[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
117th Congress Printed for the use of the
2d Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_______________________________________________________________________
Conflict of Interest? Foreign Policy and
Human Rights in Turkey
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FEBURARY 16, 2022
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_______________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2023
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
SENATE HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
Chairman Co-Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JOE WILSON, South Carolina
Ranking Member Ranking Member
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
MARCO RUBIO, Florida BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
TINA SMITH, Minnesota GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
Executive Branch Commissioners
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, to be appointed
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, to be appointed
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, to be appointed
[II]
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Conflict of Interest? Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Turkey
February 16, 2022
Page
COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Co-Chairman 1
COMMITTEE STAFF PRESENT
Bakhti Nishanov, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe 1
PARTICIPANTS
Soner Cagaptay, Director, Turkish Research Program, Washington
Institute for the Near East; 3
Deniz Yuksel, Turkey Advocacy Specialist, Amnesty International 7
Conflict of Interest? Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Turkey
----------
February 16, 2022
The briefing was held from 11:01 a.m. to 12:16 p.m. via
videoconference, Bakhti Nishanov, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.
Mr. Nishanov: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you so much
for joining us this morning.
My name is Bakhti Nishanov. I am a senior policy advisor at the
U.S. Helsinki Commission. Today we are going to have a discussion--what
we think is a very important and timely conversation about Turkey.
Before I launch into why we set this up, I first of all would like
to acknowledge our Co-chairman, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Mr.
Cohen, and he has joined us this morning, and we really appreciate
that. Maybe before we start--I know you have an incredibly busy
schedule--I would like to offer you an opportunity to offer your
remarks, sir.
Co-chair Cohen: Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the
opportunity to participate.
I have been the Co-chair of the Turkey Caucus since I came to
Congress in 2007. I think the origins of that--I am not positive how
that occurred exactly, but my grandfather, who I did not know and to be
honest my mother I do not think knew, was from Turkey, as indicated
from records I have seen on Ancestry.com. Abraham Hassan [sp] was from
Turkey, and so I am a young Turk. [Laughter.] I visited Turkey once. I
would like to go back again. It was--I enjoyed my trip to Istanbul, of
course, and to Ankara, where I really fell in love with the monument to
Ataturk, and I am a big fan of Ataturk's. He was an amazing man.
There have been concerns I have had about Turkey's descent, I
guess, concerning human rights over the years, and most recent I
guess--it has been gradual, but the last four or 5 years have been even
greater--judges who have been arrested, public officials who have been
arrested, press who have been arrested. Turkey does not have a good
record on human rights, and I regret that. Mr. Erdogan has certain
characteristics that are concerning about power and about
reestablishing Turkey as some type of an Ottoman Empire to some extent.
Anyway, I am looking forward to your testimony. We need to do what
we can to see that the whole world is fair for citizens to express
themselves and to--press to express themselves and for people to get
information, without which we will not have good democracies. With
that, I yield back my balance of my time.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Co-Chairman Cohen. Really
appreciate your personal story, and I think this gives extra meaning to
your participation in this briefing today.
Just to set the stage a little bit for this conversation, I said
timely. The reason for that, I think--obviously, I set it up, so I
would say that it is timely. I think if you follow Turkey or Eurasia or
the Middle East, you will have noted that Turkey has been in the news
in the headlines a lot lately. I mean, even if you do not follow it but
you watched the Super Bowl this past weekend, you will have noticed
that, you know, Turkish Airlines was very prominently featured in a
pregame show. They were a part --they were sponsors, actually, of the
pregame show, and they were very--it was--you know, Turkey is a part of
a conversation that is happening worldwide and here in the United--
[audio break]--too much because we want to hear it from panelists. I
think I would like just to sort of set it up just a little bit and
understand why we are having this.
Things that are happening in Turkey I think I would like to
describe as the good, the bad, and the ugly, right? The good is, on the
foreign policy front, we are very much encouraged by Turkey's efforts
to normalize its relationship with Armenia. That is been in the news.
That is great. We have seen Turkey-Israel relationship improve. In
fact, the president of Israel is going to be visiting Turkey on March
9. With Egypt, with UAE, with all the neighbors we have seen this
effort to normalize ties and to be a--[audio break]--and responsible
partner to the neighbors, but also within the context of NATO and OSCE.
We also appreciate Turkey's hosting the world's largest population
of refugees. I mean, this should not go unacknowledged. Turkey is--has
this heavy burden, and I think it is important that we acknowledge that
and we do as a global community whatever we can do to support Turkey in
this effort.
The bad side is, just like even by COVID standards--by COVID--
[inaudible]--standards, I think Turkey has had a very difficult 2021.
The economy plunged. We saw the currency plunge. Officially, I believe,
the inflation rate was almost close to 50 percent, and just incredible
pain--economic pain that COVID caused. Frankly, some of the governance
issues that Turkey has experienced, right--independence of the central
bank came under question--some of these issues are self-made. Those are
that side of things.
I think the other side of things, I think as Mr. Cohen talked
about, is the human rights record. Turkey is an important NATO ally and
a founding member of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe. As such, it has taken upon itself major commitments on
upholding human rights for its own citizens. This is not about United
States. This is not about OSCE. This is about Turkey and its own
citizens. Unfortunately, what we have seen, we see continued arrest of
journalists, including on Article 299, the controversial insulting the
president. We see people still languishing in prisons on dubious
charges. We see, frankly, a strong anti-immigrant sentiment--which,
again, it is a complex issue, but that resulted in some of the attacks
against Syrian-owned businesses and Syrian--[audio break].
All of this is with a background of Turkey saying that it wants--
reiterating time and again. Last month, President Erdogan talked--met
with Ambassadors of EU, said EU's--Turkey's path is toward the EU. The
commitment to join EU yet not upholding these values is--seems like a
contradiction. That is why we call this a conflict of--conflict of
interest, a question mark. I mean, there are all these issues
happening, but what is going on and how can we understand Turkey's
motivation? If we can understand them better, can we help Turkey--just
like any other country, it has its own issues--to live up to standards
that it has taken upon itself?
That is the--that is the briefing. That is what we want to do. I
think it is very important that--the prism through which we are looking
at this. Turkey is an important NATO ally, but it is important for
friends to have conversations--honest and frank conversations--and this
is what it is all about. It is toward an eye to improvement, to getting
a better relationship that we are holding this briefing.
Without further ado, I would like to introduce our--today's
excellent panelists. I am sure if you--again, you have been following
this world, you know both of them.
First, we have Soner Cagaptay. He is the director of Turkish
Research Program at the Washington Institute. You have seen his
multiple books he is an author of, fantastic. I highly recommend his
books. He has written extensively on the U.S.-Turkish relationship,
Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism. He is a columnist
for Turkey's oldest and most influential English-language paper and he
is a contributor to CNN. His books have been translated. They are in
English, but into Turkish, Italian, Greek, and Croatian. Thank you,
Soner, for joining us this morning.
We also have Deniz Yuksel. Deniz is a Turkey advocacy specialist at
Amnesty International. She previously had conducted research on Turkish
foreign policy in the Middle East and the U.S.-Turkey relationship,
Turkish domestic politics, refugees, human rights, and religious
freedom. She--prior to that, she designed and actually taught a human
rights education course in partnership with the Mother Child Education
Foundation in Istanbul, Turkey.
