, 
more training for our crews, and enhanced spare parts availability. 
Sustained funding and systematic reforms throughout the fleet have 
enabled those readiness gains. Despite this momentum, we are not 
satisfied. Our focus remains on continuous improvement.
    Deploying combat-credible forces starts with performing high-
quality maintenance on time and in full. To this end, we are using 
data-driven reforms such as Performance-to-Plan (P2P), the Naval 
Sustainment System (NSS), and other initiatives to improve maintenance 
processes, increase operational availability, and save taxpayer 
dollars. We continue to see positive results with these methods, 
especially in our aviation community. By leveraging the power of the 
aviation Maintenance Operations Center (MOC), we sustained a mission-
capable rate of 80 percent for our F/A-18E/F Super Hornets across three 
consecutive fiscal years. Additionally, we have seen five more aircraft 
types achieve this high mission-capable rate as we have incorporated 
them into the MOC construct over the last 18 months. With more aircraft 
available, our aircrews are more ready to dominate the skies than at 
any point over the last decade.
    We continue to take a similar, data-driven approach to improve 
surface ship maintenance, and we see positive results across the fleet. 
Since fiscal year 2020, P2P-driven improvements--such as the goal of 
awarding contracts 120 days before the start of a maintenance 
availability, level loading ports through better prediction of 
workload, better availability planning, and improved long-lead-time 
material acquisition--have generated a 58 percent decrease in days of 
maintenance delay. PB-23 prioritizes private sector ship depot 
maintenance in line with enacted fiscal year 2022 levels to provide 
industry with a stable and predictable demand signal. The Other 
Procurement, Navy (OPN) pilot, is seeing positive early results, 
including more efficient use of contracted ship maintenance throughout 
the entirety of the fiscal year, improved on-time delivery of long-lead 
time materials, and reduced impact of growth and new work. We are 
grateful for the support from Congress in continuing this budgetary 
authority.
    Despite COVID-19, public shipyards have also seen improvements over 
the last 2 years, with fewer maintenance delay days and increased on-
time completion percentages. However, submarine maintenance remains a 
pressing challenge. We are working hard to reduce submarine idle time 
at public shipyards by conducting thorough, early material condition 
assessments to reduce Days of Maintenance Delay and maximize 
operational availability. Through the Performance to Plan-Shipyard 
(P2P-SY) and Naval Sustainment System-Shipyard (NSS-SY) efforts, we 
continue to focus on achieving on-time maintenance availability 
completion. We are looking for opportunities to balance public and 
private sector workload and maintain a healthy industrial base for 
submarine maintenance and new construction. In addition, we are 
creating a Long Range (15-year) SSN Depot Maintenance Plan to improve 
workload forecasting in both the public and private sectors for fiscal 
year 2023 and beyond.
    Sustaining our platforms also requires critical investments in our 
infrastructure ashore. Our worldwide constellation of bases must be 
capable of sustaining and supporting our fleet at sea, including our 
public shipyards and aviation depots. The average age of U.S. naval 
shipyard facilities and related infrastructure is 61 years, while the 
average dry dock age is approaching 100 years. Our Shipyard 
Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap 
for necessary investments in dry docks, capital equipment, and layout 
optimization of these vital national assets. PB-23 prioritizes SIOP, 
investing over $1.7B in fiscal year 2023, including funding for three 
major shipyard projects. Additionally, the Fleet Readiness Centers 
Infrastructure Modernization and Optimization Plan (FIOP) will ensure 
our industrial facilities are resilient and optimized to maintain both 
legacy and next-generation aircraft, and their associated weapon 
systems.
    Our commitment to improving readiness also includes our information 
forces. We have established a dedicated team to improve our ability to 
generate and deploy forces for cyberspace operations. We are learning 
from other highly technical warfighting domains such as aviation and 
nuclear power to keep pace with cyber-force growth. This effort looks 
at all aspects of our readiness to include recruiting, training, 
assignment, and retention. This comprehensive review sets a course for 
the Navy to meet and sustain United States Cyber Command's demand.
    Readiness also extends to the training facilities that generate 
warfighting advantages. The modernization and expansion of the Fallon 
Range Training Complex (FRTC) is critical. As the capabilities and 
ranges of our platforms have grown, our training ranges have not. The 
FRTC is now far too small to allow carrier-based aircraft to adequately 
train for high-end conflict with precision-guided weapons, and it is 
too small for SEALs to conduct mobility maneuver training in a 
realistic tactical environment. Our Sailors need the most realistic 
training possible if they are going to defeat a strategic competitor. 
FRTC modernization will ensure that future generations of warfighters 
remain the most effective in the world. We understand the challenges 
associated with this project, and we are deeply committed to listening 
and working with every stakeholder towards a mutually acceptable 
modernization plan.
                              capabilities
    To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must modernize our 
capabilities to credibly deter war and, if necessary, win in conflict. 
Disruptive technologies are changing the potential applications and 
impacts of military activities from the seafloor to space. Artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, autonomy, quantum computing, and new 
communications technology are transforming the character of future 
warfare. Modern naval warfare demands integrated systems, resilient 
kill chains, better terminal defense, and a robust logistical footprint 
to support a more distributed force. Transitioning to these 
capabilities will increase our deterrence posture by expanding our 
ability to distribute our forces and mass effects.
    As we build and put to sea a force able to deter and, if necessary, 
defeat a strategic competitor, we must prioritize capabilities that 
support Distributed Maritime Operations, or DMO--our previously 
mentioned foundational operating concept. Kinetic and non-kinetic 
effects must be distributed geographically--on, under, and above the 
seas--as well as in the information environment, the cyber domain, the 
electromagnetic spectrum, and in space. To operate effectively, 
platforms, sensors, and weapons must all operate and work together as 
one cohesive, integrated team. The teams are centered on our Numbered 
Fleet construct--our cross-domain contribution to the Joint Force. The 
Navy must empower these teams through secure, survivable, resilient, 
and common networks. Project Overmatch will deliver the Naval 
Operational Architecture (NOA), the Navy's contribution to Joint All-
Domain Command and Control (JADC2) making major improvements in both 
resilience and capability to plan, coordinate and execute missions as a 
critical member of the Joint Force. PB-23 includes $195 million in 
fiscal year 2023 and $898 million across the Future Years Defense 
Program (FYDP) for core activities of Project Overmatch, which is an 
increase of $122 million in fiscal year 2023. This increase represents 
a deliberate and executable investment to accelerate the delivery of 
NOA Increment 1 to carrier strike groups by next year.
    Strategic competitors are continuing to develop sophisticated 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that 
complicate our operations globally. Our PB-23 investments accelerate 
and enhance core Counter-Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Combat Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and 
Targeting (C-C5ISRT) activities that generate warfighting advantage by 
degrading adversaries' understanding of the operational environment. In 
support of both offensive and defensive DMO, these investments 
integrate three Counter C5ISR&T tenets required to sustain operations 
in a contested environment with acceptable risk: (1) understand the 
risk of detection posed by adversary capabilities; (2) orchestrate 
actions to reduce naval units' targetability; (3) synchronize delivery 
of kinetic and non-kinetic effects.
    As an example, to pace the growing air and missile defense threat 
set, the Navy developed and approved a strategy over the past budget 
cycle to deliver enhanced radar sensitivity and electronic warfare 
capabilities to our DDG Flt IIA ships. This strategy is called DDG Mod 
``2.0'' and includes the back-fit installation of the Shipboard 
Electronic Warfare Improvement Plan (SEWIP) Block 3, adding enhanced 
capabilities to current SEWIP Block 2; a 24 Radar Module Assembly SPY-6 
radar to replace SPY-1; and Aegis Baseline 10.
    PB-23 also includes investments in developing and demonstrating 
conventional sea-based hypersonic strike weapon systems. The Navy 
Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Program Office and Army Hypersonic 
Project Office are using a common missile design and joint test 
opportunities to field non-nuclear hypersonic weapon systems. In 2021, 
we conducted two First Stage and one Second Stage Solid Rocket Motor 
static fires, marking the first successful tests of the newly developed 
missile. The CPS Program also completed an eight-shot Solid Slug Launch 
Test Campaign, which provided initial validation of the cold-gas launch 
approach for use on Navy platforms. Stable funding at the requested 
level will keep this critical capability on track to field on Zumwalt-
Class DDGs followed by Virginia-class SSNs equipped with the Block V 
Virginia Payload Module.
    We are incorporating other long-range, highly capable weapons into 
our magazines to improve lethality across domains. PB-23 sustains the 
production of the Blk-I/IA SM-6 and the modernized Blk-V Tomahawk 
Missile, and it funds the transition of the Maritime Strike Tomahawk to 
a Program of Record. Additionally, we are arming our submarines with 
better MK-48 Heavyweight Torpedoes and pursuing more advanced variants. 
We are also improving the effectiveness of our fighter aircraft, 
extending their all-domain reach with the Advanced Anti-radiation 
Guided Missile, AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, and 
Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. Altogether, the weapons procurement in 
PB-23 is our best capability insurance against near-term threat 
escalation while keeping us postured for the future.
    In parallel, we are maturing multiple directed energy projects to 
improve overall fleet survivability in contested environments. We have 
successfully deployed three directed energy weapons systems in the 7th 
and 5th Fleets to support Counter-ISRT and Counter-Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle missions. To reach our goal of ``bottomless'' magazines, we 
will need continued advancements and investments in directed energy, 
scaling and platforms with enough space, weight, power, and cooling 
(SWAP-C). PB-23 funds $262 million across the FYDP to install the 
eighth Optical Dazzling Interdictor and provides continued funding for 
Solid State Laser-Technology Maturation, High Energy Laser with 
Integrated Optical dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS), and the High 
Energy Laser Counter Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Project (HELCAP). Our 
future Navy surface combatants, such as FFG-62 and DDG(X), include 
SWAP-C reservations to accommodate such systems. We are taking a truly 
holistic view of this emerging portfolio to carefully incorporate 
directed energy into the fleet in an evolutionary way.
                                capacity
    To accelerate America's advantage at sea, the Navy will build a 
combat-credible, hybrid fleet, bolstered by mature, cost-effective 
unmanned technologies and operational concepts. A new platform can take 
up to a decade to go through the planning process, receive 
authorization from Congress, and complete construction before joining 
the fleet. To keep up with the accelerating pace of innovation, the 
Navy must build future platforms with modernization in mind--hardware 
upgradeable and software updateable at the speed of innovation.
    Our number one acquisition priority remains the on-time delivery of 
the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, which constitutes our 
Nation's most secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Together 
with the Trident II D5LE2 Strategic Weapons System (SWS), Columbia will 
ensure the effectiveness and availability of the nation's Sea-Based 
Strategic Deterrent through the 2080s. With the Ohio-class submarines 
nearing the end of their service life, there is no further margin for 
delays in this once-in-a-generation program without impacting U.S. 
Strategic Command requirements. Columbia must be on patrol no later 
than October 2030. The first submarine began construction last year, 
with the second boat on track for procurement next fiscal year. We will 
continue to advocate for aggressive construction schedules and 
incorporate ``lead ship learning'' to guarantee on-time delivery of the 
entire class to ensure this national asset's capability in the decades 
ahead. Columbia will continue to grow substantially as a proportion of 
the total shipbuilding budget beginning in fiscal year 2026, exceeding 
25 percent when Columbia enters full-rate production.
    Sea control and sea denial from beneath the waves are among our 
Navy's core advantages, and we refuse to yield any ground to the 
competition. PB-23 underscores our sustained support for procuring two 
Virginia-class submarines per year, and it invests in developing a 
follow-on attack submarine program, SSN(X), which will be key to 
sustaining our undersea advantage--setting the conditions for the 
warfighting advantage of our fleet.
    Unmanned systems will play a key role in DMO. We released the 
Unmanned Campaign Framework in March 2021 to serve as the comprehensive 
strategy for a future wherein unmanned systems serve as an integral 
part of the Navy's warfighting team. U.S. 3rd Fleet executed Unmanned 
Integrated Battle Problem 2021 to integrate manned and unmanned 
capabilities in operational scenarios. To further operationalize the 
Campaign Plan, we established Task Force 59 (CTF-59) to accelerate 
unmanned and AI solutions, demonstrating the importance of warfighters 
and industry partners in operational experimentation with available 
technologies. We intend to scale these lessons to 7th Fleet. We also 
continued work with partners and allies in events such as NATO Maritime 
Unmanned Systems Initiative Exercises and International Maritime 
Exercise 2022.
    We completed MQ-25A ``T1'' aircraft in-flight refueling of Navy 
carrier-based aircraft and its first carrier demonstration and 
completed over 4000 hours and 46,000 nautical miles of USV operations. 
Additionally, we recently established the Unmanned Task Force, a cross-
functional team focusing on rapid experimentation and solving 
operational problems to quickly inform acquisition strategies. The 
focus remains on enabling technologies to provide near-term capability, 
take an evolutionary approach, and lay the foundation for the future 
hybrid fleet.
    This year, we celebrated the centennial of our aircraft carriers. 
They have proven to be the most survivable and versatile airfields in 
the world, and our nuclear-powered carriers will remain a cornerstone 
of the Navy's conventional deterrence for decades to come. USS Gerald 
R. Ford (CVN 78) achieved Initial Operating Capability in December 
2021, completed flight deck certification, and is scheduled to deploy 
later this year. PB-23 supports procuring our follow-on aircraft 
carriers. CVN 79 construction is 85 percent complete and on track to 
deliver in fiscal year 2024; CVN 80 construction is 12 percent complete 
and scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2028.
    The sustained striking power and adaptability of our Carrier Air 
Wing is vital to controlling the seas and projecting power in contested 
environments. Today's air wings are more capable than ever with the 
addition of the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B 
Osprey. Carrier Air Wing TWO recently completed a deployment with these 
capabilities, showcasing the cutting-edge lethality of naval airpower. 
PB-23 adds to our F-35 inventory to expand our fourth- and fifth-
generation fighter mix, and it funds the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray, on 
track to deploy in 2026, which greatly extends the reach of our Carrier 
Air Wings into contested battlespaces.
    We are also laying the groundwork for tomorrow's air wing through 
the Next Generation Air Dominance portfolio. This highly networked 
sixth-generation family of systems will leverage manned-unmanned 
teaming to further advance the cross-domain lethality of our air wings 
in contested battlespaces. Delivering this capability is vital to 
outpace PRC fighter development.
    Our future fleet design places emphasis on a balance of greater 
numbers of large and small surface combatants as the foundation of 
distributed operations. Our newest class, the Constellation-class 
frigate, is a versatile, multi-mission platform that will support 
operations across the spectrum of conflict. The future large surface 
combatant, DDG(X), will bring additional space, weight, and power to 
support evolving capabilities for a high-end fight. Together, these two 
ship classes will form the center of our cross-domain teams, bringing 
more lethality, survivability, and endurance to the fleet.
    The Naval logistics enterprise continues to become increasingly 
agile and resilient to deliver the means to refuel, rearm, resupply, 
repair, and revive distributed forces, ensuring the Joint Force stays 
combat credible against any adversary. Over the past 2 years, we have 
improved our afloat fuel distribution systems, introduced more secure 
digital systems for better logistics planning and execution, and 
validated our Future Afloat Logistics Forces Initial Capabilities 
Document, which defines the capabilities and capacities needed to 
sustain naval forces. Adequate capacity is a continuing challenge and 
PB-23 pursues several platform solutions to close the gaps we have 
identified, including the continued construction of the John Lewis (T-
AO 205) Class Fleet Replenishment Oiler Program, the Submarine Tender 
AS(X), and continued research and development to support the Next 
Generation Logistics Ship. Additionally, we are continuing to leverage 
the generous authorities Congress has provided us to renew our surge 
sealift capacity with used vessels, helping us meet combatant commander 
readiness requirements. We are grateful for this Committee's support.
                                sailors
    To accelerate America's advantage at sea, we must invest in 
trained, resilient, and educated Sailors who can adapt faster than our 
adversaries in today's rapidly changing strategic environment. Our 
Sailors and civilians remain the true source of our naval power. We 
must continue to prioritize and care for them. From culture to training 
and education, to overall health and wellness, PB-23 supports the most 
important element of our Navy--our people.
    History shows that the navy which adapts, learns, and improves the 
fastest gains an enduring warfighting advantage. The essential element 
in doing so is fostering a healthy ecosystem--a culture--that assesses, 
corrects, solves problems, and learns faster than the opposition. Our 
``Get Real, Get Better'' movement will help us reduce the variability 
in performance between our best and worst performers. Get Real, Get 
Better will train and educate our leaders on the leadership behaviors 
required to create this culture, along with the supporting tools to 
solve our hardest problems. Focusing on our people, and their leaders, 
will further expand the asymmetric advantage that is the American 
Sailor.
    Through the Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) initiative, we are 
providing Sailors with practical, accessible knowledge and skills that 
can adapt to the needs of the Navy. Today, RRL provides timely, 
relevant training using an agile, multi-path approach to ensure our 
operators have the knowledge they need on the deck plates to succeed in 
combat. RRL supplements our traditional brick-and-mortar schoolhouses 
with modern, multi-media, multi-platform solutions. Recently, we 
transitioned 8 enlisted ratings to this model and completed 
requirements development for 39 additional ratings. With the funds 
provided by PB-23, the Navy will advance the Career Long Learning 
Continuum effort, which is critical to the program goal of maintaining 
continuity and currency of individual training.
    The Navy has prioritized the Fleet Training Wholeness initiative to 
integrate live platforms and simulators across our strike groups. This 
initiative funds Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) unit and strike 
group training. In the fleet, LVC continues to be a game-changer in 
training our combat leaders. From the pilot in the cockpit to the 
technician on the radar scope, LVC allows all domains to train together 
at unprecedented levels of integration and complexity. PB-23 builds 
upon the continued integration of live ranges, ships at sea, and 
aviation shore simulators, and includes funding to integrate aircraft 
and information warfare systems and capabilities into LVC training. 
These investments are advancing our Sailors' tactical skills and 
proficiency against our most advanced competitors.
    Building upon the momentum of the Navy's Culture of Excellence 
campaign, we will implement a holistic and prevention-based Total 
Sailor Fitness framework. This effort will maximize Sailor, unit, and 
organizational performance while improving Sailor trust, resilience, 
mental health, connectedness, and behavioral metrics. Our Warrior 
Toughness program enables better performance before, during, and after 
critical events, providing concepts and skills to develop peak 
performance and make Sailors more resilient and ready for the Fleet. We 
integrate these programs into the curricula of the Recruit Training 
Command, Officer Training Command, United States Naval Academy, and our 
NROTC units. As we drive forward with this Culture of Excellence, the 
Navy seeks to put the most combat-credible Sailors to sea--first-rate 
warriors who are willing and able to defend our Nation.
    In addition, suicide prevention, Sexual Assault Prevention and 
Response (SAPR), and Diversity, Equity and Inclusion remain pillars on 
which the Culture of Excellence will continue to build. As part of our 
suicide prevention efforts, the Sailor Assistance and Intercept for 
Life Program provides rapid assistance, ongoing risk management, 
coordination of care, and reintegration assistance for at-risk service 
members. Continued resourcing of this program saves lives. A full 
continuum of mental health and wellness support is also available 
worldwide, including at specialty and primary care clinics, Navy 
installation counseling centers, on the waterfront, embedded within the 
Fleet, and via virtual health platforms. Non-medical mental health 
services are available for Sailors and their family members through 
Fleet and Family Support Centers, Military and Family Life Counseling, 
and Military OneSource. Navy Chaplains provide confidential counseling 
and are essential in ensuring the spiritual readiness and resiliency of 
the Naval Force. There is ``no wrong door'' for our Sailors to get 
help.
    The Navy is leveraging metric-based, sexual assault data to better 
understand sexual assault risk factors. This strengthens our SAPR 
programs with research-informed approaches to prevention programs and 
policies. We are also implementing recommendations from the Independent 
Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military, using a 
deliberate, methodical approach to improve accountability, prevention, 
climate, culture, and victim care and support. These include addressing 
gaps in leader training to develop inclusive cultures that foster 
healthy command climates, providing sexual harassment victims with SAPR 
victim advocacy services, completing a SAPR Workforce Study to ensure 
unfettered support to sexual assault victims that phases out non-
deployable collateral duty victim response personnel, and the phased 
hiring and integration of a primary prevention workforce.
    The Navy is building a force that looks like the nation we serve. 
We benefit from our Sailors' talent, experience, and insights. Today, 
the Navy is more demographically diverse than ever before. As we strive 
to become a more diverse, equitable, and inclusive force, we have built 
on lessons learned from our findings in Task Force One Navy, 
implementing 36 task force recommendations, with 18 more in progress. 
We must actively include all perspectives to harness the creative power 
of diversity, accelerating the Navy's warfighting advantage. To support 
our Sailors, increase productivity, and generate cost efficiencies, the 
Navy is modernizing its Manpower, Personnel, Training, and Education 
Enterprise. Our Human Resources (HR) processes and operations have not 
fundamentally evolved in over 70 years. For too long, we have been 
managing our force with over 55 aging information technology systems, 
some of which are over 40 years old. These systems are not 
interoperable and do not provide a single authoritative data source. 
MyNavy HR Transformation is fixing this. We continue to make strides 
towards our Navy Personnel and Pay system rollout, which is an 
important foundational step for the overall transformation. By 
synchronizing and streamlining all aspects of personnel readiness, this 
overhaul will improve the lives of all Sailors and their families.
    The Navy is a family, and our families serve along with us. Having 
witnessed the steadfast resilience of Navy families every day of my 
career, I have made it a daily practice to think about how to improve 
their lives. As all service members know, when we take care of them, 
they take care of us.
                               conclusion
    The U.S. Navy's mission has never been more essential for the 
preservation of American security and prosperity. Facing increasingly 
aggressive challengers, the Navy's priorities-- Readiness, 
Capabilities, Capacity, and our Sailors--will help us maintain our 
combat credibility in contested seas.
    We will need Congress's continued support. Since 2010, the Navy's 
buying power has not kept pace with inflation. ``Must pay'' once-in-a-
generation strategic deterrence recapitalization and once-in-a-century 
shipyard infrastructure investments--along with rising readiness, 
labor, and material costs--are consuming larger shares of the Navy's 
budget. This loss in buying power has delayed modernization, reduced 
procurement, and constrained our ability to grow the force. To 
simultaneously modernize and build the capacity of our fleet, the Navy 
would need sustained budget growth at three-to-five percent above 
actual inflation. Short of that, we will prioritize capability over 
capacity. This will decrease the size of the fleet until we can deploy 
smaller, more cost-effective, and more autonomous force packages at 
scale.
    The investments we make this decade will determine the maritime 
balance of power for the rest of this century. Ships, submarines, and 
aircraft are undoubtedly expensive instruments of national power, as 
are the associated costs of maintaining them at a high level of 
readiness. But history shows that without a powerful Navy, the price 
tag is much higher.
