[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





 
THE THREAT OF TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION FROM CHINA AND THE U.S. RESPONSE


 


=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2022

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
 
 
 
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              U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
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              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS


Senate                                       House

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair          JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,  
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California                 Co-chair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana                BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine                    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
                                     JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
                                     MICHELLE STEEL, California

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                           Not yet appointed

                      Matt Squeri, Staff Director

                   Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               Statements

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from 
  Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     1
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from 
  Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on 
  China..........................................................     3
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New 
  Jersey.........................................................     4
Statement of Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary for Civilian 
  Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State     6
Statement of Serena Hoy, Assistant Secretary for International 
  Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..................     7

                                APPENDIX
                          Prepared Statements

Zeya, Hon. Uzra..................................................    31
Hoy, Serena......................................................    33

Merkley, Hon. Jeff...............................................    37
McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    38

                       Submissions for the Record

Statement of Freedom House.......................................    39
Statement of the Uyghur Human Rights Project.....................    41
The FBI ``Transnational Repression'' webpage, the ``FBI Threat 
  Intimidation Guide'' webpage, and the ``Threat Intimidation 
  Guide'' in four languages, submitted by Senator Merkley........    44
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................    54
Witness Biographies..............................................    55

                                 (iii)


                      THE THREAT OF TRANSNATIONAL

                         REPRESSION FROM CHINA

                         AND THE U.S. RESPONSE

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 2022

                            Congressional-Executive
                                       Commission on China,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The hearing was held from 10:07 a.m. to 11:44 a.m. in Room 
G-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, and via Cisco Webex, 
Senator Jeff Merkley, Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission 
on China, presiding.
    Also present: Co-chair James P. McGovern, Senators Daines 
and Ossoff, and Representatives Smith, Steel, Mast, and 
Malinowski.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM 
   OREGON; CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, ``The Threat of 
Transnational Repression from China and the U.S. Response,'' 
will come to order.
    In recent years, this Commission has devoted increased 
attention to the Chinese Communist Party and government's human 
rights violations in the United States and globally. We've 
expanded our reporting, brought in additional expertise, and 
held a range of hearings on the toolkit employed for these 
abuses. That toolkit includes economic coercion, technology-
enhanced authoritarianism, and other ways to stifle criticism, 
avoid accountability, and undermine international human rights 
norms.
    In this hearing, we will examine a part of that toolkit 
that targets individuals and communities at a very personal 
level--transnational repression. In addition to the egregious 
human rights abuses they commit within China's borders, Chinese 
authorities increasingly reach into other countries to silence 
dissidents, conduct surveillance, and force the repatriation of 
critics. This long arm of authoritarianism across borders is 
not just a violation of human rights, it is a violation of 
countries' national sovereignty.
    These tactics, targeting Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, 
Falun Gong practitioners, human rights advocates, journalists, 
and others, add up to what Freedom House calls the most 
sophisticated, global, and comprehensive campaign of 
transnational repression in the world. By Freedom House's 
conservative count, between 2014 and 2021 there were 214 cases 
of direct physical attack originating from China across dozens 
of countries, including right here in the United States of 
America. International manhunts like Operation Fox Hunt and 
Operation Sky Net go well beyond supposed corruption suspects 
to include critics and others deemed ``sensitive.'' This leaves 
many Uyghurs and others in a precarious position, especially as 
other governments at times cooperate with the Chinese 
government against the rights of migrants.
    We've also seen the Chinese government exploit 
international organizations toward these repressive ends. The 
abuse of INTERPOL mechanisms such as red notices can trigger 
detentions and even rendition of the targets of transnational 
repression. At the United Nations, authoritarian governments 
seek to erode norms of universal human rights, and Chinese 
pressure can deny representatives of civil society or diaspora 
communities the opportunity to access UN forums. Even when 
Chinese authorities don't reach their targets physically, they 
surveil and coerce them in other ways such as by deploying 
spyware, threatening them in video calls, and harassing their 
family members who still live in China.
    In response to these disturbing trends, the Biden 
administration has sought to elevate the issue of transnational 
repression both within the United States Government and in 
interactions with countries around the globe, whether they be 
like-minded countries seeking to address this menace or 
perpetrators of transnational repression or countries on whose 
soil this behavior occurs. In today's hearing, we will hear 
from two administration officials at the forefront of these 
efforts. We wanted to hear from multiple parts of the U.S. 
Government because addressing transnational repression will 
truly require a whole-of-government approach.
    To raise awareness globally and prevent these tactics from 
becoming pervasive in the international system, we need 
diplomacy. To protect those targeted, we need humanitarian and 
homeland responses. To pursue accountability for those 
responsible, we need law enforcement. The Departments of State, 
Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and others all 
have a role to play. This hearing will allow us to hear from 
two of those agencies on the steps the administration is taking 
to counter transnational repression from China, how they 
coordinate with the agencies, with other governments and 
international organizations, and where we have opportunity to 
do more.
    Certain aspects of the U.S. response will be most 
appropriate for members of the Commission to explore in a 
closed session. That is especially true for certain law 
enforcement matters, and we are working with the Department of 
Justice to arrange such an opportunity in the coming weeks. For 
today's hearing I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on 
what their departments are doing, in coordination with partners 
in government, civil society, the private sector, and the 
international community to address transnational repression 
from China. The scope and complexity of this threat requires 
not only a whole-of-government approach but vigilance, 
coordination, and decisive action across the administration and 
Congress. I hope today's hearing helps us take a step in 
developing urgency around this issue and charting a path 
forward for addressing it.
    It's now my pleasure to recognize Congressman McGovern for 
his opening remarks.

  STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS; CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON 
                             CHINA

    Co-chair McGovern. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for holding this hearing about transnational repression by the 
People's Republic of China. You know, in September 2020, 
federal authorities arrested a New York City police officer and 
U.S. Army reservist for acting as an illegal agent of the 
Chinese government. The man, originally from Tibet, had tried 
to ingratiate himself with the Tibetan-American community of 
New York. It turns out he was spying on them and advancing 
Chinese interests. This revelation caused fear and concern in 
the community.
    The Uyghur Americans at Radio Free Asia who work diligently 
to report facts from Xinjiang, including crimes against 
humanity, are protected by our First Amendment safeguard of 
freedom of the press. The Chinese government has attempted to 
silence them by punishing their relatives back home. Gulchera 
Hoja testified before this Commission in 2018 that two dozen of 
her relatives are missing, almost certainly held in reeducation 
camps run by the Chinese in Xinjiang.
    These are but two examples. The Chinese government tries to 
deflect criticism of its human rights record by claiming that 
it has a sovereign right to do what it wants within its 
borders. And yet, Chinese officials have no problem setting 
aside sovereignty principles when they reach across our border 
to threaten the human rights of Americans. In his May 26th 
speech on China, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said that the 
Chinese government purports to champion sovereignty and 
territorial integrity while standing with governments that 
brazenly violate them. I would add that the Chinese government 
itself violates them.
    I am pleased that the Biden administration has recognized 
this trend and is deploying diplomatic, investigative, and 
prosecutorial resources to the problem. I look forward to 
hearing from Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant Secretary Hoy 
about what their respective departments are doing to address 
this issue and these violations. We want to hear whether there 
are additional authorities or tools that you need from 
Congress, including the expansion of humanitarian pathways to 
provide refuge to those who risk their lives to stand up to 
authoritarian regimes. We also look forward to getting input 
from the Department of Justice in a separate setting, as the 
Chair has already mentioned.
    While our focus today is China, my concern on this issue 
has been global. Freedom House's extensive report from earlier 
this month finds that 36 governments engage in transnational 
repression, and documented 735 incidents of direct physical 
transnational repression between 2014 and 2021, with 85 
incidents in 2021 alone. I, along with several of my 
colleagues, have expressed concern over transnational 
repression by Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, including such 
heinous crimes as the murder of U.S. resident and journalist 
Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials and the poisoning of 
Russians living in exile in the U.K. by Russian authorities. I 
hope to hear how the administration is approaching the 
challenge, not only as a whole-of-government effort but as a 
global one too.
    So Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back my time.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I now recognize 
Congressman Smith, who would like to make some opening 
comments.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
                A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

    Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, 
and thank you for convening this important hearing this 
morning.
    You know, last year on June 4th, to commemorate the 32nd 
anniversary of the horrific Tiananmen Square massacre, I 
attended the unveiling of a work of art at Liberty Sculpture 
Park in Yermo, California. There, the Chinese emigree sculptor 
Chen Weiming introduced an iconic work entitled ``CCP Virus,'' 
which morphed an image of Xi Jinping onto a coronavirus cell, 
and it was the size of a small house--that's how big the 
artwork was. A physical monument to the devastation unleashed 
by the Chinese Communist Party onto the world.
    Chinese agents, it should be noted, were there in 
attendance that day. A little over a month later, however, the 
sculpture had been burned to the ground in an arson attack 
which at the time local media reports speculated was 
attributable to Chinese Communist Party agents. Certainly 
sculptor Chen and other emigrees thought so, and the repression 
they thought they had left behind in China was catching up to 
them in the California desert.
    Then in March of this year, federal prosecutors unsealed 
charges against the five men accused of taking orders from 
China's Ministry of State Security to ``stalk, harass, and 
spy'' on Chinese dissidents, and who had destroyed the 
sculpture. Among these were Frank Liu, a former corrections 
officer named Matthew Ziburis, and Jason Sun, the latter of 
whom ordered the destruction of ``all sculptures that are not 
good to our leaders.'' As this incident suggests, today's 
hearing is so timely because China's long arm of repression is 
not something that occurs ``over there,'' but right here in the 
United States of America.
    The cases of this are legion. Wei Jingsheng, the father of 
the democracy movement in China--who, parenthetically, I met in 
Beijing in the early 1990s--when the CCP thought he was such a 
high-value political prisoner, they let him out of prison and 
tried to convince the International Olympic Committee to award 
them Olympics 2000. When the IOC did not give them Olympics 
2000, they re-arrested Wei and tortured him almost to the point 
of death. In 1998 Wei testified at a hearing that I chaired and 
detailed the abuse he suffered and endured, again, all for 
democracy. Now he is free in the United States, thank God.
    Today, however, Wei believes that several assassination 
attempts have been made on his life, including a poisoning 
attempt that required nearly a month-long hospitalization and 
resulted in a 40-pound loss of weight. More recently, on May 
20th, after dropping off a guest at Reagan National Airport, 
two cars sought to run the car Wei was riding in off the road. 
I'd be happy to share with our witnesses, especially from 
Homeland Security, the police report numbers, should they wish 
to follow up on this, and I certainly hope that they will.
    Another prominent Chinese dissident who has faced 
harassment believed to be orchestrated by the CCP is Pastor Bob 
Fu, a long-time friend of this Commission. One tactic the CCP 
uses is to plant fake dissidents among the community and use 
them to create division among the emigrees. In Pastor Fu's 
case, his antagonist was Guo Wengui, also known as Miles Kwok. 
Guo not only used media platforms that he owned to attack 
Pastor Fu, something all of us in public life need to endure 
but certainly not to the degree that Bob Fu endured, but is 
alleged to have organized daily protests outside of his home. 
As the threats remained to his life, on the advice of local and 
federal law enforcement, Pastor Fu and his family were 
evacuated from their home and forced to live in separate 
distinct locations.
    Then there's the murder in March of this year of Jinjin Li, 
an organizer of the Tiananmen Square student movement, who 
spent two years in a Chinese prison following the massacre 
before fleeing and establishing himself as a lawyer, primarily 
serving the Chinese community in Flushing, New York. He was 
stabbed to death by a 25-year-old woman who arrived from China 
on a student visa, though she apparently never went to school 
and spent her time immersing herself in pro-democracy 
activities. While many of the media reports reported the death 
as a straightforward murder, many in the dissident community 
believe it was a professional hit job by a Chinese agent, given 
the ``professional nature,'' of the stabbing. I recommend an 
article by Radio Free Asia, which catalogues some of those 
concerns.
    Mr. Chairman, as you know, this is a crisis. We have 
prominent Chinese dissidents, including Wei Jingsheng, again, 
the father of the Democracy Wall Movement, whose lives are in 
danger living right here in the United States. That goes as 
well for many of the Uyghurs. I know Rebiya Kadeer and others 
over the years have had problems with Chinese agents. Again, 
look what they're doing in China itself with the genocide. Of 
course, those who speak out here are at risk. We need to bring 
more attention to this. This hearing helps to do that. I do 
thank you and yield back the balance of my time.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman Smith.
    I'd now like to introduce our panel of witnesses. Uzra Zeya 
is the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and 
Human Rights at the U.S. Department of State. She also serves 
as the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. She 
previously was the president and CEO of the Alliance for 
Peacebuilding. During her distinguished 27-year foreign service 
career, she served in missions across the globe, including 
senior assignments in Paris, New Delhi, and at the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
    Serena Hoy is the Assistant Secretary for International 
Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Previously she 
served in the office of legal affairs at INTERPOL headquarters, 
as a senior counselor to then-Deputy Secretary Mayorkas and 
Secretary Johnson at DHS, and as chief counsel to U.S. Senate 
Majority Leader Harry Reid. Before serving in government, she 
worked at several immigrant rights organizations and clerked 
for Judge Merrick Garland on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit.
    Thank you both for being here with us today. Without 
objection, your full written testimony will be entered into the 
record. We ask you to keep your remarks to about five minutes. 
Under Secretary Zeya.