These are our panelists. What our--our whole thing is to have them,
our witnesses, present their testimoneys this morning, and then I am
really hoping for a lively Q&A conversation. Just a note on that:
Please submit your questions to everyone in the chat box so that way I
can see them and I will address them to our witnesses.
Thank you so much. Soner, we are going to start with you. If you
could just lay out the framework for Turkish foreign policy, and then
we can--we are going to go to Deniz, talk about domestic human rights,
and see if we can connect them up, and how we can use one to nudge the
other. Soner?
Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you so much, Bakhti. I wanted to start by, of
course, thanking you for setting this up. When you first contacted me
to set up this conversation a while ago, there was no looming war in
Ukraine. Indeed, Turkey's importance to the U.S. continues because
Turkey sits in a neighborhood surrounded by Iran, Iraq, Syria, formerly
ISIS-held territories, and, across the Black Sea, Russia. So whatever
U.S. policies are regarding those four countries and ISIS the entity,
they are much easier with Turkey onboard and less cumbersome and more
effective. I think it is really important, as you said, to see bigger
engagement with Turkey in these areas, but also important to see that
Turkey's democracy in the meantime, you know, perhaps recovers. Thanks
again for setting up this conversation.
I also wanted to thank Co-chair Mr. Cohen for joining us this
morning. I know he is very busy.
I am especially flattered to be on the same panel with Deniz
Yuksel, whose work I am a great fan of. What I would ask to do this
morning is to have a discussion a little bit on Turkish domestic
politics, but more on the foreign policy side, and then--and then turn
the mic over to Deniz.
I think on the domestic side, of course, the biggest story is that
Turkish President Erdogan, after he had an impressive run as prime
minister and president for almost 20 years, has sort of run to the end
of his popularity. This has a lot to do with Erdogan's quite bright
economic record until recently. He won, through his party--Justice and
Development Party, AKP--over a dozen nationwide elections on a platform
of strong economic growth. Erdogan lifted many people out of poverty.
He has increased access to services, improved access to the pie. There
is a bright side to his legacy and that has helped him win over a dozen
nationwide polls.
Turkey's economy under Erdogan went into recession for the first
time in 2018, and that is the main reason why he lost the elections for
Istanbul, Ankara, and other big cities. The economy has exited
recession, but the macro indicators do not look very good. Inflation is
skyrocketing, the highest it has been since Erdogan came to power;
unemployment is rising; and there is a general sense of establishment
fatigue, I guess, linked to the Erdogan administration that, yes, he
may have been the problem solver and the face of change in Turkey once,
but not anymore. That has to do with the opposition being resilient,
especially since the--winning Istanbul and Ankara and other big cities
in local elections.
I think that one of important takeaways of Turkey under Erdogan--
and Bakhti mentioned I have written Erdogan's biography, ``New
Sultan,'' which I have highlighted in that book also; shameless plug,
of course, I have a book in the background--I think that one of the
lessons of Turkey in the last 20 years under Erdogan is that the lesson
that this country provides is the opposite of Iraq and Afghanistan. If
the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan were that it takes a really long
time to build a democracy, the lesson of Turkey under Erdogan is that
it also takes a really long time to kill one. Turkish democracy is
resilient. It is not dead. Elections matter, and elections are next
year, 2023, and unless Mr. Erdogan delivers phenomenal economic growth
and restores his base again it is very unlikely that he is going to win
those elections.
I think that, of course, that does not mean Mr. Erdogan is going to
create a fair playing field. He controls over 90 percent of the media.
That is his illiberal side. His bright side is economic growth. Of
course, he is also a nativist populist leader. He has cracked down on
demographics unlikely to vote for him, brutalized them. Over the years,
he has eliminated checks and balances. He now appoints the majority of
judges to the high courts without a confirmation process. As I said
earlier, 90 percent of the media is controlled by businesses tied to
him or linked to him. The race for the next election, unfortunately,
will not be fair, but it will be free.
That is where Turkey's different than the country that most people
like to compare it to, Russia. I think that is a false analogy when it
comes to the country's democratic record. What happened in Turkey in
2019, Erdogan losing elections in big cities to liberal opposition
mayors, could never happen under Putin's Russia. Such a thing has
happened in other countries nearby such as in Hungary and Poland, where
similarly autocratic leaders--Orban and Kaczynski and Duda and their
allies--have lost Budapest and Warsaw to liberal opposition mayors,
respectively.
One of the reasons I love studying Turkey and writing about it is
that I believe if countries were vegetables, Turkey would be the
analytical onion, meaning it does not have an analytical core. You
analyze it, you think you got to it, and it evades you.
Here is a case study. Turkey under Erdogan, unfortunately, is not a
full democracy, but it is also not a dictatorship. I think that is
simplistic to call it as such. I think Turkey is a democracy that has
fallen under an autocrat. Just as in Hungary and Poland, there is great
potential for this democratic resilience to kick back. Of course, the
big issue there is that the opposition is now not only resilient since
their victories in big cities, but also unified.
I would say President Erdogan's biggest mistake in domestic
politics to date was his switch to an executive-style Presidential
system in 2018. Now, the system was supposed to make him more powerful.
Hypothetically, it did. It increased his powers. He is now head of
state; head of government; head of the police, which is a national
force; head of ruling party. Never before in Turkey's history of having
had--being a multiparty democracy--and the country held its first
elections in 1950--has an elected leader accumulated so much power.
Ironically, the switch to this new system, Presidential system, has
also unified Erdogan's opposition, because prior to that there was a
parliamentary democratic system, multiparty race. Six or even more
parties competed and Erdogan's party, AKP, could always win elections,
sometimes with as little as a third of the popular vote. That is not
the case anymore. Now he has to win half of the popular vote. Not only
is that impossible for him mathematically, but also the opposition,
which was constituted by disparate groups of Kurdish and Turkish
nationalists and liberals and conservatives who hated each other,
realized that the switch to a Presidential system requires a two-way
race and if they do not unify they will disappear. The opposition is
coalescing, and I think that is Mr. Erdogan's biggest challenge.
Of course, Erdogan is a very smart political player and I think we
should not underestimate his next moves. I think while trying to
restore economic growth he will, unfortunately, probably also implement
more autocratic measures. Deniz is more of an expert on these and I am
sure she will do a better job of explaining them than I can. I wanted
to look at Mr. Erdogan's foreign policy a little bit before I finish,
and this is, I think, also important because we are seeing a sort of a
pivot in Turkish foreign policy.
You know, Ankara is trying to restore ties with its Gulf--rich Gulf
neighbors, Emiratis and Saudis, as well as with Israel, with which ties
ruptured in 2010 during the flotilla incident and never recovered,
really, fully since. I think that is driven by a sense of isolation,
that some of these foreign policy adventures in the Middle East have
left Turkey more isolated than before. I agree with that. I think
Turkey's more isolated in the Middle East today than it has ever been
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. That is ironic because about
10 years ago, when Mr. Erdogan launched the foreign policy, the idea
was that Turkey should just not be second fiddle to the West; it should
go to the Middle East, where it can become a star-power nation by and
through leadership of Muslim-majority countries. This was supposed to
make Turkey the leading country in the Middle East. Now, of course,
Turkey is really an isolated country except for Qatar and the
internationally recognized government of Libya. It has no friends and
allies, so it is trying to reset with the Israelis, Egyptians,
Emiratis, and Saudis. I think those are going to move forward.
