    [Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
                             AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                  CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION
                                   __________

                                 JUNE 23, 2022
                                   __________

     Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

                       [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  Available at www.cecc.gov or www.govinfo.gov

                                  ___________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    47-897 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023

                  CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                        LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

    Senate                               House

    JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon, Chair          JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts,
    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California                 Co-chair
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                BRIAN MAST, Florida
    ANGUS KING, Maine                    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
    JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
                                         JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
                                         MICHELLE STEEL, California

                         EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                               Not yet appointed

                          Matt Squeri, Staff Director

                       Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                   Statements

                                                                       Page
    Opening Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley, a U.S. Senator from
      Oregon; Chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on China.....     1
    Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern, a U.S. Representative from
      Massachusetts; Co-chair, Congressional-Executive Commission on
      China..........................................................     2
    Statement of Hon. Chris Smith, a U.S. Representative from New
      Jersey.........................................................     4
    Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of
      international law and executive president of Kreddha...........     5
    Statement of Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City
      University of Hong Kong........................................     6
    Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representative of His
      Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC...........     8
    Statement of Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose...     9

                                    APPENDIX
                              Prepared Statements

    van Walt van Praag, Michael......................................    31
    Lau, Hon-Shiang..................................................    34
    Tethong, Tenzin N................................................    38
    Bork, Ellen......................................................    39

    Merkley, Hon. Jeff...............................................    41
    McGovern, Hon. James P...........................................    42

                           Submissions for the Record

    Statement of the International Campaign for Tibet, submitted by
      Representative McGovern........................................    43
    ``The Genuine `China Version' of Tibet's History: Tibet Was Never
      Part of China since Antiquity,'' by Hon-Shiang Lau.............    55
    CECC Truth in Testimony Disclosure Form..........................   122
    Witness Biographies..............................................   123

                                     (iii)

                          TIBET: BARRIERS TO SETTLING
                             AN UNRESOLVED CONFLICT

                                  ----------

                            THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2022

                                Congressional-Executive
                                           Commission on China,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The hearing was held from 9:05 a.m. to 10:56 a.m., room H-
    313, the Capitol, Washington, DC, and virtually via Cisco
    Webex, Senator Jeff Merkley, Chairman, Congressional-Executive
    Commission on China, presiding.
        Also present: Representative James P. McGovern, Co-chair,
    Senator Jon Ossoff, and Representatives Chris Smith and
    Michelle Steel.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, A SENATOR FROM OREGON
         AND CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

        Chair Merkley. Good morning. Today's hearing of the
    Congressional-Executive Commission on China entitled ``Tibet:
    Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' will come to
    order.
        More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese
    rule in Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of
    unrelenting opposition. Chinese authorities routinely violate
    Tibetans' freedom of religion, expression, and assembly and
    deny Tibetans self-determination.
        The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign
    of ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially
    sanctioned interpretations of religion and culture, not the
    authentic practice and teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary
    to that practice and teaching, the Chinese government even
    insists on its own authority to select the next reincarnation
    of the Dalai Lama, whom authorities label a security threat.
    Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
        Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with
    Chinese rule in Tibet. Punishments range from warnings to
    surveillance to interrogation and detention. The Commission's
    Political Prisoner Database currently includes records of 715
    Tibetans detained or imprisoned for political or religious
    reasons. We note that there are considerably more cases of
    detention in China than we can capture in the database.
        Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious,
    cultural, linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan
    people. Earlier this year, we heard testimony about insidious
    efforts to separate Tibetan children from their parents, with
    nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan children now placed in
    boarding schools to disrupt the intergenerational transfer of
    language and culture. We are observing an extension or
    expansion of that practice now to children going to
    kindergarten.
        This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights
    violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so.
    In today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to
    address the aspirations of the Tibetan people that their basic
    rights and self-determination be respected. Sadly, that
    dialogue has been frozen for 12 years, as Chinese authorities
    refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or his representatives.
        The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote
    dialogue without pre-conditions to achieve a negotiated
    agreement on Tibet. In other words, we recognize that this
    remains an unsettled conflict that must be addressed. Yet the
    Chinese government would have the world believe that Tibet is
    an internal affair and that issues of its status are resolved.
    This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's hearing
    aims to set the historical record straight.
        Our witnesses will share with us their considerable
    experience analyzing the history of Tibet, the international
    law dimensions of the conflict, the barriers to resuming
    dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet. I hope this hearing helps
    cut through Chinese propaganda and helps bring attention to the
    true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for
    autonomy.
        I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan
    Parliament-in-exile--it's good to have you here--the
    International Campaign for Tibet, dignitaries, and other
    friends of Tibet who are with us this morning while they are in
    town for the 8th World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet.
    Thank you for joining us.
        The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination
    need champions all over the globe, and I look forward to
    continuing to work with my fellow parliamentarians to advance
    the cause of human dignity and freedom wherever we can.
        Among global elected officials, few have been as great a
    friend of Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for
    many years has led the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass
    legislation and advocate for the Tibetan people. I now
    recognize him for his remarks.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES P. McGOVERN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
      JERSEY AND CO-CHAIR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON
                                 CHINA

        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
    too, want to welcome our friends who are visiting Washington
    for the World Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet. I want to
    especially welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
    exile. We have two members of the Canadian Parliament here. I
    want to welcome my friends from the International Campaign for
    Tibet, and I want to welcome my dear friend Richard Gere, who
    has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights
    in Tibet. We're delighted you are all here.
        You know, I appreciate that we're holding this hearing on
    Tibet, the status of dialogue, and a path forward in the
    Tibetan quest for rights and dignity. Congress has had a long
    and abiding interest in Tibet. It created Tibetan-language
    broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid programs for
    Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed the
    landmark Tibetan Policy Act and codified the position of
    Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
        Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide.
    Congressman Tom Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by
    side with the Dalai Lama. So did President Bush and Speaker
    Pelosi, who presented him with the Congressional Gold Medal in
    2007.
        I've had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet
    bills to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet
    Act seeks to enable diplomats, journalists, and tourists to
    travel to see Tibet with their own eyes, because Chinese
    officials have closed it off. The Tibetan Policy and Support
    Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its key feature, the
    bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or reincarnation
    of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th Dalai
    Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided
    solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community, not by China.
        Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the
    human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people, but
    the core problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot
    advocate for themselves. They are forced to live in an
    authoritarian system under a paranoid central government that
    sees any expression of distinct identity as a threat to their
    power.
        His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this
    way. He's right. For decades, he sought to negotiate with
    Chinese authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side
    did agree to 10 rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai
    Lama's envoys, but they did not do so in good faith. Chinese
    officials say they will return to the table only if the Dalai
    Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only
    unreasonable, but false.
        The U.S. Government, to its credit, has consistently called
    on the Chinese to return to dialogue without pre-conditions,
    but that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood ready,
    the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we
    keep doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic
    or strategy? That's the question we will explore in this
    hearing.
        Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of
    perspectives--legal, historical, policy, and personal--on the
    Tibet-China dialogue. We hope to hear what Congress and the
    U.S. Government can do to help. Should we be countering false
    Chinese narratives? Should we reorient how we talk about the
    basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in the current
    environment, and what would the alternatives be?
        So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider
    these important questions, and I look forward to our hearing.
        Chair Merkley. Congressman Smith, I know you're with us on
    Zoom. Do you wish to make an opening comment?

                     STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH,
                    A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

        Representative Smith. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief. I
    thank you again, and our co-chair, for convening this important
    hearing.
        I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses, and
    Richard Gere, who has been an extraordinary advocate for the
    people of Tibet and especially for the Dalai Lama.
        Simply put, the barrier, obviously, is the Chinese
    Communist Party. It has an ideological commitment to control
    Tibet far beyond what previous Chinese governments sought to
    do, which has been evident since the founding of the People's
    Republic of China. Indeed, one year after the communist
    government took power in Beijing and completed its control of
    the mainland, it invaded Tibet and sought to annex it. 1959, of
    course, marked an even greater attempt to control Tibet and led
    to the dramatic flight of the Dalai Lama from his home country.
    All these years he has been in exile, while the world has
    benefited from his personal holiness and his example. He truly
    is a treasure, and I, like my other colleagues, have met him
    and have been so deeply impressed by his goodness and his
    holiness.
        Well, we saw the extreme cruelty of the Cultural
    Revolution, where Mao's Red Guards despoiled so much of Tibet's
    religious and cultural patrimony. Then there was the kidnapping
    and disappearance of the Panchen Lama, which personalizes how
    evil and totalitarian the CCP is and underscores the extent to
    which they will go to deny the Tibetan people the right to
    practice their faith freely and without interference.
        Now, today, under Xi Jinping, the suppression of Tibetan
    Buddhism--indeed, the suppression of all religion, which Xi
    Jinping seeks to sinicize--has intensified. The Chinese
    Communist Party is intent upon committing cultural genocide.
    This must end. The Tibetan people must be free to practice
    their own faith and choose their own spiritual leaders. We look
    forward to our distinguished witnesses giving us guidance on
    the path forward. I yield back.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Congressman.
        We'd now like to introduce those witnesses. I'll introduce
    all of them now.
        Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international
    law and executive president of Kreddha, an international non-
    governmental organization created to help prevent and resolve
    violent interstate conflicts. He is the author of Tibet Brief
    20/20 and he previously served as legal advisor to the Office
    of His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
        Hon-Shiang Lau is a retired professor who taught at the
    City University of Hong Kong, Oklahoma State University, and
    Washington State University. Since retiring, he has devoted his
    time to Chinese history. He is the author of the book Tibet Was
    Never Part of China since Antiquity.
        Tenzin N. Tethong is a former Representative of His
    Holiness the Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He's
    served in several roles in the Central Tibetan Administration,
    including as kalon tripa, the equivalent of prime minister. He
    has served as the director of the Tibetan language service at
    Radio Free Asia and is currently the director of the Tibetan
    language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a
    personal capacity.
        Ellen Bork will be joining us via Zoom. She is contributing
    editor at American Purpose. She previously served as the senior
    professional staff member for Asia and the Pacific at the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes frequently about
    U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her writing
    has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the
    Washington Post, and other publications.
        Thank you all for joining us for this hearing. Without
    objection, your full statements will be entered into the
    record. We ask that you keep your oral remarks to about five
    minutes. We'll start with Michael van Walt van Praag.

         STATEMENT OF MICHAEL VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, PROFESSOR OF
          INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT OF KREDDHA

        Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        My testimony today is based on the findings of 10 years of
    collaborative research, historical and legal, most of which I
    carried out during my tenure at the School of Historical
    Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, and
    the findings are published in these two books: Sacred Mandates:
    Asian International Relations since Chenggis Khan and Tibet
    Brief 20/20.
        Today, I'd like to call your attention to one of those
    findings and its international legal ramifications. Contrary to
    what the PRC claims, Tibet was historically not a part of
    China. Though not always independent in the modern legal sense
    of the term, and over the centuries subject to various degrees
    of Mongol, Manchu, and even British authority or influence,
    Tibet was never a part of China. The PRC did not inherit Tibet
    from the Republic of China or from earlier empires, as it
    claims. Tibet was, in fact, an independent state in the modern
    sense of the term in fact and law from 1912 to 1951, when the
    PRC took it by force.
        So the PRC's military invasion of Tibet constituted an act
    of aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international
    law prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of
    force against another state. This informs the legitimacy, or
    not, of China's presence in and rule of Tibet. China does not
    have sovereignty over Tibet, and therefore it is occupying
    Tibet illegally.
        That, in turn, informs the international community's legal
    obligations and its responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan
    conflict. Governments are prohibited under international law
    from recognizing China's annexation of Tibet, and they have the
    positive obligation to help bring about a resolution of the
    Sino-Tibetan conflict, to end the occupation of Tibet, and to
    enable the Tibetan people to exercise self-determination.
        As you stated, it is U.S. policy to support a negotiated
    resolution to the conflict between China and Tibet, but U.S.
    Government actions run counter to that policy. The U.S.
    Government has stated more than once that it considers Tibet to
    be a part of the PRC. If it and other governments continue to
    do so, Beijing no longer will have any incentive to negotiate
    with the Tibetans. The international community will have
    satisfied the PRC's needs without Beijing having to make any
    concessions to the Tibetans.
        The PRC wants two things above anything else regarding
    Tibet: legitimacy and no foreign interference or criticism.
    Beijing's strategy to obtain legitimacy in Tibet from the
    Tibetans is failing. The Dalai Lama disputes the PRC's only
    claim to entitlement to Tibet, namely that Tibet has been an
    integral part of China since antiquity, and he is not giving in
    to pressure to make a statement to that effect.
        Beijing has, therefore, started demanding of other
    governments that they recognize that Tibet is part of China,
    and is using their statements as a substitute for true
    legitimacy. Once a government agrees to regard Tibet as part of
    the PRC, it also accepts that Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations
    are China's internal affair, outside its purview. Beijing's
    needs are then satisfied and Tibetan negotiating power, which
    depends heavily on the international community's upholding of
    international law in keeping with Tibet's status as an occupied
    country, is then severely weakened.
        And not only that, endorsing China's sovereignty claim to
    Tibet conditions the Tibetans to envision a settlement that can
    bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know about
    China's treatment of Tibetans and also its treatment of Uyghurs
    and Beijing's determination to eradicate their very identity, I
    ask: Is marginal change what the U.S. really wants for the
    Tibetan people?
        The conflict will not be resolved with marginal change. It
    can only truly be resolved if the Tibetans' basic needs are
    satisfied. At a very minimum, this requires a robust autonomy
    with guarantees and international protection endorsed by the
    Tibetan people in accordance with their right to self-
    determination. To arrive there, the international community
    needs to play its role--uphold international law and treat
    Tibet as an occupied country and the conflict as a matter of
    international responsibility.
        Thank you.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you very much.
        We'll now turn to Professor Lau.

