[House Hearing, 117 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL 
                      ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE CHEMICAL 
                      SAFETY BOARD

=======================================================================

                             HYBRID HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

              SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

                                 OF THE

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                               __________

                           Serial No. 117-49
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                           


     Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

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                        energycommerce.house.gov
                        
                                ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                     FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
                                 Chairman
BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois              CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
ANNA G. ESHOO, California              Ranking Member
DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado              FRED UPTON, Michigan
MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana
G. K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio
DORIS O. MATSUI, California          BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky
KATHY CASTOR, Florida                DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland           ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois
JERRY McNERNEY, California           H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
PETER WELCH, Vermont                 GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
PAUL TONKO, New York                 BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York           BILLY LONG, Missouri
KURT SCHRADER, Oregon                LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
TONY CARDENAS, California            MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RAUL RUIZ, California                RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
SCOTT H. PETERS, California          TIM WALBERG, Michigan
DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan             EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia
MARC A. VEASEY, Texas                JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois, Vice       NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
    Chair                            JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah
NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California    DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona
A. DONALD McEACHIN, Virginia         GREG PENCE, Indiana
LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware       DAN CRENSHAW, Texas
DARREN SOTO, Florida                 JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona              KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York
ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
KIM SCHRIER, Washington
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
                                 ------                                

                           Professional Staff

                   TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Staff Director
                 WAVERLY GORDON, Deputy Staff Director
                  NATE HODSON, Minority Staff Director
              Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

                        DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
                                  Chair
ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire         H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia
KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York             Ranking Member
JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois             MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
PAUL TONKO, New York                 DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia
RAUL RUIZ, California                BILLY LONG, Missouri
SCOTT H. PETERS, California, Vice    NEAL P. DUNN, Florida
    Chair                            JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania
KIM SCHRIER, Washington              GARY J. PALMER, Alabama
LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts           CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 
TOM O'HALLERAN, Arizona                  (ex officio)
FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex 
    officio)
                             
                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Colorado, opening statement.................................     2
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. H. Morgan Griffith, a Representative in Congress from the 
  Commonwealth of Virginia, opening statement....................    10
    Prepared statement...........................................    11
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from 
  the State of Washington, opening statement.....................    15
    Prepared statement...........................................    16

                               Witnesses

Katherine A. Lemos, Ph.D., Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, 
  Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.................    18
    Prepared statement...........................................    21
    Answers to submitted questions...............................    87

                           Submitted Material

Letter of May 20, 2021, from Mr. Pallone, et al., to Katherine A. 
  Lemos, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety 
  and Hazard Investigation Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette.......    48
Letter of June 10, 2021, from Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and 
  Chief Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard 
  Investigation Board, to Mr. Pallone, et al., submitted by Ms. 
  DeGette........................................................    53
Letter of July 8, 2021, from John Paul Smith, United 
  Steelworkers, et al., to Katherine A. Lemos, Chairman and Chief 
  Executive Officer, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation 
  Board, submitted by Ms. DeGette................................    69
Letter of September 28, 2021, from Chris Jahn, President and 
  Chief Executive Officer, American Chemistry Council, and Chet 
  M. Thompson, President and Chief Executive Officer, American 
  Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, to Ms. DeGette and Mr. 
  Griffith, submitted by Mr. McKinley............................    85

 
  PROTECTING COMMUNITIES FROM INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS: REVITALIZING THE 
                         CHEMICAL SAFETY BOARD

                              ----------                              


                     WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2021

                  House of Representatives,
      Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
                          Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:34 a.m., in 
the John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, 
and remotely via Cisco Webex online video conferencing, Hon. 
Diana DeGette (chair of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Members present: Representatives DeGette, Kuster, Rice, 
Schakowsky, Tonko, Ruiz, Peters, Schrier, Trahan, Pallone (ex 
officio), Griffith (subcommittee ranking member), Burgess, 
McKinley, Long, Palmer, Dunn, Joyce, and Rodgers (ex officio).
    Staff present: Austin Flack, Policy Analyst; Waverly 
Gordon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Tiffany 
Guarascio, Staff Director; Perry Hamilton, Clerk; Fabrizio 
Herrera, Staff Assistant; Rebekah Jones, Counsel; Zach Kahan, 
Deputy Director, Outreach and Member Service; Chris Knauer, 
Oversight Staff Director; Will McAuliffe, Counsel; Elysa 
Montfort, Press Secretary; Kaitlyn Peel, Digital Director; Tim 
Robinson, Chief Counsel; Nikki Roy, Policy Coordinator; Andrew 
Souvall, Director of Communications, Outreach and Member 
Services; Benjamin Tabor, Junior Professional Staff Member; 
Sarah Burke, Minority Deputy Staff Director; Jerry Couri, 
Minority Deputy Chief Counsel for Environment; Marissa Gervasi, 
Minority Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Brittany 
Havens, Minority Professional Staff Member, Oversight and 
Investigations; Nate Hodson, Minority Staff Director; Emily 
King, Minority Member Services Director; Bijan Koohmaraie, 
Minority Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations Chief 
Counsel; Clare Paoletta, Minority Policy Analyst, Health; Alan 
Slobodin, Minority Chief Investigative Counsel, Oversight and 
Investigations; and Michael Taggart, Minority Policy Director.
    Ms. DeGette. The Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations hearing will now come to order.
    Today the committee is holding a hearing entitled 
``Protecting Communities from Industrial Accidents: 
Revitalizing the Chemical Safety Board.'' This hearing will 
examine the ongoing mission, governance, staffing, and other 
challenges at the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations 
Board.
    Due to the COVID-19 public health emergency, Members can 
participate in today's hearing either in person or remotely via 
online conferencing. Members who are participating in person 
must wear a mask. Such Members may remove their mask when they 
are under recognition and speaking from a microphone. Staff and 
press who are present in the committee room must also wear a 
mask at all times.
    For Members participating remotely, your microphones will 
be set on mute for the purpose of eliminating inadvertent 
background noise. Members participating remotely will need to 
unmute your microphone each time you speak--something you'd 
think we'd be used to by now.
    Please note that, once you unmute your microphone, anything 
that is said in Webex will be heard over the loudspeakers in 
the committee room and subject to be heard by livestream and C-
SPAN.
    House Members are participating from different locations at 
today's hearing. All recognition of Members, such as for 
questions, will be in the order of subcommittee seniority.
    If at any time during the hearing I'm unable to chair the 
hearing, the vice chair of the subcommittee, Mr. Peters, will 
serve as Chair until I can return.
    Documents for the record can be sent to Austin Flack at the 
email address we have provided to staff, and all documents will 
be entered into the record at the conclusion of the hearing.
    The Chair now recognizes herself for purposes of an opening 
statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DeGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 
              CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