There is an important--another part of Mr. Erdogan's pivot: It is
to the United States and Europe. Bakhti mentioned that, and I think
that is important for us to highlight. It has a lot to do with a very
basic fact. I would say in the last 10 years Mr. Erdogan has made
efforts to change Turkey's identity at home toward a more Islamic one
and not so secular, and internationally toward a Middle Eastern one and
not so European. As I said earlier, Turkey is the analytical onion. I
think Turkey's identity can never be one. It has got multiple
identities. I would say in these efforts Mr. Erdogan has only had
limited success. Turkey retains its nonbinary and multiple identities.
There is a fact. Let us say Mr. Erdogan has succeeded to an extent
to change Turkey's identity at home to an Islamic one and
internationally to a Middle Eastern one. Turkey's economy is completely
integrated with that of the European Union because of customs union in
place since 1995 and as a resource-poor country Turkey needs financial
inflows to grow again. Enter ties with the United States.
Bismarck once famously said Turkey's the east if you come from the
west and west if you come from the east, which means when investors
decide if they are going to put money into Turkey they do not just look
at macro indicators; they also look at where Turkey's heading. They do
not want to be worried about Turkey leaving the West or heading in
another direction, and I think because of that Mr. Erdogan wants to
establish a narrative of good ties with President Biden. He is been
very patient in establishing that relationship. It took President Biden
92 days to call President Erdogan after taking office here in
Washington. Usually, presidents here when they take office call Turkey
within weeks or 2 weeks at max, so that was quite a delayed call. When
Mr. Biden called, he did not call President Erdogan to say, how are
you, can we have a chat or meeting. He called to say, oh, I am going to
recognize the Armenian genocide. Erdogan's reaction was not, oh, how
dare you, but he said, oh, can we still meet.
You see that he is really patient to establish a narrative of good
ties with the U.S., and there are some foreign policy openings in this
regard. Afghanistan could have been one. Turkey wanted to run the
airport in Kabul. That would have been an important lifeline with
coalition embassies and the outside world. Unfortunately, Taliban, you
know, bookended those dreams or that vision and--by taking the airport
and the city before Turkey could step in to run the airport. Ukraine, I
think, provides now a really important area of cooperation.
I can only remember until a few months ago people would be writing
op-eds saying let us kick Turkey out of NATO. I do not think you can
publish such an op-ed in any major U.S. newspaper now because
everybody's wondering what Turkey will do in the Ukraine crisis to help
the United States. Turkey's identity as a NATO member has been
recognized and underlined again. I think that is very important. Turkey
also appreciates NATO.
Ukraine is an interesting area because Turkey has very strong ties
with Ukraine, robust. Sells drones, which Ukraine uses to attack
Russian separatists as well as Russian hardware threatening the
country. Turkey also has to balance its ties with Ukraine with its, you
know, important relationship with Russia. I would--I will say the
following three--I will leave you guys with the following three
assertions before I turn the floor to Deniz, in terms of Turkey's
Ukraine policy.
No. 1, Turkey will not deny Russia with access to the Black Sea
through the Bosporus. It will keep its policy of kind of try not to
anger the military giant to the north.
No. 2, Turkey will adopt a neutral tone. If there is a conflict and
war, it will, you know, basically have a middle-of-the-line rhetoric.
Behind closed doors--and we may not see this or read about it in the
media--Turkey will support Kyiv militarily. I think that is a very
important takeaway for the U.S. Government and others on the Hill,
that, you know, this is really, I think, going to be an important
indigenous area of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, because Turkey views
Ukraine's sovereignty important for a variety of reasons. Tatars who
live on the Crimean Peninsula, recently annexed illegally by Russia,
are linked to Turks ethnically and religiously, and Turkey will never
accept, therefore, Russia's annexation of Crimea. It will always defend
Ukraine's sovereignty.
Also, Turkey sees Ukraine as it sees other Black Sea countries, as
important partners in establishing a balance of power against Russia in
the Black Sea. Russia is a giant navy military power, nuclear power of
course. Turkey sees not just Ukraine, but Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia,
Moldova, all around the Black Sea as important partners, and it will
not allow Ukraine to fall under Russia or Kyiv to be flipped by a coup
or other kind of Russian intervention.
I think this is really important for us to look at moving forward.
With that, let me end and turn the floor over to Deniz.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Soner. I really, really appreciate
that.
Deniz, please.
Mr. Yuksel: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here
speaking alongside my esteemed colleagues and, of course, Dr. Cagaptay,
who I have had the pleasure of working with before joining Amnesty. Of
course, thank you, Chairman Cohen, so much for joining this very timely
conversation today.
Today, I actually want to draw your attention to what I feel very
comfortable at this point referring to as Turkey's human rights crisis.
This crisis began in 2015 with the collapse of the fragile peace
process between the Turkish State and the armed Kurdistan Worker's
Party, the PKK, and it intensified following a failed coup attempt in
July 2016. The Turkish government declared a State of emergency,
granting the executive branch dangerous powers. Constitutional changes
adopted in this period under the State of emergency extended executive
control over the institution responsible for the appointment and
dismissal of judges and prosecutors. These developments have seriously
undermined the independence and integrity of the Turkish judicial
system and, consequently, human rights.
The State of emergency ended in 2018, but new laws ensured that the
executive branch could retain these broad powers and continue
exercising control over an increasingly partisan judiciary. In fact,
you will learn from the rest of my testimony that abusive judicial
practices are at the center of Turkey's human rights crisis. From the
record-breaking imprisonment of journalists to the persecution of LGBTI
people, an ongoing crisis of gender-based violence, and the unlawful
deportation of refugees, the failures of Turkey's judicial system cut
across societal lines and undermine the human rights of all.
Opposition politicians, lawyers, journalists, human rights
defenders, and academics are among scores of people imprisoned for
months and sometimes even years pending trial in Turkey, often without
any evidence of wrongdoing. The government uses overly broad terrorism
laws to crack down on real and perceived opponents. The imprisonment of
high-profile critics has had a chilling effect on Turkish society more
broadly, sending a dangerous message that anyone who dares to speak out
will suffer the same fate.
Turkey's partisan judiciary routinely targets lawfully elected
opposition politicians, particularly in the country's mainly Kurdish
southeast. Two former Co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic
Party, the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, remain
imprisoned, convicted of terrorism charges, which in the absence of
credible evidence, were largely based on their public speeches. Dozens
of HDP members continue to be prosecuted, and the party itself faces a
highly problematic closure case, ahead general elections in 2023.
Amnesty International has documented credible reports that indicate
an increase in allegations of torture and other ill-treatment in
detention. In September 2020, two villagers in the eastern Van province
suffered severe injuries after being detained by soldiers and boarded
on a helicopter. The soldiers involved in the incident reported that
the man had attempted to escape by jumping off the helicopter, but in
reality they would been subjected to a brutal beating by the soldiers.
One of the men, Servet Turgut, later died of his injuries, and
journalists who covered the case were detained. More than a year later,
there has been little progress in investigating these allegations and
ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice.
Those who call out such abuses in Turkey risk being persecuted
themselves, mired in the government's crackdown on civil society. Since
the 2016 coup attempt, authorities have shuttered hundreds of NGO's,
depriving those that need them of vital support. Among them are Kurds,
LGBTI people, survivors of gender-based violence, children, and
refugees. The government uses anti-terror laws to attack human rights
defenders, including Amnesty Turkey staff and members, all in an effort
to criminalize peaceful activism.
