[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIA'S ASSAULT ON UKRAINE AND THE INTER-
NATIONAL ORDER: ASSESSING AND BOL-
STERING THE WESTERN RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
February 2, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
[CSCE117-8]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
60-400 WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. SENATE U.S. HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Co-Chairman
Chairman JOE WILSON, South Carolina Ranking
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi Member
Ranking Member ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
TINA SMITH, Minnesota GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Department of State - to be appointed
Department of Defense - to be appointed
Department of Commerce - to be appointed
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
COMMISSIONERS
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, from Maryland................. 1
Hon. Steve Cohen, Co-Chairman, from Tennessee.................... 3
Hon. Roger Wicker, from Mississippi.............................. 5
Hon. Joe Wilson, from South Carolina............................. 7
Hon. Marc Veasey, from Texas..................................... 25
Hon. Gwen Moore, from Wisconsin.................................. 27
Hon. Ruben Gallego, from Arizona................................. 30
Hon. Thom Tillis, from North Carolina............................ 33
WITNESSES
Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow, Center on the United States and
Europe, Brookings Institution.................................. 9
Lieutenant General [Retired] Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair, Center
for European Policy Analysis................................... 13
Ambassador [Retired] William B. Taylor, Vice President, U.S.
Institute of Peace............................................. 16
RUSSIA'S ASSAULT ON UKRAINE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER: ASSESSING AND
BOLSTERING THE WESTERN RESPONSE
----------
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND
COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Wednesday, February 2, 2022.
The hearing was held from 2:43 p.m. to 4:50 p.m., Room 562,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator Ben
Cardin [D-MD], Chairman, Commission for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senator Benjamin L. Cardin [D-
MD], Chairman; Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN[, Co-Chairman;
Senator Roger Wicker [R-MS]; Representative Joe Wilson [R-SC],
Ranking Member; Senator Jeanne Shaheen [D-NH]; Representative
Marc Veasey [D-TX]; Representative Robert B. Aderholt [R-AL];
Senator Tina Smith [D-MN]; Representative Gwen Moore [D-WI];
Representative Ruben Gallego [D-AZ]; Senator Thom Tillis [R-
NC].
Other Members Present: Representative Victoria Spartz [R-
IN].
Witnesses: Dr. Fiona Hill, Senior Fellow, Center on the
United States and Europe, Brookings Institution; Lieutenant
General [Retired] Ben Hodges, Pershing Chair, Center for
European Policy Analysis; Ambassador [Retired] William B.
Taylor, Vice President, U.S. Institute of Peace.
OPENING STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CHAIRMAN,
U.S. SENATE, FROM MARYLAND
Chairman Cardin: Well, welcome, everyone, to the hearing of
the United States Helsinki Commission. I want to welcome our
two witnesses that are here in person and one who is with us
virtually as we have this hearing on ``Russia's Assault on
Ukraine and the International Order: Assessing and Bolstering
the Western Response.''
We are starting a few minutes late, and I apologize for
that. The Senate is in a series of votes. The first vote has
already taken place, but the senators will need to return to
the floor at some time, depending on when they take off the
first vote. I apologize to our witnesses about the
interruptions that we are going to have as a result of votes,
but we are going to continue the hearing. Chairman Cohen will
be here, as I understand it. If we have to go vote--unless you
have some votes coming up on your side also, I do not know--
Representative Cohen: We are here.
Chairman Cardin: We will be able to keep the hearing going.
Well, there is a lot unfolding regarding Russia and
Ukraine. The Biden administration made an announcement, I
believe today, about the movement of troops into Romania so
that they will be at the disposal of NATO in order to assure
our NATO allies of our commitment to their defense. The German
national security advisor was in the United States this week,
and we had a chance to compare notes. It is clear that there is
a lot of unity between the United States and Europe as it
relates to what is happening with Russia and Ukraine.
Today, we gather as Europe stands on the precipice of war.
The Kremlin has amassed an enormous array of troops and heavy
weaponry at Ukraine's doorstep, demanding its submission to
them to restore the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe. The
Kremlin's threat menaces not only Ukraine, our partners in
Georgia and the wider region, but also the long-cherished dream
and longstanding bipartisan U.S. policy to work toward a Europe
whole and free.
In contrast to Mr. Putin's bluster and blackmail, the Biden
administration has responded with sophistication and
determination. U.S. diplomats have met with Russian officials
in good faith and focused intent to avert war, and have sought
to give Russia all the assurances it needs and more that the
United States and its allies pose no danger to Russia if it
abides by its own commitments and obligations. The United
States stands ready to find areas of common purpose and
cooperation with Russia if it is willing and sincere, but the
sovereignty of Ukraine and the freedom of Europe are not things
to bargain away. In this, the United States, Ukraine, and
Europe speak with one voice. We are united and we are resolute.
Last July, along with Ranking Member Wicker, Co-Chair
Cohen, Ranking Member Wilson, and a number of other
commissioners, I had the opportunity to travel to Estonia,
Bulgaria, and Norway. We saw in person the same unity of
purpose across NATO's frontiers at the Baltic Sea, the Black
Sea, and the Arctic. Although our shared enterprise is one of
peace, the United States and our allies will not back down in
the face of the Kremlin's aggression, and we are ready to
respond to any threat to peace and liberty in Europe.
That is why I am proud to be an original cosponsor of the
Defending Ukraine Sovereignty Act of 2022. The bill would
provide our partners in Ukraine with the tools and equipment
they need to defend themselves, bolster European security,
combat disinformation, and would extend crippling sanctions on
Russia's finance and energy sectors and on senior Russian
government and military personnel. Along with other
commissioners, including Senator Shaheen, I am also currently
involved in a bipartisan consensus-building exercise to develop
a larger bill with wide bipartisan support that we hope will be
introduced in the coming days. I want to congratulate Senator
Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, and Senator Risch, the ranking Republican member, on
their appearance on Sunday's talk show, but also their ability
to work together so that we can have a consensus bill.
If the Kremlin chooses war, it will be at great cost to the
regime and the Russian economy. However, it is not too late for
the Russian government to pursue peace. As diplomatic talks
continue, Russians have the opportunity to consider their place
in Europe and in the world. The Kremlin may elect to make war
on Europe and risk scathing international isolation, crushing
economic penalties, and invite the full defensive power of the
Euro-Atlantic to Eastern Europe; or Moscow can commit itself to
diplomacy and its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and
we can forge a new future based on mutual respect, cooperation,
human rights, and democracy. It is this future that Russia
would know no greater prosperity or global influence, and would
be a contributor to international stability instead of a danger
to international stability and prosperity.
It is certainly fitting that the Helsinki Commission is
convening this hearing today. With the core tenets of the
Helsinki Final Act so brazenly threatened, the importance of
those principles and the central role of the OSCE could not be
clearer. No other forum is so well-placed to allow for a direct
and fulsome discussion with European security and the
principles of human rights, sovereignty, and democracy. It is
also the only multinational organization other than the United
Nations where Russia, Ukraine, along with every member of NATO
and the EU, sit together at the same table. Whatever Russia's
grievance about its place in Europe and the possible need to
revisit the State of European security architecture, the OSCE
is the most appropriate and purpose-built forum for such
discussions.
I am looking forward to a robust discussion with our
witnesses, but first, let me recognize my colleagues, the chair
and ranking members, starting with Chairman Cohen.
STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TENNESSEE
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Chairman Cardin, for
scheduling this hearing, and it is a most important hearing to
the world, let alone the people here in the United States.
Thank you to our panelists for helping shed light on the
situation. You are both experts on the issues and have
experience, which we and the American public need to hear.
The very fact that we are holding this critically important
hearing is unbelievable that we are at the stage of some type
of a major possible war in Europe, something that should be
left in the Dark Ages and not part of the future of mankind
dealing with each other. We are confronted with the possibility
of the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II,
President Putin amassing over a hundred thousand troops--I
guess 170,000, they are estimating now--and military equipment
on the border of Ukraine, a country that is trying to escape
the legacy of Kremlin colonialism.
Putin is threatening the neighboring Ukrainians simply
because they dare to pursue a path of democracy, accountable
governance, and transatlantic integration. It is a developing
democracy. It is not perfect, of course, but it is a developing
democracy and can only become a better democracy if allowed to
breathe and live, and be free. The Kremlin wants to deny that
sovereign nation the ability to exercise the will of its people
and wants to stop it before it becomes more experienced with
democracy and entrenched.
Let me be very clear: The Kremlin's rhetoric about Ukraine
presenting a security threat to Russia is nothing more than a
lie being used to force its own will on an independent European
State. It is almost comical to think that when you bring
170,000 troops and all of the types of military equipment to
the borders of a country, you are saying that that country is a
security threat to Russia. It is absurd.
Moscow fears Ukraine's success as a budding democracy with
its open market of ideas, vibrant media, and a strong civil
society--all things which Russia lacks and that they fear will
threaten their own system, where they do not have an open
society and where people like Mr. Navalny end up in prison.
They do not have elections; they have prisons. Putin fears a
successful Ukrainian experiment will lead the people of Russia
to demand that autocrats like Putin leave office; they want
transparency, and they want accountability. That is the only
danger Ukraine presents to the corrupt clique of kleptocrats
and oligarchs in the Kremlin. They certainly do not pose a
military threat.
Let us not forget that Putin has been waging a war on
Ukraine in Crimea, in the Donbas since 2014, the year of the
Revolution of Dignity when Ukrainians took to the streets in
favor of European integration over submission to Moscow, really
a heroic period of time when people risked their lives for
democracy, many of whom lost their lives, many of whom were
injured, but they knew they wanted to be free. They put it on
the line, and they succeeded. Russia's illegal occupation of
Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula is a nightmare for those who speak
out against Russia's illegal presence there. Many Ukrainians
continue to be persecuted for speaking out, particularly the
indigenous Crimean Tatars. Thousands of Ukrainians have lost
their lives defending their country against hostile Russian
actions. We should not forget their sacrifices as we hold the
Kremlin accountable.
The Kremlin has time and again used Ukraine as a testing
ground for operations--be it cyberattacks, weaponization of
energy, or proxy wars--that are later used against others,
including the United States. This is as much about Europe and
the free world as it is about Ukraine. We must not forget the
lessons of history that have taught us the dangers of appeasing
aggressors who are driven by egomania, a distorted perception
of history, and lies.
This is about egomania and a desire to put oneself in
history books along with others, all of whom got there in the
military, who lost their lives pursuing land accumulation and
political accumulation of power for the egomaniac who wanted to
be written down in a history book once they were put into the
ground. It is my hope that this Kremlin-manufactured crisis can
be resolved through diplomacy. A failure to do so will lead to
the unnecessary loss of lives on both sides of this conflict.
The Russians do not want to see their children come home in
body bags, nor do the Ukrainians. Putin might not care, but
most Russian people do not want to see it, and certainly, the
parents of the soldiers do not want to see it. That could lead
to additional consequences in the region, both calculable
conflicts and others that may now be unforeseeable.
While I am neither a proponent nor an advocate for war, a
free and sovereign Ukraine capable of defending its territorial
integrity against current and future threats is the crux of
security for the whole of Europe. He will not stop at Ukraine.
He wants what Peter the Great had. He wants what the Soviet
Union used to be. That brings up our Baltic friends, our
friends in Poland, our friends all along the border.
As friends to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, the United
States and all of Ukraine's allies should stand firm and
unified in support of this crucial goal. I wish this
opportunity to use this opportunity to express solidarity with
the people of Ukraine. I have visited Ukraine on a couple of
occasions. I found the people to be warm and inviting, who
enjoyed the idea of freedom and did not want to go back under
the yoke of a repressive oligarchy and kleptocracy. I know they
will prevail. Their spirit will prevail. The Russians are
looking for trouble. Even if their tanks win, they will lose.
Inevitably, they will lose.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Congressman Cohen.
I now recognize my co-leader in the Senate, Senator Wicker.
STATEMENT OF ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATE, FROM
MISSISSIPPI
Senator Wicker: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Our
witnesses must certainly understand they will eventually get to
testify--[laughter]--but I do think it is important that we
speak with solidarity here. I want to congratulate Congressman
Cohen and Senator Cardin for their very forceful remarks.