    Good morning. Today's oversight hearing covers one of our 
small but incredibly important independent agencies, the 
Chemical Safety Board, or CSB.
    Although many of you have never heard of it, the CSB plays 
a vital role in protecting American workers and communities.
    We are all familiar with the role of the National 
Transportation Safety Board. When a plane falls from the sky, 
we want to understand not just why it happened but also how we 
can prevent it from happening again.
    And that's the role that CSB plays when it comes to 
industrial accidents. The CSB improves the safety of American 
workers, communities, and the environment by investigating the 
root causes of these tragic events and making recommendations 
to prevent them in the future.
    While many Americans may not know the CSB by name, they are 
certainly familiar with some of the critical incidents that it 
has investigated.
    Please display the first slide.
    [Pause.]
    Ms. DeGette. They did practice this in advance.
    [Pause.]
    Ms. DeGette. We have some kind of a technology problem, but 
I hope we can fix it, because the first slide was a photo of 
the 2010 Deepwater Horizon disaster.
    And we all remember the Deepwater Horizon, a sudden 
explosion and fire on an offshore rig that took the lives of 11 
workers and seriously injured 17 others.
    It also triggered a massive oil spill into the Gulf of 
Mexico that lasted for 87 days, one of the worst environmental 
disasters in U.S. history.
    In fact, this subcommittee held a field hearing in 
Louisiana to assess the local impact of the spill, and then I 
and Ranking Member Waxman later sent a letter to CSB requesting 
that they further examine the root cause of the accident. This 
was a disaster.
    In 2005, there was the BP America Refinery explosion in 
Texas City, just outside of Houston. In that incident, 15 
workers were killed and 180 more were injured during the 
restart of a unit at the refinery.
    In 2013, Texas saw yet another tragedy, this time at a 
fertilizer storage and distribution facility in the town of 
West. A fire within a storage facility triggered a massive 
explosion of ammonium nitrate. Twelve emergency responders and 
three members of the public died, over 260 people were injured, 
and more than 150 homes and businesses were damaged, resulting 
in hundreds of millions of dollars of property destruction.
    More recently, in 2019, there was a massive fire at the 
Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refinery in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, where a vapor cloud including potentially deadly 
hydrofluoric acid ignited.
    The quick actions of a control room operator to rapidly 
drain the remaining hydrofluoric acid prevented a massive 
release of more of the harmful gas which would have placed the 
highly populated surrounding communities at tremendous risk.
    These are just a few examples of the critical incidents 
that CSB has deployed to over the past several years.
    The devastating impacts that these accidents have had on 
facilities, workers, and surrounding communities are obvious, 
and the CSB safety recommendations that have come out of these 
and other investigations are directly responsible for improved 
safety conditions within many U.S. industries.
    CSB's work has saved lives and protected communities, and 
those of us with industrial facilities in our districts 
understand the stake in CSB's work. We want to see this agency 
flourish.
    But despite the positive impacts, there have been 
challenges at the agency since its inception. In recent years, 
Board vacancies, unfilled staff positions, employee morale 
issues, and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic have led to 
unproductivity at the agency.
    We were pleased to see that the CSB published two new final 
investigation reports last Friday, but there are still 
currently 18 open investigations, some dating back to incidents 
that occurred in 2016 and 2017.
    This is the biggest backlog of investigations that the 
agency has ever had--one of them.
    The timeliness of these reports matter. When CSB isn't 
expeditiously sharing its findings, it cannot effectively 
prevent future incidents and fulfill its mission to protect 
people and the environment.
    Now, we are aware of the many challenges that I have 
already mentioned today, and they were inherited by our witness 
today, Chairman and CEO Katherine Lemos. But we're also here 
today not to focus on CSB's past, but the present and future.
    And so the questions are straightforward:
    How does the CSB intend to finish and close the many 
important investigations it's opened, and when can we expect to 
see the vital recommendations that come from that work?
    How will the CSB take on important new work if it can't 
close the many investigations that remain incomplete?
    When will the CSB fill key staffing vacancies to its 
investigative mission?
    And, finally, what's the plan to address how the important 
governing board operates and to avoid the dysfunction it's 
suffered from in the past?
    In short, we need to understand the Chair's strategic plan 
to move this agency forward.
    I'm pleased that part of the solution is already underway. 
The Chairman will soon have reinforcements on the Board. 
President Biden has nominated three new Board members who we 
hope to see confirmed soon, seeing as right now we only have 
one Board member and she is sitting right here.
    We look forward to the increased activity that we expect to 
see when they are on board. But we also know new Board members 
alone will not solve all of the agency's problems, and that's 
why we're holding the hearing today.
    I want to thank the Chairwoman for being here today, and I 
look forward to the discussion so that we can ensure CSB has 
the leadership, strategic plan, and resources needed in order 
to execute on its vital mission. American workers and 
communities are simply counting on it.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. DeGette follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. DeGette. The Chair is now very pleased to recognize the 
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr. Griffith, for 5 minutes 
for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, A REPRESENTATIVE 
         IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

    Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for holding this 
hearing.
    As you said, the Chemical Safety Board is an independent, 
nonregulatory Federal agency. According to its enabling 
statute, the leading charge of the Chemical Safety Board is to 
investigate and determine the cause of any accidental release 
resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial 
property damage.
    It has been described, as Chairwoman DeGette described it, 
as the equivalent of the National Transportation Safety Board 
but for chemical spills as opposed to transportation accidents.
    Unfortunately, the Board has been criticized for falling 
short of accomplishing this primary responsibility.
    The Chemical Safety Board was created by the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1990, but it did not become operational until 
1998.
    Since then, it has been saddled with functioning 
challenges. In 2000, just 2\1/2\ years after its inception, the 
Government Accountability Office identified management 
challenges and investigative backlog.
    Now, 21 years later, we share the same concerns as our 
colleagues of Congresses past.
    Since May 1, 2020, the Chemical Safety Board has operated 
with only one of its five Board seats filled.
    Chair Lemos, I understand that under your leadership you 
have been disadvantaged with a short staff and a sharp learning 
curve. The vacancies in Board member positions impede the 
agency from making substantial progress on benchmarks. Board 
members are vital for facilitating and closing out 
investigations, including participating in site visits and 
approving investigative reports.
    The Chemical Safety Board certainly faces challenges in 
recruiting and retaining qualified staff. The quality of 
investigations hinges on the ability of experts to conduct 
complete, unbiased investigations. These investigators should 
have solid backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial 
process safety.
    We understand it is difficult to compete with industry to 
find such specialized skill sets, but we are hopeful the Board 
is taking actions to recruit these kinds of candidates for 
vacant investigator positions, and we would like to see that 
progress continue.
    I believe that Chemical Safety Board investigations can 
benefit industry, but I have ream concerns how this work is 
being conducted.
    Due to the ongoing challenges with management over the 
years, investigation processes are somewhat unclear. The Board 
should establish unbiased criteria for selecting incidents to 
investigate as well as protocols to determine when to deploy an 
investigative team.
    Uniform procedures would help to ensure objectivity and 
balance in the Board's investigative work, especially as staff 
turnovers occur.
    Based on the data and analysis of an investigation, 
investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet 
these recommendations have no legal standards. They lack 
cohesiveness from one report to the next. And an absence of 
standardized criteria allows for investigative reports to 
include agenda-setting recommendations that advance a 
particular viewpoint.
    This is not the job of the Chemical Safety Board. The job 
of the Chemical Safety Board is to determine the root cause of 
an accident.
    When recommendations are made, they should focus on 
measures to minimize the consequences of an accidental release. 
That is their purpose, as outlined in the statute. And 
recommendations should not need to be rewritten if new staff is 
placed on an investigation.
    The Chemical Safety Board should not set expectations that 
are unreachable. It is not practicable to eliminate all 
chemical accidents, and the law does not mandate that.
    Above all, the role of the Chemical Safety Board is to play 
fact finder in these incidents and to provide regulators with 
information they need to create policy. The Board should not 
seek out investigations or issue recommendations simply to 
spotlight disfavored technology or preferred new practices.
    Finally, the Chemical Safety Board must focus on completing 
outstanding investigations as quickly as possible. To gain the 
trust of stakeholders and the public, the Board must conduct 
its operations in a timely and a transparent manner, and 
communications between the Chemical Safety Board and industry 
must improve to repair the reputation of the Board.
    Today I hope we will focus on what the Chemical Safety 
Board can and should do in the upcoming months to close out 
high quality investigations in both an expeditious and an 
efficient manner. We need to hear from the Board on how they 
will improve internal processes and allocate resources 
judicially to complete rigorous and instructive investigations.
    I thank you for representing the Chemical Safety Board, 
Chair Lemos, and being here today, and we look forward to your 
testimony.
    I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Griffith follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. H. Morgan Griffith