    On behalf of more than 600,000 active and reserve Sailors and Navy 
Civilians, thank you for allowing me to testify today. I am grateful to 
this committee and to your colleagues in Congress for your steadfast 
commitment to the Navy. We look forward to sailing alongside you to 
sustain our advantage at sea.

    Senator Tester. Thank you, Admiral. General Berger, you are 
next up.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, COMMANDANT, 
            UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
    General Berger. Chair Tester, Ranking Member Shelby, and 
distinguished members of the committee, as we sit here this 
morning with the backdrop of a war ongoing in Ukraine and 
malign activities in the Indo-Pacific, it is a good reminder 
that we don't have the luxury of developing a Joint Force or 
military for one region or one theater, one type of conflict. 
That is why it is so important for your Marine Corps to be 
ready to respond to crisis in any clime and place. That is part 
of our National Security.
    Three years ago, we embarked, as the chair mentioned, on an 
ambitious program to modernize the Marine Corps to ensure that 
your Corps was ready not just for the crisis today, but for the 
future as well. With the bipartisan support of the members of 
this subcommittee, I can tell you that our modernization effort 
is on track and building momentum. There were some skeptics 
outside of Congress on our approach to divest and reinvest 
those resources over the past 3 years.
    But I would tell you this morning that we have done that, 
and we have self-funded $17 billion worth of modernization, and 
that approach has not been easy. We have made hard enterprise 
wide decisions to get rid of things that we weren't going to 
need for the future and reduce the number of things we weren't 
going to need so much of. We have refined, we have economized, 
we have optimized across the Marine Corps.
    And today, I would offer you a brief update on three areas 
where I think we have seen significant progress over the past 
year. First, over the past year and a half, we have conducted 
nine training force on force exercises out in California, which 
is where we do combined arms live training. Here is what we 
have learned during those exercise.
    Smaller, more mobile, more distributed forces, if they can 
employ 21st century combined arms and if they have loitering 
munitions and organic surveillance, ISR (Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) means, they are more lethal 
than larger formations using traditional kind of structures and 
traditional tactics. And those findings, I would say, are 
entirely consistent with what we are seeing in Ukraine right 
now.
    In less than 2 years, we have formalized a concept for 
stand in forces, built a capability that dramatically expanded 
what we can achieve in support of both land and maritime 
operations. The forces that we have deployed in Europe today, 
they are exercising those stand in concepts, advanced sensing, 
networking, distribution, all in support of the EUCOM (U.S. 
European Command) Commander as we sit here this morning.
    And the EUCOM Commander, when he was back here in 
Washington, D.C. to testify, was asked about those Marine 
forces. His words, they are precious for effective deterrence. 
Second, some important operational milestones for us. We have 
retired the aging amphibious assault vehicle ahead of schedule, 
and we will deploy its replacement, the amphibious combat 
vehicle, this year on board ship with a MEU (Marine 
Expeditionary Unit) for the first time.
    This year, we had a first deployment of our F-35C squadron 
on board a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier. And working with the 
British allies, we deployed a full squadron of F-35Bs on board 
the Royal Navy carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth. The MEU, Marine 
Expeditionary Unit, enabled by amphibious ships, remains the 
crown jewel of our naval expeditionary forces.
    No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of supporting a 
more diverse set of missions than the amphibious warship. The 
CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and I agree, the minimum number 
of L class amphibious ships that the Nation needs, the minimum 
is 31. And your support for sustaining that minimum capacity is 
essential to National Security. Finally, this past year, we 
published our plan to modernize our personnel system. That will 
allow us to better recruit, to develop, to retain, and align 
the talents of individual Marines with the needs of the Marine 
Corps. And with all that said, what the Marine Corps does for 
this Nation won't change.
    We remain America's force in readiness, capable of diverse 
missions across the operational spectrum. But how we accomplish 
those missions is changing. And with this committee's support, 
we have programed our divested dollars back into new 
capabilities, and we are putting them in the hands of combatant 
commanders now, this year, not in 2030.
    Despite self-resourcing our modernization, most of our 
Marine Corps programs remain on track, on time, on budget. And 
in those limited cases where they have not, I promise you we 
will continue to work with this subcommittee to make the 
necessary adjustments.
    In closing, I would add my thoughts, just like the CNO for 
Ranking Member Shelby. I looked up his 60 years of public 
service. City prosecutor, I wasn't aware of that, sir. A U.S. 
magistrate, a State Senator, a U.S. Representative, and a U.S. 
Senator. Among Marines we talk a lot about servant leadership. 
I think that is a pretty good example of that.
    So on behalf of all the Marines, thank you, sir, for your 
service to our Nation. And to that end, I welcome the 
opportunity to continue working with the members of this 
committee, this subcommittee, and I look forward to your 
question, sir.
    [The statement follows:]
             Prepared Statement of General David H. Berger
    Chair, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the Committee, 
thank you for the opportunity to present this annual report and share 
my perspective on the opportunities and challenges confronting your 
Marine Corps, the naval services, and the larger joint force. As recent 
events in Ukraine so clearly illustrate, our strategic adversaries and 
competitors are ready and willing to employ violence--at scale--to 
support their revisionist aims. They are willing to sow chaos, destroy 
cities, inflict mass casualties, and suffer casualties themselves to 
rewrite the international order--an order that has broadly and deeply 
benefitted humanity. To ensure the joint force remains able to deter, 
and if necessary, defeat these adversaries, we need to move at even 
greater speed to modernize the force.
    As Commandant, I offer the Service's sincere thanks for the 
committee's support to our modernization efforts--anchored on Force 
Design 2030 and Talent Management 2030. Today, I respectfully ask you 
to recommit to our modernization program. Embracing change before a 
catastrophic event occurs takes both courage and foresight; thank you 
for demonstrating both. As I have stated in the past, the Marine Corps 
does not seek any additional resources for modernization. Rather, we 
seek your oversight and assistance in ensuring that the resources the 
Service generates through divestments, reorganization, and redesign are 
reinvested in our Corps' modernization priorities.
    As I have previously testified, the suggestion that we have to 
choose between preparing to fight tonight, which we are ready to do, or 
preparing for some distant point in the future presents a false 
dichotomy. We must balance the very real and delicate resource tension 
between the force we employ today and the development of the force 
needed for the future. Our Nation can no longer afford to hold on to 
capabilities that do not create a relative advantage over our potential 
adversaries at the expense of capabilities that will keep us ahead of 
them--no matter how culturally significant or nostalgic to an 
individual service those capabilities may be.
      we will remain ``most ready when the nation is least ready''
    When defense leaders submitted their posture statements last 
spring, few of us would have predicted that a major conventional war in 
Europe--the largest since 1945--was only a year away. Russia's brutal 
invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that despite our best efforts, 
we can never know with certainty when, where, or how an adversary might 
precipitate conflict. Reflecting on this challenge in a related 
context, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said: ``When it comes 
to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, 
since Vietnam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten 
it right, from the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, 
Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more--we had no idea a year before any of 
these missions that we would be so engaged.''
    Why does this matter? From the perspective of a service chief, it 
matters because we don't have the luxury of building a joint force for 
one threat, one region, or one form of warfare. We must be prepared for 
the full range of operations in places we might not expect, and on 
timelines we did not anticipate. While this is true to some degree for 
all the services, it is especially so for the United States Marine 
Corps. Our history is footnoted by examples of our readiness to respond 
to crisis at a moment's notice in ``any clime and place.'' This is 
essential to our identity as Marines, and part of our enduring value to 
the Nation. In these times of increasing complexity and uncertainty, 
the Nation needs one force, maintained at the highest levels of 
readiness that can respond to the crises that few saw coming. We are 
that force. Maintaining the entire joint force at heightened readiness 
levels is both unnecessary and unaffordable. Ensuring that the Marine 
Corps does is both strategically vital and fiscally prudent. As 
Marines, we have been, and will continue to be, ``America's 911 
Force''--the Nation's force-in-readiness.
    Our ongoing efforts to modernize through Force Design 2030 (FD 
2030) and Talent Management 2030 (TM 2030) will ensure the Marine 
Corps' ability to meet our statutory role and be ready to respond to 
crises--across the Range of Military Operations--from active 
campaigning to conflict. While China, as the pacing threat, is critical 
to informing our force development efforts, the capabilities we seek 
are theater agnostic. The fact is, our current modernization efforts 
will enable us to operate, fight, and win in a more diverse set of 
scenarios and geographic regions than we can today. We are, and will 
remain, ``most ready when the Nation is least ready''--a force in 
readiness prepared to respond to any crisis, anywhere, at any time.
                                posture
    Today, approximately 30,000 Marines are forward-deployed or 
forward-stationed, with hundreds more on watch at our embassies across 
the globe. However, in contrast to earlier periods, fewer of these 
forward deployed Marines are afloat in service to the Fleet. I remain 
committed to a robust forward posture to support campaigning and to 
expanding this forward presence through the employment of additional 
Marines aboard L-Class ships, Light Amphibious Warships, and other 
expeditionary vessels operated by the Fleet or our allies and partners.
            l-class ships & light amphibious warships (law)
    L-Class Ships. For decades, the Navy and Marine Corps have 
demonstrated the power and versatility of Marine expeditionary forces 
embarked on amphibious ships. Operating as a combined arms team, 
Marines have come ``from the sea'' to support all manner of operations, 
to include: projecting combat power ashore, providing humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR), reinforcing U.S. embassies, 
training allies and partners, and executing non-combatant evacuation 
operations (NEO). No naval vessel in our inventory is capable of 
supporting a more diverse set of missions across the range of military 
operations than amphibious ships.
    Amphibious ships provide platforms from which to base and employ a 
host of multi-domain capabilities--air, ground, surface, undersea, and 
cyber. Amphibious ships serve as mobile command posts, strike 
platforms, expeditionary maintenance facilities, search-and-rescue 
platforms, floating hospitals, sources of potable water and electricity 
for disaster response, transport and docking stations for smaller 
vessels, and locations where Marines can train with international 
partners without the requirement for host nation access. In the near 
future, amphibious ships with well decks will increasingly be used as 
mother ships for uncrewed vessels, carrying a wide variety of unmanned 
surface vessels (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), anti-submarine 
and anti-surface warfare, mining, command and control, and military 
deception. Amphibious ships are also visible signs of U.S. reach and 
resolve, and because of their unique characteristics, can deploy to a 
region with a less escalatory posture than many traditional warships. 
Those unique characteristics include an ability to self-sustain 
embarked forces for weeks at sea without replenishment. Such resilience 
and persistence are a unique and vital capability for our combatant 
commanders.
    Viewed through the lens of both the 2018 and 2022 National Defense 
Strategies, big deck amphibious ships (LHA/LHD), which carry F-35Bs, 
MV-22s, CH-53s, unmanned aerial systems (UAS), and surface landing 
craft, are arguably the most versatile warships in our inventory. These 
ships, when paired with their embarked Marines, have the highest 
utility across the entire spectrum of conflict from building partner 
capacity to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to Embassy 
reinforcement, to recovery operations, to strikes and raids against a 
peer or near peer adversary. This is the very epitome of campaigning 
forward from mobile sovereign platforms.
    During his March 2022 testimony before the House Armed Services 
Committee (HASC), the Commander of United States European Command 
(USEUCOM), General Tod Wolters, noted that his requirement for a 365-
day Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) presence could not be met due to 
the limitations of the current amphibious fleet inventory, and further 
characterized the MEU as ``precious for effective deterrence.'' A week 
later, Secretary Austin noted in his HASC testimony that, ``Amphibs are 
important to us today. They will be important to us going forward.'' I 
wholeheartedly agree with the conclusions of both leaders, as requested 
in the fiscal year 2023 Budget. Our MEUs need them; our Fleets need 
them; and our combatant commanders need them. The National Defense 
Strategy cannot succeed without them.
    Light Amphibious Warship (LAW). Distinct, yet complementary to 
traditional L-Class amphibious ships, the LAW is envisioned to be a 
small, amphibious warship purpose-built to provide tactical maneuver 
for Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs), forward-deployed naval forces, 
and other expeditionary advanced base-enabling forces operating within 
contested environments. The LAW will be a maneuver asset, and as a 
shore-to-shore connector, is unique and critical to expeditionary 
littoral mobility. It will facilitate campaigning and will be capable 
of supporting diverse missions such as security cooperation, HA/DR, 
logistics support, and the launch and recovery of uncrewed systems for 
maritime domain awareness. While not optimized for any one threat or 
region, we envision the LAW as being of particular utility in the sort 
of maritime gray zone contests we see in the Indo-Pacific. This type of 
vessel would be well- suited as a platform for Marines countering 
threats posed by groups like the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia 
(PAFMM), and because of its size and characteristics, could be employed 
with lower risk of escalation. The LAW will be an important asset to 
advancing our strategic interests by allowing us to more effectively 
counter our adversaries' strategies, support and reinforce alliances 
and partnerships, and do so at a relatively low cost.
    On 9 September 2021, the Secretary of the Navy commissioned the 
Amphibious Fleet Requirement Study (AFRS). The study directed a 
determination of the ``required size and composition of the future 
amphibious warship fleet . . . needed to support combat operations, 
global presence, and safe and effective training.'' The study found we 
should have a mix of traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships and 
Light Amphibious Warships. The study will be one of many factors 
considered by the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of Defense and 
the Administration as shipbuilding plans and future budget requests are 
formulated. In my military judgment we will need to employ a mixed 
fleet of no less than 31 traditional L-Class Amphibious Warfare Ships 
and 18-36 Light Amphibious Warships to enable us to carry out the NDS.
       naval expeditionary crisis response forces and campaigning
    While the traditional role of crisis response forces in disaster 
relief operations, such as those executed by the Expeditionary Strike 
Group centered on the USS Bonhomme Richard during Operation Unified 
Assistance or via the USS Essex during Operation Tomodachi, is well-
documented and well-understood, these operations are not always 
perceived as ones that create relative advantage in strategic 
competition and campaigning. They do. Our response to humanitarian 
crises and other natural disasters using expeditionary forces--quickly 
and decisively--demonstrates to our allies and partners that they are 
never alone when partnered with the U.S. Further, our ability to 
execute HA/DR operations from amphibious shipping--without a large 
logistical footprint ashore in support of U.S. forces--maximizes our 
flexibility and capability to respond while preserving resources best 
used for relief. In the strategic sense, the significance of this 
amphibious-based capability and its impact should not be 
underestimated. While our ability to ``be there first'' on the scene of 
a natural or man-made disaster is, of course, critical to the 
preservation of life, it is also a strategic imperative, affecting our 
bilateral relationships and matters like access and overflight, as well 
as our international standing. This is true in every region, but today 
is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific, where China aims to expand its 
regional influence through its own amphibious crisis response 
capabilities.
    At the same time, it is important to recognize the criticality of 
campaigning with our allies and partners--in their regions--on a daily 
basis. Naval expeditionary forces operating forward and persistently 
provide combatant commanders with a sort of ``escalation rheostat,'' 
prepared to respond to crises--or prevent them--by employing 
capabilities that are credible across the range of military operations. 
Both our presence and the credibility of our forces reassure allies and 
partners.
                marine rotational force--darwin (mrf-d)
    In 2011, we established the Marine Rotational Force--Darwin (MRF-D) 
in the Northern Territory in partnership with the Australian 
government. Our rotational presence has grown from a company-sized 
element with limited capabilities to a MEU-sized Marine air-ground task 
force (MAGTF). Through our recurring presence, we have achieved a high 
level of mutual confidence and interoperability with the Australian 
Defence Force, to the point where Marines routinely operate from 
Australian amphibious ships. The training areas in the Northern 
Territory and other regions of Australia are some of the best in the 
world, and certainly the region, affording Marines an opportunity for 
high-end training alongside one of our closest allies. Additionally, 
our rotational presence in Australia has enabled Marine forces to 
engage and train with a range of international allies and partners in 
ways we did not predict when MRF-D was first established.
             vmfa 211 deployment aboard hms queen elizabeth
    From April to December 2021, ten F-35Bs from Marine Corps Fighter 
Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA 211) deployed aboard the United Kingdom's 
aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. This historic deployment--the 
first in which a Marine squadron completed a deployment aboard an 
allied vessel--represents the culmination of 10 years of focused 
bilateral cooperation and demonstrates how far we have progressed in 
building U.S.-UK interoperability. Together with the UK's embarked F-
35B squadron, VMFA 211 completed nearly 1300 sorties, flew in excess of 
2200 hours, and executed 44 combat missions in support of Operation 
Inherent Resolve. The deployment also marked the first time an F-35B 
cross-decked from a foreign vessel to a U.S. vessel (USS America) to 
refuel and arm before a strike. During its approximately seven month 
deployment, which spanned three U.S. geographic combatant commands' 
areas of responsibility, VMFA 211 conducted exercises with 10 partner 
nations and flew from the flight decks of three allied ships: Japan's 
JS Izumo, Italy's ITS Cavour, and the HMS Queen Elizabeth. Finally, 
VMFA 211 was our first F-35B squadron to deploy as a 10-jet squadron in 
accordance with our FD 2030 goals and as outlined in my 2019 planning 
guidance.
                 force design 2030 and stand-in forces
    As we further refined Force Design 2030 through wargaming, 
experimentation, and analysis, it became apparent that we required new 
thinking to address anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies, that 
our Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) needed additional operational 
flexibility, and that Marines operating with our MEUs and MLRs could be 
a substantial part of the solution. This new approach is reflected in A 
Concept for Stand-In Forces, which describes how forward-postured 
forces, operating in contested areas, and capable of transitioning 
rapidly from campaigning, to crisis, to conflict, and back again, can 
create strategic advantage for the joint force.
    Stand-in Forces (SIF) are small, lethal, low signature, mobile 
forces that are relatively simple to maintain and sustain, and designed 
to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as 
the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth. The enduring function 
of SIF is to help the fleet and joint force win the reconnaissance and 
counter-reconnaissance battle at every point on the competition 
continuum. That means SIF monitor a potential adversary's activity and 
track its forces and sensors at a level that facilitates targeting by 
the fleet or joint force. Below the threshold of conflict, SIF's 
tracking of adversary actions can help expose its malign behavior, 
which can contribute to deterrence. If armed conflict does erupt, SIF 
will have already gained and maintained contact with opposing forces in 
a posture that provides relative positional advantage, enabling the 
fleet and joint force to attack effectively first, seizing the 
initiative.
    Winning the counter-reconnaissance fight means SIF make themselves 
difficult to find by maintaining a low signature, moving frequently and 
unpredictably, and using deception to impose costs on potential 
adversaries, forcing them to expend limited ISR resources. In the 
context of a naval campaign, it also means that SIF will help screen 
for the fleet and joint force, protecting it and increasing the fleet 
commander's freedom of action.
    Beyond reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, SIF possess 
lethal capabilities for warfare at, on, below, or from the sea. For 
example, SIF can contest a chokepoint, sanitize a strait, or deny a 
specific area, presenting a surface behind which the fleet can 
maneuver. Area denial could also serve to canalize or ``herd'' an 
adversary into a maritime zone where the joint force enjoys relative 
advantage. Integrated with other elements of organic and joint 
capability, the SIF becomes both an enabler and a lethal executor of 
the joint force mission. In competition/campaigning, SIF provide 
capabilities that support new deterrence approaches like deterrence by 
detection, integrating the results of its reconnaissance with other 
elements of national power. In conflict, SIF serve as battle managers 
and provide long-range precision fires at the forward edge of a 
maritime defense-in-depth, enabling naval and joint forces to persist 
within contested areas rather than attempting to force access into them 
by fighting through an adversary's A2/AD defenses. Our ongoing 
experiments with SIF have focused on building a globally-relevant 
capability of value to all geographic combatant commanders, rather than 
more narrowly on a single potential threat or theater. While some view 
the SIF concept as Indo-Pacific focused, the fact is that some of our 
most aggressive experimentation is occurring in other theaters. For 
example, in his March 2022 HASC testimony, the USEUCOM Commander noted 
of his II MEF SIF capabilities: ``a brown water force that can shoot, 
move, and communicate, and that is very, very expeditionary, is 
priceless for 21st century security.''
            force design 2030 and the russo-ukraine conflict
    It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the changing 
character of war based on the current conflict in Ukraine. Marines aim 
to be careful and humble students of the ongoing struggle, and resist 
temptations to declare that it validates or invalidates the 
foundational assumptions of FD 2030. With that said, we can draw some 
preliminary conclusions. First, winning the reconnaissance and counter-
reconnaissance battle matters. If you are located on a modern 
battlefield saturated with sensors, you will be targeted. Signature 
management, maneuver, deception, and tempo are playing an increasingly 
important role on the modern battlefield. Second, loitering munitions, 
missiles and rockets are increasingly capable of rendering major 
weapons platforms vulnerable, whether MANPADS against helicopters, 
modern anti-armor systems against armor, or ground-based anti-ship 
missiles against surface vessels. Finally, highly-trained and 
distributable small units able to create combined-arms effects continue 
to prove their worth on the modern battlefield. Assertions as to the 
waning utility of dismounted infantry are proving baseless.
              force design 2030 and close combat lethality
    Generations of Marines have been educated and trained to locate, 
close with, and destroy the enemy through fire and maneuver. While the 
tactical tasks associated with that mission set have not changed, how 
we satisfy those tasks on a modern battlefield is changing. In 
addition, the weighting of the discrete tasks within that simple 
statement is changing, and we must change with it. ``Locating,'' for 
example, has become far more important on the modern battlefield. 
Marines within our three experimental infantry battalions, as well as 
those participating in force-on-force field exercises, are learning and 
fine-tuning their skills, integrating existing and emerging 
capabilities in a combined arms system that accounts for the ongoing 
changes we see on modern battlefields--changes witnessed since at least 
the 2006 Second Lebanon War. We will build upon the major investments 
made by the 37th Commandant in close combat lethality (e.g., 
investments in the Multi-purpose Anti-armor Anti-personnel Weapons 
Systems [MAAWS]) by adding loitering munitions, organic UAS, and 
additional Javelins to our infantry units. Finally, it is important to 
note that throughout the Force Design process, the focus has been, and 
remains, maneuver warfare in every dimension and combined arms in all 
domains, including space and cyber.
    In the midst of this organizational change, it is also important to 
highlight those things that are not changing. When we consider ways to 
maximize our close combat lethality, two things that will never change 
are: (1) our commitment to growing and sustaining smart and tough small 
unit leaders--those Marines actually tasked with locating, closing 
with, and destroying the enemy; and (2) our commitment to what the 29th 
Commandant called operational excellence--the ability of a Marine to 
apply their training, leadership, and discipline with lethal 
proficiency. No new piece of equipment or warfighting concept can ever 
be as important. We have always maintained that the individual Marine 
is the most formidable weapon on the battlefield. We still do.
               force design 2030 prioritized investments
    MQ-9 & Related Sensors. We remain on-schedule to both modernize and 
increase the number of Marine Corps uncrewed aerial vehicle squadrons 
(VMU). In 2022, we will expand fielding of the MQ-9, immediately 
improving the Marine Corps' capability to support both naval 
expeditionary forces and the joint force. Uncrewed aerial systems are 
ubiquitous on the modern battlefield, as recent global conflicts have 
powerfully demonstrated--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Gaza, 
Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh, or Ukraine. Over the next 2 years, the Air 
Force will transfer ten MQ-9AER Block V aircraft to the Marine Corps, 
saving the Service approximately $170 million in procurement costs, 
which can be invested into sophisticated sensors like Skytower or 
sonobuoy dispensing pods. These advanced sensors, employed from our MQ-
9s, will radically improve our ability to conduct reconnaissance and 
counter- reconnaissance, and further reinforce our competitive 
advantages in undersea warfare.