We are aware of the circumstances under which we are
meeting. Ukraine is under imminent threat of an invasion from a
massive military force assembled on its border by Putin's
Russia. It could happen this week. It could happen any day.
These forces threaten not only the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv
but also cause concerns for our friends in Poland and the
Baltic states, and they cause concern for the United States. If
you are concerned about our status in the world, if you are
concerned about Taiwan, if you are concerned about a free
Pacific, you are concerned about Ukraine today.
Russia's already using cyberattacks and information warfare
against Ukraine, and we are warned that Moscow is likely or may
very well stage a provocation as a pretext for military action.
It certainly would not be the first time. Such a shameful
tactic would echo Putin's own actions in the past, as well as
those of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis when they began trying to
subjugate large portions of Europe.
The Helsinki Commission is uniquely positioned for this
conversation. After all, the Commission is tasked with
monitoring the commitments made under the Helsinki Final Act of
1975, which served as a common foundation for acceptable
behavior of European states and has promoted peace and
security, and prosperity. I might mention that the Helsinki
Final Act of 1975 was signed by the leadership of every member
country, including the leadership of Russia at the time. They
voluntarily entered into this agreement, and they should be
bound by it.
I want to--I want to mention what a stalwart Senator Cardin
was after the invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 in
leading the resolution on the floor of the Parliamentary
Assembly pointing out that Putin's Russia had violated every
single precept--every single precept--of the Helsinki Final
Act, and that resolution was overwhelmingly, overwhelmingly
adopted by our allies in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
I need not also mention Georgia in 2008, invaded illegally
under a pretext invented by the Russian dictator, Vladimir
Putin. Putin is now treading under foot the principles at the
heart of the Commission's work, principles agreed to by Mr.
Putin's predecessors in Moscow.
My colleagues, as you know, I recently traveled to Ukraine
with a bipartisan group of senators, four Democrats and three
Republicans. Based on what I heard there, I have no doubt the
Ukrainians will fight fiercely to defend their sovereignty and
their boundaries. I would say to my colleagues, I did not see
panic in the voices and in the eyes, and the demeanor of our
Ukrainian friends. I did see resolve, but not panic.
Our responsibility here is clear. We must do everything we
can to deter the dictator, Putin, by making plain to him the
costs of his brazen assault on an OSCE member country. Ronald
Reagan called the Soviet Union the Evil Empire, and he was
advised by diplomats, by some diplomats, not to say this. It is
a resumption of that Evil Empire that Vladimir Putin longs for
and that he strives for, and it is the reason he has done what
he has done in Transnistria. It is the reason he has done what
he has done in the two provinces he has invaded in the Republic
of Georgia. It is the reason for his invasion and the
threatened invasion of the sovereign Ukrainian Republic.
Let me--let me close by stressing two things. Nobody wants
to see an escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. If it is
escalated, it is because Mr. Putin has brought a hundred
thousand troops in to the--to the edge of the eastern part of
Ukraine. It is because he has moved elite Russian troops from
the far eastern parts of Russia to the borders, very
dangerously close to the border of Poland, in Belarus, and to
the border of Ukraine in Belarus.
What happens in Ukraine will not stop in Ukraine. How this
crisis plays out will affect other countries in the region,
including our NATO partners. Emergent powers around the world
are watching closely what the United States does.
I must make this final point to my colleagues in, House and
Senate. We have yet to update our national defense
appropriation bill. There is talk about another continuing
resolution. Members of the military leadership met with members
of the--of the Senate just this morning and talked about how
inadequate a continuing resolution, keeping the appropriations
where they were a year ago--a year-and-a-half ago instead of
updating them as we know we have to do, how injurious that is
to our national security. I cannot think of a better signal
that the House and Senate could send than to resolve our
differences about how much money needs to be spent on the
domestic programs and on the defense programs, and to get at
least the defense portion of our appropriation bill updated and
passed within the next few weeks. That would send, to me, a
strong signal to Putin's Russia as the passage of legislation
which members on both sides of the aisle are working on
diligently.
I yield--I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cardin: Well, first, let me just concur with
Senator Wicker. I think the strongest message we could send
right now is the passage of the budget--the appropriation
bills, so we do not do a CR. I agree completely. Plus, also, I
hope the bipartisan bill in regards to unity gives this
administration all the tools they need and a clear message to
Mr. Putin, the consequences if he invades further into Ukraine.
We will now recognize the Republican leader from the
Helsinki Commission in the House, Representative Wilson.
STATEMENT OF JOE WILSON, U.S. HOUSE, FROM SOUTH
CAROLINA
Representative Wilson: Thank you, Chairman Ben Cardin.
Thank you for convening this hearing, and thank you for your
bipartisan leadership as you just indicated how important that
is that the world recognize that Republicans and Democrats
stand together.
It has never been more urgent to understand the threats to
Ukraine, not only militarily but on the humanitarian level.
Conflict breaking out between these two nations would result in
a needless and horrific loss of Russian and Ukrainian lives.
Russian families would suffer again. The world must not repeat
the consequences of a European cross-border occasion as
occurred in 1939, by Hitler into Poland, ultimately resulting
in 27 million dead in the Soviet Union, 8 million dead in
Germany, and the genocide of over 6 million Jews. Americans
appreciate that German ambassador to the United States Emily
Haber has been outspoken for the people of Ukraine.
I was grateful to join a bipartisan congressional
delegation to Ukraine in December to hear firsthand from
Ukrainians about the situation on the ground and their need and
expectations for the future. The Kremlin must pay attention to
these meetings. Putin should know by now that both parties in
the U.S. Congress are firmly united in support of the people of
Ukraine, as we see so clearly today of Democrats and
Republicans, and so well expressed, and not surprisingly, by
Senator Roger Wilkins being correct again--Wicker being correct
again.
Not only Ukraine, but any country that has been invaded/
occupied, such as Georgia and Moldova, or coerced by the
Kremlin, and all those living under threat from Putin, such as
the Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, along
with adjoining Belarus. Putin's tyrannical decisions continue
to damage the reputations of the talented people of Russia.
There should be no repetition of the 1932 Red Famine, where
Stalin starved 4 million Ukrainians along with 1 million in
Kazakhstan and the Volga region, as documented by Anne
Appelbaum. Where we stand in Ukraine in this decisive moment
has serious implications.
With my visits over the years, I have been impressed by the
city of Kyiv with its energized people. Western democracies
must be bold. I continue to call for sending advanced anti-
tank, antiaircraft, and anti-ship missiles to Ukraine for
maximum defense of their freedom. Since the siege of Leningrad
in World War II, where Russian citizens with American equipment
successfully stopped the Nazi invaders, this country continues
the great tradition of America providing military aid to its
allies opposing invaders. At the end of the siege of Leningrad,
over 800,000 Russian lives were lost in the city, and more--
that is, more than the United States and United Kingdom lost in
all of World War II.
I was inspired and humbled to lead an American delegation
in presenting a floral wreath at the Piskaryovskoe Memorial
Cemetery in St. Petersburg in honor of the 500,000 Russians who
are buried there, their lives taken, and recognized as the
world's largest open cemetery. History cannot be forgotten.
Putin should recognize a murderous invasion will be disastrous
for all. Putin and his cronies should stop silencing and
exploiting their populations for personal enrichment.
We have already seen the toll Putin's occupation has taken
on Crimea and the Donbas--restrictions on freedom of speech and
religion, punishment for asserting Ukrainian identity. All
these things would be implemented further in Ukraine should
Putin capture more territory. Millions more lives would be
upended. And needless deaths, including civilians, would be
inevitable. Let us not only hope that further tragedy can be
avoided, but work to do what we can to bolster Ukraine's
defenses against Putin.
I look forward to learning from our witnesses today what is
happening in the region, particularly how the American people
can continue to support a trusted partner, the people of
Ukraine, in these troubling times. I am also hopeful that the
Russian people to continue to respect international treaties
and boundaries, even though the Kremlin does not. I am grateful
that today, The Washington Times published an op-ed, ``Why
Ukraine Matters For The American People,'' and the families of
Germany, Japan, Korea, Israel, and India.
With this, I, again, appreciate the witnesses today, and I
yield back.
Chairman Cardin: Let me thank all my colleagues for their
comments. I also want to acknowledge that we have Senator
Shaheen, Representative Veasey, and Representative Aderholt who
are with us. Online, we have Senator Smith, Representative
Moore, and Representative Gallego. Large attendance because of
the subject matter and our distinguished panel of witnesses.
Let me introduce our witnesses. We welcome your testimony.
Your full testimony is being made part of the record, and you
will be permitted to proceed as you wish, and then we will do
rounds of questioning.
Dr. Fiona Hill is a senior fellow in the Center of the
United States and Europe in the foreign policy program at
Brookings. She recently served as deputy assistant to the
president and senior director for European and Russian affairs
at the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019. From 2006
to 2009, she served as national intelligence officer for Russia
and Eurasia at the National Intelligence Council. She is a co-
author of ``Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin,'' and has
researched and published extensively on issues related to
Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, regional conflicts, energy,
and strategic issues. She is a true expert on the subject
matter.
We are also joined by Lieutenant General Ben Hodges. He is
joining us virtually, I believe, from Germany. He is a
lieutenant general, retired, and holds the Pershing Chair in
Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
He joined CEPA in February 2018. A native of Quincy, Florida,
General Hodges graduated from the United States Military
Academy in May 1980 and was commissioned in the infantry. He
has served in so many places, including Iraq and Afghanistan. I
believe he is recently back from Ukraine.
Ambassador, retired, William Taylor is the vice president
of Russia and Europe at the U.S. Institute for Peace. In 2019,
he served as the charge d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv.
During the Arab Spring, he oversaw U.S. assistance and support
in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. He served as U.S.
Ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. He earlier served on
the staff of Senator Bill Bradley. We always mention the most
important parts of your resume, if you have connections to the
U.S. Senate. He graduated from West Point and Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government. Served our Nation in
Vietnam and Germany, and was recently also back, I believe,
from Ukraine.
We will start with Dr. Hill.
TESTIMONY DR. FIONA HILL, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER ON
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Dr. Hill: Thank you so much, Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman
Cohen, and all the other members of the Commission. It is a
real privilege and an honor to be with you today, especially,
as you have all pointed out, what is happening in Ukraine is
very much at the forefront, at the heart of everything that
this Commission does. I am delighted that you are having these
hearings, and very honored to be able to participate alongside
my colleagues, Lieutenant General Hodges and Ambassador Taylor.
As Co-Chairman Cohen has already pointed out, I think you
used exactly the same word as I was going to begin my oral
remarks, Congressman. The current phase of this crisis in
Ukraine has been manufactured by Russian President Vladimir
Putin and the Kremlin. I think for all of us, it is quite
difficult to identify a specific trigger for the decision to
buildup forces to such an extent on the borders close to
Ukraine, or to suddenly escalate events in December of last
year. In many respects, the timing seems driven more by
Vladimir Putin's own political predilections and perceptions of
developments rather than by events on the ground in Ukraine or
in the contested Donbas region. I will just give a few overview
points for us to take into consideration before hearing more
from my colleagues.
In terms of understanding the current context for the
crisis, there are several factors at play for Moscow and Putin,
I think are relevant for us to consider during this hearing.
First of all, Moscow has actually successfully reasserted
itself as the dominant political force and security provider in
Eurasia. In contrast with Ukraine currently, the other former
Soviet states have now either been pressured into closer
political and security relations with Moscow or into a more
neutral, marginal international status. Just as a couple of
examples, you already mentioned, Moldova and some of the other
republics here, but I will just a couple of key examples from
the last couple of years.
In Georgia, for example, 14 years after Russia's August
2008 invasion, the current government is, I would say, more on
the back foot than it has been before, treading very carefully
with Russia, more so than its predecessors. Georgia's former
president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who was a perennial thorn in
Moscow's side, now sits in jail in Tbilisi after an ill-advised
return to Georgia in October 2021. Although Russia cannot claim
direct credit for this, Russian officials and commentators
nonetheless frequently use Saakashvili and his fate as a
cautionary tale for the rest of the region, including Ukraine.
