[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE THREAT OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION FROM CHINA AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
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HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-898 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Co-chair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
MICHELLE STEEL, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Not yet appointed
Matt Squeri, Staff Director
Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from
Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China..... 1
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from
Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 3
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New
Jersey......................................................... 4
Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State 6
Statement of Serena Hoy, Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.................. 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Zeya, Hon. Uzra.................................................. 31
Hoy, Serena...................................................... 33
Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 37
McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 38
Submissions for the Record
Statement of Freedom House....................................... 39
Statement of the Uyghur Human Rights Project..................... 41
The FBI ``Transnational Repression'' webpage, the ``FBI Threat
Intimidation Guide'' webpage, and the ``Threat Intimidation
Guide'' in four languages, submitted by Senator Merkley........ 44
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 54
Witness Biographies.............................................. 55
(iii)
THE THREAT OF TRANSNATIONAL
REPRESSION FROM CHINA
AND THE U.S. RESPONSE
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2022
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 10:07 a.m. to 11:44 a.m. in Room
G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, and via Cisco Webex,
Senator Jeff Merkley, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission
on China, presiding.
Also present: Co-chair James P. McGovern, Senators Daines
and Ossoff, and Representatives Smith, Steel, Mast, and
Malinowski.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
OREGON; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, ``The Threat of
Transnational Repression from China and the U.S. Response,''
will come to order.
In recent years, this Commission has devoted increased
attention to the Chinese Communist Party and government's human
rights violations in the United States and globally. We've
expanded our reporting, brought in additional expertise, and
held a range of hearings on the toolkit employed for these
abuses. That toolkit includes economic coercion, technology-
enhanced authoritarianism, and other ways to stifle criticism,
avoid accountability, and undermine international human rights
norms.
In this hearing, we will examine a part of that toolkit
that targets individuals and communities at a very personal
level--transnational repression. In addition to the egregious
human rights abuses they commit within China's borders, Chinese
authorities increasingly reach into other countries to silence
dissidents, conduct surveillance, and force the repatriation of
critics. This long arm of authoritarianism across borders is
not just a violation of human rights, it is a violation of
countries' national sovereignty.
These tactics, targeting Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans,
Falun Gong practitioners, human rights advocates, journalists,
and others, add up to what Freedom House calls the most
sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of
transnational repression in the world. By Freedom House's
conservative count, between 2014 and 2021 there were 214 cases
of direct physical attack originating from China across dozens
of countries, including right here in the United States of
America. International manhunts like Operation Fox Hunt and
Operation Sky Net go well beyond supposed corruption suspects
to include critics and others deemed ``sensitive.'' This leaves
many Uyghurs and others in a precarious position, especially as
other governments at times cooperate with the Chinese
government against the rights of migrants.
We've also seen the Chinese government exploit
international organizations toward these repressive ends. The
abuse of INTERPOL mechanisms such as red notices can trigger
detentions and even rendition of the targets of transnational
repression. At the United Nations, authoritarian governments
seek to erode norms of universal human rights, and Chinese
pressure can deny representatives of civil society or diaspora
communities the opportunity to access UN forums. Even when
Chinese authorities don't reach their targets physically, they
surveil and coerce them in other ways such as by deploying
spyware, threatening them in video calls, and harassing their
family members who still live in China.
In response to these disturbing trends, the Biden
administration has sought to elevate the issue of transnational
repression both within the United States Government and in
interactions with countries around the globe, whether they be
like-minded countries seeking to address this menace or
perpetrators of transnational repression or countries on whose
soil this behavior occurs. In today's hearing, we will hear
from two administration officials at the forefront of these
efforts. We wanted to hear from multiple parts of the U.S.
Government because addressing transnational repression will
truly require a whole-of-government approach.
To raise awareness globally and prevent these tactics from
becoming pervasive in the international system, we need
diplomacy. To protect those targeted, we need humanitarian and
homeland responses. To pursue accountability for those
responsible, we need law enforcement. The Departments of State,
Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and others all
have a role to play. This hearing will allow us to hear from
two of those agencies on the steps the administration is taking
to counter transnational repression from China, how they
coordinate with the agencies, with other governments and
international organizations, and where we have opportunity to
do more.
Certain aspects of the U.S. response will be most
appropriate for members of the Commission to explore in a
closed session. That is especially true for certain law
enforcement matters, and we are working with the Department of
Justice to arrange such an opportunity in the coming weeks. For
today's hearing I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on
what their departments are doing, in coordination with partners
in government, civil society, the private sector, and the
international community to address transnational repression
from China. The scope and complexity of this threat requires
not only a whole-of-government approach but vigilance,
coordination, and decisive action across the administration and
Congress. I hope today's hearing helps us take a step in
developing urgency around this issue and charting a path
forward for addressing it.
It's now my pleasure to recognize Congressman McGovern for
his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Co-chair McGovern. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for holding this hearing about transnational repression by the
People's Republic of China. You know, in September 2020,
federal authorities arrested a New York City police officer and
U.S. Army reservist for acting as an illegal agent of the
Chinese government. The man, originally from Tibet, had tried
to ingratiate himself with the Tibetan-American community of
New York. It turns out he was spying on them and advancing
Chinese interests. This revelation caused fear and concern in
the community.
The Uyghur Americans at Radio Free Asia who work diligently
to report facts from Xinjiang, including crimes against
humanity, are protected by our First Amendment safeguard of
freedom of the press. The Chinese government has attempted to
silence them by punishing their relatives back home. Gulchera
Hoja testified before this Commission in 2018 that two dozen of
her relatives are missing, almost certainly held in reeducation
camps run by the Chinese in Xinjiang.
These are but two examples. The Chinese government tries to
deflect criticism of its human rights record by claiming that
it has a sovereign right to do what it wants within its
borders. And yet, Chinese officials have no problem setting
aside sovereignty principles when they reach across our border
to threaten the human rights of Americans. In his May 26th
speech on China, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said that the
Chinese government purports to champion sovereignty and
territorial integrity while standing with governments that
brazenly violate them. I would add that the Chinese government
itself violates them.
I am pleased that the Biden administration has recognized
this trend and is deploying diplomatic, investigative, and
prosecutorial resources to the problem. I look forward to
hearing from Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant Secretary Hoy
about what their respective departments are doing to address
this issue and these violations. We want to hear whether there
are additional authorities or tools that you need from
Congress, including the expansion of humanitarian pathways to
provide refuge to those who risk their lives to stand up to
authoritarian regimes. We also look forward to getting input
from the Department of Justice in a separate setting, as the
Chair has already mentioned.
While our focus today is China, my concern on this issue
has been global. Freedom House's extensive report from earlier
this month finds that 36 governments engage in transnational
repression, and documented 735 incidents of direct physical
transnational repression between 2014 and 2021, with 85
incidents in 2021 alone. I, along with several of my
colleagues, have expressed concern over transnational
repression by Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, including such
heinous crimes as the murder of U.S. resident and journalist
Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials and the poisoning of
Russians living in exile in the U.K. by Russian authorities. I
hope to hear how the administration is approaching the
challenge, not only as a whole-of-government effort but as a
global one too.
So Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back my time.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I now recognize
Congressman Smith, who would like to make some opening
comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY
Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you for convening this important hearing this
morning.
You know, last year on June 4th, to commemorate the 32nd
anniversary of the horrific Tiananmen Square massacre, I
attended the unveiling of a work of art at Liberty Sculpture
Park in Yermo, California. There, the Chinese emigree sculptor
Chen Weiming introduced an iconic work entitled ``CCP Virus,''
which morphed an image of Xi Jinping onto a coronavirus cell,
and it was the size of a small house--that's how big the
artwork was. A physical monument to the devastation unleashed
by the Chinese Communist Party onto the world.
Chinese agents, it should be noted, were there in
attendance that day. A little over a month later, however, the
sculpture had been burned to the ground in an arson attack
which at the time local media reports speculated was
attributable to Chinese Communist Party agents. Certainly
sculptor Chen and other emigrees thought so, and the repression
they thought they had left behind in China was catching up to
them in the California desert.
Then in March of this year, federal prosecutors unsealed
charges against the five men accused of taking orders from
China's Ministry of State Security to ``stalk, harass, and
spy'' on Chinese dissidents, and who had destroyed the
sculpture. Among these were Frank Liu, a former corrections
officer named Matthew Ziburis, and Jason Sun, the latter of
whom ordered the destruction of ``all sculptures that are not
good to our leaders.'' As this incident suggests, today's
hearing is so timely because China's long arm of repression is
not something that occurs ``over there,'' but right here in the
United States of America.
The cases of this are legion. Wei Jingsheng, the father of
the democracy movement in China--who, parenthetically, I met in
Beijing in the early 1990s--when the CCP thought he was such a
high-value political prisoner, they let him out of prison and
tried to convince the International Olympic Committee to award
them Olympics 2000. When the IOC did not give them Olympics
2000, they re-arrested Wei and tortured him almost to the point
of death. In 1998 Wei testified at a hearing that I chaired and
detailed the abuse he suffered and endured, again, all for
democracy. Now he is free in the United States, thank God.
Today, however, Wei believes that several assassination
attempts have been made on his life, including a poisoning
attempt that required nearly a month-long hospitalization and
resulted in a 40-pound loss of weight. More recently, on May
20th, after dropping off a guest at Reagan National Airport,
two cars sought to run the car Wei was riding in off the road.
I'd be happy to share with our witnesses, especially from
Homeland Security, the police report numbers, should they wish
to follow up on this, and I certainly hope that they will.
Another prominent Chinese dissident who has faced
harassment believed to be orchestrated by the CCP is Pastor Bob
Fu, a long-time friend of this Commission. One tactic the CCP
uses is to plant fake dissidents among the community and use
them to create division among the emigrees. In Pastor Fu's
case, his antagonist was Guo Wengui, also known as Miles Kwok.
Guo not only used media platforms that he owned to attack
Pastor Fu, something all of us in public life need to endure
but certainly not to the degree that Bob Fu endured, but is
alleged to have organized daily protests outside of his home.
As the threats remained to his life, on the advice of local and
federal law enforcement, Pastor Fu and his family were
evacuated from their home and forced to live in separate
distinct locations.
Then there's the murder in March of this year of Jinjin Li,
an organizer of the Tiananmen Square student movement, who
spent two years in a Chinese prison following the massacre
before fleeing and establishing himself as a lawyer, primarily
serving the Chinese community in Flushing, New York. He was
stabbed to death by a 25-year-old woman who arrived from China
on a student visa, though she apparently never went to school
and spent her time immersing herself in pro-democracy
activities. While many of the media reports reported the death
as a straightforward murder, many in the dissident community
believe it was a professional hit job by a Chinese agent, given
the ``professional nature,'' of the stabbing. I recommend an
article by Radio Free Asia, which catalogues some of those
concerns.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a crisis. We have
prominent Chinese dissidents, including Wei Jingsheng, again,
the father of the Democracy Wall Movement, whose lives are in
danger living right here in the United States. That goes as
well for many of the Uyghurs. I know Rebiya Kadeer and others
over the years have had problems with Chinese agents. Again,
look what they're doing in China itself with the genocide. Of
course, those who speak out here are at risk. We need to bring
more attention to this. This hearing helps to do that. I do
thank you and yield back the balance of my time.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman Smith.
I'd now like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Uzra Zeya
is the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and
Human Rights at the U.S. Department of State. She also serves
as the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. She
previously was the president and CEO of the Alliance for
Peacebuilding. During her distinguished 27-year foreign service
career, she served in missions across the globe, including
senior assignments in Paris, New Delhi, and at the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
Serena Hoy is the Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Previously she
served in the office of legal affairs at INTERPOL headquarters,
as a senior counselor to then-Deputy Secretary Mayorkas and
Secretary Johnson at DHS, and as chief counsel to U.S. Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid. Before serving in government, she
worked at several immigrant rights organizations and clerked
for Judge Merrick Garland on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit.
Thank you both for being here with us today. Without
objection, your full written testimony will be entered into the
record. We ask you to keep your remarks to about five minutes.
Under Secretary Zeya.
STATEMENT OF HON. UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Under Secretary Zeya. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern,
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
As Secretary Blinken recently declared, ``The scale and
scope of the challenge posed by the People's Republic of China
will test American diplomacy like nothing we've seen before.''
Few things are more emblematic of this challenge than PRC
transnational repression. The reach and frequency of the PRC's
global repression is growing more alarming by the day. NGOs
have documented thousands of cases over the last several years
of the PRC conducting involuntary returns from over 120
countries worldwide. In response to this growing threat, the
Biden-Harris administration has developed an approach that is
whole-of-government, inclusive, agile, and results oriented.
With these principles guiding our approach, the
administration's strategy to counter PRC transnational
repression revolves around four key pillars. First, we are
using all available tools, in coordination with the interagency
partners, to promote accountability for the PRC's transnational
repression. These tools include visa and investment
restrictions, export controls, and law enforcement actions in
the United States to investigate and prosecute perpetrators.
The Secretary's March 2022 announcement of visa restrictions
against PRC officials involved in transnational repression is
one recent example of accountability actions taken by this
administration.
Second, we are curbing the PRC's ability to perpetrate
these abuses by engaging third countries that may be
implicated, willingly or not, in the PRC's transnational
repression, as well as international law enforcement agencies
and the private sector. We're facilitating more rapid diplomacy
with host governments to protect individuals at risk of
refoulement. We continue to support INTERPOL reforms to prevent
countries from misusing INTERPOL systems for political or other
improper purposes. Our federal assistance programs are
empowering civil society activists to mitigate the PRC's
transnational repression by providing digital security tools
and financial assistance. We're engaging with the private
sector to ensure that firms are cognizant of and have the tools
to counter the PRC's increasingly sophisticated digital
authoritarianism.