    F-35B/C. The F-35 is the most advanced fighter, strike, and sensor 
platform in the world. As the Commander of United States Indo-Pacific 
Command (USINDOPACOM) recently noted during testimony, ``The importance 
of the F-35 cannot be overstated.'' We remain convinced that low 
observable and very low observable, short take-off and vertical landing 
(STOVL) aircraft like the F-35B provide combatant commanders a 
competitive warfighting advantage. Mindful of both cost per flight hour 
(CPFH) and cost per tail per year (CPTPY), I remain committed to 
working with the Joint Program Office to reduce costs for both 
acquisition and sustainment. The Marine Corps remains focused on 
accelerated transition to an all F-35 tactical aviation (TACAIR) fleet 
in order to stay in front of our pacing challenge. We have procured 176 
of 353 F-35Bs and 48 of 67 F-35Cs to-date.
    Organic Precision Fires--Infantry/Mounted (OPF-I/M). OPF-I/M will 
provide multiple echelons of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) with an 
organic, loitering, beyond line-of-sight, precision strike capability, 
profoundly enhancing the close-combat lethality of maneuver forces. We 
are currently investing $2 billion in OPF across the Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP), and expect the first systems to be fielded with 
our enhanced infantry battalions and new mobile reconnaissance units in 
fiscal year (FY) 2025. OPF-I will be employed at the low tactical level 
to allow Marines to rapidly engage the enemy beyond the range of direct 
fire weapons, while minimizing collateral damage and exposure to enemy 
direct and indirect fires. OPF-M will integrate a vehicle mounted, 
multi canister launch platform on our Joint Light Tactical Vehicles 
(JLTV), Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), and Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles 
(ULTV). On its own, OPF-M can strike targets at ranges beyond 40km. 
However, its lethality is amplified when employed with Group-2 UAS as 
part of our emerging ``hunter-killer team'' employment concept. 
Operating as a hunter-killer combination, our mounted units can deliver 
precision effects, as well as surveillance before, during, and after 
striking targets, at ranges previously reserved for the air wing. These 
combat-tested and combat-proven capabilities will redefine how small 
units close with and destroy an adversary. Once fully fielded, each 
infantry and mobile reconnaissance battalion will possess no fewer than 
four ``hunter'' UAS (potentially the Stalker VXE Block 30) and seven 
dedicated ``killer'' mounted launchers.
    Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV). In 1989, the 29th Commandant wrote 
in his posture statement that his number one priority was the 
procurement of an advanced amphibious vehicle to ``replace our current 
amphibious assault vehicle (AAV), now approaching the end of its 
service life.'' Thirty-three years later, we divested of the AAV and 
are now focused on accelerating the procurement of the ACV. It remains 
a ``must-have'' capability for our forces operating in the global 
littorals--especially in archipelagic environs across the Pacific. We 
remain committed to an approved acquisition objective (AAO) of 632 
vehicles and have procured 267 to-date. We anticipate procuring another 
74 in fiscal year 2023.
    Medium Range Missile (MMSL) Batteries. Due to the continued support 
of Congress, we remain on-schedule to reach initial operating 
capability (IOC) for one MMSL battery in the Pacific by 2023 (to be 
employed by 3d MLR). We remain focused on fielding 14 total MMSL 
batteries (142 total launchers) by fiscal year 2030. These MMSL 
batteries--combining the Navy Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship 
Interdiction System (NMESIS) and ROGUE Fires--will be capable of firing 
the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) and Tactical Tomahawk, thereby holding 
adversary targets at-risk both afloat and ashore, further complicating 
their decisionmaking. This capability is just as relevant in the 
Western Pacific as it would be in eastern Ukraine, where shore-based 
fires have already been used to destroy enemy surface combatants.
    Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). In addition to the 
investments made in Ground-Based Anti- Ship Missiles (GBASM), we have 
also begun investing in AGM-158C (LRASM) to further expand the range 
and lethality of our aviation-delivered fires. Marine aircraft equipped 
with LRASM, operating from both ship and shore, will thicken the 
existing network of fires, further distribute lethality across a 
theater, and enhance the credibility of our existing deterrent in any 
region.
    CH-53K. The CH-53K provides the FMF and combatant commanders with 
an unmatched vertical heavy- lift capability to project, maneuver, and 
sustain combat forces. It remains the only fully marinized heavy- lift 
helicopter in development or production. The CH-53K can lift more, 
farther, and faster than any other rotary wing platform in the world. 
We declared CH-53K IOC on 22 April after fielding a four-plane 
detachment worth of aircraft, support equipment, and trained aircrew 
and maintainers. While we remain concerned by the continued growth of 
procurement costs, we have actions in place to try to mitigate growth. 
We are further concerned by the projection of the sustainment costs and 
the total cost of ownership, which may exceed $390 million per 
aircraft. We are actively working with industry to reduce those costs 
and will continue that fight throughout the life of the weapon system. 
Still, a marinized, heavy-lift capability is an absolute ``must have'' 
for the joint force as the costs of maintaining the increasingly 
outmoded CH-53E inventory is prohibitive. To date, we have procured 40 
aircraft.
    Ground Based Air Defense (GBAD). GBAD includes multiple FD 2030 
priority programs such as the Marine Air Defense Integrated System 
(MADIS) and Medium Range Intercept Capability (MRIC). MADIS will enable 
our low altitude air defense (LAAD) battalions to provide short-range 
air defense (SHORAD) for our maneuver forces and fixed facilities, to 
include against hostile aerial threats from UAS. MRIC--currently in 
development--is an air defense system for fixed sites, designed to 
counter large UAS (Groups 3 and 4), cruise missiles, and fixed/rotary 
wing aircraft. Based on on-going operations in Ukraine, and lessons 
learned from recent conflicts in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh, we believe 
these GBAD programs to be essential for our Marine expeditionary 
forces.
                     fd 2030 emerging capabilities
    Long-Range Unmanned Surface Vessel (LRUSV) and Unmanned Underwater 
Vehicles (UUV). Just as our MQ-9AER and successor platforms will 
provide persistent surveillance and reconnaissance of competitors and 
strategically critical geography from the air, the Long-Range Unmanned 
Surface Vessel (LRUSV) will do the same from a sea-based platform. It 
will also provide unique capabilities for undersea scouting and C2 
enabling. The rapid evolution of long-range precision munitions allows 
for form factors that can be employed at sea or ashore, and will 
progressively increase deterrence options as they become available. Our 
plan is to home-station these capabilities in Guam, Japan, and Hawaii. 
In addition, UUVs deployed from our existing inventory of L-Class ships 
or from future Light Amphibious Warships can further reinforce our 
competitive advantages in undersea warfare, expand our battlespace 
awareness and that of our partners and allies, and when armed with 
torpedoes, further reinforce sea-denial operations in contested spaces.
    Artificial Intelligence (AI)-Enabled Counter-Intrusion and Counter-
UAS. For the past 18 months, we have conducted tests with AI-enabled 
counter-intrusion and counter-UAS systems aboard several of our bases 
and stations. The performance of these systems has exceeded all 
expectations. As a result, the Commander of Marine Corps Forces, 
Pacific submitted an urgent-needs statement requesting the capability 
be fielded at all bases and stations in the Pacific. Initially, this 
capability will be employed at fixed sites. However, in the near-to-
mid-term we anticipate employing a mobile version of this small 
footprint, AI-enabled sensing platform. This will allow our stand-in 
forces--with allies, and partners--to better sense and make sense of 
the dynamic maritime and urban terrain where we operate.
    Swarming UAS. Over the next 12 months, we will conduct a series of 
experiments at I MEF with AI-enabled swarming UAS and loitering 
munitions. While planning for this effort is in the early stages, we 
are confident this capability will create game-changing improvements to 
close-combat lethality for our ground forces and will further realize 
the vision of the 31st Commandant's Hunter Warrior experiments from 
1997-1998. Swarming UAS will extend the area of influence of every 
maneuver element, creating competitive warfighting advantages over our 
adversaries.
    Unmanned Logistics System-Aerial (ULS-A) and Future Vertical Lift 
(FVL) Family of Systems (FOS). The past 5 years of wargames have 
demonstrated that our logistics and sustainment capabilities will be 
targeted by near-peer competitors. As the ongoing conflict in Ukraine 
has poignantly illustrated, even traditional ground logistics resupply, 
executed over interior lines and relatively short distances, can be 
disrupted, with operational level effects. As we develop our new naval 
expeditionary units and expand our uncrewed aircraft capability, we 
will increasingly invest in uncrewed logistics aircraft such as the 
ULS-A Medium and ULS-A Large. This year we will invest $32 million in 
ULS-A Medium (Group 3 UAS), which is capable of carrying 300-600 pounds 
of cargo a distance of 100NM, while developing plans to procure ULS-A 
Large. To date, the Air Force has the most mature understanding of this 
capability, and has experimented with an electric vertical takeoff and 
landing (eVTOL) aircraft that may satisfy our needs in the future. We 
are wrapping all these efforts together within our aviation 
enterprise's FVL (VTOL FOS) program, and have invested $584 million 
over the FYDP.
             force design 2030 installations and logistics
    Our ability to sustain our tactical forces across time and space is 
a critical component of integrated deterrence. The pacing threat 
continues to erode our traditional warfighting advantages, particularly 
the ability to close and sustain our forces at times and places of our 
choosing. Unfortunately, most of our current logistics processes and 
procedures play right into their strengths. Because the operational 
environment is increasingly contested, our logistics efforts from the 
tactical edge all the way back to the homeland will have to 
fundamentally change. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, even a 
numerically superior force will struggle to sustain itself and protect 
supply routes against persistent attack and disruption. We cannot allow 
this occur.
    As part of the broader logistics enterprise, we must improve the 
ability of our installations to provide the critical requirements that 
enable FMF readiness. We must have resilient infrastructure and 
services that provide the platforms necessary to enable delivery of 
capabilities from across the service enterprise. Because the 
environment is dynamic, we must have the means to protect our 
installations and organic industrial base from an increasingly complex 
range of operational, environmental, and climate-related threats. With 
the proliferation of the Mature Precision Strike Regime and expanding 
information-related threats, we need to better leverage technology, 
specifically AI, to ensure we maintain the ability to defend ourselves 
from emerging and evolving threats such as those posed by small, 
unmanned aerial systems.
    In the Pacific, we are experimenting with command and control and 
organizational proofs of concept so our installations and logistics 
units can make more effective, direct contributions to FMF warfighting 
capability. We will place our installations under an operational 
command structure to ensure they are more resilient to operational, 
environmental, and climate-related threats, and better postured to meet 
the needs of the FMF.
    We are pursuing a range of material capabilities to diversify and 
modernize our logistics portfolio, aligned to a contested littoral 
environment. At the tactical level, we are currently testing and 
assessing several platforms that will enable us to transition from a 
battlefield maneuver and sustainment capability based on crewed 
aircraft and wheeled vehicles to a diverse collection of crewed and 
uncrewed air and ground platforms that are smaller, cheaper, and 
collectively result in a more resilient distribution network of 
platforms and connectors. In addition to our efforts to generate, 
store, and distribute renewable energy forward, these platforms will 
exploit rapidly moving technologies that the Department and our 
industry partners are pursuing to decrease our dependence on vulnerable 
fuel supply chains, while enabling us to deliver critical commodities 
via the naval and joint logistics enterprise across the vast distances 
of the Pacific, despite enemy sensing and targeting capabilities. The 
most visible platforms will be a family of uncrewed logistics air 
systems, the smallest of which are already in prototyping and live 
experimentation. Our experimentation is yielding exciting results that 
underscore the need to expand into large and medium uncrewed logistics 
systems. Additionally, we will begin exploring options to replace our 
ground logistics fleet with a smaller, lighter, fuel-efficient 
replacement for vehicles that have run long past sustainability. We are 
now exploring emerging technologies that we can leverage to deliver 
capable, yet affordable vehicles that reduce our reliance on fossil 
fuels. As a modest first step, we will lease 3,875 non-tactical 
electric vehicles this year, and likely expand our inventory of 
electric vehicles in the future.
    As I have said numerous times over the last year, logistics is the 
pacing function, and the on-going conflict in Ukraine appears to 
validate that conclusion. As such, logistics provides the resources and 
sets the limits for what is operationally possible, even as 
logisticians attempt to extend those limits as far as possible.
                 force design and the reserve component
    We recently established the Marine Innovation Unit (MIU) within our 
Reserve Component. The MIU's work will complement that of our Marine 
Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) by accelerating advanced technology 
development. Reserve Marines in the grades of sergeant through colonel 
will be assigned to this unit on the basis of their expertise in areas 
like artificial intelligence, data science, human systems, advanced 
manufacturing, quantum computing, autonomy/robotics, space, supply 
chain management, cyber, synthetic biology, energy and materials 
sciences, and other technology fields. This initiative will allow us to 
tap into the diverse talent pool in Marine Corps Forces Reserve, and 
through its collaboration with MCWL, integrate research in multiple 
advanced disciplines into Force Design and related efforts.
                               readiness
    Though some aspects of our military require substantial change, we 
should be clear to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain 
as relevant and operationally suitable today as they have been over the 
previous 70 years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps 
``can prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt 
and vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock 
troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready . . . to 
provide a balanced force-in- readiness for a naval campaign and, at the 
same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain 
international disturbances short of large-scale war...'' This role as 
the Nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic advantage 
via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or conflict, 
and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the threshold 
of armed conflict, remains as valid today as it was when first 
articulated. I remain as committed to ensuring your Marine Corps can 
fulfill this vital role as those who preceded me.
    But as I have previously noted, readiness and availability are not 
the same things. Ready forces are those that create competitive 
warfighting advantages. As we are witnessing in Ukraine, available 
Russian forces are being met by Ukrainian forces possessing competitive 
warfighting advantages. Prior to the commencement of hostilities, if 
one had asked for a relative combat power assessment based on each 
side's bench of ready (available) forces, that assessment would have 
been disproportionately skewed towards the Russians. As we have seen in 
Ukraine and in other recent conflicts, true readiness is a hypothesis 
to be tested and proven via employment in combat, and is not something 
that can be determined via availability alone.
                     readiness and covid-19 update
    As of 22 April 2022, 96 percent of the Active Component is fully 
vaccinated and 97 percent partially vaccinated. Within our Reserve 
Component, 91 percent are fully vaccinated and 92 percent partially 
vaccinated. 3,702 Marines asked for a religious accommodation and seven 
have been approved. 1,067 Marines have received approval for a medical 
or administrative exemption. As of 22 April, 1,978 Marines have been 
separated for a failure to comply with a lawful order.
                    climate readiness and resilience
    The Secretary of the Navy has directed the Navy and Marine Corps to 
develop plans for increasing our capability and capacity to mitigate 
both the near-term and long-term operational impacts of climate change. 
He has also set a goal of achieving net-zero carbon emissions at our 
bases and stations by 2040. For the Marine Corps, I view our climate-
related mitigation efforts as crucial to increasing the Service's 
operational capability, capacity, and resilience in the face of serious 
environmental challenges, including extreme storms along the East 
Coast, rising oceans levels along the Carolina coast, and water 
scarcity at bases and stations in the Southwest. It also important to 
note that many of the communities surrounding our installations share 
our climate-related vulnerabilities. We believe that partnering with 
Federal agencies, states, localities, tribes, and territories on 
climate change related planning is critical to maximizing the impact of 
our collective mitigation efforts.
                         talent management 2030
    Late last year we published Talent Management 2030 (TM 2030), and 
in doing so, took a major step toward realizing the goals of Force 
Design 2030 and our larger service modernization effort. TM 2030 aims 
to create a personnel system that better harnesses, develops, and 
aligns the talents of individual Marines with the needs of the service 
to maximize the performance of both, improving both individual and unit 
readiness, capability, and lethality. The report details the 
deficiencies in our current manpower model and directs a series of 
reforms, initiatives, and changes that will fundamentally improve our 
service's organization, processes, and approach to personnel and talent 
management. TM2030 was informed by years of studies, reports, and other 
research, as well as the work of our sister services in the joint 
force. The influence of Congress is also evident throughout the report, 
and many of the most important initiatives described in its pages are 
the direct consequence of expanded authorities that Congress gave the 
services in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2019.
    The totality of changes described in TM2030 are significant. They 
are also essential, especially within the broader context of our 
ongoing Force Design 2030 effort. In short, the capabilities we are 
building as part of Force Design 2030, along with the complementary 
concepts of Stand-In Forces, Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations 
(EABO), and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), cannot reach their 
full potential without a profound change to our personnel system. In 
that way, TM2030 should be viewed as a critical requirement to the 
success of our overall service modernization.
    We plan to fully implement the changes described in TM2030 and 
transition from our current manpower system to a talent management 
system no later than 2025. Change of this magnitude requires the 
dedicated commitment and long-term support of both military and 
civilian leaders. While I believe we have most of the necessary 
authorities to fully implement TM2030, I will be sure to inform 
Congress if any challenges or obstacles arise for which we may need 
your assistance.
    Among the more important changes, the implementation of TM2030 will 
adjust our decades-old recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model, 
placing more emphasis on retention. This change will raise the 
aggregate age of our Marines and create a more mature force, consistent 
with future warfighting requirements. We expect this will raise 
personnel costs, yet well within accepted norms. For example, today the 
average cost per Marine is $73,800 per year (pay, housing, training, 
etc.). By comparison, the average cost of a Soldier is $79,800, the 
average cost of an Airman is $82,500, and the average cost of a Sailor 
is $89,900. While we anticipate a cost increase in the short term, we 
also expect a cost savings over the long term as we reduce the number 
of recruiters, instructors, and other resources required to maintain a 
recruiting-centric enlisted personnel model. In the near term, the most 
visible sign of our shift towards a more mature retention-based force 
will be a drop in the annual recruiting mission by several thousand, 
and a congruent increase in retention.
                    diversity, equity, and inclusion
    I remain committed to maintaining a total workforce that benefits 
from the whole of our Nation's vast human capital by recruiting, 
developing, and retaining Marines and civilians from all personal, 
cultural, and professional backgrounds. In practice, that means 
eliminating all structural, administrative, cultural, or other 
obstacles that might limit a Marine's ability to have a successful 
career. Capitalizing on the talents, knowledge, skills, abilities, 
experiences, and perspectives of every Marine will make our Corps 
stronger, more lethal, and more effective on the battlefield, today and 
tomorrow.
    As a Corps, we have made great strides over the last 5 years in 
eliminating obstacles to the upward mobility of talented Marines from 
traditionally underrepresented demographics. One way to measure our 
progress is to examine the rate at which Marines from these backgrounds 
are selected to command battalions and squadrons at the O5/lieutenant 
colonel level, a key career milestone that indicates a Marine has 
potential for a significant leadership position within the Service. 
Five years ago, 19 percent of African American Marines screened for O5 
command were selected. Since then, the average is 34 percent with a 
high of 44 percent. Five years ago, 3 percent of our battalions and 
squadrons were commanded by female Marines. Today that number has 
increased to 9 percent. In fiscal year 2021, for the first time, a 
higher percentage of female Marines who screened for O5 command were 
selected than their male counterparts. We do not select our commanders 
based on gender, race, or any other marker, so the fact that Marines 
from these diverse backgrounds are being selected for O5 command 
indicates to me that we are making progress in reducing obstacles to 
the upward mobility of talent.
    While there is evidence of some progress, there is also evidence we 
still have obstacles to eliminate. For example, we continue to 
experience a concerning lack of diversity within our TACAIR community. 
Despite a significant increase in the number of African American 
officers over the last four decades, we have the same number of African 
American TACAIR pilots today as we did in 1981. Last year we asked 
former NASA Administrator and Marine, Major General Charles Bolden 
(USMC, Ret.), to conduct a third-party review to examine the structural 
and systemic issues that might be leading to this outcome. His 
observations and conclusions were valuable, and I am confident his 
recommendations will help us to create a more equitable playing field.
         sexual assault prevention and military justice reform
    The eradication of sexual assault from our ranks has been a goal of 
every Marine Commandant for decades. Despite making progress in 
fostering a culture where reporting of sexual assault crimes has 
increased and where victims are more willing to communicate with their 
leadership, we have admittedly been unable to accomplish what we all 
seek--the elimination of sexual assault altogether. In 2021, there were 
1,202 reported sexual assaults in the Marine Corps. We must consider 
any policies that could increase prevention and offender 
accountability, and reduce or eliminate retaliation or retribution 
against victims. I remain committed to timely implementation of the 
Independent Review Committee's (IRC) recommendations, as well as 
implementation of changes in the fiscal year 2022 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) that seek to improve the investigation, 
disposition, and litigation of victim- related crimes.
                      parental leave and childcare
    As part of TM2030, we will begin making several key updates to our 
parental leave program beginning in 2022. First, we are grateful to the 
Congress for the additional authorities to increase the duration of 
parental leave for primary and secondary caregivers; we have expanded 
our secondary caregiver leave and are working with OSD on the timely 
implementation of increased leave in cases of adoption or long-term 
foster care. Second, we are developing mechanisms by which primary and 
secondary caregivers can take additional parental leave--beyond the 
congressionally-authorized 12-weeks--if they agree to extend their 
service contracts. Third, we will implement a phased return to work 
program for the primary caregiver, allowing the caregiver to return to 
work gradually. Finally, and most importantly, we won't stop learning. 
We will carefully study the best practices of top performing American 
companies and institutions, always with an eye to enhancing our service 
parental leave programs as new research becomes available.
    Increasing the availability of childcare remains a top priority for 
the Service. Unfortunately, persistent supply and demand imbalances 
have resulted in unacceptable wait times for our Marine families. The 
average wait time for childcare across our major bases and stations is 
65 days. However, based on a number of actions taken this year, we 
anticipate a decrease in the average wait time by 50 percent over the 
next 12 months. Additionally, we increased funding for our Marine 
Family Care Programs by $91 million, beginning in fiscal year 2023 
across the next 5 years. To provide a variety of options that fit a 
families' needs and to mitigate lengthy Child Development Center (CDC) 
waitlists, we also offer fee assistance for eligible Marines who are 
geographically remote, reside more than 15 miles from an installation, 
or are assigned to an installation with a lengthy CDC waitlist.
                      barracks and family housing
    In fiscal year 2021, we renovated 13 barracks, and in fiscal year 
2022, we plan to renovate another 10 at a cost of $93 million. We 
anticipate renovating a further 10 barracks in fiscal year 2023 at a 
cost of $112 million. This will leave 94 barracks for future 
renovation. The renovations completed in fiscal year 2021 to fiscal 
year 2023 will positively impact 3,780 Marines living in the barracks. 
