[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONTAINING RUSSIA: OPPOSING RUSSIAN
IMPERIALISM IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
[CSCE117-11]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-801 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. SENATE U.S HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Co-Chairman
Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE WILSON, South Carolina Ranking
Ranking Member Member
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
TINA SMITH, Minnesota RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island MARC VEASEY, Texas
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Department of State - to be appointed
Department of Defense - to be appointed
Department of Commerce - to be appointed
C O N T E N T S
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Page
COMMISSIONERS
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, from Maryland................. 1
Hon. Roger F. Wicker, Ranking Member, from Mississippi........... 4
Hon. Steve Cohen, Co-Chairman, from Tennessee.................... 4
Hon. Richard Blumenthal, from Conneticut......................... 6
WITNESSES
Ambassador Oksana Markarova, Ukrainian ambassador to the United
States......................................................... 7
General [Ret.] Philip Breedlove, NATO's Former Supreme Allied
Commander Europe; Distinguished Professor of theractice and
CETS Senior Fellow, Georgia Tech............................... 9
Michael Kimmage, Former Policy Planning Staff, U.S, Department of
State; Professor of History, The Catholic University of
America; Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States..... 13
Miriam Lanskoy, Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia, National
Endowment for Democracy........................................ 17
CONTAINING RUSSIA: OPPOSING RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND
----------
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE,
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Wednesday, March 23, 2022.
The hearing was held from 2:45 p.m. to 4:26 p.m., Room 106,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Benjamin L.
Cardin [D-MD], Chairman, Commission for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senator Benjamin L. Cardin [D-
MD], Chairman; Senator Roger F. Wicker [R-MS], Ranking Member;
Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Co-Chairman; Senator Richard
Blumenthal [D-CT].
Witnesses: Ambassador Oksana Markarova, Ukrainian
ambassador to the United States; General [Ret.] Philip
Breedlove, NATO's Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe;
Distinguished Professor of the Practice and CETS Senior Fellow,
Georgia Tech; Michael Kimmage, Former Policy Planning Staff,
U.S, Department of State; Professor of History, The Catholic
University of America; Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the
United States; Miriam Lanskoy, Senior Director for Russia and
Eurasia, National Endowment for Democracy.
OPENING STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE,
FROM MARYLAND
Chairman Cardin: The Helsinki Commission will come to
order. Let me first acknowledge the loss of a great American.
Madeline Albright passed away just recently. We just found out
about it. She was an incredible person. I will always remember
our personal interactions over many, many years. She was, of
course, our U.N. ambassador under President Clinton, and became
secretary of state--the first woman to hold that position. She
was a powerful figure in the global community and a powerful
figure here in America. I know that her good counsel is going
to be missed by all, and on behalf of the Helsinki Commission,
we express our deepest condolences to her family. She was a
refugee from Prague in 1948. Her whole life experience really
prepared her for the challenges that she could confront and
make such a contribution in regards to furthering diplomacy.
This is our third hearing of the Helsinki--
Senator Wicker: If the senator would yield--
Chairman Cardin: Sure, Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker: I want to subscribe to the comments of my
friend, Senator Cardin, about Madeline Albright. I actually had
more dealings with her after she left public service. Were
associated together on some human rights initiatives. I had the
honor several years ago of being awarded the Vaclav Havel
Award. Secretary Albright introduced me at that occasion, and
it is one of the distinct honors of my career in public
service. I wanted to add my expression of appreciation for a
life well-lived and a public service well-rendered.
Chairman Cardin: Your observation about her contributions
after she left the public office is so well-placed. I was with
her on several occasions where she used her talent to help
bridge communities and to help advance U.S. national security
concerns as a private citizen in an extremely effective manner.
What a just dignified person, what an incredible leader.
We are now holding our third hearing regarding Ukraine. We
had our first hearing, a basic overview of the threat that Mr.
Putin posed to Ukraine, under the leadership of Senator Wicker.
We had a hearing last week in regards to the Baltic states, the
frontline, in regards to countries that understand what Ukraine
is going through today since they experienced a similar assault
on their country under the Soviet Union. In this hearing, we
will explore the containing Russian oppression--Containing
Russia, Opposing Russia's Imperialism in Ukraine and Beyond. We
are also, just for the members of the Commission, we are
looking at having additional hearings. They will be coming up
rather quickly because of the urgency of the circumstance.
I know that Congressman Cohen is directly interested in
helping us put together a hearing regarding understanding
Russia's propaganda campaign. We will have a hearing to deal
with the risk factors of the refugees, particularly the
children, who could well end up victims of trafficking. We want
to pay attention to that under the Helsinki Commission. I know
that Senator Whitehouse is interested in us putting together a
hearing that Senator Wicker and I are going to be very much
interested in, and that is enforcing the individual sanctions,
the Magnitsky sanctions, and looking at the use of shell
corporations, et cetera, and how do we trace to make sure that
we actually get the enforcement of our sanctions.
I say all that because we are going to be busy in the
Helsinki Commission, and it is just a clear message that we
stand with the people of Ukraine. This is good versus evil,
make no mistake about it. When we see what Mr. Putin is doing
in Ukraine, we see the horrors that he has created, the
atrocities, the use of cluster bombs, the use of supersonic
missiles, the targeting of shelters, the targeting of
hospitals, the targeting of civilian populations, the
atrocities that he is committing, the threats to use chemical
weapons, the threat to use nuclear weapons. Mr. Putin needs to
be held accountable for these atrocities. He needs to be held
accountable as a war criminal, and we are going to continue to
point out that, yes, we want Russian troops removed immediately
from Ukraine, but we also want accountability for the
atrocities that have been created by Mr. Putin.
Make no mistake about it, it was an unprovoked attack in
Ukraine. We are, every day, just marvel at the courage of the
Ukrainian people. They are an inspiration to all of us.
President Zelensky has been an inspirational leader for the
global community, and we recognize that he is there fighting
for the sovereignty of Ukraine, but he is also fighting for the
sovereignty of the free world. We recognize that.
I want to first welcome Ambassador Markarova here to our
committee. She has been with us before, and we always
appreciate her presence, and she is an extremely effective
representative of Ukraine. We appreciate the briefings that you
have held for members and the messages that we have been able
to bring back and forth to the Ukrainian government and people.
Thank you very much, and we will hear from you after we finish
some opening statements and before we call on the panel.
I want to just summarize this very briefly, where we are. I
want to compliment the Biden administration for their
leadership in supplying lethal defensive weapons to the
Ukrainians so they could defend themselves, for leading in the
imposition of very strong sectorial and individual sanctions
against Russia and Mr. Putin and his oligarchs, and providing
humanitarian assistance to the Ukrainian people, those that are
refugees--the three million that have left already the country
to seek safety, and the ten million that have been displaced
since the beginning of this invasion by Mr. Putin.
We need to continue these efforts, as we have all
indicated. I am particularly pleased that we have been able to
see global unity with our NATO partners, with our traditional
partners, and with basically the global community, with a few
notable exceptions that we are continuing to work on. As I
said, this is good versus evil, and we are going to continue
our resolve in support of Ukraine and its sovereignty. The
Helsinki Commission is going to continue to be very much
focused on these particular issues, and we welcome how we can
continue to play a constructive role.
I personally want to thank Senator Wicker. The two of us
have been working today on additional sanctions against Mr.
Putin and Russia. We hope to pass today the legislation that
passed the United States Congress, House, that would take away
PNTR from Russia. I pointed out to my colleagues on the floor
that when PNTR was granted to Russia, it was coupled with the
Magnitsky sanction bill dealing with those who perpetrated the
atrocities against Mr. Magnitsky himself. Since that time, we
have passed the global Magnitsky statute. I was pleased to
partner with our former colleague John McCain and with Senator
Wicker on getting those bills to the finish line.
What Mr. Zelensky asked us to do is to expand those
sanctions to include the enablers, that allow Mr. Putin to do
what he is able to do. That is exactly what this global
Magnitsky reauthorization bill will do: Remove the sunset and
expand the sanction list. We are hopeful that we will be able
to get that legislation done. We also want to make it clear
that we do not want to see any exports of Russian oil or gas.
We can implement that quickly in the United States. We
recognize it is a little bit more challenging in Europe, but we
do want to make sure that we do not supply any resources to
finance Mr. Putin's war against Ukraine, his human rights
violations, and the atrocities that he has committed.
I just want the Ukrainian people to know that this cause is
our top priority in the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Putin has
violated every single commitment of the Helsinki Final Act--
every single commitment. He has to be held accountable, and
this Commission will do everything we can to make that a
reality.
With that, let me recognize Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF ROGER F. WICKER, CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE, FROM
MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker: Thank you, Senator Cardin. I know our
attendees are eager to hear from the witnesses, but it is good
to be back together again. Let me reiterate what Chairman
Cardin has said. The Global Magnitsky Act, which is set to
sunset, needs to be reenacted today with the same strengthened
language that President Trump used in an executive order to the
benefit of our country and--for the safety of individuals
around the globe, including the Americas, who were having their
human rights grossly violated.