In summer 2020 in Armenia, President Nikol Pashinyan--
another leader who has fallen out of favor with Moscow--saw his
domestic position and former foreign policy autonomy crushed by
the war with Azerbaijan. Given the fact that Russia and Armenia
have a long-standing defense pact, and Russian forces are
permanently based in Armenia, Azerbaijan's military assault to
retake territory occupied by Armenia for the last three decades
was unlikely to have been feasible without a green light from
Moscow. Russia has now exploited the 2020 war to introduce its
military forces into Nagorno-Karabakh, sidelining the OSCE
Minsk Group.
Elsewhere, Belarusian strongman Aleksandr Lukashenko has
been forced back into the fold after a disastrous Presidential
election on his part in the last year. In January 2022, so just
in the last month, Russia and its regional security alliance--
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, were, of
course, called in to quash protests and to quell a political
power struggle in Kazakhstan. This was the first time that the
CSTO was deployed on the territory of a member country. Russia
feels emboldened by all of these developments in Eurasia.
From Russia's perspective, the United States played no
significant role in addressing these upheavals. The United
States, again, from Russia's perspective, seems grievously
weakened at home and abroad. For Vladimir Putin--again, this is
his view--America's political disarray mirror's predicament
immediately after the dissolution of the USSR and offers a rare
opportunity. If the United States really is in a State of
collapse at home and in retreat abroad, as Putin and the
Kremlin assess, then in Putin's view, again, perhaps Russia can
overturn the last 30 years of American dominance in European
security and also constrain Ukraine's independence.
If we look at Europe, not just at Eurasia, Moscow now sees
ample opportunity to take advantage of developments there--the
reverberations from Brexit, Poland, and Hungary's disputes with
the EU. Of course, we have just seen Viktor Orban in Moscow
meeting with Vladimir Putin directly. The legacy of 4 years of
rifts between the United States and its European allies, the
departure of long-serving Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel from
the political scene, preparations for Presidential elections in
France, and Washington's precipitous withdrawal from
Afghanistan have exacerbated frictions and fractures in NATO
and the EU that Russia thinks it can exploit.
Again, from Russia's perspective, there is an opportunity
because European military spending and operational readiness
have declined over the last decades, relative to the United
States and Russia. Despite an uptick in spending and deployment
since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, two of our most
significant European military partners--the U.K. and France--
are increasingly at loggerheads, while our other major partner,
Turkey, is preoccupied with Syria and the Middle East.
Again, from Russia's perspective, Europe's punitive
financial tools, along with the political will to deploy them,
have been weakened. Moscow has effectively moved over the past
decade, and especially since its annexation of Crimea in 2014,
to shore up the Russian economy against Western sanctions,
including through paying off State debts, making strategic
direct investments in companies across Europe in critical
infrastructure, energy, and metallurgy, and also by deepening
ties with the private sectors of key European countries, even
at the height of this crisis, to try to offset any retaliatory
economic actions that we might take.
Putin and the Kremlin clearly believe that European and
American investors will serve as Russian allies and advocates
for limited sanctions, and that they will push for a speedy
reconciliation with Russia, limiting our government's capacity
for confrontation. Putin has also, as members of the Commission
are well aware, taken Russia's ambitions and positions during
this crisis well beyond Eurasia and Europe. Russia is
consolidating relationships with U.S. adversaries with the
blatantly signaled goal of challenging America's global
posture. We have seen this with recent visits to Iran by Putin,
and of course, we are soon going to be seeing Vladimir Putin
sitting alongside President Xi at the opening of the Beijing
Olympics. There have been many other instances where Putin has
clearly moved out into other theaters to signal that Russia
means business there as well.
Putin's been quite explicit about these moves, as well as
about the ideas of deploying new nuclear weapon systems to
parts of territory closer to Europe, or perhaps even to the
Caribbean, under some recent commentary out of Moscow. Its
whole goal here seems to be to undermine the current
international order, or at least to show an intent to do so, as
a gambit to get the United States to the negotiating table. As
members of the Commission have already stated, Russia has long
sought a commitment from the United States, NATO, and the
European Union that it will have a clearly defined role in
post-cold war European security institutions, and also
decisionmaking power whenever developments or events run
counter to its interests.
Russian officials have recently expressed frustration about
the slow response from the United States to Moscow's repeated
requests to engage on proposals for a new European security
order. In many respects, Putin is pushing this really hard
because of his own timeline. Just again something to bear in
mind, Putin's very mindful of 2024, not just when we have our
Presidential election but also when he must, theoretically as
well as in practice, submit himself for reelection at home to
then gain the presidency for perhaps another six to even 12
years, depending on how many terms he sees before him at this
particular juncture.
In many respects, time is of the essence for Putin. He
would like to achieve a resolution of these issues before 2024.
Right now, his public opinion ratings are not what they used to
be. The last time Putin's popular approval fell significantly
was just before the annexation of Crimea back in 2014. At that
juncture, annexation proved universally popular in Russia, and
Putin may hope for a similar boost ahead of the Russian
Presidential elections by showing the Russian people that he
can take decisive action against Ukraine, NATO, and the United
States.
In the meantime, at home, Putin has done a very good job in
Russia of making the United States and NATO look like the
aggressors in the perpetration of this crisis. Abroad, he is
also bent on convincing the rest of the world that Ukraine is
either an internal matter for Russia to resolve, or the object
of a cold war-style dust-up with the United States. It is Putin
who is trying to depict this as a proxy war, like Korea and
Vietnam were in the cold war. However, in recent Russian
polling, half of Russians believe that the United States and
NATO were to blame for the crisis, and only a tiny fraction
that Russia itself was to blame. Across the border in Ukraine,
in stark contrast, more than 70 percent of Ukrainians now view
Russia as a hostile State, which has increased from 60 percent
in the spring of 2021.
I would just offer to the Commission--and, again, I would
be very interested to hear with Lieutenant General Hodges and
Ambassador Taylor have to say about this after their recent
visit to Ukraine--that this last point about Ukrainian
attitudes could prove very problematic for Putin. The Russian
president knows history inside-out--Russian history, that is.
He also has his very own version of it, which is not always
shared not only by us, but also by Ukrainians. The Kremlin and
Putin have long deployed Russian values and Russian history as
weapons in their conduct of information warfare, especially
when it comes to Ukraine. Putin is, of course, asserting that
Russia and Ukraine are historically, culturally,
linguistically, and inextricably tied together. He posits that
they have only been separated by an accident of history, the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
In this narrative context, for Putin, this is why we are in
this crisis. The mere prospect of any kind of formal
relationship between Ukraine and NATO, or between Ukraine and
the EU, or Ukraine and the United States is considered a direct
threat to Russia. Also, to Putin personally, because every
aspect of the Ukraine conflict is being made personal for him.
He has talked repeatedly about his own connections to Ukraine
and to Crimea, and every move has so far been on his timetable,
and every Russian official and commentator stressed that the
ultimate decisionmaking in Ukraine is up to Vladimir Putin, as
well as the small group of people in his inner circle who share
his own views.
In acting against Ukraine, Putin and Russia look set to
create an eternal enemy out of this neighboring country, as
well as destabilizing European and global affairs for years to
come, especially if Ukrainian views that Russia is engaged in
hostile acts are really as high as they seem to be in the
polls. This is where something interesting should be borne in
mind, and reflects what Congressman Wilson said in his
reference to World War II, about some of the impacts of hostile
acts. Even Putin himself has reflected upon the fact, at the
beginning of his presidency, that acts of aggression against
another country, no matter what their motivation, whatever the
intent, have lasting consequences.
When he was asked by a journalist at the very beginning of
his presidency in 2000 whether the Soviet interventions in
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 or in Germany in
1953 were big mistakes. He said, yes, they were. They were all
big mistakes, in my opinion. The Russophobia that we have today
in Eastern Europe is the result of those mistakes. That was
Vladimir Putin in the year 2000. Well, in 2022, twenty-two
years exactly to when he made these comments, the Russophobia
or negative attitudes toward Russia today in Ukraine and
elsewhere are the direct result of Russian military
intervention, cyberattacks and intrusions, and political
influence operations that we have seen since the 2000's.
In closing, in countering Putin on this occasion, we have
to continue to keep demonstrating to Putin that today's actions
in and around Ukraine are a significant mistake, just as they
were in the 1950's and 1960's. We should continue to make clear
to Moscow that we are open to negotiation, as Chairman Cardin
has said, and other members have, but not under the current
coercive circumstances. We need to reframe this crisis for what
it is, as the administration has just done in the United
Nations. This is not a proxy conflict. This is not aggression
by the United States or NATO. This is not a righteous effort to
counter some great historic wrong, as President Putin says.
This is an act of post-colonial revisionism on the part of
Russia. Ukraine's been an independent country for more than 30
years.
Many other countries, as you have said, Chairman Cardin,
and other members have said, have--find themselves in similar
predicaments today, also threatened by territorial assaults
from their neighbors, or having their sovereignty threatened.
Senator Wicker also made this reference before he left. We need
to keep making it very clear that any further invasion of
Ukraine is unacceptable.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Dr. Hill. Appreciate your
testimony. I do want to acknowledge that Representative Spartz
has joined us. It is nice to have you here. Not a member of the
Commission, but you are always welcome to our hearings.
We will now hear from General Hodges, who I believe is in
Germany, which means the time difference there is getting late
at night. We very much appreciate you being with us virtually.
TESTIMONY LIEUTENANT GENERAL [RETIRED] BEN HODGES,
PERSHING CHAIR, CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY ANALYSIS
Mr. Hodges: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Greetings
from Frankfurt, Germany. Thanks for the privilege, to all of
you, for providing testimony today. I have just returned from a
short trip to Kyiv as part of a delegation of five former
Ambassadors, including my co-panelist, Ambassador Bill Taylor,
and former Supreme Allied Commander General, retired, Phil
Breedlove. Our visit to Ukraine included a private meeting with
President Zelensky, as well as with several members of the
Ukrainian Rada, ministers, and military officials.
President Zelensky is not confused about the threat. He
knows it is very real, and that the survival of his government
and of his country are at stake. He differs with the U.S.
Government as to the scale of what a new Russian offensive will
look like, but he has no illusions about the threat. President
Zelensky's aim is to grow the size of his armed forces by
100,000 soldiers over the next three years. For that, he needs
financial resourcing. He is not asking for any soldiers from
any nation.
He only asks for the financial resources to build his own
army, for weapons and ammunition, and for continued diplomatic
and economic support from the West. The threat from Russia is
real, and it is growing. While a new Russian offensive is not
imminent, I fear it is increasingly likely. There is no sign of
de-escalation. President Putin appears overconfident. He is
applying maximum pressure on the West in this self-manufactured
crisis, in hopes that Ukraine and/or NATO will eventually make
concessions.
What is at stake? As German Foreign Minister Baerbock
recently stated, it is the entire European peace order.
Stability and security in the transatlantic area are endangered
if Putin can enlarge Russia's territory at will, without regard
for international law, existing treaties, and borders. A
failure of deterrence would further open the door to the
Russian way of war, with cyberattacks, disinformation
campaigns, aggression in the air and maritime domains, targeted
assassinations, and the weaponization of Russian-controlled
energy resources.
A new influx of potentially tens of thousands of refugees
into Western Europe would have destabilizing effects across
Europe, which is one of the Kremlin's intended outcomes of such
an attack. I do not believe that a large-scale attack toward
Kyiv is likely, as it will generate too many Russian
casualties, and it is not actually necessary for them to
achieve their strategic aims. Instead, I anticipate that a new
offensive will be a continuation of what they are already
doing. A new offensive is more likely to be a series of
rolling, limited objective operations to, No. 1, demonstrate
that the Kremlin is not deterred by NATO, two, to further
weaken the government of Ukraine and, three, to frustrate
Western decisionmakers with actions below some perceived
threshold of violence that might make going forward with the
most severe sanctions more difficult.