Third, we're building the resilience of targeted
communities in the United States and around the world, to
better understand their needs and develop tailored responses.
We are proactively engaging affected communities and developing
solutions in partnership. Additionally, we're amplifying the
voices of affected communities by shining a light on
transnational repression and bringing it out from the shadows.
We now report on transnational repression in the department's
Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the annual
Trafficking in Persons Report. We're advocating for individual
cases of transnational repression where family members of
activists and others have been imprisoned or disappeared in the
PRC.
Fourth, we're engaging allies and partners to mount
coordinated multilateral responses. We work with partners to
jointly advocate for political prisoner cases, many of which
have ties to transnational repression. This included a Voices
of Political Prisoners event at the December Summit for
Democracy, led by Secretary Blinken and Lithuanian Foreign
Minister Landsbergis. Additionally, we worked with multiple
partners to launch the Export Controls and Human Rights
Initiative, which seeks to stem the tide of PRC and other
authoritarian governments' misuse of technology. Through the
EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, we're working with our
European partners on developing common standards that will
address the misuse of technology that facilitates transnational
repression.
Lastly, we've sought to ``call out'' transnational
repression in statements or resolutions at the UN General
Assembly and other UN bodies. Just yesterday, 47 countries from
the Asia-Pacific, to Africa, to Latin America to Europe, signed
a statement at the Human Rights Council condemning the PRC's
human rights abuses and calling on countries to respect the
principle of non-refoulement, and we intend to do more.
In closing, let me repeat--the PRC's transnational
repression poses a direct threat to human rights and democracy,
the rules-based international order, and even our own citizens
and institutions. We are combating it with the attention,
seriousness, and resources it deserves. Our close partnership
with Congress will be integral to this effort. Bipartisan
legislation has given us the tools we need to confront the
PRC's egregious atrocities and human rights abuses. We welcome
an ongoing partnership with Congress to refine our tools and
our diplomatic approaches to address the PRC's transnational
repression threat. Thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today, and I welcome your questions.
Chair Merkley. Now we'll hear from Assistant Secretary Hoy.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF SERENA HOY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you. Chair Merkley, Co-chair
McGovern, and distinguished members of the Commission, it is a
privilege to appear before you today to discuss the critical
work the Department of Homeland Security is doing to combat the
ongoing campaign of transnational repression waged by the
People's Republic of China. This practice represents a serious
threat to human freedom and security and is an issue of
significant human rights and national security concern to DHS.
The PRC government uses a range of tactics to control its
diaspora, citizens, and others critical of its policies and
actions abroad, including sustained efforts to repress multiple
members of ethnic and religious minority groups, political
dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and former
insiders accused of corruption.
My testimony today will focus on the department's efforts
to counter attempts by the PRC to intimidate and repatriate
perceived opponents present in the United States and to prevent
the PRC's abuse of the international criminal police
organization known as INTERPOL. I will also discuss how the
department has engaged Uyghur and other diaspora communities
within the United States to amplify and inform our efforts to
counter the PRC's transnational repression activities on U.S.
soil, as well as ensure that these populations are aware of the
tools and best practices available to combat these attacks.
DHS is focused, with its interagency partners, on the PRC's
Operation Fox Hunt, through which Beijing targets and seeks to
repatriate individuals living in foreign countries whom the PRC
alleges are guilty of corruption and should be returned to face
criminal charges. The individuals targeted include members of a
number of religious and ethnic minority groups, as well as
political dissidents. In support of FBI and other government,
law enforcement, and intelligence community efforts to combat
Operation Fox Hunt, DHS seeks to provide traditional and
nontraditional disruption options to overall investigative
strategies, pursuant to its broad scope of criminal and
administrative immigration and customs-related authorities and
capabilities.
The department also works diligently with our international
partners to prevent abuse of law enforcement authorities for
political purposes. One of these lines of effort has been our
work with our interagency partners over the last year to
support the reforms INTERPOL has undertaken to make it harder
for states to target dissidents or other vulnerable populations
through the abuse of its systems. In general, we have sought to
strengthen the ways in which the U.S. Government is able to
provide INTERPOL with relevant information, which can be kept
confidential, that would assist it in identifying notices and
diffusions that might be based on political motivations. I am
particularly invested in these efforts, given my previous
tenure at INTERPOL.
The department also conducts due diligence to prevent PRC
authorities from exploiting DHS information-sharing mechanisms,
immigration systems, and other tools to engage in transnational
repression. Among these efforts, DHS is working to ensure that
our law enforcement officers are trained in how to recognize
and respond to potentially abusive requests for law enforcement
cooperation and are aware of countries known to engage in
transnational repression. While DHS seeks to prevent PRC
government actors from engaging in transnational repression on
U.S. soil, we also engage with the victims of this campaign,
including the Uyghur diaspora and other targeted communities.
For example, leadership from DHS and the State Department,
including Under Secretary Zeya, convened a roundtable
discussion in March with individuals who have been the target
of transnational repression. That same month, DHS's Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) hosted a virtual
interagency engagement with the Uyghur diaspora community in
the United States to share information on federal resources to
address threats of transnational repression. DHS remains
unwavering in its efforts to combat transnational repression
committed by the PRC and looks forward to working with Congress
on ways to address such activities.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and look
forward to taking your questions.
Chair Merkley. Thank you both for your testimony and, more
importantly, for the work you're doing on transnational
repression. We'll turn to questions now. I want to start with
something both of you referred to, which is working with
targeted communities. I'm thinking about the Uyghurs, the
Tibetans, the Hong Kongers in the U.S. who are very fearful of
their family members being retaliated against inside China if
they exercise their free speech and express their concerns
about human rights violations or other actions of China they
disapprove of. You mentioned, Assistant Secretary Hoy, a
conference or a gathering you had held with, I believe it was,
Uyghur dissidents who were targeted.
Could either of you expand on the effort to coordinate with
leaders of various dissident communities in the United States--
if threatened or if they experience actions, or they hear about
their niece or nephew, their wife, their son, their grandchild
being retaliated against in China--how do they channel that
information? Is there a State Department or Department of
Homeland Security hotline or a coordinated effort between the
two departments to enable us to collect information about all
of the folks that China is targeting?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising
a very important question. As Assistant Secretary Hoy noted,
engagement with diaspora communities is a joint endeavor and
one which the State Department is very committed to. Of course,
these targets include Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christians, other
minorities, and simply any diaspora PRC citizens seeking to
exercise their universal human rights. The responsibility for
the U.S. enforcement side, the lead agency on this, is the
Department of Justice.
But we have, as I noted in my opening remarks and my
submitted written statement, really prioritized a whole-of-
government approach, where we had an important roundtable that
I and Under Secretary Silvers convened with affected
communities, not limited to those targeted by PRC transnational
repression, but certainly including them, in March, and follow-
on sessions between DHS and diaspora communities, which I'll
allow Assistant Secretary Hoy to comment on.
I would also note that Secretary Blinken has engaged Uyghur
exiles in the United States and human rights activists as part
of his ongoing effort to center human rights and democratic
values in our foreign policy. Assistant Secretary Hoy.
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Under Secretary Zeya,
and thank you, Senator, for that question.
In addition to the roundtable that Under Secretary Zeya
mentioned and participated in, our Office for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties--this is the roundtable, the virtual
interagency engagement I mentioned in my testimony. This was a
Uyghur-focused event that CRCL convened, and it was an
opportunity for interagency partners to talk to the community
about the resources that are available and to listen to their
concerns. If there are individuals who have concerns about
activity they're experiencing, then, as Under Secretary Zeya
mentioned, our colleagues at the Department of Justice and the
FBI would be the right place, or state and local law
enforcement authorities, who would then work with the FBI on
any concerns or complaints. They would be the lead agency on
that.
But DHS's ICE, Homeland Security's investigations agency,
works very closely with our FBI partners, and in coordination
with them might participate in any investigation, if an
investigation were appropriate. But as I think you mentioned,
even if an investigation isn't appropriate, it is helpful for
the FBI and the agencies to monitor trends that enable it to
prepare proper responses to respond at a more systemic level to
the threat we're facing.
Chair Merkley. Thank you both. I'm very intrigued by this
question because I don't believe that our diaspora communities
in my home state have any idea of how to report. They will
share among themselves their concerns about what they have
heard about their family members being targeted. I have a
feeling we're perhaps possibly missing a full, comprehensive
understanding of the extent of Chinese transnational
repression.
I look forward to following up on this because I want to
publicize to my diaspora communities how to report and channel.
I picture that maybe there is a need for absolute clarity, a
coordinated point person for people to be able to share their
information with, whether that is at the Department of Justice,
or elsewhere. I think many in the diaspora community, when they
hear about the pressure back home, aren't thinking of it as a
crime to be contacting local police or the FBI about.
I now want to turn to a broader question. I'm picturing a
theoretical conversation between perhaps our secretary of
state, our secretary of homeland security, and a counterpart in
China saying: Here is our evidence of what you've done to
retaliate against free speech in the United States of America
exercised by members of the Chinese diaspora community, and
here's what's going to happen if these cases continue. I'm
trying to picture exactly what the most effective tool we have
to counter this is.
Several tools have been mentioned, and one of those is to
hold the perpetrators accountable through visa restrictions and
investment restrictions, but can't China really strive to make
it very hard to identify a specific perpetrator, and thereby
render such tools less effective?
Under Secretary Zeya. Mr. Chairman, I do want to respond,
first, to your earlier point about information sharing and
reporting this crime. There is a public FBI webpage on
transnational repression--it's available to all. Clearly, we'll
want to continue to put the word out about this. It advises
anyone who believes they may have been the victim of this crime
on how to report it, and it has contact information directly to
contact the FBI and, of course, local law enforcement, as you
noted.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
Under Secretary Zeya. To your point on the tools,
absolutely. You know, the administration is deploying a wide
range of diplomatic, regulatory, and law enforcement tools to
deter, and ultimately seek accountability for, acts of
transnational repression, but we are also, as I noted earlier,
working to build international opposition to this practice and
intensively engaging with allies and partners to hold
perpetrators accountable, as this is truly a global phenomenon
not limited to our own shores. We're also working to increase
measures that will protect our own citizens from transnational
repression, through ongoing engagement with communities that
we've noted, but also to actively engage human rights
activists, dissidents, journalists, and others who may very
well be targeted for their courageous actions.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
Congressman McGovern.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Secretary Zeya, you mention in your testimony the Chinese
government's efforts to pressure other governments to forcibly
return people who are seeking asylum in other countries. They
are not the only country that does this. Refoulement is a
violation of international law. My question is whether there
are sufficient tools in the U.S. toolbox to deter refoulement
or punish those who do commit the violation. So the question
is, is there anything besides diplomacy? Is refoulement a
sanctionable crime under U.S. authority, and if not, should it
be?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising
a very important issue. I would say that on the issue of
refoulement, this is a global policy priority for the
administration that we raise at the highest levels. I have done
so myself in my own international engagement in these 11 months
on the job. With respect to refoulement and sanctions, although
it's generally not a basis for financial or visa restrictions
under our existing authorities, we are absolutely resolute and
adamant in calling upon states to respect the principle of
nonrefoulement and to uphold their obligations in this area as
appropriate. And I would say we will continue to explore the
extent to which sanctions could apply in these cases with
existing authorities.
Co-chair McGovern. Well, thank you. I think one of the
things that this Commission always tries to find is whether or
not there are additional tools or authorities that we can act
upon here to give to you, so that we can more effectively deter
things like refoulement. Obviously we stand willing to work
with you.
Assistant Secretary Hoy, you know, while the overall scale
of transnational repression is global, individual cases are
sometimes very personal--targeting individuals, their families,
or their communities. You testified as to how DHS components
raise awareness among U.S. law enforcement agencies who might
unwittingly assist Operation Fox Hunt. Does such activity
include state and municipal police as well? Does this include
coordination and/or training?
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Co-chair McGovern.
Homeland Security Investigations is the agency that we have
worked with--and their sister agency within Immigration and
Customs Enforcement--to ensure training in recognizing
transnational repression and ensure that it doesn't unwittingly
aid it. We also have a state and local partner engagement
program that liaises closely with our state and local law
enforcement partners. I don't believe that we conduct any
training with our state and local law enforcement partners. It
may be that the FBI does. We can look into that and get back to
you with that answer.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, because I think that might be
an area that the Chinese government potentially is exploiting,
as well as other countries for that matter. Under Secretary
Zeya, are officers who serve at U.S. embassies and consulates
trained to identify potential transnational repression,
including transnational repression carried out by Chinese
authorities? Do they know what to look for? Are they reporting
on that stuff?
Under Secretary Zeya. Yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Our
raising awareness efforts, of course, include our own teams
overseas. There are 270-plus U.S. missions, so that has been
part of our guidance and training resources and materials to
post in the field so that they can learn what this is, how
pervasive it is, how to identify it and report it, and most
important, how to counter it.
Co-chair McGovern. Yes. It seems to me, and maybe because
I'm on this Commission I'm becoming more aware of some of these
things, but it seems to me that this interference is becoming
more of a problem, and not less. You know, I seem to hear more
about it with each passing year. I'm wondering whether or not
there are--again, that's why I asked the question as to whether
there are other additional tools that we can provide you that
might help more effectively deter this.
I appreciate the diplomacy and ``calling out'' examples of
outside interference, you know, attacks on individuals in this
country who are exercising their freedom of speech, but it
seems that that, in and of itself, is not deterring what seems
to be a growing problem. Again, to either of you, are there
additional tools that you think we should look at, that we can
provide you? Are there things that Congress can do that might
be helpful in not only calling attention to this problem, but
deterring it?
