[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





 
   ONE YEAR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW'S REPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
                         FREEDOMS IN HONG KONG

=======================================================================

                               ROUNDTABLE

                               before the

              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JUNE 29, 2021

                               __________

 Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
 
 
 
 
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             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
45-055 PDF            WASHINGTON : 2021               
              






              CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

                    LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House

                                     Senate

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon                 JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts 
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California         Cochair
MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             THOMAS SUOZZI, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey
STEVE DAINES, Montana                BRIAN MAST, Florida
ANGUS KING, Maine                    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
JON OSSOFF, Georgia                  RASHIDA TLAIB, Michigan
                                     JENNIFER WEXTON, Virginia
                                     MICHELLE STEEL, California

                     EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

                           Not yet appointed

                      Matt Squeri, Staff Director

                   Todd Stein, Deputy Staff Director

                                  (ii)
                                  


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                               Statements

                                                                   Page
Opening Statement of Matt Squeri, Staff Director, Congressional-
  Executive Commission on China..................................     1
Introduction of Keynote Speaker Jerome A. Cohen by Todd Stein, 
  Deputy Staff Director, Congressional-Executive Commission on 
  China..........................................................     2
Cohen, Jerome A., Adjunct Senior Fellow for Asia Studies, Council 
  on
  Foreign Relations..............................................     2
Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, Associate Professor, Department of 
  Political Science, University of Notre Dame....................     7
Kellogg, Thomas E., Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law 
  School.........................................................    10
Teng Biao, Pozen Visiting Professor, University of Chicago.......    13
Chen Jiangang, Hubert H. Humphrey Fellow, American University
  Washington College of Law......................................    14

                                 (iii)


   ONE YEAR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW'S REPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
                         FREEDOMS IN HONG KONG

                              ----------                              


                         TUESDAY, JUNE 29, 2021

                            Congressional-Executive
                                       Commission on China,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The roundtable was convened via Webex at 1 p.m., Matt 
Squeri, Staff Director, Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, presiding.
    Participants: Jerome A. Cohen, Adjunct Senior Fellow for 
Asia Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, Victoria Tin-bor 
Hui, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, 
University of Notre Dame, Thomas E. Kellogg, Adjunct Professor 
of Law, Georgetown Law School, Teng Biao, Pozen Visiting 
Professor, University of Chicago, and Chen Jiangang, Hubert H. 
Humphrey Fellow, American University Washington College of Law

     OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. MATT SQUERI, STAFF DIRECTOR, 
          CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Staff Director Squeri. Good morning. I'm Matt Squeri, staff 
director of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 
Today's roundtable recognizes two anniversaries--the passage of 
the Hong Kong National Security Law and the 709 Crackdown on 
rights defenders and lawyers across China in July 2015. In 
particular, today's roundtable will examine procedural rights 
violations by the Chinese government, as illustrated by the 709 
Crackdown, and their implications for the extraterritorial 
reach of the National Security Law and the potential for 
defendants to be extradited from Hong Kong to mainland China.
    Our Commission, currently chaired by Senator Merkley and 
Representative McGovern, was created in 2000 to monitor China's 
compliance with, and violations of, international human rights 
standards. We also maintain a political prisoner database 
which, unfortunately, has recently begun to include political 
prisoners from Hong Kong. We periodically hold roundtables and 
hearings on China's human rights practices, including two 
hearings focusing on Hong Kong in 2019.
    In May 2019, four witnesses--including Martin Lee and 
Nathan Law--testified about an extradition bill that would 
allow extradition from Hong Kong to mainland China. Given 
China's track record of serious violations of substantive and 
procedural rights of criminal defendants, as well as the threat 
that this extradition bill poses to Hong Kong's one country, 
two systems model, the bill prompted a series of large-scale 
protests by Hong Kong residents in 2019. Sixteen weeks 
following our May hearing, Joshua Wong, Denise Ho, and three 
other witnesses testified in September about the widespread 
abuse of power and use of excessive force with impunity by Hong 
Kong police, which vividly illustrated the rapid deterioration 
of the rule of law in Hong Kong.
    The National Security Law, passed in June 2020 without any 
meaningful input from Hong Kong residents, has effectively 
dismantled the one country, two systems model and destroyed the 
high degree of autonomy promised to Hong Kong. The law provides 
for heavy penalties for vaguely defined offenses and authorizes 
the Chinese government to take over certain cases, which 
potentially allows the government to physically transfer a 
person to China--a result that the people of Hong Kong tried so 
hard to prevent in reaction to the extradition bill in 2019.
    Today we have invited five distinguished panelists to 
highlight important issues surrounding this troubling pair of 
anniversaries. To introduce our keynote speaker, I'd like to 
turn to the deputy staff director of the CECC, Todd Stein.

 INTRODUCTION OF KEYNOTE SPEAKER PROFESSOR JEROME A. COHEN BY 
MR. TODD STEIN, DEPUTY STAFF DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 
                      COMMISSION ON CHINA

    Deputy Staff Director Stein. Thank you. It's my honor to 
introduce Professor Jerome Cohen, a pioneer and leading figure 
in the field of study of Chinese law and government. He was a 
professor at NYU School of Law from 1990 to 2020 and mentor to 
several generations of experts in Chinese law. He is the 
founder of and faculty director emeritus at the U.S.-Asia Law 
Institute of NYU's School of Law and is adjunct senior fellow 
for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Professor 
Cohen has published several books on Chinese law and continues 
his research and writing on Asian law. And, in contrast to the 
dour marking of several July 1st anniversaries--the National 
Security Law, the Hong Kong handover, and the founding of the 
Chinese Communist Party--we are happy to celebrate Professor 
Cohen's 91st birthday on that day. Happy birthday. Over to you, 
Professor.