    Thank you, Chair DeGette for holding this hearing.
    The Chemical Safety Board (CSB) is an independent, non-
regulatory federal agency. According to its enabling statute, 
the leading charge of the CSB is to investigate and determine 
the cause of any accidental release resulting in a fatality, 
serious injury or substantial property damages.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) Sec. 7412(r)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unfortunately, though, the Board has historically been 
criticized for falling short of accomplishing this primary 
responsibility. CSB was created by the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, but it did not become operational until 1998. Since 
then, the CSB has been saddled with functioning challenges. 
Back in 2000, two and a half years after its inception, the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified management 
challenges and an investigative backlog. Now, 21 years later, 
we share in the same concerns as our colleagues of Congress' 
past.
    Since May 1, 2020, CSB has carried on with only one of its 
five board seats filled. Chair Lemos, I understand that under 
your leadership you have been disadvantaged with a short staff 
and sharp learning curve. The vacancies in Board member 
positions impede the agency from making substantial progress on 
benchmarks. Board members are vital for facilitating and 
closing out investigations, such as participating in site 
visits and voting on investigative reports.
    The CSB also faces challenges in recruiting and retaining 
qualified staff. The quality of investigations hinges on the 
expertise of investigators to conduct complete, unbiased 
investigations. These investigators should have solid 
backgrounds in chemical engineering or industrial process 
safety. We understand it is difficult to compete with the 
industry to find such a specialized skill set. But we are 
hopeful that CSB is taking actions to recruit these kinds of 
candidates for vacant investigator positions; and we would like 
to see that progress continue.
    I believe CSB investigations can have a beneficial value to 
the industry, but I have real concerns with how this work is 
being conducted. Due to the ongoing challenges with management 
over the years, the Board has not created standardized 
processes for its investigations. The Board has finite 
resources and needs to establish unbiased criteria for 
selecting incidents to investigate and protocols to determine 
when to deploy an investigative team. The Board needs policies 
and procedures in place to ensure its objectivity and balance 
in its investigative work.
    Based on the data and analysis of an investigation, 
investigative reports usually include recommendations. Yet, 
these recommendations have no legal criteria. They are lacking 
in cohesiveness from one report to the next. When 
recommendations favor a position, the report loses its 
independent, investigative aspects. A lack of standardized 
criteria allows for investigative reports to include agenda-
setting recommendations that advance a viewpoint.
    This is not the job of the CSB. The job of the CSB is to 
determine the root cause of an accident. Any periodic 
recommendations should suggest measures to minimize the 
consequences of an accidental release-their purpose as outlined 
in the statute. They should not need to be rewritten each time 
turnover places new staff on an investigation.
    A ``nation safe from chemical accidents'' is a nation of 
closed chemical industrial plants. It is not practicable to 
eliminate all chemical accidents, the law doesn't mandate it, 
and the CSB should not set expectations that are unreachable. 
First and foremost, the CSB must play the fact finder in these 
incidents. The Board should not seek out investigations or 
issue recommendations simply to spotlight disfavored technology 
or preferred, new process safety practices. What the Chemical 
Safety Board must do is focus on completing the outstanding 
investigations as soon as possible. To gain the trust of 
stakeholders and the public, the Board must remain transparent, 
and communications between CSB and industry should improve to 
repair the reputation of the Board. Today, I hope we will focus 
on what CSB can and should do in the upcoming months to close 
out high-quality investigations in both an expeditious and 
efficient way. We need to hear from the CSB on how they will 
improve internal processes and allocate resources judiciously 
to complete rigorous and instructive investigations. Thank you, 
Chair Lemos, for representing the CSB here today. We look 
forward to hearing your testimony. I yield back.

    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full 
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE 
            IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
    Today we are conducting an oversight of a little-known but 
important Federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board. Coming 
from a State with a large number of industrial facilities, I 
have been involved with the CSB since its inception, helping to 
create and secure appropriations for the agency back in 1998.
    Since that time, CSB has conducted vital investigations 
into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission is to find 
answers and provide recommendations to prevent future 
incidents.
    For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005 
Acetylene Service Company gas explosion in Perth Amboy, which 
killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made 
recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas 
accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the 
future.
    But despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous 
challenges in recent years. This past May the committee sent a 
bipartisan letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a 
backlog in investigations, understaffing, and management 
challenges. And these concerns are shared by Members on both 
sides of the aisle, and I'm pleased that we're here today to 
continue this important bipartisan oversight.
    One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to 
finalize its reports and provide critical safety 
recommendations in recent years.
    For instance, CSB has yet to release its investigative 
report on the 2019 Philadelphia Energy Solutions refinery fire 
and explosions which involved the release of hydrofluoric acid, 
a highly toxic chemical.
    Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the 
plant and the heroic action of the workers, the worst potential 
outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
    It has been 2 years now since this incident, and CSB still 
has not released its investigative findings. It's imperative 
that we understand the root causes of these types of incidents 
so that we can safeguard workers, protect communities, and 
prevent future incidents.
    And I look forward to hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her 
plan to close this and other investigations.
    The CSB also plays an important strategic role in 
preventing future incidents in the face of climate change and 
extreme weather. Industrial facilities across the country are 
at increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most 
recent hurricane to see that.
    Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in 
New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating 
communities throughout the State. The Environmental Protection 
Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical 
facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely 
inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large 
chemical plant.
    Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in 
regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane 
Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these 
facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We 
don't know yet the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks, 
and toxic air releases in the State.
    And to its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities 
about the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events, 
particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017 
Arkema chemical plant fire near Houston, Texas, and found that 
the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced 
during Hurricane Harvey.
    Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before the 
subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to 
countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities, 
experienced three 500-year floods in 3 years. And recent 
analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the U.S. lie in 
moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
    So there is no question that floods and other extreme 
weather events are getting worse. I look forward to hearing how 
the Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these 
growing strategic challenges.
    In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the 
highest level is the first step, and the goal of today's 
hearing is to help get CSB back on track. And I hope that we 
can all come back together to revitalize this critical agency. 
It really is critical.
    And I thank the chairperson for having this hearing, which 
I think is very important.
    Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]

             Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.

    Today we are conducting oversight of a little known but 
important federal agency, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB).
    Coming from a state with a large number of industrial 
facilities, I have been involved with the CSB since its 
inception, helping to create and secure appropriations for the 
agency back in 1998. Since that time, CSB has conducted vital 
investigations into industrial chemical accidents. Its mission 
is to find answers and provide recommendations to prevent 
future incidents.
    For example, in my district, CSB investigated the 2005 
Acetylene Service Company Gas Explosion in Perth Amboy which 
killed three workers. From its findings, CSB made 
recommendations that addressed the dangers of flammable gas 
accumulation and how to prevent similar incidents in the 
future.
    Despite its good work, CSB has faced numerous challenges in 
recent years. This past May, the Committee sent a bipartisan 
letter to CSB outlining our concerns, including a backlog in 
investigations, understaffing, and management challenges. These 
concerns are shared by members on both sides of the aisle, and 
I am pleased that we are here today to continue this important 
bipartisan oversight.
    One of my biggest concerns is that CSB has been slow to 
finalize its reports and provide critical safety 
recommendations in recent years. For instance, CSB has yet to 
release its investigative report on the 2019 Philadelphia 
Energy Solutions Refinery Fire and Explosions, which involved a 
release of hydrofluoric acid, a highly toxic chemical.
    Fortunately, because of built-in safety protocols at the 
plant and the heroic actions of workers, the worst potential 
outcomes for both the workers and the surrounding Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey communities were narrowly avoided.
    Yet it has been two years now since this incident and CSB 
still has not released its investigative findings. It is 
imperative that we understand the root causes of these types of 
incidents so that we can safeguard workers, protect 
communities, and prevent future incidents. I look forward to 
hearing from Chairperson Lemos on her plan to close this and 
other investigations.
    CSB also plays an important strategic role in preventing 
future incidents in the face of climate change and extreme 
weather. Industrial facilities across the country are at 
increasing risk. You need to look no further than this most 
recent hurricane to see that.
    Earlier this month, Hurricane Ida dumped record rainfall in 
New Jersey, flooding the Raritan River and devastating 
communities throughout the state. The Environmental Protection 
Agency is still assessing the damage at oil sites, chemical 
facilities, and Superfund sites, including one completely 
inundated Superfund site that was previously home to a large 
chemical plant.
    Meanwhile, in Louisiana, 138 industrial facilities were in 
regions that fully or partially lost power due to Hurricane 
Ida. This is problematic considering that some of these 
facilities use electricity to contain hazardous materials. We 
do not yet know the full extent of chemical spills, oil leaks, 
and toxic air releases in the state.
    To its credit, CSB has warned industrial facilities about 
the safety hazards posed by extreme weather events, 
particularly hurricanes. For example, CSB highlighted the 2017 
Arkema Chemical Plant Fire near Houston, Texas, finding that 
the company was unprepared for the flooding levels experienced 
during Hurricane Harvey.
    Houston Mayor Sylvester Turner testified before this 
Subcommittee in March that the Houston region, which is home to 
countless petrochemical and other industrial facilities, 
experienced three ``500-year'' floods in three years. And 
recent analysis shows that 2,500 chemical sites in the United 
States lie in moderate- to high-risk flood zones.
    There is no question that floods and other extreme weather 
events are getting worse, and I look forward to hearing how the 
Chairperson is positioning the agency to address these growing 
strategic challenges.
    In my view, getting the CSB back to functioning at the 
highest level is the first step. The goal of today's hearing is 
to help get CSB back on track, and I hope that we can all come 
together to revitalize this critical agency.

    Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chair will now recognize the ranking member of the full 
committee, Mrs. Rodgers, for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A 
    REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

    Mrs. Rodgers. Good morning, Madam Chair. Thank you.
    The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing 
sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global 
marketplace. Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy 
by providing materials that we use in our everyday life.
    But when major chemical accidents occur, it can result in 
devastating impacts, including death, serious injury, and 
significant property damage. These accidents pose a significant 
risk not only for workers but for surrounding communities.
    In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a 
three-faceted approach to address the potential risk from these 
significant events, using the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the 
Chemical Safety Board.
    To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to 
understand the landscape in which the Board operates, including 
its main players and their designated roles.
    The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental 
releases. The 1990 amendments required the EPA to publish 
regulations and guidance for chemical accident prevention, 
preparedness, and response activities at facilities using 
substances that pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental 
releases. This act placed EPA in charge of requiring qualifying 
companies to develop their own risk management plans.
    To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental 
releases, the 1990 amendments provided OSHA with standard 
setting and enforcement authority concerning process safety 
management. OSHA also provides training, outreach, education, 
and assistance in this area.
    Unlike EPA and OSHA, the CSB by law is an independent, 
nonregulatory body established to provide objective knowledge. 
The Board's primary purpose, as stated in the conference 
report, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, is to investigate 
the root causes of accidental releases.
    This is an important function. Without an independent 
investigative body searching for the answers, the industry will 
not have all the valuable information needed to reduce the risk 
of a chemical accident that causes substantial damage.
    Unfortunately, though, the CSB has recently failed in 
fulfilling this mission. Right now the CSB has a backlog of 18 
investigations, not including the 2 investigations that were 
closed last Friday, with the oldest open investigation from 
2016.
    Let me be clear: Waiting more than 5 years to close out 
these timely and important investigations simply is not 
acceptable. These investigations help companies understand what 
went wrong to help prevent future accidents. Something must be 
done to improve the investigative process and end the waiting 
game for owners and operators of these facilities.
    I recognize the CSB must have all of its parts working to 
ensure functionality, otherwise it cannot address its 
investigative backlog and new investigations.
    A key building block here is quality investigators. They 
must have chemical or process safety expertise to analyze 
accidental releases and discover their root causes.
    It is also crucial that investigators have proper 
experience and the relevant scientific qualifications to make 
technically feasible and practical recommendations about how to 
reduce risks from chemical accidents.
    The Board's statutory responsibilities include 
investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress, 
Federal, and State authorities with periodic reports that 
contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
    Unfortunately, CSB is not fulfilling those 
responsibilities. Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking 
ways to expand its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's 
authorities.
    The testimony mischaracterizes, quote, ``safety 
recommendations'' as part of a root cause investigation. While 
it seems reasonable CSB suggest steps to address a specific 
accident, its statute seems to suggest something different.
    Under the law, ``safe'' is a feature that may be explicitly 
covered in CSB's periodic reports, not root cause 
investigations; moreover, the majority of the law's reference 
isn't to recommendations, suggested changes, and regulations.
    The CSB should channel its resources into conducting 
investigations, especially looking for ways to meet the 
baseline. It should not use its investigations and the 
recommendations in its report to push certain agendas.
    My hope is that the Board will resist the urge to become 
distracted with other priorities and focus on the main task at 
hand: demonstrating it can color inside the lines by focusing 
on investigations. Ultimately, workers, communities, and our 
manufacturing sector depend on it.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]

           Prepared Statement of Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers

LANDSCAPE OF ACCIDENTAL RELEASES
    The chemical industry is one of the largest manufacturing 
sectors in the U.S., serving both a domestic and global 
marketplace.
    Our chemical industries help stimulate the economy by 
providing raw materials that we use in our everyday life.
    But when major chemical accidents occur, they can result in 
devastating impacts including death, serious injury, and 
significant property damage.
    These accidents pose a serious risk not only for workers, 
but surrounding communities.
    In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took a 
three-faceted approach to addressing the potential risks from 
these significant events, using the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 
the Chemical Safety Board.
    To understand the role of the CSB, it is essential to 
understand the landscape in which this Board operates, 
including its main players and their designated roles.
EPA
    The EPA has a primary role in addressing accidental 
releases.
    The 1990 Amendments required the EPA to publish regulations 
and guidance for chemical accident prevention, preparedness, 
and response activities at facilities using substances that 
pose the greatest risk of harm from accidental releases.
    It is also the EPA's role to build upon existing industrial 
codes and standards and require qualifying companies to develop 
their own Risk Management Program under Clean Air Act.
OSHA
    To protect workers from injury resulting from accidental 
releases, the 1990 Amendments also provided OSHA (Oh-sha) with 
standard setting and enforcement authority concerning process 
safety management.
    OSHA also provides training, outreach, education, and 
assistance in this area.
PURPOSE OF CSB
    Unlike, EPA and OSHA, the CSB, by law, is an independent, 
non-regulatory body established to provide objective knowledge.
    The Board's principal role is to investigate the root 
causes of accidental releases.
    Without an independent, investigative body searching for 
the answers, the industry will not have all the valuable 
information needed to reduce the risk of a chemical accident.
    Unfortunately, though, CSB has recently failed in 
fulfilling its mission.
    Right now, the CSB has a backlog of 18 investigations, not 
including the two investigations were closed last Friday. with 
the oldest open investigation from 2016.
    Let me be clear: waiting more than 5 years to close out 
these timely and important investigations simply is not 
acceptable.
    These investigations help companies understand what went 
wrong to help prevent future accidents,
    Something must be done to improve the investigative process 
and end the waiting game for owners and operators of these 
facilities.
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CSB
    The CSB must have all its working parts to ensure 
functionality. Otherwise, CSB will be unable to address its 
investigative backlog, while also addressing new 
investigations. A key building block of CSB work is quality 
investigators. They must have chemical or process safety 
expertise to analyze accidental releases and discover their 
root causes.
    It is crucial that investigators have proper experience and 
the relevant scientific qualifications to make technically 
feasible and practical recommendations about how to reduce 
risks from chemical accidents.
EXPANDING AUTHORITY
    The Board's statutory responsibilities include 
investigating chemical accidents and providing Congress, 
federal, and state authorities with periodic reports that 
contain recommendations to improve chemical safety.
    Unfortunately, the CSB is not fulfilling those 
responsibilities.
    Importantly, the CSB should not be seeking ways to expand 
its jurisdiction into EPA's or OSHA's authorities. The Board 
conflates ``safety recommendations'' as part of a root cause 
investigation. ``Safe'' is a feature that may be covered in 
CSB's periodic reports, not root cause investigations. The CSB 
should channel its resources into conducting investigations, 
especially looking for ways to meet the baseline.
    Similarly, the CSB should remain independent in its work. 
It should not use the findings and recommendations in its 
reports to push certain agendas.
    My hope is the Board will resist the urge to become 
distracted with other priorities outside its statutory 
authority and focus on the main task at hand--demonstrating it 
can color inside the lines. Ultimately, workers, communities, 
and our manufacturing sector depend on it.
    Thank you, I yield back.