I hope we can do that today or this week, very, very soon.
It would be--it would be the height of irony if the legislative
body where Magnitsky began failed to join the rest of the globe
in strengthening our ability to sanction the kleptocrats who
not only steal from the Russian people, but violate their human
rights in so many, many ways, but also a tool that is used to
uncover the money laundering that allows Mr. Putin and his
cronies to become multi-, multi-, multibillionaires. It is good
to be here, to hear from these witnesses.
I do appreciate what the administration has done so far,
but I do believe I would be remiss if I did not point out that
there is much more that the Biden administration could have
already done. I call on the president today, the secretary of
state, and the White House to unleash the full package of
sanctions that are available to them, and to enhance the
weaponry that we have already made available to our friends in
Ukraine. They have not asked us for boots on the ground. They
have not asked us for military intervention. They said they
would fight their war if they had the tools. I think there are
many more tools. I share a bipartisan viewpoint in that
respect.
I have a statement here, to the extent that I am able to
put it in the record, I will do so. However, at this point, I
yield back my time and hope that we can get onto witnesses
soon.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Senator Wicker.
Congressman Cohen, our co-chair of the Commission, is with
us through Webex.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate
it.
WEBEX STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TENNESSEE
I understand there have been some comments made about the
loss of our great former Secretary of State Madeline Albright,
and I share those thoughts about her exemplary life and the
sadness at her passing. I also wanted to mention the ironic
tragedy of a gentleman who was killed in Kyiv yesterday who was
a Holocaust--or, the day before--a Holocaust survivor. I think
he was in four concentration camps, something like that. This--
Putin, who claims he is de-Nazifying Ukraine, killed one of the
Holocaust survivors who has been a great supporter of letting
people know the horrors of the Holocaust and what the Nazi
danger is, and it is not in Ukraine.
General Breedlove, I am going to ask you, and you probably
have prepared remarks--but my main concern--I concur somewhat
with Senator Wicker. I did not hear his total remarks, but I
support the president in bringing our European allies together
on sanctions and other issues. We need to work together or else
it will be looked upon as an American war with Russia, and that
is what we do not want. I believe we should give, facilitate,
the transference of the Polish airplanes or, if they need to
be, if they are Hungarian, Moldovan, Slovak--whoever has the
planes they can fly.
There was a story in The New York Times today that said
that the Ukrainian Air Force has done a spectacular job, and
that is why Russia has not taken control of the skies over
Ukraine. They have had dogfights, they have been successful in
shooting down missiles, they have been successful in shooting
down some Russian planes, and they have made their sorites and
come back, they survived. I believe it was President Zelensky
who said they will have more pilots at some point than planes,
and they need planes.
I understand--and I am not a defense expert by any means. I
am not even on the scoreboard, but they want the planes. They
think they need them. They have been effective. I understand
that certain anti-aircraft weapons and drones are effective
too, and they should have those as well. I do not understand
why they do not get the planes. If Zelensky and everybody from
Ukraine say give us the planes, and if they have the pilots
that have done a spectacular job flying the planes, they can do
even more with more planes. We, in my opinion, need to do
everything we can to facilitate that.
Their pilots are willing to fly the planes. We should give
them the planes, in my opinion, and I would appreciate your
thoughts on that as an Air Force retired general. It just seems
we should do everything we can. You just--you cannot watch
these films of the just disaster, destruction of cities, and
families uprooted and giving up all their possessions, and the
kids going to school where they do not understand the language
and leaving behind their friends, and their fathers, and their
uncles, and you name it.
For us not to do everything for this man who is a saint--
Navalny is right, he is a saint, and maybe there is sanity with
him, but I do not know. He is narcissistic, he is a sociopath,
he is cruel, and he is doing the unthinkable, unfathomable, and
who knows where he will stop. I do not think the planes
personally would get him to get into World War III and shoot a
nuclear weapon off or do anything to the United States. I would
like your thoughts on that too, and with that, I yield back,
and I thank you for your career and your appearance today.
Chairman Cardin: We are joined by Senator Blumenthal, who
is dividing his time, taking a break from the Judiciary
Committee today on the confirmation hearings of our Supreme
Court justice.
Senator Blumenthal.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, U.S. SENATE, FROM CONNECTICUT
Senator Blumenthal: Thanks very much, Senator Cardin.
Thanks to this very, very distinguished panel. I apologize that
we are in the middle of hearings on Judge Jackson to be our
next Supreme Court justice. I am actually up for my questioning
in somewhere between 30 and 60 minutes, we believe. I apologize
that I am going to have to leave. I hope to come back.
However, let me just say we had a bipartisan trip to
Ukraine in January before this conflict began. Madam
Ambassador, we went to the Polish-Ukraine border just weeks
ago, in a profoundly moving experience. As I said to President
Zelensky, all of us said, and as I can say to you today, we are
united in America behind you, as you well know from the
standing ovation that President Zelensky received when he
addressed us, and the reception you have received when you have
come to visit with us. This cause is all of our cause, and I
have a button that I use when I go to rallies in Connecticut--
and I have been to seven or eight now--and its says: I am a
Ukrainian. Just as President Kennedy said, decades ago when he
visited Berlin, and said: I am a Berliner.
We are all Ukrainian, and that means more military support,
whether it is planes or more anti-aircraft batteries, or
Stinger and Javelin missiles, and other kinds of armament that
will protect you from the reign of terror--the reign of terror
from the skies. If the Ukrainians have a fair fight on the
ground, they will win. They will push the Russians out of
Ukraine. It is the dominance it the skies, the reign of terror
on cities--maternity wards, hospitals, nurseries, residences--
that Vladimir Putin is inflicting. Stronger economic sanctions
also are what I hope will be pursued by the administration, as
well as humanitarian relief. Because I saw in those faces and
voices of people coming across the border horror and terror,
the fear of the unknown that they face. Of course, they were
all women and children because the men were staying to fight.
We need to recognize the importance of human rights, which
are protected by the Helsinki Commission, that are deeply at
stake. I hope that we will engage in a massive humanitarian
relief program, even as we aid in concluding the war, which we
all pray will in fact end soon. Two quick points: President
Biden is at this moment on his way to meet with leaders of the
Western world. He has demonstrated real leadership in unifying
the NATO countries and in building a consensus. He is been
deliberate and responsible, and rightly cautious about
escalation. I have been an advocate of more military assistance
as well as stronger economic sanctions. I will continue to be
so.
I hope that he will continue this leadership as he goes to
NATO and seeks continued unity among our NATO allies. I am
grateful to the people of Ukraine for showing us a lesson in
courage because we are all Ukrainians in our own national
security, as well as our rights being at stake. As I go back to
our Judiciary Committee, involved in confirming another United
States Supreme Court justice, what has been on my mind is those
faces and voices of refugees seeking nothing more than the
freedoms we have and that we are using today in that hearing
room, and that Americans use every day and often take for
granted. The plight of Ukrainians reminds us how precious these
freedoms are, and how blood has been shed and continues to be
shed, and lives lost, to preserve those freedoms.
Thank you. Thank you all for being here. I will try to be
back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Senator Blumenthal. Appreciate
it very much.
We are going to deviate from our normal practice and hear
first, before we hear from the panel, from the Ambassador from
Ukraine to the United States, Oksana Markarova, who, as I said
before, has been an incredible spokesperson for the Ukrainian
people and government.
Madam Ambassador.
TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR OKSANA MARKAROVA, UKRAINIAN AMBASSADOR
TO THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Markarova: Dear Commission members, dear ladies and
gentlemen, dear Chairman, thank you very much for having me
here today. After Russia attacked us in 2015 and illegally
occupied Crimea, and illegally occupied part of Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts, Ukraine was no threat to anyone. Even though
we had all the legal rights to reclaim our territorial
integrity and independence, we only used diplomatic tools to do
so. That did not stop Russia, and on February 24, as you know,
they brutally attacked us again. This time, from north, east,
south. This time from the air, and today is the 28th day of
this brutal war that nuclear power, a large country, is--an
autocratic regime--is waging on free, peaceful, and independent
Ukraine.
This, as you, Chairman, rightfully said, is not only an
attack on Ukraine. It is a brutal violation of all the norms of
international law, including the U.N. Charter and the Final
Helsinki Act. Ukrainians have made our choice. We would like to
be free, and independent. We would like to be part of the
European Union. We would like to be part of the transatlantic
community. We would like to simply peacefully live in our own
country. This attack is to prevent us from doing so. What is
happening in Ukraine is not only about Ukraine. Of course, it
is the people of Ukraine who suffer today, but it affects
everyone. The very foundation of the world rule-based order, as
we all knew and respected it after World War II, has been under
attack today.
