[Senate Hearing 117-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022
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THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room SD-192, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Jon Tester (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Tester, Murray, Schatz, Baldwin, Shelby,
Collins, Blunt, and Moran.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Department of the Navy
Office of the Secretary
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS W. HARKER, ACTING SECRETARY
opening statement of senator jon tester
Senator Tester. I want to call this subcommittee meeting to
order.
Let me begin by welcoming our witnesses. Acting Secretary
Harker, this is your first appearance before the Senate
Appropriations Committee and I welcome you.
Admiral Gilday and General Berger, you were both here last
year for the last live hearing before the pandemic, so welcome
back. It is good to host you in person.
I think we can all agree that China is a current-pacing
threat and that the pace is a run, if not a full-out sprint.
So, how are we keeping up? The Navy and Marine Corps are
facing the current challenges with different approaches. On one
hand, the Marine Corps has taken major steps to reshape its
force for the future based on General Berger's strategy to
self-fund the reforms.
On the other hand, the Navy is faced with the balancing act
between the substantial cost of maintaining a fleet of nearly
300 ships and the additional cost of modernizing to meet the
threats of the future.
The Navy's 2022 budget protects readiness in order to
deliver a combat-credible force. As for the future, the path is
less clear. Secretary Harker has reportedly found that plans to
design new destroyer submarines and jets all at the same time
are unaffordable.
So, how do we increase our pace to keep up with the threat?
For the Navy, I understand there are ongoing reviews on what
the fleet of tomorrow should look like. I would add that, no
matter what you find in those studies, holding people
accountable, whether it is government or civilian, for delays
in ship deliveries or increase in weapons costs has to be part
of that solution.
The committee is eager to work with you to find the right
balance between modernization, or between modernizing and
maintaining the force and fleet that we have.
Once again, I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony that they are about to give today and look forward to
hearing from each one of them.
With that, I will turn it over to you, Senator Shelby.
statement of senator richard c. shelby
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be
brief.
Welcome. I welcome you, too, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, and
General Berger. Thank you for being here.
We all look forward to hearing about the Navy and the
Marine Corps' budget proposal for 2022. This discussion is
particularly important, I believe, because the Navy's budget
proposal reflects a meager 1.8 percent increase from fiscal
year 2021 while reducing the end strength in procurement
investments. The reductions are proposed despite the need to
maintain readiness and make progress on key modernization
priorities, like the Navy's leg of the nuclear triad and the
introduction of a new weapons system.
In addition to other deficiencies in the Navy's budget
proposal, I believe this budget fails to include funding to
support the multi-year procurement contract for the DDG-51,
which reflects poorly, I believe, on the Department's view of
its commitments to Congress and its long-term ship- building
plans.
It also calls into question the seriousness with which this
Administration approaches defense-related funding decisions
given that the DDG-51 appears as the Navy's top priority on its
unfunded requirements list.
You are all very well aware that our adversaries, including
China and Russia, pose new and increasing threats, and they
will grow. They are making unprecedented investments in their
capability and capacity, investments that this budget does not
even come close to matching.
I believe that this budget, which fails to even keep pace
with inflation, sends the wrong message to our allies and our
adversaries. I am interested in hearing how the 2022 budget
request fully meets, if it does, the needs of the Navy and
Marine Corps while maintaining our advantage over our
adversaries. It will be an interesting discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Shelby.
We will start out with you, Secretary Harker.
summary statement of hon. thomas w. harker
Secretary Harker. Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for your
bipartisan support on behalf of our sailors, marines, and
civilians. I am honored to be here with General Berger and
Admiral Gilday. I support their efforts to build a more
integrated, all-domain naval force through the NAVPLAN and the
Force Design 2030.
In order to move these plans forward within existing
resources, we have had to make some very hard choices in this
budget, but that is exactly what the American people expect us
to do. Every dollar is a strategic asset that must be maximized
to stay ahead of the pacing threat of China and the many other
challenges facing our fleet and our Nation.
Every investment must be done in a balanced and sustainable
manner to ensure we maintain the readiness of our current
fleet, while building the capacity and the capability we will
need in the future. The cost of readiness is increasing.
Personnel and maintenance costs have grown at a rate that is
well above inflation. This growth squeezes the rest of our
budget.
In order to maintain our readiness, we have had to delay
some of our planned ship purchases to future years. In order to
invest in a superior future force, we have had to divest of
less-capable assets. These were not easy choices, but we cannot
create a hollow force that does not train our sailors or
Marines, or which leaves holes in units, or does not provide
for sufficient crew rest. We have learned those lessons through
the tragic mishaps that have occurred over the last 5 years.
In order to ensure future availability and readiness of our
fleet, we are prioritizing investments in our physical
infrastructure, including full commitment to the Shipyard
Infrastructure Optimization Program.
I have visited all four of our public Navy shipyards, as
well as most of the private shipyards, and other commercial
facilities. It has been an inspiration to shake the hands of
the men and women who are building and maintaining our fleet.
I have had the opportunity to speak with every level of
labor and management about the issues they face, and the need
for consistency in funding and demand. That is why we are
increasing the capability and resiliency of these century-old
installations, increasing the size and capability of our dry
docks, and equipping our 40,000-person workforce with the tools
they need to maintain our new, more lethal assets.
To ensure our resources reach the warfighters who need
them, we are demanding rigorous self-assessment and responsive
accountability in every part of our enterprise through the
Performance to Plan initiative. This effort has improved our
readiness of our strike fighters and is being rolled out
successfully across the fleet in other areas.
As good stewards, we are on the right path towards
obtaining an audit opinion for the Navy and Marine Corps
General Funds and the Department's Working Capital Fund. We are
the only military department that has eliminated audit material
weaknesses--three in the Navy, one in the Marine Corps--and are
leading the way on this critical effort.
This has enabled us to improve cybersecurity in our
business systems. Since 2017, the Marine Corps has closed 41
out of 110 IT findings, 17 of which were cybersecurity related.
We are also increasing investment in the Department's
oversight functions, while maximizing the return on our
investment in the performance audit process.
Effective use and management of data is key to our digital
transformation and will change how we will fight and win at
every level. This requires the modernization of our information
technology infrastructure, which is a critical war-fighting
priority for our department.
We are also prioritizing the mental health of our force,
speaking out at the senior level about the benefits of
counseling and ensuring the availability of counselors,
chaplains, and other professionals. We appreciate the
committee's attention to this vital issue and your support in
providing additional mental health support to our sailors and
Marines and our forward operational units.
We are fighting the scourge of sexual harassment and sexual
assault through efforts like the Watch List, a tool that uses
Navy and Marine Corps data to alert commanders to conditions in
their units that may lead to these toxic behaviors. We are
increasing investment in this area, focusing on the prevention
of and response to sexual harassment and assault.
In this fiscal year 2022 budget, we have added over 200
personnel across the Navy and Marine Corps focused on
prevention. The majority of these personnel will be placed at
Navy and Marine Corps installations, working with sailors and
Marines.
We are also adding an additional 80 sexual assault response
coordinators for the Marine Corps, as well as 18 Navy criminal
investigative service personnel dedicated to a sexual assault
prevention and response.
Secretary Austin's 90-Day Independent Review Commission has
completed its work, and we look forward to implementing the
Secretary's forthcoming recommendations to make meaningful and
lasting progress in this area.
Around the world and around the clock, the sailors,
Marines, and civilians of our integrated naval force stand the
watch and execute the mission. On behalf of each of them and
their families, I thank you for your time, oversight, and
appropriations. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas Harker
Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, distinguished Members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the posture of the
Department of the Navy (DON). I appreciate the hard work of the Members
and Staff of this Committee to ensure funding stability and principled
oversight for every Sailor and Marine now standing watch around the
world.
The reemergence of long-term strategic competition from China and
Russia is spurring a period of rapid transformation in the global
security environment. The disruptions related to the COVID-19 pandemic
underscore the need for agility and distributed readiness. Climate
change is accelerating, and its impact on both our planet and force
will continue to grow as significant weather events threaten our
infrastructure, and the arctic opens to unprecedented activity.
In a world more interconnected and interdependent than ever before,
a fully integrated and forward maneuverable Navy-Marine Corps Team has
never been more important to the security of our Nation and the
preservation of the rules-based international order. We must protect
our nation, our allies and partners, and our global interests, while
also leading on the urgent issues facing our personnel and planet, from
the mental and physical health care needs of our people, to the scourge
of sexual assault and harassment, to the need for diversity and
inclusion at every echelon, to the ongoing threat of climate change.
General Berger, Admiral Gilday, and I stand united in our resolve
to ensure your DON will be ready for the global challenges before us
with the personnel, platforms, and technology to secure vital sea
lanes, stand together with our allies, and protect the United States of
America.
defend the nation
The President's Budget submission for FY 2022 (PB22) reflects hard
choices to divest of less capable platforms and systems to invest in a
powerful and superior future force. Throughout the budget process and
in all aspects of capability acquisition, design, construction, and
deployment, we must balance the urgent readiness needs of our force
today with investments in the future force and effective business
process reforms in order to ensure our Sailors and Marines are always
ready to fight and win in any clime or place.
Force Posture
The presence and availability of naval forces must always reflect
the strategic needs of the Nation, providing effective options for the
President and Secretary of Defense to counter every challenge. To
ensure preparedness, the DON provides maximum operational flexibility
through warfighting concepts including Distributed Maritime Operations,
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment, and Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations, ensuring continual overmatch and flexibility
in the battle space.
Secretary Austin has identified China as the pacing threat for our
military forces, and we will continue to position our integrated global
maritime force to lead in the Indo-Pacific. But ours is a global force
with global responsibilities, including increased Russian presence in
the Atlantic, terrorism and instability in the Arabian Gulf, an
increasingly blue arctic, a global need for agile and ready Marine
forces to respond to the unexpected in every domain, and the constant
threat of cyberattacks to our force, support infrastructure, industrial
base, and supply chain.
The DON FY22 budget request delivers ready maritime forces through
sustained investment and performance improvement, developing more
lethal, networked capabilities and concepts, closely integrated between
the services and with our joint force and government partners. Within
limited resources, we will field the right platforms and capability to
maintain freedom of the seas, support international law, and stand by
our allies as we continue to fly, sail and operate wherever
international law allows.
That spirit is reflected in the guidance put forth by our services.
I support Admiral Gilday's Navigation Plan, which refocuses our
integrated all-domain naval power on the core functions of sea control
and power projection we need to compete and win. It places a high
priority on a more lethal and better connected fleet to project power
from blue water, to the littorals, to the shoreline and beyond.
The guidance centers on four lines of effort:
--Deliver a More Ready Fleet. Deliver a Navy that is organized,
trained, and equipped to deploy forward and win in day-to-day
competition, in crisis, and in conflict.
--Deliver a More Lethal, Better-Connected Fleet. Deliver a Navy
capable of projecting synchronized lethal and non-lethal
effects across all domains.
--Deliver a Larger, Hybrid Fleet. Grow a larger, hybrid fleet of
manned and unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the sea--
that meets the strategic and operational demands of our force.
--Develop a Seasoned Team of Naval Warriors. Develop a dominant naval
force that can outthink and outfight any adversary.
To meet the forward maneuverable force requirements of the Joint
Force long into the future, the Marine Corps has put into motion an
aggressive modernization of the Service. I support General Berger's
Force Design 2030, which is not simply an improvement on its existing
form and function. It is a transformational effort rooted in the
anticipated challenges of the future operating environment. Building on
the cooperative efforts of all of our sea services, the Marine Corps is
reinvigorating the Fleet Marine Forces within existing resource
constraints as an indispensable element to global maritime operations.
The goal of Force Design 2030 is to provide a Marine expeditionary
assets that will:
--Successfully compete with peer adversaries in the maritime gray
zone
--Deter, and if required, fight and win in support of naval campaigns
--Facilitate sea denial and sea control
--Win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance competition
--Persist inside actively contested spaces
--Be capable of ``rapidly sensing, making sense of, and acting upon
information'' inside an adversary's weapon engagement zone.
Across both services and throughout the DON, we are executing force
designs centered on Naval Expeditionary force deployment, giving us a
sustainable edge and a resilient capability to deliver the integrated
all-domain naval power required by the Joint Force. We are investing in
the readiness of the integration-ready platforms to ensure continued
freedom of action throughout the maritime domain, from amphibious and
ground element equipment, to agile warships and submarines, to dominant
aircraft carriers and air wings. Successful implementation of the
concepts within the Navigation Plan and Force Design 2030 will be
pursued through a unified, integrated effort at every echelon.
Maintain the Edge
We greatly appreciate the Committee's efforts to ensure funding
stability and predictability over the past several years. This has
given our force the agility and flexibility needed to address emerging
threats, to invest in critical future capabilities for our integrated
naval force, while shifting away from less beneficial spending.
The DON is building on this foundation by aggressively pursuing
better readiness, lethality, and capabilities in those areas of
warfighting technology showing the greatest promise of delivering non-
linear warfighting advantages. From artificial intelligence and cyber
weapons to unmanned platforms and directed energy, we are on the cusp
of technological breakthroughs that will define future conflict. Our
future force will be defined by our decisions today.
We will continue to invest in key naval capabilities to control the
seas and project power in every domain. We will field a resilient,
networked, and dispersed fleet, connected through the Naval Operational
Architecture to provide decision advantage in contested environments.
We will continue to invest in advanced technologies such as long range
hypersonic and directed energy capabilities to ensure maximum reach,
survivability and decision space for our forces.
Our number one shipbuilding priority remains resourcing COLUMBIA
SSBN for on-track delivery in order to ensure the future strength of
the most survivable leg of our Nation's nuclear triad. We are also
advancing our asymmetric undersea attack advantage through the Tactical
Submarine Evolution Plan, including follow-on Blocks VI and VII of the
VIRGINIA Class, and the SSN(X) program. We are advancing battle force
shipbuilding programs such as the CONSTELLATION class frigate and the
GERALD R. FORD class carriers, as well as enhancing our fleet
capabilities through additional battle force ships.
We are also extending the reach of our warriors from the sea with
the addition of sea-based platforms such as USS MIGUEL KEITH, our third
Expeditionary Sea Base, which was commissioned on May 8th. To ensure
our Marines maintain their edge, we will continue to invest in key
Marine Corps development programs that support the Marine Corps Force
Design concept, such as the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile, Ground
Based Air Defense, Medium Altitude-Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial
System, Long Range Unmanned Surface Vessel, and the Light Amphibious
Warship. These enhance the ability of Marines to maneuver and deter
competitors within range of enemy weapon systems.
Targeted investments in key emerging technologies and capabilities
will enhance and sustain amphibious battlefield maneuverability ashore
and superiority at sea, with the support of properly resourced
facilities, infrastructure, and systems to sustain our frontline
forces.
Continual Readiness
Hard experience has shown long term readiness cannot be sustainably
achieved through ``can do'' and ``make do'' improvisation. Our front
line personnel may be determined, adaptive, and skillful enough to get
the job done in the face of equipment shortfalls and intense battle
rhythms, butrelying on their adaptability is no substitute for genuine
fleet readiness. We owe it to the Sailors and Marines out in the fleet
to make sure they always have the tools they need to do the dangerous
jobs we ask of them.
The changes generated from the Readiness Reform and Oversight
Council (RROC) and other introspective efforts have enabled us to
improve readiness, training, and maintenance processes at every level.
For example, we've implemented a uniform readiness assessment and
certification process that must be followed before a ship can be
certified to return to the fleet. We have also increased opportunities
for shipboard certification and skills enhancement, while adjusting
manning schedules to maximize safety and improve quality of life and
professional effectiveness for our personnel while underway. These and
many other changes will result in a better prepared and equipped force.
We continue to build on our efforts to increase availability,
improve maintenance, and maximize throughput, by making targeted shore
investments designed to increase fleet readiness. The Navy's four
public shipyards--Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth Naval Shipyard,
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility, and
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility--are
critical infrastructure elements of America's national defense. In
order to improve naval maintenance production capacity at these
facilities, the DON is fully committed to the Shipyard Infrastructure
Optimization Program (SIOP), comprising three primary focus areas: dry
dock recapitalization, facility layout and optimization, and capital
equipment and modernization. The DON is dedicating the resources and
oversight necessary to ensure the required maintenance is completed
across all shipyards as quickly as possible, and has established a
Program Office (PMS-555) to ensure integration of all elements of the
plan.
Building on the successful Naval Aviation Enterprise efforts to
meet Strike Fighter aircraft availability goals for both the Navy and
Marine Corps, we are targeting greater aviation readiness across the
force, incorporating commercial best practices to improve performance.
Through the Performance to Plan initiative we're using data driven
decision making to enable to remove the root causes of maintenance
delays as well as operational mishaps. This data-driven approach is
based on a ``Get Real, Get Better'' approach, demanding rigorous self-
assessment, strong characterization of current performance, and
detailed analysis backed by accountability and the opportunity to
implement needed improvements.
We appreciate the Committee's interest in ensuring our Naval forces
have the right facilities to train, fight, and win, even as various
demands on the land, sea, and air reduce the available area for
military training. Specifically, we are grateful for the Committee's
continued attention to the urgent need to expand the Fallon Training
Range Complex, which is necessary to the readiness of every Naval
Aviator and Navy SEAL. We are listening to the interests of Tribal
governments, environmental organizations, and the local community, as
well as our counterparts across the Federal Government, and are
committed to finding a favorable solution for everyone involved.
Combat Climate Change
The United States Navy and Marine Corps recognize the reality of
global climate change, our responsibility to mitigate our contribution
to it, and our need to prepare for its short and long term effects. As
we grapple with the effects of climate change on maritime operations
around the globe, the DON must continue to lead and find ways to go
farther, both in substantially reducing our impact on climate change
and building a force that is resilient to its potential effects.
We must adapt our infrastructure for the coming changes with
initiative and problem solving throughout the DON. In the past few
months I have visited and recognized several Marine Corps and Navy
installations that have demonstrated leadership in climate resiliency,
environmental stewardship, and sustainable development. These
facilities include Parris Island, Naval Base San Diego, Marine Corps
Air Base Camp Pendleton, and Naval Base Point Loma. We will continue to
invest in vehicles, infrastructure, and technology that increase our
resiliency and efficiency, as we pursue the use and availability of
alternative fuels. The DON is determined to lead from the front against
the threat of climate change.
take care of our people
The greatest source of readiness and strength for our force will
always be the people who wear the uniform and comprise our civilian
workforce, as well as the families that serve alongside them. We are
committed to ensuring our Sailors, Marines, and Civilians are trained
and equipped to execute the mission and return home safely, and that
their families are provided with the housing, medical attention, and
education they deserve.
Building the Future Force
To maintain a Fleet prepared to fight and win in long term
strategic competition, we continue to evaluate and improve our
capability to attract, retain, and develop a talented and diverse
workforce. In the context of an intense competition for talent in our
country, and in light of the rapidly evolving tactical and technical
landscape, we are modernizing and enhancing our entire talent
management approach to succeed.
We are continuously identifying opportunities for personnel to
develop their leadership skills throughout the ranks, promoting equal
opportunity in every aspect of our force. The DON is investing in the
training, education, and professional development of our officers,
enlisted personnel, and civilian teammates with special emphasis on
partnerships with civilian institutions to enhance educational
opportunities for our junior Sailors and Marines.
Eliminate Toxic Behaviors
It is a personal priority for all three of us to build a climate of
trust, respect and inclusion throughout our force. A major focus of
that effort must be on recognizing and stopping destructive behaviors
early and consistently, so leaders at every level can take appropriate
and effective actions.
We remain determined to eliminate sexual assault, sexual
harassment, and gender discrimination from every part of our force.
These behaviors are a betrayal of those who have stepped forward to
serve in uniform. We will continue to work with this Committee to share
best practices and ideas, relentlessly pursuing a future where no
Sailor, Marine, or civilian teammate ever has to fear for their own
safety while protecting us all.
To assist leaders in this effort, we have developed The Watch List:
Top Five Signals of Risk for Sexual Assault, a research-driven tool
that used Navy and Marine Corps data to identify five of the key
destructive behaviors that increase risk for sexual assault. These
include sexual harassment, gender discrimination, lack of
responsibility and intervention, lack of respect and cohesion, and
workplace hostility behaviors. We have promulgated The Watch List
throughout the Navy and Marine Corps and are actively working to
develop tools that will provide operational commanders data on their
units so they can take action to prevent incidents.
We are actively engaged in rooting out extremism throughout our
force. In coordination with efforts across the joint force, the DON has
conducted ``Extremism Stand Downs'' at every echelon. This process
sparked important conversations and made the position of our leadership
and force clear to every Sailor, Marine, and Civilian in the DON, and
we will continue to build on these efforts.
Trust is at the heart of all our warriors do. Extremist ideologies
are a strategic threat to that trust and have no place within the Navy
and Marine Corps. We will persistently focus on this problem, and
appreciate this Committee's partnership and involvement in this
critical effort.
As leaders we must do all in our power to ensure that our people
feel respected and valued. We cannot and will not tolerate
discrimination or racism of any kind. Our core values and oath demand
that we critically examine all of our policies and practices to remove
inequity and unconscious bias.
Promote Mental Health
Mental health is a critical aspect of our readiness as a force--and
our responsibility to our warriors and their families. We have made it
a priority to ensure the ready availability of mental health
professionals, chaplains, family counselors and other support
professionals when our people are in need--or when they see the need in
others.
I know from personal experience how helpful counseling can be
during both personal and professional struggles. That's why as part of
our recognition of May as Mental Health Awareness Month, I launched a
series of videos encouraging leaders throughout the DON to share their
personal stories of seeking and receiving counseling and help. I also
emphasized this point to our newest officers at the US Naval Academy
Commissioning Ceremony, and will continue promoting mental health care
throughout the force. We have to remove the stigma and start the
conversation, particularly as our warriors and their families contend
with the added stressors related to COVID-19.
The DON is committed to ensuring the health, safety, and well-being
for all members within our military community. The loss of any Sailor,
Marine or civilian to suicide is one too many. The DON offers a variety
of suicide prevention efforts, encouraging positive help-seeking
behaviors, eliminating stigma, and increasing visibility and access to
critical resources. We are constantly revisiting and revising the
portfolio to meet the needs of our people, and have increased our
investment in this area.
Take Care of Our People
We are reforming operating procedures and promotion practices to
reward initiative, applied problem solving, and innovative thinking at
every level. A top priority as we evaluate personnel practices are the
needs and challenges of military families, particularly dual service
families. Senior leaders are also taking a personal and hands-on
approach to ensure enduring excellence in housing, dependent education,
and other quality of life concerns for our military families.
Through a combination of non-monetary, quality of life, and
customer service programs, we are increasing our responsiveness to the
needs of the individual warfighters and their families, making
continued service a viable and attractive option. We are expanding
opportunities for civilians with prior service through the Targeted
Reentry Program. We are also expanding avenues for personnel to learn,
operate, and innovate with partners from the private sector, across the
joint force, and alongside our allies.
Defeat COVID-19
With consistent personal and fleet discipline and continued
refinement of best practices, we have ensured a robust, proactive, and
coordinated COVID-19 response across the DON. We are preventing and
containing outbreaks with minimal impact on fleet readiness, and are
doing everything in our power to get the vaccine out to our Sailors,
Marines and Civilians as quickly and effectively as possible.
The DON is also working with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to assist local, state, and tribal governments in the overall
vaccination effort of the Nation, building on the proactive
contributions to the urgent medical and security needs of the American
civilian population, including the deployment of COMFORT and MERCY to
our Nation's two most populous cities, and the deployment of medical
personnel to facilities in communities across the country.
Like all Americans, the Navy and Marine Corps have adjusted to this
global pandemic, from addressing outbreaks aboard ships, to changes in
recruitment and training, to supporting our military families through
extended deployments and virtual leaning. We have invested significant
resources to upgrade the Navy and Marine Corps intranet to improve
functionality and to enable telework for our military and civilian
workforce.
The Navy and Marine Corps continue to operate under Force Health
Protection measures to protect Marines, Sailors, civilians,
contractors, and our military families. Across the DON, we've
implemented flexibilities to help minimize risk to military personnel
and their families, respond to evolving situations, and ensure the
readiness of our force. We continue to use active testing protocols to
detect asymptomatic COVID-19 positive personnel, contain outbreaks
aboard vessels, and conduct surveillance to detect and treat the
disease as early as possible.
We will not relent in these critical measures. We are well
positioned to emerge stronger than ever, as the pandemic has forced us
to rethink and refine our recruitment, training, and personnel
movements across the DON, as well as our shipyard operations,
deployments, and maintenance schedules, with efficiencies and
applications of technology that can continue to benefit our operations
and throughput long after COVID-19 is in our wake.
succeed through teamwork
A dominant naval force is central to the effective execution of our
strategic goals. We must be ready at all times to execute as one
integrated naval force--Navy and Marine Corps seamlessly linked at
every level--with common logistics, infrastructure, practices and
support networks--executing a fleet-wide emphasis on resilient and
combat ready forces. These integrated connections must extend beyond
the DON as well, encompassing our vital partners across the joint force
and the whole of government, as well as our industry partners,
shipyards, and allies and partners around the world.
Trust and Collaboration
Leaders throughout the DON are actively engaged with the joint
force and the whole of government to meet the maritime challenges that
face our nation. One key initiative of this collaboration is the Tri-
Service Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea. This is was truly
collaborative maritime strategic planning effort led jointly by all
three of our Nation's sea services--Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard. In order to execute these goals, Admiral Gilday, General Berger,
Admiral Schultz and I are working together in order to promote
integration, communication, and collaboration as a warfighting
priority. There can be no daylight between us as we strengthen the
integrated all-domain Naval power of the United States.
Operationalizing the Audit
In my previous roles as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Financial Management and Comptroller, and while Performing the Duties
of Comptroller for the Department of Defense, I saw first-hand the
importance of effective, transparent examination and oversight, and I
witnessed the direct relationship of accountable financial controls to
our frontline strength. In my current role as Acting Secretary of the
Navy, I am determined to strengthen this process in order to provide
our Congressional oversight partners with complete visibility and
accountability for every dime.