In terms of family housing, our biggest challenge is related to ongoing 
efforts to renovate over 300 homes at MCAS Iwakuni, for which we 
recently issued a contract to renovate 44, to be completed by fiscal 
year 2023. Additionally, we anticipate spending a further $104 million 
in fiscal year 2023 to further remediate housing deficiencies across 
our bases and stations.
                          training philosophy
    In 1990, then Commandant Gray stated, ``Training will reflect the 
fact the modern battlefield demands high levels of initiative and an 
ability to operate at a fast tempo in an atmosphere of uncertainty, 
confusion, and rapid change. Unit training will largely be free-play 
training in order to develop this ability. Individual training, 
starting with boot camp, will seek to develop independent action and 
initiative.'' This guidance remains as relevant today as it was 32 
years ago.
                            training ranges
    The Marine Corps has no outdoor training spaces or ranges where 
ground units can operate in an electromagnetic spectrum operations 
(EMSO) denied, degraded, or disrupted environment, and limited 
opportunities to replicate such an environment in simulation. Today, we 
are able to conduct some of this training at joint facilities, most 
notably in Alaska's Joint Pacific Alaskan Range Complex (JPARC). 
However, we need to be able to train in a similar manner at all of our 
major training facilities. This is a critical shortfall of our existing 
training infrastructure in Arizona, California, Hawaii, and North 
Carolina. Additionally, we lack littoral maritime training ranges akin 
to our legendary Range 400 at the MAGTF Training Center in Twentynine 
Palms, California. As we modernize the force for naval expeditionary 
operations in contested environments, we will require a maritime 
training site with suitable seaward and landward ranges where we can 
train with the full range of our multi-domain weapon systems, to 
include uncrewed systems. Finally, we must remain mindful of the 
impacts of urbanization and community growth on our training capacity, 
especially in Hawaii.
                 enhanced infantry and leader training
    In 1997, the 31st Commandant gave a speech at the National Press 
Club in which he articulated the need to transform our most valued 
Marine Corps asset--the Marine infantry non-commissioned officer (NCO). 
While most remember his characterization of the future ``Three Block 
War'' and the new importance of the ``Strategic Corporal,'' most forget 
the context of his argument. General Krulak described to his audience 
the Battle of Teutoburg Forest, during which the Roman pro-consul 
Quintilius Varus had his force of three legions ambushed and destroyed 
by an adversary he put down 3 years prior. As his force was collapsing 
around him, Varus was heard to say, ``Ne cras, Ne cras'' (Latin for 
``not like yesterday''). General Krulak's prescient assumptions about 
the future of ground combat in urban areas has proven accurate time and 
again--whether in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, or Ukraine today.
    Our continued force-on-force experimentation and training in 
support of FD 2030 further demonstrate that the future battlespace will 
not be like yesterday, and change is required--even among the elite 
Marine infantry community. As a result, over the past year we have 
greatly expanded our infantry training by adding an additional six 
weeks to the program of instruction. This expansion provides our 
infantry Marines with the training necessary to employ networked 
communications, organic precision fires to include loitering munitions, 
and multi-domain ISR capabilities at the lowest tactical level. The 
result will be a more technically competent and tactically proficient 
infantry than has ever existed in the Marine Corps--prepared to 
operate, fight, and win on any modern battlefield. And, one with both 
the physical stamina and mental resilience required of all Marine 
infantry past and present. These changes are not limited only to our 
enlisted force. We have made significant improvements at our Infantry 
Officers Course (IOC) to expand practical applications via a new live-
fire ambush, a new amphibious operations package, uncrewed aircraft 
systems integration instruction, and final live-fire exercise against a 
multi-domain threat. Through our continued wargaming and 
experimentation, it is perfectly clear that an elite infantry is a 
critical requirement to success on the future battlefield, and the 
changes that are occurring at IOC and at our Schools of Infantry are 
now producing that force.
                            recruit training
    In the 2020 NDAA, Congress directed the Marine Corps to gender 
integrate training at both Marine Corps Recruit Depots (MCRDs) Parris 
Island and San Diego no later than fiscal year 2025 and fiscal year 
2028, respectively. We are on pace to achieve those deadlines. Since 
enactment, we have trained 26 integrated companies at MCRD Parris 
Island and 3 at MCRD San Diego--a total of 11,121 male and female 
Marines who started their service and journeys together. At present, 
each MCRD company consists of five male platoons and one female platoon 
(5+1 model), although there are times when a four male platoon plus two 
female platoon model (4+2 model) has been employed to accommodate 
increased female recruit throughput.
                              afghanistan
    In August of last year, our collective mission in Afghanistan 
ended. During nearly 20 years of operations, 115,992 Marines served in 
Afghanistan; 5,101 Marines were wounded in action; an untold number 
sustained invisible and permanent emotional wounds; and 478 families 
became Gold Star Families after the loss of their Marine. We have a 
moral obligation to each of our Marines and their families to resist 
the temptation to push Afghanistan into our distant memory, and instead 
bring our experiences there into sharp focus in order to learn. 
Thousands of Marines, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen answered the call 
to serve in Afghanistan, and while the outcome there was not what any 
of them expected, their service was honorable and their courage real. 
We owe them a hard look at how the war was executed--what we got right 
and what we got wrong. To that end, I fully endorse the nonpartisan 
Afghanistan War Commission and its aims to help us more completely 
understand the full scope of the conflict.
    When reflecting on our experience in Afghanistan, we also cannot 
forget the significant contributions of our allies and partners. The 
U.S. military was fortunate to operate alongside patriots from dozens 
of allied and partner nations, and we will never forget the service and 
sacrifices of these brothers and sisters in arms.
                        joint chief perspective
    Trust and Confidence in the Military. I remain concerned with 
continued reports of the public's declining trust and confidence in the 
uniformed leadership of the armed services. I am old enough to remember 
when military service was not perceived in the positive light that it 
is today. I entered service within a decade after the collapse of the 
U.S. position in Southeast Asia and a year after the failed rescue 
attempt known as Desert One. Within 2 years of my commissioning, faith 
in the uniformed and civilian leadership of the military was further 
rocked by the tragedy of the suicide-bombing of the Marine Barracks in 
Beirut.
    We must address negative perceptions of the military without 
hesitation. We must also remain mindful that the deeper we dig into the 
decisions of the past, particularly related to our campaigns in 
Afghanistan that such negative perceptions may grow. The long-term 
health of the Marine Corps, naval services, and entire joint force is 
dependent upon the cultivation and sustainment of a special bond of 
trust and confidence between the military and the public. We must 
ensure that Americans who wish to serve, and the families who support 
them in their service, trust their military and pursue their service 
``without any mental reservation.'' To that end, we must all make a 
concerted effort to speak with precision, encourage transparency, and 
welcome any and all oversight that would restore the public's 
confidence in the military.
    Finally, I am increasingly concerned that in our shared desire to 
eliminate discrimination, harassment, sexual assault, extremism, and 
every other destructive act within the joint force that is contrary to 
the core values of all the services, we are unintentionally creating a 
harmful mental model and stereotype of the services as places where 
these are the norm vice the exception. The vast majority of young men 
and women across the joint force serve honorably, and are incredible 
representatives of their individual families and communities across the 
entire country. We must never allow the public to think for a moment 
that military service is anything other than the most honorable service 
one can provide to their fellow citizens. The success of our all-
volunteer force requires the special trust and confidence of the 
public. As you hold me and the other senior leaders accountable for all 
we do or fail to do, and rightfully seek to eliminate persistent 
behaviors inconsistent with our values, please continue to help me 
spread the word that military service is honorable service, and that 
you remain incredibly proud of the young men and women in uniform.
    Wargaming and Transparency. In September 1964, the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsored a wargame on Vietnam for uniformed and 
civilian leaders from the Department of Defense (DoD), Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Department of State (DoS). The wargame 
was intended to provide senior policy makers with an opportunity to re-
examine our national strategic objectives and the strategy required to 
attain those objectives. For those passionate about wargaming, SIGMA II 
64 is ``Exhibit A'' in the case for its importance. Once declassified, 
the wargame report provided clear evidence that senior uniformed and 
civilian leaders understood the situation in Vietnam much better than 
historians previously assumed.
    The story of SIGMA II 64 illustrates the potential of wargames to 
increase the breadth and depth of our understanding, but more, it 
illustrates the damage that can result from a lack of transparency. The 
SIGMA II 64 wargame results were classified and tightly controlled, not 
shared widely or with those who maintain oversight responsibilities, 
like Congress. While it is impossible to know if our national leaders 
would have pursued a different course in Vietnam had the SIGMA II 64 
results been more widely shared, it is certain that the debate would 
have been better informed.
    As a joint force, we should make every effort to increase the 
frequency, sophistication, and scope of our wargames. In particular, we 
should look to expand the participation of our allies, partners, 
interagency teammates, and industry, whose collective insights are 
essential to a strategy which aims at integrated deterrence. At the 
same time, we must seek greater transparency. I encourage Congress and 
staff to participate in wargames, continue asking tough questions, and 
challenge us to be as transparent as possible.
                               conclusion
    As HASC Chairman Smith recently noted, ``The Pentagon tends to 
reward conformity. As long as you check all the boxes and go up through 
the 15 layers of decisionmaking, we're all good, instead of you saw a 
problem and solved it.'' This has to change, is changing, and can 
continue to change with your oversight and assistance. For some, the 
daily feed of images and intelligence from Ukraine has persuaded them 
that a change in our availability-based model of readiness and our 
warfighting investments are required. I agree with these individuals. 
For others, the case for change has long since been made on 21st 
century battlefields with little if anything in common. I agree with 
those individuals as well. However, this does not mean that everything 
requires change, and that our forces are not ready today, to create 
advantage today, and to succeed today in whatever challenge confronts 
them. While the need to train and equip our Marines and Sailors with 
modern capabilities and equipment that create advantage is beyond 
dispute, what is also beyond dispute is that those individuals--the 
individual Marine and Sailor--are a source of competitive advantage for 
the service and for the larger joint force, and will always be the most 
important resource. Your Marines are ready today, just as they have 
always been. What they need is your continued support for resourcing, 
your continued policy oversight, and your continued faith and 
confidence. With those things, they will never fail.

    Senator Tester. Thank you, General. And we all feel the 
same way about the great Senator from Alabama. We are going to 
miss him, and we are going to celebrate him while he is here, 
too. So, look, we appreciate all your testimonies very, very 
much. I am going to start with you, General Berger.
    You went over Force Design 2030 pretty well in your opening 
statement. I guess my question would be, are there 
opportunities that you are evaluating in coordination and 
collaboration with the other services, Army and others, all of 
them, to develop capabilities to address China specifically, 
but others also?
    And when you are doing that, if you are doing that, which I 
anticipate you are, are there any--how do you avoid 
duplication?
    General Berger. Sir, thanks. I would offer you perhaps 
three examples. First, with the Army long range precision 
fires. Here, I would say we know where there is a degree of 
overlap. That is good. But the ranges and the size of the 
weapons that we are both developing are complementary, not 
overly duplicative. They have much longer range, long range 
precision fires that are ground based.
    We need them for the Marine Corps. They are lighter, more 
mobile, more expeditionary on the back of like a joint light 
tactical vehicle. We need both. So in that respect, we are 
working together to make sure that we can stitch together the 
whole fires chain.
    Future vertical lift, also with the Army. We have MV-22s 
right now and helicopters, and together for the past 2 years, 
we are developing the future of vertical lift, what that might 
look like.
    Lastly, I would say--not lastly, but third, I would say 
sensing. We are doubling, perhaps tripling, the volume, the 
quantity, the capacity of ISR in the Marine Corps, organic.
    And the way to do that at speed and efficiently was to--
with the help of the Congress, 10 MQ-9s that the Air Force was 
going to buy, we are now going to procure. So it speeds them 
going in the direction they need it to go, it gets us what we 
need at cost. So in those three areas and other, sir, we are 
absolutely coordinating across the services.
    Senator Tester. Thank you. And I appreciate your 
leadership. I think it is important and it is valued, so thank 
you. The China threat requires our military to modernize with 
an emphasis on nimble and distributed operations.
    Most of the other services are choosing to adapt to 
proliferated agile approaches to solve these problems. However, 
the Navy's shipbuilding plan continues to include fewer, more 
exquisite platforms to meet the Chinese maritime threat. So, 
Admiral, why does the Navy's current modernization plan offer 
the best capability to meet the challenges in the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, in terms of modernizing the fleet that 
we have. So we are beginning within this budget cycle to begin 
DDG (guided missile destroyers) modernization. So our front 
line greyhound ships will undergo advancements with respect to 
the radar and sensing systems, as well as new missiles that we 
are investing in. That would include hypersonics, it would 
include the SM-6.
    We are trying to actually maximize the domestic production 
lines for all of our weapons with range and speed, so that the 
ships that we do have out at sea are highly capable. With 
respect to the ships that we are building, if we think about 
the submarine force, the force under the sea with Virginia 
Block IVs and Block Vs, within this budget cycle, mid-decade 
you will have a strong force of Block IVs and Block Vs with 
increased magazine capacity will be entering the fleet.
    The third Block 5 Virginia class will have a hypersonics 
capability in 2028. The Navy SEALs have pivoted from a primary 
focus on counterterrorism back to their frogman roots. So we 
are working very closely with the submarine community in highly 
classified operations to give us a leg up against the 
adversary, not only today, but in the future. Also, the 
unmanned work we are doing under the sea, as with respect to a 
mining capability, is showing really solid progress.
    With respect to the surface force, the new frigates that we 
are building up in Wisconsin are going to be a game changer for 
us. The destroyers, our Flight III destroyers that are now 
delivering out of both Pascagoula, Mississippi and Bath, Maine, 
game changers for us.
    And actually the bridge to DDG-X in the early 2030s, 
putting hypersonics on the Zumwalt Class destroyers is another 
modernization leap ahead for us. With respect to the Air Wing 
of the future, right now we are integrating fourth and fifth 
generation aircraft together in our air wings. By mid-decade, 
half of our air wings will be integrated with F-35s and F/A-
18s.
    Our F/A-18s are undergoing upgrades right now to give them 
increased flying hours to take them from 6,000 to 10,000, as 
well as an advanced combat system. For the weapons that those 
aircraft will carry, again, we are maximizing domestic 
production lines so the magazines in those carriers are filled 
with the best weapons that we have.
    And as you are aware, sir, we are integrating MQ-25 
unmanned into the fleet on our carriers right now. We will go 
IOC (Initial Operational Capability) in 2025. That will take 
the refueling role away from a strike fighter, enabling us to 
keep more strike fighters in the air, extend the range of the 
wing while they are in the air with longer range weapons.
    And that MQ-25 is absolutely the trailblazer for us into 
the next generation of unmanned that we are working very 
closely with the Air Force on. Sir, apologize for the bit of a 
long answer to your statement, but this budget proposes some 
significant enhancements for us in terms of modernizing the 
force.
    Senator Tester. I appreciate your leadership. I appreciate 
your obvious knowledge of the situation, so I want to thank you 
for that. Secretary Del Toro, I will catch you in the next 
round. Senator Shelby.
    Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank 
you, all of you for your nice comments, you now, earlier. The 
Guam defense system. This committee has strongly supported the 
Department's shift in focus to near-peer competition, which 
places an emphasis on the Pacific Theater.
    And I will direct my question to General Berger here. With 
the relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam and the committed U.S. 
investment in Guam, can you provide your perspective, if you 
can here in this open hearing, on the importance of providing 
air defense against current and future missile threats in that 
area?
    General Berger. The points you highlighted about the 
growing significance of Guam and the role it plays for National 
Security, I think from Admiral Aquilino to all the Service 
Chiefs, we would agree 100 percent. It is going to become a 
major hub. I think that is--there is no question. And that is 
why Admiral Aquilino is prioritizing the air defense picture on 
top of Guam and Hawaii, because the range of weapon systems, as 
you are alluding to, is growing.
    Both from missile defense and air defense, we are going to 
have to ensure that Guam is protected, not just point defense 
from Guam, but forward as well. And here, I think this is 
probably lesser known to most, but well known to you, members 
of this committee, this is where the forward Marine Corps and 
Navy, you know, forces that are all the way forward, they 
contribute to that defense in depth. You don't want to just 
engage them at the last minute right before Guam. So having the 
Navy and Marine Corps far forward, where we can pick that up, 
where we can sense it, where we can target their shooters that 
is where you want to be.
    Senator Shelby. Thank you. Hypersonic weapons, we talk 
about them. It is very important to all of us. This committee 
recognizes that the U.S. commitment to the deterrence is aimed 
at both preventing war and avoiding escalation of a conflict 
should war begin, all of it. Deterrence requires spending our 
limited resources on both offensive and defensive weapons.
    Admiral Gilday, as much as you can in an open hearing, 
would you provide an update on the Navy's conventional prompt 
strike weapon, as well as the context on the need for 
hypersonic missiles on both submarines and surface ships, and 
why meeting your current timelines are strategically important 
to us?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. In terms of offensive capability, 
they will be a game changer not only for the Navy, but for the 
Nation. As you know, sir, for way too long, the Navy has 
invested in defensive systems. And so the past few years, with 
the help of this subcommittee, we made a significant transition 
to offensive capabilities, hypersonics leading the way.
    That effort--and I have been down in Huntsville with the 
Army leadership to see the work ongoing there. Our hypersonics 
program in conjunction with the Army has met every benchmark 
and milestone, sir. You were a significant supporter for our 
doubling our budget in 2022 from $0.7 billion to $1.4 billion 
investment to keep us on track so that the Army could field 
that capability in 2023 on a mobile system, and the Navy to 
field that same capability on a destroyer in 2025.
    So, sir, to--I guess to get to the point, it has been our 
primary R&D effort in terms of delivering this capability on 
time, not without a significant amount of work from scientists 
across the country. And so, it remains a priority for us, sir, 
as we work closely with the Army to deliver this in 2023.
    Senator Shelby. Admiral, the 2022 budget included funds for 
the development of a nuclear armed sea launch cruise missile. 
To the extent you can, we know this is open hearing, can you 
provide an update on the investments that China and Russia are 
making in their tactical nuclear weapons arsenal and how your 
budget seeks to meet that challenge?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. The unclassified----
    Senator Shelby. And how important is that?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. At the unclassified level, I 
would say that Chinese and Russian investments in those 
tactical systems are a significant concern. The Nuclear Posture 
Review speaks to those concerns. As the committee is well 
aware, as you are well aware, sir, the Navy has made 
investments in low yield nuclear weapons capability based on 
the previous Nuke Posture Review in 2018. That program remains 
on track, and we are fielding that capability at this time. But 
again, the Chinese and Russian, the path that they are on right 
now is concerning in terms of----
    Senator Shelby. But that is a battle we cannot lose, isn't 
it?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, we need to be able to deter that 
capability, absolutely.
    Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, my last question to you has 
to do with the budget, overall budget. A lot of people, 
including this Senator, believe that the request is not enough 
considering the problems in the world. And we understand that 
you are part of this Administration. Inflation is eroding, even 
today, eroding what you are asking for. We will have to make 
that determination working with the House before the year is 
out.
    But we have got to get our arms, one, around the inflation 
first, and then try to boost our defense capabilities in a 
dangerous world. I know you have to be restrained by some 
things in the Administration, but we don't, you know, here and 
we are going to continue to try to make you funded and not 
underfunded in defense. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Tester. Senator Baldwin.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, in response to 
President Biden's January 2021 Executive Order, the Navy is 
working towards a 75 percent domestic content standard for all 
Navy ships. As you know, the frigate is going to exceed that 
minimum and will be 100 percent domestic content because 
Congress required it and the Navy and industry really stepped 
up. Provided with similar timelines and flexibilities and 
necessary waivers, would you support getting all Navy ships 
closer to 100 percent domestic content?
    Secretary Del Toro. Well, first, Senator, thank you for 
your support of our Marine Corps team and thank you for your 
support of this issue of Buy America. And as you know, the 
Department of the Navy does support Buy America. In fact on our 
first frigate, we are close to 100 percent on the HM&E (Hull, 
Mechanical, & Electrical) side of the house, for example, and 
about 96 percent on the rest of the ship. So we are committed 
to continuing to Buy America as much as possible.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you. This year, I am requesting 
additional funding for developing the frigate industrial base 
and workforce to help ensure a stable and robust foundation as 
this program ramps up. This is envisioned as being similar to 
what we have done in other programs. Would you be supportive of 
this additional funding, and do you agree that such an 
investment would greatly benefit the program?
    Secretary Del Toro. Senator, I often say that it takes a 
team to build a ship or any capability in the Department of 
Defense, and it takes close cooperation among industry, among 
the Navy, among the American people to bring it to fruition. In 
similar fashion to the DDG program and Columbia and others, 
proper investments in the frigate industrial base will be 
important to the successful completion of that ship.
    At the same time, it is also important to hold the 
shipyards accountable for delivering these ships and platforms 
on time, on cost, on schedule as well.
    Senator Baldwin. Great. I support getting the frigate 
program up to three or maybe even four ships per year as a 
procurement plan, which would require a second yard to build 
the same design. However, do you agree that we need to get 
through certain first in class production issues before adding 
a second yard?
    Secretary Del Toro. I think that is correct, Senator. I 
mean, I would be all in favor of adding a second shipyard at 
the right moment in time.
    But I think before we make that decision, it is very 
important to ensure that the technologies that we put on the 
frigate and our investment of this committee, for example, to 
the LBES, or the land based engineering support structure, in 
Philadelphia, is critically important to the success of that 
ship. And so we have to make sure that that ship stays on 
schedule, on cost, on time, and those investments should be--
come first before we actually consider a second shipyard for 
that.
    Senator Baldwin. And do you also agree that at only two 
ships per year, there is simply not enough demand to introduce 
a second yard?
    Secretary Del Toro. That is likely the case, Senator.
    Senator Baldwin. Okay. And General Berger, you have 
testified that 31 is the minimum number of large amphibious 
ships you need to execute your missions. However, all signs 
point to decommissioning more amphibs and bringing that number 
down to 24. I know more funding for the LPDs (Landing Platform 
Docks) is your top unfunded request, which I support. But can 
you please share any concerns you have about what a reduction 
will mean to the shipbuilding supplier base?
    General Berger. To make sure I understand, the impact to 
the shipbuilding industrial base. I would say two parts there, 
ma'am, and you are going to know these with your background. 
First would be the shipbuilding, the shipyard itself, 
certainly.
    When you reduce the centers or extend the centers on 
shipbuilding, the labor force, really difficult to keep them on 
site because they need work, the families need incomes. And you 
go beyond a certain center, and it is just they can't stay. 