      STATEMENT OF HON-SHIANG LAU, RETIRED CHAIR PROFESSOR, CITY
                        UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

        Mr. Lau. I want to thank this distinguished audience for
    enabling me to make this presentation. My theme is that China's
    pre-1949 official historical records clearly show that Tibet
    was never part of China before the PRC invaded Tibet in 1950.
    This is an important issue because China is a signatory to the
    relevant covenants of the League of Nations and the United
    Nations which means that, since 1919, China has promised not to
    gain territories through military conquest thereafter.
        Moreover, the PRC incessantly condemns other countries for
    their past colonial conquests and their past bullying of China.
    Therefore, the PRC needs to cover up its 1950 Tibet conquest as
    a unification of a territory that has been part of China since
    antiquity. Sadly, today many governments incorrectly believe
    this ridiculous lie, and this is part of the reason why many
    Western democracies fail to provide adequate support for
    upholding Tibet's sovereignty.
        There are two important foundational concepts behind my
    theme. Foundation A: There is an abundance of authentic and
    reliable pre-1949 Chinese official historical records. The PRC
    version of Chinese history is very, very different from the
    version of Chinese history reflected in these pre-1949 official
    Chinese records.
        Foundation B: We used a comprehensive range of objective
    criteria to examine whether Tibet was part of China. Thus, to
    judge whether Tibet was part of China during China's Ming
    dynasty, we used official classical Chinese records to examine,
    for example: (1) Whether the Ming Empire had designated Tibet
    as part of China or as a foreign entity, say, via a promulgated
    map. (2) Was the Ming Empire able to conduct censuses or
    collect taxes in Tibet? (3) Was the Ming Empire able to appoint
    and dismiss judges or governing officials in Tibet? (4) Was
    China's language, legal system, and monetary system used in
    Tibet? etc.
        Combining Foundations A and B, we can prove the following
    conclusion: China's pre-1949 official records clearly show that
    Tibet was never part of China before the PRC's 1950 invasion.
    We also prove that the PRC's so-called evidence of sovereignty
    over Tibet is based on not only distortions, but outright
    fabrications and forgeries of pre-1949 Chinese records. This
    means that a current permanent member of the UN Security
    Council militarily conquered a foreign country in 1950 and
    continues to subjugate it today. This crime obligates the
    intervention of the international community.
        I'm going to show you two examples of these proofs. The
    first example is a Ming dynasty map. It's on your tablet. This
    is labeled as Map 1, purported to show the entire Ming Empire.
    [Map 1 appears on page 36 in the written statement of Mr. Lau.]
    Regarding my Foundation A stated earlier, this proof is from a
    Ming dynasty 1461 A.D. government publication. That is, it
    comes from a very authoritative Chinese source. Regarding my
    Foundation B, it relates to an objective sovereignty claim,
    depicted on a national map.
        In this map, labels for Chinese territories are framed in
    white lettering on a black background. In contrast, the map
    labels non-Chinese territories, such as Japan in the east and
    then Tibet over here in the west, in non-framed black lettering
    on a white background. The contrast is literally in black and
    white. In other words, the Ming government clearly declared
    that Tibet was a non-China foreign entity.
        If you would flip the tablet, you will see Map 2, which is
    an example of a Qing dynasty proof. This is from a Qing dynasty
    1732 government publication, purported to show the entire Qing
    Empire. [Map 2 appears on page 37 in the written statement of
    Mr. Lau.] On this map, the Qing government shows the position
    corresponding to today's Tibet Autonomous Region (the TAR) as a
    blank space. Hundreds of similar proofs are presented in this
    book that I have written. Most of them involve textual records,
    and not just merely pictorial proofs like this. And they are,
    of course, much more reliable. Thank you very much.
        Chair Merkley. Professor, thank you very much for your
    comments and for sharing these maps and this history. We will
    now turn to Mr. Tethong.

      STATMENT OF TENZIN N. TETHONG, FORMER REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS
          HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA, NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON, DC

        Mr. Tethong. Chairman Merkley, Co-chair McGovern, it is my
    distinct honor to offer testimony this morning in this hearing
    on Tibet and to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in
    the 20th century, including efforts toward a resolution of the
    Tibet issue. Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever
    since the establishment of the People's Republic of China. One
    of Mao Zedong's earliest declarations was his intention to
    liberate Tibet from the West, and the Tibetan people from a
    backward and oppressive society.
        The Tibetan government protested immediately, citing
    Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan kings
    to the rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu
    Qing dynasties. With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the
    United Nations and the global community, especially to India,
    the United Kingdom, and the United States. Unfortunately, China
    did not heed Tibet's protests, and the global community did not
    come to Tibet's defense. The People's Liberation Army marched
    into Tibet in 1950, easily overwhelming the Tibetan Army and
    militia. China knew right then that rhetorical justification
    for such an invasion was not enough and called for negotiations
    to formalize an agreement.
        Tibetan representatives negotiated in Beijing but,
    disregarding any proper ratification process, were forced to
    sign what is called the 17-Point Agreement for the Peaceful
    Liberation of Tibet. Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His
    Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government tried to
    work within the broad confines of the agreement, which promised
    no change in the status of the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan
    government. However, China did not live up to these
    commitments, nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had
    received from Mao Zedong.
        Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years,
    and protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the
    uprising in Lhasa on March 10th, 1959, which led to the escape
    of the Dalai Lama, and the escape of thousands, to India and
    neighboring countries. For the next 20 years, Tibet was
    completely shut off from the rest of the world. An extreme
    overhaul of Tibetan life, from its traditional Buddhist roots
    to Chinese Marxist socialism, was introduced, which in the
    latter years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese
    Cultural Revolution.
        However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue
    important enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the
    Dalai Lama's older brother to Beijing and declared that short
    of separation everything would be discussed, meaning that short
    of granting Tibetan independence, China would be open to all
    Tibetan concerns and aspirations. This breakthrough meeting led
    to renewed dialogue between His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the
    Chinese government. Four delegations of exile leaders were able
    to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had
    transpired under two decades of Chinese rule.
        By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in
    deliberations with Chinese officials to address larger issues
    related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, party general
    secretary and the main proponent of changes in the Tibet
    policies, died. This was soon followed by the Tiananmen student
    protests and the massacre. China stepped backwards, and the
    Tibetan issue also retreated.
        In 2001, however, communication with China was restored,
    and envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in
    Beijing, where the Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's
    Middle Way policy, seeking genuine autonomy for Tibet within
    the framework of the PRC. The envoys met many times, even after
    the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests that called for
    greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the envoys'
    last meeting was to be in 2010, when the Chinese ended the
    dialogue process.
        This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should
    show that even at the most challenging of times, China has seen
    the need to address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet and
    that there is perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of
    their rule. China has also repeatedly initiated direct
    communication with His Holiness the Dalai Lama, demonstrating
    the obvious need to find a meaningful resolution to these
    outstanding issues.
        Ever since the exile delegation visited Tibet in the 1980s,
    to the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's envoys in Beijing,
    the Chinese leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan
    perspectives of their rule in Tibet and of the unvarnished
    aspirations of the Tibetan people, both of which contradict the
    official Chinese narrative. Worldwide attention to Tibet has
    been an important part of creating greater awareness of the
    Tibetan issue, even in China, allowing for more liberal and
    reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan hopes and
    demands to have some standing.
        There is little doubt that public support for Tibet,
    through the person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concern
    for the cultural and human rights of the Tibetan people, has
    been an important factor in the U.S. Government's attention on
    the issue--which has been sustained to a large degree by
    individual Members of Congress. The continued efforts of the
    United States will help remove barriers to this unresolved
    conflict and will advance the Tibetan people's desire for
    greater freedom and democracy. I thank you.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Tethong.
        We're now going to turn to Ellen Bork, who is joining us
    via Zoom. Welcome.

