[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                      TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
                         AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT


=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION
                               __________

                             JUNE 23, 2022
                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
 
 
                   [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


              Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov
                                          
                              ___________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
47-897 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023   




              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS



Senate                               House

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair          JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,  
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California                 Co-chair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana                BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine                    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
                                     JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
                                     MICHELLE STEEL, California

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                           Not yet appointed

                      Matt Squeri, Staff Director

                   Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               Statements

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from 
  Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     1
Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from 
  Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on 
  China..........................................................     2
Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New 
  Jersey.........................................................     4
Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of 
  international law and executive president of Kreddha...........     5
Statement of Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City 
  University of Hong Kong........................................     6
Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representative of His 
  Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC...........     8
Statement of Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose...     9

                                APPENDIX
                          Prepared Statements

van Walt van Praag, Michael......................................    31
Lau, Hon-Shiang..................................................    34
Tethong, Tenzin N................................................    38
Bork, Ellen......................................................    39

Merkley, Hon. Jeff...............................................    41
McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    42

                       Submissions for the Record

Statement of the International Campaign for Tibet, submitted by 
  Representative McGovern........................................    43
``The Genuine `China Version' of Tibet's History: Tibet Was Never 
  Part of China since Antiquity,'' by Hon-Shiang Lau.............    55
CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................   122
Witness Biographies..............................................   123

                                 (iii)

 
                      TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
                         AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2022

                            Congressional-Executive
                                       Commission on China,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The hearing was held from 9:05 a.m. to 10:56 a.m., room H-
313, the Capitol, Washington, DC, and virtually via Cisco 
Webex, Senator Jeff Merkley, Chairman, Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China, presiding.
    Also present: Representative James P. McGovern, Co-chair, 
Senator Jon Ossoff, and Representatives Chris Smith and 
Michelle Steel.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM OREGON 
     AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: 
Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' will come to 
order.
    More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese 
rule in Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of 
unrelenting opposition. Chinese authorities routinely violate 
Tibetans' freedom of religion, expression, and assembly and 
deny Tibetans self-determination.
    The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign 
of ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially 
sanctioned interpretations of religion and culture, not the 
authentic practice and teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary 
to that practice and teaching, the Chinese government even 
insists on its own authority to select the next reincarnation 
of the Dalai Lama, whom authorities label a security threat. 
Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
    Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with 
Chinese rule in Tibet. Punishments range from warnings to 
surveillance to interrogation and detention. The Commission's 
Political Prisoner Database currently includes records of 715 
Tibetans detained or imprisoned for political or religious 
reasons. We note that there are considerably more cases of 
detention in China than we can capture in the database.
    Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, 
cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan 
people. Earlier this year, we heard testimony about insidious 
efforts to separate Tibetan children from their parents, with 
nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children now placed in 
boarding schools to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of 
language and culture. We are observing an extension or 
expansion of that practice now to children going to 
kindergarten.
    This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights 
violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. 
In today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to 
address the aspirations of the Tibetan people that their basic 
rights and self-determination be respected. Sadly, that 
dialogue has been frozen for 12 years, as Chinese authorities 
refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
    The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote 
dialogue without pre-conditions to achieve a negotiated 
agreement on Tibet. In other words, we recognize that this 
remains an unsettled conflict that must be addressed. Yet the 
Chinese government would have the world believe that Tibet is 
an internal affair and that issues of its status are resolved. 
This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's hearing 
aims to set the historical record straight.
    Our witnesses will share with us their considerable 
experience analyzing the history of Tibet, the international 
law dimensions of the conflict, the barriers to resuming 
dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. I hope this hearing helps 
cut through Chinese propaganda and helps bring attention to the 
true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for 
autonomy.
    I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan 
Parliament-in-exile--it's good to have you here--the 
International Campaign for Tibet, dignitaries, and other 
friends of Tibet who are with us this morning while they are in 
town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. 
Thank you for joining us.
    The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination 
need champions all over the globe, and I look forward to 
continuing to work with my fellow parliamentarians to advance 
the cause of human dignity and freedom wherever we can.
    Among global elected officials, few have been as great a 
friend of Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for 
many years has led the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass 
legislation and advocate for the Tibetan people. I now 
recognize him for his remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW 
  JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON 
                             CHINA

    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 
too, want to welcome our friends who are visiting Washington 
for the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. I want to 
especially welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
exile. We have two members of the Canadian Parliament here. I 
want to welcome my friends from the International Campaign for 
Tibet, and I want to welcome my dear friend Richard Gere, who 
has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights 
in Tibet. We're delighted you are all here.
    You know, I appreciate that we're holding this hearing on 
Tibet, the status of dialogue, and a path forward in the 
Tibetan quest for rights and dignity. Congress has had a long 
and abiding interest in Tibet. It created Tibetan-language 
broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid programs for 
Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed the 
landmark Tibetan Policy Act and codified the position of 
Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
    Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. 
Congressman Tom Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by 
side with the Dalai Lama. So did President Bush and Speaker 
Pelosi, who presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal in 
2007.
    I've had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet 
bills to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet 
Act seeks to enable diplomats, journalists, and tourists to 
travel to see Tibet with their own eyes, because Chinese 
officials have closed it off. The Tibetan Policy and Support 
Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its key feature, the 
bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or reincarnation 
of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th Dalai 
Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided 
solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, not by China.
    Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the 
human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people, but 
the core problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot 
advocate for themselves. They are forced to live in an 
authoritarian system under a paranoid central government that 
sees any expression of distinct identity as a threat to their 
power.
    His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this 
way. He's right. For decades, he sought to negotiate with 
Chinese authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side 
did agree to 10 rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai 
Lama's envoys, but they did not do so in good faith. Chinese 
officials say they will return to the table only if the Dalai 
Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only 
unreasonable, but false.
    The U.S. Government, to its credit, has consistently called 
on the Chinese to return to dialogue without pre-conditions, 
but that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood ready, 
the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we 
keep doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic 
or strategy? That's the question we will explore in this 
hearing.
    Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of 
perspectives--legal, historical, policy, and personal--on the 
Tibet-China dialogue. We hope to hear what Congress and the 
U.S. Government can do to help. Should we be countering false 
Chinese narratives? Should we reorient how we talk about the 
basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in the current 
environment, and what would the alternatives be?
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider 
these important questions, and I look forward to our hearing.
    Chair Merkley. Congressman Smith, I know you're with us on 
Zoom. Do you wish to make an opening comment?

                 STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
                A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

    Representative Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I 
thank you again, and our co-chair, for convening this important 
hearing.
    I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses, and 
Richard Gere, who has been an extraordinary advocate for the 
people of Tibet and especially for the Dalai Lama.
    Simply put, the barrier, obviously, is the Chinese 
Communist Party. It has an ideological commitment to control 
Tibet far beyond what previous Chinese governments sought to 
do, which has been evident since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China. Indeed, one year after the communist 
government took power in Beijing and completed its control of 
the mainland, it invaded Tibet and sought to annex it. 1959, of 
course, marked an even greater attempt to control Tibet and led 
to the dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama from his home country. 
All these years he has been in exile, while the world has 
benefited from his personal holiness and his example. He truly 
is a treasure, and I, like my other colleagues, have met him 
and have been so deeply impressed by his goodness and his 
holiness.
    Well, we saw the extreme cruelty of the Cultural 
Revolution, where Mao's Red Guards despoiled so much of Tibet's 
religious and cultural patrimony. Then there was the kidnapping 
and disappearance of the Panchen Lama, which personalizes how 
evil and totalitarian the CCP is and underscores the extent to 
which they will go to deny the Tibetan people the right to 
practice their faith freely and without interference.
    Now, today, under Xi Jinping, the suppression of Tibetan 
Buddhism--indeed, the suppression of all religion, which Xi 
Jinping seeks to sinicize--has intensified. The Chinese 
Communist Party is intent upon committing cultural genocide. 
This must end. The Tibetan people must be free to practice 
their own faith and choose their own spiritual leaders. We look 
forward to our distinguished witnesses giving us guidance on 
the path forward. I yield back.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman.
    We'd now like to introduce those witnesses. I'll introduce 
all of them now.
    Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international 
law and executive president of Kreddha, an international non-
governmental organization created to help prevent and resolve 
violent interstate conflicts. He is the author of Tibet Brief 
20/20 and he previously served as legal advisor to the Office 
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
    Hon-Shiang Lau is a retired professor who taught at the 
City University of Hong Kong, Oklahoma State University, and 
Washington State University. Since retiring, he has devoted his 
time to Chinese history. He is the author of the book Tibet Was 
Never Part of China since Antiquity.
    Tenzin N. Tethong is a former Representative of His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He's 
served in several roles in the Central Tibetan Administration, 
including as kalon tripa, the equivalent of prime minister. He 
has served as the director of the Tibetan language service at 
Radio Free Asia and is currently the director of the Tibetan 
language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a 
personal capacity.
    Ellen Bork will be joining us via Zoom. She is contributing 
editor at American Purpose. She previously served as the senior 
professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific at the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes frequently about 
U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her writing 
has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the 
Washington Post, and other publications.
    Thank you all for joining us for this hearing. Without 
objection, your full statements will be entered into the 
record. We ask that you keep your oral remarks to about five 
minutes. We'll start with Michael van Walt van Praag.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, PROFESSOR OF 
      INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF KREDDHA

    Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    My testimony today is based on the findings of 10 years of 
collaborative research, historical and legal, most of which I 
carried out during my tenure at the School of Historical 
Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and 
the findings are published in these two books: Sacred Mandates: 
Asian International Relations since Chenggis Khan and Tibet 
Brief 20/20.
    Today, I'd like to call your attention to one of those 
findings and its international legal ramifications. Contrary to 
what the PRC claims, Tibet was historically not a part of 
China. Though not always independent in the modern legal sense 
of the term, and over the centuries subject to various degrees 
of Mongol, Manchu, and even British authority or influence, 
Tibet was never a part of China. The PRC did not inherit Tibet 
from the Republic of China or from earlier empires, as it 
claims. Tibet was, in fact, an independent state in the modern 
sense of the term in fact and law from 1912 to 1951, when the 
PRC took it by force.
    So the PRC's military invasion of Tibet constituted an act 
of aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international 
law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of 
force against another state. This informs the legitimacy, or 
not, of China's presence in and rule of Tibet. China does not 
have sovereignty over Tibet, and therefore it is occupying 
Tibet illegally.
    That, in turn, informs the international community's legal 
obligations and its responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan 
conflict. Governments are prohibited under international law 
from recognizing China's annexation of Tibet, and they have the 
positive obligation to help bring about a resolution of the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict, to end the occupation of Tibet, and to 
enable the Tibetan people to exercise self-determination.
    As you stated, it is U.S. policy to support a negotiated 
resolution to the conflict between China and Tibet, but U.S. 
Government actions run counter to that policy. The U.S. 
Government has stated more than once that it considers Tibet to 
be a part of the PRC. If it and other governments continue to 
do so, Beijing no longer will have any incentive to negotiate 
with the Tibetans. The international community will have 
satisfied the PRC's needs without Beijing having to make any 
concessions to the Tibetans.
    The PRC wants two things above anything else regarding 
Tibet: legitimacy and no foreign interference or criticism. 
Beijing's strategy to obtain legitimacy in Tibet from the 
Tibetans is failing. The Dalai Lama disputes the PRC's only 
claim to entitlement to Tibet, namely that Tibet has been an 
integral part of China since antiquity, and he is not giving in 
to pressure to make a statement to that effect.
    Beijing has, therefore, started demanding of other 
governments that they recognize that Tibet is part of China, 
and is using their statements as a substitute for true 
legitimacy. Once a government agrees to regard Tibet as part of 
the PRC, it also accepts that Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations 
are China's internal affair, outside its purview. Beijing's 
needs are then satisfied and Tibetan negotiating power, which 
depends heavily on the international community's upholding of 
international law in keeping with Tibet's status as an occupied 
country, is then severely weakened.
    And not only that, endorsing China's sovereignty claim to 
Tibet conditions the Tibetans to envision a settlement that can 
bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know about 
China's treatment of Tibetans and also its treatment of Uyghurs 
and Beijing's determination to eradicate their very identity, I 
ask: Is marginal change what the U.S. really wants for the 
Tibetan people?
    The conflict will not be resolved with marginal change. It 
can only truly be resolved if the Tibetans' basic needs are 
satisfied. At a very minimum, this requires a robust autonomy 
with guarantees and international protection endorsed by the 
Tibetan people in accordance with their right to self-
determination. To arrive there, the international community 
needs to play its role--uphold international law and treat 
Tibet as an occupied country and the conflict as a matter of 
international responsibility.
    Thank you.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much.
    We'll now turn to Professor Lau.