 STATEMENT OF JEROME A. COHEN, ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW FOR ASIA 
             STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    Mr. Cohen. The Communist Party is older than I am.
    [Laughter.]
     Mr. Cohen. This Commission has done great work. And I'm 
honored to be asked to take part in today's important exercise. 
It's an opportunity to reflect on both the 709 repression and, 
of course, the National Security Law recently enacted for Hong 
Kong.
    It's a sad day, of course. The handover, as it was called 
in 1997, has certainly become the takeover. And I can't discuss 
all the aspects, but I do, in my opening remarks, want to focus 
on the legal and judicial aspects. And I should point out, I've 
just had the privilege of reading the report by Georgetown's 
Center for Asian Law that Tom Kellogg and his colleagues have 
done. I'm glad to see Tom is among the participants today in 
our discussion. And of course, many of you already know Michael 
Davis's book that gives a wonderful review of how things 
developed in Hong Kong.
    Hong Kong people, of course, have been resisting the 
takeover for some time. Their resistance became so strong in 
2019 over the struggle to prevent forcible extradition from 
Hong Kong to the mainland for criminal trials that it really 
has provoked what we have seen in the National Security Law. 
Beijing ended the Hong Kong struggle just a year ago. And 
they've done more than just end the struggle. Hong Kong people 
are familiar with justice in China. Therefore, they didn't want 
to be subject to extradition--what technically, because it's 
not an international problem, should be called rendition.
    And yet the new National Security Law has done two things. 
It has authorized extradition to the mainland in national 
security cases, which are very, very vaguely and broadly 
defined. But more importantly and immediately, it has brought 
the national security system of the mainland, the police state 
that it is, to Hong Kong. And this, of course, means--I 
wouldn't say the death of Hong Kong--a phrase that first became 
popular when the joint declaration between the U.K. and the PRC 
was signed in 1984--but it certainly transforms Hong Kong. It 
introduces ``stability,'' as the mainland advocates keep 
saying. But of course, you have a lot of stability in 
cemeteries also.
    So one has to appraise what's going on. I can't talk, 
because of time limitations, about all the restraints that have 
been imposed on Hong Kong in terms of the media, the government 
itself, the political-legislative system, the elections, the 
educational system. We could go on at length, and perhaps some 
of my distinguished colleagues will do that. But I do want to 
say something about the judicial system. A criminal defense 
lawyer in Hong Kong was recently quoted as saying that the 
infliction on Hong Kong of the new National Security Law is 
like an alien species invading our territory. How alien it is, 
of course, I'm going to demonstrate in certain respects. And I 
urge you to read the Georgetown report, which has some amazing 
revelations and very important detail.
    We should say, first of all, a word about prosecutors. I 
was for a brief time a Federal prosecutor in Washington. I know 
the power that prosecutors have to ruin people's lives, 
regardless of the outcome of criminal prosecutions that they 
institute. And sadly, we see in Hong Kong today an illustration 
of the exercise of that power. I worry what the Secretary of 
Justice who presides over the Department of Justice has done to 
the system. Prosecutors in every jurisdiction have to exercise 
discretion. And it seems like discretion is being exercised for 
political reasons, and in ways that often wouldn't previously 
justify prosecution, or prosecution for cases as serious as 
have been brought.
    Recently we know that a former director of public 
prosecutions resigned in protest because he wasn't even being 
told about--much less taking part in--decisions of security 
people who determined whether national security prosecutions 
would be brought in Hong Kong. And I'm sure he could tell us a 
lot. There's also the allegation in the Georgetown report that 
the staff, the lawyers in the Department of Justice in Hong 
Kong, may have been drafting, certainly, the implementing 
regulations that are crucial to understanding the scope of the 
authority of the central government's security police apparatus 
that has been brought to Hong Kong.
    So I feel that the Department of Justice, the people who 
decide on prosecutions and who force the courts to consider 
very difficult and perhaps sometimes irresponsible accusations 
under great pressure, really deserves more attention than the 
prosecutors have received. The courts, of course, have been 
getting a lot of attention but perhaps their dilemma is not 
completely understood. We have seen that the National Security 
Law strips the courts of the review power, the jurisdiction to 
consider some of the basic constitutional law protection issues 
that the new regime has imposed on Hong Kong.
    And we know from previous experience, and the court knows, 
that if it makes a decision that the central government doesn't 
like, that decision can be immediately overridden by the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, as we 
have seen in the past. Not only do we have that problem, of 
course, but we have problems now that the prosecution of actual 
NSL cases has begun. What kind of fair trial are these people 
going to receive? And of course, the first question that we 
have to understand is: Who are the judges?
    And here we see the special arrangements to select only 
certain judges, in whom the chief executive has confidence and 
who are assigned to cases in a way that isn't entirely clear to 
the public. But these are judges who are not ordinary judges 
but specially selected, and only for one-year terms, which 
means that if they say or do the wrong thing, they will not 
continue to enjoy that status, and they will be, of course, 
publicly embarrassed. It's not even possible to know who these 
judges are now because the government has not made the full 
list public.
    So it's a sad thing about who is going to judge these 
cases. Not every regular Hong Kong judge will be allowed to 
take part. Some have been eliminated from these cases at the 
decision of the Secretary for Security of the Hong Kong 
government. Without persuasive argument, we've just seen a jury 
trial denied in the first prosecution being brought. And of 
course, that's one of the basic defenses that the common law 
system has guaranteed to people.
    Even more important to me is the change in bail procedures. 
Normally there is a presumption of bail being granted in cases 
where at least the accused is not accused of violence. What 
we've seen under the NSL is a reversal of that presumption. And 
that means that the government can simply bring a charge 
against anybody. Given the vagueness and ambiguity of the 
prescriptions in the law, they can charge almost anybody for 
anything. And when they bring that case, it means it's very 
likely that the accused suspect--and he's only a suspect--can 
be kept in jail until the proceeding is entirely finished, 
which could take several years.
    So the burden that the accused has--to persuade a court, 
even a conscientious one that doesn't feel under pressure--is 
very great to show that the accused is not likely to repeat any 
violation of the National Security Law when people don't really 
know yet what conduct violates the National Security Law. And 
the person, as many have been already, kept in detention, is 
kept there pending trial, pending conviction, appeal. It could 
go out to the Court of Final Appeal, and that person's life has 
been ruined, even if the court system should ultimately 
vindicate the rights of the accused. Three years later, the 
accused has lost everything. So it's a win-win proposition for 
the prosecution and the Hong Kong government and the Chinese 
Communist Party to bring accusations against anybody, because 
it's a sure way of punishing. In a way, trial--certainly jury 
trial--but trial, has become secondary. It's arrest and 
detention, denial of bail, that is the sure thing. So that's a 
very sinister, of course, situation.
    When we look at the question of judicial independence, the 
best defense that the PRC government and the Communist Party 
and the Hong Kong government can mount is they keep reciting 
how we can all rely on the judicial independence of Hong Kong 
judges. Well, that claim no longer looks very persuasive, and 
it's very likely to get worse. I've already said the courts 
have been denied full jurisdiction to consider constitutional 
issues. We already know that the selection of judges, even for 
the Court of Final Appeal--the highest court in Hong Kong--is 
being affected by political considerations. We have just seen a 
very able candidate for the CFA have to withdraw under 
political pressure that has not yet been publicly articulated. 
And this whole business about judges for security cases again 
shows the limits on the court system.
    In a way, public attention has been diverted and misled by 
a focus on the continuing participation of foreign judges in 
the Court of Final Appeal. I think that's an eyewash question. 
I think those foreign judges who still have not resigned from 
the Court of Final Appeal should do so. They are there now as 
mere decoration for an increasingly oppressive national 
security system in Hong Kong. They don't play a role in 
national security cases. They're not there very often. They're 
just icing on the cake.
    But there is a serious foreign judge problem that hasn't 
been focused on. Many, many lower court judges in Hong Kong 
have foreign nationality. And they are under pressure. Should 
they resign? Should they keep their jobs and listen to the 
party line and the pressure that every day is being evoked in 
the communist press in Hong Kong? And how will their successors 
be selected? This is going to be an increasingly apparent 
problem. But in the meantime, some of these judges have to make 
decisions, and not only in security cases--if they're among the 
elite, the chosen few to handle those cases. But there are many 
other cases in Hong Kong that involve charges of violating Hong 
Kong law before the National Security Law, and in addition to 
it, today. And we ought to be looking carefully at foreign 
judges in the lower courts in Hong Kong.
    Finally, I'd like to say a word about the bar. One of the 
most serious revelations in the Georgetown report that just 
came out is that there are cases where there's a high suspicion 
that people accused under the National Security Law may be 
pressured to change their defense counsel. They may be 
pressured and advised, perhaps by the prosecution, perhaps by 
others, that it's wise to pick certain lawyers, certain 
solicitors, certain barristers who are known to have good 
connections to the existing government and the Public 
Prosecution Department at the Department of Justice. 
Connections, political contacts--seem to be rising in 
importance.
    And this, of course, brings into focus the 709 movement and 
the denial of counsel, and all the sanctions against active 
independent human rights lawyers who try to provide criminal 
defense in China. Some have been sent to prison. Some have been 
disbarred. Some have been suspended. Some law firms have been 
closed down. Some have been forced into exile. The accused have 
not been free to select their own counsel. They have long had 
counsel imposed on them who aren't very vigorous. They're just 
there as decoration. And is that what Hong Kong could be coming 
to?
    So we're having problems that we, I think, have to 
anticipate. But in the meantime, we have to recognize that the 
bar--the Bar Association, the barristers, the criminal defense 
lawyers in Hong Kong, many of them are as able as any in the 
world and courageous and dynamic. And they have been trying to 
stand up against the repression of the National Security Law. 
And the last two Bar Association chiefs have been publicly 
attacked. And there are underway schemes being discussed to 
dilute the influence of the Bar Association, most of whose 
members, but not all, seem to support opposition to repression 
imposed by the National Security Law.
    Will there be some new Bar Association? Will there be some 
forced union of the solicitors--the lawyers' association who 
are not litigators--with the Bar Association? The law society 
seems to be majority in favor, at least insofar as people are 
not afraid to express themselves, of the national security 
regime. If there's a forced merger, that would change the 
balance of power and you'd see protests begin to cease from the 
Bar Association. Will there be some mainland organization that 
absorbs the Bar Association? We don't know. There are schemes 
afoot to try to dilute the last defense that Hong Kong has 
against further intrusions into the rule of law. And of course, 
if the Bar Association is muted or intimidated, then the courts 
are going to be denied the assistance they need for full 
consideration of the case.
    Well, I won't go on. I do want to quote a professor at Hong 
Kong University Law School, who in March wrote that ``the court 
maintains the rule of law in the shadow of a giant.'' Of 
course, that giant is the mainland. And since last March, that 
giant has begun to show that its influence is not limited to 
that of a shadow. And what we have found is that no matter 
whether you talk about the prosecutors, you talk about the 
court, you talk about defense lawyers, and solicitors, etc., 
they're all under increasing challenge.
    And that leads to my ultimate worry which is, What about 
the law schools? Hong Kong now has several very good law 
schools. And Hong Kong University Law School, which was merely 
starting out in the '70s when I was first an early honorary 
lecturer there for eight weeks, has on its faculty many able, 
informed, courageous critics. Its students are also interested. 
And their programs have distinguished public intellectuals and 
others who are distinguished scholars and are increasingly 
necessarily critical of recent developments.
    Will they be able to go on teaching? Will the example of 
Professor Benny Tai, who was ousted from his academic post 
because of his political involvement--will that be expanded? 
What will be taught in the future? Who will be accepted as 
students? Who will be able to publish in what periodicals, 
etc.? I think this is going to be coming on the scene, just as 
I'm afraid restrictions on freedom of travel from Hong Kong 
also will be coming on the scene. But I think I've said enough, 
and I look forward to what my colleagues have to say, and to 
our discussion.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Professor Cohen. It is an 
honor to have you kick off our discussion and then this 
roundtable, with the rich detailing of the landscape in Hong 
Kong, and the evolution over time, and the troubling 
developments. Now we'll turn to the other panelists, as 
Professor Cohen mentioned.
    First, we have Dr. Victoria Hui. Dr. Hui is Associate 
Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. 
She received her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia 
University and Batchelor of Social Sciences degree. in 
journalism and communications from the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong. Dr. Hui studies contentious politics in Hong Kong's 
democracy movement. She has testified before both the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China and the U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission and written on Hong 
Kong's Tiananmen 2.0 crackdown for Foreign Affairs, the Journal 
of Democracy, The Diplomat, and the Washington Post's Monkey 
Cage.
    Dr. Hui also examines the centrality of war in Chinese 
history. She has published on state formation, nascent 
constitutional rights, Confucian pacificism or Confucian 
confusion, cultural diversity, assimilation and genocide, Asian 
civilizations, international order, and violent change. Before 
her academic career, Dr. Hui worked as the press officer for 
the then-United Democrats of Hong Kong and its chair, Martin 
Lee. We are delighted that starting later this summer Dr. Hui 
will participate in a Council on Foreign Relations 
International Affairs fellowship with the CECC. Dr. Hui, the 
floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF VICTORIA TIN-BOR HUI, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, 
   DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