We believe, unfortunately, that Russia will not stop in
Ukraine, and they say so publicly. That is why it is the job of
Ukraine, and the civilized world, to contain this threat and
stop this war while it is still local in Ukraine. Today Russian
troops continue to attack us on the ground. Today they continue
to attack us from Belarus. Today they continue to attack us
from our occupied Crimea and partially occupied Donetsk and
Luhansk Oblasts with missiles, aviation, tanks, artillery, and
all kinds of prohibited weaponry, but also by cyberattacks and
disinformation. When the blitzkrieg that they probably
initially planned failed, they resorted to terror. We see it
daily on the--all TV channels here how they are specifically
targeting civilians, killing women, killing children,
destroying unnecessary civilian infrastructure, targeting
specifically kindergartens, schools, churches, and museums.
To date, we already have three million--3.5 million
refugees to the west who left Ukraine through the western
border, primarily women and children, but we total of 10
million people who were forced to leave their houses. We have
mass graves on the outskirts of Kyiv and Mariupol, something
that we thought we would never see in Europe after World War
II. The most painful thing is that 121 children are killed
today, 176 wounded, and 548 educational institutions
destroyed--schools and universities. Seventy-two of them do not
exist, there is nothing on the ground where they stood.
Russian plans failed because he miscalculated the response
from the West, the united response from the civilized world,
but also miscalculated Ukrainians. Our President Zelensky, our
armed forces, and every Ukrainian is defending our country. We
will do, and we will not end, we will not get tired, and we
will not stop, and we will not surrender. Because this is the
only home we have, and we will defend it until the victory.
We also call to hold Putin and everyone responsible for
this, all the Russians, accountable for all this--for the
attack, but also for the war crimes and for all the actions
they are doing on the ground. As you know, on February 26,
Ukraine submitted our application to the International Court of
Justice. On March 16, they already ordered Russia to
immediately stop the invasion. On March 1st, the European Court
of Human Rights also instructed Russia to refrain from any
military attacks against civilians and civilian objects.
After the referral of 39 states of the situation in Ukraine
to the International Criminal Court in the Hague, we--the
prospector also opened a criminal investigation. We also are
working to have a separate tribunal. These war crimes and
everything that is done to Ukraine and Ukrainians should not go
unpunished. Not only as a justice to Ukrainians but also as a
deterrence for any other dictators that after Hitler in 1939
and after Putin in 2014 and now will have this idea that it is
okay in the 21st century to attack a neighboring peaceful
country.
I would like to finish by saying how grateful we are to all
Americans across the country, for everyone, for all the
support, and for people around the world for standing together
with Ukrainians today. We really appreciate the tremendous
support from the United States, from President Biden, from
Congress on a strong bipartisan basis, including military
assistance, powerful sanctions, and rallying international
support. We are fighting, as I said, 28th day of a very
difficult fight. As our president says, we need all the tools
to finish this and to defend our country. While we are grateful
for everything we have received, we all need to do more. We all
need to do more to stop Putin. We all need to do more to help
us to defend our country.
As we said numerous times, we need more strong sanctions
and we need more defense, and all kinds of weapons including
anti-air, including planes, everything short of boots on the
ground, that we are motivated, and very capable armed forces
and men and women of Ukraine can use to stop this war and to
defend our country. Special thank you to this Commission, to
the U.S. Congress, and to the administration for standing with
Ukraine in this critical time. Today Ukrainians are united.
Today the civilized world is united. Only together we can win
this war and prevent it from happening again. God bless
America, and glory to Ukraine, and thank you very much.
Chairman Cardin: Well, Madam Ambassador, please express our
strong, unified support to provide whatever you need to defend
yourself, and that we will continue to participate in the
humanitarian assistance. We continue to look at ways that we
can hold those responsible accountable, including sanctions and
the war crimes that they have committed. Please express that to
your leaders and your people and know that our doors are always
open as we stand together in this fight for freedom.
We will now turn to the panel and our witnesses. Our first
witness, General Phillip Breedlove. General Breedlove retired
as a four-star general in the U.S. Air Force, finishing his 39-
year career as commander of U.S. European Command and NATO's
supreme allied commander in Europe. General Breedlove has
extensive experience in our nation's senior-most strategic
decision-making and national security policymaking at both the
Pentagon and the National Security Council. He currently is a
consultant to industry and serves as a distinguished professor
at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at Georgia
Tech.
Our second witness is Dr. Michael Kimmage, who is a
professor of history and department chair at the Catholic
University of America. He is also a fellow at the German
Marshall Fund. Professor Kimmage specializes in the history of
the Cold War, 20th-century U.S. diplomatic and intellectual
history, and U.S.-Russian relations since 1991. From 2014 to
2016, he served as--on the secretary's Policy Planning Staff at
the U.S. Department of State, where he held the Russian/Ukraine
portfolio.
Our third witness is Dr. Miriam Lanskoy, who is the senior
director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Endowment of
Democracy. Dr. Lanskoy has an extensive background in policy
analysis related to post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia, as well as
democracy promotion in the region, and will be able to provide
us with a clear-eyed perspective of the new political and human
rights challenges in the broader region.
Your full testimonies will be made part of our record. You
may proceed as you wish, and we will start with General
Breedlove, who I understand is with us through Webex.
WEBEX TESTIMONY OF PHILIP BREEDLOVE, GENERAL [RET.] NATO'S
FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE; DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR
OF THE PRACTICE AND CETS SENIOR FELLOW, GEORGIA TECH
Mr. Breedlove: Chairman Cardin, Ranking Senator Wicker, Co-
Chairman Cohen, and Ranking Representative Wilson, thank you
for inviting me to testify before the Commission today on a
subject of immense importance to America and, indeed, the free
world. Before I go any further, I would just like to just
assure Co-Chairman Cohen that I am on record and in print
recommending the transfer not only of the MiGs but the S-300s
that our allies are offering up.
Sir, today I do not represent the views of the government,
of DOD, nor of Georgia Tech where I teach, as you pointed out.
Rather, I represent my thoughts and experiences. I have served
in Europe eight times, at every level of command. As a very
young officer, I flew my F-16 there, and I was nuclear-
qualified. I also spent time with the United States Army, 2nd
Brigade, 3rd ID as a tactical air control party, staring across
the inter-German border at the Russian forces there. Finally, I
closed my career, as you mentioned, sir, as the U.S. European
Command commander and the 17th supreme allied commander of
Europe. My tour included the last two times that Ukraine was
invaded by Russia.
By way of short introduction, immediately after the fall of
the wall we entered into a phase of trying to make a partner
out of Russia. I called it hugging the bear. Institutions such
as NATO created structures that facilitated closer and more
coordinated actions, like the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and
the NATO-Russia Council of 2002. Meanwhile, our nations--and I
make no argument with it--but our nations entered a period of
peace dividends and began to sacrifice readiness and allow our
weapon systems to age and, in some cases, lose currency and
capability. Defense budgets took a steep decline in real
purchasing power, and some European budgets, as we know, were
severely cut.
When I was the vice chief of staff of the United States Air
Force, my first four-star job, we were then the oldest and
smallest Air Force we had ever been in our history. At that
time, you may remember, sir, that part of my task was to make
the Budget Act sequestration cuts at that point in our history.
In 2008, the invasion of Georgia and occupation of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia was a shock and a stark reminder of the
true intentions of the opponent that we were trying to bring
towards Western values. The way we handled the invasion of
Georgia is part of why we find ourselves in the ugly messes of
2014 and 2022, in my opinion.
In each of our responses, I believe we were inadequate to
the task, and now are looking at the problem again. We in
Europe and the U.S. quickly got past that invasion in 2008, and
we were eager and settled back into business as usual with
Russia. However, we know now Russia was continuing military
growth and investment, working towards regaining its lost past.
Today we are facing an enemy that attacks the West and Ukraine,
our great friends, across all elements of national power. When
I teach I talk about DIME, diplomatic, informational, military,
and economic power.
Yet, when we respond to Russia, we respond almost
exclusively in economic measures--i.e., sanctions. Similarly,
when we face radical Islam these days, we reply dominantly with
military instruments. We seem to be treating these various
issues in a silo of excellence rather than across our national
powers. Today I advocate for a more active response across all
elements of national power, a more balanced all-of-nation
response.
Some ideas that I would put forward for consideration--and
I am happy to answer these questions. Diplomatically, what are
we doing to sanction's voice in the U.N.? We are told all the
time that we cannot do some of these things, like remove them
from the Security Council. I believe we should not be deterred
by that is the way the U.N. works. Rather, we should attack
these norms to make the required changes. Just doing that is a
big signal, I think. We should seek International Court
determination of Putin as a war criminal. There has never been
a more clear case played out for the whole world to see. We
should seek a U.N.-sponsored response to a Russian leader and
nation gone rogue.
