[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-897 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate House
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Co-chair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
MICHELLE STEEL, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Not yet appointed
Matt Squeri, Staff Director
Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Statements
Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from
Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China..... 1
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from
Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 2
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New
Jersey......................................................... 4
Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of
international law and executive president of Kreddha........... 5
Statement of Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City
University of Hong Kong........................................ 6
Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representative of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC........... 8
Statement of Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
van Walt van Praag, Michael...................................... 31
Lau, Hon-Shiang.................................................. 34
Tethong, Tenzin N................................................ 38
Bork, Ellen...................................................... 39
Merkley, Hon. Jeff............................................... 41
McGovern, Hon. James P........................................... 42
Submissions for the Record
Statement of the International Campaign for Tibet, submitted by
Representative McGovern........................................ 43
``The Genuine `China Version' of Tibet's History: Tibet Was Never
Part of China since Antiquity,'' by Hon-Shiang Lau............. 55
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form.......................... 122
Witness Biographies.............................................. 123
(iii)
TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2022
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The hearing was held from 9:05 a.m. to 10:56 a.m., room H-
313, the Capitol, Washington, DC, and virtually via Cisco
Webex, Senator Jeff Merkley, Chairman, Congressional-Executive
Commission on China, presiding.
Also present: Representative James P. McGovern, Co-chair,
Senator Jon Ossoff, and Representatives Chris Smith and
Michelle Steel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM OREGON
AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``Tibet:
Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' will come to
order.
More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese
rule in Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of
unrelenting opposition. Chinese authorities routinely violate
Tibetans' freedom of religion, expression, and assembly and
deny Tibetans self-determination.
The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign
of ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially
sanctioned interpretations of religion and culture, not the
authentic practice and teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary
to that practice and teaching, the Chinese government even
insists on its own authority to select the next reincarnation
of the Dalai Lama, whom authorities label a security threat.
Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with
Chinese rule in Tibet. Punishments range from warnings to
surveillance to interrogation and detention. The Commission's
Political Prisoner Database currently includes records of 715
Tibetans detained or imprisoned for political or religious
reasons. We note that there are considerably more cases of
detention in China than we can capture in the database.
Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious,
cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan
people. Earlier this year, we heard testimony about insidious
efforts to separate Tibetan children from their parents, with
nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children now placed in
boarding schools to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of
language and culture. We are observing an extension or
expansion of that practice now to children going to
kindergarten.
This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights
violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so.
In today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to
address the aspirations of the Tibetan people that their basic
rights and self-determination be respected. Sadly, that
dialogue has been frozen for 12 years, as Chinese authorities
refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote
dialogue without pre-conditions to achieve a negotiated
agreement on Tibet. In other words, we recognize that this
remains an unsettled conflict that must be addressed. Yet the
Chinese government would have the world believe that Tibet is
an internal affair and that issues of its status are resolved.
This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's hearing
aims to set the historical record straight.
Our witnesses will share with us their considerable
experience analyzing the history of Tibet, the international
law dimensions of the conflict, the barriers to resuming
dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. I hope this hearing helps
cut through Chinese propaganda and helps bring attention to the
true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for
autonomy.
I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan
Parliament-in-exile--it's good to have you here--the
International Campaign for Tibet, dignitaries, and other
friends of Tibet who are with us this morning while they are in
town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet.
Thank you for joining us.
The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination
need champions all over the globe, and I look forward to
continuing to work with my fellow parliamentarians to advance
the cause of human dignity and freedom wherever we can.
Among global elected officials, few have been as great a
friend of Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for
many years has led the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass
legislation and advocate for the Tibetan people. I now
recognize him for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
CHINA
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
too, want to welcome our friends who are visiting Washington
for the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. I want to
especially welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
exile. We have two members of the Canadian Parliament here. I
want to welcome my friends from the International Campaign for
Tibet, and I want to welcome my dear friend Richard Gere, who
has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights
in Tibet. We're delighted you are all here.
You know, I appreciate that we're holding this hearing on
Tibet, the status of dialogue, and a path forward in the
Tibetan quest for rights and dignity. Congress has had a long
and abiding interest in Tibet. It created Tibetan-language
broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid programs for
Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed the
landmark Tibetan Policy Act and codified the position of
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide.
Congressman Tom Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by
side with the Dalai Lama. So did President Bush and Speaker
Pelosi, who presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal in
2007.
I've had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet
bills to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet
Act seeks to enable diplomats, journalists, and tourists to
travel to see Tibet with their own eyes, because Chinese
officials have closed it off. The Tibetan Policy and Support
Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its key feature, the
bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or reincarnation
of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th Dalai
Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided
solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, not by China.
Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the
human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people, but
the core problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot
advocate for themselves. They are forced to live in an
authoritarian system under a paranoid central government that
sees any expression of distinct identity as a threat to their
power.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this
way. He's right. For decades, he sought to negotiate with
Chinese authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side
did agree to 10 rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai
Lama's envoys, but they did not do so in good faith. Chinese
officials say they will return to the table only if the Dalai
Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only
unreasonable, but false.
The U.S. Government, to its credit, has consistently called
on the Chinese to return to dialogue without pre-conditions,
but that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood ready,
the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we
keep doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic
or strategy? That's the question we will explore in this
hearing.
Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of
perspectives--legal, historical, policy, and personal--on the
Tibet-China dialogue. We hope to hear what Congress and the
U.S. Government can do to help. Should we be countering false
Chinese narratives? Should we reorient how we talk about the
basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in the current
environment, and what would the alternatives be?
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider
these important questions, and I look forward to our hearing.
Chair Merkley. Congressman Smith, I know you're with us on
Zoom. Do you wish to make an opening comment?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY
Representative Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I
thank you again, and our co-chair, for convening this important
hearing.
I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses, and
Richard Gere, who has been an extraordinary advocate for the
people of Tibet and especially for the Dalai Lama.
Simply put, the barrier, obviously, is the Chinese
Communist Party. It has an ideological commitment to control
Tibet far beyond what previous Chinese governments sought to
do, which has been evident since the founding of the People's
Republic of China. Indeed, one year after the communist
government took power in Beijing and completed its control of
the mainland, it invaded Tibet and sought to annex it. 1959, of
course, marked an even greater attempt to control Tibet and led
to the dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama from his home country.
All these years he has been in exile, while the world has
benefited from his personal holiness and his example. He truly
is a treasure, and I, like my other colleagues, have met him
and have been so deeply impressed by his goodness and his
holiness.
Well, we saw the extreme cruelty of the Cultural
Revolution, where Mao's Red Guards despoiled so much of Tibet's
religious and cultural patrimony. Then there was the kidnapping
and disappearance of the Panchen Lama, which personalizes how
evil and totalitarian the CCP is and underscores the extent to
which they will go to deny the Tibetan people the right to
practice their faith freely and without interference.
Now, today, under Xi Jinping, the suppression of Tibetan
Buddhism--indeed, the suppression of all religion, which Xi
Jinping seeks to sinicize--has intensified. The Chinese
Communist Party is intent upon committing cultural genocide.
This must end. The Tibetan people must be free to practice
their own faith and choose their own spiritual leaders. We look
forward to our distinguished witnesses giving us guidance on
the path forward. I yield back.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman.
We'd now like to introduce those witnesses. I'll introduce
all of them now.
Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international
law and executive president of Kreddha, an international non-
governmental organization created to help prevent and resolve
violent interstate conflicts. He is the author of Tibet Brief
20/20 and he previously served as legal advisor to the Office
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
Hon-Shiang Lau is a retired professor who taught at the
City University of Hong Kong, Oklahoma State University, and
Washington State University. Since retiring, he has devoted his
time to Chinese history. He is the author of the book Tibet Was
Never Part of China since Antiquity.
Tenzin N. Tethong is a former Representative of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He's
served in several roles in the Central Tibetan Administration,
including as kalon tripa, the equivalent of prime minister. He
has served as the director of the Tibetan language service at
Radio Free Asia and is currently the director of the Tibetan
language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a
personal capacity.
Ellen Bork will be joining us via Zoom. She is contributing
editor at American Purpose. She previously served as the senior
professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific at the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes frequently about
U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her writing
has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the
Washington Post, and other publications.
Thank you all for joining us for this hearing. Without
objection, your full statements will be entered into the
record. We ask that you keep your oral remarks to about five
minutes. We'll start with Michael van Walt van Praag.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, PROFESSOR OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF KREDDHA
Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My testimony today is based on the findings of 10 years of
collaborative research, historical and legal, most of which I
carried out during my tenure at the School of Historical
Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and
the findings are published in these two books: Sacred Mandates:
Asian International Relations since Chenggis Khan and Tibet
Brief 20/20.
Today, I'd like to call your attention to one of those
findings and its international legal ramifications. Contrary to
what the PRC claims, Tibet was historically not a part of
China. Though not always independent in the modern legal sense
of the term, and over the centuries subject to various degrees
of Mongol, Manchu, and even British authority or influence,
Tibet was never a part of China. The PRC did not inherit Tibet
from the Republic of China or from earlier empires, as it
claims. Tibet was, in fact, an independent state in the modern
sense of the term in fact and law from 1912 to 1951, when the
PRC took it by force.
So the PRC's military invasion of Tibet constituted an act
of aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international
law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of
force against another state. This informs the legitimacy, or
not, of China's presence in and rule of Tibet. China does not
have sovereignty over Tibet, and therefore it is occupying
Tibet illegally.
That, in turn, informs the international community's legal
obligations and its responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan
conflict. Governments are prohibited under international law
from recognizing China's annexation of Tibet, and they have the
positive obligation to help bring about a resolution of the
Sino-Tibetan conflict, to end the occupation of Tibet, and to
enable the Tibetan people to exercise self-determination.
As you stated, it is U.S. policy to support a negotiated
resolution to the conflict between China and Tibet, but U.S.
Government actions run counter to that policy. The U.S.
Government has stated more than once that it considers Tibet to
be a part of the PRC. If it and other governments continue to
do so, Beijing no longer will have any incentive to negotiate
with the Tibetans. The international community will have
satisfied the PRC's needs without Beijing having to make any
concessions to the Tibetans.
The PRC wants two things above anything else regarding
Tibet: legitimacy and no foreign interference or criticism.
Beijing's strategy to obtain legitimacy in Tibet from the
Tibetans is failing. The Dalai Lama disputes the PRC's only
claim to entitlement to Tibet, namely that Tibet has been an
integral part of China since antiquity, and he is not giving in
to pressure to make a statement to that effect.
Beijing has, therefore, started demanding of other
governments that they recognize that Tibet is part of China,
and is using their statements as a substitute for true
legitimacy. Once a government agrees to regard Tibet as part of
the PRC, it also accepts that Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations
are China's internal affair, outside its purview. Beijing's
needs are then satisfied and Tibetan negotiating power, which
depends heavily on the international community's upholding of
international law in keeping with Tibet's status as an occupied
country, is then severely weakened.
And not only that, endorsing China's sovereignty claim to
Tibet conditions the Tibetans to envision a settlement that can
bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know about
China's treatment of Tibetans and also its treatment of Uyghurs
and Beijing's determination to eradicate their very identity, I
ask: Is marginal change what the U.S. really wants for the
Tibetan people?
The conflict will not be resolved with marginal change. It
can only truly be resolved if the Tibetans' basic needs are
satisfied. At a very minimum, this requires a robust autonomy
with guarantees and international protection endorsed by the
Tibetan people in accordance with their right to self-
determination. To arrive there, the international community
needs to play its role--uphold international law and treat
Tibet as an occupied country and the conflict as a matter of
international responsibility.
Thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much.
We'll now turn to Professor Lau.
STATEMENT OF HON-SHIANG LAU, RETIRED CHAIR PROFESSOR, CITY
UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG
Mr. Lau. I want to thank this distinguished audience for
enabling me to make this presentation. My theme is that China's
pre-1949 official historical records clearly show that Tibet
was never part of China before the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950.
This is an important issue because China is a signatory to the
relevant covenants of the League of Nations and the United
Nations which means that, since 1919, China has promised not to
gain territories through military conquest thereafter.
Moreover, the PRC incessantly condemns other countries for
their past colonial conquests and their past bullying of China.
Therefore, the PRC needs to cover up its 1950 Tibet conquest as
a unification of a territory that has been part of China since
antiquity. Sadly, today many governments incorrectly believe
this ridiculous lie, and this is part of the reason why many
Western democracies fail to provide adequate support for
upholding Tibet's sovereignty.
There are two important foundational concepts behind my
theme. Foundation A: There is an abundance of authentic and
reliable pre-1949 Chinese official historical records. The PRC
version of Chinese history is very, very different from the
version of Chinese history reflected in these pre-1949 official
Chinese records.
Foundation B: We used a comprehensive range of objective
criteria to examine whether Tibet was part of China. Thus, to
judge whether Tibet was part of China during China's Ming
dynasty, we used official classical Chinese records to examine,
for example: (1) Whether the Ming Empire had designated Tibet
as part of China or as a foreign entity, say, via a promulgated
map. (2) Was the Ming Empire able to conduct censuses or
collect taxes in Tibet? (3) Was the Ming Empire able to appoint
and dismiss judges or governing officials in Tibet? (4) Was
China's language, legal system, and monetary system used in
Tibet? etc.
Combining Foundations A and B, we can prove the following
conclusion: China's pre-1949 official records clearly show that
Tibet was never part of China before the PRC's 1950 invasion.
We also prove that the PRC's so-called evidence of sovereignty
over Tibet is based on not only distortions, but outright
fabrications and forgeries of pre-1949 Chinese records. This
means that a current permanent member of the UN Security
Council militarily conquered a foreign country in 1950 and
continues to subjugate it today. This crime obligates the
intervention of the international community.
I'm going to show you two examples of these proofs. The
first example is a Ming dynasty map. It's on your tablet. This
is labeled as Map 1, purported to show the entire Ming Empire.
[Map 1 appears on page 36 in the written statement of Mr. Lau.]
Regarding my Foundation A stated earlier, this proof is from a
Ming dynasty 1461 A.D. government publication. That is, it
comes from a very authoritative Chinese source. Regarding my
Foundation B, it relates to an objective sovereignty claim,
depicted on a national map.
In this map, labels for Chinese territories are framed in
white lettering on a black background. In contrast, the map
labels non-Chinese territories, such as Japan in the east and
then Tibet over here in the west, in non-framed black lettering
on a white background. The contrast is literally in black and
white. In other words, the Ming government clearly declared
that Tibet was a non-China foreign entity.
If you would flip the tablet, you will see Map 2, which is
an example of a Qing dynasty proof. This is from a Qing dynasty
1732 government publication, purported to show the entire Qing
Empire. [Map 2 appears on page 37 in the written statement of
Mr. Lau.] On this map, the Qing government shows the position
corresponding to today's Tibet Autonomous Region (the TAR) as a
blank space. Hundreds of similar proofs are presented in this
book that I have written. Most of them involve textual records,
and not just merely pictorial proofs like this. And they are,
of course, much more reliable. Thank you very much.
Chair Merkley. Professor, thank you very much for your
comments and for sharing these maps and this history. We will
now turn to Mr. Tethong.
STATMENT OF TENZIN N. TETHONG, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS
HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Tethong. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, it is my
distinct honor to offer testimony this morning in this hearing
on Tibet and to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in
the 20th century, including efforts toward a resolution of the
Tibet issue. Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever
since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. One
of Mao Zedong's earliest declarations was his intention to
liberate Tibet from the West, and the Tibetan people from a
backward and oppressive society.
The Tibetan government protested immediately, citing
Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan kings
to the rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu
Qing dynasties. With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the
United Nations and the global community, especially to India,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unfortunately, China
did not heed Tibet's protests, and the global community did not
come to Tibet's defense. The People's Liberation Army marched
into Tibet in 1950, easily overwhelming the Tibetan Army and
militia. China knew right then that rhetorical justification
for such an invasion was not enough and called for negotiations
to formalize an agreement.
Tibetan representatives negotiated in Beijing but,
disregarding any proper ratification process, were forced to
sign what is called the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful
Liberation of Tibet. Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His
Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government tried to
work within the broad confines of the agreement, which promised
no change in the status of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan
government. However, China did not live up to these
commitments, nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had
received from Mao Zedong.
Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years,
and protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the
uprising in Lhasa on March 10th, 1959, which led to the escape
of the Dalai Lama, and the escape of thousands, to India and
neighboring countries. For the next 20 years, Tibet was
completely shut off from the rest of the world. An extreme
overhaul of Tibetan life, from its traditional Buddhist roots
to Chinese Marxist socialism, was introduced, which in the
latter years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese
Cultural Revolution.
However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue
important enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the
Dalai Lama's older brother to Beijing and declared that short
of separation everything would be discussed, meaning that short
of granting Tibetan independence, China would be open to all
Tibetan concerns and aspirations. This breakthrough meeting led
to renewed dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the
Chinese government. Four delegations of exile leaders were able
to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had
transpired under two decades of Chinese rule.
By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in
deliberations with Chinese officials to address larger issues
related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, party general
secretary and the main proponent of changes in the Tibet
policies, died. This was soon followed by the Tiananmen student
protests and the massacre. China stepped backwards, and the
Tibetan issue also retreated.
In 2001, however, communication with China was restored,
and envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in
Beijing, where the Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's
Middle Way policy, seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within
the framework of the PRC. The envoys met many times, even after
the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests that called for
greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the envoys'
last meeting was to be in 2010, when the Chinese ended the
dialogue process.
This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should
show that even at the most challenging of times, China has seen
the need to address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet and
that there is perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of
their rule. China has also repeatedly initiated direct
communication with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, demonstrating
the obvious need to find a meaningful resolution to these
outstanding issues.
Ever since the exile delegation visited Tibet in the 1980s,
to the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's envoys in Beijing,
the Chinese leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan
perspectives of their rule in Tibet and of the unvarnished
aspirations of the Tibetan people, both of which contradict the
official Chinese narrative. Worldwide attention to Tibet has
been an important part of creating greater awareness of the
Tibetan issue, even in China, allowing for more liberal and
reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan hopes and
demands to have some standing.
There is little doubt that public support for Tibet,
through the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concern
for the cultural and human rights of the Tibetan people, has
been an important factor in the U.S. Government's attention on
the issue--which has been sustained to a large degree by
individual Members of Congress. The continued efforts of the
United States will help remove barriers to this unresolved
conflict and will advance the Tibetan people's desire for
greater freedom and democracy. I thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Tethong.
We're now going to turn to Ellen Bork, who is joining us
via Zoom. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK,
CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, AMERICAN PURPOSE
Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Thank you to the members of
the Commission and staff, and I appreciate appearing alongside
the other witnesses very much.
As you all know, the United States has charted a new course
toward China on a lot of issues, but Tibet, so far, has not
been the subject of a considerable revived agenda. It should
be. Unfortunately, Tibet is often viewed as a fait accompli, a
tragic but closed chapter of history. That is not the case, of
course, for the Chinese Communist Party. Tibet, for them,
remains a cornerstone of China's aggression, both territorially
and ideologically. It is part of China's assault on liberal
democratic norms, which in turn will advance the Party's plan
to control the succession of the Dalai Lama, or at least gain
preference and acquiescence to its choice of successor.
Addressing that challenge by building support for the
authentic Dalai Lama now and in the future, and in particular
building support for Tibetan democracy, which is his legacy,
should play a much larger role in the U.S. response to China.
Unfortunately, the foundations of American Tibet policy make
this difficult. A look back at history shows America's Tibet
policy was not the product of historical fact or international
law but of outdated perceptions of America's strategic interest
in subordinating Tibet to China. U.S. involvement in Tibet is,
compared to some other powers, relatively recent, but it has
played a decisive role in what's happening today.
First, of course, the United States accepted Great
Britain's application of the concept of suzerainty over Tibet.
This is something short of sovereignty. According to many
scholars, it is not even applicable, but Great Britain found it
useful while it was involved in the great geopolitical
competition of the Great Game in the region. The United States
accepted that term, but if you read through a lot of the
diplomatic memos you'll see how uncomfortable and ambivalent
officials were about it, as well as about the concept of
sovereignty. And for several decades, policy fluctuated in
terms of the language used and the way the United States
thought about what had happened in Tibet from the 1950s, and
even before. Officials really accepted that it was de facto
independent, even though the United States refused to accept
requests to recognize Tibet's independence.
Later on, after several decades--it was when the United
States forged a rapprochement with Beijing at Taipei's expense
that the position on sovereignty really gelled. Again, this was
the result of its perception of the strategic need with regard
to China, and deciding to choose one Chinese priority, in
Tibet, over another. I don't think it's too far-fetched to say
that in that way, it transferred deference to China over Tibet
from one dictatorship that never exerted authority there--
meaning Chiang Kai-shek--to a totalitarian regime that it
decided to favor at the time.
As a result of this decision--incidentally, Vice President
Mondale visited Beijing in 1979 and sort of said: We will no
longer view the Dalai Lama as a political leader. And we've
essentially said we're going with your sovereignty over Tibet.
Not surprisingly, with that decision taken, Tibet had to become
diminished within U.S.-PRC relations. It's not uncommon for
diplomats to consider that it's an irritant in the U.S.-China
relationship and even that Tibet can only be helped if we lower
the temperature with Beijing over Tibet, and I think exactly
the opposite.
Above all, this meant that the United States would not
focus on legitimacy questions about the PRC's role in Tibet or
give adequate attention to the extraordinary achievement of
democracy in exile. That democratization process was carried
out under the Dalai Lama's leadership and with the support of
the Tibetan people in exile, at exactly the same time that
democratic transitions were occurring in Asia, the Philippines,
South Korea, Taiwan, and later Indonesia, and that has been the
basis of American policy toward the region ever since.
By contrast, of course, Tibet is a huge priority for the
Party. And it has an international Tibet agenda. It's not just
the domestic repression, or inside Tibet's border, that we need
to focus on. It has a really corrosive agenda for Tibet, trying
to impose litmus tests on the way countries and NGOs deal with
Tibet. And it has a Buddhist agenda in its Belt and Road
investment initiatives. It seeks to appropriate Buddhist sites
and cultivate and co-opt leaders and make Tibet a core
interest--a condition of its good relations.
I'd just like to note, before I give a few recommendations,
the importance of understanding that many brave Chinese
democracy advocates have over time challenged the Party on
Tibet. It's very easy to imagine that the Chinese people are
sort of inherently nationalist when it comes to Tibet, and I
think that's false. It's the product of intense propaganda and
fear. It's important to recognize that going back to Wei
Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo, there's been a thrust
among Chinese democrats increasingly to see democracy as the
solution to both Tibet and China's problems. Charter 08, the
democracy manifesto of 2008, took this up, and although I think
it was too sensitive to use the word ``Tibet'' in that
document, there was a clear reference to the goal of
``federation of democratic communities of China.''