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
raising a very important question. As I mentioned in my opening
remarks and written statement, this is an upward trendline. We
believe this problem is growing, and it's also evolving in
terms of the tactics, so we have an imperative to stay ahead of
it. We can't have a static response. We have to remain agile
and continually refine our tools and our best practices.
So in terms of what we are doing, I would say the
President's budget request includes funding for the State
Department to support a variety of programs that would address
and counter transnational repression, but at the same time,
there is limited funding currently for state programs to
support and help protect victims and individuals who are
vulnerable to transnational repression, as well as the
capability to mitigate surveillance technology and cyber
threats. Year after year we're finding with this trendline that
we've declared from the outside, we are consistently receiving
more program proposals, more competitive ones than we're able
to fund.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
We would be turning to Senator Ossoff, however he had to
attend another meeting, so Congressman Smith, you're up.
Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses for their
leadership and for being here today to give us these important
updates. You know, I wonder if you can tell us to whom a member
of the diaspora would report if they thought they were being
victimized by Chinese Communist Party agents. How confidential
is all of that? We know, and I know the Chairman referenced
it--I do it all the time as well--one of the ways that the
Chinese Communist Party continues to have a chokehold on
dissidents and people once they come here are the people that
are left behind, their family members who then could be
retaliated against with impunity.
I'm wondering if there's a sensitivity to that because when
somebody does report, to whom do they report? The FBI? What's
the best source? Is there any thought being given to a hotline
where somebody could report confidentially that they think
they're being harassed by the Chinese Communist Party? Because,
like I said, I've been in so many events, including the one out
in California, where you could pick out--and people who were
there could pick out--who the agents were. It was very, very
eye-opening that, in such a brazen way, they were there and a
month later they burned down the sculpture. If you could speak
to that.
Secondly, Under Secretary Zaya and Assistant Secretary Hoy,
back in February of 2006 I chaired probably the longest hearing
I have ever chaired, an eight-hour hearing. We had Google,
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Cisco testify. I swore them in because
they were aiding and abetting the Chinese Communist Party in a
huge way on surveillance, on censorship. People were being
arrested because personally identifiable information, for
example, that Yahoo had, was just turned over to the secret
police when they made a request for it, and once that happened,
all the other contacts were laid bare.
I had several hearings after that. We raised it over and
over again, and I don't think Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and
Cisco have joined the democracy side on this. They always, like
many U.S. corporations, desperately want to have access to
markets and so they mute their words and their actions. The
most disappointing part of that hearing in February 2006, from
the top people from those four companies, was when they
basically said: We're just following orders; if we get a
``lawful'' request for information, we give it.
I said, These aren't police officers. These are secret
police officers. These are people who work for a dictatorship,
not for a democracy that has checks and balances. But they
nevertheless said: We just turn over the information. So I'm
wondering if that has been cured, in whole or in part, because
I am deeply concerned with so many people who go on social
media here--is it being monitored? And then people back home
especially are retaliated against. These large high-tech
corporations--again, who did nothing but aid and abet the
Chinese Communist Party for decades--where are they now when it
comes to these things?
Finally, I would just bring up one case that has always
troubled me. A guy named Shi Tao--you might remember him--Yahoo
gave up his personally identifiable information. And what had
he done? He had sent information to some folks in New York City
about what they can and cannot do vis-a-vis the Tiananmen
Square commemorations, and for that, he got 10 years in prison.
I mean, 10 years for sharing on censorship--just like we're
seeing in Hong Kong, as all my fellow commissioners know. You
know, this year the churches and others were barred, and some
even self-censored in not commemorating the horrific events of
the Tiananmen Square massacre out of fear of retaliation by the
Chinese Communist Party. So, you know, these companies I think
have a lot to account for.
As a matter of fact, in my opening statement I pointed out
that I had read a book years ago called IBM and the Holocaust.
In that book, which was very heavily documented, it talked
about how the Gestapo had done such an effective job in finding
the Jews throughout Germany and elsewhere because, in large
part, IBM was their partner and was using the best high-tech
capability available at that time to track down who they were.
As a matter of fact, in the book it mentions how--why did the
Gestapo always have these lists? Where did they come from? IBM.
IBM protested when I mentioned this. I said, have you read the
book? You know, that kind of complicity with the horrors of the
Nazis needs to be apologized for, not defended.
So the high-tech companies issue and do people report to a
hotline--if you could speak to some of those issues I'd deeply
appreciate it.
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Smith.
You've raised some very important points that I will seek to
address from the State Department perspective and then cede the
floor to my colleague. With respect to domestic law
enforcement, as you're well aware, the State Department defers
to U.S. law enforcement agencies regarding PRC unauthorized
activities in the United States, but let me make clear, we
continue to oppose the PRC's use of illegal, extraterritorial
law enforcement activities to target various groups outside its
borders and inside our own. This activity is unacceptable,
damaging to our bilateral relationship, and must stop.
So as an agency, we are working closely with DHS, DOJ, and
the FBI to identify and define threats, to help develop and
hone policy tools to respond and deter internally. We are
sharing information with domestic law enforcement regarding the
PRC's overarching transnational repression tactics and trends.
I can't share details here in an open hearing, but our
department does work with DOJ and the FBI to support the
investigation and charging of those who are committing this
crime inside the United States.
To your very important point with respect to the misuse of
technology--this is a top priority for the State Department,
and it is a focal point of our Summit for Democracy effort,
where we are working with 100-plus governments around the world
to lead efforts to develop, as I noted, voluntary codes of
conduct to basically shape the norms to apply human rights
criteria to export controls. This also corresponds with an
effort we're leading to develop common principles, the rules of
the road, on responsible use of surveillance tech.
This requires ongoing continual outreach with tech and
social media companies to work more actively to counter PRC
online harassment, digital surveillance, and disinformation. We
have to make sure that these platforms are not misused to fuel
authoritarianism but in fact allow users to freely express
themselves without fear of reprisal.
I'd like to give my DHS colleague a chance to respond as
well.
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you very much. I will just
say briefly, as discussed with the Chair, the FBI has a very
helpful website focused on transnational repression. It may be
that we need to ensure that you all have it in a way that's
easy for you to communicate with your constituents, but I do
believe there is a hotline for reporting these sorts of abuses.
Just one note on the surveillance issues raised--our
cybersecurity agency has online resources available. They're
free for individuals, for organizations, to share with them
best practices for protecting themselves against harassment,
stalking, and surveillance. Thank you.
Representative Smith. If I could just add one final
comment. Hopefully at the highest levels, including the
President when he talks to Xi Jinping, he's raising these
issues about, you know, don't harass the diaspora, in addition
to all the other human rights abuses that the Chinese Communist
Party commits. I hope he's raising it. I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Now I will turn to Senator Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
the panel. Under Secretary Zeya, I want to direct my first
question to you. Before I took office, I produced
investigations of war crimes, organized crime, and official
corruption for international news organizations. Press freedom
is vital and under threat worldwide, with journalists facing
chilling restrictions, and with threats to their lives and
safety increasing around the world. Reporters Without Borders
ranks China 175th out of 180 countries for world press freedom.
The CCP's monitoring systems, firewalls, and media controls
have shut down any free reporting at home. In November of last
year, the BBC reported that the Chinese province of Hunan was
building a surveillance system with face-scanning technology
that can detect journalists and other ``people of concern.''
My question for you, Under Secretary, is about the CCP's
efforts to repress, intimidate, and chill press freedom beyond
the borders of the PRC. How do they engage in such
transnational repression? What tactics do they employ to chill
and restrict press freedom and free reporting about the CCP, or
to influence reporting about the CCP, beyond China's borders?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a
critically important dimension of our efforts to counter and
deter PRC transnational repression. Certainly we agree that our
efforts have to address the concerted PRC effort through
transnational repression to shape and repress media reporting
that is shedding a light on what's happening. As the co-chairs
noted in their opening remarks, the egregious actions taken
against family members of Radio Free Asia journalists are just
one emblematic example of the scope and severity of these
efforts.
In response, our efforts are putting a premium on promoting
and protecting open and resilient information ecosystems by
addressing the needs of at-risk journalists, fostering the
long-term sustainability of independent media outlets, and
enhancing the impact of investigative journalism, which is
critical to shining a light not only on what is happening
inside China, but with respect to this growing threat of
transnational repression which we are discussing today.
This is also an area for our multilateral engagement with
allies and partners. We have important platforms, such as the
Media Freedom Coalition and the Freedom Online Coalition, which
are building, I would say, like-minded solidarity to respond to
this problem more collectively, and recognize that it is truly
global in scope, and we can't be complacent, admiring the
problem, without taking more concerted action to support free
and independent media and investigative journalism.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Under Secretary, and I ask for
your commitment to work with my office and to set up a meeting
between your staff and mine to discuss how we can work together
to protect and enhance press freedom and the security of
journalists around the world. Will you make that commitment?
Under Secretary Zeya. Yes, Senator. I'm happy to make that
commitment and we will follow up forthwith.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Looking forward to it.
Assistant Secretary Hoy, I want to ask you about synthetic
opioids, the precursors to which are increasingly originating
within China. This is a matter of serious concern to my
constituents in Georgia. It's why I worked with Senator
Grassley to introduce and pass through the Senate our
bipartisan Rural Opioid Abuse Prevention Act. According to the
Georgia Department of Public Health, drug overdose deaths in
Georgia increased by 55 percent from 2019 to 2021. According to
the DEA, China is one of the primary sources for fentanyl-
related substances and the precursors to synthetic opioids.
I want to ask you this question, and it's one particular to
my state. I'm asking for your commitment to work through my
office to consult directly with local law enforcement agencies
in Georgia, as well as the Georgia Ports Authority and the
leadership at the Port of Savannah, to ensure that we are
mitigating the flow of illicit opioids produced and originating
in China or produced and originating elsewhere with ingredients
and precursors originating in China, into the State of Georgia
and the United States. Will you please make that commitment to
work with me with that focus on Georgia as part of your
national portfolio, and to have your staff follow up with mine
to set up those actions?
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Senator, thank you for that
question. It's an issue of the utmost importance for the
Department of Homeland Security and the interagency partners
that we work with, as well as our international partners. We
would be happy to follow up with your office and your staff on
that point.
Senator Ossoff. I appreciate the commitment and follow-up.
I just want to be clear and precise. What I'm looking for is a
commitment to work with my office to connect the department
directly with local law enforcement and the Georgia Ports
Authority to enhance our collaboration to protect Georgians
from these dangerous substances. Will you please make that
commitment explicitly?
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Yes, Senator. You have our
commitment.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you kindly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Senator Ossoff.
We will now turn to Congresswoman Steel.
Representative Steel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
A recent report from the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute found that Asian women are the newest target of the
CCP. Women who spoke against the CCP have been victim to
repeated cases of digital harassment that result in unspeakable
attacks, rape threats, and distribution of fabricated photos.
We must continue to denounce the CCP harassment and
disinformation campaigns. Stopping transnational repression
must be a joint effort. Our country should also work with other
countries to fight this abusive tactic, and let the whole world
know.
Under Secretary Zeya, does the State Department have a
directive to work with other countries to condemn digital
transnational repression? If not, is something preventing this
partnership from moving forward?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Congresswoman, for raising
a very important point with respect to digital repression and
how to counter it. I will be clear--we absolutely recognize the
severity of the PRC's efforts to use digital means to spread
disinformation, but also to intimidate, coerce, and censor
critics globally, so our response to this effort is absolutely
resolute and multipronged. It is absolutely grounded in
increased collaboration with allies and partners. One, we are
working to expose these tactics by working with partner
governments as well as the private sector and tech platforms to
identify inauthentic and ultimately bullying behavior.
Second, we are working to puncture narratives, including by
providing factual information through third-party researchers,
and ``calling out'' these attacks as they occur. Third, we're
working with allies and partners to build resilience to these
threats, particularly among those targeted. You described, I
think quite well, the vulnerability of the courageous women and
others who are speaking up about China's human rights
situation. We are working to share information and support
their capacity to protect themselves online. Fourth, as I
mentioned in my comments to Senator Ossoff, we are absolutely
determined to promote and protect open and resilient
information ecosystems so that at-risk journalists and others
can continue their vital work, free from reprisal and threats.
Representative Steel. Thank you for your answer. Are State
Department officials equipped to identify transnational
repression attacks from the CCP? Do officials communicate with
other agencies or officials in other countries to help fight
future attacks?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you for raising this question.
We are continually gathering information from public as well as
private sources to consider all the facts at our disposal. As I
noted earlier, in what is an evolving tactic of transnational
repression, these inform our efforts in coordination with
allies and partners, with multilateral actors, with civil
society and the private sector. So I would say we are in a
continual mode of reviewing all credible information with
respect to PRC transnational repression, as well as PRC
officials' specific responsibility for these actions.
Representative Steel. So is there any way possible that
Congressmembers can get into that information and data that you
collected?
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, Madam Congresswoman, I would
certainly recommend that we could follow up with a briefing for
your staff, where we might be able to discuss this information
in more specific detail. I'm happy to commit to that.
Representative Steel. I really appreciate that. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you so much, Congresswoman Steel. Now
we'll turn to Congressman Mast.
Representative Mast. Thank you for your time today, Under
Secretary Zeya.
I have a brief statement on this, and then I'd love to know
your analysis and your thoughts. My understanding is that there
are red notices that are published through INTERPOL saying we
need an extradition of this individual or we need this person
to be detained or arrested for this reason, because of
accusations of these crimes. We know that this is something we
use. China uses it as well, as well as other countries.