They got to go find work somewhere else.
    So the impact to the quality of the workforce in HII 
(Huntington Ingalls Industries) or anywhere else is absolutely 
key. The second part, which you mentioned, the whole supply 
chain. Here, this is where the education of the CNO for me over 
the past few years has paid off because what I have learned on 
it, like an LPD (Landing Platform, Dock), the components for 
that ship are made in 39 different States.
    So the supply lines, the supply chain for ship construction 
and ship maintenance is deep in this country. If you, as the 
CNO says, if you don't give industry the head lights that they 
need, then their supply chains become very fragile. We can't--
this Nation can't afford for that to happen.
    Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. Senator Moran.
    Senator Moran. Chairman Tester, thank you very much. Mr. 
Secretary, pleased to get acquainted with you, and I thank you 
for your service, and I look forward to working with you as we 
care for the needs of the Navy and the Marine Corps as we take 
care of our Nation's defense requirements.
    I have discussed with your predecessor the talent that 
exists in Kansas, at our universities to conduct cutting edge 
research on Department of Navy programs. We also have, as you 
would know, have a vibrant defense industrial base that 
supports both the Navy and Marine Corps requirements.
    I appreciate the conversation I had with Admiral Gilday 
before the meeting started, in which he was complimentary of 
things going on at a couple of our universities in our State. 
How does the Department of Navy, under your leadership, see 
using partnerships with academia and industry to stay ahead of 
our adversaries and in the development of new technologies?
    Secretary Del Toro. Senator, I think the partnership with 
academia is critical to our success. And I have had numerous 
sessions now with the Office of Naval Research, as well as the 
Naval Sea Systems Command, and my Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for RD&A, across the entire department in fact, about 
building stronger ties to academia.
    It is so critically important. And you may mention the 
University at Wichita, for example, is a program institute for 
aviation that you have there, is critical to the research that 
we do on our aircraft across the Department of the Navy. So we 
are looking for opportunities to actually increase that.
    One thing that Secretary Austin, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Hicks are committed to is larger investments in 
research, development, and engineering, and the partnership 
with academia is just critical to that relationship. And there 
have been actually quite significant increases in this 
Presidential budget that I think would enforce that.
    Senator Moran. Mr. Secretary, if you or your team--
opportunities, if you can provide me with suggestions of places 
for cooperation, I would be glad to try to join the two 
together.
    Secretary Del Toro. Absolutely.
    Senator Moran. I appreciate that. General Berger, it is my 
understanding that the CH-53 King Stallion is one of the best 
heavy lift helicopters in the world, and it provides incredible 
capacity capabilities for our Marines.
    But I also understand that the programs like this, there is 
always cost concerns, and this program is no exception since 
the cost of one King Stallion has been above--at or above the 
level of the F-35, for example, for the last fiscal year.
    How do you anticipate the cost of the 53-K changing in the 
coming years, and what is the Marine Corps doing to ensure 
sustainment of costs for this aircraft are controlled?
    General Berger. I have had the fortune to fly on that 
aircraft. And I would never correct a Senator, but I would tell 
you, having flown on that thing, it is not one of the best, 
there is no other heavy lift aircraft like that in the world.
    Senator Moran. I was just giving you the opportunity----
    General Berger. I know, sir. And I am going to take it. I 
mean, speed, and lift, capacity. As an example, there was an H-
60 that crashed in the mountains of California a month or two 
ago. To recover there was no--we didn't have anything in the 
commercial or private sector that can lift an H-60 out of a 
12,000 feet altitude mountain, nothing, except for that 
aircraft.
    They went up to 12,000 feet, picked up a 14,000 pound H-60 
crashed helicopter and lifted it down to sea level. There is 
nothing in the world that can do that. Translate that into 
warfighting, in other words.
    To your question on cost, IOC, initial operating capability 
for us is for aircraft, the crews, trained, maintainers. That 
is where we are right now. And we are in the very early stages 
of procurement and the cost per aircraft is going down. It will 
continue to go down, just like the F-35 and every other major 
program. The more they build, the more they learn, cost will go 
down.
    Add to that, FMS (Foreign Military Sales) sales to overseas 
customers that is going to drive the unit cost down too. All 
that said, sir, just like the CNO and the Secretary alluded to, 
in both the manufacturing and the long term sustainment costs, 
we have to work with the manufacturer to make sure that it is 
affordable, and we are doing that.
    Senator Moran. Thank you for your answer. Mr. Chairman, I 
have other questions, and I don't know what the intention is of 
the Chair in regard to a second round.
    Senator Tester. We are going to do a second round, 
especially if you are willing to stick around, so it is good. 
Secretary Del Toro, we have talked about the threats that are 
being posed, China in the Indo-Pacific theater. You have got a 
shipbuilding plan. Is it achievable, that shipbuilding plan?
    Secretary Del Toro. I believe the shipbuilding plan is very 
achievable, Senator, Mr. Chairman. The shipbuilding plan 
actually provide stability over the next 10 years. When you 
look at the FY DP (Future Years Defense Program) and then you 
look at the 5 years beyond that, and you look at the three 
ranges that we have provided in the shipbuilding plan, there is 
consistency over the course of the next 10 years.
    And I think that is the consistency that the industrial 
base needs to be able to project its workload and its planning 
ahead of time. Beyond that, it becomes really difficult to 
predict exactly the nature of the threat and what the threat 
may actually be.
    And so there are three ranges that allows future National 
Security leaders to take a look at that and determine exactly 
which path they need to proceed on, also impacted by the fiscal 
realities of what is going on at that moment in time and 
inflation and all the other factors that weigh into investments 
in our National Security program.
    Senator Tester. Appreciate that. Senator Graham.
    Senator Graham. Thank you. You made a comment about you are 
okay with the next 10 years in terms of funding for the Navy. 
Well, I am not. So what percentage of GDP are we spending in 
this budget?
    Secretary Del Toro. I would have to get back to you on the 
exact----
    Senator Graham. Well, no, you shouldn't have to get back to 
me. You should know that. It is 3.1 percent of GDP. The last 
time we spent 3 percent below was in 1940, 1998, 1999, and 
2000. In the next 5 years, according to the budget proposals of 
this Administration, how many ships will there be in the Navy?
    Secretary Del Toro. There will be 52 ships that get built 
over the next FY DP.
    Senator Graham. How many will there be in the Navy?
    Secretary Del Toro. In the Navy, there will be 
approximately 280 ships.
    Senator Graham. Okay. How many are there now?
    Secretary Del Toro. There are 300--approximately 300.
    Senator Graham. So we are going to go down in terms of 
ships over the next 5 years. How many will there be in China?
    Secretary Del Toro. That is correct, sir. Over the last 20 
years, there was also a reduction of 20 ships. And in China, 
there will be a greater number of those. But what I would 
argue, it is just not the number of ships that matter, it is 
the modernization of the ships and the----
    Senator Graham. Here is what I would argue to. In the next 
5 years, our defense spending, particularly for the Navy, will 
be below 3 percent GDP, the lowest in modern history.
    So tell me why the world as it is would justify in the next 
5 years reducing the number of ships and having the lowest 
percentage of GDP spent on defense in modern history. Start 
with you, General. Does that make sense to you, Berger?
    General Berger. Sir, I can't answer the second question 
about percentage of GDP, but I can answer the first part. 
Absolutely, we have to be able to do three things. We have got 
to deter, got to be able to respond to a crisis, and if 
deterrence doesn't work, we got to be able to fight----
    Senator Graham. So how--are you okay with going to 280 
ships in the Navy?
    General Berger. We have to have--I know the number of 
amphib ships we have to do the national defense strategy, and 
that is 31.
    Senator Graham. Okay. All I can say is, I am just astounded 
that China is going to be at 480 and we are going to be at 280. 
We are going backwards in terms of the size of the Navy. I just 
got back from Asia. Do you think we should have a bigger 
footprint west of the international dateline, Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Absolutely, sir. Navy, Marine Corps teams 
are your best deterrent forward.
    Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more. When it 
comes to Asia, it is the Navy, Marine Corps. The Air Force 
plays an important role, but--Mr. Chairman, this budget that is 
being proposed for this year and the next 5 years is incredibly 
dangerous. There is no way you will ever convince me that going 
to about 2.5 to 2.6 percent of GDP on defense makes sense given 
the threats we face. So you can say anything you want to about 
the magic ships of 280.
    We need more--we need a bigger Navy, not a smaller Navy. We 
need a robust military that can deter war. And if we get in 
one, win it. So all I can say to our friends in the Navy and 
the Marine Corps, this budget represents irresponsibility, in 
my view, in terms of what the threats are facing this Nation, 
and the ability of the Navy and Marine Corps over time to 
effectively manage these threats, deter, and win the war.
    I just don't understand, what about this world in the next 
5 years would justify going to the lowest percentage of GDP in 
modern history. Mr. Secretary, answer that question if you can.
    Secretary Del Toro. Senator, first and foremost, thank you 
for your support of our Navy, Marine Corps team. It really does 
mean a lot to us and on many different fronts.
    Senator Graham. And you all mean a lot to me.
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sir. Again, I go back to what 
capability--I believe that we need the right capacity, plus the 
right capability to deliver the right lethality to deter our 
threat----
    Senator Graham. Do we have enough ships west of the 
international dateline to deter China?
    Secretary Del Toro. I think we do have enough ships west of 
the international dateline today to deter China in the threat 
that----
    Senator Graham. I just literally got back and the footprint 
I saw was just unbelievably shallow compared to the threats we 
face. So you are okay with this 5 year plan to go to 280 ship 
Navy, you find that it is okay?
    Secretary Del Toro. I do support it, and actually our 
engagement, as I said in my opening statement, strengthening 
our partnerships with our allies and partners is increasingly 
important. So----
    Senator Graham. What other navies--are there going up, is 
the European's navies getting bigger? How many European ships 
do we have west of the international dateline?
    Secretary Del Toro. Last year we had four modern aircraft 
carriers operating together for the first time in history. 
China has never been able to do that ever.
    Senator Graham. So who were they?
    Secretary Del Toro. So----I am sorry, sir?
    Senator Graham. Who were the aircraft carriers?
    Secretary Del Toro. It was the Harriet--excuse me, it was 
the Carl Vinson, we had the Izumo from Japan, and we had the 
Queen Elizabeth as well too, and there was a second aircraft 
carrier--the Abraham Lincoln? Ronald Reagan.
    Senator Graham. What is the trajectory of the Chinese navy, 
Admiral?
    Admiral Gilday. Pretty steep, sir. So right now there are 
three----
    Senator Graham. Would you say they are doing more than they 
have ever done to build a blue water navy?
    Admiral Gilday. Absolutely.
    Senator Graham. Would you say they are all in in building a 
blue water navy?
    Admiral Gilday. Their aspirations is to go well beyond the 
region, yes, sir.
    Senator Graham. General, they are all in in trying to 
dominate Asia in terms of a military presence?
    General Berger. Concur. Absolutely.
    Senator Graham. Okay. Thank you. Well, we are not all in 
and we need to be. To those who serve, it is not your fight. I 
will wrap up here, Mr. Chairman. I just, the number one job of 
this Congress, every Congress is to defend the Nation, and 
these budgets are woefully inadequate to the task.
    Our enemies are building up and we are going down and that 
is a formula for more war, not less. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. Senator Moran, if you are ready, you can 
go. Otherwise, I will continue. Your choice. Go ahead.
    Senator Moran. Thank you, Chairman. General, the Marine 
Corps' unfunded priority list in this year's budget includes 
the procurement of three UC-12 aircraft to complete the 
operational support aircraft program of record. Can you explain 
why the procurement of this aircraft has been important to the 
Marine Corps' modernization efforts?
    General Berger. We have been flying the UC-12, as have the 
other services, for a long time--earlier models. These are 
Whiskey models, UC-12Ws specifically. And that model that we 
are--to your point, these will be the last three in our program 
of record. These have self-defense systems on board that the 
previous versions did not. So why are they so important, to 
your question, Senator?
    They are important because if you don't have enough of that 
type aircraft, you are going to use tactical aircraft to 
shuttle around people and parts and cargo. We don't want to do 
that. So we don't want to use the tactical aircraft, the KC-
130s or tactical helicopters in place of UC-12s. UC-12s allow 
us to drive that down and use the tactical aircraft for 
tactical purposes.
    Senator Moran. I appreciate you answered my following 
question, what is the difference with them than without them? 
Thank you, General. Admiral, let me turn to you, one of the 
highlights and I was telling the Secretary this before the 
hearing began, one of the highlights of my tenure in the United 
States Senate was to attend a christening of a Navy ship, the 
USS Wichita.
    And it was great to see the sailors. It was good to be 
there with the Secretary. It was great to see the community in 
Florida respond to a new ship. And it was great to have Kansans 
on the water celebrating that moment. My understanding is that 
that ship, littoral ship, is going to be decommissioned, or at 
least that is contemplated. And I also understand it applies to 
nine Freedom Class littoral combat ships, presumably due to 
mechanical issues.
    I think the christening was just a few years ago, maybe 
three or so. So the fact that we christen a ship 1 year and a 
few years later we are decommissioning troubles me. Does the 
Navy plan to retire these nine ships and how, and is there a 
priority, order in which the ships would be decommissioned?
    One of the nine Freedom Class littoral combat ships was 
involved in a joint exercises with the Dominican Republic Navy. 
And those exercises, as I understand and I have read, were 
successful. They interdicted drugs smugglers. Are there no 
other uses, if there is something missing from this class of 
ships, that we would avoid decommissioning?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, given our top line, what we did was we 
prioritized or stratified our platforms under the sea, on the 
sea, and in the air based on their war fighting value. So what 
they bring against a fight consistent--in a fight against 
China, consistent with the National Defense Strategy, given 
our--and a priority for us has been to have a Navy that we can 
sustain.
    So in other words, we need a capable, lethal, ready Navy 
more than we need a larger Navy that is less capable, less 
lethal, and less ready. And so, unfortunately, the littoral 
combat ships that we have, while the mechanical issues were a 
factor, a bigger factor was the lack of sufficient war fighting 
capability against a peer competitor in China.
    And a key factor in the determination was the anti-
submarine warfare package that was being developed for those, 
for the Freedom Class hull that just were ineffective. And so 
we refused to put an additional dollar against that system that 
wouldn't match the Chinese undersea threat.
    That was a primary driver, sir, in leading us to determine 
that those ships, relative to others, just didn't bring the 
warfighting value to the fight. Now, in terms of what are the 
options going forward with these ships, I would offer to the 
subcommittee that we should consider offering these ships to 
other countries that would be able to use them effectively.
    There are countries in the Southern, in South America, as 
an example, as you pointed out that would be able to use these 
ships that have small crews. And so instead of just considering 
scrapping as a single option, I think there are others that we 
can look at, sir.
    Senator Moran. Admiral, I understand the importance of 
prioritizing. Let me ask, what were those ships doing that will 
not be done by the U.S. Navy?
    Admiral Gilday. So the new class of frigate that we are 
building will bring an enhanced anti-submarine warfare 
capability. The destroyers that we have right now have very 
capable anti-submarine warfare capability.
    So while those were an additional capacity, if you will, in 
terms of anti-submarine warfare, we do have other capable 
systems in the fleet, not just on the sea, but also I mentioned 
the submarines, the quietest submarines in the world, most 
effective submarines in the world that we are fielding, as well 
as our P-8 aircraft for a large area, ASW surveillance.
    Senator Moran. Admiral, thank you. And if your team would 
be interested in having a conversation with me or my team about 
the suggestion that you made, please pursue.
    Admiral Gilday. Absolutely, yes, sir. Thank you.
    Senator Moran. Thank you.
    Senator Tester. Gentlemen, I want to talk about ship 
maintenance for a second here. Ship maintenance and the private 
shipyards is over cost and behind schedule. I will give you a 
couple of data points. The USS Columbus was $333 million. To 
date, Congress has appropriated $625 million and it is still 
not back into fleet. In fact, the projected return, two and a 
half later--two and a half years later than originally 
projected.
    Another one is the USS Boise, a sub that has been idle 
since 2016. The original overhaul estimate was $389 million. To 
date, Congress has appropriated $1.1 billion. It is now over 7 
years delayed. So, Admiral, I can't imagine that you find this 
acceptable at all. You have stated that you are going to try to 
work with shipyards to get this fixed. I mean, we can talk 
about money, and it is always good to talk about money because 
there is a cost. But the truth is, if things aren't coming out 
on time and they are coming out over budget and it is repeated 
over and over again, that is not a good business model.
    And so my question to you is, is have you had the 
conversation with the industry partners, the private sector 
folks, what has been their response? Have they made any 
commitment to clean up the over budget, over time experiences 
that we have been having, that you have been having?
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So we have had very pointed 
discussions with those vendors. We are not satisfied with 
either cost or schedule. Very dissatisfied, to be honest with 
you. We have reduced our delay days out of private shipyards 
from almost 8,000 in late 2019 to just over 3,000 today.
    Not satisfied with where we are, but that is where we are 
trying to go, is to drive those delayed days down to zero, 
which will keep these ships on budget and within schedule. With 
respect to the submarine availability, maintenance availability 
that you mentioned specifically, it has been years since we 
have done that work in those two shipyards, one being 
Huntington Ingalls in Newport News and the other, Electric Boat 
up in Groton. So they are slowly restarting that capability.
    We are not in a good place in terms--as you pointed out, 
sir, in terms of being on glide slope. In terms of what levers 
do we have to use against industry? One most effective one is 
withholding payments when they don't meet schedule. Another, if 
I could go back to the littoral combat ship.
    When we had problems with the combining gear on that ship, 
we refused to accept delivery of any additional ships until it 
was fixed. So we are trying to do a better job up front and 
working in our contracts with levers to pull so that we can 
hold industry accountable.
    Senator Tester. The other thing I would add is if you need 
additional levers and we can help----
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. Thanks. We would like to work 
with the committee on other options.
    Senator Tester. I mean, I think the bottom line is this is 
a team effort. Everybody has to work together. Congress has to 
be a part of that team to deliver a budget on time, too, I 
might add. But the bottom line is if anybody is not pulling 
their weight, it puts everything at risk. Thank you for your--
--
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, could I mention one thing the 
committee's done, among others, to help us. So they have 
actually given us the ability to use 3 year money for 
maintenance availabilities. We started a pilot in 2020 in the 
Pacific fleet. We have expanded that to the Atlantic fleet. We 
have done 55 availabilities now using this 3 year money. Why is 
that important?
    Because it allows us to begin contracts across fiscal 
years. So the Navy has been in a cadence where we have been 
closing contracts within 30 days of repairs. Imagine trying to 
do that in your house when you can't get the right parts, you 
know, lumber, etcetera.
    So our goal now is at least 120 days. We would like to 
stretch out to a year. Using that 3 year money to do that, 
gives those repair yards the ability to get long lead parts in 
time. It gives them the ability to plan to have the right 
workforce at the right time to conduct that work.
    So I think that is an example of how the committee has 
helped us, and I would appreciate that continue examination of 
that pilot with your staff so that we can further examine other 
options.
    Senator Tester. We will continue to exchange information on 
that, so thank you. Senator Hoeven.
    Senator Hoeven. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. General Berger, the 
Marine Corps is getting into the MQ-9 business for its, I guess 
what you would call medium altitude, long endurance, unmanned 
capabilities. Can you talk to me about what your plan is for 
MQ-9?
    General Berger. Sir, thanks. We have been flying the MQ-9 
initially as a contractor owned, contractor operated, and 
learning phase for us for the last 2 years in the Middle East. 
Great learning from the Air Force. It sped up our learning 
curve and our training of our operators. The next phase for us 
will be to expand the number of squadrons that we are flying 
and the number of vehicles that we are buying, and the number 
of people that need to be trained.
    First priority is push them out into the Pacific. So we 
need to establish an MQ-9 squadron in Hawaii that can then push 
that ISR coverage, that surveillance coverage more towards 
China.
    And the way to get there at cost, which I mentioned 
earlier, is the coordination between us and the Air Force, and 
with the help of this committee to procure ten aircraft that 
the Air Force was going to procure, we are now going to 
purchase. So it is a win all around for us.
    Senator Hoeven. That is interesting. So Air Force is not 
procuring as many. You are moving more into them. How come the 
disparity there? What is your assessment of that?
    General Berger. Yes, sir. Different missions, different 
roles, different flight envelopes. Whereas you need a certain 
kind of capability to penetrate airspace in a very high threat 
environment, you need a different capability in a more medium 
threat environment, in a persistent day to day. That is what we 
need.
    Senator Hoeven. Yes. Mr. Secretary, status on Columbia 
Class submarine. Obviously, we are very committed to the 
nuclear triad. In my State, we have two legs, the bombers and 
the ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles). And so, you 
know, we are very committed to it, but obviously the submarine 
is a very important part. What is the status on the Columbia?
    Secretary Del Toro. Yes, sure. Columbia is on track. It is 
our number one acquisition program. There have been additional 
expenses that we are assessing now. We have to ensure that it 
stays on track. To the Chairman's point, we have to make sure 
that the cost of completion and the schedule completion stays 
on track.
    As a result of that, we are also looking at potential 
delays to the Ohio program in terms of life extension to make 
sure that there are no gaps between Ohio and Columbia as well. 
There are major investments that have been made at Electric 
Boat. We are working very, very closely with Electric Boat on 
that and also monitoring the impact that Columbia has on the 
construction of Virginia as well, too. So it is complicated. We 
are heavily engaged in that.
    Senator Hoeven. Do you know when Columbia will conduct its 
first patrol? Has that been----
    Secretary Del Toro. First patrol is around 2028----
    Admiral Gilday. Will deliver in 2028. First patrol in 2031.
    Senator Hoeven. So there will have to be some extensions on 
Ohio class then.
    Secretary Del Toro. We are looking at potential boat by 
boat to see what additional extensions are possible in order to 
provide, you know, the minimum risk to any gap between Ohio and 
Columbia.
    Senator Hoeven. Right. Admiral Gilday, back to the 
unmanned. What are your unmanned priorities--for unmanned 
technologies, what are--we do a lot in our State in unmanned, 
particularly with Air Force? But what are your priorities in 
the unmanned?
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I would tell you that----
    Senator Hoeven. Not the submersible----
    Admiral Gilday. We are pursuing options in the air, on the 
sea, and under the sea. And so we did the largest unmanned 
exercise in the world 2 months ago in the Middle East. We had 
ten different countries, dozens of vendors from across the 
world, from across the United States, 100 different platforms 
integrated with AI and software vendors. We are doing a similar 
big exercise right now based out of Australia.
    We are aggressively pursuing how we can put unmanned 
capabilities in the hands of sailors and Marines today in this 
5 year FY DP. At the same time, examining longer term problems 
for larger unmanned platforms, let's say like missile trucks, 
large unmanned or minimally manned ships that carry a ton of 
missiles, right. And so we are looking at land based 
prototyping.
