[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UPHOLDING OSCE COMMITMENTS IN HUNGARY
AND POLAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMISSION ON SECURITY
AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 3, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe
[CSCE117-6]
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via www.csce.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
55-070 WASHINGTON : 2025
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COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION
U.S. SENATE U.S. HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland STEVE COHEN, Tennessee Co-Chairman
Chairman JOE WILSON, South Carolina Ranking
Member
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
Ranking Member EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
MARCO RUBIO, Florida RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
TINA SMITH, Minnesota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Department of State - to be appointed
Department of Defense - to be appointed
Department of Commerce - to be appointed
C O N T E N T S
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Page
COMMISSIONERS
Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Chairman, from Maryland................. 1
Hon. Steve Cohen, Co-Chairman, from Tennessee.................... 2
Hon. Ruben Gallego, from Arizona................................. 14
WITNESSES
Zselyke Csaky, Research Director, Europe & Eurasia, Freedom House 4
Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute...... 6
Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and
the Arctic, Center for Strategic and International Studies..... 8
UPHOLDING OSCE COMMITMENTS IN HUNGARY AND POLAND
----------
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN
EUROPE,
U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Wednesday, November 3, 2021.
The hearing was held from 2:37 p.m. to 3:44 p.m. in Room
419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin [D-MD], Chairman, Commission for Security
and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senator Benjamin L. Cardin [D-
MD], Chairman; Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Co-Chairman;
Representative Ruben Gallego [D-AZ].
Witnesses: Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for
Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, Center for Strategic and
International Studies; Zselyke Csaky, Research Director, Europe
and Eurasia, Freedom House; Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow,
American Enterprise Institute.
OPENING STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, CHAIRMAN, U.S. SENATE,
FROM MARYLAND
Chairman Cardin: The Helsinki Commission will come to
order. I want to welcome our witnesses and our guests that are
with us today. Today, the Commission will consider the current
circumstances of the upholding of the OSCE commitments in
Hungary and Poland. I am very pleased to welcome our witnesses
here today to testify before the Helsinki Commission on
upholding democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland.
In January 1999, just one decade after the fall of the
Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary joined the NATO alliance. Five
years later, both nations joined the European Union and have
become strong, valued allies and friends of the United States.
I have had the opportunity to visit both countries on numerous
occasions, and always in awe of the storied history of these
nations to achieve freedom and democracy.
As good friends and allies, we must keep one another
accountable to uphold the shared values that underpin our
relationship, the freedoms which these nations have fought so
hard for, the freedoms which also form the basis of the
commitments of the OSCE.
Unfortunately, we have seen a downward trajectory with
regard to democratic freedoms and the rule of law in Hungary
and Poland over the last several years. According to Freedom
House's ``Nations in Transit'' report, Hungary's democracy
score has fallen 19 points, from a consolidated democracy in
2015 to a transitional or hybrid regime in 2021. Poland's
democracy score has similarly fallen 20 points since 2015, but
is still labeled a semi-consolidated democracy. We look forward
to hearing more on these from our Freedom House witness here
today.
Although we see similar trends in both countries, the
situation in Hungary is uniquely concerning. Prime Minister
Orban has altered the constitution, packed the Constitutional
Court, purged judges, and fostered corruption. He has
consolidated the media in the hands of oligarchs whose outlets
serve as a megaphone for the ruling party's propaganda. He has
brought Hungary closer to Russia and China instead of
strengthening the transatlantic bond.
Poland, an indispensable defense ally and friend of the
United States, has also taken steps to compromise judicial
independence, limit free expression, and engage in other
practices out of step with democratic practices and norms. In
my capacity as Special Representative of the OSCE Parliamentary
Assembly on Anti-Semitism, Racism and Intolerance, I have noted
a disturbing trend in both nations of scapegoating Jewish,
Roma, migrant, LGBTQ+, and other vulnerable populations for
political gain.
Legislative efforts making it more difficult for Holocaust
survivors to reclaim their property in Poland and efforts by
Prime Minister Orban in Hungary to prevent Roma families from
receiving compensation for segregated schooling are
particularly egregious. Such efforts, led by mainstream and
other political leaders, are out of sync with democratic
values. As Hungary moves toward elections, it is my sincere
hope that candidates run on platforms that do not further
divide their societies through bigotry and violence. I hope to
see Hungary and Poland do more to uphold the OSCE commitments
that they have willingly agreed to for the sake of freedom and
democracy everywhere. We look forward to hearing from our
witnesses today on what the U.S. Congress can do to support
civil society and good governance in Hungary and Poland.
It is now my pleasure to recognize the co-chair of the U.S.
Helsinki Commission, Representative Steve Cohen.
STATEMENT OF STEVE COHEN, U.S. HOUSE, FROM TENNESSEE
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to
appreciate, first, your convening this important hearing. It is
important to me as well and should be important to all
Americans and all freedom-loving people, and I thank our
witnesses for being with us to give us information.
Poland and Hungary are critical allies to the United
States, but the trends we are seeing toward anti-democratic
behavior are cause for concern. We count on our allies in
Europe to uphold democracy. The price to pay for a weak,
illiberal Europe, as we know from its dark past, is too great.
I have visited both Poland and Hungary, and I enjoyed the
history, the culture in both countries, but I was concerned,
particularly in Hungary, where we met with NGO's that told us
that they did not have opportunities to express themselves and
to meet properly, that the press was limited in its abilities
to have a freedom of the press, that there were--we visited--I
visited a synagogue, and that we were told that the relations
with the Jewish population was good. The people at the
synagogue said that it was not so good. In fact, they were
concerned.
We saw lots of posters at the time of George Soros, and
George Soros is more than a Jewish person. He is an individual
human being and, indeed, they could have had posters up about
George Soros because he was an individual who the Hungarian
government did not like because of the university that he
helped fund, which, in my opinion from what I visited, was an
outstanding university allowing people to study and learn in a
liberal context the arts and all perspectives.