Central to this effort is building on the findings of our financial
statement audit process, and improving that process moving forward. As
I've emphasized to senior leaders across the Navy and Marine Corps, the
audit is Commander's business. Accurate inventory, proper resource
allocation, redundancy elimination are all directly connected to our
end strength.
We are on the right path towards obtaining an audit opinion for the
Navy and Marine Corps general funds, and the DON working capital fund.
We have a detailed roadmap that will guide our effort, placing a strong
emphasis on budgetary reform, including receipt, distribution,
execution, and monitoring.
PB22 increases investment in DON oversight functions. In addition
to our work on the financial statement audit, we are looking at ways to
increase effective oversight going forward, removing redundancy and
duplication of effort in every part of our enterprise through the
performance audit process. I have met with leaders across the
government and the DOD to discuss audit planning and understand areas
of high risk, and am incorporating that feedback into the FY22 audit
priorities direction provided to the Naval Audit Service and our
internal control program under the Federal Managers Financial Integrity
Act and OMB Circular A-123. Our top priority is to ensure that our
oversight capabilities and capacity is as efficient and effective as
possible in order to keep our promise to the American taxpayer and the
warriors on the frontline.
Sustaining Maritime Information Superiority
Leaders in every functional unit and discipline have been directed
to set business systems modernization on an integrated path that is
sufficiently resourced and supported across the DON. We are using data
driven decision-making to achieve tangible savings while consistently
working to become more effective and more efficient.
Modernization of our information technology infrastructure is a
critical warfighting priority for the DON. Effective use and management
of data is key to our digital transformation, and will change how we
will fight and win at every level. We are consolidating legacy systems
and will have moved from ten financial systems to three by the end of
this fiscal year. I have established top-down performance management
efforts, driven by data, to ensure the cyber resilience and strength of
our defense business and warfighting networks.
As an information age naval force, every DON warfighting function
and mission area is dependent on data and information to rapidly inform
decision-making throughout the entire competition to conflict
continuum. The dependency on secure and reliable IT has grown
exponentially over the last decade and is critical to maintaining a
competitive warfighting advantage. Simply put, information is combat
power.
In order to generate and sustain that power, the DON is building on
the findings of our Cybersecurity Readiness Review with an Information
Superiority Vision, detailing how the Navy and Marine Corps will:
--Modernize our infrastructure to bring the DON to parity with
industry, move data and information from anywhere to anywhere
securely.
--Innovate and leverage emerging technology including 5G and
Artificial Intelligence to drive capability outcomes for
competitive advantage at speed.
--Defend forward with robust information protection regardless of
where data resides.
Through Operation FLANK SPEED, the DON is shifting enterprise
collaboration and productivity services to an enduring cloud-based
Microsoft Office 365 solution which will provide world-class security
and collaboration tools to improve productivity across our distributed
workforce.
This initiative will modernize our infrastructure to a more cloud-
enabled, performant, and defendable network allowing data and
information to move from anywhere to anywhere securely. It will also
improve our overall cyber readiness posture by implementing key Zero-
Trust-Architecture principles; securing devices and endpoints,
establishing identity and user privileges, and introducing content and
data rights management.
The Marine Corps has now completed the transition of all users to
Microsoft Office 365, and I have directed the transition of over
470,000 users in the Navy no later than December 31, 2021. Flank Speed
will create the capabilities needed to increase Naval lethality and our
ability to fight and win.
Failure to invest now will result in this effort now would further
delay much needed improvements to our core technology infrastructure
and leave the workforce without a sustained follow-on capability once
the DOD-provided Commercial Virtual Remote capability is sunset in June
2021, extending our reliance on outdated, duplicative and less secure
legacy IT systems that cost more and deliver less, further eroding
DON's competitive warfighting advantage.
Strengthen Relationships with Stakeholders
Working alongside our vital industry partners, we are aligning our
efforts to produce the right platforms and capabilities for the
warfighter, and ensure maximum availability and throughput from design
to production to maintenance.
We're working closely with our partners and suppliers in the
defense industrial base to ensure the continued viability of the
crucial businesses and infrastructure needed to ensure our ships,
aircraft, and ground equipment are available when needed for the
defense of our nation, both during the current COVID-19 challenge and
long into the future. A robust, resilient, and nimble industrial base
and supply chain is critical to the long term strength of our Navy and
Marine Corps. Funding predictability and long term planning are key
elements in ensuring the efficiency of our acquisitions and maintenance
processes in partnership with a supply chain calibrated to deliver
maximum value to the taxpayer and warfighter.
At our public shipyards, the DON took aggressive steps at the start
of the COVID-19 pandemic to implement and require safety measures to
protect the personnel, civilians, contractors, and families. These
steps have included maximum telework opportunities for shipyard
employees, administrative leave for high-risk individuals unable to
telework, altered shifts to maximize social distancing, sanitization
and hand-washing stations throughout the shipyard, cloth face coverings
and face shields for the workforce, and screening checks at all
workplace entry points.
Global Engagement
We cannot meet the global challenges our Nation faces alone.
Readiness requires presence and rapid capabilities in every part of the
world, as well as specialized and localized knowledge to handle
evolving and challenging situations. The strategic maritime defense
partnerships we maintain today with our partners and allies extend the
reach and power of our force. They underscore the importance of
cooperation and coordination in maintaining the rules-based
international order that enables so much of our global prosperity and
security.
Our personnel regularly train and operate alongside their foreign
counterparts, test the interoperability of our systems, and build our
collective readiness on the front lines of great power competition.
Operational exercises, international port calls, joint Marine force
training, and other interactions generate the personal contact that
builds understanding, respect, and trust across national and functional
lines. Our Sailors, Marines and civilian personnel know that through
their service they are front-line diplomats for our nation. Their
professionalism and dedication promotes the connections that strengthen
our collective security and cultivate shared ideals that send the
message that the United States is a friend worth having.
conclusion
Our Sailors, Marines, and civilian teammates will always be our
greatest source of strength in a challenging and changing world. On
behalf of each of these brave patriots and the families that serve at
their side, I once again thank the leadership and membership of this
Committee for your attention, interest, and ongoing commitment to the
defense of the United States of America. It is an honor to work with
each of you, and I look forward to your questions.
Senator Tester. Secretary Harker, thank you for your
statement. Now we will go to Admiral Gilday.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL MICHAEL GILDAY, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY
Admiral Gilday. Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today along with Secretary Harker and
General Berger. I am thankful for the enduring support that
this subcommittee provides the United States Navy.
I believe that this hearing comes at a critical time in our
Country. The competition at sea is intensifying. China and
Russia are rapidly mobilizing their militaries. They are
attempting to undermine our alliances and degrade the free and
open order.
The Chinese battle force is the largest in the world, and
it is growing. Backed by a robust industrial base and the
biggest shipbuilding infrastructure in the world, they command
a modern fleet of surface combatants, submarines, aircraft
carriers, amphibious assault ships, and next-generation
fighters.
Furthermore, they are strengthening their space
capabilities and stockpiling an arsenal of long-range missiles
to hold us and our allies and partners at risk.
China is deliberately modernizing for the twenty-first
century, building all domain capabilities that rival our own.
Make no mistake. Our fleet, your fleet, can control the seas in
conflict and project power is sure today, but we will be
increasingly challenged to do so in the future, unless
difficult choices continue to be made.
The results of analysis over the past 5 years inside and
outside the Pentagon have been consistent, and they have been
clear. America needs a larger, more capable fleet. Importantly,
our latest study gave us the headlights not only for the size,
but also for the composition of that force.
We need to transition away from older, less capable
platforms and deliver the platforms, weapons, and systems that
provide overmatch. At the same time, I think that we need to
grow. However, the Navy currently faces a task of
recapitalizing our strategic nuclear deterrent, something we
have not done in four decades, making a once-in-a-century
investment in our public shipyards and preserving the current
readiness so that our fleet can confidently operate forward and
be relevant.
Nearly 70 percent of the ships that we have today we will
have a decade from now. We have to take care of the ships that
we own, but the price tag on that readiness is rising. Over the
last 20 years, manpower operations and maintenance costs, which
make up over 60 percent of our budget, have grown at a rate 2.4
percent above inflation.
Meanwhile, our buying power is less than it was in 2010.
Back then, we had 288 ships. Today, we have 296. Given these
factors, if the Navy's topline remains flat or goes down, the
size of our fleet will shrink.
Nevertheless, we are determined to deliver the most ready,
the most capable, and the most lethal Navy we can with the
budget that we are given. To do this, we are improving
maintenance in our shipyards and aviation depots.
We are ensuring our ships are properly manned, our
magazines are filled with ammunition, spare parts are in our
storerooms, and our sailors are getting their steaming days and
the flying hours they need to hone their skills.
We are working hard on a more robust, resilient network
infrastructure as part of JADC2 (Joint All Domain Command and
Control).
We are investing in long-range precision firers, like
hypersonics and tactical Tomahawk, and we are developing
directed energy systems, lasers, to improve fleet
survivability.
Our eye is on the larger, hybrid fleet. We are determined
to build affordable capacity, including a deliberate approach
to uncrude vessels.
And, we are making sure every sailor can outthink and
outfight any adversary by scaling our twenty-first century
training framework, Ready Relevant Learning, as well as our
investment in live, virtual constructive training.
Senators, the average age of the Chinese fleet is 11 years.
Ours is 21. It is time to move decisively and build a future
Navy. We must modernize now, in this decade, or risk falling
behind while we maintain a forward posture that keeps America
safe and prosperous.
I am extremely proud of our sailors, our Navy civilians,
and our families, who have endured sustained, historic high
optempo in the midst of this pandemic. They are the source of
our strength, as are the patriots in our shipyards and our
aircraft depots, and our partners in industry, companies large
and small, who keep the production lines moving.
Again, I am grateful for this subcommittee's support to our
Navy and Marine Corps team, and I look forward to answering
your questions. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral Michael M. Gilday
Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the
posture of the United States Navy. Moreover, on behalf of all our
Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, thank you for your
continued leadership and support. With the funding provided by Congress
these last several years, we are building back our readiness,
strengthening our advantages at sea, and keeping our fleet deployed
forward where it matters.
This hearing comes at a critical time for our country. Multiple
nations are working to undermine the free and open rules-based
international system that has benefited so many for so long. Our rivals
are rapidly modernizing their militaries to erode our advantages. The
COVID-19 pandemic threatens the health and livelihood of our people.
Climate change puts our coast lines at risk with rising seas levels and
more severe weather. And the maritime environment--a vital source of
our nation's prosperity and protection--has become increasingly
contested. America's Navy is ready to meet these challenges. As we have
done since our founding, we will set sail to defend our Nation, take
care of our people, and succeed through teamwork.
The President has made it clear--America stands at an inflection
point. The choices we make today will have a dramatic impact on the
future of our nation. The very nature of the free and open
international system is threatened. To defend our nation, safeguard
economic opportunity, and secure the blessings of liberty for years to
come, we must renew our enduring advantages and work in concert with
our allies and partners to secure the rules-based order at sea.
america is a maritime nation--our people depend on the freedom of the
seas
The United States Navy--alongside the Marine Corps and Coast
Guard--provides a unique, enduring advantage to the American people.
Since our nation was founded, Americans have relied on the seas for
prosperity and protection. For 245 years, our Navy has deployed forward
to ensure safe passage for our commerce and to keep fights far from our
shores. Since the end of World War II, we have sailed with like-minded
navies to build and sustain the open, rules-based international system
at sea. Together, we have provided stability, deterred great power war,
and ushered in prosperity for billions across the world.
Over time, our reliance on the seas has only grown. Today, 90
percent of global trade by volume travels by sea, facilitating $3.7
trillion in U.S. commerce annually and supporting 31 million American
jobs. 95 percent of global internet traffic travels along undersea
cables, fueling our digital economy and accounting for $10 trillion of
financial transactions every day. The free flow of commerce--both
physical and digital--cannot be taken for granted. It relies on the
rules-based international system at sea and unimpeded access to markets
through open waterways. Even minor disruptions can have extraordinary
impacts. The recent grounding of the container ship Ever Given in the
Suez Canal, which delayed hundreds of ships and cost the global economy
an estimated $9.6 billion per day, highlights the importance of
predictable passage through the world's strategic waterways. If a rival
nation attempted to control passage through the South China Sea--a
strategic location where $208 billion of U.S. commerce flows annually--
the impact to the global economy would be extremely costly.
Meanwhile, the competition for offshore resources such as
aquaculture, energy, and rare-earth minerals is increasing across the
globe. Currently, 93 percent of the world's fishing stocks are
overexploited, threatening a major protein source for 3.3 billion
people. Several nations have deployed distant water fishing fleets and
expanded the use of maritime militias in their quest to maintain their
lucrative fishing industries. Additionally, many nations are
increasingly looking to maritime sources of energy and mineral wealth.
The global oil and gas industry, which generates an estimated $3.3
trillion in annual revenue, is turning toward energy exploration along
the seafloor to extract untapped reserves. With trillions of dollars in
raw resources awaiting discovery on the unmapped ocean floor, states
and multinational companies are racing to develop capabilities for
deep-sea mining.
The world's oceans have always been a wellspring of wealth and
prosperity. Today, and in the years ahead, they pose an increased risk
of competition turning into conflict.
the growing challenge to the united states and the open international
system
Despite benefiting from free and open seas for decades, the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia are currently working to
undermine the rules-based international system at sea. Both are
attempting to control access to key waters and the resources that lie
within these waters, inhibiting freedom of the seas and overflight.
Both are intimidating their neighbors and attempting to enforce
unlawful claims with the threat of force. Both are expanding
sophisticated networks of sensors and long-range weapons to hold
important waterways at risk. Both are leveraging offensive cyber
tactics to advance their competitive advantage, illegitimately
obtaining U.S. intellectual property to close research and development
gaps and disrupt our industrial base And both are attempting to replace
the free and open international system with a more unilateral and self-
serving one by turning incremental gains from their malign actions into
long-term advantages--such as militarizing contested features in the
South China Sea or illegally annexing the Crimean peninsula.
The PRC's and Russia's revisionist approaches at sea threaten U.S.
interests, undermine alliances and partnerships, and degrade the free
and open international order. Moreover, the PRC's and Russia's
aggressive naval growth and modernization are eroding U.S. military
advantages. Unchecked, these trends will leave the Navy unprepared to
ensure our advantage at sea and protect national interests within the
next decade.
The PRC--our pacing challenge--is carrying out a strategy aimed at
the heart of America's maritime power. They are deliberately working to
erode maritime governance, inhibit freedom of the seas and overflight,
deter our engagement in regional disputes, and displace the United
States as the partner of choice across the world. To achieve its
strategic goals, the PRC has rapidly grown its Navy from 262 to 350
ships. Today, their fleet includes modern surface combatants,
submarines, aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships, and polar
icebreakers. Expanding their robust naval force with a hundreds of
Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, they routinely harass
neighbors to exert pressure at a level below traditional armed
conflict. They have built the world's largest missile force to target
regional waters in an attempt to intimidate others. They have
strengthened all dimensions of military power to contest the United
States from the seafloor to space and in the information domain. Under
the One Belt, One Road Initiative, they are extending their maritime
infrastructure across the globe through aggressive investments,
particularly in ports, to control access to critical waterways.
As our U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander recently stated, the greatest
danger for America and our allies is the erosion of our conventional
deterrence with respect to the PRC. Absent a convincing conventional
deterrent, the PRC will continue to take action to undermine the free
and open conditions at sea upon which our citizens rely. While the PRC
is expanding its influence across the globe, this challenge is most
acutely present in the Indo-Pacific, including the East and South China
Seas and increasingly in the Indian Ocean. History shows that a strong
U.S. Navy provides a stabilizing influence across the world, assists in
peaceful maritime dispute resolution, and expands economic
opportunities for the American people. The future will prove no
different.
u.s. navy--deployed forward to defend america and our allies and
protect the freedom of the seas
The U.S. Navy is responding to the challenges to our free and open
international system by demonstrating our global reach, enforcing
common principles, sustaining the conditions that enable shared
prosperity, strengthening our alliances and partnerships, and
modernizing our fleet to control the seas in conflict and project power
in contested environments. Today, over 42,000 Sailors are deployed on
111 ships and submarines to preserve freedom of the seas, deter
conflict, and keep America and our allies safe. Together with the
Marine Corps and Coast Guard, our Navy is delivering integrated all-
domain naval power across the globe. And we are doing this in the midst
of a global pandemic.
Even with many parts of the world shut down in response to COVID-
19, the worldwide demand for naval forces required us to maintain a
high operational tempo, which included eight major Carrier Strike Group
and Expeditionary Strike Group deployments in FY-20. Since I appeared
before you last year, the Navy has continued to steam and fly from the
Arctic Circle to the Cape of Good Hope and from the Caribbean to the
South China Sea. Our hospital ships provided relief to American
communities; we executed underway training events for deployment
certification; and we conducted exercises as part of the Joint Force
and alongside our allies and partners. Our ability to sustain a forward
posture rests on the individual commitments of over 600,000 Sailors and
Navy civilians and their families. Their adaptive spirit and commitment
to COVID-19 protocols kept the force healthy and our ships at sea.
The pandemic taught us a great deal about operating in a
challenging environment. Our entire force learned how to adapt as we
iterated and honed our COVID-19 Standardized Operational Guidance. Our
logistics teams learned what it means to sustain our fleet with limited
means. Our information technology workforce quickly scaled virtual
private network licenses and supported the roll-out of virtual and
remote environments to keep us connected. Our dedicated, patriotic
shipyard and aviation depot workforce adapted to our COVID-19
protocols, came to work, and got our ships and aircraft back to sea.
And we learned how brittle portions of our defense industrial base
could be if not postured appropriately. We took every opportunity to
learn throughout this dynamic year--and shared those lessons with our
allies and partners--to improve the resiliency of our Navy in the years
ahead.
We certainly did not address the challenges of continued maritime
operations during this pandemic alone. Our broader Navy team--which
includes Congress, industry, research institutions and laboratories,
and our international allies and partners--overcame so much to design,
build, and sustain our fleet through this pandemic. We cannot thank all
of you enough. As our nation--and the world--emerges from this
pandemic, we will continue to face the daunting challenge posed by
long-term competition with the PRC and Russia. And we will need your
support, now more than ever, as we modernize and recapitalize the Navy
to sustain our enduring advantage at sea.
timeless roles of sea control and power projection
American security and prosperity is underpinned by the U.S. Navy's
ability to control the seas and project power ashore in conflict. The
world would be a less prosperous, more dangerous place if the seas were
not open and free for the benefit of all. Every day, combat-credible
naval forces operate forward to reassure our allies and partners,
confront malign behavior, and deter potential adversaries from
escalating into conflict. We preserve a stable and secure global
maritime environment and advance prosperity through transit, trade, and
the lawful pursuit of natural resources. Our ability to carry out these
essential functions comes from our ability to credibly control the seas
and project power ashore in conflict. These missions are timeless.
Controlling the seas protects friendly shipping, provides the Joint
Force and our allies freedom to maneuver, and denies the use of the
seas to our adversaries. In the past, sea control required us to fight
our adversaries on, under, and above the sea. Now, in our digital age,
it requires us to also fight in space, cyberspace, and across the
electromagnetic spectrum. In short, modern sea control demands the all-
domain power of our Navy and Joint Force.
America also needs a Navy that can influence events ashore. This
starts with deterring nuclear attack against our nation with our
ballistic missile submarines--the most survivable leg of the nuclear
triad. Projecting power and influence from the seas is vital to
deterring aggression and resolving crises on acceptable terms to the
United States. Our Navy must field capabilities in all domains--
employing information warfare, cyber capabilities, special operations,
and a host of conventional weapons launched from on, under, and above
the sea--to convince our rivals they have no viable means of achieving
their objectives through force. Our sea control and power projection
capabilities, alongside our strategic deterrent, provide America and
our allies their surest guarantee of peace. If the Navy fails to
deliver a fleet that can control the seas and project power, our nation
will lack the conventional deterrent needed to protect America and our
allies and expand economic opportunities for the American people.
While America's need for sea control and power projection
capabilities has not changed over time, how we operate and what we
operate with is changing. Emerging technologies have expanded modern
fights at sea into all domains. Ubiquitous and persistent sensors,
advanced battle networks, and long range weapons have made contested
spaces more lethal. Advances in artificial intelligence have increased
the importance of achieving decision superiority in combat.
Additionally, autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective
and affordable way for us to fight and win in contested spaces. These
technologies offer clear advantages to the militaries that integrate
them first. America cannot afford to fall behind.
Meanwhile, our fleet is adapting to operate in new ways. To
preserve and promote the rules- based order, we are taking a more
assertive posture in daily operations. We are challenging excessive
maritime claims by sailing and flying wherever international law allows
and expanding our decision advantage by persistently monitoring
activities at sea to expose malign behavior that undermines the rules-
based order. Our cyber teams are actively defending our networks and
projecting power in the cyber domain to maintain a tactical advantage
against our rivals. Furthermore, we are dynamically deploying our
forces forward to deter our rivals from making incremental gains and to
work alongside our allies and partners to keep the seas free and open.
Should deterrence fail, our Navy stands ready to confront
aggression and decisively win a fight. Using concepts such as the Joint
Warfighting Concept and Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO), we will
mass sea- and shore-based fires from distributed forces. By maneuvering
distributed forces across all domains, we will complicate adversary
targeting, exploit uncertainty, and achieve surprise. Controlling the
seas by constraining or destroying adversary fleets will enable freedom
of movement at sea and power projection ashore. Working with the Joint
Force and our allies and partners, Navy submarines, aircraft, and
surface ships will launch massed volleys of networked weapons to
overwhelm adversary defenses and compel a termination of conflict on
favorable terms. Delivering an all-domain fleet that is capable of
effectively executing these concepts is vital to maintaining a credible
conventional deterrent with respect to the PRC and Russia.
delivering all-domain naval power
To deliver the all-domain naval power America needs, our Navy must
evolve our capabilities and grow our capacity. The Navy--working in
close collaboration with the Joint Force--has studied, identified, and
prioritized the future capabilities we need to execute our evolving
warfighting concepts and maintain a credible deterrent with respect to
the PRC. The PRC has invested heavily in anti-access capabilities. In
conflict, they will seek to contest all domains and hold our forces at
risk with sophisticated networks of sensors and a large number of long-
range, precision weapons. To effectively deter the PRC as part of the
Joint Force, our fleet must be imbued with distributed weapons of
increasing range and speed, more magazine depth, more mobility, more
stealth and deception, and more sustainability. This requires a
deliberate adjustment to our naval force structure.
Based upon multiple rigorous, threat informed assessments conducted
over the past five years--both inside and outside the Navy--it is my
best military advice that America needs a larger Navy to counter the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) that is growing in both capability
and capacity. To fill critical Joint Force demands, the Navy requires
greater numbers of submarines, smaller and more numerous surface
combatants, more lethal offensive capabilities, a host of integrated
unmanned platforms--under, on, and above the seas--and a modern
strategic deterrent. We also need a robust network infrastructure to
link our distributed forces together and resilient logistics to sustain
them. In short, a balanced, hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned
platforms is the most effective and affordable way to meet the security
demands of our nation.
Analysis has also confirmed that numbers are not the only factor--
the composition and combat effectiveness of our fleet matters more.
Naval power is not a function of ship numbers alone, nor is it simply a
result of the lethal systems employed from those ships. It comes from
the concepts that shape how we fight and the means to maintain, train,
and equip our forces to win in combat. And it fundamentally comes from
developing Sailors--the true source of our naval power--who can
outthink and outfight and adversary.
Within the scope of the President's FY-22 Budget request (PB-22),
we are maximizing our Navy's contribution to the Joint Force. We are
prioritizing a fleet that is ready for combat over a larger fleet that
is not ready to fight. We are divesting of legacy assets that do not
bring sufficient lethality to the fight and investing in next-
generation platforms and systems that close critical Joint capability
gaps. Meanwhile, we are prioritizing the training and education needed
to prepare our Sailors to outthink and outfight any adversary. And we
are using every dollar we can to sustainably grow the fleet. As we
prepare our fleet for long-term competition with the PRC, we are
focused on key objectives in the following areas--readiness,
capabilities, capacity, and our Sailors.
Readiness
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver combat-ready
forces to deter aggression and keep the seas free and open. Deploying
battle-ready ships, submarines, and squadrons around the world--from
the South China Sea to the Arctic--deters aggression, reaffirms our
commitment to allies and partners, and keeps the seas open and free.
Readiness underpins our forward-engaged posture and touches all
elements of the Navy, from our shipyards and aviation depots to the
steaming and flying hours our Sailors use to hone their skills. With
nearly 70 percent of the fleet we will have in 2030 already in service
today, affordably sustaining our ships and aircraft is vital to meeting
future demands. This is why PB-22 places such an emphasis on critical
components of our Navy's readiness.
Our force is in a higher state of readiness today than prior to
2017 with a healthier surge force, improved shipboard manning, better
training for our crews, and improved parts availability. Increased
funding, combined with cultural reforms throughout the fleet, have
arrested the decline in our readiness and put us on a path to recovery.
Still, we have much work to do.
Deploying combat-ready forces starts with taking expert care of our
platforms. To this end, we are using data-driven reforms to improve
maintenance processes, increase operational availability, and save
taxpayer dollars. We have seen tremendous success with these methods in
our aviation community. For years our F/A-18 aircraft were stuck at a
55 percent mission capable rate. At the time, we assumed only an
increase in inputs--aircraft, manpower, or parts--could raise the
number of ready jets available to our pilots. However, in FY-19 we
shifted our focus to cultural reform and used the power of data-
analytics to raise our F/A-18E/F mission capable rate to 80 percent--a
rate we have continued to maintain throughout all of FY-20 and into FY-
21. With higher numbers of aircraft available, our aircrew are more
ready to fly and fight than at any point over the last decade.
We are now applying a similar approach to improving ship
maintenance. On-time private shipyard surface ship availability
completion rates rose from 37 percent in FY-19 to 67 percent in FY-20.
Meanwhile, public shipyards reduced maintenance delay days by over 75
percent from FY-19 to FY-20. To generate these gains, we modified
contracting strategies, increased dry dock capacity, and optimized
facility and pier layouts. We improved planning and adjusted
maintenance durations to better align workload with shipyard capacity.