My understanding is that China is using this for the
purpose of political suppression, getting people extradited
back to China, again, for the purpose of political suppression,
and not because they've committed ``crimes'' that wouldn't be
considered anything other than free speech. So what is your
understanding of that occurring? And then to go beyond that,
has there been success with the administration in combating
what China is doing with these red notices? Are there other
government agencies that China is using in a similar way for
political repression to bring people back to be detained in
China in other ways that we might be missing? That is the
breadth of my question.
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Mast, for
raising a very important point. I will be clear, we absolutely
share your concern for the potential misuse of INTERPOL systems
to target dissidents, human rights defenders, activists,
journalists, and others via PRC transnational repression.
Now, while the Department of Justice is the lead U.S.
agency on INTERPOL, the State Department has worked in close
collaboration with DOJ. Some specific successes we've had were
on the successful election campaigns for two U.S.
representatives to two key INTERPOL bodies, including the
Executive Committee. And this is part of our determined effort
to prevent the misuse of INTERPOL's tools.
We're also working to identify and provide more tools to
support INTERPOL's Notices and Diffusions Task Force, to
protect the integrity of red notice requests and wanted persons
diffusions. I'd like to defer to Assistant Secretary Hoy, who I
think has more to offer here.
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Congressman. I'm
pleased you raised this issue. This is something I care about a
lot, as a former staff member at INTERPOL. INTERPOL--after
conducting a comprehensive analysis of its tools and the way
they might be abused--undertook a series of reforms over a
number of years. But in 2016, it stood up the taskforce that
Under Secretary Zeya referenced, on which I used to work, that
works very hard to ensure that requests from member countries
are vetted for exactly the concerns that you raised.
If those issues are identified, obviously, the notices
aren't published. However, INTERPOL only knows what it knows.
It only knows information that's available through public
sources, or information that's shared with it by its member
countries. So the administration, as has been mentioned in this
hearing, has been focused on this issue of transnational
repression and has launched an internal effort--an interagency
effort to ensure that the U.S. Government is doing everything
it can to support the reforms that INTERPOL itself launched.
That includes ensuring that the U.S. Government is sharing
with INTERPOL the information that it might have that indicates
that a request for a red notice or other request might not be
for legitimate law enforcement purposes, but actually to
persecute dissidents. And if the U.S. Government receives a
request--an INTERPOL notice or another request for law
enforcement cooperation--law enforcement agencies, including
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland
Security, conduct due diligence to look into whether or not the
request is for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
If it's identified that it's not, that's information that
we have sought to--and are working harder to strengthen our
efforts to--share that information with INTERPOL where
relevant, so that INTERPOL can take appropriate action with
respect to the request. Thank you.
Representative Mast. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my
time.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We have two members who
may be joining us but may not be here yet, so I'll just ask,
has Senator Daines or Congressman Malinowski joined us yet
electronically?
They are not here yet, but they will be. Meanwhile, I'm
going to try to explore a little bit more this process by which
Americans or migrants living in the United States who are
experiencing their family members back in China being harassed,
perhaps detained, perhaps disappeared, perhaps threatened--how
they report that. You all clarified that there is an FBI
website addressing this. so that is the primary point of
contact.
Let's imagine a situation in which a citizen back in Oregon
shares with my office that their family is being harassed
because of their statements about Chinese human rights
violations. I direct them to this FBI website. The FBI looks at
it and says, Well, this isn't a crime within the United States,
because it's something happening back in China. It's not the
FBI that has the ability to engage in the intelligence
operation to know who is ordering that harassment or if,
indeed, that action is related to the action of an individual
in the United States. Meanwhile, that FBI report doesn't
necessarily get to the Department of State or the Department of
Homeland Security.
So I want to clarify--at what point does a report being
made at the FBI website--is it immediately shared with the
Department of State, so the Department of State can start to
think about who is responsible? Is there coordination with the
intelligence community to help determine who is making that
order? Because if our main tool is to say, Hey, China, if your
folks are involved in this, they're going to be sanctioned,
they're going to have a travel restriction or an investment
restriction, or a visa restriction--but I'm not seeing that
there is really a clear path to make that an effective tool.
So I guess I'll boil down my question to you, Under
Secretary Zeya. Do you immediately get notified? Do we feel
that there is really an effective pathway in which you're able
to have this tracked down and effectively respond in a way that
makes China think twice about having engaged in such
retaliation against family members back home in China?
Under Secretary Zeya. Mr. Chairman, thank you for probing
in more detail on, let's say, the operational mechanisms of our
coordination. I'm not able to share the details in this public
hearing, you know, based on a hypothetical, at what point it
would occur, but I would propose that if we could follow up
with a briefing, a closed briefing, for you and other
Commission members, we could describe more in detail how this
works. I will say, though, I'm hearing loud and clear your
concern and that of other Commission members, that this
information needs to be more broadly disseminated, and what to
do when, in fact, a crime is committed while outside the United
States, with family members in the U.S. basically being
intimidated or threatened with reprisals for family members not
within our country.
I would highlight here that we have our Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State Department,
which I oversee. They do receive referrals from member offices,
and they are very keen to continue that direct engagement. They
can take this information, act on it appropriately, and it can
really help us in our own data and information-sharing efforts
to ascertain what's happening and take appropriate
accountability actions. So I don't want you to feel that the
only route is to go the route of the FBI information for the
public, or that it's only to go to local law enforcement. I
think we are receptive and open to receiving queries from you
and your fellow members, if you feel that there is a case that
is not being acted upon or taken seriously.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Under Secretary, and
for your offer of a confidential or potentially classified
briefing open to members of the Commission. We'll take you up
on that offer, and we'll further pursue the appropriate way we
can educate Members about how to communicate information to
your team when our constituents contact us.
I want to ask one other question here, which is: We have
heard from certain human rights organizations that it is common
for China to have a specific member of the diplomatic community
at each embassy responsible for coordinating harassment of the
Chinese diaspora that is critical of China. Can you comment on
that?
Under Secretary Zeya. We would take such information very
seriously and integrate it into our own efforts to determine
what is happening and how we can hold individuals accountable,
but I do not have further information to share in this public
setting.
Chair Merkley. OK, great. Well, we'll pursue that further.
I was struck by Congressman Smith's testimony about the
brazenness of the presence of individuals in his home district
who are monitoring the behavior of the Chinese diaspora. That
all just goes toward this huge assault on freedom of expression
here in the United States. I know you're all very much
concerned about that. That's why we're holding this hearing
emphasizing that. I certainly appreciate it. I think we're
going to have a lot more work to do to try to curb or end these
strategies, not just by China but by other governments.
Let me turn to the Co-chair, Congressman McGovern.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one
question, then I have to go to another hearing. Under Secretary
Zeya, you know, in February Chair Merkley and I sent a letter
to Secretary Blinken about reports that Uyghurs in Morocco,
Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan might be at risk of refoulement to
China, where, obviously, they could face torture and
imprisonment and other kinds of abuse.
In April, Amnesty International reported on an imminent
refoulement of a mother and daughter from Saudi Arabia to
China. I don't know whether you can tell us what the State
Department has done on these cases, and I guess I request that
you urge the White House to ensure that the Uyghur cases are on
President Biden's agenda if, in fact, he does go to Saudi
Arabia next month.
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for citing
your letter, which I read carefully. Certainly, your concern on
refoulement is a shared one by this administration. As I noted
in my opening remarks, this was an element of the Human Rights
Council statement that the Netherlands led in terms of
reaffirming the importance of countries respecting their
obligations on nonrefoulement.
With respect to Saudi Arabia and Morocco, I can assure you
that the United States is closely tracking and engaging at high
levels with the governments in question on this issue. This
applies to Kazakhstan as well. And I can tell you that I raised
this issue personally on my visit to Kazakhstan just a couple
of months ago. This is an ongoing and high-level concern for
our engagement.
Co-chair McGovern. I would just close by reiterating my
hope that, as much as I hope the President does not go to Saudi
Arabia, if he does, that he raises this issue with the
government there, because, again, human rights organizations
have pointed to the fact that Saudi Arabia may very well be
engaged in these activities. As I pointed out--I gave an
example of a specific case, so I hope there will be a
recommendation that if he goes, he raises this issue
specifically.
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will
certainly convey your concern and request.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman. I might
add, in that vein, that Saudi Arabia has worked to sweep
several individuals out of the state of Oregon, and we found
that this is a practice around the United States, of those who
have been involved in significant crimes against American
citizens, including murder, rape, and other egregious
activities. Senator Wyden and I have made a big issue out of
this, and we really want to convey that it's so important that
this get raised, along with other human rights issues, if the
President proceeds to go to Saudi Arabia.
Let me now turn to Senator Daines.
Senator Daines. Senator Merkley, thank you.
I want to thank you all for coming before this Commission
today. I've spent more than half a decade actually
professionally working in China as an expat in the private
sector. I've led several congressional delegation visits to
China, as well as its neighbors. As I look at what's going on
at the moment, it's clear the United States needs to work
closely with our allies to counter China's growing economic
coercion and influence, as well as its efforts to export its
surveillance state abroad, including initiatives to silence
criticism abroad and intimidate or harass the Uyghurs,
Tibetans, or dissidents who no longer reside in the PRC.
Under Secretary Zeya, it's readily apparent that China is
not satisfied with simply censoring its own population, but
aggressively seeks to influence speech and actions abroad,
including the self-censorship of dissidents, foreign
publishers, businesses, or academic journals related to China.
What are the long-term effects of such actions and what is
being done to help both partners and allies in the region, as
well as the private sector and private sector stakeholders, to
withstand such pressure?
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Senator. You raise a very
important point with respect to self-censorship. You know, we
absolutely reject this, and we find it unacceptable that PRC
surveillance, harassment, and intimidation is prompting its own
citizens and others abroad to self-censor their words and
actions out of a fear of reprisal or retaliation. Respect for
freedom of expression, as you know, is a bedrock American
principle. This is integrated into our transnational repression
response, as we call on the PRC to respect the right of those
inside and outside their borders to express their own opinions.
As you noted, working with allies and partners is
absolutely essential, so we are working with foreign
governments to expose these tactics through our Global
Engagement Center, and through other multilateral efforts, such
as the Freedom Online Coalition and the Media Freedom
Coalition, which Canada is leading at this moment. We are also
working, as I noted, to puncture PRC narratives in this space
and provide factual information that sheds a light, an
antiseptic light, on the misinformation and propaganda being
put forward by the PRC side.
We're working very closely with allies and partners to
build resilience to these threats. Just earlier this month our
Global Engagement Center signed a new and important memorandum
of understanding with the United Kingdom to enhance our already
strong counter-disinformation and counter-propaganda
activities. The final element of this effort is what I noted
earlier in the testimony, an imperative to really promote and
protect open and resilient information ecosystems as a
counterpoint to the great firewall and the absolute censorship
exercised by the PRC, by meeting the critical needs of at-risk
journalists, supporting long-term sustainability of independent
media, enhancing the impact of investigative journalists, and
bolstering all of these actors' resilience to legal and
regulatory challenges, which are often censorship in disguise.
So initiatives such as the journalist protection platform, part
of our Summit for Democracy, and the Presidential Initiative
for Democratic Renewal, are very important in terms of an
affirmative effort to allow a counterpoint to this nefarious
disinformation and self-censorship.
Senator Daines. Thank you. I want to follow up with a
question that relates to the digital yuan, because I think
there's also--you used the word ``nefarious.'' As you know,
China's in the process of testing a digital yuan. When most
countries look into digital currencies, they're very concerned
about privacy implications. China's motivation stems in large
part from a desire to gain insights into the financial lives of
its citizens. Under Secretary, how could a push by the Chinese
government to spread the usage of the digital yuan outside of
its own borders threaten human rights in neighboring countries
and countries where China has made significant capital
investments?
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, Senator, I would concur, there
is absolutely a human rights nexus with the digital yuan, or
what is often called the e-CNY. We believe that the PRC's very
poor record of responsible behavior in cyberspace and misuse of
technology raises very serious concerns about widespread
adoption of platforms and standards related to tech developed
by the PRC in general and this includes the e-CNY. We have very
well-based concerns that e-CNY could pose a heightened privacy
and consumer protection risk and could also enhance the PRC's
surveillance and social control capabilities--some of their
primary tools for transnational repression--and further extend
that globally.
So we are urging individuals, businesses, and global
financial institutions to assess these risks cautiously and to
integrate human rights concerns before considering any use of
e-CNY. Our counterpoint to that is also an affirmative agenda
of using technology in a way that serves our people, protects
our interests, and upholds our democratic values. That is part
of our multilateral efforts with allies and partners to ensure
responsible development of digital assets that will put
guardrails in place that prevent this kind of misuse of
technology from proliferating more widely.
Senator Daines. In the 30 seconds that I have left, and
this would be for both of you, how are your agencies seeking to
improve monitoring, measurement, and effectiveness of efforts
to counter transnational repression? I'm about out of time, so
we'll start with the Under Secretary first.
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, you know, monitoring and
evaluation is a critical element of our work through the
department as a whole. I think we are investing in that and
ensuring that we are not simply putting programs in place, but
really, as I emphasized at the top, our transnational
repression effort is results oriented. So we need to see that
we are having a measurable impact on the problem we are seeking
to address.
Senator Daines. Your comment on that?
Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Senator. This is
actually an opportunity for me to go back to a point that the
Chair made earlier about his concern that reports of
individuals who may be subject to an act of transnational
repression on U.S. soil might report it to the FBI, and then it
might stay there and not be shared with the FBI's interagency
partners. I just want to make a point that the FBI has task
forces around the country, Homeland Security Investigations
under the Department of Homeland Security as a participant, and
task forces all over the country.