In that sense, the first recommendation I would make is to
reintroduce support for democracy in China and to support
Chinese and Tibetan political prisoners and activists, lawyers,
and journalists more than we currently are in our relationship
with Beijing. I think I'd like to suggest also an independent
review of U.S. policy, to go deeply into some of the issues I
mentioned about the choices the United States made from the
'40s on, to see how United States policy or attitudes about
Tibet's status fluctuated, and why the United States made these
decisions, and how they are not related. As Michael points out,
our position is in violation of international law. How did this
happen? And what should we understand about not only Tibet's
status but how the United States treated Tibet and subordinated
it to China historically?
Finally, I would say we should enlist allies in a common
position on the Dalai Lama's succession and make that very
public. Give the elected Tibetan exile government more access
and support and include it in forums like the Summit for
Democracy, and counter Chinese influence in international
organizations and on campuses and at state and local levels,
not only on Tibet but on other questions, like Taiwan. Thank
you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Ms. Bork, and I thank
all four of you for the expertise you bring to this
conversation. We'll now have a period of questioning. I think
we're set for seven minutes. I'll be handing the gavel over to
Representative McGovern after my questions because I have
another hearing to chair, but I'll tell you, this Member of the
Senate will never recognize as legitimate Chinese control over
Tibet.
In the hearings that we have held in this Commission about
what China is now doing in Tibet--in particular I can't get out
of my mind the fact that 80 percent of the children are being
sent to boarding school to separate them from their parents,
and to essentially re-educate them in a false narrative and
destroy the religious and cultural foundations of the Tibetan
people. This is truly an enormous crime against Tibet.
I appreciate the historical perspectives. I was struck by
two of you testifying about 1979. Mr. Tethong, you noted that
in 1979 Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to
come and said that, short of separation, China was open to
discussion of how to address Tibetan concerns and aspirations.
Then Ms. Bork, you noted that in 1979, Vice President Mondale
went to China and essentially recognized--if I understood your
testimony correctly--recognized that the United States saw
China as having legitimate authority over Tibet. How do we
reconcile these two things happening in that particular year?
How did one precede the other? And are they tied together? I'd
invite both Ms. Bork and Mr. Tethong to help us understand
that.
Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think, as I'll try to explain
very briefly, that even though China had just come out of the
very serious period of the Cultural Revolution, to set China on
the right course they had to deal with many important issues.
Obviously Tibet was right up there on their agenda. It shows
that Tibet remained a key issue in the Chinese government's
state of mind. Unfortunately, what Vice President Mondale
declared during the Carter administration, shall we say,
overlooked the importance of the Tibetan human rights
situation. In part, maybe we were unable to present our case to
a President who had a strong interest in human rights. But
maybe at the time, President Carter was very engaged in
establishing normalized relations with China. That's all I can
say.
Chair Merkley. Thank you. Ms. Bork, would you like to
comment on the juxtaposition of those two events in 1979?
Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. I don't know the interaction
or the interplay between those two events. I think that would
be a really interesting thing to explore. I suspect that
getting the Tibetan leadership to acquiesce, to sort of buy in
to some solution, is not inconsistent with getting the United
States to settle its position on Tibet's sovereignty. But it
would be very interesting. I've done a little research. It's
not easy to know what went into the preparation for Vice
President Mondale's trip. I think that would be a great subject
for an independent commission.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
Let me turn to our two professors, Professor Lau and
Professor Michael van Walt van Praag. Where is American
leverage in bringing China back to the conversation through the
dialogue about autonomy with Tibet?
Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you. Because China's primary
objective in the international field in relation to Tibet is
precisely to obtain legitimacy for its rule in Tibet,
questioning that legitimacy creates leverage. In other words,
in the reverse, accepting or otherwise identifying Tibet as a
part of China or as a part of the PRC or accepting Chinese
sovereignty over Tibet today takes away any leverage the
Tibetans have.
It takes away the need for the Chinese leaders to approach
the Tibetans, to negotiate with them and find an agreement that
will end up with an arrangement where the Tibetans accept some
form of Chinese sovereignty, rule, relationship, that works for
both parties. If the international community, and therefore the
U.S. as perhaps one of the most important players in relation
to China, does not question China's legitimacy in Tibet,
China's sovereignty in Tibet, then that takes away that
leverage.
Chair Merkley. Thank you.
Professor Lau.
Mr. Lau. Thank you, sir. I can only echo what Michael has
just said. I think that the United States and the world should
actively counter and oppose the PRC's narrative, by producing
solid proofs to show that the PRC's version is incorrect, or
that they're just basically telling lies. I think in the past
I've heard many people denying the PRC's version but without
producing believable and authoritative proofs. I think it's
about time that the world becomes more explicit in
contradicting the PRC's claim by doing more than just simply
saying: ``You are wrong, I am right.'' Show the proofs. That's
all I know. Thank you.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I'll close with this
question to Ms. Bork. Thank you, by the way, for your five
recommendations. One of the things you talk about is enlisting
allies in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan
process for selecting the next Dalai Lama. Can you comment for
just a moment on your general sense of the disposition of the
European Union, both in terms of that specific issue, but more
broadly on the issue of establishing a clear, united position
that China's control or authority over Tibet is illegitimate.
Ms. Bork. Thank you, Senator. There's no question that the
Chinese government has made great inroads in Europe, but that,
I think, on a number of issues has been slow, if not completely
reversed. Like in the United States, there are many countries
where there's great reverence for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.
It's not viewed there as quite as huge a matter. It doesn't get
quite as much attention. I think that the attention to the
reincarnation issue that the U.S. Congress has shown is also
spreading in Europe. I'm optimistic that some of the leading
countries there in support for the Dalai Lama would step
forward, but they've always been treated to that kind of divide
and conquer. They've suffered so much--as you remember, the way
Norway suffered after the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. So
it's essential that there's some kind of shared burden and
protection for people--for countries as they take this
position. I'm very heartened by the appointment of the new
special coordinator, Uzra Zeya, and believe that there is
prospect for greater attention to Tibet within U.S.-Europe
relations.
Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We're now going to turn
to Co-chair McGovern.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
me thank all the panelists for being here. And let me make
clear, the reason why we're doing this hearing, the reason why
we've done other hearings on Tibet, the reason why we have
passed legislation on Tibet, is because China is not living up
to the expectations of the international community with regard
to Tibet. You know, I think there might be a perception in
China that the world will soon forget and move on to something
else, but I hope we're making it clear that that's not going to
be the case. In fact, activity in the United States Congress on
Tibet has intensified in recent years. More attention is being
devoted to Tibet, and some of the topics that we're talking
about here today many members of Congress are unaware of. They
will be enlightened by this hearing, and it will bring
additional perspective as we deal with other legislation
impacting China in the future.
I just say to the government of China, who always gets
annoyed when we do these hearings--you know what? You have a
Tibet problem. Deal with it. You can go back to the negotiating
table. I mean, that would be a good first step. Let's try to
resolve these differences. But as long as you don't, as long as
you pretend that there's not a problem here, please be assured
that activity focused on Tibet in the United States and in
other countries around the world will intensify.
Professor Lau, would you say that the Chinese government's
insistence that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of
China since antiquity is tantamount to a demand that the Dalai
Lama say something that is false?
Mr. Lau. Absolutely. I agree with that 100 percent. The PRC
knows that that claim is a lie, and they are forcing the Dalai
Lama to lie with the PRC.
Co-chair McGovern. OK. Mr. van Walt, you testified that
governments using the Chinese narrative that Tibet has always
been part of China is an obstacle to resolving the conflict
through dialogue. Now, there has been no dialogue in 12 years.
Assuming that governments made such statements as a concession
to get the Chinese to the table back then, is there any reason
for them to continue saying the same thing?
Mr. van Walt van Praag. I think it was a mistake for
governments to play China's game, and I don't know what the
objective was of making those statements acknowledging Tibet
being a part of the PRC. But I think it was a mistake to do so,
if the hope was that this would encourage China to negotiate. I
think it's quite the contrary. And I think we must realize that
the Middle Way approach of His Holiness the Dalai Lama can only
work if we're conscious that the kind of genuine autonomy that
we're talking about is only a possible middle path if it is the
middle between the legitimate right of the Tibetans to restore
their independence on the one hand and China's intention to
fully integrate Tibet into China on the other. If we take away
this legitimate right of the Tibetans, then there's really very
little to negotiate that is left.
Co-chair McGovern. I think it's fair to say that those
governments that bought into the Chinese narrative, maybe
thinking that it might make the Chinese government more
reasonable with regard to Tibet, it didn't work.
Mr. van Walt van Praag. It didn't work, and I think it is
counterproductive today.
Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Tethong, the Chinese insist that
they have the right to select the next Dalai Lama, and demand
that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of China since
ancient times. Do you think that these reveal a latent
insecurity within Chinese leadership about the legitimacy of
their claim to own Tibet?
Mr. Tethong. Definitely, Chairman. We've all touched on
this issue of legitimacy. I believe that even within the
Chinese leadership and the Chinese mindset, legitimacy of the
rule of the CCP is what is at stake. Tibet or the Tibetans were
the ones who contested that legitimacy. That's why there is
total control over Tibet, yet China often finds itself needing
to address it somehow, because the question of legitimacy will
never be fully satisfactory for the Chinese until the Tibetans
have a proper role in that.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Ms. Bork, given what the other three witnesses have said,
what actions should the United States Government take to get
the parties back to the table? Do you agree that the State
Department should stop using the ``Tibet is part of the PRC''
phrase, as they did in the Tibet negotiations report this
month? And given that the PRC was founded in 1949, would it be
fair to say that the U.S. statements do not endorse the Chinese
position that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity?
Ms. Bork. I'm not sure what the intention of the department
was in that particular matter, but I do think there's a lot to
be done before approaching Beijing. I think dialogue can take
many forms, and people may have different attitudes about it.
I'm not a particular supporter of the idea of dialogue, at
least not without much more coordination among the allies in
support of the Tibetans. I think that without that, I don't
think it's going to go anywhere. I'm deeply skeptical about
Chinese intentions with regard to any kind of dialogue.
By all means, again, review the defects in the American
position, why they've used language in the past and the fact
that they should stop using it. Again, it's because it's not
accurate historically and not helpful right now. Yes, they
should stop using that and begin to talk about Tibet in a
different way.
Co-chair McGovern. I appreciate that, and whatever the
deficiencies in U.S. policy have been over the years, I think
it is fair to say that we are reorienting our policy in a way
that is more in tune with what the Tibetan community wants. I
just want to say that we're working on a bill that we'll be
introducing soon to help the U.S. Government counter Chinese
disinformation on Tibet and ensure that U.S. policy supports
the basis for the Dalai Lama's quest for genuine autonomy. And
also making it clear that, you know, facts matter and that you
can't rewrite history because you want to. I mean, history is
history. Facts are facts.
And so, again, I think that there is a renewed interest in
the United States and in other countries around the world, as
we witnessed yesterday talking to parliamentarians from all
over the world who are in Washington to find ways to support
the Tibetan people, and I think things are changing globally. I
wish they'd changed a long time ago, but they're now changing.
My time is up right now. I'm going to recognize Senator
Ossoff.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to
our panelists. I'd like to ask each of our panelists to comment
on the intersection of press freedom and the issue at hand
today. Last week in the Commission we heard from Under
Secretary Zeya, who committed to work with my office to expand
press freedom internationally and strengthen U.S. leadership
for press freedom. My question, please, beginning with you, Mr.