In the informational sphere, Putin is perpetuating lies
externally and internally. What are we doing to get the truth
through to his people? What are we doing internationally to
those who accept and support his lies? We have the world's
greatest cyber capacity. We should use that discretely to help
get real information about Putin's war to the Russians via
their social media spaces--social media. Militarily, this
criminal war by Mr. Putin is creating a humanitarian disaster
of incredible proportions. The impact on children, children
being killed, hospitals being targeted, and families being
separated and displaced, will scar our world for decades to
come.
I am controversial, but I continue to support humanitarian
corridors and a humanitarian airlift into Ukraine, protected by
a humanitarian no-fly zone. Many are opposed to this and are
completely deterred by fears of World War III and nuclear
options. Mr. Putin's messaging is very effective about this. He
knows it, and he works that message hard. If we are so fearful
of Putin's nuclear card that we do not do all that we can,
short of committing U.S. troops, of course, to stop Putin in
Ukraine, what is going to stop him then from waving the nuclear
card as he sets his eyes on other states, like Georgia,
Moldova, or possibly our Baltic NATO allies?
It is easier, I believe to defeat Putin how working
alongside the great Ukrainian military which is fighting so
well. There is no no-risk way out of this war. I believe that
there are those who have hope in that way. If we do not change
our approach, risk will continue to grow every day as Mr.
Putin's frustration grows. I wonder what atrocity is next.
Rather than remain deterred without consideration for change, I
advocate for a mature discussion about that risk. We love, we
support, and we grieve for our Ukrainian brothers and sisters.
We have to also know that this war is bigger than Ukraine. The
documents Mr. Putin directed us to sign were about
restructuring the very security architecture of Eastern Europe.
We need to focus on that on the Black Sea, and our eastern
front nations.
Finally, in the economic sphere, I am appreciative of what
we are doing. We must acknowledge that sanctions are hurting
the Russian Federation. Sanctions are hurting the Russian
people. Sanctions are hurting the Russian economy, and I
commend to you that those are not the measures of merit.
Sanctions have--in my history, and my understanding, and my
watch of Mr. Putin--have never changed Mr. Putin's actions. I
believe that should be the measure of merit. In both peacetime
and periods of war, a nation seeks to deter potential opponents
from taking military action, both conventional and nuclear.
Further, a military commander seeks to always gain and maintain
the initiative.
During the buildup of Russia's forces and the debates
concerning his intentions, we took a very passive deterrent
stance. Phrases that we use all the time--we are not going to
fight Russia in Ukraine. We will defend every inch of NATO
territory. Which, by the way, is a wonderful message to
somebody like me who commanded NATO, but I think a horrible
message to our brothers and sisters in Ukraine. If he invades,
we are going to hit him with--and you use whatever adjective
you want--sanctions. While the sanctions were not publicly
debated or announced, we were assured several times that we,
the United States, had conveyed them explicitly to Russia. Mr.
Putin was not deterred. He took measure of our stated
intentions and decided to invade.
We have allowed Mr. Putin to accomplish both the goals of
deterring us and gaining the initiative. We, the U.S. and NATO,
are almost completely deterred, and Mr. Putin is almost
completely undeterred. We tell Mr. Putin almost every time we
make a speech what we will not do. There are multiple
capabilities that Ukraine has asked for that we have not
supplied. We were--we have supplied them with U.S. Stingers,
and they are using them magnificently. We were late getting
those good Stingers to our Ukrainian brothers and sisters. We
have yet to supply them with the medium and high-altitude SAMs
that they have asked for over and over. We have yet to supply
the coastal defense cruise missiles that they so desperately
need now as the Russian Navy sits off the coast and pounds
Mariupol and portions of the Russian Navy are now aligning
themselves, we think, for an amphibious landing nearby Odesa.
Now there is a whole new set of language which worries me,
and where we talk about defensive weapons. To a military
individual, that is kind of a hard word to talk about because a
weapon can be used either defensively or offensively. Are we to
assume that only Russia is allowed to use offensive weapons
that only Russia can use on the offense, or that this world is
only to be fought on Ukrainian soil? We have finally, as you
know, I mentioned before, I am a proponent for a humanitarian
no-fly zone. That is what Ukraine calls for all the time in
their urgent pleas to close the skies.
Finally, we, the U.S. and NATO, have ceded the initiative
to the enemy. We have said over and over, if Mr. Putin does
this, then we will do that. We are observing and reacting
rather than setting the content, tempo, and tone of the
conflict, which is what a military man seeks to do--or woman. I
am advocating that we and our Western partners reevaluate our
strategic approach: Mr. Putin should be deterred, vice we in
the West. This requires moving away from a passive deterrent
posture to affecting a more active deterrence. We should take
action to regain the initiative, vice following Mr. Putin's
leads. If or when this war touches NATO, we need to be
immediately ready, rather than begin a conversation about
getting there.
Members of the Committee, in closing, while I sound very
critical, I want you to know that I am very appreciative of the
things that we are doing. NATO's reactions and preparations to
defend NATO are strong. I am proud of it, and I believe we have
more to do. While the sanctions will, once again, not change
Mr. Putin's actions, they may change the time and change the
actions of those around him. While we have not given Ukraine
all the weapon systems they have asked for, the ones we have
given them they have used extremely effectively. While we have
been deterred from directly supporting Ukraine on the
battlefield, there is hope that the human suffering of the
people of Ukraine may yet remind us of the values we hold.
However, we need to do more. We have an urgent interest in
helping Ukraine to defend their nation and making Mr. Putin
fail. We must not let Putin deter us from doing this. That only
risks our NATO allies and truly brings us close to a
confrontation with Russia. Once again, sir, I am very
appreciative of your allowing me to be here today, and I do
look forward to your questions.
Chairman Cardin: General Breedlove, first of all, thank you
for your service to our country, and we very much appreciate
your testimony.
We will now hear from Dr. Kimmage.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL KIMMAGE, FORMER POLICY PLANNING STAFF,
U.S, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, THE CATHOLIC
UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA; FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE
UNITED STATES;
Mr. Kimmage: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
senators, for the invitation. Thank you to the Commission as
well for the invitation. Madam Ambassador, it is an honor to be
in your presence for this--for this conversation this
afternoon.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24,
2022, has altered Europe's strategic dynamic. Prior to the
invasion, Europe faced instability to the south due to migrant
flows, in Ukraine a long-festering war had been unresolved by
eight years by January 2022. These were by no means small
problems, but they were more readily manageable than the
current situation--a large-scale war in Ukraine waged by Russia
with the assistance of Belarus, a Russian leadership that is
anything but risk-averse, and whose true strategic intentions
are hard to read, a robust effort on the part of the United
States and its allies to encourage and supply the Ukrainian
military. A vast array of escalators possibilities stemming
either from Russian intent, from accident or from the desire of
one or several actors in the conflict to resolve this crisis,
military crisis, more immediately.
U.S. foreign policy has, since 1945 and since the collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991, seen a Europe whole, free and at
peace. The United States must now adjust to a Europe living in
the shadow of war. To those making strategic adjustments,
history can be helpful. In particular, the Cold War doctrine of
containment is relevant to contemporary U.S. foreign policy.
Containment arose in the late 1940s, at the pen of the diplomat
George Kennan, in response to challenges presented by the
Soviet Union, first and foremost in Europe. Containment was
explicitly a doctrine created for the nuclear age in which we
are still living.
In the spring of 2022, a recommitment to containment can
contribute to U.S.-Russia policy. It can provide strategic
clarity, it can link the military with political aspirations,
and containment can help describe what U.S. policy is not. The
primary meaning of containment was the ambition to contain the
Soviet Union. The less well-known meaning of the word applied
to the United States. To survive and prosper in the nuclear
age, the United States must contain itself at times, as it will
have to do against Putin's Russia.
Five points about Cold War containment. Since I come before
you as a history professor, I cannot not begin with history.
Five historical points. Five points to follow about the overall
situation, and five points briefly in conclusion about where I
think U.S. policy should go vis-a-vis the idea of containment.
The first point about containment historically: It was
forged to deal with an entirely new strategic situation. The
challenge the Soviet Union presented was its combination of
military power--its armies had conquered half of Europe during
the war--and its political appeal on the other side. When
Kennan came up with containment, he worried about this
combination of political and military power. That, for example,
an election in Italy might result in a communist victory, and
in the wake of this victory, the Soviet Union could start to
talk about control over Italy. It was the combination of
military and political power that was potentially problematic
all around the world.
The second point, containment reflected a disagreement
within the U.S. government on its proper interpretation. This
ran throughout the Cold War. Kennan felt that containment was
primarily a political project, meant to push back the appeal of
communism in Asia, the Middle East, or Europe. Many, in a way
the winners of the argument, felt that containment was
primarily a military doctrine meant to contain or push back
against Soviet or Chinese military power.
The third point, containment was proactive. Containment
involved, and General Breedlove just mentioned this point about
the integration of U.S. forces at the present moment.