George Soros could have been up there because he was
Jewish, and he could have been a trope and a symbol of anti-
Semitism in the country and, unfortunately, I think that is
what it was. His pictures were everywhere. He was put up as an
enemy of the State and an enemy of the party.
The party and the government in Hungary, as I understand
it, controls the media and so they do not have particularly
free elections because even if people can vote fairly, and I am
not sure about that, but the people get one side from the media
and that is not fair either.
There are a lot of concerns raised there, and I have
concerns with Poland and their efforts to change the judiciary,
discipline judges when they feel that their rulings have not
been in keeping with the executive, violation of separation of
powers, and an independent judiciary. There are concerns we
have with both these countries.
During my time in Congress, and especially with the
Helsinki Commission, I have consistently advocated for minority
rights--in fact, I have done that in the 24 years as a State
senator before I came to Congress--for the rights of the Jewish
communities after the Holocaust, and the fundamental freedoms
that underpin the OSCE like freedom of media, freedom of
expression.
In Orban's Hungary, as I have discussed, so many of these
fundamental freedoms are at risk, serious risk. I think his
opponent in the coming election has, basically, said, I am not
a crook, and there are questions about Mr. Orban's contracts
with individuals, I think, that put up, if I remember, it was
the--maybe the electrical system or lights or whatever, but
somebody who had no experience whatsoever in that business and
they gave him a multi, multi, multi-million dollar contract and
made that man a multi multi-millionaire.
Just being fair in this parceling out of government moneys
is the right thing to do, and it is not happening in Hungary.
There are no true democracies when the electoral system is
stilted to benefit the ruling party, which it is, and the media
has consolidated under single ownership to espouse the
government narrative. The media's use of anti-Semitic and anti-
Muslim rhetoric and propaganda by Hungarian officials
compromises core OSCE values.
Mr. Orban has cozied up to Vladimir Putin, and Orban risks
doing such, pushing Hungary further away from its allies in the
West. Mr. Putin is rarely on the side of transparency and
freedom of expression, and freedom of the press. He is an
authoritarian leader as well.
It is troubling that Hungary and Poland are flirting with
these autocratic and anti-democratic behaviors and palling
around with the people who like that, especially with the pain
of having lived behind the Iron Curtain, which is not far in
the rearview mirror. We expect better of our allies in NATO and
the EU.
I am looking forward to hearing an honest assessment of the
situation from our witnesses and what the United States can do
to support freedom and democracy in Central Europe. With that,
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you, Representative Cohen. I
appreciate those comments.
Let me now welcome our three witnesses to today's
discussion. Your written testimony will be made part of our
record, without objection. Each of you can proceed as you wish.
We hope that you would limit your comments to about 5 minutes
to allow time for questioning.
First, we will hear from Zselyke Csaky, the research
director of Europe and Eurasia at Freedom House and author of
Freedom House's ``Nations in Transit'' report. That is the
report I referred to in my opening statement, and she is
joining us by video today.
Second, we will hear from Dalibor Rohac, senior fellow at
the American Enterprise Institute, which has been very much
engaged in Hungary and Poland.
Then, finally, we will hear from Heather Conley, senior
vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic at CSIS,
which we invited her here in that capacity, but we just learned
of your selection to be president of the German Marshall Fund.
Congratulations. We have a very close relationship with the
German Marshall Fund.
It is good to have all three of our witnesses today. We
will start with Zselyke Csaky by video.
TESTIMONY OF ZSELYKE CSAKY, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, EUROPE AND
EURASIA, FREEDOM HOUSE
Ms. Csaky: Thank you, Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Cohen,
and members of the Commission. It is an honor to testify before
you today.
Poland and Hungary stand out for their unparalleled
democratic evolution over the past decade. As Senator Cardin
has said, Hungary has undergone the largest decline ever
measured in ``Nations in Transit,'' and last year dropped out
of the group of democracies to become a hybrid regime. Poland
is still categorized as a semi-consolidated democracy, but its
decline over the past 5 years has been steeper than that of
Hungary.
To understand how we got here, I will focus on four core
institutions today and give you some examples of how the
governments are increasingly silencing or co-opting them. There
are, of course, important differences between Poland and
Hungary. What we are seeing is a story of institutional
capture.
The four institutions--the media, the judiciary, the civic
sector, and elections--all have pockets of independence, but
they are increasingly being used to serve the governing
parties.
Media independence is under attack in both countries, but
the situation is much worse in Hungary. Independent outlets
face a hostile regulatory and economic environment and compete
against a massive media empire funded by the government.
Last year, staff at Index.hu, which at the time was the
country's most-read online portal, resigned en masse over
claims of political interference, and earlier this year, the
media regulator forced Klubradio, a government-critical
station, off the air on a technicality. At the same time,
KESMA, a media conglomerate established after government-
friendly businessmen donated their outlets for free to it,
accounted for as much as 40 percent of the turnover on the
media market in 2018 when it was established.
Poland's media environment remains much more vibrant than
that of Hungary. The Law and Justice Party has copied tactics
from Hungary, including financial and economic pressures. These
pressures in Poland are compounded by a situation in the
judiciary that can be described as nothing short of dire.
Over the past several years, the government has overhauled
the judicial system in an unconstitutional unlawful way and
this has been confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights,
which in May established that the current composition of the
Polish Constitutional Tribunal is unlawful, as well as the
European Court of Justice that ruled that parts of the reform,
such as the creation of the Disciplinary Chamber, breach EU
law. Judges in Poland have been called enemies of the State and
face threats, intimidation, and harassment.
In both countries, civil society and especially public
interest NGO's have been facing increasing pressure as well.