So when reports do come in to the FBI, and those are
investigated, that is shared within the interagency law
enforcement community. So that's an excellent way for the law
enforcement community to be monitoring trends, whether or not
it ends up in a criminal investigation. It's a way for the law
enforcement community to know what's happening and to ensure
that that helps shape our response as a law enforcement
community to the activity we're seeing. Thank you.
Senator Daines. Thank you. Senator Merkley, thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Senator Daines. Thank
you for bringing your direct experience in China to this
conversation today. We are so pleased to have Congressman
Malinowski with us. He has direct experience working in the
Department of State in these areas. Let me turn it over to you
for your opportunity to make comments and ask questions.
Representative Malinowski. Thank you so much, Senator
Merkley, for holding this hearing. Under Secretary Zeya, good
to see you, way over there. I apologize for missing your
testimony and most of the exchanges. I would assume most of the
obvious issues have been covered. Obviously, I share the
concerns of everybody in this room with respect to China and
other countries reaching beyond their borders to harass,
intimidate, and harm people who are critics of their
governments. I applaud the administration for identifying
transnational repression as a particular threat.
I have a human rights background. I do not see this as a
human rights issue. I see this as part of the United States
exercising--our government exercising--its most fundamental
responsibility and that is to protect people inside our
country. This is a national security issue and as such, I think
it should be centrally elevated over virtually everything else
that we do with the governments that are responsible for this
kind of conduct.
With respect to China, one aspect of the CCP's efforts that
I've been concerned about for some time is pressure on American
companies and other foreign companies to censor their
employees, to change the ways in which they do business, to
avoid any real or perceived criticism of the Chinese
government. There was, of course, a case a couple of years ago
that got a lot of attention involving the Houston Rockets, the
NBA team, which did in fact seek to punish one of its American
employees for personal speech that was critical of the Chinese
government. I think that's an ongoing phenomenon.
I wonder whether you have any thoughts about the proper
role of the U.S. Government and Congress in developing
standards for American companies, multinational companies, when
it comes to how they should respond to that kind of pressure.
Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Malinowski,
for raising this very important issue, that was also raised by
Senator Daines, about self-censorship. Certainly we reject PRC
surveillance, harassment, and intimidation that is prompting
its own citizens and others abroad, as you noted, to self-
censor their words and actions. We enshrine freedom of
expression as a bedrock American principle centered in our
foreign policy, so we are resolute in supporting exercise of
that right and we absolutely call on the PRC to respect that
right of those inside and outside its borders to express their
own opinions.
I think our engagement with the private sector is ongoing
with respect to business advisories for Hong Kong and Xinjiang
that have made clear that we need to engage American companies
directly to ensure that they do not facilitate or fall victim
to PRC repression or censorship efforts. So I would say this is
an ongoing area of engagement as part of our whole-of-
government effort to respond to and curb PRC transnational
repression.
Representative Malinowski. Should we prohibit U.S.
companies from complying with censorship requests?
Under Secretary Zeya. In terms of prohibition, I think I'm
not in a position to pronounce on that point, but we certainly
regularly engage U.S. companies and point out where I think
quite clearly they don't want to be part of the PRC's
repressive efforts inside, and certainly outside, China, within
U.S. borders.
Representative Malinowski. Well, it's an unfair question,
because it would be really up to the U.S. Congress, but I do
think it is within the administration's purview, as you've done
in other similar realms, to be thinking about the development
of voluntary standards that go beyond just raising concerns in
individual cases. I think we've been very defensive about this.
Something happens, and then we express concern. I think there's
at least room for a more proactive effort to develop preemptive
standards that companies could at least sign up for.
I'm going to cheat a little bit here. We're talking about
transnational repression, and it's hard to do that with regard
to China alone. The President is embarking on a trip to Saudi
Arabia, which was responsible for the most horrific act of
transnational repression aimed at somebody within the United
States in recent years. I wonder whether you guys can assure us
that those operations to target, harass, intimidate, and
pressure critics of Saudi Arabia within the United States have
ceased. Has the State Department conferred with the FBI to
assure itself of that, hopefully, fact?
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, thank you, Representative, for
sharing your concerns. I would say my preparation for this
hearing was focused on transnational repression from the PRC,
but we certainly take your concerns onboard with respect to
Saudi Arabia. Our efforts to curb transnational repression are
absolutely global, and we will take your position into account.
There's really nothing further I can share here in a public
hearing.
Representative Malinowski. OK. I think it would be very
helpful to have an assessment from the FBI, because the case we
all know about, the Khashoggi case, was the tip of the iceberg.
I think we all know that there is routine harassment and
intimidation of a number of people in the United States.
Then finally, again, a global question. The only law on our
books, as far as I know, with respect to transnational
repression, is the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits
arms sales to any country that engages in a pattern of
intimidation and harassment of persons in the United States.
Does the State Department have any process by which it
evaluates compliance with that standard with regard to
countries around the world?
Under Secretary Zeya. Well, one of the points that I made
in terms of our multilateral responses to transnational
repression is certainly focused on the area of export controls
and human rights. This is one of the priority action sets from
the Summit for Democracy, where we are working with like-minded
countries to develop new norms that are going to strengthen
collective action and responsibility to ensure that these
issues are integrated not only by the United States, but by
several other leading allies and partners around the world.
Representative Malinowski. OK. That's not a direct answer
to my question, but we will follow up. Thank you very much, and
I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman Malinowski,
and for the expertise you bring on human rights to this
conversation.
As we wrap up here, I want to note that in the conversation
with Senator Daines, you referred to e-CNY as a term for the
digital yuan. Can you tell us what e-CNY stands for?
Under Secretary Zeya. I would have to ask my staff to give
that relevant detail. I'm sorry about that.
Chair Merkley. Very good. We were speculating here that it
was electronic currency national yuan, but I had not heard that
term before, so thank you.
Both of you mentioned that the FBI has a website for
transnational repression, so I asked my team to print out
information regarding that, and I have here a copy of several
pages of the website. In addition, it has information in many
different languages including Uyghur and Chinese. I'll submit
those for the record.
I was struck in looking at this website that it says, ``How
to Report.'' It says: Contact your local FBI field office,
contact the FBI online at tips.fbi.gov. Then it provides a
different website in the Uyghur language and Chinese language,
which is fbi.gov/tips, but nothing specific about a hotline for
transnational repression. Of course, thousands and thousands of
things come in to the FBI on a generalized tip hotline, so
maybe one of the things we can explore is whether there needs
to be a more specific way to channel reports of transnational
repression.
I was also struck in reviewing this that, while the FBI
website does mention that threatening or detaining family
members in a home country is a form of transnational
repression, all the rest of the information is really about
threats to those inside the United States. I really want to see
how we bring attention to this threat against people in the
home country because it is such an effective strategy for China
in discouraging freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and
freedom of assembly here in the United States. It's just so
absolutely unacceptable.
I just want to conclude by noting that I really appreciate,
Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant Secretary Hoy, the work
you're doing on transnational repression. It is a growing
problem and it's magnified by social media and by new
technologies, surveillance and facial recognition and forms of
communication. It is an assault on the freedom of the citizens
and residents of the United States of America that we need to
do all we can to develop effective responses to.
I note that we are anticipating written statements from the
Uyghur Human Rights Project and Freedom House that will be
entered into the record when they are received, without
objection, and that the record will remain open until the close
of business on Friday, June 17th for any items members would
like to submit for the record or any additional questions for
all of you as witnesses. Again, thank you very much for your
expertise and your presentations and your work on this
important issue. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]
?
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A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of Under Secretary Zeya
Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, distinguished Members of the
Commission; thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
As Secretary Blinken noted in his recent speech, ``The scale and
scope of the challenge posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC)
will test American diplomacy like nothing we've seen before.'' Few
things are more emblematic of this challenge and the need to contest
the PRC's behavior than its transnational repression. It is the most
sophisticated form of repression that exists in the world today. It is
pervasive, it is pernicious, and it presents a threat to the values we
hold dear as Americans and the integrity of the rules-based
international order.
From the ongoing cases of Uyghurs at risk of refoulement to the May
18 indictment of Shujun Wang and four PRC intelligence officers in New
York for spying on activists in the United States, the reach and
frequency of the PRC's global repression is growing more alarming by
the day. The historical data also proves that this phenomenon is not a
recent one. NGOs have documented thousands of cases over the last
several years of the PRC conducting involuntary returns to the PRC from
over 120 countries worldwide.
Additionally, the extent and sophistication of PRC tactics are
deeply concerning. They include physical threats, harassment, and
surveillance against individuals; threatening individuals' family
members within the PRC with detention, imprisonment, or the loss of
economic opportunities; digital threats including online harassment,
surveillance, and other malicious cyber activity, and use of
disinformation and online smear campaigns; misuse and attempted misuse
of other states' immigration enforcement mechanisms and international
law enforcement systems, including INTERPOL; and applying direct
bilateral pressure on other nations to return individuals to the PRC.
PRC agents apply these tactics against individuals of all
nationalities, including U.S. citizens in the United States.
In response to these threats, the Biden-Harris Administration is
executing a multifaceted strategy to counter, deter, and mitigate their
prevalence and impact. It is grounded in an approach that is:
(1) Whole-of-government--The Administration has spearheaded a
sustained interagency effort to encourage information sharing within
the USG on the PRC's transnational repression; coordinate on public-
facing materials to raise awareness; threat information sharing with
partners, conduct outreach and offer resources to victims; and optimize
accountability tools.
(2) Inclusive--We are proactively engaging the full spectrum of
stakeholders impacted by the PRC's transnational repression, including
most importantly, the targeted communities themselves, such as Uyghurs,
Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, Hong Kongers, and human rights
defenders; civil society representatives; like-minded and affected
governments; and the business and investor community.
(3) Agile--To address the PRC's ever-evolving tactics and reach, we
are increasing cooperation with government and non-government partners
to collect data about the incidence, methods, and perpetrators of
transnational repression, publicize it, and adapt our approach
accordingly.
(4) Results oriented--Our involvement in cases of transnational
repression has literally saved lives, and we prioritize our engagement
to achieve practical results for individuals at immediate risk.
The Administration's strategy revolves around four key pillars.
First, we are using all available tools, in coordination with our
interagency partners, to promote accountability for the PRC's
transnational repression and to help support those brave enough to
speak out against serious human rights abuses in the PRC. These tools
include visa restrictions, investment restrictions by the Treasury
Department, export controls by the Commerce Department on technology
that could be misused to help facilitate transnational repression, and,
of course, law enforcement actions in the United States to investigate
and prosecute perpetrators. The Secretary's March 2022 announcement of
visa restrictions against PRC officials involved in transnational
repression and the Treasury Department's December 2021 announcement of
investment restrictions against PRC entities manufacturing and
exporting surveillance technology are two recent examples of actions
taken by this Administration.
Second, we are curbing the PRC's ability to perpetrate these abuses
by engaging third countries that may be implicated, willingly or not,
in the PRC's transnational repression efforts, as well as international
law enforcement agencies and the private sector. We are facilitating
more rapid diplomacy for individuals at risk of refoulement, including
immediate and high-level engagement with host governments to prevent
forced repatriation and help ensure their safety. We continue to
support INTERPOL reforms and good governance that strengthen safeguards
to prevent countries from using INTERPOL systems for political or other
improper purposes to target peaceful activists or those fleeing
repression. Our federal assistance programs are empowering civil
society activists and others to mitigate and counter the PRC's
transnational repression through providing digital security tools and
financial assistance. Through the Summit for Democracy and other
forums, we are engaging with the private sector to ensure that firms
are cognizant of and have the tools to counter the PRC's increasingly
sophisticated digital authoritarianism.
Third, we are building the resilience of targeted communities in
the U.S. and around the world, including through listening sessions led
by U.S. government officials, to better understand the needs and
develop tailored responses. Through our engagement in Washington and at
our embassies, we are proactively engaging with affected communities,
understanding their challenges, and developing solutions in
partnership. Additionally, we are amplifying the voices of affected
communities by shining a light on transnational repression and bringing
it out from the shadows. We are now reporting on transnational
repression in the Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices, and the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. We are also
supporting affected communities by advocating for individual cases of
transnational repression where family members of activists and others
have been imprisoned or disappeared in the PRC.
Fourth, we are engaging our allies and partners to mount
coordinated multilateral responses. For instance, we work with partners
to jointly advocate for political prisoner cases, many of which have
ties to transnational repression. This included a ``Voices of Political
Prisoners'' event co-led by Secretary Blinken and Lithuanian Foreign
Minister Landsbergis at the December Summit for Democracy.
Additionally, in coordination with the Commerce Department and with the
support of Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, we
partnered with Australia, Norway and Denmark to launch the Export
Controls and Human Rights Initiative, which seeks to stem the tide of
PRC and other authoritarian governments' misuse of technology. Through
the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, we are working with our
European partners on developing common standards that will address the
misuse of technology that threatens human rights and facilitates
transnational repression. Lastly, we have sought to call out repressive
acts that fall in the category of transnational repression in
statements or resolutions at the UN General Assembly and other UN
bodies. And we intend to do more.
In closing, let me repeat--the PRC's transnational repression poses
a direct threat to human rights and democracy, the rules-based
international order, and even our own citizens and institutions. It
also poses a direct threat to citizens and communities in the United
States. We must reckon with this serious threat, and we are combating
it with the attention, seriousness, and resources it deserves.