Containment entailed the coordination of the U.S. military
force, intelligence, and diplomacy. This might mean the active
defense of West Berlin in the early Cold War. Containment could
also mean the waging of a hot war in Korea or Vietnam. It could
also mean covert action in countries like Guatemala or Iran.
Containment might also have meant during the Cold War the
battle for hearts and minds, support for national independence
behind the Iron Curtain, advertisements for the American way of
life, and alliances made with religious communities from the
Vatican to the Mujahideen of Afghanistan. Containment gave
direction and purpose to U.S. foreign policy throughout the
Cold War.
Fourth point, containment was most proactive in those
places that were not yet communist. In the contested domains of
the Cold War, the U.S. applied its many powers strenuously.
Yet, containment left the Soviet or communist side largely
untouched. Kennan thought that the Soviet Union was too
repressive and not Russian enough to survive forever. Kennan
did not equate containment with democracy promotion, nor did he
expect a post-Soviet Russia to become a democracy. The success
of containment was a success in the end only with the Soviet
Union and never with China. Not only did China not collapse,
its influence has grown immensely over the past few decades. We
have never managed to--we have never succeeded or managed to
contain China.
Fifth point, containment was a long-term policy. For
Kennan, unconditional surrender was a conceivable outcome in
some wars, but it was very often the wrong framing of many
wars. Many wars, he observed as a historian, end in negotiated
settlements. Kennan did not believe that the United States
could defeat the Soviet Union outright, hence it should not
seek unconditional surrender. Kennan's conviction took on new
meaning when the Soviet Union gained access to nuclear weapons
in 1949, and when the costs of confrontation with the Soviet
Union became exorbitant. Containment appealed to patience--to
patience and diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union when
possible. Thus, in conclusion, historically containment was a
balancing act.
Five points about the current situation that attempt to
update containment for contemporary conditions. The challenge
that Putin's Russia presents, much like the Soviet Union, is
part military and part political. The military challenge is, I
think, clearly the most acute one. Since 2008, as General
Breedlove mentioned, when Russia invaded Georgia Putin had been
pursuing an expansionary foreign policy. Putin's military
modernization has given him the capacity to engage in
conventional military conflict in Ukraine in 2014, to make an
expeditionary move in Syria in 2015, and to mount a massive
invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin's rhetoric suggests that
might be willing to apply conventional force or use nuclear
weapons outside the territory of Ukraine. To this, the Kremlin
can add instruments of soft power, which range from the
outreach--from outreach to the Russian diaspora, from networks
within the world of Orthodox Christianity to overt and covert
efforts at manipulating the political order and information
space of countries outside of Russia. On balance, though, the
political and military powers of Putin's Russia are not on par
with those of the Soviet Union.
Second point, it is hard to see the political threat--this
is, again, bearing the Soviet example in mind--it is hard to
see the political threat Russia embodies as fundamentally
destabilizing. What is striking in 2022 with the war in Ukraine
is Russia's almost complete failure to capture the narrative.
It is had a bit of success in China, a bit of success in India,
and in the global south, but it is completely failed to
persuade the populations of Europe and the United States. Only
with great difficulty can Putin separate himself from the
actions of his invading army. Putin has also inadvertently
reenergized the transatlantic relationship in ways that
actively undermine his interests. Russia's threat in 2022 is
mostly military, therefore, and it is quite a lot less than
global. Russia is not performing militarily at all well in
Ukraine. The core issue then is how far Russia will go
militarily in Ukraine, and to what extent Putin's military
designs on this country can be thwarted.
Third point, the Cold War is an excellent precedent for
combining the overlapping responsibilities of government--
again, this idea of integration. First and foremost, today's
military dimension of the consequent need to provide the
Ukrainian military with whatever it needs to endure and
prevail. Russia's war in Ukraine also has a crucial political,
and diplomatic component. This is to ensure that the true story
of the war is told, and told to big audiences, to remind
audiences of the war's stakes and to construct the widest
possible alliance of support for Ukraine. The key tool for the
United States and its allies is economic sanctions. There is an
acute need as well to coordinate the military, diplomatic, and
economic components of policy.
Fourth point, the United States has considerable agency in
Ukraine. Its support for Ukraine is giving Ukraine hope. No
less essential is the U.S. commitment to European security
through NATO and other channels. The United States has far less
agency in Russia. Putin's demise might be a boon to the United
States, and the prospect of a Russian democracy should remain
in view, but a new Berlin Wall is being erected in Europe as we
speak, and it will dramatically reduce U.S. leverage within
Russia. Sanctions are quite likely to embitter the Russian
population against the United States. U.S. foreign policy will
have to acknowledge severe limits in terms of what can be
accomplished in Russia.
Fifth point, the brutality of Putin's war, the first major
war in the era of social media, has generated an immense moral
and political outcry. This has helped to ground sanctions
policy and military assistance to Ukraine. The outcry has the
potential to favor quick solutions. Yet, the Cold War strategic
dilemmas are still in effect. Russia possesses the largest
conventional military in Europe and the United States is in no
position to defeat Russia in Ukraine, not to mention inside of
Russia itself. An escalation to nuclear conflict is not out of
the question. Containment must block Russia in Europe by
containing its formidable military and relatively modest
political power. Containment must also rein in unconsidered
military escalation on the side of the United States and its
allies.
Five points by way of conclusion, briefly. First, Russia is
not the global superpower that the Soviet Union was.
Containment of Russia will not, I think, become the ordering
principle of U.S. policy, as containing the Soviet Union was
for so long, and as the global war on terror was after 9/11. It
is best not to overestimate Russia's capacities, especially in
light of how badly the war has been going for Russia. Putin's
strategic blunder may furnish the United States with
opportunities for improving relations with Turkey and, though
this is more tricky, with China. At issue is not only the task
of containing Russian power, at issue is the task of managing
and, at times, of exploiting the weakness Russia has brought
upon itself by waging a costly, criminal, and ultimately
unwinnable war--unwinnable for Russia.
Second, Putin has shown himself to be more reckless than
any of the Soviet leaders were. The best technique for
containing Russia is to take advantage of Putin's recklessness.
This could be translated into the construction of sizable
alliances in Europe and Asia whose goal will be to degrade the
Russian war machine through sanctions and the prevention of
technology transfer. The long-term thinking that went into
containment is essential here. Slowing down Russia's military
modernization may or may not help to end the war in Ukraine. It
will make it more difficult for Russia to wage other wars.
Third, and I think most important for this audience, the
narrative that justifies containment must be constantly
refreshed, because containment is a long-term policy. This is
of particular importance to member of Congress, who are in
close touch with their constituents. It should be impressed
upon the American public that Russia's war in Ukraine does not
just violate Ukrainian sovereignty and does not just wreak
havoc on the people of Ukraine, it is an assault upon Ukraine's
capacity for liberty and self-government. That narrative, I
think, needs to be made as emphatically and as eloquently as
possible.
Fourth, containment never assumed the quick collapse of the
Soviet adversary. Its value was how it helped to manage
relations between Washington and Moscow, to honor core U.S.
interests and values, and to ensure that this relationship
never slipped into direct military conflict--that the Cold War
stayed cold. Even if Putin does not fall during this war or its
aftermath, he is--even if Putin does fall, he is likely to be
replaced by a hardliner. The military and security services are
likely to maintain their grip on Russia. Sanctions should be
folded into a policy of containment not because they will
initiate regime change but because they will allow Washington
to deal capably with the regime that is there and likely to
stay in the Kremlin.
Fifth, and final point: Containment's deepest appeal
policy-wise is its connection to achievable goals. Regime
change in Russia is beyond reach. Total victory in Ukraine is
beyond reach. Russia's defeat on the battlefield is beyond
reach. Russia's surrender in Ukraine is beyond reach. Yet,
Russia is a country that is vulnerable in so many ways. It has
made itself much more vulnerable by choosing to fight the wrong
war in Ukraine. Russia can easily be outmatched in the
information space, the Russian economy will suffer greatly
under sanctions, and that will limit Russian military power
over time. Russia can be prevented from winning in Ukraine--it
may already have been prevented from winning, in large part
because the Ukrainian military knows what it is fighting for.
In addition, U.S. and allied help is given to Ukraine and
is greatly important and is akin to the help given to the
United Kingdom in the first two years of World War II. It is
Ukraine's lifeline, and this military assistance is a perfect
example of containment in action. Policy success should be
measured not against maximalist dreams in which Putin, and with
him Russian military power, exits the scene. Russian power is
here to stay. Policy success should be measured against the
much more achievable goal of containing this very power.
Thanks very much.
Chairman Cardin: Well, thank you very much for your
testimony. We appreciate it very, very much.
We will now hear from Dr. Lanskoy.