Political action and legislative initiatives have targeted the
LGBT+ community. Hungary banned the depiction and,
``promotion'' of homosexuality and gender change for minors,
while Poland's parliament last week discussed a proposal to ban
public gatherings that, ``promote'' same-sex orientation and
relationships.
Despite these initiatives, however, the civic sector is
still very vibrant in Poland, and numerous mass protests have
taken place, demonstrating the exceptional strength and resolve
of Polish civil society. The situation in Hungary, on the other
hand, is much less encouraging.
Finally, the last institution that I want to mention today
is that of free and fair elections, a cornerstone of democracy
that is increasingly under strain in both countries. Both of
them will hold elections. Hungarians will vote next spring.
Poles are scheduled to go to the polls in 2023. This means that
developments over the next several months could be decisive for
both countries' democratic trajectory.
In Hungary, as was mentioned before, the opposition faces
an uneven playing field as a result of electoral changes,
gerrymandering, and the governing party's massive reliance on
State resources. For the first time, the electoral race has
tightened considerably.
The opposition has united and elected a joint candidate, a
conservative newcomer who, according to recent polls, might
have a chance of defeating Fidesz. What this means for undoing
the damage that more than a decade of institutional capture has
brought on Hungary's democracy, however, is too early to tell.
Poland's electoral framework is in much better shape than
that of Hungary. The recent escalation in the country's tug-of-
war with the EU demonstrates the government's desire to press
on with anti-democratic changes.
What can the United States do? Ultimately, it is up to the
Polish and Hungarian electorates to change the situation on the
ground, but the United States can be a force for good if it
continues to press for upholding democracy. However, any U.S.
commitment needs to be long-term and strategic to avoid
instrumentalization.
On the one hand, there is a need for a strategic commitment
at the political level. Recent developments in Warsaw and
Budapest present an existential challenge for the EU. It is
important that the United States works with the European Union
when addressing this democratic erosion and supports current
steps, including steps by the European Commission, to link the
deployment of EU funds to respecting the rule of law.
Second, there is also a need for a strategic commitment at
the practical level. This can include fostering systemic
resilience in the civic sector and continued support for free
and independent media. There is a need to ensure that these
anti-democratic practices do not take root in other countries
that are vulnerable to authoritarian trends.
The United States benefits from a strong, united Europe and
strong allies, so a commitment to upholding democracy in Poland
and Hungary contributes to that.
Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you very much for your testimony. We
appreciate that very much.
We will now hear from Dalibor Rohac.
TESTIMONY OF DALIBOR ROHAC, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE
INSTITUTE
Mr. Rohac: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, thank you very
much, indeed, for the opportunity to address you today on this
important subject.
I, like many others in Washington, have followed the
developments across Visigoth countries over the past decade
with some degree of concern, having penned my first alarmist
piece about the deteriorating State of Hungary's democracy
already in January 2012 for the ``Weekly Standard.''
As of late, however, I have noticed that a number of
thought leaders on the American conservative right, in
particular, have been looking to the current government in
Poland and Hungary with sympathy, if not with admiration,
rather than with concern. Those sentiments are fundamentally
misguided, not because there will be no policy particulars on
which one could not agree with the current government in
Hungary and Poland, but rather because both governments have
pushed their countries on distinctly authoritarian
trajectories.
Examples of those developments include the rewriting of the
rules of the democratic game in Hungary, so to speak, through
the adoption of a new constitution in 2011, so-called
fundamental law, on purely partisan lines, the overhaul of the
country's electoral system to strengthen its majoritarian
winner-takes-all elements, along with the gerrymandering, the
packing and politicization of courts in both countries, the de
facto end of constitutional review of new legislation in both
Hungary and Poland, gradual erosion of media freedom through a
politicized public broadcasting, through the concentration of
media ownership in the hands of few politically connected
organizations, companies, and individuals very prominently in
Hungary through the Central European press and media foundation
KESMA, to which some 500 outlets were donated by their previous
owners, which is also exempt from the country's antitrust law.
Both Hungary and Poland have seen frivolous lawsuits
against independent media outlets, discriminatory advertising
practices aimed at making opposition media outlets financially
nonviable, and arbitrary policies regarding broadcasting
licenses, including, recently, a case that targeted a U.S.-
owned media outlet, TVN24. Both countries, particularly
Hungary, though, have seen attacks on civil society exemplified
by the 2017 Lex NGO, so to speak, and the 2018 law
criminalizing groups providing assistance to asylum seekers.
Hungary has seen an extraordinary rise in corruption as
measured by a number of indicators and ample anecdotal
evidence. Also, Hungary has forged deeper ties with revisionist
powers such as Russia and China. Viktor Orban himself called
Hungary a pillar of the Belt and Road Initiative.
Hungarian government has repeatedly blocked EU efforts to
hold China accountable over its repression in Hong Kong, over a
number of other issues. Orban lambasted those efforts as being
politically inconsequential and frivolous, and I suppose
members of this Commission will also remember the rebuke of
Hungary's government through the Trump administration over its
own 5G initiative.
Now, to be constructive, a U.S. response to these
practices, which are sometimes labeled as de-democratization or
democratic backsliding, ought to be guided by priorities that
are shared across partisan lines, that are nuanced and prudent,
and are part of a long-term outlook that our allies and friends
can count on and work with.
In particular, the engagement of Central European
countries, including criticism and pushback whenever
appropriate, should be organized around, in my opinion, a
narrow conception of democracy, rule of law, and human rights
instead of a more ambitious, more encompassing, more
progressive outlook, if you will, because too broad a focus
risks inserting the United States on front lines of local
culture wars and risks being weaponized by irresponsible and
malevolent actors, particularly by Russian propaganda.
The downside risk of a too heavy-handed response is further
amplified by the fact that both Hungary and Poland are holding
elections in 2022 and 2023, respectively, which could either
reverse some of these trends or accelerate them further.
