[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



117th Congress                               Printed for the use of the
2d Session             Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
_______________________________________________________________________

                    Conflict of Interest?  Foreign Policy and 
                               Human Rights in Turkey


[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             FEBURARY 16, 2022
                             
                             
                             
                            Briefing of the
             Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

_______________________________________________________________________

                            Washington: 2023



             Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
                    234 Ford House Office Building
                           Washington, DC 20515
                               202-225-1901
                            [email protected]
                            http://www.csce.gov
                               @HelsinkiComm



                       Legislative Branch Commissioners

              SENATE			        HOUSE
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 		STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
  Chairman				  Co-Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 		JOE WILSON, South Carolina   
  Ranking Member			  Ranking Member
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut	        ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas			EMANUEL CLEAVER II, Missouri
MARCO RUBIO, Florida			BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania
TIM SCOTT, South Carolina		RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
TINA SMITH, Minnesota			GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina		MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
                                           
                      Executive Branch Commissioners

		  DEPARTMENT OF STATE, to be appointed
		 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, to be appointed
		DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, to be appointed
		


		                 [II]

     ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE                                                             
                                                                
                                 
    The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the 
Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 
European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1, 
1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].
    The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 57 participating States, 
reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and 
Yugoslavia.
    The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings 
of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In 
addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various 
locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials, 
Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
    Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the 
fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation, 
and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is 
primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and 
resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The 
Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in 
Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The 
website of the OSCE is: .


    The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as 
the Helsinki Commission, is an independent U.S. Government commission 
created in 1976 to monitor and encourage compliance by the 
participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 
emphasis on human rights.
    The Commission consists of nine members from the United States 
Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member 
each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions 
of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two 
years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the 
Commissioners in their work.
    In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates 
relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening 
hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the 
Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities 
of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.
    The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of 
U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff 
participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the 
Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government 
officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and 
private individuals from participating States. The website of the 
Commission is: .


     Conflict of Interest? Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Turkey

                           February 16, 2022


                                                                        Page
                       COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT


    Representative Steve Cohen [D-TN], Co-Chairman                        1

                        COMMITTEE STAFF PRESENT


    Bakhti Nishanov, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe                                                      1

                              PARTICIPANTS


    Soner Cagaptay, Director, Turkish Research Program, Washington 
Institute for the Near East;                                               3

    Deniz Yuksel, Turkey Advocacy Specialist, Amnesty International        7




 
Conflict of Interest? Foreign Policy and Human Rights in Turkey

                              ----------                              

                           February 16, 2022


    The briefing was held from 11:01 a.m. to 12:16 p.m. via 
videoconference, Bakhti Nishanov, Senior Policy Advisor, Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding.