Turkish philanthropist and human rights defender Osman Kavala has
spent over 4 years in pretrial detention, despite calls from the U.S.
and EU for his release. Osman Kavala is a peaceful civil society leader
who had dedicated his life to promoting dialog between Turkey's Muslim
Turkish majority and Kurdish, Armenian, and other minorities. Kavala's
case is well known not just because of his celebrated civil society
work, but also because of the deliberate cruelty of his legal ordeal.
In February 2020, a Turkish court acquitted Kavala and ordered his
release, but he was quickly rearrested in a separate, but equally
baseless, case. This glimpse of freedom must have been unimaginably
painful for his friends and family, who just hours earlier had
celebrated his release in a crowded courtroom.
Kavala's case is emblematic of thousands of people arbitrarily
detained in Turkish prisons in the context of these politically
motivated charges. The European Court of Human Rights has made
judgments calling on Turkey to release a number of these political
detainees, including Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtas. Although the
court's decisions are binding, Turkish authorities have refused to
implement them, and continue to unlawfully imprison both men. In fact,
Turkish official, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have
repeatedly asserted that these rulings do not apply to Turkey. Of
course, these statements are verifiably false, and have implications
beyond these two cases. They obstruct Turkish courts' treaty obligation
to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
Further, Turkey's persistent non-implementation of ECHR judgments
threatens the authority of the European Human Rights System more
broadly. If Turkey can reject these judgments without consequence, why
not Hungary, Poland, or others? That is why Amnesty International
welcomed the Council of Europe's decision this month to launch
infringement proceedings in the case of Kavala v. Turkey. We hope that
the potential consequences of infringement--which range from the
suspension of Turkey's voting rights to expulsion from the Council
altogether--will provide incentive for Turkish authorities to free
Osman Kavala and end this incomprehensible injustice once and for all.
Despite the Turkish government's efforts to criminalize peaceful
dissent, Turkey is still home to a resilient civil society. Human
rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and everyday people continue to
risk their freedom and well-being to protest the government's human
rights abuses. The U.S. Government must stand in solidarity with them,
and support their efforts to create a more free, a more just, and
stable Turkey. The Biden administration's stated commitment to
upholding universal rights at home and abroad is welcome. In Turkey
too, the United States should put human rights first.
All U.S. officials at all levels must raise human rights concerns
in every engagement with Turkish authorities, as well as in every
speech and every statement on Turkey. A stronger focus on human rights
will not hurt other U.S. interests and, most importantly, it is the
right thing to do. Specifically, the U.S. Government should urge
Turkish authorities to respect judicial independence, bring anti-terror
legislation in line with international law and, of course, end the
crackdown on peaceful dissent. U.S. officials should call on Turkey to
promptly implement ECHR judgments, including by releasing Osman Kavala
and Selahattin Demirtas.
U.S. diplomats should convey to Turkish authorities that banning
the HDP, Turkey's third-largest political party, would be a major step
backward for freedom of expression, and severely damage the prospects
for a peaceful and enduring resolution to the conflict between Turkish
authorities and the PKK. The U.S. should call on the Turkish government
to launch prompt investigations into all allegations of torture and
other human rights abuses and detention. The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey
and his staff should meet regularly with local human rights defenders
and CSO representatives and make public statements of support. They
should visit activists in prison and attend trials of human rights
defenders and civil society activists.
There are also specific actions Members of Congress can take to
address Turkey's human rights crisis. Members should support a public
hearing which highlights the Turkish government's human rights abuses
and includes the testimonies of affected communities. Members should
participate in the Lantos Commission Defending Freedoms Project, and
advocate on behalf of prisoners of conscience from Turkey. Members
should regularly raise concerns with the State Department and directly
with the Turkish government, through actions such as dear colleague
letters, floor statements, resolutions, and so on.
Member-level and staff delegations to Turkey must include prep
meetings with human rights organizations prior to their visit, and also
once on the ground in Turkey. Finally, members should consider
providing additional funding for grassroots organizations in Turkey,
and continue funding critical programs, like the lifeline, embattled,
CSO assistance fund. These measures are critical to ensure that Turkish
civil society can survive Turkey's ongoing human rights crisis.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and comments.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Deniz. This has been both eye-
opening and disturbing. I think the theme from both of your testimonies
is that there are challenges--there are serious challenges--but also
there are some opportunities. I think that is the goal of the briefing
today is to identify those opportunities. My first question--and,
again, I would like to--I would like to ask if Co-Chairman Cohen, if
you might have some questions for our witnesses and also open this up
to other people. Again, feel free to use the chat box function and ask
a question. Co-Chairman, did you have any questions just to follow-up
on these two testimonies?
Co-chair Cohen: Thank you. I appreciate it, and I appreciate the--I
failed to mention, which I guess I consider it a given, but it is not a
given, how Turkey has been our friend in so many areas. That iis one of
the reason I was proud to be, and have been proud to be a Co-chair of
the Turkey Caucus. They have worked with us. They have been friendly
with Israel on and off, but more on. I think there is a visit coming up
soon where they are reestablishing their previous relations. They have
been a strong member of NATO and a member of the European Union. They--
I have had soldiers, older people, who have told me how they fought
with them in the Korean War, and how much they respected that. That
memory still exists in current folks, and it has been passed on to me.
I would--I am concerned a little bit about the Turkish attitude
toward the Kurds. The PKK is a terrorist organization, and they were
doing a lot of terror when I was there. I think it was 2008 or 2007.
There was a lot of activities of bombings in Turkey, in Istanbul. All
the Kurds are not terrorists. Indeed, the Kurdish people in northern
Iraq have a good reputation and had a good reputation during the Iraqi
War. Certainly the Kurds in Syria have worked with us, the United
States, against ISIS and have been our friends. I would like your
thoughts, either one of you, on how Turkey is treating Kurds in
general. I know you mentioned the arrest of the two members of the
parliament, but in general are Kurds being discriminated against in
Turkey and how do they distinguish between the Kurds in Iraq and the
Kurds in Syria, and their concerns about their being terrorist
organizations as well?
Mr. Yuksel: I am happy to take this question. Thank you for this
very relevant question, Chairman Cohen. You are absolutely right, the
Turkish government's crackdown on human rights in general affects
marginalized and minority communities more acutely, and the Kurds in
particular, who have, of course, been repressed by successive Turkish
governments for decades. I think one issue that is particularly timely,
you know, leading into an election year--and I sort of refer to it in
my testimony a little bit as well--is the repression of Kurdish
communities' political rights, right? The big case right now that we
have to be watching is the closure case facing the HDP, the pro-Kurdish
party which represents the interests and the votes of millions and
millions of people.
At the root of this case in 2016 was the Turkish legislature's vote
to remove the parliamentary immunities of dozens of HDP MPs. That
opened the way for countless investigations and prosecutions and, of
course, the detention of HDP leaders. These cases are currently at the
basis of the government's efforts to shut down the party itself, and of
course, it is part of the government's larger crackdown on Kurdish
political expression, Kurdish civil society, and so on. I wanted to
raise this because there is a recent development that pertains to this
case. And that is the ruling, I think earlier this month by the
European Court of Human Rights, which said that the removal of the HDP
MPs' immunity back in 2016, which formed the basis for all of these
prosecutions, was actually a violation of these parliamentarians' human
rights and a violation of their freedom of expression.