    Ms. Hui. Thank you so much for having me. I noticed that I 
am the only political scientist among a panel of lawyers. So 
I'm just trying to highlight the political aspects. What the 
National Security Law means is--it is a very cynical Beijing 
response to Hong Kong people's objection to extradition. ``So 
you Hong Kong people, you guys do not like to be extradited 
across the border? We are just going to bring China's security 
police and public security agents to come in to overrun your 
once autonomous judiciary and criminal justice system.''
    And many people are worried very much that some of those 
who are particularly attacked by Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po, 
the CCP's mouthpieces in Hong Kong, these are the likely 
suspects to be taken across the border--especially Jimmy Lai, 
the publisher of the Apple Daily, Joshua Wong, and Benny Tai, 
who were already mentioned by Jerry. My worst fear is that it 
may not matter anymore if some of these people are going to be 
taken across the border. What Jerry just said, and I suppose 
what Tom is going to say, is that some of those practices, very 
typical in mainland China, have already been imported to Hong 
Kong.
    And we can think of Andy Li, one of those safe in Hong 
Kong, but who was intercepted at sea and taken to Shenzhen. 
Even when he was brought back to Hong Kong, he was assigned 
lawyers not of his family's choosing and he's been kept in a 
psychiatric hospital. We should also note that the National 
Security Office operates on a budget of $1,000,000, just for 
the coming year, and it occupies two huge hotels. It has all 
the resources and physical space it needs to bring in all the 
practices of mistreatment of political prisoners and do that 
within Hong Kong.
    And it seems that things are just going to get worse 
because now in Hong Kong we formally have a police state in 
command. Last week the promotions of John Lee from the security 
bureau chief to chief secretary and Chris Tang from the 
commissioner of police to security bureau chief mark the formal 
installation of the police state. We should say that this is 
essentially something long in the making, especially since the 
Umbrella Movement of 2014. In the aftermath, at the time the 
former deputy director of the Hong Kong Macau Affairs Office 
Chen Zuoer already said that, ``we have to rein in Hong Kong's 
governance.'' And he declared an all-out struggle against civil 
society and especially the courts, the legislative counsel, 
people inside the government, universities, secondary schools--
all of those pockets of civil society.
    Now, Lee and Tang were rewarded for their very harsh 
crackdown on Hong Kong, especially the forced closure of Apple 
Daily and arrest of top executives and editors-in-chief. Their 
report cards also include over 10,000 arrests since June 2019, 
over 100 arrests under the National Security Law since July 
2020, the arrest of pretty much the entire opposition camp. 
Many are denied bail, convicted, and jailed. And now there are 
no more pro-democracy legislators in the legislature. There 
will be no more meaningful elections. There will be no more 
street protests, no more Tiananmen candlelight vigils on June 
4th, no more commemoration and mass protests on June 4th, June 
9th, June 12th, June 16th, or the upcoming July 1st.
    I've argued that what we are witnessing in Hong Kong is 
Tiananmen 2.0, essentially the wholesale transfer of mainland 
China's crackdown into Hong Kong. We shouldn't really focus on 
the fact that Beijing has not rolled out tanks into the streets 
of Hong Kong. There were other similarities--massive arrests, 
torture in full view of livestreaming media throughout 2019. 
And the Tiananmen model also includes both hard and soft 
repression. By hard, I mean physical forms of repression--
arrests, beatings, torture. But also nonphysical forms of 
repression. Freezing people's accounts--including the Apple 
Daily's accounts and former legislators' accounts--and making 
people pledge loyalty to the CCP and fire those who are less 
than loyal.
    And Jerry mentioned arrests. What is really important is 
that those who are arrested, even when they are not charged--
thus not denied bail--even those who are charged and not 
convicted, what happens is that all those arrested incur 
immense legal fees, so they go broke. There have been many 
campaigns to fundraise to help these people. But at the same 
time, a lot of these funds themselves have become targets. At 
the same time when there are so many arrested, it's just really 
straining people's resources. Another ``softer'' aspect of 
repression is censorship and the imposition of patriotic 
education in order to impose amnesia.
    So what do we mean by a police state? A police state 
prosecutes political opponents and overlooks the crimes of 
security agents and political supporters. We've seen that there 
have been many cases of police brutality against protesters in 
2019. They were caught on film, both local and international. 
And yet many of these officials, officers, have not really been 
held accountable. In fact, any accountability has been in the 
form of promotions. The most notorious was the August 31st 
incident in the downtown train station in Prince Edward. Police 
were just charging into these trains and indiscriminately 
attacking passengers. In the aftermath, the authorities said 
that anyone who talks about the August 31st incident--
especially the possibility that some people got killed--is all 
fake news. And people who do so are subject to prosecution.
    Another thing about tolerating regime supporters is another 
infamous case of collusion at the Yeun Long station on July 21, 
2019. That evening thugs armed with sticks and rocks attacked 
communities and pedestrians at the train station. At the time, 
Chris Tang--who was later promoted to be commissioner of police 
and now is the security bureau chief--was the district 
commander. Officers did not show up until after all the thugs 
had left. Senior officers were filmed speaking with the men in 
white shirts; those thugs that evening were all wearing white 
shirts. And they were speaking prior to the attacks. And so 
many people have come up with the suspicion that the police 
were colluding with the attackers. So instead of arresting most 
of those people on the spot right in the aftermath, pro-
democracy legislator Lam Cheuk-ting, who was himself beaten 
bloody, was actually arrested for rioting that day.
    And then these security officers replaced Matthew Cheung. 
He was the last career administrator in the Carrie Lam 
administration. One thing he did well was apologize over the 
Yeun Long incident. He said the police handling fell short of 
the citizens' expectations. Immediately he was publicly rebuked 
by the police inspectors' association. Some of those statements 
read: ``Matthew Cheung, why do you deserve to represent the 
police force? If you want to apologize, you should resign. If 
you don't step down or apologize to the whole force, you'll be 
a sworn enemy of the police.'' The fact that subordinates could 
openly challenge the number two in the government suggested 
that the police had backers more powerful than the Carrie Lam 
administration.
    We should note that in fact Carrie Lam, as well as the 
city's security chiefs, has been under the direct command of 
the Beijing security apparatus. They began to have very regular 
sit-downs whenever Carrie Lam and Chris Tang visited Beijing. 
They were always having sit-downs with the Minister of Public 
Security Zhao Kezhi, and also the Police and Legal Affairs 
Commissioner Guo Shengkun in the rest of 2019. So now that the 
police are formally in charge of the Hong Kong government and 
they are subordinate to Beijing's security apparatus, the 
frightening prospect is that there's very little distinction 
between being arrested in Hong Kong versus the mainland. And 
this is why we really need to take stock of what has happened 
to political prisoners and rights defense lawyers, from other 
panelists.
    Let me also highlight that even though the name of the 
bill, the law, is ``national security,'' it really is about 
Beijing security. Tiny Hong Kong presents no threat to the 
national security of China. What Hong Kong represents is a 
threat to a regime that brooks no dissent. The one country, two 
systems model could work, except that what really is in place 
is a one party, two systems model, which cannot work at all. 
The CCP is a Leninist party that brooks no dissent. And it 
cannot tolerate any professional independence. ``Any 
professional'' here means somebody--the administration, or the 
police, the judiciary, the civil service, the media, the 
education sector--it's actually the entire society. Once upon a 
time we thought that one country, two systems was meant to 
create a firewall to shield the city's preexisting rights and 
freedoms from the one-party dictatorship in mainland China. 
What Beijing has done is to turn that into essentially 
capitalism without freedom. It helps to kill Hong Kong's 
freedom while preserving its capitalism.
    Let me just close with one point. If one country, two 
systems does not work because it is, in fact, one party, two 
systems, what does this also mean for the emerging order of one 
world, two systems? If Hong Kong once had a functioning legal 
order with a politically neutral civil service, an impartial 
police force, an independent judiciary, and an unfettered free 
press, and all that were taken down, what would that mean if 
China now is holding up these alternative institutions, 
creating this one world, two orders? One thing is that the 
immediate effect is this is just going to harden the line so 
that we are entering the next cold war in a more solid way. But 
more important in the long term, will Beijing's order take over 
the liberal world order or would this world of one world, two 
systems, actually work? So let me close here and let's hear 
from other panelist lawyers.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you so much, Dr. Hui, for your 
comments.
    Our next panelist is Professor Tom Kellogg. Professor 
Kellogg is Executive Director of the Center for Asian Law, 
where he oversees various programs related to law and 
governance in Asia. He is a leading scholar of legal reform in 
China, Chinese constitutionalism, and civil society movements 
in China. Prior to joining Georgetown Law, Professor Kellogg 
was Director of the East Asia Program at Open Society 
Foundations, during which he focused most closely on civil 
society development, legal reform, and human rights. He also 
oversaw work on a range of other issues, including public 
health, environmental protection, and media development. 
Professor Kellogg has written widely on law and politics in 
China, U.S.-China relations, and Asian geopolitics. He has 
lectured on Chinese law at a number of universities in the 
United States, China, and Europe, and he has also taught 
courses on Chinese law at Columbia, Fordham, and Yale Law 
Schools.
    Professor Kellogg.







   STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. KELLOGG, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
                     GEORGETOWN LAW SCHOOL

    Mr. Kellogg. Wonderful, wonderful. Well, I want to thank 
the CECC for this invitation to talk about the important topic 
of human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. And I 
certainly want to thank my colleagues on the panel for some 
very insightful remarks on where we are now. And I would agree 
with the other members of the panel that we are in a very 
difficult moment for human rights and the rule of law, both in 
Hong Kong and, as I think we'll hear in a little bit, on the 
mainland itself.
    I do want to make sure to mention the report that my Center 
just put out yesterday on the Hong Kong National Security Law 
one-year anniversary, with a focus on the right to a fair 
trial. I thank Jerry for his kind words on the report. And I 
hope that those who are interested in more detail on some of 
these issues will check the report out. It is available on our 
website.
    I want to say a quick word about the extraterritoriality 
concerns raised by the National Security Law and then use the 
remainder of my time to touch on the right to a fair trial for 
NSL suspects.
    Article 38 of the National Security Law does create almost 
unlimited extraterritorial scope for the National Security Law, 
which means that individuals can be charged for national 
security crimes that take place anywhere in the world. And of 
course, as many in this audience will know, we've had at least 
one American citizen--Samuel Chu, head of the group HKDC, the 
Hong Kong Democracy Council, be named as somebody who was under 
investigation under the National Security Law, and other exiled 
activists have been similarly named by the Hong Kong police 
over the past year.
    But I should point out that Article 38 is just one of many 
entry points into the international community that the Hong 
Kong police, the Hong Kong government, and by extension Beijing 
can use to extend the reach of the National Security Law. Under 
Schedule 5 of the National Security Law's implementing rules, 
the police can target foreign ``political organizations'' 
operating in Hong Kong and force them to answer questions about 
their activities in Hong Kong in ways that very much parallel 
the mainland's 2015 foreign NGO law. And of course the CECC has 
written about the rather extensive reach of that law and its 
implications for U.S. NGOs, U.S. universities, and others 
operating in China.
    I would argue that Schedule 5 of the implementing rules 
sets up similar very thorny moral and ethical questions for 
organizations operating in Hong Kong and needs to be the 
subject of more attention and more discussion. Of course, many 
in this audience will know that Nathan Law, the exiled 
activist, was told by the Israeli internet service provision 
company Wix that his website was being taken down because the 
Hong Kong police, using their authority under Article 43 of the 
National Security Law, said that his website had to be taken 
down. The website was returned to service within a day or two, 
but the precedent was set. And we have to wonder whether other 
similar exiled activists will be targeted as well.
    Now, on due process rights for individuals accused of NSL 
crimes--well, actually, if I could just quickly say a word or 
two about some of the broad brushstrokes of the NSL. First, I 
think it's undeniable that the NSL's had a major impact on 
human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. And this is 
going to be a challenge that all of us are facing, and 
particularly the people of Hong Kong are facing, for years to 
come. I would argue that the law's passage itself is a 
violation of Hong Kong's Basic Law and the promises made to 
Hong Kong for a high degree of autonomy. And just to highlight 
one element--basically, mainland political entities operating 
in Hong Kong is a violation of the Basic Law itself and the 
promise by Beijing that it would be Hong Kong people themselves 
running Hong Kong.
    The aggressive implementation of the law over the past year 
is also deeply disturbing. Since the law went into effect, 
we've had, by Georgetown's count, something like 128 
individuals who have been arrested over the past 12 months, and 
65 who have been charged. The vast majority of those 65 
individuals have been targeted for peaceful political activity 
that should be protected by Hong Kong's Basic Law. And it's now 
an open question as to how the courts will reconcile the 
apparent conflict between the human rights of those accused and 
the very serious National Security Law crimes that they are 
charged with. That question, I think, will animate a lot of the 
conversation on the National Security Law in the months to 
come, as the trials get underway.
    Quickly, on due process rights, Jerry already covered some 
of the questions related to bail so I will hold off on saying 
any more on that front for now. But of course, we could say 
more about that in the Q&A. I will say that jury trial is a 
disturbing element of the restrictions on due process rights 
that we have seen thus far. And we know that Tong Ying-kit, the 
first defendant to go on trial under the National Security Law, 
was denied his right to a jury trial literally in the days 
before his trial began. So he too will not have the benefit of 
this important prophylactic measure that can really do a lot to 
ensure judicial independence and that can guard against 
political prosecutions by the Hong Kong government.
    Again, I share Jerry's concern, but there's been a lack of 
discussion of the role of the prosecutor in these cases over 
the past year. It's certainly welcome that there's been a lot 
of focus on judicial independence, and that needs to be a 
continuing subject of conversation and analysis. But we do need 
to be thinking more about the role that prosecutors are playing 
in some of these cases.
    In conclusion, let me just say that the moves by the 
government that I've been mentioning here and that are 
described in the Georgetown report released yesterday do 
suggest that the government is chipping away at the due process 
rights of those accused of National Security Law crimes in ways 
that have grave implications for the right to a fair trial for 
those accused of crimes under the NSL. It's too early to say 
whether or not NSL defendants will actually get a fair trial. 
Any final analysis will have to wait until we have final 
verdicts in some of these initial cases, but the initial 
prospects, the initial signals are, to put it mildly, not good. 
Let me leave it there, and I look forward to continued 
discussion.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Professor Kellogg.
    Our next panelist is Dr. Teng Biao. Dr. Teng is an academic 
lawyer, currently the Pozen Visiting Professor at the 
University of Chicago, and Grove Human Rights Scholar at Hunter 
College. He has been a lecturer at the China University of 
Political Science and Law and a visiting scholar at Yale, 
Harvard, and NYU. Dr. Teng's research focuses on criminal 
justice, human rights, social movements, and political 
transition in China. Dr. Teng defended cases involving freedom 
of expression, religious freedom, the death penalty, Tibetans, 
and Uyghurs. He co-founded two human rights NGOs in Beijing, 
the Open Constitution Initiative and China Against the Death 
Penalty in 2003 and 2010, respectively. Dr. Teng is one of the 
earliest promoters of the rights defense movement in China and 
of the manifesto Charter 08 for which Dr. Liu Xiaobo was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Dr. Teng has received various 
international human rights awards, including the Human Rights 
Prize of the French Republic.
    Dr. Teng, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF TENG BIAO, POZEN VISITING PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF 
                            CHICAGO