        STATEMENT OF HON. UZRA ZEYA, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
                            OF STATE

    Under Secretary Zeya. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, 
Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of the 
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    As Secretary Blinken recently declared, ``The scale and 
scope of the challenge posed by the People's Republic of China 
will test American diplomacy like nothing we've seen before.'' 
Few things are more emblematic of this challenge than PRC 
transnational repression. The reach and frequency of the PRC's 
global repression is growing more alarming by the day. NGOs 
have documented thousands of cases over the last several years 
of the PRC conducting involuntary returns from over 120 
countries worldwide. In response to this growing threat, the 
Biden-Harris administration has developed an approach that is 
whole-of-government, inclusive, agile, and results oriented.
    With these principles guiding our approach, the 
administration's strategy to counter PRC transnational 
repression revolves around four key pillars. First, we are 
using all available tools, in coordination with the interagency 
partners, to promote accountability for the PRC's transnational 
repression. These tools include visa and investment 
restrictions, export controls, and law enforcement actions in 
the United States to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. 
The Secretary's March 2022 announcement of visa restrictions 
against PRC officials involved in transnational repression is 
one recent example of accountability actions taken by this 
administration.
    Second, we are curbing the PRC's ability to perpetrate 
these abuses by engaging third countries that may be 
implicated, willingly or not, in the PRC's transnational 
repression, as well as international law enforcement agencies 
and the private sector. We're facilitating more rapid diplomacy 
with host governments to protect individuals at risk of 
refoulement. We continue to support INTERPOL reforms to prevent 
countries from misusing INTERPOL systems for political or other 
improper purposes. Our federal assistance programs are 
empowering civil society activists to mitigate the PRC's 
transnational repression by providing digital security tools 
and financial assistance. We're engaging with the private 
sector to ensure that firms are cognizant of and have the tools 
to counter the PRC's increasingly sophisticated digital 
authoritarianism.
    Third, we're building the resilience of targeted 
communities in the United States and around the world, to 
better understand their needs and develop tailored responses. 
We are proactively engaging affected communities and developing 
solutions in partnership. Additionally, we're amplifying the 
voices of affected communities by shining a light on 
transnational repression and bringing it out from the shadows. 
We now report on transnational repression in the department's 
Annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report. We're advocating for individual 
cases of transnational repression where family members of 
activists and others have been imprisoned or disappeared in the 
PRC.
    Fourth, we're engaging allies and partners to mount 
coordinated multilateral responses. We work with partners to 
jointly advocate for political prisoner cases, many of which 
have ties to transnational repression. This included a Voices 
of Political Prisoners event at the December Summit for 
Democracy, led by Secretary Blinken and Lithuanian Foreign 
Minister Landsbergis. Additionally, we worked with multiple 
partners to launch the Export Controls and Human Rights 
Initiative, which seeks to stem the tide of PRC and other 
authoritarian governments' misuse of technology. Through the 
EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council, we're working with our 
European partners on developing common standards that will 
address the misuse of technology that facilitates transnational 
repression.
    Lastly, we've sought to ``call out'' transnational 
repression in statements or resolutions at the UN General 
Assembly and other UN bodies. Just yesterday, 47 countries from 
the Asia-Pacific, to Africa, to Latin America to Europe, signed 
a statement at the Human Rights Council condemning the PRC's 
human rights abuses and calling on countries to respect the 
principle of non-refoulement, and we intend to do more.
    In closing, let me repeat--the PRC's transnational 
repression poses a direct threat to human rights and democracy, 
the rules-based international order, and even our own citizens 
and institutions. We are combating it with the attention, 
seriousness, and resources it deserves. Our close partnership 
with Congress will be integral to this effort. Bipartisan 
legislation has given us the tools we need to confront the 
PRC's egregious atrocities and human rights abuses. We welcome 
an ongoing partnership with Congress to refine our tools and 
our diplomatic approaches to address the PRC's transnational 
repression threat. Thank you again for the opportunity to 
testify today, and I welcome your questions.
    Chair Merkley. Now we'll hear from Assistant Secretary Hoy. 
Welcome.