    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
    The Chair now asks unanimous consent that the Members' 
written opening statements be made part of the record. And 
without objection, so ordered.
    I now want to introduce our witness for today's hearing, 
the Honorable Katherine A. Lemos--am I pronouncing that 
correctly? ``Lemm-ohs.'' OK, thank you.
    Dr. Lemos. ``Lemm-ohs'' is correct.
    Ms. DeGette. Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.
    We really want to thank you for appearing today. And I know 
you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative 
hearing, and when we do so, we have a practice of taking the 
testimony under oath.
    Do you have any objections to testifying under oath?
    Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
    Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness responded 
no.
    The Chair then advises you that under the rules of the 
House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled to be 
accompanied by counsel.
    Do you desire to be accompanied by counsel today?
    Dr. Lemos. No, ma'am.
    Ms. DeGette. Let the record reflect the witness has 
responded no.
    And so, if you would, would you please rise and raise your 
right hand so you may be sworn in?
    [Witness sworn.]
    Ms. DeGette. And let the record reflect the witness 
responded affirmatively.
    And you are now under oath and subject to the penalties set 
forth in Title 18, Section 1001 of the United States Code.
    And at this time the Chair will now recognize you for 5 
minutes to provide your opening statement.
    Before we begin, I want to explain the lighting system. In 
front of you are a series of lights. The light will initially 
be green. Then it turns yellow when you have 1 minute 
remaining. We would ask that you try to wrap up at that time, 
start wrapping up. And the light turns red when your time 
expires.
    And so, Chairperson Lemos, you are now recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Just move it a little closer, I think.

 STATEMENT OF KATHERINE A. LEMOS, Ph.D., CHAIRPERSON AND CHIEF 
      EXECUTIVE OFFICER, U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD 
                      INVESTIGATION BOARD