    Mr. Nishanov: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you so much 
for joining us this morning.
    My name is Bakhti Nishanov. I am a senior policy advisor at the 
U.S. Helsinki Commission. Today we are going to have a discussion--what 
we think is a very important and timely conversation about Turkey.
    Before I launch into why we set this up, I first of all would like 
to acknowledge our Co-chairman, Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Mr. 
Cohen, and he has joined us this morning, and we really appreciate 
that. Maybe before we start--I know you have an incredibly busy 
schedule--I would like to offer you an opportunity to offer your 
remarks, sir.
    Co-chair Cohen: Well, thank you very much. I appreciate the 
opportunity to participate.
    I have been the Co-chair of the Turkey Caucus since I came to 
Congress in 2007. I think the origins of that--I am not positive how 
that occurred exactly, but my grandfather, who I did not know and to be 
honest my mother I do not think knew, was from Turkey, as indicated 
from records I have seen on Ancestry.com. Abraham Hassan [sp] was from 
Turkey, and so I am a young Turk. [Laughter.] I visited Turkey once. I 
would like to go back again. It was--I enjoyed my trip to Istanbul, of 
course, and to Ankara, where I really fell in love with the monument to 
Ataturk, and I am a big fan of Ataturk's. He was an amazing man.
    There have been concerns I have had about Turkey's descent, I 
guess, concerning human rights over the years, and most recent I 
guess--it has been gradual, but the last four or 5 years have been even 
greater--judges who have been arrested, public officials who have been 
arrested, press who have been arrested. Turkey does not have a good 
record on human rights, and I regret that. Mr. Erdogan has certain 
characteristics that are concerning about power and about 
reestablishing Turkey as some type of an Ottoman Empire to some extent.
    Anyway, I am looking forward to your testimony. We need to do what 
we can to see that the whole world is fair for citizens to express 
themselves and to--press to express themselves and for people to get 
information, without which we will not have good democracies. With 
that, I yield back my balance of my time.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Co-Chairman Cohen. Really 
appreciate your personal story, and I think this gives extra meaning to 
your participation in this briefing today.
    Just to set the stage a little bit for this conversation, I said 
timely. The reason for that, I think--obviously, I set it up, so I 
would say that it is timely. I think if you follow Turkey or Eurasia or 
the Middle East, you will have noted that Turkey has been in the news 
in the headlines a lot lately. I mean, even if you do not follow it but 
you watched the Super Bowl this past weekend, you will have noticed 
that, you know, Turkish Airlines was very prominently featured in a 
pregame show. They were a part --they were sponsors, actually, of the 
pregame show, and they were very--it was--you know, Turkey is a part of 
a conversation that is happening worldwide and here in the United--
[audio break]--too much because we want to hear it from panelists. I 
think I would like just to sort of set it up just a little bit and 
understand why we are having this.
    Things that are happening in Turkey I think I would like to 
describe as the good, the bad, and the ugly, right? The good is, on the 
foreign policy front, we are very much encouraged by Turkey's efforts 
to normalize its relationship with Armenia. That is been in the news. 
That is great. We have seen Turkey-Israel relationship improve. In 
fact, the president of Israel is going to be visiting Turkey on March 
9. With Egypt, with UAE, with all the neighbors we have seen this 
effort to normalize ties and to be a--[audio break]--and responsible 
partner to the neighbors, but also within the context of NATO and OSCE.
    We also appreciate Turkey's hosting the world's largest population 
of refugees. I mean, this should not go unacknowledged. Turkey is--has 
this heavy burden, and I think it is important that we acknowledge that 
and we do as a global community whatever we can do to support Turkey in 
this effort.
    The bad side is, just like even by COVID standards--by COVID--
[inaudible]--standards, I think Turkey has had a very difficult 2021. 
The economy plunged. We saw the currency plunge. Officially, I believe, 
the inflation rate was almost close to 50 percent, and just incredible 
pain--economic pain that COVID caused. Frankly, some of the governance 
issues that Turkey has experienced, right--independence of the central 
bank came under question--some of these issues are self-made. Those are 
that side of things.
    I think the other side of things, I think as Mr. Cohen talked 
about, is the human rights record. Turkey is an important NATO ally and 
a founding member of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. As such, it has taken upon itself major commitments on 
upholding human rights for its own citizens. This is not about United 
States. This is not about OSCE. This is about Turkey and its own 
citizens. Unfortunately, what we have seen, we see continued arrest of 
journalists, including on Article 299, the controversial insulting the 
president. We see people still languishing in prisons on dubious 
charges. We see, frankly, a strong anti-immigrant sentiment--which, 
again, it is a complex issue, but that resulted in some of the attacks 
against Syrian-owned businesses and Syrian--[audio break].
    All of this is with a background of Turkey saying that it wants--
reiterating time and again. Last month, President Erdogan talked--met 
with Ambassadors of EU, said EU's--Turkey's path is toward the EU. The 
commitment to join EU yet not upholding these values is--seems like a 
contradiction. That is why we call this a conflict of--conflict of 
interest, a question mark. I mean, there are all these issues 
happening, but what is going on and how can we understand Turkey's 
motivation? If we can understand them better, can we help Turkey--just 
like any other country, it has its own issues--to live up to standards 
that it has taken upon itself?
    That is the--that is the briefing. That is what we want to do. I 
think it is very important that--the prism through which we are looking 
at this. Turkey is an important NATO ally, but it is important for 
friends to have conversations--honest and frank conversations--and this 
is what it is all about. It is toward an eye to improvement, to getting 
a better relationship that we are holding this briefing.
    Without further ado, I would like to introduce our--today's 
excellent panelists. I am sure if you--again, you have been following 
this world, you know both of them.
    First, we have Soner Cagaptay. He is the director of Turkish 
Research Program at the Washington Institute. You have seen his 
multiple books he is an author of, fantastic. I highly recommend his 
books. He has written extensively on the U.S.-Turkish relationship, 
Turkish domestic politics, and Turkish nationalism. He is a columnist 
for Turkey's oldest and most influential English-language paper and he 
is a contributor to CNN. His books have been translated. They are in 
English, but into Turkish, Italian, Greek, and Croatian. Thank you, 
Soner, for joining us this morning.
    We also have Deniz Yuksel. Deniz is a Turkey advocacy specialist at 
Amnesty International. She previously had conducted research on Turkish 
foreign policy in the Middle East and the U.S.-Turkey relationship, 
Turkish domestic politics, refugees, human rights, and religious 
freedom. She--prior to that, she designed and actually taught a human 
rights education course in partnership with the Mother Child Education 
Foundation in Istanbul, Turkey.
    These are our panelists. What our--our whole thing is to have them, 
our witnesses, present their testimoneys this morning, and then I am 
really hoping for a lively Q&A conversation. Just a note on that: 
Please submit your questions to everyone in the chat box so that way I 
can see them and I will address them to our witnesses.
    Thank you so much. Soner, we are going to start with you. If you 
could just lay out the framework for Turkish foreign policy, and then 
we can--we are going to go to Deniz, talk about domestic human rights, 
and see if we can connect them up, and how we can use one to nudge the 
other. Soner?
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you so much, Bakhti. I wanted to start by, of 
course, thanking you for setting this up. When you first contacted me 
to set up this conversation a while ago, there was no looming war in 
Ukraine. Indeed, Turkey's importance to the U.S. continues because 
Turkey sits in a neighborhood surrounded by Iran, Iraq, Syria, formerly 
ISIS-held territories, and, across the Black Sea, Russia. So whatever 
U.S. policies are regarding those four countries and ISIS the entity, 
they are much easier with Turkey onboard and less cumbersome and more 
effective. I think it is really important, as you said, to see bigger 
engagement with Turkey in these areas, but also important to see that 
Turkey's democracy in the meantime, you know, perhaps recovers. Thanks 
again for setting up this conversation.
    I also wanted to thank Co-chair Mr. Cohen for joining us this 
morning. I know he is very busy.
    I am especially flattered to be on the same panel with Deniz 
Yuksel, whose work I am a great fan of. What I would ask to do this 
morning is to have a discussion a little bit on Turkish domestic 
politics, but more on the foreign policy side, and then--and then turn 
the mic over to Deniz.
    I think on the domestic side, of course, the biggest story is that 
Turkish President Erdogan, after he had an impressive run as prime 
minister and president for almost 20 years, has sort of run to the end 
of his popularity. This has a lot to do with Erdogan's quite bright 
economic record until recently. He won, through his party--Justice and 
Development Party, AKP--over a dozen nationwide elections on a platform 
of strong economic growth. Erdogan lifted many people out of poverty. 
He has increased access to services, improved access to the pie. There 
is a bright side to his legacy and that has helped him win over a dozen 
nationwide polls.
    Turkey's economy under Erdogan went into recession for the first 