    Mr. Teng. Thank you, Matt, for your invitation and 
introduction. I will briefly make a few points. First, how the 
National Security Law threatens human rights and freedom not 
only in Hong Kong, but also globally, focusing on two articles. 
The first one is Article 55 and the following Articles 56 and 
61--between 56 and 61. And Article 55, the Office for 
Safeguarding National Security for the Central People's 
Government in Hong Kong, still exercises jurisdiction over 
cases concerning endangering national security if the case is 
complex or a serious situation occurs where Hong Kong is unable 
to effectively enforce the law or a major and imminent threat 
to national security has occurred. So it's very vague. And 
under these circumstances the police, the prosecution, and the 
court will be designated by Beijing.
    And Hong Kong people can be sent to and detained in 
mainland China. The criminal procedure law of the People's 
Republic of China, not the Hong Kong procedural law, still 
applies to these cases. And this has almost legalized conduct 
like the kidnapping of Gui Minhai and the Causeway Bay 
booksellers. I call it the Causeway Bay Article. And you know, 
in 2015 Gui Minhai was abducted in Thailand and Lee Bo in Hong 
Kong. And Gui has a Swedish passport and Lee Bo has a U.K. 
passport. They were severely tortured. And Gui Minhai was 
forced to give up his Swedish citizenship and reapply for his 
Chinese passport. It's really, really terrifying. And by the 
way, the Causeway Bay kidnappings partly contributed to the 
protests in 2019.
    Another article is Article 38. I call it the Long-Arm 
Article. I'm glad that Tom Kellogg has discussed this ``long-
arm article.'' Actually, this article targets anyone who 
criticizes Beijing's Hong Kong policy or who advocates for Hong 
Kong democracy or independence, no matter what passport you 
have or where you are based. And the second point is that 
torture is rampant in mainland China and is institutionalized. 
All the detained criminal suspects and defendants I represented 
in China have been tortured, without exception. And I myself 
was severely tortured in China. And if we go by the standards 
of the Convention against Torture, which China signed and 
ratified, I should say all over China nearly 100 percent of 
detainees have been tortured.
    And what are the institutional reasons, the systemic 
reasons for the rampant torture? There are many. First is the 
narrow definition of torture. You know, the Chinese authorities 
adopted a narrower definition than the CAT, the Convention 
against Torture. Second, the flawed criminal procedure and 
evidence rules. And third, no judicial independence. And as 
I've observed, police have more power than the courts or the 
judges. The criminal investigations and the prosecutions rely 
heavily on extracting confessions and obtaining evidence 
through torture. And the purpose of the Criminal Procedure Law 
of the PRC includes the priority of combating crime and 
impunity for most torturers.
    In China, most torturers are not punished. Or even if they 
are punished, it is generally very slight. And the political 
punishment--like dissidents, Falun Gong practitioners, and 
Tibetans, Uyghurs--there are many different kinds of 
extrajudicial detention, like legal education centers, like the 
concentration camps in Xinjiang, and many other kinds of 
extrajudicial or extralegal detention. And the limited role of 
Chinese lawyers--the human rights lawyers in China are 
frequently subjected to forced disappearance, house arrest, or 
disbarment, or even conviction and torture. And then there's 
the lack of freedom of expression and no independent--no free 
media in China, and that also contributes to the frequent use 
of torture.
    And the final brief point I want to make--in mainland 
China, who has been charged with and convicted of endangering 
national security? I think 99 percent of them were not the 
people who are really endangering national security or those 
resorting to violence. Ninety-nine percent of them are people 
like Liu Xiaobo--dissidents, or NGO activists, or human rights 
defenders. And they were just exercising freedom of expression 
or writing articles critical of the CCP, the system, the 
policies, or the party officials, or practicing law 
representing dissidents. Unfortunately, this is happening not 
only in mainland China but also in Hong Kong.
    Look at the cases like Joshua Wong, Benny Tai, Zhou Ting, 
or Jimmy Lai. The Chinese Communist Party is destroying Hong 
Kong's freedom and rule of law by implementing the draconian 
NSL. And the Chinese government violates its international 
commitments. So it is a legal, political, and moral obligation 
for the international community to protect a free Hong Kong and 
stand up to the CCP. I'll stop here. Thank you.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Dr. Teng.
    Our fifth panelist is Mr. Chen Jiangang. Mr. Chen is a 
Hubert H. Humphrey fellow at the American University Washington 
College of Law. Before coming to the United States, Mr. Chen 
practiced law in China for over a decade with a focus on rights 
defense cases. He has handled cases involving torture, speech 
and religious freedom violations, and infringement of property 
rights. Notably, Mr. Chen was co-counsel for lawyer Xie Yang 
and played a critical role in exposing his client's experience 
of being tortured by Chinese officials. Mr. Chen fled China in 
2019 after receiving threats of being disappeared in connection 
with his representation of a United States citizen who was 
subject to an exit ban.
    Mr. Chen.

STATEMENT OF CHEN JIANGANG, HUBERT H. HUMPHREY FELLOW, AMERICAN 
              UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF LAW