Tethong, is: How does the CCP repress freedom of reporting and
publication within Tibet, and more broadly within China? How
does the CCP seek to influence reporting and publication on
related issues internationally? And when you've concluded, we
can move to Ms. Bork. I'd like to hear from each panelist on
this. Thank you.
Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Senator. There is no press freedom
in Tibet, or in any of the Tibetan areas within the PRC. No
foreign journalists are allowed to visit Tibet freely. Very
rarely and occasionally, groups of Western journalists who are
stationed in Beijing might be allowed on a short trip that is
fully managed by Chinese officials. So with regard to press
freedom, I think Tibet is regarded as one of the worst, even
worse than North Korea, according to Freedom House, I believe.
We are only able to get news items, news reports through
personal contacts of Tibetans who are in exile and occasionally
through social media.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Ms. Bork.
Ms. Bork. Oh, I'd certainly concur with what Mr. Tethong
has said. I think it's important to think about the way China
is challenging norms of freedoms, and we have to be really very
attuned to the way they treat rights and the way they'd like to
alter the way the world respects universal norms. I don't have
anything to add about inside Tibet, but I would be very alert
to the way Chinese Communist Party officials talk about
democratic norms, including press freedom, and try to shape
them, particularly in countries where they have a great deal of
influence or where they're trying to acquire influence.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. van Walt van Praag.
Mr. van Walt van Praag. Yes. I don't have anything to add
about press freedom or the lack of it in Tibet. What I would
say is that at the same time, China is, in a sense, abusing the
freedom of the press internationally, outside of China, but
using the press very actively to project its narrative on
Tibet, to project also its vocabulary on Tibet. For example,
many members of the press write articles in which they refer to
Tibetans as a minority--one of China's minorities, which is an
implicit acceptance of Tibet being part of China and the
Tibetans being one of China's peoples, minorities. Whereas, in
effect, the Tibetans are not a minority. They are the
population of Tibet. They are the people of Tibet. And they are
a people under international law with the full right to self-
determination. That's just one example, but there are so many
examples of articles in the press and reports in the press that
use Chinese terminology in regard to Tibet.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. Lau.
Mr. Lau. Thank you. I'm not an expert in this area and have
nothing of value to add, but I would like to use this
opportunity to emphasize something else that was brought up
just now. China or the Qing Empire never had any power in
selecting the Dalai Lama. It is clearly reflected in the
official Chinese records. The Qing Empire only made a request
to the Tibetans to use a golden urn to do one minor step of the
selection by drawing lots. That was all, and even that request
was not consistently followed or acceded to by the Tibetan
authorities during the Qing dynasty. Thank you.
Senator Ossoff. Thank you all for your responses. Thanks
for the additional context and information. I worked prior to
my election producing investigative reports of crimes, official
corruption, crimes against humanity. Freedom of the press and
freedom of publication are under attack worldwide. The United
States Government must strengthen and redouble its commitment
to stand en garde for press freedom around the world. And this
hearing will help inform our efforts to that end.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Senator.
Congresswoman Steel.
Representative Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Every person has the right to religious and cultural
beliefs, and all governments, including the CCP, have no right
to restrict this fundamental ability. It is inexcusable that
the people of Tibet are not free and are currently threatened
with punishment ranging from warnings and surveillance to
interrogation and detention. We cannot sit still while Tibetans
are being detained and imprisoned for political and religious
reasons. I was honored to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama in
my district. We have to make the world know that the leader of
Tibet cannot go back to his own country and his own people
because of CCP oppression.
With that, to all the witnesses, with the current abuses by
the CCP oppressing autonomous regions, what should the United
States and other countries do to stand with the Tibet people.
I'm just asking all the witnesses. So if anybody wants to
answer, I'd love to hear that.
And can local global corporations play a role in raising
awareness about the Tibetan oppression? That's what I asked
last year, before the Winter Olympics. I wanted these
corporations that were going to spend billions and billions of
dollars in advertising to use their platform. But I didn't get
a response from any of those 17, the Olympic sponsor
corporations.
So could you just let me know? You can start, I guess, Ms.
Bork.
Ms. Bork. I'm so sorry. If someone else could start,
please. I'm having trouble hearing.
Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman, if you could just repeat
the crux of your question again, because it kind of went in and
out.
Representative Steel. Oh. With the current abuses by the
CCP oppressing the autonomous regions, what should the United
States and other countries do to work together to stand with
Tibet's people? And can global corporations play a role in
raising awareness about the Tibet oppression?
Ms. Bork. Thank you very much for the question. I think
international solidarity and coordination on all these points
is vital, given the Party's adept use of tools like financial
diplomacy and propaganda, and various other kinds of
intimidation, not to mention that we haven't even talked about
how China continues to redefine Tibet, to the point that it is
referring to northeast India as southern Tibet. So this is very
much an ongoing issue that requires staunch and coordinated
reply.
There was an interesting proposal, unrelated to Tibet, from
a fellow in Scandinavia about an economic Article 5 for NATO. I
think it's certainly worth discussing the kind of retaliation
that countries could experience if they take a more thoughtful
and principled stance on Tibet. We really can't prepare enough
for that eventuality, and I'd certainly recommend that Congress
think about that as well.
As for global companies, they haven't really--I guess I'm
too negative. I only know the bad examples. Maybe someone else
knows some good examples with companies on Tibet. But I do
think that attitude is changing as a result of the Olympics and
some other--you know, the NBA, and things like that. I think
unfortunately there's still a market for companies to kowtow to
the Chinese line on Tibet and other issues. But I do think it's
changing, and people are more sensitive to that, so I'm a
little more optimistic than I might have once been.
Representative Steel. Thank you. Any other witnesses?
Mr. van Walt van Praag. I would like to make two
observations that follow on what Ellen Bork has just mentioned.
Regarding cooperation among countries, I think it's also very
important to emphasize that not only is this of crucial
importance for Tibet and the Tibetan people themselves, but
this has broader international ramifications, because the
appeasement of China on Tibet for the past 70 years is not
unrelated to China's expansion today--or its efforts to
expand--in the South China Sea, where it uses a similar
historical narrative as it does to claim sovereignty over
Tibet, and its aggressive stance in relation to northern India,
both in the eastern and western part of northern India, and as
Ellen Bork mentioned, even calling one part of northeast India
southern Tibet, where it makes territorial claims, again,
directly related to its historical narrative of Tibet.
One cannot accept the historical narrative on Tibet and
then contest China's claim to northern India. Or perhaps it
even makes it difficult to contest their claim to the South
China Sea islands. And the second question, regarding
corporations, the only thing I would mention is that, again,
under international law, because China is denying the Tibetan
people their right to self-determination, which they have, and
because it is occupying Tibet, corporations and governments are
forbidden from benefiting from the exploitation of resources in
Tibet, because those resources under international law belong
to the Tibetan people and therefore cannot be exploited, and
one cannot benefit from it without the express permission of
the Tibetan people, given freely.
Thank you.
Representative Steel. Thank you very much for those
answers. The CCP continues to have oversight of Tibetan
religious life by mandating political education for monks and
nuns and creating apparatus to surveil and manage monastic
institutions. Can you expand more on how CCP authorities
continue to reorient Tibetan society? I think maybe Professor
Lau.
Mr. Lau. Actually, I would like to comment on the earlier
topic that you brought up. I think it's important for the world
to realize that the Tibet issue is not necessarily just a China
issue. I read in mainstream newspaper articles in the past
several days, and you have pointed out, that Putin is going to
re-create the old Russian empire by bringing up all these
historical ``territorial rights,'' even over the Baltic
nations. If you look at the Chinese records, these records
clearly show that Tibet was not part of China, but they do
indicate that Burma, Korea, Thailand, Laos, and a whole bunch
of other areas were clearly part of China. They also indicate
that even countries like Holland and Portugal were tributary
countries to China.
We have seen what has developed in Putin's and in Ukraine's
case. If we do not explicitly reject this kind of attitude,
there is a strong possibility that 20 years from now, when
China becomes even stronger, that they could bring up these old
claims of sovereignty over Korea and over Vietnam and then, as
I've said, even over Portugal. I think that's the point that I
would like to make. Thank you.
Mr. Tethong. I would just like to add a comment, that yes,
for the last 20 or 30 years, global attention to what is
happening in Tibet, and especially concerns expressed by the
United States Congress, has had a tremendous impact on the
situation in Tibet and on the rights and safety of the Tibetan
people; to a great degree they have been provided simply
because the outside world is watching, especially the United
States.
For a long-term goal to help resolve the Tibet issue, I
think, as my co-panelists have said, we should not look at
Tibet and the Tibetan people as a unique element on their own,
but that this is an issue that concerns the whole world. When
we deal with any development in Tibet, of course, we are going
to look at it from the perspective of the human rights of an
individual Tibetan, and therefore the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights should be a central theme to work with. And along
with that, as far as the Tibetan people are concerned, their
right to self-determination should be an underlying feature of
how we deal with Tibet in the future.
Representative Steel. I totally agree with Professor Lau
because China is one of the biggest threats in the whole world.
If we don't stop the CCP's invasion and oppression of
autonomous regions right now, then in 20 years, what kind of
map are we going to have? So this is a very important hearing.
I really appreciate that we can hear from our witnesses. Thank
you for coming out.
I yield back.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
I have a series of questions. I'm trying to get through
them all, so bear with me here. Mr. van Walt van Praag, your
testimony addresses the concept of self-determination as core
to your thesis. Can you discuss the gap, if any, between the
basis of the right to self-determination in international law,
and the extent to which governments honor and protect that
right? And how would you respond to those who say Tibetans are
not entitled to self-determination?
Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much for your
question. Self-determination, under international law, is a
basic right. It is both a basic right and it is codified in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in its very first article, because there is a recognition, and
there was a recognition when those two conventions were
written, that without honoring the right to self-determination,
many of the other human rights are difficult to conceive of and
to respect, and therefore, those rights are dependent, to some
degree, on respecting the right to self-determination.
But self-determination is also a fundamental principle of
international relations. As many UN declarations make clear,
respect for the right to self-determination is a fundamental
requirement for friendly relations among states and so both
these things are truly fundamental. At the same time, self-
determination, as it has developed, was for a long time
considered to be primarily a right of countries to de-colonize
from Western colonialism. But increasingly, it is being
recognized that when we're speaking about colonialism, we're
speaking about the nature of rule, the nature of the
relationship between dominant power and a subjugated country, a
subjugated people under alien domination.
Regardless of whether it is a Western power, regardless of
whether there is an ocean between the cosmopolitan country and
the colony, colonialism is about the nature of relations
between the dominant and the dominated and about the latter's
exploitation. Under that concept, Tibet very clearly is under
colonial rule today, and I think it should be recognized that
way. The PRC just introduced this, at an earlier session of the
Human Rights Council in Geneva, a resolution on--and I don't
know the exact words but--something like the continuing
consequences of colonialism. Even within that context, we
should be using colonialism to address the situation in Tibet.
Aside from colonialism, Tibetans also, because they are a
people--under any definition in international law--a people
with a right to self-determination, fit squarely in that
category. In terms of the difference between, in other words,
their right to full self-determination and the honoring of that
right internationally, there is, I think, a big gap. In the
1950s and '60s, a number of countries, including the United
States, recognized and supported the Tibetan people's right to
self-determination. And as we know, there is a United Nations
General Assembly resolution on that subject from the 1960s that
recognizes the Tibetans' right to self-determination and calls
for its respect and for its implementation.
So Tibetans have had that recognition internationally. The
discrepancy is that today many countries, probably most
countries, do not refer to the Tibetan people's right to self-
determination anymore, simply out of fear of displeasing China.