    So we have a reliable engineering plan in those platforms. 
We have a significant effort ongoing with the other services, 
specifically the Marine Corps, in command and control 
infrastructure. So think about the infrastructure of things. We 
are now talking about the ocean of things and how we plug all 
that into a system of systems architecture that can actually 
handle it.
    Senator Hoeven. Well, you know, it is interesting in that 
you have unmanned in the aviation sphere, in the surface 
sphere, and in the underwater sphere. Unique in that regard.
    Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir.
    Senator Hoeven. So that is interesting. One of the programs 
we are working with, I will just mention briefly, is the Sky 
Range program. So then instead of lining up Navy ships to test 
hypersonics, we want to do that actually with some of the 
Global Hawks, Block 20s, and Block 30s. I don't know--have you 
interfaced with that at all?
    Admiral Gilday. We are doing a ton of work with the Army 
right now in terms of our first hypersonics weapons. And they 
will actually field one in 2023. We will field it in 2025, sir. 
But also, we are working closely with the Air Force as well on 
an air launch weapon, both in this budget and in my UPL 
(Unfunded Priorities List), or my UPL as a request for 
additional money for an air launch hypersonics capability that 
we can deliver in this FY DP.
    Senator Hoeven. Yes. Thanks to all three of you for all you 
do. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
    Senator Tester. You betcha. Last summer, there were five 
sailors that tragically died when their helicopter plunged off 
the side of the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Media 
reports indicate the cause of the crash was a damaged hose in 
the rotor head of the aircraft, which is about $100,000 item. I 
think this committee wants to make sure we are providing our 
warfighters with the necessary funding to ensure that the 
equipment they are using is adequately maintained. It is pretty 
basic.
    That means getting the necessary spare parts and safety 
equipment up front, not after something like this happens. For 
the Navy and the Marine Corps, both of your budgets have 
included spare parts in their unfunded requirements for fiscal 
year 2023.
    Just curious, but why in the unfunded thing when this seems 
pretty basic, at least in my perspective, as to making sure 
that we are keeping folks safe and effective in the field.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, I will tell you that with respect to 
those spares accounts, and there is a GAO (Government 
Accountability Office) report that actually lays out in a lot 
of detail, it was delivered within the last 6 months, the Navy 
has underinvested in our spares at sea in order to save money. 
And so, again, our first priority after Columbia is readiness.
    Spare parts are part of that. And so that is why in both 
our budget, with the Secretary's help, and also in my unfunded 
list, we are trying to get back to where we need to be. You 
can't--sir, you can't fool the fleet. You can't fool sailors. 
They know when they don't have the stuff that they need.
    And so in our trips out to the fleet, we have heard loud 
and clear that supply parts have been a problem. The GAO report 
confirmed that for us. And so we are trying to make things 
right with respect to spares.
    Senator Tester. So I am not going to beat you up because 
you guys got a tough job, but what you just said indicates to 
me that it shouldn't have been on the unfunded list.
    Admiral Gilday. Sir, it is a valid point.
    Senator Tester. Okay. General Berger, would you like to 
approach this from a Marine's perspective?
    General Berger. I think it would be--my approach would be 
to, some of the spares that are listed on our unfunded match 
the aircraft that are on the unfunded, so they are--part of 
buying the aircraft is buying the spares to go along with them.
    The second part, I would say, is a clear recognition over 
the past year, year and a half of the fragility of our supply 
chain system. In other words, not that we can't get the parts 
today, but it is taking longer and longer, and the sources are 
getting fewer and fewer. So buying them ahead, as the CNO said, 
seems prudent going forward.

                     ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS

    Senator Tester. Thank you all three for being here. I 
appreciate your testimony. I appreciate the job you guys do. I 
appreciate the leadership you provide. I appreciate the answers 
you give to the questions, too, by the way. Straight up, and I 
like that. Senators may submit additional questions.
    We would ask if you get them, that you respond to them in a 
reasonable amount of time.
    [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but 
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the 
hearing:]
              Questions Submitted to Hon. Carlos Del Toro
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
Partnerships with Academic Institutions
    Question. During the hearing, you emphasized the importance of 
partnering with academic institutions to research and develop solutions 
for the problems faced by the United States Navy. You suggested that 
continuing to build and expand partnerships is important to naval 
research and development.
    Currently, Norwich University in Northfield, Vermont, works with 
the National Security Agency as a cyber-institute to address the 
shortfall of cyber-security experts in the United States. I would 
welcome the expansion of partnerships between academic institutions in 
Vermont and the Department of Defense, and specifically the Department 
of the Navy.
    What research and development topic areas is the Navy looking to 
create academic partnerships in?
    How will you develop a diverse group of partners to ensure the Navy 
has innovative ideas from every corner of America?
    Answer. For over 75 years, the Department of the Navy (DON), 
through the Office of Naval Research (ONR) has built a partnership 
model with academia to seed new scientific research, harvest new 
concepts, build new technology and deliver it to the fleet and force. 
The DON leverages the research, the diversity, the protection of 
intellectual property, and the open innovation environment that thrives 
here in the United States' academic community.
    Naval research and development topic areas include artificial 
intelligence, quantum sciences, advanced computing, autonomy, cyber 
security, advanced networks, hypersonics, alternative fuels, high 
performance and novel materials, and energetics, to name a few. In 
addition to the Critical Technology Areas, the DON invests in a number 
of areas critically important to the Naval mission including ocean and 
atmospheric sciences, undersea warfare, future naval platform design 
(including digital engineering), and naval-unique experimentation, 
training, and readiness.
    Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) leads two multi-institutional 
consortia. One, the Consortium for Additive Manufacturing Research and 
Education, is a Congressionally-defined organization funded by the 
Navy's ROT&E budget. External partner organizations include the United 
States Naval Academy, NAVSEA-05/-08, NAVAIR, the U.S. Marine Corps, the 
U.S. Coast Guard, and the Defense Innovation Unit. Future partners such 
as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the 
Pennsylvania State Applied Research Laboratory, and Purdue University 
are also anticipated. The second, the Consortium for Robotics and 
Unmanned Systems Education and Research, is an Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisitions-supported 
organization funded by ONR. Members include individuals from a variety 
of organizations, such as U.S. Naval Academy, University of Alabama 
Huntsville, Georgia Tech, Open Robotics, Saildrone, and many others. 
NPS also recently joined the University Consortium for Applied 
Hypersonics, led by Texas A&M University. This Consortium has over 100 
university members, including Auburn University, Duke University, 
Georgia Institute of Technology, Howard University, Johns Hopkins, 
Tuskegee University, University of Florida, Notre Dame University, and 
many others. NPS currently has three active Educational Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with local institutions, and is in the process of 
initiating a fourth EPA with Stanford University.
    Question. How will you develop a diverse group of partners to 
ensure the Navy has innovative ideas from every corner of America?
    Answer. The Navy has a strategic partnership with universities all 
over the U.S. to develop technologies for our warfighters. At the 
University of Vermont, we support a Science, Technology, Engineering & 
Math (STEM) education effort in Communications, Control, Cybersecurity, 
and Electromagnetic Sensing Research for Navy Reserve Officer Training 
Corps. Other areas of research with universities include artificial 
intelligence, cyber, ocean sciences--including meteorology and 
acoustics--and materials development. The Navy is continuing to grow 
partnerships with Historically Black Colleges and Universities and 
Minority Serving Institutions (HBCU/MSI) and continuing to establish 
STEM consortia to foster the next generation of scientists to continue 
development of technologies for our fleet and force.
    Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) recently established a graduate 
STEM Scholarship for Service program for HBCU/MSI graduates through 
support from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering, Science and Technology. The initial 
pilot program is being coordinated with NAVWAR and will commence in 
July 2023. This will provide a pathway for HBCU/MSI graduates into the 
Department of the Navy and Department of Defense STEM workforce through 
early immersion into Defense-related problems while simultaneously 
developing relationships with operationally experienced NPS warrior-
scholars. During their time at NPS, these young academics will have 
fleet engagement opportunities while also bringing their own diverse 
perspectives into the national security discussions.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
    Question. The National Defense Strategy prioritizes deterring, and 
if necessary prevailing in, a conflict in the Pacific. A sustained 
conflict there would require the Navy to dramatically increase ship 
repair and construction. However, our shipyards do not have capacity to 
spare. If the Navy simply builds more dry-docks for use during 
peacetime, then it will displace industry investment and capacity and 
result in no additional surge capacity. How are you preparing to meet 
wartime requirements for ship repair and construction without 
undermining industry's incentives to invest in its own infrastructure?
    Answer. The Navy closely monitors and manages the health of the 
maintenance industrial base as a vital asset to the readiness of our 
surface fleet and national security. The principal mechanisms of 
monitoring include assessment of publicly and privately shared 
financial information, tracking of contract awards, and analysis of 
shipyard workload data. This data will be instrumental in continued 
monitoring of the health of our national ship repair industrial base 
through the implementation of Navy-owned dry docks for use in the 
execution of CNO maintenance availabilities. In aggregate, the 
availability of Navy-owned dry docks for use by the private sector 
increases maintenance capacity within the respective surface homeports. 
Since 2018, the Navy has certified two private sector dry docks in 
support of the maintenance and repair of the surface fleet. Currently 
there are three additional dry docks in procurement or re-certification 
and one in planning. These future dry docks represent a combination of 
private sector, Navy, and joint investments to meet the needs of the 
surface fleet, providing required peacetime and wartime capacity and 
capability.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
Red Hill
    Question. The Navy waived its right to contest the most recent 
Hawai'i DOH-issued emergency order on the defueling and closure of the 
Red Hill storage facility. The DOH emergency order requires the Navy to 
provide a plan to defuel by June 30th and a plan for closure by 
November 1st.
    How does the Navy plan to comply with the emergency order without 
an appropriate cost estimate? What steps are you taking to ensure the 
Navy successfully completes this process on schedule?
    Answer. The defueling plan that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
delivered to the State of Hawaii Department of Health (DOH) on June 30, 
2022, expressly acknowledges the iterative nature of the planning 
process. The Department of the Navy (DON) will support the DoD's 
efforts to refine the universe of actions required to enable defueling 
(phase two of the plan) through the end of August, incorporating the 
results of ongoing assessments, including the Naval Facilities 
Engineering Systems Command's assessment of piping infrastructure at 
the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility. The DoD will be in a better 
position to estimate the cost of defueling when we have identified the 
full scope of the repair effort.
    Closure planning is in the early stages. Costs associated with 
closure are largely, and necessarily, undefined.
    The DoD and the DON are engaged in a sustained effort to ensure 
that defueling and closure proceed as expeditiously as possible, 
consistent with the objectives of safety and protection of the 
environment. Since the ``meet and confer'' session with DOH on May 20, 
2022, representatives of the DoD, DON and DOH have had regular 
discussions regarding defueling. In the defueling plan, the DoD 
announced its intent to establish a Joint Task Force Red Hill, under 
the leadership of a commander who will report to the Secretary of 
Defense through the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, to ensure 
strong command and control that will facilitate successful planning and 
implementation of defueling.
    Question. How does Secretary Austin's assessment on the 
redistribution of the Red Hill fuel reserve best support the Warfighter 
and do you agree with his assessment?
    Answer. The realignment of fuel reserves for Department of Defense 
(DoD) operations in the Pacific theater supports the warfighter while 
protecting the people of Hawaii, our military families, the 
environment, and the security of the nation. Redistributing the DoD's 
fuel reserve across the Indo-Pacific will better position the United 
States to meet future challenges in the region and will support the 
National Defense Strategy objective to build a resilient Joint Force 
and defense ecosystem.
    Question. It has been brought to my staff's attention that 8-10 
percent of the $1billion President's Budget Request for Red Hill will 
supposedly be going to RDT&E. Which DoD directorate will serve as the 
lead to manage this account?
    Answer. The $1 billion was requested in a Department of Defense 
budget line, so I must defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
to provide those details.
Defense Community Resilience
    Question. Most of the 4,000 military installations nationwide are 
surrounded by communities that are tightly linked to their military 
neighbors. These ``defense communities'' are home to Service Members, 
DoD civilians, and their families, but we have paid less attention to 
potential critical infrastructure failures in these communities--
whether from manmade or natural disasters--and their impact on national 
security. The Navy recently released its new climate action strategy 
and directly calls out the need to work with community stakeholders in 
infrastructure resiliency.
    Can you explain how the Navy plans to engage with State, local, 
Tribal, territorial, Federal community leaders and why the Navy 
believes this the best approach to build infrastructure resiliency?
    Answer. The Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration 
(REPI) Program assists in preserving military missions by limiting or 
alleviating encroachment threats that could adversely affect Department 
of Defense (DoD) installations, to include incompatible development, 
endangered species restrictions, and habitat loss. Additionally, 
climate change and extreme weather events ranging from severe flooding 
to catastrophic wildfire are an increasing threat to DoD training 
lands, infrastructure, and public safety. To reduce risks to 
installation and range operations from changes in environmental 
conditions, the REPI program is now able to fund off-base natural 
infrastructure projects, known as REPI Resilience Projects, in addition 
to more traditional REPI projects that typically occur within Navy 
property boundaries. The Navy has taken advantage of this new authority 
and has initiated several resilience projects. Examples include:
  --Naval Weapons Station (NWS) Earle, in coordination with Monmouth 
        County, is purchasing conservation easements that preserve 
        critical nearby wetlands and secure the base's sensitive 
        drinking water supply from over-withdrawal and saltwater 
        intrusion;
  --NWS Yorktown is constructing 2,000 linear feet of shoreline 
        protection structures to help prevent erosion and support 
        oyster restoration efforts, building resiliency to hurricanes 
        and other high water events;
  --Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay is acquiring restrictive-use 
        easements on over 16,000 acres of land and carrying out 
        wildfire management and restoration activities to prevent 
        incompatible development, conserve and restore habitat, and 
        improve wildfire resilience; and
  --Naval Air Station Oceana has initiated deliberate outreach 
        activities to local municipalities to explore shared planning 
        interests as Oceana works to enhance and refine its base 
        design.
    We coordinate with service providers when planning and conducting 
various exercises--to include complete, base-wide power failures--in 
order to identify and prioritize issues requiring mitigations and 
develop prioritized restoral plans and prioritized refueling plans for 
emergency power systems. This requires coordination with local 
communities as they would also be attempting to restore services, 
refuel emergency power systems, provide emergency response and 
transport, and respond to their constituents' needs.
    Intergovernmental Support Agreements enable us to work with 
communities to build and maintain resiliency in shared infrastructure.
    Question. How could failures in critical infrastructure within 
these defense communities negatively impact readiness?
    Answer. Installations rely on the long-term support provided by 
commercial/public utility organization located off-installation. The 
Navy increases mission resiliency by building in redundancy for 
critical systems, but none of this is intended for long-term use. 
Requirements for items such as power, water, sewage, and fuel are 
routinely sourced from the local community, and if these services 
suddenly become unavailable, the effects on mission accomplishment/
recovery can be devastating after just a few days. Roads, railways, and 
communications pathways are all utilized to enable mission success and 
could impact mission readiness should they be lost.
    Question. Would it benefit national security to: (1) assess these 
risks; and (2) work more closely with State, Tribal, and local 
officials so defense community leaders can make more informed 
resilience planning decisions?
    Answer. Yes, and much of this work is on-going today. The Navy 
conducts mission assurance assessments, capturing capability gaps and 
system failure points, which provide a starting point for cooperative 
analysis and mitigation identification and resolution with the local 
providers. Installation representatives meet with service providers to 
discuss how they can work together in achieving mission resilience. We 
then work with the provider, within authorized limits, to ensure 
mitigations are put in place and mission resiliency is achieved.
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)
    Question. Expanding our presence in the Indo-Pacific heavily relies 
on investments made in infrastructure, responsiveness, and resilience 
throughout the region.
    What additional logistical capabilities does the Navy need to 
effectively respond to crises--both defense and humanitarian--in the 
Indo-Pacific?
    As China is the ``pacing threat,'' and given the vast expanse of 
the Indo-Pacific, can you explain how the Navy's budget request 
addresses the challenge of contested logistics?
    Answer. The Navy is seeking to improve logistical capabilities in 
the following areas:
  --Distributed Maritime Logistics Capability and Capacity.
  --Naval Logistics Enterprise (NLE) Command and Control (C2).
  --Strategic Sealift Readiness.
  --Platform Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
        Intelligence (C4I)/Cyber Readiness and Resilience.
  --Battle Damage Recovery, Repair, and Revive Capability and Capacity.
  --Expeditionary Infrastructure and Logistics Posture.
  --Afloat Logistics Force Survivability.
  --Rapid Delivery of Scalable Medical Capabilities.
  --Intra-theater Air and Surface Distribution Platforms, including 
        Consolidation Cargo (CONSOL) Certified Tanking.
  --Afloat Warehousing and At-Sea Trans-Loading.
    Additional details can be provided in a classified forum.
    Question. As China is the ``pacing threat,'' and given the vast 
expanse of the Indo-Pacific, can you explain how the Navy's budget 
request addresses the challenge of contested logistics?
    Answer. The Navy's PB23 budget request seeks to improve readiness 
and warfighting capabilities, including contested logistics 
requirements. Through detailed analysis, the Navy identified resources 
needed to address recognized gaps in our capability and capacity. The 
PB23 budget requests resources to continue to make investments to 
address those challenges, such as:
  --Funding for executing a vigorous analytic campaign, including 
        wargames, studies, and experiments to collect data and lessons 
        learned in support of future contested logistics capabilities.
  --Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding to 
        continue efforts on the fielded operational prototype for a 
        Seabased Petroleum Distribution System, as well as continued 
        procurement of mobile consolidated cargo (CONSOL) adapter kits 
        (MCAK) for rapid installation aboard commercial oil tankers as 
        an alternative means of pumping fuel to combat logistics force 
        (CLF) ships supporting replenishment at sea.
  --Continued procurement of the Navy's Fleet Oiler, T-AO 205-class 
        ship, which has improved cargo fuel and freeze/chill stowage 
        capacities over the T-AO 187-class ships being replaced. This 
        increased capacity improves CLF support to distributed forces.
  --Continued RDT&E funding for the Next Generation Logistics Ship 
        (NGLS) concept which provides a flexible, responsive platform 
        to move fuel, equipment, and supplies between ships, advanced 
        bases, ports, and dispersed nodes of the sea base.
  --Continued RDT&E funds for the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) 
        concept which enables distributed maneuver and logistics to 
        fill the gap in capability between the Navy's large, 
        multipurpose amphibious warfare ``L' class ships and smaller 
        landing craft.
  --Continued funding for the development of the Improved Modular Cargo 
        Distribution Station (IMCDS) will enable commercial freighter 
        vessels to conduct underway replenishment of palletized cargo, 
        providing options to increase the capacity and flexibility of 
        intra-theater distribution networks.
  --Funding to support the repair, resupply, and rearm capability of 
        Pacific Fleet submarines with the recapitalization of two EMORY 
        S. LAND class submarine tenders, with the procurement of two 
        hulls in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
USMC Energy Resiliency
    Question. Marine installations are transitioning to an electric 
vehicle fleet and the use of smart grids as a power source.
    When can Marine installations in Hawaii expect functioning electric 
vehicle chargers and photovoltaic panels?
    Answer. Marine Corps Base Hawaii (MCBH) currently has functioning 
electric vehicle chargers for fleet vehicles, including two Beam 
Electric Vehicle (EV) Arc stations, which are rapidly deployable, 
transportable, solar, off-grid, and resilient EV supply equipment 
charging capability. MCBH currently has functioning photovoltaic 
panels, including Marine Corps-owned and third-party owned rooftop and 
carport systems, totaling over 2.8 megawatts. MCBH ordered an 
additional two Beam EV station this year to support additional 
vehicles. The planned General Services Administration lease of four EV 
trucks in fiscal year (FY) 2022 was canceled due to manufacturer supply 
chain delays, so the procurement of those vehicles is planned for 
fiscal year 2023. MCBH is also requesting approval for ten additional 
EVs to replace current gas-powered vehicles.
    Question. How do both services conduct energy resilience readiness 
exercises?
    Answer. The Marine Corps Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise 
(ERRE) program provides a framework for Marine Corps installations to 
build the capacity to execute ERREs through an iterative learning 
approach incorporating table top, intermediate-level, and full-scale 
exercises in accordance with established guidance published by the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. ERREs test mission continuity of 
operations plans, utility emergency response plans, infrastructure 
configuration, and equipment condition as well as an installation's 
resilience to conduct critical and essential missions while 
disconnected from the commercial power grid. The Marine Corps ERRE 
program requires engagement between mission owners, installation 
leadership, public works, and other key stakeholders to identify and 
mitigate risks to future operations in the event of a prolonged outage, 
while balancing the demands of current operations.
Climate Change Resiliency
    Question. It is clear that our defense strategy in the Indo-Pacific 
will require the U.S. to operate much further forward and in a 
dispersed fashion in what will be a theater of contested logistics, 
with requirements for additional logistic capability, including pre-
positioned logistics further into the theater and enhanced 
collaboration with the COFA nations and other Pacific island states. 
The role of security cooperation in addressing the risks to allies and 
partners from climate change is unclear at best. The DoD Climate Risk 
Analysis (CRA) states that ``DoD will integrate the security 
implications of climate change into key strategic documents, programs, 
and international partner engagements'', and lists ``Security 
Cooperation Programs'' as one of the ``Partnered Activities'' to 
address climate risks. But the security cooperation programs under 
chapter 16 of title 10, U.S. Code are not listed among the ``specific 
tools, funds, and programs'' for supporting allies and partners address 
climate risks listed in Appendix 2 of the CRA.
    Do the provisions of chapter 16 of title 10, U.S. Code governing 
the DoD security cooperation enterprise include the authority to 
provide assistance to allies and partners on climate security and 
climate adaptation?
    Answer. This question is best answered by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, it is my understanding that 
there is not an authority under Chapter 16 of Title 10 that 
specifically authorizes the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide 
assistance to allies and partners for climate security and/or climate 
adaptation. However, the DoD did request, in a fiscal year (FY) 2022 
legislative proposal, an amendment to 10 U.S.C. 333 that would provide 
the DoD with additional authority to enhance the resilience and 
disaster preparedness of our allies and partners, including with 
respect to climate adaptation challenges.
    In the absence of new authorities or additional resources, the DoD 
may be able to leverage Section 312, ``Payment of personnel expenses 
necessary for Theater Security Cooperation,'' to support climate-
related conferences and events with certain countries. Section 321 may 
likewise enable the DoD to support certain training and exercise 
expenses with allies and partners related to climate change 
preparedness. However, the use of these authorities, as well as those 
relating to the State Partnership Program and/or DoD Regional Centers, 
comes with significant caveats, are subject to Department legal 
guidance, and are unlikely to be equal to the scale of the challenge 
that climate change poses to our allies, partners, and the wider 
international security environment.