Our close partnership with Congress will be integral to this
effort. Bipartisan legislation such as the Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, among
many other bills, has given us the tools we need to confront the PRC's
egregious atrocities and human rights abuses. We welcome an ongoing
partnership with Congress to refine our tools and our diplomatic
approaches to address the PRC's transnational repression threat.
Chair Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, distinguished Members, let me
again express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify today, and
I look forward to your questions.
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Hoy
Chair Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, and distinguished Members of the
Commission:
It is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the
critical work the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing to
combat the ongoing campaign of transnational repression (TNR) waged by
the People's Republic of China (PRC).
DHS combats diverse and dynamic threats to the homeland, many of
which have a transnational nexus. I lead the Office of International
Affairs (OIA) within the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
which oversees DHS's activities to advance our strategic and policy
objectives and raise security standards globally across the full range
of the Department's missions in order to protect our homeland.
Collaboration with our international allies and partners is critical to
preventing threats to our homeland, including threats emanating from
malign state-sponsored activity.
One such malign state-sponsored activity directly tied to
transnational repression involves foreign governments that harass and
intimidate their own citizens residing in the United States. These
governments, to include the PRC, also target U.S. citizens and
permanent residents who have family residing overseas. In either case,
these actions may violate individual rights and freedoms under U.S. and
international law.
As part of the whole-of-government effort, DHS contributes to the
federal interagency response in combating many of the threats the PRC
poses to our homeland and our interests abroad. Today, I am focused on
the threat of transnational repression and the PRC's efforts to reach
across national borders to silence dissent among its citizens abroad as
well as non-citizens, including U.S. citizens, they see as a political
threat. This practice represents a serious danger to human freedom and
security and is an issue of significant human rights and national
security concern to DHS.
The Department will not tolerate nation states seeking to surveil,
intimidate, or do harm to individuals residing in the United States. By
prioritizing efforts to counter transnational repression, we protect
the human rights of those residing within our borders and we enhance
our national security. DHS brings unique authorities to bear in the
whole-of-government effort to combat and prevent the sustained PRC
campaign of repression that has harmed countless individuals within our
borders and violated our national sovereignty.
While the PRC's activities of concern stretch across many fronts,
during today's testimony, I will highlight three priority lines of
effort through which the Department has worked to fend off attempts by
the PRC to commit repressive acts on U.S. soil. First, I will focus on
Operation Fox Hunt, through which the PRC--under the guise of its anti-
corruption efforts--seeks to intimidate and ultimately repatriate,
voluntarily or forcibly, current and former citizens of the PRC and
their families living overseas whom it sees as a political or financial
threat. A team from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) leads the Department's efforts
to combat this repressive campaign and works across the interagency,
particularly with our colleagues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), to thwart these extralegal attempts. Second, I will discuss a
particular line of effort I have helped lead to counter abuse of the
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), a topic which is
connected to the PRC's wider attempts to set the rules of the road by
influencing international bodies through agenda-setting and elections.
And finally, I will discuss the important work of the Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to engage and protect Uyghur and
other communities affected by transnational repression within the
United States.
thwarting operation fox hunt
The Department has worked for nearly two decades to combat targeted
harassment on U.S. soil by the PRC. ICE, through HSI and with
interagency partners like the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI,
has targeted a PRC government effort known as Operation Fox Hunt,
through which Beijing targets and seeks to repatriate and prosecute PRC
individuals living in foreign countries whom the PRC alleges are guilty
of corruption and should be returned to the PRC to face criminal
charges. The PRC has portrayed this as an international anti-corruption
campaign, but the effort has in fact been used to target critics and
dissidents living around the globe, including within the United States,
using extrajudicial channels. In total, through these efforts, the PRC
has returned over 9,000 individuals worldwide to China, where they may
face imprisonment or other repressive measures. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese
Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United
States--FBI; Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside
the U.S.--FBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC often uses illegal tactics to surveil, threaten, and harass
its targets, both in person and digitally, including in the United
States. Such attempts circumvent established means of law enforcement
cooperation, directly violate U.S. sovereignty, and highlight that the
PRC often lacks a legal basis for pursuing such targets. There have
been a number of cases in recent years that illustrate illegal PRC
activity in the United States. As just one example, in October 2020,
eight individuals were charged as illegal PRC agents in the United
States who conspired to surveil, stalk, harass, and coerce U.S.
residents to force those residents to return to the PRC. In this
instance, six defendants were also charged with conspiring to commit
interstate and international stalking. The defendants were allegedly
acting at the direction of PRC government officials as part of
Operation Fox Hunt's global, concerted, and extralegal repatriation
effort.
The complaint stated that defendants participated in a plan to
bring an individual's father to the United States against his will to
then leverage the father's surprise arrival in the United States to
coerce the son's return to the PRC. Conspirators consulted with one
another to determine how the individual's father should lie to U.S.
immigration officials regarding the purpose of his visit to the United
States. Other actions taken by the defendants included surveilling and
harassing the daughter of the individual in question, as well as her
friends, on social media. \2\
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\2\ Eight Individuals Charged With Conspiring to Act as Illegal
Agents of the People's Republic of China--OPA, Department of Justice.
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In support of the FBI and other U.S. government law enforcement and
intelligence community efforts to combat Operation Fox Hunt, DHS seeks
to provide traditional and non-traditional disruption options to
overall investigative strategies pursuant to its broad scope of
criminal and administrative immigration and customs-related authorities
and capabilities. In support of U.S.-based efforts to counter Operation
Fox Hunt, HSI primarily works with and through its FBI partners and
their Counterintelligence Task Forces.
To mitigate the threats posed by the PRC's illegal activity outside
its borders, DHS will build on recent successes and continue its work
to prevent attempts by the PRC to illicitly surveil and harass
individuals in the United States.
DHS will continue to conduct due diligence when presented with
information by PRC authorities on alleged fugitive case files. As part
of routine police-to-police information sharing, HSI receives requests
for information from the PRC's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for
fugitives from China whom the Ministry alleges have taken criminal
proceeds with them to the United States. Ensuring appropriate due
diligence prevents PRC authorities from using HSI-furnished information
to engage in transnational repression, that is, using this information
to target dissidents and other opponents. These requests are vetted and
handled in accordance with DHS and HSI policies regarding information
received from foreign law enforcement sources, and if warranted, are
investigated for potential violations of U.S. law. Requests for
information sent to HSI or ICE field offices from the PRC must be fully
vetted at HSI or ICE headquarters to ensure coordination and compliance
with agency policy before any information is shared with MPS.
HSI will also continue to work with the interagency to investigate
individuals linked to Operation Fox Hunt. While cases and
investigations are ongoing and specifics cannot be relayed through open
testimony, HSI has helped to identify subjects involved in Operation
Fox Hunt and potential targets of the program. For example, HSI has
tracked assets used to facilitate Operation Fox Hunt and provided this
information to partner agencies, which has ultimately led to the
disruption of those operations.
HSI has also sought to raise the awareness of other relevant DHS
operational components and across the interagency concerning the PRC's
use of U.S. law enforcement agencies to unwittingly assist Operation
Fox Hunt. DHS has worked to ensure the tools our components have to
counter the PRC's illicit activity are fully utilized. For example,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has used its intelligence-based
targeting programs to identify PRC-affiliated operatives traveling for
nefarious purposes, and will continue to advance and strengthen these
efforts.
The PRC has sought to message the legality and legitimacy of
Operation Fox Hunt through measures such as announcing the campaign
alongside the dissemination of a list of 100 individuals the PRC said
were sought through INTERPOL red notices. \3\ Like other countries, the
PRC uses INTERPOL notices to imply international endorsement of its
pursuit, even though INTERPOL notices are not subject to judicial
review and their purpose is not to serve as any such political or other
endorsement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a
Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight--Freedom House.
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supporting interpol reforms
The PRC's repressive activities span far beyond U.S. borders and
involve efforts to manipulate the rules and mechanisms of international
law enforcement cooperation. The PRC has attempted to influence
international bodies such as the United Nations to achieve its aims.
The U.S. government wants to be sure it is taking all appropriate
measures to ensure that the PRC is not in a position to exploit for
nefarious purposes the unique tools that INTERPOL provides to bring
criminals to justice. Uyghur and other communities in the United States
have highlighted the detrimental impacts of politically motivated
INTERPOL red notices issued at the request of the PRC government, which
have resulted in the detention of community members overseas.
Therefore, I want to highlight the measures the U.S. government and
the Department are putting in place to support INTERPOL in its efforts
to prevent abuse of INTERPOL channels. This line of effort, which is
part of the broader U.S. government work to combat transnational
repression, is particularly close to my heart given my previous tenure
at INTERPOL. At INTERPOL, I helped lead the group tasked with ensuring
compliance of notices and diffusions with INTERPOL's Constitution and
Rules, including identifying and blocking attempts to abuse INTERPOL
channels to target political opponents or for other illegitimate
purposes.
INTERPOL's system of notices and diffusions is the most important
global policing capability it offers to its member countries. INTERPOL
red notices and wanted persons diffusions are requests by INTERPOL
member governments, or International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, to
member countries' law enforcement agencies to locate and arrest a
wanted person for the purpose of extradition or similar legal action.
These requests include information allowing for the identification of
the wanted person and the crime for which the person is wanted and must
comply with INTERPOL's Constitution and Rules for Processing Data,
which prohibit their use for political, racial, religious, or military
purposes. Individuals who are the subject of a red notice or wanted
persons diffusion are at risk of arrest if they travel and may suffer
other negative impacts on their lives and livelihoods. Other types of
notices and diffusions INTERPOL issues may have less impactful
consequences, but may nevertheless be improperly used by requesting
countries to harass or persecute individuals for their political or
religious views.
DHS and its interagency partners have worked together over the last
year to strengthen the actions the U.S. government is able to take in
support of the internal reforms INTERPOL has made to target the abuse
of its critical tools for politically motivated purposes. Some of the
measures the U.S. government has put in place will be described in a
report submitted jointly by the Departments of Justice and State in
accordance with the Transnational Repression Accountability and
Prevention (TRAP) Act of 2021 (Section 6503(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022). In general, these
actions are intended to strengthen the ways in which the U.S.
government is able to comply with INTERPOL's request that member
countries provide it with relevant information, which can be kept
confidential, that would assist it in identifying notices and
diffusions that might be based on political motivations.
In line with this broader U.S. government effort, DHS is working to
ensure that our enforcement officers are trained in how to recognize
and respond to potentially abusive INTERPOL notices and diffusions and
are aware of countries known to engage in transnational repression,
including through misuse of INTERPOL channels. Importantly, DHS,
consistent with existing practice and legal requirements, does not use
INTERPOL notices or diffusions as the sole basis for any law
enforcement action, including with respect to decisions to detain
individuals.
Finally, DHS is encouraging INTERPOL to increase its use of
corrective measures against countries that attempt to abuse INTERPOL
channels. This issue has been a particular focus for the Department's
leadership, which has expressed to INTERPOL leadership our deep concern
over abuse of red notices and diffusions and has urged the organization
take all appropriate measures to hold accountable states that try to
abuse the system. DHS appreciates INTERPOL leadership's receptiveness
to these concerns and willingness to take action on these important
matters.
In March, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United
States, alongside Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New
Zealand, called on INTERPOL to suspend Russian access to its system in
accordance with its rules. DHS, along with its interagency partners,
will continue working to ensure that INTERPOL mechanisms and processes
remain robust and effective and that they uphold democratic principles
and the rule of law.
engaging affected communities
While DHS works to directly prevent the PRC from engaging in
transnational repression on U.S. soil, we recognize this line of effort
represents just one part of our important mission to counter Beijing's
global campaign of repression. DHS sees the need to amplify and inform
these efforts through continuous engagement with the victims of this
campaign, including with the Uyghur diaspora, as well as other targeted
communities. Uyghur communities face virtual harassment, threats, and
attacks, including on social media platforms in the United States and
around the world. For example, college education has been interrupted
for some in the Uyghur community living in the United States, as
financial support from family members living in China has been cut off
by the PRC government. Some individuals are the subject of
disinformation campaigns fabricated by the PRC government. Others are
experiencing cyberattacks on diaspora organizations and Uyghur
diaspora-owned email accounts. The PRC has compelled individuals to
harass Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and other individuals deemed
unfavorable to the PRC on university campuses or during protests and
other activism-related events.
Most significantly, PRC-resident family members of the diaspora,
including but not limited to Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Hong Kongers living
in the United States, often face retaliation, including detention and
exit bans, and in the case of Uyghurs, detention in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) internment camps. Some diaspora community
members are themselves survivors of these camps.
CRCL has connected Uyghur diaspora community leaders and members
with relevant DHS offices and operational components, such as the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to follow up on specific
concerns. In response to Uyghur community leaders' questions regarding
prevention of online harassment and threats to individuals and
community organizations, CISA shared information on its freely
available resources, namely, free cybersecurity tools for use at the
individual and organizational level. CRCL has also shared with Uyghur
diaspora community leaders information on opportunities for engagement
with USCIS, in particular with respect to asylum cases and processes.
CRCL hosted a virtual interagency engagement in March 2022 with the
Uyghur diaspora community in the United States to share information on
federal resources to address threats of transnational repression. The
roundtable included presentations from the White House, as well as DHS
components and offices, on available resources to protect communities
and address the community's concerns. Following the engagement, CRCL
created and shared with participants a list of relevant federal
resources. CRCL continues to engage with representatives of the Uyghur
diaspora community through ongoing community stakeholder engagements
nationwide.
Other federal agencies, including the FBI and Department of State,
are also directly engaged with these communities and individuals.