time in 2018, and that is the main reason why he lost the elections for 
Istanbul, Ankara, and other big cities. The economy has exited 
recession, but the macro indicators do not look very good. Inflation is 
skyrocketing, the highest it has been since Erdogan came to power; 
unemployment is rising; and there is a general sense of establishment 
fatigue, I guess, linked to the Erdogan administration that, yes, he 
may have been the problem solver and the face of change in Turkey once, 
but not anymore. That has to do with the opposition being resilient, 
especially since the--winning Istanbul and Ankara and other big cities 
in local elections.
    I think that one of important takeaways of Turkey under Erdogan--
and Bakhti mentioned I have written Erdogan's biography, ``New 
Sultan,'' which I have highlighted in that book also; shameless plug, 
of course, I have a book in the background--I think that one of the 
lessons of Turkey in the last 20 years under Erdogan is that the lesson 
that this country provides is the opposite of Iraq and Afghanistan. If 
the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan were that it takes a really long 
time to build a democracy, the lesson of Turkey under Erdogan is that 
it also takes a really long time to kill one. Turkish democracy is 
resilient. It is not dead. Elections matter, and elections are next 
year, 2023, and unless Mr. Erdogan delivers phenomenal economic growth 
and restores his base again it is very unlikely that he is going to win 
those elections.
    I think that, of course, that does not mean Mr. Erdogan is going to 
create a fair playing field. He controls over 90 percent of the media. 
That is his illiberal side. His bright side is economic growth. Of 
course, he is also a nativist populist leader. He has cracked down on 
demographics unlikely to vote for him, brutalized them. Over the years, 
he has eliminated checks and balances. He now appoints the majority of 
judges to the high courts without a confirmation process. As I said 
earlier, 90 percent of the media is controlled by businesses tied to 
him or linked to him. The race for the next election, unfortunately, 
will not be fair, but it will be free.
    That is where Turkey's different than the country that most people 
like to compare it to, Russia. I think that is a false analogy when it 
comes to the country's democratic record. What happened in Turkey in 
2019, Erdogan losing elections in big cities to liberal opposition 
mayors, could never happen under Putin's Russia. Such a thing has 
happened in other countries nearby such as in Hungary and Poland, where 
similarly autocratic leaders--Orban and Kaczynski and Duda and their 
allies--have lost Budapest and Warsaw to liberal opposition mayors, 
respectively.
    One of the reasons I love studying Turkey and writing about it is 
that I believe if countries were vegetables, Turkey would be the 
analytical onion, meaning it does not have an analytical core. You 
analyze it, you think you got to it, and it evades you.
    Here is a case study. Turkey under Erdogan, unfortunately, is not a 
full democracy, but it is also not a dictatorship. I think that is 
simplistic to call it as such. I think Turkey is a democracy that has 
fallen under an autocrat. Just as in Hungary and Poland, there is great 
potential for this democratic resilience to kick back. Of course, the 
big issue there is that the opposition is now not only resilient since 
their victories in big cities, but also unified.
    I would say President Erdogan's biggest mistake in domestic 
politics to date was his switch to an executive-style Presidential 
system in 2018. Now, the system was supposed to make him more powerful. 
Hypothetically, it did. It increased his powers. He is now head of 
state; head of government; head of the police, which is a national 
force; head of ruling party. Never before in Turkey's history of having 
had--being a multiparty democracy--and the country held its first 
elections in 1950--has an elected leader accumulated so much power. 
Ironically, the switch to this new system, Presidential system, has 
also unified Erdogan's opposition, because prior to that there was a 
parliamentary democratic system, multiparty race. Six or even more 
parties competed and Erdogan's party, AKP, could always win elections, 
sometimes with as little as a third of the popular vote. That is not 
the case anymore. Now he has to win half of the popular vote. Not only 
is that impossible for him mathematically, but also the opposition, 
which was constituted by disparate groups of Kurdish and Turkish 
nationalists and liberals and conservatives who hated each other, 
realized that the switch to a Presidential system requires a two-way 
race and if they do not unify they will disappear. The opposition is 
coalescing, and I think that is Mr. Erdogan's biggest challenge.
    Of course, Erdogan is a very smart political player and I think we 
should not underestimate his next moves. I think while trying to 
restore economic growth he will, unfortunately, probably also implement 
more autocratic measures. Deniz is more of an expert on these and I am 
sure she will do a better job of explaining them than I can. I wanted 
to look at Mr. Erdogan's foreign policy a little bit before I finish, 
and this is, I think, also important because we are seeing a sort of a 
pivot in Turkish foreign policy.
    You know, Ankara is trying to restore ties with its Gulf--rich Gulf 
neighbors, Emiratis and Saudis, as well as with Israel, with which ties 
ruptured in 2010 during the flotilla incident and never recovered, 
really, fully since. I think that is driven by a sense of isolation, 
that some of these foreign policy adventures in the Middle East have 
left Turkey more isolated than before. I agree with that. I think 
Turkey's more isolated in the Middle East today than it has ever been 
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. That is ironic because about 
10 years ago, when Mr. Erdogan launched the foreign policy, the idea 
was that Turkey should just not be second fiddle to the West; it should 
go to the Middle East, where it can become a star-power nation by and 
through leadership of Muslim-majority countries. This was supposed to 
make Turkey the leading country in the Middle East. Now, of course, 
Turkey is really an isolated country except for Qatar and the 
internationally recognized government of Libya. It has no friends and 
allies, so it is trying to reset with the Israelis, Egyptians, 
Emiratis, and Saudis. I think those are going to move forward.
    There is an important--another part of Mr. Erdogan's pivot: It is 
to the United States and Europe. Bakhti mentioned that, and I think 
that is important for us to highlight. It has a lot to do with a very 
basic fact. I would say in the last 10 years Mr. Erdogan has made 
efforts to change Turkey's identity at home toward a more Islamic one 
and not so secular, and internationally toward a Middle Eastern one and 
not so European. As I said earlier, Turkey is the analytical onion. I 
think Turkey's identity can never be one. It has got multiple 
identities. I would say in these efforts Mr. Erdogan has only had 
limited success. Turkey retains its nonbinary and multiple identities.
    There is a fact. Let us say Mr. Erdogan has succeeded to an extent 
to change Turkey's identity at home to an Islamic one and 
internationally to a Middle Eastern one. Turkey's economy is completely 
integrated with that of the European Union because of customs union in 
place since 1995 and as a resource-poor country Turkey needs financial 
inflows to grow again. Enter ties with the United States.
    Bismarck once famously said Turkey's the east if you come from the 
west and west if you come from the east, which means when investors 
decide if they are going to put money into Turkey they do not just look 
at macro indicators; they also look at where Turkey's heading. They do 
not want to be worried about Turkey leaving the West or heading in 
another direction, and I think because of that Mr. Erdogan wants to 
establish a narrative of good ties with President Biden. He is been 
very patient in establishing that relationship. It took President Biden 
92 days to call President Erdogan after taking office here in 
Washington. Usually, presidents here when they take office call Turkey 
within weeks or 2 weeks at max, so that was quite a delayed call. When 
Mr. Biden called, he did not call President Erdogan to say, how are 
you, can we have a chat or meeting. He called to say, oh, I am going to 
recognize the Armenian genocide. Erdogan's reaction was not, oh, how 
dare you, but he said, oh, can we still meet.
    You see that he is really patient to establish a narrative of good 
ties with the U.S., and there are some foreign policy openings in this 
regard. Afghanistan could have been one. Turkey wanted to run the 
airport in Kabul. That would have been an important lifeline with 
coalition embassies and the outside world. Unfortunately, Taliban, you 
know, bookended those dreams or that vision and--by taking the airport 
and the city before Turkey could step in to run the airport. Ukraine, I 
think, provides now a really important area of cooperation.
    I can only remember until a few months ago people would be writing 
op-eds saying let us kick Turkey out of NATO. I do not think you can 
publish such an op-ed in any major U.S. newspaper now because 
everybody's wondering what Turkey will do in the Ukraine crisis to help 
the United States. Turkey's identity as a NATO member has been 
recognized and underlined again. I think that is very important. Turkey 
also appreciates NATO.
    Ukraine is an interesting area because Turkey has very strong ties 
with Ukraine, robust. Sells drones, which Ukraine uses to attack 
Russian separatists as well as Russian hardware threatening the 
country. Turkey also has to balance its ties with Ukraine with its, you 
know, important relationship with Russia. I would--I will say the 
following three--I will leave you guys with the following three 
assertions before I turn the floor to Deniz, in terms of Turkey's 
Ukraine policy.
    No. 1, Turkey will not deny Russia with access to the Black Sea 
through the Bosporus. It will keep its policy of kind of try not to 
anger the military giant to the north.
    No. 2, Turkey will adopt a neutral tone. If there is a conflict and 
war, it will, you know, basically have a middle-of-the-line rhetoric. 