We also leveraged authorities provided by Congress, such as the three
year ``Other Procurement, Navy'' pilot program, to increase flexibility
and stabilize demand for our shipyard workforces.
Unfortunately, COVID-19 impacted our recent ship depot maintenance
gains--as the need to protect our people caused delays in on-time
completion of ship maintenance. Half of our maintenance availabilities
in both public and private shipyards are trending late due to workforce
capacity reductions. To mitigate further impacts in our private
shipyards, we accelerated awards of contract options and improved the
cash positions of the industrial base. For our public shipyards, we
mobilized over 1,300 skilled Navy Reserve Sailors, increased overtime
usage, and rebalanced future workloads to address these delays. These
efforts have stemmed the disruption COVID-19 caused to our shipyard
maintenance and will mitigate work spilling over into FY-22. We are
methodically and safely returning to normal operating conditions.
Though some delays will continue to persist until the shipyards return
to full strength, the production workforce in both public and private
shipyards is returning to pre-pandemic levels.
Sustaining our advantage at sea requires us to make targeted
investments in critical infrastructure. This includes ensuring our
worldwide constellation of bases are postured to sustain and support
our fleet at sea. Of particular importance are critical elements of our
national defense industrial base such as our public shipyards and
aviation depots. Our Shipyard Infrastructure and Optimization Program
(SIOP) provides a strategic roadmap for necessary investments in dry-
docks, capital equipment, and optimizing the layout of these vital
national assets. We have already broken ground on a perimeter floodwall
at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and are building a new lock system at
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard with many more projects on the horizon. We
are also recapitalizing our aviation depot infrastructure. Through our
Naval Aviation Fleet Infrastructure Optimization Plan (FIOP), we are
developing a 10-year Master Plan that provides our aviation depots the
capacity to sustain and modernize our aircraft, engines, components,
and support equipment. Meanwhile, we are also transforming our Navy
enterprise shore network infrastructure into a secure, resilient
digital platform.
Sustaining our advantage also requires us to master all-domain
fleet operations. To credibly deter aggression, we must integrate the
all-domain power of the Navy with the Joint Force and our allies and
partners. This starts with providing our Sailors adequate ranges to
train for the high-end fight. The speed and scale of a potential fight
for control of the seas has changed. The size of our premier Carrier
Air Wing and SEAL training center--the Fallon Range Training Complex
(FRTC)--is no longer sufficient. Within existing capacity, our Sailors
cannot sufficiently train with longer-range weapons or practice the
tactics and techniques they will need to employ against a near-peer
threat. We will continue to work with Congress, tribal leadership,
local communities, and key stakeholders in the year ahead to modernize
the FRTC and ensure our Sailors have the infrastructure they need to
train to win in combat.
Mastering all-domain fleet operations also requires a rigorous
learning campaign. We are conducting a series of fleet battle problems,
wargames, and exercises to refine our concepts and capabilities. For
example, we recently conducted our most complex exercise to date
involving unmanned systems, which brought unmanned surface vessels and
aircraft under the control of a Zumwalt-class destroyer--the USS
Michael Monsoor (DDG-1001). This summer we will conduct Large Scale
Exercise 2021--bringing together our fleets from across the globe to
test out key components of our DMO concept. Overall, our campaign of
experimentation and learning prepares our Sailors for high-end
warfighting and drives updated joint concepts, fleet requirements, and
future naval capabilities.
Sustaining our advantage at sea depends on developing, training,
and fielding battle ready surface force crews. As of the end of 2020,
we have fully implemented all 111 Comprehensive Review/Strategic
Readiness Review recommendations. Over 1,700 junior officers have now
graduated from our new Junior Officer of the Deck course with training
aligned to International Maritime Organization's standards. We are
broadening the use of instructor-led virtual reality training through
the construction of two Mariner Skills Training Centers and the
modernization of our Integrated Navigation Seamanship and Ship handling
Trainers. With the support of Congress, we are investing in and
employing meaningful reforms in how we man our surface fleet, train our
crews, schedule and execute workups and deployments, and how we equip
and maintain the surface force.
We will continue to invest in these key priorities and drive
maximum efficiency from every dollar to deliver the naval power America
needs. We are currently meeting operational demands while adapting to
protect our Sailors and their families. But readiness recovery remains
a long game and will require sustained funding over time to fully
recover.
Capabilities
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must deliver a more
lethal and better connected fleet. The fight at sea is evolving
rapidly. Emerging technologies have expanded into all domains and made
contested spaces more lethal. Artificial intelligence and machine
learning, autonomy, quantum computing, additive manufacturing, and new
communications technologies are transforming the maritime environment.
These changes emphasize the need for the Navy to develop sea control
and power projection capabilities at speed and scale. That means more
lethality, more survivability, better combat logistics, and a resilient
network that connects command and control nodes, platforms, weapons,
and sensors all together.
PB-22 prioritizes capabilities that amplify the fleet's ability to
disperse and project synchronized lethal and non-lethal effects from
multiple axes and in all domains. To achieve this vision, we are
developing a Naval Operational Architecture (NOA) that integrates with
Joint All-Domain Command and Control. The NOA is a collection of
networks, infrastructure, data, and analytic tools that connects our
distributed forces and provides decision advantage. Beyond
recapitalization of our undersea nuclear deterrent, there is no higher
development priority. We launched Task Force Overmatch this past
October to align resources and expertise from across our force to field
the NOA by the middle of this decade.
Developing longer-range, higher-speed weapons--such as hypersonic
missiles--will give our warfighters the competitive advantage they
need. Hypersonic missiles change the risk calculus for our rivals by
providing a non-nuclear sea-based prompt, global strike capability. We
are working in close partnership with the Army to deliver a truly-
joint, conventional hypersonic weapon across land and sea-based
platforms. We conducted a successful test of our common hypersonic
glide body in March 2020, which keeps our Conventional Prompt Strike
program on- track to field this game changing capability by the mid-to-
late 2020s. PB-22 signals our strong support for developing this vital
joint capability.
Our adversaries are attempting to deter us with massive numbers of
sea- and shore-based missiles. To complicate their ability to
understand the potential battlespace, we are investing in Counter-
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence,
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting systems. Our response also
includes fielding an inexhaustible directed-energy system that
accurately and reliably defeats anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The
High Energy Laser Counter ASCM Project is expediting the development of
critical technologies to protect our ships from the cruise missile
threat. At the same time, we are pursuing other directed energy
initiatives in parallel--such as the 150 kilowatt class laser weapon
system--to accelerate learning and fielding of this critical
capability. The recent demonstration onboard USS Portland showed how we
can disable an unmanned aerial vehicle using directed energy. We will
continue to invest in laser technology and non-kinetic defensive
systems to increase fleet survivability while maintaining free magazine
space for our offensive weapons.
Our logistics enterprise and strategic sealift capacity are also
vital to sustaining our advantage at sea and keeping the Joint Force
operating forward. Accordingly, we are modernizing networks and
communication and navigation systems of our Combat Logistics Force to
best posture this aging fleet to operate in a contested environment. We
are also investing in increased fuel distribution capacity as well as
improvements in our expeditionary rearm capabilities and resuscitative
care surgery systems. Specific to the Sealift Fleet, which provides
inter-theater lift capability to the Joint Force, we have accelerated
recapitalization, leveraging a ``buy used'' strategy to replace our
least ready vessels, and invested in service life extension for the net
effect of increased readiness. We are grateful for Congress's
authorization to affordably revitalize our Sealift Fleet with used
vessels. We are moving ahead with purchasing two used ships in 2021 and
five used vessels in PB-22, signaling our continued support for this
approach. We will continue to work with Congress to efficiently
recapitalize this critical capability in the years ahead and request
that Congress remove remaining obstacles to used ship procurement. Our
longer-term plan is to construct new vessels to replace prepositioned
vessels in the Maritime Prepositioning Force as those ships begin to
reach expected service life at the end of this decade.
Pivoting toward the future and resourcing needed capabilities--
especially in the Indo-Pacific region--requires tough choices. To
invest in the next-generation capabilities we need to meet the
challenge of near-peer competitors, we need to divest of our legacy
capabilities that no longer bring sufficient lethality to the fight. We
will work transparently with Congress to make these critical divestment
decisions and free up resources to modernize the fleet.
Capacity
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must field a larger,
hybrid fleet that is designed for sea control and power projection. To
provide a credible conventional deterrent in peace and win in war, we
need to sustainably generate cost-effective platforms and mature
unmanned systems. This transition will increase the capacity of the
fleet, expand our ability to distribute our forces, and rebalance the
fleet away from exquisite, manpower-intensive platforms and toward
smaller, less-expensive ones. By growing a hybrid fleet--on, above, and
below the seas--we will ensure our success across the continuum of day-
to-day competition, crisis, and conflict.
As we design and build a larger, hybrid-fleet, our number one
acquisition priority remains delivering the Columbia-class ballistic
missile submarine on time. No mission is more important to our nation
than providing a secure and reliable strategic nuclear deterrent. Our
ballistic missile submarines are the most survivable portion of our
nuclear triad and provide an assured response to any strategic nuclear
attack on the United States. With our Ohio-class submarines nearing the
end of their service life, we cannot afford to get behind in delivering
on the Columbia program. The first submarine is starting construction
this year with the second boat on-track for procurement in FY-24. We
will continue to drive affordability, technology development, and
integration efforts to ensure the program remains on schedule and our
ballistic missile submarines remain on patrol in the decades ahead.
Meanwhile, our future fleet places a premium on expanding our
undersea advantage. During conflict, sea control and sea denial from
beneath the waves are among our Navy's core advantages--we cannot
afford to yield any ground to our competitors. We are now planning to
construct the tenth Block V Virginia-class submarine with a Virginia
Payload Module (VPM). PB-22 underscores our sustained support for
procuring two Virginia-class submarines per year. Sustainable
production of the Virginia-class submarine, in addition to the
development of a follow-on attack submarine program, is key to
sustaining our undersea advantage in the years ahead.
As we shift our focus toward smaller platforms that can operate in
a more dispersed manner, there is a clear need to rapidly incorporate
unmanned systems into our fleet architecture. They expand our
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to
our missile magazines, enhance fleet survivability, and provide more
risk-worthy vessels to operate inside the weapons engagement zone of
any adversary. In other words, they give our operational commanders
flexible and effective options to maneuver within a contested
environment. The Navy is taking a deliberate approach to developing
unmanned systems through our Unmanned Campaign Framework. Our framework
lays out an overarching vision on how we intend to produce tested and
proven systems at scale, as well as develop the core technologies
required to successfully integrate unmanned systems on, below, and
above the sea. By the end of this decade, our Sailors must have a high
degree of confidence and skill operating alongside proven unmanned
platforms. The combined capability of manned and unmanned systems will
provide our operational forces the advantage we need in a future fight.
Nuclear powered aircraft carriers are the most survivable and
versatile airfields in the world. For decades to come, they will remain
a cornerstone of the Navy's forward presence, sea control, and power
projection capabilities. USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) represents a
generational leap in the aircraft carrier's capacity to project power.
Over the past year, Ford has been underway, executing over 7,100 total
launches and recoveries with the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System
and Advanced Arresting Gear. Additionally, over 30,000 pounds of
ordnance has been moved, loaded and expended by embarked F/A-18
aircraft using Advanced Weapons Elevators (AWEs). Seven of Ford's AWEs
have completed certification and the remaining four are on track to
certify by this summer. We expect Ford to be cleared for blue water
operations later this year and ready for employment in 2022.
The striking power of our Carrier Air Wing is vital to controlling
the seas and projecting power in a high-end fight, and the adaptability
of the air wing keeps our carriers relevant for 50-plus years of life.
The air wing of today is currently transforming with the addition of
the F-35C, the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and the CMV-22B Osprey. PB-22
increases our F-35 inventory to get the fleet closer to a fourth
generation and fifth generation fighter mix. Carrier Air Wing TWO--
which includes the first operational F-35C squadron--is currently
undergoing pre-deployment training and will deploy later this year.
Meanwhile, we are rapidly developing the MQ-25 Stingray--the Air Wing's
first unmanned platform--to extend the striking range of our fleet. And
we are laying the groundwork for the highly networked air wing of the
future--a 6th generation family of systems that leverages manned-
unmanned teaming--which will deliver overwhelming firepower in
contested spaces in the years ahead. Delivering a 6th generation family
of systems is vital to keeping pace with PRC fighter development and
sustaining our advantage over the seas. America cannot afford to fall
behind.
We are also going through a surface combatant reset on ship design
and construction to provide the next enduring hull forms for small and
large surface combatants. Our surface combatant inventory is aging with
limited options for future upgrades. At the same time, our future fleet
design places an emphasis on greater numbers of small surface
combatants. The Constellation-class frigate is a versatile, multi-
mission platform capable of supporting day-to-day operations and the
high-end fight. We began cutting steel on Constellation this year, and
we are excited to incorporate this ship into the fleet in 2026.
Meanwhile, the future large surface combatant (DDG(X)) will bring the
space, weight, and power needed to incorporate future capabilities for
the high-end fight such as high power lasers, long-range strike, and
sensor growth. Together, both ship classes will bring more lethality,
more survivability, more endurance, and more self-sufficiency to the
fleet.
We are not just building better ships--we are building ships
better. The Navy is mindful of past shipbuilding efforts that did not
perform to plan, which is why we are moving ahead in ways that
deliberately reduce risk. Early and sustained industry involvement,
robust land based testing, and focused design maturity are foundational
to our shipbuilding approach. We appreciate the strong support from
Congress in FY-21. Delivering ships on time, on budget, and within
performance targets is our priority.
Sailors
To sustain America's advantage at sea, we must recruit, develop,
and retain a seasoned team of naval warriors. The strength of our naval
power depends on the strength of our Sailors--active and reserve,
uniformed and civilian. In the long-term strategic competition we face
today, every Sailor must be able to outthink and outfight any
adversary. Our Navy must remain the best trained, finest educated, and
most ready maritime force in the world. We recognize the strength we
gain from a diverse force and our actively pursuing combat-minded
Sailors with varied backgrounds, experiences, and thought to build up
our readiness and resilience. As we take care of our Sailors, we will
accelerate their development and harness their talents to keep America
safe and prosperous.
As we modernize our fleet, we are modernizing our talent management
systems to better recruit, train, retain, and support our Sailors. We
achieved our accession goal of 39,600 new active duty Sailors in FY-20
to further improve afloat manning and filled operational billets to
their highest point in six years. PB-22 makes a slight reduction in our
end-strength with the divestment of legacy ships. However, the demand
for a highly trained, diverse force has not abated. We are grateful to
Congress for the generous pay raises and personnel reforms. The Navy is
leveraging both--alongside our talent management initiatives--to better
recruit and retain our incredibly talented force. Meanwhile, we
continue to transform our MyNavyHR infrastructure to rapidly deliver
services to our Sailors and families at a reduced cost. This includes
the DOD-leading mobile applications that help with the challenge of
military moves and finding childcare or housing and the MyNavy Career
Centers which proved vital during the COVID-19 pandemic.
We are continuing to cultivate a culture of excellence across the
fleet, which builds resilience and strengthens our Navy's enduring
standards of professional competence and personal character. Over the
past year, our culture of excellence campaign has strengthened the
signature behaviors that define our service to prevent the occurrence
of destructive behaviors--such as sexual harassment or discrimination.
At the same time, we have maintained a resolute focus on preventing the
scourge of sexual assault within our ranks. PB-22 increases our
civilian Sexual Assault Prevention and Response workforce to provide
greater support for our Sailors and drive down investigation timelines.
Overall, we are providing more training, more tools, and more resources
so every Sailor receives the support they need.
We are also actively building a workforce that represents the full
diversity of America and the strength it brings. Task Force One Navy
(TF1N) was launched last year to analyze and evaluate issues in our
military that detract from Navy cohesiveness and readiness. The task
force released their report in January 2021 and highlighted 56
recommendations that will elevate a culture of diversity, equity, and
inclusion throughout the fleet. Respect and the promise of opportunity
are core to our Navy, and we are committed to implementing TF1N reforms
and ridding discrimination, sexism, and other forms of structural
biases from our ranks.
Without a doubt, the vast majority of Sailors in the U.S. Navy
serve every day with honor, character, and integrity. However, we
cannot be under any illusions that extremist behaviors do not exist in
our Navy. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, each command across
the fleet conducted a stand down to address extremism within our ranks.
Racism, injustice, indignity, and disrespect keeps us from reaching our
potential--an inclusive, respectful, professional fighting force that
answers the Nation's call with unparalleled readiness and lethality.
The stand down was only a starting point; this will be an ongoing
fight. We are committed to eliminating extremist behavior and all of
its corrosive effects on our fighting force.
The intellectual investments we make in each Sailor provide a key
advantage over our rivals. To strengthen our advantage in this area, we
are aligning the curriculum and research of the Navy's education
enterprise to deliver warfighting advantage in our operations at sea
and in how we design, deliver, and generate our forces. Additionally,
the Naval Community College is on track to provide our Sailors
opportunities for education in fields that strengthen the service.
Maintaining educational relationships with our international partners
through exchanges and scholarships remains a priority for us to deepen
enduring relationships and broaden understanding between likeminded
navies.
To ensure our Sailors are ready for any challenge on the horizon,
we are scaling Ready Relevant Learning (RRL) and Live, Virtual,
Constructive (LVC) training. RRL provides the right training, at the
right time, in the right way for our Sailors. It replaces ``one-and-
done'' classroom training events with career-long learning continuums
through a mix of in-classroom instruction and modern training methods.
LVC technology blends the intensity of underway operation with high-
fidelity synthetic training, allowing our Sailors to master high-end
tactics in secure and controllable conditions. Our force will always
fall back to their baseline under the stress of combat--RRL and LVC
will raise their baseline.
conclusion
Let there be no doubt--America is a maritime nation. Our security
and prosperity are inextricably linked to the seas. For 245 years--in
both calm and rough waters--your Navy has stood the watch to protect
our homeland, preserve the freedom of the seas, and defend our way of
life. For generations, we have provided a bulwark against aggression
and have underwritten the international order that led to an
unprecedented era of peace and prosperity. Now that order is under
threat.
As the President stated, we are at an inflection point. The PRC's
rapid military growth and aggressive behavior at sea has put it on a
trajectory that will challenge our maritime advantage in the years
ahead. Our naval forces--and the American people--must maintain a
clear-eyed resolve to compete, deter, and--if necessary--defeat our
rivals, while accelerating the development of a larger and more lethal
future fleet. We must do so while integrating more closely with the
Marine Corps and Coast Guard to generate integrated all-domain naval
Power. Only by working as a team and taking care of our people will we
be able to defend the nation in the years ahead. We must move
deliberately, but also with speed. Our actions this decade will shape
the maritime balance of power for the rest of this century.
On behalf of more than 600,000 active and reserve Sailors and Navy
Civilians, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I
am grateful to this committee, and to all of your colleagues in
Congress, for your steadfast commitment to the Navy. We look forward to
sailing alongside you to sustain our advantage at sea.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Admiral Gilday.
Next up, it is you, General Berger.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. BERGER, COMMANDANT,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
General Berger. Chairman Tester, Ranking Member Shelby, and
distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the posture of your Marine Corps this
morning, our priorities, and the resources required to fund it
all.
Over the past 2 years, since becoming Commandant, I have
come to better understand and appreciate the bipartisan support
of this committee, which I think is critical to creating and
sustaining the force we have today, but also the force we are
going to need for the future. I realize there are competing
national priorities you must wrestle with, and that is going to
put pressure on Defense budgets. But, I am also confident that
you appreciate the severity of the security environment today.
The global competition, which the Chairman and Ranking both
mentioned, with China and Russia is accelerating. Your military
is going to need more advanced capabilities to effectively
compete, to reassure our allies and partners, and to deter war.
Force Design 2030 is the Marine Corps' answer to creating
the cutting-edge capabilities that will better enable the fleet
and the joint force to deter, to compete, and to respond with
ready forces to any crisis anywhere on the globe.
We are roughly 2 years into our Force Design effort. And
while I am encouraged by our progress, I am not satisfied by
the pace of change. We must move faster. To accelerate our
modernization, we, as a service, need to do a better job of
explaining the details of Force Design 2030 to yourselves and
to your staff, and that is my responsibility as your
Commandant.
It is important that this committee understands that the
capabilities we seek are not the stuff of science fiction. They
are already programs of record based on proven technology. And,
while we do not have sufficient time this morning to address
the full scope of our Force Design effort, I do want to
highlight three key capabilities.
First is long-range precision fires for sea denial and sea
control. Over the past several years, we have proven that our
existing HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System)
vehicles can hold naval vessels at risk with ground-based,
anti-ship missiles. Through aggressive experimentation, we
can--we have further enhanced that capability.
This year, we successfully launched a naval strike missile
from a modified, unmanned, joint light tactical vehicle,
hitting a target at sea underway. This system, which we call
the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or
NMESIS, is exactly the type of capability that Combatant
Commanders are calling for to enhance their deterrent posture.
Second is unmanned ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance). In 2020, we began a transition to a mixed
capability of long-range ship and ground-based, unmanned aerial
systems, to include the MQ-9 Reaper. The Reaper has a proven
capability that will significantly expand our organic ISR and
enable us to better support fleet and joint operations,
including anti-submarine operations.
We have also initiated a partnership with industry to
develop a future autonomous, long-range, unmanned surface
vessel. That is going to significantly improve the
reconnaissance capability of our Marine Expeditionary Units, or
MEUs.
Third, we are investing in loitering munitions. These
swarming aerial munitions, which employ automatic target
recognition, have proven exceptionally lethal in recent global
conflicts, most recently in Europe. Our own tests have also
demonstrated this technology to be effective with five of five
successful shots during testing.
We plan to equip our infantry and reconnaissance Marines
with this loitering capability. Mounting those munitions on
both ground vehicles and long-range unmanned surface vessels--
the one I mentioned earlier--and we will make a final decision
on vendors this year.
With that brief update in mind, a fair question I think
might be to ask, How do you plan to pay for all these new
capabilities and other force design investments? Recognizing
today's budget environment, the Marine Corps has, for the past
2 years, and we will continue, pursuing a cost-neutral approach
to force design. We will self-fund our modernization. To ensure
the success of this approach, I will ask for your support in
reducing the total procurement of some platforms, commensurate
with the recent reductions in our end strength.
The fact is, today's Marine Corps is significantly smaller
than it was a decade ago--about 24,000 Marines smaller. That
means we will not need as many ground vehicles. We will not
need as many aircraft as we thought we did when initial
procurement decisions were made decades ago. It is just simple
math.
With the reductions outlined in our force design report, I
believe we will have sufficient resources to create the modern
capabilities required for competition, deterrence, and crisis
response without a further reduction in our end strength.
That approach, however, relies 100 percent on this
committee's confidence in allowing the Marine Corps to retain
and reallocate the internal resources we generate through end
strength reductions, cutting legacy platforms, and right-sizing
previously set programs of record for new capabilities, like
the F-35, CH-53K, and the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.
My promise to you as Commandant is to remain the very best
steward of taxpayer dollars, and I ask for your continued
support to ensure your Marines, which are the Nation's force in
readiness, remain ready to respond to any crisis, anywhere in
the world, today, and into the future.
Like the Acting Secretary mentioned, I welcome the
opportunity to work with this committee, and I look forward to
your questions, both in this hearing and in the weeks to come.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of General David H. Berger
Chairman Tester, Vice Chairman Shelby, and distinguished members of
this committee, thank you for this opportunity to present the annual
report on the Marine Corps. More importantly, thank you for your
continued support and leadership over this challenging year. I believe
strongly that major change in existing force structure and ways of
doing business are needed in this era of renewed great power
competition. The strategic environment the Marine Corps and joint force
operate in has changed, as has the domestic context as a result of the
ongoing COVID-19 and related relief measures. We must therefore make
appropriate adjustments to our investment plans to ensure a proper
return on the taxpayers' investment. The promotion and sustainment of
the Marine Corps that our nation and fleets will need in 2030 and
beyond requires your continued active support.
Since testifying last year, our nation has engaged in a long
overdue conversation on race and social justice sparked by several
visible incidents of institutional racism, and perhaps more
importantly--how to remedy the inequities of the present. As with all
other Americans, I--and every other Marine--have acknowledged these
challenges, and will continue to do our part to overcome them once and
for all. While confronting issues of inequality, we have simultaneously
endured the adverse consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. Like
millions of others, Marines and their families across the country and
globe suffered the consequences of isolation, closure of our public
schools, and increased childcare demands; and like those millions of
other Americans, Marines made the necessary sacrifices to stop the
spread. I am proud of every one of those Marines with their collective
leadership and of their ability to rapidly adapt and lead by example.
Our nation witnessed a small but violent minority attempt to
subvert the rule of law through an overt act of violent coercion on
January 6, 2021. Like most every other American, I was shocked by this
attack on our democracy. I was even more dismayed to learn that some of
those engaged in that attack had previously served in the military--to
include the United States Marine Corps. Thankfully, we as a nation and
military have done as we always do--learned, endured, and grown
stronger. We have and will continue to actively work to identify
recruits and Marines who hold extremist views and we look forward to
participating in the Secretary of Defense's new Countering Extremism
Working Group to develop additional methods of keeping extremists from
within our ranks.
Over the past year, I have continued to communicate my
understanding of the future demands of naval expeditionary warfare and
maritime gray zone competition. Related to the future of naval
campaigns, I have articulated a case for change to reinforce and expand
existing naval warfighting advantages and create future strategic
advantages. It is abundantly clear that a future operating environment
characterized by a maturing and proliferating precision strike regime
will place heavy demands on our Nation's Naval Services. We are not yet
organized, trained, equipped, or postured to meet those demands and
support fleet operations. This is no longer a controversial assertion
as it was when my predecessor first uttered it. The vast majority of
defense professionals--including the Members of the bipartisan Future
of Defense Task Force--perceive the same challenges I do in the
emerging operating environment, as well as the urgent need for real
innovation and rapid change in response. Although there is an ongoing,
healthy debate about how and what we should change across the Armed
Services, there are very few lining up to defend the status quo. We
must continue to discuss these changes, but defense professionals have
almost unanimously acknowledged that real change is required--and soon.