STATEMENT OF SERENA HOY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
         AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you. Chair Merkley, Co-chair 
McGovern, and distinguished members of the Commission, it is a 
privilege to appear before you today to discuss the critical 
work the Department of Homeland Security is doing to combat the 
ongoing campaign of transnational repression waged by the 
People's Republic of China. This practice represents a serious 
threat to human freedom and security and is an issue of 
significant human rights and national security concern to DHS. 
The PRC government uses a range of tactics to control its 
diaspora, citizens, and others critical of its policies and 
actions abroad, including sustained efforts to repress multiple 
members of ethnic and religious minority groups, political 
dissidents, human rights activists, journalists, and former 
insiders accused of corruption.
    My testimony today will focus on the department's efforts 
to counter attempts by the PRC to intimidate and repatriate 
perceived opponents present in the United States and to prevent 
the PRC's abuse of the international criminal police 
organization known as INTERPOL. I will also discuss how the 
department has engaged Uyghur and other diaspora communities 
within the United States to amplify and inform our efforts to 
counter the PRC's transnational repression activities on U.S. 
soil, as well as ensure that these populations are aware of the 
tools and best practices available to combat these attacks.
    DHS is focused, with its interagency partners, on the PRC's 
Operation Fox Hunt, through which Beijing targets and seeks to 
repatriate individuals living in foreign countries whom the PRC 
alleges are guilty of corruption and should be returned to face 
criminal charges. The individuals targeted include members of a 
number of religious and ethnic minority groups, as well as 
political dissidents. In support of FBI and other government, 
law enforcement, and intelligence community efforts to combat 
Operation Fox Hunt, DHS seeks to provide traditional and 
nontraditional disruption options to overall investigative 
strategies, pursuant to its broad scope of criminal and 
administrative immigration and customs-related authorities and 
capabilities.
    The department also works diligently with our international 
partners to prevent abuse of law enforcement authorities for 
political purposes. One of these lines of effort has been our 
work with our interagency partners over the last year to 
support the reforms INTERPOL has undertaken to make it harder 
for states to target dissidents or other vulnerable populations 
through the abuse of its systems. In general, we have sought to 
strengthen the ways in which the U.S. Government is able to 
provide INTERPOL with relevant information, which can be kept 
confidential, that would assist it in identifying notices and 
diffusions that might be based on political motivations. I am 
particularly invested in these efforts, given my previous 
tenure at INTERPOL.
    The department also conducts due diligence to prevent PRC 
authorities from exploiting DHS information-sharing mechanisms, 
immigration systems, and other tools to engage in transnational 
repression. Among these efforts, DHS is working to ensure that 
our law enforcement officers are trained in how to recognize 
and respond to potentially abusive requests for law enforcement 
cooperation and are aware of countries known to engage in 
transnational repression. While DHS seeks to prevent PRC 
government actors from engaging in transnational repression on 
U.S. soil, we also engage with the victims of this campaign, 
including the Uyghur diaspora and other targeted communities.
    For example, leadership from DHS and the State Department, 
including Under Secretary Zeya, convened a roundtable 
discussion in March with individuals who have been the target 
of transnational repression. That same month, DHS's Office for 
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) hosted a virtual 
interagency engagement with the Uyghur diaspora community in 
the United States to share information on federal resources to 
address threats of transnational repression. DHS remains 
unwavering in its efforts to combat transnational repression 
committed by the PRC and looks forward to working with Congress 
on ways to address such activities.
    I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and look 
forward to taking your questions.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you both for your testimony and, more 
importantly, for the work you're doing on transnational 
repression. We'll turn to questions now. I want to start with 
something both of you referred to, which is working with 
targeted communities. I'm thinking about the Uyghurs, the 
Tibetans, the Hong Kongers in the U.S. who are very fearful of 
their family members being retaliated against inside China if 
they exercise their free speech and express their concerns 
about human rights violations or other actions of China they 
disapprove of. You mentioned, Assistant Secretary Hoy, a 
conference or a gathering you had held with, I believe it was, 
Uyghur dissidents who were targeted.
    Could either of you expand on the effort to coordinate with 
leaders of various dissident communities in the United States--
if threatened or if they experience actions, or they hear about 
their niece or nephew, their wife, their son, their grandchild 
being retaliated against in China--how do they channel that 
information? Is there a State Department or Department of 
Homeland Security hotline or a coordinated effort between the 
two departments to enable us to collect information about all 
of the folks that China is targeting?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising 
a very important question. As Assistant Secretary Hoy noted, 
engagement with diaspora communities is a joint endeavor and 
one which the State Department is very committed to. Of course, 
these targets include Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christians, other 
minorities, and simply any diaspora PRC citizens seeking to 
exercise their universal human rights. The responsibility for 
the U.S. enforcement side, the lead agency on this, is the 
Department of Justice.
    But we have, as I noted in my opening remarks and my 
submitted written statement, really prioritized a whole-of-
government approach, where we had an important roundtable that 
I and Under Secretary Silvers convened with affected 
communities, not limited to those targeted by PRC transnational 
repression, but certainly including them, in March, and follow-
on sessions between DHS and diaspora communities, which I'll 
allow Assistant Secretary Hoy to comment on.
    I would also note that Secretary Blinken has engaged Uyghur 
exiles in the United States and human rights activists as part 
of his ongoing effort to center human rights and democratic 
values in our foreign policy. Assistant Secretary Hoy.
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Under Secretary Zeya, 
and thank you, Senator, for that question.
    In addition to the roundtable that Under Secretary Zeya 
mentioned and participated in, our Office for Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties--this is the roundtable, the virtual 
interagency engagement I mentioned in my testimony. This was a 
Uyghur-focused event that CRCL convened, and it was an 
opportunity for interagency partners to talk to the community 
about the resources that are available and to listen to their 
concerns. If there are individuals who have concerns about 
activity they're experiencing, then, as Under Secretary Zeya 
mentioned, our colleagues at the Department of Justice and the 
FBI would be the right place, or state and local law 
enforcement authorities, who would then work with the FBI on 
any concerns or complaints. They would be the lead agency on 
that.
    But DHS's ICE, Homeland Security's investigations agency, 
works very closely with our FBI partners, and in coordination 
with them might participate in any investigation, if an 
investigation were appropriate. But as I think you mentioned, 
even if an investigation isn't appropriate, it is helpful for 
the FBI and the agencies to monitor trends that enable it to 
prepare proper responses to respond at a more systemic level to 
the threat we're facing.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you both. I'm very intrigued by this 
question because I don't believe that our diaspora communities 
in my home state have any idea of how to report. They will 
share among themselves their concerns about what they have 
heard about their family members being targeted. I have a 
feeling we're perhaps possibly missing a full, comprehensive 
understanding of the extent of Chinese transnational 
repression.
    I look forward to following up on this because I want to 
publicize to my diaspora communities how to report and channel. 
I picture that maybe there is a need for absolute clarity, a 
coordinated point person for people to be able to share their 
information with, whether that is at the Department of Justice, 
or elsewhere. I think many in the diaspora community, when they 
hear about the pressure back home, aren't thinking of it as a 
crime to be contacting local police or the FBI about.
    I now want to turn to a broader question. I'm picturing a 
theoretical conversation between perhaps our secretary of 
state, our secretary of homeland security, and a counterpart in 
China saying: Here is our evidence of what you've done to 
retaliate against free speech in the United States of America 
exercised by members of the Chinese diaspora community, and 
here's what's going to happen if these cases continue. I'm 
trying to picture exactly what the most effective tool we have 
to counter this is.
    Several tools have been mentioned, and one of those is to 
hold the perpetrators accountable through visa restrictions and 
investment restrictions, but can't China really strive to make 
it very hard to identify a specific perpetrator, and thereby 
render such tools less effective?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Mr. Chairman, I do want to respond, 
first, to your earlier point about information sharing and 
reporting this crime. There is a public FBI webpage on 
transnational repression--it's available to all. Clearly, we'll 
want to continue to put the word out about this. It advises 
anyone who believes they may have been the victim of this crime 
on how to report it, and it has contact information directly to 
contact the FBI and, of course, local law enforcement, as you 
noted.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Under Secretary Zeya. To your point on the tools, 
absolutely. You know, the administration is deploying a wide 
range of diplomatic, regulatory, and law enforcement tools to 
deter, and ultimately seek accountability for, acts of 
transnational repression, but we are also, as I noted earlier, 
working to build international opposition to this practice and 
intensively engaging with allies and partners to hold 
perpetrators accountable, as this is truly a global phenomenon 
not limited to our own shores. We're also working to increase 
measures that will protect our own citizens from transnational 
repression, through ongoing engagement with communities that 
we've noted, but also to actively engage human rights 
activists, dissidents, journalists, and others who may very 
well be targeted for their courageous actions.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Congressman McGovern.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Secretary Zeya, you mention in your testimony the Chinese 
government's efforts to pressure other governments to forcibly 
return people who are seeking asylum in other countries. They 
are not the only country that does this. Refoulement is a 
violation of international law. My question is whether there 
are sufficient tools in the U.S. toolbox to deter refoulement 
or punish those who do commit the violation. So the question 
is, is there anything besides diplomacy? Is refoulement a 
sanctionable crime under U.S. authority, and if not, should it 
be?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising 
a very important issue. I would say that on the issue of 
refoulement, this is a global policy priority for the 
administration that we raise at the highest levels. I have done 
so myself in my own international engagement in these 11 months 
on the job. With respect to refoulement and sanctions, although 
it's generally not a basis for financial or visa restrictions 
under our existing authorities, we are absolutely resolute and 
adamant in calling upon states to respect the principle of 
nonrefoulement and to uphold their obligations in this area as 
appropriate. And I would say we will continue to explore the 
extent to which sanctions could apply in these cases with 
existing authorities.
    Co-chair McGovern. Well, thank you. I think one of the 
things that this Commission always tries to find is whether or 
not there are additional tools or authorities that we can act 
upon here to give to you, so that we can more effectively deter 
things like refoulement. Obviously we stand willing to work 
with you.
    Assistant Secretary Hoy, you know, while the overall scale 
of transnational repression is global, individual cases are 
sometimes very personal--targeting individuals, their families, 
or their communities. You testified as to how DHS components 
raise awareness among U.S. law enforcement agencies who might 
unwittingly assist Operation Fox Hunt. Does such activity 
include state and municipal police as well? Does this include 
coordination and/or training?
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Co-chair McGovern. 
Homeland Security Investigations is the agency that we have 
worked with--and their sister agency within Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement--to ensure training in recognizing 
transnational repression and ensure that it doesn't unwittingly 
aid it. We also have a state and local partner engagement 
program that liaises closely with our state and local law 
enforcement partners. I don't believe that we conduct any 
training with our state and local law enforcement partners. It 
may be that the FBI does. We can look into that and get back to 
you with that answer.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, because I think that might be 
an area that the Chinese government potentially is exploiting, 
as well as other countries for that matter. Under Secretary 
Zeya, are officers who serve at U.S. embassies and consulates 
trained to identify potential transnational repression, 
including transnational repression carried out by Chinese 
authorities? Do they know what to look for? Are they reporting 
on that stuff?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Our 
raising awareness efforts, of course, include our own teams 
overseas. There are 270-plus U.S. missions, so that has been 
part of our guidance and training resources and materials to 
post in the field so that they can learn what this is, how 
pervasive it is, how to identify it and report it, and most 
important, how to counter it.
    Co-chair McGovern. Yes. It seems to me, and maybe because 
I'm on this Commission I'm becoming more aware of some of these 
things, but it seems to me that this interference is becoming 
more of a problem, and not less. You know, I seem to hear more 
about it with each passing year. I'm wondering whether or not 
there are--again, that's why I asked the question as to whether 
there are other additional tools that we can provide you that 
might help more effectively deter this.
    I appreciate the diplomacy and ``calling out'' examples of 
outside interference, you know, attacks on individuals in this 
country who are exercising their freedom of speech, but it 
seems that that, in and of itself, is not deterring what seems 
to be a growing problem. Again, to either of you, are there 
additional tools that you think we should look at, that we can 
provide you? Are there things that Congress can do that might 
be helpful in not only calling attention to this problem, but 
deterring it?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for 
raising a very important question. As I mentioned in my opening 
remarks and written statement, this is an upward trendline. We 
believe this problem is growing, and it's also evolving in 
terms of the tactics, so we have an imperative to stay ahead of 
it. We can't have a static response. We have to remain agile 
and continually refine our tools and our best practices.
    So in terms of what we are doing, I would say the 
President's budget request includes funding for the State 
Department to support a variety of programs that would address 
and counter transnational repression, but at the same time, 
there is limited funding currently for state programs to 
support and help protect victims and individuals who are 
vulnerable to transnational repression, as well as the 
capability to mitigate surveillance technology and cyber 
threats. Year after year we're finding with this trendline that 
we've declared from the outside, we are consistently receiving 
more program proposals, more competitive ones than we're able 
to fund.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you.
    We would be turning to Senator Ossoff, however he had to 
attend another meeting, so Congressman Smith, you're up.
    Representative Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 
Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses for their 
leadership and for being here today to give us these important 
updates. You know, I wonder if you can tell us to whom a member 
of the diaspora would report if they thought they were being 
victimized by Chinese Communist Party agents. How confidential 
is all of that? We know, and I know the Chairman referenced 
it--I do it all the time as well--one of the ways that the 
Chinese Communist Party continues to have a chokehold on 
dissidents and people once they come here are the people that 
are left behind, their family members who then could be 
retaliated against with impunity.
    I'm wondering if there's a sensitivity to that because when 
somebody does report, to whom do they report? The FBI? What's 
the best source? Is there any thought being given to a hotline 
where somebody could report confidentially that they think 
they're being harassed by the Chinese Communist Party? Because, 
like I said, I've been in so many events, including the one out 
in California, where you could pick out--and people who were 
there could pick out--who the agents were. It was very, very 
eye-opening that, in such a brazen way, they were there and a 
month later they burned down the sculpture. If you could speak 
to that.
    Secondly, Under Secretary Zaya and Assistant Secretary Hoy, 
back in February of 2006 I chaired probably the longest hearing 
I have ever chaired, an eight-hour hearing. We had Google, 
Microsoft, Yahoo, and Cisco testify. I swore them in because 
they were aiding and abetting the Chinese Communist Party in a 
huge way on surveillance, on censorship. People were being 
arrested because personally identifiable information, for 
example, that Yahoo had, was just turned over to the secret 
police when they made a request for it, and once that happened, 
all the other contacts were laid bare.
    I had several hearings after that. We raised it over and 
over again, and I don't think Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and 
Cisco have joined the democracy side on this. They always, like 
many U.S. corporations, desperately want to have access to 
markets and so they mute their words and their actions. The 
most disappointing part of that hearing in February 2006, from 
the top people from those four companies, was when they 
basically said: We're just following orders; if we get a 
``lawful'' request for information, we give it.
    I said, These aren't police officers. These are secret 
police officers. These are people who work for a dictatorship, 
not for a democracy that has checks and balances. But they 
nevertheless said: We just turn over the information. So I'm 
wondering if that has been cured, in whole or in part, because 
I am deeply concerned with so many people who go on social 
media here--is it being monitored? And then people back home 
especially are retaliated against. These large high-tech 
corporations--again, who did nothing but aid and abet the 
Chinese Communist Party for decades--where are they now when it 
comes to these things?
    Finally, I would just bring up one case that has always 
troubled me. A guy named Shi Tao--you might remember him--Yahoo 
gave up his personally identifiable information. And what had 
he done? He had sent information to some folks in New York City 
about what they can and cannot do vis-a-vis the Tiananmen 
Square commemorations, and for that, he got 10 years in prison. 
I mean, 10 years for sharing on censorship--just like we're 
seeing in Hong Kong, as all my fellow commissioners know. You 
know, this year the churches and others were barred, and some 
even self-censored in not commemorating the horrific events of 
the Tiananmen Square massacre out of fear of retaliation by the 
Chinese Communist Party. So, you know, these companies I think 
have a lot to account for.
    As a matter of fact, in my opening statement I pointed out 
that I had read a book years ago called IBM and the Holocaust. 
In that book, which was very heavily documented, it talked 
about how the Gestapo had done such an effective job in finding 
the Jews throughout Germany and elsewhere because, in large 
part, IBM was their partner and was using the best high-tech 
capability available at that time to track down who they were. 
As a matter of fact, in the book it mentions how--why did the 
Gestapo always have these lists? Where did they come from? IBM. 
IBM protested when I mentioned this. I said, have you read the 
book? You know, that kind of complicity with the horrors of the 
Nazis needs to be apologized for, not defended.
    So the high-tech companies issue and do people report to a 
hotline--if you could speak to some of those issues I'd deeply 
appreciate it.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Smith. 
You've raised some very important points that I will seek to 
address from the State Department perspective and then cede the 
floor to my colleague. With respect to domestic law 
enforcement, as you're well aware, the State Department defers 
to U.S. law enforcement agencies regarding PRC unauthorized 
activities in the United States, but let me make clear, we 
continue to oppose the PRC's use of illegal, extraterritorial 
law enforcement activities to target various groups outside its 
borders and inside our own. This activity is unacceptable, 
damaging to our bilateral relationship, and must stop.
    So as an agency, we are working closely with DHS, DOJ, and 
the FBI to identify and define threats, to help develop and 
hone policy tools to respond and deter internally. We are 
sharing information with domestic law enforcement regarding the 
PRC's overarching transnational repression tactics and trends. 
I can't share details here in an open hearing, but our 
department does work with DOJ and the FBI to support the 
investigation and charging of those who are committing this 
crime inside the United States.
    To your very important point with respect to the misuse of 
technology--this is a top priority for the State Department, 
and it is a focal point of our Summit for Democracy effort, 
where we are working with 100-plus governments around the world 
to lead efforts to develop, as I noted, voluntary codes of 
conduct to basically shape the norms to apply human rights 
criteria to export controls. This also corresponds with an 
effort we're leading to develop common principles, the rules of 
the road, on responsible use of surveillance tech.
    This requires ongoing continual outreach with tech and 
social media companies to work more actively to counter PRC 
online harassment, digital surveillance, and disinformation. We 
have to make sure that these platforms are not misused to fuel 
authoritarianism but in fact allow users to freely express 
themselves without fear of reprisal.
    I'd like to give my DHS colleague a chance to respond as 
well.
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you very much. I will just 
say briefly, as discussed with the Chair, the FBI has a very 
helpful website focused on transnational repression. It may be 
that we need to ensure that you all have it in a way that's 
easy for you to communicate with your constituents, but I do 
believe there is a hotline for reporting these sorts of abuses. 
Just one note on the surveillance issues raised--our 
cybersecurity agency has online resources available. They're 
free for individuals, for organizations, to share with them 
best practices for protecting themselves against harassment, 
stalking, and surveillance. Thank you.
    Representative Smith. If I could just add one final 
comment. Hopefully at the highest levels, including the 
President when he talks to Xi Jinping, he's raising these 
issues about, you know, don't harass the diaspora, in addition 
to all the other human rights abuses that the Chinese Communist 
Party commits. I hope he's raising it. I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    Now I will turn to Senator Ossoff.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
the panel. Under Secretary Zeya, I want to direct my first 
question to you. Before I took office, I produced 
investigations of war crimes, organized crime, and official 
corruption for international news organizations. Press freedom 
is vital and under threat worldwide, with journalists facing 
chilling restrictions, and with threats to their lives and 
safety increasing around the world. Reporters Without Borders 
ranks China 175th out of 180 countries for world press freedom. 
The CCP's monitoring systems, firewalls, and media controls 
have shut down any free reporting at home. In November of last 
year, the BBC reported that the Chinese province of Hunan was 
building a surveillance system with face-scanning technology 
that can detect journalists and other ``people of concern.''
    My question for you, Under Secretary, is about the CCP's 
efforts to repress, intimidate, and chill press freedom beyond 
the borders of the PRC. How do they engage in such 
transnational repression? What tactics do they employ to chill 
and restrict press freedom and free reporting about the CCP, or 
to influence reporting about the CCP, beyond China's borders?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a 
critically important dimension of our efforts to counter and 
deter PRC transnational repression. Certainly we agree that our 
efforts have to address the concerted PRC effort through 
transnational repression to shape and repress media reporting 
that is shedding a light on what's happening. As the co-chairs 
noted in their opening remarks, the egregious actions taken 
against family members of Radio Free Asia journalists are just 
one emblematic example of the scope and severity of these 
efforts.
    In response, our efforts are putting a premium on promoting 
and protecting open and resilient information ecosystems by 
addressing the needs of at-risk journalists, fostering the 
long-term sustainability of independent media outlets, and 
enhancing the impact of investigative journalism, which is 
critical to shining a light not only on what is happening 
inside China, but with respect to this growing threat of 
transnational repression which we are discussing today.
    This is also an area for our multilateral engagement with 
allies and partners. We have important platforms, such as the 
Media Freedom Coalition and the Freedom Online Coalition, which 
are building, I would say, like-minded solidarity to respond to 
this problem more collectively, and recognize that it is truly 
global in scope, and we can't be complacent, admiring the 
problem, without taking more concerted action to support free 
and independent media and investigative journalism.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Under Secretary, and I ask for 
your commitment to work with my office and to set up a meeting 
between your staff and mine to discuss how we can work together 
to protect and enhance press freedom and the security of 
journalists around the world. Will you make that commitment?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Yes, Senator. I'm happy to make that 
commitment and we will follow up forthwith.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Looking forward to it.
    Assistant Secretary Hoy, I want to ask you about synthetic 
opioids, the precursors to which are increasingly originating 
within China. This is a matter of serious concern to my 
constituents in Georgia. It's why I worked with Senator 
Grassley to introduce and pass through the Senate our 
bipartisan Rural Opioid Abuse Prevention Act. According to the 
Georgia Department of Public Health, drug overdose deaths in 
Georgia increased by 55 percent from 2019 to 2021. According to 
the DEA, China is one of the primary sources for fentanyl-
related substances and the precursors to synthetic opioids.
    I want to ask you this question, and it's one particular to 
my state. I'm asking for your commitment to work through my 
office to consult directly with local law enforcement agencies 
in Georgia, as well as the Georgia Ports Authority and the 
leadership at the Port of Savannah, to ensure that we are 
mitigating the flow of illicit opioids produced and originating 
in China or produced and originating elsewhere with ingredients 
and precursors originating in China, into the State of Georgia 
and the United States. Will you please make that commitment to 
work with me with that focus on Georgia as part of your 
national portfolio, and to have your staff follow up with mine 
to set up those actions?
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Senator, thank you for that 
question. It's an issue of the utmost importance for the 
Department of Homeland Security and the interagency partners 
that we work with, as well as our international partners. We 
would be happy to follow up with your office and your staff on 
that point.
    Senator Ossoff. I appreciate the commitment and follow-up. 
I just want to be clear and precise. What I'm looking for is a 
commitment to work with my office to connect the department 
directly with local law enforcement and the Georgia Ports 
Authority to enhance our collaboration to protect Georgians 
from these dangerous substances. Will you please make that 
commitment explicitly?
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Yes, Senator. You have our 
commitment.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you kindly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Senator Ossoff.
    We will now turn to Congresswoman Steel.
    Representative Steel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    A recent report from the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute found that Asian women are the newest target of the 
CCP. Women who spoke against the CCP have been victim to 
repeated cases of digital harassment that result in unspeakable 
attacks, rape threats, and distribution of fabricated photos. 
We must continue to denounce the CCP harassment and 
disinformation campaigns. Stopping transnational repression 
must be a joint effort. Our country should also work with other 
countries to fight this abusive tactic, and let the whole world 
know.
    Under Secretary Zeya, does the State Department have a 
directive to work with other countries to condemn digital 
transnational repression? If not, is something preventing this 
partnership from moving forward?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Congresswoman, for raising 
a very important point with respect to digital repression and 
how to counter it. I will be clear--we absolutely recognize the 
severity of the PRC's efforts to use digital means to spread 
disinformation, but also to intimidate, coerce, and censor 
critics globally, so our response to this effort is absolutely 