    Mr. Chen. Hello. Thanks to CECC for inviting me. I have 
been a lawyer in China for 12 years, including 10 years 
representing human rights cases. In 2009 I represented my first 
human rights case, helping a client protect their family's 
house from the government. The last case I represented in 2019 
was to help an American citizen, Fiona Huang. The Chinese 
government did not allow me to represent Fiona and asked me to 
quit the case. I replied that I would never quit, and the 
Chinese government issued death threats against me. So in July 
2019, I led my wife and children out of China. Behind the 
living conditions of human rights lawyers lies the human rights 
situation and the judicial situation in China. What I'm talking 
about today is the personal experience of myself and my lawyer 
friends.
    Now, we are talking about Hong Kong. I am not surprised at 
the state of Hong Kong today, because I know that the current 
situation in China that I have experienced is the future of 
Hong Kong. I need to tell you about the living conditions of 
human rights lawyers in China.
    First, every lawyer in China is faced with the difficulties 
of annual inspection. In the case-filing system, lawyers are 
forbidden to use self-media to make comments, and the 
government monitors lawyers in handling cases. The annual 
inspection of lawyers has become an annual introductory 
approval and administrative license for lawyers, which is 
actually a rope through which the CCP controls lawyers. The 
Bureau of Justice has stipulated the degree of case reporting, 
which means that lawyers must report cases involving national 
security, religious belief, and mass incidents to the Bureau of 
Justice for filing.
    In fact, the filing system is a disguised monitoring, or 
even a disguised restriction on the practice of lawyers. In 
some cases, the Justice Department sends agents to follow 
lawyers directly, monitor their sessions, and threaten those 
who dare to fight. The Supreme People's Court of the CCP and 
the Ministry of Justice issued a joint statement asking lawyers 
``not to hype up cases in their own names or by issuing 
statements, open letters, or urging letters in the media.'' 
Several lawyers have been punished or even stripped of their 
legal licenses for speaking out.
    Second, government departments and the law firms can simply 
strip lawyers of their cases. There is now a tendency for the 
CCP to simply strip lawyers of their cases. The measure is to 
forbid the lawyer to meet with the person after arrest, forbid 
the family members and the person to appoint a lawyer, and then 
require the people to accept a lawyer appointed by the 
government. Even if a family member has a lawyer, the CCP can 
still ask the client to cancel the appointment.
    Since 2015 this has been the norm. For example, the Chinese 
government explicitly prohibits lawyers from representing cases 
related to COVID-19. The bureau will instruct law firms and 
directors of law firms to directly suppress and control 
sensitive lawyers and prohibit them from handling sensitive 
cases. Once a lawyer is banned from working, it will put the 
lawyer's family into financial crisis.
    Third, various government agencies hinder the practice of 
lawyers and use various means to destroy the daily lives of 
lawyers. The CCP has imposed various obstacles on lawyers' 
handling of cases, such as refusing to let lawyers meet 
defendants without any justification, denying them access to 
their papers, denying them permission to speak in court, 
forcing them to go through security checks, frisking them, and 
even preventing them from entering court sessions. There are 
also direct beatings of lawyers, illegal seizure of lawyers' 
equipment for handling cases, and even illegal detention, 
torture, imposition of charges, and even imprisonment. The 
cases are numerous, and I have been a victim myself.
    The CCP will destroy everything about a lawyer and his 
family in order to force them to obey, leaving them in 
immediate trouble. This often involves forcing lawyers to move, 
cutting off the water, power, gas, and internet of the lawyer's 
family, and cutting off the telephone, threatening a lawyer's 
family members, banning their children from school, and so on.
    Fourth, among human rights lawyers in China, a large number 
were eventually deprived of their law licenses by the CCP 
through various means. I myself and a large number of my lawyer 
friends who are all well-known human rights lawyers and human 
rights defenders, were deprived of their licenses, and a number 
of law firms were dissolved.
    Fifth, torture, imprisonment, and insulting media coverage. 
Dozens of Chinese lawyers have been found guilty by the CCP for 
their involvement in human rights cases, such as Gao Zhisheng, 
Li Heping, Wang Quanzhang, Xie Yang, Jiang Tianyong, and Wang 
Yu, who just won a Woman of Courage Award from the U.S. 
Government. All of these arrested lawyers have been tortured, 
and they're reported on in insulting ways by the CCP's media. 
The CCP also humiliates lawyers by fabricating shameful 
charges, such as visiting prostitutes.
    Sixth, the CCP controls lawyers by keeping family members 
as hostages, and some lawyers have been held for long periods, 
or even been disappeared. In persecuting lawyers, the CCP 
controls the lawyers themselves by holding family members, 
especially children, as hostages--a tactic that has become 
common since 2015, with almost all persecuted lawyers and their 
families barred from leaving the country and their children 
prevented from going to school.
    In my own case, in May 2017 my whole family was arrested. 
The police held the barrel of a pistol to the heads of my two 
sons, age six and two, in front of me. Then, for more than two 
years, the Beijing police put my home under 24-hour 
surveillance. The police told me in no uncertain terms that my 
children were their hostages. Individual lawyers, such as Gao 
Zhisheng and Jiang Tianyong, have been jailed for long periods, 
or even disappeared.
    I can't cover all the ways in which the CCP persecutes 
lawyers because the CCP controls everything in China and has 
unlimited power. There are countless ways in which they can 
persecute lawyers.
    In conclusion, I would like to make it clear to all of you 
that anti-human rights, anti-rule of law, and anti-
constitutionalism are the essence of the CCP. Never, never, 
never trust the CCP. Thank you.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Mr. Chen. And thank you 
to all of our panelists for the very illuminating and thought-
provoking comments. Each of you laid a lot on the table that I 
know is to the benefit of the CECC staff and commissioner staff 
that is joining us, as well as the broader public watching 
online. I will take the moderator's prerogative by starting off 
with an initial question, but if any CECC staff or commissioner 
staff have any questions or would like to make any comments, 
please use the smiley-face function at the bottom of your 
screen to use the raise-hand function. And I will make sure 
that we can recognize those who wish to speak or ask questions.
    I'd like to start by asking our panelists for any 
reflections on where we go from here, what Congress can do in 
light of the deterioration in rule of law and the human rights 
situation that you've all so eloquently laid out. Should 
Congress be contemplating additional economic sanctions due to 
the Hong Kong government's seizure of Apple Daily's assets 
without a court order? Are there items of leverage that 
Congress can use when it comes to promoting a more robust focus 
on these issues at the United Nations?
    There was a group of 50 independent United Nations human 
rights experts in June 2020 who urged the Human Rights Council 
to act with a sense of urgency and take all appropriate 
measures to monitor Chinese human rights practices. So are 
there steps that can be taken in that venue? I would just like 
to draw out the panelists on any reflections on policy levers 
or actions that the United States Government should be 
contemplating in light of what has been laid on the table.
    Yes, Professor Cohen, let's start with you.
    Mr. Cohen. I am glad that you raise the question, because 
for years I have been trying to persuade Congress to support 
research on what's taking place in China, especially with 
respect to the political-legal problems. Congress and the 
executive have done a lot to provide funding for training in 
China for cooperation and exchanges in China with respect to 
legal matters. And our NYU U.S.-Asia Law Institute has done 
remarkable and little-recognized work, often with the support 
of the State Department Human Rights Bureau, distributing funds 
made available by Congress.
    But what Congress has resisted is putting up money for 
research on China. I have argued that it's nice to know more 
about the people you're trying to cooperate with and even 
train. And yet, research hasn't been attractive. And today, of 
course, we're restricted in opportunities for many of the 
things we used to do in China, in cooperation with the courts, 
with the lawyers, with academic people, the legal profession. 
Now it's hard to do that. We're trying to do more in this 
country and elsewhere, to the extent that those people are free 
to leave China. But this is the time for more research. This is 
a time for training our own people. We're going to need a new 
generation. I appreciated your birthday congratulations at the 
outset today, but I'm going to be 91 on July 1. We need a new 
generation.
    Tom Kellogg is a wonderful scholar, but he's already--I 
hate to say it--approaching middle age, and the others here. So 
we need to train people and we need research. Congress is doing 
a good job on legislation, both with respect to Hong Kong and 
to Taiwan. And what I'd like to see with respect to Hong Kong, 
of course, is more information being made available. We just 
heard very good statements from two experienced mainland 
lawyers. It's lucky they are out of China so we can hear from 
Mr. Chen and Mr. Teng Biao. I hope their statements, by the 
way, can be circulated and published by the CECC so they'll 
have a much wider audience.
    I was particularly struck by what Mr. Chen has said today. 
I know Teng Biao. We've cooperated on many things. He's a 
marvelous lawyer and courageous scholar. But I didn't know 
anything about Mr. Chen. And he gave a very detailed talk. To 
the extent people could follow that talk, they could learn 
about the realities of lawyers' lives. That should be made 
broadly available by the CECC. And if they need help, I'm sure 
many of us would help.
    Finally, we should be cooperating with people in Hong Kong 
who are trying to defend the rule of law. We should be doing 