This administration deserves credit for leading perhaps the
most comprehensive U.S. diplomatic effort I have seen since the
1995 Dayton Peace Accord. Although there are still significant
differences among some nations about how to respond, every NATO
country has agreed to reject the Kremlin's ridiculous demands,
although recent unhelpful statements by Hungary's Prime
Minister Orban and Croatia's president are cracks that the
Kremlin will exploit. The administration and NATO have
transitioned from passive deterrence to active deterrence, as
evidenced by the heightened alert of the NATO response force,
today's welcome announcement of U.S. troop deployments to
Europe, other nations delivering weapons, and even France has
offered to lead a new battlegroup into Romania.
Not all of our allies have been as decisive as they should,
Germany foremost among them. Germany is the key. Most of the
European Union will follow Germany's lead on most diplomatic
and economic sanctions. Therefore, I am frustrated that
Germany, our most important ally, has not yet acted decisively
regarding Nord Stream 2. I do note that the German government
has publicly acknowledged, at least, that Russia is the
aggressor and that, ``everything is on the table'' as an option
for sanctions should Russia attack. These are positive steps. I
believe that leaders within the Green Party are particularly
helpful.
The Biden administration must continue to work closely with
the German government to ensure we remain unified in our
assessment of the Russian threat and in our response.
Therefore, we need to understand the domestic political
challenges facing this new German coalition government and seek
alternative sources of gas to mitigate the threat of Russia
disrupting gas supplies to Europe, which the administration is
now doing. A partnership between Germany and the United States,
which ensures a strong, unified effort in all domains, is what
will ultimately give the Kremlin the greatest pause.
What else can the alliance do to prevent a new Russian
offensive against Ukraine? We need to take the initiative
instead of always reacting to whatever the Kremlin does. We
have to do this in unity with our allies. We need to realize
that this is about so much more than Ukraine. We need a
strategy for the greater Black Sea region. We must repair the
damaged relationship with Turkey, which holds the key to the
region. In the near term, we should be doing everything
possible to enable Ukraine to more effectively defend itself. I
am happy with most of what the administration is already
sending. We just need to get it there faster, especially air
defense and anti-ship capability.
We must be prepared to escalate horizontally to force the
Kremlin to look in other directions, versus being able to focus
fully on its operations in Ukraine, such as threatening the
Kerch Strait Bridge and the Russian Navy's illegal base at
Sevastopol. We should encourage Turkey to close the Bosporus
and Dardanelles Straits to Russian Navy vessels, in accordance
with its authority under the Montreux Convention. We should let
it be known that we are seriously prepared to blockade the
Russian Navy base at Tartus in Syria. I fully support the
administration's plans to enact sanctions targeting President
Putin's personal wealth and to remove Russia from SWIFT. We
must continue competing in the information domain by countering
false Kremlin-backed narratives, such as that NATO is a threat
to Russia.
Finally, the West should build an off-ramp for President
Putin. There are things we can do which will not in any way
betray Ukraine, our allies, or any of our values, but could
give President Putin an opportunity to draw back his forces.
For example, we should double down on exercise transparency and
offer to re-establish the mutual military special observer
missions that existed during the cold war. NATO members could
make a public joint statement where member states guarantee
Russia's internationally recognized borders. We have already
done this. In effect, for decades, NATO has been guaranteeing
Russia's border. On its face, it seems almost ludicrous for
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to have to guarantee that they
would never invade Russia. Maybe because it does seem so
ludicrous, making a public event out of it might help counter
the false narrative of Russia being threatened by NATO.
Of course, the alliance should still keep communication
channels open with the Kremlin in every possible format. We
must have a clear-eyed perspective about the nature of
diplomacy with the Kremlin. These are not Boy Scouts. They use
chemical weapons, poison, and murder against their own
opposition, and they use cyber and disinformation to destroy
lives and trust in our democratic system. We should talk, but
we need to understand with whom we are talking. I look forward
to your questions. Thank you again for the privilege of
testimony today.
Chairman Cardin: General, thank you for your testimony and
making yourself available. We appreciate it very much. I want
to acknowledge also that Senator Tillis is with us vis-a-vis
the internet.
We will now hear from Ambassador Taylor.
TESTIMONY AMBASSADOR [RETIRED] WILLIAM B. TAYLOR,
VICE PRESIDENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
Mr. Taylor: Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Cohen, and other
members of the Commission, it is a great honor for me to join
you here today. It is a great honor for me to be here with Dr.
Hill and General Hodges. As General Hodges said, he and I spent
some time in Kyiv over the past weekend. Just got back
yesterday afternoon. We would be glad to talk to you about what
we saw--what we saw there.
The United States and the rest of NATO and Ukraine face a
challenge from the Russian Federation that threatens stability
and security in Europe and the world. If President Putin
decides to invade Ukraine, it will drastically escalate a war
that has already killed 14,000 Ukrainians and will result in
the deaths of tens of thousands more, thousands of Russian
soldiers. As President Putin considers his options, he should
remember that in addition to the crippling cost of sanctions
and heavy losses on the battlefield, attacking and killing
civilians is a war crime.
As you have heard from Dr. Hill and General Hodges, Mr.
Putin is making demands that he knows the United States and the
rest of NATO and Ukraine will never agree to. President
Zelensky and President Biden have firmly rejected those
demands. President Zelensky and Biden are not backing down in
the face of Putin's saber-rattling. They are not compromising
principles. They are not blinking.
Mr. Chairman, I believe President Putin will blink. I think
Presidents Biden and Zelensky are staring him down
successfully. Putin appears, for now, to be seeking
negotiations. The strong measures taken by Ukraine, NATO, and
the United States appear to have deterred an invasion, at least
for now. However, until Mr. Putin withdraws the large military
force from Ukraine's borders and sends it back to normal duty
stations, we should continue to take the strong steps that seem
to have deterred an invasion so far.
Mr. Putin seems to be coming around to the conclusion that
negotiations are a better option than invading. The United
States, NATO, Ukraine, and the rest of Europe are ready to sit
at the negotiating tables to discuss ways to improve the
security of NATO, Russia, and Europe. Placement of nuclear
missiles, size and location of military exercises, confidence-
building measures--these can all be discussed. Some of these
issues have already been the subject of negotiations between
the United States and Russia since last summer.
What is not subject to negotiation is the sovereignty of
any nation, including and especially Ukraine. The United
States, its allies, and Ukraine have been rock-solid on this
principle. Sticking to that firm stance, backed by credible
threats of heavy military and financial costs, seems to have
worked.
Why do I think Mr. Putin has decided not to invade for now?
His statements yesterday suggest that he wants to negotiate. He
has complained about, but has not rejected, the responses from
the United States and NATO to his demands. His officials have
indicated that they are still studying the responses, and that
further exchanges of papers and further conversations can
happen. Mr. Lavrov has asked all 57 nations of the OSCE to
answer a vague question about the indivisibility of security.
The negotiations in the Normandy Format among Ukraine, Russia,
Germany, and France have restarted.
The strong united stand of Ukraine, Europe, and the United
States seems to have deterred an invasion for now. They should
continue until all Russian forces are back in their peacetime
posts. Mr. Chairman, you and the members of this Commission
today have explained the importance of abiding by the
principles of sovereignty that have kept Europe free of major
wars for 69 years, until Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014. Until
Russia recommits to those principles and accepts Ukrainian
sovereignty and withdraws from its territory, Europe and the
world will not be secure.
Ukraine matters for another reason. Even though it is an
old civilization and culture, centuries older than Russia, by
the way, it is a young democracy of 45 million people, the vast
majority of whom seek nothing more than the ability to live a
normal life as a normal European country. Able to choose their
leaders. Able to choose their trading partners. Able to choose
their security alliances. Able to choose their political
partners. They find themselves on the frontline of a war they
did not start. They are fighting Russia on our behalf. Like
American soldiers and military who fight on behalf of all
American citizens, Ukraine is fighting Russia on behalf of
Europe and the United States. It is the frontline of the battle
between democracy and autocracy. We should support them. With
that support, they will prevail. Putin will lose.
Glad to answer your questions.
Chairman Cardin: I want to thank all three of our
witnesses. I found your testimoneys to be extremely helpful. It
fills in some of the blanks. I am going to turn the gavel over
to Congressman Cohen. The Senate, as I indicated earlier, has
two votes scheduled now. I will be returning shortly. With
that, we will start a 5-minute round, and Chairman Cohen will
have the gavel.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Senator Cardin. I also
thank each of the witnesses for their testimoneys. It has been
quite enlightening. I will start questioning myself.
Dr. Hill, you have done much of your work on the Soviet
Union, but also on Putin. To some extent, he has already won,
in that he has been on stage, and he will be on stage again in
Beijing. How much do you think he has to win before he goes
further and engages in some type of military activity? Can he
accept taking his forces away from Ukraine without having
incurred on their land and still consider it to be a victory?
Dr. Hill: Thank you very much, sir, for that question.
Congressman, I am sure that Ambassador Taylor and Lieutenant
General Hodges may have some views on this as well. I think
from Putin's perspective, he has already had something of a
win, because he has got our undivided attention. Part of the
exercise was clearly to get us to focus on him. As I mentioned
in my opening remarks, and I have also said so in the paper
that I submitted ahead of time, Putin and others around him
have been very frustrated that from their perspective they have
not been able to have a big sit-down with the United States--
the United States in particular--to, in effect, go over and
perhaps even have a redo of the European security arrangement
since the end of the cold war.
They have made it very clear that the current arrangement
for the OSCE is not sufficient, because, of course, that gives
equal standing to every member of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, no matter the size of the country
or, you know, the significance of their military. They have
been looking for decisionmaking or veto power. If we look back
to 2008, when Vladimir Putin was at that point sort of standing
behind the shoulders of President Medvedev, Putin was, of
course, the prime minister and had stepped aside for a period
before coming back again.
Dmitry Medvedev made a visit to Berlin in the early part of
2008 and made a pitch, an open request then, for a rethinking
and a revision, a refurbishment of European security
arrangements. From the Russian perspective, we did not pick
this up because, in effect, what they were looking for was
almost an overturning of the Helsinki Final Act, and of the
OSCE, and looking for something more along the format that we
would seen in earlier centuries, for of a concert of Europe of
the big powers. Essentially, the U.S. and Russia sitting down
and resolving, you know, the deep position and the forces, as
well as the various institutional arrangements of Europe.
Putin's still looking for that.
I think what Ambassador Taylor was saying, in Putin saying
that they are still considering, they are still reviewing, this
strange ask of a country, a kind of question about the
indivisibility of security to all of the member states of the
OSCE, is very telling. They are kind of looking for something
here that Putin will be able to say, look, I got everyone's
attention, I have got everyone to resolve this question or
address this question of security. I have gotten everyone to
the negotiating table. I do not suspect that it will be
sufficient to have just the responses from all 50-plus members.
Putin will want to be seen to be sitting down with President
Biden in some fashion, just like he already did in Geneva and
again during the various telephone or telecommunication
sessions, just like, you know, the set pieces that they have
had at NATO and in other settings.
Putin is looking for something to show that his interests
have been addressed in some fashion. If, however, he feels that
they have not--and I think this is where Ambassador Taylor and
Lieutenant General Hodges have got their finger on--he will
continue to keep escalating. That is where we might see some
steps forward, perhaps along the lines that Lieutenant General
Hodges has laid out. I think for us right now, it is all in the
art of the diplomacy, and in a way that we can be able to show
to Putin the incredible cost that he is incurring, because it
has not been cost-free in moving all these troops from the
Russian far east. I mean, this is logistically a major effort--
these costs have paid off in some way.
Representative Cohen: Do either of you have a response, or
General Hodges--[off mic].
Mr. Taylor: Mr. Cohen, I am glad to. I also would be--why
do not I go forward, and then--and General Hodges can chime in?
Representative Cohen: [Off mic.]
Mr. Taylor: I agree with Dr. Hill. That is, he has been
deterred so far. It has been expensive for him. The right
question is the one you asked, Mr. Cohen. That is, what did he
get for this? Or what can he get for this? How can he back
down, not invade Ukraine, and still say to the Russian people
that he got what he wanted? Well, he clearly is not going to
get one of the things--indeed, the core thing that he says he
wants. That is an infringement on Ukrainian sovereignty and the
closing of NATO's open door. He is not going to get that. It is
very clear.