Also, Central European countries are very different from
each other. The Czech Republic and Slovakia, if you look at
other Visigoth countries, do not suffer from the same problem
of de-democratization or democratic backsliding that we see in
Hungary and Poland, and dramatic differences exist between the
extent of the problem in Poland and in Hungary, not to mention
the different geopolitical outlooks of the two countries.
Central Europe is a close and steadfast partner and ally of
the United States. Hearing an occasional hard truth is an
integral part of any such partnership. However, there are good
and bad ways to hold difficult conversations with one's
partner. Here is to hoping that the U.S. policy on these
matters will live up to its core values while also being
prudent and thoughtful, and constructive.
Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you very much for that very
constructive testimony. We appreciate it very much.
Ms. Conley?
TESTIMONY OF HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Conley:
Chairman Cardin, Co-Chairman Cohen, thank you so much for
holding this hearing. You asked us what Congress could do. This
is what Congress can and must do: Hold hearings, visit CODELs,
and hold Hungary and Poland accountable.
I have to tell you, as preparing for this testimony, I took
absolutely no pleasure in writing my testimony. Poland and
Hungary, I believe, represent one of America's greatest foreign
policy accomplishments, and you noted it so beautifully in your
opening remarks. What I wish I could tell you today is that
Poland and Hungary are modeling behavior in the region, that
they are beacons of freedom and democracy in the region and
around the world, and, unfortunately, that is not what this
hearing is about.
In fact, I think it is extremely important to hold this
hearing because Poland will assume the chairmanship in office
of the OEC beginning in January 2022. This is important.
I think the other tragic part, as I was preparing for this
testimony, is that we have watched these developments happen
well over a decade. We have described them. We have watched
them. The problem is we have not been able to stop them. Our
policy responses, whether from Washington or from Brussels,
have been ineffective.
The U.S. has tried, particularly in the case of Hungary, to
impose a visa ban on Hungarian government officials because of
corruption in the Orban administration. The Trump
administration attempted a very different approach, all
carrots, trying to engage Hungary in changing its behavior. It
did not work.
The European Union has used a variety of its instruments,
but they, too, have been ineffective. I think we have to
acknowledge that the policy responses thus far have not been
effective. What more can we do?
The democratic diminishment of Poland and Hungary--and I
completely agree we do need to separate out these two
countries. Hungary by far is an illiberal template that,
unfortunately, other countries in the region are following,
whether that is Poland, whether that is Slovenia, Serbia, and
other countries.
Let us focus on the security dimension of this. Hungary, as
a member of NATO and the European Union, its a close
association with Russia, which includes a very problematic
international investment bank that is, certainly, considered a
front for Russia and potentially alleged illicit financing. We
have this strong relationship with China, whether that's
Huawei's Research and Development Center or, potentially, a
future Chinese campus of Wuhan in Budapest.
We have to start to question whether Hungary is able to
maintain the secrecy required for NATO. It has already blocked
NATO and the Ukraine Commission meeting at the most senior
levels. It will bleed into other elements of our agenda. This
has real collateral damage.
For Poland and Hungary, as far as European Union cohesion,
we are seeing where the rule of law challenge to the European
Union cuts at the very unity of the union. The question of the
efficacy of European arrest warrants is in question. This is an
enormous challenge to the European Union that both Poland and
Hungary present.
What can we do? I think, very much to my fellow panelists,
we have to remain sustained and engaged in our investment. We
can no longer pursue episodic responses to this growing
challenge. We have to perhaps look at our own security posture
in the region.
Again, I take no pleasure in arguing that we have to in any
way weaken NATO. If Poland continues to take these steps, we
have to, I believe, make an assessment of whether our force
posture is in the appropriate place. We have to, I think, begin
to look at imposing a potentially economic cost for this. This
is the only way that we can arrest this behavior, potentially.
Finally, I would absolutely further argue that we have to
continue to be a beacon of hope to those who are seeking a
different future. I am so grateful that RFE/RL has returned to
Hungary. We need to continue to make those investments even
though they themselves are under pressure. We have to provide
hope to civil society, to investigative journalists. This is
absolutely correct. This is the Hungarian people's fight. This
is the Polish people's fight. We can only provide hope,
support, and assistance for them to strengthen their own
democracy.
I thank you again for holding this important hearing. I
encourage these hearings to be as bipartisan in nature as they
possibly can. We are becoming partisan in our approach to
Poland and Hungary. That is not a strong message as well. This
is important. This is one of America's greatest foreign policy
successes. It has been diminishing on our watch. We have to do
everything we can to restore democracy and support the
Hungarian and Polish people.
Thank you so much.
Chairman Cardin: Well, again, thank you for your testimony
and your suggestions. Obviously, we do think this hearing is
important, and the last congressional trip I took before COVID-
19 with Congressman Hoyer we were in Budapest, and we did have
a chance to meet with a lot of the NGO's that were really
suffering in that country. I do think our visits are very
important.
I do want to acknowledge Congressman Gallego. Pleased to
have you here with us, an active member of our Commission. We
will now start rounds of questioning.
Let me just acknowledge, which I think of all three of you
have said, and that is that Poland and Hungary are two separate
countries, and they are--they have, obviously, a different set
of governments and priorities and we recognize that.
Both have a lot in common. Both showed tremendous courage
after the fall of the Soviet Union to develop democratic
institutions and free and fair elections so the people could
choose their own leaders, and both went on a path to fully
integrate into the EU and to become NATO partners. As I said in
my opening statement, both are valued allies and friends of the
United States. Both have seen a significant decline in their
democratic institutions, and I want to just drill down a little
bit on that.
If I might start with Ms. Csaky, if I might, in regards to
Poland. Poland was recently fined by the European Union. Its
limits on the independence of its judiciary by dismantling the
Disciplinary Chamber of its supreme court have called into
question its commitment to the EU tenets.