TESTIMONY OF MIRIAM LANSKOY, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR RUSSIA AND
EURASIA, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
Ms. Lanskoy: Thank you. I am very grateful to the co-
chairs, Senator Cardin and Representative Cohen, and the
ranking members, Senator Wicker and Representative Wilson, and
to all the commissioners, for the opportunity to testify here
today. I am grateful to the Commission for its support of human
rights and for this opportunity to analyze the regional
consequences of the war. The National Endowment for Democracy
is a private nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and
strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. We
have been working in Eurasia to support civil society and
encourage democratic development for over 30 years, and we
maintain a large and diverse grants portfolio.
What are the largest scope and medium-term effects of the
war? What does it entail for the longer time horizon? With very
few divisions or defections among the Russian government or
military and given the fact that virtually any outcome can be
presented to the Russian public as a victory, the Putin regime
may indeed survive this war. As part of the negotiations to end
the war, would the U.S. and Europe consider rescinding the
wide-ranging sanctions that have been applied? However, even if
Putin's regime survives this war and the sanctions are
rescinded, the enormous costs of the war and the total
reassessment of Russia in Europe will have profound and
unpredictable consequences.
On more than one occasion in the past, military
disappointments triggered reform efforts and led over the
medium term to openings. Throughout Russian history, the
modernizing and democratizing part of Russian society was
precisely that part that was integrated with Europe. This is a
part of society that is today most directly impacted by the
economic crisis and most likely to be either on the run, taking
literally any flight or any train to any foreign destination,
or still inside Russia steeling themselves for what comes next.
Putin has spoken already of the need to purify the nation by
ridding itself of the fifth column.
Expulsion from the Council of Europe leaves the door open
to reinstating the death penalty in Russia. The loss of access
to the European Court for Human Rights is devastating for those
who sought to use this international mechanism to hold the
government accountable. Political prisoners and opposition
activists on trial this week--Alexei Navalny, who yesterday got
a nine-year term and Andrei Pivovarov will be on trial
tomorrow. For them, this is a great loss, having the prospect
of appeal to international mechanisms, especially the European
court, is a way to put pressure on the regime and attract
attention to political prisoners. Today there are over 400
political prisoners in Russia, and the number of those detained
in anti-war protests is over 15,000. The OSCE and, of course,
HDIM are another very significant avenues for civil society in
Russia to try and hold its government accountable.
The Kremlin's efforts of information control now extend to
blocking social media and trying to isolate Russians from the
global internet. Our approach should be to engage and connect
with the Russian people, even as we oppose the Russian
government. There are technological means to bypass censorship
which can be employed to reach out to the Russian public, by
amplifying the voices of recently exiled Russian journalists
and civil society. Putin's efforts to gather together the lands
of the former empire apply not only to Ukraine and the
countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Particularly in
Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, people have reason to fear
that they can also become targets of aggression in the medium
term.
If they are to chart an independent and pro-democratic
course, they need our attention and support. While public
sentiment, even in the most authoritarian states, is
sympathetic to Ukraine, the governments throughout the regions
are reluctant to take a public stance. Uzbekistan is the only
one in Central Asia that recognized Ukraine's territorial
integrity, publicly reaffirmed it, and has stated that it will
not recognize the independence of the breakaway republics.
Russia has gained enormous leverage over Belarus. It is the
main arbiter of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and continues
to maintain a military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
giving it leverage over the Caucasus. Following the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia is the main grantor of
stability in Central Asia.
We need to be more involved with each country, more in tune
with their particular needs and predicaments. Supporting the EU
application of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia is one such path.
Building awareness in Armenian society that mending relations
with Turkey would create opportunities for them abroad and open
up other paths. Reinvigorating the Minsk process as a form of
mediation for Nagorno-Karabakh and helping Georgians to
overcome their bitter and polarizing divisions--these sorts of
policies would strengthen these states and give them the space
to embrace the sort of positions that they hold privately.
Central Asia lies between Russia and China, and yet it is
often neglected in our strategic thinking. They are already
suffering economic shocks and are likely to experience more
turbulence as the currency continues to lose value and fears of
wheat shortages and instability mount. Needlessly impoverished,
they are governed by kleptocratic regimes that plunder natural
resources from society and stash proceeds abroad. As these
states try to maintain a neutral stance and resist pressure to
support Russia, we can use this moment to re-engage in the
region and help them strengthen their sovereignty and
independence from Russia and China. Central Asia should not
become collateral damage to sanctions but rather be
incentivized to pull away from Russia.
As a major destination for refugees, they can become a
vibrant source of new diaspora communities of Afghans,
Ukrainians, and Russians. Given that Central Asia is eager to
welcome foreign economic investment, we should make genuine
democratic reform a necessary corollary. Finally, this moment
of extraordinary human suffering, but also profound
international solidarity, could be directed to strategic ends.
In addition to standing with Ukraine and doing all in our power
to end the war, we may also consider some medium- and long-term
goals, conduct systemic reform to counteract transnational
kleptocracy, build regional solidarity among democratic groups
throughout Europe and Eurasia to counteract authoritarian
regimes, develop deeper relations with the states of the
Caucasus and Central Asia based on a nuanced understanding of
their strategic predicaments while also holding them to
democratic standards. Distinguish between Putin regime and its
various enablers and the Russian people, preserve support, and
amplify the voices of Russian democrats now fleeing the country
and those who remain inside. Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Well, thank you for your testimony. I
think your final points are really important issues for us to
double down on, so thank you for that summary. Let me start,
and whoever wants to respond, maybe I will start with the
general. You talked about a Cold War. This is not a Cold War,
and is there anyone here who believes that Russia's desires do
not go beyond Ukraine? We know that they are already in Moldova
and Georgia, but you mentioned many countries that are not NATO
members that feel very threatened that Mr. Putin has his desire
to use military against their borders.
It is--the comparison about a Cold War I do not quite fully
understand because I do think that we will see what--how much
resources are used in Ukraine, but that Mr. Putin does not
intend to stop at Ukraine. Those of us who feel a little bit
more comfortable with the NATO alliance, I can tell you that
our eastern partners do not feel particularly safe as to what
is happening today, and feel that they are vulnerable and that
Mr. Putin could use his arsenal, which is an asymmetric
arsenal, to provoke a conflict with a NATO country that could
cause some confusion as to our responsibilities under the NATO
treaty.
I guess my question, I will start with General Breedlove if
I might, is there any doubt in your mind that Mr. Putin, given
the opportunity, would use his military beyond Ukraine?
Mr. Breedlove: Thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity.
No, there is no doubt. Again, those two documents that they
gave us and said: Sign these or you will get other measures--
which we understand now--both of those outlined a very
different Europe than we have now. In fact, it advocated moving
NATO and equipment out of the bordering nations. Essentially I
coined it as NATO back and U.S. out, to allow them room to re-
expand into their border nations and set the same arrangements
that they had during the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union days.
Chairman, I believe you are on it.
I actually believed we were in a warm war before Ukraine
was invaded, again, for the third time, because if we look at
all the actions that Mr. Putin and Mr. Gerasimov and others
were doing below the line of kinetic response--all of the
things to include the--I mean, the pipeline interruption in the
southeast, where gas prices went out of control due to a
Russian attack, they are meddling in elections all around
Europe and the United States. The war was already on. It was
just a below-the-line warm war. Now we see the true colors as
Mr. Putin invaded Ukraine, and I agree with you one last time,
Chairman. I do not believe this is the last of it.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you. Before I go to the other two
witnesses, I understand the ambassador's going to need to
leave. Any final comments that you would like to make?
Mr. Markarova: Thank you very much, Chairman, everyone on
the Commission. Just wanted to say that, unfortunately, during
these 28 days that we are fighting, and that Russia is brutally
attacking Ukraine, we see that the support for Putin among the
Russian people increased. It is not only one bad Putin who's
responsible for this. It is unfortunately, you know, these
imperialistic ideas and thoughts that cannot stand. The
Ukrainians just want to be democratic and live in our own
country.
I just want to agree that this is not only about Ukraine
and that we--today I, ask everyone to focus on more support to
Ukraine, more sanctions on everyone, including the secondary
sanctions that would preclude some countries from benefiting
from --and help Russia to continue having this war. Only
together we can stop it. I would like to thank you, and please
use us as a resource. We are always here to come provide you
with all the information, and we are thankful for all the
support. Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Madam Ambassador. You are
always welcome. Thank you.
Dr. Kimmage, I want to give you a chance. You gave an
excellent analysis of the Cold War and the challenges that we
face in objectives during a Cold War, which I found to be very,
very helpful in understanding history. Let me ask you the
question, is there--do you believe that we could be entering a
period of a cold war between the United States and Russia? That
Russia would stop with Ukraine, regardless of how it ends? We
expect Ukraine will maintain its sovereignty, and I do not mean
to give any other outcome that we will accept, but do you
believe Russia would want to enter a period of not challenging
additional borders?
Mr. Kimmage: Thank you very much for the question, Senator.
I think that there are a lot of direct parallels between now
and the Cold War, and they cut in a couple of different ways.