However, as Dr. Hill just said, he is going to get an
opportunity to negotiate with President Biden, with NATO, with
the rest of Europe, in the OSCE. He will be able to say,
exactly as Dr. Hill just said, Look, I have been complaining
about the fact that the West has not taken my security concerns
seriously. They have not taken into account my concerns. Well,
I have finally gotten them to do that, he can say to the
Russian people. They are sitting down with me and having this
conversation. Mr. Chairman, I think that is okay. It is fine
for him to say that. He did not get the principle--he did not
get us to violate the principle of sovereignty. He did not get
close to NATO's open door. He got to sit down and talk. That is
fine. He can convince the Russian people that that is a win.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, sir. General Hodges, do
you have anything that you would like to add? [Comes on mic.]
General Hodges, do you have anything you would like to add?
Mr. Hodges: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say this, of
course, President Putin had a seat with all the leaders of the
world when he used to be a part of the G-8. He is now--it is
now the G-7, and he lost his seat because of his behavior and
illegal conduct. Has he won at huge risk? I want to slightly
disagree with Dr. Hill, whom I have respected for years. What
has he achieved? NATO is more vigorous today than it has
probably been in the last 20 to 25 years.
There are other nations in the queue to join NATO. Finland
and Sweden are openly talking about it is their right to decide
whether or not they want to join NATO, unthinkable even just a
couple of years ago. Sweden has put troops back on Gotland
Island in the Baltic Sea. There are very bright lights now
shining on the dirty money in London real eState belonging to
various oligarchs in Russia. More and more nations are
increasingly energy independent and looking for ways to get
themselves off dependence on Russian gas. I am not sure he is
quite the genius that he is sometimes made out to be.
Of course, the key is how long can he sustain what he is
doing? I spoke with a Ukrainian officer just the other day and
he said, indefinitely, because, of course, President Putin does
not have to answer to the Duma the way an American president
would have to answer to the U.S. Congress. He does not have to
worry about those things. I am not sure he can--I believe he
can sustain it for a long time. I am just not sure how much
longer.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, General.
One of the questions I have got--and there are several of
them--one of them is that you say Dr. Hill, he may be losing
some of his popularity in Russia. What difference does it make
when he, as we have heard from different people, it is not so
much who votes but who counts the votes? We have heard it in
our country, scarily enough. You know, he counts the votes. If
you get too close to him, he puts you in the gulag. Why should
he care?
Dr. Hill: Well, as strange as it may seem, Putin cares very
much because he is drawing all of his legitimacy from himself
alone and the constitution. He has no political party. As we
have already, you know, made very clear, the Russian Duma, the
parliament, does not, you know, matter quite so much. What he
always has is his ratings, because it is also a signal to all
the people around him who might actually be quite interested in
his job over the longer term. Putin has been able to actually
say to, you know, a lot of younger guys who might say, well,
hang on, are you really going to stay out till 2036 as
president? By that time, you are going to be 84 years old. You
will have been in, you know, power in Russia longer than any
other contemporary modern leader.
You know, we think that one of the reasons that he pushed
out the possibility of staying for an extra two terms from
2024, which was supposed to his actual expiration date for the
current presidency, was that he was worried that not only would
he be a lame duck, but that people would be maneuvering around
him trying to displace him or maybe make an early bid even for
the presidency if they were selected as, you know, one of the
potentials as a replacement. If he can keep pointing to major
support in the ratings in popularity polls, then that helps to
boost his legitimacy and his own influence inside that tight
circle around him. It is actually more important than it seems.
I mean, right now, of course, his ratings, even in, you
know, the current Russian polls, do not look that low from our
perspective. I mean, from most American Members of Congress or,
you know, presidents, these would look like great ratings. When
you have pushed them into stratospheric levels--you know, to
the upper 80 percentages--after the annexation of Crimea, the
only place really to go is down. You know, a lot of the way
that he handles this--I mean, actually, I agree with Lieutenant
General Hodges. From our perspective, he is actually lost quite
a lot. I think the important thing is for him to have seen to
win--to have won. I think that is kind of what we are both
trying to say here.
We have to be able to kind of allow him to have the space
at home for declaring a win to give an offramp, because he has
to be able to spin it. I mean, he does not have the media
breathing down his neck, but he does have the people around him
that he has to demonstrate strength and infallibility to. I
mean, he may not appear to be the genius to you, you know, that
he wants to be, but he has to be at home. Because his own
position, in a way, and his support depend on that.
Representative Cohen: You may have said it as well,
Ambassador Taylor said it. He said that we have already been
successful in the way we have dealt with him because we have
deterred him. Well, when you say we have deterred him, I guess
you are saying that he has not invaded.
Dr. Hill: Yes, for now. I mean, that is, I think--
Representative Cohen: Your thought is he would have
invaded?
Dr. Hill: Well, yes--
Representative Cohen: If he had invaded, why do you think
he would not have invaded?
Dr. Hill: Well, he still could. Let us just be very, very
clear about this. I think Ambassador Taylor was very careful,
for now, because, you know, we were, in fact, anticipating some
action, absolutely. We keep saying it is imminent because it
really could happen every time. If we go back, and I think this
is where Ambassador Taylor and Lieutenant General Hodges could
come in on this as well. If we look back to what happened in
2014, certainly the Russian intent was to push much further
than the Donbas region, to push down to the areas around the
Sea of Azov, port cities like Mariupol, to go to Kherson, which
is further beyond the Crimea Peninsula, maybe as far as Odessa.
To try to consolidate a hold over various proxy forces that
would cut Ukraine off from the sea, and also link up with
Crimea.
Very forceful action by the United States, together with
its allies--especially after the downing of the Malaysian
Airlines in 2014--I think we can make a very strong case that
it helped to stop Russia in their tracks, deter them somewhat,
and force them to pull back. Also, there was a strong response
from the Ukrainian people in opposition to this. I think what
we have seen right now, for now--and I think it is very
important to listen to what General Hodges and Ambassador
Taylor said about keeping up this pressure, this unity, and the
unity that you have all displayed, honestly, here in Congress
in a bipartisan fashion--that might also not have factored into
Putin's calculations, to be frank. I think that showing that we
are actually determined to counter this has given him some
pause.
Representative Cohen: General Hodges, let me ask you this.
What type of military powers does Ukraine have to stop a Soviet
invasion, particularly from the north, where they have not
historically been prepared, because Belarus was not a threat?
There are a lot of Russian forces there, and if Russia comes
from the north, what does Ukraine have to respond? How long
could they--could they resist an invasion?
Mr. Hodges: Well, sir, the Ukrainian armed forces, of
course, are significantly improved from 2014. They are not
small. I mean, we are talking about 200,000 regular soldiers,
plus reservists. Candidly, I am not terribly concerned about
there being 50-70,000 Russian troops along the northern border.
I mean, when you think about the size of Ukraine, I mean, it is
twice the size of Germany. Sir, if you think about 100,000
troops, I mean, that would barely fill up the stadium where the
University of Tennessee plays football, or the University of
Michigan plays football. That is a lot of people, but when you
spread it out, the combat power does not look quite as daunting
as when you just say the number.
They do not have enough forces right now deployed that
could capture Kyiv, in my view. I believe that Ukrainian forces
are going to fight like hell and that this will be a real
bloody fight for the Russians. Now, they do have advantages,
obviously, in their maritime fleet and their navy, and their
air power, and certainly long-range systems. Whatever they do,
it is going to be led by massive cyber that will make
everything difficult, disinformation that will confuse people
and cause panic. Without a doubt, there is going to be
sabotage. Already, Ukrainian interior forces have rolled up
several different groups of saboteurs coming from Transnistria,
Belarus, and from Russia--excuse me--Chechnya. That is all
going to happen. I do not see this massive assault that is just
going to roll over Ukrainian land forces.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, General. We are kind of
coming down on time a bit. I want to ask one question and ask
for a brief response. One of the big issues seems to be
sanctions before they invade, sanctions after they invade.
Ambassador Taylor, what do you think is more effective?
Mr. Taylor: Mr. Cohen, I think that the purpose of
sanctions, unlike the purpose of the movement of military
forces, is best done after they move. Let me--if I can do two
sentences on that. I know you want a short answer. Move
military forces before they move--before the invasion comes, in
order to demonstrate that this is a serious deterrent. The goal
is to deter him from invading Ukraine. Move those forces, like
the administration has decided to do this morning.
The sanctions, as you--as Congress knows very well--can go
on in a hurry and go off very slowly. We are thinking of
Jackson-Vanik sanctions, which must have taken 20 years to
remove. [Laughs.] That is not a deterrent if you put those on
in advance. It is a deterrent if those serious sanctions are
promised and detailed and are credibly coordinated with
Europeans, so that when he comes across them, they go on. Once
they are on, then if you do it in advance, they lack--they lose
their deterrent value.
Representative Cohen: Thank you. If you did them in
advance, would that give Putin an opportunity to say the West
has done this, and we need to proceed further, and then blame
us for being the provocateur, in an economic sense?
Mr. Taylor: That is the deterrent issue. That is exactly
it, Mr. Cohen.
Representative Cohen: Thank you. I am going to yield to--
thank you.
I am going to yield to Mr. Wilson.
Representative Wilson: Thank you very much, Chairman Cohen.
I want to thank all the witnesses today. I think it has been
very revealing. Truly, it needs to be known how important this
issue is to the people of the United States, beginning with the
fact that we have 10,000 Americans in Ukraine currently who
would be at risk. Really positive.
We have 1 million Ukrainian Americans who have been very
important. I am really pleased in the audience right here; we
have Congresswoman Victoria Spartz of Indiana. She is from--and
I am going to not pronounce Ukrainian correctly, but I mean to
do this correctly. I am sure she will let me know, but Nosivka,
Chernihiv Oblast. We have a real-life Ukrainian American in
Congress, and very outspoken and very articulate on behalf of
her love and affection for the people of Ukraine. Then, hey, in
my home State of South Carolina, the former president of
Newberry College, elected statewide as State superintendent of
education, Mick Zais. Ukrainian Americans are very important.
Equally important, as we appreciate, 2.4 million Russian
Americans. They, too, are going to be insulted and humiliated
by any conduct. That is why I was so grateful, Ambassador, that
you said you did not feel like there would be an invasion,
because it would be catastrophic for the people of Russia.
Then we get to another point, and I want to--General Hodges
correctly pointed out that this had an unintended effect of
unifying NATO and the EU, but possibly particularly having an
effect on Finland and Sweden. Right here in the room today,
another consequence. It has unified Republicans and Democrats
to be working together, and lightning's going to strike. I am
really pleased that Mr. Biden has changed course. Just in
December, we were planning on $40 million after an invasion,
while in the meantime, nearly a billion dollars of very
important defensive materiel have been provided to the people
of Ukraine, and so this needs to be understood.
Then, what other countries are directly affected? Poland;
very important to me. My daughter-in-law is Polish American--
Miskowicz [sp]--to see them so involved. Then Slovakia, the
heart of Europe, adjacent to Ukraine, is so significant. Then
the Black Sea region with Romania, MK Air Base, and the
American personnel there. Then we have Novo Selo in Bulgaria,
with the American and NATO forces, and a consequence of this,
it makes it more important than ever that we develop a port at
Varna.
Over and over again, there are indications. With that,
truly, Dr. Hill, how in the world, with--we are no longer in a
closed society, and the people of Russia are not in a closed
society either. How in the world is this being kept from--and I
know it is state-controlled media--but how is this being kept
from the people, highly educated people of Russia? What can we
do to get a message to them that they would be the most
victimized by an invasion of Ukraine?
Dr. Hill: I think this is a really important point,
Congressman Wilson. I mean, you have very clearly delineated,
you know, all of the countries that are going to be directly
affected. I think, actually, in Slovakia right now, the second-
largest ethnic group besides Slovaks is not actually Czechs but
Ukrainians because of Slovakia's border. I am sure you were
well aware of that.
Representative Wilson: Yes.
Dr. Hill: Of course, there are Ukrainians all over Europe
now, especially over the last several years, as Ukrainians have
gotten visa liberalization with Europe. You know, more broadly,
we could have gone further afield. Obviously, Canada, to our
north, has a very large population that has its roots in
Ukraine, not least--I think she is still--Chrystia Freeland,
the deputy prime minister and former foreign minister, a
classmate of mine from school as well.