    Dr. Lemos. Thank you. Good morning. I'm Dr. Katherine 
Lemos, and I'm proud to serve as the Chairperson and CEO of the 
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 
or CSB.
    As you know, and as you stated, our mission is to ``drive 
chemical safety change through independent investigations to 
protect people and the environment.'' This is a critically 
important mission and one to which we are fully committed.
    We achieve this mission through three strategic goals: to 
advocate for safety, to prevent the recurrence of significant 
chemical incidents, and to maintain an engaged and high-
performing workforce.
    I would like to address each of these.
    First, our strategic goal to advocate for safety, which 
involves achieving change through recommendations, outreach, 
and education.
    In total, CSB has released 860 safety recommendations; 742 
of those are closed. In fiscal year 2021, CSB has issued 19 new 
safety recommendations, in comparison to zero for fiscal year 
2020.
    A major focus of CSB in fiscal year 2021 has been advancing 
and closing previously issued recommendations, because this is 
a key driver to realizing positive safety change.
    In fiscal year 2021, CSB advanced 46 recommendations; 28 
closed successfully. In comparison, in fiscal year 2020, CSB 
advanced only 15 recommendations; 4 closed successfully.
    Another strategic goal is to prevent recurrence of 
significant chemical incidents through independent 
investigations.
    Over the years, CSB deployed to 146 incidents. Even through 
the pandemic, following our COVID Safety Plan, which we 
implemented very early on in my tenure, CSB has continued to 
efficiently deploy to meet our mission.
    In fiscal year 2021, CSB made a commitment to increased 
transparency, and we have demonstrated this through initiating 
live Board meetings upon completion of our investigations.
    In fiscal year 2021, utilizing this new transparency 
process, we completed three investigations: Aghorn, AB 
Specialty Silicones, and Evergreen Packaging. This compares to 
only one completed investigation in fiscal year 2020.
    We are working diligently to complete the remaining 18 open 
investigations. Due to enhanced internal processes developed 
this year, we are poised to complete investigations more 
efficiently moving forward.
    Our third goal, it is to create and maintain an engaged, 
high-performing workforce. After accepting this role last year, 
I was shocked to learn of how low the staff numbers actually 
were.
    Our agency is critical to the safety and the well-being of 
our workers, the public, the communities, and our environment.
    To address this, we have prioritized hiring a robust, 
diverse, and engaged Mission Product Team. And by year end 
fiscal year 2023, our plan is to have an all-time high number 
of investigation and technical specialists on the Mission 
Product Team.
    We have also increased technical contractor support, with 
expertise in specialized fields such as metallurgy, blast 
modeling, and equipment testing.
    To create more stability at the agency, we are hiring key 
support staff and leadership at the career level.
    Finally, CSB looks forward to onboarding new Board members. 
These appointees are critical to our mission. They bring unique 
subject matter expertise and additional perspectives that helps 
to ensure the integrity of our products while enhancing our 
advocacy.
    Ultimately, we are committed to the CSB mission, we are 
committed to its growth, and we are committed to ensure that we 
can respond and react properly to catastrophic chemical events.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Lemos follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much, Chairperson Lemos.
    The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes for 
questioning.
    And as I said in the opening statement, today's discussion 
is really focused on where the agency is right now and what we 
need for it to do for it to function going forward.
    And so I just want to ask you a series of questions, 
Chairperson, and if you can, if you can answer as briefly as 
you can, that would help because, of course, we each only have 
5 minutes to question.
    Now, as we all talked about on both sides of the aisle, CSB 
investigates some of the most consequential industrial 
accidents in the United States. Is that correct?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. DeGette. And the purpose of those investigations is to 
identify the root causes and then make corresponding safety 
recommendations to prevent future incidents. Isn't that 
correct?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. DeGette. So conducting these investigations and then 
informing the public of its findings is really the bread and 
butter of CSB's work, and I know that you agree with that.
    So let's talk for a minute about the investigation backlog, 
which I know you are striving mightily to reduce. But as many 
of us on both sides of the aisle said, there are 18 open 
investigations, some which go back to 2018.
    So my first question to you, Chairperson Lemos, is, do you 
currently have a strategic plan and scheduled timeline to close 
each of the 18 open investigations?
    Chairperson, do you have a plan to close each of those 18 
investigations?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, Chairwoman, we have a plan. And I'm looking 
for my specific notes on the data for that right now.
    Ms. DeGette. OK.
    Dr. Lemos. So hold just a moment.
    Ms. DeGette. The ranking member points out the plan is with 
the slide.
    Do you have that there? You know what, what I'm going to--
OK. Do you have it now?
    Can you turn your mike on, please?
    Dr. Lemos. So sorry. I actually have two different aspects.
    First of all, our top priority is to focus on the mission.
    Ms. DeGette. Yes, OK. But do you have a plan for closing 
those 18 open investigations? Yes or no?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes.
    Ms. DeGette. And can you give me a copy of that plan?
    Dr. Lemos. We can provide a copy of the plan, as we have 
discussed or as we have exchanged information with your staff--
--
    Ms. DeGette. OK. If you can give me a copy of that plan, 
then I will put it into the record.
    And the other point that I want to ask in my time 
remaining, that's transparency of the agency. CSB's regulations 
require that each quarterly public meeting include a review of 
the Board of the schedule for completion of all open 
investigations.
    Now, I understand that the schedule has not always been 
made public in the past. So will you commit to providing this 
schedule of completion for all open investigations at your 
quarterly public meetings going forward?
    Dr. Lemos. So, first of all, I would like to address one of 
the questions you asked before.
    Ms. DeGette. OK. But, first of all--and I will have time 
for you to do that, but let's answer this question.
    Can you provide the schedule of completion for all open 
investigations at your quarterly meetings? So if you have a 
quarterly meeting, you can say which ones you are planning to 
close.
    Dr. Lemos. I can tell you right now which four are the next 
to come up.
    Ms. DeGette. OK. But do you plan to release those at your 
quarterly meetings?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, we plan to release those.
    Ms. DeGette. OK.
    Dr. Lemos. And we have actually recently, in the last two 
meetings, said which ones will be up for finalization.
    Ms. DeGette. Super. Thank you.
    And then you can go back to your--I've got 45 seconds, so 
you can answer my previous question.
    Dr. Lemos. Understand. Yes, we have a plan. We have got 
early phase, mid-phase, and late phase.
    Ms. DeGette. Super.
    Dr. Lemos. And I can tell you the four right now that are 
up for legal review, which is the final phase before the Board 
receives them----
    Ms. DeGette. Great.
    Dr. Lemos [continuing]. Are Sunoco, Didion, BioLab, and Loy 
Lange. And I would give you all of the details on that except 
you have limited time.
    Ms. DeGette. That's OK. We have a lot of Members that can 
ask.
    And then what about the rest of the investigations? Do you 
have a plan for completion of those?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, we do, and we will provide that to you.
    Ms. DeGette. I so appreciate it. Thanks.
    And, again, I really appreciate the yeoman's work that you 
are doing in a very tough situation. But we all agree on the 
mission here. We just have to get this agency working to 
protect the safety of our constituents.
    With that, I will yield to the ranking member 5 minutes for 
his questioning.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it.
    According to its statutory authority, the Chemical Safety 
Board can incorporate recommendation measures into 
investigative reports. But I have been told investigators 
sometimes may write investigative reports that incorporate 
their own background or biases when developing recommendations.
    If they are doing so, that might challenge the independent 
investigatory jurisdiction of the Chemical Safety Board to 
determine the root cause of an accident.
    Does the Board have standardized requirements for its 
recommendations?
    Dr. Lemos. The Board has standardized requirements which 
are in the process of being codified, and that is exactly what 
we're trying to address in our internal process improvement.
    Mr. Griffith. And when do you anticipate that that will be 
codified? I know you are the only member of the Board, so it 
makes it more difficult, but when do you anticipate that would 
be completed?
    Dr. Lemos. Within months.
    Mr. Griffith. So if we check back in 6 months, it either 
ought to be done or pretty darn close? Is that what you're 
saying?
    Dr. Lemos. It should be prior to that. We actually have 
drafts written, and it would be nice to have other Board 
members to weigh in on that as well.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you. I don't disagree with that.
    Dr. Lemos. OK.
    Mr. Griffith. And do appreciate that you have been carrying 
this load yourself. So I don't want to underscore that with any 
of my----
    Dr. Lemos. We've already drafted it.
    Mr. Griffith. I don't want to undermine that or neglect to 
say that, because I'm going to ask some tough questions. I 
understand you have got some handicaps.
    Do you think it would be a good idea to establish legal 
criteria? So you're going to codify these standardized 
requirements, but do you think it would be a good idea to 
establish legal criteria so we can have a greater 
standardization among recommendations and reduce the chance of 
agenda setting through recommendations?
    Dr. Lemos. So everything that we process currently under my 
tenure undergoes legal review, every recommendation, every 
report, every safety bulletin, every safety alert. That was not 
the case prior.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess that's, in essence, a yes.
    Dr. Lemos. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. All right.
    In your message in ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical Safety 
Board Impact Report,'' you state, ``The U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board has successfully carried out its core mission work in 
fiscal year 2020 despite an unprecedented impact from COVID-
19.''
    The Board's mission is to ``drive chemical safety change 
through independent investigations to protect people and the 
environment.'' But that language is not actually found in the 
statute.
    Is the Chemical Safety Board's mission different from its 
statutory requirements?
    Dr. Lemos. Per my understanding, they are exactly the same.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. We might disagree on that. We can talk 
about that later.
    In determining the success of carrying out its mission for 
a fiscal year, does the Board factor in how many investigations 
were closed during that year?
    Dr. Lemos. Can you please repeat that question one more 
time?
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, ma'am. In determining the success of 
carrying out its mission for a fiscal year, does the Board 
factor in how many investigations were closed during that year?
    Dr. Lemos. In the past, performance has not been a measure 
that has been held accountable, that the Board has been 
accountable to, and I've instituted that. We have included that 
information in budget requests. But that is something that I am 
working strongly to institute.
    Mr. Griffith. So that should be a part of the determination 
as to whether or not you've had a successful year?
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely.
    Mr. Griffith. OK.