                        STATEMENT OF ELLEN BORK,
                 CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, AMERICAN PURPOSE

        Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Thank you to the members of
    the Commission and staff, and I appreciate appearing alongside
    the other witnesses very much.
        As you all know, the United States has charted a new course
    toward China on a lot of issues, but Tibet, so far, has not
    been the subject of a considerable revived agenda. It should
    be. Unfortunately, Tibet is often viewed as a fait accompli, a
    tragic but closed chapter of history. That is not the case, of
    course, for the Chinese Communist Party. Tibet, for them,
    remains a cornerstone of China's aggression, both territorially
    and ideologically. It is part of China's assault on liberal
    democratic norms, which in turn will advance the Party's plan
    to control the succession of the Dalai Lama, or at least gain
    preference and acquiescence to its choice of successor.
        Addressing that challenge by building support for the
    authentic Dalai Lama now and in the future, and in particular
    building support for Tibetan democracy, which is his legacy,
    should play a much larger role in the U.S. response to China.
    Unfortunately, the foundations of American Tibet policy make
    this difficult. A look back at history shows America's Tibet
    policy was not the product of historical fact or international
    law but of outdated perceptions of America's strategic interest
    in subordinating Tibet to China. U.S. involvement in Tibet is,
    compared to some other powers, relatively recent, but it has
    played a decisive role in what's happening today.
        First, of course, the United States accepted Great
    Britain's application of the concept of suzerainty over Tibet.
    This is something short of sovereignty. According to many
    scholars, it is not even applicable, but Great Britain found it
    useful while it was involved in the great geopolitical
    competition of the Great Game in the region. The United States
    accepted that term, but if you read through a lot of the
    diplomatic memos you'll see how uncomfortable and ambivalent
    officials were about it, as well as about the concept of
    sovereignty. And for several decades, policy fluctuated in
    terms of the language used and the way the United States
    thought about what had happened in Tibet from the 1950s, and
    even before. Officials really accepted that it was de facto
    independent, even though the United States refused to accept
    requests to recognize Tibet's independence.
        Later on, after several decades--it was when the United
    States forged a rapprochement with Beijing at Taipei's expense
    that the position on sovereignty really gelled. Again, this was
    the result of its perception of the strategic need with regard
    to China, and deciding to choose one Chinese priority, in
    Tibet, over another. I don't think it's too far-fetched to say
    that in that way, it transferred deference to China over Tibet
    from one dictatorship that never exerted authority there--
    meaning Chiang Kai-shek--to a totalitarian regime that it
    decided to favor at the time.
        As a result of this decision--incidentally, Vice President
    Mondale visited Beijing in 1979 and sort of said: We will no
    longer view the Dalai Lama as a political leader. And we've
    essentially said we're going with your sovereignty over Tibet.
    Not surprisingly, with that decision taken, Tibet had to become
    diminished within U.S.-PRC relations. It's not uncommon for
    diplomats to consider that it's an irritant in the U.S.-China
    relationship and even that Tibet can only be helped if we lower
    the temperature with Beijing over Tibet, and I think exactly
    the opposite.
        Above all, this meant that the United States would not
    focus on legitimacy questions about the PRC's role in Tibet or
    give adequate attention to the extraordinary achievement of
    democracy in exile. That democratization process was carried
    out under the Dalai Lama's leadership and with the support of
    the Tibetan people in exile, at exactly the same time that
    democratic transitions were occurring in Asia, the Philippines,
    South Korea, Taiwan, and later Indonesia, and that has been the
    basis of American policy toward the region ever since.
        By contrast, of course, Tibet is a huge priority for the
    Party. And it has an international Tibet agenda. It's not just
    the domestic repression, or inside Tibet's border, that we need
    to focus on. It has a really corrosive agenda for Tibet, trying
    to impose litmus tests on the way countries and NGOs deal with
    Tibet. And it has a Buddhist agenda in its Belt and Road
    investment initiatives. It seeks to appropriate Buddhist sites
    and cultivate and co-opt leaders and make Tibet a core
    interest--a condition of its good relations.
        I'd just like to note, before I give a few recommendations,
    the importance of understanding that many brave Chinese
    democracy advocates have over time challenged the Party on
    Tibet. It's very easy to imagine that the Chinese people are
    sort of inherently nationalist when it comes to Tibet, and I
    think that's false. It's the product of intense propaganda and
    fear. It's important to recognize that going back to Wei
    Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo, there's been a thrust
    among Chinese democrats increasingly to see democracy as the
    solution to both Tibet and China's problems. Charter 08, the
    democracy manifesto of 2008, took this up, and although I think
    it was too sensitive to use the word ``Tibet'' in that
    document, there was a clear reference to the goal of
    ``federation of democratic communities of China.''
        In that sense, the first recommendation I would make is to
    reintroduce support for democracy in China and to support
    Chinese and Tibetan political prisoners and activists, lawyers,
    and journalists more than we currently are in our relationship
    with Beijing. I think I'd like to suggest also an independent
    review of U.S. policy, to go deeply into some of the issues I
    mentioned about the choices the United States made from the
    '40s on, to see how United States policy or attitudes about
    Tibet's status fluctuated, and why the United States made these
    decisions, and how they are not related. As Michael points out,
    our position is in violation of international law. How did this
    happen? And what should we understand about not only Tibet's
    status but how the United States treated Tibet and subordinated
    it to China historically?
        Finally, I would say we should enlist allies in a common
    position on the Dalai Lama's succession and make that very
    public. Give the elected Tibetan exile government more access
    and support and include it in forums like the Summit for
    Democracy, and counter Chinese influence in international
    organizations and on campuses and at state and local levels,
    not only on Tibet but on other questions, like Taiwan. Thank
    you.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you very much, Ms. Bork, and I thank
    all four of you for the expertise you bring to this
    conversation. We'll now have a period of questioning. I think
    we're set for seven minutes. I'll be handing the gavel over to
    Representative McGovern after my questions because I have
    another hearing to chair, but I'll tell you, this Member of the
    Senate will never recognize as legitimate Chinese control over
    Tibet.
        In the hearings that we have held in this Commission about
    what China is now doing in Tibet--in particular I can't get out
    of my mind the fact that 80 percent of the children are being
    sent to boarding school to separate them from their parents,
    and to essentially re-educate them in a false narrative and
    destroy the religious and cultural foundations of the Tibetan
    people. This is truly an enormous crime against Tibet.
        I appreciate the historical perspectives. I was struck by
    two of you testifying about 1979. Mr. Tethong, you noted that
    in 1979 Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older brother to
    come and said that, short of separation, China was open to
    discussion of how to address Tibetan concerns and aspirations.
    Then Ms. Bork, you noted that in 1979, Vice President Mondale
    went to China and essentially recognized--if I understood your
    testimony correctly--recognized that the United States saw
    China as having legitimate authority over Tibet. How do we
    reconcile these two things happening in that particular year?
    How did one precede the other? And are they tied together? I'd
    invite both Ms. Bork and Mr. Tethong to help us understand
    that.
        Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think, as I'll try to explain
    very briefly, that even though China had just come out of the
    very serious period of the Cultural Revolution, to set China on
    the right course they had to deal with many important issues.
    Obviously Tibet was right up there on their agenda. It shows
    that Tibet remained a key issue in the Chinese government's
    state of mind. Unfortunately, what Vice President Mondale
    declared during the Carter administration, shall we say,
    overlooked the importance of the Tibetan human rights
    situation. In part, maybe we were unable to present our case to
    a President who had a strong interest in human rights. But
    maybe at the time, President Carter was very engaged in
    establishing normalized relations with China. That's all I can
    say.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you. Ms. Bork, would you like to
    comment on the juxtaposition of those two events in 1979?
        Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. I don't know the interaction
    or the interplay between those two events. I think that would
    be a really interesting thing to explore. I suspect that
    getting the Tibetan leadership to acquiesce, to sort of buy in
    to some solution, is not inconsistent with getting the United
    States to settle its position on Tibet's sovereignty. But it
    would be very interesting. I've done a little research. It's
    not easy to know what went into the preparation for Vice
    President Mondale's trip. I think that would be a great subject
    for an independent commission.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you.
        Let me turn to our two professors, Professor Lau and
    Professor Michael van Walt van Praag. Where is American
    leverage in bringing China back to the conversation through the
    dialogue about autonomy with Tibet?
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you. Because China's primary
    objective in the international field in relation to Tibet is
    precisely to obtain legitimacy for its rule in Tibet,
    questioning that legitimacy creates leverage. In other words,
    in the reverse, accepting or otherwise identifying Tibet as a
    part of China or as a part of the PRC or accepting Chinese
    sovereignty over Tibet today takes away any leverage the
    Tibetans have.
        It takes away the need for the Chinese leaders to approach
    the Tibetans, to negotiate with them and find an agreement that
    will end up with an arrangement where the Tibetans accept some
    form of Chinese sovereignty, rule, relationship, that works for
    both parties. If the international community, and therefore the
    U.S. as perhaps one of the most important players in relation
    to China, does not question China's legitimacy in Tibet,
    China's sovereignty in Tibet, then that takes away that
    leverage.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you.
        Professor Lau.
        Mr. Lau. Thank you, sir. I can only echo what Michael has
    just said. I think that the United States and the world should
    actively counter and oppose the PRC's narrative, by producing
    solid proofs to show that the PRC's version is incorrect, or
    that they're just basically telling lies. I think in the past
    I've heard many people denying the PRC's version but without
    producing believable and authoritative proofs. I think it's
    about time that the world becomes more explicit in
    contradicting the PRC's claim by doing more than just simply
    saying: ``You are wrong, I am right.'' Show the proofs. That's
    all I know. Thank you.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. I'll close with this
    question to Ms. Bork. Thank you, by the way, for your five
    recommendations. One of the things you talk about is enlisting
    allies in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan
    process for selecting the next Dalai Lama. Can you comment for
    just a moment on your general sense of the disposition of the
    European Union, both in terms of that specific issue, but more
    broadly on the issue of establishing a clear, united position
    that China's control or authority over Tibet is illegitimate.
        Ms. Bork. Thank you, Senator. There's no question that the
    Chinese government has made great inroads in Europe, but that,
    I think, on a number of issues has been slow, if not completely
    reversed. Like in the United States, there are many countries
    where there's great reverence for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.
    It's not viewed there as quite as huge a matter. It doesn't get
    quite as much attention. I think that the attention to the
    reincarnation issue that the U.S. Congress has shown is also
    spreading in Europe. I'm optimistic that some of the leading
    countries there in support for the Dalai Lama would step
    forward, but they've always been treated to that kind of divide
    and conquer. They've suffered so much--as you remember, the way
    Norway suffered after the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo. So
    it's essential that there's some kind of shared burden and
    protection for people--for countries as they take this
    position. I'm very heartened by the appointment of the new
    special coordinator, Uzra Zeya, and believe that there is
    prospect for greater attention to Tibet within U.S.-Europe
    relations.
        Chair Merkley. Thank you very much. We're now going to turn
    to Co-chair McGovern.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let
    me thank all the panelists for being here. And let me make
    clear, the reason why we're doing this hearing, the reason why
    we've done other hearings on Tibet, the reason why we have
    passed legislation on Tibet, is because China is not living up
    to the expectations of the international community with regard
    to Tibet. You know, I think there might be a perception in
    China that the world will soon forget and move on to something
    else, but I hope we're making it clear that that's not going to
    be the case. In fact, activity in the United States Congress on
    Tibet has intensified in recent years. More attention is being
    devoted to Tibet, and some of the topics that we're talking
    about here today many members of Congress are unaware of. They
    will be enlightened by this hearing, and it will bring
    additional perspective as we deal with other legislation
    impacting China in the future.
        I just say to the government of China, who always gets
    annoyed when we do these hearings--you know what? You have a
    Tibet problem. Deal with it. You can go back to the negotiating
    table. I mean, that would be a good first step. Let's try to
    resolve these differences. But as long as you don't, as long as
    you pretend that there's not a problem here, please be assured
    that activity focused on Tibet in the United States and in
    other countries around the world will intensify.
        Professor Lau, would you say that the Chinese government's
    insistence that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of
    China since antiquity is tantamount to a demand that the Dalai
    Lama say something that is false?
        Mr. Lau. Absolutely. I agree with that 100 percent. The PRC
    knows that that claim is a lie, and they are forcing the Dalai
    Lama to lie with the PRC.
        Co-chair McGovern. OK. Mr. van Walt, you testified that
    governments using the Chinese narrative that Tibet has always
    been part of China is an obstacle to resolving the conflict
    through dialogue. Now, there has been no dialogue in 12 years.
    Assuming that governments made such statements as a concession
    to get the Chinese to the table back then, is there any reason
    for them to continue saying the same thing?
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. I think it was a mistake for
    governments to play China's game, and I don't know what the
    objective was of making those statements acknowledging Tibet
    being a part of the PRC. But I think it was a mistake to do so,
    if the hope was that this would encourage China to negotiate. I
    think it's quite the contrary. And I think we must realize that
    the Middle Way approach of His Holiness the Dalai Lama can only
    work if we're conscious that the kind of genuine autonomy that
    we're talking about is only a possible middle path if it is the
    middle between the legitimate right of the Tibetans to restore
    their independence on the one hand and China's intention to
    fully integrate Tibet into China on the other. If we take away
    this legitimate right of the Tibetans, then there's really very
    little to negotiate that is left.
        Co-chair McGovern. I think it's fair to say that those
    governments that bought into the Chinese narrative, maybe
    thinking that it might make the Chinese government more
    reasonable with regard to Tibet, it didn't work.
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. It didn't work, and I think it is
    counterproductive today.
        Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Tethong, the Chinese insist that
    they have the right to select the next Dalai Lama, and demand
    that the Dalai Lama say that Tibet has been part of China since
    ancient times. Do you think that these reveal a latent
    insecurity within Chinese leadership about the legitimacy of
    their claim to own Tibet?
        Mr. Tethong. Definitely, Chairman. We've all touched on
    this issue of legitimacy. I believe that even within the
    Chinese leadership and the Chinese mindset, legitimacy of the
    rule of the CCP is what is at stake. Tibet or the Tibetans were
    the ones who contested that legitimacy. That's why there is
    total control over Tibet, yet China often finds itself needing
    to address it somehow, because the question of legitimacy will
    never be fully satisfactory for the Chinese until the Tibetans
    have a proper role in that.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
        Ms. Bork, given what the other three witnesses have said,
    what actions should the United States Government take to get
    the parties back to the table? Do you agree that the State
    Department should stop using the ``Tibet is part of the PRC''
    phrase, as they did in the Tibet negotiations report this
    month? And given that the PRC was founded in 1949, would it be
    fair to say that the U.S. statements do not endorse the Chinese
    position that Tibet has been part of China since antiquity?
        Ms. Bork. I'm not sure what the intention of the department
    was in that particular matter, but I do think there's a lot to
    be done before approaching Beijing. I think dialogue can take
    many forms, and people may have different attitudes about it.
    I'm not a particular supporter of the idea of dialogue, at
    least not without much more coordination among the allies in
    support of the Tibetans. I think that without that, I don't
    think it's going to go anywhere. I'm deeply skeptical about
    Chinese intentions with regard to any kind of dialogue.
        By all means, again, review the defects in the American
    position, why they've used language in the past and the fact
    that they should stop using it. Again, it's because it's not
    accurate historically and not helpful right now. Yes, they
    should stop using that and begin to talk about Tibet in a
    different way.
        Co-chair McGovern. I appreciate that, and whatever the
    deficiencies in U.S. policy have been over the years, I think
    it is fair to say that we are reorienting our policy in a way
    that is more in tune with what the Tibetan community wants. I
    just want to say that we're working on a bill that we'll be
    introducing soon to help the U.S. Government counter Chinese
    disinformation on Tibet and ensure that U.S. policy supports
    the basis for the Dalai Lama's quest for genuine autonomy. And
    also making it clear that, you know, facts matter and that you
    can't rewrite history because you want to. I mean, history is
    history. Facts are facts.
        And so, again, I think that there is a renewed interest in