  STATEMENT OF HON-SHIANG LAU, RETIRED CHAIR PROFESSOR, CITY 
                    UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

    Mr. Lau. I want to thank this distinguished audience for 
enabling me to make this presentation. My theme is that China's 
pre-1949 official historical records clearly show that Tibet 
was never part of China before the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950. 
This is an important issue because China is a signatory to the 
relevant covenants of the League of Nations and the United 
Nations which means that, since 1919, China has promised not to 
gain territories through military conquest thereafter.
    Moreover, the PRC incessantly condemns other countries for 
their past colonial conquests and their past bullying of China. 
Therefore, the PRC needs to cover up its 1950 Tibet conquest as 
a unification of a territory that has been part of China since 
antiquity. Sadly, today many governments incorrectly believe 
this ridiculous lie, and this is part of the reason why many 
Western democracies fail to provide adequate support for 
upholding Tibet's sovereignty.
    There are two important foundational concepts behind my 
theme. Foundation A: There is an abundance of authentic and 
reliable pre-1949 Chinese official historical records. The PRC 
version of Chinese history is very, very different from the 
version of Chinese history reflected in these pre-1949 official 
Chinese records.
    Foundation B: We used a comprehensive range of objective 
criteria to examine whether Tibet was part of China. Thus, to 
judge whether Tibet was part of China during China's Ming 
dynasty, we used official classical Chinese records to examine, 
for example: (1) Whether the Ming Empire had designated Tibet 
as part of China or as a foreign entity, say, via a promulgated 
map. (2) Was the Ming Empire able to conduct censuses or 
collect taxes in Tibet? (3) Was the Ming Empire able to appoint 
and dismiss judges or governing officials in Tibet? (4) Was 
China's language, legal system, and monetary system used in 
Tibet? etc.
    Combining Foundations A and B, we can prove the following 
conclusion: China's pre-1949 official records clearly show that 
Tibet was never part of China before the PRC's 1950 invasion. 
We also prove that the PRC's so-called evidence of sovereignty 
over Tibet is based on not only distortions, but outright 
fabrications and forgeries of pre-1949 Chinese records. This 
means that a current permanent member of the UN Security 
Council militarily conquered a foreign country in 1950 and 
continues to subjugate it today. This crime obligates the 
intervention of the international community.
    I'm going to show you two examples of these proofs. The 
first example is a Ming dynasty map. It's on your tablet. This 
is labeled as Map 1, purported to show the entire Ming Empire. 
[Map 1 appears on page 36 in the written statement of Mr. Lau.] 
Regarding my Foundation A stated earlier, this proof is from a 
Ming dynasty 1461 A.D. government publication. That is, it 
comes from a very authoritative Chinese source. Regarding my 
Foundation B, it relates to an objective sovereignty claim, 
depicted on a national map.
    In this map, labels for Chinese territories are framed in 
white lettering on a black background. In contrast, the map 
labels non-Chinese territories, such as Japan in the east and 
then Tibet over here in the west, in non-framed black lettering 
on a white background. The contrast is literally in black and 
white. In other words, the Ming government clearly declared 
that Tibet was a non-China foreign entity.
    If you would flip the tablet, you will see Map 2, which is 
an example of a Qing dynasty proof. This is from a Qing dynasty 
1732 government publication, purported to show the entire Qing 
Empire. [Map 2 appears on page 37 in the written statement of 
Mr. Lau.] On this map, the Qing government shows the position 
corresponding to today's Tibet Autonomous Region (the TAR) as a 
blank space. Hundreds of similar proofs are presented in this 
book that I have written. Most of them involve textual records, 
and not just merely pictorial proofs like this. And they are, 
of course, much more reliable. Thank you very much.
    Chair Merkley. Professor, thank you very much for your 
comments and for sharing these maps and this history. We will 
now turn to Mr. Tethong.

  STATMENT OF TENZIN N. TETHONG, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS 
      HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, DC

    Mr. Tethong. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, it is my 
distinct honor to offer testimony this morning in this hearing 
on Tibet and to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in 
the 20th century, including efforts toward a resolution of the 
Tibet issue. Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever 
since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. One 
of Mao Zedong's earliest declarations was his intention to 
liberate Tibet from the West, and the Tibetan people from a 
backward and oppressive society.
    The Tibetan government protested immediately, citing 
Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan kings 
to the rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu 
Qing dynasties. With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the 
United Nations and the global community, especially to India, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unfortunately, China 
did not heed Tibet's protests, and the global community did not 
come to Tibet's defense. The People's Liberation Army marched 
into Tibet in 1950, easily overwhelming the Tibetan Army and 
militia. China knew right then that rhetorical justification 
for such an invasion was not enough and called for negotiations 
to formalize an agreement.
    Tibetan representatives negotiated in Beijing but, 
disregarding any proper ratification process, were forced to 
sign what is called the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet. Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government tried to 
work within the broad confines of the agreement, which promised 
no change in the status of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan 
government. However, China did not live up to these 
commitments, nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had 
received from Mao Zedong.
    Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years, 
and protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the 
uprising in Lhasa on March 10th, 1959, which led to the escape 
of the Dalai Lama, and the escape of thousands, to India and 
neighboring countries. For the next 20 years, Tibet was 
completely shut off from the rest of the world. An extreme 
overhaul of Tibetan life, from its traditional Buddhist roots 
to Chinese Marxist socialism, was introduced, which in the 
latter years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution.
    However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue 
important enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the 
Dalai Lama's older brother to Beijing and declared that short 
of separation everything would be discussed, meaning that short 
of granting Tibetan independence, China would be open to all 
Tibetan concerns and aspirations. This breakthrough meeting led 
to renewed dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the 
Chinese government. Four delegations of exile leaders were able 
to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had 
transpired under two decades of Chinese rule.
    By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in 
deliberations with Chinese officials to address larger issues 
related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, party general 
secretary and the main proponent of changes in the Tibet 
policies, died. This was soon followed by the Tiananmen student 
protests and the massacre. China stepped backwards, and the 
Tibetan issue also retreated.
    In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, 
and envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in 
Beijing, where the Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's 
Middle Way policy, seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within 
the framework of the PRC. The envoys met many times, even after 
the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests that called for 
greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the envoys' 
last meeting was to be in 2010, when the Chinese ended the 
dialogue process.
    This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should 
show that even at the most challenging of times, China has seen 
the need to address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet and 
that there is perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of 
their rule. China has also repeatedly initiated direct 
communication with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, demonstrating 
the obvious need to find a meaningful resolution to these 
outstanding issues.
    Ever since the exile delegation visited Tibet in the 1980s, 
to the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's envoys in Beijing, 
the Chinese leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan 
perspectives of their rule in Tibet and of the unvarnished 
aspirations of the Tibetan people, both of which contradict the 
official Chinese narrative. Worldwide attention to Tibet has 
been an important part of creating greater awareness of the 
Tibetan issue, even in China, allowing for more liberal and 
reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan hopes and 
demands to have some standing.
    There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, 
through the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concern 
for the cultural and human rights of the Tibetan people, has 
been an important factor in the U.S. Government's attention on 
the issue--which has been sustained to a large degree by 
individual Members of Congress. The continued efforts of the 
United States will help remove barriers to this unresolved 
conflict and will advance the Tibetan people's desire for 
greater freedom and democracy. I thank you.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Tethong.
    We're now going to turn to Ellen Bork, who is joining us 
via Zoom. Welcome.

                    STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK,
             CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, AMERICAN PURPOSE

    Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Thank you to the members of 
the Commission and staff, and I appreciate appearing alongside 
the other witnesses very much.
    As you all know, the United States has charted a new course 
toward China on a lot of issues, but Tibet, so far, has not 
been the subject of a considerable revived agenda. It should 
be. Unfortunately, Tibet is often viewed as a fait accompli, a 
tragic but closed chapter of history. That is not the case, of 
course, for the Chinese Communist Party. Tibet, for them, 
remains a cornerstone of China's aggression, both territorially 
and ideologically. It is part of China's assault on liberal 
democratic norms, which in turn will advance the Party's plan 
to control the succession of the Dalai Lama, or at least gain 
preference and acquiescence to its choice of successor.
    Addressing that challenge by building support for the 
authentic Dalai Lama now and in the future, and in particular 
building support for Tibetan democracy, which is his legacy, 
should play a much larger role in the U.S. response to China. 
Unfortunately, the foundations of American Tibet policy make 
this difficult. A look back at history shows America's Tibet 
policy was not the product of historical fact or international 
law but of outdated perceptions of America's strategic interest 
in subordinating Tibet to China. U.S. involvement in Tibet is, 
compared to some other powers, relatively recent, but it has 
played a decisive role in what's happening today.
    First, of course, the United States accepted Great 
Britain's application of the concept of suzerainty over Tibet. 
This is something short of sovereignty. According to many 
scholars, it is not even applicable, but Great Britain found it 
useful while it was involved in the great geopolitical 
competition of the Great Game in the region. The United States 
accepted that term, but if you read through a lot of the 
diplomatic memos you'll see how uncomfortable and ambivalent 
officials were about it, as well as about the concept of 
sovereignty. And for several decades, policy fluctuated in 
terms of the language used and the way the United States 
thought about what had happened in Tibet from the 1950s, and 
even before. Officials really accepted that it was de facto 
independent, even though the United States refused to accept 
requests to recognize Tibet's independence.
    Later on, after several decades--it was when the United 
States forged a rapprochement with Beijing at Taipei's expense 
that the position on sovereignty really gelled. Again, this was 
the result of its perception of the strategic need with regard 
to China, and deciding to choose one Chinese priority, in 
Tibet, over another. I don't think it's too far-fetched to say 
that in that way, it transferred deference to China over Tibet 
from one dictatorship that never exerted authority there--
meaning Chiang Kai-shek--to a totalitarian regime that it 
decided to favor at the time.
    As a result of this decision--incidentally, Vice President 
Mondale visited Beijing in 1979 and sort of said: We will no 
longer view the Dalai Lama as a political leader. And we've 
essentially said we're going with your sovereignty over Tibet. 
Not surprisingly, with that decision taken, Tibet had to become 
diminished within U.S.-PRC relations. It's not uncommon for 
diplomats to consider that it's an irritant in the U.S.-China 
relationship and even that Tibet can only be helped if we lower 
the temperature with Beijing over Tibet, and I think exactly 
the opposite.
    Above all, this meant that the United States would not 
focus on legitimacy questions about the PRC's role in Tibet or 
give adequate attention to the extraordinary achievement of 
democracy in exile. That democratization process was carried 
out under the Dalai Lama's leadership and with the support of 
the Tibetan people in exile, at exactly the same time that 
democratic transitions were occurring in Asia, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and later Indonesia, and that has been the 
basis of American policy toward the region ever since.
    By contrast, of course, Tibet is a huge priority for the 
Party. And it has an international Tibet agenda. It's not just 
the domestic repression, or inside Tibet's border, that we need 
to focus on. It has a really corrosive agenda for Tibet, trying 
to impose litmus tests on the way countries and NGOs deal with 
Tibet. And it has a Buddhist agenda in its Belt and Road 
investment initiatives. It seeks to appropriate Buddhist sites 
and cultivate and co-opt leaders and make Tibet a core 
interest--a condition of its good relations.
    I'd just like to note, before I give a few recommendations, 
the importance of understanding that many brave Chinese 
democracy advocates have over time challenged the Party on 
Tibet. It's very easy to imagine that the Chinese people are 
sort of inherently nationalist when it comes to Tibet, and I 
think that's false. It's the product of intense propaganda and 
fear. It's important to recognize that going back to Wei 
Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo, there's been a thrust 
among Chinese democrats increasingly to see democracy as the 
solution to both Tibet and China's problems. Charter 08, the 
democracy manifesto of 2008, took this up, and although I think 
it was too sensitive to use the word ``Tibet'' in that 
document, there was a clear reference to the goal of 
``federation of democratic communities of China.''
    In that sense, the first recommendation I would make is to 
reintroduce support for democracy in China and to support 
Chinese and Tibetan political prisoners and activists, lawyers, 
and journalists more than we currently are in our relationship 
with Beijing. I think I'd like to suggest also an independent 
review of U.S. policy, to go deeply into some of the issues I 
mentioned about the choices the United States made from the 
'40s on, to see how United States policy or attitudes about 
Tibet's status fluctuated, and why the United States made these 
decisions, and how they are not related. As Michael points out, 
our position is in violation of international law. How did this 
happen? And what should we understand about not only Tibet's 
status but how the United States treated Tibet and subordinated 
it to China historically?
    Finally, I would say we should enlist allies in a common 
position on the Dalai Lama's succession and make that very 
public. Give the elected Tibetan exile government more access 
and support and include it in forums like the Summit for 
Democracy, and counter Chinese influence in international 
organizations and on campuses and at state and local levels, 
not only on Tibet but on other questions, like Taiwan. Thank 
you.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Ms. Bork, and I thank 
all four of you for the expertise you bring to this 
conversation. We'll now have a period of questioning. I think 
we're set for seven minutes. I'll be handing the gavel over to 
Representative McGovern after my questions because I have 
another hearing to chair, but I'll tell you, this Member of the 
Senate will never recognize as legitimate Chinese control over 
Tibet.
    In the hearings that we have held in this Commission about 
what China is now doing in Tibet--in particular I can't get out 
of my mind the fact that 80 percent of the children are being 
sent to boarding school to separate them from their parents, 
and to essentially re-educate them in a false narrative and 
destroy the religious and cultural foundations of the Tibetan 
people. This is truly an enormous crime against Tibet.
    I appreciate the historical perspectives. I was struck by 
two of you testifying about 1979. Mr. Tethong, you noted that 
in 1979 Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to 
come and said that, short of separation, China was open to 
discussion of how to address Tibetan concerns and aspirations. 
Then Ms. Bork, you noted that in 1979, Vice President Mondale 
went to China and essentially recognized--if I understood your 
testimony correctly--recognized that the United States saw 
China as having legitimate authority over Tibet. How do we 
reconcile these two things happening in that particular year? 
How did one precede the other? And are they tied together? I'd 
invite both Ms. Bork and Mr. Tethong to help us understand 
that.
    Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think, as I'll try to explain 
very briefly, that even though China had just come out of the 
very serious period of the Cultural Revolution, to set China on 
the right course they had to deal with many important issues. 
Obviously Tibet was right up there on their agenda. It shows 
that Tibet remained a key issue in the Chinese government's 
state of mind. Unfortunately, what Vice President Mondale 
declared during the Carter administration, shall we say, 
overlooked the importance of the Tibetan human rights 
situation. In part, maybe we were unable to present our case to 
a President who had a strong interest in human rights. But 
maybe at the time, President Carter was very engaged in 
establishing normalized relations with China. That's all I can 
say.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you. Ms. Bork, would you like to 
comment on the juxtaposition of those two events in 1979?
    Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. I don't know the interaction 
or the interplay between those two events. I think that would 
be a really interesting thing to explore. I suspect that 
getting the Tibetan leadership to acquiesce, to sort of buy in 
to some solution, is not inconsistent with getting the United 
States to settle its position on Tibet's sovereignty. But it 
would be very interesting. I've done a little research. It's 
not easy to know what went into the preparation for Vice 
President Mondale's trip. I think that would be a great subject 
for an independent commission.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Let me turn to our two professors, Professor Lau and 
Professor Michael van Walt van Praag. Where is American 
leverage in bringing China back to the conversation through the 
dialogue about autonomy with Tibet?
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you. Because China's primary 
objective in the international field in relation to Tibet is 
precisely to obtain legitimacy for its rule in Tibet, 
questioning that legitimacy creates leverage. In other words, 
in the reverse, accepting or otherwise identifying Tibet as a 
part of China or as a part of the PRC or accepting Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet today takes away any leverage the 
Tibetans have.
    It takes away the need for the Chinese leaders to approach 
the Tibetans, to negotiate with them and find an agreement that 
will end up with an arrangement where the Tibetans accept some 
form of Chinese sovereignty, rule, relationship, that works for 
both parties. If the international community, and therefore the 
U.S. as perhaps one of the most important players in relation 
to China, does not question China's legitimacy in Tibet, 
China's sovereignty in Tibet, then that takes away that 
leverage.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you.
    Professor Lau.
    Mr. Lau. Thank you, sir. I can only echo what Michael has 
just said. I think that the United States and the world should 
actively counter and oppose the PRC's narrative, by producing 
solid proofs to show that the PRC's version is incorrect, or 
that they're just basically telling lies. I think in the past 
I've heard many people denying the PRC's version but without 
producing believable and authoritative proofs. I think it's 
about time that the world becomes more explicit in 
contradicting the PRC's claim by doing more than just simply 
saying: ``You are wrong, I am right.'' Show the proofs. That's 
all I know. Thank you.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I'll close with this 
question to Ms. Bork. Thank you, by the way, for your five 
recommendations. One of the things you talk about is enlisting 
allies in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan 
process for selecting the next Dalai Lama. Can you comment for 
just a moment on your general sense of the disposition of the 
European Union, both in terms of that specific issue, but more 
broadly on the issue of establishing a clear, united position 
that China's control or authority over Tibet is illegitimate.
    Ms. Bork. Thank you, Senator. There's no question that the 
Chinese government has made great inroads in Europe, but that, 
I think, on a number of issues has been slow, if not completely 
reversed. Like in the United States, there are many countries 
where there's great reverence for Tibet and the Dalai Lama. 
It's not viewed there as quite as huge a matter. It doesn't get 
quite as much attention. I think that the attention to the 
reincarnation issue that the U.S. Congress has shown is also 
spreading in Europe. I'm optimistic that some of the leading 
countries there in support for the Dalai Lama would step 
forward, but they've always been treated to that kind of divide 
and conquer. They've suffered so much--as you remember, the way 
Norway suffered after the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. So 
it's essential that there's some kind of shared burden and 
protection for people--for countries as they take this 
position. I'm very heartened by the appointment of the new 
special coordinator, Uzra Zeya, and believe that there is 
prospect for greater attention to Tibet within U.S.-Europe 
relations.
    Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We're now going to turn 
to Co-chair McGovern.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let 
me thank all the panelists for being here. And let me make 
clear, the reason why we're doing this hearing, the reason why 
we've done other hearings on Tibet, the reason why we have 
passed legislation on Tibet, is because China is not living up 
to the expectations of the international community with regard 
to Tibet. You know, I think there might be a perception in 
China that the world will soon forget and move on to something 
else, but I hope we're making it clear that that's not going to 
be the case. In fact, activity in the United States Congress on 
Tibet has intensified in recent years. More attention is being 
devoted to Tibet, and some of the topics that we're talking 
about here today many members of Congress are unaware of. They 
will be enlightened by this hearing, and it will bring 
additional perspective as we deal with other legislation 
impacting China in the future.
    I just say to the government of China, who always gets 
annoyed when we do these hearings--you know what? You have a 
Tibet problem. Deal with it. You can go back to the negotiating 
table. I mean, that would be a good first step. Let's try to 
resolve these differences. But as long as you don't, as long as 
you pretend that there's not a problem here, please be assured 
that activity focused on Tibet in the United States and in 
other countries around the world will intensify.
    Professor Lau, would you say that the Chinese government's 