As part of DHS's effort to strengthen the resilience of U.S.-based
communities vulnerable to transnational repression, DHS Under Secretary
for Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert Silvers and the Department of
State's Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights Uzra Zeya hosted a roundtable discussion in March of 2022 with
individuals who have been the targets of transnational repression.
Participants included members of the Uyghur diaspora, members of other
religious and ethnic minorities, and human rights defenders who shared
harrowing stories of the PRC using surveillance, spyware, harassment,
and coercion to silence Uyghur individuals in the United States. Under
Secretary Silvers and Under Secretary Zeya reaffirmed the U.S.
government's commitment to supporting individuals impacted by
transnational repression and to promoting accountability for the
individuals who perpetrate these acts. They underscored the Biden-
Harris Administration's resolve to push back against governments that
reach beyond their borders to threaten and attack journalists and
perceived dissidents for exercising their human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
As part of its mission to ensure the protection of civil rights and
civil liberties in all DHS policies, programs, and activities, CRCL
will address transnational repression concerns raised by community
stakeholders in its ongoing, regular engagement activities, especially
in metropolitan areas with large Uyghur diaspora populations. CRCL will
also deepen collaboration with the Department of State on priority
communities for engagement.
conclusion
DHS will remain unwavering in its efforts to combat transnational
repression committed by the PRC and looks forward to working with
Congress to pursue this critical mission. I thank you again for the
opportunity to appear before you and to discuss our ongoing work in
these areas. I look forward to taking your questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Merkley
Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, ``The Threat of Transnational Repression from
China and the U.S. Response,'' will come to order.
In recent years, this Commission has devoted increased attention to
the Chinese Communist Party and government's human rights violations in
the United States and globally. We've expanded our reporting, brought
in additional expertise, and held a range of hearings on the toolkit
employed for these abuses. That toolkit includes economic coercion,
technology-enhanced authoritarianism, and other ways to stifle
criticism, avoid accountability, and undermine international human
rights norms.
In this hearing, we will examine a part of that toolkit that
targets individuals and communities at a very personal level:
transnational repression. In addition to the egregious human rights
abuses they commit within Chinese borders, Chinese authorities
increasingly reach into other countries to silence dissidents, conduct
surveillance, and force the repatriation of critics. This long arm of
authoritarianism across borders is not just a violation of human
rights, it is a violation of countries' national sovereignty.
These tactics, targeting Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Falun
Gong practitioners, human rights advocates, journalists, and others,
add up to what Freedom House calls ``the most sophisticated, global,
and comprehensive'' campaign of transnational repression in the world.
By Freedom House's conservative count, between 2014 and 2021 there
were 214 cases of ``direct, physical attack'' originating from China
across dozens of countries, including right here in the United States
of America.
International manhunts like Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Sky
Net go well beyond supposed corruption suspects to include critics and
others deemed sensitive. This leaves many Uyghurs and others in a
precarious position, especially as other governments at times cooperate
with the Chinese government against the rights of migrants.
We have also seen the Chinese government exploit international
organizations toward these repressive ends. The abuse of INTERPOL
mechanisms such as ``Red Notices'' can trigger detentions and even
rendition of the targets of transnational repression. At the United
Nations, authoritarian governments seek to erode norms of universal
human rights, and Chinese pressure can deny representatives of civil
society or diaspora communities the opportunity to access UN forums.
Even when Chinese authorities don't reach their targets physically,
they surveil and coerce them in other ways, such as by deploying
spyware, threatening them in video calls, or harassing their family
members who still live in China.
In response to these disturbing trends, the Biden administration
has sought to elevate the issue of transnational repression both within
the United States Government and in interactions with countries around
the globe, whether they be like-minded countries seeking to address
this menace or perpetrators of transnational repression or countries on
whose soil this behavior occurs.
In today's hearing, we will hear from two administration officials
at the forefront of those efforts. We wanted to hear from multiple
parts of the U.S. Government because addressing transnational
repression will truly require a whole-of-government approach. To raise
awareness globally and prevent these tactics from becoming pervasive in
the international system, we need diplomacy. To protect those targeted,
we need humanitarian and homeland responses. To pursue accountability
for those responsible, we need law enforcement. The Departments of
State, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and others all
have a role to play. This hearing will allow us to hear from two of
those agencies on the steps the administration is taking to counter
transnational repression from China, how they coordinate across the
interagency and with other governments and international organizations,
and where we have opportunity to do more.
Certain aspects of the U.S. response will be most appropriate for
members of this Commission to explore in a closed session. That is
especially true for certain law enforcement matters, and we are working
with the Department of Justice to arrange such an opportunity in the
coming weeks.
For today's hearing, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses
on what their departments are doing, in coordination with partners in
government, civil society, the private sector, and international
community, to address transnational repression from China. The scope
and complexity of this threat requires not only a whole-of-government
approach but vigilance, coordination, and decisive action across the
administration and Congress. I hope today's hearing helps us take a
step in developing urgency around this issue and charting a path
forward for addressing it.
______
Prepared Statement of Representative McGovern
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing about
transnational repression by the People's Republic of China.
In September 2020, federal authorities arrested a New York City
police officer and U.S. Army reservist for acting as an illegal agent
of the Chinese government. The man, originally from Tibet, had tried to
ingratiate himself within the Tibetan-American community of New York.
It turns out he was spying on them and advancing Chinese interests.
This revelation caused fear and concern in the community.
The Uyghur Americans at Radio Free Asia who work diligently to
report facts from Xinjiang, including crimes against humanity, are
protected by our First Amendment's safeguard of freedom of the press.
The Chinese government has attempted to silence them by punishing their
relatives back home. Gulchera Hoja testified before this Commission in
2018 that two dozen of her relatives are missing, almost certainly held
in reeducation camps run by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang.
These are but two examples. The Chinese government tries to deflect
criticism of its human rights record by claiming that it has a
sovereign right to do what it wants within its borders, and yet Chinese
officials have no problem setting aside sovereignty principles when
they reach across our border to threaten the human rights of Americans.
In his May 26 speech on China, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said
the Chinese government ``purports to champion sovereignty and
territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly
violate them.'' I would add that the Chinese government itself violates
them. I am pleased that the Biden administration has recognized this
trend and is deploying diplomatic, investigative, and prosecutorial
resources to the problem.
I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant
Secretary Hoy about what their respective Departments are doing to
address this issue and these violations. We want to hear whether there
are additional authorities or tools that you need from Congress,
including the expansion of humanitarian pathways to provide refuge to
those who risk their lives to stand up to authoritarian regimes. We
also look forward to getting input from the Department of Justice in a
separate setting, as the Chair has mentioned.
While our focus today is China, my concern has been global. Freedom
House's extensive report from earlier this month finds that 36
governments engage in transnational repression, and documented 735
incidents of ``direct, physical transnational repression'' between 2014
and 2021, with 85 incidents in 2021 alone.
I, along with several of my colleagues, have expressed concern over
transnational repression by Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, including
such heinous crimes as the murder of U.S. resident and journalist Jamal
Khashoggi by Saudi officials and the poisoning of Russians living in
exile in the U.K. by Russian authorities.
I hope to hear how the administration is approaching the challenge
not only as a whole-of-government effort but as a global one, too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Submissions for the Record
------
Statement Submitted by Freedom House
transnational repression is a driving factor of the
decline in freedom around the world
Freedom House has tracked sixteen consecutive years of decline in
democracy and freedom around the world. In nondemocratic countries all
over the globe, political leaders rule without the consent of their
citizens. They preside over brittle regimes that harass, assault,
detain, and surveil those whom they perceive as threatening their grip
on power. The same impulse that drives authoritarians to crush
opposition at home also motivates them to pursue critics abroad. This
is the phenomenon known as transnational repression, in which
governments reach across borders to silence dissent among exiles and
diasporas. Transnational repression is a potent tool of global
authoritarianism, and it poses a threat to freedom and democracy
worldwide, not only endangering those who are targeted but also
violating the sovereignty of the nations in which transnational
repression is perpetrated.
Freedom House has released two reports detailing this growing
threat, and documenting at least 735 direct, physical incidents of
transnational repression since 2014--including assassinations,
abductions, assaults, detentions, and unlawful deportations. \1\
Instances of non-physical transnational repression, such as threatening
phone calls and messages, frequently occur, but because they are often
difficult to verify with open source information, Freedom House did not
include non-physical transnational repression in our database of 735
incidents.
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\1\ https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-transnational-
repression-growing-threat-global-democracy; https://freedomhouse.org/
article/new-report-more-governments-reaching-across-
borders-silence-dissent-responses-lagging
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the chinese communist party conducts the world's most comprehensive
campaign of transnational repression
The information in Freedom House's database of physical incidents
shows that China's ruling regime conducts the world's most
sophisticated, comprehensive, and far-reaching campaign of
transnational repression. The Chinese government's use of transnational
repression is part of Beijing's broader campaign to extend its
influence abroad, which includes media influence, economic investment,
and military expansion. The Chinese government uses transnational
repression more than any other country and attempts to exert political
and legal influence over all overseas citizens. Since 2014, Freedom
House has found evidence of Beijing being responsible for 229 of the
735 recorded incidents of physical transnational repression. But we
know this is a conservative estimate of the Chinese Communist Party's
(CCP) campaign, since these numbers do not include pressure put on the
China-based relatives of targeted individuals, digital tactics like
harassment and surveillance, or foiled attempts at physical violence
such as those recently uncovered by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Mirroring patterns of repression at home, Beijing targets both
individuals and whole groups abroad. At risk are people living in at
least 36 countries around the world, including current and former pro-
democracy activists, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, Mongolians,
Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, human rights defenders, journalists, and others
who criticize the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP's campaign of
digital transnational repression is unparalleled in the world.
Employing spyware and digital surveillance, the PRC has infected phones
and whole telecommunications networks to track targeted individuals.
Unilateral acts of transnational repression--such as the forced
landing of a plane by Belarus in May 2021--are rare. Instead, our
research shows that the vast majority of successful cases of
transnational repression involve either overt cooperation between the
origin state and host governments where targeted individuals live or
manipulation of their agencies and institutions. In this respect, the
Chinese government wields transnational repression especially
skillfully. The PRC is adept at utilizing and exploiting established
networks of cooperation, legal agreements, and vulnerabilities in
countries around the world.
Last year, Beijing continued to abuse INTERPOL Red Notices,
including to successfully detain Idris Hasan in Morocco despite the
fact that INTERPOL cancelled the notice shortly after he was arrested.
Hasan, a Uyghur activist, is now awaiting extradition to China.
Ironically, Hasan had left his home in Turkey because of the increasing
pressure from Turkish authorities acting on behalf of Beijing to
silence vocal members of the Uyghur diaspora. Ankara's actions against
the Uyghurs, a group to which it has traditionally offered safe haven,
was driven by increased Chinese economic investment in the country and
closer diplomatic ties. Turkish authorities threatened several groups
of Uyghurs with deportation after they had participated in protests
outside that country's embassies. Uyghurs in Gulf states, such as Saudi
Arabia, where many travel to make the Hajj pilgrimage, are at risk of
being detained and deported to China. Freedom House is aware of
information suggesting that at least four Uyghurs, including one child,
face deportation currently.
A similar cooperative dynamic can be seen with other countries.
Authorities in the United Arab Emirates detained a teenage Chinese
activist transiting through the Dubai airport in May 2021 and allowed
Chinese embassy staff to interrogate him in an effort to have him
return home. The activist's girlfriend, also a Chinese citizen, was
taken from a hotel in Dubai and detained for eight days at what she
described in media accounts as a ``black site'' run by the Chinese
government. She was released only after signing documents accusing her
partner of threatening behavior.
the prc's transnational repression in the united states
In countries where official channels of cooperation are less
susceptible to manipulation, the PRC nevertheless finds methods for
targeting individuals. In the United States, the PRC has targeted
individuals since at least the early 2000s, when Congress passed a
resolution condemning physical attacks and break-ins targeting U.S.-
based Falun Gong practitioners. More recently, since 2016, through its
Fox Hunt campaign, the PRC has tried to pressure individuals to either
return to China to face criminal accusations or else take their own
lives. Fox Hunt, and its partner campaign, SkyNet, attempt to export
China's legal system beyond its territorial borders. The PRC has also
targeted pro-democracy activists, including a candidate running for a
seat in the House of Representatives. Agents of China's Ministry of
State Security plotted to collect or fabricate damaging information on
this individual or even physically assault him, fearing the impact his
critical stance on China would have if he were elected to office. The
PRC also surveilled artists, other pro-democracy activists, and members
of the Tibetan diaspora in the United States. In these efforts, they
hired private investigators, a New York City police officer, and
attempted to bribe officials at the Internal Revenue Service. It is
common for those living in the United States who are targeted by
Beijing to receive threatening messages on social media. One Hong Kong-
born American activist even discovered a drone hovering outside the
windows of his home, apparently looking through his windows with a
camera, though he was unable to determine who was operating it.
Possibly the biggest challenge in terms of transnational repression
for the United States and other democratic countries that are home to
dissidents and political exiles is the impact of coercion by proxy, in
which a person's family, loved one, or business located in the origin
state is targeted. Even when the dissident is out of reach of direct
violence or harassment, they continue to be vulnerable to transnational
repression because other people close to them can be taken hostage by
autocrats. As with other tactics, the Chinese regime makes wide use of
this, not only threatening family members of U.S.-based activists in
China with detention or financial ruin, but also arresting and
sentencing them to prison. Alongside other tactics--such as harassment,
surveillance, and intimidation--transnational repression by proxy
changes the way people communicate with friends, family members, and
professional associates in China or even among the local Chinese, Hong
Kong, Tibetan, or Uyghur community in the United States.
the ccp's campaign of transnational repression poses a threat to
democracy that must be urgently addressed
Steps to better protect against the CCP's campaign of transnational
repression, both in the United States and abroad, include:
1. Codifying a definition of transnational repression, which will
facilitate the tracking of incidents at home and abroad, distinguish
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate inter-agency action, in
addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed.