This case is really important as a development while we are still
going through this closure case against the HDP because now it brings
into question whether all the cases that were brought against the
individuals which the government is using in its argument to shut down
the organization itself, it brings into question whether those are
legitimate, whether those were done lawfully, and in fair trial
processes. So with these in mind, it is really clear that the closure
case is a very problematic one. We are headed into an election year.
Also because there has not been a permanent resolution, as you referred
to in your comments. To the conflict between the Turkish State and the
PKK. As the representative of million and millions of people, the HDP
has a critical role to play, along with the Turkish State, in ensuring
an enduring resolution to this conflict. So it is a major step backward
on both of those fronts. Thank you for raising that.
Co-chair Cohen: I appreciate your response. I understand that, and
I agree it is a serious issue. Are there not quite a few members of the
party that represents Kurdish people, I guess it is the HDP, in the
parliament? How are they responding to this? Also back to the issue
about how--you know, Turkey, when I bring this issue up with them--and
I appreciate your remarks about what Congress can do. I know I have,
and I believe my Co-chairs have joined me, particularly Congressman
Connolly, we have expressed our regret to the Turkish government on
many occasions for human rights abuses--many, many occasions. They
always respond when you ask them about Kurds in Iraq or in Syria, that
they are just kind of cousins or something. They are all part of the
same anti-Turkish terrorist-type organization. Have you noticed any
distinction between how they treat the Kurds, or their attitude toward
the Kurds in Iraq and Syria? Or do they feel they are supporting the
PKK?
Mr. Yuksel: Thank you for that question. I think that description
at least of the Turkish government's view of Kurdish communities, you
know, in Turkey and abroad, I think that is an accurate one. I think
their actions do reflect this very, very problematic idea of Kurds--and
there is millions and millions of Kurds around the world, right? It is
impossible for all of them to be involved in one organization or
another. It is just a very inhumane way of looking at a community, and
a very discriminatory and bigoted way to be associating all parts of a
community with one particular organization, which is of course not the
case, and could not be the case.
I think we are seeing that not just in the political repression
domestically of the Kurds, which I talked about a little bit, but also
in the Turkish government's foreign operations, particularly, as you
mentioned, in Syria and in northern Iraq as well. I mean, in Syria we
saw Turkish forces and Turkish-backed groups, including some of which
are reported to be directly armed by Turkey, engaging in serious human
rights violations, some of which amount to war crimes, including
enforced disappearances, unlawful killings, indiscriminate attacks on,
you know, schools and civilian areas, which have resulted in, you know,
a great number of civilian deaths and casualties as well.
I think there has not really been an effort--you know, there has
been several years since these operations have first started, back in
2016, and there has not really been a serious effort to hold the
Turkish State and the groups it has supported and worked with
accountable for these human rights abuses. We have no guarantee that
Turkey is not going to launch another operation which is going to
involve, you know, another set of serious crimes against civilians
there. Thank you for raising that.
Co-chair Cohen: Now, would you like to add anything, sir?
Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you, Congressman. I agree with everything that
Deniz said. I think it is an important human rights issue in Turkey,
obviously. I think that the party elected to the parliament should be
treated like all other parties elected to parliament. I will stand with
that.
Co-chair Cohen: Thank you. The only other thing I would like to
mention is Hussein Ibish had a really nice piece today about UAE and
Turkey, and how they are getting kind of back together. I think there
was a visit on Valentine's Day, how appropriate. They seem to be
getting together, and it shows Erdogan is seeing the realities because
of economic problems in Turkey and reuniting or establishing new
relationships. That is a bad reason, but good result. I yield back.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, Congressman--Co-Chairman Cohen, thank you
so much for your comments. Also we would all like to acknowledge your
leadership on this issue. You have been a proponent of a stronger
engagement with Turkey, a principled engagement with Turkey. We
appreciate everything you have done. I think you and Congressman
Connolly's efforts never go unnoticed. Thank you so much. To all of us
who watch Turkey, you are one of those leaders who have done much and
more to make sure Turkey, again, lives up to its potential.
One question that we got here, and maybe, Soner, I do not know if
you would like to take that. The question is: Would you like--would you
say there is a correlation--and, Deniz, please feel free to jump in as
well--would you say there is a correlation between Turkey's movement
away from secularism and an increase in intolerance toward religious
minorities? I think it is a really good question. You have pointed out
in your opening remarks that Turkey, you know, there is an effort to
move away from secularism. What kind of an impact does it have on
Turkish minorities--on minorities in Turkey?
Mr. Cagaptay: Absolutely. Let me step in. I am sure Deniz can add a
lot more. No, I think that actually giving him credit and being fair,
under President Erdogan, back when he was prime minister during his
first decade in power, Turkey actually saw an era of increased rights
and liberties for non-Muslim communities. These are very small
communities in the context of Turkish demographics. Turkey's population
is 84 million people and non-Muslim communities add up to just about,
you know, 0.1 percent of the total population at this stage. You know,
I think a democracy is a real one not when it protects large groups,
but when it protects small and vulnerable groups. In this regard, there
was a lot of progress, improved liberties for non-Muslim communities in
the first decade of Erdogan's rule.
Now we have seen perhaps a reversal of that. Rising anti-Semitism I
think is a huge concern in Turkey, and hate speech that is oftentimes
endorsed by people as high up--government ministers targeting these
communities, also a very serious concern. So I would say maybe legally
rights and liberties have been expanded, but also we have seen a really
dramatic rise in hate speech targeting mostly Jews, but also Armenians
and Christians at the same time. Very problematic trends. I think, as I
said earlier, you know, the strength of a democracy is not when it
protects a group that is a third of the population. It is when it
protects a group that is one thousandth of the population. I think in
this regard there is a lot the Turkish government can do.
Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Thank you so much. Another question that
we have, and I think this sort of gets to the core of what we are
trying to discuss here, is to what extent the cooperation between
Turkey and the United States and EU on the Ukraine crisis, amid the
Ukraine crisis, would affect their stance on human rights issues in
Turkey. I think we have talked about it a little bit, but I think that
is always a concern. If we increase that, you know, mil-to-mil
cooperation, will--is the United States and the EU--are we going to be
more silent on human rights issues that are happening in Turkey? Maybe
both of you--Soner and Deniz--maybe you could both sort of try that?
Yes.
Mr. Cagaptay: Sure, let me go first--or, Deniz, unless you want to
jump in?
Mr. Nishanov: Soner, please.
Mr. Cagaptay: All right. I will go first then. Thank you. Yes, I
think that the administration's policy regarding Turkey is to create
three silos, since President Biden took office. The first silo include
areas of disagreement, that is two topics under it. Of course,
continued U.S. cooperation with Kurdish People's Protection Forces, YPG
in Syria. Although the YPG helps U.S. fight ISIS, or contain it,
rather, at this stage, there is a problem. The YPG's an offshoot of
PKK, Kurdistan Worker's Party, that is a terror-designated entity.
There is no way Turkish government or Turkish public will embrace that
policy, and that is a serious issue of discord.
The other side of it, of course, is Turkey's purchase of Russian-
made S-400 missile defense system, for which Turkey has been
sanctioned. It is impossible for U.S. Government to embrace that
policy. The first silo--or, area of discord includes these two items.
The Biden administration, in my view, has decided to kind of
compartmentalize and say: Let us put these aside, let us not focus on
these areas of disagreement. They are looking actually for areas of
engagement--Afghanistan, Ukraine.