resolute and multipronged. It is absolutely grounded in 
increased collaboration with allies and partners. One, we are 
working to expose these tactics by working with partner 
governments as well as the private sector and tech platforms to 
identify inauthentic and ultimately bullying behavior.
    Second, we are working to puncture narratives, including by 
providing factual information through third-party researchers, 
and ``calling out'' these attacks as they occur. Third, we're 
working with allies and partners to build resilience to these 
threats, particularly among those targeted. You described, I 
think quite well, the vulnerability of the courageous women and 
others who are speaking up about China's human rights 
situation. We are working to share information and support 
their capacity to protect themselves online. Fourth, as I 
mentioned in my comments to Senator Ossoff, we are absolutely 
determined to promote and protect open and resilient 
information ecosystems so that at-risk journalists and others 
can continue their vital work, free from reprisal and threats.
    Representative Steel. Thank you for your answer. Are State 
Department officials equipped to identify transnational 
repression attacks from the CCP? Do officials communicate with 
other agencies or officials in other countries to help fight 
future attacks?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you for raising this question. 
We are continually gathering information from public as well as 
private sources to consider all the facts at our disposal. As I 
noted earlier, in what is an evolving tactic of transnational 
repression, these inform our efforts in coordination with 
allies and partners, with multilateral actors, with civil 
society and the private sector. So I would say we are in a 
continual mode of reviewing all credible information with 
respect to PRC transnational repression, as well as PRC 
officials' specific responsibility for these actions.
    Representative Steel. So is there any way possible that 
Congressmembers can get into that information and data that you 
collected?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, Madam Congresswoman, I would 
certainly recommend that we could follow up with a briefing for 
your staff, where we might be able to discuss this information 
in more specific detail. I'm happy to commit to that.
    Representative Steel. I really appreciate that. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you so much, Congresswoman Steel. Now 
we'll turn to Congressman Mast.
    Representative Mast. Thank you for your time today, Under 
Secretary Zeya.
    I have a brief statement on this, and then I'd love to know 
your analysis and your thoughts. My understanding is that there 
are red notices that are published through INTERPOL saying we 
need an extradition of this individual or we need this person 
to be detained or arrested for this reason, because of 
accusations of these crimes. We know that this is something we 
use. China uses it as well, as well as other countries.
    My understanding is that China is using this for the 
purpose of political suppression, getting people extradited 
back to China, again, for the purpose of political suppression, 
and not because they've committed ``crimes'' that wouldn't be 
considered anything other than free speech. So what is your 
understanding of that occurring? And then to go beyond that, 
has there been success with the administration in combating 
what China is doing with these red notices? Are there other 
government agencies that China is using in a similar way for 
political repression to bring people back to be detained in 
China in other ways that we might be missing? That is the 
breadth of my question.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Mast, for 
raising a very important point. I will be clear, we absolutely 
share your concern for the potential misuse of INTERPOL systems 
to target dissidents, human rights defenders, activists, 
journalists, and others via PRC transnational repression.
    Now, while the Department of Justice is the lead U.S. 
agency on INTERPOL, the State Department has worked in close 
collaboration with DOJ. Some specific successes we've had were 
on the successful election campaigns for two U.S. 
representatives to two key INTERPOL bodies, including the 
Executive Committee. And this is part of our determined effort 
to prevent the misuse of INTERPOL's tools.
    We're also working to identify and provide more tools to 
support INTERPOL's Notices and Diffusions Task Force, to 
protect the integrity of red notice requests and wanted persons 
diffusions. I'd like to defer to Assistant Secretary Hoy, who I 
think has more to offer here.
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Congressman. I'm 
pleased you raised this issue. This is something I care about a 
lot, as a former staff member at INTERPOL. INTERPOL--after 
conducting a comprehensive analysis of its tools and the way 
they might be abused--undertook a series of reforms over a 
number of years. But in 2016, it stood up the taskforce that 
Under Secretary Zeya referenced, on which I used to work, that 
works very hard to ensure that requests from member countries 
are vetted for exactly the concerns that you raised.
    If those issues are identified, obviously, the notices 
aren't published. However, INTERPOL only knows what it knows. 
It only knows information that's available through public 
sources, or information that's shared with it by its member 
countries. So the administration, as has been mentioned in this 
hearing, has been focused on this issue of transnational 
repression and has launched an internal effort--an interagency 
effort to ensure that the U.S. Government is doing everything 
it can to support the reforms that INTERPOL itself launched.
    That includes ensuring that the U.S. Government is sharing 
with INTERPOL the information that it might have that indicates 
that a request for a red notice or other request might not be 
for legitimate law enforcement purposes, but actually to 
persecute dissidents. And if the U.S. Government receives a 
request--an INTERPOL notice or another request for law 
enforcement cooperation--law enforcement agencies, including 
the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland 
Security, conduct due diligence to look into whether or not the 
request is for a legitimate law enforcement purpose.
    If it's identified that it's not, that's information that 
we have sought to--and are working harder to strengthen our 
efforts to--share that information with INTERPOL where 
relevant, so that INTERPOL can take appropriate action with 
respect to the request. Thank you.
    Representative Mast. Thank you. I yield the remainder of my 
time.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We have two members who 
may be joining us but may not be here yet, so I'll just ask, 
has Senator Daines or Congressman Malinowski joined us yet 
electronically?
    They are not here yet, but they will be. Meanwhile, I'm 
going to try to explore a little bit more this process by which 
Americans or migrants living in the United States who are 
experiencing their family members back in China being harassed, 
perhaps detained, perhaps disappeared, perhaps threatened--how 
they report that. You all clarified that there is an FBI 
website addressing this. so that is the primary point of 
contact.
    Let's imagine a situation in which a citizen back in Oregon 
shares with my office that their family is being harassed 
because of their statements about Chinese human rights 
violations. I direct them to this FBI website. The FBI looks at 
it and says, Well, this isn't a crime within the United States, 
because it's something happening back in China. It's not the 
FBI that has the ability to engage in the intelligence 
operation to know who is ordering that harassment or if, 
indeed, that action is related to the action of an individual 
in the United States. Meanwhile, that FBI report doesn't 
necessarily get to the Department of State or the Department of 
Homeland Security.
    So I want to clarify--at what point does a report being 
made at the FBI website--is it immediately shared with the 
Department of State, so the Department of State can start to 
think about who is responsible? Is there coordination with the 
intelligence community to help determine who is making that 
order? Because if our main tool is to say, Hey, China, if your 
folks are involved in this, they're going to be sanctioned, 
they're going to have a travel restriction or an investment 
restriction, or a visa restriction--but I'm not seeing that 
there is really a clear path to make that an effective tool.
    So I guess I'll boil down my question to you, Under 
Secretary Zeya. Do you immediately get notified? Do we feel 
that there is really an effective pathway in which you're able 
to have this tracked down and effectively respond in a way that 
makes China think twice about having engaged in such 
retaliation against family members back home in China?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Mr. Chairman, thank you for probing 
in more detail on, let's say, the operational mechanisms of our 
coordination. I'm not able to share the details in this public 
hearing, you know, based on a hypothetical, at what point it 
would occur, but I would propose that if we could follow up 
with a briefing, a closed briefing, for you and other 
Commission members, we could describe more in detail how this 
works. I will say, though, I'm hearing loud and clear your 
concern and that of other Commission members, that this 
information needs to be more broadly disseminated, and what to 
do when, in fact, a crime is committed while outside the United 
States, with family members in the U.S. basically being 
intimidated or threatened with reprisals for family members not 
within our country.
    I would highlight here that we have our Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State Department, 
which I oversee. They do receive referrals from member offices, 
and they are very keen to continue that direct engagement. They 
can take this information, act on it appropriately, and it can 
really help us in our own data and information-sharing efforts 
to ascertain what's happening and take appropriate 
accountability actions. So I don't want you to feel that the 
only route is to go the route of the FBI information for the 
public, or that it's only to go to local law enforcement. I 
think we are receptive and open to receiving queries from you 
and your fellow members, if you feel that there is a case that 
is not being acted upon or taken seriously.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Under Secretary, and 
for your offer of a confidential or potentially classified 
briefing open to members of the Commission. We'll take you up 
on that offer, and we'll further pursue the appropriate way we 
can educate Members about how to communicate information to 
your team when our constituents contact us.
    I want to ask one other question here, which is: We have 
heard from certain human rights organizations that it is common 
for China to have a specific member of the diplomatic community 
at each embassy responsible for coordinating harassment of the 
Chinese diaspora that is critical of China. Can you comment on 
that?
    Under Secretary Zeya. We would take such information very 
seriously and integrate it into our own efforts to determine 
what is happening and how we can hold individuals accountable, 
but I do not have further information to share in this public 
setting.
    Chair Merkley. OK, great. Well, we'll pursue that further. 
I was struck by Congressman Smith's testimony about the 
brazenness of the presence of individuals in his home district 
who are monitoring the behavior of the Chinese diaspora. That 
all just goes toward this huge assault on freedom of expression 
here in the United States. I know you're all very much 
concerned about that. That's why we're holding this hearing 
emphasizing that. I certainly appreciate it. I think we're 
going to have a lot more work to do to try to curb or end these 
strategies, not just by China but by other governments.
    Let me turn to the Co-chair, Congressman McGovern.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have one 
question, then I have to go to another hearing. Under Secretary 
Zeya, you know, in February Chair Merkley and I sent a letter 
to Secretary Blinken about reports that Uyghurs in Morocco, 
Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan might be at risk of refoulement to 
China, where, obviously, they could face torture and 
imprisonment and other kinds of abuse.
    In April, Amnesty International reported on an imminent 
refoulement of a mother and daughter from Saudi Arabia to 
China. I don't know whether you can tell us what the State 
Department has done on these cases, and I guess I request that 
you urge the White House to ensure that the Uyghur cases are on 
President Biden's agenda if, in fact, he does go to Saudi 
Arabia next month.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for citing 
your letter, which I read carefully. Certainly, your concern on 
refoulement is a shared one by this administration. As I noted 
in my opening remarks, this was an element of the Human Rights 
Council statement that the Netherlands led in terms of 
reaffirming the importance of countries respecting their 
obligations on nonrefoulement.
    With respect to Saudi Arabia and Morocco, I can assure you 
that the United States is closely tracking and engaging at high 
levels with the governments in question on this issue. This 
applies to Kazakhstan as well. And I can tell you that I raised 
this issue personally on my visit to Kazakhstan just a couple 
of months ago. This is an ongoing and high-level concern for 
our engagement.
    Co-chair McGovern. I would just close by reiterating my 
hope that, as much as I hope the President does not go to Saudi 
Arabia, if he does, that he raises this issue with the 
government there, because, again, human rights organizations 
have pointed to the fact that Saudi Arabia may very well be 
engaged in these activities. As I pointed out--I gave an 
example of a specific case, so I hope there will be a 
recommendation that if he goes, he raises this issue 
specifically.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We will 
certainly convey your concern and request.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman. I might 
add, in that vein, that Saudi Arabia has worked to sweep 
several individuals out of the state of Oregon, and we found 
that this is a practice around the United States, of those who 
have been involved in significant crimes against American 
citizens, including murder, rape, and other egregious 
activities. Senator Wyden and I have made a big issue out of 
this, and we really want to convey that it's so important that 
this get raised, along with other human rights issues, if the 
President proceeds to go to Saudi Arabia.
    Let me now turn to Senator Daines.
    Senator Daines. Senator Merkley, thank you.
    I want to thank you all for coming before this Commission 
today. I've spent more than half a decade actually 
professionally working in China as an expat in the private 
sector. I've led several congressional delegation visits to 
China, as well as its neighbors. As I look at what's going on 
at the moment, it's clear the United States needs to work 
closely with our allies to counter China's growing economic 
coercion and influence, as well as its efforts to export its 
surveillance state abroad, including initiatives to silence 
criticism abroad and intimidate or harass the Uyghurs, 
Tibetans, or dissidents who no longer reside in the PRC.
    Under Secretary Zeya, it's readily apparent that China is 
not satisfied with simply censoring its own population, but 
aggressively seeks to influence speech and actions abroad, 
including the self-censorship of dissidents, foreign 
publishers, businesses, or academic journals related to China. 
What are the long-term effects of such actions and what is 
being done to help both partners and allies in the region, as 
well as the private sector and private sector stakeholders, to 
withstand such pressure?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Senator. You raise a very 
important point with respect to self-censorship. You know, we 
absolutely reject this, and we find it unacceptable that PRC 
surveillance, harassment, and intimidation is prompting its own 
citizens and others abroad to self-censor their words and 
actions out of a fear of reprisal or retaliation. Respect for 
freedom of expression, as you know, is a bedrock American 
principle. This is integrated into our transnational repression 
response, as we call on the PRC to respect the right of those 
inside and outside their borders to express their own opinions.
    As you noted, working with allies and partners is 
absolutely essential, so we are working with foreign 
governments to expose these tactics through our Global 
Engagement Center, and through other multilateral efforts, such 
as the Freedom Online Coalition and the Media Freedom 
Coalition, which Canada is leading at this moment. We are also 
working, as I noted, to puncture PRC narratives in this space 
and provide factual information that sheds a light, an 
antiseptic light, on the misinformation and propaganda being 
put forward by the PRC side.
    We're working very closely with allies and partners to 
build resilience to these threats. Just earlier this month our 
Global Engagement Center signed a new and important memorandum 
of understanding with the United Kingdom to enhance our already 
strong counter-disinformation and counter-propaganda 
activities. The final element of this effort is what I noted 
earlier in the testimony, an imperative to really promote and 
protect open and resilient information ecosystems as a 
counterpoint to the great firewall and the absolute censorship 
exercised by the PRC, by meeting the critical needs of at-risk 
journalists, supporting long-term sustainability of independent 
media, enhancing the impact of investigative journalists, and 
bolstering all of these actors' resilience to legal and 
regulatory challenges, which are often censorship in disguise. 
So initiatives such as the journalist protection platform, part 
of our Summit for Democracy, and the Presidential Initiative 
for Democratic Renewal, are very important in terms of an 
affirmative effort to allow a counterpoint to this nefarious 
disinformation and self-censorship.
    Senator Daines. Thank you. I want to follow up with a 
question that relates to the digital yuan, because I think 
there's also--you used the word ``nefarious.'' As you know, 
China's in the process of testing a digital yuan. When most 
countries look into digital currencies, they're very concerned 
about privacy implications. China's motivation stems in large 
part from a desire to gain insights into the financial lives of 
its citizens. Under Secretary, how could a push by the Chinese 
government to spread the usage of the digital yuan outside of 
its own borders threaten human rights in neighboring countries 
and countries where China has made significant capital 
investments?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, Senator, I would concur, there 
is absolutely a human rights nexus with the digital yuan, or 
what is often called the e-CNY. We believe that the PRC's very 
poor record of responsible behavior in cyberspace and misuse of 
technology raises very serious concerns about widespread 
adoption of platforms and standards related to tech developed 
by the PRC in general and this includes the e-CNY. We have very 
well-based concerns that e-CNY could pose a heightened privacy 
and consumer protection risk and could also enhance the PRC's 
surveillance and social control capabilities--some of their 
primary tools for transnational repression--and further extend 
that globally.
    So we are urging individuals, businesses, and global 
financial institutions to assess these risks cautiously and to 
integrate human rights concerns before considering any use of 
e-CNY. Our counterpoint to that is also an affirmative agenda 
of using technology in a way that serves our people, protects 
our interests, and upholds our democratic values. That is part 
of our multilateral efforts with allies and partners to ensure 
responsible development of digital assets that will put 
guardrails in place that prevent this kind of misuse of 
technology from proliferating more widely.
    Senator Daines. In the 30 seconds that I have left, and 
this would be for both of you, how are your agencies seeking to 
improve monitoring, measurement, and effectiveness of efforts 
to counter transnational repression? I'm about out of time, so 
we'll start with the Under Secretary first.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, you know, monitoring and 
evaluation is a critical element of our work through the 
department as a whole. I think we are investing in that and 
ensuring that we are not simply putting programs in place, but 
really, as I emphasized at the top, our transnational 
repression effort is results oriented. So we need to see that 
we are having a measurable impact on the problem we are seeking 
to address.
    Senator Daines. Your comment on that?
    Assistant Secretary Hoy. Thank you, Senator. This is 
actually an opportunity for me to go back to a point that the 
Chair made earlier about his concern that reports of 
individuals who may be subject to an act of transnational 
repression on U.S. soil might report it to the FBI, and then it 
might stay there and not be shared with the FBI's interagency 
partners. I just want to make a point that the FBI has task 
forces around the country, Homeland Security Investigations 
under the Department of Homeland Security as a participant, and 
task forces all over the country.
    So when reports do come in to the FBI, and those are 
investigated, that is shared within the interagency law 
enforcement community. So that's an excellent way for the law 
enforcement community to be monitoring trends, whether or not 
it ends up in a criminal investigation. It's a way for the law 
enforcement community to know what's happening and to ensure 
that that helps shape our response as a law enforcement 
community to the activity we're seeing. Thank you.
    Senator Daines. Thank you. Senator Merkley, thank you.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Senator Daines. Thank 
you for bringing your direct experience in China to this 
conversation today. We are so pleased to have Congressman 
Malinowski with us. He has direct experience working in the 
Department of State in these areas. Let me turn it over to you 
for your opportunity to make comments and ask questions.
    Representative Malinowski. Thank you so much, Senator 
Merkley, for holding this hearing. Under Secretary Zeya, good 
to see you, way over there. I apologize for missing your 
testimony and most of the exchanges. I would assume most of the 
obvious issues have been covered. Obviously, I share the 
concerns of everybody in this room with respect to China and 
other countries reaching beyond their borders to harass, 
intimidate, and harm people who are critics of their 
governments. I applaud the administration for identifying 
transnational repression as a particular threat.
    I have a human rights background. I do not see this as a 
human rights issue. I see this as part of the United States 
exercising--our government exercising--its most fundamental 
responsibility and that is to protect people inside our 
country. This is a national security issue and as such, I think 
it should be centrally elevated over virtually everything else 
that we do with the governments that are responsible for this 
kind of conduct.
    With respect to China, one aspect of the CCP's efforts that 
I've been concerned about for some time is pressure on American 
companies and other foreign companies to censor their 
employees, to change the ways in which they do business, to 
avoid any real or perceived criticism of the Chinese 
government. There was, of course, a case a couple of years ago 
that got a lot of attention involving the Houston Rockets, the 
NBA team, which did in fact seek to punish one of its American 
employees for personal speech that was critical of the Chinese 
government. I think that's an ongoing phenomenon.
    I wonder whether you have any thoughts about the proper 
role of the U.S. Government and Congress in developing 
standards for American companies, multinational companies, when 
it comes to how they should respond to that kind of pressure.
    Under Secretary Zeya. Thank you, Representative Malinowski, 
for raising this very important issue, that was also raised by 
Senator Daines, about self-censorship. Certainly we reject PRC 
surveillance, harassment, and intimidation that is prompting 
its own citizens and others abroad, as you noted, to self-
censor their words and actions. We enshrine freedom of 
expression as a bedrock American principle centered in our 
foreign policy, so we are resolute in supporting exercise of 
that right and we absolutely call on the PRC to respect that 
right of those inside and outside its borders to express their 
own opinions.
    I think our engagement with the private sector is ongoing 
with respect to business advisories for Hong Kong and Xinjiang 
that have made clear that we need to engage American companies 
directly to ensure that they do not facilitate or fall victim 
to PRC repression or censorship efforts. So I would say this is 
an ongoing area of engagement as part of our whole-of-
government effort to respond to and curb PRC transnational 
repression.
    Representative Malinowski. Should we prohibit U.S. 
companies from complying with censorship requests?
    Under Secretary Zeya. In terms of prohibition, I think I'm 
not in a position to pronounce on that point, but we certainly 
regularly engage U.S. companies and point out where I think 
quite clearly they don't want to be part of the PRC's 
repressive efforts inside, and certainly outside, China, within 
U.S. borders.
    Representative Malinowski. Well, it's an unfair question, 
because it would be really up to the U.S. Congress, but I do 
think it is within the administration's purview, as you've done 
in other similar realms, to be thinking about the development 
of voluntary standards that go beyond just raising concerns in 
individual cases. I think we've been very defensive about this. 
Something happens, and then we express concern. I think there's 
at least room for a more proactive effort to develop preemptive 
standards that companies could at least sign up for.
    I'm going to cheat a little bit here. We're talking about 
transnational repression, and it's hard to do that with regard 
to China alone. The President is embarking on a trip to Saudi 
Arabia, which was responsible for the most horrific act of 
transnational repression aimed at somebody within the United 
States in recent years. I wonder whether you guys can assure us 
that those operations to target, harass, intimidate, and 
pressure critics of Saudi Arabia within the United States have 
ceased. Has the State Department conferred with the FBI to 
assure itself of that, hopefully, fact?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, thank you, Representative, for 
sharing your concerns. I would say my preparation for this 
hearing was focused on transnational repression from the PRC, 
but we certainly take your concerns onboard with respect to 
Saudi Arabia. Our efforts to curb transnational repression are 
absolutely global, and we will take your position into account. 
There's really nothing further I can share here in a public 
hearing.
    Representative Malinowski. OK. I think it would be very 
helpful to have an assessment from the FBI, because the case we 
all know about, the Khashoggi case, was the tip of the iceberg. 
I think we all know that there is routine harassment and 
intimidation of a number of people in the United States.
    Then finally, again, a global question. The only law on our 
books, as far as I know, with respect to transnational 
repression, is the Arms Export Control Act, which prohibits 
arms sales to any country that engages in a pattern of 
intimidation and harassment of persons in the United States. 
Does the State Department have any process by which it 
evaluates compliance with that standard with regard to 
countries around the world?
    Under Secretary Zeya. Well, one of the points that I made 
in terms of our multilateral responses to transnational 
repression is certainly focused on the area of export controls 
and human rights. This is one of the priority action sets from 
the Summit for Democracy, where we are working with like-minded 
countries to develop new norms that are going to strengthen 
collective action and responsibility to ensure that these 
issues are integrated not only by the United States, but by 
several other leading allies and partners around the world.
    Representative Malinowski. OK. That's not a direct answer 
to my question, but we will follow up. Thank you very much, and 
I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman Malinowski, 
and for the expertise you bring on human rights to this 
conversation.
    As we wrap up here, I want to note that in the conversation 
with Senator Daines, you referred to e-CNY as a term for the 
digital yuan. Can you tell us what e-CNY stands for?
    Under Secretary Zeya. I would have to ask my staff to give 
that relevant detail. I'm sorry about that.
    Chair Merkley. Very good. We were speculating here that it 
was electronic currency national yuan, but I had not heard that 
term before, so thank you.
    Both of you mentioned that the FBI has a website for 
transnational repression, so I asked my team to print out 
information regarding that, and I have here a copy of several 
pages of the website. In addition, it has information in many 
different languages including Uyghur and Chinese. I'll submit 
those for the record.
    I was struck in looking at this website that it says, ``How 
to Report.'' It says: Contact your local FBI field office, 
contact the FBI online at tips.fbi.gov. Then it provides a 
different website in the Uyghur language and Chinese language, 
which is fbi.gov/tips, but nothing specific about a hotline for 
transnational repression. Of course, thousands and thousands of 
things come in to the FBI on a generalized tip hotline, so 
maybe one of the things we can explore is whether there needs 
to be a more specific way to channel reports of transnational 
repression.
    I was also struck in reviewing this that, while the FBI 
website does mention that threatening or detaining family 
members in a home country is a form of transnational 
repression, all the rest of the information is really about 
threats to those inside the United States. I really want to see 
how we bring attention to this threat against people in the 
home country because it is such an effective strategy for China 
in discouraging freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and 
freedom of assembly here in the United States. It's just so 
absolutely unacceptable.
    I just want to conclude by noting that I really appreciate, 
Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant Secretary Hoy, the work 
you're doing on transnational repression. It is a growing 
problem and it's magnified by social media and by new 
technologies, surveillance and facial recognition and forms of 
communication. It is an assault on the freedom of the citizens 
and residents of the United States of America that we need to 
do all we can to develop effective responses to.
    I note that we are anticipating written statements from the 
Uyghur Human Rights Project and Freedom House that will be 
entered into the record when they are received, without 
objection, and that the record will remain open until the close 
of business on Friday, June 17th for any items members would 
like to submit for the record or any additional questions for 
all of you as witnesses. Again, thank you very much for your 
expertise and your presentations and your work on this 
important issue. This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]