    The impact report also states that a top priority for the 
Board is to continue delivering high-quality safety products to 
the community. Can you explain what ``high-quality'' means in 
this case?
    Dr. Lemos. This means they're all cause, they investigate 
to the degree that the safety impact is warranted, and we apply 
our resources accordingly, and that the outcome is sound.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. What were prior Chemical Safety 
Board products lacking that caused you to establish different 
standards to improve the quality of the work product?
    Dr. Lemos. As mentioned, there have been widely varying 
product types and product integrity levels. Having come from 
the NTSB and having been at the FAA receiving those 
recommendations and reports, it's really important that you 
have consistency in your logic flow from the facts to the 
findings to the conclusions to the recommendations. And that is 
something that we have been working on vehemently this past 6 
months to a year.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. Thank you very much.
    I yield back.
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full 
committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Chairwoman DeGette.
    I wanted to focus on CSB's strategic role in addressing 
climate change risk to industrial facilities.
    As you know, thousands of our chemical and petrochemical 
facilities are in low-lying areas that are vulnerable to 
flooding. Just this past month, Hurricane Ida caused a serious 
risk of power outages and flooding at a number of facilities in 
my State, Louisiana, and New York.
    And I'm pleased that CSB's guidance and recommendations 
began to address climate change and extreme weather following 
Hurricane Harvey and the resulting Arkema chemical plant fire 
in 2017, but we have to do more. Many facilities seem to be 
caught off guard by catastrophic events driven by climate 
change.
    So let me ask the Chairperson: What more should industrial 
facilities be doing to prepare for a changing climate, in your 
opinion?
    Dr. Lemos. So just to repeat, what more should facilities--
--
    Mr. Pallone. What more should you think that industrial 
facilities should be doing to prepare for a changing climate? 
What are your suggestions?
    Dr. Lemos. So based on the Arkema report, we recommended 
that CCPS put out comprehensive guidance, which is how to 
prepare for extreme weather events. As we have seen with Ida, 
behind me, Managing Director David LaCerte is from Louisiana, 
Baton Rouge, lived through that. And a lot of our--we 
anticipate seeing more and more of these events, so it's going 
to become even more of a challenge for chemical industry moving 
forward.
    So we have interacted with GAO in extreme weather, in 
making sure that we collect the information and trending and 
tracking and which incidents in the past and the future have 
occurred due to extreme weather to try to find some causal 
factors.
    But in terms of what plants or facilities can be doing, 
following guidance that is out there to ensure that they are 
not just preparing for today's historical, but tomorrow's, 
based on recent history, and predicted future level of extreme 
events.
    Mr. Pallone. Well, I appreciate that you are, you know, 
putting out recommendations, and hopefully there will be more. 
But I did want to ask, I want to make sure that CSB, that its 
Board members, staff, and specialists are relying on sound 
science.
    Let me just ask you, Chairperson, has the Board identified 
a set of scientific resources that it draws upon to help assess 
the impacts of increased sea levels, rise in storm surge, storm 
intensity, or other extreme weather events? Have, you know, 
what are the scientific resources that you draw upon?
    Dr. Lemos. So I'm glad that you mentioned that the CSB is 
an independent and scientifically based agency.
    We, as we mentioned to the GAO--and a report is forthcoming 
in a few months--we focus on the extreme weather events. And 
it's more responsive.
    There are other agencies that are responsible for 
predicting what might occur. What we need to do is ensure 
facility resiliency and ensure that there is guidance that is 
adequate to help facilities prepare for these extreme weather 
events.
    Mr. Pallone. But, I mean, have you identified a set of 
scientific resources that you draw upon to assess the impacts 
of this climate change?
    I mean, there is that, and then there is also, like, the 
challenge with staffing. So, you know, having the right mix of 
experts to do these assessments.
    So I guess I'll just repeat, if you've identified a set of 
scientific resources to draw upon or you're considering 
bringing on additional investigators to examine the nexus 
between climate change and industrial preparedness?
    Dr. Lemos. That's a wonderful point. And in terms of 
staffing and our ability to conduct scientific studies, first 
of all, we need to partner with our Federal agencies as our 
enabling legislation encourages, because at this point we don't 
have the staff to conduct that level of safety study and 
analysis.
    So we need to rely on a range of our Federal partners and 
outside entities to be able to identify what could be done and 
what should be done in the chemical community.
    Mr. Pallone. I mean, I know you can't lobby us for 
additional resources, but it sounds like you do need additional 
resources. So I'll take that to mean you do need additional 
resources and you would like to see additional resources for 
more staffing.
    Dr. Lemos. Um, I'm certainly not lobbying. I'm telling you 
that there's only so much that we can do with the resources 
that we have. And I would--we would appreciate fully funding 
what we have requested. I believe that we're in an upward 
trend. We have hired more staff. They are joining. We're likely 
to get more Board members. I believe that that's an upward 
trend, and we're going to maintain that staff and engage them.
    But to be able to conduct all of the activities in our 
enabling legislation, which is to conduct safety studies in 
addition to investigations--although investigations is the 
primary--we would need that additional staff to be able to 
carry that out effectively and fully.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you. Thank you so much.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Dr. Lemos. You're welcome.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Mrs. McMorris Rodgers for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I believe it's important that we focus on the mission of 
this Board, the Chemical Safety Board. And before we start 
talking about more people and more resources, let's make sure 
that the Board is actually even fulfilling the mission as 
currently stated in the statute.
    And I think it's clear that Members on both sides of the 
aisle have concerns about the effectiveness and the outcomes of 
the Board with the current staff and current levels of funding.
    On the CSB website, it states that the investigative 
process generally takes 6 to 12 months to complete, and a draft 
report is then submitted to the Board for consideration. 
Reports may be adopted through a written vote of the Board or 
in a formal public meeting during the incident site or in 
Washington, DC.
    Dr. Lemos, can you walk us through the investigative 
process currently and if we can expect new investigations to be 
completed within the stated timeline of 6 to 12 months?
    Dr. Lemos. I think, to answer your question, 6 to 12 
months, if you look at our history, that's not the timeline 
that things have been closing. But the community and our agency 
is accountable to actually meet a more rigorous timeline.
    If you look at our counterpart, the NTSB, it's about 2\1/2\ 
years for a major investigation. Part of the problem or part of 
the challenge is that our agency has moved to an all-or-nothing 
full investigation, 160-page report, or not at all.
    And part of what I'm trying to do is return to what the CSB 
used to do and what the NTSB does and provide a range of 
products such that we can get out immediate safety 
recommendations and products within that timeframe.
    Mrs. Rodgers. So do you believe that the 6 to 12 months is 
the right timeline? Or, if it's not the right timeline, then do 
you think Congress needs to evaluate the timeliness of CSB's 
work?
    Dr. Lemos. So I believe that the enabling legislation says 
1 year. One year is very aggressive, especially for a major 
investigation. I believe that less than that is very reasonable 
for a minor investigation.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The oldest investigation in the backlog is 
from 2016. Do you think that the recommendations for that 
report, assuming the investigation is closed at some point, if 
implemented, would be outdated or carry less weight as these 
recommendations would have a year or so after the incident?
    Dr. Lemos. There's no doubt that the delay has a negative 
impact on the safety.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Dr. Lemos. But we do have the ability to issue urgent 
safety recommendations, if identified, any phase of the 
investigation.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK. And ``The Chairman's FY 2020 Chemical 
Safety Board Impact Report'' states that one investigation was 
closed. If there's a backlog of 18 investigations, does it mean 
it would take 18 years to address only the backlog? Or do you 
have a plan for an accelerated process for backlogged 
investigations?
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
    We absolutely have a plan for accelerated closure. We've 
already executed on that. We did three, we completed three this 
year versus one last year. There were different reasons for 
that.
    And I've already committed to six in the coming year. And 
we've already identified four that will be coming to the Board 
before the end of the year or early in the next year.
    I would like to have other Board members to vote on those 
with me. But that would close the three oldest, plus one of the 
newer.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The statutory purpose of the CSB in the Clean 
Air Act is to investigate root causes of accidental releases.
    Have you discussed providing alternative types of work 
product, besides an investigative report, that identifies the 
root cause in a condensed bulletin report form?
    Dr. Lemos. I'm so glad you mentioned that, because that's 
exactly what the CSB used to do and what the NTSB does.
    And so, by providing a range of products, a safety 
bulletin, a safety case, one of the most impactful reports I've 
ever read was from 1998, two events in 8 pages in a safety 
bulletin unrelated, but they both--unrelated industries--but 
they both dealt with management of change.
    Those were out, I believe, within 6 to 8 months. That is 
what we need to be able to accomplish.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
    The Chair now recognizes Miss Rice for 5 minutes.
    Miss Rice. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Ms. Lemos, if we could just go down, I'd just like to talk 
about the nuts and bolts of the agency.
    Ms. DeGette. Miss Rice, you're fading in and out.
    Miss Rice. OK. Can you hear me now?
    Ms. DeGette. Yes.
    Miss Rice. OK. Great.
    Ms. Lemos, I'd like to get to the nuts and bolts of the 
purpose for this agency and remind everyone that, while it was 
created in 1990 and authorized by the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1990, it wasn't funded until 1998 as a result of a series of 
industrial accidents led to a renewed impetus to secure 
appropriations for the organization.
    So now it's my understanding there are presently four 
vacancies on a five-member Board, and President Biden has made 
three nominations that are sitting in the Senate waiting for 
confirmation.
    So I'm sure that that is providing an enormous amount of 
difficulty for you to actually carry out the mission of this 
organization since you're the only Board member out of a five-
member Board.
    And I would ask--I'm sure that I will get the agreement of 
my Republican colleagues on this committee, to ask their 
Republicans colleagues in the Senate to move these nominations 
as quickly as possible so that this Board can be fully 
constituted and get going.
    So that's number one.
    Number two, I understand that there are or were 40 full-
time employees, 20 of whom were investigators. I believe that 
there are unfilled positions for those investigators.
    Dr. Lemos, what I would like to ask you is, who else makes 
up your staff? I mean, it's all well and good to talk about the 
outcome of certain investigations, but if we don't have an 
agency that is fully staffed with the appropriate personnel and 