insistence that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of 
China since antiquity is tantamount to a demand that the Dalai 
Lama say something that is false?
    Mr. Lau. Absolutely. I agree with that 100 percent. The PRC 
knows that that claim is a lie, and they are forcing the Dalai 
Lama to lie with the PRC.
    Co-chair McGovern. OK. Mr. van Walt, you testified that 
governments using the Chinese narrative that Tibet has always 
been part of China is an obstacle to resolving the conflict 
through dialogue. Now, there has been no dialogue in 12 years. 
Assuming that governments made such statements as a concession 
to get the Chinese to the table back then, is there any reason 
for them to continue saying the same thing?
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. I think it was a mistake for 
governments to play China's game, and I don't know what the 
objective was of making those statements acknowledging Tibet 
being a part of the PRC. But I think it was a mistake to do so, 
if the hope was that this would encourage China to negotiate. I 
think it's quite the contrary. And I think we must realize that 
the Middle Way approach of His Holiness the Dalai Lama can only 
work if we're conscious that the kind of genuine autonomy that 
we're talking about is only a possible middle path if it is the 
middle between the legitimate right of the Tibetans to restore 
their independence on the one hand and China's intention to 
fully integrate Tibet into China on the other. If we take away 
this legitimate right of the Tibetans, then there's really very 
little to negotiate that is left.
    Co-chair McGovern. I think it's fair to say that those 
governments that bought into the Chinese narrative, maybe 
thinking that it might make the Chinese government more 
reasonable with regard to Tibet, it didn't work.
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. It didn't work, and I think it is 
counterproductive today.
    Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Tethong, the Chinese insist that 
they have the right to select the next Dalai Lama, and demand 
that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of China since 
ancient times. Do you think that these reveal a latent 
insecurity within Chinese leadership about the legitimacy of 
their claim to own Tibet?
    Mr. Tethong. Definitely, Chairman. We've all touched on 
this issue of legitimacy. I believe that even within the 
Chinese leadership and the Chinese mindset, legitimacy of the 
rule of the CCP is what is at stake. Tibet or the Tibetans were 
the ones who contested that legitimacy. That's why there is 
total control over Tibet, yet China often finds itself needing 
to address it somehow, because the question of legitimacy will 
never be fully satisfactory for the Chinese until the Tibetans 
have a proper role in that.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Ms. Bork, given what the other three witnesses have said, 
what actions should the United States Government take to get 
the parties back to the table? Do you agree that the State 
Department should stop using the ``Tibet is part of the PRC'' 
phrase, as they did in the Tibet negotiations report this 
month? And given that the PRC was founded in 1949, would it be 
fair to say that the U.S. statements do not endorse the Chinese 
position that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity?
    Ms. Bork. I'm not sure what the intention of the department 
was in that particular matter, but I do think there's a lot to 
be done before approaching Beijing. I think dialogue can take 
many forms, and people may have different attitudes about it. 
I'm not a particular supporter of the idea of dialogue, at 
least not without much more coordination among the allies in 
support of the Tibetans. I think that without that, I don't 
think it's going to go anywhere. I'm deeply skeptical about 
Chinese intentions with regard to any kind of dialogue.
    By all means, again, review the defects in the American 
position, why they've used language in the past and the fact 
that they should stop using it. Again, it's because it's not 
accurate historically and not helpful right now. Yes, they 
should stop using that and begin to talk about Tibet in a 
different way.
    Co-chair McGovern. I appreciate that, and whatever the 
deficiencies in U.S. policy have been over the years, I think 
it is fair to say that we are reorienting our policy in a way 
that is more in tune with what the Tibetan community wants. I 
just want to say that we're working on a bill that we'll be 
introducing soon to help the U.S. Government counter Chinese 
disinformation on Tibet and ensure that U.S. policy supports 
the basis for the Dalai Lama's quest for genuine autonomy. And 
also making it clear that, you know, facts matter and that you 
can't rewrite history because you want to. I mean, history is 
history. Facts are facts.
    And so, again, I think that there is a renewed interest in 
the United States and in other countries around the world, as 
we witnessed yesterday talking to parliamentarians from all 
over the world who are in Washington to find ways to support 
the Tibetan people, and I think things are changing globally. I 
wish they'd changed a long time ago, but they're now changing.
    My time is up right now. I'm going to recognize Senator 
Ossoff.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to 
our panelists. I'd like to ask each of our panelists to comment 
on the intersection of press freedom and the issue at hand 
today. Last week in the Commission we heard from Under 
Secretary Zeya, who committed to work with my office to expand 
press freedom internationally and strengthen U.S. leadership 
for press freedom. My question, please, beginning with you, Mr. 
Tethong, is: How does the CCP repress freedom of reporting and 
publication within Tibet, and more broadly within China? How 
does the CCP seek to influence reporting and publication on 
related issues internationally? And when you've concluded, we 
can move to Ms. Bork. I'd like to hear from each panelist on 
this. Thank you.
    Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Senator. There is no press freedom 
in Tibet, or in any of the Tibetan areas within the PRC. No 
foreign journalists are allowed to visit Tibet freely. Very 
rarely and occasionally, groups of Western journalists who are 
stationed in Beijing might be allowed on a short trip that is 
fully managed by Chinese officials. So with regard to press 
freedom, I think Tibet is regarded as one of the worst, even 
worse than North Korea, according to Freedom House, I believe. 
We are only able to get news items, news reports through 
personal contacts of Tibetans who are in exile and occasionally 
through social media.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Ms. Bork.
    Ms. Bork. Oh, I'd certainly concur with what Mr. Tethong 
has said. I think it's important to think about the way China 
is challenging norms of freedoms, and we have to be really very 
attuned to the way they treat rights and the way they'd like to 
alter the way the world respects universal norms. I don't have 
anything to add about inside Tibet, but I would be very alert 
to the way Chinese Communist Party officials talk about 
democratic norms, including press freedom, and try to shape 
them, particularly in countries where they have a great deal of 
influence or where they're trying to acquire influence.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. van Walt van Praag.
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. Yes. I don't have anything to add 
about press freedom or the lack of it in Tibet. What I would 
say is that at the same time, China is, in a sense, abusing the 
freedom of the press internationally, outside of China, but 
using the press very actively to project its narrative on 
Tibet, to project also its vocabulary on Tibet. For example, 
many members of the press write articles in which they refer to 
Tibetans as a minority--one of China's minorities, which is an 
implicit acceptance of Tibet being part of China and the 
Tibetans being one of China's peoples, minorities. Whereas, in 
effect, the Tibetans are not a minority. They are the 
population of Tibet. They are the people of Tibet. And they are 
a people under international law with the full right to self-
determination. That's just one example, but there are so many 
examples of articles in the press and reports in the press that 
use Chinese terminology in regard to Tibet.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. Lau.
    Mr. Lau. Thank you. I'm not an expert in this area and have 
nothing of value to add, but I would like to use this 
opportunity to emphasize something else that was brought up 
just now. China or the Qing Empire never had any power in 
selecting the Dalai Lama. It is clearly reflected in the 
official Chinese records. The Qing Empire only made a request 
to the Tibetans to use a golden urn to do one minor step of the 
selection by drawing lots. That was all, and even that request 
was not consistently followed or acceded to by the Tibetan 
authorities during the Qing dynasty. Thank you.
    Senator Ossoff. Thank you all for your responses. Thanks 
for the additional context and information. I worked prior to 
my election producing investigative reports of crimes, official 
corruption, crimes against humanity. Freedom of the press and 
freedom of publication are under attack worldwide. The United 
States Government must strengthen and redouble its commitment 
to stand en garde for press freedom around the world. And this 
hearing will help inform our efforts to that end.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Senator.
    Congresswoman Steel.
    Representative Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Every person has the right to religious and cultural 
beliefs, and all governments, including the CCP, have no right 
to restrict this fundamental ability. It is inexcusable that 
the people of Tibet are not free and are currently threatened 
with punishment ranging from warnings and surveillance to 
interrogation and detention. We cannot sit still while Tibetans 
are being detained and imprisoned for political and religious 
reasons. I was honored to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama in 
my district. We have to make the world know that the leader of 
Tibet cannot go back to his own country and his own people 
because of CCP oppression.
    With that, to all the witnesses, with the current abuses by 
the CCP oppressing autonomous regions, what should the United 
States and other countries do to stand with the Tibet people. 
I'm just asking all the witnesses. So if anybody wants to 
answer, I'd love to hear that.
    And can local global corporations play a role in raising 
awareness about the Tibetan oppression? That's what I asked 
last year, before the Winter Olympics. I wanted these 
corporations that were going to spend billions and billions of 
dollars in advertising to use their platform. But I didn't get 
a response from any of those 17, the Olympic sponsor 
corporations.
    So could you just let me know? You can start, I guess, Ms. 
Bork.
    Ms. Bork. I'm so sorry. If someone else could start, 
please. I'm having trouble hearing.
    Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman, if you could just repeat 
the crux of your question again, because it kind of went in and 
out.
    Representative Steel. Oh. With the current abuses by the 
CCP oppressing the autonomous regions, what should the United 
States and other countries do to work together to stand with 
Tibet's people? And can global corporations play a role in 
raising awareness about the Tibet oppression?
    Ms. Bork. Thank you very much for the question. I think 
international solidarity and coordination on all these points 
is vital, given the Party's adept use of tools like financial 
diplomacy and propaganda, and various other kinds of 
intimidation, not to mention that we haven't even talked about 
how China continues to redefine Tibet, to the point that it is 
referring to northeast India as southern Tibet. So this is very 
much an ongoing issue that requires staunch and coordinated 
reply.
    There was an interesting proposal, unrelated to Tibet, from 
a fellow in Scandinavia about an economic Article 5 for NATO. I 
think it's certainly worth discussing the kind of retaliation 
that countries could experience if they take a more thoughtful 
and principled stance on Tibet. We really can't prepare enough 
for that eventuality, and I'd certainly recommend that Congress 
think about that as well.
    As for global companies, they haven't really--I guess I'm 
too negative. I only know the bad examples. Maybe someone else 
knows some good examples with companies on Tibet. But I do 
think that attitude is changing as a result of the Olympics and 
some other--you know, the NBA, and things like that. I think 
unfortunately there's still a market for companies to kowtow to 
the Chinese line on Tibet and other issues. But I do think it's 
changing, and people are more sensitive to that, so I'm a 
little more optimistic than I might have once been.
    Representative Steel. Thank you. Any other witnesses?
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. I would like to make two 
observations that follow on what Ellen Bork has just mentioned. 
Regarding cooperation among countries, I think it's also very 
important to emphasize that not only is this of crucial 
importance for Tibet and the Tibetan people themselves, but 
this has broader international ramifications, because the 
appeasement of China on Tibet for the past 70 years is not 
unrelated to China's expansion today--or its efforts to 
expand--in the South China Sea, where it uses a similar 
historical narrative as it does to claim sovereignty over 
Tibet, and its aggressive stance in relation to northern India, 
both in the eastern and western part of northern India, and as 
Ellen Bork mentioned, even calling one part of northeast India 
southern Tibet, where it makes territorial claims, again, 
directly related to its historical narrative of Tibet.
    One cannot accept the historical narrative on Tibet and 
then contest China's claim to northern India. Or perhaps it 
even makes it difficult to contest their claim to the South 
China Sea islands. And the second question, regarding 
corporations, the only thing I would mention is that, again, 
under international law, because China is denying the Tibetan 
people their right to self-determination, which they have, and 
because it is occupying Tibet, corporations and governments are 
forbidden from benefiting from the exploitation of resources in 
Tibet, because those resources under international law belong 
to the Tibetan people and therefore cannot be exploited, and 
one cannot benefit from it without the express permission of 
the Tibetan people, given freely.
    Thank you.
    Representative Steel. Thank you very much for those 
answers. The CCP continues to have oversight of Tibetan 
religious life by mandating political education for monks and 
nuns and creating apparatus to surveil and manage monastic 
institutions. Can you expand more on how CCP authorities 