Though some things require substantial change, we should be clear
to acknowledge those foundational tenets which remain as relevant and
operationally suitable today as they have been over the previous 70
years. In 1952, Members of Congress noted the Marine Corps ``can
prevent the growth of potentially large conflagrations by prompt and
vigorous action during their incipient stages. The nation's shock
troops must be the most ready when the nation is least ready...to
provide a balanced force-in-readiness for a naval campaign and, at the
same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain
international disturbances short of large-scale war...'' This role as
the nation's force-in-readiness, prepared to create strategic advantage
via its ability to be quickest to respond to either crisis or conflict,
and prepared to both prevent and contain conflict below the threshold
of traditional armed conflict remains as valid today as it was when
first articulated.
personnel and talent management
None of our Force Design 2030 aspirations are possible without
addressing the people within our ranks. As Secretary Austin
highlighted, ``our most critical asset...is our people.'' I believe
this is even more relevant within the Marine Corps. Marines are the
heart and soul of the Corps. Almost all of your 225,000 Marines serve
honorably every day, representing the very best of our country and your
constituencies. No institution, however, is without flaws. As I noted
last year, malignant individuals and small malignant subcultures
continue to exist within your Marine Corps. In this era of profound
ideological division within our nation, some individual Marines
regrettably bring with them, or fall victim to while in service,
misogynistic, racist, and homophobic/transphobic ideologies driven by
hate, fear, and ignorance. While I have instituted even more rigorous
policies than previously existed to ensure we identify such individuals
during enlistment and accession screening, I remain committed to
identifying and holding accountable any Marine unable to uphold our
core values and to adhere to our unapologetically high standards. This
is what you should expect from me, and you will get it.
Within the context of the larger national conversation on race,
social justice, and equality, it became clear to me early in my
Commandancy that there were symbols and behaviors within our Corps that
challenged the cohesion and unity essential to military effectiveness.
The Confederate Battle flag stood out as one such symbol. I am not a
historian and do not take a position as to the true meaning of this
ancient banner, but some in today's world have rallied around the
colors of that defeated rebellion to foster division and hate. As a
result, I prohibited its display aboard all Marine Corps installations
beginning last spring. My primary responsibility is to prepare Marines
to fight and win in combat, and we cannot tolerate artificial division
driving wedges among your Marines--especially ones so easy to identify
and remove. I will do everything within my authority to remove any
obstacle preventing equality and cohesion. Signs or symbols that
support or endorse hatred, ignorance, or injustice have no place in our
Corps.
While these acknowledgements of past prejudice are good first
steps, we must do more than simply look over our shoulders at the past.
We must acknowledge the real bias and obstacles in the system today. We
must promote and retain the very best Marines; however, it is clear to
me that a degree of structural racism and sexism exists within our
current system. We must create a system of structural equality that
ensures all Marines--of all backgrounds--are able to use their best
talents to solve the problems we soon will face. The diversity of
thought and actions each Marine brings will help us find more creative
and innovative solutions to these future challenges. We must actively
work to retain and grow this diversity of thought through a more
diverse group of talented individuals, while at the same time
protecting against extremism.
Over the past decade and in close coordination with Congress, we've
prioritized the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual assault as
well as dedicated tremendous effort into providing the appropriate
response to these criminal acts. I am convinced of the linkage between
sexual harassment and sexual assault, thus we will continue to make
every effort to eliminate both from our ranks with your continued
assistance. We have increased the number of Victim Legal Counselors
dedicated to supporting sexual assault victims over the past 12 months.
However, all of these efforts are dedicated to the response after a
tragic event has occurred. We must do better at the prevention in order
to stop sexual assault and sexual harassment before they occur.
Although we conduct regular training aimed at preventing this from
happening, we are still working to overcome unhealthy attitudes and
behaviors recruits arrive with to Recruit Training. We must develop
practices that identify those negative behaviors before they turn into
heinous acts and prevent such behaviors from occurring in the first
place.
Improving the capabilities and proficiencies of the individual
Marine necessitates we must also have the very best senior leaders for
those Marines. I am humbled to serve alongside the General Officers and
Flag Officers within the Department of the Navy. But even one instance
of misconduct or misbehavior within our General Officer ranks is too
many. Over the past decade, the Marine Corps has selected several
officers for promotion to brigadier general who subsequently failed to
be confirmed by the Senate. This is unacceptable. Over the coming
months, I will announce several major policy changes related to talent
management to include how we screen and select our commanders and most
senior leaders. We are currently reviewing the efficacy of implementing
a 360-degree review for all lieutenant colonels and colonels eligible
for command selection and all colonels eligible for selection to
brigadier general, to help ensure we identify the absolute best who
have earned the trust and respect of juniors, peers, and seniors alike.
In addition to these issues related to screening, I remain concerned at
the absence of Black officers within the senior ranks of our aviation
enterprise and specifically within the ranks of our fixed-wing pilots,
as well as the paucity of female general officers. We are currently
studying both issues, and will share the results of those studies once
completed.
As you are aware, we cannot create new senior leaders in a day. If
we are to correct our gap in diversity at the senior ranks, we must
also address diversity at accessions. The largest single source of
commissioning within the Marine Corps is the U. S. Naval Academy,
accounting for nearly 20% of officer commissions each year. A recently
released study identified that almost 75% of the nominations to our
service academies were given to white students. The diversity of this
population has a direct impact on what leaders are available for
selection to our senior ranks.
It is not enough that we recruit and train the very best. Once
Marines have joined our ranks, we must nurture and incentivize them
along their individual journeys through a modern talent management
system flexible enough to account for changing career interests and
common life choices over time. Without such a system, we will
increasingly struggle to retain the very best people in an ever more
competitive marketplace. Our one-size-fits-all, industrial-era approach
that treats individuals as interchangeable cogs within a larger machine
does not appropriately incentivize the most talented individuals to
remain in service. We are currently reviewing policy options that will
offer Marines greater flexibility when it comes to tour lengths based
on an individual's circumstances--most notably when a Marine has a
child entering or completing high school. Our Marines must not be
forced to choose between being good parents or being good Marines.
Those sterling goals must be compatible. I remain committed to
improving the lives of our Marines as they become parents and we are
looking into ways that would prevent them from having to choose between
the newborn and continued service as a Marine. I truly desire a Marine
Corps known for being the best within the joint force for our treatment
of new parents and families--and not just our warfighting prowess.
It is a well-known issue that the Marine Corps is struggling to
recruit and retain Americans possessing the crucial science,
technology, engineering, and mathematical skills and competencies
required for the future. Technology companies present exciting and
challenging opportunities for software developers, cyber professionals,
and engineers. We must offer opportunities that allow someone to choose
both service and professional reward. In addition, we must do a better
job targeting the application of our NROTC scholarships to these
individuals, as well as explore new possibilities with Historically
Black Colleges and Universities to satisfy these shortfalls.
The military services--including your Marine Corps--continue to
lose the competition with the civilian airline industry for pilots and
maintainers, even with the adverse impacts of COVID-19 on the airline
industry. We are not maintaining sufficient numbers of naval aviators
and F-35 maintainers to sustain either our existing inventory of
aircraft or aircraft programmed for the years to come. Within our F-35
community, we have a shortfall of both pilots and maintainers. I am
concerned that if we do not remedy these shortfalls in the very near
future, we may be in a situation in which we are directed by Congress
to procure aircraft for which we have insufficient pilots and
maintainers.
training and education
A key element of our larger force design transformation is our need
to adopt an information age approach to training and education that
produces better leaders and warfighters more effectively and
efficiently. The essence of this approach is to focus on identifying,
developing, and sustaining the unique talents of individual Marines,
not turning out MOS-shaped cogs to fit MOS-shaped slots in a machine.
Better warfighters in an era of exponential change means adaptive,
critical thinkers who are also tactical and operational masters of
their profession.
Among many implications of this shift will be higher expectations
and intellectual standards for Marines, especially commissioned
officers, at every stage of their selection for and attendance at
formal schools. We still need standardized training and education to
set a baseline and inculcate our core Service values and ethos, but
there are significant aspects of entry-level training that must be
adapted. Much of our current understanding of future warfighting
requirements, associated concepts, and force design point to a more
highly trained force from the entry-level onward. We need to change how
we train and educate as well. We have known for a long time that rote
repetition and even ``perfect practice'' against static, unresisting
targets is only the barest beginning of mastery. Consistent
opportunities to make tactical and operational decisions against a
thinking enemy must be a critical part of our curricula at all levels.
This kind of force- on-force wargaming and training must stand on a
solid foundation of military history and theory-games, simulations, and
exercises are necessary, but not sufficient. We will develop that
foundation in school, but sustain it by rigorous, accountable, self-
directed effort. We must address the question of ``standards''
transparently and head-on to create the force we desire, and to create
the force we advertise. In an initial step to creating a philosophy and
culture of a learning organization, last year I signed the first all-
new service doctrine since 1998; MCDP 7 Learning was released in
February and MCDP 1-4 Competing in December. In addition to releasing
new doctrine, we have elevated command of our Training and Education
Command to a three-star general, equal to all other Deputy Commandants,
and are in the process of re-establishing a robust Futures Directorate.
Achieving diversity of thought requires fixing our entry-level
instruction to allow every new recruit and officer candidate the same
opportunity to master these skills without it impeding their future
career opportunities. Not every young man or woman who joins our ranks
grew up participating in activities relevant to individual battlefield
skills such as marksmanship, orienteering, water survival, or technical
skills. As a matter of longstanding practice, however, we continue to
assess potential at the very earliest stages of our recruit and officer
training programs based on performance in precisely those skills. There
is no doubt of the continuing importance of these military basics, but
we cannot expect every new Marine to master those individual skills
with the same amount of in-service instruction, regardless of previous
experience. A new recruit who has never touched a rifle cannot be
expected to master marksmanship in the same amount of time as a recruit
who grew up handling rifles regularly, and a Marine who never learned
to swim should not compete unaided for job placement with a Marine who
grew up as a competitive swimmer. In effect, we penalize Marines who
fail to master these basic skills because they did not start with the
same knowledge or skill base. While holding the line on the standard of
basic competencies that define a Marine, our entry-level training must
provide the instruction necessary for every recruit and officer
candidate to achieve mastery in basic skills, regardless of how much
time it takes.
The COVID-19 pandemic brought new challenges and opportunities to
your Marine Corps. During the entire time, your force-in-readiness
continued recruiting, training, operating, and deploying around the
globe. Although we did not stop any of our activities, we did learn
many lessons from the pandemic that we can continue to use going
forward to make a more resilient and capable force. We devised new
methods of virtually connecting with potential recruits and with our
force, internally. For entry-level training, we spread out recruits
while they slept and installed more handwashing stations, which has
virtually eliminated the inevitable illness that the new recruits will
pass around as they come in from all over the country. A key factor in
this success has been the level of discipline instilled by small unit
leaders which prevented any significant outbreaks and kept Marines
healthy. Your Marines continue to serve their communities by
establishing federal COVID-19 vaccine sites in local communities in
support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. As President Biden
highlighted, we don't have enough people to provide vaccination shots--
put the shots in people's arms--so Marines are filling in this
immediate shortfall.
gender integrated training
The FY 2020 NDAA directed the Marine Corps to integrate training at
both Marine Corps Recruit Depots Parris Island and San Diego. Since the
signing of the law, we have trained multiple integrated companies at
MCRD Parris Island. In February, the recruits of Lima Company were the
first gender-integrated company at MCRD San Diego in the installation's
100-year existence. To train the first females at MCRD San Diego, we
graduated the first gender-integrated class at Drill Instructor School
in San Diego in December and relocated female drill instructors from
MCRD Parris Island. We will take the lessons learned from this company
as well as a concurrent study to identify the requirements needed to
fulfill the 2020 NDAA within the prescribed timelines. However, as I
have publicly stated several times, we will prioritize options that
provide the best training and most efficient use of resources to ensure
Marines graduating from boot camp are ready for the rigors of service
in an elite organization during challenging times.
force design
Shortly after I testified before this Committee in the spring of
2020, I published the Force Design 2030 report. Force Design 2030 is
how your Marine Corps is changing its trajectory to create advantage
for the fleets and joint force in both maritime gray zone competition
and more traditional conflict. Although we need new capabilities to
deter adversaries, we must fundamentally change how we think about
armed conflict. We can no longer view warfare through the binary lens
of war and peace, but should recognize the existence of a cyclical
continuum of competition that occurs every day and involves all
elements of national power. Historically, the military viewed
maintaining the peace as deterring war through denial or by punishment.
Force Design 2030 offers a third option in addition to those two that
will counter strategies below the threshold of armed-conflict by
winning the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance competition and
facilitating deterrence by detection.
At its core, Force Design 2030 is a campaign of learning. Through
wargames, analysis, and limited experimentation, it has become clear
the joint force needs a capability that operates persistently and with
maximum organic mobility and dispersion to compete and deter in the
contact and blunt layers. The vulnerability of large fixed bases and
shore-based infrastructure to long-range precision strike, combined
with the impracticality of defending such infrastructure from the
pacing threat's emerging capabilities at any politically-feasible level
of resourcing and regional posture, necessitates that the stand-in
force be able to perform these functions from a strictly expeditionary
and highly mobile and resilient naval posture. This refined analysis
and understanding is what is driving our Force Design 2030 to support
concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), as well as
informing the recently released Tentative Manual on Expeditionary
Advanced Based Operations. We will continue to refine and update the
Tentative Manual with the lessons learned from our FMF experimentation.
In the near future, we will release our latest concept--Stand-In
Forces.
Much as our 29th Commandant codified maneuver warfare in our
principal doctrine MCDP-1 Warfighting to instill a maneuver warfare
mindset into every Marine, I felt it necessary to codify how we compete
every day around the globe. We recently released a doctrinal
publication entitled Competing to instill a competitive mindset into
every Marine, whether above or below the threshold of armed conflict.
Marines--and the military as a whole--must be aware that every action
or inaction has an effect on reassuring our partners and allies and
deterring our competitors. All that we do, from our force laydown, to
the activity at each location, to the equipment we buy, signals our
commitment to reassure and deter. In a globally connected operating
environment, we no longer have the luxury of maintaining a binary
combat or garrison mindset; our posture and mindset must be one of
continuous competition.
naval expeditionary stand-in forces
Expeditionary advanced bases are a platform for small, mission-
tailored groups of Marines to distribute and hide in plain sight with
the assistance of advanced camouflage, cover, concealment, detection,
and deception (C3D2) capabilities against a competitor who is seeking
to locate our forces. Expeditionary advanced bases will enable the
convergence of capabilities from multiple domains and create the
virtues of mass without concentration. The Marine Littoral Regiment
(MLR)--the base unit for our future force--will provide fleet and joint
force commanders with persistent, survivable forces that will enable
the generation of effects within areas that our adversaries hope to
deny to us through their integrated systems of anti-access and area-
denial capabilities. In terms of hardware, Marine capabilities will
include anti-ship Naval Strike Missiles (NSM) loaded on the unmanned
Remotely Operated Ground Unit Expeditionary (ROGUE) Fires; self-
sustainment and mobility with the Light Amphibious Warship (LAW); and,
long-loiter aerial reconnaissance in an expeditionary environment with
the Medium Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) Group 5 unmanned aerial
systems (UAS). Future infantry units operating within the MLR construct
will be equipped with organic precision fires to include loitering
munitions. The MLRs will be networked with our F-35 capabilities,
providing a further layer of combat credibility and sensing. In the
future, these forces could employ more advanced munitions such as
Tomahawk Land Attack Munitions (TLAM), Maritime Strike Tomahawks (MST),
SM-6 containerized anti-ship missiles; and a wide array of unmanned or
optionally manned systems to enhance deterrence. Without these long-
range precision fires, the MLRs will not be suitable to support the
fleets and will lack the ability to influence the vast maritime area
your Marine Corps must do.
In the even more critical human domain, these capabilities will
encompass the necessary training and education to produce leaders who
understand how to deter competitors and provide civilian leadership
strategic options across a wider spectrum. The MLRs will offer
deterrence by detection through constant surveillance of the
competitor, complicating their decision-making calculus if they attempt
fait accompli gambits, and doing so while networked into the larger
architecture of naval and joint command, control, computers,
communications, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and
tracking (C5ISR-T) articulated in the Joint All-Domain Command and
Control (JADC2) concept and previous discussions on Mosaic Warfare.
With global sensors becoming ubiquitous, the value of
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance or scouting and counter-
scouting will increase. Force Design 2030 offers civilian leaders
strategic options to identify, deter, and hold accountable competitors
challenging U.S. interests or infringing on international norms at any
point on the globe. It creates advantage by providing uniformed and
civilian leadership with a force capable of denying key maritime
terrain to an adversary or to force a change in decision calculus and
facilitate de-escalation. Those naval expeditionary forces will also be
capable of rapidly sensing, making sense, and acting upon information
from inside the enemy's weapon engagement zone (WEZ) in support of the
fleet and larger joint force, further complicating adversary decision
calculus. These stand-in forces will be able to support anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) efforts and help sanitize key maritime straits, thus
expanding our strategic undersea warfare advantage. Your Marine Corps
is transforming into a force capable of competing and winning the
hider/finder competition by proliferating sensors to detect adversary
presence, employing advanced C3D2 for resilience, and maintaining a
lethal array of long-range precision fires to prosecute targets at a
time and place of our choosing--whether ashore or afloat or in the air.
Stand-in forces will simultaneously satisfy traditional requirements
from the fleet and combatant commanders for a modern, resilient crisis
response force capable of responding across the range of military
operations. And, as noted in the most recent testimony by the
Commander, USINDOPACOM, these stand-in expeditionary forces are further
required as the forward leading-edge to any strategic defense in the
Indo-Pacific and any maritime defense-in-depth.
From our continued wargaming and experimentation, we have learned
much about the utility of multi-domain reconnaissance. As a result,
over the coming months a new Marine reconnaissance enterprise will
consolidate disparate elements of existing organizations within a
structure capable of generating a coherent, persistent, forward-
presence focused on key maritime terrain that is vital to U.S. national
security interests. The next step will be the development of our Mobile
Reconnaissance framework which will deliver expanded all-domain
capabilities to our naval expeditionary forces and fleets via a
combination of Marine Commandos, manned and unmanned surface platforms
to include the Long-Range, Unmanned Surface Vessels (LRUSV) and small
boats, manned and unmanned ground Ultra-Light Tactical Vehicles (ULTV),
unmanned aerial systems, and unmanned subsurface vehicles. As with
other force design efforts, these forces will be fully capable of
networking with our 5th generation F-35 capabilities as well as
connecting with the larger joint architecture.
In addition to offering continuous surveillance in the contact
layer, the MLR increases lethality, disbursement, mobility, and
survivability in a way that our current stable of large, expensive,
high-signature platforms cannot match to deter and counter aggression
in critical regions. The MLRs will provide a unique expeditionary
advanced base capability, but they will not be the sole definition of
the FMF as our Marine Expeditionary Units will remain our ``crown
jewel.'' Your Marine Corps can compete, deter, and win as part of a
naval expeditionary force operating in international waters and with
light footprints ashore on the territory of local allies and partners.
It does not require the sustained presence of heavy ground forces or
the regular deployment of large, land-based aviation elements. These
unique capabilities make the Marine Corps the ideal choice for a force-
in-readiness that serves as the backbone of the contact layer because
our forces can cooperate with allied and partnered nations without
burdening their local infrastructure, whether for steady-state
operations or disaster response operations. Additionally, the sensing
elements of the FMF coupled with lethality are key attributes in
preventing conflict.
posture
21st century strategic competition requires a new posture to deter
modern threats. Our current force posture is strikingly similar to the
one designed coming out of the Korean War. That posture was designed to
deter and confront a Soviet threat that consisted of strategic bombers
and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Over the last two decades, our
strategic competitors took note of our strengths and designed forces
specifically to counter them. We must now adjust our posture against
the pacing threat of China due to its ability to hold our fleet at
stand-off ranges and prevent significant force projections. This does
not mean abandoning our forward position of advantage, but rather
adopting a more robust and resilient forward-deployed posture as
described in testimony by Admiral Davidson as part of a larger defense-
in-depth.
Marine forces working with Navy ships must occupy space within the
contested first and second island chains in the Indo-Pacific with the
ability to effectively operate in all domains. Guam remains one of our
most important strategic locations as it is US territory located
closest to contested maritime regions. In order to effectively deter by
detection, our forces must be within sensor and striking range to
impose cost on the adversary through their allocation of limited C5ISR-
T assets or determining that the cost is too high to attempt anything
that would cross the line of established international laws and norms.
However, while Guam remains a strategically important location within
our larger defense-in-depth, we must not ignore the potential impacts
to it due to the adverse effects of climate change. We must take the
necessary steps to protect Guam and the strategic advantage it
provides.
Our posture includes more than the laydown of our forces around the
world, it also must include what our forces are doing in those
locations. As Secretary Austin has told us, ``our success will depend
on how closely we work with our friends around the world to secure our
common interests and promote our shared values.'' Marines regularly
conduct training with allies and partners globally. This training is
beneficial to building trusting relationships and interoperability.
These relationships are not--and should not be--one way, in that US
Forces tell partners and allies how to operate. We can learn from other
nations as much as we can teach.
For example, the Japanese Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade may
have used the U. S. Marine Corps as an example in its development, but
we have much to learn from them based on how quickly they designed,
assembled, tested, and operationalized the brigade. Our commitment to
working with allies and partners creates a mutually beneficial
relationship for our military organizations while simultaneously
signaling our resolve to competitors. Initiatives like the Pacific
Deterrence and the European Deterrence are so important in supporting
our posture.
competition and risk
Some critics of our Force Design 2030 suggest that non-stealthy
platforms such as the LAW, LPD-17 class amphibious ship, and the
current Group 5 UAS are operationally unsuitable for high-end
warfighting. This critique's foundational assumption is that our
decades-old stealth technology or military-standard naval architecture
will be overcome with technological countermeasures and that stealth
technologies will become affordable enough to proliferate the operating
environment in large quantities. Survivability under such conditions is
likely to prove far more a matter of quantity, dispersion, signature
management, and distributed lethality than of being able to avoid
technical detection or defend against all threats. We must view
survivability in terms of the entire system--the entire system must be
able to survive long enough to accomplish the mission vice an
individual platform. The expeditionary system of platforms our Marines
employ--and the networks they operate on--must be capable of competing
and deterring below the level of armed conflict as well as fight at the
high-end to reassure our partners and allies as well as demonstrate a
credible capability to a would-be adversary. For example, while not a
part of the currently envisioned program, LAWs operating in plain sight
with containerized missiles could effectively compete and deter. Such a
reimagining of the program could involve greater costs, so we will have
to study the benefits and make resource informed decisions about
tradeoffs in capabilities and capacity. Traditional amphibious ships,
such as the LPD-17s, possessing tactical advantages derived from well-
decks will confound adversaries and force them to consume resources
attempting to positively identify those capabilities loaded inside--
whether unmanned surface vessels, unmanned underwater vessels, or more
traditional capabilities. Long-endurance Group 5 UAS, like the MQ-9,
also provides the persistent presence necessary to win the hider/finder
competition for the fleet. Additionally, a proven platform like the MQ-
9 supports quickly learning the platform through the experience of the
US Air Force while continuing adaptation and innovation over time as we
procure the future system.
If competition expands from opening volleys or punishment strikes
to large-scale conflict, the Fleet Marine Force offers the Joint Force
Commander a persistent stand-in force capable of conducting
reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and targeting in the blunt
layer. A stand-in force with the ability to support allies and partners
while striking the adversary with long range precision fires, 5th
generation short take-off and vertical landing aircraft, and a host of
electronic warfare options combined with the mobility of the Amphibious
Combat Vehicle (ACV), LAW, and unmanned surface and undersea vehicles
provides a survivable option to buy time for the remainder of the joint
force to bring war-winning capabilities.
logistics and resilience
Sustaining the force we are developing now becomes even more
critical in the years ahead. The relative ease with which we have been
able to project power into the Middle East over the last few decades
has lulled us into a false sense of security. As a result, we have
optimized service logistics efforts to support requirements without
regard to the threat actions that could disrupt them. My predecessor
said ``we are going to have to fight to get to the fight.'' I will take
that a step further by saying we will have to fight to sustain our
warfighting efforts over time. The Joint Logistics Enterprise must
connect our emerging operational concepts at the tactical edge all the
way back to the defense industrial base. We have been an end user of
the system, but that needs to change. We must develop new methods for
the Naval Force to enable broader joint force sustainment efforts. On a
day-to-day basis, today's distributed force strains our systems to the
limits. This will only get more challenging considering the dynamic,
evolving threats that competitors can apply against our supply chains,
manufacturing bases, and global sustainment network.
Based on anticipated funding levels and the additional budget
uncertainty that has been introduced by the COVID-19 response, we must
clearly consider risk as we move forward. Our force design efforts for
the future will provide the context necessary to make the difficult
choices for our installations and logistics enterprise. We can no
longer accept the inefficiencies inherent in legacy bureaucratic
processes nor accept incremental improvements. In order for our
installations and logistics organizations to change effectively, we
must better understand the implications that Force Design 2030 will
have on the FMF across multiple time horizons so we can resource our
installations and logistics enterprise appropriately. In coordination
with partners both inside and outside the service, we will evolve our
organization to meet the future FMF's operational requirements in the
air, on land, and at sea while continuing to provide world-class
support to the force today. This may require a change in the existing
command relationships between the bases and stations and the forces
they support. I will keep the committee fully informed of any such
changes as our understanding evolves. Finally, in an effort to
modernize our bases and stations in a manner commensurate with our
overall force design, we are experimenting with advanced force
protection systems enabled by artificial intelligence at several of our
installations. This capability is promising and may provide the service
an opportunity to greatly enhance the protection of our installations
while drastically cutting personnel costs.
major defense acquisition programs
I have always operated under the assumption that evidence, wargame
findings, modeling and simulations, and my own best military advice as
Commandant would persuade people across the defense enterprise and
within Congress that we need change now. While I remain convinced that
this assumption remains valid and look forward to a continued dialogue
with the Committee, we have more work to do to persuade key audiences
of the merits of our desired changes. Congressional support for Ground
Based Anti-Ship Missiles (GBASM); LRUSV; Medium Altitude, Long
Endurance UAS; and I believe that Light Amphibious Warship (LAW) will
be essential to our modernization efforts. We will continue to work
with the Congress to demonstrate the importance of a rapid acquisition
of these critical capabilities. I have repeatedly asked for
Congressional support to change legacy programs that are no longer
operationally relevant or have become cost prohibitive, as well as
support for new initiatives that create a relative warfighting
advantage. This is the kind of agility we will need going forward in
order to sustain that warfighting advantage.