And I think it is very important to restore the situation to
where it was universally recognized that Tibetans had the right
to self-determination.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Ms. Bork, you have written about how democracy should be a
component of our policy on Tibet, keeping in mind that the
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has established a
democratic form of government-in-exile. The Biden
administration has created a process to prioritize this issue
called the Summit for Democracy, and as I understand it, the
CTA was not involved in the first summit meeting last December.
Would you recommend that the administration include the CTA in
the upcoming summit this December? And if so, how?
Ms. Bork. I would very strongly recommend that. It seems to
me a great oversight to continue to neglect this achievement,
especially if the administration is trying to develop support
for the reincarnation as an element of, effectively, liberal
democracy and liberal democratic norms being effective, human
rights, and so forth. So yes, I would strongly do that. I don't
know the governing basis for inclusion. Whatever it is, it can
include representatives of the democratically elected body,
even if they are not a sovereign country. So I hope so.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Mr. Tethong, you have firsthand experience dealing with
Chinese interlocutors, including during your participation in a
fact-finding delegation to Tibet. What perspective can you
provide on the Chinese attitude toward dialogue with the Dalai
Lama?
Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think through the interactions
we've had with the delegations that visited Tibet in the '80s--
I was a part of one of the groups--and the later interactions
that the envoys have had, which have been very extensive,
although the Chinese government brought the process to an end,
we know that during that process many key officials in the
Chinese government and the United Front officials became fully
aware of, shall I mention, the misrule in Tibet, and also fully
aware of what Tibetan intentions or Tibetan hopes and
aspirations were. And so there is, within the Chinese
government and leadership, I think, a full understanding of
where the Tibetans stand and where it could make
accommodations. It's not as though the Chinese leadership is
ignorant about the real situation.
So while on one level it seems like the negotiations have
stopped, we know that there are elements within the Chinese
leadership and the Chinese government who can, given the right
circumstances, take up Tibet once again. So this process and
the possibility of renewed dialogue, and an initiative from the
Chinese side, I think, remains very possible.
Co-chair McGovern. Professor Lau, are the maps and
documents that you cite available in archives inside of China?
And do researchers and historians in China have access to the
information? And to what extent is this information digitized
and online, or otherwise available at libraries outside of
China?
Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. Please allow me to
answer the preceding question.
Co-chair McGovern. Absolutely.
Mr. Lau. Yes. I want to add to what Michael had said about
self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party in the earlier
version of the Party constitution, in the 1930s, repeatedly
affirmed the self-determination rights of the so-called
minorities, with an explicit sentence stating, ``up to the
level of independence and seceding from China.'' In other
words, they practically advocated the right of the Tibetans
and, well, actually the Xinjiang Uyghurs too, to form
independent countries. They only deleted those clauses after
they gained power after 1949.
Now, to answer your question. Actually, in my book, which
is written in Chinese, and my target audience is people in
China, I wanted to sort of convince the people in China that
they haven't done the right thing with respect to Tibet. So I
have taken a totally Chinese chauvinistic approach. I dismiss
all Tibetan records. I dismiss all Western records. I only use
Chinese records that are authored by Chinese, written in the
Chinese language, from the 13th century up until 1949, before
the Chinese Communist Party took power. And I also restrict
myself to only those records that are reprinted by the People's
Republic of China, indicating their acceptance of the
authoritativeness of these publications.
And yes, most of them are digitized by companies or
libraries under PRC rule. And I think actually 80 percent of
them are not only available and digitized, they're available
free of charge on public websites. Also, I explicitly tell my
readers: Don't believe a single word in my book. Go to the
internet and check it out yourself. The two maps that I'm
showing over here, they are available for free on websites,
many of them operated within the PRC, many of them operated by
official units of the PRC.
Co-chair McGovern. Well, maybe President Xi ought to visit
the library or go online. (Laughter.)
Mr. Lau. Well. (Laughs.)
Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman Steel, I don't know if you
have an additional question. I see you're still on the line. Do
you have additional questions?
Representative Steel. No, I don't.
Co-chair McGovern. OK. Thank you.
Representative Steel. Mr. Chairman, I just love to listen.
Co-chair McGovern. Very good. Thank you. Mr. van Walt, what
other governments have made statements about Tibet being part
of China? I mean, how many also say ``since ancient times''?
Can you provide examples of how the Chinese narrative has been
embraced by the international community?
Mr. van Walt van Praag. I can't give you exact numbers of
how many governments have and how many governments have not. I
know that some governments--and I know that because I've spoken
to their officials--have been very careful not to make any
explicit statements, despite pressure. Others have been
pressured by China, especially after, for example, somebody
higher up in the government, the minister of foreign affairs or
the prime minister, has received His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
After that, they're subjected to a tremendous amount of
pressure from Beijing, and a number of them then make a
statement to the effect that they recognize or that they
identify Tibet as a part of the PRC.
A good example of that is France. After President Sarkozy,
in his capacity as president of the European Union, met with
His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Poland, France was put under a
lot of pressure and made a statement that since the time of
Charles de Gaulle, France recognized that Tibet was a part of
China, which is actually not true, or not accurate, I should
say. But that is an example. The statement continues by saying
that this will not change. Denmark was pressured to make a
similar statement. They added that the Danish government does
not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama added
that statement as well.
I think that addition is even more harmful, and completely
unnecessary. It takes away and violates the Tibetans' right to
self-determination to say that they cannot have any say in
their future because we do not support a particular outcome.
Again, this type of statement reduces the leverage for
Tibetans, should negotiations take place.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I think our position is that
Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
government-in-exile, as recognized by the Tibetan people. That
is the direction that our government should follow, as well as
other governments around the world. Mr. Tethong, the position
of the Central Tibetan Administration is that the Middle Way
approach proposed by the Dalai Lama is the only viable solution
to the Tibet problem--and would you characterize the Chinese
government's response to the Tibetan position as their
disagreement that the Middle Way approach is viable, or is it a
denial that there's even a Tibetan problem at all?
Mr. Tethong. That's a difficult question to answer. It
seems very complicated. I couldn't understand what you were
saying, actually.
Co-chair McGovern. Yes, I mean, I guess the question is
that His Holiness outlined this Middle Way approach, and the
Chinese government hasn't responded, right? The question is, is
it that they cannot see themselves getting to the Middle Way
approach, or is it basically that they feel they don't have to,
because there isn't a Tibetan issue they have to deal with?
Mr. Tethong. I think it may be more of a lack of confidence
on their part on how to deal with the Tibet issue--afraid that
if they give in to the Tibetans, other issues will arise within
China. Also, the Tibet situation is not entirely comparable to
any other. That may be one reason. And the basic reason, I
think I tried to point out earlier, is that within the Chinese
leadership, from a position of being confident and trying to
find a solution during Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping's time, it
has retreated to another direction. And this Middle Way policy
may have suffered.
Co-chair McGovern. I apologize. I just have a few more
questions. I just think it's important to establish a full
record here, not only for the Commission but for my colleagues.
Ms. Bork, there have been many meetings between U.S.
Presidents and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Would you say that
these meetings have strengthened the hand of the Dalai Lama
vis-a-vis China? And if President Biden were to meet with His
Holiness during his term, what would you advise him to say?
Ms. Bork. I think the reception by U.S. Presidents of the
Dalai Lama has been extremely important, and also because it
has become so regular. It would be wonderful for President
Biden to be able to visit with the Dalai Lama, or if travel for
either one of them were a problem, having the vice president
call on His Holiness would signal American support and an
effort to break down some of the isolation that His Holiness
has experienced over the years.
What should he say? I think it's very much a part of the
broader U.S. policy for China. A democratic basis of government
for Tibet and China would be what the U.S. President seeks, and
committing to that and committing to support Tibetan democracy
in exile, but also Tibetan democracy eventually and Chinese
democracy, under whatever arrangement most people can agree on
should be the goal. I don't see any problem with the United
States standing for that. In fact, I think it's imperative.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Professor Lau, Mr. van Walt's
books argue that it is inappropriate--and if I'm
mischaracterizing your books, correct me--that it is
inappropriate to apply the modern definition of sovereignty to
Tibet and its neighbors because ruling powers in East Asia are
related to each other in ways that were distinct from the
Western notion of sovereignty that was applied later. Does your
research conform to this view? And how would you characterize
Tibet's relations with its neighbors over the centuries?
Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. As far as I could
tell, there are many places in Chinese official records where
entities were referred to as ``countries,'' which in Chinese is
guojia, (country). And Tibet is also referred to as a country,
guojia, just like Vietnam and Holland, and other countries. So
if you look at the history of Tibet over the past 1,000 years,
they are not that dissimilar or that different from the
histories of Germany, or China, whatever. Sometimes they are
unified into a central administration and at other times it was
fragmented. And sometimes there were all these principalities.
So I guess your question itself would take hours to debate,
and I'm not good enough to answer the question. Certainly, by
the Qing Empire's time, or actually even before that, I think
by the 15th or 16th century, Tibet became sufficiently unified.
They had all these structures of government such as legal
codes, central taxation, and so forth, that qualified them to
be a country. But I've always felt that--pardon me for saying
this--it's a less relevant question. The more relevant question
is, was Tibet part of China? And if Tibet wasn't part of China,
to put it bluntly, it's really none of your business whether
Tibet itself was a country.
So on one hand I would say, yes, Tibet was definitely a
country, compared to the standards that would be applicable to
China and Germany since the 15th century or so. But again, I
want to repeat that that's probably an unnecessary confusion of
the issue. The more important issue is that nobody has the
right to judge whether Tibet was a country. The more important
thing is whether Tibet was part of somebody else's territory.
And if it wasn't, then leave Tibet alone.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you for clarifying all that for
us. Let me ask one other question, and then, to everybody here,
any closing remarks that you want to make. In a May press
conference with the Japanese prime minister, President Biden
said, ``I believe what Putin is attempting to do is eliminate
the identity of Ukraine''--the identity. He can't occupy it,
but he can try to destroy its identity, and you know, I think
those words are true, what Putin is trying to do in Ukraine,
but I think they're also applicable to what China is trying to
do in Tibet.
When we visited Lhasa back in 2015 with Speaker Pelosi, it
was clear what they're trying to do--deny Tibetans access to
their religion, prevent them from speaking their language and
honoring their customs, you know, being who they are. They're
doing it in a thousand different ways, and displacing people.
And it really is quite horrific what is going on; the brutality
is really horrific. How should we view Tibet through the lens
of President Biden's comment about eliminating the identity of
Ukraine? And I will ask you all to respond, and also with
anything that you think we should add for the record. This is
the time to make that clear as well.
So why don't we begin with Mr. van Walt.
Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much. I think what
is happening in Ukraine--Russia's war within Ukraine is
bringing home a number of issues that are directly related to
Tibet as well. I mean, we are obviously shocked by the blatant
aggression against Ukraine and are reminded that exactly the
same happened a little over 70 years ago, in relation to Tibet.
President Biden also made a statement to the effect that taking
another's territory by force is unacceptable, that it violates
fundamental norms of our international order. I couldn't agree
more. And I think that should apply to Tibet.
In terms of the destruction of the very identity of the
Tibetans, and I believe the same is true when we look at the
Uyghurs in East Turkestan, it has become very clear, I think,
at this point, that the very policy of the PRC and of the
Chinese Communist Party is precisely this: To destroy the
identity of these peoples because they have found them to be an
obstacle to their full integration in China. And not only that,
but they have found that as long as there is a sense of
identity in the Tibetan case and in the Uyghur case, both very
closely linked to their religious beliefs and traditions, that
the CCP will not be able to fully control the Tibetans.