Behind closed doors--and we may not see this or read about it in the 
media--Turkey will support Kyiv militarily. I think that is a very 
important takeaway for the U.S. Government and others on the Hill, 
that, you know, this is really, I think, going to be an important 
indigenous area of U.S.-Turkish cooperation, because Turkey views 
Ukraine's sovereignty important for a variety of reasons. Tatars who 
live on the Crimean Peninsula, recently annexed illegally by Russia, 
are linked to Turks ethnically and religiously, and Turkey will never 
accept, therefore, Russia's annexation of Crimea. It will always defend 
Ukraine's sovereignty.
    Also, Turkey sees Ukraine as it sees other Black Sea countries, as 
important partners in establishing a balance of power against Russia in 
the Black Sea. Russia is a giant navy military power, nuclear power of 
course. Turkey sees not just Ukraine, but Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, 
Moldova, all around the Black Sea as important partners, and it will 
not allow Ukraine to fall under Russia or Kyiv to be flipped by a coup 
or other kind of Russian intervention.
    I think this is really important for us to look at moving forward. 
With that, let me end and turn the floor over to Deniz.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Soner. I really, really appreciate 
that.
    Deniz, please.
    Mr. Yuksel: Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here 
speaking alongside my esteemed colleagues and, of course, Dr. Cagaptay, 
who I have had the pleasure of working with before joining Amnesty. Of 
course, thank you, Chairman Cohen, so much for joining this very timely 
conversation today.
    Today, I actually want to draw your attention to what I feel very 
comfortable at this point referring to as Turkey's human rights crisis. 
This crisis began in 2015 with the collapse of the fragile peace 
process between the Turkish State and the armed Kurdistan Worker's 
Party, the PKK, and it intensified following a failed coup attempt in 
July 2016. The Turkish government declared a State of emergency, 
granting the executive branch dangerous powers. Constitutional changes 
adopted in this period under the State of emergency extended executive 
control over the institution responsible for the appointment and 
dismissal of judges and prosecutors. These developments have seriously 
undermined the independence and integrity of the Turkish judicial 
system and, consequently, human rights.
    The State of emergency ended in 2018, but new laws ensured that the 
executive branch could retain these broad powers and continue 
exercising control over an increasingly partisan judiciary. In fact, 
you will learn from the rest of my testimony that abusive judicial 
practices are at the center of Turkey's human rights crisis. From the 
record-breaking imprisonment of journalists to the persecution of LGBTI 
people, an ongoing crisis of gender-based violence, and the unlawful 
deportation of refugees, the failures of Turkey's judicial system cut 
across societal lines and undermine the human rights of all.
    Opposition politicians, lawyers, journalists, human rights 
defenders, and academics are among scores of people imprisoned for 
months and sometimes even years pending trial in Turkey, often without 
any evidence of wrongdoing. The government uses overly broad terrorism 
laws to crack down on real and perceived opponents. The imprisonment of 
high-profile critics has had a chilling effect on Turkish society more 
broadly, sending a dangerous message that anyone who dares to speak out 
will suffer the same fate.
    Turkey's partisan judiciary routinely targets lawfully elected 
opposition politicians, particularly in the country's mainly Kurdish 
southeast. Two former Co-chairs of the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic 
Party, the HDP, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdag, remain 
imprisoned, convicted of terrorism charges, which in the absence of 
credible evidence, were largely based on their public speeches. Dozens 
of HDP members continue to be prosecuted, and the party itself faces a 
highly problematic closure case, ahead general elections in 2023.
    Amnesty International has documented credible reports that indicate 
an increase in allegations of torture and other ill-treatment in 
detention. In September 2020, two villagers in the eastern Van province 
suffered severe injuries after being detained by soldiers and boarded 
on a helicopter. The soldiers involved in the incident reported that 
the man had attempted to escape by jumping off the helicopter, but in 
reality they would been subjected to a brutal beating by the soldiers. 
One of the men, Servet Turgut, later died of his injuries, and 
journalists who covered the case were detained. More than a year later, 
there has been little progress in investigating these allegations and 
ensuring that perpetrators are brought to justice.
    Those who call out such abuses in Turkey risk being persecuted 
themselves, mired in the government's crackdown on civil society. Since 
the 2016 coup attempt, authorities have shuttered hundreds of NGO's, 
depriving those that need them of vital support. Among them are Kurds, 
LGBTI people, survivors of gender-based violence, children, and 
refugees. The government uses anti-terror laws to attack human rights 
defenders, including Amnesty Turkey staff and members, all in an effort 
to criminalize peaceful activism.
    Turkish philanthropist and human rights defender Osman Kavala has 
spent over 4 years in pretrial detention, despite calls from the U.S. 
and EU for his release. Osman Kavala is a peaceful civil society leader 
who had dedicated his life to promoting dialog between Turkey's Muslim 
Turkish majority and Kurdish, Armenian, and other minorities. Kavala's 
case is well known not just because of his celebrated civil society 
work, but also because of the deliberate cruelty of his legal ordeal. 
In February 2020, a Turkish court acquitted Kavala and ordered his 
release, but he was quickly rearrested in a separate, but equally 
baseless, case. This glimpse of freedom must have been unimaginably 
painful for his friends and family, who just hours earlier had 
celebrated his release in a crowded courtroom.
    Kavala's case is emblematic of thousands of people arbitrarily 
detained in Turkish prisons in the context of these politically 
motivated charges. The European Court of Human Rights has made 
judgments calling on Turkey to release a number of these political 
detainees, including Osman Kavala and Selahattin Demirtas. Although the 
court's decisions are binding, Turkish authorities have refused to 
implement them, and continue to unlawfully imprison both men. In fact, 
Turkish official, including President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have 
repeatedly asserted that these rulings do not apply to Turkey. Of 
course, these statements are verifiably false, and have implications 
beyond these two cases. They obstruct Turkish courts' treaty obligation 
to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights.
    Further, Turkey's persistent non-implementation of ECHR judgments 
threatens the authority of the European Human Rights System more 
broadly. If Turkey can reject these judgments without consequence, why 
not Hungary, Poland, or others? That is why Amnesty International 
welcomed the Council of Europe's decision this month to launch 
infringement proceedings in the case of Kavala v. Turkey. We hope that 
the potential consequences of infringement--which range from the 
suspension of Turkey's voting rights to expulsion from the Council 
altogether--will provide incentive for Turkish authorities to free 
Osman Kavala and end this incomprehensible injustice once and for all.
    Despite the Turkish government's efforts to criminalize peaceful 
dissent, Turkey is still home to a resilient civil society. Human 
rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and everyday people continue to 
risk their freedom and well-being to protest the government's human 
rights abuses. The U.S. Government must stand in solidarity with them, 
and support their efforts to create a more free, a more just, and 
stable Turkey. The Biden administration's stated commitment to 
upholding universal rights at home and abroad is welcome. In Turkey 
too, the United States should put human rights first.
    All U.S. officials at all levels must raise human rights concerns 
in every engagement with Turkish authorities, as well as in every 
speech and every statement on Turkey. A stronger focus on human rights 
will not hurt other U.S. interests and, most importantly, it is the 
right thing to do. Specifically, the U.S. Government should urge 
Turkish authorities to respect judicial independence, bring anti-terror 
legislation in line with international law and, of course, end the 
crackdown on peaceful dissent. U.S. officials should call on Turkey to 
promptly implement ECHR judgments, including by releasing Osman Kavala 
and Selahattin Demirtas.
    U.S. diplomats should convey to Turkish authorities that banning 
the HDP, Turkey's third-largest political party, would be a major step 
backward for freedom of expression, and severely damage the prospects 
for a peaceful and enduring resolution to the conflict between Turkish 
authorities and the PKK. The U.S. should call on the Turkish government 
to launch prompt investigations into all allegations of torture and 
other human rights abuses and detention. The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey 
and his staff should meet regularly with local human rights defenders 
and CSO representatives and make public statements of support. They 
should visit activists in prison and attend trials of human rights 
defenders and civil society activists.
    There are also specific actions Members of Congress can take to 
address Turkey's human rights crisis. Members should support a public 
hearing which highlights the Turkish government's human rights abuses 
and includes the testimonies of affected communities. Members should 
participate in the Lantos Commission Defending Freedoms Project, and 
advocate on behalf of prisoners of conscience from Turkey. Members 
should regularly raise concerns with the State Department and directly 
with the Turkish government, through actions such as dear colleague 
letters, floor statements, resolutions, and so on.