There is a zero-sum nature now to the conflict between call it
the West, we could call it the transatlantic alliance on the
one side, and Russia on the other where, as already mentioned,
Moldova, Belarus, and lots of countries outside of Ukraine are
going to be a part of this conflict. I think Russia is very
much bogged down in Ukraine. I think for reasons of military
capacity there is no way that they are going to make a move on
the Baltic, or Poland, or any of these places. We have to keep
that in mind as a possibility, given how radical Putin has
chosen to be with the war in Ukraine.
You know, I think the Cold War is relevant in two ways at
the moment. One is that the Cold War was often hot. You had two
hot wars for the U.S. in Vietnam and Korea. The Cold War was
full of proxy wars. You know, a lot of what the U.S. is doing
in Ukraine is reminiscent of what the U.S. did in Afghanistan
in the 1980s, down to the Stinger missiles that--it is the same
weapon that the U.S. was supplying there. The proxy wars where
borders move, where there is military engagement, where things
are fluid and dangerous, that was the Cold War. That is the
situation on the ground in Ukraine at the moment.
However, there is one other aspect of the Cold War that is
relevant at the moment. This speaks to the question of no-fly
zones and how far the U.S. should go. One thing that the U.S.
always tried to do during the Cold War was to avoid military
engagements between uniformed American soldiers and uniformed
Soviet soldiers. That was considered to be the threshold, you
know, that you could not go beyond. I think that is still
relevant now. I do not think that we would want uniformed
American soldiers in Ukraine, I do not think we would want them
engaging Russian soldiers. I think the Biden administration has
been very clear about that. That is what kept the war--Cold War
cold, and that is still a relevant point at the present moment.
However, proxy wars, there were a million of them. We
should draw as many lessons as we can about how to succeed with
them because that is, in a way, what is happening right before
our eyes in Ukraine.
Chairman Cardin: Dr. Lanskoy, let me raise the issue of
engagement. Because it is interesting, the Helsinki Final Act
of 1975, Russia, the Soviet Union, was very interested in
pursuing that, because they wanted the legitimacy of being part
of an organization that professed--that was committed to
democratic principles that included the United States. There
was some reluctance on behalf of the United States initially,
but Russia was very--the Soviet Union was very anxious to be
engaged. We are now looking at isolating Russia.
We are wondering whether--there was a suggestion made
here--their role in the United Nations is certainly that we
should be looking at, their role within OSCE is something that
we are looking at, as to whether they should have full
participation considering they violated all of their
commitments within OSCE. Our sanctions, in a way, try to
isolate Russia. As you--I forgot which witness pointed out, the
ICC, the availability of protection for some of their citizens,
being part of EU, the Council of Europe--those issues do
provide certain protection here and certain engagement. Yet, in
our strategy to isolate Russia globally, on the table are
further steps that could isolate the government even more. Your
views as to the strategy, the pros and cons, and where we
should be putting our priorities?
Mr. Lanskoy: Thank you very much, Senator, for that
question. I wonder whether it can be known whether it is
possible to isolate them in those settings where they
exercise--where they have a platform, be promoting themselves
in fundamentally inappropriate ways, but keep other mechanisms
or other arrangements that do provide some leverage for
protection for people who are victims of human rights abuses in
Russia. I do not think this is necessarily easy. [Laughs.]
For the Helsinki Final Act, I think it was a surprise to
people how powerful the human rights components would become.
It was at the time much more about security and economics, but
it was this principle that the state was responsible both
internally and externally. That was--that gave a push for the
whole development of how we monitor human rights and try to
pursue human rights. That principle, to me, is important, and
if we can figure out how to sustain it. It was a huge triumph
at the time, the idea that the Soviet Union agreed to some kind
of accountability on these issues.
It is a shame to lose that, even though, of course, Russia
should be isolated and punished. I do not disagree with any of
that. I just wonder whether it can be nuanced.
Chairman Cardin: Good points.
Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker: Well, thank you, Senator Cardin.
Regrettably, I have been having to go in and out. It is a
convenience that my office is right across the hall--[laughs]--
but it also facilitates interrupting my ability to hear all of
the witnesses. I assume, General Breedlove, you are still
listening and part of this.
Mr. Breedlove: Yes, sir. I am.
Senator Wicker: Okay. Well, it seems to me that your
approach is starkly different from that of Dr. Kimmage. I
thought I would ask a question or two about that. You
advocate--well, okay, let us go to the end game first. It seems
to me that Dr. Kimmage believes this war cannot be won by
either side. my hope has been that Ukraine would eventually win
and somehow would be able to expel the Russians from the
territory that they have conquered.
What is your view there? What is victory? What is a
satisfactory outcome, in your view?
Mr. Breedlove: Senator, thanks for the opportunity. I do
disagree a little bit with Dr. Kimmage, but it is--but then
that is nuanced. How do you find a winner now after what is
happened in Ukraine? Even if Ukraine is victorious at this
point, the destruction of this country, the wanton criminality
of this attack, is just horrendous. You know, to say that there
is a clear winner would be tough.
Here is what I do believe. The world grossly misjudged the
ability of the Ukrainian people to fight and misjudged their
will, just like Mr. Putin misjudged both of those. Now we see a
Ukrainian military that has held its own; not only held its own
but it is performed well against the Russians. The Russians
have made mistakes to facilitate that. However, at this point,
we are starting to see the Ukrainian military turn around and
make some very serious threats to the Russian forces.
Here is the outcome I would love to see, and that is that
Mr. Putin's forces would culminate, based on all of the supply
and morale problems that they are having and their ability to
be able to fight Ukraine on their terms, and then Mr. Putin
either chooses to cease work and try to sue for what he has in
hand, or someone takes him from power in Russia and they sue
for what they are in hand.
I think, to the doctor's remarks, any conclusion at this
point is not going to favor either side the way they want. That
is the main sticking point. I would never advocate for Ukraine
having to give up any of the land that Mr. Putin has
temporarily taken hold of. I think that is going to be the
major sticking point.
However, I have been a little bit rambling here. Sir, I
think that given more help from external sources, Russia could
continue and cause a lot more problems for Ukraine. If Ukraine
is allowed to fight as it is now, they have a fighting chance.
Senator Wicker: Okay, I am going to continue, if the chair
will indulge me, with some questions for you, General, and then
see if we can get some responses.
Antiship missiles are an obvious next step to be provided
by the United States and our allies to sink the Black Sea
fleet. Of course, Russia is going to say this is escalatory.
You also advocate sea mines, and electronic warfare systems to
deceive, mislead, jam, and direct long-range precise fires,
among others. What do you say to people who say that would be
an escalation and might lead to the use of chemical or nuclear
weapons or might involve the United States in a war against
Russia?
Then I am going to ask you about the International Criminal
Court.
Mr. Breedlove: Senator, Mr. Putin is introducing everything
that he has, including supersonic missiles. He has changed
tactics from trying to fight the military to his battle now
with the people of Ukraine. I guess my answer to you, sir, is
not flippant or meant to be disrespectful, but Mr. Putin is
introducing all manner of new kinds of weapons and
capabilities.
Then why is it escalatory when Ukraine enters--brings those
same capabilities to the fore? The reason that I push for
coastal-defense cruise missiles is because Ukraine asked for
them early. They were denied, and they have not come up again.
Now we see Russia's fleet pounding Mariupol from the water and
Russia's fleet preparing for the possibility of an amphibious
landing near Odesa. Here is a navy threatening the army with
these new asymmetric capabilities, and Ukraine is left without
coastal defense cruise missiles.
I would just say there is no zero-risk way forward, but Mr.
Putin is not deterred from bringing new weapons to the fight.
Why would we deny Ukraine the ability to defend its coasts?
Senator Wicker: Then, if I might, without prolonging this,
how do you bring a charge of being a war criminal to--how do
you begin proceedings at this point before the international
tribunal?
Mr. Breedlove: Sir, I am going to beg your forgiveness
here. I am not a lawyer. I would get out--that is one of those
things I think NATO and our nation should be pursuing with the
international courts and do it appropriately. I do not think
you need a whole lot more evidence than what we are watching
every day.
The ambassador talked about all the hospitals that had been
knocked down. We watched one of them in Mariupol happen on
world TV screens. I just do not think, if we had the right team
of lawyers involved, this would be too hard to do. Sir, I am
sorry I do not know the details.
Senator Wicker: Okay, Dr. Kimmage, there is a lot for you
to respond to if you care to. I will give you an opportunity.
Mr. Kimmage: Well, thank you, Senator, so much for the
question.
I mean, I think that one thing that we cannot do in this
situation, to sort of pick up where the comments left off just
a moment ago, is to analogize Yugoslavia in the 1990s and
analogize Russia to Serbia. You know, Russia is just vastly
bigger. It is a nuclear power. We are not going to be able to
do to Russia what we did to Serbia in that conflict.