How do you see the future of Poland in the EU if changes
are not made in regards to these issues?
Ms. Csaky: Thank you for that question, Senator Cardin. I
hope you can hear me.
Chairman Cardin: We hear you.
Ms. Csaky: Yes, thank you. That is a very important point
that you raised, and I think this is why it is important to
understand what happened.
As the European Court of Human Rights decision said,
Poland's Constitutional Tribunal can no longer be regarded as a
tribunal established by law, and as the European Court of
Justice ruling said, the Disciplinary Chamber is not a
legitimate body, so it cannot be regarded as independent and
impartial.
Based on these decisions, I believe that Poland will have
to make changes to these laws because, currently, they
contravene international standards. Poland is in a dialog with
the European Union. Unfortunately, what we have seen over the
past several months is that there have been promises made with
regard to reforming the Disciplinary Chamber, but Poland has
not delivered on those promises.
At the same time, the reason why I remain optimistic is
because, as I said, that this is an existential challenge for
the European Union. If there is no change to Poland's laws,
then other countries might copy what Poland has been doing, and
that will lead to a breakdown in traditional cooperation, as my
colleague, Heather Conley, mentioned, the European arrest
warrants.
There are other areas where this is relevant. For example,
cross-border legal proceedings can be affected. There will be
or there already is a legal uncertainty that impacts the
European legal fabric. Businesses, for example, might not be
certain that they will get a fair hearing if they invest in
Poland.
I believe that by now this problem has grown to such
enormous size that there will be some steps taken by Poland.
The question is how comprehensive those steps will be.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you.
Let me turn, if I might, to Mr. Rohac in regards to your
observation that there will be parliamentary elections in both
countries. I believe in Hungary it is in 2022. Congressman
Cohen observed the type of election tactics that were used by
the Orban government in the most recent elections, appealing to
the worst instincts, including anti-Semitic type of activities.
We have also observed the Orban government controlling the
messaging through the news outlets in the country.
We always have confidence in free and fair elections, but
is it possible to have a truly free and fair election in
Hungary today, considering the steps that the Orban government
has taken in order to maintain control?
Mr. Rohac: That is an excellent question, which is somewhat
difficult to answer in a sort of sweeping general way. There is
no question about the fact that the incumbent government will
play dirty in different ways in the run-up to the election, and
it is also true that the opposition has become much better
organized than in the previous elections. Right now, the
polling for the joint opposition bloc led by Peter Marki-Zay is
at around 39 percent, whereas the Fidesz-led coalition is
polling at around 35 percent. A lot can happen between now and
the election in terms of campaigning and so forth.
The real concern, I think, is the one that this country,
frankly, faced not that long ago, namely, whether there would
be a calm, peaceful transfer of power. I do not want to sound
overly alarmist, but it is true that in 2006, there was great
resistance in the ranks of Fidesz to recognize the outcome of
the election. There was a wave of popular unrest and, you know,
conspiracy theories being spouted, and I think this is
something that the world needs to watch very closely once it
gets to April and once the votes are being counted.
I think it is something that the Hungarians themselves are
going to be very much preoccupied with. This is an
environment--this is, frankly, a political environment where
the opposition can compete and does compete and does stand the
chance of unseating the current government. We should not be
under any illusion that it is a perfectly fair and clean fight.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you.
Last, to Ms. Conley, we know the Hungarian--current
Hungarian government strategy for a greater Hungary, which is
somewhat very concerning, the increased numbers of Hungarian
citizens now that do not live in Hungary and the potential
challenges to the territorial integrity of its neighbors, how
much of a concern is this in regards to Hungary's democratic
future?
Ms. Conley: Senator Cardin, it is a great concern.
Chairman Cardin: Your mic again.
Ms. Conley: It is a great concern. Thank you. In part, the
rise of ethno-nationalism across the region, particularly in
the Western Balkans, this, unfortunately, a trend, again,
something we have watched for at least 15 years. While it has
always been an approach of the Hungarian government to retain
close links with ethnic Hungarian populations, whether that is
in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, or even Serbia, what we have
seen over the last several years under Prime Minister Orban in
some ways is a very purposeful weaponization of Hungarian
history and the Treaty of Trianon--we saw that at the 100th
anniversary of Trianon--that increasingly we are seeing
Hungarian passports being handed out to these ethnic
communities and, in turn, these ethnic communities then vote in
the election. They do not live within Hungary, but they are
provided generous financial and economic assistance as well as
passports.
This causes great tensions within the neighboring
countries, particularly Romania, where we did see a flare-up of
tensions because, in some ways, Hungarian government policy is
to separate the ethnic Hungarian populations in these countries
away from their own host country and to create greater fidelity
toward Budapest and not toward their own host country.
We see similar tactics by President Putin in the handing
out of passports, whether that is in Ukraine or elsewhere. It
also gives, obviously, a rationale for having to continue to
intervene in neighboring countries to protect those ethnic
populations. Again, this is something that we need to be very
firm. It destabilizes the region. Increasingly, we are seeing
not only a construct of a greater Hungary, we are seeing this
construct of a greater Serbia. We are seeing where ethno-
nationalism is now challenging borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This is a region that, unfortunately, is seized with this
and, as in many things, Mr. Orban is giving a playbook that
others will follow.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you.
Congressman Cohen?
Representative Cohen: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As a followup on that question, it is my understanding that
Orban cultivates these folks by soccer clubs in these different
countries that are Hungarian soccer clubs, even though they are
in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, or wherever, and he does the
same thing with funding political parties there, et cetera.
Is this just the typical playbook of an authoritarian? Is
this emulating Putin? Or what do you think is the genesis of
this type of activity?
Ms. Conley: Well, we know Mr. Orban loves soccer, and this
is something that, I think, he feels very personally passionate
about. He has used a lot of very significant European Union
infrastructure funds to build large stadiums in small villages.