Ukraine is a big one. It seems to be NATO's biggest test since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps since the war in Bosnia, in terms
of its area of operation being Europe, and the conflict brewing, of
course. I think Turkey, if Turkey helped the United States, even if
this is behind closed doors and militarily, as I am predicting, because
Mr. Erdogan does not want to anger President Putin in Moscow, that will
be--create a positive sentiment toward Turkey. The question is, you
know, can Turkey get away with broader human rights abuses and more
autocratic measures at home?
The third silo that the Biden administration has created in regards
to its policy on Turkey is that it also wants to have a human rights
compartment where it engages Turkey on this area. I will refer to Deniz
on this, Ms. Yuksel, to see if the Biden administration has been
forthcoming of keeping its promise of engaging Turkey on this--in this
area. As the question highlights I think, yes, there is a potential
here that if Turkish assistance to the U.S. regarding Ukraine is
significant, as invisible as it might be to the public eye, of course
that that would allow--not so much, I think, in the eyes of the U.S.
public, not necessarily--but in the eyes of many European governments,
who already have a pragmatic relationship with Turkey, to sort of turn
their head the other way.
Europe and Turkey have a more intimate relationship than do United
States and Turkey, because Turkey's part of Europe. It sits on the edge
of the European continent as well. Crisis in Turkey has the potential
to export itself to Europe faster, and quicker, and easier than, of
course, would be the case into the United States. Refugee crisis is one
that recently got transported from Turkey to Europe. I think that
European countries, especially Germany, have a more pragmatic view of
ties with Turkey. They engage Turkey's government. They raise their
human rights concerns on the side.
Overall, I think that Turkey's autocratic slide under President
Erdogan has become so severe, you know, those of you who follow me on
Twitter may know that I am a map nerd. I just saw the map this morning
looking at how countries are colored in terms of their democracies.
Turkey is the only country other than Belarus and Russia on the
continent that is now considered hybrid and not democratic, and not
even a flawed one. It is hard for me at this stage to see what kind of
a hall pass Turkish government would get, even if it helped everyone
else in Ukraine, because the democratic slide under Mr. Erdogan is so
severe.
I think maybe some cosmetic statements here and there, but broadly
speaking, given how unfair the democratic playing field is, and given
the increased nature of autocratic crackdown inside Turkey in the runup
to elections that I am predicting, it will be impossible, I think, for
anyone to put lipstick on the pig and say, this is fine. We can deal
with it. I hope that expression translates well in Turkish. I just made
it up. [Laughter.]
Mr. Nishanov: It was excellent.
Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you.
Mr. Yuksel: Thank you.
Mr. Nishanov: Deniz, please.
Mr. Yuksel: I think, Dr. Cagaptay, you are the expert when it comes
to foreign policy and defense issues. I think sometimes we do tend to
over-compartmentalize human rights, and see it as something that, you
know, does not have any links to the issues that we are talking about
when it comes to security and so on. I think we should really avoid
doing that, and that is sort of, like, a simplistic way of viewing
things. I would--for example, in this case, in the case in Ukraine,
there is talk of Turkey supplying drones to the Ukraine. I would really
like to caution people on this call, given credible media reports
during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that Azeri forces used Turkish
drones to carry out disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on
civilian areas.
There is a history of Turkey supplying drones, perhaps in good
faith, to its partners, to other countries, and then not really
overseeing how these drones are being used. It is also raised the
question of whether U.S. parts are being used in these Turkish drones,
and therefore implicated in unlawful killings and attacks on civilian
areas. I mean, we have laws here in the U.S., the Leahy laws and the
Foreign Assistance Act, which obligates us to be considering these
human rights aspects. Even when we are talking about what seems to be a
purely defense and security issue, these human rights obligations still
exist.
Given this history, I think implications of Turkish support or how
Turkey can be positioned to, you know, benefit the interests of the
United States, has to be considered alongside other factors given, you
know, this administration's commitments to human rights, and also
every, you know, country who is, you know, signed these treaties has
commitments to human rights and has to consider them in every context.
Thank you.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Deniz.
Let us go to the next question. I think this is, again, important.
I think we have alluded a little bit to the elections--upcoming
elections in Turkey. In addition to the more long-standing problems
noted in the presentation, are there any that require additional
attention, given the upcoming elections this year? Would you expect
further crackdowns on media, for example?
Deniz, if you would like to take that. Soner, please feel free to
jump in.
Mr. Yuksel: Absolutely. I think the No. 1, you know, issue that I
would like to highlight with relation to the elections is the closure
case against the HDP. I know I have already extensively talked about
that, so I guess we can also talk about some other things that, you
know, we would not be surprised to see leading into an election year.
Even at this point, you know, journalistic freedoms and highly, highly
limited in Turkey.
You know, dozens of media workers are persecuted for performing the
most basic and most foundational acts of their professions, right?
Cartoonists have been arrested for drawing cartoons, and reporters have
been arrested for interviewing controversial guests. This is all, you
know, an effort to criminalize journalism itself. It becomes even more
important leading into an election year, when the government has even
more incentive to crack down on criticism and to crack down on dissent.
We are seeing signs of that already. We have heard from Erdogan's
communications director a few months ago, signaled that there might be
additional legislation coming to further regulate media organizations
in Turkey. We also have seen recently the Turkish media watchdog has
started to implement an existing law regarding the extra, you know,
regulations place upon foreign media organizations. Voice of America,
in fact, has been affected by this. They have put out a statement
saying that no matter what they are going to try to do their best to
provide accurate and timely information to the people of Turkey.
Accurate and timely information is especially important in a time
of election, especially when you have folks that are protesting the
economic situation, and so on. Accurate information is really, really
important for everybody's well-being and safety and, of course, for the
integrity of the elections themselves. I would be really, really
closely watching this issue. Again, would not be surprised to see the
crackdown deepening in the next year or so.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, Deniz.
Soner, I wonder if you have any thoughts on this? Specifically, I
think, it would be--you would mentioned that the elections are going to
be free, but they are not going to be fair. I think this is a very,
very, very good point. If you could sort of talk a little bit about why
they would not be fair.
Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you, again. I will just follow what Deniz left.
Elections have not been fair for a while. They were free and fair, and
Mr. Erdogan deserves credit for winning free and fair elections for
almost 15 years--strong popular support, basically driven by the
phenomenal economic growth that he delivered. That is why he is in
trouble, because since the economy entered into recession now he needs
to win elections--continues to win elections, as he sees it, but not
free any--not fair anymore, of course, I think. Ninety percent of
conventional media is controlled by businesses that are loyal to him,
some are directly linked to him. He appoints majority of judges to the
high courts without a confirmation process. He controls electoral
boards. The race is definitely not fair.
It remains free, and in my view, it will be free. That is because
Turkey is democratically resilient. What it means is that Turkey has
been having free and fair elections longer than has been Spain. The
country's first free and fair elections were held in 1950. That means
four generation of Turkish citizens have been voting in elections.
People know how to vote, and they love to vote. Turnout in Turkey is 85
percent. Impressive compared to the turnout rates we get here in the
U.S. Not only that, but people protect their vote.
Mr. Erdogan lost a first round Istanbul election in March 2019,
very narrow margin. He thought that because he controls institutions--
media, electoral boards--he could repeat the elections and win them. He
claimed there was fraud. There was an insignificant margin of 13,000
votes in a city of 15 million people. He thought that he could make up
for that margin easily in the repeat round that took place in June same
year. Guess what? He lost that second round by nearly a 1 million vote
margin--800,000, to be precise.