This is linked also to the question of the reincarnation of
the Dalai Lama. All Chinese policies today under Xi Jinping are
geared at full and total control of the Tibetans, whether it is
through the Dalai Lama, by picking him and educating him in
accordance with CCP views, or whether it is by taking the
children and placing them in this network of colonial schools,
or whether it is by suppressing religious freedom, and other
things as well. So, yes, the intention is to rub Tibet off the
map in terms of the identity and the distinctness of the
Tibetan people. As part of that, there is a strong effort to
rob the Tibetans also of their history, since that's also tied
to their identity and is a continuing embarrassment to China's
attempt to continue to rule Tibet.
Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Lau.
Mr. Lau. Well, I would like to reiterate two points. The
first point is I hope the United States and other governments
would counter directly the claims of some of these empire
revivalists. We're seeing that, of course, in Putin's case, and
then very likely a few years from now we'll see that explicitly
expressed in China, that they can use historical fabrications
to justify their attempts to reunify their ancestral lands. And
that comes to the second point, which is that I hope in the
future, in schools throughout the world, people will try to
change this perception that I know is very deeply ingrained
among the Chinese, that it's very important to be a national of
a big country, of a powerful country. They believe that it is
essential to their well-being. My background is that I was born
in Singapore. And of course, I've seen countries like
Liechtenstein and Switzerland; people in Singapore and
Liechtenstein have no interest in enlarging their countries.
And people can live very well. But people who are educated in
Russia and China, it never comes to their minds that they could
live happily ever after if they lose Xinjiang, or Ukraine, or
Tibet, or whatever it is. They think it's the end of the world
if their country is splintered, and then Tibet is gone, and
Xinjiang is gone. I think it's important for us, using the
Voice of America, or whatever, to try to somehow tell people
explicitly that people in Switzerland and Liechtenstein live
very well. This is all the message that I have.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Mr. Tethong.
Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Chairman. With reference to what's
happening in Ukraine, I think one can say that 70 years ago
Tibet was in the same situation, and unfortunately, the world
community could not come to Tibet's assistance. We hope
attention and focus on Ukraine will be much better, and the
outcome will be better too.
For the record, I would like to take the opportunity, on
behalf of all Tibetans, to express acknowledgement and
gratitude to the United States Government for the attention and
focus on what's happening in Tibet. Clearly a tremendous amount
of change has happened in Tibet, for the better, because there
is attention from the outside world, and especially the United
States. We especially acknowledge Members of Congress who have
taken the lead, and your leadership at this time on the Tibet
issues as well. I would like to say thank you on behalf of the
Tibetan people.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
Ms. Bork.
Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Just in closing, as you're
talking about what happened 70 years ago, I just wanted to
mention that the United States took a very principled position
in support of the Baltic states against the annexation by the
Soviet Union. There are some dissimilarities, but not really
serious ones, in my view. It's really valuable for the United
States to look back at the constraints it's imposed on itself
all these decades, acting on behalf of Tibet and making the
Tibetan exile government's position stronger in trying to reach
some kind of improvement. In that regard, I think a strategic
focusing on Tibet as a strategic issue is vital.
For the record, I will pass along to the staff a readout of
a tabletop exercise that several of us conducted in 2019 about
the future, with the passing of the Dalai Lama and how
governments will respond at that time. Clearly that is an
exercise that needs to be repeated. And it would be something
that I think Members of Congress would find useful to think
about--being prepared for that eventuality, and what China will
do and what the United States and its allies should do in
preparation. Thank you very much.
Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, and thank all of you for your
testimony. I think this is a very important hearing because in
our discussions on Tibet, and some of the topics that we
covered here today, we don't include the historical fact that
Tibet has not been a part of China since ancient times. I think
everybody here has disputed that very clearly. Our focus is on
standing with the people of Tibet to protect their identity, to
protect their history, to protect their culture, and to protect
their human rights, and I believe that we in the United
States--and, Mr. Tethong, I appreciate your kind words, but to
be honest with you, we're not doing enough. The world community
is not doing enough. You know, if we were, we would be having a
very different discussion right now.
And it's complicated. There are corporate interests
involved, urging governments not to rock the boat because
they're all worried about continued corporate profits and
strategic issues. Nobody wants to rock the boat with China.
We're very good at talking the talk; we're not very good at
always walking the walk on these issues.
But I think that's changing. I really do. I mean, I look at
the last few years here in the United States Congress. We have
legislated more; we have created more policy on Tibet than at
any other time. As I said, Tibet's true representatives are His
Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as
recognized by the Tibetan people, and I think that that should
be our guiding principle here as we move forward. I mean, it's
not up to President Biden, or it's not about what President Xi
wants for Tibet. It's not about what the President of France
wants. It's what the Tibetan people want.
So any solution, any way forward, has to be what the
Tibetan people want. It can't be imposed by somebody who's not
part of the Tibetan community and I think there's a growing
recognition of that. The Tibetan government-in-exile is showing
an embrace of democracy, which is really inspiring. I witnessed
some of the election. I've watched online as people voted in
far-off places, participating in this process. It really is
inspirational. But I've also met with families who have been
torn apart, people who don't know where their mothers or
fathers are, who were disappeared. It's cruel and it is
horrific.
Again, we are moving forward with additional legislation.
We are encouraged by the new special coordinator in this
administration. We will work with her to have her not only be a
spokesperson for what U.S. policy should be but to work with
the international community. I was particularly grateful that
this hearing is being held at the same time that the World
Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet is meeting. This is not
just a U.S. issue. It is a global issue. If you care about
human rights, this has to be a central issue. I mean, you go
all over the world and you have these countries go, Oh, human
rights, human rights, human rights. Well, if you can't stand up
to China on something like this, then stop talking about human
rights.
And to the Chinese government, look, if you want to do
something constructive right now, you should re-enter the
direct dialogue that you walked away from 12 years ago. This
issue is not going away.
I appreciate everybody being here. I want to thank all the
witnesses for their testimony. Without objection, I'd like to
enter into the record a written statement from the
International Campaign for Tibet and an additional paper by
Professor Lau. The record will remain open until the close of
business on Friday, June 24th, for any items that members would
like to submit for the record or any additional questions for
the witnesses. And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
------
Prepared Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag
Contrary to what the People's Republic of China claims and to what
many people take for granted, Tibet was historically not a part of
China. This is one of the outcomes of a multiyear collaborative
historical research project that I recently completed and published.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 10-year research project, which involved some 100 leading
scholars worldwide, resulted in the publication of Sacred Mandates:
Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan, co-authored/edited
with Timothy Brook and Miek Boltjes, Chicago University Press, 2018,
and Tibet Brief 20/20, co-authored with Miek Boltjes, Outskirts Press,
2020. Sacred Mandates won a 2021 International Convention of Asian
Scholars Book Prize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is relevant and requires our attention because the PRC
government has made agreement on its version of history a precondition
to Sino-Tibetan negotiations, which have been in deadlock now for 12
years.\2\ More fundamentally, the PRC bases its entitlement to Tibet
solely on its assertion that Tibet has been an integral part of China
since antiquity.\3\ Whether or not Tibet was historically a part of
China therefore determines whether the PRC has the legitimacy to rule
Tibet or not. And that in turn informs the international community's
obligations and responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See State Council Information Office of the People's Republic
of China, Tibet's Path to Development Is Driven by an Irresistible
Historical Tide (Beijing, April 15, 2015).
\3\ Tibet Brief 20/20, op. cit. pp. 6-10.
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Addressing the plight of the Tibetan people has been one of my
lifelong goals, and my contributions have mostly been in the
international legal and diplomacy spheres, in line with my career. I
undertook this academic historical research to get to the bottom of
what informs the PRC government and the Dalai Lama in their opposing
views on Tibet's historical status, with the aim to be able to come up
with strategies for those with access and clout to encourage the
parties to break through the stalemate and resume their dialogue.
In the process it became clear that the PRC's historical
narrative--that Tibet has always been a part of China--stands in the
way of Sino-Tibetan negotiations in more than one way. The
international community has started to buy into that narrative and
governments have started to act accordingly, treating Tibet as if it
was China's internal affair and even stating they consider Tibet to be
a part of China. I strongly believe that this development is one of the
main obstacles to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through
negotiations. It is also in violation of international law.
Our research firmly establishes that though not always
`independent' in the modern legal sense of that term and over time
subject to various degrees of Mongol, Manchu and even British authority
or influence, Tibet was most certainly never a part of China. The PRC
could therefore not have `inherited' Tibet from the Republic of China
or earlier empires, as it claims. As a matter of fact, Tibet was an
independent state de facto and de jure from 1912 to 1950/51, when the
PRC invaded it.
Because Tibet was not at any point in time a part of China, the
PRC's military invasion of Tibet in 1950/51 constituted an act of
aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international law
prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force against
another state.\4\ This informs the legitimacy of the PRC's presence in
and rule of Tibet the past seven decades: China does not have
sovereignty over Tibet. It is occupying Tibet illegally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A peremptory norm is an international obligation ``so essential
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international
community that [its] breach [is] recognized as a crime by that
community as a whole''. International Law Commission Rapporteur Roberto
Ago. Quoted in Cassese, International Law, p. 202. Aggression is a
prime example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
International law prohibits governments from explicitly or
implicitly recognizing China's unlawful annexation of Tibet, from doing
anything that helps China consolidate its hold on Tibet, and from
denying the Tibetans the exercise of their right to self-
determination.\5\ It also prohibits states from benefiting from the
exploitation of Tibet's resources so long as Tibetans are denied the
ability to make decisions concerning them.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ International Law Commission, `Articles on the Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)' (2001) YILC Vol.
2, Part 2, Arts. 40, 41, and commentary para 5. See also, UNGA Res 2625
(XXV) Declaration on Friendly Relations Confirmed by the International
Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), paras 119, 124, ICJ Reports
1971; and in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras 155-159, ICJ Reports 2004.
\6\ Court of Justice of the European Union in a landmark case
concerning the Sahrawi people's rights, in 2016, CJEU, Judgment in Case
C-104/16 P Council v Front populaire pour la liberation de la saguia-
el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Dec. 21, 2016 https://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/
cp160146en.pdf, accessed 08/28/2021. Confirmed by the UK High Court on
2019, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=e9a48d23-358c-4948-b754-3f8868bda922.
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At the same time, governments have the positive obligation to take
action to help bring about a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict,
end the occupation of Tibet and enable the Tibetan people to exercise
self-determination.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ International Law Commission, ARSIWA, op. cit., Commentary to
Art. 41(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many governments are today acting contrary to these obligations, in
plain violation of international law and to the detriment of the
resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. This includes the US
government.
Two developments stand out in this regard: governments make
statements recognizing that Tibet is a part of the PRC, and they treat
Tibet as China's internal affair, outside their purview.
When governments state that they consider Tibet to be a part of the
PRC, they take away the PRC's principal incentive to negotiate with the
Tibetans as well as reduce the latter's main source of leverage. In the
first place, Beijing uses these statements as `evidence' for its claim
that it has sovereignty and legitimacy in Tibet, and even for its
historical claim. The more such statements it obtains, the less it
feels the need to turn to Tibetans for legitimacy. Instead, it uses the
international community's pronouncements as a substitute for true
legitimacy, that is, the legitimacy that would result from the consent
of the governed--through an exercise by the Tibetans of self-
determination or through a process of sincere negotiations with the
Tibetan leadership.