In terms of bringing Putin to justice, there is every
reason to--the war crimes arising as we speak--but unless we
are able to defeat Russia and somehow--or the Russians
overthrow Putin--he is going to stay behind that wall and be, I
think, in many respects, impervious to those accusations. It
does not mean that it is not good to make those accusations and
to tabulate the names of Russian officers who commit war crimes
and see what can be done, but it is not going to be Milosevic
behind bars in The Hague at the end of this conflict, in my
estimation.
Just to go back to the first question that you asked, I
mean, it is my prediction--I would love for General Breedlove
to be correct that Russian soldiers might mutiny, that the
Russian population would rise and put an end to a war that will
be devastating for Russia. I think that is self-evident at the
moment. For that reason, Russia might pull back not just from
the territory that they have occupied since February 24, but
from Crimea. We could have what we have strived for since I was
in the State Department in 2014, which is a Ukraine that has
its full sovereignty, independence, and autonomy.
I think the law of averages suggests in this conflict,
given that Russia's military is enormous, that they have all
kinds of air power that they have not used, they have lots of
escalatory possibilities on their side, that Putin will not
give up and that he will not surrender and that he will not
back down, whatever that means in his terms.
You know, I think there are lots of good reasons for Putin
to come to the table to negotiate, and there might be ways in
the short term to do it. I think it is probably tricky, but I
guess that this conflict will end in a negotiated settlement.
It will be a dance, a long dance, between Zelensky and Putin as
to who is willing to compromise on which point. Yet Ukraine
will not get everything it wants and Russia will not get
everything it wants. It is a question of time and, of course, a
question of what happens on the battlefield.
However for Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its
territory--you know, I am not a military expert; I cannot say
what it would take in terms of what the U.S. would provide and
what partners and allies of Ukraine would provide, but it just
seems beyond what is conceivable. That just points the arrow
toward some kind of negotiated settlement at some point. That
is my view of the conflict.
Senator Wicker: Mr. Chairman, it might be fair to ask Dr.
Lanskoy if she would like to weigh in about any of these
issues.
Mr. Lanskoy: Thank you.
I guess I would just add that, in addition, if we are
speaking about war crimes, I would want to put Chechnya and
Syria there as well among the--
Senator Wicker: Absolutely.
Mr. Lanskoy: --Among the cities that have been leveled and
the kind of--[laughs]--the whole range of atrocities that have
gone on. I also--you know, there are efforts to document these
things and there is already an International Criminal Court
[ICC] case opened on the Ukraine war and there are efforts to
document--and it is been enormously important always to
document and to seek proceedings, even if you cannot ultimately
carry it all out to the end, but at least you can establish
what happened. That will be--that is in itself enormously
important, even if you cannot get Putin himself behind bars or,
you know, on the stand.
Those--you know, those kinds of efforts, I think, are very,
very important. We saw, for instance, some of the same military
units and individuals engaged in Chechnya and then in the
Donbas or Georgia, often the same individuals, often the same
kinds of war crimes. Yes, I agree with what Dr. Kimmage just
said in terms of it is not--it is hard to imagine Putin up
there as--on trial. Yet, the possibility of holding even lower-
level officials or the military accountable, or even just
having the records, is very important.
Chairman Cardin: Congressman Cohen has been very patient.
Congressman Cohen via Webex.
Representative Cohen: I heard your response and that you
support the [utilization ?] of airplanes from other former
communist Soviet-bloc nations to Ukraine. What is your response
to the Defense Department or administration's thought that
those planes would be shot down easily and that they would not
provide as much help as the antiaircraft systems that they are
trying to secure through Turkey or other defense provisions?
Mr. Breedlove: Well, sir, it would be hard for me to start
arguing with my old department, but I would just say that the
Ukrainian Air Force has done a pretty good job with the MiGs
that they have. I would expect that they would do a pretty good
job with any more MiGs they would get.
I do agree, though, that it is important that we get that
medium- and high-altitude capability to Ukraine because it is
the combination of the surface-to-air missiles and the MiGs
that makes this capable. I would just say that having led a few
air campaigns and flown in a few air campaigns, having some
more airplanes is pretty much normal going to be helpful.
Representative Cohen: Well, I agree with you. I just wanted
to know what your thoughts were.
President Zelensky addressed the Israeli Knesset, I
believe, yesterday or the day before, and he expressed his
displeasure at the fact that Israel had not helped them with an
Iron Dome system. I have visited Israel. I recall the Iron
Dome. Many of the missiles that they intercept are rockets from
Hamas and whatever. Is the Iron Dome capable of helping with
the type of missiles that are being fired by the Russians in
Ukraine?
Mr. Breedlove: That is what it is optimized for, sir. It is
optimized for, as you talk about, the smaller missiles and the
mortars and things like that. It is a magnificent capability to
do that. I would focus first on getting them the S-300s and
possibly the S-400s, which give them the medium- and high-
altitude capability, and with the S-400 a little bit of an
ability to intercept some of the missiles that are coming in.
As you know, Russia has now fired over 1,100 missiles into
Ukraine. That is a problem.
Representative Cohen: My colleague, my ranking member, who
is not on the call, Mr. Wilson, always asks about and advocated
earlier some type of weapon called a Harpoon that is apparently
effective with boats; ships, I think. We do not call them
boats, we call them ships. What is the--what do you know about
the Harpoon and the possible advantage to the Ukrainians and
the facilitating of it from us?
Mr. Breedlove: That missile falls into the category that I
was just talking to the chairman about, the coastal--defense
cruise-missile capability. Sir, what I would advocate for
coastal-defense cruise missiles is to work with our NATO allies
to provide--both the Norwegians and the Polish militaries have
good coastal-defense cruise missiles that they could get to
Ukraine faster than we could get Harpoons in there. The Harpoon
is a very different system, employed differently. They would be
much quicker to bring about the NASAMS and the Polish kit if we
were to work with those two nations to get those capabilities
to them there. Sir, the point is, the Harpoons are a coastal-
defense cruise missile, and I do advocate for giving them the
capability to defend their coasts.
Representative Cohen: The Russians have used hypersonic
missiles. They are a scary thought because they are--I do not
think we have an ability to stop them. I suspect the Ukrainians
do not either. Is that the main advantage of the hypersonic
missile, the inability to be detected and/or deterred? If that
is the main inability, which I am guessing it is, but we will
just kind of go on with that supposition, why do you think the
Russians have only used them two or three times? When they use
them two or three times, is that just kind of a--they do not
have a great inventory of those weapons, or are they just--or
just kind of want to show the West we have got these missiles,
and back off?
Mr. Breedlove: Sir, I am a bit of a contrarian on this
subject. They have fired, I think, at least two, and they used
them to almost zero effect. They fired them just like any of
the other 1,100 missiles that they have fired at targets, the
very same targets. I think it was more sending a message to the
West that we are upping the ante; we are going to start using
some of these special weapons, et cetera.
The fact of the matter is the Ukrainians have zero
capability to defeat any of the 1,100 that were shot at them,
much less now the hypersonic. It was not of consequence to the
Ukrainians, and yes, sir, you were right. We even have trouble
defending against some of these capabilities.
Representative Cohen: I guess those were my main questions.
I do not want to take much more time. Let me ask you this. I
believe you said in your testimony that some of our weapons
have gotten there late and have not been as--logistics have not
been as quick or as effective. Is that the problem with our
decision-making, or is that the problem with our military and/
or our transit in getting them there?
Mr. Breedlove: Sir, what I was referring to were the
Stingers. We got--we, the West, got Stingers there almost
immediately. A lot of those Stingers were two generations old
and supplied by some of our allies, and we are thankful for
them doing that. I am not complaining about that. However, we
were slower getting the more advanced versions that we use in
the U.S. military to them. I believe that was a matter of
releasable of some portions of the kit.
Representative Cohen: There was some announcement I heard
today of a possibility--this might have been a newsperson
ruminating; might have been--[an audio break]--the idea of us
possibly contributing chemical masks or masks that would defeat
chemical weapons. Do we have--[an audio break]--to do that?
[Audio break]--something in the media about that. Does that
just kind of give Russia the idea that they are going to start
doing it?
Mr. Breedlove: Sir, I think that is a tough question to
talk about because this is a big army and a big place. I do not
know--I have been out of the active military now for six years.
I do not know the status of our supply, et cetera, et cetera.
However, to outfit an army with chemical gear, which is not
issue one and wear it for five months, it is issue one, wear it
a little while, issue another, wear it a little while. Stocks
are a big problem. I just--I am unqualified, sir, to talk to
you about our--the depth of our supplies and our ability to
provide those.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, General Breedlove. I give
back the balance of my time.
Chairman Cardin: Well, let me thank all three of our
witnesses. This has been an extremely helpful hearing. This
information will be very helpful to us and, it will be shared
with all of our commission members and with the members of the
House and the Senate.
There being no further business, the hearing will stand
adjourned with our thanks.
Mr. Breedlove: Thank you, sir.
Representative Cohen: Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the hearing ended.]
[all]
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