Based on my understanding of the strategic challenges before us and
my desire to remain the best steward of taxpayer dollars, I am
convinced that we must be willing to critically assess the scope of
current Programs of Record for our Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAP). As we reduce the end strength of the Marine Corps in order to
internally fund our modernization, each MDAP must be reevaluated for
capacity and sustainability. We will need the continued support of
Congress to re-scope any program that exceeds our requirement or is
unaffordable to procure, man, and sustain.
In addition, we should acknowledge that up to three quarters of a
weapon system's cost occurs in sustainment--the operational and
maintenance upkeep after the initial acquisition. With the new
procurement of large weapon systems like the F-35B/C, CH-53K, MV-22,
JLTV, and ACV--to name but a few--we should be prepared to modify
programs of records to ensure affordability and viability throughout
the entire lifecycle of each program. Prioritizing high-end platforms
without resourcing the supplies and infrastructure needed to sustain
its operational capability is fundamentally irresponsible; the result
would be a hollow force.
With every dollar we expend to upgrade a legacy platform that is no
longer survivable against a peer competitor, we are slowing our rate of
transformation. Our competitors no longer wait to see what America does
and follow suit; they have embarked on their own trajectory, which
currently outpaces ours. Our Force Design 2030 addresses this problem
by forcing the competitor to adapt to us through the tactical,
operational, and strategic challenges a truly modern force presents.
This does create domestic dilemmas as we are forced to transition from
legacy platforms built in certain districts to modern and relevant
equipment that may be built elsewhere. However, if we are to succeed in
this great power competition, we must make those difficult choices. I
remain confident that this can occur in a responsible and balanced way,
without creating winners and losers, and look forward to discussions
with each of you on a way ahead that satisfies shared interests.
The Marine Corps remains constrained by an acquisition process that
tries to eliminate risk--risk poorly defined as uncertainty. We must
recognize that incrementally better versions of the current Marine
Corps is not going to be enough for real great power competition. As
noted in the House Armed Services Committee's Future of Defense Task
Force Report 2020, our acquisition process is too sluggish to work
effectively at scale with many technology companies, as they need to
innovate and compete daily to survive in their dynamic industry. With
the rapid transition we need to make over the next decade, we must be
willing to incur some short-term risk to better prepare and compete in
the future. The ability to prototype new technologies, then
aggressively experiment and exercise with prototype equipment to
understand its full capability on the battlefield is paramount. Lastly,
I agree with the Report's recommendation that we need a process that
better bridges the ``valley of death'' to transition critical prototype
equipment into full-scale fielding without taking years through the
traditional planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.
readiness and strategic advantage
As we build a more capable and lethal force, we must also take into
consideration the readiness of that force. Since 2017, the Marine Corps
has significantly increased the availability of forces to Combatant
Commanders based on the generous funding of Congress. As Marines deploy
forward in support of operational requirements, they buy down today's
risk by deterring competitors from violating international norms while
assuring allies and partners of the strength of our commitments.
However, the mere availability of those Marines does not equal
readiness to compete in the maritime gray zone, nor does it create
strategic advantage to deter or defeat rapidly evolving threats. It is
time for us to embrace a more sophisticated and balanced understanding
of military readiness and cease using availability as the primary
metric in our readiness evaluations. This antiquated model is hugely
consumptive and forces us to spend limited resources ensuring the
availability of platforms designated for retirement and replacement.
This also applies to equipment that we are attempting to transition to
more modern capabilities. For example, every dollar spent to make a 4th
generation aircraft that has exceeded its intended service life is a
dollar that cannot be spent to accelerate the fielding of 5th
generation very low-observable aircraft and advanced UAS. We must
invest in future capabilities that create, maintain, and expand
warfighting advantage to ensure a ready force tomorrow that maintains
its ability to compete and deter.
During the most recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
Armenian ground forces that we would have labeled ready based on
availability, were easily targeted and destroyed by Azerbaijani forces
employing elements of a precision strike regime to include swarms of
loitering munitions and lethal unmanned systems. While Armenia's tanks
and infantry fighting vehicles were available, they were not
operationally suitable, thus not ready for the conflict. As our
competitors continue to expand their capabilities, we will soon find
ourselves outmatched unless we change our readiness framework. To do
so, we should embrace a new readiness paradigm in which availability
ranks behind generating a relative warfighting advantage. A ready
capability in the future must be one that is both available when we
need it and creates a strategic warfighting advantage against a
specific threat in great power competition and conflict.
A ready force that creates a strategic advantage over the pacing
threat must be organized to generate faster decision cycles against the
enemy. A large part of our Force Design 2030 efforts is aimed at
developing the right capabilities for the future force, but just as
important is devising the correct organizational model to employ those
capabilities. I do not support creating more or larger headquarters
organizations to accommodate the larger quantities of data coming in as
I feel this will only slow the decision-making process. I'm also not
committed to organizations that we have employed in the past if they
don't work to fulfill our future requirements. In addition to right-
sizing our FMF, I've also directed an ongoing assessment to reduce 15%
of our personnel across Headquarters Marine Corps to generate savings
that we can reinvest into our warfighting capabilities without losing
the institutional processes necessary to support an adaptable force.
Your Marine Corps, and the Naval Service as a whole, have a proven
record when it comes to driving change. Both the People's Republic of
China and Russia modernized their militaries over the past decade based
on what they assessed as our strengths and our competitive warfighting
advantages. They adapted their operational and strategic approaches to
counter us and now we must modernize in order to remedy shortfalls and
drive the next cycle of change. Simply making our legacy platforms
better or more of them available will not force our competitors to
change course, nor will it create the strategic advantage required. I
concur with the Air Force Chief of Staff General CQ Brown: we must
accelerate change or lose.
One way we can accelerate change is by seeking a more nuanced
understanding of readiness as it applies to each service or even common
force elements within each service, and to ask--how many forces-in-
readiness can we collectively afford? A critical factor of
understanding readiness is identifying when a joint force will need a
capability in accordance with a detailed mobilization plan. The Marine
Corps--as well as other critical elements of the joint force--will
always be at the front of the timelines because we are the force who is
present before conflict and deters an adversary's early escalation.
Serving as the foundational element of our persistent contact layer
allows time for the joint force to mobilize and surge the war winning
capabilities of the other services. However, without your Marines
forward deployed to tamp back the aggressor and create decision space,
the joint force will not have the time and opportunity to deploy.
fleet design and naval integration
Thus far, my comments have focused on issues germane to my role as
Commandant of the Marine Corps--to organize, train, and equip Marine
Corps forces in support of the Fleets and Combatant Commanders. Please
now allow me to share a few thoughts with you as one of the three
senior naval officials testifying before you and also as a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. My experience and role as a senior Naval
officer requires that I share my best military advice in the ongoing
fleet design conversation. One thing is clear: serious naval
professionals both in and out of service agree that the status quo
fleet will not provide the strategic advantages required in an era of
great power competition, and must change.
I would like to state for the record my thanks to the CNO and his
OPNAV staff for their continued support redesigning the fleet and the
amphibious/naval expeditionary portion of it without reservation or
hesitation in support of our shared understanding of the operational
dilemmas created by peer adversaries. The CNO is leading a major change
in future fleet design and I wish to acknowledge that for the record,
and formally communicate my support. I agree with the CNO that the Navy
does not need to be ``reimagined'' or ``reinvented,'' and neither does
the Marine Corps for that matter. However, as the CNO has noted, how we
perform our core roles and functions of deterrence, maritime security,
power projection, and sea control must change--just as it has many
times in the past.
Being physically present within the area of responsibility is no
longer evidence of success, and we should no longer think presence
somehow produces deterrence in and of itself. For naval presence to
deter competitors, physical positioning must create real strategic
advantage. The specific capabilities present must provide a competitive
warfighting advantage against specific peer threats and do so in a
resource neutral manner. Dispersing large numbers of militarized
fishing vessels with a nuclear aircraft carrier may result in the
temporary absence of those adversary vessels in key maritime terrain,
but it comes at a fiscally prohibitive cost, not to mention the
operational cost of not having that warfighting capability postured to
project power via its carrier air wing. However, having a robust
inventory of submarines, frigates, light amphibious warships, and
networked unmanned or optionally manned surface vessels--or even T-AGOS
and military sealift vessels--operating in the same region would
provide a competitive warfighting advantage without resource
prohibitive operating costs. Such a fleet would further reinforce our
strategic advantages in undersea warfare through their modern ASW
capabilities and our advantages in naval expeditionary warfare. The
process of redesigning the fleet will not be an easy or inexpensive,
nor will it be accomplished quickly, but it can be done with your
continued oversight and support. I wish to thank the Secretary, the
CNO, and the members of this committee for their continued commitment
to the construction and sustainment of our ships necessary to support
amphibious operations.
Not that long ago, the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) that comprised
the Navy ships for the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) consisted of
five ships with a combined gross tonnage of approximately 73,000
tonnes. Today, our standard three ship ARG/MEUs operate in a
distributed manner from platforms with a combined gross tonnage of
approximately 86,000 tonnes. As with many other systems and
capabilities across the joint force, our ARG/MEU has become smaller yet
heavier, while simultaneously being asked to be more agile. Distributed
Maritime Operations is not only the future of naval operations, but in
reality--the present. As we modernize our Marine forces as part of our
force design efforts, we must also modernize the ARG/MEU. We have seen
the great value of disaggregating the ARG/MEU with each individual ship
conducting its own mission within the same Area of Operational
Responsibility for a Combatant Commander. Greater numbers of smaller
ships would allow us to disaggregate for a greater number of mission
sets while maintaining the ability to reassemble into a large force
with expansive mission sets. Defining our future operational concept
will also help drive us to better understand what we need from LXX--or
the next class of amphibious ships. We know they will need to be
smaller, faster, more lethal, and better networked, but we don't yet
know to what degree we need these characteristics. As we continue our
analysis with the Navy, we know that they must be affordable so that we
can purchase and maintain the number of ships we need to operate
globally. Therefore, our requirements will be matched to a program that
is affordable and sustainable over the long-term.
Finally, I wish to state my support for the observations,
positions, and conclusions articulated by Admiral Davidson in his most
recent testimony. The vision he articulated for a strategic defense to
include a defense-in-depth with naval expeditionary forces postured
forward and west of the international dateline is one I share, and have
attempted to communicate as often as possible over the previous 22
months. I share his conclusion that highly lethal and distributable
expeditionary forces than can generate the effects of mass without the
liabilities of concentration are of the highest utility, and am doing
everything possible to create such forces via my force design efforts
with the Marine Littoral Regiment.
conclusion
The American people expect us to be our own toughest critics, and
we are. We have significant strides to make in the near future, but I
know the leadership and support of this Congress will help us to
revolutionize our approach to competition and conflict. I pledge to
keep you informed and involved in the transformation of your Marine
Corps. The American people are counting on their Marines, Navy, and
joint force to maintain our ideals and way of life now and into the
future. The dustbin of history is crammed with once successful
militaries, businesses, and organizations that recognized the world was
changing and attempted to meet that change through merely incremental
improvements in existing ways of doing business. Despite their previous
successes, these institutions failed in the new environment because
they could not make the fundamental changes necessary to remain on top.
We are now in the midst of just such a period of change, and we will
need all the help and support of this Congress to ensure we continue
our long history of successful innovation and adaptation.
While our aspirations and expectations are great, I am certain that
you expect nothing less from your Marine Corps. With your continued
support, we shall succeed. We will achieve our goals of transformation,
both in our culture and warfighting capability, to best support the
naval campaign and the joint force.
Senator Tester. Thank you, General Berger. And I appreciate
all three of your statements. I think it is critically
important that you continue to communicate with this committee
so that you are prepared to fight the next conflict, not the
last one. So, thank you all very much for your statements.
General Berger, your top priority has been the
implementation of Force Design 2030. You talked about it in
your opening statement. It is a plan to modernize the Marine
Corps and ensure it remains the world's most effective naval
expeditionary force.
When we consider what it will take to serve as a credible
deterrent to China and, if necessary, fight and win future
wars, it is essential that our Marine Corps can successfully
modernize and meet the challenge.
This subcommittee is strongly supportive of the strategic
concepts associated with force design. We must ensure that
force design priority programs stay on schedule and responsibly
use taxpayer dollars.
So, here is my question, General Berger. Your unfunded
priorities list contains several items that would accelerate
the Marine Corps' long-range fires program, increase troop
mobility, improve command and control capabilities. Where does
the unfunded priorities list provide us opportunity to
accelerate force design implementation?
General Berger. Part of the challenge, Chairman, and as you
all are well aware, is that in a pacing threat environment,
like we are at right now, both of us are moving. Add to that
the speed at which technology is developing.
So, the items on our unfunded priority list, as you
mentioned, Chairman that is what we need to ensure we stay in
front. We are very ready today, but those items will allow us
to be ready in the future, in front of our adversary, with some
margin of error, which I believe we must have.
So, things like ground-based, anti-ship missiles, the G/
ATOR Radar, the CH-53K, those--the MQ-9 Reaper, those will
allow your forward force, your stand-in force, to deter
effectively forward, in the future, as well.
Senator Tester. Are you confident the programs you are
requesting funding for in fiscal year 2022 can deliver results
quickly?
General Berger. Absolutely, yes.
Senator Tester. Okay. And how are you balancing the need to
move quickly on strategic concepts while keeping those costs
affordable?
General Berger. We are small enough that we could not set
aside an experimentation force in the Marine Corps. So, for
example, Chairman, what we did is we have three Marine
divisions in the Marine Corps. You pick one battalion in each
division, outfit it differently, organize differently, equip
differently, and train differently. And for the next 18, 24
months, we will experiment with all three. And the rationale
behind that is that is how we are going to learn faster. That
is how we are going to introduce the results of experimentation
in war gaming into our force design process at speed.
Senator Tester. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday, recent media articles suggest that the Navy
is expecting to face a challenge in next year's budget request
and will have to make some difficult funding decisions on how
to proceed with the Navy's modernization act. These funding
decisions will only become more difficult in the future as the
Navy continues to modernize and introduces new weapon systems
and programs, like next-generation submarines, surface
combatants, and aircraft.
So, Admiral Gilday, we never are going to have enough money
to do everything that we would like to do. That is a fact.
Which generation systems and programs should be prioritized in
the upcoming budget request?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, thank you. So, big picture, what my
intention, or our intention to do with our investment strategy,
is to field the most capable, most lethal, most ready force
that we can, given the topline that we have. And, so, we have
not come off of our priority to continue to invest heavily in
readiness and training of the force that we have today because
that force needs to be forward to be relevant.
With respect to modernization, key programs include
hypersonics. We have doubled our investment in hypersonics and
R and D. I think that is a very reasonable investment strategy
based on the fact that we are ahead or on track with every
milestone in that program, including a very successful multi-
thousand-mile test last year and a successful new generation
engine burn just a month ago, working very closely with both
the Army and the Air Force on that particular project.
Likewise, on the defensive side, directed energy is an
important investment for us with respect to fleet
survivability. I mentioned up front in my opening statement
that the major investments by the Chinese are in space and
missiles. We have to have a way to defeat those missiles, and I
think an afford--the most affordable way to do that is the
defense-in-depth type of framework that includes laser energy.
We have those systems now at sea and are fielding.
Senator Tester. So, I just want to flesh this out just a
little bit more. All four defense committees are going to be
making decisions soon on what changes we are going to make to
the 2022 budget requests. What views do you wish to share about
your investment priorities today so that we might avoid
disagreements on what systems deserve more funding?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir. So, if I start in the undersea,
that is our most survivable strike platform in the United
States Navy, and arguably in the U.S. military. Our underwater
superiority over the Chinese, we must maintain that overmatch.
With respect to surface, continue investment in new ships.
We know that our cruisers are nearing 35 years old. We need to
replace those. We are going with a smaller, more distributed
force.
The frigate investment is really important, as are the
long-range weapons we are investing to put at sea, and
hypersonics on our first--on our Zumwalt-class ships by 2025.
If it needs to be balanced across the three domains, sir--
under the sea, on the sea, in the air. The fourth- and fifth-
generation mix of aircraft that we are fielding by--we are
fielding now, this summer, with our first deployment. But, by
2025, we will have five to six squadrons. And, by the end of
the decade, we will have all nine squadrons that have that mix
of fourth and fifth. We want to keep that on track, as well.
Senator Tester. Thanks, Admiral.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Harker, the Administration's budget proposal
includes a request for new language to authorize multi-year
procurement contracts for multiple ship classes, including the
destroyer, while at the same time breaking the current multi-
year contract for the destroyer.
My question is this. How does the Navy, sir, plan to
measure the impact of its proposal to breach the current
destroyer multi-year contract on the cost of future multi-year
procurements? In other words, how can Congress and the
industrial base trust the Navy to fulfill its commitments to
multi-year contracts, which I think are important?
Secretary Harker. Thank you, sir. Yes, multi-year contracts
are very important to us. We do intend to sign another multi-
year for DDGs starting in 2023 through 2027 and continue that
procurement into the foreseeable future.
DDG-51 is a very valuable asset for us. We really struggled
with the decision to take that out of this year's budget. It
was the hardest decision we made, and we would love to have
been able to include it.
Going into this next year, we are committed to multi-years
for both submarines and for DDGs. Over the last multi-year
period, it was a 10-ship, multi-year over a 5-year period. With
the assistance of the committees and the Congress, we were able
to purchase 10 ships, so the one that is in our budget this
year will be an eleventh ship. That gave us the ability to not
buy the DDG this year, but it was a very difficult decision for
us, sir.
Senator Shelby. Sir, do you believe that it is very
important for the industrial base to believe that the Navy is
going to fulfill their contracts?
Secretary Harker. Yes, sir, I do. Very much so. It is
critical for our industrial base.
Senator Shelby. Okay.
Secretary Harker. And we believe that we have a strong
working relationship with them.
Senator Shelby. Sir, in the final year of a 5-year multi-
year procurement contract for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers,
this subject--despite the multi-year contract, in--the 2022
budget request includes only one destroyer rather than the
contracted two. This is perplexing because of the Navy's number
one unfunded requirement is $1.7 billion for the second
destroyer. Seems like a contradiction.
Admiral Gilday, why did the Navy remove one destroyer from
its 2022 budget proposal? Is it no longer needed or is that
just playing with the budget, the numbers?
Admiral Gilday. No, sir, it was not playing with the
numbers. So, I go back to the thesis of our budget proposal,
which is to field the best, most capable, most lethal fleet
that we get--we can, that is 296 ships, and make it the best
that we can, including a modernization plan that gives us
increased capabilities, and then growing the Navy at an
affordable rate.
And, so, it was a balance across those three areas, sir.
And as the secretary said in his opening statement, based on
incidents like the collisions in 2017, we are unwilling--at
least my best advice, sir, is to continue to prioritize
training and readiness as our job priority.
Senator Shelby. I think it is a given by this Committee on
Appropriations, Defense to--not to shortchange the Navy, not to
shortchange readiness, and also future weapons. And, if we do
it, we do it at the peril of this Country; would we not?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Shelby. General Berger, I will direct this to you,
sir. In 2019, the U.S. Marine Corps' unfunded requirements list
totaled $235.9 million. In 2020, it was $2 billion. In 2021, it
is $769.8 million. This year's unfunded requirements list from
the Marine Corps is as much as all 3 years' lists combined,
totaling nearly $3 billion, according to our committee.
General Berger, has the Marine Corps been resourced
adequately to support your force redesign and maintain pace on
modernization priorities and readiness? In other words, sir,
what is the impact of such a significant unfunded requirements
list to the Marine Corps if left unfunded?
General Berger. If left unfunded, I think for all of our
unfunded requirements list, it equals risk. That is probably
the simplest way to categorize it. We are learning as we go
with force design. We did not know 2 years ago exactly what the
Marine Corps would need to look like a decade out. We have a
much clearer picture now.
So, in order to give the committees a larger menu to select
from with a clear picture of where the Marine Corps is going,
we added to the unfunded priorities list. But, those things
near the top that are not funded equal risk, equal strategic
risk.
Senator Shelby. And I will direct this, my last question,
to you, Admiral Gilday. The submarine industrial base,
construction of the new Columbia-class submarine is now
underway at shipyards that are already working on the Virginia-
class submarine. You know all of this.
The schedule for the Virginia boats has fallen off of the
2-year per year delivery cadence of the Block III boats, and
current ships under construction are as much as 2 years behind
delivery, is our understanding.
Admiral, what is the Navy doing to get the delivery cadence
of the Virginia back on track as work on the Columbia begins to
pick up? And, how is this investment in the so-called
integrated enterprise plan paying off in terms of industrial-
based readiness and cost reduction to our submarine program?
Admiral Gilday. Sir, in terms of capacity, I think it is
fair to say that our submarine industrial base has probably
never been as busy as they are today. We have 12 boats under
construction right now. We are going to deliver two this year.
I think we will christen Rickover by the end of July.
Right now, we are moving at a pretty good pace to put--to
build two per year in terms of subcomponents. That then needs
to go to the larger components and they need to be able to
build at the rate of two submarines a year, as well.
The investments that the private yards are making include
hiring more people, the training that is associated with that.
The advanced funding that the Congress has given us, that has
allowed us to buy spare parts and materials to help neck down
or reduce that delay in those submarine builds.
We are watching the Block IV Virginia class very closely.
Those delivery dates are not where they need to be, but they
are moving in the right direction to the left.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Shelby.
Senator Schatz.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your service. Good to see you all.
I am going to start with General Berger and talk a little
bit about Marines in the Pacific as part of the Defense Policy
Review Initiative.
The plan to realign Marines began with a series of
conversations between the U.S. and Japanese governments in
2002. It became official in 2006. There were some changes in
2012. And, stipulating to the fact that, as Senator Mike
Mansfield says--said, excuse me that the bilateral relationship
between the United States and Japan is the most important
bilateral relationship that we have, bar none, and that we
should keep our commitments to our greatest ally in the region.
It still seems to me that whether it is lift, whether it is
the difficulty in finding a replacement facility, whether it is
the challenge of construction on Guam, whether it is beddowns
on Oahu, that--and maybe more importantly, that the whole
region has changed.
I would like to be reassured that we are striking the right
balance between maintaining our ironclad commitment to the
Japanese government and still maintaining the flexibility to
make sure this thing makes any sense at all.
General Berger. I think, Senator, your characterization--I
would see it exactly the same way. That agreement that was made
9 years ago did not account for, to your point, where the world
is right now. I think this is the driving force behind the
Secretary's effort right now to do a global posture review
because it is not set right for the future. I think he senses
that, and he has driven us to undertake a global posture
review.
Within the Pacific, I think the view from Japan, to your
point, and the view from the U.S. is the threat from PRC
(People's Republic of China), from the PLAN, their military, is
significantly different than it was in 2012. We have to have
forces stationed forward and deployed forces if we are going to
have a best chance of preventing the next conflict.
But, the laydown of DPRI (Defense Policy Review Initiative)
is worth revising, it is worth looking at, because it was set
under different conditions. This is going to be led, as you
know better than me, by diplomacy, by an effort with the State
Department to work with Japan on what is the best way forward.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Secretary Harker, the Navy's reliance on fossil fuels
contributes to a vulnerability. The President issued an
executive order to all Federal agencies, including the DOD
(Department of Defense), to use their procurement authority to
move the Country towards carbon-free electricity by 2035.
So, can you talk about the new things that the Navy is
doing pursuant to that? And, as you probably know, I have been
tracking this issue for a while, so I am not as interested in
pilot projects or separate programs related to clean energy,
but more importantly, how we are integrating the President's EO
in all aspects of bases, installations, fuel, forward
deployments, the smart grid, all of that.
And, I think it is really important that we do not silo
clean energy into some space called pilot projects and
environmental initiatives and bases and installations and
environment, but, rather, to understand this as core to the
mission, and therefore core to the way we do our procurement. I
am wondering if you can comment on that.
Secretary Harker. Yes, Senator, definitely. I have looked
into this since taking this job, and I have been to several of
our bases where we have done a lot to improve our ability to
provide a carbon-free energy footprint and to take more
advantage of things like solar and wind generation.
I was down at Parris Island on a trip there. They have a
huge solar energy capability there that they have built on some
old abandoned runways. We have other bases that have been doing
that, and it is something that we are focused, where each
installation has a climate installation plan focus to try to
improve how we are doing in this area.
Senator Schatz. And are you integrating that into your
requirements when you do the procurements of energy more
generally? Again, establishing like a climate person at each
base and installation, that is great, but what matters is your
RFIs, your RFQs, your RFPs.
Secretary Harker. Yes, sir. I know there is projects that
focus on this on the R and D side, and we are including it in
future requirements.
Senator Schatz. Okay. And final question. I want to talk to
you about operational energy. What are we doing to make ship
hulls more hydrodynamic and our combat aircraft more fuel-
efficient?
Secretary Harker. So, I am going to ask the CNO (Chief of
Naval Operations) to help me on that.
Admiral Gilday. So, our--right now, we are collaborating
with industry in a new design for DDG(X), and that will include
taking a look at the latest industry best practices with
respect to improved hull forms. It is the same thing as we look
at a new class of submarine we call SSN(X). The initial R and D
that we are putting against that project, again, collaborating
very closely with industry, is to look for a submarine that
will travel higher speeds, and part of that is based on the
shape of the hull.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Schatz.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Harker, Admiral Gilday, let me start by thanking
you both for coming to the great State of Maine to visit Bath
Ironworks and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I know that you
saw that they are outstanding assets that are critical to the
Navy and our industrial base.