    the United States and in other countries around the world, as
    we witnessed yesterday talking to parliamentarians from all
    over the world who are in Washington to find ways to support
    the Tibetan people, and I think things are changing globally. I
    wish they'd changed a long time ago, but they're now changing.
        My time is up right now. I'm going to recognize Senator
    Ossoff.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to
    our panelists. I'd like to ask each of our panelists to comment
    on the intersection of press freedom and the issue at hand
    today. Last week in the Commission we heard from Under
    Secretary Zeya, who committed to work with my office to expand
    press freedom internationally and strengthen U.S. leadership
    for press freedom. My question, please, beginning with you, Mr.
    Tethong, is: How does the CCP repress freedom of reporting and
    publication within Tibet, and more broadly within China? How
    does the CCP seek to influence reporting and publication on
    related issues internationally? And when you've concluded, we
    can move to Ms. Bork. I'd like to hear from each panelist on
    this. Thank you.
        Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Senator. There is no press freedom
    in Tibet, or in any of the Tibetan areas within the PRC. No
    foreign journalists are allowed to visit Tibet freely. Very
    rarely and occasionally, groups of Western journalists who are
    stationed in Beijing might be allowed on a short trip that is
    fully managed by Chinese officials. So with regard to press
    freedom, I think Tibet is regarded as one of the worst, even
    worse than North Korea, according to Freedom House, I believe.
    We are only able to get news items, news reports through
    personal contacts of Tibetans who are in exile and occasionally
    through social media.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Ms. Bork.
        Ms. Bork. Oh, I'd certainly concur with what Mr. Tethong
    has said. I think it's important to think about the way China
    is challenging norms of freedoms, and we have to be really very
    attuned to the way they treat rights and the way they'd like to
    alter the way the world respects universal norms. I don't have
    anything to add about inside Tibet, but I would be very alert
    to the way Chinese Communist Party officials talk about
    democratic norms, including press freedom, and try to shape
    them, particularly in countries where they have a great deal of
    influence or where they're trying to acquire influence.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. van Walt van Praag.
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. Yes. I don't have anything to add
    about press freedom or the lack of it in Tibet. What I would
    say is that at the same time, China is, in a sense, abusing the
    freedom of the press internationally, outside of China, but
    using the press very actively to project its narrative on
    Tibet, to project also its vocabulary on Tibet. For example,
    many members of the press write articles in which they refer to
    Tibetans as a minority--one of China's minorities, which is an
    implicit acceptance of Tibet being part of China and the
    Tibetans being one of China's peoples, minorities. Whereas, in
    effect, the Tibetans are not a minority. They are the
    population of Tibet. They are the people of Tibet. And they are
    a people under international law with the full right to self-
    determination. That's just one example, but there are so many
    examples of articles in the press and reports in the press that
    use Chinese terminology in regard to Tibet.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you. Mr. Lau.
        Mr. Lau. Thank you. I'm not an expert in this area and have
    nothing of value to add, but I would like to use this
    opportunity to emphasize something else that was brought up
    just now. China or the Qing Empire never had any power in
    selecting the Dalai Lama. It is clearly reflected in the
    official Chinese records. The Qing Empire only made a request
    to the Tibetans to use a golden urn to do one minor step of the
    selection by drawing lots. That was all, and even that request
    was not consistently followed or acceded to by the Tibetan
    authorities during the Qing dynasty. Thank you.
        Senator Ossoff. Thank you all for your responses. Thanks
    for the additional context and information. I worked prior to
    my election producing investigative reports of crimes, official
    corruption, crimes against humanity. Freedom of the press and
    freedom of publication are under attack worldwide. The United
    States Government must strengthen and redouble its commitment
    to stand en garde for press freedom around the world. And this
    hearing will help inform our efforts to that end.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much, Senator.
        Congresswoman Steel.
        Representative Steel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Every person has the right to religious and cultural
    beliefs, and all governments, including the CCP, have no right
    to restrict this fundamental ability. It is inexcusable that
    the people of Tibet are not free and are currently threatened
    with punishment ranging from warnings and surveillance to
    interrogation and detention. We cannot sit still while Tibetans
    are being detained and imprisoned for political and religious
    reasons. I was honored to meet His Holiness the Dalai Lama in
    my district. We have to make the world know that the leader of
    Tibet cannot go back to his own country and his own people
    because of CCP oppression.
        With that, to all the witnesses, with the current abuses by
    the CCP oppressing autonomous regions, what should the United
    States and other countries do to stand with the Tibet people.
    I'm just asking all the witnesses. So if anybody wants to
    answer, I'd love to hear that.
        And can local global corporations play a role in raising
    awareness about the Tibetan oppression? That's what I asked
    last year, before the Winter Olympics. I wanted these
    corporations that were going to spend billions and billions of
    dollars in advertising to use their platform. But I didn't get
    a response from any of those 17, the Olympic sponsor
    corporations.
        So could you just let me know? You can start, I guess, Ms.
    Bork.
        Ms. Bork. I'm so sorry. If someone else could start,
    please. I'm having trouble hearing.
        Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman, if you could just repeat
    the crux of your question again, because it kind of went in and
    out.
        Representative Steel. Oh. With the current abuses by the
    CCP oppressing the autonomous regions, what should the United
    States and other countries do to work together to stand with
    Tibet's people? And can global corporations play a role in
    raising awareness about the Tibet oppression?
        Ms. Bork. Thank you very much for the question. I think
    international solidarity and coordination on all these points
    is vital, given the Party's adept use of tools like financial
    diplomacy and propaganda, and various other kinds of
    intimidation, not to mention that we haven't even talked about
    how China continues to redefine Tibet, to the point that it is
    referring to northeast India as southern Tibet. So this is very
    much an ongoing issue that requires staunch and coordinated
    reply.
        There was an interesting proposal, unrelated to Tibet, from
    a fellow in Scandinavia about an economic Article 5 for NATO. I
    think it's certainly worth discussing the kind of retaliation
    that countries could experience if they take a more thoughtful
    and principled stance on Tibet. We really can't prepare enough
    for that eventuality, and I'd certainly recommend that Congress
    think about that as well.
        As for global companies, they haven't really--I guess I'm
    too negative. I only know the bad examples. Maybe someone else
    knows some good examples with companies on Tibet. But I do
    think that attitude is changing as a result of the Olympics and
    some other--you know, the NBA, and things like that. I think
    unfortunately there's still a market for companies to kowtow to
    the Chinese line on Tibet and other issues. But I do think it's
    changing, and people are more sensitive to that, so I'm a
    little more optimistic than I might have once been.
        Representative Steel. Thank you. Any other witnesses?
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. I would like to make two
    observations that follow on what Ellen Bork has just mentioned.
    Regarding cooperation among countries, I think it's also very
    important to emphasize that not only is this of crucial
    importance for Tibet and the Tibetan people themselves, but
    this has broader international ramifications, because the
    appeasement of China on Tibet for the past 70 years is not
    unrelated to China's expansion today--or its efforts to
    expand--in the South China Sea, where it uses a similar
    historical narrative as it does to claim sovereignty over
    Tibet, and its aggressive stance in relation to northern India,
    both in the eastern and western part of northern India, and as
    Ellen Bork mentioned, even calling one part of northeast India
    southern Tibet, where it makes territorial claims, again,
    directly related to its historical narrative of Tibet.
        One cannot accept the historical narrative on Tibet and
    then contest China's claim to northern India. Or perhaps it
    even makes it difficult to contest their claim to the South
    China Sea islands. And the second question, regarding
    corporations, the only thing I would mention is that, again,
    under international law, because China is denying the Tibetan
    people their right to self-determination, which they have, and
    because it is occupying Tibet, corporations and governments are
    forbidden from benefiting from the exploitation of resources in
    Tibet, because those resources under international law belong
    to the Tibetan people and therefore cannot be exploited, and
    one cannot benefit from it without the express permission of
    the Tibetan people, given freely.
        Thank you.
        Representative Steel. Thank you very much for those
    answers. The CCP continues to have oversight of Tibetan
    religious life by mandating political education for monks and
    nuns and creating apparatus to surveil and manage monastic
    institutions. Can you expand more on how CCP authorities
    continue to reorient Tibetan society? I think maybe Professor
    Lau.
        Mr. Lau. Actually, I would like to comment on the earlier
    topic that you brought up. I think it's important for the world
    to realize that the Tibet issue is not necessarily just a China
    issue. I read in mainstream newspaper articles in the past
    several days, and you have pointed out, that Putin is going to
    re-create the old Russian empire by bringing up all these
    historical ``territorial rights,'' even over the Baltic
    nations. If you look at the Chinese records, these records
    clearly show that Tibet was not part of China, but they do
    indicate that Burma, Korea, Thailand, Laos, and a whole bunch
    of other areas were clearly part of China. They also indicate
    that even countries like Holland and Portugal were tributary
    countries to China.
        We have seen what has developed in Putin's and in Ukraine's
    case. If we do not explicitly reject this kind of attitude,
    there is a strong possibility that 20 years from now, when
    China becomes even stronger, that they could bring up these old
    claims of sovereignty over Korea and over Vietnam and then, as
    I've said, even over Portugal. I think that's the point that I
    would like to make. Thank you.
        Mr. Tethong. I would just like to add a comment, that yes,
    for the last 20 or 30 years, global attention to what is
    happening in Tibet, and especially concerns expressed by the
    United States Congress, has had a tremendous impact on the
    situation in Tibet and on the rights and safety of the Tibetan
    people; to a great degree they have been provided simply
    because the outside world is watching, especially the United
    States.
        For a long-term goal to help resolve the Tibet issue, I
    think, as my co-panelists have said, we should not look at
    Tibet and the Tibetan people as a unique element on their own,
    but that this is an issue that concerns the whole world. When
    we deal with any development in Tibet, of course, we are going
    to look at it from the perspective of the human rights of an
    individual Tibetan, and therefore the Universal Declaration of
    Human Rights should be a central theme to work with. And along
    with that, as far as the Tibetan people are concerned, their
    right to self-determination should be an underlying feature of
    how we deal with Tibet in the future.
        Representative Steel. I totally agree with Professor Lau
    because China is one of the biggest threats in the whole world.
    If we don't stop the CCP's invasion and oppression of
    autonomous regions right now, then in 20 years, what kind of
    map are we going to have? So this is a very important hearing.
    I really appreciate that we can hear from our witnesses. Thank
    you for coming out.
        I yield back.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
        I have a series of questions. I'm trying to get through
    them all, so bear with me here. Mr. van Walt van Praag, your
    testimony addresses the concept of self-determination as core
    to your thesis. Can you discuss the gap, if any, between the
    basis of the right to self-determination in international law,
    and the extent to which governments honor and protect that
    right? And how would you respond to those who say Tibetans are
    not entitled to self-determination?
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much for your
    question. Self-determination, under international law, is a
    basic right. It is both a basic right and it is codified in the
    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
    in its very first article, because there is a recognition, and
    there was a recognition when those two conventions were
    written, that without honoring the right to self-determination,
    many of the other human rights are difficult to conceive of and
    to respect, and therefore, those rights are dependent, to some
    degree, on respecting the right to self-determination.
        But self-determination is also a fundamental principle of
    international relations. As many UN declarations make clear,
    respect for the right to self-determination is a fundamental
    requirement for friendly relations among states and so both
    these things are truly fundamental. At the same time, self-
    determination, as it has developed, was for a long time
    considered to be primarily a right of countries to de-colonize
    from Western colonialism. But increasingly, it is being
    recognized that when we're speaking about colonialism, we're
    speaking about the nature of rule, the nature of the
    relationship between dominant power and a subjugated country, a
    subjugated people under alien domination.
        Regardless of whether it is a Western power, regardless of
    whether there is an ocean between the cosmopolitan country and
    the colony, colonialism is about the nature of relations
    between the dominant and the dominated and about the latter's
    exploitation. Under that concept, Tibet very clearly is under
    colonial rule today, and I think it should be recognized that
    way. The PRC just introduced this, at an earlier session of the
    Human Rights Council in Geneva, a resolution on--and I don't
    know the exact words but--something like the continuing
    consequences of colonialism. Even within that context, we
    should be using colonialism to address the situation in Tibet.
        Aside from colonialism, Tibetans also, because they are a
    people--under any definition in international law--a people
    with a right to self-determination, fit squarely in that
    category. In terms of the difference between, in other words,
    their right to full self-determination and the honoring of that
    right internationally, there is, I think, a big gap. In the
    1950s and '60s, a number of countries, including the United
    States, recognized and supported the Tibetan people's right to
    self-determination. And as we know, there is a United Nations
    General Assembly resolution on that subject from the 1960s that
    recognizes the Tibetans' right to self-determination and calls
    for its respect and for its implementation.
        So Tibetans have had that recognition internationally. The
    discrepancy is that today many countries, probably most
    countries, do not refer to the Tibetan people's right to self-
    determination anymore, simply out of fear of displeasing China.
    And I think it is very important to restore the situation to
    where it was universally recognized that Tibetans had the right
    to self-determination.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
        Ms. Bork, you have written about how democracy should be a
    component of our policy on Tibet, keeping in mind that the
    Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) has established a
    democratic form of government-in-exile. The Biden
    administration has created a process to prioritize this issue
    called the Summit for Democracy, and as I understand it, the
    CTA was not involved in the first summit meeting last December.
    Would you recommend that the administration include the CTA in
    the upcoming summit this December? And if so, how?
        Ms. Bork. I would very strongly recommend that. It seems to
    me a great oversight to continue to neglect this achievement,
    especially if the administration is trying to develop support
    for the reincarnation as an element of, effectively, liberal
    democracy and liberal democratic norms being effective, human
    rights, and so forth. So yes, I would strongly do that. I don't
    know the governing basis for inclusion. Whatever it is, it can
    include representatives of the democratically elected body,
    even if they are not a sovereign country. So I hope so.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
        Mr. Tethong, you have firsthand experience dealing with
    Chinese interlocutors, including during your participation in a
    fact-finding delegation to Tibet. What perspective can you
    provide on the Chinese attitude toward dialogue with the Dalai
    Lama?
        Mr. Tethong. Mr. Chairman, I think through the interactions
    we've had with the delegations that visited Tibet in the '80s--
    I was a part of one of the groups--and the later interactions
    that the envoys have had, which have been very extensive,
    although the Chinese government brought the process to an end,
    we know that during that process many key officials in the
    Chinese government and the United Front officials became fully
    aware of, shall I mention, the misrule in Tibet, and also fully
    aware of what Tibetan intentions or Tibetan hopes and
    aspirations were. And so there is, within the Chinese
    government and leadership, I think, a full understanding of
    where the Tibetans stand and where it could make
    accommodations. It's not as though the Chinese leadership is
    ignorant about the real situation.
        So while on one level it seems like the negotiations have
    stopped, we know that there are elements within the Chinese
    leadership and the Chinese government who can, given the right
    circumstances, take up Tibet once again. So this process and
    the possibility of renewed dialogue, and an initiative from the
    Chinese side, I think, remains very possible.
        Co-chair McGovern. Professor Lau, are the maps and
    documents that you cite available in archives inside of China?
    And do researchers and historians in China have access to the
    information? And to what extent is this information digitized
    and online, or otherwise available at libraries outside of
    China?
        Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. Please allow me to
    answer the preceding question.
        Co-chair McGovern. Absolutely.
        Mr. Lau. Yes. I want to add to what Michael had said about
    self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party in the earlier
    version of the Party constitution, in the 1930s, repeatedly
    affirmed the self-determination rights of the so-called
    minorities, with an explicit sentence stating, ``up to the
    level of independence and seceding from China.'' In other
    words, they practically advocated the right of the Tibetans
    and, well, actually the Xinjiang Uyghurs too, to form
    independent countries. They only deleted those clauses after