That is democratic resilience for you, right? That is for citizens
who voted for him saying, that is not fair. You lost. You know, you get
one chance. You lose, you step down. Opposition organized a massive
campaign, protect the vote, 100,000 volunteers, who went with their
smartphones, documented the tally. Turkish law allows any citizen to
observe the vote count, and Turks love to do that. On top of it, these
volunteers slept on top of the ballot boxes, literally, to prevent any
rigging. I think that the vote will be unfair, but it will be free, and
that is a big challenge for Mr. Erdogan.
Just also answering the question a little bit deeper, I do expect,
as Ms. Yuksel said, further demonization of the opposition. There is a
little bit of domestic baseball, if I can explain. The opposition bloc
has informal and formal partners, but it has one large party, a
secular, leftist Republican People's Party, CHP, main opposition. It
has--the bloc has two wings. Formally, the Turkish nationalist Iyi
Party--I-Y-I--of Meral Aksener, and informally HDP, pro-Kurdish
liberalized People's Democratic Party, are in the bloc. HDP's going to
support it from outside for a variety of things to do with the dynamics
of the opposition, but they are part of the same bloc.
I think what Mr. Erdogan will do is he will demonize the HDP in
order to force--as the HDP being a pro-Kurdish force with a large
Kurdish nationalist constituency, he is going to demonize the HDP
further so as to push Turkish nationalist Iyi Party to abandon the
opposition bloc. He knows that--Mr. Erdogan knows that he will lose the
race--he will lose the elections in a two-way race. That is his own
doing, because the switch to the Presidential system in 2018 has
created this two-way race, because it has, you know, eliminated the
multiparty parliamentary democratic race. Now Mr. Erdogan wants to
create a three-way race. For that, he is demonizing the Kurdish
nationalist opposition in order to force the Turkish nationalist party
in the bloc to abandon the opposition.
To put it very simply, Mr. Erdogan will win in a three-way race. He
will lose in a two-way race. I think that is why we are going to see,
unfortunately, more demonization of the opposition. There will be other
steps. For instance, crackdown on social media. With Mr. Erdogan having
taken control over 90 percent of conventional media--and, again, Turkey
has been a democracy and they have had free press for almost four
generations now. You know, people, if they see government dictating
headlines to 90 percent of papers and primetime, you know, networks,
they will not read the news anymore.
Citizens and voters and news consumers are migrating in droves to
social media platforms, where you have independent journalists who have
millions of followers who do video, who do podcasts, who do tweets. I
think you will see a bigger crackdown on these platforms that provide
for new avenues of journalism, free, of course, areas of journalism. I
would say that is another area to watch. Maybe if you want to help
Turkish elections be free, you know, allow for these platforms to
remain free. That is important.
It is ultimately up to Turkey's citizens to decide who they like
and who they want to see in power. That vote, though it may not be
fair, I think will be free. It will be important. Turkish elections
matter. Right now they are scheduled for June 2023. I think those are
going to be the most historic elections in the history of the Turkish
Republic, since the first free and fair elections in 1950.
Mr. Nishanov: That is a great point. It is a great overview. Thank
you so much, and it is a perfect segue to our next question, which is--
[audio break]--so CHP chairman, opposition leader, came out--[audio
break]--that elections could take place as soon as this fall, almost a
year ahead of the scheduled date in summer 2023. Do you think this is
likely?
Soner, maybe you will take it. Deniz, please feel free to jump in
as well.
Mr. Cagaptay: Sorry, Bakhti, you got cutoff for a second. Was this
about whether early elections are likely?
Mr. Nishanov: Yes. Yes. I am sorry--yes. I do apologize. Yes.
Mr. Cagaptay: So--
Mr. Nishanov: Do you think snap election--early election is likely?
Yes.
Mr. Cagaptay: I think--I mean, technically, yes. Actually, it is in
the interests Mr. Erdogan. The new constitution he put in place, or
amendments, rather, that created the executive style Presidential
system in 2018 give him two additional--two terms. There are still term
limits, but the law also says that if the parliament is dissolved
before the end of his one term, that gives Mr. Erdogan a third term. It
is in his interest to have early elections, either this term or, if he
wins, next term, in order to add one more term to his tenure. He might
do it this time, but probably not because if elections were held today,
he would not win them. If elections were held in 6 months, I think he
still would not win them--meaning, getting 50 percent.
That is a lot to do with the economic problems in the country.
After phenomenal growth, 15 years of prosperity, Turkish citizens are
coming down hard, economically speaking. I think Mr. Erdogan's interest
is to have growth--phenomenal, double-digits, if he can--for at least a
year so citizens will forget the hardships of the economic crisis, and
pandemic-related shrinking as well. These are independent factors, but
they have been compounded in Turkey. You had indigenous economic
problems, and COVID-related economic problems. They are both now adding
up to each other. I think Mr. Erdogan is more interested in having at
least a year of strong growth, waiting until June 2023, before he will
do elections, because if he did elections after a few months of growth
it will not be enough for citizens to forget the hardship they went
through for at least 4 years.
He has got really a multitude of problems here, and that has to do
with his own success, right? The economy was so good, people were so
prosperous, that they are finding it hard now to adjust to the new
reality of skyrocketing inflation. Thirty percent this year, high
unemployment, double digits already. That is unusual because citizens
lived so well for so long under Mr. Erdogan. Perhaps he is a victim--he
is a victim of his own economic success. Citizens are finding it very
hard to embrace economic downturn, inflation, and unemployment. I think
that this stage my vote will be for elections on time.
Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Deniz, anything you would like to add to
this?
Mr. Yuksel: No. I think this is all really great analysis. I will
just say that one person knows the answer and he is not on this panel
today, unfortunately. [Laughter.] but--
Mr. Nishanov: Next time we will have to make sure to invite him,,
but sorry, yes. Yes. Thank you. Thank you. To be clear, we did invite
Turkish government representatives, and they mulled it over, and we
appreciate their consideration. For various reasons, they could not
join us this morning. Again, this is--again, this is in the spirit of
cooperation and coordination. This briefing--that is the spirit of this
briefing.
Well, one more question. I know we went over time, but if you guys
can stay feel free to, and then maybe we could just--yes, maybe we
could try to wrap it up maybe in the next 10 minutes. So--and this one
is very complementary to you, Dr. Cagaptay. How do you--Dr. Soner--how
do you conceive of the foreign policy of Turkey on East Asia,
especially China and South Asia regions? I love your work on ``New
Sultan: Erdogan and the Price of Modern Turkey.'' Great analysis with
various perspectives covered. There you go.
Mr. Cagaptay: Well, thank you, Bakhti. Please call me Soner. China
is an important piece of the puzzle. I think that Mr. Erdogan's
reelection strategy, of course, as we have debated it, depends on
returning strong economic growth. For which, he wants to get along with
the U.S. and Europe. Turkey being part of Europe economically, he wants
to increase investment. The major source of FDI coming to Turkey is
still European, notwithstanding Mr. Erdogan's efforts to change
Turkey's identity. Economically, this is a European country. He wants
to get along well with President Biden, to create a narrative of good
ties with the U.S. so that markets will invest in Turkey again.