    Member-level and staff delegations to Turkey must include prep 
meetings with human rights organizations prior to their visit, and also 
once on the ground in Turkey. Finally, members should consider 
providing additional funding for grassroots organizations in Turkey, 
and continue funding critical programs, like the lifeline, embattled, 
CSO assistance fund. These measures are critical to ensure that Turkish 
civil society can survive Turkey's ongoing human rights crisis.
    Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions and comments.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Deniz. This has been both eye-
opening and disturbing. I think the theme from both of your testimonies 
is that there are challenges--there are serious challenges--but also 
there are some opportunities. I think that is the goal of the briefing 
today is to identify those opportunities. My first question--and, 
again, I would like to--I would like to ask if Co-Chairman Cohen, if 
you might have some questions for our witnesses and also open this up 
to other people. Again, feel free to use the chat box function and ask 
a question. Co-Chairman, did you have any questions just to follow-up 
on these two testimonies?
    Co-chair Cohen: Thank you. I appreciate it, and I appreciate the--I 
failed to mention, which I guess I consider it a given, but it is not a 
given, how Turkey has been our friend in so many areas. That iis one of 
the reason I was proud to be, and have been proud to be a Co-chair of 
the Turkey Caucus. They have worked with us. They have been friendly 
with Israel on and off, but more on. I think there is a visit coming up 
soon where they are reestablishing their previous relations. They have 
been a strong member of NATO and a member of the European Union. They--
I have had soldiers, older people, who have told me how they fought 
with them in the Korean War, and how much they respected that. That 
memory still exists in current folks, and it has been passed on to me.
    I would--I am concerned a little bit about the Turkish attitude 
toward the Kurds. The PKK is a terrorist organization, and they were 
doing a lot of terror when I was there. I think it was 2008 or 2007. 
There was a lot of activities of bombings in Turkey, in Istanbul. All 
the Kurds are not terrorists. Indeed, the Kurdish people in northern 
Iraq have a good reputation and had a good reputation during the Iraqi 
War. Certainly the Kurds in Syria have worked with us, the United 
States, against ISIS and have been our friends. I would like your 
thoughts, either one of you, on how Turkey is treating Kurds in 
general. I know you mentioned the arrest of the two members of the 
parliament, but in general are Kurds being discriminated against in 
Turkey and how do they distinguish between the Kurds in Iraq and the 
Kurds in Syria, and their concerns about their being terrorist 
organizations as well?
    Mr. Yuksel: I am happy to take this question. Thank you for this 
very relevant question, Chairman Cohen. You are absolutely right, the 
Turkish government's crackdown on human rights in general affects 
marginalized and minority communities more acutely, and the Kurds in 
particular, who have, of course, been repressed by successive Turkish 
governments for decades. I think one issue that is particularly timely, 
you know, leading into an election year--and I sort of refer to it in 
my testimony a little bit as well--is the repression of Kurdish 
communities' political rights, right? The big case right now that we 
have to be watching is the closure case facing the HDP, the pro-Kurdish 
party which represents the interests and the votes of millions and 
millions of people.
    At the root of this case in 2016 was the Turkish legislature's vote 
to remove the parliamentary immunities of dozens of HDP MPs. That 
opened the way for countless investigations and prosecutions and, of 
course, the detention of HDP leaders. These cases are currently at the 
basis of the government's efforts to shut down the party itself, and of 
course, it is part of the government's larger crackdown on Kurdish 
political expression, Kurdish civil society, and so on. I wanted to 
raise this because there is a recent development that pertains to this 
case. And that is the ruling, I think earlier this month by the 
European Court of Human Rights, which said that the removal of the HDP 
MPs' immunity back in 2016, which formed the basis for all of these 
prosecutions, was actually a violation of these parliamentarians' human 
rights and a violation of their freedom of expression.
    This case is really important as a development while we are still 
going through this closure case against the HDP because now it brings 
into question whether all the cases that were brought against the 
individuals which the government is using in its argument to shut down 
the organization itself, it brings into question whether those are 
legitimate, whether those were done lawfully, and in fair trial 
processes. So with these in mind, it is really clear that the closure 
case is a very problematic one. We are headed into an election year. 
Also because there has not been a permanent resolution, as you referred 
to in your comments. To the conflict between the Turkish State and the 
PKK. As the representative of million and millions of people, the HDP 
has a critical role to play, along with the Turkish State, in ensuring 
an enduring resolution to this conflict. So it is a major step backward 
on both of those fronts. Thank you for raising that.
    Co-chair Cohen: I appreciate your response. I understand that, and 
I agree it is a serious issue. Are there not quite a few members of the 
party that represents Kurdish people, I guess it is the HDP, in the 
parliament? How are they responding to this? Also back to the issue 
about how--you know, Turkey, when I bring this issue up with them--and 
I appreciate your remarks about what Congress can do. I know I have, 
and I believe my Co-chairs have joined me, particularly Congressman 
Connolly, we have expressed our regret to the Turkish government on 
many occasions for human rights abuses--many, many occasions. They 
always respond when you ask them about Kurds in Iraq or in Syria, that 
they are just kind of cousins or something. They are all part of the 
same anti-Turkish terrorist-type organization. Have you noticed any 
distinction between how they treat the Kurds, or their attitude toward 
the Kurds in Iraq and Syria? Or do they feel they are supporting the 
PKK?
    Mr. Yuksel: Thank you for that question. I think that description 
at least of the Turkish government's view of Kurdish communities, you 
know, in Turkey and abroad, I think that is an accurate one. I think 
their actions do reflect this very, very problematic idea of Kurds--and 
there is millions and millions of Kurds around the world, right? It is 
impossible for all of them to be involved in one organization or 
another. It is just a very inhumane way of looking at a community, and 
a very discriminatory and bigoted way to be associating all parts of a 
community with one particular organization, which is of course not the 
case, and could not be the case.
    I think we are seeing that not just in the political repression 
domestically of the Kurds, which I talked about a little bit, but also 
in the Turkish government's foreign operations, particularly, as you 
mentioned, in Syria and in northern Iraq as well. I mean, in Syria we 
saw Turkish forces and Turkish-backed groups, including some of which 
are reported to be directly armed by Turkey, engaging in serious human 
rights violations, some of which amount to war crimes, including 
enforced disappearances, unlawful killings, indiscriminate attacks on, 
you know, schools and civilian areas, which have resulted in, you know, 
a great number of civilian deaths and casualties as well.
    I think there has not really been an effort--you know, there has 
been several years since these operations have first started, back in 
2016, and there has not really been a serious effort to hold the 
Turkish State and the groups it has supported and worked with 
accountable for these human rights abuses. We have no guarantee that 
Turkey is not going to launch another operation which is going to 
involve, you know, another set of serious crimes against civilians 
there. Thank you for raising that.
    Co-chair Cohen: Now, would you like to add anything, sir?
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you, Congressman. I agree with everything that 
Deniz said. I think it is an important human rights issue in Turkey, 
obviously. I think that the party elected to the parliament should be 
treated like all other parties elected to parliament. I will stand with 
that.
    Co-chair Cohen: Thank you. The only other thing I would like to 
mention is Hussein Ibish had a really nice piece today about UAE and 
Turkey, and how they are getting kind of back together. I think there 
was a visit on Valentine's Day, how appropriate. They seem to be 
getting together, and it shows Erdogan is seeing the realities because 
of economic problems in Turkey and reuniting or establishing new 
relationships. That is a bad reason, but good result. I yield back.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, Congressman--Co-Chairman Cohen, thank you 
so much for your comments. Also we would all like to acknowledge your 
leadership on this issue. You have been a proponent of a stronger 
engagement with Turkey, a principled engagement with Turkey. We 
appreciate everything you have done. I think you and Congressman 
Connolly's efforts never go unnoticed. Thank you so much. To all of us 
who watch Turkey, you are one of those leaders who have done much and 
more to make sure Turkey, again, lives up to its potential.
    One question that we got here, and maybe, Soner, I do not know if 
you would like to take that. The question is: Would you like--would you 
say there is a correlation--and, Deniz, please feel free to jump in as 
well--would you say there is a correlation between Turkey's movement 
away from secularism and an increase in intolerance toward religious 
minorities? I think it is a really good question. You have pointed out 
in your opening remarks that Turkey, you know, there is an effort to 
move away from secularism. What kind of an impact does it have on 
Turkish minorities--on minorities in Turkey?
    Mr. Cagaptay: Absolutely. Let me step in. I am sure Deniz can add a 