    they gained power after 1949.
        Now, to answer your question. Actually, in my book, which
    is written in Chinese, and my target audience is people in
    China, I wanted to sort of convince the people in China that
    they haven't done the right thing with respect to Tibet. So I
    have taken a totally Chinese chauvinistic approach. I dismiss
    all Tibetan records. I dismiss all Western records. I only use
    Chinese records that are authored by Chinese, written in the
    Chinese language, from the 13th century up until 1949, before
    the Chinese Communist Party took power. And I also restrict
    myself to only those records that are reprinted by the People's
    Republic of China, indicating their acceptance of the
    authoritativeness of these publications.
        And yes, most of them are digitized by companies or
    libraries under PRC rule. And I think actually 80 percent of
    them are not only available and digitized, they're available
    free of charge on public websites. Also, I explicitly tell my
    readers: Don't believe a single word in my book. Go to the
    internet and check it out yourself. The two maps that I'm
    showing over here, they are available for free on websites,
    many of them operated within the PRC, many of them operated by
    official units of the PRC.
        Co-chair McGovern. Well, maybe President Xi ought to visit
    the library or go online. (Laughter.)
        Mr. Lau. Well. (Laughs.)
        Co-chair McGovern. Congresswoman Steel, I don't know if you
    have an additional question. I see you're still on the line. Do
    you have additional questions?
        Representative Steel. No, I don't.
        Co-chair McGovern. OK. Thank you.
        Representative Steel. Mr. Chairman, I just love to listen.
        Co-chair McGovern. Very good. Thank you. Mr. van Walt, what
    other governments have made statements about Tibet being part
    of China? I mean, how many also say ``since ancient times''?
    Can you provide examples of how the Chinese narrative has been
    embraced by the international community?
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. I can't give you exact numbers of
    how many governments have and how many governments have not. I
    know that some governments--and I know that because I've spoken
    to their officials--have been very careful not to make any
    explicit statements, despite pressure. Others have been
    pressured by China, especially after, for example, somebody
    higher up in the government, the minister of foreign affairs or
    the prime minister, has received His Holiness the Dalai Lama.
    After that, they're subjected to a tremendous amount of
    pressure from Beijing, and a number of them then make a
    statement to the effect that they recognize or that they
    identify Tibet as a part of the PRC.
        A good example of that is France. After President Sarkozy,
    in his capacity as president of the European Union, met with
    His Holiness the Dalai Lama in Poland, France was put under a
    lot of pressure and made a statement that since the time of
    Charles de Gaulle, France recognized that Tibet was a part of
    China, which is actually not true, or not accurate, I should
    say. But that is an example. The statement continues by saying
    that this will not change. Denmark was pressured to make a
    similar statement. They added that the Danish government does
    not support Tibetan independence, and President Obama added
    that statement as well.
        I think that addition is even more harmful, and completely
    unnecessary. It takes away and violates the Tibetans' right to
    self-determination to say that they cannot have any say in
    their future because we do not support a particular outcome.
    Again, this type of statement reduces the leverage for
    Tibetans, should negotiations take place.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. I think our position is that
    Tibet's true representatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
    government-in-exile, as recognized by the Tibetan people. That
    is the direction that our government should follow, as well as
    other governments around the world. Mr. Tethong, the position
    of the Central Tibetan Administration is that the Middle Way
    approach proposed by the Dalai Lama is the only viable solution
    to the Tibet problem--and would you characterize the Chinese
    government's response to the Tibetan position as their
    disagreement that the Middle Way approach is viable, or is it a
    denial that there's even a Tibetan problem at all?
        Mr. Tethong. That's a difficult question to answer. It
    seems very complicated. I couldn't understand what you were
    saying, actually.
        Co-chair McGovern. Yes, I mean, I guess the question is
    that His Holiness outlined this Middle Way approach, and the
    Chinese government hasn't responded, right? The question is, is
    it that they cannot see themselves getting to the Middle Way
    approach, or is it basically that they feel they don't have to,
    because there isn't a Tibetan issue they have to deal with?
        Mr. Tethong. I think it may be more of a lack of confidence
    on their part on how to deal with the Tibet issue--afraid that
    if they give in to the Tibetans, other issues will arise within
    China. Also, the Tibet situation is not entirely comparable to
    any other. That may be one reason. And the basic reason, I
    think I tried to point out earlier, is that within the Chinese
    leadership, from a position of being confident and trying to
    find a solution during Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping's time, it
    has retreated to another direction. And this Middle Way policy
    may have suffered.
        Co-chair McGovern. I apologize. I just have a few more
    questions. I just think it's important to establish a full
    record here, not only for the Commission but for my colleagues.
        Ms. Bork, there have been many meetings between U.S.
    Presidents and His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Would you say that
    these meetings have strengthened the hand of the Dalai Lama
    vis-a-vis China? And if President Biden were to meet with His
    Holiness during his term, what would you advise him to say?
        Ms. Bork. I think the reception by U.S. Presidents of the
    Dalai Lama has been extremely important, and also because it
    has become so regular. It would be wonderful for President
    Biden to be able to visit with the Dalai Lama, or if travel for
    either one of them were a problem, having the vice president
    call on His Holiness would signal American support and an
    effort to break down some of the isolation that His Holiness
    has experienced over the years.
        What should he say? I think it's very much a part of the
    broader U.S. policy for China. A democratic basis of government
    for Tibet and China would be what the U.S. President seeks, and
    committing to that and committing to support Tibetan democracy
    in exile, but also Tibetan democracy eventually and Chinese
    democracy, under whatever arrangement most people can agree on
    should be the goal. I don't see any problem with the United
    States standing for that. In fact, I think it's imperative.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you. Professor Lau, Mr. van Walt's
    books argue that it is inappropriate--and if I'm
    mischaracterizing your books, correct me--that it is
    inappropriate to apply the modern definition of sovereignty to
    Tibet and its neighbors because ruling powers in East Asia are
    related to each other in ways that were distinct from the
    Western notion of sovereignty that was applied later. Does your
    research conform to this view? And how would you characterize
    Tibet's relations with its neighbors over the centuries?
        Mr. Lau. Thank you for your question. As far as I could
    tell, there are many places in Chinese official records where
    entities were referred to as ``countries,'' which in Chinese is
    guojia, (country). And Tibet is also referred to as a country,
    guojia, just like Vietnam and Holland, and other countries. So
    if you look at the history of Tibet over the past 1,000 years,
    they are not that dissimilar or that different from the
    histories of Germany, or China, whatever. Sometimes they are
    unified into a central administration and at other times it was
    fragmented. And sometimes there were all these principalities.
        So I guess your question itself would take hours to debate,
    and I'm not good enough to answer the question. Certainly, by
    the Qing Empire's time, or actually even before that, I think
    by the 15th or 16th century, Tibet became sufficiently unified.
    They had all these structures of government such as legal
    codes, central taxation, and so forth, that qualified them to
    be a country. But I've always felt that--pardon me for saying
    this--it's a less relevant question. The more relevant question
    is, was Tibet part of China? And if Tibet wasn't part of China,
    to put it bluntly, it's really none of your business whether
    Tibet itself was a country.
        So on one hand I would say, yes, Tibet was definitely a
    country, compared to the standards that would be applicable to
    China and Germany since the 15th century or so. But again, I
    want to repeat that that's probably an unnecessary confusion of
    the issue. The more important issue is that nobody has the
    right to judge whether Tibet was a country. The more important
    thing is whether Tibet was part of somebody else's territory.
    And if it wasn't, then leave Tibet alone.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you for clarifying all that for
    us. Let me ask one other question, and then, to everybody here,
    any closing remarks that you want to make. In a May press
    conference with the Japanese prime minister, President Biden
    said, ``I believe what Putin is attempting to do is eliminate
    the identity of Ukraine''--the identity. He can't occupy it,
    but he can try to destroy its identity, and you know, I think
    those words are true, what Putin is trying to do in Ukraine,
    but I think they're also applicable to what China is trying to
    do in Tibet.
        When we visited Lhasa back in 2015 with Speaker Pelosi, it
    was clear what they're trying to do--deny Tibetans access to
    their religion, prevent them from speaking their language and
    honoring their customs, you know, being who they are. They're
    doing it in a thousand different ways, and displacing people.
    And it really is quite horrific what is going on; the brutality
    is really horrific. How should we view Tibet through the lens
    of President Biden's comment about eliminating the identity of
    Ukraine? And I will ask you all to respond, and also with
    anything that you think we should add for the record. This is
    the time to make that clear as well.
        So why don't we begin with Mr. van Walt.
        Mr. van Walt van Praag. Thank you very much. I think what
    is happening in Ukraine--Russia's war within Ukraine is
    bringing home a number of issues that are directly related to
    Tibet as well. I mean, we are obviously shocked by the blatant
    aggression against Ukraine and are reminded that exactly the
    same happened a little over 70 years ago, in relation to Tibet.
    President Biden also made a statement to the effect that taking
    another's territory by force is unacceptable, that it violates
    fundamental norms of our international order. I couldn't agree
    more. And I think that should apply to Tibet.
        In terms of the destruction of the very identity of the
    Tibetans, and I believe the same is true when we look at the
    Uyghurs in East Turkestan, it has become very clear, I think,
    at this point, that the very policy of the PRC and of the
    Chinese Communist Party is precisely this: To destroy the
    identity of these peoples because they have found them to be an
    obstacle to their full integration in China. And not only that,
    but they have found that as long as there is a sense of
    identity in the Tibetan case and in the Uyghur case, both very
    closely linked to their religious beliefs and traditions, that
    the CCP will not be able to fully control the Tibetans.
        This is linked also to the question of the reincarnation of
    the Dalai Lama. All Chinese policies today under Xi Jinping are
    geared at full and total control of the Tibetans, whether it is
    through the Dalai Lama, by picking him and educating him in
    accordance with CCP views, or whether it is by taking the
    children and placing them in this network of colonial schools,
    or whether it is by suppressing religious freedom, and other
    things as well. So, yes, the intention is to rub Tibet off the
    map in terms of the identity and the distinctness of the
    Tibetan people. As part of that, there is a strong effort to
    rob the Tibetans also of their history, since that's also tied
    to their identity and is a continuing embarrassment to China's
    attempt to continue to rule Tibet.
        Co-chair McGovern. Mr. Lau.
        Mr. Lau. Well, I would like to reiterate two points. The
    first point is I hope the United States and other governments
    would counter directly the claims of some of these empire
    revivalists. We're seeing that, of course, in Putin's case, and
    then very likely a few years from now we'll see that explicitly
    expressed in China, that they can use historical fabrications
    to justify their attempts to reunify their ancestral lands. And
    that comes to the second point, which is that I hope in the
    future, in schools throughout the world, people will try to
    change this perception that I know is very deeply ingrained
    among the Chinese, that it's very important to be a national of
    a big country, of a powerful country. They believe that it is
    essential to their well-being. My background is that I was born
    in Singapore. And of course, I've seen countries like
    Liechtenstein and Switzerland; people in Singapore and
    Liechtenstein have no interest in enlarging their countries.
    And people can live very well. But people who are educated in
    Russia and China, it never comes to their minds that they could
    live happily ever after if they lose Xinjiang, or Ukraine, or
    Tibet, or whatever it is. They think it's the end of the world
    if their country is splintered, and then Tibet is gone, and
    Xinjiang is gone. I think it's important for us, using the
    Voice of America, or whatever, to try to somehow tell people
    explicitly that people in Switzerland and Liechtenstein live
    very well. This is all the message that I have.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
        Mr. Tethong.
        Mr. Tethong. Thank you, Chairman. With reference to what's
    happening in Ukraine, I think one can say that 70 years ago
    Tibet was in the same situation, and unfortunately, the world
    community could not come to Tibet's assistance. We hope
    attention and focus on Ukraine will be much better, and the
    outcome will be better too.
        For the record, I would like to take the opportunity, on
    behalf of all Tibetans, to express acknowledgement and
    gratitude to the United States Government for the attention and
    focus on what's happening in Tibet. Clearly a tremendous amount
    of change has happened in Tibet, for the better, because there
    is attention from the outside world, and especially the United
    States. We especially acknowledge Members of Congress who have
    taken the lead, and your leadership at this time on the Tibet
    issues as well. I would like to say thank you on behalf of the
    Tibetan people.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you.
        Ms. Bork.
        Ms. Bork. Thank you very much. Just in closing, as you're
    talking about what happened 70 years ago, I just wanted to
    mention that the United States took a very principled position
    in support of the Baltic states against the annexation by the
    Soviet Union. There are some dissimilarities, but not really
    serious ones, in my view. It's really valuable for the United
    States to look back at the constraints it's imposed on itself
    all these decades, acting on behalf of Tibet and making the
    Tibetan exile government's position stronger in trying to reach
    some kind of improvement. In that regard, I think a strategic
    focusing on Tibet as a strategic issue is vital.
        For the record, I will pass along to the staff a readout of
    a tabletop exercise that several of us conducted in 2019 about
    the future, with the passing of the Dalai Lama and how
    governments will respond at that time. Clearly that is an
    exercise that needs to be repeated. And it would be something
    that I think Members of Congress would find useful to think
    about--being prepared for that eventuality, and what China will
    do and what the United States and its allies should do in
    preparation. Thank you very much.
        Co-chair McGovern. Thank you, and thank all of you for your
    testimony. I think this is a very important hearing because in
    our discussions on Tibet, and some of the topics that we
    covered here today, we don't include the historical fact that
    Tibet has not been a part of China since ancient times. I think
    everybody here has disputed that very clearly. Our focus is on
    standing with the people of Tibet to protect their identity, to
    protect their history, to protect their culture, and to protect
    their human rights, and I believe that we in the United
    States--and, Mr. Tethong, I appreciate your kind words, but to
    be honest with you, we're not doing enough. The world community
    is not doing enough. You know, if we were, we would be having a
    very different discussion right now.
        And it's complicated. There are corporate interests
    involved, urging governments not to rock the boat because
    they're all worried about continued corporate profits and
    strategic issues. Nobody wants to rock the boat with China.
    We're very good at talking the talk; we're not very good at
    always walking the walk on these issues.
        But I think that's changing. I really do. I mean, I look at
    the last few years here in the United States Congress. We have
    legislated more; we have created more policy on Tibet than at
    any other time. As I said, Tibet's true representatives are His
    Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile, as
    recognized by the Tibetan people, and I think that that should
    be our guiding principle here as we move forward. I mean, it's
    not up to President Biden, or it's not about what President Xi
    wants for Tibet. It's not about what the President of France
    wants. It's what the Tibetan people want.
        So any solution, any way forward, has to be what the
    Tibetan people want. It can't be imposed by somebody who's not
    part of the Tibetan community and I think there's a growing
    recognition of that. The Tibetan government-in-exile is showing
    an embrace of democracy, which is really inspiring. I witnessed
    some of the election. I've watched online as people voted in
    far-off places, participating in this process. It really is
    inspirational. But I've also met with families who have been
    torn apart, people who don't know where their mothers or
    fathers are, who were disappeared. It's cruel and it is
    horrific.
        Again, we are moving forward with additional legislation.
    We are encouraged by the new special coordinator in this
    administration. We will work with her to have her not only be a
    spokesperson for what U.S. policy should be but to work with
    the international community. I was particularly grateful that
    this hearing is being held at the same time that the World
    Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet is meeting. This is not
    just a U.S. issue. It is a global issue. If you care about
    human rights, this has to be a central issue. I mean, you go
    all over the world and you have these countries go, Oh, human
    rights, human rights, human rights. Well, if you can't stand up
    to China on something like this, then stop talking about human
    rights.
        And to the Chinese government, look, if you want to do
    something constructive right now, you should re-enter the
    direct dialogue that you walked away from 12 years ago. This
    issue is not going away.
        I appreciate everybody being here. I want to thank all the
    witnesses for their testimony. Without objection, I'd like to
    enter into the record a written statement from the
    International Campaign for Tibet and an additional paper by
    Professor Lau. The record will remain open until the close of
    business on Friday, June 24th, for any items that members would
    like to submit for the record or any additional questions for
    the witnesses. And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the hearing was concluded.]