You know, we have--as you have said, this is not a
contained conflict by any means. There are also many other
countries around the world--India, Japan--who are watching this
very anxiously; the idea of a confrontation that would be
depicted, at least from the Russian side, as a proxy war
between Russia and the United States over Ukraine. China, we
have talked about Taiwan and our concerns, you know, ahead of
the Beijing Olympics as well, about how this might reverberate
in the Asia-Pacific region.
I think this is actually one way in which we need to get
this message across to Russia and to the Russian people is by
these other channels. It is not so much that information is
being kept out; it is the spin on the information. If you are
looking at Russian television, what you see is, of course, the
depiction of the United States and NATO as the aggressors. A
lot of the news is really more opinion than it is actual news.
You know, the kind of alternate information is, obviously,
there on the internet for people to see or in their
interactions, but it also has to be our private sector sending
messages.
One of the things that I skipped over in my opening
remarks, but that is in the fuller testimony that I put into
the record, is my, really, concern about the position of the
private sector. We have many American companies invested in
Russia. There is a lot of Russian investment in the United
States. Really, President Putin has emphasized investment in
Europe and in European countries. Not only have we just seen
Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary, going and making a
huge gas deal in the middle of this crisis for his own domestic
purposes, we saw Putin reaching out to heads of Italian
business because he sees that Italy might be a weak link here.
We have to somehow, you know, within your interactions with
your constituents, you know, those who might be investors--you
know, particularly from major--you know, states like Texas,
Congressman Veasey, where there is a--[inaudible]--oil and gas
sector--figure out ways in which we can pass messages on. This
is going to be disastrous for business, not just for
international security. It is going to be disastrous at the
human level. Then all the ties and connections that have been
built up in the last 30 years will be jeopardized by this.
We have--and there is signaling coming from London right
now where a lot of the Russian oligarchs, but a lot of ordinary
Russians, have now, you know, made their home and made their
base there for business. I mean, not everyone in Russia is
somehow related to the Kremlin and involved in nefarious
dealings. We have students at universities, especially in
Europe. All of this is going to be upended. That is a way of
spreading out this kind of information. We will not make much
headway, unfortunately, through our own broadcasting into
Russia. It will have to be through our using these connections
that Putin uses for his own purposes, ourselves to pass on
messages.
Representative Wilson: Again, I want to thank each of the
witnesses. Chairman Cohen, thank you for your leadership, and
Senator Cardin and Senator Wicker. Gosh, this has just been--
the people of Europe, but people of Ukraine and the people of
Russia should know that, hey, we want no loss of life. Gosh, on
our visit to Kyiv, gosh, what an incredible country that is,
and such opportunities and possibilities for the people of
Ukraine.
Thank you.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
We are going to go next to Representative Veasey, and then
we will go to Senator Tillis if he is with us, and then
Representatives Moore and Gallego. We have only got
theoretically about 25 minutes to go.
Representative Veasey, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF MARC A. VEASEY, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TEXAS
Representative Veasey: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Dr. Hill, I wanted to talk with you about some of the off-
ramps. I think that you have heard a couple of off-ramp
scenarios mentioned during testimony here earlier. You have
studied Putin. You understand his ego. You know what is
acceptable to him and what is not. What, in your opinion, are
some acceptable off-ramps that have been offered and some that
you think are just completely out of the question?
Dr. Hill: Well, I mean, part of the problem--I mean, you
have mentioned the word ego--is that it has to look like a win
for Putin. I think that is kind of what Ambassador Taylor and I
were trying to sketch out here. If he can say to the Russian
people, in this environment in which, obviously, there is a lot
of slants in the media--and, you know, obviously, the Kremlin
can shape that in a major way, that they have used to good
effect their military force that they have by threatening
Europe. They have got our attention. They have got our full and
undivided attention. They have pushed us to the negotiating
table.
That in itself can certainly buy us some time for some more
diplomacy to then craft something that might be a bit more
meaningful as an offramp, which is going to be tricky, however,
because, as we have already stated and as the administration
has stated, NATO has stated, we are not going to compromise on
the sovereignty of Ukraine. That is not ours to compromise. We
are not going to compromise on NATO's open-door policy, because
for Finland, Sweden, and other countries that are potentially
aspirants for NATO candidacy, that is very important. I mean,
members of NATO, other members of the alliance, do not want to
see the open door for NATO closed, although they may actually
have some hesitancy about Ukraine and Georgia and other former
Soviet states that might seek to join.
If there is any change, that has to be Ukraine's to decide,
not just NATO trying to close that door, even though, of
course, it is a consensus organization. That is not on the
agenda right now. Russia has been pushing for a serious
discussion of European security for years. They made a proposal
in 2008 in Berlin when Dmitri Medvedev came there, and it was
in the context of the OSCE.
For the members of this commission, this could be something
very important to consider about how we might shape and
formulate a major discussion about European security
architecture that would then include confidence-building
measures. I think we have already talked about many of these,
as you have suggested. The disposition of forces; we have--the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty is kind of now in
abeyance. Since 2015, I do not think we have had any kind of
discussions about this.
Obviously, Russia has made a big show with its novel
nuclear weapons of wanting a debate about the future of nuclear
missiles, both tactical and intermediate, on European
territory. We were on the verge of talking to them about
commitments not to actually station missiles or further
missiles in Europe. I mean, that was all part of a discussion
that we were moving forward that is, obviously, being put a
halt to right now.
There are many things that we could do. It will have to be
framed from Putin in such a way that he can credibly go about
not just to the people around him but to the Russian public and
say I got a win, and that we might not actually want to give
him. Part of that will be, you know, dependent on us as well.
Representative Veasey: Yes. No, absolutely. I also wanted
to ask you as well, you know, the oligarchs have been mentioned
a couple of times in the testimony, likewise, and the
tremendous amount of money that they have invested in different
places in Europe. Can they be used--and I know that, you know,
aside from cutting off their money, if you were to suspend
their visas or make it hard for them to travel throughout
Europe, is there a way to really put pressure on them and have
it get back to Putin and perhaps have him back off through
those guys since they also have money and he is very influenced
by money and oil?
Dr. Hill: Yes. I mean, look, you also here in Congress and
in the Senate have been discussing various ways of tackling
illicit finance. I mean, we had the revelations from the
Pandora papers most recently about all of the offshore zones,
including places like South Dakota, which I think was probably
a surprise for most people, probably including Members of
Congress from South Dakota, that were being used as, you know,
places where shell companies, you know, can set themselves up.
You know, those are the kinds of instruments that are used by
Russian oligarchs and others, you know, basically to hide
money, to safeguard money.
Also, ultimately, you know, they tried to make strategic
investments, as I have said already, in companies here in the
United States. We have to use the CFIUS process to make sure
that it is not being leveraged in any way. There are an awful
lot of things that we can do to clean up our own act, to
enforce our own regulations. I think here in the U.S., we have
been much more forward-leaning on the Federal and congressional
and Senate level than, you know, many of our counterparts have
been in Europe. A lot of it has to be done on the State and
local government level as well, to be frank. We are going to
have to work with our European allies.
The Brits actually are a real weak link in this. Now, the
British House of Commons is about to do a series of hearings in
the next week--perhaps you could reach out to some of your
counterparts, looking specifically at similar legislation to
the legislation we already have here in the United States that
we passed in the NDAA, for example. They are trying to figure
out how they can also close up loopholes, make it more
difficult for Russian oligarchs and the Kremlin itself to use
the British legal system as well as the financial system. There
is an awful lot of dirty money and illicit finance floating
around in London. Then, you know, more broadly in Europe, we
have to be working with our European allies, the European Union
as well, to figure out how they can put some of the processes
to CFIUS in place.
There is an awful lot that we can do. I think there is an
awfully large role for Congress. I mean, we already set the
tone, Congress did, with the international Magnitsky bill, for
example. You yourselves, as Members of the Congress, can also
drive some of the other efforts in our European partner
countries.
Representative Veasey: Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Representative Cohen: Thank you, sir.
Senator Tillis is with us. He is recognized. He is a proud,
proud North Carolinian and proud of Bojangles chicken. I just
wish Bojangles' chicken might have had the contract to feed all
those troops. That has got to be some awesome logistics and a
whole lot of meals.
Senator Tillis, you are recognized.
[Pause.]
Is he not with us? His camera's on? Is he on?
Staff: His camera's off.
Representative Cohen: His camera's off? All right.
Representative Gwen Moore, are you with us?
STATEMENT OF GWEN MOORE, U.S. HOUSE, FROM WISCONSIN
Representative Moore: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.
Representative Cohen: You can send us some brats.
Representative Moore: [Laughs.] I sure will.
Listen, thank you so much. This is--I cannot think of--I
just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, all of the commissioners.
Our staff are doing a tremendous job with all of our materials.
I could not have gotten a better briefing on this subject than
from the witnesses that we have had today.
I do have some questions. Would our strategies or tactics
differ if we thought, for example, that, you know, Russia was
on the brink of some sort of military action, or if we thought
that they were really calling the bluff, as it were, of the
NATO coalition and the Section 5 provisions? I mean, because
after all, I think, Dr. Hill, you have really sort of laid out
all of the weak links that we are experiencing. We have got so-
called NATO members like Hungary and Turkey that are flaky. We
have Germany being concerned about its own fossil-fuel
resources. France is about to experience an election. Of
course, there are always concerns there.
Would our tactics and strategies change were--you know,
were we to focus on really ensuring that this alliance is
solid? Even we, as the United States, have shown some light of
day in terms of our resolve, saying, yes, if it is a small
incursion, we will do this, or we will do that; we are going to
send troops, but the troops are not going to do anything.
I guess I know if it is okay to talk tactically about where
we should be putting our energy. Is that to shore up the NATO
alliance, or is it to try to put those units on the borders?
You know, Belarus is right there to be a staging ground. I just
wonder strategically what we ought to focus on.
Thank you.
Dr. Hill and Lieutenant General.
Dr. Hill: Yes. I also think it would be important to have
Ambassador Taylor talk about this as well because, I mean, he
is--
Representative Moore: Thank you. Yes.
Dr. Hill: --been involved, you know, very closely with much
of this too.
You know, I think this is really an excellent way of laying
this out. We have covered every base. You know, of course, we
do have a difference. It would be interesting to hear, you
know, how that came out in Ukraine with some of our European
allies and partners about--and I think actually some of our
Western European partners have been a bit of skepticism on the
part of the French, for example, about whether this is an
elaborate bluff.
Well, if it is an elaborate bluff, it is also a very
expensive bluff on the part of Putin. This is the first time
that we have seen forces being moved from the Russian far east,
as was mentioned at the very beginning, and certainly since the
end of the cold war, for example, to the borders with Ukraine.
I would like to get General Hodges to comment on, you know,
what we have seen here.
My experience also of Putin is that he usually, if he
threatens, he usually intends to act in some fashion. The
Russians themselves have threatened this military technical
action, so, giving themselves a lot of options, you know.
Notwithstanding what General Hodges has said about the
unlikelihood of being able to do a massive full invasion that
would take Kyiv, there is a lot of options that Putin has laid
out for himself there, including, you know, kind of further
repetition--this gets to that point about another incursion,
which President Zelensky of Ukraine said there is no such thing
as an incursion when it is your territory that is being taken,
the kind of salami tactics of one move and then waiting and
taking some more moves. There are many things that he can do.
Each time, you know, people have thought that Putin was
bluffing--Georgia, for example, in 2008--he moved in. In Syria,
we were not sure whether they were going to intervene on behalf
of Assad, and they did. We have had a firefight between
paramilitary forces. Again, so they can also use subversion; in
Syria in 2018, when members of the Wagner paramilitary group of
Russian contract forces fired on our Special Forces, and we had
a whole firefight with the Russians behind the scenes. We
should be very careful about the idea of this being a bluff. I
know that many of our allies are a bit skeptical about what
they see as happening.