It is, certainly, part of his own patronage network.
Yes, Congressman Cohen, this is soft power. This is where
love of sport and that affinity toward teams, yes, you could
see in the purchases of the British Premier League by
countries. That is a great manifestation of soft power. I
think, again, we have to be--joking aside, we have to be very
vigilant. These soccer matches and the hooliganism and, again,
the virulence of this nationalism are showing itself on these
soccer matches.
Again, it is sort of this--the pitch is becoming a place
for, really, this ethno-nationalism to be stoked and for
radicalization to happen, but it is a soft power mechanism. It
is a way to hand out funds and to help people, you know, again,
be very supportive of the Hungarian government.
Representative Cohen: As I understand it, he has provided--
has added 1 million new voters by granting citizenship to these
ethnic Hungarians in these other countries who end up, I guess,
voting pretty much for his party. Is this something he started,
or were there previous Hungarian governments that issued
citizenship to Hungarians living in other countries, and what
other countries do this type of thing?
Ms. Conley: As I mentioned, certainly, Mr. Putin has made
passportization, using that to pull ethnic populations and to
create discord within countries. I would say this habit of
strong connections to ethnic Hungarian parties, such as in
Slovakia, in Romania, that, certainly, predates Mr. Orban. It
is something that previous Hungarian governments have certainly
practiced.
We have never seen the purposeful and the intentionality
that is occurring under the current Hungarian government, and
Prime Minister Orban has already told us very publicly that he
sees the ethnic Hungarians living outside of Hungary as a
primary source of those votes that he needs and, I believe, we
will see in the run-up to the April 2022 Hungarian parliament
election we will see him use that to great effect as the
contest becomes quite close within Hungary.
Representative Cohen: The previous Hungarian governments--
did they not only reached out to these people with cultural
exchanges but also gave them the right to vote?
Ms. Conley: Well, there is, certainly, strong relations
with those ethnic Hungarian communities, particularly in
Romania and Slovakia, and it supports the political parties
within those countries that support ethnic Hungarians. Yes,
that is been consistent. As I said, over the last 10 years we
have really seen the intentionality and, really, the passport
use has been quite substantial, where we are seeing up to--you
know, up to hundreds of thousands of passports being issued.
Representative Cohen: Could someone out there, and it might
be our friend on the Zoom, Ms. Csaky, tell us more about the
corruption in Hungary. I remember when I was there, it was
something. It was a sewer system or it was a light system. It
was something I looked out the bus and I saw along the road.
What was it, and are there other examples of that corruption
where Orban takes care of his friends who have no expertise?
Ms. Csaky: Yes. In Hungary's case, we have seen a
significant increase in corruption, and I think the example
that you mentioned and other examples show what experts call a
sort of reverse State capture.
It is not oligarchs capturing the State but it is a strong
State that is creating its own, ``oligarchs,'' and I think one
proof for that is Lorinc Meszaros, who is a businessman who
used to be the mayor of a small town and who by now has become
the richest Hungarian over the past few years. He also owns
several media outlets, several other companies.
What we are seeing is an intentional use by the government,
an intentional creation of these oligarchs, of these rich
people that are at the same time dependent fully on the
government. It is further proof of a centralization of power
that we are seeing.
Representative Cohen: Thank you. If anybody present would
like to add anything. Otherwise, I would yield back the balance
of my time.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Cardin: Congressman Gallego?
STATEMENT OF RUBEN GALLEGO, U.S. HOUSE, FROM ARIZONA
Representative Gallego: Thank you. It is disturbing to hear
this. I actually taught English in a Hungarian enclave in
Slovakia, a city called Nesvady in the Komarno region, and when
you are talking about the ethnic unity that they have, you see
it there. I mean, the area that I was teaching English only
spoke Hungarian, though it had been part of Slovakia for a
while. They identified with Orban even though they were in
Slovakia, and they certainly talked about the history. It is--
and I was roaming around Hungary when Orban was this young
liberal, you know, reforming this post-Soviet satellite.
It is very disturbing to hear that, and I guess one of the
questions that I have, just remembering from my experience in
Hungary and Slovakia, is that though they did identify
themselves as Hungarians and ethnically Hungarian, the one
thing they did appreciate and loved was, you know, democracy
and the fact that they are now a democratic country and they
had the right to vote.
Kind of studying other movements and other oligarchs being
able to kind of pick apart societies, what is it that is
actually driving this? Is there a massive amount of
unemployment in certain areas, or do they feel threatened by
movements of immigrants coming through?
I know that, you know, when I was there, the Roma was
always used as a political tool and there was a lot of
prejudice against the Roma, and I am wondering if, for some
reason, you know, they are, again, kind of using that. It is
always--there is always got to be a functioning reason besides
the fact that, obviously, he wants power, but what is the
underlying cause that the public is buying into this, in your
opinion?
Yes, we will start with Ms. Conley and then--boy, my
sight's really going bad. [Laughter.] The gentleman after you.
Yes.
Ms. Conley: That is all right. We are very far away. No, it
is a really great question, and thank you, and your insights,
from your own experience, I think, are extremely important.
What I think has been--it is hard for me to say this, but
Mr. Orban is a political innovator. He captures early political
trends. He is instinctive about that, and he is able to use
that instinct to draw out, I think, very compelling political
narratives. I do not like these political narratives but they
are very compelling, and he was very early on speaking of these
illiberal winds that blew from the east, and what he was saying
is democracy is not delivering anymore. There is too much
change happening.
The best way--so liberal democracy is over. This--what I am
presenting and his use of illiberalism, this is the better way,
and it pulls inspiration, certainly, from Moscow, I think
elements of it from Beijing, and he wrapped this into people's,
you know, being very unsettled by change. There is the, you
know, an urban-rural divide that we would see today. Migration,
of course, is a challenge, and that this is all a threat to,
you know, the unique civilization of Hungary and its great
history.