    =======================================================================

                             A  P  P  E  N  D  I  X

    =======================================================================

                              Prepared Statements

                                    ------

                Prepared Statement of Michael van Walt van Praag

        Contrary to what the People's Republic of China claims and to what
    many people take for granted, Tibet was historically not a part of
    China. This is one of the outcomes of a multiyear collaborative
    historical research project that I recently completed and published.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The 10-year research project, which involved some 100 leading
    scholars worldwide, resulted in the publication of Sacred Mandates:
    Asian International Relations since Chinggis Khan, co-authored/edited
    with Timothy Brook and Miek Boltjes, Chicago University Press, 2018,
    and Tibet Brief 20/20, co-authored with Miek Boltjes, Outskirts Press,
    2020. Sacred Mandates won a 2021 International Convention of Asian
    Scholars Book Prize.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is relevant and requires our attention because the PRC
    government has made agreement on its version of history a precondition
    to Sino-Tibetan negotiations, which have been in deadlock now for 12
    years.\2\ More fundamentally, the PRC bases its entitlement to Tibet
    solely on its assertion that Tibet has been an integral part of China
    since antiquity.\3\ Whether or not Tibet was historically a part of
    China therefore determines whether the PRC has the legitimacy to rule
    Tibet or not. And that in turn informs the international community's
    obligations and responsibilities regarding the Sino-Tibetan conflict.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ See State Council Information Office of the People's Republic
    of China, Tibet's Path to Development Is Driven by an Irresistible
    Historical Tide (Beijing, April 15, 2015).
        \3\ Tibet Brief 20/20, op. cit. pp. 6-10.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Addressing the plight of the Tibetan people has been one of my
    lifelong goals, and my contributions have mostly been in the
    international legal and diplomacy spheres, in line with my career. I
    undertook this academic historical research to get to the bottom of
    what informs the PRC government and the Dalai Lama in their opposing
    views on Tibet's historical status, with the aim to be able to come up
    with strategies for those with access and clout to encourage the
    parties to break through the stalemate and resume their dialogue.
        In the process it became clear that the PRC's historical
    narrative--that Tibet has always been a part of China--stands in the
    way of Sino-Tibetan negotiations in more than one way. The
    international community has started to buy into that narrative and
    governments have started to act accordingly, treating Tibet as if it
    was China's internal affair and even stating they consider Tibet to be
    a part of China. I strongly believe that this development is one of the
    main obstacles to resolving the Sino-Tibetan conflict through
    negotiations. It is also in violation of international law.
        Our research firmly establishes that though not always
    `independent' in the modern legal sense of that term and over time
    subject to various degrees of Mongol, Manchu and even British authority
    or influence, Tibet was most certainly never a part of China. The PRC
    could therefore not have `inherited' Tibet from the Republic of China
    or earlier empires, as it claims. As a matter of fact, Tibet was an
    independent state de facto and de jure from 1912 to 1950/51, when the
    PRC invaded it.
        Because Tibet was not at any point in time a part of China, the
    PRC's military invasion of Tibet in 1950/51 constituted an act of
    aggression and violated the peremptory norm of international law
    prohibiting the acquisition of territory by the use of force against
    another state.\4\ This informs the legitimacy of the PRC's presence in
    and rule of Tibet the past seven decades: China does not have
    sovereignty over Tibet. It is occupying Tibet illegally.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ A peremptory norm is an international obligation ``so essential
    for the protection of fundamental interests of the international
    community that [its] breach [is] recognized as a crime by that
    community as a whole''. International Law Commission Rapporteur Roberto
    Ago. Quoted in Cassese, International Law, p. 202. Aggression is a
    prime example.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        International law prohibits governments from explicitly or
    implicitly recognizing China's unlawful annexation of Tibet, from doing
    anything that helps China consolidate its hold on Tibet, and from
    denying the Tibetans the exercise of their right to self-
    determination.\5\ It also prohibits states from benefiting from the
    exploitation of Tibet's resources so long as Tibetans are denied the
    ability to make decisions concerning them.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ International Law Commission, `Articles on the Responsibility
    of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA)' (2001) YILC Vol.
    2, Part 2, Arts. 40, 41, and commentary para 5. See also, UNGA Res 2625
    (XXV) Declaration on Friendly Relations Confirmed by the International
    Court of Justice in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
    Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding
    Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), paras 119, 124, ICJ Reports
    1971; and in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in
    Occupied Palestinian Territory, paras 155-159, ICJ Reports 2004.
        \6\ Court of Justice of the European Union in a landmark case
    concerning the Sahrawi people's rights, in 2016, CJEU, Judgment in Case
    C-104/16 P Council v Front populaire pour la liberation de la saguia-
    el-hamra et du rio de oro (Front Polisario), Dec. 21, 2016 https://
    curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-12/
    cp160146en.pdf, accessed 08/28/2021. Confirmed by the UK High Court on
    2019, https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?
    g=e9a48d23-358c-4948-b754-3f8868bda922.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        At the same time, governments have the positive obligation to take
    action to help bring about a resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict,
    end the occupation of Tibet and enable the Tibetan people to exercise
    self-determination.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ International Law Commission, ARSIWA, op. cit., Commentary to
    Art. 41(1).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Many governments are today acting contrary to these obligations, in
    plain violation of international law and to the detriment of the
    resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict. This includes the US
    government.
        Two developments stand out in this regard: governments make
    statements recognizing that Tibet is a part of the PRC, and they treat
    Tibet as China's internal affair, outside their purview.
        When governments state that they consider Tibet to be a part of the
    PRC, they take away the PRC's principal incentive to negotiate with the
    Tibetans as well as reduce the latter's main source of leverage. In the
    first place, Beijing uses these statements as `evidence' for its claim
    that it has sovereignty and legitimacy in Tibet, and even for its
    historical claim. The more such statements it obtains, the less it
    feels the need to turn to Tibetans for legitimacy. Instead, it uses the
    international community's pronouncements as a substitute for true
    legitimacy, that is, the legitimacy that would result from the consent
    of the governed--through an exercise by the Tibetans of self-
    determination or through a process of sincere negotiations with the
    Tibetan leadership.
        Secondly, once a government states that it considers Tibet to be a
    part of the PRC it cannot but treat Tibet and Sino-Tibetan relations as
    China's internal affair. This is effectively happening today: most
    governments are limiting their expressions of concern to human rights
    abuses. In this way Beijing has largely succeeded in containing
    international scrutiny and reproach to where it can manage it.
        Some governments, including the U.S., have also added that they do
    not support or are opposed to Tibetan independence.\8\ Such statements
    not only violate the prohibition against recognizing annexation by
    force, but also constitute a denial of the Tibetan people's right to
    self-determination, an equally serious violation of international law.
    Even though states cannot actually take away the right to self-
    determination--including the option of independence--from the Tibetan
    people, such statements do the Tibetans a great disservice and
    encourage Beijing to ignore the Tibetans' rights. By supporting the
    aggressor, not the injured, they also fail to fulfill the fundamental
    role international law requires the international community to play--to
    prevent war and promote friendly relations and cooperation among states
    based inter alia on the principles of non-use of force against other
    states and of equal rights and self-determination of peoples--
    frustrating the very purpose of international law in the process. For,
    as the International Court of Justice underscored in the Namibia case,
    \9\ it is precisely to the international community that the injured
    people must look for ending the illegality and for realizing its
    rights.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See, e.g., President Barack Obama--February 21, 2014, Readout
    of the President's Meeting with His Holiness the XIV Dalai Lama. See
    also, `Note Verbale' of the Danish government of Dec. 9, 2009. Reported
    by AFP, Dec. 10, 2009.
        \9\ International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legal Consequences for
    States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West
    Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), ICJ
    Reports 1971, para 127, concerning South Africa's illegal annexation of
    Namibia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It is for Tibetans, and Tibetans only, to make concessions with
    respect to their right to independence--if and when they so decide.
    Ruling out independence one-sidedly disempowers the Tibetan side. It
    weakens the Tibetans' negotiation position, exacerbates the already
    stark power asymmetry, and conditions the expectations of the Tibetans
    as well as of the international community to envision a settlement that
    can bring only marginal change in Tibet. Given what we know, not only
    about China's treatment of Tibetans \10\ but also of Uyghurs, as
    detailed in the recent Newslines Institute Genocide report,\11\ and the
    fact that Tibetans are resorting to self-immolation to protest
    Beijing's oppression and policies to eradicate Tibetan identity,\12\ I
    ask: is marginal change in Tibet what the U.S. wants for the Tibetan
    people?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ See Tibet Action Institute, Separated from Their Families,
    Hidden from the World; China's Vast System of Colonial Boarding Schools
    inside Tibet, December 2021; Tibet Advocacy Coalition, Assaulting
    Identity: China's New Coercive Strategies in Tibet, March 2021.
        \11\ Newslines Institute for Strategy and Policy, The Uyghur
    Genocide: An Examination of China's Breaches of the 1948 Genocide
    Convention, March 2021.
        \12\ There have been 160 confirmed cases of self-immolation since
    2009.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The need for the international community to take responsibility and
    effectively address the Sino-Tibetan conflict is not just a legal and
    moral imperative, it is also a political necessity. Looking the other
    way with an underlying ``let's not make the Tibetans' problem our
    problem'' has been a mistake for which the international community is
    today paying a price as it tries to deal with an emboldened PRC and
    Russia asserting expanding territorial claims and influence.
        Beijing's aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and
    threatening moves towards India and Bhutan to press territorial claims,
    as well as its genocidal policies against Uyghurs, all taking place at
    the time of this writing, cannot be treated as unrelated to the years
    of international appeasement of Beijing as concerns its unlawful
    seizure and occupation of Tibet and its implementation of oppressive
    policies of integration and assimilation there. And neither can
    Russia's attempt at forcefully annexing part or all of Ukraine.
        It is U.S. policy to support a negotiated resolution of the Sino-
    Tibetan conflict. U.S. Government actions, however, run counter to U.S.
    policy. Supporting a negotiated resolution of the Sino-Tibetan conflict
    requires the political will to be vocal about the lack of legitimacy of
    China's presence in and rule of Tibet, not statements that imply an
    acceptance of China's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. It requires
    calling and treating Tibet what it is: an occupied country, and the
    Tibetans what they are: a people under alien subjugation and
    domination, not a `minority' or `ethnic group of China'. Adopting such
    PRC terminology denies the Tibetan people its proper status and
    implicitly its right to self-determination. And lastly, it requires the
    Sino-Tibetan conflict to be called and treated what it is: an
    international conflict, falling squarely within the international
    community's--including the U.S. Government's--purview and
    responsibility, not China's internal affair.
        It is also U.S. policy not to recognize a country's attempt to
    annex territory by the use of force. President Joe Biden recently
    reiterated that taking territory by force is unacceptable. He said so
    publicly in reference to Taiwan and Ukraine.\13\ The prohibition
    against taking another country's territory by force is a cornerstone
    and fundamental norm of modern international law and the international
    legal order. No derogation from this is allowed, and governments are
    prohibited from recognizing such territorial expansion. Just as
    Russia's attempted annexation of Ukrainian territory cannot be accepted
    or recognized by the international community, so China's attempted
    annexation of Tibet must not be accepted or recognized. Only in the
    absence of such recognition may the PRC government be moved to
    negotiate with the Tibetan leadership to resolve their conflict.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/
    2022/05/23/remarks-by-
    president-biden-and-prime-minister-fumio-kishida-of-japan-in-joint-
    press-conference/. President Biden accused President Putin of attacking
    ``the norms and principles that are the foundations of our
    international order.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The U.S. Department of State stated on March 12, in relation to the
    Russo-Ukrainian conflict, that the U.S. is committed to ``putting the
    Ukrainians in the strongest possible negotiating position''.\14\
    Tibet's leaders are committed to non-violence and do not seek weapons.
    But they do need coordinated international action to--at a minimum--
    firmly anchor Tibet's international legal status, to bolster its
    negotiating capacity and to bring China to the negotiating table. The
    U.S. and other governments have shown in recent months how coordinated
    diplomatic and economic measures, including sanctions, can be deployed
    in efforts to stop and punish aggression. Such coordinated action is
    overdue to address China's occupation of Tibet.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/us-ready-take-diplomatic-
    steps-ukraine-will-find-
    helpful-state-dept-2022-03-12/