    Question. What authority, if any, in chapter 16 or otherwise, does 
DoD have to assist in and/or contribute to the cost of military 
construction necessary to ensure the climate resilience of the military 
installations, airports, and seaports of allies and partners that are 
now and will increasingly become more critical to dispersed operations 
and logistics in the Indo-Pacific and globally?
    Answer. This question is best answered by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for Policy. However, it is my understanding that 
the Department of Defense (DoD) possesses only limited authorities to 
contribute to the cost of military construction necessary to ensure the 
climate resilience of allied and partner facilities and installations. 
The DoD has authorities to support small-scale construction projects 
for exercise-related construction and disaster risk reduction through 
the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program.
    Question. Would ensuring that DoD has or is provided such 
authorities enhance the ability of DoD to work with allies and partners 
on shared climate security risks, and for DoD to remain the ``partner 
of choice'' among our allies and partners for such assistance?
    Answer. The Department of the Navy will continue to support the 
Department of Defense in promoting a robust dialog on the authorities 
needed to work with allies and partners to tackle shared climate 
security risks and increase partnerships.
    Question. Climate change is a global issue. How are we prioritizing 
international climate cooperation with partners and allies?
    Answer. The 2022 National Defense Strategy recognizes that global 
climate change is transforming the context in which the Department of 
Defense operates and that mutually-beneficial alliances and 
partnerships are an enduring strength for the United States.
    The Department of the Navy is working with allies and international 
partners to integrate climate into security cooperation and 
affirmatively build climate resilience in areas of the world that are 
most susceptible to climate-induced conflicts, humanitarian disasters, 
or acute climate impacts such as water and food insecurity or migration 
pressures. The newly-released Department of the Navy's Climate Action 
2030 has a dedicated line of effort to ``Enhance mitigation and 
adaptation through collaboration,'' which includes security cooperation 
activities.
Climate Strategy and Defense Communities
    Question. The ``Climate Action 2030'' document calls for extensive 
collaboration with others in the public and private sectors on actions 
both on and off Department of the Navy installations to advance climate 
resilience of both those installations and key supporting civilian 
infrastructure and defense communities, and also to leverage natural 
infrastructure for carbon sequestration. That document also highlighted 
that ``the DON has prioritized climate investments in the budget review 
and approval process, including a team dedicated to assessing and 
prioritizing additional climate change investments. The DON is working 
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to refine and standardize 
this analysis and guidance for climate investments in future budget 
submissions.''
    What specifically in the fiscal year 2023 PBR for DON at the 
program and line item detail level addresses DON funding for planning, 
projects, staff and other resources related to:
  --Collaboration with non-DoD public and private entities for these 
        purposes under the Readiness and Environmental Protection 
        Integration (REPI) program;
  --Military installation resilience programs administered by the 
        Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation;
  --``Off installation'' resilience projects under 10 USC 2815, as 
        amended by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA;
  --Actions under the Defense Access Roads authority in 23 USC 210, as 
        amended in the fiscal year 2019 and 2020 NDAAs, to enhance the 
        climate resilience of key access roads to DON installations;
  --Actions on and outside DON installations to manage storm water, 
        under 10 USC 2815a, as added by the fiscal year 2022 NDAA;
  --Actions to include the ``military installation resilience 
        component'' to installation master plans for DON installations, 
        and to ensure that these also address actions ``outside the 
        fence line''; and
  --Supporting INDO-PACOM in its engagement with allies and partners in 
        the Indo-Pacific AOR on climate resilience.
    Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) is committed to advancing 
the climate resilience of our installations and supporting civilian 
infrastructure in defense communities. We are continuing to examine 
authorities, funding and partnerships that can be leveraged to build a 
climate ready force and working to best account for climate-related 
efforts in future budget submissions.
    Details on the fiscal year (FY) 2023 President's Budget Request 
(PBR) for planning, projects, staff, and other resources related to 
specific authorities and programs/initiatives are:
  --Collaboration with non-Department of Defense (DoD) public and 
        private entities for these purposes under the Readiness and 
        Environmental Protection Integration (REPI) program;
      The Readiness and Environmental Protection and Integration 
        program is administered by the DoD. The DON works internally 
        and externally with non-DoD public and private entities to 
        develop projects for submittal and evaluation by DoD for REPI 
        funding. The DON does not track the specific funds used for the 
        planning and staff that support the DON's participation in the 
        REPI program; that funding is embedded in the BSS1 line item.
  --Military installation resilience programs administered by the 
        Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation (OLDCC);
      The OLDCC administers the Military Installation Sustainability 
        Program (MIS) on behalf of the Department of Defense. The MIS 
        is designed to provide technical and financial assistance to 
        states and local governments to analyze and implement actions 
        necessary to foster, protect, and enhance military installation 
        sustainability. The DON does not track the specific funds used 
        for the staff time to provide technical support to states and 
        local governments by providing input on their compatible use or 
        military installation review plan; that funding is embedded in 
        the BSS1 line item.
  --``Off installation'' resilience projects under 10 United States 
        Code (USC) 2815, as amended by the fiscal year 2021 National 
        Defense Authorization Act (NDAA);
      The fiscal year 2023 PBR does not currently include any specific 
        funding for resilience actions funded under this existing 
        authority. The DON continues to evaluate resiliency 
        requirements for use and execution under this authority.
  --Actions under the Defense Access Roads authority in 23 USC 210, as 
        amended in the fiscal year 2019 and 2020 NDAAs, to enhance the 
        climate resilience of key access roads to DON installations;
      The fiscal year 2023 PBR does not include specific funding for 
        actions under the Defense Access Road 23 USC 210. The DON 
        continues to evaluate resiliency requirements for use under 
        this authority.
  --Actions on and outside DON installations to manage storm water, 
        under 10 USC 2815a, as added by the fiscal year 2022 NDAA;
      Due to the timing of the development of the fiscal year 2023 PBR 
        relative to the signing of the fiscal year 2022 NDAA, the 
        fiscal year 2023 PBR does not include specific funding for 
        actions under this new authority. However, the Department is 
        examining projects that could be funded utilizing authorities 
        added under 10 USC 2815a during the year of execution.
  --Actions to include the ``military installation resilience 
        component'' to installation master plans for DON installations, 
        and to ensure that these also address actions ``outside the 
        fence line''; and
      The DON is incorporating a resilience component and addressing 
        ``outside the fence- line'' actions as we update installation 
        master plans; that funding is embedded in the BSS1 line item.
  --Supporting INDO-PACOM in its engagement with allies and partners in 
        the Indo-Pacific AOR on climate resilience.
      The DON is incorporating climate resilience into infrastructure 
        investments in the United States and across the world, 
        including in the Indo-Pacific Area of Operations. However, the 
        DON does not track the specific funds used for the planning, 
        projects and staff associated with those efforts; that funding 
        is embedded in the BSS1 line item.
DON Climate Resilience with Allies and Partners
    Question. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the aim of the 
United States is to ``be the partner of choice'' for our allies and 
partners in the Indo-Pacific AOR and globally. In a 2021 survey of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations members' greatest fears, the 
threat of climate change outranked the threat of military conflict in 
the region by almost 10 points. The DoD Climate Risk Analysis states 
that ``In the Indo-Pacific, sea-level rise and more extreme weather 
events complicate the security environment, place key DoD warfighting 
infrastructure and surrounding communities at risk, and challenge local 
capacity to respond. For example, the United States has important 
defense assets located in Guam, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, all of 
which are vulnerable to these hazards. Additionally, competitors such 
as China may try to take advantage of climate change impacts to gain 
influence.''
    China is in fact increasingly seeking to displace the U.S. as the 
``partner of choice'' in the Indo-Pacific and among the Pacific Island 
Nations, including in the context of providing assistance related to 
climate change. It is clear that our defense strategy in the Indo-
Pacific will require the U.S. to operate much further forward and in a 
dispersed fashion in what will be a theater of contested logistics, 
with requirements for additional logistic capability, including pre-
positioned logistics further into the theater and enhanced 
collaboration with the COFA nations and other Pacific Island States.
    The DON is tasked with providing administrative support to 
INDOPACOM. In the fiscal year 2022 Defense Appropriations Act, DON was 
provided $50.17 million in O&M funding for the INDOPACOM mission 
partner environment program, and an additional $5 million to partner 
with USFS in support of international programs that support national 
security priorities related to the destabilizing effects of extreme 
weather conditions.
    What specific funding, if any, is included in the fiscal year 2023 
DON PBR for supporting the efforts of INDOPACOM to work with allies and 
partners in the INDOPACOM AOR on climate resilience?
    Answer. Mission Partner Environment (MPE) is not related to climate 
change. MPE provides a common information infrastructure across the 
theater with critical data nodes that provides the standards and 
protocols for all United States', allies', and partners' needs in the 
region. The data/information-centric warfighting environment will 
expand application service center capacity by 33 percent, which 
includes 300 percent increase in compute and store, as well as 100 
percent increase in system resilience, while expanding user base by 40 
percent, and achieves the following:
  --Increases/expands capacity and access of the application service 
        centers to:
    --Conduct large scale operations
    --Joint/Coalition targeting and synchronized fires
    --Real time access to Command and Control (C2) information and 
            nodes at the tactical edge
  --Provides multi-domain delivery and access via single device for 
        improved efficiency
  --Provides path diversity for continuous C2 and information sharing 
        in a denied, degraded, intermittent, and limited bandwidth 
        environment.
    In fiscal year (FY) 2022, USINDOPACOM did receive the $5 million to 
partner with the United States Forest Service and is also allocating 
$300,000 to climate change.
    In fiscal year 2023, USINDOPACOM expects to execute $600,000 to 
continue its work on climate change.
                                 ______
                                 
            Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
Trajectory of the U.S. Navy Fleet Size
    Question. There has been a lot of discussion in your recent 
hearings about the trajectory of the U.S. Navy fleet size. It is a 
serious deficiency that the budget request would actually shrink our 
fleet to 280 ships by 2027. That is the very year that GEN Milley and 
others have identified as a critical window with respect to China 
likely obtaining the capability to invade Taiwan. Our fleet would be 
significantly smaller than China's, which will have 420 ships by 2025, 
and unlike China our Navy is heavily dispersed all around the world.
    Even in the most ambitious shipbuilding scenario detailed in the 
30-year shipbuilding plan, we wouldn't hit 355 ships until 2043. In the 
two other budget-constrained scenarios, we never get to 355 ships even 
out to 2052.
    During this critical time-frame with regards to China's 
capabilities, why is the Navy accepting risk by requesting a fleet 
significantly smaller than the size called for in the multiple recent 
fleet assessments conducted across several administrations?
    Answer. The new era of strategic competition requires a modernized, 
capable, global, forward, and multi-domain Navy. In the fiscal year 
(FY) 2023 budget, the Navy prioritized promising technologies that need 
to be fielded quickly and at scale to be operationally relevant in the 
coming years to ensure that the Navy meets Joint Force operational 
requirements and made difficult choices to divest of ships that do not 
meaningfully support warfighting requirements. The President's Budget 
Request 2023 only grows warfighting capacity at a rate supported by the 
fiscal guidance and our ability to sustain that capacity in the future. 
Consistent with the Defense Planning Guidance, this plan does not 
resource any capacity beyond what can be sustained with regards to 
manning, training, operations, and future modernization. Additionally, 
the Navy is limited by the capability of industry to produce the ships 
currently planned and on order in a timely manner. Within the Future 
Years Defense Plan, this careful prioritization in the near-term, in 
accordance with the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and 
National Defense Strategy, will result in a Navy battle force that is 
more ready, sustainable, and lethal.
Dry Dock #1 at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
    Question. Dry Dock #1 at Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is an important 
part of the SIOP and the $500 million requested in the budget for the 
next increment of funding is vital to ensuring our Virginia-Class 
submarine fleet can operate decades into the future.
    Given the recent GAO report on the SIOP finding major issues with 
the Navy's cost estimates, what is the Navy doing to ensure important 
projects like the one at PNSY stay on track?
    Answer. For new and on-going projects in construction, the Navy has 
and will continue to create dedicated construction offices on site 
headed by a senior Civil Engineering Corps Officer. These offices are 
fully staffed to leverage key performance indicators, formal 
partnering, shared construction management software, and a decision 
elevation matrix to identify and mitigate cost and schedule risks early 
on. These tools and trained leadership ensure the projects stay on 
track.
    For projects in planning and design, the Navy is continuing to 
improve assurance of Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program 
(SIOP) costs and schedule targets by extrapolating data and methodology 
from ongoing projects to those in design and acquisition. The Navy is 
incorporating industry best practices for mega projects. This includes 
emphasis on developing designs earlier; greater awareness of means, 
methods, and constructability from early contractor involvement; third-
party estimates for selected projects; real-time cost and schedule risk 
management; and early contract award of key critical path contract 
enablers.
    In addition, the Navy is establishing an Acquisition Strategy (AS) 
and Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) documents for each shipyard. The 
AS and APBs will be the guiding documents for managing SIOP program 
execution, and the APBs will establish threshold and objective 
parameters for the overall cost, schedule, and performance of SIOP 
execution at each shipyard.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
Arctic Maritime Presence
    Question. As warming increases in the Arctic region, sea ice 
coverage is decreasing. As such, waters are becoming more navigable, 
and maritime traffic is increasing, especially in the Bering Sea and 
North American Arctic. What was once a formidable and isolated region 
is rapidly populated with commercial and military traffic. As this 
traffic continues to steadily increase, the U.S. must have a strategy 
for increasing our Arctic maritime presence. In particular, the Bering 
Strait is a critical choke point for Arctic shipping and transport 
representing the only gateway from the Arctic to the Pacific. While 
it's narrow in size, it's big in importance and the U.S. must be 
prepared to and have the capabilities to ensure it remains free, open, 
and secure.
    What are the requirements for the Navy to establish a persistent, 
year-round presence of the Navy in the U.S. Arctic region in order to 
deter aggression and protect our homeland?
    Answer. The Navy routinely operates in the Arctic and High North in 
support of the Arctic Blueprint's objective of maintaining enhanced 
presence and in support of the National Defense Strategy's objectives 
of managing competition and deterring threats to the U.S. homeland. 
While the Navy does not currently have any requirements to establish a 
persistent, year-round presence in the U.S. Arctic region, the Navy 
does recognize the need to continue to assess our force posture 
requirements, factoring in allied contributions, to meet the unique and 
evolving requirements of the Arctic Region.
    Question. Based on current capabilities and mission requirements of 
the U.S. Navy, could the United States be denied access to or through 
the Bering Strait?
    Answer. Specific discussions on countering potential threats to the 
Bering Strait must be held at a higher classification level.
    Question. What actions would need to be taken by the Department of 
the Navy to prevent such scenarios from occurring and how would the 
Navy respond to such scenarios if they were to occur?
    Answer. To defend the homeland, ensure the global commons remain 
free and open, and maintain a favorable balance of power, the 
Department of the Navy conducts various activities year-round in the 
High North and Arctic alongside the joint force, other agencies, and 
allies and partners. Specific discussions on countering potential 
threats to the Bering Strait must be held at a higher classification 
level.
Arctic Presence
    Question. It is imperative we keep a watch over Russian and Chinese 
movement in and near the Arctic--especially near America's Arctic. As a 
nation, we have grown increasingly concerned over ceding ground to 
Russia and China in the Arctic, as both countries are outpacing the 
United States in the construction of icebreakers. It is also imperative 
we have the ability to increase our presence in the Arctic region for 
if and when we need to be there, yet we lack much of the infrastructure 
required to operate there. For example, the runway at what was formerly 
Naval Air Facility Adak has been operating commercially since 1997 and 
could serve as a viable location for P8 Poseidon aircraft to base from. 
To do so however, improvements to the runway would likely need to be 
made. Previously, the Secretary of the Navy stated that the airstrip on 
Adak is in ``great shape'' and the Navy would only need to clean up one 
of the hangars in order to resume operations. Additionally, the Port of 
Nome received $250 million as part of the recent bipartisan 
infrastructure bill and the port will soon begin to take shape. Various 
military services, to include the Department of the Navy have expressed 
interest in utilizing a port in America's Arctic to conduct operations.
    Is it possible to deploy P8 Poseidon to Adak, Alaska for emergency 
operations; to support episodic operations such as exercise support; to 
deploy seasonal rotations of aircraft, and/or permanent basing?
    What is the Navy currently doing to ensure Adak is an operable 
location to base resources?
    What infrastructure developments are needed to resume full time and 
part time naval air operations at Adak, Alaska to accommodate the use 
of the P8 Poseidon or other aircraft?
    Has or will the Department of the Navy consult with the Chief of 
Engineers of the Army Corps of Engineers to ensure that the Port of 
Nome is usable for the implementation of the Arctic strategy of the 
Department of the Navy, as described in the strategic blueprint for the 
Arctic of the Department of the Navy entitled ``A Blue Arctic?''
    How does the Navy anticipate utilizing the Port of Nome on a full-
time, part-time, and emergency basis? Please describes the requirements 
necessary to establish a persistent, year-round presence of the Navy at 
the Port of Nome. To the greatest extent possible, please provide an 
estimated cost of implementing the requirements at the Port Nome taking 
into account the establishment of onshore infrastructure required to 
support year-round maritime operations in the vicinity of the Bering 
Sea and the Arctic region.
    Answer. The Navy has established an Arctic Alignment and 
Integration Working Group, and one of the items assessed is 
infrastructure. The analysis conducted by the working group has not 
identified any resourcing or infrastructure requirements in Alaska.
    While it is possible to deploy P8 Poseidon aircraft to Adak, with 
significant investments in support and infrastructure, there are no 
current plans for the U.S. Navy to reopen the base at Adak.
    The U.S. Navy has evaluated costs for a port at Nome, however, 
there are currently no plans to pursue U.S. Navy-led infrastructure 
projects at Nome, consistent with the draft Office of the Secretary of 
Defense report to Congress on the subject.
ICEX Storage Space/Plans
    Question. The Navy conducts its Ice Exercise (ICEX) every other 
year in Arctic Alaska. In past years, the Navy has used non-government 
facilities to forward deploy and preposition equipment to support the 
exercise. With increased traffic in the region comes a greater demand 
for infrastructure. As such, much of the space used by the Navy to 
store equipment is being taken up far in advance.
    What is the Navy's long-term plan to secure storage space to 
support its ICEX operation?
    Does the Navy plan to build any structures to support its exercises 
and operations in Alaska?
    Answer. The Navy has established an Arctic Alignment and 
Integration Working Group, and one of the items assessed is 
infrastructure. The analysis conducted by this group has not identified 
any resourcing or infrastructure requirements in Alaska.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted to Admiral Michael Gilday
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
Aviator Physiological Response to Flight
    Question. The strains of flying high-performance aircrafts are 
universal for service members in all branches of the military. 
Physiological events while flying are some of the most dangerous to 
crew and aircraft, and stresses experienced by the body in flight can 
have long lasting effects on individuals.
    In Vermont, our Air National Guard pilots prepare for the strains 
of flight in an F-35A through a program called the Optimizing Human 
Weapon System (OHWS). The OHWS programs prepare pilots for the physical 
demands of flying and treats injuries resulting from flying to reduce 
the occurrences, longevity, and severity of flight-related injuries 
among their pilots.
    How do you prepare Naval Aviators for flight and treat injuries 
resulting from flight?
    Answer. ``How do you prepare Naval Aviators for flight . . . ''
    The training and preparation that all Naval Aviators participate in 
is comprehensive. It is required prior to flight events in flight 
school and is repeated and reinforced throughout their careers. Naval 
Aviators are required to complete the Naval Aviation Survival Training 
Program (NASTP) prior to entering a flight status and every 4 years 
thereafter. This training includes aviation physiology, acceleration 
physiology, aviation life support systems, water survival training, 
ejection seat training, and centrifuge flight environment training as 
needed.
    CNAF Level A Annual Aeromedical Training is completed prior to 
entering a flight status and annually thereafter. This includes 
ejection seat training, egress training, sensory physiology/situational 
awareness, laser eye protection, high performance high altitude 
physiology, gravity tolerance improvement program, aviation life 
support systems, and survival radios.
    Further training includes CNAF Level B Deployment briefs to include 
first aid/self-aid/buddy aid, stress and human performance, 
environmental stressors, Combat Survival Evader Locator (CSEL), and 
chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) defense.
    The training curriculum for U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S .Marine Corps 
(USMC) student pilots is identical throughout flight school, varying 
only between type aircraft (i.e. rotary wing, jet, multi-engine, etc.) 
in the different phases of flight training, and not by service. After 
students successfully complete flight school, they are designated 
``Naval Aviators'' and are selected to fly a specific Type, Model, 
Series (T/M/S) aircraft in either the USN or USMC inventory. At that 
time, USN and USMC Naval Aviators report to service and T/M/S specific 
training squadrons to learn the fundamentals particular to that 
aircraft's mission areas.
    Question. How do you . . . treat injuries resulting from flight?
    Answer. Both the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps utilize the same 
resources to treat and address injuries resulting from flight and 
flight-related MISHAPs. Naval Aviators have medical resources and 
personnel available to them within their units, onboard aviation ships 
(e.g. CVN, LHD/A), Naval Air Stations, and higher headquarters. United 
States Naval Flight Surgeons and Corpsmen as well as Aerospace 
Physiologists are available to all aircrew and are trained in 
diagnosing and treating injuries related to flight duties and/or 
performing aforementioned training. Navy Aerospace Medicine is capable 
of treating flight related illnesses and returning aviators to full 
duty. This is accomplished by leveraging additional Navy Medicine 
assets through the Bureau of Medicine (BUMED) and the Defense Health 
Agency (DHA) when required. Both USN and USMC also leverage the same 
Safety Management Systems to mitigate, report, and learn from injuries 
resulting from flight and flight-related MISHAPs.
    Question. How does the Navy monitor the physiology of aviators in 
flight?
    Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps do not currently have a program 
of record to monitor the physiology of Naval Aviators in flight. 
However, USN and USMC efforts are underway, spearheaded by the 
Department of the Navy's aviation life support systems program office, 
to field a product to monitor the physiology of aviator's in flight.
    A Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) has 
resulted in a partnership with private industry to develop an ``in-
mask'' sensor to collect in-flight physiological data from aviators. 
Thirty (30) ``in-mask'' devices will be fielded to the T-45 community 
beginning the week of 25Jul22. Data collection will continue for eight 
(8) weeks and be conducted at both NAS Kingsville and NAS Meridian. 
Data analysis and trend identification will continue through fiscal 
year 23-1 and will inform future helmet, mask, and regulator program 
requirements.
    Question. What procedures could be improved to better share across 
the branches of the military best practices for preparation and 
treatment for the demands of flight?
    Answer. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps will continue to work 
together making improvements to our current Safety Management Systems. 
Specifically, we will continue to document training, investigate 
MISHAPs, report causal factors, and share lessons learned. These 
efforts will be shared across services via the web-enabled Risk 
Management Information (RMI) reporting and analysis system.