continue to reorient Tibetan society? I think maybe Professor 
Lau.
    Mr. Lau. Actually, I would like to comment on the earlier 
topic that you brought up. I think it's important for the world 
to realize that the Tibet issue is not necessarily just a China 
issue. I read in mainstream newspaper articles in the past 
several days, and you have pointed out, that Putin is going to 
re-create the old Russian empire by bringing up all these 
historical ``territorial rights,'' even over the Baltic 
nations. If you look at the Chinese records, these records 
clearly show that Tibet was not part of China, but they do 
indicate that Burma, Korea, Thailand, Laos, and a whole bunch 
of other areas were clearly part of China. They also indicate 
that even countries like Holland and Portugal were tributary 
countries to China.
    We have seen what has developed in Putin's and in Ukraine's 
case. If we do not explicitly reject this kind of attitude, 
there is a strong possibility that 20 years from now, when 
China becomes even stronger, that they could bring up these old 
claims of sovereignty over Korea and over Vietnam and then, as 
I've said, even over Portugal. I think that's the point that I 
would like to make. Thank you.
    Mr. Tethong. I would just like to add a comment, that yes, 
for the last 20 or 30 years, global attention to what is 
happening in Tibet, and especially concerns expressed by the 
United States Congress, has had a tremendous impact on the 
situation in Tibet and on the rights and safety of the Tibetan 
people; to a great degree they have been provided simply 
because the outside world is watching, especially the United 
States.
    For a long-term goal to help resolve the Tibet issue, I 
think, as my co-panelists have said, we should not look at 
Tibet and the Tibetan people as a unique element on their own, 
but that this is an issue that concerns the whole world. When 
we deal with any development in Tibet, of course, we are going 
to look at it from the perspective of the human rights of an 
individual Tibetan, and therefore the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should be a central theme to work with. And along 
with that, as far as the Tibetan people are concerned, their 
right to self-determination should be an underlying feature of 
how we deal with Tibet in the future.
    Representative Steel. I totally agree with Professor Lau 
because China is one of the biggest threats in the whole world. 
If we don't stop the CCP's invasion and oppression of 
autonomous regions right now, then in 20 years, what kind of 
map are we going to have? So this is a very important hearing. 
I really appreciate that we can hear from our witnesses. Thank 
you for coming out.
    I yield back.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
    I have a series of questions. I'm trying to get through 
them all, so bear with me here. Mr. van Walt van Praag, your 
testimony addresses the concept of self-determination as core 
to your thesis. Can you discuss the gap, if any, between the 
basis of the right to self-determination in international law, 
and the extent to which governments honor and protect that 
right? And how would you respond to those who say Tibetans are 
not entitled to self-determination?
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much for your 
question. Self-determination, under international law, is a 
basic right. It is both a basic right and it is codified in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
in its very first article, because there is a recognition, and 
there was a recognition when those two conventions were 
written, that without honoring the right to self-determination, 
many of the other human rights are difficult to conceive of and 
to respect, and therefore, those rights are dependent, to some 
degree, on respecting the right to self-determination.
    But self-determination is also a fundamental principle of 
international relations. As many UN declarations make clear, 
respect for the right to self-determination is a fundamental 
requirement for friendly relations among states and so both 
these things are truly fundamental. At the same time, self-
determination, as it has developed, was for a long time 
considered to be primarily a right of countries to de-colonize 
from Western colonialism. But increasingly, it is being 
recognized that when we're speaking about colonialism, we're 
speaking about the nature of rule, the nature of the 
relationship between dominant power and a subjugated country, a 
subjugated people under alien domination.
    Regardless of whether it is a Western power, regardless of 
whether there is an ocean between the cosmopolitan country and 
the colony, colonialism is about the nature of relations 
between the dominant and the dominated and about the latter's 
exploitation. Under that concept, Tibet very clearly is under 
colonial rule today, and I think it should be recognized that 
way. The PRC just introduced this, at an earlier session of the 
Human Rights Council in Geneva, a resolution on--and I don't 
know the exact words but--something like the continuing 
consequences of colonialism. Even within that context, we 
should be using colonialism to address the situation in Tibet.
    Aside from colonialism, Tibetans also, because they are a 
people--under any definition in international law--a people 
with a right to self-determination, fit squarely in that 
category. In terms of the difference between, in other words, 
their right to full self-determination and the honoring of that 
right internationally, there is, I think, a big gap. In the 
1950s and '60s, a number of countries, including the United 
States, recognized and supported the Tibetan people's right to 
self-determination. And as we know, there is a United Nations 
General Assembly resolution on that subject from the 1960s that 
recognizes the Tibetans' right to self-determination and calls 
for its respect and for its implementation.
    So Tibetans have had that recognition internationally. The 
discrepancy is that today many countries, probably most 
countries, do not refer to the Tibetan people's right to self-
determination anymore, simply out of fear of displeasing China. 
And I think it is very important to restore the situation to 
where it was universally recognized that Tibetans had the right 
to self-determination.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Ms. Bork, you have written about how democracy should be a 
component of our policy on Tibet, keeping in mind that the 
Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has established a 
democratic form of government-in-exile. The Biden 
administration has created a process to prioritize this issue 
called the Summit for Democracy, and as I understand it, the 
CTA was not involved in the first summit meeting last December. 
Would you recommend that the administration include the CTA in 
the upcoming summit this December? And if so, how?
    Ms. Bork. I would very strongly recommend that. It seems to 
me a great oversight to continue to neglect this achievement, 
especially if the administration is trying to develop support 
for the reincarnation as an element of, effectively, liberal 
democracy and liberal democratic norms being effective, human 
rights, and so forth. So yes, I would strongly do that. I don't 
know the governing basis for inclusion. Whatever it is, it can 
include representatives of the democratically elected body, 
even if they are not a sovereign country. So I hope so.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Mr. Tethong, you have firsthand experience dealing with 
Chinese interlocutors, including during your participation in a 
fact-finding delegation to Tibet. What perspective can you 
provide on the Chinese attitude toward dialogue with the Dalai 
Lama?
    Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think through the interactions 
we've had with the delegations that visited Tibet in the '80s--
I was a part of one of the groups--and the later interactions 
that the envoys have had, which have been very extensive, 
although the Chinese government brought the process to an end, 
we know that during that process many key officials in the 
Chinese government and the United Front officials became fully 
aware of, shall I mention, the misrule in Tibet, and also fully 
aware of what Tibetan intentions or Tibetan hopes and 
aspirations were. And so there is, within the Chinese 
government and leadership, I think, a full understanding of 
where the Tibetans stand and where it could make 
accommodations. It's not as though the Chinese leadership is 
ignorant about the real situation.
    So while on one level it seems like the negotiations have 
stopped, we know that there are elements within the Chinese 
leadership and the Chinese government who can, given the right 
circumstances, take up Tibet once again. So this process and 
the possibility of renewed dialogue, and an initiative from the 
Chinese side, I think, remains very possible.
    Co-chair McGovern. Professor Lau, are the maps and 
documents that you cite available in archives inside of China? 
And do researchers and historians in China have access to the 
information? And to what extent is this information digitized 
and online, or otherwise available at libraries outside of 
China?
    Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. Please allow me to 
answer the preceding question.
    Co-chair McGovern. Absolutely.
    Mr. Lau. Yes. I want to add to what Michael had said about 
self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party in the earlier 
version of the Party constitution, in the 1930s, repeatedly 
affirmed the self-determination rights of the so-called 
minorities, with an explicit sentence stating, ``up to the 
level of independence and seceding from China.'' In other 
words, they practically advocated the right of the Tibetans 
and, well, actually the Xinjiang Uyghurs too, to form 
independent countries. They only deleted those clauses after 
they gained power after 1949.
    Now, to answer your question. Actually, in my book, which 
is written in Chinese, and my target audience is people in 
China, I wanted to sort of convince the people in China that 
they haven't done the right thing with respect to Tibet. So I 
have taken a totally Chinese chauvinistic approach. I dismiss 
all Tibetan records. I dismiss all Western records. I only use 
Chinese records that are authored by Chinese, written in the 
Chinese language, from the 13th century up until 1949, before 
the Chinese Communist Party took power. And I also restrict 
myself to only those records that are reprinted by the People's 
Republic of China, indicating their acceptance of the 
authoritativeness of these publications.
    And yes, most of them are digitized by companies or 
libraries under PRC rule. And I think actually 80 percent of 
them are not only available and digitized, they're available 
free of charge on public websites. Also, I explicitly tell my 
readers: Don't believe a single word in my book. Go to the 
internet and check it out yourself. The two maps that I'm 
showing over here, they are available for free on websites, 
many of them operated within the PRC, many of them operated by 
official units of the PRC.
    Co-chair McGovern. Well, maybe President Xi ought to visit 
the library or go online. (Laughter.)
    Mr. Lau. Well. (Laughs.)
    Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman Steel, I don't know if you 
have an additional question. I see you're still on the line. Do 
you have additional questions?
    Representative Steel. No, I don't.
    Co-chair McGovern. OK. Thank you.
    Representative Steel. Mr. Chairman, I just love to listen.
    Co-chair McGovern. Very good. Thank you. Mr. van Walt, what 
other governments have made statements about Tibet being part 
of China? I mean, how many also say ``since ancient times''? 
Can you provide examples of how the Chinese narrative has been 
embraced by the international community?
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. I can't give you exact numbers of 
how many governments have and how many governments have not. I 
know that some governments--and I know that because I've spoken 
to their officials--have been very careful not to make any 
explicit statements, despite pressure. Others have been 
pressured by China, especially after, for example, somebody 
higher up in the government, the minister of foreign affairs or 
the prime minister, has received His Holiness the Dalai Lama. 
After that, they're subjected to a tremendous amount of 
pressure from Beijing, and a number of them then make a 
statement to the effect that they recognize or that they 
identify Tibet as a part of the PRC.
    A good example of that is France. After President Sarkozy, 
in his capacity as president of the European Union, met with 
His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Poland, France was put under a 
lot of pressure and made a statement that since the time of 
Charles de Gaulle, France recognized that Tibet was a part of 
China, which is actually not true, or not accurate, I should 
say. But that is an example. The statement continues by saying 
that this will not change. Denmark was pressured to make a 
similar statement. They added that the Danish government does 
not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama added 
that statement as well.
    I think that addition is even more harmful, and completely 
unnecessary. It takes away and violates the Tibetans' right to 
self-determination to say that they cannot have any say in 
their future because we do not support a particular outcome. 
Again, this type of statement reduces the leverage for 
Tibetans, should negotiations take place.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I think our position is that 
Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan 
government-in-exile, as recognized by the Tibetan people. That 
is the direction that our government should follow, as well as 
other governments around the world. Mr. Tethong, the position 
of the Central Tibetan Administration is that the Middle Way 
approach proposed by the Dalai Lama is the only viable solution 
to the Tibet problem--and would you characterize the Chinese 
government's response to the Tibetan position as their 
disagreement that the Middle Way approach is viable, or is it a 
denial that there's even a Tibetan problem at all?
    Mr. Tethong. That's a difficult question to answer. It 
seems very complicated. I couldn't understand what you were 
saying, actually.
    Co-chair McGovern. Yes, I mean, I guess the question is 
that His Holiness outlined this Middle Way approach, and the 
Chinese government hasn't responded, right? The question is, is 
it that they cannot see themselves getting to the Middle Way 
approach, or is it basically that they feel they don't have to, 
because there isn't a Tibetan issue they have to deal with?
    Mr. Tethong. I think it may be more of a lack of confidence 
on their part on how to deal with the Tibet issue--afraid that 
if they give in to the Tibetans, other issues will arise within 
China. Also, the Tibet situation is not entirely comparable to 