2. Codification should be accompanied with appropriate training for
law enforcement and other agencies that may encounter transnational
repression. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun this effort.
3. Resilience also encompasses strategic outreach to communities
that are at risk of experiencing transnational repression in order to
equip them with the resources to report these activities.
4. The United States should also use its voice and vote to limit
the ability of Interpol member states to target individuals through the
misuse of Red Notices and other alerts.
5. The United States can also deploy a robust strategy for targeted
sanctions against China for the use of transnational repression and
appropriate screening of Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing
diaspora members in their postings.
More details about these recommendations, and additional
recommendations, are available in our reports. \2\
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\2\ https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/transnational-
repression#US.
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The CCP's campaign of transnational repression is a threat to the
sovereignty, democratic institutions, and exercise of fundamental
rights in the United States and around the globe, including by
individuals who have fled abroad precisely to escape horrific
violations in China. Building resilience and imposing accountability
are key to curbing the CCP's campaign of transnational repression.
Taking actions such as those above to impede this practice, which
literally brings authoritarianism to our front doorstep is vital to
protecting U.S. residents and upholding democratic values.
______
Statement Submitted by the Uyghur Human Rights Project
The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) welcomes the opportunity to
submit a written statement for consideration by the Commission in
connection with its hearing on the threat of transnational repression
from China and the U.S. response. UHRP conducts research-based advocacy
to promote the rights of the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim peoples in
East Turkistan, referred to by the Chinese government as the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region, in accordance with international human rights
standards.
UHRP has documented the transnational repression (TNR) experienced
by Uyghurs in a series of ten reports, published from 2011 through
2022. In addition, we have called attention to the issues and made
policy recommendations in 25 statements and published commentaries
since 2016.
UHRP's 2019 report, ``Repression Across Borders: The CCP's Illegal
Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans,'' documents how the
Chinese government routinely carries out surveillance, threats and
coercion on American soil to control the speech and actions of Uyghur
Americans. We pointed out that the Chinese government's program of
transnational repression is an ambitious and well-resourced campaign
affecting all Uyghur Americans, especially the many brave journalists,
activists, and students engaged in raising awareness about the crisis
of repression in their homeland.
UHRP also pointed out that the intimidation campaign constitutes an
ongoing series of crimes committed with impunity on U.S. persons. It is
illegal under U.S. federal and state law to issue threats that
interfere with free-speech rights. For the Uyghur American community,
the enduring and menacing presence of the Chinese government in their
daily lives deprives them of their constitutionally protected rights
and freedoms.
UHRP was pleased to see our analysis of the violations on U.S. soil
confirmed on every point, in the Unclassified FBI Counterintelligence
bulletin on violations of Uyghur civil rights on U.S. soil (PRC),
issued on August 11, 2021.
We also commend the FBI's general factsheet on TNR: Transnational
Repression--What is it, How you can get help to stop it (FBI--undated).
UHRP's 2019 report details Chinese state pressure placed on Uyghur
Americans to end activism, highlighting dire human rights conditions in
the Uyghur region. The threats come by text, chat apps, voicemail,
email, and messages delivered by third parties; some members of the
community report receiving such messages on a weekly or even a near-
daily basis. Non-compliance could result in family members being taken
to a concentration camp.
These communications illustrate the way Chinese agents apply
pressure against Uyghurs abroad through their family members at home,
adding to the extreme emotional distress of separated Uyghur families.
That so many speak out, despite the dire risks, demonstrates the
resilience of Uyghurs in the United States.
In his 2014 book, The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda, Kingsley
Edney describes how the Chinese state seeks ``cohesion'' between its
overseas and domestic messaging. The method is to enlist actors abroad
to rearticulate pro-Beijing viewpoints and suppress counternarratives.
Silencing Uyghurs overseas is not only about control of all Uyghur
bodies, regardless of location, but also an attempt to promote China's
ludicrous claim that the concentration camps are indeed ``vocational
training centers.'' Denying overseas Uyghurs a voice means the world is
deprived of knowing the true extent of China's ongoing crimes against
humanity.
PRC transnational repression is also a challenge to the sovereignty
of the United States and the authority of the U.S. government to
protect the rights of its citizens and legal residents. Like other
illegal Chinese government influence operations on U.S. soil, Chinese
government harassment and abuse of Uyghurs from California to Virginia
should be a U.S. government priority. It is a test of U.S. resolve and
impacts all of us, as the limitation of some U.S. citizens' rights by a
foreign power should always be unacceptable.
recommendations
Strengthen refugee resettlement programs by increasing
quotas and streamlining procedures. The U.S. government should increase
their quota of refugees from China and from third countries that are
likely to extradite citizens to China, such as Turkey and Thailand.
Uphold the non-refoulement principle. Under international
law, governments are prohibited from sending individuals back to
countries where they would be at risk of persecution, torture, ill-
treatment, or other serious human rights violations.
Restrict the export of surveillance technology. The
potential for malicious use of technology by Chinese companies active
in the campaign of repression in the Uyghur Region should make
countries hesitant about allowing them to operate within their borders
without scrutiny. The U.S. government should work to achieve clear
standards on transparency for such dual-use technologies.
Increase outreach to Uyghur communities. The U.S.
government should recognize the unique dangers faced by Uyghurs and
other Turkic peoples residing within their borders. Outreach
initiatives could include teaching Uyghurs about their legal and
political rights or about basic digital security strategies to
counteract the growing threat of Chinese malware and hacks.
Form a caucus of democratic states within INTERPOL.
Democracies make up 14 of the 15 top statutory funders of the body.
These democracies could caucus together on key general assembly votes,
support common candidates for key positions, and adopt policies to
insulate INTERPOL against abuse, such as pushing for abusers to be
suspended from accessing Interpol databases, as stipulated by Article
131 of the Rules on the Processing of Data.
Continue to speak publicly, with allies, about
transnational repression. Raising awareness of the threat transnational
repression poses to national sovereignty and to the human rights of
targeted individuals is critical to formulating a coalition and a
coherent multilateral response in forums such as INTERPOL and the UN.
uhrp reports and briefings
1. New UHRP Report Finds Arab States Have Deported or Detained 292
Uyghurs at China's Bidding, March 24, 2022
2. ``Your Family Will Suffer'': How China Is Hacking, Surveilling,
and Intimidating Uyghurs in 22 Liberal Democracies, November 10, 2021
3. ``Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky'': China's Hunt for
Pakistan's Uyghurs, August 11, 2021
4. No Space Left to Run: China's Transnational Repression of
Uyghurs, June 24, 2021
5. Weaponized Passports: The Crisis of Uyghur Statelessness, April
1, 2021
6. ``The Government Never Oppresses Us'': China's proof-of-life
videos as intimidation of Uyghurs abroad, February 1, 2021
7. Repression Across Borders: The CCP's Illegal Harassment and
Coercion of Uyghur Americans, August 28, 2019
8. ``Another Form of Control'': Complications in obtaining
documents from China impacts immigration processes and livelihoods for
Uyghurs abroad, August 10, 2018
9. ``The Fifth Poison'': The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas,
November 28, 2017
10. ``They Can't Send Me Back'': Uyghur Asylum Seekers in Europe
face pressure to return to China, September 20, 2011
statements
1. UHRP Encouraged by U.S. Visa Ban to Oppose Transnational
Repression, Urges Multilateral Action, March 22, 2022
2. UHRP Welcomes Prosecutions of Chinese Secret Police Harassing
and Spying in the U.S., March 16, 2022
3. 12 Years After July 5 Unrest in Urumqi, UHRP Again Calls for
Safe Haven for Uyghur Refugees, July 5, 2021
4. On World Refugee Day 2021, UHRP Calls for Global Protections
for Uyghur Refugees, June 20, 2021
5. UHRP Calls for Due Process in Turkish Case regarding Dolkun
Isa, June 8, 2021
6. UHRP Welcomes Senate Legislation to Support Safe Haven for
Uyghurs Abroad, April 13, 2021
7. UHRP Welcomes House Bill to Provide Uyghurs Safe Haven, March
9, 2021
8. Op-ed: How Beijing Uses Family Videos to Try to Discredit
Uyghur Advocates, Emily Upson in the HK Free Press, February 28, 2021
9. UHRP Submits Statement on Issues Facing Uyghur Refugees to the
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), February
12, 2021
10. Uyghurs Fear Deportation if Turkey-China Extradition Agreement
Comes into Force, December 30, 2020
11. Op-ed: China's Barbarity toward Uyghur Families Should Shock
Our Consciences and Spur Action, Omer Kanat in The Diplomat, October
22, 2020
12. Uyghur Camp Survivor Arrives Safely in the United States,
September 25, 2020
13. On World Refugee Day, UHRP Urges UNHCR to Address Looming
Uyghur Statelessness, June 19, 2020
14. Op-ed: Uyghurs without Passports: Forced Legibility and
Illegibility, Henryk Szadziewski in The Geopolitics, May 12, 2020
15. UHRP Welcomes Rescue of Uyghur Camp Survivors, April 29, 2020
16. Open Threats against Uyghur Activist in Germany Lay Bare
China's Lawless Persecution, January 15, 2020
17. China's Propaganda Videos Are an Ineffective Attempt to
Discredit #StillNoInfo, January 14, 2020
18. Op-ed: China's Cross-Border Campaign to Terrorize Uyghur
Americans, Omer Kanat in The Diplomat, August 29, 2019
19. World Refugee Day 2019: Thailand Should Free Uyghur Refugees,
June 19, 2019
20. Op-ed: Uyghur Refugees Deserve Freedom, Omer Kanat in the
Bangkok Post, November 20, 2018
21. World Refugee Day 2018: End Forced Returns of Uyghurs, June 19,
2018
22. Media Advisory: UHRP-WUC EVENT: Dolkun Isa Speaks on Removal of
INTERPOL Red Notice after 20 Years, March 5, 2018
23. World Refugee Day 2017: UHRP Calls for Information on Returned
Uyghur Refugees, June 17, 2017
24. China: Reveal Condition and Whereabouts of Uyghur Refugees
Forcibly Deported from Thailand to China One Year Ago, July 7, 2016
25. World Refugee Day 2016: End Forced Returns of Uyghur Refugees
and Resettle Remaining Uyghurs in Thailand to Safe Third Country, June
20, 2016
Submission of Senator Jeff Merkley
On pages 45-53 of this hearing are screenshots of FBI webpages
useful for reporting transnational repression/threats. Instructions for
reaching the Transnational Repression webpage, the Threat Intimidation
Guide webpage, and the Threat Intimidation Guide in English, Simplified
Chinese, Traditional Chinese, and Uyghur are given below. Each Guide
lists a web address where tips can be reported.
To access the Transnational Repression webpage and then to reach a
tips.fbi.gov link and/or the Threat Intimidation Guide webpage,
(screenshots on pages 45-49 of this hearing), go to fbi.gov, click the
What We Investigate tab, click the Counterintelligence tab, and then
click on the ``Transnational Repression Is Illegal'' box below to reach
the Transnational Repression webpage containing (in the box on the
right) the heading ``How to Report.'' Click on either tips.fbi.gov to
provide a tip or click on the Threat Intimidation Guide link.
To access a Threat Intimidation Guide, (screenshots on pages 50-53 of
this hearing), click the desired language on the right hand side of the
Threat Intimidation Guide webpage. Each Guide lists an additional
address, www.fbi.gov/tips, to use for reporting tips.
Threat Intimidation Guide (in English) (screenshot on page 50 of this
hearing)
Threat Intimidation Guide (in Chinese, Simplified) (screenshot on page
51 of this hearing)
Threat Intimidation Guide (in Chinese, Traditional) (screenshot on page
52 of this hearing)
Threat Intimidation Guide (in Uyghur) (screenshot on page 53 of this
hearing)
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Witness Biographies
Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy,
and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State
The Honorable Uzra Zeya is the Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the U.S. Special Coordinator
for Tibetan Issues at the U.S. Department of State. From 2019 to 2021,
she served as president and CEO of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a
non-partisan global network of more than 130 organizations working in
more than 180 countries to end conflict by peaceful means. During her
distinguished 27-year Foreign Service career, Zeya served as deputy
chief of mission and charge d'affaires in Paris; principal deputy
assistant secretary and acting assistant secretary at the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; chief of staff to the Deputy
Secretary of State; political minister-counselor in New Delhi; and
deputy executive secretary to Secretaries of State Rice and Clinton.
She also served in Syria, Egypt, Oman, Jamaica, and in various policy
roles at the Department of State. Zeya speaks Arabic, French, and
Spanish. She has a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University and is
the recipient of several State Department Superior Honor and Senior
Performance awards, the Presidential Rank Award, and the French Legion
d'honneur.
Serena Hoy, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security
Ms. Serena Hoy is the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Previously, she served in
the Office of Legal Affairs at INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon, France;
as a senior counselor to then-Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and
Secretary Jeh Johnson at the Department of Homeland Security; and with
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, including as his chief counsel.
Before working in government, she was a staff attorney for the Florida
Immigrant Advocacy Center and served as the Detention Project director
for the Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition. She clerked for
Judge Merrick Garland on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
after earning her law degree from Yale Law School. She also holds a
master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Oxford University where
she was a Rhodes Scholar, and a bachelor's degree from the University
of Arizona.