In the larger strategic context, which I think my
colleagues and I have already laid out, we need to keep this
up. We need to keep up our response as if we are taking this
absolutely 100 percent seriously. Call the bluff, as you were,
because, you know, in past practice, Putin often has not
bluffed and has done something. Deterring on the military front
is very important. As you have said, Belarus is right next to a
NATO country, Poland.
Russia has also raised questions about a threat to its
territory from Poland and from Lithuania because of the exclave
of Russian territory, Kaliningrad, the former Konigsberg, which
Russia took as territory on the Baltic Sea during World War II.
That, of course, borders Lithuania and Poland. Belarus is the
main supply corridor for Kaliningrad as a sort of military base
from Russian territory, as well as from the Baltic Sea.
This is a very tense situation there. There is a lot of
saber-rattling going on there. We have to take this 100 percent
seriously.
Clearly, also on cyber, we see that Anne Neuberger is going
out to deal with the cyber front. We really have to work very
hard, as Ambassador Taylor said, in making the threats of
sanctions very credible, along with our allies.
I think this major point of how do we deal with Hungary
and, you know, some of our other allies that may be trying to
choose a bilateral route is going to be rather complicated,
because Putin clearly, in making this bid for each individual
OSCE member to write in their own sort of postcard about how
they see indivisible security is trying to pick countries off.
I think trying to maintain unity is pretty critical.
I really liked, Congressman Wilson, what you said too about
the unity here in the House and in the Senate. I do not think,
honestly, that Putin did expect that, given, you know, some of
our polarization in parties on infighting on many other topics.
I think we have surprised them. I think we need to keep on
doing that.
Mr. Taylor: Congresswoman Moore, I would agree that
President Putin is probably surprised at the unity, as Dr. Hill
just said, not just in the United States and not just in
Ukraine, but also in Europe. I think he is probably surprised
that his saber-rattling, his movement of all these troops to
the borders of Ukraine, he is probably surprised that President
Zelensky has not caved or has not been intimidated. He is
probably surprised that the United States has not been
intimidated or surprised--or intimidated. This is a strong
showing by the United States, by Ukraine, together with the
Europeans. We have to remember that the Europeans have
reauthorized sanctions every 6 months for the last 8 years
since the Russians invaded. I am sure President Putin was
surprised by that. If he is thinking that we are bluffing, that
is a mistake.
There is the question that Dr. Hill just raised, and that
is, is he bluffing? We cannot assume he is bluffing because he
has been invaded before. He has surprised us before. He invaded
Ukraine in 2014. What we can say is he is been looking at the
unity; he has been looking at the possibility of severe
sanctions; he has been looking at the additional reinforcements
that the United States is already sending into eastern Europe.
He did not expect this, so that is the bluff that he has to
worry about.
Representative Moore: Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and
I yield back.
Representative Cohen: Thank you so much.
Representative Gallego is on and I would like to recognize
him and then Senator Cardin's back and he will take the chair,
and he will close out after Representative Gallego's questions.
Representative Gallego: I am sorry, Mr. Chair, I was
actually just voting on a markup. Am I next?
Representative Cohen: You are not next, you are now.
STATEMENT OF RUBEN GALLEGO, U.S. HOUSE, FROM ARIZONA
Representative Gallego: I am now. Even better! [Laughs.]
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank the chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for joining
us today. Like my colleagues here, I am very deeply concerned
by Russia's increasingly belligerent behavior and large-scale
military buildup on the Ukrainian border. I saw this firsthand.
Just as Mr. Wilson had said earlier, we went to a CODEL in
Ukraine as part of my subcommittee chairmanship on the Armed
Services Committee, and we know that Russia's directly
threatening the sovereignty of Ukraine and the democracy by its
people and its ability and security that Europe has enjoyed
since the end of the cold war, all to rewrite European
security.
We cannot forget that, most importantly, this crisis is one
that Russia itself has manufactured, all for its own gain. We
must continue to strengthen deterrence and must do so in
coordination with our allies and our partners.
My first question is for Dr. Hill. Thank you for your
testimony and for your long-standing courage to speak truth to
power. I appreciate the detail in which you outlined Russian
thinking in your written testimony, including the advantages
the Kremlin perceives vis-a-vis the United States and the West.
I wanted to ask you to describe the flipside of it. What do you
see as Russia's greatest vulnerabilities, and both where, and
with Nord Stream 2 as an example, how do you think we can do a
better job exploiting Russian weaknesses with our allies and
partners?
Dr. Hill: Well, thank you very much, Representative
Gallego. I think the biggest vulnerabilities are with time for
Russia, so I think this is one of the reasons why Putin is
acting now. A vulnerability always comes in Russia and in other
places, too, when you have a Presidential election. You know,
we had a question before from Congressman Cohen about Putin's
popularity and, you know, whether this really matters, and
that, in fact, does. You know, one vulnerability, really, is in
the legitimacy of the system because Putin in 2020 basically
pushed through his amendment to extend his Presidential terms,
and there were some questions about, really, the validity of
that, even from the Russian constitutional perspective. You
know, all eyes are really on him and his inner circle as to
whether they can carry off a smooth transition into the next
phase of his presidency, or if he, in fact, has a successor
that he wants to put in place. We have seen what happened in
Kazakhstan where President Nazarbayev handed off to President
TOKev and we have just seen, you know, what looks like some
really nasty protests in response to, you know, kind of
socioeconomic problems there but also a power struggle behind
the scenes, which often happens when you change over. You know,
I think that Putin and the people around him are a little bit
worried about their version of 2024 and what might happen.
Also, you have mentioned energy. Time is on Russia's side
right now for energy because Russia has, you know, very
effectively continued to dominate the gas sector in a number of
particular European countries, including Germany and, most
notably, Hungary, Viktor Orban being in Moscow to essentially
sign a massive gas deal for cheaper gas, which Russia also
hopes will give political influence, and of course, that is why
we have all been concerned about Nord Stream 2. Over time,
Russia knows that its dominance in the European energy sector
will change. The Europeans have not done a great job of gas
storage because of the COVID pandemic, not really sure how the
economy would bounce back. It is a cold winter. They are
worried about gas shortages and other energy shortages, and
Russia hopes that, of course, will mean that there will be much
reluctance to put sanctions on the energy sector, and there
will be a lot of pressure from the European energy companies
and consumers, and, you know, governments against sanctions.
That is a vulnerability over the longer term. The more that
we can push for diversification of the European energy sector,
and successive U.S. administrations have done just that, the
more that we can also, you know, stick true to our own
democracy and, you know, our own free and fair elections. I
mean, that will also be signaling. I mean, the Russians,
unfortunately, you know, tend to kind of point to weaknesses
elsewhere as an excuse for their own messing about in their
domestic politics, but there is a vulnerability ahead for Putin
in his reelection and pushing forward. Obviously, that is why
Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition figure, is sitting in
jail because, you know, Putin's clearly frightened of him and
the challenge that he poses. Ultimately, just like Alexander
Lukashenko in Belarus, Putin's worried about the Russian people
and their own feelings about, you know, how a war might play
out, their own socioeconomic concerns. This could be a
distraction from the pandemic. Russia has not fared very well
with COVID. Just, you know, like many other countries, the
government has not really handled it. They have actually had a
backlash to their own propaganda against vaccinations. The
Sputnik vaccine, although it has been effective, has not been
as effective as the vaccines that have been produced here and
in Europe. The propaganda that the Russians perpetrate has come
back to bite them. They have very low vaccine rates in Russia.
There are all kinds of things that--climate change is also a
major problem for Russia, looking ahead as well.
This is why Putin's trying to act now. I think those
vulnerabilities are things that we can press on later, but with
the aim, of course, of trying to engage Russia. I mean, we
should want to see a better relationship over time with Russia.
I think there are also vulnerabilities--and I hope
Lieutenant General Hodges is still on here to talk to this--in
the Russian military as well. Russia makes a big show of its
novel nuclear weapons, its strategic nuclear arsenal, because
Russia does feel very vulnerable against our conventional
forces. I think a lot of this posturing, Russia is, of course,
strong when you look at it from the point of view of the
Ukrainian military, but when you look at the full array of NATO
forces, Russia is still at a major disadvantage on the
conventional front, and so I think that that is part of an
element of this as well.
Representative Gallego: Well, and General Hodges, if you
could talk a little bit about that, but I also want to ask you
what you describe in your written testimony as a Russian way of
war. Russia has been relying on gray-zone techniques to exert
influence, whether that is launching cyber campaigns or
spreading disinformation. How would you assess the U.S.
response to these Russian activities? Are there certain steps
that we should take in order to be more effective in operating,
potentially, and fighting in the gray zone?
Mr. Hodges: Thanks, sir. First of all, as far as
vulnerabilities, I would like to associate myself with
everything that Dr. Hill has said. Two things that are real
vulnerabilities: They do not have any friends. I mean, they may
have--Prime Minister Orban, of course, will come sucking up a
little bit, but they do not have allies. We have got 29 allies
plus real partners with real capabilities, all focused on this
threat. That is the main vulnerability that we should be
exploiting to isolate them and make sure we do not lose that
advantage. Then, down inside their formation, even though they
have done a lot to modernize, it still is about 50 percent a
conscript army, which means that you have got a wide range of
capabilities. You know, we can get caught up in they have 75 or
80 of these BTGs, the battalion tactical groups, but these are
not like the battalion from the 101st Airborne Division or a
Marine battalion; this is a different kind of capability. We
should not be overwhelmed by that.
In terms of the Russian way of war, we continue to be
surprised--this is the collective ``we,'' not just the United
States but the West--we continue to be surprised by what they
do because we just cannot imagine that in the year 2022 that a
European leader would do the things that they do, the murder,
the targeted assassinations, the use of cyber not only to
interfere with our elections and cause us to lose trust in our
institutions, but also to ruin people's lives, smashing their
financial institutions and so on.
When we get into a war mindset--that does not mean kinetic,
but we have to be in the same frame of mind that they are, or
at least recognize that they are in a war footing all the time,
whether it is disinformation or nuclear weapons and everything
in between--then we can take advantage of all of our assets and
dominate them.
Representative Gallego: Mr. Chairman, do I have time for
one more question?
Chairman Cardin: Yes, you do, but make it brief; we have
other members that want to speak.
Representative Gallego: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is for Ambassador Taylor. I wanted to ask you about
our recent--or your recent trip to Ukraine. As I mentioned, our
CODEL was there recently, and I was impressed by the
transformation of the Ukrainian military. I believe that we can
and should do more to make them obviously lethal and create
deterrence. Is there something that you have from takeaways
there that we could be doing to make them, you know, more
lethal and create, you know, at least some deterrence in the
minds of Russia?
Mr. Taylor: Thank you, Congressman. Yes. General Hodges and
I heard President Zelensky answer that question, and he said he
wanted to increase the size of his military, he wants to be
able to have a larger military, and he wants to double their
pay. For both--to do both of those functions, both of those
tasks, he needs funds. He needs money. He needs financial
support. He has got intent, determination, and military. You
saw it as well. I was very glad that you were there last month.
You saw it as well. They are determined. They are overmatched.
The Ukrainians are overmatched by the Russians, and President
Zelensky wants to begin to address that by hiring and
recruiting more soldiers for them, and he wants to pay them
better. That has the one thing--that is one new thing that--
and, by the way, just the day after General Hodges and I saw
him, he put out a decree to increase the size of the army and
to pay them better. He intends to do.
Representative Gallego: Excellent. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you.
Representative Wilson: Mr. Chairman, very briefly--
Chairman Cardin: Congressman Wilson?
Representative Wilson: Congressman Gallego is being very
modest. On our visit, he was so effective in expressing support
for the people of Ukraine that a member of the Russian Duma on
Russian television announced that he should be kidnapped and
brought to Moscow for trial. What a backhanded compliment.
Representative Gallego: Thank you. [Laughs.]
Chairman Cardin: [Laughs.]
Representative Gallego: Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Chairman Cardin: Joining a distinguished list of U.S.
Congressmen and senators who have been put on that list.
[Laughter.]
Senator Tillis.