Secondly, once a government states that it considers Tibet to be a
part of the PRC it cannot but treat Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations as
China's internal affair. This is effectively happening today: most
governments are limiting their expressions of concern to human rights
abuses. In this way Beijing has largely succeeded in containing
international scrutiny and reproach to where it can manage it.
Some governments, including the U.S., have also added that they do
not support or are opposed to Tibetan independence.\8\ Such statements
not only violate the prohibition against recognizing annexation by
force, but also constitute a denial of the Tibetan people's right to
self-determination, an equally serious violation of international law.
Even though states cannot actually take away the right to self-
determination--including the option of independence--from the Tibetan
people, such statements do the Tibetans a great disservice and
encourage Beijing to ignore the Tibetans' rights. By supporting the
aggressor, not the injured, they also fail to fulfill the fundamental
role international law requires the international community to play--to
prevent war and promote friendly relations and cooperation among states
based inter alia on the principles of non-use of force against other
states and of equal rights and self-determination of peoples--
frustrating the very purpose of international law in the process. For,
as the International Court of Justice underscored in the Namibia case,
\9\ it is precisely to the international community that the injured
people must look for ending the illegality and for realizing its
rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See, e.g., President Barack Obama--February 21, 2014, Readout
of the President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama. See
also, `Note Verbale' of the Danish government of Dec. 9, 2009. Reported
by AFP, Dec. 10, 2009.
\9\ International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences for
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ
Reports 1971, para 127, concerning South Africa's illegal annexation of
Namibia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is for Tibetans, and Tibetans only, to make concessions with
respect to their right to independence--if and when they so decide.
Ruling out independence one-sidedly disempowers the Tibetan side. It
weakens the Tibetans' negotiation position, exacerbates the already
stark power asymmetry, and conditions the expectations of the Tibetans
as well as of the international community to envision a settlement that
can bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know, not only
about China's treatment of Tibetans \10\ but also of Uyghurs, as
detailed in the recent Newslines Institute Genocide report,\11\ and the
fact that Tibetans are resorting to self-immolation to protest
Beijing's oppression and policies to eradicate Tibetan identity,\12\ I
ask: is marginal change in Tibet what the U.S. wants for the Tibetan
people?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See Tibet Action Institute, Separated from Their Families,
Hidden from the World; China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools
inside Tibet, December 2021; Tibet Advocacy Coalition, Assaulting
Identity: China's New Coercive Strategies in Tibet, March 2021.
\11\ Newslines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Uyghur
Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide
Convention, March 2021.
\12\ There have been 160 confirmed cases of self-immolation since
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The need for the international community to take responsibility and
effectively address the Sino-Tibetan conflict is not just a legal and
moral imperative, it is also a political necessity. Looking the other
way with an underlying ``let's not make the Tibetans' problem our
problem'' has been a mistake for which the international community is
today paying a price as it tries to deal with an emboldened PRC and
Russia asserting expanding territorial claims and influence.
Beijing's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and
threatening moves towards India and Bhutan to press territorial claims,
as well as its genocidal policies against Uyghurs, all taking place at
the time of this writing, cannot be treated as unrelated to the years
of international appeasement of Beijing as concerns its unlawful
seizure and occupation of Tibet and its implementation of oppressive
policies of integration and assimilation there. And neither can
Russia's attempt at forcefully annexing part or all of Ukraine.
It is U.S. policy to support a negotiated resolution of the Sino-
Tibetan conflict. U.S. Government actions, however, run counter to U.S.
policy. Supporting a negotiated resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict
requires the political will to be vocal about the lack of legitimacy of
China's presence in and rule of Tibet, not statements that imply an
acceptance of China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. It requires
calling and treating Tibet what it is: an occupied country, and the
Tibetans what they are: a people under alien subjugation and
domination, not a `minority' or `ethnic group of China'. Adopting such
PRC terminology denies the Tibetan people its proper status and
implicitly its right to self-determination. And lastly, it requires the
Sino-Tibetan conflict to be called and treated what it is: an
international conflict, falling squarely within the international
community's--including the U.S. Government's--purview and
responsibility, not China's internal affair.
It is also U.S. policy not to recognize a country's attempt to
annex territory by the use of force. President Joe Biden recently
reiterated that taking territory by force is unacceptable. He said so
publicly in reference to Taiwan and Ukraine.\13\ The prohibition
against taking another country's territory by force is a cornerstone
and fundamental norm of modern international law and the international
legal order. No derogation from this is allowed, and governments are
prohibited from recognizing such territorial expansion. Just as
Russia's attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory cannot be accepted
or recognized by the international community, so China's attempted
annexation of Tibet must not be accepted or recognized. Only in the
absence of such recognition may the PRC government be moved to
negotiate with the Tibetan leadership to resolve their conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
2022/05/23/remarks-by-
president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-
press-conference/. President Biden accused President Putin of attacking
``the norms and principles that are the foundations of our
international order.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Department of State stated on March 12, in relation to the
Russo-Ukrainian conflict, that the U.S. is committed to ``putting the
Ukrainians in the strongest possible negotiating position''.\14\
Tibet's leaders are committed to non-violence and do not seek weapons.
But they do need coordinated international action to--at a minimum--
firmly anchor Tibet's international legal status, to bolster its
negotiating capacity and to bring China to the negotiating table. The
U.S. and other governments have shown in recent months how coordinated
diplomatic and economic measures, including sanctions, can be deployed
in efforts to stop and punish aggression. Such coordinated action is
overdue to address China's occupation of Tibet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-ready-take-diplomatic-
steps-ukraine-will-find-
helpful-state-dept-2022-03-12/
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong
Hon. Chairman,
It is my distinct honor to offer testimony this morning at this
hearing on ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' and
to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in the 20th century,
including efforts towards a resolution of the Tibet issue.
Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever since the
establishment of the People's Republic of China. One of Mao Zedong's
earliest declarations was his intention to ``liberate'' Tibet from the
West, and the Tibetan people from a backward and oppressive society.
The Tibetan government protested to the new Chinese state citing
Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan Kings to the
rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu Qing dynasties.
With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the United Nations and the global
community, especially to India, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Unfortunately, China did not heed Tibet's protests and the
global community did not come to Tibet's defense.
The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950, easily
overwhelming the Tibetan army and militia. China knew right then that
rhetorical justification for such an invasion was not enough and called
for negotiations to formalize an agreement. Tibetan representatives
negotiated in Beijing, but disregarding any proper ratification
process, were forced to sign what is called ``The 17 Point Agreement
for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.''
Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His Holiness the Dalai Lama
and the Tibetan government tried to work within the broad confines of
the agreement which promised no change in the status of the Dalai Lama
or the Tibetan government. However, the Chinese did not live up to
their commitments nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had
received from Mao Zedong.
Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years and
protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the uprising in
Lhasa on March 10, 1959, which led to the escape of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama and thousands to India and neighboring countries.
For the next twenty years Tibet was completely shut off from the
rest of the world. An extreme overhaul of Tibetan life from its
traditional Buddhist roots to Chinese Marxist socialism was introduced,
which in the later years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese
Cultural revolution.
However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue important
enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older
brother to Beijing and declared that short of separation, everything
could be discussed, meaning that short of granting Tibetan
independence, China would be open to all Tibetan concerns and
aspirations.
This breakthrough meeting led to renewed dialogue between the Dalai
Lama and the Chinese government, and four delegations of exile leaders
were able to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had
transpired in the two decades of Chinese rule.
By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in
deliberations with Chinese officials to address the larger issues
related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, Party General Secretary
and the main proponent of change in their Tibet policies died. This was
soon followed by the Tiananmen student protests and the massacre. China
stepped backwards and the Tibet issue also retreated.
In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, and Envoys
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in Beijing, and the
Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's Middle Way policy seeking
genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. The Envoys
met many times, even after the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests
that called for greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the
Envoys' last meeting was to be in 2010 when the Chinese ended the
dialogue process.
This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should show that
even at the most challenging of times, China has seen the need to
address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet. And that there is
perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of their rule. China has
also repeatedly initiated direct communication with His Holiness the
Dalai Lama, demonstrating the obvious need to find a meaningful
resolution to these outstanding issues.
Ever since the exile delegation visits to Tibet in the 1980s, to
the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in Beijing, the Chinese
leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan perspectives of
their rule in Tibet, and of the unvarnished aspirations of the Tibetan
people, both of which contradict the official Chinese narrative.
Worldwide attention to Tibet has been an important part of creating
greater awareness of the Tibetan issue even within China, allowing for
more liberal and reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan
hopes and demands to have some standing.
There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, through the
person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concerns for the cultural and
human rights of the Tibetan people, has been an important factor in the
U.S. Government's attention to the issue, which has been sustained to a
large degree by individual members of Congress.
The continued efforts of the United States can only help in
removing barriers to this unresolved conflict and will advance the
Tibetan people's desire for greater freedom and democracy.
Thank you.
______
Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork
Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
to appear before you today. I am also grateful to the Commission staff
for their advice and expertise.
The Trump Administration began, and the Biden Administration
continues, to chart a profound change in American policy toward
Communist Party-ruled China.
So far, however, Tibet has not been the focus of significant policy
revisions by the executive branch. Certainly, Tibet today would be far
down the list of most Americans' concerns when it comes to China.
Compared to China's aggression in the South China Sea, coercive
financial diplomacy, and the threat to Taiwan, Tibet is sometimes
viewed as a closed, albeit tragic, chapter of history.
By contrast, more than 70 years after the invasion, Tibet remains a
high priority for the Chinese Communist Party. This priority is evident
in the attention and resources the Party devotes to surveillance,
repression and control, to General Secretary Xi Jinping's goal of
sinicizing religion, to the exploitation of natural resources and to
building up military forces along Tibet's border with India.
Furthermore, the Party's ambitions regarding Tibet are
international and expansive. They are a part of China's assault on
liberal democratic norms. This in turn serves Beijing's ultimate goal
of gaining international deference to its choice of the next Dalai
Lama. Preventing that, reversing the diminution of support for the
Dalai Lama and building support for Tibetan democracy should play a
much greater role in America's response to China.
The foundations of American Tibet policy make this more difficult
than it should be. A look back at history shows that America's Tibet
policy is not the product of historical facts, or principles of
international law, but rather of outdated perceptions of America's
strategic interest in subordinating Tibet to China.
Washington had little involvement in Tibet until World War II.
Before then, the U.S. favored China's territorial integrity even while
its empire was disintegrating. During World War II, Washington was
allied with Chiang Kai-Shek. That relationship had profound and lasting
effect on Tibet.
Chiang hoped to recover lost imperial territory, including Tibet.
American officials did not wish to undermine him, even though officials
knew that he exerted no authority there and they considered that Tibet
had been de facto independent for decades since the collapse of
imperial rule.
Also damaging was Washington's acceptance of imperial Britain's
assertion of Chinese ``suzerainty'' over Tibet. Less than sovereignty,
suzerainty is an anachronistic and inapt concept which neither Tibet
nor China accepted but which imperial Britain introduced in order to
fend off Russia's eastward advance during the geopolitical competition
in the region known as the Great Game.
Even so, American officials seemed uncomfortable with the term, and
resisted using it. From the 1940s through the 1960s, in internal
documents, officials considered different views of Tibet's status in
response to developments. At the time of the invasion, a memo by the
State Department's legal advisor suggested that recognition of Tibetan
independence was a possibility. Later on, in the 1960s, there was
sympathy for the idea of Tibetan self-determination, including in a
letter from the Secretary of State to the Dalai Lama. But it was easy
enough to say this while doing little except provide some support to
Tibetan rebels, and while the U.S. was still allied with Chiang Kai-
shek, who had fled to Taiwan.