    The services will continue to target emergent issues related to 
physiological episodes in flight by sharing expertise, lessons learned, 
and product developments generated from teams such as the U.S. Air 
Force's 711th Human Performance Wing, the Naval Safety Command's 
Physiological Episode Action Team (PEAT), and the Navy's Human Systems 
Engineering Department (HSED).
    Continue to develop and implement the Naval Aircrew Conditioning 
Program to leverage best practices and lessons learned from the U.S. 
Air Force's OHWS and USA Holistic Health & Fitness (HHF) programs. 
These programs utilize state of the art industry practices and focus on 
injury prevention, rehabilitation therapies, and increasing aircrew 
physiologic margin.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
Fuel Redistribution and National Security Interests
    Question. Secretary Austin recently testified that the centrally 
located bulk fuel storage at Red Hill did not make sense to support 
today's Indo-Pacific operations.
    Do you agree with Secretary Austin's statement that having a 
centrally-located fuel storage facility at Red Hill ``doesn't 
necessarily support the way that we operate today,'' as we are ``much 
further forward and operate in a dispersed fashion''?
    Answer. As the Secretary of Defense stated when he announced the 
defueling and closure of Red Hill, the distributed and dynamic nature 
of our force posture in the Indo-Pacific, the sophisticated threats we 
face, and the technology available to us demand an equally advanced and 
resilient fueling capability. To a large degree, the Department of 
Defense already uses dispersed fueling at sea and ashore, permanent and 
rotational. We will now expand and accelerate that strategic 
distribution.
    Question. Given the evolving challenges in the region--including 
increased threats from China, North Korea, climate change, and extreme 
weather events--how should we think about how we locate strategic 
reserves throughout the Indo-Pacific?
    Answer. Decisions made regarding the location of the strategic bulk 
fuel reserves throughout the Indo-Pacific must align with the National 
Defense Strategy objective to build a resilient Joint Force and defense 
ecosystem. The placement of our strategic fuel reserves is based on 
several considerations. When we think about how we locate strategic 
fuel reserves in the Indo-Pacific region, consideration is given to 
current threats and the impacts of climate change. The primary 
consideration for location placement is the proximity of need for our 
operational forces that support contingency plans. Those operational 
requirements narrow the locations down to possible areas that are able 
to support the respective volume of fuel in terms of infrastructure, 
accessibility, and security. Additionally, any placement of fuel on 
foreign soil must abide by the local policies and laws specified in our 
national agreements.
Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI)
    Question. Expanding our presence in the Indo-Pacific heavily relies 
on investments made in infrastructure, responsiveness, and resilience 
throughout the region.
    How is the Navy factoring in climate change and environmental risk 
mitigation as it develops the PDI?
    Answer. We recognize the reality of global climate change and the 
need to prepare for its short and long term effects on operational 
capability, as well as our responsibility to mitigate our environmental 
impact. The Department of Navy is incorporating climate change and 
environmental risk mitigation into all our infrastructure projects, to 
include those projects that meet the Department of Defense's criteria 
for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. We leverage Department of 
Defense Unified Facilities Criteria, the Department of Defense Overseas 
Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, the DoD Regional Sea Level 
(DRSL) database, the DoD Climate Assessment Tool (DCAT), and the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Systems Command Climate Change Planning 
Handbook. In addition, Climate Action 2030, the Department of the 
Navy's climate strategy prioritizes climate readiness as mission 
readiness; this is especially true in the Indo-Pacific AOR. We recently 
conducted a table top exercise to validate the components of our 
strategy and further explore how we can continue to factor climate 
change and environmental risk mitigation into our decisionmaking.
Defense of Hawaii
    Question. The threat of ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles 
is increasing, as potential adversaries are ever more capable 
delivering conventional and nuclear payloads--and in some cases, 
farther, faster, and with greater accuracy.
    What capabilities does DoD have now, and in the near future, that 
will be able to defend Hawaii from evolving missile threats?
    Answer. The Navy in partnership with the Missile Defense Agency 
(MDA) remains a key aspect to the Joint mission of fielding a robust 
and credible Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability. The ballistic 
and hypersonic missile threats continue to evolve and threaten the sea 
base, and regional and theater land assets in multiple areas of 
responsibility (AOR). Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) 
capability is being delivered to the Fleet through the Aegis 
Modernization (AMOD) program and new construction Aegis Destroyer 
program utilizing the most advanced Aegis Baselines 9 combat system, 
which leverages proven Aegis Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capability in a BMD 
environment. Future capability with the Air and Missile Defense Radar 
(AMDR)/SPY-6(V)1 with Aegis BL 10 (BMD 6.0) provide next generation 
IAMD capabilities to USS JACK H. LUCAS (DDG 125), the first FLT III 
Aegis destroyer. This capability will be delivered in Aegis BMD, 
providing regional BMD against short, medium, and intermediate range 
ballistic missile threats utilizing the SM-3 missile and sensor cueing 
to the Nation's Missile Defense System (MDS) for regional defense and 
homeland defense from at-sea and a land-based component.
            Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
    Question. I recently visited Kyiv as part of a small Senate 
delegation that met with President Zelensky and his senior advisors. In 
our meeting with President Zelensky, he cited the need for additional 
anti-ship missiles like the one they used to strike Russia's Black Sea 
capital ship in April as a top priority. This capability is important 
for Ukraine to break the Russian blockade of the port city of Odessa, 
which is creating the threat of famine and food shortages by blocking 
Ukrainian grain shipments.
    Earlier this week, Secretary Austin announced that Denmark will 
provide Ukraine with a Harpoon launcher and missiles. I encourage the 
Navy and the administration to continue supporting those efforts, 
either through direct donations of U.S. stocks or by further 
encouraging our allies to supply similar systems.
    How might Ukraine's continued successful use of these types of 
anti-ship weapons affect Russia's ability to operate near the coast of 
Ukraine in the Black Sea?
    Answer:
  --The MOSKVA was in a position off the coast of Ukraine where they 
        should have been concerned about coastal defense cruise 
        missiles, but were not. The successful engagement has forced 
        Russia to operate further away from the coast and has impacted 
        their ability to protect operational interests. Anti-ship 
        weapons are anticipated to further stress Russia's ability to 
        maneuver as they would like against Ukraine--forcing risk-based 
        decisions in response to Ukraine's success.
    Question. What lessons is the Navy taking away from the challenges 
Russia has faced from Ukraine's asymmetric capabilities, such as its 
successful anti-ship missile strike?
    Answer:
  --The Ukrainians' sinking of the Russian Cruiser MOSKVA is a reminder 
        that naval commanders must understand the environment in which 
        they operate. Commanders have to understand the capabilities of 
        their adversary--including asymmetric capabilities--and their 
        own vulnerabilities.
  --The Russian Navy has shown it puts a premium on capacity over 
        readiness and capabilities, seemingly sacrificing readiness and 
        modernization of their current force. For the U.S. Navy, we are 
        committed to balancing readiness, capability and then capacity, 
        understanding that 70 percent of our current force will still 
        be in service a decade from now.
  --In order to make our fleet as ready, capable, and lethal as 
        possible at its current size, the USN Research and Development 
        budget is focused on technologies like hypersonics, quantum 
        computing, directed energy and high-power microwave 
        capabilities to defend the fleet. Modernized technologies such 
        as these will help the Navy counter a wide range of 
        conventional and asymmetric threats as we work with Congress on 
        the longer term efforts of growing the Fleet.
    Question.Have Russia's challenges affected how you think about 
Chinese missile threats against U.S. ships or how Taiwan might defend 
itself from a potential Chinese invasion?
    Answer:
  --Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine emphasizes the need for the 
        Navy to be a combat capable force that is postured forward. The 
        Navy also understands the urgency for supporting the Department 
        of Defense to meet the requirements of the Taiwan Relations Act 
        to provide Taiwan the defensive articles and services it needs.
    Question. I recently visited Sweden and Finland on the eve of their 
decision to formally apply for admission to NATO, which is something I 
strongly support. Swedish officials have reportedly requested a larger 
U.S. naval presence in the Baltic Sea as part of an effort to continue 
to deter Russian aggression and demonstrate our support for the Nordic 
countries' joint-security.
    Many have been pushing for an increased fleet presence in Europe 
for years, including basing two additional DDGs at Rota, Spain. Gen. 
Wolters, the head of European Command, has called destroyers the 
``workhouses of deterrence'' in Europe against Russia.
    How do you see our Naval presence in Europe changing in the coming 
months and years?
    Answer. As the president has recently announced, we will indeed be 
basing two additional DDGs at Rota, bringing the total number of 
forward deployed DDGs in the European theater to six. We plan to have 
the first of these additional ships deploy in fiscal year 2024, and the 
second in fiscal year 2026. Additionally, we are optimistic that we 
will be able to meet the requirement of a 1.0 Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG) allocation to NAVEUR. This is a requirement that we, until 
recently, have been unable to meet, due to competing requirements in 
other theaters. We see this trending now back towards a year round 
rotational presence of the CSG in the European theater. Importantly, 
the CSG also includes its own complement of cruisers and destroyers, 
which are in addition to those permanently assigned in Rota.
    Question. What are the plans for increased exercises with our NATO 
and aspiring NATO allies?
    Answer. The annual list of maritime exercises scheduled by NATO and 
individual NATO member states is lengthy. Additional DDGs, along with 
increased rotational forces will give the Naval Component Commander 
added flexibility to not only participate in more exercises but also 
increase our participation in exercises in which we were already signed 
up to take part. We conduct more than 75 exercises each year from the 
Arctic Ocean, to the Black Sea and down to the Gulf of Guinea, and in 
many cases these extra forces will add complexity in maritime exercises 
and in others allow us to be involved when we were not able to in 
previous years. For example, next year we plan to participate in 
Exercise AURORA (Sweden) and Exercise FREEZING WINDS (Finland), 
exercises we have not had much play in, in previous years.
    Question. The Navy's future years defense plan calls for the 
procurement of two destroyers per year through fiscal year 2027, though 
the request for the multiyear is for nine guaranteed ships and a single 
option ship. You have also spoken about your desire to get BIW to a 1.5 
ships per year build rate, which points to the need for three ships per 
year rather than two. It is important for the multiyear contract to 
allow for up to those 15 ships, similar to the current multiyear.
    As I know you understand, it is important to send the right demand 
signals to industry. First, the Flight III DDGs will be the most 
capable warship in the world once they are in the fleet, and they are 
ships we need right away for the potential China fight that could occur 
by 2027. But we also need to ensure the industrial base is firing on 
all cylinders once we start building DDG(X) at the end of the decade. A 
lack of predictability adds to the workforce and supply chain 
challenges.
    Can you talk about the importance of the multiyear contract for 
ensuring stability and predictability in the industrial base?
    Answer. Multi-year Procurement (MYP) contracts, when compared to 
annual contracts, reduce acquisition costs by virtue of advance 
planning and bulk-purchasing. For new ship construction, a five-year 
MYP provides shipyards with the long-term stability that enables 
competitive bidding and internal investment. Under MYP contracts, the 
Navy is permitted to make bulk purchases and timely procurements of 
long-lead time items. This practice allows vendors and shipyards alike 
to utilize production economies of scale, reducing construction times 
and cost.
    Question. It seems inconsistent to push for a ramp up to 1.5 ships 
per year at the shipyards while the budget only calls for two ships per 
year, and the proposed multiyear only calls for nine guaranteed ships. 
How can we send a clearer signal to industry?
    Answer. The President's fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget Future Year 
Defense Plan requests the procurement of 10 ships from fiscal year 2023 
to fiscal year 2027 at a rate of two DDG 51s per year. The contract is 
planned to have the flexibility to procure up to 15 total ships. The 
additional options in the fiscal year 2023-2027 MYP contract and the 
existing workload at the shipbuilders allows both shipyards to execute 
up to 1.5 ships per year.
                                 ______
                                 
             Questions Submitted to General David H. Berger
              Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
    Question. The strains of flying high-performance aircrafts are 
universal for service members in all branches of the military. 
Physiological events while flying are some of the most dangerous to 
crew and aircraft, and stresses experienced by the body in flight can 
have long lasting effects on individuals.
    In Vermont, our Air National Guard pilots prepare for the strains 
of flight in an F-35A through a program called the Optimizing Human 
Weapon System (OHWS). The OHWS programs prepare pilots for the physical 
demands of flying and treats injuries resulting from flying to reduce 
the occurrences, longevity, and severity of flight-related injuries 
among their pilots.
    How do you prepare Marine Naval Aviators for flight and treat 
injuries resulting from flight?
    Answer. Marine and Navy Aviators are required to complete the Naval 
Aviation Survival Training Program (NASTP) prior to entering a flight 
status and every 4 years thereafter. This training includes aviation 
physiology, human performance enhancement, sensory physiology/
situational awareness, acceleration physiology, aviation life support 
systems, survival first aid, water survival training (underwater 
egress, parachute training, life rafts and sea survival, rescue 
devices/helicopter hoist, underwater emergency egress breathing device, 
dynamic hypoxia training with adjunctive training using a reduced 
oxygen breathing device), ejection seat training, and centrifuge flight 
environment training as needed.
    While in their training pipeline, all class one aviators (Ejection 
Seat Aircraft) are required to attend centrifuge training in order to 
experience Gravitational (G) forces similar to those in flight and 
learn how to properly execute the Anti-G Straining Maneuver. This was 
previously done at Aviation Survival Training Center (ASTC) Lemoore, 
but that centrifuge is no longer operational. Currently, centrifuge 
training is either done at Air Force facilities or via contractors.
    Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF) Level A Annual Aeromedical 
Training is completed prior to entering a flight status and annually 
thereafter. This includes ejection seat training, egress training, 
sensory physiology/situational awareness, laser eye protection, high 
performance high altitude physiology, gravity tolerance improvement 
program, aviation life support systems, survival radios.
    Further training includes CNAF Level B Deployment briefs to include 
first aid/self-aid/buddy aid, stress and human performance, 
environmental stressors, Combat Survival Evader Locator (CSEL), and 
chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) defense. Additionally, 
aviators complete Night Imaging and Threat Evaluation (NITE) Lab 
Training Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 (MAWTS-1) 
curriculum (intro to Night Vision Goggles (NVG) tactical employment, 
the night environment, Night Vision Device (NVD) design considerations, 
NVG components and preflight procedures, aeromedical aspects of NVG 
aided flight, NVG misperceptions and illusions, NVG eye lane 
demonstration, night scene simulation, NVG related mishap lessons 
learned).
    Throughout their service, Marine and Navy Aviators have medical 
personal available to them within their units and higher headquarters. 
United States Naval Flight Surgeons and Corpsmen are available to all 
aircrew that are trained in diagnosing and treating injuries related to 
flight duties. Naval Medicine is capable of treating flight related 
Illnesses and returning aviators to full duty.
    Question. How does the Marine Corps monitor the physiology of 
aviators in flight?
    Answer. In-flight physiological monitoring is being investigated 
presently, but has proven extremely challenging. A monitor that 
appropriately measures metrics, will annunciate appropriately, can 
survive the aviation environment, is ejection safe, and will function 
under multiple-G stress has yet to be discovered. Consideration has 
included devices such as Garmin watches and more, and engineering teams 
are investigating the feasibility and effectiveness of installing a 
physiological monitor in the oxygen mask.
    Annual short form flight physicals and quinquennial long form 
flight physicals are used to qualify and monitor pilots and aircrew for 
flight. These physicals are utilized to determine physical 
qualification and aeronautical adaptability of aviators and aircrew. 
Long form physicals and any medical waivers also go through Naval 
Aerospace Medicine Institute for their specialist recommendations of 
flight status.
    Whenever a physiological event occurs, a full investigation is 
launched to determine the cause.
    Question. What procedures could be improved to better share across 
the branches of the military best practices for preparation and 
treatment for the demands of flight?
    Answer. The services must continue ensuring that each event is 
documented, that practices for documentation and investigation are 
uniform, and that results are shared. This coordination could be 
specifically facilitated by an aeromedical working group that meets 
periodically to discuss aeromedical and aviation physiological 
concerns.
    Navy and Marine Corps units can further enhance sharing by ensuring 
that all physiological episodes are reported. This can best be achieved 
by fostering command climates that promote self-reporting of episodes. 
Selecting the right individuals to serve as Commanding Officers is 
critical to creating this environment.
                                 ______
                                 
              Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
USMC Energy Resiliency
    Question. Marine installations are transitioning to an electric 
vehicle fleet and the use of smart grids as a power source.
    When can Marine installations in Hawaii expect functioning electric 
vehicle chargers and photovoltaic panels?
    Answer. Although there is currently no in-ground Electric Vehicle 
(EV) supply equipment installed aboard Marine Corps Base Hawaii, two 
Beam EV ARCs are deployed and operational aboard the installation to 
support EV recharge requirements.
    Question. How does the USMC conduct energy resilience readiness 
exercises?
    Answer. The Marine Corps' Energy Resilience Readiness Exercise 
(ERRE) program includes table top, intermediate-level, and black-start 
exercises to test mission continuity of operations plans, utility 
emergency response plans, infrastructure configuration, and equipment 
conditions. These ``pull the plug'' exercises test the installation's 
resilience to conduct critical and essential missions while 
disconnected from the commercial power grid. ERREs are performed per 
Office of the Secretary of Defense guidance published in August 2020 
and are designed to meet the following objectives as presented in 10 
USC 2920:
  --Determine the ability of the backup systems to start independently, 
        transfer the load, and carry the load until energy from off the 
        installation is restored;
  --Align organizations with critical missions to coordinate in meeting 
        critical mission requirements;
  --Validate mission operation plans, such as continuity of operations 
        plans;
  --Identify infrastructure interdependencies; and
  --Verify backup electric power system performance.
USMC logistical and amphibious requirements
    Question. Expanding our presence in the Indo-Pacific heavily relies 
on investments made in infrastructure, responsiveness, and resilience 
throughout the region.
    How is the Marine Corps positioned to effectively respond to 
crises--both defense and humanitarian--in the Indo-Pacific?
    Answer. The Marine Corps, as part of the forward deployed naval 
force, makes up the inside force within the Indo-Pacific area of 
operations. Marine Corps units in the First Island Chain are stand-in 
forces that provide a range of options for crisis response and 
demonstrate the U.S. commitment to maintaining a free and open Indo-
Pacific. In addition to having forces postured on bases and stations 
throughout the Pacific, the Marine Corps continues to maintain a 
presence on amphibious ships with the deployment of Marine 
Expeditionary Units west of the International Date Line. This naval 
team, conducting exercises with our partners and allies, further 
increases a deep understanding and appreciation for the places and 
people throughout the Indo-Pacific, while increasing readiness and 
providing assurance in both steady state and crisis. This combination 
of readiness, assurance and understanding of the area enables the 
Marines to rapidly respond to crisis and contingencies, while providing 
deterrence in steady state.
    Question. What logistical shortcomings or gaps in the region that 
could be of potential concern to the Marine Corps?
    Answer. The tyranny of distance across the Indo-Pacific make 
current and future operations across the range of conflict ever more 
complex. Supply chain interruptions from COVID highlight the challenges 
of logistics and supply throughout the theater. To deploy responsive 
and resilient Marine forces across the ocean and into the littorals, 
the naval team will need to invest in increased lift and non-
traditional logistical capabilities, to include prepositioning of 
resources, to project and sustain the inside force. Increased intra-
theater lift and operational-to-tactical logistical sustainment is 
required to ensure operational viability and maintain the deterrence 
effect of the force. Resilient and redundant airfields and ports would 
enable rapid response to humanitarian crises and dispersal in case of 
conflict.
    Question. As China is the ``pacing threat,'' and given the vast 
expanse of the Indo-Pacific, can you explain how the Navy's budget 
request addresses the challenge of contested logistics?
    Answer. The fiscal year (FY) 2023 budget request strongly supports 
solutions to the challenges of contested logistics in the Indo-Pacific. 
The budget includes investments in L-Class ships, the Light Amphibious 
Warship and the Next Generation Logistics Ship, all of which are 
indispensable elements of the Marine Corps' and Navy's ability to 
address mobility and sustainment in a contested context. The budget 
also invests in new construction, industrial capability, and 
infrastructure to improve maintenance, logistics responsiveness, and 
capacity. It also supports efforts in prepositioning and coordination 
with key allies and partners, both of which are key parts of mitigating 
the tyranny of distance in the region. Finally, the budget continues to 
fund Force Design 2030 and its associated campaign of learning, 
supporting innovation, experimentation, and analysis to ensure the 
Marine Corps is positioned to sustain operations across the spectrum of 
competition.
Climate Change Resiliency
    Question. U.S. military bases are regularly plagued by extensive 
damage to infrastructure due to flooding by sea-level rise, extreme 
storm surges, and lack of clean drinking water due to saltwater 
intrusion into the groundwater aquifer. This particularly affects bases 
on low-lying Pacific atolls. Damage to our critical infrastructure 
caused by extreme weather will no doubt cost billions in replacements 
and repairs and will acutely shape the way DoD conducts global 
operations.
    It is reported that the Marine Corps is considering moving bases in 
response to the growing effects of climate change on installations. Can 
you explain how the impacts of rising sea-levels, temperatures, and 
storms negatively impact our national security readiness and what led 
to your consideration to relocate bases?
    Answer. The impacts of rising sea-levels, temperatures, and 
destructive storms increase, instability and demands on the Marine 
Corps while simultaneously impacting the ability to respond to those 
demands. Rising sea levels test the ability of coastal Marine Corps 
installations to support missions. As temperatures continue to rise, 
oceans will get warmer, creating more destructive storms requiring the 
Marine Corps forces to increase operational tempo to respond. The 
Marine Corps is using a variety of tools to ensure it has resilient 
installations capable of continuous operations, including building new 
construction outside of known flood plains, ensuring compliance with 
updated construction codes, and developing the ability to operate 
independent from local electrical grids. As the Marine Corps assesses 
risk to its installations, it has also considered relocation as an 
option. However, at this time, there are no plans to relocate any 
Marine Corps installations, and any future plans will be developed in 
close collaboration with Congress.
    Question. How are the Marines Corps mitigating climate change 
risks?
    Answer. In conjunction with the Department of the Navy, the Marine 
Corps will build climate resilience by ensuring that its forces, 
systems, and facilities can continue to operate effectively to achieve 
the mission in the face of changing climate conditions and worsening 
climate impacts. The Marine Corps is also participating in the 
Department's efforts to reduce greenhouse emissions.
    Question. Can you update me on the progress that has been made in 
infusing both implications of, and efforts to combat, climate change in 
organizational structures and exercises?
    Answer. Characteristics of the future operating environment, to 
include the effects of changes in the environment and weather planning, 
are considered during future planning to ensure installations are 
resilient and that exercises can be conducted effectively.

                          SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

    Senator Tester. This defense subcommittee will reconvene on 
Tuesday, June 7th, at 10 a.m. for a hearing with the National 
Guard and Reserve components. As of now, we stand in recess.
    [Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., Thursday, May 26, the 
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, 
June 7.]