STATEMENT OF THOM TILLIS, U.S. HOUSE, NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Tillis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Taylor, in your opening comments, you were
talking about how you thought that the threat of an imminent
invasion may be reduced and that there is an interest in
negotiation. I am trying to understand why on earth we would
accept any--I mean, they have laid a predicate through a very
provocative posture. Now they are saying, if we behave or agree
to something differently, what is the rational basis for us
getting into a kind of hostage-like negotiation discussion with
them? It just does not seem like it is a good-faith discussion,
so why am I wrong?
Mr. Taylor: Senator, you are absolutely right. While Russia
has all those troops on the border, it is a threat to Ukraine.
It is holding a gun to Ukraine's head, the hostage, while they
negotiate on these other issues. In order to have any kind of
legitimate conversation, productive conversation, they have to
demobilize. They have to send their troops, forces back to
barracks, back to their home stations. That is No. 1.
No. 2, if the threat of their invasion has gone down, and I
think it probably has, to some degree--I mean, we see a lot
of--we see less of the imminent rhetoric that we are going to--
if you do not answer right away, we are going to use military
tactical means to get you to answer. That is gone. They are now
talking about--first of all, they are saying, well, we never
intended to invade, which we of course do not believe, but that
is what they would have us believe. They also now say that they
are willing to have this negotiation. Again, as long as the gun
goes down from Ukraine's head, we can have this negotiation.
There are at least two areas that would make sense to
negotiate, from our standpoint, from NATO's standpoint. They
are military exercises. If we had visibility into their
exercise, they say that all these troops on the border of
Ukraine and up into Belarus are there for exercises. Well, if
we had had some notice of that exercise, that would have been
more credible. Totally incredible at this point. That is an
area where we could benefit. That is, if they were to give us
notice of their exercises, and invite our people to observe
them, in return for--we, NATO would tell them when we are going
to have exercises and invite Russian officers to observe our
exercises, that would be an increase in stability and security
for both sides. The second area is on intermediate-range
nuclear weapons, which, again, those conversations had already
started. We would be happy to have that conversation. Those are
areas, again, if the gun goes down from the Ukrainians' heads.
Senator Tillis: Thank you for that.
General Hodges, I actually agree with the decision to
deploy some of our 82nd Airborne to Poland and Germany. Do you
all believe that the increased troop posture is wise in the
current conditions?
Mr. Hodges: Sir, I absolutely do, for a couple reasons. No.
1, it demonstrates will and resolve. When we take our highest
readiness forces and send them over to Europe for an
undetermined amount of time, that demonstrates that we are
serious about this, because obviously this is not cheap or
easy, and then also I think it brings along other allies who
will want to follow the American example. That is important,
and then, of course, this is prudent. You do not want to wait
till a crisis to decide you need to have more troops over
there. I think this was a prudent move by the department to get
capability that is much closer, because we could be sure, if
there is a no-kidding fight, we will not have uncontested
passage of the Atlantic or flying in there either, whether it
is kinetic or cyber. I was really happy to see this.
Senator Tillis: I agree. I think that it is also--we had a
discussion with the Ambassadors from the Baltic states and a
diplomatic representative from Poland on a call earlier today.
I think it is also just important to reaffirm our commitment to
our NATO allies.
Ms. Hill, one thing that I am curious about with President
Zelensky's comments about--using my words, not his--kind of
tone down the rhetoric; you are not helping me. On the one
hand, I can understand that because he is literally at ground
zero, the hostage, but on the other hand, I think that some of
this is necessary to wake up the American people and the global
community about the real threat there. How do we thread the
needle and not make it harder for President Zelensky to do his
job, but also keep our foot on the accelerator?
Dr. Hill: Well, I think General Hodges and Ambassador
Taylor can speak to this because I think you have put that
question, you know, directly to him in the meeting; the two of
them met with him just a couple of days ago. I think, you know,
the administration and others have tried to explain this very
well, but as you said, you know, the broader public is probably
scratching their head and thinking, hang on, what is going on
here; why are we saying, the United States, that this is
imminent and the British are saying the same, and the guy who
is sitting right there on the border is saying, no need to
panic, nothing happening? In part, this obviously is that real
concern about panic and people actually already crossing
Ukraine's borders into other countries in anticipation of a
conflict, because we have already seen, of course, what happens
when Russia invades, in Donbas, and there have been many people
displaced. Tens of thousands of people have left the Donbas
region for Ukraine itself; some have gone into Russia. Ukraine
already has a problem with internally displaced people and
refugees.
The other point is, of course, the economy, and in fact,
when we think about what Putin might have already gotten out of
this massive movement of troops, it might be exactly this,
which is ruining Ukraine's current chances of turning around
its economy. Ukraine was on the verge of really getting its
macroeconomic situation stabilized. I mean, we have all been
worrying about this for some considerable period of time,
finding a new arrangement with the International Monetary Fund,
and starting to get investment. It really looked as if Ukraine
was getting its act together economically. You know, just as
that moment starts to appear, you then see the looming forces
on the border. I do not think that is also coincidental. I
think that Russia was starting to worry that, actually, Ukraine
was looking a bit more successful than it had been previously.
There is a lot of infighting going on with Ukrainian oligarchs
and businesspeople, you know, kind of in and around Zelensky
and the former presidents in Ukraine. Nonetheless, Ukraine was
looking more promising as a place for international investment.
I think Zelensky is very mindful of that right now. I mean,
a run on the currency, the crash of the economy, investors not
just putting things on pause but, you know, pulling out
entirely, and that could be one serious win for the Russians,
you know, if nothing else happens, that they scared everyone
away from investing in Ukraine because, of course, Moscow's
been trying to point to Ukraine as a basket case, as not worthy
of investment, and, you know, basically that Ukraine is not
going to succeed. I think that is actually a large part of it.
As you said, we are going to try to thread the needle on that
one. How can we kind of reassure the markets that, you know,
Ukraine is a long-term good investment at the same time as we
are trying to warn everybody that they are at risk of imminent
invasion from Russia?
I think you addressed this directly with President
Zelensky, correct?
Mr. Taylor: We did. Senator, if I may? We asked President
Zelensky about this apparent difference in the perception. He
is very clear. He understands very well what the forces are. He
gets the same--almost the same briefing from his intelligence
agencies as President Biden does. President Zelensky said he
was very happy, by the way, with his relationship with
President Biden. He said that there was an area of improvement
on message discipline, on message consistency between the two
governments, but he is very happy with the way that it is
working. As Dr. Hill just said, he wants to--President Zelensky
wants to present a firm posture, a firm face, a firm stance as
he faces down President Putin. He and President Biden--
President Zelensky and President Biden--have held firm. They
have not been rattled, they have not been intimidated, and they
have been together on this, and they--and President Zelensky in
particular want to demonstrate calm, determination, and he is
very pleased with the results of all of the NATO allies who are
providing him with weapons. As you said, there is an important
role to be played in demonstrating the concern in order to get
other allies to provide those weapons. That is succeeding. In
particular, in the last week, it has been succeeding. President
Zelensky wants to project calm, concern. He has got his
military very focused on this issue. There is no doubt. He
wants to enlarge them. He wants to grow that military, as he
has just indicated. That is his direction at this point.
Senator Tillis: Thank you all. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It is great to see you. Congressman Cohen?
Representative Cohen: Good to see you. Thanks.
Chairman Cardin: Well, this has been a very, very
productive hearing, significant participation by members of the
Commission, and I appreciate that, and I think it speaks to the
quality of our witnesses and the content of your testimony and
response to questions.
General Hodges, I just really want to reinforce the issue
of unity among our partners, and you mentioned that the fact
that President Biden is sending some of our troops over as part
of a NATO effort to make it clear the unity in NATO and
protection of the security alliance. I am concerned, as you
have already pointed out, to Mr. Orban's presence in Moscow and
the image that he portrayed, but more importantly, his conduct
over a period of time that questions his long-term commitment
to the NATO alliance. I am concerned about that issue, but it
appears to date that it has had no noticeable impact on NATO's
resolve, so I think at this stage it appears like--if you have
a different view on that, please let me know.
I do want to give you my own observations. You mentioned
Germany, and Germany has a lot of different interests. We
recognize that. Nord Stream 2 has been an area where we have
been in total disagreement with Germany. From the conversations
that have taken place as recently as this week, there appears
to be a solid commitment by Germany to NATO's mission, as well
as unity on additional sanctions against Russia for further
incursions. I am pleased to see the unity that we have, and I
think that message has not been lost on Mr. Putin.
I think the comments you made, Dr. Hill, about the damage
done already to Ukraine are real. I mean, I think that it is
true. I mean, when you are a country that does not have total
control over your whole country and you are being threatened by
an enemy that is trying to bring down your government, that
very much affects the confidence of investment in your country.
To a certain degree, the sanctions that have been imposed
against Mr. Putin and Russia likewise affect Russia's
viability, and if they do further incursions, there is going to
be much more severe sanctions, as we all know, including the
banking SWIFT issues, which we have talked about.
What really, I think, gets Mr. Putin's attention are the
personal sanctions, and we are very prepared, working with our
allies, to expand the use of the individual sanctions with
Russia. I have made this comment and I know right now our major
effort is to try to avoid further incursions, but Russia
already has violated international norms; they are already
subject to sanctions, and they are already subject--could be
subject to additional sanctions, for which they have already
done. I think that needs to be under consideration. Our
immediate point is to try to eliminate the immediate threat, so
we recognize all of that.
I just think this testimony has been extremely helpful, and
I thank you for that. If you have any final comments, fine, or
if any of my colleagues--I see that Representative Wilson has a
comment.
Representative Wilson: I just agree with you so much.
Again, can you imagine that Mr. Putin has brought Republicans
and Democrats together in such a warm way? Another country
affected that needs to be appreciated is Turkey, with the
Crimea, with the Russian occupation of portions of Georgia on
both sides of the Black Sea. Our great ally of Turkey, which
has significant influence in Central Asia, is being affected,
and we just appreciate so much our 70-year alliance of NATO
with Turkey.
Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Right. As you have pointed out, if you
look at those that are on the list that Russia has an interest
in making sure we are not invited to their country, you will
find there is are equal number of Democrats and Republicans, so
we are together in that effort.
Congressman Cohen?
Representative Cohen: I just want to say one last thing,
and that is--I presume Mr. Putin may watch this or hear about
it. I want to make a direct appeal to Mr. Putin. Please, pour
yourself a vodka, get a blini, have some caviar, enjoy the
Winter Olympics, get your thrills vicariously, and watch your
athletes perform. Hopefully, they will win some gold medals. I
am sure they will; they are great athletes. Russia has great
athletes and great people. Chill.
Chairman Cardin: That is a nice final comment. [Laughter.]
General Hodges, anything further that you want to respond
to?
Mr. Hodges: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just want to say, we
have got to get Ambassadors in post.
Chairman Cardin: Yes.
Mr. Hodges: It makes it so difficult for our country to
carry out our foreign policy when we do not have our diplomats
in the post. I--I mean, I am not naive, I understand the
process, but we are paying a price right now by not having all
of our posts filled. Thank you for your support there.
Chairman Cardin: Absolutely agree. There is a lot of fault
to go by--the Biden administration was not that fast in naming
Ambassadors and still has not named Ambassadors to some key
positions, and there has been individual senators, Republican
senators, who have put holds on just about every nomination,
which means that we have to go through a lengthy process on
confirmation, which is totally uncalled for. We recognize that.
We have raised that issue many times. We do think it is a
national security concern to get confirmed Ambassadors. I have
to respond because I am the only senator that is here right
now, but all the other senators are thereby.
Any further comments, Dr. Hill?
Anything further, Ambassador Taylor?
Thank you all very much. Again, we appreciate all of your
participation. With that, the Commission will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the hearing ended.]
[all]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The United States Helsinki Commission, an independent
federal agency, by law monitors and encourages progress in
implementing provisions of the Helsinki Accords.
The Commission, Created in 1976, is composed of nine
Senators, nine Representatives and one official each from the
Department of State, Defense and Commerce.
All Commission publications may be freely reproduced,
in any form, with appropriate credit. The Commission
encourages the widest possible dissemination of its publications.
WWW.CSCE.GOV
youtube.com/HelsinkiCommission
facebook.com/helsinkicommission
flickr.com/photos/helsinkicommission
twitter.com/@HelsinkiComm