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                    Prepared Statement of Tenzin N. Tethong

        Hon. Chairman,
        It is my distinct honor to offer testimony this morning at this
    hearing on ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an Unresolved Conflict'' and
    to speak briefly on Tibetan-Chinese relations in the 20th century,
    including efforts towards a resolution of the Tibet issue.
        Tibet has remained an unresolved conflict ever since the
    establishment of the People's Republic of China. One of Mao Zedong's
    earliest declarations was his intention to ``liberate'' Tibet from the
    West, and the Tibetan people from a backward and oppressive society.
        The Tibetan government protested to the new Chinese state citing
    Tibet's historical independence from the time of Tibetan Kings to the
    rule of the Dalai Lamas, from the Tang to the Manchu Qing dynasties.
    With equal urgency, Tibet appealed to the United Nations and the global
    community, especially to India, the United Kingdom and the United
    States. Unfortunately, China did not heed Tibet's protests and the
    global community did not come to Tibet's defense.
        The People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in 1950, easily
    overwhelming the Tibetan army and militia. China knew right then that
    rhetorical justification for such an invasion was not enough and called
    for negotiations to formalize an agreement. Tibetan representatives
    negotiated in Beijing, but disregarding any proper ratification
    process, were forced to sign what is called ``The 17 Point Agreement
    for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.''
        Nevertheless, for the next nine years, His Holiness the Dalai Lama
    and the Tibetan government tried to work within the broad confines of
    the agreement which promised no change in the status of the Dalai Lama
    or the Tibetan government. However, the Chinese did not live up to
    their commitments nor to the personal assurances the Dalai Lama had
    received from Mao Zedong.
        Tibetan dissatisfaction was widespread during these years and
    protests against the Chinese finally culminated in the uprising in
    Lhasa on March 10, 1959, which led to the escape of His Holiness the
    Dalai Lama and thousands to India and neighboring countries.
        For the next twenty years Tibet was completely shut off from the
    rest of the world. An extreme overhaul of Tibetan life from its
    traditional Buddhist roots to Chinese Marxist socialism was introduced,
    which in the later years was consumed by the madness of the Chinese
    Cultural revolution.
        However, in early 1979, China deemed the Tibetan issue important
    enough to be revisited. Deng Xiaoping invited the Dalai Lama's older
    brother to Beijing and declared that short of separation, everything
    could be discussed, meaning that short of granting Tibetan
    independence, China would be open to all Tibetan concerns and
    aspirations.
        This breakthrough meeting led to renewed dialogue between the Dalai
    Lama and the Chinese government, and four delegations of exile leaders
    were able to visit Tibet extensively, to see and learn what had
    transpired in the two decades of Chinese rule.
        By 1984, representatives of the exile government were in
    deliberations with Chinese officials to address the larger issues
    related to Tibet. However, in 1987, Hu Yaobang, Party General Secretary
    and the main proponent of change in their Tibet policies died. This was
    soon followed by the Tiananmen student protests and the massacre. China
    stepped backwards and the Tibet issue also retreated.
        In 2001, however, communication with China was restored, and Envoys
    of His Holiness the Dalai Lama began meeting in Beijing, and the
    Tibetan side presented the Dalai Lama's Middle Way policy seeking
    genuine autonomy for Tibet within the framework of the PRC. The Envoys
    met many times, even after the unprecedented 2008 Tibet-wide protests
    that called for greater freedom for the Tibetan people. However, the
    Envoys' last meeting was to be in 2010 when the Chinese ended the
    dialogue process.
        This brief overview of Tibetan-Chinese relations should show that
    even at the most challenging of times, China has seen the need to
    address the legitimacy of their rule in Tibet. And that there is
    perhaps now a realization of the shortcomings of their rule. China has
    also repeatedly initiated direct communication with His Holiness the
    Dalai Lama, demonstrating the obvious need to find a meaningful
    resolution to these outstanding issues.
        Ever since the exile delegation visits to Tibet in the 1980s, to
    the later meetings of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in Beijing, the Chinese
    leadership has been made much more aware of Tibetan perspectives of
    their rule in Tibet, and of the unvarnished aspirations of the Tibetan
    people, both of which contradict the official Chinese narrative.
        Worldwide attention to Tibet has been an important part of creating
    greater awareness of the Tibetan issue even within China, allowing for
    more liberal and reasonable views of the Dalai Lama and of Tibetan
    hopes and demands to have some standing.
        There is little doubt that public support for Tibet, through the
    person of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and concerns for the cultural and
    human rights of the Tibetan people, has been an important factor in the
    U.S. Government's attention to the issue, which has been sustained to a
    large degree by individual members of Congress.
        The continued efforts of the United States can only help in
    removing barriers to this unresolved conflict and will advance the
    Tibetan people's desire for greater freedom and democracy.
        Thank you.
                                     ______

                        Prepared Statement of Ellen Bork

        Mr. Chairman, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me
    to appear before you today. I am also grateful to the Commission staff
    for their advice and expertise.
        The Trump Administration began, and the Biden Administration
    continues, to chart a profound change in American policy toward
    Communist Party-ruled China.
        So far, however, Tibet has not been the focus of significant policy
    revisions by the executive branch. Certainly, Tibet today would be far
    down the list of most Americans' concerns when it comes to China.
    Compared to China's aggression in the South China Sea, coercive
    financial diplomacy, and the threat to Taiwan, Tibet is sometimes
    viewed as a closed, albeit tragic, chapter of history.
        By contrast, more than 70 years after the invasion, Tibet remains a
    high priority for the Chinese Communist Party. This priority is evident
    in the attention and resources the Party devotes to surveillance,
    repression and control, to General Secretary Xi Jinping's goal of
    sinicizing religion, to the exploitation of natural resources and to
    building up military forces along Tibet's border with India.
        Furthermore, the Party's ambitions regarding Tibet are
    international and expansive. They are a part of China's assault on
    liberal democratic norms. This in turn serves Beijing's ultimate goal
    of gaining international deference to its choice of the next Dalai
    Lama. Preventing that, reversing the diminution of support for the
    Dalai Lama and building support for Tibetan democracy should play a
    much greater role in America's response to China.
        The foundations of American Tibet policy make this more difficult
    than it should be. A look back at history shows that America's Tibet
    policy is not the product of historical facts, or principles of
    international law, but rather of outdated perceptions of America's
    strategic interest in subordinating Tibet to China.
        Washington had little involvement in Tibet until World War II.
    Before then, the U.S. favored China's territorial integrity even while
    its empire was disintegrating. During World War II, Washington was
    allied with Chiang Kai-Shek. That relationship had profound and lasting
    effect on Tibet.
        Chiang hoped to recover lost imperial territory, including Tibet.
    American officials did not wish to undermine him, even though officials
    knew that he exerted no authority there and they considered that Tibet
    had been de facto independent for decades since the collapse of
    imperial rule.
        Also damaging was Washington's acceptance of imperial Britain's
    assertion of Chinese ``suzerainty'' over Tibet. Less than sovereignty,
    suzerainty is an anachronistic and inapt concept which neither Tibet
    nor China accepted but which imperial Britain introduced in order to
    fend off Russia's eastward advance during the geopolitical competition
    in the region known as the Great Game.
        Even so, American officials seemed uncomfortable with the term, and
    resisted using it. From the 1940s through the 1960s, in internal
    documents, officials considered different views of Tibet's status in
    response to developments. At the time of the invasion, a memo by the
    State Department's legal advisor suggested that recognition of Tibetan
    independence was a possibility. Later on, in the 1960s, there was
    sympathy for the idea of Tibetan self-determination, including in a
    letter from the Secretary of State to the Dalai Lama. But it was easy
    enough to say this while doing little except provide some support to
    Tibetan rebels, and while the U.S. was still allied with Chiang Kai-
    shek, who had fled to Taiwan.
        Only decades after the invasion did the U.S. recognize Chinese
    sovereignty. In 1987, the State Department, responding to questions
    about unrest in Tibet, dated this position to 1978. That reference
    appears to have been an internal decision rather than a public
    statement. And it took place around the time of the break in relations
    with Taipei. Visiting Beijing in August 1979, Vice President Mondale
    told Deng Xiao-ping, ``our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is
    part of China.'' The Vice President also said that henceforth, the
    Dalai Lama would be received as a religious figure, not a political
    leader.
        In short, America's approach to Tibet fluctuated according to its
    perception of its strategic interests with regard to China--and with
    regard to which Chinese government it favored--the Republic of China or
    the People's Republic of China. Ultimately, Washington transferred its
    deference to China over Tibet from a cultish dictatorship that never
    exerted authority there to a cultish totalitarian regime that invaded
    and repressed it.
        Once this was done, Tibet became problematic within U.S.-PRC
    relations. As Melvyn Goldstein writes, with policy focused on improving
    its accommodation with China, Tibet became ``an embarrassment for the
    United States,'' ``no longer relevant to U.S. national interests'' and
    even ``potentially harmful.'' \1\ The characterization of Tibet as a
    problem in U.S.-China relations that should be neutralized, including
    for Tibet's own sake, has persisted.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Melvyn Goldstein, Snow Lion and the Dragon,(Berkeley:
    University of California Press, 1997), p. 57-58.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Of course this approach to Tibet, and the decision to accept the
    PRC's sovereignty, meant that the democratization of the theocratic
    government in exile--and the illegitimacy of Party rule there--could
    not be a major factor in America's policy. The extraordinary
    accomplishment of Tibet's democracy in exile would not be discussed
    alongside the democratic transitions in the Philippines, Taiwan,
    Indonesia, and South Korea at the end of the last century which have
    shaped America's approach to the region ever since. It should also be
    noted that America's approach to Tibet had been out of step with the
    principled stance Washington took against communist aggression in
    Europe and the annexation of the Baltic states.