any other. That may be one reason. And the basic reason, I 
think I tried to point out earlier, is that within the Chinese 
leadership, from a position of being confident and trying to 
find a solution during Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping's time, it 
has retreated to another direction. And this Middle Way policy 
may have suffered.
    Co-chair McGovern. I apologize. I just have a few more 
questions. I just think it's important to establish a full 
record here, not only for the Commission but for my colleagues.
    Ms. Bork, there have been many meetings between U.S. 
Presidents and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Would you say that 
these meetings have strengthened the hand of the Dalai Lama 
vis-a-vis China? And if President Biden were to meet with His 
Holiness during his term, what would you advise him to say?
    Ms. Bork. I think the reception by U.S. Presidents of the 
Dalai Lama has been extremely important, and also because it 
has become so regular. It would be wonderful for President 
Biden to be able to visit with the Dalai Lama, or if travel for 
either one of them were a problem, having the vice president 
call on His Holiness would signal American support and an 
effort to break down some of the isolation that His Holiness 
has experienced over the years.
    What should he say? I think it's very much a part of the 
broader U.S. policy for China. A democratic basis of government 
for Tibet and China would be what the U.S. President seeks, and 
committing to that and committing to support Tibetan democracy 
in exile, but also Tibetan democracy eventually and Chinese 
democracy, under whatever arrangement most people can agree on 
should be the goal. I don't see any problem with the United 
States standing for that. In fact, I think it's imperative.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Professor Lau, Mr. van Walt's 
books argue that it is inappropriate--and if I'm 
mischaracterizing your books, correct me--that it is 
inappropriate to apply the modern definition of sovereignty to 
Tibet and its neighbors because ruling powers in East Asia are 
related to each other in ways that were distinct from the 
Western notion of sovereignty that was applied later. Does your 
research conform to this view? And how would you characterize 
Tibet's relations with its neighbors over the centuries?
    Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. As far as I could 
tell, there are many places in Chinese official records where 
entities were referred to as ``countries,'' which in Chinese is 
guojia, (country). And Tibet is also referred to as a country, 
guojia, just like Vietnam and Holland, and other countries. So 
if you look at the history of Tibet over the past 1,000 years, 
they are not that dissimilar or that different from the 
histories of Germany, or China, whatever. Sometimes they are 
unified into a central administration and at other times it was 
fragmented. And sometimes there were all these principalities.
    So I guess your question itself would take hours to debate, 
and I'm not good enough to answer the question. Certainly, by 
the Qing Empire's time, or actually even before that, I think 
by the 15th or 16th century, Tibet became sufficiently unified. 
They had all these structures of government such as legal 
codes, central taxation, and so forth, that qualified them to 
be a country. But I've always felt that--pardon me for saying 
this--it's a less relevant question. The more relevant question 
is, was Tibet part of China? And if Tibet wasn't part of China, 
to put it bluntly, it's really none of your business whether 
Tibet itself was a country.
    So on one hand I would say, yes, Tibet was definitely a 
country, compared to the standards that would be applicable to 
China and Germany since the 15th century or so. But again, I 
want to repeat that that's probably an unnecessary confusion of 
the issue. The more important issue is that nobody has the 
right to judge whether Tibet was a country. The more important 
thing is whether Tibet was part of somebody else's territory. 
And if it wasn't, then leave Tibet alone.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you for clarifying all that for 
us. Let me ask one other question, and then, to everybody here, 
any closing remarks that you want to make. In a May press 
conference with the Japanese prime minister, President Biden 
said, ``I believe what Putin is attempting to do is eliminate 
the identity of Ukraine''--the identity. He can't occupy it, 
but he can try to destroy its identity, and you know, I think 
those words are true, what Putin is trying to do in Ukraine, 
but I think they're also applicable to what China is trying to 
do in Tibet.
    When we visited Lhasa back in 2015 with Speaker Pelosi, it 
was clear what they're trying to do--deny Tibetans access to 
their religion, prevent them from speaking their language and 
honoring their customs, you know, being who they are. They're 
doing it in a thousand different ways, and displacing people. 
And it really is quite horrific what is going on; the brutality 
is really horrific. How should we view Tibet through the lens 
of President Biden's comment about eliminating the identity of 
Ukraine? And I will ask you all to respond, and also with 
anything that you think we should add for the record. This is 
the time to make that clear as well.
    So why don't we begin with Mr. van Walt.
    Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much. I think what 
is happening in Ukraine--Russia's war within Ukraine is 
bringing home a number of issues that are directly related to 
Tibet as well. I mean, we are obviously shocked by the blatant 
aggression against Ukraine and are reminded that exactly the 
same happened a little over 70 years ago, in relation to Tibet. 
President Biden also made a statement to the effect that taking 
another's territory by force is unacceptable, that it violates 
fundamental norms of our international order. I couldn't agree 
more. And I think that should apply to Tibet.
    In terms of the destruction of the very identity of the 
Tibetans, and I believe the same is true when we look at the 
Uyghurs in East Turkestan, it has become very clear, I think, 
at this point, that the very policy of the PRC and of the 
Chinese Communist Party is precisely this: To destroy the 
identity of these peoples because they have found them to be an 
obstacle to their full integration in China. And not only that, 
but they have found that as long as there is a sense of 
identity in the Tibetan case and in the Uyghur case, both very 
closely linked to their religious beliefs and traditions, that 
the CCP will not be able to fully control the Tibetans.
    This is linked also to the question of the reincarnation of 
the Dalai Lama. All Chinese policies today under Xi Jinping are 
geared at full and total control of the Tibetans, whether it is 
through the Dalai Lama, by picking him and educating him in 
accordance with CCP views, or whether it is by taking the 
children and placing them in this network of colonial schools, 
or whether it is by suppressing religious freedom, and other 
things as well. So, yes, the intention is to rub Tibet off the 
map in terms of the identity and the distinctness of the 
Tibetan people. As part of that, there is a strong effort to 
rob the Tibetans also of their history, since that's also tied 
to their identity and is a continuing embarrassment to China's 
attempt to continue to rule Tibet.
    Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Lau.
    Mr. Lau. Well, I would like to reiterate two points. The 
first point is I hope the United States and other governments 
would counter directly the claims of some of these empire 
revivalists. We're seeing that, of course, in Putin's case, and 
then very likely a few years from now we'll see that explicitly 
expressed in China, that they can use historical fabrications 
to justify their attempts to reunify their ancestral lands. And 
that comes to the second point, which is that I hope in the 
future, in schools throughout the world, people will try to 
change this perception that I know is very deeply ingrained 
among the Chinese, that it's very important to be a national of 
a big country, of a powerful country. They believe that it is 
essential to their well-being. My background is that I was born 
in Singapore. And of course, I've seen countries like 
Liechtenstein and Switzerland; people in Singapore and 
Liechtenstein have no interest in enlarging their countries. 
And people can live very well. But people who are educated in 
Russia and China, it never comes to their minds that they could 
live happily ever after if they lose Xinjiang, or Ukraine, or 
Tibet, or whatever it is. They think it's the end of the world 
if their country is splintered, and then Tibet is gone, and 
Xinjiang is gone. I think it's important for us, using the 
Voice of America, or whatever, to try to somehow tell people 
explicitly that people in Switzerland and Liechtenstein live 
very well. This is all the message that I have.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Mr. Tethong.
    Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Chairman. With reference to what's 
happening in Ukraine, I think one can say that 70 years ago 
Tibet was in the same situation, and unfortunately, the world 
community could not come to Tibet's assistance. We hope 
attention and focus on Ukraine will be much better, and the 
outcome will be better too.
    For the record, I would like to take the opportunity, on 
behalf of all Tibetans, to express acknowledgement and 
gratitude to the United States Government for the attention and 
focus on what's happening in Tibet. Clearly a tremendous amount 
of change has happened in Tibet, for the better, because there 
is attention from the outside world, and especially the United 
States. We especially acknowledge Members of Congress who have 
taken the lead, and your leadership at this time on the Tibet 
issues as well. I would like to say thank you on behalf of the 
Tibetan people.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
    Ms. Bork.
    Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Just in closing, as you're 
talking about what happened 70 years ago, I just wanted to 
mention that the United States took a very principled position 
in support of the Baltic states against the annexation by the 
Soviet Union. There are some dissimilarities, but not really 
serious ones, in my view. It's really valuable for the United 
States to look back at the constraints it's imposed on itself 
all these decades, acting on behalf of Tibet and making the 
Tibetan exile government's position stronger in trying to reach 
some kind of improvement. In that regard, I think a strategic 
focusing on Tibet as a strategic issue is vital.
    For the record, I will pass along to the staff a readout of 
a tabletop exercise that several of us conducted in 2019 about 
the future, with the passing of the Dalai Lama and how 
governments will respond at that time. Clearly that is an 
exercise that needs to be repeated. And it would be something 
that I think Members of Congress would find useful to think 
about--being prepared for that eventuality, and what China will 
do and what the United States and its allies should do in 
preparation. Thank you very much.
    Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, and thank all of you for your 
testimony. I think this is a very important hearing because in 
our discussions on Tibet, and some of the topics that we 
covered here today, we don't include the historical fact that 
Tibet has not been a part of China since ancient times. I think 
everybody here has disputed that very clearly. Our focus is on 
standing with the people of Tibet to protect their identity, to 
protect their history, to protect their culture, and to protect 
their human rights, and I believe that we in the United 
States--and, Mr. Tethong, I appreciate your kind words, but to 
be honest with you, we're not doing enough. The world community 
is not doing enough. You know, if we were, we would be having a 
very different discussion right now.
    And it's complicated. There are corporate interests 
involved, urging governments not to rock the boat because 
they're all worried about continued corporate profits and 
strategic issues. Nobody wants to rock the boat with China. 
We're very good at talking the talk; we're not very good at 
always walking the walk on these issues.
    But I think that's changing. I really do. I mean, I look at 
the last few years here in the United States Congress. We have 
legislated more; we have created more policy on Tibet than at 
any other time. As I said, Tibet's true representatives are His 
Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as 
recognized by the Tibetan people, and I think that that should 
be our guiding principle here as we move forward. I mean, it's 
not up to President Biden, or it's not about what President Xi 
wants for Tibet. It's not about what the President of France 
wants. It's what the Tibetan people want.
    So any solution, any way forward, has to be what the 
Tibetan people want. It can't be imposed by somebody who's not 
part of the Tibetan community and I think there's a growing 
recognition of that. The Tibetan government-in-exile is showing 
an embrace of democracy, which is really inspiring. I witnessed 
some of the election. I've watched online as people voted in 
far-off places, participating in this process. It really is 
inspirational. But I've also met with families who have been 
torn apart, people who don't know where their mothers or 
fathers are, who were disappeared. It's cruel and it is 
horrific.
    Again, we are moving forward with additional legislation. 
We are encouraged by the new special coordinator in this 
administration. We will work with her to have her not only be a 
spokesperson for what U.S. policy should be but to work with 
the international community. I was particularly grateful that 
this hearing is being held at the same time that the World 
Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet is meeting. This is not 
just a U.S. issue. It is a global issue. If you care about 
human rights, this has to be a central issue. I mean, you go 
all over the world and you have these countries go, Oh, human 
rights, human rights, human rights. Well, if you can't stand up 
to China on something like this, then stop talking about human 
rights.
    And to the Chinese government, look, if you want to do 
something constructive right now, you should re-enter the 
direct dialogue that you walked away from 12 years ago. This 
issue is not going away.
    I appreciate everybody being here. I want to thank all the 
witnesses for their testimony. Without objection, I'd like to 
enter into the record a written statement from the 
International Campaign for Tibet and an additional paper by 
Professor Lau. The record will remain open until the close of 
business on Friday, June 24th, for any items that members would 
like to submit for the record or any additional questions for 
the witnesses. And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]