Nevertheless, let me be blunt in my assessment of this
budget. It is not close to adequate to meet the challenges that
we are facing around the globe. It does nothing to help us
counter the increase in the Chinese fleet. In fact, it goes in
the opposite direction, and the disparity will be even greater.
And, third, it jeopardizes our industrial base where we
have only two yards building large surface combatants. And the
information I have is that, if this budget is enacted, that 500
skilled jobs will be lost next year at one of those yards, and
even more in subsequent years.
So, my question to you is also blunt, and that is, was the
DDG excluded from the budget simply because you were given an
inadequate top line that you had to meet? Secretary Harker, we
will start with you, and then Admiral Gilday.
Secretary Harker. Thanks, Senator. I really appreciated the
opportunity to tour both Bath Ironworks and the Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard with you. The workers there were outstanding,
and the integration between labor and management at Bath
Ironworks and at the shipyard was just a model for all of our
shipbuilding and ship maintenance facilities, and that is
something that we definitely want to keep and invest in.
We were unable to procure the DDG because of funding
challenges. We did not have sufficient funds in the budget for
us to be able to meet the balanced needs of providing a ready
force today, the capability that each of the ships needed, and
then the capacity of adding that additional destroyer. So, as
we went through and we balanced things out to provide the best
budget we could, we did not have room for that destroyer in the
budget.
Senator Collins. Admiral Gilday, do you have anything to
add to that?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. It was absolutely an
affordability issue. We fought for that hull right to the
bitter end. And, if you take a look at where the money would
come from to pay for that additional destroyer, we are
decomming--or our proposal is to decommission 15 ships, old
cruisers primarily. We would be taking money out of manpower,
out of spare parts, out of ammunition, and we have learned
those lessons in the past, that that is a bad place to take
that money from.
And, so, it really did come down to priorities. As
difficult as it was to break the multi-year and to send mixed
signals to industry, it really did come down to prioritizing
the investments that we had to make right now in the fleet that
we have today.
Senator Collins. And our job, I would suggest to the
Chairman and Vice Chairman, is going to be to look across the
entire government and every department's budget as a full
committee. Because when you see the double digit increases for
all of the civilian agencies, and then you get to the
Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security
and essentially see a cut, in real terms, is just our
priorities are out of whack here. And, I hope that we can
remedy that.
I just, Admiral Gilday, want to quickly touch on the
Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan. That includes 250
million for the second increment of the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard's multi-mission dry dock number one project, and that
is really important, as well. Could you explain to the
committee what will happen if we do not provide that funding in
terms of the ability to return submarines and sailors to the
fleet?
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. It is my judgment that if we do
not fund that, if we do not fund that project in 2022
adequately, it will put at risk the ability to do our first
availabilities on Virginia class submarines beginning in fiscal
year 2026.
The project up there in Kittery, at Portsmouth, is
absolutely critical for us to have that East Coast capability.
We are simply not going to have it. We do not have dry docks
large enough to put those ships, to put those hulls in, to do
the maintenance on them that is required.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Murray.
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you to all of you for being here today.
Secretary Harker, let me just start with saying--by saying
that I was really pleased that the Navy decided to base the
first new Constellation-class frigates at Naval Station
Everett. As you well know, Everett is a really important base
for the Navy, and we have to continue investing in that base
and the community for the long term.
I wanted to ask you today what additional investments at
Everett are going to be necessary to accommodate those new
ships or additional sailors and their families?
Secretary Harker. I do not have that information with me,
ma'am, but I know we are committed to making sure that we do
not send our ships out there without the additional crew
facilities necessary for both the crew and the families and so
on. The CNO may have additional points.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, absolutely. So, that work is ongoing
right now. The hulls go in the water in--the first hull will be
delivered in 2026, ma'am. So, in addition to things like
housing, childcare, training facilities that we will need for
those crews, as well. So, we will look at it holistically so
that we do not cut those crews and their families short.
Senator Murray. Good. All right. Well, I look forward to
working with you on that as it continues.
General Berger, I did want to ask you. You are proposing
the boldest rethinking of the Marine Corps role and structure
in decades. And, as part of that, you are proposing to cut end
strength and have smaller units operating from inside the area
our adversaries can strike.
How will training need to change to prepare our Marines for
those missions?
General Berger. Training will have to, one, take the
individual Marine to a higher level than they are right now.
From recruitment, in other words, through their entry-level
training, to their first unit, we have to raise the bar because
we are going to expect non-commissioned officers and junior
officers to make decisions than two levels up than they make
today.
When we are more distributed, when we are more spread out,
then junior leaders are going to make the calls, especially if
you are in a high-threat environment where they are kind of
challenging your communications. They are going to make their
decisions independent of probably great communications with
their higher headquarters. So, our training for them has to get
higher.
We are lengthening, for example, infantry training right
now by 50 percent this year. It has to be longer. It has to get
them to another level. The same individual that now maybe three
people have three different skill sets, we have to make sure
one person has three skills sets, if you follow me.
Senator Murray. Yes.
General Berger. So that one person is not a corpsman and
one person is not a machine gunner and the next person is a
sniper. We have to have people with multiple skills. So, I
think we will raise the bar in training to make sure that we
can empower and train them to a level where they can make the
decisions on the spot.
Senator Murray. How do you expect this to increase the
operational tempo? And how are you going to support Marines'
families during more frequent or longer deployments that you
envision?
General Berger. Separate issue on the frequency of
deployments, and that is really driven by what the Nation needs
year to year to year.
But, the difference in force design, ma'am, is from the
beginning. Our premise was, we are going to build a force that
is manned at 100 percent in the Fleet Marine Force. That is not
the case right now. We take risks. In other words, we man them
at less than a hundred. But, we are buying--we are building the
Marine Corps manned at 100 percent. When you do that, then you
can accept an increase of surge for periods of time.
But, your point on the stress on the families, absolutely
so. When we deploy forces like we have right now onboard naval
ships and it is a planned 6- or 7-month deployment, you know,
that is tough. When it is extended, it is to a whole other
level because then you are into unpredictable land for them.
All of which is manageable, but we need to run the machine at a
pace we can sustain, which I think you are highlighting, ma'am.
Senator Murray. Okay. Thank you.
And, finally, a vote has been called, so let me just say
this, Secretary Harker. The Department of the Navy has been
pursuing a number of actions that are--I am concerned are very
harmful to workers in my home State of Washington and which
jeopardize the stability of the industrial base, and those
include proposals to divest UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and
virtually brand new patrol boats, changing shipbuilding
specifications to circumvent Buy American requirements in
appropriations law, and a lack of clarity on the disposition of
a dry dock.
I have not gotten satisfactory answers on that. There is
not time right now. But, I want to know if there--what
reasonable alternatives are considered, and I would like to
follow up with you and my staff on that.
Secretary Harker. Yes, ma'am, definitely. I will follow up
with you on that. I know I have been out to the dry dock there
over in Bremerton. And I have talked with the shipyard
commander there, and I am fully committed to the shipyard
infrastructure optimization effort to renew or replace that dry
dock and part of our effort to modernize that. And then the
other areas, we will definitely get back with you, ma'am.
Senator Murray. Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you.
Senator Tester. Thanks, Senator Murray.
Senator Baldwin.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are very
excited to be building the new frigate in the State of
Wisconsin. However, even though this ship is based on proven
hull design, new ship classes often experience challenges
related to technical concurrency, cost overruns, or schedule
slips.
As you know, it is important that our acquisition programs
account for these challenges, which means requiring things like
technology maturation, systems integration, and full-ship tech
data.
I believe these milestones should be achieved prior to
bringing on any additional shipyards should the Navy want to
increase their buy down the road. Similarly, to avoid affecting
the production ramp up, we must avoid any gap- year funding for
the frigate.
So, can you--this is to Secretary Harker and Admiral
Gilday. Can you commit to requiring these technical milestones
are met prior to bringing on a second shipyard? And, can you
also commit to avoiding gap years in the procurement profile?
Secretary Harker. Yes, ma'am. So, first, I have been out to
Marinette and have been working with that shipyard for probably
20 years, since I was back in the Coast Guard as the business
manager for the buoy tender acquisition project. So, I have got
a lot of great experience, a lot of respect for the people that
work at that shipyard.
As we go forward, it is definitely something that we want
to do is make sure that we do not make mistakes by delivering
ships that are not fully mature and proceeding down that road.
So, I think there is definitely a need to make sure we get the
technology mature, and that is something that I believe the CNO
has some thoughts on, as well.
Admiral Gilday. Yes, ma'am. So, we are--with respect to
risk in building that ship, I was just on a FREMM class over in
Europe three weeks ago. Really impressive. Really impressive
hull. So, we have done this before to minimize risk, where we
have taken an existing hull and put a known combat system, a
weapon system, on it. We did this back in the '80s and it
worked out really well between the Ticonderoga-class cruisers
and the Arleigh Burke DDGs.
It is the same type of approach that we have up in
Marinette. I went to Marinette myself. That was a--you know, it
was a great trip, number one, to get to talk to the ship
workers. But, I will say that that risk is something that we
are carefully trying to manage. We are not introducing new
systems, trying to create success or miracles that have to all
line up before the ship delivers in 2026.
So, I am highly confident that both the Navy and the
shipyard are working very closely together to make sure we are
not introducing any additional risk into that build.
With respect to moving to a second yard, I am taking a very
conservative approach myself with respect to anything that we
would do in that regard. I understand the benefits of the
industrial base, but we have to get that right and we have to
leverage what we have learned from other builds, like the LCS,
to make sure that we get that right.
The last thing I would say is that predictability with
respect to budgets, especially shipbuilding, are really
important for industry, and I recognize that. One of the things
that struck me at Marinette was the amount of infrastructure
that they are building to support the Constellation-class
frigate. So, if we change those numbers, that--those
investments are going to be a waste. I recognize that, ma'am.
And again, I take the formulation of the budget very seriously
in terms of how we prioritize and the message that we send to
industry.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you. I appreciate that focus on the
industrial base.
And I think we have observed that the shipbuilding
industrial base has become more fragile over the last 25 years.
Congress has invested significant additional funding to support
submarine- and ship-specific workforce and supplier expansion
programs, which has really paid off for programs like Columbia,
Virginia, and DDG-51. The same rationale for those industrial-
based programs holds true for the frigate.
So, do you believe that these types of congressional
investments have benefitted the Navy fleet, our industrial
base, and our national security? And, if so, do you agree that
similar investments into the frigate industrial base and
workforce will have the same positive results? And, again, to
you, Secretary Harker and Admiral Gilday.
Secretary Harker. So, yes, definitely. Investing in our
industrial base is something that is critical for us. We used
funds from the Defense Production Act Authority to invest $50
million. And, also, we have invested money in other places, and
we have worked with the shipyards and other sources of funding
to continue to invest in the industrial base. We believe in a
strong industrial base, and that is critical to our needs.
Admiral Gilday. Ma'am, as I answer this question, I am
going to speak more generally and not to Marinette in
particular. I do think that those investments are important.
However, I also think it is important to set expectations.
So, you mentioned, let's say, the Columbia class, which we
will be building out to 2035, or Virginia class, which we are
going to be building out to the late 2020s. So, when you have--
when industry has that kind of set of headlights, as does
Congress with respect to a commitment to building that many
ships in a class for that long a period, I think it then
becomes easier to justify those investments in private yard
infrastructure.
And, so, I think that they should be tied together so we
should not kid ourselves in terms of putting money down that we
are not going to reap the benefits of.
Senator Baldwin. Thank you.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Baldwin.
Senator Moran.
Senator Moran. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
General Berger, as you look to shift the Marine Corps'
focus from counterinsurgency efforts to its original mission of
naval expeditionary force, logistics will play a major role in
the force structure. Your current CH-53E fleet continues to
struggle with readiness issues, so I want to be certain the
Marine Corps is prepared for a near-pier fight. Can you
describe the new CH-53K heavy lift helicopter's contribution to
your force structure redesign, particularly as it pertains to
distributed maritime logistics in a contested environment?
General Berger. I can, Senator. It is a phenomenal
aircraft. I flew on that aircraft maybe 3 months ago, this past
spring, down in North Carolina. Because growing up in 53Ds and
53Es, you kind of knew what that platform was like. I had not
been on a 53K, other than in a simulator. Simulator does not do
it justice. It is an incredible aircraft. Speed, lift
capability, reliability, its fly-by-wire. He hovered and picked
up a weight, hands off. I mean, it is that kind of technology.
It is a glass cockpit. Now we just have to right-size it for
what we need.
But, distributing the force the way the CNO and I have in
mind, we are going to need the 53K. We are going to need the
Light Amphibious Warship in order to move the troops and
supplies and lethal aspects around. Critical.
Senator Moran. How is this helicopter currently performing
in preparation for the initial operation test and evaluation in
July?
General Berger. Probably like most programs, in the areas
we look closest at, its performance, it is meeting the
requirements. There are some areas where flight crews have
suggestions on how to improve it, as you would expect. But, so
far, on track, sir.
Senator Moran. Great. Thank you for your answer.
General Berger. Yes, sir.
Senator Moran. Thank you for your service, all of you.
Senator Tester. Thank you, Senator Moran.
We appreciate all of your testimony here today and the
answers to the questions.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Senators may submit additional written questions, and we
ask you to respond to them within a reasonable amount of time.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Hon. Thomas W. Harker
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard J. Durbin
Question. Russia has built numerous Arctic bases and seems poised
to bring very provocative nuclear weapons capable armaments--notably
the Poseidon 2M39 torpedo-into the region that threaten us and our
allies. Secretary of State Blinken recently raised the importance of
keeping the Arctic a peaceful zone with his Russian counterpart and the
Department of Defense says it reserves the right to conduct freedom of
navigation exercises in the Arctic. But I remain concerned about
Russia's aggressive moves in the region, particularly as the ice melts
from climate change.
Please comment on the growing Russia presence and challenge in the
Arctic.
Answer. The Arctic is a top priority for Russia as outlined in
multiple Russian strategy documents. Russia is investing heavily to
enhance its Arctic defense and economic sectors towards its northern
flank. About 20 percent of Russia's land mass is north of the Arctic
Circle. Russia aims to improve command and control, infrastructure, and
joint force employment to project power and defend its northern
approaches through modernized military capabilities and posture. The
escalatory and non-transparent nature of Russia's military activity and
unlawful regulation of maritime traffic along the Northern Sea Route
undermines global interests, promotes instability, and ultimately
degrades security in the region. Our strong relationships with Arctic
allies and partners, further strengthened through exercises and U.S.
presence in the High North and Arctic region, are our greatest
strategic advantage strengthening our collective deterrent against
these strategic challenges.
The Department of the Navy will work closely with interagency,
international, and joint partners-especially the U.S. Coast Guard-while
building new partnerships to protect the homeland, keep Arctic seas
free and open, and deter coercive behavior and conventional aggression.
Regional cooperation, built on a bedrock of internationally recognized
principles like national sovereignty, is in the United States' interest
and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Leahy
Question. Given the administration's priority of taking care of our
people, and the important role that unit cohesion plays in improving
readiness, it is crucial that the Navy take a fresh look at policies
and practices that may not support all servicemembers. To that end,
please outline what changes, if any, the Navy has made, is making, and
plans to make, or is considering in order to:
Improve diversity in leadership positions;
Answer. Improving diversity in leadership positions compels the
Department of the Navy (DON) to focus on diversity at all levels.
Admiral Gilday meets routinely with his 17 Navy Community Leaders to
discuss various community challenges to include the diversity
demographics of each community, initiatives to support the recruiting
and retention of under-represented groups, the prevalence of
destructive behaviors, and efforts to develop and retain future
leaders.
Additionally, the Navy Junior Officer Counsel (NJOC) provides a
formal link between Junior Officers and Senior Navy Leadership to
provide feedback, ensuring we are doing everything we can to make our
Junior Officers feel connected and included. The DON Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion (DE&I) lead will leverage feedback mechanisms and
advisory groups similar to the NJOC to help advance DE&I initiatives.
The Marine Corps is focusing on areas where potential bias and
discrimination could occur before a qualified officer reaches the
selection or assignment board process. The assignment process and the
performance evaluation system are areas where evaluation and selection
are based on subjective analysis and where intentional or unintentional
bias could occur. The Fitness Report Bias Study is an analysis that
examines objectivity of the current performance appraisal process. The
Basic School Military Occupational Specialty Assignment Study examines
historical performance data, based on demographics, to evaluate the
impact of performance on MOS assignment. The Marine Corps is also
funding an independent study to identify and understand any barriers to
advancement and retention of women and minorities in the Marine Corps.
Question. Improve diversity retention at all levels;
Answer. The Navy and Marine Corps are in line with the Office of
the Secretary of Defense and the other Services in accomplishing the
recommendations set out in the Secretary's Diversity and Inclusion
Board Final Report.
Specifically, the Navy is currently implementing 56 recommendations
from the Task Force One Navy (TFlN) final report. TFlN identified and
made recommendations to dismantle barriers to equality while creating
sustainable opportunities, ultimately achieving our desired end-state
of warfighting excellence. In accordance with Secretary of Defense
guidance, the Navy removed photographs during all Officer Selection and
Command/Milestone Boards. Additionally, the Navy requires diverse
representation on all boards and provides bias training to board
members to be aware of their potential conscious and unconscious bias
and ensure board fairness.
The Marine Corps DEI Strategic Plan will focus on recruiting and
accessions, talent management, education, training, and commandership
over the next 5 years. Independent studies are currently underway to
better understand diversity and inclusion challenges and make
improvements. The Marine Corps Outreach Program budget has increased
from $150,000 in fiscal year 2014 to $1M in fiscal year 2021. The
program provides opportunities for professional development, mentoring,
and networking experiences by fully funding approximately 500 Marines
to attend 19 national/regional conferences hosted by non-Federal entity
affinity groups events throughout the year.
The various TFlN recommendations and initiatives found in the USMC
DEI Strategic plan will be integrated into the DON DEI Implementation
strategy to ensure ongoing efforts are sustained, measurable, possible
to achieve, and specific enough to assess progress.
Question. Improve trainings, including sexual assault prevention,
with input from women, LGBTQ servicemembers, BIPOC servicemembers, and
sexual assault survivors;
Answer. The DON is committed to a culture of trust, respect, and
inclusion that strengthens and promotes the resiliency and readiness of
our force, our families, and our DON civilian workforce. Our DON DEI
Team is working closely with the Services and stakeholders to update
training and DEI competencies to incorporate the Navy's Culture of
Excellence, USMC training frameworks and associated Signature Behaviors
with input from DON and Service sexual assault prevention and response
(SAPR) experts. The training uses adult learning theory best practices
concerning small group-facilitated discussions. Once the training is in
the pilot phase, we intend to solicit input from different populations
of Sailors that may include specific groups such as women; LGBTQ+;
black, Indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC); and sexual assault
survivors.
The Marine Corps actively uses collaboration to address SAPR. They
have collaborated with sexual assault survivors, members of the LGBTQ+
community, SAPR personnel, women, and BIPOC Service Members to improve
SAPR training. The SAPR program works together with the other Services,
DON and Department of Defense (DoD) SAPR Offices, and outside entities
to enhance the ability to prevent and respond to sexual assault,
identify best practices, and leverage resources. Training is tailored
to specific levels of leadership. The Commander's Course better
prepares senior leadership to prevent sexual assault once they assume
command. Likewise, the First Sergeant's Course includes actionable
recommendations for sexual assault prevention, information on responses
to trauma, and actions to take if a Marine is sexually assaulted.
In fiscal year 2021, the DON Sexual Assault, Sexual Harassment, and
Suicide Prevention & Response Office led a robust revision of civilian
training for DON, Marine Corps, and Navy personnel. Key revisions
include a focus on early negative behaviors that increase risk for
sexual assault (i.e., gender harassment, sexual harassment), skill-
building to recognize negative behaviors and intervene, and the
promotion of relevant response resources and programs (i.e., SAPR,
Equal Opportunity, Employee Assistance Programs, etc.).
Revisions also include additional terminal learning objectives that
focus on prevention, response, and supervisory skills related to the
protection of populations at increased risk for harm. To protect
civilians and Service member survivors or those who identify as LGBTQ+
and/or BIPOC, these objectives reinforce key concepts and skills.
Additional efforts to ensure culturally responsive trainings
include Navy and Marine Corps Recruit Training updates that emphasize
the knowledge and skills needed for healthy professional and personal
relationships (i.e., trust, respect, inclusion, teamwork) and
professional development webinars on the intersections between gender,
race, sexual orientation, and sexual violence.
Question. Increase availability and accessibility of mental health
support services for servicemembers and their families, including
services tailored specifically toward minority servicemembers;
Answer. The Navy remains committed to promoting, maintaining and
advancing a healthcare environment that adheres to the principles of
community and equity by fostering principles that support: Care with
Request; Excellence with Equity; Mindful Actions with Transparency,
Responsibility, and Accountability; and Diversity with Inclusion.
Specific to mental health support services, the Navy and Marine
Corps ascribes to a ``no wrong door'' policy to assist Marines,
Sailors, and family members in getting help and support. This policy
helps to facilitate access and decrease stigma in seeking mental health
and substance misuse services. Services are available worldwide,
including in specialty clinics, within primary care, at Navy and Marine
Corps installation counseling centers, on the waterfront, and embedded
within the fleet. Sailors and their families can also get mental health
support, to include chaplains, Military and Family Life Counseling,
Fleet and Family Support Centers, Marine Corps Community Services, and
Military OneSource.
Within Navy Medicine, efforts are underway develop more formal
structures for addressing and integrating health equity/disparities
within the context of the Navy's Diversity and Inclusion framework.
This work includes collaboration with the Defense Health Agency and the
other Services to advance access, equity, and opportunity among the
healthcare staff, as well as to develop programs to ensure equitable
care and treatment for all Service Members and families.
The Marine Corps' focus is to treat all Service Members and their
families with equality while recognizing and embracing diversity.
Accessibility of nonmedical support services expanded in May 2020 to
telephonic and virtual platforms.
Two significant support programs are the Unit Marine Awareness and
Prevention Integrated Training for Marines (UMAPIT) and our Operational
Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) programs. UMAPIT is a training and
education calendar year requirement for all Marines and provides
specific information and actions Marines can employ to access mental
health resources. OSCAR is a Marine-trained team of Marines within
Marine Corps units who help recognize and respond to stress. If a
Marine believes their stress-level is negatively affecting their unit,
an OSCAR member is there to talk and to connect the Marine with other
resources.
Question. Improve outreach to and support for minority
servicemembers facing discrimination from within their units;
Answer. DON policy is that each member of the team is entitled to
be treated fairly, with dignity and respect, and must be allowed to
work in an environment free of unlawful discrimination. The DON is
committed to maintaining an inclusive work environment free from
unlawful discriminatory practices and inappropriate behavior.
The Navy ensures all personnel are aware of the command and shore-
based assistance available to those who need help in processing
harassment or unlawful discrimination reports. In addition, the Navy
identifies available counseling support or referral services for all
personnel involved in incidents of harassment or unlawful
discrimination. Follow-up debriefs are conducted with complainants no
later than 45 days following the determination or resolution of
harassment or unlawful discrimination report to determine the
complainant's satisfaction with the effectiveness of the corrective
action, timeliness, present command climate, and to ensure retaliation
did not occur.
The Marine Corps takes a comprehensive approach to support minority
Service Members facing discrimination within units. Combatting such
behavior is a team effort that requires the commander to set the
correct climate denouncing Prohibited Activities and Conduct (PAC)
violations, Equal Opportunity Advisors/Equal Opportunity
Representatives (EOAs/EORS) to educate and support the command and its
unit members, and each unit member to be held accountable for their
actions. The Marine Corps' support for minority Service Members facing
discrimination within their units is rooted in the DoD's Strategic
Elements of prevention, reporting, advocacy, education/training, and
accountability; with MCO 5354.IF, ``Prohibited Activities and Conduct
Prevention and Response Policy.'' Marines complete PAC training every
year, and commands can use their EOAs/EORs to conduct additional PAC
training or focus groups, at any time, in order to combat PAC
behavioral trends. The PAC order stipulates commanders must ensure
Service Members have access to support services such as mental health
counseling, medical, EOA, Victim and Witness Assistance Personnel, and
Victim Legal Counsel.
Question. Improve medical care for transgender servicemembers,
women, and Black parents, particularly for transition care, pregnancy,
and post-partum care;
Answer. Navy Medicine is committed to ensuring all Sailors and
Marines are treated with dignity and respect and have access to the
highest quality healthcare in accordance with current evidence-based
practice guidelines. We currently have two Navy Medicine
interdisciplinary expert Regional Transgender Care Teams in place to
support and improve the health and lives of transgender and gender non-
binary Sailors and Marines. Our experts work closely with our Defense
Health Agency, Army, and Air Force colleagues to ensure the
incorporation of best clinical practices to support the medical
readiness of our transgender and gender non-binary Sailors and Marines.
Navy Medicine continues to recognize and emphasize the importance
of innovative pregnancy and postpartum care, resources, and educational
materials for our Sailors and Marines to facilitate their return to
duty. To recover in a healthy manner prior to being required to meet
fitness and body composition standard, our updated Physical Readiness
Program policies provide postpartum Sailors and Marines more time
(i.e., 12 months vice nine months). We are also prioritizing the
importance of ensuring our pregnant and postpartum Sailors and Marines
have access to the support they need from a headquarters and a front
line approach. Navy Medicine has developed a Postpartum Return to Duty
Resource to provide Sailors and Marines with critical education on
physical fitness, mental health, support services, and Navy and Marine
Corps policies related to the postpartum transition to full duty.
Within the military health system, our Navy Medicine women's health
experts participate with the Defense Health Agency and the other
Services. The focus is on women's health, perinatal practices,
newborns, and infants, as well as a review of data and issues related
to maternal and infant health care disparities, health equity, and
social determinants of health, potentially impacted by race/ethnicity.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question. Secretary Harker, the 2017 Navy force structure
assessment identified the need for three additional Expeditionary Sea
Base ships. Congress included $73 million in advance procurement
funding for the eighth ship in fiscal year 2021. However, that eighth
ESB ship was not in your latest long-range plan, and no additional
funding is in your budget request. I am concerned that not building the
eighth ESB will break critical supply chains for the main shipbuilder
on the West Coast.