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                         A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X

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                          Prepared Statements

                                ------                                


               Prepared Statement of Under Secretary Zeya

    Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, distinguished Members of the 
Commission; thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
    As Secretary Blinken noted in his recent speech, ``The scale and 
scope of the challenge posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
will test American diplomacy like nothing we've seen before.'' Few 
things are more emblematic of this challenge and the need to contest 
the PRC's behavior than its transnational repression. It is the most 
sophisticated form of repression that exists in the world today. It is 
pervasive, it is pernicious, and it presents a threat to the values we 
hold dear as Americans and the integrity of the rules-based 
international order.
    From the ongoing cases of Uyghurs at risk of refoulement to the May 
18 indictment of Shujun Wang and four PRC intelligence officers in New 
York for spying on activists in the United States, the reach and 
frequency of the PRC's global repression is growing more alarming by 
the day. The historical data also proves that this phenomenon is not a 
recent one. NGOs have documented thousands of cases over the last 
several years of the PRC conducting involuntary returns to the PRC from 
over 120 countries worldwide.
    Additionally, the extent and sophistication of PRC tactics are 
deeply concerning. They include physical threats, harassment, and 
surveillance against individuals; threatening individuals' family 
members within the PRC with detention, imprisonment, or the loss of 
economic opportunities; digital threats including online harassment, 
surveillance, and other malicious cyber activity, and use of 
disinformation and online smear campaigns; misuse and attempted misuse 
of other states' immigration enforcement mechanisms and international 
law enforcement systems, including INTERPOL; and applying direct 
bilateral pressure on other nations to return individuals to the PRC. 
PRC agents apply these tactics against individuals of all 
nationalities, including U.S. citizens in the United States.
    In response to these threats, the Biden-Harris Administration is 
executing a multifaceted strategy to counter, deter, and mitigate their 
prevalence and impact. It is grounded in an approach that is:

    (1) Whole-of-government--The Administration has spearheaded a 
sustained interagency effort to encourage information sharing within 
the USG on the PRC's transnational repression; coordinate on public-
facing materials to raise awareness; threat information sharing with 
partners, conduct outreach and offer resources to victims; and optimize 
accountability tools.
    (2) Inclusive--We are proactively engaging the full spectrum of 
stakeholders impacted by the PRC's transnational repression, including 
most importantly, the targeted communities themselves, such as Uyghurs, 
Tibetans, Falun Gong practitioners, Hong Kongers, and human rights 
defenders; civil society representatives; like-minded and affected 
governments; and the business and investor community.
    (3) Agile--To address the PRC's ever-evolving tactics and reach, we 
are increasing cooperation with government and non-government partners 
to collect data about the incidence, methods, and perpetrators of 
transnational repression, publicize it, and adapt our approach 
accordingly.
    (4) Results oriented--Our involvement in cases of transnational 
repression has literally saved lives, and we prioritize our engagement 
to achieve practical results for individuals at immediate risk.

    The Administration's strategy revolves around four key pillars.
    First, we are using all available tools, in coordination with our 
interagency partners, to promote accountability for the PRC's 
transnational repression and to help support those brave enough to 
speak out against serious human rights abuses in the PRC. These tools 
include visa restrictions, investment restrictions by the Treasury 
Department, export controls by the Commerce Department on technology 
that could be misused to help facilitate transnational repression, and, 
of course, law enforcement actions in the United States to investigate 
and prosecute perpetrators. The Secretary's March 2022 announcement of 
visa restrictions against PRC officials involved in transnational 
repression and the Treasury Department's December 2021 announcement of 
investment restrictions against PRC entities manufacturing and 
exporting surveillance technology are two recent examples of actions 
taken by this Administration.
    Second, we are curbing the PRC's ability to perpetrate these abuses 
by engaging third countries that may be implicated, willingly or not, 
in the PRC's transnational repression efforts, as well as international 
law enforcement agencies and the private sector. We are facilitating 
more rapid diplomacy for individuals at risk of refoulement, including 
immediate and high-level engagement with host governments to prevent 
forced repatriation and help ensure their safety. We continue to 
support INTERPOL reforms and good governance that strengthen safeguards 
to prevent countries from using INTERPOL systems for political or other 
improper purposes to target peaceful activists or those fleeing 
repression. Our federal assistance programs are empowering civil 
society activists and others to mitigate and counter the PRC's 
transnational repression through providing digital security tools and 
financial assistance. Through the Summit for Democracy and other 
forums, we are engaging with the private sector to ensure that firms 
are cognizant of and have the tools to counter the PRC's increasingly 
sophisticated digital authoritarianism.
    Third, we are building the resilience of targeted communities in 
the U.S. and around the world, including through listening sessions led 
by U.S. government officials, to better understand the needs and 
develop tailored responses. Through our engagement in Washington and at 
our embassies, we are proactively engaging with affected communities, 
understanding their challenges, and developing solutions in 
partnership. Additionally, we are amplifying the voices of affected 
communities by shining a light on transnational repression and bringing 
it out from the shadows. We are now reporting on transnational 
repression in the Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, and the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. We are also 
supporting affected communities by advocating for individual cases of 
transnational repression where family members of activists and others 
have been imprisoned or disappeared in the PRC.
    Fourth, we are engaging our allies and partners to mount 
coordinated multilateral responses. For instance, we work with partners 
to jointly advocate for political prisoner cases, many of which have 
ties to transnational repression. This included a ``Voices of Political 
Prisoners'' event co-led by Secretary Blinken and Lithuanian Foreign 
Minister Landsbergis at the December Summit for Democracy. 
Additionally, in coordination with the Commerce Department and with the 
support of Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, we 
partnered with Australia, Norway and Denmark to launch the Export 
Controls and Human Rights Initiative, which seeks to stem the tide of 
PRC and other authoritarian governments' misuse of technology. Through 
the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, we are working with our 
European partners on developing common standards that will address the 
misuse of technology that threatens human rights and facilitates 
transnational repression. Lastly, we have sought to call out repressive 
acts that fall in the category of transnational repression in 
statements or resolutions at the UN General Assembly and other UN 
bodies. And we intend to do more.
    In closing, let me repeat--the PRC's transnational repression poses 
a direct threat to human rights and democracy, the rules-based 
international order, and even our own citizens and institutions. It 
also poses a direct threat to citizens and communities in the United 
States. We must reckon with this serious threat, and we are combating 
it with the attention, seriousness, and resources it deserves.
    Our close partnership with Congress will be integral to this 
effort. Bipartisan legislation such as the Uyghur Forced Labor 
Prevention Act and the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, among 
many other bills, has given us the tools we need to confront the PRC's 
egregious atrocities and human rights abuses. We welcome an ongoing 
partnership with Congress to refine our tools and our diplomatic 
approaches to address the PRC's transnational repression threat.
    Chair Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, distinguished Members, let me 
again express my appreciation for the opportunity to testify today, and 
I look forward to your questions.

             Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Hoy

    Chair Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, and distinguished Members of the 
Commission:
    It is a privilege to appear before you today to discuss the 
critical work the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is doing to 
combat the ongoing campaign of transnational repression (TNR) waged by 
the People's Republic of China (PRC).
    DHS combats diverse and dynamic threats to the homeland, many of 
which have a transnational nexus. I lead the Office of International 
Affairs (OIA) within the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, 
which oversees DHS's activities to advance our strategic and policy 
objectives and raise security standards globally across the full range 
of the Department's missions in order to protect our homeland. 
Collaboration with our international allies and partners is critical to 
preventing threats to our homeland, including threats emanating from 
malign state-sponsored activity.
    One such malign state-sponsored activity directly tied to 
transnational repression involves foreign governments that harass and 
intimidate their own citizens residing in the United States. These 
governments, to include the PRC, also target U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents who have family residing overseas. In either case, 
these actions may violate individual rights and freedoms under U.S. and 
international law.
    As part of the whole-of-government effort, DHS contributes to the 
federal interagency response in combating many of the threats the PRC 
poses to our homeland and our interests abroad. Today, I am focused on 
the threat of transnational repression and the PRC's efforts to reach 
across national borders to silence dissent among its citizens abroad as 
well as non-citizens, including U.S. citizens, they see as a political 
threat. This practice represents a serious danger to human freedom and 
security and is an issue of significant human rights and national 
security concern to DHS.
    The Department will not tolerate nation states seeking to surveil, 
intimidate, or do harm to individuals residing in the United States. By 
prioritizing efforts to counter transnational repression, we protect 
the human rights of those residing within our borders and we enhance 
our national security. DHS brings unique authorities to bear in the 
whole-of-government effort to combat and prevent the sustained PRC 
campaign of repression that has harmed countless individuals within our 
borders and violated our national sovereignty.
    While the PRC's activities of concern stretch across many fronts, 
during today's testimony, I will highlight three priority lines of 
effort through which the Department has worked to fend off attempts by 
the PRC to commit repressive acts on U.S. soil. First, I will focus on 
Operation Fox Hunt, through which the PRC--under the guise of its anti-
corruption efforts--seeks to intimidate and ultimately repatriate, 
voluntarily or forcibly, current and former citizens of the PRC and 
their families living overseas whom it sees as a political or financial 
threat. A team from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) leads the Department's efforts 
to combat this repressive campaign and works across the interagency, 
particularly with our colleagues at the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), to thwart these extralegal attempts. Second, I will discuss a 
particular line of effort I have helped lead to counter abuse of the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), a topic which is 
connected to the PRC's wider attempts to set the rules of the road by 
influencing international bodies through agenda-setting and elections. 
And finally, I will discuss the important work of the Office for Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to engage and protect Uyghur and 
other communities affected by transnational repression within the 
United States.
                      thwarting operation fox hunt
    The Department has worked for nearly two decades to combat targeted 
harassment on U.S. soil by the PRC. ICE, through HSI and with 
interagency partners like the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI, 
has targeted a PRC government effort known as Operation Fox Hunt, 
through which Beijing targets and seeks to repatriate and prosecute PRC 
individuals living in foreign countries whom the PRC alleges are guilty 
of corruption and should be returned to the PRC to face criminal 
charges. The PRC has portrayed this as an international anti-corruption 
campaign, but the effort has in fact been used to target critics and 
dissidents living around the globe, including within the United States, 
using extrajudicial channels. In total, through these efforts, the PRC 
has returned over 9,000 individuals worldwide to China, where they may 
face imprisonment or other repressive measures. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese 
Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United 
States--FBI; Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Government Inside 
the U.S.--FBI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC often uses illegal tactics to surveil, threaten, and harass 
its targets, both in person and digitally, including in the United 
States. Such attempts circumvent established means of law enforcement 
cooperation, directly violate U.S. sovereignty, and highlight that the 
PRC often lacks a legal basis for pursuing such targets. There have 
been a number of cases in recent years that illustrate illegal PRC 
activity in the United States. As just one example, in October 2020, 
eight individuals were charged as illegal PRC agents in the United 
States who conspired to surveil, stalk, harass, and coerce U.S. 
residents to force those residents to return to the PRC. In this 
instance, six defendants were also charged with conspiring to commit 
interstate and international stalking. The defendants were allegedly 
acting at the direction of PRC government officials as part of 
Operation Fox Hunt's global, concerted, and extralegal repatriation 
effort.
    The complaint stated that defendants participated in a plan to 
bring an individual's father to the United States against his will to 
then leverage the father's surprise arrival in the United States to 
coerce the son's return to the PRC. Conspirators consulted with one 
another to determine how the individual's father should lie to U.S. 
immigration officials regarding the purpose of his visit to the United 
States. Other actions taken by the defendants included surveilling and 
harassing the daughter of the individual in question, as well as her 
friends, on social media. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Eight Individuals Charged With Conspiring to Act as Illegal 
Agents of the People's Republic of China--OPA, Department of Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In support of the FBI and other U.S. government law enforcement and 
intelligence community efforts to combat Operation Fox Hunt, DHS seeks 
to provide traditional and non-traditional disruption options to 
overall investigative strategies pursuant to its broad scope of 
criminal and administrative immigration and customs-related authorities 
and capabilities. In support of U.S.-based efforts to counter Operation 
Fox Hunt, HSI primarily works with and through its FBI partners and 
their Counterintelligence Task Forces.
    To mitigate the threats posed by the PRC's illegal activity outside 
its borders, DHS will build on recent successes and continue its work 
to prevent attempts by the PRC to illicitly surveil and harass 
individuals in the United States.
    DHS will continue to conduct due diligence when presented with 
information by PRC authorities on alleged fugitive case files. As part 
of routine police-to-police information sharing, HSI receives requests 
for information from the PRC's Ministry of Public Security (MPS) for 
fugitives from China whom the Ministry alleges have taken criminal 
proceeds with them to the United States. Ensuring appropriate due 
diligence prevents PRC authorities from using HSI-furnished information 
to engage in transnational repression, that is, using this information 
to target dissidents and other opponents. These requests are vetted and 
handled in accordance with DHS and HSI policies regarding information 
received from foreign law enforcement sources, and if warranted, are 
investigated for potential violations of U.S. law. Requests for 
information sent to HSI or ICE field offices from the PRC must be fully 
vetted at HSI or ICE headquarters to ensure coordination and compliance 
with agency policy before any information is shared with MPS.
    HSI will also continue to work with the interagency to investigate 
individuals linked to Operation Fox Hunt. While cases and 
investigations are ongoing and specifics cannot be relayed through open 
testimony, HSI has helped to identify subjects involved in Operation 
Fox Hunt and potential targets of the program. For example, HSI has 
tracked assets used to facilitate Operation Fox Hunt and provided this 
information to partner agencies, which has ultimately led to the 
disruption of those operations.
    HSI has also sought to raise the awareness of other relevant DHS 
operational components and across the interagency concerning the PRC's 
use of U.S. law enforcement agencies to unwittingly assist Operation 
Fox Hunt. DHS has worked to ensure the tools our components have to 
counter the PRC's illicit activity are fully utilized. For example, 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has used its intelligence-based 
targeting programs to identify PRC-affiliated operatives traveling for 
nefarious purposes, and will continue to advance and strengthen these 
efforts.
    The PRC has sought to message the legality and legitimacy of 
Operation Fox Hunt through measures such as announcing the campaign 
alongside the dissemination of a list of 100 individuals the PRC said 
were sought through INTERPOL red notices. \3\ Like other countries, the 
PRC uses INTERPOL notices to imply international endorsement of its 
pursuit, even though INTERPOL notices are not subject to judicial 
review and their purpose is not to serve as any such political or other 
endorsement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Operation Fox Hunt: How China Exports Repression Using a 
Network of Spies Hidden in Plain Sight--Freedom House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      supporting interpol reforms
    The PRC's repressive activities span far beyond U.S. borders and 
involve efforts to manipulate the rules and mechanisms of international 
law enforcement cooperation. The PRC has attempted to influence 
international bodies such as the United Nations to achieve its aims. 
The U.S. government wants to be sure it is taking all appropriate 
measures to ensure that the PRC is not in a position to exploit for 
nefarious purposes the unique tools that INTERPOL provides to bring 
criminals to justice. Uyghur and other communities in the United States 
have highlighted the detrimental impacts of politically motivated 
INTERPOL red notices issued at the request of the PRC government, which 
have resulted in the detention of community members overseas.
    Therefore, I want to highlight the measures the U.S. government and 
the Department are putting in place to support INTERPOL in its efforts 
to prevent abuse of INTERPOL channels. This line of effort, which is 
part of the broader U.S. government work to combat transnational 
repression, is particularly close to my heart given my previous tenure 
at INTERPOL. At INTERPOL, I helped lead the group tasked with ensuring 
compliance of notices and diffusions with INTERPOL's Constitution and 
Rules, including identifying and blocking attempts to abuse INTERPOL 
channels to target political opponents or for other illegitimate 
purposes.
    INTERPOL's system of notices and diffusions is the most important 
global policing capability it offers to its member countries. INTERPOL 
red notices and wanted persons diffusions are requests by INTERPOL 
member governments, or International Criminal Courts and Tribunals, to 
member countries' law enforcement agencies to locate and arrest a 
wanted person for the purpose of extradition or similar legal action. 
These requests include information allowing for the identification of 
the wanted person and the crime for which the person is wanted and must 
comply with INTERPOL's Constitution and Rules for Processing Data, 
which prohibit their use for political, racial, religious, or military 
purposes. Individuals who are the subject of a red notice or wanted 
persons diffusion are at risk of arrest if they travel and may suffer 
other negative impacts on their lives and livelihoods. Other types of 
notices and diffusions INTERPOL issues may have less impactful 
consequences, but may nevertheless be improperly used by requesting 
countries to harass or persecute individuals for their political or 
religious views.
    DHS and its interagency partners have worked together over the last 
year to strengthen the actions the U.S. government is able to take in 
support of the internal reforms INTERPOL has made to target the abuse 
of its critical tools for politically motivated purposes. Some of the 
measures the U.S. government has put in place will be described in a 
report submitted jointly by the Departments of Justice and State in 
accordance with the Transnational Repression Accountability and 
Prevention (TRAP) Act of 2021 (Section 6503(c) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2022). In general, these 
actions are intended to strengthen the ways in which the U.S. 
government is able to comply with INTERPOL's request that member 
countries provide it with relevant information, which can be kept 
confidential, that would assist it in identifying notices and 
diffusions that might be based on political motivations.
    In line with this broader U.S. government effort, DHS is working to 
ensure that our enforcement officers are trained in how to recognize 
and respond to potentially abusive INTERPOL notices and diffusions and 
are aware of countries known to engage in transnational repression, 
including through misuse of INTERPOL channels. Importantly, DHS, 
consistent with existing practice and legal requirements, does not use 
INTERPOL notices or diffusions as the sole basis for any law 
enforcement action, including with respect to decisions to detain 
individuals.
    Finally, DHS is encouraging INTERPOL to increase its use of 
corrective measures against countries that attempt to abuse INTERPOL 
channels. This issue has been a particular focus for the Department's 
leadership, which has expressed to INTERPOL leadership our deep concern 
over abuse of red notices and diffusions and has urged the organization 
take all appropriate measures to hold accountable states that try to 
abuse the system. DHS appreciates INTERPOL leadership's receptiveness 
to these concerns and willingness to take action on these important 
matters.
    In March, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United 
States, alongside Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and New 
Zealand, called on INTERPOL to suspend Russian access to its system in 
accordance with its rules. DHS, along with its interagency partners, 
will continue working to ensure that INTERPOL mechanisms and processes 
remain robust and effective and that they uphold democratic principles 
and the rule of law.
                     engaging affected communities
    While DHS works to directly prevent the PRC from engaging in 
transnational repression on U.S. soil, we recognize this line of effort 
represents just one part of our important mission to counter Beijing's 
global campaign of repression. DHS sees the need to amplify and inform 
these efforts through continuous engagement with the victims of this 
campaign, including with the Uyghur diaspora, as well as other targeted 
communities. Uyghur communities face virtual harassment, threats, and 
attacks, including on social media platforms in the United States and 
around the world. For example, college education has been interrupted 
for some in the Uyghur community living in the United States, as 
financial support from family members living in China has been cut off 
by the PRC government. Some individuals are the subject of 
disinformation campaigns fabricated by the PRC government. Others are 
experiencing cyberattacks on diaspora organizations and Uyghur 
diaspora-owned email accounts. The PRC has compelled individuals to 
harass Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, and other individuals deemed 
unfavorable to the PRC on university campuses or during protests and 
other activism-related events.
    Most significantly, PRC-resident family members of the diaspora, 
including but not limited to Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Hong Kongers living 
in the United States, often face retaliation, including detention and 
exit bans, and in the case of Uyghurs, detention in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) internment camps. Some diaspora community 
members are themselves survivors of these camps.
    CRCL has connected Uyghur diaspora community leaders and members 
with relevant DHS offices and operational components, such as the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), to follow up on specific 
concerns. In response to Uyghur community leaders' questions regarding 
prevention of online harassment and threats to individuals and 
community organizations, CISA shared information on its freely 
available resources, namely, free cybersecurity tools for use at the 
individual and organizational level. CRCL has also shared with Uyghur 
diaspora community leaders information on opportunities for engagement 
with USCIS, in particular with respect to asylum cases and processes.
    CRCL hosted a virtual interagency engagement in March 2022 with the 
Uyghur diaspora community in the United States to share information on 
federal resources to address threats of transnational repression. The 
roundtable included presentations from the White House, as well as DHS 
components and offices, on available resources to protect communities 
and address the community's concerns. Following the engagement, CRCL 
created and shared with participants a list of relevant federal 
resources. CRCL continues to engage with representatives of the Uyghur 
diaspora community through ongoing community stakeholder engagements 
nationwide.
    Other federal agencies, including the FBI and Department of State, 
are also directly engaged with these communities and individuals.
    As part of DHS's effort to strengthen the resilience of U.S.-based 
communities vulnerable to transnational repression, DHS Under Secretary 
for Strategy, Policy, and Plans Robert Silvers and the Department of 
State's Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human 
Rights Uzra Zeya hosted a roundtable discussion in March of 2022 with 
individuals who have been the targets of transnational repression. 
Participants included members of the Uyghur diaspora, members of other 
religious and ethnic minorities, and human rights defenders who shared 
harrowing stories of the PRC using surveillance, spyware, harassment, 
and coercion to silence Uyghur individuals in the United States. Under 
Secretary Silvers and Under Secretary Zeya reaffirmed the U.S. 
government's commitment to supporting individuals impacted by 
transnational repression and to promoting accountability for the 
individuals who perpetrate these acts. They underscored the Biden-
Harris Administration's resolve to push back against governments that 
reach beyond their borders to threaten and attack journalists and 
perceived dissidents for exercising their human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.
    As part of its mission to ensure the protection of civil rights and 
civil liberties in all DHS policies, programs, and activities, CRCL 
will address transnational repression concerns raised by community 
stakeholders in its ongoing, regular engagement activities, especially 
in metropolitan areas with large Uyghur diaspora populations. CRCL will 
also deepen collaboration with the Department of State on priority 
communities for engagement.
                               conclusion
    DHS will remain unwavering in its efforts to combat transnational 
repression committed by the PRC and looks forward to working with 
Congress to pursue this critical mission. I thank you again for the 
opportunity to appear before you and to discuss our ongoing work in 
these areas. I look forward to taking your questions.
                                 ______
                                 