more to publicize their plight, as you're doing today, and we 
should be helping them in other ways. And last of all, I hope 
that Congress will open our doors to a greater extent for those 
people from Hong Kong who want to leave, and make money 
available for those who can't afford to take the risk on what 
is an upheaval in the lives of themselves and their family. I 
think we've got to do more. Let them try to walk with their 
feet before the door closes, because the PRC is not very likely 
to tolerate the humiliation of several hundred thousand people 
walking out on the new communist dictatorship.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Professor Cohen. 
Certainly poignant recommendations in light of the situation 
and the constricting space for civil society, both in Hong Kong 
and the mainland, as well as humanitarian issues that you 
rightly bring up.
    I'd like to next turn to Dr. Hui for her thoughts on the 
question.
    Ms. Hui. Thanks, Matt. Let me answer your question by 
providing a diagnosis of why the U.S. has not done more. The 
U.S. has decertified Hong Kong's autonomous status. The U.S. 
has imposed sanctions on a bunch of individuals in charge of 
Hong Kong. And at 2:30 there's going to be another kickoff of 
the Safe Harbor Act to provide asylum status to Hong Kongers 
trying to flee and who manage to get out. But these measures do 
not hurt. Last year and this year the State Department 
decertified Hong Kong's autonomous status. But then, so what?
    What Beijing is counting on is that the rest of the world 
is going to continue to be dependent on China's economy. And so 
therefore even early this year the EU was going to sign the 
trade agreement with Beijing. Beijing is just counting on--
well, you know, you guys continue to invest in Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen, and Beijing. So what does it matter that Hong Kong's 
just going to become part of China? So ultimately, it is very 
important to take actions that bite, but then at the same time 
for a lot of companies--essentially, Hong Kong has served as 
the window for China's businesses, for China to get technology 
and money. But now the international presence in Hong Kong is 
being taken hostage.
    So you look at all these international embassies in Hong 
Kong. Can they leave easily? A survey says that 42 percent of 
them are planning to leave, but over 50 percent of them do not 
want to leave because this is still where they can make money. 
And we continue to have American businesses--just the other day 
Nike said, ``We are for China.'' And this is the kind of 
struggle, the obstacles that we face. Essentially the U.S. 
Government and U.S. businesses continue to support China's 
ideal scenario for Hong Kong--capitalism without freedom. And 
this is something we need to target.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    Professor Kellogg.
    Mr. Kellogg. Sure. I would echo the comments of both Jerry 
and Victoria and say in general--it would be great if Congress 
could provide some additional funding to allow for new kinds of 
engagement by different players here in the United States who 
can build even stronger partnerships with their counterparts in 
Hong Kong. I think it's pretty clear, and we've spoken about 
this during the discussion, that one of the goals of the 
National Security Law is to generally isolate key players in 
Hong Kong--academics, journalists, lawyers, and others--and to 
make them even more subject to government pressure, to 
Communist Party pressure, to all sorts of different pressures 
that can be brought--the financial pressure that can be brought 
to bear on them.
    And it's my hope that engagement by U.S. universities, that 
engagement by entities like the American Bar Association, 
journalistic collaboration and exchange, can help to break that 
kind of isolation that Hong Kong hopes, and Beijing hopes, will 
be a sort of very, very advantageous byproduct of the National 
Security Law itself. And again, the role of Congress is to 
provide the kind of funding support that would make it possible 
for some of these groups and some of these universities to step 
up their partnerships with their counterparts in Hong Kong.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    Dr. Teng Biao.
    Mr. Teng. Yes. It's great that Congress has passed the 
Global Magnitsky Act and Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy 
Act, and some Chinese government officials and Hong Kong 
officials have been sanctioned, like the deputy heads of the 
National People's Congress. And I think the United States 
should sanction more people who have violated human rights and 
who have suppressed Hong Kong freedom. And I think that 
sanctions are a powerful form of leverage that the 
international community has.
    And the second suggestion might be to adopt more policies 
to protect Hong Kong asylees, get them special channels to 
approve their political asylum. And then third, the U.S. 
Congress has nominated Hong Kong activists to win the Nobel 
Peace Prize. I think that's also a good idea, from Martin Lee 
to Joshua Wong. I think quite a few Hong Kong dissidents and 
democracy activists are qualified to get the Nobel Peace Prize.
    And finally, it's not only in Hong Kong that the human 
rights situation has been deteriorating. It's much worse in 
Xinjiang and other parts of China, in Tibet, Mongolia, 
especially the ongoing Uyghur genocide. So I think the United 
States should consider a full boycott of the Beijing 2022 
Olympics. And we have seen many people--more and more people 
agree with the idea of a diplomatic and financial boycott, but 
we are calling for a full boycott. Anyway, any kind of boycott 
would be powerful in raising awareness of the situation of Hong 
Kong and Xinjiang.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    Mr. Chen, would you like to add anything?
    Interpreter Mr. Chang. Mr. Chen will speak through me, his 
interpreter right now. So please allow time for interpretation. 
Thank you.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    Mr. Chen. (Through interpreter.) The current status of the 
CCP government is that the Chinese government, in fact, needs 
help from the United States Government. So the United States 
Government is able to control or to decide what the Chinese 
government is going to do. And the resistance and the fighting 
from the Chinese government against the United States 
Government right now is a show that China is putting on for the 
world. The only voice that the Chinese will listen to right now 
is the voice of the U.S. Government.
    In my humble opinion, and then also my personal plea to the 
U.S. Government are the following three points: that the 
current U.S. Government should impose a very powerful and 
efficient retaliation or sanctions mechanism against the 
Chinese government. And then I hope that the U.S. Government 
can actually put this into practice upon the people who violate 
human rights. And that would be those Chinese government 
officials.
    And then my second opinion is that, right now, it would be 
to the U.S.'s advantage to use this economic cooperation as a 
measure to force or to coerce the Chinese government to do 
something if the Chinese government violates human rights. This 
is the only way the Chinese government will listen, when such 
human rights violations happen. The Chinese government seems to 
play a big role right now in the economic aspect of the world. 
But we all know that the reason why China has obtained this 
power is because of the Chinese government's cooperation with 
the United States Government.
    The third point that I would like to make--the U.S. 
Government should help people, those human rights fighters in 
China or in Hong Kong. And not only those people but also 
extend assistance to their families, because what the Chinese 
government is doing right now is holding people's family 
members as hostages. This is their weak point. Some of those 
fighters' families are trapped in China or in Hong Kong. 
Extending help to those families can give them more support to 
pursue what they are fighting for. I hope that this can be 
taken into consideration.
    For example, one lawyer--Li Heping--his oldest son 
graduated from high school and was planning to come to the 
United States to study. But instead, he is being held in China. 
This is an obstacle to his dad's career and might not be a good 
thing for this young fellow's future. That's all I want to say.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you so much.
    We are running short on time, but I would like to give an 
opportunity for a lightning round of questions, since we have 
such terrific expertise on this roundtable. Let's stick with 
Mr. Chen. Thank you for sharing your personal story regarding 
your experience in detention and the harassment that your 
family underwent. We really commend your courage and we're 
sorry that you had to go through those threats.
    Q. Can you tell us about the situation of rights defenders 
and lawyers connected to the 709 Crackdown, whom you've been in 
close contact with, and how the United States can most 
effectively advocate for them?
    Mr. Chen. (Through interpreter.) Let me tell you more about 
my personal experience. In 2019, I was planning to fly to the 
United States to study. Instead, I was forbidden to go. At the 
time, the U.S. Government I think made two tweets regarding my 
situation, and a journalist at the press conference also asked 
about this, but the CCP said very little and provided few 
details.
    And that's the only help that I got from the United States 
Government. And then from the embassy--the U.S. embassy in 
China, the ambassador told me, ``That's the only help that we 
can provide right now.'' At the time my situation was very 
dangerous because the CCP government had learned of my 
intention to flee the country, to come to the United States as 
a visiting scholar. I really needed a lot of help, any support 
that I could get from the outside world.
    I believe that if I had not fled from Guangxi with my 
family and crossed the border, I would be in jail right now. 
The same thing that happened to me happened to a friend of 
mine, also a human rights lawyer, from Sichuan, Chengdu. He was 
also planning to come to the United States, but was forbidden, 
and is now stranded in China. The only support that he got was 
exactly the same as I got in 2009--just an article in a 
newspaper. This lawyer was stripped of his law license and was 
then out of a job. He is also under severe monitoring right 
now--surveillance by the government. He is even forbidden to 
travel right now. So my plea to the Commission and to the 
United States Government is . . . Is there any assistance that 