What operational risks are you accepting by not requesting ESB 8?
Answer. The current laydown plan will assign ESBs to the EUCOM/
AFRICOM, CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM Areas of Responsibility. We
assess minimal operational risk as five ESBs can provide presence in
each of these theaters and can be re-allocated across theaters if
necessary.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
Question. I authored an amendment included as Section 121 in last
year's NDAA, which required certifications and reports from the Navy if
it intended to deviate below the Large Surface Combatants called for in
the Navy's 2016 Force Structure Assessment. The fiscal year 2022
shipbuilding plan submitted to Congress proposes a significantly lower
range of large surface combatants--between 63 and 65 ships. However, in
the Navy's report required by the NDAA, which the Committee received
just 2 months ago, the Navy identified 78 large surface combatants as
the best performing mix based on a 2019 analysis of alternatives. The
Navy certified that a reduction of large surface combatants down from
104 could be mitigated due to having a reduced number of the Flight
Ill's with the advanced AN/SPY-6 radar. The Navy also stated in its
report that it did not expect any detrimental impacts to the industrial
base based on current workload. But as we can see with the cut to the
DDG-51 in this proposed budget, that workload seems anything but
certain.
It seems that the Navy's report required by the NDAA was based on
some incorrect or outdated assumptions regarding the number of large
surface combatants the Navy planned to procure as well as the impact of
this limited procurement on the industrial base. Will the Navy revisit
this report?
Answer. To compete and win in an era of peer military competition,
the United States needs a balanced naval force capable of striking
targets in all domains. The force design must emphasize distributed
awareness, lethality, and survivability in high-intensity conflict. The
force must be adaptable, demonstrate presence, achieve sea control, and
be capable of projecting power by delivering precision effects at long
ranges. The Navy, working closely with the Office of the Secretary of
Defense Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, continues
to develop comparative assessments of naval force structure options
consistent with Interim National Security Strategic Guidance and
designed to maximize the maritime contribution to the joint force. The
results of these efforts and ongoing experimentation and prototyping
will be reflected in the fiscal year 2023 shipbuilding plan.
The Department is conducting analysis to refine understanding of
the readiness and performance of the fleet against a future near-peer
competitor capable of global operations. Furthermore, the Navy
continues to evaluate the industrial base pivot points required to
support future platform development and the industrial base development
needed for these future planned platforms, such as the next generation
attack submarine and the future large surface combatant, including
land-based testing to enable success in these future programs. A
complete 30-year shipbuilding plan will be submitted with the
President's Budget for fiscal year 2023. The Navy does not plan to
submit a separate Report to Congress on Large Surface Combatants and
AN/SPY-6 in fiscal year 2023.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance osr in the arctic region
Question. Fonner Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Zukunft, a fellow
maritime service chief relayed an alarming anecdote last fall saying,
``We have significant domain awareness challenges, and that really
begins in the high latitudes,'' Things start to get pretty dark once
you get up higher than 72 degrees north.'' He went on to discuss the
Coast Guard stumbling upon a joint Chinese and Russian exercise in the
region without any prior knowledge from our intelligence assets.
And, just last August, a Russian military exercise in our own
Exclusive Economic Zone, just off the coast of Alaska, spooked a fleet
of our own fishennan out of our own waters--waters that they have every
right to be in and cost them millions of dollars in lost catch and
equipment.
Secretary Harker, does this budget include capabilities for our
naval services that will increase our domain awareness in the Arctic?
Does this budget provide you the ability to operate in the High
North whenever called upon and with the proper resources to be
effective?
Answer. While the budget does not include investments on ISR
specifically focused on the Arctic, it does continue the pattern of
equipping our Navy's globally deployable ships, submarines, and
aircraft with the ISR capabilities needed to contribute to domain
awareness whenever and wherever we operate. It also positions our Naval
Forces, through its acquisition programs and Naval Intelligence arm, to
maintain strong relationships with the IC. That long-standing
relationship sets conditions for us to not only influence the
development of IC capabilities but to secure the advantages that come
from being able to access those capabilities to advance our worldwide
military mission in this era of renewed strategic competition at sea.
arctic strategy
Question. As an Alaskan, I am well aware and proud of our nation's
history in the Arctic, but, frankly, I'm focused on the now. With that
in mind, your strategy, ``Blue Arctic'' specifically states ``The
[Navy] will be postured to deter aggressive and malign behavior, keep
the seas free and open, and assure allies and partners of our long-term
commitment to preserving peace and advancing shared interests.'' It
also emphasizes the need for ``credible naval forces [to] ensure the
ability to deter competitors and rapidly respond to crises in the
region.
Secretary Harker are we postured right now, at this very moment, to
deter aggressive and malign behavior in the Arctic? Having the Russians
chase off an American fishing fleet or stumbling upon a joint Chinese/
Russia exercise doesn't sound like we're quite there yet.
Can you discuss how in your proposed budget you are acquiring the
means to do so in the future?
Answer. The Arctic is a top priority for Russia as outlined in
multiple Russian strategy documents. Russia is investing heavily to
enhance its Arctic defense and economic sectors towards its northern
flank. About 20 percent of Russia's and mass is north of the Arctic
Circle. Russia aims to improve command and control, infrastructure, and
joint force employment to project power and defend its northern
approaches through modernized military capabilities and posture. The
escalatory and non-transparent nature of Russia's military activity and
unlawful regulation of maritime traffic along the Northern Sea Route
undermines global interests, promotes instability, and ultimately
degrades security in the region. Our strong relationships with Arctic
allies and partners, further strengthened through exercises and U.S.
presence in the High North and Arctic region, are our greatest
strategic advantage strengthening our collective deterrent against
these strategic challenges.
The Department of the Navy will work closely with interagency,
international, and joint partners-especially the U.S. Coast Guard--
while building new partnerships to protect the homeland, keep Arctic
seas free and open, and deter coercive behavior and conventional
aggression. Regional cooperation, built on a bedrock of internationally
recognized principles like national sovereignty, is in the United
States' interest and contributes to a secure and stable Arctic.
icebreakers
Question. I have a growing concern with the lack of icebreakers and
even ice-hardened surface ships in our fleet to carry out the strategic
deterrence that you have identified as necessary in the Navy's strategy
and the use of icebreakers for other purposes. I have long advocated
for the procurement of icebreakers and I'm glad we're making some
progress in building some for the Coast Guard, but those are still a
long ways away from being sea ready. As it pertains to icebreakers, my
number one priority is building them here. My second priority is
getting this capability in our hands as soon as possible.
The previous administrations was in discussions about leasing
icebreakers through the Navy. To be clear, I am not advocating for
leasing instead of building our own, but being cognizant of the fact
that we need this capability now, are you doing anything to acquire ice
breaking capabilities to bridge the gap between now and when we field
new ones ourselves? As your strategy, ``Blue Arctic'' mentions six
times, how the Navy will address issues in the ``decades ahead,'' but
current events illustrate they are needed now. If not icebreakers, are
other mechanisms being put in place to overcome this shortfall?
Answer. Icebreaking remains a core U.S. Coast Guard mission. The
Navy continues to provide acquisition assistance to the Coast Guard to
ensure the Polar Security Cutter meets the demands of the Nation.
Question. Mr. Secretary, your Arctic strategy also states, ``Naval
forces will work in concert with interagency efforts and ensure our
planning efforts are integrated with local, state, Federal, and
indigenous communities. Native Alaskan tribes have a long and honorable
history of military service that blend seamlessly with such efforts.''
Can you discuss these efforts to date, or are they forthcoming? Do you
have a timeline or plan for when this coordination will begin? Who in
your department has been given the lead for these efforts?
Answer. While the Arctic largely remains a region of cooperation,
continuing changes in the physical environment, increased military
activity, and efforts by non-Arctic nations to restructure Arctic
governance require continual assessment of the region. The Department
of the Navy's (DON) priorities in the Arctic Blueprint include working
closely with our partners and allies as well as with interagency
partners. As we look to strengthen interagency efforts, the DON is
developing its implementation approach to ensure alignment with the
2022 National Defense Strategy and the Secretary of the Navy's
strategic vision. In addition to preserving economic prosperity and
keeping the seas open and free, the DON remains fully committed to
safeguarding the homeland and protecting our national security. While
the DON requires more time to consider specific details of
implementation and coordination, the Arctic region remains of
significant importance to the DON mission. The Implementation Plan will
be tailored to meet the demands of the Arctic region, to include the
integration of planning efforts with local, state, and Federal
entities, and with indigenous communities. Additionally, we will have
an opportunity to better align the DON's objectives with the impending
release of the National Security Council's National Arctic Strategy.
united nations convention law of the sea
Question. At a recent budget-hearing for the State Department,
Secretary Blinken told me that, by his own determination, and I quote:
``the United States would be extremely well served by ratifying the Law
of the Sea Treaty.'' He even went as far as to say that this is not
only his opinion, but ``it's been the judgement across the board by our
military leadership, uniform and civilian for many years.'' Secretary
Blinken is the latest in a long line of department secretaries to agree
on this point. I believe that ratifying the Law of the Sea is in the
best interest of the United States. Along with Senator Hirono, I put
forward legislation urging the Senate to ratify Law of Sea.
Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Senate should ratify the Law of
Sea?
Answer. The Convention reflects customary international law on
which the United States has long relied for its freedoms of navigation
and overflight around the world. Acceding to the Convention would
reinforce these rights and freedoms and could place the United States
in a stronger position when challenging violations of international law
by our adversaries.
Question. What benefit will it provide to the United States? Would
we be in a stronger military position if we were to ratify the Law of
the Sea?
Answer. The Convention sets forth navigational rights and freedoms
across the globe for civilian and military ships and aircraft that are
vital to our national security, including innocent passage through
territorial seas and transit passage through, under, and over
international straits. The United States must currently rely on
customary international law as the legal authority for these and other
provisions, which does not adequately protect U.S. maritime security
interests over the long term. Becoming a party to the Convention would
solidify these and other rights and freedoms in a manner beneficial to
naval operation, facilitate closer cooperation with our allies and
partners, and silence the claims of some nations that say only member
states may enjoy the freedoms the Convention provides. In other words,
joining the Convention is the best means of placing our rights and
freedoms on a secure footing and maximizing the ability of our armed
forces to move through and over the world's ocean waters.
In addition, the Navy's maritime strategy and daily operations are
heavily based on the navigational rights enumerated in the Convention.
Both current and future operations contemplate operating with allies
and partners--all of whom are parties to the Convention. Acceding to
the Convention enables U.S. leadership and influence in the shaping of
global maritime law and policy in ways that facilitate U.S. interests,
lends legitimacy to U.S. maritime activities, and demonstrates U.S.
commitment to the rule of law in the conduct of its operations.
Question. And what would you say to those that want to be tough on
China and Russia, but are still against the ratification of the treaty?
Answer. The law of the sea is continuously being interpreted,
applied, and developed. Accession to the Convention would give the
United States a seat at the table to set the course for future law of
the sea discussions on a co-equal level with China and Russia, who are
member states. China portrays an increasingly aggressive posture in the
South China Sea, attacking the international rules-based order embodied
by the Convention through gray zone activities that seek to erode its
provisions. As a party, U.S. objections to these violations would have
significantly more force and credibility.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
no fiscal year 2022 funding for f/a-18 super hornet production
Question. Secretary Harker, I acknowledge that in this tough budget
cycle, difficult choices must be made. I appreciate your efforts toward
finding efficiencies, for reducing our reliance on legacy systems and
for placing an emphasis both on our people first and on critical
efforts to modernize for the future fight. However, I think we need to
be mindful of building a sound bridge to future capabilities that also
maintains and safeguards our readiness for today's fight.
The F/A-18 is presently the backbone of the Navy's carrier air
wing. While I appreciate a forward-looking focus with the Next
Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, as I understand it, NGAD will
not provide a successor to the Super Hornet until 2030, at the very
earliest. I'm concerned that if we end Super Hornet production
prematurely, simply relying upon Service Life Modification (SLM)
upgrades to get our fleet to Block III-capable is not a sound bridging
solution, particularly when the SLM process is already falling behind
schedule.
When the Block III program began in 2018-2019, the Navy planned to
have 20 Block III-capable Super Hornet squadrons by 2027. But
currently, 67 Block II aircraft that were meant to be upgraded between
2018 and 2023 are already pushed back to at least 2024.
If we combine this SLM slow down with no funding for additional
Super Hornets this year or next, the Navy is ultimately short 103 Block
III-capable Super Hornets that you initially planned to have by 2027.
We then have three more years, at a minimum, before the Next Generation
Air Dominance Program produces results that we can operationally
employ.
My question for you, Secretary Harker, is can you help me
understand this modified bridging strategy to the next generation of
our carrier's air wing? Would it not make more sense to continue with
the original Super Hornet transition plan--to continue the production
line for several more years while working Block III modifications--to
achieve the necessary inventory levels of the most capable tactical
fighter in the Navy's current inventory until a successor is ready?
Answer. To ensure the Navy has the advanced capabilities required
to compete with peer adversaries in the 2020s and 2030s, continued
investments in the procurement of new F-35C and the Next Generation Air
Dominance Family of Systems (NGAD FoS) are necessary. Given the ongoing
delivery of new procurement Block III F/A-18E/F, new procurement F-35C,
and Service Life Modification (SLM) to extend the life and capability
of existing F/A-18E/F Block II aircraft, strike-fighter shortfall
(SFSF) is projected to be eliminated by 2025. Additional procurement of
new F/A-18E/F Block III aircraft beyond fiscal year 2021 is not
required to mitigate near- or long-term SFSF risk. The Navy assesses
that new F/A-18E/F procurement beyond fiscal year 2021 would arrive
late-to-need to address near-term SFSF challenges--which are actively
being managed- and excess-to-need for fourth generation aircraft
capacity to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy.
NAVPLAN 2021 prioritizes development of capabilities to enable a
more lethal and better connected fleet that can outpace the growing
Chinese threat. New F/A-18E/Fs delivered in fiscal year 2026 will have
the service life (10K Flight Hours) to operate well into the 2050s.
Current analysis shows the F/A-18E/F is insufficient to meet the Long
Range Fires requirement against peer threats in the 2030s, even when
partnered with F-35C. Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) for BLKIII
that were anticipated to increase range never srune to fruition. The
remaining ECPs do increase capability as a stop-gap in the short-term,
however further procurement of F/A-18E/F at the expense of future
capability will directly inhibit the Navy's ability to fight and win in
the Great Power Competition. Procurement of F-35C and SLM remain our
best levers to manage Strike Fighter capacity until NGAD FoS comes
online.
The Navy is on track to meet the Super Hornet Block III supply
requirements demanded by the Master Aviation Plan 20-02 (MAP 20-02).
Block III capacity is being delivered through new procurement and
upgrading Block II aircraft to Block III capabilities through SLM
beginning in Quarter 4 (Q4) fiscal year 2022. Through 2027, Boeing will
deliver 78 new Block III aircraft (fiscal year 2021 through fiscal year
2025), and 119 SLM Block III aircraft to meet our Carrier Air Wing
requirements.
Today we have 436 BLK II aircraft. Due to fiscal constraints, we
are not currently maximizing Boeing's advertised SLM conversion
capacity. We have the inventory and capacity to meter SLM output as
required in the future.
The flyaway cost for a new Block III F/A-18E/F is $69 million in
calendar year 2020. Block III modifications required to convert a Block
II aircraft is currently estimated at $9 million. Adding Block III
modification costs to SLM establishes an estimated cost of $18-$23
million per aircraft. A cost range was required due to multiple
aircraft configurations of the F/A-1BE/F fleet, all of which require
different configurations and modifications. Current estimates show that
three SLM aircraft can be upgraded to Block III configuration for the
srune cost as one brand new aircraft, without impacting Strike Fighter
Inventory Management (SFIM).
Though there have been unanticipated delays in the early phase of
SLM, Boeing is confident it can meet the projected SLM turnaround and
delivery times for Block III aircraft. While there is risk inherent in
the analysis and projections, there are currently several risk
mitigation actions underway-by both Boeing and the Navy to ensure the
Carrier Air Wings will have enough Block III aircraft to meet
operational requirements.
SLM has two phases of execution. Phase 1 is the planned 'crawl and
'walk' phases of SLM which is only a flight hour extension of Block II
aircraft from 6000 to 7500 flight hours and does not include Block III
capabilities. Phase 1 has experienced unanticipated challenges with the
material condition of early aircraft inductions, which has driven a
significant increase to SLM workload, staffing gaps, slower learning,
significant cost overruns, and schedule delay. In response to these
challenges, both Boeing and the Navy have implemented mitigation
strategies. Boeing has surged staff at both SLM locations (St Louis,
MO, and San Antonio, TX) and has initiated early detection teams for
common material condition cost/schedule drivers with a feedback loop to
Navy fleet. The Navy has commenced pre-SLM grooming to address known
material condition prior to SLM induction and established improved
corrosion prevention practices. A total of 49 aircraft will receive SLM
phase 1 and will complete in Q4 fiscal year 2022.
SLM Phase 2 is the full Block Ill upgrade to 10,000 flight hours
and the same capabilities as new production aircraft. Phase 2 is
expected to commence in Q4 fiscal year 2022 with Boeing advertised
turnaround time (TAT) per aircraft inducted of 12 months. The SLM
program has seen steady improvement to cost and schedule since
mitigations were implemented, and Boeing is confident they can achieve
the 12-month TAT for SLM phase 2. As part of the Navy's SFIM planning,
the Navy has determined that the MAP 20-02 demand can be met with up to
an 18-month TAT. Even if some of the SLM phase 1 complications were to
continue into phase 2, there will be minimal to no effect to the Block
III capacity to meet the MAP20-02 demand.
The SLM of existing F/A-18E/F aircraft, combined with an active F-
35C production line, are the two risk mitigations in place for the Navy
to manage total strike-fighter inventory. The total number of SLM
aircraft conversions will depend on the timeline for the NGAD FoS
initial operational capability and full operational capability in the
2030s. The Navy will continue to SLM aircraft at a rate commensurate
with capacity requirements, with an option to SLM all current Block II
FIA-18E/F aircraft if deemed necessary.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
Question. I am a strong supporter of our nuclear deterrent, not
only the two legs of the triad located at Minot Air Force Base with our
B-52s and the Minuteman III ICBMs, but also the submarine based leg of
the triad. You've stated that the Columbia-class submarine, which will
replace the aging Ohio class, is the Navy's top procurement priority,
but of course, you also have to ensure that the D5 Trident, which is
the ballistic missile carried by our boomers, is ready and reliable
when the Columbia-class boats enter the fleet.
Could you describe the basic plan to modernize the Trident missiles
and whether there is any coordination with the Air Force's effort to
modernize our land-based ICBMs?
Answer. The Navy is committed to ensuring that the transition
between Ohio-class and Columbia-class submarines stays on schedule.
This includes a seamless transition of the current TRIDENT II D5 Life
Extension (D5LE) weapon system and missile inventory on to the new
Columbia-class. To be clear, the D5LE weapon system currently deployed
on Ohio-class will be the same weapon system deployed on the first
eight hulls of the Columbia-class. To ensure the Navy has missiles for
Columbia Hull 9 and able to replace the missiles on the first eight
hulls when the missiles' safety-related components expire, it is
imperative that we start the work on a future missile and corresponding
weapons system now. This next generation of the current OSLE missile--a
missile in service since 1989 and boasting a remarkable history of 182
successful flight tests--is called D5 Life Extension 2 (D5LE2). Several
areas of the industrial base will have to be reconstituted as suppliers
of critical obsolete components have gone out of business or shifted
production to other fields. D5LE2 will primarily safely extend the D5
strategic weapons system, but this industrial base reconstitution
coupled with improved manufacturing processes also provides the
opportunity to build in flexibility that will ensure that TRIDENT
remains credible in the face of a dynamic threat environment throughout
the Columbia-class service life. D5LE2 must be developed, tested, and
produced with the lead-time sufficient to deploy 16 missiles on
Columbia Hull 9 in fiscal year 2039.
The Navy works closely with the Air Force and Missile Defense
Agency (MDA) through a Flag Level 2018 Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) that governs the collaboration of strategic ballistic missile
systems. The efforts established by this MOU enable affordability by
avoiding redundant efforts (e.g., Radiation Hardened Electronics
Testing and Flight Testing Instrumentation), advance capability by
sharing and leap frogging technology (e.g., Strategic Grade Inertial
Measuring Units), and reduce risks across programs via industrial base
collaboration (e.g., Solid Rocket Motor Production). With similar
technical challenges and a joint industrial base, the Navy fully
recognizes the importance of collaborating with both the Air Force and
MDA while simultaneously sustaining and modernizing our strategic
ballistic missile systems.
______
Questions Submitted to Admiral Michael Gilday
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
Question. Given the administration's priority of taking care of our
people, and the important role that unit cohesion plays in improving
readiness, it's crucial that the Navy take a fresh look at policies and
practices that may not support all servicemembers. To that end, please
outline what changes, if any, the Navy has made, is making, plans to
make, or is considering in order to:
Improve diversity in leadership positions;
Answer. Navy has implemented numerous initiatives to improve
diverse representation in leadership positions and is currently
implementing recommendations from the Task Force One Navy (TF1N) final
report. TF1N was established to identify and make recommendations to
dismantle barriers to equality while creating sustainable
opportunities, ultimately achieving our desired end-state of
warfighting excellence. Following the TF1N final report, Navy removed
photographs during all Officer Selection and Command/Milestone Boards.
Additionally, Navy requires diverse representation on all boards and
provides bias training to board members to be aware of their potential
conscious and unconscious bias and ensure board fairness.
Question. Improve diversity retention at all levels;
Answer. To improve diversity retention, I meet routinely with our
17 Navy Community Leaders, all flag officers, to discuss various
community challenges to include the diversity demographics of each
community, initiatives to support the recruiting and retention of
under-represented groups, the prevalence of destructive behaviors, and
efforts to develop and retain future leaders. We conduct listening
sessions around the Fleet to ensure all voices are heard and that
Sailors and civilian employees understand their opinions matter and are
taken into account by command leadership. Additionally, the Navy Junior
Officer Counsel formed a formal link between Junior Officers and Senior
Navy Leadership to provide feedback, ensuring we are doing everything
we can to make our Junior Officers feel connected and included. Though
Navy has more work to do to reduce and eliminate barriers to upward
career trajectory based on race, gender, ethnicity, or socio-cultural
background, we are encouraged by our team's progress.
Question. Improve trainings, including sexual assault prevention,
with input from women, LGBTQ servicemembers, BIPOC servicemembers, and
sexual assault survivors;
Answer. Our training is being updated to incorporate the Navy's
Culture of Excellence and associated Signature Behaviors with input
from our sexual assault prevention and response team. Adult learning
theory best practices concerning small-group, facilitated discussions
will be also be used throughout the training. Once the training is in
the pilot phase, we intend to solicit input from different populations
of Sailors that may include specific groups such as women, LGBTQ,
BIPOC, and sexual assault survivors.
Question. Increase availability and accessibility of mental health
support services for servicemembers and their families, including
services tailored specifically toward minority servicemembers;
Answer. Senator Leahy, I want to assure you that the Navy remains
committed to promoting, maintaining and advancing a healthcare
environment which adheres to the principles of community and equity by
fostering principles that support: Care with Request; Excellence with
Equity; Mindful Actions with Transparency, Responsibility and
Accountability; and Diversity with Inclusion.
Specific to mental health support services, Navy ascribes to a ``no
wrong door'' policy to assist Sailors and family members in getting
help and support. This policy helps to facilitate access and decrease
stigma in seeking mental health and substance misuse services. Services
are available worldwide, including in specialty clinics, within primary
care, at Navy installation counseling centers, on the waterfront, and
embedded within the Fleet. Sailors and their families can also get
mental health support, to include chaplains, Military and Family Life
Counseling, Fleet and Family Support Centers, and Military OneSource.
Within Navy Medicine efforts are underway develop more formal
structures for addressing and integrating health equity/disparities
within the context of the Navy's Diversity and Inclusion Framework.
This work includes collaboration with the Defense Health Agency and the
other Services to advance access, equity and opportunity amongst the
healthcare staff as well as develop programs to ensure equitable care
and treatment for all service members and families.
Question. Improve outreach to and support for minority
servicemembers facing discrimination from within their units;
Answer. Navy ensures all personnel are aware of the command and
shore-based assistance available to those who need help in processing
harassment or unlawful discrimination reports. In addition, Navy
identifies available counseling support or referral services for all
personnel involved in incidents of harassment or unlawful
discrimination.
Follow-up debriefs are conducted with complainants no later than 45
days following the determination or resolution of harassment or
unlawful discrimination report to determine the complainant's
satisfaction with the effectiveness of the corrective action,
timeliness, present command climate, and to ensure retaliation did not
occur.
Question. Improve medical care for transgender servicemembers,
women, and Black parents, particularly for transition care, pregnancy,
and post-partum care;
Answer. Navy is committed to ensuring all Sailors are treated with
dignity and respect and have access to the highest quality healthcare
in accordance with current evidence-based practice guidelines. We
currently have two Navy Medicine interdisciplinary expert Regional
Transgender Care Teams in place to support and improve the health and
lives of transgender and gender non-binary Sailors. Our experts work
closely with Defense Health Agency and our Army and Air Force
colleagues to ensure we incorporate best clinical practices in support
of the medical readiness of our transgender and gender non-binary
Sailors.
We continue to recognize and emphasize the importance of innovative
pregnancy and postpartum care, resources, and educational materials for
our Sailors to facilitate their return to duty. Our updated Physical
Readiness Program policy provides postpartum Sailors more time, 12
months vice 9 months, to fully recover in a healthy manner prior to
being required to meet fitness and body composition standards. We are
also prioritizing the importance of ensuring our pregnant and
postpartum Sailors have access to the support they need. Navy Medicine
has developed a Postpartum Return to Duty Resource to provide Sailors
with critical education on physical fitness, mental health, support
services, and Navy and Marine Corps policies related to the postpartum
transition to full duty. Within the Military Health System, our Navy
Medicine women's health experts participate with the Defense Health
Agency and the other Services on lines of efforts focused on women's
health, perinatal practices, newborn and infants as well as review of
data and issues related to maternal and infant healthcare disparities,
health equity, and social determinants of health which may be impacted
by race/ethnicity.