lot more. No, I think that actually giving him credit and being fair, 
under President Erdogan, back when he was prime minister during his 
first decade in power, Turkey actually saw an era of increased rights 
and liberties for non-Muslim communities. These are very small 
communities in the context of Turkish demographics. Turkey's population 
is 84 million people and non-Muslim communities add up to just about, 
you know, 0.1 percent of the total population at this stage. You know, 
I think a democracy is a real one not when it protects large groups, 
but when it protects small and vulnerable groups. In this regard, there 
was a lot of progress, improved liberties for non-Muslim communities in 
the first decade of Erdogan's rule.
    Now we have seen perhaps a reversal of that. Rising anti-Semitism I 
think is a huge concern in Turkey, and hate speech that is oftentimes 
endorsed by people as high up--government ministers targeting these 
communities, also a very serious concern. So I would say maybe legally 
rights and liberties have been expanded, but also we have seen a really 
dramatic rise in hate speech targeting mostly Jews, but also Armenians 
and Christians at the same time. Very problematic trends. I think, as I 
said earlier, you know, the strength of a democracy is not when it 
protects a group that is a third of the population. It is when it 
protects a group that is one thousandth of the population. I think in 
this regard there is a lot the Turkish government can do.
    Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Thank you so much. Another question that 
we have, and I think this sort of gets to the core of what we are 
trying to discuss here, is to what extent the cooperation between 
Turkey and the United States and EU on the Ukraine crisis, amid the 
Ukraine crisis, would affect their stance on human rights issues in 
Turkey. I think we have talked about it a little bit, but I think that 
is always a concern. If we increase that, you know, mil-to-mil 
cooperation, will--is the United States and the EU--are we going to be 
more silent on human rights issues that are happening in Turkey? Maybe 
both of you--Soner and Deniz--maybe you could both sort of try that? 
Yes.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Sure, let me go first--or, Deniz, unless you want to 
jump in?
    Mr. Nishanov: Soner, please.
    Mr. Cagaptay: All right. I will go first then. Thank you. Yes, I 
think that the administration's policy regarding Turkey is to create 
three silos, since President Biden took office. The first silo include 
areas of disagreement, that is two topics under it. Of course, 
continued U.S. cooperation with Kurdish People's Protection Forces, YPG 
in Syria. Although the YPG helps U.S. fight ISIS, or contain it, 
rather, at this stage, there is a problem. The YPG's an offshoot of 
PKK, Kurdistan Worker's Party, that is a terror-designated entity. 
There is no way Turkish government or Turkish public will embrace that 
policy, and that is a serious issue of discord.
    The other side of it, of course, is Turkey's purchase of Russian-
made S-400 missile defense system, for which Turkey has been 
sanctioned. It is impossible for U.S. Government to embrace that 
policy. The first silo--or, area of discord includes these two items. 
The Biden administration, in my view, has decided to kind of 
compartmentalize and say: Let us put these aside, let us not focus on 
these areas of disagreement. They are looking actually for areas of 
engagement--Afghanistan, Ukraine.
    Ukraine is a big one. It seems to be NATO's biggest test since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, perhaps since the war in Bosnia, in terms 
of its area of operation being Europe, and the conflict brewing, of 
course. I think Turkey, if Turkey helped the United States, even if 
this is behind closed doors and militarily, as I am predicting, because 
Mr. Erdogan does not want to anger President Putin in Moscow, that will 
be--create a positive sentiment toward Turkey. The question is, you 
know, can Turkey get away with broader human rights abuses and more 
autocratic measures at home?
    The third silo that the Biden administration has created in regards 
to its policy on Turkey is that it also wants to have a human rights 
compartment where it engages Turkey on this area. I will refer to Deniz 
on this, Ms. Yuksel, to see if the Biden administration has been 
forthcoming of keeping its promise of engaging Turkey on this--in this 
area. As the question highlights I think, yes, there is a potential 
here that if Turkish assistance to the U.S. regarding Ukraine is 
significant, as invisible as it might be to the public eye, of course 
that that would allow--not so much, I think, in the eyes of the U.S. 
public, not necessarily--but in the eyes of many European governments, 
who already have a pragmatic relationship with Turkey, to sort of turn 
their head the other way.
    Europe and Turkey have a more intimate relationship than do United 
States and Turkey, because Turkey's part of Europe. It sits on the edge 
of the European continent as well. Crisis in Turkey has the potential 
to export itself to Europe faster, and quicker, and easier than, of 
course, would be the case into the United States. Refugee crisis is one 
that recently got transported from Turkey to Europe. I think that 
European countries, especially Germany, have a more pragmatic view of 
ties with Turkey. They engage Turkey's government. They raise their 
human rights concerns on the side.
    Overall, I think that Turkey's autocratic slide under President 
Erdogan has become so severe, you know, those of you who follow me on 
Twitter may know that I am a map nerd. I just saw the map this morning 
looking at how countries are colored in terms of their democracies. 
Turkey is the only country other than Belarus and Russia on the 
continent that is now considered hybrid and not democratic, and not 
even a flawed one. It is hard for me at this stage to see what kind of 
a hall pass Turkish government would get, even if it helped everyone 
else in Ukraine, because the democratic slide under Mr. Erdogan is so 
severe.
    I think maybe some cosmetic statements here and there, but broadly 
speaking, given how unfair the democratic playing field is, and given 
the increased nature of autocratic crackdown inside Turkey in the runup 
to elections that I am predicting, it will be impossible, I think, for 
anyone to put lipstick on the pig and say, this is fine. We can deal 
with it. I hope that expression translates well in Turkish. I just made 
it up. [Laughter.]
    Mr. Nishanov: It was excellent.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you.
    Mr. Yuksel: Thank you.
    Mr. Nishanov: Deniz, please.
    Mr. Yuksel: I think, Dr. Cagaptay, you are the expert when it comes 
to foreign policy and defense issues. I think sometimes we do tend to 
over-compartmentalize human rights, and see it as something that, you 
know, does not have any links to the issues that we are talking about 
when it comes to security and so on. I think we should really avoid 
doing that, and that is sort of, like, a simplistic way of viewing 
things. I would--for example, in this case, in the case in Ukraine, 
there is talk of Turkey supplying drones to the Ukraine. I would really 
like to caution people on this call, given credible media reports 
during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that Azeri forces used Turkish 
drones to carry out disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on 
civilian areas.
    There is a history of Turkey supplying drones, perhaps in good 
faith, to its partners, to other countries, and then not really 
overseeing how these drones are being used. It is also raised the 
question of whether U.S. parts are being used in these Turkish drones, 
and therefore implicated in unlawful killings and attacks on civilian 
areas. I mean, we have laws here in the U.S., the Leahy laws and the 
Foreign Assistance Act, which obligates us to be considering these 
human rights aspects. Even when we are talking about what seems to be a 
purely defense and security issue, these human rights obligations still 
exist.
    Given this history, I think implications of Turkish support or how 
Turkey can be positioned to, you know, benefit the interests of the 
United States, has to be considered alongside other factors given, you 
know, this administration's commitments to human rights, and also 
every, you know, country who is, you know, signed these treaties has 
commitments to human rights and has to consider them in every context. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much, Deniz.
    Let us go to the next question. I think this is, again, important. 
I think we have alluded a little bit to the elections--upcoming 
elections in Turkey. In addition to the more long-standing problems 
noted in the presentation, are there any that require additional 
attention, given the upcoming elections this year? Would you expect 
further crackdowns on media, for example?
    Deniz, if you would like to take that. Soner, please feel free to 
jump in.
    Mr. Yuksel: Absolutely. I think the No. 1, you know, issue that I 
would like to highlight with relation to the elections is the closure 
case against the HDP. I know I have already extensively talked about 
that, so I guess we can also talk about some other things that, you 
know, we would not be surprised to see leading into an election year. 
Even at this point, you know, journalistic freedoms and highly, highly 
limited in Turkey.
    You know, dozens of media workers are persecuted for performing the 
most basic and most foundational acts of their professions, right? 
Cartoonists have been arrested for drawing cartoons, and reporters have 
been arrested for interviewing controversial guests. This is all, you 
know, an effort to criminalize journalism itself. It becomes even more 
important leading into an election year, when the government has even 
more incentive to crack down on criticism and to crack down on dissent.
    We are seeing signs of that already. We have heard from Erdogan's 
communications director a few months ago, signaled that there might be 
additional legislation coming to further regulate media organizations 
in Turkey. We also have seen recently the Turkish media watchdog has 
started to implement an existing law regarding the extra, you know, 
regulations place upon foreign media organizations. Voice of America, 