              * * * * * * *

        For its part, the CCP has maintained an ambitious agenda for Tibet,
    and not only inside its borders. In neighboring countries it has used
    border settlements, security relationships, investment and the
    development and appropriation of Buddhist sites to advance its
    interests. In fact, even today, Chinese officials maintain territorial
    ambitions with regard to Tibet, speaking of parts of northeastern India
    as ``Southern Tibet'' and putting pressure on India across the Tibet-
    India border.
        Beijing also pursues its Tibet agenda aggressively in foreign
    capitals and international organizations. Beijing uses its self-
    proclaimed ``core interest'' in Tibet to impose litmus tests in the
    United Nations, and in foreign capitals.
        In this way, Tibet is an instrument of the Party's assault on
    liberal democratic norms. It is also intended to help the Party win
    international deference to its selection of the next Dalai Lama.
        In 2019, I convened a group with expertise in Tibet, China, India,
    and American foreign policy to consider how governments would respond
    when the Dalai Lama dies, and China seeks to install an impostor. The
    group concluded that the Dalai Lama's succession is a matter of
    strategic competition and should be viewed as such by the U.S. and its
    democratic allies.
        A final note: the Party's intense propaganda and control makes it
    seem that Chinese people are irredeemably nationalist when it comes to
    Tibet. This has an effect inside China, of course, but also outside,
    making new thinking about Tibet seem hopeless. In fact, leading Chinese
    dissidents have offered criticism of Party policies in Tibet. Going
    back to Wei Jingsheng, and continuing to Liu Xiaobo and Xu Zhiyong,
    pro-democracy activists, lawyers and others have bravely linked Tibet's
    fate to China's, stressing that the solution for both Tibetans and
    Chinese is democracy. Liu Xiaobo wrote in 2008, ``a confrontation
    between freedom and dictatorship has been made to look like a clash
    between ethnicities.'' \2\ The democracy manifesto, Charter 08,
    referenced Tibet indirectly in its call for a ``federation of
    democratic communities of China'' and the resolution of ``disputes in
    the national minority areas of China . . . to find a workable framework
    within which all ethnic and religious groups can flourish.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Liu Xiaobo, ``So Long as Han Chinese Have No Freedom, Tibetans
    Will Have No Autonomy,'' April 11, 2008, No Enemies, No Hatred, Perry
    Link, Tienchi Martin-Liao, Liu Xia, editors, (Cambridge: Belknap Press
    of Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 263.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is a message from inside China that American officials should
    consider. Taken together with the democratic achievement of the Tibetan
    people in exile, the U.S. can chart a new approach based on Tibet's
    strategic importance, not only in the territorial sense, but in the
    ideological one.
        A few recommendations follow:

          Renew and redouble support for Chinese and Tibetan
    political prisoners, dissidents, democracy activists, independent
    journalists and lawyers.
          Conduct an independent review of U.S. Tibet policy since
    the end of Chinese imperial rule, including the diplomatic history, and
    of internal deliberations that have influenced America's approach to
    Tibet.
          Bring Tibet policy into line with America's interest in
    combating China's assault on democratic norms, including international
    law, and in advancing democracy in the Indo-Pacific by enlisting allies
    in a united position on the integrity of the Tibetan process for
    selecting the next Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama, or his designee, should
    regain the access he once had in foreign capitals.
          Receive elected officials of the Central Tibet
    Administration (CTA), the Sikyong, his cabinet and other Tibetan
    officials at the highest levels of government and include them in the
    Summit for Democracy and other gatherings.
          Make Tibet a part of efforts to counter Chinese influence
    in international organizations, on university campuses and at the state
    and local level.
                                     ______

                    Prepared Statement of Hon. Jeff Merkley

        Good morning. Today's hearing of the Congressional-Executive
    Commission on China entitled ``Tibet: Barriers to Settling an
    Unresolved Conflict'' will come to order.
        More than 70 years after the invasion that led to Chinese rule in
    Tibet, Tibetans continue to struggle in the face of unrelenting
    oppression. Chinese authorities routinely violate Tibetans' freedom of
    religion, expression, and assembly, as well as denying their self-
    determination.
        The Chinese Communist Party has waged a years-long campaign of
    ``sinicization'' requiring conformity with officially sanctioned
    interpretations of religion and culture, not the authentic practice and
    teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Contrary to that practice and teaching,
    the Chinese government even insists on its own authority to select the
    next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, who authorities label a security
    threat. Those who express reverence for the Dalai Lama are punished.
        Also punished are those who express dissatisfaction with Chinese
    rule in Tibet. These punishments range from warnings to surveillance to
    interrogation and detention. The Commission's Political Prisoner
    Database currently includes records of 715 Tibetans detained or
    imprisoned for political or religious reasons. We note that there are
    considerably more cases of detention in China than we can capture in
    the database.
        Increasingly, this oppression threatens the religious, cultural,
    linguistic, and historical identity of the Tibetan people. Earlier this
    year, we heard testimony about insidious efforts to separate Tibetan
    children from their parents, with nearly 80 percent of all Tibetan
    children now placed in boarding schools to disrupt the
    intergenerational transfer of language and culture. We are observing an
    expansion of that practice to children going to kindergarten.
        This Commission has documented these kinds of human rights
    violations in Tibet for 20 years and we will continue to do so. In
    today's hearing, our focus turns to the dialogue needed to address the
    aspirations of the Tibetan people for their basic rights and self-
    determination to be respected. Sadly, that dialogue has been frozen for
    12 years as Chinese authorities refuse to meet with the Dalai Lama or
    his representatives.
        The longstanding policy of the United States is to promote dialogue
    without preconditions to lead to a negotiated agreement on Tibet. In
    other words, we recognize that this remains an unsettled conflict that
    must be addressed. Yet the Chinese government would have the world
    believe that Tibet is an internal affair and that issues of its status
    are resolved. This narrative ignores Tibet's history, and today's
    hearing aims to set the historical record straight.
        Our witnesses will share with us their considerable experience
    analyzing the history of Tibet, the international law dimensions of the
    conflict, the barriers to resuming dialogue, and U.S. policy on Tibet.
    I hope this hearing helps cut through Chinese propaganda and brings
    attention to the true historical underpinnings of the Tibetan quest for
    autonomy.
        I'd also like to welcome the members of the Tibetan Parliament-in-
    Exile--it's good to have you here--the International Campaign for
    Tibet, dignitaries, and other friends of Tibet who are with us this
    morning while they are in town for the 8th World Parliamentarians'
    Convention on Tibet. Thank you for joining us.
        The causes of Tibetan human rights and self-determination need
    champions all over the globe and I look forward to continuing to work
    with my fellow parliamentarians to advance the causes of human dignity
    and freedom wherever we can.
        Among global elected officials, few have been as great a friend of
    Tibet as my co-chair, Congressman McGovern, who for many years has led
    the charge in the U.S. Congress to pass legislation and advocate for
    the Tibetan people.
                                     ______

                  Prepared Statement of Hon. James P. McGovern

        Thank you, very much Mr. Chairman, and I too also want to welcome
    our friends who are visiting Washington to participate in the World
    Parliamentarians' Convention on Tibet.
        I want to especially welcome the members of the Tibetan parliament-
    in-exile. We have two members of the Canadian parliament here. I
    welcome our friends from ICT. And I welcome my dear friend Richard
    Gere, who has been an incredible activist and advocate for human rights
    in Tibet. We are delighted you are all here.
        I appreciate that we are holding this hearing on Tibet, the status
    of dialogue, and a path forward in the Tibetan quest for rights and
    dignity.
        Congress has had a long and abiding interest in Tibet. It created
    Tibetan language broadcasting, scholarships and exchanges, and aid
    programs for Tibetans in Tibet and in exile. In 2002, Congress passed
    the landmark Tibetan Policy Act, and codified the position of Special
    Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.
        Support for Tibet transcends the partisan divide. Congressman Tom
    Lantos and Senator Jesse Helms stood side by side with the Dalai Lama.
    So did President Bush and Speaker Pelosi, who presented him with the
    Congressional Gold Medal in 2007.
        I have had the honor of authoring the two most recent Tibet bills
    to be enacted into law. The Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act seeks to
    enable diplomats, journalists,and tourists to travel and see Tibet with
    their own eyes, because Chinese officials have closed it off. The
    Tibetan Policy and Support Act expands the U.S. policy approach. As its
    key feature, the bill makes it U.S. policy that the succession or
    reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist leaders, including a future 15th
    Dalai Lama, is an exclusively religious matter that should be decided
    solely by the Tibetan Buddhist community. Not by China.
        Congress and the U.S. Government have advocated for the human
    rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people. But the core
    problem remains that the Tibetan people cannot advocate for themselves.
    They are forced to live in an authoritarian system under a paranoid
    central government that sees any expression of distinct identity as a
    threat to their power.
        His Holiness the Dalai Lama says it doesn't have to be this way.
    He's right. For decades he sought to negotiate with Chinese
    authorities. He did so in good faith. The Chinese side did agree to ten
    rounds of dialogue. They talked to the Dalai Lama's envoys. But they
    did not do so in good faith.
        Chinese officials say they will return to the table only if the
    Dalai Lama meets certain demands--demands that are not only
    unreasonable, but false. The U.S. Government, to its credit, has
    consistently called on the Chinese to return to dialogue, without
    preconditions. But that hasn't worked. For 12 years, the Tibetans stood
    ready, the Americans asked, but the Chinese turned away. Should we keep
    doing it this way, or should we explore some other tactic or strategy?
    That is the question we will explore in this hearing.
        Our witnesses today bring expertise and a variety of perspectives--
    legal, historical, policy, and personal--to the Tibet-China dialogue.
    We hope to hear what Congress and the U.S. Government can do to help.
    Should we be countering false Chinese narratives? Should we reorient
    how we talk about the basis for dialogue? Is dialogue even possible in
    the current environment, and what would the alternatives be?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to consider these
    important questions. I look forward to our hearing.

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                              Witness Biographies

        Michael van Walt van Praag, professor of international law and
    executive president of Kreddha

        Michael van Walt van Praag is a professor of international law and
    executive president of Kreddha, an international NGO created to help
    prevent and resolve violent intrastate conflicts. He is a Senior Fellow
    at the Sompong Sucharitkul Center for Advanced International Legal
    Studies, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, and a
    member of the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission. He has
    served as a Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Social Sciences,
    University of California Davis, as Visiting Professor of Modern
    International Relations and International Law, Institute for Advanced
    Study, Princeton, and as Legal Advisor to the Office of His Holiness
    the Dalai Lama. He is the author with Miek Boltjes of Tibet Brief 20/20
    and author and editor of Sacred Mandates: Asian International Relations
    since Chinggis Khan.

        Hon-Shiang Lau, retired chair professor, City University of Hong
    Kong

        Hon-Shiang Lau's ancestry is Guangdong province, China. He was born
    and educated in Singapore. He obtained his bachelor of engineering
    degree from the University of Singapore in 1969, and a Ph.D. in
    business administration from the University of North Carolina at Chapel
    Hill in 1973. He was Full Professor of Business Administration at
    Washington State University starting in 1980, Regents Professor at
    Oklahoma State University starting in 1987, and Chair Professor of
    Operations Management at the City University of Hong Kong starting in
    2000. He took early retirement in 2011 to devote his time to Chinese
    history. The Chinese-language edition of his book Tibet Was Never Part
    of China since Antiquity was published in 2019; its English-language
    translation will appear soon.

        Tenzin N. Tethong, former Representive of His Holiness the Dalai
    Lama, New York and Washington, DC

        Tenzin N. Tethong is the former Representative of His Holiness the
    Dalai Lama, New York and Washington, DC. He served in several roles in
    the Central Tibetan Administration based in Dharamsala, India,
    including as Kalon Tripa (Chief of Cabinet) and Kalon of various
    portfolios such as the Departments of Finance, Home, and Information &
    International Relations. He headed the second delegation of Tibetans to
    Tibet and China in 1980. From 1997 to 2011 he was a Distinguished
    Fellow and taught in the Tibetan Studies Initiative at Stanford
    University. He previously served as Director of the Tibetan language
    service at Radio Free Asia and currently serves as Director of the
    Tibetan language service at Voice of America. He is testifying in a
    personal capacity.

        Ellen Bork, contributing editor, American Purpose

        Ellen Bork is a contributing editor at American Purpose. She writes
    about American foreign policy with an emphasis on democracy and human
    rights. She served as the senior professional staff member for Asia and
    the Pacific on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and writes
    frequently about U.S. policy toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Her
    writing has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The Dispatch, the
    Washington Post, and other publications. She graduated from Yale
    University and the Georgetown University Law Center.

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