you can provide to people like me or my friends in this 
situation? Can you do anything else, other than what you have 
already done? Thank you.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you very much. And again, it's 
very powerful to hear your personal experience and the 
testimony that you've provided.
    Q. Dr. Cohen, as you noted in your remarks, there is a 
clear trend of Hong Kong prosecutors exercising prosecutorial 
discretion based on political motivations. What recommendations 
would you give to lawyers in Hong Kong to resist or to at least 
slow down this erosion of the institutional integrity of the 
prosecutor's office?
    Mr.  Cohen. I think that the lawyers who are knowledgeable 
about attempts and successful efforts to deprive the accused of 
adequate counsel should speak out. I'd like to hear from the 
former head of public prosecutions who last year resigned in 
protest, but he has not made public, as far as I know, the 
reasons. And he's got to have a successful law practice now. 
And I'm sure he's under conflicting pressures about going 
public. But we need to know more. I think the revelations in 
Tom Kellogg's Georgetown report about interference with the 
right to counsel are so reminiscent of what we've heard takes 
place in China today. Teng Biao has personally experienced 
that. I've had exposure to that in trying to advise on some 
cases. And we've just heard a very moving statement from Mr. 
Chen.
    I think we're going to see more of that in Hong Kong. And 
the more public exposure we can give--I hope the media picks up 
this aspect of Tom's report because, like his discussion of the 
implementing regulations, which is too little known, this is 
too new--we need to have more public exposure. So we need to 
help Hong Kong people describe and evaluate this, and we need 
to have our own outside people better informed because this is 
a very sinister aspect of what's taking place.
    Finally, I was very glad to hear Mr. Chen drop a few 
Chinese names that may not mean anything to most people, but 
when I hear the name Gao Zhisheng--once recognized, before he 
became too political, in opposition--as one of China's great 
lawyers--I think of what has happened to this man. Is he dead? 
Is he alive? He's been disappeared. And no one remembers him 
now except those who worked with him. I warned him in 2005 that 
if he went on going public as much as he did in his criticism 
of the Party, he wouldn't be on the street. And within months 
after that, he was arrested multiple times, tortured, and 
finally disposed of somehow. Is he a vegetable? Is he alive? 
What has happened to him?
    And he's just one example. Xu Zhiyong is another great 
person I met, like Teng Biao and others, when I lectured at 
Yale. He's, again, in prison. We'd be better off if Xu Zhiyong, 
Gao Zhisheng, and others whose names aren't known to most 
people outside were outside of China, like Teng Biao and Mr. 
Chen, and able to tell us more. And I think it's a hard 
decision. Should we help people more who want to leave? Teng 
Biao and Mr. Chen got out via the underground railway. It took 
Teng Biao's wife and one of his children almost 28 days to go 
from Beijing to Boston. They need help. And how are these 
people going to live when they're here? If we had research 
projects, we would not only learn more, but we would provide 
support for people who have no way to maintain their livelihood 
once they get here.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    And following up on Professor Cohen's reference to the 
Georgetown research that Professor Kellogg led, I'd like to 
turn to you next, Professor Kellogg. And congratulations again 
on the release of the report on procedural rights under the 
National Security Law.
    Q, One case that you highlighted in the report is the case 
of Tong Ying-kit, who was charged with an offense under the 
National Security Law and was denied jury trial. Can you tell 
us more about how this case compares with politically sensitive 
trials in mainland China?
    Mr. Kellogg. Thank you for that great question. And I do 
think Tong Ying-kit, his case is one to watch. We have talked a 
little bit about his right to a jury trial, which has been 
denied. But there are also key substantive law questions that 
are going to be at the forefront of his trial as it moves 
forward over the next couple of weeks. I've said publicly that 
I am not sure that a terrorism charge really makes sense in 
this case. He is credibly accused of driving his motorcycle 
into a group of police officers, and if those facts are proven, 
then an assault charge would certainly be warranted, a 
dangerous driving charge would certainly be warranted. But it 
doesn't look to me like he has engaged in the level of 
planning, in the level of forethought with a political goal in 
mind that is usually required for a terrorism conviction under 
international press practice for domestic counterterrorism 
laws.
    So you have that as one core concern. And then on top of 
that, you have the speech crime that he is accused of because 
he was carrying a banner that used one of those forbidden 
slogans from the 2019 movement. And there I think--coming back 
to your question--there I think are some of the parallels with 
political dissidents and political activism on the mainland, 
that if Tong Ying-kit is going to be convicted and punished 
merely for carrying a banner with a slogan, then we're getting 
into very, very difficult territory for the right of free 
expression in Hong Kong, which has all too many disturbing 
parallels to prosecutions of individuals for exercising their 
right to free speech on the mainland.
    And we'll have to wait and see how this case plays out. And 
we'll have to wait and see how the three-judge panel weighs the 
arguments in this case, both on the terrorism charge and on the 
inciting subversion, I believe it is, charge. And one has to 
hope that the three-judge panel will rigorously use the Basic 
Law's human rights protections and apply them to this case. And 
then we'll see what kind of verdict we get.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you, Professor Kellogg.
    Q. Dr. Teng Biao, between your detention in 2011 and today, 
I would be curious to hear your reflections on what has changed 
and what's remained the same in the landscape of how rights 
lawyers are treated by the Chinese government. One recent 
development that the Commission is tracking is the Chinese 
government's announcement of the expansion of legal aid 
services. And I would appreciate your evaluation of these 
services in terms of access to independent counsel and whether 
independent groups in China are allowed to provide legal 
services with any sort of latitude in their operations.
    Mr. Teng. Yes, thank you. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 
late 2012, the human rights situation has been deteriorating. 
And Xi Jinping actually waged war on law. And many lawyers, 
human rights defenders, and activists, dissidents, also related 
groups, have been arrested and detained. And the roundup of 
human rights lawyers and defenders is really brutal suppression 
of the rule of law. And the legal aid became more and more 
difficult. You know, many lawyers--scores of human rights 
lawyers--have been disbarred, and they've lost their law 
licenses.
    The chilling effect is apparent. You know, most lawyers 
fear taking sensitive cases, and in many cases, the Chinese 
government just blocks the human rights lawyers, the die-hard 
lawyers, from representing the clients, the suspect. And they 
appoint--the government appoints their own lawyers, who will 
definitely not challenge the abuse of power. So it's getting 
worse. Really worrying. Thank you.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you.
    Q. And for our last question, I'd like to turn again to Dr. 
Hui. A human rights attorney who has been mentioned in this 
roundtable, Lu Siwei, has represented the Hong Kong 12 after 
they were apprehended at sea. There's at least one other 
mainland Chinese attorney who also represented this group and 
is being threatened. How much danger do you assess that 
attorneys face for representing National Security Law cases, 
either in Hong Kong or in mainland China? And how likely is it 
that these attorneys will face--that the attorneys in Hong Kong 
will face similar treatment to their mainland peers?
    Ms. Hui. Yes, Matt, thank you so much. That's essentially 
the case--and thank you for highlighting that, because I think 
Tom also earlier said that even those arrested are now told 
that there are certain lawyers that you should go to. And at 
the same time, there's also pro-regime people saying, because 
Martin Lee and Margaret Ng are already convicted, even though 
they've been given a suspended sentence, that they should be 
debarred as well.
    So there are those very worrisome trends. And at the same 
time--again, it's not just about who agrees to represent these 
people, but also that as soon as you are arrested you are 
basically--for a lot of these people, they continue to live in 
stress. They are embattled. You know, when the police actually 
go to lay charges on them, how can they afford the legal fees? 
All of this is just basically mental torture.
    I should also note that Chen Jiangang said that today's 
China is tomorrow's Hong Kong. I think once upon a time we said 
today's Tiananmen, tomorrow's Hong Kong. When we said that in 
1989, it felt like tomorrow was going to be many years away--
decades away. But, you know, when we say today's China, 
tomorrow's Hong Kong, it could well be tomorrow--literally the 
next day, or the next week. Just look at what happened, how 
rapidly Apple Daily was forced to shut down.
    So these days we just have to really look at what happens 
to political prisoners in China, where we should expect to see 
horrible things happening--even in Hong Kong. At the same time, 
all the experiences of rights defense lawyers in China--there's 
a group of about 200 lawyers who do pro bono for a lot of the 
arrested--we also have to keep an eye on how they can survive 
and how much they can do, and if they themselves will be 
subjected to prosecution.
    Staff Director Squeri. Thank you. That is a very bracing, 
but I think accurate, characterization, and I think it should 
serve as a call to action for all of us. And I think this 
roundtable has been a tremendous contribution to the 
Commission's work and to the knowledge base of our 
Commissioners, the staff on Capitol Hill, and those watching 
these proceedings. And so I really want to thank our panelists 
for the very rich and illuminating discussion. And with that, 
that concludes our roundtable. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 2:54 p.m., the roundtable was concluded.]