Only decades after the invasion did the U.S. recognize Chinese
sovereignty. In 1987, the State Department, responding to questions
about unrest in Tibet, dated this position to 1978. That reference
appears to have been an internal decision rather than a public
statement. And it took place around the time of the break in relations
with Taipei. Visiting Beijing in August 1979, Vice President Mondale
told Deng Xiao-ping, ``our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is
part of China.'' The Vice President also said that henceforth, the
Dalai Lama would be received as a religious figure, not a political
leader.
In short, America's approach to Tibet fluctuated according to its
perception of its strategic interests with regard to China--and with
regard to which Chinese government it favored--the Republic of China or
the People's Republic of China. Ultimately, Washington transferred its
deference to China over Tibet from a cultish dictatorship that never
exerted authority there to a cultish totalitarian regime that invaded
and repressed it.
Once this was done, Tibet became problematic within U.S.-PRC
relations. As Melvyn Goldstein writes, with policy focused on improving
its accommodation with China, Tibet became ``an embarrassment for the
United States,'' ``no longer relevant to U.S. national interests'' and
even ``potentially harmful.'' \1\ The characterization of Tibet as a
problem in U.S.-China relations that should be neutralized, including
for Tibet's own sake, has persisted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Melvyn Goldstein, Snow Lion and the Dragon,(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1997), p. 57-58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course this approach to Tibet, and the decision to accept the
PRC's sovereignty, meant that the democratization of the theocratic
government in exile--and the illegitimacy of Party rule there--could
not be a major factor in America's policy. The extraordinary
accomplishment of Tibet's democracy in exile would not be discussed
alongside the democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan,
Indonesia, and South Korea at the end of the last century which have
shaped America's approach to the region ever since. It should also be
noted that America's approach to Tibet had been out of step with the
principled stance Washington took against communist aggression in
Europe and the annexation of the Baltic states.
* * * * * * *
For its part, the CCP has maintained an ambitious agenda for Tibet,
and not only inside its borders. In neighboring countries it has used
border settlements, security relationships, investment and the
development and appropriation of Buddhist sites to advance its
interests. In fact, even today, Chinese officials maintain territorial
ambitions with regard to Tibet, speaking of parts of northeastern India
as ``Southern Tibet'' and putting pressure on India across the Tibet-
India border.
Beijing also pursues its Tibet agenda aggressively in foreign
capitals and international organizations. Beijing uses its self-
proclaimed ``core interest'' in Tibet to impose litmus tests in the
United Nations, and in foreign capitals.
In this way, Tibet is an instrument of the Party's assault on
liberal democratic norms. It is also intended to help the Party win
international deference to its selection of the next Dalai Lama.
In 2019, I convened a group with expertise in Tibet, China, India,
and American foreign policy to consider how governments would respond
when the Dalai Lama dies, and China seeks to install an impostor. The
group concluded that the Dalai Lama's succession is a matter of
strategic competition and should be viewed as such by the U.S. and its
democratic allies.
A final note: the Party's intense propaganda and control makes it
seem that Chinese people are irredeemably nationalist when it comes to
Tibet. This has an effect inside China, of course, but also outside,
making new thinking about Tibet seem hopeless. In fact, leading Chinese
dissidents have offered criticism of Party policies in Tibet. Going
back to Wei Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong,
pro-democracy activists, lawyers and others have bravely linked Tibet's
fate to China's, stressing that the solution for both Tibetans and
Chinese is democracy. Liu Xiaobo wrote in 2008, ``a confrontation
between freedom and dictatorship has been made to look like a clash
between ethnicities.'' \2\ The democracy manifesto, Charter 08,
referenced Tibet indirectly in its call for a ``federation of
democratic communities of China'' and the resolution of ``disputes in
the national minority areas of China . . . to find a workable framework
within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Liu Xiaobo, ``So Long as Han Chinese Have No Freedom, Tibetans
Will Have No Autonomy,'' April 11, 2008, No Enemies, No Hatred, Perry
Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, Liu Xia, editors, (Cambridge: Belknap Press
of Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is a message from inside China that American officials should
consider. Taken together with the democratic achievement of the Tibetan
people in exile, the U.S. can chart a new approach based on Tibet's
strategic importance, not only in the territorial sense, but in the
ideological one.
A few recommendations follow:
Renew and redouble support for Chinese and Tibetan
political prisoners, dissidents, democracy activists, independent
journalists and lawyers.
Conduct an independent review of U.S. Tibet policy since
the end of Chinese imperial rule, including the diplomatic history, and
of internal deliberations that have influenced America's approach to
Tibet.
Bring Tibet policy into line with America's interest in
combating China's assault on democratic norms, including international
law, and in advancing democracy in the Indo-Pacific by enlisting allies
in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan process for
selecting the next Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama, or his designee, should
regain the access he once had in foreign capitals.
Receive elected officials of the Central Tibet
Administration (CTA), the Sikyong, his cabinet and other Tibetan
officials at the highest levels of government and include them in the
Summit for Democracy and other gatherings.
Make Tibet a part of efforts to counter Chinese influence
in international organizations, on university campuses and at the state
and local level.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley
Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive
Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an
Unresolved Conflict'' will come to order.
More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese rule in
Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of unrelenting
oppression. Chinese authorities routinely violate Tibetans' freedom of
religion, expression, and assembly, as well as denying their self-
determination.
The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign of
``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially sanctioned
interpretations of religion and culture, not the authentic practice and
teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary to that practice and teaching,
the Chinese government even insists on its own authority to select the
next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, who authorities label a security
threat. Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with Chinese
rule in Tibet. These punishments range from warnings to surveillance to
interrogation and detention. The Commission's Political Prisoner
Database currently includes records of 715 Tibetans detained or
imprisoned for political or religious reasons. We note that there are
considerably more cases of detention in China than we can capture in
the database.
Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, cultural,
linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people. Earlier this
year, we heard testimony about insidious efforts to separate Tibetan
children from their parents, with nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan
children now placed in boarding schools to disrupt the
intergenerational transfer of language and culture. We are observing an
expansion of that practice to children going to kindergarten.
This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights
violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. In
today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to address the
aspirations of the Tibetan people for their basic rights and self-
determination to be respected. Sadly, that dialogue has been frozen for
12 years as Chinese authorities refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or
his representatives.
The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote dialogue
without preconditions to lead to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. In
other words, we recognize that this remains an unsettled conflict that
must be addressed. Yet the Chinese government would have the world
believe that Tibet is an internal affair and that issues of its status
are resolved. This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's
hearing aims to set the historical record straight.
Our witnesses will share with us their considerable experience
analyzing the history of Tibet, the international law dimensions of the
conflict, the barriers to resuming dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet.
I hope this hearing helps cut through Chinese propaganda and brings
attention to the true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for
autonomy.
I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
Exile--it's good to have you here--the International Campaign for
Tibet, dignitaries, and other friends of Tibet who are with us this
morning while they are in town for the 8th World Parliamentarians'
Convention on Tibet. Thank you for joining us.
The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination need
champions all over the globe and I look forward to continuing to work
with my fellow parliamentarians to advance the causes of human dignity
and freedom wherever we can.
Among global elected officials, few have been as great a friend of
Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for many years has led
the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation and advocate for
the Tibetan people.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern
Thank you, very much Mr. Chairman, and I too also want to welcome
our friends who are visiting Washington to participate in the World
Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet.
I want to especially welcome the members of the Tibetan parliament-
in-exile. We have two members of the Canadian parliament here. I
welcome our friends from ICT. And I welcome my dear friend Richard
Gere, who has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights
in Tibet. We are delighted you are all here.
I appreciate that we are holding this hearing on Tibet, the status
of dialogue, and a path forward in the Tibetan quest for rights and
dignity.
Congress has had a long and abiding interest in Tibet. It created
Tibetan language broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid
programs for Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed
the landmark Tibetan Policy Act, and codified the position of Special
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. Congressman Tom
Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by side with the Dalai Lama.
So did President Bush and Speaker Pelosi, who presented him with the
Congressional Gold Medal in 2007.
I have had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet bills
to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act seeks to
enable diplomats, journalists,and tourists to travel and see Tibet with
their own eyes, because Chinese officials have closed it off. The
Tibetan Policy and Support Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its
key feature, the bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or
reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th
Dalai Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided
solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community. Not by China.
Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the human
rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people. But the core
problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot advocate for themselves.
They are forced to live in an authoritarian system under a paranoid
central government that sees any expression of distinct identity as a
threat to their power.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this way.
He's right. For decades he sought to negotiate with Chinese
authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side did agree to ten
rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai Lama's envoys. But they
did not do so in good faith.
Chinese officials say they will return to the table only if the
Dalai Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only
unreasonable, but false. The U.S. Government, to its credit, has
consistently called on the Chinese to return to dialogue, without
preconditions. But that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood
ready, the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we keep
doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic or strategy?
That is the question we will explore in this hearing.
Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of perspectives--
legal, historical, policy, and personal--to the Tibet-China dialogue.
We hope to hear what Congress and the U.S. Government can do to help.
Should we be countering false Chinese narratives? Should we reorient
how we talk about the basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in
the current environment, and what would the alternatives be?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider these
important questions. I look forward to our hearing.
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Witness Biographies
Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of international law and
executive president of Kreddha
Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international law and
executive president of Kreddha, an international NGO created to help
prevent and resolve violent intrastate conflicts. He is a Senior Fellow
at the Sompong Sucharitkul Center for Advanced International Legal
Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, and a
member of the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. He has
served as a Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Social Sciences,
University of California Davis, as Visiting Professor of Modern
International Relations and International Law, Institute for Advanced
Study, Princeton, and as Legal Advisor to the Office of His Holiness
the Dalai Lama. He is the author with Miek Boltjes of Tibet Brief 20/20
and author and editor of Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations
since Chinggis Khan.
Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City University of Hong
Kong
Hon-Shiang Lau's ancestry is Guangdong province, China. He was born
and educated in Singapore. He obtained his bachelor of engineering
degree from the University of Singapore in 1969, and a Ph.D. in
business administration from the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill in 1973. He was Full Professor of Business Administration at
Washington State University starting in 1980, Regents Professor at
Oklahoma State University starting in 1987, and Chair Professor of
Operations Management at the City University of Hong Kong starting in
2000. He took early retirement in 2011 to devote his time to Chinese
history. The Chinese-language edition of his book Tibet Was Never Part
of China since Antiquity was published in 2019; its English-language
translation will appear soon.
Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representive of His Holiness the Dalai
Lama, New York and Washington, DC
Tenzin N. Tethong is the former Representative of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He served in several roles in
the Central Tibetan Administration based in Dharamsala, India,
including as Kalon Tripa (Chief of Cabinet) and Kalon of various
portfolios such as the Departments of Finance, Home, and Information &
International Relations. He headed the second delegation of Tibetans to
Tibet and China in 1980. From 1997 to 2011 he was a Distinguished
Fellow and taught in the Tibetan Studies Initiative at Stanford
University. He previously served as Director of the Tibetan language
service at Radio Free Asia and currently serves as Director of the
Tibetan language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a
personal capacity.
Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose
Ellen Bork is a contributing editor at American Purpose. She writes
about American foreign policy with an emphasis on democracy and human
rights. She served as the senior professional staff member for Asia and
the Pacific on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes
frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her
writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the
Washington Post, and other publications. She graduated from Yale
University and the Georgetown University Law Center.
[all]