______
Questions Submitted to General David H. Berger
Questions Submitted by Senator Patrick Leahy
Question. Given the administration's priority of taking care of our
people, and the important role that unit cohesion plays in improving
readiness, it's crucial that the Marine Corps take a fresh look at
policies and practices that may not support all service members. To
that end, please outline what changes, if any, the Marine Corps has
made, is making, plans to make, or is considering in order to:
Improve diversity in leadership positions;
Answer. Diversity and inclusion are force multipliers and take
advantage of the wide array of experiences and perspectives necessary
to maintain our current and future warfighting excellence. We are
committed to capitalizing on the knowledge, skills, abilities,
performance, and potential of every Marine.
Diversity in the Marine Corps is increasing. Since 2009, diverse
enlisted accessions have increased from 34 percent to 43 percent, and
diverse officer accessions have increased from 16 percent to 35
percent. Women officer accessions have increased from 8 percent to 13.8
percent during this same time period. Women represented in previously
restricted military occupational specialties (MOS's) are also on the
rise. Last year, 737 women were in previously restricted units; that
number is now 1,101. Similarly, 283 women were serving in previously
restricted MOS's; today that number is 415, including the first woman
Reconnaissance Marine.
This year, the Marine Corps reached the level of 21 percent in
diversity for Brigadier Generals and Brigadier General-selects, the
highest level of diverse representation at that rank in Marine Corps
history. And by the end of July of this year, two minority officers
from that cohort will promote to Major General. We look forward to
seeing this trend continue.
The Marine Corps is a full partner with the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the other Services in accomplishing the recommendations
set out in the Secretary's Diversity and Inclusion Board Final Report.
However, the Marine Corps is also taking its own initiative to both
study and make changes to continue to improve diversity and inclusion.
First, our Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategic Plan will
guide our actions over the next 5 years in the areas of recruiting and
accessions, talent management, education, training, and commandership.
It provides a framework to align a number of efforts, identify new
initiatives, and provide oversight across the Corps for implementation
by commanders at every level. One of our first actions to implement our
plan was the appointment of a general officer as the Service's Chief
Diversity and Inclusion Officer. This position will communicate program
goals, develop policy, and action per the aforementioned strategic
plan. Concurrently, the Marine Corps bolstered the Diversity, Equity,
and Inclusion Review Board (DRB). The DRB serves as the action arm of
the Marine Corps Diversity and Inclusion Management Program to address
diversity, inclusion, and command climate issues that may affect the
Marine Corps.
Second, a host of independent studies are currently underway to
better understand diversity and inclusion challenges and make
improvements. Our Fitness Report Bias Study is an analysis which is
examining the objectivity of the current performance appraisal process.
The Basic School Military Occupational Specialty Assignment Study which
will examine historical performance data, based on demographics, to
evaluate the impact of performance on MOS assignment. We are also
funding an independent study to identify and understand any barriers to
advancement and retention of women and minorities in the Marine Corps.
Finally, our Exit & Milestone Longitudinal Survey provides feedback to
better understand personnel satisfaction regarding career
opportunities, leadership, performance management, diversity, and work-
life programs.
Outreach and external engagement are an important facet of our
holistic approach to diversity and inclusion. We have steadily
increased our Outreach Program budget from $150,000 in fiscal year 2014
to $1 million in fiscal year 2021. This Program provides opportunities
for professional development, mentoring, and networking experiences by
fully funding approximately 500 Marines to attend 19 national/regional
conferences hosted by non-Federal entity affinity groups events
throughout the year.
The Marine Corps is working collaboratively with our training
command to incorporate unconscious bias training at every rank
throughout the training continuum. Diversity of thought and experience
that each Marine brings will help us find more creative and innovative
solutions to these future challenges.
Diversity and inclusion are, more than anything, a leadership
issue. Marine leaders must not just talk about changing culture--they
must be the example of how to treat fellow Marines and all individuals
with dignity, respect, empathy and compassion.
Question. Improve diversity retention at all levels;
Answer. See response to 1a above.
Question. Improve trainings, including sexual assault prevention,
with input from women, LGBTQ servicemembers, BIPOC servicemembers, and
sexual assault survivors;
Answer. Collaboration is key in addressing sexual assault
prevention and response. We have collaborated with sexual assault
survivors, members of the LGBTQ+ community, SAPR personnel, women, and
BIPOC servicemembers to improve our SAPR training; we will continue to
do so. Our SAPR program works together with the other Services,
Department of the Navy and Department of Defense Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response Offices, and outside entities to enhance our
ability to prevent and respond to sexual assault, identify best
practices, and leverage resources.
Our continued focus on prevention seeks to tailor training to
specific levels of leadership. This enables a multi-layered approach to
prevention to fit Marines of every age, rank, and billet. For example,
our updated SAPR annual training for Staff Non-Commissioned Officers
(SNCO) provides more focus at the small unit level. This training's
goal is to help increase SNCO knowledge about sexual assault,
reporting, resources, rank-specific roles and responsibilities, and to
build skills consistent with primary prevention.
We also updated the SAPR training for the Commander's Course to
better prepare senior leadership to prevent sexual assault once they
assume command. This includes information focused on actionable
recommendations for pre-command leaders and small group discussions
facilitated by Marine Corps mentors and SAPR experts. Commanders set
the tone of their unit--we know how important it is to ensure they are
equipped before they assume command to establish the right command
climate--a climate that encourages Marines to look out for one another
and report destructive behaviors and crimes, and that mandates
accountability for perpetrators and enablers. Likewise, we updated
First Sergeant's Course to include actionable recommendations for
sexual assault prevention, information on responses to trauma, and
actions to take if one of their Marines is sexually assaulted,
appropriate to their new positions.
While we highlight our prevention efforts, we acknowledge that we
are not where we need to be; we still have incidents of sexual
harassment and assault and so we must ensure we provide the best
support possible to victims. A revised SAPR Victim Advocate (VA)
training was released in October 2019 and has been fully implemented.
The revised 40-hour curriculum focuses on building and refining
advocacy skills and includes cultural competency and prevention
training. We are currently revising Sexual Assault Response Coordinator
(SARC) Initial Training to build on advocacy and cultural competency
skills taught in the 40-hour training and prepare SARCs to oversee
their SAPR program.
The Marine Corps continually evaluates SAPR initiatives for
effectiveness by conducting needs assessments, surveys, and staffing
analysis. SARC and VA training curriculum development has been
standardized which better ensures that Marines understand reporting
options, SARCs and VAs are prepared to support victims, and all
understand their role in sexual assault prevention.
We want to leverage technological developments too. We are
implementing online evaluation tools for select SAPR annual training,
Victim Advocate training, and Sexual Assault Response Coordinators
initial training. The evaluation tools measure changes in knowledge,
attitudes, and intentions, as well as training satisfaction,
consistency of instruction, and quality of instruction. These
evaluation results will inform local SAPR personnel, as well as HQMC
personnel, on the effectiveness of the trainings.
Question. Increase availability and accessibility of mental health
support services for servicemembers and their families, including
services tailored specifically toward minority servicemembers;
Answer. Marine Corps' focus is to treat all Service member and
their families with equality while recognizing and embracing diversity.
Accessibility of nonmedical support services was expanded in May 2020
to telephonic and virtual platforms. Traditional knee-cap to knee-cap
counseling remained intact whenever possible as well. Although each
installation across the Marine Corps provides published service hours,
standard practice from the field staff in the behavioral health
programs is to accommodate alternate hours upon request.
Two significant support programs are the Unit Marine Awareness and
Prevention Integrated Training for Marines (UMAPIT) and our Operational
Stress Control and Readiness (OSCAR) programs. UMAPIT is a training and
education calendar year requirement for all Marines, and provides
specific information and actions Marines can employ to access mental
health resources. OSCAR is a Marine-trained team of Marines within
Marine Corps units who help recognize and respond to stress. If a
Marine believes their stress-level is negatively impacting their unit,
an OSCAR member is there to talk and to connect the Marine with other
resources. These and other programs are specifically geared to
nonmedical mental health support.
The Marine Corps remains committed to promoting, maintaining, and
advancing a healthcare environment that adheres to the principles of
community and equity by fostering principles that support: Care with
Request; Excellence with Equity; Mindful Actions with Transparency,
Responsibility and Accountability; and Diversity with Inclusion.
Specific to mental health support services, the Marine Corps
ascribes to a ``no wrong door'' policy to assist Marines and family
members in getting help and support. This policy helps to facilitate
access and decrease stigma in seeking mental health and substance
misuse services. These services are available worldwide, including in
specialty clinics, within primary care, at Marine Corps installation
counseling centers, and embedded within the Fleet Marine Force.
Marines and their families can also get mental health support, to
include chaplains, Military and Family Life Counseling, Marine & Family
Programs, and Military OneSource.
Within Navy Medicine, efforts are underway to develop more formal
structures for addressing and integrating health equity/disparities
within the context of the Department of the Navy's Diversity and
Inclusion Strategic Framework. This work includes collaboration with
the Defense Health Agency and the other Services to advance access,
equity, and opportunity amongst the healthcare staff; as well as
develop programs to ensure equitable care and treatment for all service
members and families.
Question. Improve outreach to and support for minority
servicemembers facing discrimination from within their units;
Answer. The Marine Corps' support for minority service members
facing discrimination within their units is rooted in the DoD's
Strategic Elements of prevention, reporting, advocacy, education/
training, and accountability; with Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5354.1F,
``Prohibited Activities and Conduct (PAC) Prevention and Response
Policy,'' encompassing all of the aforementioned elements of support.
Our PAC order defines that any conduct discriminating an individual
or a group based on race, color, national origin, religion, sex
(including pregnancy), gender identity, or sexual orientation is
prohibited by all personnel. The order describes how qualitative and
quantitative data collection from Command Climate Assessments (CCAs)
allows commands to best leverage command-level Equal Opportunity
Advisors/Equal Opportunity Representatives (EOAs/EORs) to facilitate
focus groups and tailor annual PAC training to include additional
topics, as part of a comprehensive prevention strategy.
Not only do all Marines complete PAC training every year, commands
can use their EOAs/EORs to conduct additional PAC training or focus
groups, at any time, in order to combat PAC behavioral trends.
As an additional part of CCAs, any areas falling below the average
require a corrective action plan by the commander. The plan is
implemented and evaluated during all Comprehensive Command Inspections,
Independent Command Inspections, and the Commanding General's
Inspection Program Inspections as an additional level of validation by
external command entities. The commander is appropriately held further
accountable on his/her annual fitness report by a statement identifying
a commander's failure, if any, to conduct required CCAs.
Annual PAC training also informs unit members that any complaints
of violating behaviors they witness can be reported for command
resolution. The complaint will then be resolved through informal or
formal resolution. All unit members have access to full-time EOAs and
collateral-duty EORs, who provide advice and guidance to complainants
on matters related to PAC. Typically, EOAs/EORs provide the annual
training and conduct focus groups, so unit members know who these
appointed personnel are, but each command also posts fliers identifying
these personnel in an effort to ensure service members have this
information at all times.
Additionally, the PAC order stipulates commanders must ensure
Service members have access to support services, such as mental health
counseling, medical, EOA, Victim and Witness Assistance Personnel, and
Victim Legal Counsel.
The Marine Corps takes a comprehensive approach to support minority
service members facing discrimination within units. Combatting such
behavior is a team effort that requires the commander to set the
correct climate denouncing PAC violations, EOAs/EORs educate and
support the command and its unit members, and each unit member being
held appropriately accountable for their actions.
Question. Improve medical care for transgender servicemembers,
women, and Black parents, particularly for transition care, pregnancy,
and post-partum care;
Answer. The Marine Corps is committed to ensuring all Marines are
treated with dignity and respect, along with access to the highest
quality healthcare in accordance with current evidence-based practice
guidelines. There are currently two Navy Medicine interdisciplinary
expert Regional Transgender Care Teams in place to support and improve
the health and lives of transgender and gender non-binary Marines.
These experts work closely with the Defense Health Agency, as well as
Army and Air Force colleagues, to ensure the best clinical practices
are incorporated in support of the medical readiness of our transgender
and gender non-binary Marines.
We continue to recognize and emphasize the importance of innovative
pregnancy and postpartum care, resources, and educational materials for
our Marines to facilitate their return to duty. Our physical readiness
program is focused on providing postpartum Marines time to fully
recover in a healthy manner prior to being required to meet fitness and
body composition standards. We also recognize the importance of
ensuring our pregnant and postpartum Marines have access to the support
they need. Navy Medicine has developed a Postpartum Return to Duty
Resource to provide Marines with critical education on physical
fitness, mental health, support services, as well as Navy and Marine
Corps guidance related to the postpartum transition to full duty.
Within the Military Health System, Navy Medicine women's health experts
participate with the Defense Health Agency and the other Services on
lines of effort focused on women's health, perinatal practices, newborn
and infants; as well as review of data and issues related to maternal
and infant healthcare disparities, health equity, and social
determinants of health that may be impacted by race/ethnicity.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question. General Berger, last year we lost 8 Marines and 1 Sailor
during a terrible training accident involving an Amphibious Assault
Vehicle off the coast of California. The investigation report
highlighted several training and equipment deficiencies.
How is the Marine Corps working to prevent a recurrence of future
amphibious vehicle accidents, and has the Marine Corps requested enough
funding in the budget to adequately maintain these vehicles and procure
the replacement vehicles?
Answer. The Marine Corps is committed to identifying the issues
that led to this tragedy and to preventing future occurrences. We have
concluded a safety investigation and a command investigation into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the sinking of 15th Marine
Expeditionary Unit's (MEU) amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) and the
resulting loss of life. An investigation into the formation of the 15th
MEU is pending endorsement. Finally, a Blue Ribbon Panel of senior
Marine Corps and Navy personnel has formed and is currently conducting
a strategic review of amphibious operations.
We are confident the safety and command investigations identified
contributing and causal factors. As a result of these investigations,
the Marine Corps has directed 23 institutional actions to ensure the
safe execution of AAV waterborne operations. These actions fall into
one of three categories: equipment, procedures, and training. Equipment
actions include a combination of equipment advances and additional
inspections such as: procurement and sustainment of a Waterborne Egress
Capability program; electronic tablets for crewmembers to manage
associated technical and procedural manuals; and new criteria for hull
watertight integrity, bilge pump function, communications systems, and
emergency egress lighting systems. To address procedural actions, the
Marine Corps has administered many publication and policy reviews to
operating procedures, technical manuals, and safety structure
requirements during training. These include updates to: training and
qualification prerequisites; authority and decisionmaking procedures;
and safety boat requirements. Finally, training actions include
implementing additional standards for water survival, underwater egress
training for both crew members and embarked personnel, and standardized
knowledge tests for crew members. These last two tasks, plus oversight
of mechanical and procedural inspections, have to be completed by
operational level units and certified by the first general officer in
the chain of command in order for them to gain authority to perform
waterborne operations.
We have fully funded the AAV program to implement the institutional
actions related to the safety and command investigations as well as
routine maintenance requirements.
We are confident the directed service level actions will rectify
any issues that contributed to this terrible tragedy with the goal of
ensuring no similar incident occurs again.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Lisa Murkowski
Question. The Navy and Marine Corps Arctic strategy document,
``Blue Arctic'' specifically states the ``The [Naval Services] will be
postured to deter aggressive and malign behavior, keep the seas free
and open, and assure allies and partners of our long-term commitment to
preserving peace and advancing shared interests.'' It also emphasizes
the need for ``credible naval forces [to] ensure the ability to deter
competitors and rapidly respond to crises in the region.''
Do you see any lessons learned in the Marine Corps' Expeditionary
Advanced Based Operations (EABO) concept that can be applied to a
homeland archipelago, such as the Aleutians, for a deterrence model?
Answer. Yes, the capabilities used to conduct Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations (EABO) would be especially useful in a complex
homeland archipelago such as the Aleutians. EABO is a form of
expeditionary warfare that involves the employment of mobile, low-
signature, persistent, and relatively easy to maintain and sustain
naval expeditionary forces from a series of austere, temporary
locations ashore or inshore within a contested or potentially contested
maritime area in order to conduct sea denial, support sea control, or
enable fleet sustainment. The capabilities we are developing to conduct
EABO--to include various combinations of manned and unmanned sensors
and long-range precision fires--are absolutely applicable to detecting
and countering malign behavior, contributing to integrated deterrence
and, if necessary, conducting sea denial to maintain the sovereign
integrity of our own waters.
Through an iterative campaign of experimentation and exercises, the
Marine Corps will continue to refine and update the capabilities and
force structure required to conduct EABO over the coming years.
Question. At a recent budget hearing for the State Department,
Secretary Blinken told me that, by his own determination, and I quote:
``the United States would be extremely well served by ratifying the Law
of the Sea Treaty.'' He even went as far as to say that this is not
only his opinion, but ``it's been the judgement across the board by our
military leadership, uniform and civilian for many years.'' Secretary
Blinken is the latest in a long line of department secretaries to agree
on this point. I believe that ratifying the Law of the Sea is in the
best interest of the United States. Along with Senator Hirono, I put
forward legislation urging the Senate to ratify Law of Sea.
General Berger, would you expect Marines to be required for
missions to uphold UNCLOS norms?
Answer. Yes. Our Marines are expected and trained to uphold our
international legal obligations in all military operations.
Question. As a naval service chief, do you believe the Senate
should ratify the Law of Sea?
Answer. Consistent with past Commandants, I believe acceding to the
Convention could strengthen our position when challenging violations of
international law by our adversaries.
While the Convention reflects customary international law on which
the United States has long relied for its freedoms of navigation and
overflight around the world, acceding to the Convention would reinforce
these rights and freedoms.
Question. What benefit will it provide to the United States? Would
we be in a stronger military position if we were to ratify the Law of
the Sea?
Answer. The Convention reflects the traditional uses of the oceans
such as navigation and overflight rights and freedoms across the globe
for our civilian and military ships and aircraft. These traditional
uses, including innocent passage through other nations' territorial
seas and transit passage through, under, and over international
straits, are vital to our national security interests. To date, the
United States has relied on customary international law as the legal
basis for these rights and freedoms, but customary international law
will not adequately protect U.S. maritime security interests over the
long term. For instance, a number of our adversaries claim that only
States that are party to the Convention enjoy the rights and freedoms
that the Convention provides. Acceding to the Convention would solidify
these and other rights and freedoms in a manner beneficial to naval
operations, facilitate closer cooperation with our allies and partners,
and disarm our adversaries of these claims. Joining the Convention is
the best means of securing U.S. rights and freedoms, and maximizing the
ability of our armed forces to move through and over the world's ocean
waters.
The Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness
prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in
support of fleet operations that are largely dependent upon the
navigational rights enumerated in the Convention. Moreover, the United
States conducts its operations in coalitions with allies and partners--
most of whom are parties to the Convention. Acceding to the Convention
will reinforce U.S. leadership and influence in the shaping of global
maritime law and policy in ways that serve U.S. interests, validate
U.S. maritime activities under international law, and demonstrate U.S.
commitment to the rule of law in the conduct of its operations.
Question. And what would you say to those that want to be tough on
China and Russia, but are still against the ratification of the treaty?
Answer. Accession to the Convention would allow the United States
to participate in future law of the sea discussions on a coequal level
with China and Russia, who are member States. In 1983, President Reagan
set forth the U.S. Oceans Policy, which stated that the United States
will not ``acquiesce in unilateral acts of other States designed to
restrict the rights and freedoms of the international community in
navigation and overflight and other related high seas uses.'' China's
increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea is a direct
attack on the international rules-based order embodied by the
Convention. Its conduct of gray zone activities seeks to erode its
provisions. As a party to the Convention, U.S. objections to these
violations would have significantly more force and credibility. The
United States would also be better positioned to contest excessive
maritime claims and other unlawful activities by China and others, such
as Russia and Iran, who continuously attempt to restrict the
Convention's navigational rights and freedoms.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
Question. You mentioned in your written statement that you expect
to make use of medium altitude, long endurance unmanned aircraft like
the MQ-9 even when Marines are deployed in close proximity to our
adversaries. Additionally, your fiscal year 2022 budget request
includes a substantial investment in the MQ-9A extended range aircraft.
Could you describe the role you expect unmanned aircraft to play
for Marines deployed near China or Russia?
Answer. The MQ-9A Extended Range will fulfill a primary mission of
communication and data relay with an additional airborne early warning
capability. This will provide deployed Marine Corps and Joint Force
units with persistent tactical maritime Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control gateways. The MQ-9A
Extended Range is also a critical enabler to the Naval force in
building an alternate Precision, Navigation, and Timing network.
The Marine Corps seeks to procure six MQ-9A Extended Range systems
in fiscal year 2022, and a total of 18 systems over the next several
years, to form three Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) squadrons. The
Marine Corps will leverage an existing Air Force system and two current
Marine Corps assets in USCENTCOM to reduce risk, while providing
advanced capabilities to the Marine Corps and overall joint warfighting
enterprise.
Additionally, the Marine Corps continues to develop and experiment
a family of UAS with a variety of plug-and-play payloads. These systems
will give ground combat units organic Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and
Target Acquisition (RSTA) assets capable of supporting long-range
precision kinetic and non-kinetic fires, both afloat and ashore. This
includes conducting extended user evaluations with industry leading
systems to include the UAV V-BAT and the Stalker UAS to inform
requirements for the Ground Combat Element.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Boozman
Question. General Berger, the budget request includes a significant
increase for the Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile program. I understand
this program is vital to your future force design. Given the tough
budget decisions facing this committee:
Why is this program so important to the Marine Corps and what
progress was made on the development of this program since last year?
Answer. Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile (GBASM) is the Marine Corps'
top modernization priority and is the key lethality component for the
Marine Corps to facilitate sea denial in support of naval and joint
operations. The capability creates cost impositions for an adversary by
introducing a new and highly credible threat into their decisionmaking,
while providing us with a relatively low cost and highly effective
capability.
The initial materiel solution for GBASM is the Navy-Marine
Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) which consists of two
Naval Strike Missiles mounted on a remotely operated Joint Light
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)-based chassis. By combining existing
technologies in the missile and the platform, the Marine Corps has
reduced programmatic risks through the use of proven capabilities,
which enables us to move faster. The Marine Corps successfully tested
this system against a ship target in November 2020, and in our fiscal
year 2022 budget request, we are seeking funding for 10 production
representative models (PRMs) for further developmental and operational
testing. With the ability to strike enemy ships at ranges of 100
nautical miles and beyond, we believe it will be a ``game changer'' for
the Marine Corps, the Naval Fleet Commander, and Combatant Commanders.
Additionally, the Marine Corps is developing a longer-range
capability, which we call ``Long Range Fires.'' The Marine Corps
successfully tested this program in March 2021.
Question. How will the Unfunded Request for additional missiles
support your fielding of this capability?
Answer. Naval Strike Missiles are the munition component of the
Navy/Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) which is
the Marine Corps' first iteration of the GBASM capability. These
additional missiles in the Unfunded Priority List (UPL) would provide
greater magazine depth for the units that will employ them in the Indo-
Pacific.
As the pacing threat moves with us and technology develops at a
speed faster than the budget, funding the entirety of our UPL request
provides us the opportunity to capitalize on successful technological
developments. This will accelerate additional capability to the
Combatant
Commanders, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, buying down strategic
risk for them and our forward deployed forces, and deterring conflict
sooner.
Question. General Berger, I want to expand on 2030 Force Design.
Secretary Austin recently testified in this committee that China is the
#1 pacing threat. How will the different elements of your Force Design
support the Joint Force within the INDOPACOM area of responsibility and
how does the Pacific Deterrent Initiative support your efforts within
the Joint Force?
Answer. A new type of unit, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), is
a vital element of the Marine Corps' Force Design transformation. These
new units will be task-organized and dispersed across key maritime
terrain in the Indo-Pacific region to support the Naval and Joint
Force. The MLR capabilities will augment and reinforce a host nation's
ability to monitor, expose, and challenge malign behavior, but the MLRs
will also be fully capable of operating without host-nation support if
required. Additionally, the MLRs will be highly mobile, constantly
changing their positioning and posture to increase ambiguity and
increase the adversary's challenge of monitoring and targeting MLR
units. In order to provide lethality when needed, the MLRs will possess
complementary capabilities of sensing, communication, maneuverability,
and precision fires. These characteristics and capabilities will reduce
an adversary's confidence and encourage off-ramps from conflict.
Marine Corps investments in new capabilities and current operations
are in direct alignment with and supported by the Pacific Deterrence
Initiative (PDI). Namely, PDI supports the Commandant's Force Design
2030 initiative to build a force able to operate in actively contested
spaces in support of the Joint Force, providing the Combatant Commander
with ready, relevant crisis response forces and a capability to work
effectively with allies and partners.
As part of the Naval Expeditionary Force resiliency, investments
allow Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) elements to maneuver,
communicate, and conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
within contested maritime environments. Air defense is provided through
investments which will identify, track, and defeat enemy Unmanned
Aerial Systems. Funding is also provided for effective Aviation Command
and Control, to foster resiliency in logistics lines of communication,
deter and defeat threats in the electromagnetic spectrum, and provide
precision strike fire support in support of distributed operations.
Investments in these capabilities allow our forward deployed Stand-in
Force to support Joint operations inside the enemy's weapon engagement
zone (WEZ) and to compete and deter in the contact and blunt layers.
Additionally, PDI investments in security cooperation programs will
strengthen relationships with our allies and partners in the Indo-
Pacific region, and these investments directly support the Marine
Forces Pacific Afloat Prepositioning Training and Exercise Employment
Plan through the funding of exercises FREEDOM BANNER, BALIKATAN, and
COBRA GOLD.
SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS
Senator Tester. This committee stands in recess.
[Whereupon, at 11:02 a.m., Thursday, June 24, the
subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of
the Chair.]