                 Prepared Statement of Senator Merkley

    Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, ``The Threat of Transnational Repression from 
China and the U.S. Response,'' will come to order.
    In recent years, this Commission has devoted increased attention to 
the Chinese Communist Party and government's human rights violations in 
the United States and globally. We've expanded our reporting, brought 
in additional expertise, and held a range of hearings on the toolkit 
employed for these abuses. That toolkit includes economic coercion, 
technology-enhanced authoritarianism, and other ways to stifle 
criticism, avoid accountability, and undermine international human 
rights norms.
    In this hearing, we will examine a part of that toolkit that 
targets individuals and communities at a very personal level: 
transnational repression. In addition to the egregious human rights 
abuses they commit within Chinese borders, Chinese authorities 
increasingly reach into other countries to silence dissidents, conduct 
surveillance, and force the repatriation of critics. This long arm of 
authoritarianism across borders is not just a violation of human 
rights, it is a violation of countries' national sovereignty.
    These tactics, targeting Uyghurs, Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Falun 
Gong practitioners, human rights advocates, journalists, and others, 
add up to what Freedom House calls ``the most sophisticated, global, 
and comprehensive'' campaign of transnational repression in the world.
    By Freedom House's conservative count, between 2014 and 2021 there 
were 214 cases of ``direct, physical attack'' originating from China 
across dozens of countries, including right here in the United States 
of America.
    International manhunts like Operation Fox Hunt and Operation Sky 
Net go well beyond supposed corruption suspects to include critics and 
others deemed sensitive. This leaves many Uyghurs and others in a 
precarious position, especially as other governments at times cooperate 
with the Chinese government against the rights of migrants.
    We have also seen the Chinese government exploit international 
organizations toward these repressive ends. The abuse of INTERPOL 
mechanisms such as ``Red Notices'' can trigger detentions and even 
rendition of the targets of transnational repression. At the United 
Nations, authoritarian governments seek to erode norms of universal 
human rights, and Chinese pressure can deny representatives of civil 
society or diaspora communities the opportunity to access UN forums.
    Even when Chinese authorities don't reach their targets physically, 
they surveil and coerce them in other ways, such as by deploying 
spyware, threatening them in video calls, or harassing their family 
members who still live in China.
    In response to these disturbing trends, the Biden administration 
has sought to elevate the issue of transnational repression both within 
the United States Government and in interactions with countries around 
the globe, whether they be like-minded countries seeking to address 
this menace or perpetrators of transnational repression or countries on 
whose soil this behavior occurs.
    In today's hearing, we will hear from two administration officials 
at the forefront of those efforts. We wanted to hear from multiple 
parts of the U.S. Government because addressing transnational 
repression will truly require a whole-of-government approach. To raise 
awareness globally and prevent these tactics from becoming pervasive in 
the international system, we need diplomacy. To protect those targeted, 
we need humanitarian and homeland responses. To pursue accountability 
for those responsible, we need law enforcement. The Departments of 
State, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, and others all 
have a role to play. This hearing will allow us to hear from two of 
those agencies on the steps the administration is taking to counter 
transnational repression from China, how they coordinate across the 
interagency and with other governments and international organizations, 
and where we have opportunity to do more.
    Certain aspects of the U.S. response will be most appropriate for 
members of this Commission to explore in a closed session. That is 
especially true for certain law enforcement matters, and we are working 
with the Department of Justice to arrange such an opportunity in the 
coming weeks.
    For today's hearing, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses 
on what their departments are doing, in coordination with partners in 
government, civil society, the private sector, and international 
community, to address transnational repression from China. The scope 
and complexity of this threat requires not only a whole-of-government 
approach but vigilance, coordination, and decisive action across the 
administration and Congress. I hope today's hearing helps us take a 
step in developing urgency around this issue and charting a path 
forward for addressing it.
                                 ______
                                 

             Prepared Statement of Representative McGovern

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing about 
transnational repression by the People's Republic of China.
    In September 2020, federal authorities arrested a New York City 
police officer and U.S. Army reservist for acting as an illegal agent 
of the Chinese government. The man, originally from Tibet, had tried to 
ingratiate himself within the Tibetan-American community of New York. 
It turns out he was spying on them and advancing Chinese interests. 
This revelation caused fear and concern in the community.
    The Uyghur Americans at Radio Free Asia who work diligently to 
report facts from Xinjiang, including crimes against humanity, are 
protected by our First Amendment's safeguard of freedom of the press. 
The Chinese government has attempted to silence them by punishing their 
relatives back home. Gulchera Hoja testified before this Commission in 
2018 that two dozen of her relatives are missing, almost certainly held 
in reeducation camps run by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang.
    These are but two examples. The Chinese government tries to deflect 
criticism of its human rights record by claiming that it has a 
sovereign right to do what it wants within its borders, and yet Chinese 
officials have no problem setting aside sovereignty principles when 
they reach across our border to threaten the human rights of Americans.
    In his May 26 speech on China, Secretary of State Tony Blinken said 
the Chinese government ``purports to champion sovereignty and 
territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly 
violate them.'' I would add that the Chinese government itself violates 
them. I am pleased that the Biden administration has recognized this 
trend and is deploying diplomatic, investigative, and prosecutorial 
resources to the problem.
    I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Zeya and Assistant 
Secretary Hoy about what their respective Departments are doing to 
address this issue and these violations. We want to hear whether there 
are additional authorities or tools that you need from Congress, 
including the expansion of humanitarian pathways to provide refuge to 
those who risk their lives to stand up to authoritarian regimes. We 
also look forward to getting input from the Department of Justice in a 
separate setting, as the Chair has mentioned.
    While our focus today is China, my concern has been global. Freedom 
House's extensive report from earlier this month finds that 36 
governments engage in transnational repression, and documented 735 
incidents of ``direct, physical transnational repression'' between 2014 
and 2021, with 85 incidents in 2021 alone.
    I, along with several of my colleagues, have expressed concern over 
transnational repression by Egypt, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, including 
such heinous crimes as the murder of U.S. resident and journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi by Saudi officials and the poisoning of Russians living in 
exile in the U.K. by Russian authorities.
    I hope to hear how the administration is approaching the challenge 
not only as a whole-of-government effort but as a global one, too.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
                       Submissions for the Record

                                ------                                


                  Statement Submitted by Freedom House

          transnational repression is a driving factor of the
                  decline in freedom around the world
    Freedom House has tracked sixteen consecutive years of decline in 
democracy and freedom around the world. In nondemocratic countries all 
over the globe, political leaders rule without the consent of their 
citizens. They preside over brittle regimes that harass, assault, 
detain, and surveil those whom they perceive as threatening their grip 
on power. The same impulse that drives authoritarians to crush 
opposition at home also motivates them to pursue critics abroad. This 
is the phenomenon known as transnational repression, in which 
governments reach across borders to silence dissent among exiles and 
diasporas. Transnational repression is a potent tool of global 
authoritarianism, and it poses a threat to freedom and democracy 
worldwide, not only endangering those who are targeted but also 
violating the sovereignty of the nations in which transnational 
repression is perpetrated.
    Freedom House has released two reports detailing this growing 
threat, and documenting at least 735 direct, physical incidents of 
transnational repression since 2014--including assassinations, 
abductions, assaults, detentions, and unlawful deportations. \1\ 
Instances of non-physical transnational repression, such as threatening 
phone calls and messages, frequently occur, but because they are often 
difficult to verify with open source information, Freedom House did not 
include non-physical transnational repression in our database of 735 
incidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://freedomhouse.org/article/new-report-transnational-
repression-growing-threat-global-democracy; https://freedomhouse.org/
article/new-report-more-governments-reaching-across-
borders-silence-dissent-responses-lagging
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  the chinese communist party conducts the world's most comprehensive 
                  campaign of transnational repression
    The information in Freedom House's database of physical incidents 
shows that China's ruling regime conducts the world's most 
sophisticated, comprehensive, and far-reaching campaign of 
transnational repression. The Chinese government's use of transnational 
repression is part of Beijing's broader campaign to extend its 
influence abroad, which includes media influence, economic investment, 
and military expansion. The Chinese government uses transnational 
repression more than any other country and attempts to exert political 
and legal influence over all overseas citizens. Since 2014, Freedom 
House has found evidence of Beijing being responsible for 229 of the 
735 recorded incidents of physical transnational repression. But we 
know this is a conservative estimate of the Chinese Communist Party's 
(CCP) campaign, since these numbers do not include pressure put on the 
China-based relatives of targeted individuals, digital tactics like 
harassment and surveillance, or foiled attempts at physical violence 
such as those recently uncovered by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.
    Mirroring patterns of repression at home, Beijing targets both 
individuals and whole groups abroad. At risk are people living in at 
least 36 countries around the world, including current and former pro-
democracy activists, Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, Mongolians, 
Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, human rights defenders, journalists, and others 
who criticize the Chinese Communist Party. The CCP's campaign of 
digital transnational repression is unparalleled in the world. 
Employing spyware and digital surveillance, the PRC has infected phones 
and whole telecommunications networks to track targeted individuals.
    Unilateral acts of transnational repression--such as the forced 
landing of a plane by Belarus in May 2021--are rare. Instead, our 
research shows that the vast majority of successful cases of 
transnational repression involve either overt cooperation between the 
origin state and host governments where targeted individuals live or 
manipulation of their agencies and institutions. In this respect, the 
Chinese government wields transnational repression especially 
skillfully. The PRC is adept at utilizing and exploiting established 
networks of cooperation, legal agreements, and vulnerabilities in 
countries around the world.
    Last year, Beijing continued to abuse INTERPOL Red Notices, 
including to successfully detain Idris Hasan in Morocco despite the 
fact that INTERPOL cancelled the notice shortly after he was arrested. 
Hasan, a Uyghur activist, is now awaiting extradition to China. 
Ironically, Hasan had left his home in Turkey because of the increasing 
pressure from Turkish authorities acting on behalf of Beijing to 
silence vocal members of the Uyghur diaspora. Ankara's actions against 
the Uyghurs, a group to which it has traditionally offered safe haven, 
was driven by increased Chinese economic investment in the country and 
closer diplomatic ties. Turkish authorities threatened several groups 
of Uyghurs with deportation after they had participated in protests 
outside that country's embassies. Uyghurs in Gulf states, such as Saudi 
Arabia, where many travel to make the Hajj pilgrimage, are at risk of 
being detained and deported to China. Freedom House is aware of 
information suggesting that at least four Uyghurs, including one child, 
face deportation currently.
    A similar cooperative dynamic can be seen with other countries. 
Authorities in the United Arab Emirates detained a teenage Chinese 
activist transiting through the Dubai airport in May 2021 and allowed 
Chinese embassy staff to interrogate him in an effort to have him 
return home. The activist's girlfriend, also a Chinese citizen, was 
taken from a hotel in Dubai and detained for eight days at what she 
described in media accounts as a ``black site'' run by the Chinese 
government. She was released only after signing documents accusing her 
partner of threatening behavior.
        the prc's transnational repression in the united states
    In countries where official channels of cooperation are less 
susceptible to manipulation, the PRC nevertheless finds methods for 
targeting individuals. In the United States, the PRC has targeted 
individuals since at least the early 2000s, when Congress passed a 
resolution condemning physical attacks and break-ins targeting U.S.-
based Falun Gong practitioners. More recently, since 2016, through its 
Fox Hunt campaign, the PRC has tried to pressure individuals to either 
return to China to face criminal accusations or else take their own 
lives. Fox Hunt, and its partner campaign, SkyNet, attempt to export 
China's legal system beyond its territorial borders. The PRC has also 
targeted pro-democracy activists, including a candidate running for a 
seat in the House of Representatives. Agents of China's Ministry of 
State Security plotted to collect or fabricate damaging information on 
this individual or even physically assault him, fearing the impact his 
critical stance on China would have if he were elected to office. The 
PRC also surveilled artists, other pro-democracy activists, and members 
of the Tibetan diaspora in the United States. In these efforts, they 
hired private investigators, a New York City police officer, and 
attempted to bribe officials at the Internal Revenue Service. It is 
common for those living in the United States who are targeted by 
Beijing to receive threatening messages on social media. One Hong Kong-
born American activist even discovered a drone hovering outside the 
windows of his home, apparently looking through his windows with a 
camera, though he was unable to determine who was operating it.
    Possibly the biggest challenge in terms of transnational repression 
for the United States and other democratic countries that are home to 
dissidents and political exiles is the impact of coercion by proxy, in 
which a person's family, loved one, or business located in the origin 
state is targeted. Even when the dissident is out of reach of direct 
violence or harassment, they continue to be vulnerable to transnational 
repression because other people close to them can be taken hostage by 
autocrats. As with other tactics, the Chinese regime makes wide use of 
this, not only threatening family members of U.S.-based activists in 
China with detention or financial ruin, but also arresting and 
sentencing them to prison. Alongside other tactics--such as harassment, 
surveillance, and intimidation--transnational repression by proxy 
changes the way people communicate with friends, family members, and 
professional associates in China or even among the local Chinese, Hong 
Kong, Tibetan, or Uyghur community in the United States.
    the ccp's campaign of transnational repression poses a threat to
               democracy that must be urgently addressed
    Steps to better protect against the CCP's campaign of transnational 
repression, both in the United States and abroad, include:

    1. Codifying a definition of transnational repression, which will 
facilitate the tracking of incidents at home and abroad, distinguish 
attacks from ordinary crime, and coordinate inter-agency action, in 
addition to serving as a basis for any other laws that may be needed.
    2. Codification should be accompanied with appropriate training for 
law enforcement and other agencies that may encounter transnational 
repression. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has begun this effort.
    3. Resilience also encompasses strategic outreach to communities 
that are at risk of experiencing transnational repression in order to 
equip them with the resources to report these activities.
    4. The United States should also use its voice and vote to limit 
the ability of Interpol member states to target individuals through the 
misuse of Red Notices and other alerts.
    5. The United States can also deploy a robust strategy for targeted 
sanctions against China for the use of transnational repression and 
appropriate screening of Chinese diplomats for a history of harassing 
diaspora members in their postings.