=======================================================================


                         A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X

=======================================================================


                          Prepared Statements

                                ------                                


            Prepared Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag

    Contrary to what the People's Republic of China claims and to what 
many people take for granted, Tibet was historically not a part of 
China. This is one of the outcomes of a multiyear collaborative 
historical research project that I recently completed and published.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The 10-year research project, which involved some 100 leading 
scholars worldwide, resulted in the publication of Sacred Mandates: 
Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan, co-authored/edited 
with Timothy Brook and Miek Boltjes, Chicago University Press, 2018, 
and Tibet Brief 20/20, co-authored with Miek Boltjes, Outskirts Press, 
2020. Sacred Mandates won a 2021 International Convention of Asian 
Scholars Book Prize.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is relevant and requires our attention because the PRC 
government has made agreement on its version of history a precondition 
to Sino-Tibetan negotiations, which have been in deadlock now for 12 
years.\2\ More fundamentally, the PRC bases its entitlement to Tibet 
solely on its assertion that Tibet has been an integral part of China 
since antiquity.\3\ Whether or not Tibet was historically a part of 
China therefore determines whether the PRC has the legitimacy to rule 
Tibet or not. And that in turn informs the international community's 
obligations and responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See State Council Information Office of the People's Republic 
of China, Tibet's Path to Development Is Driven by an Irresistible 
Historical Tide (Beijing, April 15, 2015).
    \3\ Tibet Brief 20/20, op. cit. pp. 6-10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Addressing the plight of the Tibetan people has been one of my 
lifelong goals, and my contributions have mostly been in the 
international legal and diplomacy spheres, in line with my career. I 
undertook this academic historical research to get to the bottom of 
what informs the PRC government and the Dalai Lama in their opposing 
views on Tibet's historical status, with the aim to be able to come up 
with strategies for those with access and clout to encourage the 
parties to break through the stalemate and resume their dialogue.
    In the process it became clear that the PRC's historical 
narrative--that Tibet has always been a part of China--stands in the 
way of Sino-Tibetan negotiations in more than one way. The 
international community has started to buy into that narrative and 
governments have started to act accordingly, treating Tibet as if it 
was China's internal affair and even stating they consider Tibet to be 
a part of China. I strongly believe that this development is one of the 
main obstacles to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through 
negotiations. It is also in violation of international law.
    Our research firmly establishes that though not always 
`independent' in the modern legal sense of that term and over time 
subject to various degrees of Mongol, Manchu and even British authority 
or influence, Tibet was most certainly never a part of China. The PRC 
could therefore not have `inherited' Tibet from the Republic of China 
or earlier empires, as it claims. As a matter of fact, Tibet was an 
independent state de facto and de jure from 1912 to 1950/51, when the 
PRC invaded it.
    Because Tibet was not at any point in time a part of China, the 
PRC's military invasion of Tibet in 1950/51 constituted an act of 
aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international law 
prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force against 
another state.\4\ This informs the legitimacy of the PRC's presence in 
and rule of Tibet the past seven decades: China does not have 
sovereignty over Tibet. It is occupying Tibet illegally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ A peremptory norm is an international obligation ``so essential 
for the protection of fundamental interests of the international 
community that [its] breach [is] recognized as a crime by that 
community as a whole''. International Law Commission Rapporteur Roberto 
Ago. Quoted in Cassese, International Law, p. 202. Aggression is a 
prime example.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    International law prohibits governments from explicitly or 
implicitly recognizing China's unlawful annexation of Tibet, from doing 
anything that helps China consolidate its hold on Tibet, and from 
denying the Tibetans the exercise of their right to self-
determination.\5\ It also prohibits states from benefiting from the 
exploitation of Tibet's resources so long as Tibetans are denied the 
ability to make decisions concerning them.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ International Law Commission, `Articles on the Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)' (2001) YILC Vol. 
2, Part 2, Arts. 40, 41, and commentary para 5. See also, UNGA Res 2625 
(XXV) Declaration on Friendly Relations Confirmed by the International 
Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued 
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding 
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), paras 119, 124, ICJ Reports 
1971; and in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras 155-159, ICJ Reports 2004.
    \6\ Court of Justice of the European Union in a landmark case 
concerning the Sahrawi people's rights, in 2016, CJEU, Judgment in Case 
C-104/16 P Council v Front populaire pour la liberation de la saguia-
el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Dec. 21, 2016 https://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/
cp160146en.pdf, accessed 08/28/2021. Confirmed by the UK High Court on 
2019, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
g=e9a48d23-358c-4948-b754-3f8868bda922.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the same time, governments have the positive obligation to take 
action to help bring about a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict, 
end the occupation of Tibet and enable the Tibetan people to exercise 
self-determination.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ International Law Commission, ARSIWA, op. cit., Commentary to 
Art. 41(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many governments are today acting contrary to these obligations, in 
plain violation of international law and to the detriment of the 
resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. This includes the US 
government.
    Two developments stand out in this regard: governments make 
statements recognizing that Tibet is a part of the PRC, and they treat 
Tibet as China's internal affair, outside their purview.
    When governments state that they consider Tibet to be a part of the 
PRC, they take away the PRC's principal incentive to negotiate with the 
Tibetans as well as reduce the latter's main source of leverage. In the 
first place, Beijing uses these statements as `evidence' for its claim 
that it has sovereignty and legitimacy in Tibet, and even for its 
historical claim. The more such statements it obtains, the less it 
feels the need to turn to Tibetans for legitimacy. Instead, it uses the 
international community's pronouncements as a substitute for true 
legitimacy, that is, the legitimacy that would result from the consent 
of the governed--through an exercise by the Tibetans of self-
determination or through a process of sincere negotiations with the 
Tibetan leadership.
    Secondly, once a government states that it considers Tibet to be a 
part of the PRC it cannot but treat Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations as 
China's internal affair. This is effectively happening today: most 
governments are limiting their expressions of concern to human rights 
abuses. In this way Beijing has largely succeeded in containing 
international scrutiny and reproach to where it can manage it.
    Some governments, including the U.S., have also added that they do 
not support or are opposed to Tibetan independence.\8\ Such statements 
not only violate the prohibition against recognizing annexation by 
force, but also constitute a denial of the Tibetan people's right to 
self-determination, an equally serious violation of international law. 
Even though states cannot actually take away the right to self-
determination--including the option of independence--from the Tibetan 
people, such statements do the Tibetans a great disservice and 
encourage Beijing to ignore the Tibetans' rights. By supporting the 
aggressor, not the injured, they also fail to fulfill the fundamental 
role international law requires the international community to play--to 
prevent war and promote friendly relations and cooperation among states 
based inter alia on the principles of non-use of force against other 
states and of equal rights and self-determination of peoples--
frustrating the very purpose of international law in the process. For, 
as the International Court of Justice underscored in the Namibia case, 
\9\ it is precisely to the international community that the injured 
people must look for ending the illegality and for realizing its 
rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ See, e.g., President Barack Obama--February 21, 2014, Readout 
of the President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama. See 
also, `Note Verbale' of the Danish government of Dec. 9, 2009. Reported 
by AFP, Dec. 10, 2009.
    \9\ International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences for 
States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ 
Reports 1971, para 127, concerning South Africa's illegal annexation of 
Namibia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is for Tibetans, and Tibetans only, to make concessions with 
respect to their right to independence--if and when they so decide. 
Ruling out independence one-sidedly disempowers the Tibetan side. It 
weakens the Tibetans' negotiation position, exacerbates the already 
stark power asymmetry, and conditions the expectations of the Tibetans 
as well as of the international community to envision a settlement that 
can bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know, not only 
about China's treatment of Tibetans \10\ but also of Uyghurs, as 
detailed in the recent Newslines Institute Genocide report,\11\ and the 
fact that Tibetans are resorting to self-immolation to protest 
Beijing's oppression and policies to eradicate Tibetan identity,\12\ I 
ask: is marginal change in Tibet what the U.S. wants for the Tibetan 
people?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ See Tibet Action Institute, Separated from Their Families, 
Hidden from the World; China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools 
inside Tibet, December 2021; Tibet Advocacy Coalition, Assaulting 
Identity: China's New Coercive Strategies in Tibet, March 2021.
    \11\ Newslines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Uyghur 
Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, March 2021.
    \12\ There have been 160 confirmed cases of self-immolation since 
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The need for the international community to take responsibility and 
effectively address the Sino-Tibetan conflict is not just a legal and 
moral imperative, it is also a political necessity. Looking the other 
way with an underlying ``let's not make the Tibetans' problem our 
problem'' has been a mistake for which the international community is 
today paying a price as it tries to deal with an emboldened PRC and 
Russia asserting expanding territorial claims and influence.
    Beijing's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and 
threatening moves towards India and Bhutan to press territorial claims, 
as well as its genocidal policies against Uyghurs, all taking place at 
the time of this writing, cannot be treated as unrelated to the years 
of international appeasement of Beijing as concerns its unlawful 
seizure and occupation of Tibet and its implementation of oppressive 
policies of integration and assimilation there. And neither can 
Russia's attempt at forcefully annexing part or all of Ukraine.
    It is U.S. policy to support a negotiated resolution of the Sino-
Tibetan conflict. U.S. Government actions, however, run counter to U.S. 
policy. Supporting a negotiated resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict 
requires the political will to be vocal about the lack of legitimacy of 
China's presence in and rule of Tibet, not statements that imply an 
acceptance of China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. It requires 
calling and treating Tibet what it is: an occupied country, and the 
Tibetans what they are: a people under alien subjugation and 
domination, not a `minority' or `ethnic group of China'. Adopting such 
PRC terminology denies the Tibetan people its proper status and 
implicitly its right to self-determination. And lastly, it requires the 
Sino-Tibetan conflict to be called and treated what it is: an 
international conflict, falling squarely within the international 
community's--including the U.S. Government's--purview and 
responsibility, not China's internal affair.
    It is also U.S. policy not to recognize a country's attempt to 
annex territory by the use of force. President Joe Biden recently 
reiterated that taking territory by force is unacceptable. He said so 
publicly in reference to Taiwan and Ukraine.\13\ The prohibition 
against taking another country's territory by force is a cornerstone 
and fundamental norm of modern international law and the international 
legal order. No derogation from this is allowed, and governments are 
prohibited from recognizing such territorial expansion. Just as 
Russia's attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory cannot be accepted 
or recognized by the international community, so China's attempted 
annexation of Tibet must not be accepted or recognized. Only in the 
absence of such recognition may the PRC government be moved to 
negotiate with the Tibetan leadership to resolve their conflict.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
2022/05/23/remarks-by-
president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-
press-conference/. President Biden accused President Putin of attacking 
``the norms and principles that are the foundations of our 
international order.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Department of State stated on March 12, in relation to the 
Russo-Ukrainian conflict, that the U.S. is committed to ``putting the 
Ukrainians in the strongest possible negotiating position''.\14\ 
Tibet's leaders are committed to non-violence and do not seek weapons. 
But they do need coordinated international action to--at a minimum--
firmly anchor Tibet's international legal status, to bolster its 
negotiating capacity and to bring China to the negotiating table. The 
U.S. and other governments have shown in recent months how coordinated 
diplomatic and economic measures, including sanctions, can be deployed 
in efforts to stop and punish aggression. Such coordinated action is 
overdue to address China's occupation of Tibet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-ready-take-diplomatic-
steps-ukraine-will-find-
helpful-state-dept-2022-03-12/

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                Prepared Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong

    Hon. Chairman,
    It is my distinct honor to offer testimony this morning at this 
hearing on ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' and 
to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in the 20th century, 
including efforts towards a resolution of the Tibet issue.
    Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever since the 
establishment of the People's Republic of China. One of Mao Zedong's 
earliest declarations was his intention to ``liberate'' Tibet from the 
West, and the Tibetan people from a backward and oppressive society.
    The Tibetan government protested to the new Chinese state citing 
Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan Kings to the 
rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu Qing dynasties. 
With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the United Nations and the global 
community, especially to India, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Unfortunately, China did not heed Tibet's protests and the 
global community did not come to Tibet's defense.
    The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950, easily 
overwhelming the Tibetan army and militia. China knew right then that 
rhetorical justification for such an invasion was not enough and called 
for negotiations to formalize an agreement. Tibetan representatives 
negotiated in Beijing, but disregarding any proper ratification 
process, were forced to sign what is called ``The 17 Point Agreement 
for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.''
    Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His Holiness the Dalai Lama 
and the Tibetan government tried to work within the broad confines of 
the agreement which promised no change in the status of the Dalai Lama 
or the Tibetan government. However, the Chinese did not live up to 
their commitments nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had 
received from Mao Zedong.
    Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years and 
protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the uprising in 
Lhasa on March 10, 1959, which led to the escape of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama and thousands to India and neighboring countries.
    For the next twenty years Tibet was completely shut off from the 
rest of the world. An extreme overhaul of Tibetan life from its 
traditional Buddhist roots to Chinese Marxist socialism was introduced, 
which in the later years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese 
Cultural revolution.
    However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue important 
enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older 
brother to Beijing and declared that short of separation, everything 
could be discussed, meaning that short of granting Tibetan 
independence, China would be open to all Tibetan concerns and 
aspirations.
    This breakthrough meeting led to renewed dialogue between the Dalai 
Lama and the Chinese government, and four delegations of exile leaders 
were able to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had 
transpired in the two decades of Chinese rule.
    By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in 
deliberations with Chinese officials to address the larger issues 
related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, Party General Secretary 
and the main proponent of change in their Tibet policies died. This was 
soon followed by the Tiananmen student protests and the massacre. China 
stepped backwards and the Tibet issue also retreated.
    In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, and Envoys 
of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in Beijing, and the 
Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's Middle Way policy seeking 
genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. The Envoys 
met many times, even after the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests 
that called for greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the 
Envoys' last meeting was to be in 2010 when the Chinese ended the 
dialogue process.
    This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should show that 
even at the most challenging of times, China has seen the need to 
address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet. And that there is 
perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of their rule. China has 
also repeatedly initiated direct communication with His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, demonstrating the obvious need to find a meaningful 
resolution to these outstanding issues.
    Ever since the exile delegation visits to Tibet in the 1980s, to 
the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in Beijing, the Chinese 
leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan perspectives of 
their rule in Tibet, and of the unvarnished aspirations of the Tibetan 
people, both of which contradict the official Chinese narrative.
    Worldwide attention to Tibet has been an important part of creating 
greater awareness of the Tibetan issue even within China, allowing for 
more liberal and reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan 
hopes and demands to have some standing.
    There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, through the 
person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concerns for the cultural and 
human rights of the Tibetan people, has been an important factor in the 
U.S. Government's attention to the issue, which has been sustained to a 
large degree by individual members of Congress.
    The continued efforts of the United States can only help in 
removing barriers to this unresolved conflict and will advance the 
Tibetan people's desire for greater freedom and democracy.
    Thank you.
                                 ______
                                 

                    Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork

    Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me 
to appear before you today. I am also grateful to the Commission staff 
for their advice and expertise.
    The Trump Administration began, and the Biden Administration 
continues, to chart a profound change in American policy toward 
Communist Party-ruled China.
    So far, however, Tibet has not been the focus of significant policy 
revisions by the executive branch. Certainly, Tibet today would be far 
down the list of most Americans' concerns when it comes to China. 
Compared to China's aggression in the South China Sea, coercive 
financial diplomacy, and the threat to Taiwan, Tibet is sometimes 
viewed as a closed, albeit tragic, chapter of history.
    By contrast, more than 70 years after the invasion, Tibet remains a 
high priority for the Chinese Communist Party. This priority is evident 
in the attention and resources the Party devotes to surveillance, 
repression and control, to General Secretary Xi Jinping's goal of 
sinicizing religion, to the exploitation of natural resources and to 
building up military forces along Tibet's border with India.
    Furthermore, the Party's ambitions regarding Tibet are 
international and expansive. They are a part of China's assault on 
liberal democratic norms. This in turn serves Beijing's ultimate goal 
of gaining international deference to its choice of the next Dalai 
Lama. Preventing that, reversing the diminution of support for the 
Dalai Lama and building support for Tibetan democracy should play a 
much greater role in America's response to China.
    The foundations of American Tibet policy make this more difficult 
than it should be. A look back at history shows that America's Tibet 
policy is not the product of historical facts, or principles of 
international law, but rather of outdated perceptions of America's 
strategic interest in subordinating Tibet to China.
    Washington had little involvement in Tibet until World War II. 
Before then, the U.S. favored China's territorial integrity even while 
its empire was disintegrating. During World War II, Washington was 
allied with Chiang Kai-Shek. That relationship had profound and lasting 
effect on Tibet.
    Chiang hoped to recover lost imperial territory, including Tibet. 
American officials did not wish to undermine him, even though officials 
knew that he exerted no authority there and they considered that Tibet 
had been de facto independent for decades since the collapse of 
imperial rule.
    Also damaging was Washington's acceptance of imperial Britain's 
assertion of Chinese ``suzerainty'' over Tibet. Less than sovereignty, 
suzerainty is an anachronistic and inapt concept which neither Tibet 
nor China accepted but which imperial Britain introduced in order to 
fend off Russia's eastward advance during the geopolitical competition 
in the region known as the Great Game.
    Even so, American officials seemed uncomfortable with the term, and 
resisted using it. From the 1940s through the 1960s, in internal 
documents, officials considered different views of Tibet's status in 
response to developments. At the time of the invasion, a memo by the 
State Department's legal advisor suggested that recognition of Tibetan 
independence was a possibility. Later on, in the 1960s, there was 
sympathy for the idea of Tibetan self-determination, including in a 
letter from the Secretary of State to the Dalai Lama. But it was easy 
enough to say this while doing little except provide some support to 
Tibetan rebels, and while the U.S. was still allied with Chiang Kai-
shek, who had fled to Taiwan.
    Only decades after the invasion did the U.S. recognize Chinese 
sovereignty. In 1987, the State Department, responding to questions 
about unrest in Tibet, dated this position to 1978. That reference 
appears to have been an internal decision rather than a public 
statement. And it took place around the time of the break in relations 
with Taipei. Visiting Beijing in August 1979, Vice President Mondale 
told Deng Xiao-ping, ``our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is 
part of China.'' The Vice President also said that henceforth, the 
Dalai Lama would be received as a religious figure, not a political 
leader.
    In short, America's approach to Tibet fluctuated according to its 
perception of its strategic interests with regard to China--and with 
regard to which Chinese government it favored--the Republic of China or 
the People's Republic of China. Ultimately, Washington transferred its 
deference to China over Tibet from a cultish dictatorship that never 
exerted authority there to a cultish totalitarian regime that invaded 
and repressed it.
    Once this was done, Tibet became problematic within U.S.-PRC 
relations. As Melvyn Goldstein writes, with policy focused on improving 
its accommodation with China, Tibet became ``an embarrassment for the 
United States,'' ``no longer relevant to U.S. national interests'' and 
even ``potentially harmful.'' \1\ The characterization of Tibet as a 
problem in U.S.-China relations that should be neutralized, including 
for Tibet's own sake, has persisted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Melvyn Goldstein, Snow Lion and the Dragon,(Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997), p. 57-58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Of course this approach to Tibet, and the decision to accept the 
PRC's sovereignty, meant that the democratization of the theocratic 
government in exile--and the illegitimacy of Party rule there--could 
not be a major factor in America's policy. The extraordinary 
accomplishment of Tibet's democracy in exile would not be discussed 
alongside the democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan, 
Indonesia, and South Korea at the end of the last century which have 
shaped America's approach to the region ever since. It should also be 
noted that America's approach to Tibet had been out of step with the 
principled stance Washington took against communist aggression in 
Europe and the annexation of the Baltic states.