in fact, has been affected by this. They have put out a statement 
saying that no matter what they are going to try to do their best to 
provide accurate and timely information to the people of Turkey.
    Accurate and timely information is especially important in a time 
of election, especially when you have folks that are protesting the 
economic situation, and so on. Accurate information is really, really 
important for everybody's well-being and safety and, of course, for the 
integrity of the elections themselves. I would be really, really 
closely watching this issue. Again, would not be surprised to see the 
crackdown deepening in the next year or so.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, Deniz.
    Soner, I wonder if you have any thoughts on this? Specifically, I 
think, it would be--you would mentioned that the elections are going to 
be free, but they are not going to be fair. I think this is a very, 
very, very good point. If you could sort of talk a little bit about why 
they would not be fair.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thank you, again. I will just follow what Deniz left. 
Elections have not been fair for a while. They were free and fair, and 
Mr. Erdogan deserves credit for winning free and fair elections for 
almost 15 years--strong popular support, basically driven by the 
phenomenal economic growth that he delivered. That is why he is in 
trouble, because since the economy entered into recession now he needs 
to win elections--continues to win elections, as he sees it, but not 
free any--not fair anymore, of course, I think. Ninety percent of 
conventional media is controlled by businesses that are loyal to him, 
some are directly linked to him. He appoints majority of judges to the 
high courts without a confirmation process. He controls electoral 
boards. The race is definitely not fair.
    It remains free, and in my view, it will be free. That is because 
Turkey is democratically resilient. What it means is that Turkey has 
been having free and fair elections longer than has been Spain. The 
country's first free and fair elections were held in 1950. That means 
four generation of Turkish citizens have been voting in elections. 
People know how to vote, and they love to vote. Turnout in Turkey is 85 
percent. Impressive compared to the turnout rates we get here in the 
U.S. Not only that, but people protect their vote.
    Mr. Erdogan lost a first round Istanbul election in March 2019, 
very narrow margin. He thought that because he controls institutions--
media, electoral boards--he could repeat the elections and win them. He 
claimed there was fraud. There was an insignificant margin of 13,000 
votes in a city of 15 million people. He thought that he could make up 
for that margin easily in the repeat round that took place in June same 
year. Guess what? He lost that second round by nearly a 1 million vote 
margin--800,000, to be precise.
    That is democratic resilience for you, right? That is for citizens 
who voted for him saying, that is not fair. You lost. You know, you get 
one chance. You lose, you step down. Opposition organized a massive 
campaign, protect the vote, 100,000 volunteers, who went with their 
smartphones, documented the tally. Turkish law allows any citizen to 
observe the vote count, and Turks love to do that. On top of it, these 
volunteers slept on top of the ballot boxes, literally, to prevent any 
rigging. I think that the vote will be unfair, but it will be free, and 
that is a big challenge for Mr. Erdogan.
    Just also answering the question a little bit deeper, I do expect, 
as Ms. Yuksel said, further demonization of the opposition. There is a 
little bit of domestic baseball, if I can explain. The opposition bloc 
has informal and formal partners, but it has one large party, a 
secular, leftist Republican People's Party, CHP, main opposition. It 
has--the bloc has two wings. Formally, the Turkish nationalist Iyi 
Party--I-Y-I--of Meral Aksener, and informally HDP, pro-Kurdish 
liberalized People's Democratic Party, are in the bloc. HDP's going to 
support it from outside for a variety of things to do with the dynamics 
of the opposition, but they are part of the same bloc.
    I think what Mr. Erdogan will do is he will demonize the HDP in 
order to force--as the HDP being a pro-Kurdish force with a large 
Kurdish nationalist constituency, he is going to demonize the HDP 
further so as to push Turkish nationalist Iyi Party to abandon the 
opposition bloc. He knows that--Mr. Erdogan knows that he will lose the 
race--he will lose the elections in a two-way race. That is his own 
doing, because the switch to the Presidential system in 2018 has 
created this two-way race, because it has, you know, eliminated the 
multiparty parliamentary democratic race. Now Mr. Erdogan wants to 
create a three-way race. For that, he is demonizing the Kurdish 
nationalist opposition in order to force the Turkish nationalist party 
in the bloc to abandon the opposition.
    To put it very simply, Mr. Erdogan will win in a three-way race. He 
will lose in a two-way race. I think that is why we are going to see, 
unfortunately, more demonization of the opposition. There will be other 
steps. For instance, crackdown on social media. With Mr. Erdogan having 
taken control over 90 percent of conventional media--and, again, Turkey 
has been a democracy and they have had free press for almost four 
generations now. You know, people, if they see government dictating 
headlines to 90 percent of papers and primetime, you know, networks, 
they will not read the news anymore.
    Citizens and voters and news consumers are migrating in droves to 
social media platforms, where you have independent journalists who have 
millions of followers who do video, who do podcasts, who do tweets. I 
think you will see a bigger crackdown on these platforms that provide 
for new avenues of journalism, free, of course, areas of journalism. I 
would say that is another area to watch. Maybe if you want to help 
Turkish elections be free, you know, allow for these platforms to 
remain free. That is important.
    It is ultimately up to Turkey's citizens to decide who they like 
and who they want to see in power. That vote, though it may not be 
fair, I think will be free. It will be important. Turkish elections 
matter. Right now they are scheduled for June 2023. I think those are 
going to be the most historic elections in the history of the Turkish 
Republic, since the first free and fair elections in 1950.
    Mr. Nishanov: That is a great point. It is a great overview. Thank 
you so much, and it is a perfect segue to our next question, which is--
[audio break]--so CHP chairman, opposition leader, came out--[audio 
break]--that elections could take place as soon as this fall, almost a 
year ahead of the scheduled date in summer 2023. Do you think this is 
likely?
    Soner, maybe you will take it. Deniz, please feel free to jump in 
as well.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Sorry, Bakhti, you got cutoff for a second. Was this 
about whether early elections are likely?
    Mr. Nishanov: Yes. Yes. I am sorry--yes. I do apologize. Yes.
    Mr. Cagaptay: So--
    Mr. Nishanov: Do you think snap election--early election is likely? 
Yes.
    Mr. Cagaptay: I think--I mean, technically, yes. Actually, it is in 
the interests Mr. Erdogan. The new constitution he put in place, or 
amendments, rather, that created the executive style Presidential 
system in 2018 give him two additional--two terms. There are still term 
limits, but the law also says that if the parliament is dissolved 
before the end of his one term, that gives Mr. Erdogan a third term. It 
is in his interest to have early elections, either this term or, if he 
wins, next term, in order to add one more term to his tenure. He might 
do it this time, but probably not because if elections were held today, 
he would not win them. If elections were held in 6 months, I think he 
still would not win them--meaning, getting 50 percent.
    That is a lot to do with the economic problems in the country. 
After phenomenal growth, 15 years of prosperity, Turkish citizens are 
coming down hard, economically speaking. I think Mr. Erdogan's interest 
is to have growth--phenomenal, double-digits, if he can--for at least a 
year so citizens will forget the hardships of the economic crisis, and 
pandemic-related shrinking as well. These are independent factors, but 
they have been compounded in Turkey. You had indigenous economic 
problems, and COVID-related economic problems. They are both now adding 
up to each other. I think Mr. Erdogan is more interested in having at 
least a year of strong growth, waiting until June 2023, before he will 
do elections, because if he did elections after a few months of growth 
it will not be enough for citizens to forget the hardship they went 
through for at least 4 years.
    He has got really a multitude of problems here, and that has to do 
with his own success, right? The economy was so good, people were so 
prosperous, that they are finding it hard now to adjust to the new 
reality of skyrocketing inflation. Thirty percent this year, high 
unemployment, double digits already. That is unusual because citizens 
lived so well for so long under Mr. Erdogan. Perhaps he is a victim--he 
is a victim of his own economic success. Citizens are finding it very 
hard to embrace economic downturn, inflation, and unemployment. I think 
that this stage my vote will be for elections on time.
    Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Deniz, anything you would like to add to 
this?
    Mr. Yuksel: No. I think this is all really great analysis. I will 
just say that one person knows the answer and he is not on this panel 
today, unfortunately. [Laughter.] but--
    Mr. Nishanov: Next time we will have to make sure to invite him,, 
but sorry, yes. Yes. Thank you. Thank you. To be clear, we did invite 
Turkish government representatives, and they mulled it over, and we 
appreciate their consideration. For various reasons, they could not 
join us this morning. Again, this is--again, this is in the spirit of 
cooperation and coordination. This briefing--that is the spirit of this 
briefing.
    Well, one more question. I know we went over time, but if you guys 
can stay feel free to, and then maybe we could just--yes, maybe we 
could try to wrap it up maybe in the next 10 minutes. So--and this one 