    More details about these recommendations, and additional 
recommendations, are available in our reports. \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://freedomhouse.org/policy-recommendations/transnational-
repression#US.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The CCP's campaign of transnational repression is a threat to the 
sovereignty, democratic institutions, and exercise of fundamental 
rights in the United States and around the globe, including by 
individuals who have fled abroad precisely to escape horrific 
violations in China. Building resilience and imposing accountability 
are key to curbing the CCP's campaign of transnational repression. 
Taking actions such as those above to impede this practice, which 
literally brings authoritarianism to our front doorstep is vital to 
protecting U.S. residents and upholding democratic values.
                                 ______
                                 

         Statement Submitted by the Uyghur Human Rights Project

    The Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP) welcomes the opportunity to 
submit a written statement for consideration by the Commission in 
connection with its hearing on the threat of transnational repression 
from China and the U.S. response. UHRP conducts research-based advocacy 
to promote the rights of the Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim peoples in 
East Turkistan, referred to by the Chinese government as the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region, in accordance with international human rights 
standards.
    UHRP has documented the transnational repression (TNR) experienced 
by Uyghurs in a series of ten reports, published from 2011 through 
2022. In addition, we have called attention to the issues and made 
policy recommendations in 25 statements and published commentaries 
since 2016.
    UHRP's 2019 report, ``Repression Across Borders: The CCP's Illegal 
Harassment and Coercion of Uyghur Americans,'' documents how the 
Chinese government routinely carries out surveillance, threats and 
coercion on American soil to control the speech and actions of Uyghur 
Americans. We pointed out that the Chinese government's program of 
transnational repression is an ambitious and well-resourced campaign 
affecting all Uyghur Americans, especially the many brave journalists, 
activists, and students engaged in raising awareness about the crisis 
of repression in their homeland.
    UHRP also pointed out that the intimidation campaign constitutes an 
ongoing series of crimes committed with impunity on U.S. persons. It is 
illegal under U.S. federal and state law to issue threats that 
interfere with free-speech rights. For the Uyghur American community, 
the enduring and menacing presence of the Chinese government in their 
daily lives deprives them of their constitutionally protected rights 
and freedoms.
    UHRP was pleased to see our analysis of the violations on U.S. soil 
confirmed on every point, in the Unclassified FBI Counterintelligence 
bulletin on violations of Uyghur civil rights on U.S. soil (PRC), 
issued on August 11, 2021.
    We also commend the FBI's general factsheet on TNR: Transnational 
Repression--What is it, How you can get help to stop it (FBI--undated).
    UHRP's 2019 report details Chinese state pressure placed on Uyghur 
Americans to end activism, highlighting dire human rights conditions in 
the Uyghur region. The threats come by text, chat apps, voicemail, 
email, and messages delivered by third parties; some members of the 
community report receiving such messages on a weekly or even a near-
daily basis. Non-compliance could result in family members being taken 
to a concentration camp.
    These communications illustrate the way Chinese agents apply 
pressure against Uyghurs abroad through their family members at home, 
adding to the extreme emotional distress of separated Uyghur families.
    That so many speak out, despite the dire risks, demonstrates the 
resilience of Uyghurs in the United States.
    In his 2014 book, The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda, Kingsley 
Edney describes how the Chinese state seeks ``cohesion'' between its 
overseas and domestic messaging. The method is to enlist actors abroad 
to rearticulate pro-Beijing viewpoints and suppress counternarratives. 
Silencing Uyghurs overseas is not only about control of all Uyghur 
bodies, regardless of location, but also an attempt to promote China's 
ludicrous claim that the concentration camps are indeed ``vocational 
training centers.'' Denying overseas Uyghurs a voice means the world is 
deprived of knowing the true extent of China's ongoing crimes against 
humanity.
    PRC transnational repression is also a challenge to the sovereignty 
of the United States and the authority of the U.S. government to 
protect the rights of its citizens and legal residents. Like other 
illegal Chinese government influence operations on U.S. soil, Chinese 
government harassment and abuse of Uyghurs from California to Virginia 
should be a U.S. government priority. It is a test of U.S. resolve and 
impacts all of us, as the limitation of some U.S. citizens' rights by a 
foreign power should always be unacceptable.
                            recommendations
      Strengthen refugee resettlement programs by increasing 
quotas and streamlining procedures. The U.S. government should increase 
their quota of refugees from China and from third countries that are 
likely to extradite citizens to China, such as Turkey and Thailand.
      Uphold the non-refoulement principle. Under international 
law, governments are prohibited from sending individuals back to 
countries where they would be at risk of persecution, torture, ill-
treatment, or other serious human rights violations.
      Restrict the export of surveillance technology. The 
potential for malicious use of technology by Chinese companies active 
in the campaign of repression in the Uyghur Region should make 
countries hesitant about allowing them to operate within their borders 
without scrutiny. The U.S. government should work to achieve clear 
standards on transparency for such dual-use technologies.
      Increase outreach to Uyghur communities. The U.S. 
government should recognize the unique dangers faced by Uyghurs and 
other Turkic peoples residing within their borders. Outreach 
initiatives could include teaching Uyghurs about their legal and 
political rights or about basic digital security strategies to 
counteract the growing threat of Chinese malware and hacks.
      Form a caucus of democratic states within INTERPOL. 
Democracies make up 14 of the 15 top statutory funders of the body. 
These democracies could caucus together on key general assembly votes, 
support common candidates for key positions, and adopt policies to 
insulate INTERPOL against abuse, such as pushing for abusers to be 
suspended from accessing Interpol databases, as stipulated by Article 
131 of the Rules on the Processing of Data.
      Continue to speak publicly, with allies, about 
transnational repression. Raising awareness of the threat transnational 
repression poses to national sovereignty and to the human rights of 
targeted individuals is critical to formulating a coalition and a 
coherent multilateral response in forums such as INTERPOL and the UN.
                       uhrp reports and briefings
     1. New UHRP Report Finds Arab States Have Deported or Detained 292 
Uyghurs at China's Bidding, March 24, 2022
     2. ``Your Family Will Suffer'': How China Is Hacking, Surveilling, 
and Intimidating Uyghurs in 22 Liberal Democracies, November 10, 2021
     3. ``Nets Cast from the Earth to the Sky'': China's Hunt for 
Pakistan's Uyghurs, August 11, 2021
     4. No Space Left to Run: China's Transnational Repression of 
Uyghurs, June 24, 2021
     5. Weaponized Passports: The Crisis of Uyghur Statelessness, April 
1, 2021
     6. ``The Government Never Oppresses Us'': China's proof-of-life 
videos as intimidation of Uyghurs abroad, February 1, 2021
     7. Repression Across Borders: The CCP's Illegal Harassment and 
Coercion of Uyghur Americans, August 28, 2019
     8. ``Another Form of Control'': Complications in obtaining 
documents from China impacts immigration processes and livelihoods for 
Uyghurs abroad, August 10, 2018
     9. ``The Fifth Poison'': The Harassment of Uyghurs Overseas, 
November 28, 2017
    10. ``They Can't Send Me Back'': Uyghur Asylum Seekers in Europe 
face pressure to return to China, September 20, 2011
                               statements
     1. UHRP Encouraged by U.S. Visa Ban to Oppose Transnational 
Repression, Urges Multilateral Action, March 22, 2022
     2. UHRP Welcomes Prosecutions of Chinese Secret Police Harassing 
and Spying in the U.S., March 16, 2022
     3. 12 Years After July 5 Unrest in Urumqi, UHRP Again Calls for 
Safe Haven for Uyghur Refugees, July 5, 2021
     4. On World Refugee Day 2021, UHRP Calls for Global Protections 
for Uyghur Refugees, June 20, 2021
     5. UHRP Calls for Due Process in Turkish Case regarding Dolkun 
Isa, June 8, 2021
     6. UHRP Welcomes Senate Legislation to Support Safe Haven for 
Uyghurs Abroad, April 13, 2021
     7. UHRP Welcomes House Bill to Provide Uyghurs Safe Haven, March 
9, 2021
     8. Op-ed: How Beijing Uses Family Videos to Try to Discredit 
Uyghur Advocates, Emily Upson in the HK Free Press, February 28, 2021
     9. UHRP Submits Statement on Issues Facing Uyghur Refugees to the 
U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), February 
12, 2021
    10. Uyghurs Fear Deportation if Turkey-China Extradition Agreement 
Comes into Force, December 30, 2020
    11. Op-ed: China's Barbarity toward Uyghur Families Should Shock 
Our Consciences and Spur Action, Omer Kanat in The Diplomat, October 
22, 2020
    12. Uyghur Camp Survivor Arrives Safely in the United States, 
September 25, 2020
    13. On World Refugee Day, UHRP Urges UNHCR to Address Looming 
Uyghur Statelessness, June 19, 2020
    14. Op-ed: Uyghurs without Passports: Forced Legibility and 
Illegibility, Henryk Szadziewski in The Geopolitics, May 12, 2020
    15. UHRP Welcomes Rescue of Uyghur Camp Survivors, April 29, 2020
    16. Open Threats against Uyghur Activist in Germany Lay Bare 
China's Lawless Persecution, January 15, 2020
    17. China's Propaganda Videos Are an Ineffective Attempt to 
Discredit #StillNoInfo, January 14, 2020
    18. Op-ed: China's Cross-Border Campaign to Terrorize Uyghur 
Americans, Omer Kanat in The Diplomat, August 29, 2019
    19. World Refugee Day 2019: Thailand Should Free Uyghur Refugees, 
June 19, 2019
    20. Op-ed: Uyghur Refugees Deserve Freedom, Omer Kanat in the 
Bangkok Post, November 20, 2018
    21. World Refugee Day 2018: End Forced Returns of Uyghurs, June 19, 
2018
    22. Media Advisory: UHRP-WUC EVENT: Dolkun Isa Speaks on Removal of 
INTERPOL Red Notice after 20 Years, March 5, 2018
    23. World Refugee Day 2017: UHRP Calls for Information on Returned 
Uyghur Refugees, June 17, 2017
    24. China: Reveal Condition and Whereabouts of Uyghur Refugees 
Forcibly Deported from Thailand to China One Year Ago, July 7, 2016
    25. World Refugee Day 2016: End Forced Returns of Uyghur Refugees 
and Resettle Remaining Uyghurs in Thailand to Safe Third Country, June 
20, 2016

                   Submission of Senator Jeff Merkley

    On pages 45-53 of this hearing are screenshots of FBI webpages 
useful for reporting transnational repression/threats. Instructions for 
reaching the Transnational Repression webpage, the Threat Intimidation 
Guide webpage, and the Threat Intimidation Guide in English, Simplified 
Chinese, Traditional Chinese, and Uyghur are given below. Each Guide 
lists a web address where tips can be reported.

To access the Transnational Repression webpage and then to reach a 
tips.fbi.gov link and/or the Threat Intimidation Guide webpage, 
(screenshots on pages 45-49 of this hearing), go to fbi.gov, click the 
What We Investigate tab, click the Counterintelligence tab, and then 
click on the ``Transnational Repression Is Illegal'' box below to reach 
the Transnational Repression webpage containing (in the box on the 
right) the heading ``How to Report.'' Click on either tips.fbi.gov to 
provide a tip or click on the Threat Intimidation Guide link.

To access a Threat Intimidation Guide, (screenshots on pages 50-53 of 
this hearing), click the desired language on the right hand side of the 
Threat Intimidation Guide webpage. Each Guide lists an additional 
address, www.fbi.gov/tips, to use for reporting tips.

Threat Intimidation Guide (in English) (screenshot on page 50 of this 
hearing)

Threat Intimidation Guide (in Chinese, Simplified) (screenshot on page 
51 of this hearing)

Threat Intimidation Guide (in Chinese, Traditional) (screenshot on page 
52 of this hearing)

Threat Intimidation Guide (in Uyghur) (screenshot on page 53 of this 
hearing)

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]




             Witness Biographies

    Hon. Uzra Zeya, Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, 
and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State

     The Honorable Uzra Zeya is the Under Secretary for Civilian 
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the U.S. Special Coordinator 
for Tibetan Issues at the U.S. Department of State. From 2019 to 2021, 
she served as president and CEO of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, a 
non-partisan global network of more than 130 organizations working in 
more than 180 countries to end conflict by peaceful means. During her 
distinguished 27-year Foreign Service career, Zeya served as deputy 
chief of mission and charge d'affaires in Paris; principal deputy 
assistant secretary and acting assistant secretary at the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; chief of staff to the Deputy 
Secretary of State; political minister-counselor in New Delhi; and 
deputy executive secretary to Secretaries of State Rice and Clinton. 
She also served in Syria, Egypt, Oman, Jamaica, and in various policy 
roles at the Department of State. Zeya speaks Arabic, French, and 
Spanish. She has a bachelor's degree from Georgetown University and is 
the recipient of several State Department Superior Honor and Senior 
Performance awards, the Presidential Rank Award, and the French Legion 
d'honneur.

    Serena Hoy, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security

    Ms. Serena Hoy is the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 
at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Previously, she served in 
the Office of Legal Affairs at INTERPOL Headquarters in Lyon, France; 
as a senior counselor to then-Deputy Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and 
Secretary Jeh Johnson at the Department of Homeland Security; and with 
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, including as his chief counsel. 
Before working in government, she was a staff attorney for the Florida 
Immigrant Advocacy Center and served as the Detention Project director 
for the Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition. She clerked for 
Judge Merrick Garland on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
after earning her law degree from Yale Law School. She also holds a 
master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies from Oxford University where 
she was a Rhodes Scholar, and a bachelor's degree from the University 
of Arizona.