          * * * * * * *

    For its part, the CCP has maintained an ambitious agenda for Tibet, 
and not only inside its borders. In neighboring countries it has used 
border settlements, security relationships, investment and the 
development and appropriation of Buddhist sites to advance its 
interests. In fact, even today, Chinese officials maintain territorial 
ambitions with regard to Tibet, speaking of parts of northeastern India 
as ``Southern Tibet'' and putting pressure on India across the Tibet-
India border.
    Beijing also pursues its Tibet agenda aggressively in foreign 
capitals and international organizations. Beijing uses its self-
proclaimed ``core interest'' in Tibet to impose litmus tests in the 
United Nations, and in foreign capitals.
    In this way, Tibet is an instrument of the Party's assault on 
liberal democratic norms. It is also intended to help the Party win 
international deference to its selection of the next Dalai Lama.
    In 2019, I convened a group with expertise in Tibet, China, India, 
and American foreign policy to consider how governments would respond 
when the Dalai Lama dies, and China seeks to install an impostor. The 
group concluded that the Dalai Lama's succession is a matter of 
strategic competition and should be viewed as such by the U.S. and its 
democratic allies.
    A final note: the Party's intense propaganda and control makes it 
seem that Chinese people are irredeemably nationalist when it comes to 
Tibet. This has an effect inside China, of course, but also outside, 
making new thinking about Tibet seem hopeless. In fact, leading Chinese 
dissidents have offered criticism of Party policies in Tibet. Going 
back to Wei Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong, 
pro-democracy activists, lawyers and others have bravely linked Tibet's 
fate to China's, stressing that the solution for both Tibetans and 
Chinese is democracy. Liu Xiaobo wrote in 2008, ``a confrontation 
between freedom and dictatorship has been made to look like a clash 
between ethnicities.'' \2\ The democracy manifesto, Charter 08, 
referenced Tibet indirectly in its call for a ``federation of 
democratic communities of China'' and the resolution of ``disputes in 
the national minority areas of China . . . to find a workable framework 
within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Liu Xiaobo, ``So Long as Han Chinese Have No Freedom, Tibetans 
Will Have No Autonomy,'' April 11, 2008, No Enemies, No Hatred, Perry 
Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, Liu Xia, editors, (Cambridge: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 263.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is a message from inside China that American officials should 
consider. Taken together with the democratic achievement of the Tibetan 
people in exile, the U.S. can chart a new approach based on Tibet's 
strategic importance, not only in the territorial sense, but in the 
ideological one.
    A few recommendations follow:

      Renew and redouble support for Chinese and Tibetan 
political prisoners, dissidents, democracy activists, independent 
journalists and lawyers.
      Conduct an independent review of U.S. Tibet policy since 
the end of Chinese imperial rule, including the diplomatic history, and 
of internal deliberations that have influenced America's approach to 
Tibet.
      Bring Tibet policy into line with America's interest in 
combating China's assault on democratic norms, including international 
law, and in advancing democracy in the Indo-Pacific by enlisting allies 
in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan process for 
selecting the next Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama, or his designee, should 
regain the access he once had in foreign capitals.
      Receive elected officials of the Central Tibet 
Administration (CTA), the Sikyong, his cabinet and other Tibetan 
officials at the highest levels of government and include them in the 
Summit for Democracy and other gatherings.
      Make Tibet a part of efforts to counter Chinese influence 
in international organizations, on university campuses and at the state 
and local level.
                                 ______
                                 

                Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley

    Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive 
Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an 
Unresolved Conflict'' will come to order.
    More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese rule in 
Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of unrelenting 
oppression. Chinese authorities routinely violate Tibetans' freedom of 
religion, expression, and assembly, as well as denying their self-
determination.
    The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign of 
``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially sanctioned 
interpretations of religion and culture, not the authentic practice and 
teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary to that practice and teaching, 
the Chinese government even insists on its own authority to select the 
next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, who authorities label a security 
threat. Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
    Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with Chinese 
rule in Tibet. These punishments range from warnings to surveillance to 
interrogation and detention. The Commission's Political Prisoner 
Database currently includes records of 715 Tibetans detained or 
imprisoned for political or religious reasons. We note that there are 
considerably more cases of detention in China than we can capture in 
the database.
    Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, cultural, 
linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people. Earlier this 
year, we heard testimony about insidious efforts to separate Tibetan 
children from their parents, with nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan 
children now placed in boarding schools to disrupt the 
intergenerational transfer of language and culture. We are observing an 
expansion of that practice to children going to kindergarten.
    This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights 
violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. In 
today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to address the 
aspirations of the Tibetan people for their basic rights and self-
determination to be respected. Sadly, that dialogue has been frozen for 
12 years as Chinese authorities refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or 
his representatives.
    The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote dialogue 
without preconditions to lead to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. In 
other words, we recognize that this remains an unsettled conflict that 
must be addressed. Yet the Chinese government would have the world 
believe that Tibet is an internal affair and that issues of its status 
are resolved. This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's 
hearing aims to set the historical record straight.
    Our witnesses will share with us their considerable experience 
analyzing the history of Tibet, the international law dimensions of the 
conflict, the barriers to resuming dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. 
I hope this hearing helps cut through Chinese propaganda and brings 
attention to the true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for 
autonomy.
    I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
Exile--it's good to have you here--the International Campaign for 
Tibet, dignitaries, and other friends of Tibet who are with us this 
morning while they are in town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' 
Convention on Tibet. Thank you for joining us.
    The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination need 
champions all over the globe and I look forward to continuing to work 
with my fellow parliamentarians to advance the causes of human dignity 
and freedom wherever we can.
    Among global elected officials, few have been as great a friend of 
Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for many years has led 
the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation and advocate for 
the Tibetan people.
                                 ______
                                 

              Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern

    Thank you, very much Mr. Chairman, and I too also want to welcome 
our friends who are visiting Washington to participate in the World 
Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet.
    I want to especially welcome the members of the Tibetan parliament-
in-exile. We have two members of the Canadian parliament here. I 
welcome our friends from ICT. And I welcome my dear friend Richard 
Gere, who has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights 
in Tibet. We are delighted you are all here.
    I appreciate that we are holding this hearing on Tibet, the status 
of dialogue, and a path forward in the Tibetan quest for rights and 
dignity.
    Congress has had a long and abiding interest in Tibet. It created 
Tibetan language broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid 
programs for Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed 
the landmark Tibetan Policy Act, and codified the position of Special 
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
    Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. Congressman Tom 
Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by side with the Dalai Lama. 
So did President Bush and Speaker Pelosi, who presented him with the 
Congressional Gold Medal in 2007.
    I have had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet bills 
to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act seeks to 
enable diplomats, journalists,and tourists to travel and see Tibet with 
their own eyes, because Chinese officials have closed it off. The 
Tibetan Policy and Support Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its 
key feature, the bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or 
reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th 
Dalai Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided 
solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community. Not by China.
    Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the human 
rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people. But the core 
problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot advocate for themselves. 
They are forced to live in an authoritarian system under a paranoid 
central government that sees any expression of distinct identity as a 
threat to their power.
    His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this way. 
He's right. For decades he sought to negotiate with Chinese 
authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side did agree to ten 
rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai Lama's envoys. But they 
did not do so in good faith.
    Chinese officials say they will return to the table only if the 
Dalai Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only 
unreasonable, but false. The U.S. Government, to its credit, has 
consistently called on the Chinese to return to dialogue, without 
preconditions. But that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood 
ready, the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we keep 
doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic or strategy? 
That is the question we will explore in this hearing.
    Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of perspectives--
legal, historical, policy, and personal--to the Tibet-China dialogue. 
We hope to hear what Congress and the U.S. Government can do to help. 
Should we be countering false Chinese narratives? Should we reorient 
how we talk about the basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in 
the current environment, and what would the alternatives be?
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider these 
important questions. I look forward to our hearing.

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                          Witness Biographies

    Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of international law and 
executive president of Kreddha

    Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international law and 
executive president of Kreddha, an international NGO created to help 
prevent and resolve violent intrastate conflicts. He is a Senior Fellow 
at the Sompong Sucharitkul Center for Advanced International Legal 
Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, and a 
member of the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. He has 
served as a Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Social Sciences, 
University of California Davis, as Visiting Professor of Modern 
International Relations and International Law, Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton, and as Legal Advisor to the Office of His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama. He is the author with Miek Boltjes of Tibet Brief 20/20 
and author and editor of Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations 
since Chinggis Khan.

    Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City University of Hong 
Kong

    Hon-Shiang Lau's ancestry is Guangdong province, China. He was born 
and educated in Singapore. He obtained his bachelor of engineering 
degree from the University of Singapore in 1969, and a Ph.D. in 
business administration from the University of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill in 1973. He was Full Professor of Business Administration at 
Washington State University starting in 1980, Regents Professor at 
Oklahoma State University starting in 1987, and Chair Professor of 
Operations Management at the City University of Hong Kong starting in 
2000. He took early retirement in 2011 to devote his time to Chinese 
history. The Chinese-language edition of his book Tibet Was Never Part 
of China since Antiquity was published in 2019; its English-language 
translation will appear soon.

    Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representive of His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama, New York and Washington, DC

    Tenzin N. Tethong is the former Representative of His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He served in several roles in 
the Central Tibetan Administration based in Dharamsala, India, 
including as Kalon Tripa (Chief of Cabinet) and Kalon of various 
portfolios such as the Departments of Finance, Home, and Information & 
International Relations. He headed the second delegation of Tibetans to 
Tibet and China in 1980. From 1997 to 2011 he was a Distinguished 
Fellow and taught in the Tibetan Studies Initiative at Stanford 
University. He previously served as Director of the Tibetan language 
service at Radio Free Asia and currently serves as Director of the 
Tibetan language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a 
personal capacity.

    Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose

    Ellen Bork is a contributing editor at American Purpose. She writes 
about American foreign policy with an emphasis on democracy and human 
rights. She served as the senior professional staff member for Asia and 
the Pacific on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes 
frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her 
writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the 
Washington Post, and other publications. She graduated from Yale 
University and the Georgetown University Law Center.
        
        

                                 [all]