He is the unique one to protect that and, certainly, wrap
that in the Christian values and change the constitution to
recognize that. In some ways, this was a simple answer to a
complex time. As you correctly noted, this really was not a
socioeconomic issue. Hungary has done extremely well
economically. Of course, during the financial crisis it
suffered, but it has been more resilient economically. This is
about, I believe, Viktor Orban remaining in power, sustaining
his legitimacy, that only he is uniquely placed to protect
Hungary's unique civilization.
I think the challenge here, moving forward, is because over
the last decade-plus the corruption and the networks that he
has now created this will not be dislodged easily even if Mr.
Orban does not win election, and I think the warning that
Dalibor just gave us that this may not be a peaceful transfer
is something that we should remain quite focused on.
Mr. Orban is already suggesting it will be the United
States' and the European Union's fault if he does lose this
election. Those patronage networks, even if a new government is
formed, will be proactively working against that government to
ensure either Mr. Orban's return or that his network is
protected.
This is going to be a long-term process to unravel the
illiberalism that has taken place over the last decade.
Representative Gallego: Before we go to the gentleman, it
just--it confounds me that the college students of the 1968
revolution are going to--that are now adults and seniors,
actually, are going to stand by and allow totalitarianism to
happen if there is a free and fair election. That is the same
generation.
Ms. Conley: Well, we are hoping that the Hungarian people
know that they must fight for their future and for their
democratic future. I think the young people, quite frankly,
Congressman, are voting with their feet. The emigration that is
coming out of Hungary, the brain drains, because young people
do not see a promising future, that hurts Hungary's future. I
think, unfortunately, Mr. Orban speaks to, largely, a rural and
an elderly population that believe and support what he is
saying, and that there will always have to be an enemy.
Representative Gallego: It sounds very familiar, Ms.
Conley.
Sir, go ahead.
Mr. Rohac: Yes. If I may just--add one thing as sort of a
historical footnote to all this, which is that, really, the
year 1920 and the Trianon agreement, which reduced Hungary
dramatically, both geographically, in terms of its population,
casts a very long shadow and--
Representative Gallego: Right. Trust me, I heard the
stories.
I heard the stories how many times they stopped the advance
of the Muslims--Muslim religion into the European--into
mainland Europe.
Mr. Rohac: Whereas in other countries of the region--yes,
the capital of Slovakia, Bratislava, used to be called Wilson
City for a while, you know, Hungarians will have a much more
ambivalent view of the West and of the United States and the
role that was played in the aftermath of the First World War.
There has been pushback in other countries against these
efforts, most recently against the Hungarian government's
buying of real eState in neighboring countries, particularly
historic buildings in sort of central areas of cities. That
sort of sense of historic injustice or trauma is something that
I suppose we need to work with and help to channel it into
constructive uses. Otherwise, it just fosters really
problematic relationships that are already emerging in the
region.
For example, the Orban government's links to Serbia where,
you know, Serbia, again, is one of these former mini empires
reduced in size and having, you know, axes to grind with the
West. You might have seen recently the so-called Demographic
Summit that took place in September in Budapest in which Vice
President Pence was sharing a podium with Milorad Dodik, who is
a war criminal, somebody on, you know, numerous sanctions
lists. Obviously, it was the decision of the Hungarian
government to place the former vice president of the United
States in that situation, presumably as a favor to his Serbian
counterpart.
To have the sort of revisionist powers, which are also
linked to China--I mean, it is not a coincidence that the Belt
and Road Initiative connects Budapest and Belgrade with a
railway, which is being funded by China. We should be extremely
vigilant about sort of emergence of these sorts of mini
alliances that really chip away at the unity of NATO and the
European Union and of the West, more broadly.
Representative Gallego: Just a last question because I
actually have to go, but I apologize. There has been a very
fraught relationship between Turkey and Hungary that is also
affected our capability to maneuver within NATO and actually
have consensus. Has that tension reduced at all or is it still
in existence?
Ms. Conley: Happy to answer that. The tension still exists,
although I think it is been reduced, in part because there is a
bit of admiration for more authoritarian tactics by the
government. But--
Representative Gallego: By the Erdo'an government or by the
Hungarian government?
Ms. Conley: Mutually reinforced.
Representative Gallego: Yes. Okay. That is what I thought.
Yes.
Ms. Conley: I think, again, because of Turkey's very
important role in keeping back potential migration waves from
coming, I think, again, Mr. Orban is very clear about making
sure those migrants do not, and so there has been some
cooperation, I think. Turkey represents a different set of
challenges to the NATO alliance, and particularly--
Representative Gallego: Well, we could have another
conference call on that.
Ms. Conley: That is another seminar.
Representative Gallego: Yes. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Chairman Cardin: Our House colleagues have a vote on in the
House, so they need to leave.
Let me followup in regards to the relationship between
Hungary and Poland with Russia and China. After World War Two,
the transatlantic security agreements were aimed at trying to
protect against the rise of the Soviet Union, and NATO was
formed as a protection. With the fall of the Soviet Union, we
were not sure who our next threats would be.
We knew we would have a terrorism issue, but we did not
know exactly where the threats would come from. There was the
expansion of NATO with the former republics of the Soviet Union
and those that were under the domination of the Soviet Union,
and this security alliance was--we thought would protect us
from our geopolitical threats.
With the activities in Russia following the rise in Mr.
Putin's strength, we find that Russia has invaded the
sovereignty not just of Ukraine but of Georgia and Moldova. I
was in Estonia and I can tell you they worry greatly about one
day Russia coming across their border. Of course, we could
argue the same in regards to Poland and other countries.
Yet, it looks like, when we look at Poland and we look at
Hungary, they do not necessarily share the same view about NATO
and its concerns with Russia. Now, after World War Two, our
eyes were not toward China. Today, they are toward China and we
recognize China as a threat, because--not their economic
desires, which we think are not based upon international
standards and we want to debate that and argue that, but also
they are using that pressure to dominate security issues,
including the China Seas.