is very complementary to you, Dr. Cagaptay. How do you--Dr. Soner--how 
do you conceive of the foreign policy of Turkey on East Asia, 
especially China and South Asia regions? I love your work on ``New 
Sultan: Erdogan and the Price of Modern Turkey.'' Great analysis with 
various perspectives covered. There you go.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Well, thank you, Bakhti. Please call me Soner. China 
is an important piece of the puzzle. I think that Mr. Erdogan's 
reelection strategy, of course, as we have debated it, depends on 
returning strong economic growth. For which, he wants to get along with 
the U.S. and Europe. Turkey being part of Europe economically, he wants 
to increase investment. The major source of FDI coming to Turkey is 
still European, notwithstanding Mr. Erdogan's efforts to change 
Turkey's identity. Economically, this is a European country. He wants 
to get along well with President Biden, to create a narrative of good 
ties with the U.S. so that markets will invest in Turkey again.
    He also, Mr. Erdogan also has to get along with Russia. President 
Putin has many levers. Russians were No. 1 among the arrivals to Turkey 
before the pandemic. Turkey has a very large tourism industry. In fact, 
it is among the--always among the top 10, sometimes top five most 
visited countries in the world. If anybody on this call has not visited 
Turkey, you guys should go and visit. There is great food, of course, 
that helps. The bottom line is the Russians are No. 1 among--were among 
number-one arrivals to Turkey. Ten million Russians visited Turkey 
before the pandemic. Maybe this summer 15 million will come and visit. 
That is over $10 billion added to Turkey's economy. That is how Turkey 
will bounce back from economic recession.
    Trade is an important part of the piece with Russia also. I think 
one of the reason why Turkish support to the U.S. regarding Ukraine w 
ill not be public is because Turkish President Erdogan does not want to 
cross Vladimir Putin. He does not want to trigger retaliatory measures 
by Russia in case of overt Turkish assistance to Ukraine. These 
measures by Russia could include sanctions. Putin could tell Russian 
tourists, do not go to Turkey. Go to Egypt. There is zero cost to him. 
He could ban Turkish exports. Usually he does that when he is angry at 
Turkey for political reasons. He has health excuses, or alibi, rather. 
So--and if he did that, you know, trade sanctions and tourism boycott 
could shave off a few percent points from Turkey's growth, and with 
that, of course, undermine President Erdogan's reelection prospects.
    China comes in similarly. I think that President Erdogan has relied 
on China for soft loans, especially to build megaprojects, with the 
drawing off of FDI coming to Turkey, now that many people consider 
Turkey too unstable and risky to invest. President Erdogan's economic 
growth model is now driven by megaprojects. These are giant 
reconstruction projects, mostly bridges, tunnels, high-speed rail 
lines, metro lines. The Chinese have played a big role in funding 
these. The Chinese central bank has also established a swap line to 
Turkish central bank to help it sustain currency crisis. I think 
President Erdogan wants to not anger Beijing as well.
    That is a tall order. He has to get along well with Washington, the 
EU, Moscow, and Beijing all at the same time, while resetting ties with 
Israel and rich Gulf neighbors. He is also hoping, I think, for 
investment from the Gulf to restore economic growth. I think Chinese 
policymakers are quite smart. They know that President Erdogan wants to 
court them, but they also know that Turkey is among the hub--one of 
the--is actually, I would say, the biggest hub of the Uyghur diaspora 
globally. There is a Uyghur diaspora here in Northern Virginia, in 
Germany. These are more recent diaspora hubs. Turkey has been a hub 
since 1949, since the Chinese Communist Party took physical control of 
Xinjiang, at the time called East Turkestan. Everybody in Beijing and 
their uncles know the fact that Uyghur leadership is in Turkey.
    I think that the Chinese are not going to be super crazy about 
bailing Turkey out, but at the moment, President Erdogan wants to 
maintain moderately good ties with China. Turkey has been absent from 
any condemnation of Chinese policy targeted at Uyghurs and their 
persecution of the Uyghur Community. I think that has a lot to do with 
President Erdogan's own reelection prospects. I would say, as Deniz 
said, only one person knows when elections will be held, if they are 
early or not, and I would say the other takeaway of this conversation, 
if you want to kind of have a talking point writing to your bosses or 
to media or to anybody else, or summarizing it just for yourself, 
Turkish politics is all about Erdogan now. It is all about Erdogan 
winning the next elections. He will do whatever it takes to get to that 
goal. That also includes maintaining moderately good ties with China.
    Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. Thank you so much. I have one more 
question. I think this is a fascinating question and I would appreciate 
both of your perspectives: How does Turkish society view or respond to 
the Turkish government's increasing crackdown on individuals for 
insulting the president or insulting religious values, blasphemy, 
especially in connection with their social media posts? Would you say 
it has had an overall chilling effect, or how does the society in 
Turkey respond to that?
    Maybe, Deniz, you would like to take it. Soner, I would appreciate 
your thoughts on it as well.
    Mr. Yuksel: The simple answer to that is yes, it has had a 
significant chilling effect. I mean, I think those of us who are from 
Turkey or have friends in Turkey, we know this very intimately. I mean, 
our friends and families, you know, do not feel as comfortable tweeting 
their opinions and sharing their opinions publicly when it comes to the 
government's policies. We are seeing a really, really unfortunate 
intensification of the way that the government uses these defamation 
laws. Particularly the criminal--parts of the criminal code in Turkey 
which establish the definition of criminal defamation, criminal 
defamation against a public official, against the head of State, and 
criminal blasphemy are very, very vaguely defined and, you know, not 
necessarily in line with international human rights law and standards.
    Traditionally, these have been, for the most part, abused in order 
to silence media and journalists. We are still seeing examples of that, 
right? Some of you might have heard of the journalist Sedef Kabash, who 
is now facing, I think, up to 11 years in prison for a tweet 
supposedly, you know, making a reference to the president--although 
without mentioning his name. That continues to be the case, but 
increasingly also these laws are being used against everyday people, 
just a bunch of followers tweeting out to their friends. I think we are 
likely to see more of that headed into elections.
    Mr. Nishanov: Soner, your thoughts on this?
    Mr. Cagaptay: I will just say I agree with Deniz, Ms. Yuksel, in 
the sake of keeping our time.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much. This has been an incredible 
conversation and I would like to thank our--everyone who is submitted 
their questions. [Audio break]--continue this, the Helsinki Commission. 
Turkey is an important country, is an important regional power and a 
global power. It is important for everyone, for all of us, but 
especially for people who live in Turkey, Turkish citizens, I mean, and 
it is--it is our concern as part of--Helsinki Commission, obviously, 
works very closely as part of that Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe. Turkey being as, as I mentioned before, a 
founding member, I think it is important for us to see that Turkey is 
again living up to commitments it has taken on itself.
    This has been a great conversation. Chairman Cohen, would you have 
any closing words? Any closing remarks?
    Co-chair Cohen: I just appreciate our witnesses and the hearing. I 
think it is important. The Turkey-American relationship has been 
strong, it needs to continue to be strong, but we do not need to 
overlook the human rights abuses in Turkey. We need to remain vigilant, 
and we shall.
    Mr. Nishanov: Excellent. I mean, I think I could not have summed 
this up better. It is important, but we will stay vigilant. Thank you 
so much, again, for your leadership on this issue.
    Co-chair Cohen: Thank you.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you so much to our witnesses. Incredibly 
knowledgeable. Oh--yes, everybody in the comments, in the chat box, you 
will see that they are appreciating your in-depth research. We are 
going to continue this conversation. Again, for a lot of reasons this 
is incredibly important, and as the election is coming up, I think we 
are going to be--we are probably going to have a hearing on Turkey, and 
make sure, again, that it is--you know, the election standards are 
held, and we will continue this conversation. Thank you so much, Soner, 
Deniz. This was wonderful. Please--if you have any--I know we are short 
on time, but anything you would like to add to close us off, I would 
appreciate that.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thanks so much, Bakhti. I also want to thank Co-chair 
Congressman Cohen for hosting us. Very generous with his time. Members 
on the staff of the Commission, of course. It was a great pleasure to 
be on the same panel with my colleague, Deniz Yuksel.
    Mr. Yuksel: Likewise. I mean, repeat all of those sentiments. 
Really, really grateful to the Commission staff and, of course, 
Chairman Cohen. Thank you, everyone, for being here, and for your 
excellent, excellent question.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Likewise. Great questions, everyone, and thanks for 
being engaged in Turkey, a very important country. I appreciate 
everyone coming in today.
    Mr. Nishanov: Thank you, once again, to everyone for participating, 
and thank you to our witnesses. With that, we are going to close this, 
and have a wonderful rest of the day. Bye-bye, everyone.
    Mr. Cagaptay: Thanks so much.
    [Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., the briefing ended.]

                                          [all]