He also, Mr. Erdogan also has to get along with Russia. President
Putin has many levers. Russians were No. 1 among the arrivals to Turkey
before the pandemic. Turkey has a very large tourism industry. In fact,
it is among the--always among the top 10, sometimes top five most
visited countries in the world. If anybody on this call has not visited
Turkey, you guys should go and visit. There is great food, of course,
that helps. The bottom line is the Russians are No. 1 among--were among
number-one arrivals to Turkey. Ten million Russians visited Turkey
before the pandemic. Maybe this summer 15 million will come and visit.
That is over $10 billion added to Turkey's economy. That is how Turkey
will bounce back from economic recession.
Trade is an important part of the piece with Russia also. I think
one of the reason why Turkish support to the U.S. regarding Ukraine w
ill not be public is because Turkish President Erdogan does not want to
cross Vladimir Putin. He does not want to trigger retaliatory measures
by Russia in case of overt Turkish assistance to Ukraine. These
measures by Russia could include sanctions. Putin could tell Russian
tourists, do not go to Turkey. Go to Egypt. There is zero cost to him.
He could ban Turkish exports. Usually he does that when he is angry at
Turkey for political reasons. He has health excuses, or alibi, rather.
So--and if he did that, you know, trade sanctions and tourism boycott
could shave off a few percent points from Turkey's growth, and with
that, of course, undermine President Erdogan's reelection prospects.
China comes in similarly. I think that President Erdogan has relied
on China for soft loans, especially to build megaprojects, with the
drawing off of FDI coming to Turkey, now that many people consider
Turkey too unstable and risky to invest. President Erdogan's economic
growth model is now driven by megaprojects. These are giant
reconstruction projects, mostly bridges, tunnels, high-speed rail
lines, metro lines. The Chinese have played a big role in funding
these. The Chinese central bank has also established a swap line to
Turkish central bank to help it sustain currency crisis. I think
President Erdogan wants to not anger Beijing as well.
That is a tall order. He has to get along well with Washington, the
EU, Moscow, and Beijing all at the same time, while resetting ties with
Israel and rich Gulf neighbors. He is also hoping, I think, for
investment from the Gulf to restore economic growth. I think Chinese
policymakers are quite smart. They know that President Erdogan wants to
court them, but they also know that Turkey is among the hub--one of
the--is actually, I would say, the biggest hub of the Uyghur diaspora
globally. There is a Uyghur diaspora here in Northern Virginia, in
Germany. These are more recent diaspora hubs. Turkey has been a hub
since 1949, since the Chinese Communist Party took physical control of
Xinjiang, at the time called East Turkestan. Everybody in Beijing and
their uncles know the fact that Uyghur leadership is in Turkey.
I think that the Chinese are not going to be super crazy about
bailing Turkey out, but at the moment, President Erdogan wants to
maintain moderately good ties with China. Turkey has been absent from
any condemnation of Chinese policy targeted at Uyghurs and their
persecution of the Uyghur Community. I think that has a lot to do with
President Erdogan's own reelection prospects. I would say, as Deniz
said, only one person knows when elections will be held, if they are
early or not, and I would say the other takeaway of this conversation,
if you want to kind of have a talking point writing to your bosses or
to media or to anybody else, or summarizing it just for yourself,
Turkish politics is all about Erdogan now. It is all about Erdogan
winning the next elections. He will do whatever it takes to get to that
goal. That also includes maintaining moderately good ties with China.
Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Thank you so much. I have one more
question. I think this is a fascinating question and I would appreciate
both of your perspectives: How does Turkish society view or respond to
the Turkish government's increasing crackdown on individuals for
insulting the president or insulting religious values, blasphemy,
especially in connection with their social media posts? Would you say
it has had an overall chilling effect, or how does the society in
Turkey respond to that?
Maybe, Deniz, you would like to take it. Soner, I would appreciate
your thoughts on it as well.
Mr. Yuksel: The simple answer to that is yes, it has had a
significant chilling effect. I mean, I think those of us who are from
Turkey or have friends in Turkey, we know this very intimately. I mean,
our friends and families, you know, do not feel as comfortable tweeting
their opinions and sharing their opinions publicly when it comes to the
government's policies. We are seeing a really, really unfortunate
intensification of the way that the government uses these defamation
laws. Particularly the criminal--parts of the criminal code in Turkey
which establish the definition of criminal defamation, criminal
defamation against a public official, against the head of State, and
criminal blasphemy are very, very vaguely defined and, you know, not
necessarily in line with international human rights law and standards.
Traditionally, these have been, for the most part, abused in order
to silence media and journalists. We are still seeing examples of that,
right? Some of you might have heard of the journalist Sedef Kabash, who
is now facing, I think, up to 11 years in prison for a tweet
supposedly, you know, making a reference to the president--although
without mentioning his name. That continues to be the case, but
increasingly also these laws are being used against everyday people,
just a bunch of followers tweeting out to their friends. I think we are
likely to see more of that headed into elections.
Mr. Nishanov: Soner, your thoughts on this?
Mr. Cagaptay: I will just say I agree with Deniz, Ms. Yuksel, in
the sake of keeping our time.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much. This has been an incredible
conversation and I would like to thank our--everyone who is submitted
their questions. [Audio break]--continue this, the Helsinki Commission.
Turkey is an important country, is an important regional power and a
global power. It is important for everyone, for all of us, but
especially for people who live in Turkey, Turkish citizens, I mean, and
it is--it is our concern as part of--Helsinki Commission, obviously,
works very closely as part of that Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Turkey being as, as I mentioned before, a
founding member, I think it is important for us to see that Turkey is
again living up to commitments it has taken on itself.
This has been a great conversation. Chairman Cohen, would you have
any closing words? Any closing remarks?
Co-chair Cohen: I just appreciate our witnesses and the hearing. I
think it is important. The Turkey-American relationship has been
strong, it needs to continue to be strong, but we do not need to
overlook the human rights abuses in Turkey. We need to remain vigilant,
and we shall.
Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. I mean, I think I could not have summed
this up better. It is important, but we will stay vigilant. Thank you
so much, again, for your leadership on this issue.
Co-chair Cohen: Thank you.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much to our witnesses. Incredibly
knowledgeable. Oh--yes, everybody in the comments, in the chat box, you
will see that they are appreciating your in-depth research. We are
going to continue this conversation. Again, for a lot of reasons this
is incredibly important, and as the election is coming up, I think we
are going to be--we are probably going to have a hearing on Turkey, and
make sure, again, that it is--you know, the election standards are
held, and we will continue this conversation. Thank you so much, Soner,
Deniz. This was wonderful. Please--if you have any--I know we are short
on time, but anything you would like to add to close us off, I would
appreciate that.
Mr. Cagaptay: Thanks so much, Bakhti. I also want to thank Co-chair
Congressman Cohen for hosting us. Very generous with his time. Members
on the staff of the Commission, of course. It was a great pleasure to
be on the same panel with my colleague, Deniz Yuksel.
Mr. Yuksel: Likewise. I mean, repeat all of those sentiments.
Really, really grateful to the Commission staff and, of course,
Chairman Cohen. Thank you, everyone, for being here, and for your
excellent, excellent question.
Mr. Cagaptay: Likewise. Great questions, everyone, and thanks for
being engaged in Turkey, a very important country. I appreciate
everyone coming in today.
Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, once again, to everyone for participating,
and thank you to our witnesses. With that, we are going to close this,
and have a wonderful rest of the day. Bye-bye, everyone.
Mr. Cagaptay: Thanks so much.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the briefing ended.]
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