We look at that as a security threat as well. My question
to--I will ask all three if you want to comment on it. As we
see these relationships developing between Poland and Hungary
with Russia and China, which seems to me and many of my
colleagues to be inconsistent with the transatlantic
partnership in which NATO was created and the European Union is
focused, what should be our strategies in regards to these two
countries in their relationship with Russia and China?
Why do not we just go--first, let me ask, Ms. Csaky, if you
want to weigh in on this, we would love to hear from you.
Ms. Csaky: Thank you. I would like my colleagues to weigh
in first.
Chairman Cardin: Certainly. Why do not we go to Mr. Rohac?
Mr. Rohac: Thank you. I think this is one of those issues
where there is a fairly clear difference between Poland and
Hungary, and it is also one that should inform American--U.S.
policy, going forward. There is a consensus across Polish
political parties, across the Polish political class, about the
threat that Russia poses, about the incredibly important role
that NATO and the transatlantic link play for the security of
Poland.
There is also, I think, a much greater degree of sort of
circumspection when it comes to China and when it comes to sort
of forging those deeper links with China. Hungary, for historic
reasons, a number of other reasons, partly the fact that the
Russian threat today remains much more abstract for Hungarian
public than in the case of Poland, there is not such a
consensus, and we have seen Hungary forge deeper ties with both
Russia and China, and also Russian propaganda and Russian
outreach efforts, Russian sort of methods for co-opting Western
political elites, have really exploited some of these pressure
points that we have seen over the past 10 years with migration,
with culture wars, presenting Russia as a sort of bulwark of
traditional Christian values against Western decadence.
For a variety of reasons, those tactics work much better in
Hungary than in Poland, and I think for U.S. policy this should
be a reason to, in a way, play a much tougher game with
Budapest than with Warsaw, which has been a much more reliable
and more consistent ally on these points. At some point, the
Hungarian political class will have to choose.
Chairman Cardin: Ms. Conley?
Ms. Conley: Yes, absolutely. To just echo Dalibor, we
really have to understand that this threat to democracy is the
challenge of the threat from within. The democratic weaknesses
allow both Poland and Hungary to be much more susceptible to
malign influence. I would say with Hungary it is intentional.
They seek it. Poland, these democratic weaknesses make it more
vulnerable, more susceptible to Russian disinformation,
potentially.
Dalibor is absolutely right. I think you really have to
separate Poland because of its strong and dependent
relationship on the United States. It will be hard work, but
they have shifted their position on China quite significantly
during the last administration. I think they would respond if
there were some very clear and very tough messages about our
security posture, and I think they would make some changes. I
really think it would be existential for them.
In Hungary, there has really been no penalty for this
behavior at all, and, you know, we have to do this--in my
written statement, I talk about we have to have a transatlantic
approach. There is no unified European approach to Hungary. We
would have to work very clearly, and we would have to impose
costs.
I have to tell you, Senator Cardin, if Congressman Tom
Lantos were alive today, I believe that Congress would have
sanctioned Hungary a long time ago. He had a very clear view on
Hungary. He was a moral voice.
We have to, perhaps, use the toughest of love for these
important allies, and we may have to change their calculation.
They are sovereign countries. They can choose their path. We do
not have to choose to financially support and support them
militarily if they make choices against being vibrant
democracies. Our security rests on the health of their
democracy, and their security rests on the health of our
democracy. We are mutually dependent on one another.
As I said, I do not say this lightly. I do not--I hate that
we are here in this position. I am now at a point where this is
such a crisis that we may have to take extremely difficult
measures and hope we can change the calculations for both.
Chairman Cardin: Thank you for that.
Ms. Csaky, I want to ask you one question, if I might, as
to COVID-19. We have seen COVID-19 be used by certain
governments to restrict the rights of its citizens, in some
cases for public health reasons but in other cases in order to
abridge their basic freedom, and now that we are coming out of
COVID-19 we do not see any action to restore those principles
of basic rights.
In your view, in Poland and/or Hungary, has COVID-19
affected the government's policies relative to the personal
liberties of its citizens?
Ms. Csaky: Thank you for that question, Senator Cardin.
COVID-19, at the beginning, did have an impact, especially
in Hungary's case, and especially on government transparency.
The government failed to publish data on the number of
infections and failed to, really, bring transparency with
regards to the steps that it was taking. There was also a fear
at the beginning of the pandemic that the government would use
COVID-19 as an excuse to push through other initiatives, and
that, to some extent, perhaps, was true. I think that the
government mostly pushed through initiatives that it wanted to
push through anyway.
When it comes to civil liberties on the ground, however,
there are no significant restrictions to those in either Poland
or in Hungary. In that sense, COVID-19 has not had a
significant impact yet. I think we should be watching what
happens with the elections and if the current situation with
the infection's changes, because in both countries they both
are experiencing a very bad fourth wave, just the start of that
very bad fourth wave. We should be watching what happens,
especially in Hungary in the runup to the elections, and
whether the government will want to use the bad situation as an
excuse, although I would think that that is not really a
realistic scenario.
Chairman Cardin: Well, let me thank all three of our
witnesses. I have found this panel to be particularly helpful
as we try to sort out. That is to say, we are dealing with
allies. We are dealing with NATO allies. We are dealing with
countries that we have a deep tie to. We see disturbing trends,
and they are different in Poland and Hungary. We recognize
that. I think we have to be clear, and we have to look for ways
in which we can strengthen the values that make our
relationship so important, and I think America can play an
important role here and I think the Congress can play an
important role.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for your testimoneys
and for your help, and I am certain that we will be relying
upon you as we go forward for some technical and expert advice.
With that, the Commission will stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the hearing ended.]
[all]
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