a specific mission, then the result of investigations are 
surely going to be delayed and questioned.
    So I just want to get into the nuts and bolts of who else 
are your employees, other than investigators?
    And I also want to ask you, if you could--I know this is a 
very long question, but I'm just trying to understand the 
makeup here: Is there a specific enough description of what the 
responsibilities and duties are of each individual Board 
member?
    So first tell me who your employees are, and then speak 
about the specific responsibilities of the Board, if you would.
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
    So the first part of that is who our employees are, and 
I'll talk about the Mission Product Team. I have trouble seeing 
you on the screen, so I'll just look up here at the Chair.
    So the Mission Product Team is comprised of investigators 
who actually go out to the sites, do the followup, do the 
investigation. They oversee the testing and whatnot.
    We have also on the Mission Product Team recommendations 
staff that are assigned to help identify the gaps in guidance, 
regulation, procedures, policies that are related to the 
contributing factor.
    So those are important elements of that team, as well as 
the recommendations staff and advocacy team to provide 
materials.
    In terms of support staff, that includes human resources, 
general counsel, contracting, all of the other things--
administration--all of the other things--IT--that are required 
to support and feed our investigative and Mission Product Team.
    Miss Rice. Can I just interrupt you for 1 second? Are up 
to--do you have the staff that you need? Yes or no?
    Dr. Lemos. Not yet, but we are getting there.
    So we just hired a contracting manager, and we just hired a 
new human resources director. We will be hiring a career 
managing director as well as replacing our general counsel.
    Miss Rice. And the responsibility of the Board again--I'm 
running out of time--could you just tell me, do you feel that 
the mission, the responsibility of the individual Board 
members, is specific, or does it need to be more--better 
defined?
    Dr. Lemos. So I believe you've asked whether or not--so 
what the roles and responsibilities of the Board members are 
and whether that needs to be better defined. Is that correct?
    Miss Rice. Yes.
    Dr. Lemos. OK. So Board Order 28, that discussion, 
specifically discusses the roles and responsibilities of Board 
members versus vis-a-vis the staff.
    So as the OIG reported out, mentioned in several management 
challenges reports, we needed to settle this. So we have in 
writing and already passed roles and responsibilities that are 
clear so that Board members can focus on their mission.
    And what their mission is in technical reviews, they review 
reports, they review recommendations, they vote. They engage in 
stakeholder collaboration and community outreach.
    They are our technical--they lend their technical expertise 
and perspectives to the products, and they also assist with the 
strategy and the mission of the agency.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you so much. The gentlelady's time has 
expired.
    Staff has asked me, Chairperson Lemos, if you can mute your 
microphone when you're not talking. I guess it's causing 
feedback.
    And the Chair will now next recognize Mr. Burgess for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair. And I thank our witness for 
being here with us this morning.
    I apologize for not being there in person. We have a Rules 
Committee hearing going on at the same time. But through the 
miracle of the hybrid hearing, I'm able to participate in this 
one.
    And it was important to me because a little bit south of 
the district that I represent in Texas, back in 2013, a 
fertilizer plant blew up in the town of West, Texas.
    [Audio malfunction.]
    Ms. DeGette. Dr. Burgess, we've lost your audio.
    We've lost Mr. Burgess. So we're going to go to Mr. 
McKinley, and if Mr. Burgess can get back on, then we will have 
him after Ms. Schakowsky.
    So, Mr. McKinley, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
    We apologize profusely, Chairperson Lemos.
    Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    If we could start, I would like to enter into the record a 
statement from the American Chemistry and the American Fuel and 
Petrochemical Manufacturers in support of the CSB.
    Ms. DeGette. Without objection.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. McKinley. Dr. Lemos, the role of the CSB is to 
investigate--I've heard all the testimony before--investigate 
accidents and determine the conditions and circumstances that 
led up to those accidents and identify the cause or causes so 
that similar events might be prevented.
    For the record, is that a fair assessment?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McKinley. OK. But according to the CSB's website, its 
mission is to, quote, ``drive chemical safety change through 
independent investigations.'' That's worded slightly 
differently than the statute.
    And the phrase, quote, ``drive chemical safety change'' 
seems to suggest some form of an attempt to regulate chemical 
safety, which we've heard testimony that's really the 
responsibility of the EPA. The CSB should only be making 
recommendations to them.
    Now, the Senate Environmental and Public Works Committee 
recently considered, as we've talked about, the three Democrat 
nominees to fill the vacancies at the CSB.
    These chairmen do have different backgrounds. One of them, 
however, has focused her work on ``advocating for 
regulations,'' close quote, and in a recently deleted Tweet 
targeted the Trump EPA and her inability to work in a technical 
and in an unbiased manner.
    So given the nominees' background and the extensive backlog 
for accident investigations and staffing shortages, and with 
the full awareness that you're under oath, can you ensure us 
that the committee--that the CSB will not attempt to take on 
the role of a regulatory agency and remain focused on its 
statutory mission of independent investigations and 
recommendations?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir. Our mission and our mandate is to be 
free from political interference and to not regulate.
    Now, the gaps identify recommendations and safety gaps, but 
they have to--we are not a regulator.
    Mr. McKinley. Were you concerned that this nominee has 
expressed such strong opinions about wanting to regulate? Was 
that a concern to you?
    Dr. Lemos. I would prefer not to express my opinion 
regarding statements of nominees that have not been confirmed. 
But I can commit to you that I will maintain what I committed 
to the Senate, that we are a nonpolitical agency, we're not 
regulatory, and our job is to be safety focused and to call out 
the safety gaps.
    Mr. McKinley. Thank you.
    I yield back the balance of my time.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schakowsky for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you, Ms. Lemos. And I want to thank you, begin by 
thanking you--some positive news--that the Chemical Safety 
Board approved its investigation report of a May 2019 AB 
Specialty Silicones explosion that took place in my State of 
Illinois.
    It was very serious. The incident killed four workers and 
caused serious damage to the town of Waukegan, Illinois.
    So I'm very grateful for that. But I want to talk about the 
abilities that you have to answer the enormous issues that face 
you.
    So exactly how many or approximately how many a year of 
these incident reports do you get?
    Dr. Lemos. Are you asking how many incident reports meet 
our reporting criteria?
    Ms. Schakowsky. I mean when someone calls up and says there 
has been a problem, how many of those?
    Dr. Lemos. Twenty thousand to 30,000 per year.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand or 30,000 per year. But we 
know--in fact, in your testimony you said you were shocked to 
learn about the low staffing numbers. We've been talking about 
that. I understand that about 30 to 40 percent of the 
investigative positions were vacant this year.
    And so my understanding is that you also noted in your 
testimony that by year's end of this year that you plan to have 
an all-time high number of investigators and technical 
specialists, et cetera, on the Mission Product Teams. And I 
wonder if we're going to be able to get there. And what is your 
plan to get there?
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, because more staff 
are certainly needed to address more of these events.
    So the all-time low in staffing in recent years was in 
2019, which was eight investigators. And currently we have 14. 
Two new persons just joined us this past week.
    So we're on track by the end of fiscal year 2023, so the 
end of the next fiscal year, with your support and 
appropriations, to have an all-time high across the Mission 
Product Team, and that includes the recommendations staff and 
advocacy, technical writers, and others that are required to 
put together that full report in an efficient manner and with 
integrity.
    Ms. Schakowsky. So how many more people does that mean? How 
many more people do you have to have at that point?
    Dr. Lemos. I believe--well, so on the Mission Product Team 
or the entire staff?
    Ms. Schakowsky. Well, the entire staff. You can divide it 
any way you like.
    Dr. Lemos. I believe the entire staff, we just submitted 
for 61 positions by the end of fiscal year 2023. My belief, 
that's low.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Is there any way to speed this up so that 
we can get even more sooner?
    Dr. Lemos. So there's a scaling issue as well. Currently 
most of our investigators are 12 months to 18 months new to the 
agency, despite them having a lot of experience. So that's why 
we've been investing in the processes so much to ensure a 
consistency.
    Is there a way to speed it up? We can ramp up a plan to do 
that. If we were able to and funded to do so, absolutely.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Let me ask you this. You said you get tens 
of thousands now of calls about toxic or accidents that need to 
be investigated.
    How do you make the decision of what comes first, 
especially with this current shortage and limitation on the 
staff? What's the process?
    Dr. Lemos. So that's a good question.
    So of the 20,000 to 30,000 reports per year that we 
receive, I'll just say from the reporting event, since the 
reporting criteria last year, March of last year at the end, 88 
actually qualified.
    So we determine that based on the criteria of fatality, 
injuries, environmental impact. There is whether or not it's a 
critical driver on our list, and the potential safety impact 
that it has.
    However, our attempt to take a range approach of our 
products will allow us to address all of those 88.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Twenty thousand to 30,000, and you're 
saying that 88 actually qualified? That's it? None of those 
others your agency can address in any way? That's the max that 
gets qualified?
    Dr. Lemos. So it's important--well, it's important for us 
to be able to track and trend incidents and to be able to 
identify high risk areas.
    But 20,000 to 30,000 incidents, which may not meet our 
reporting criteria but are reported to us, based on what we 
request, are important, and I do know that the regulatory 
agencies also track these events.
    Ms. Schakowsky. OK. I'm out of time. I appreciate that. 
Thank you.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Long for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Long. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And, Ms. Lemos, are desk investigations different from 
regular investigations? And if so, how?
    Dr. Lemos. So I'll first take your question regarding desk 
investigations. Desk launches are what I'm referring to, and 
that's actually not a formal name. We don't have that. We're 
still exploring the model and the method by which to have a 
more agile approach to addressing the range of events that we 
see.
    Mr. Long. OK. And why might an accidental release not 
warrant a deployment of investigators to that site?
    Dr. Lemos. We have to prioritize the limited resources. We 
can't deploy to every single accident, nor is it necessary to 
deploy personally to each and every incident.
    Mr. Long. Given a backlog of 18 investigations and new 
incidents occurring to investigate or need to be investigated, 
can work be done at the desk to determine whether or not to 
deploy to an ordinance, allocate resources that might be 
impactful for investigations to the industry?
    Dr. Lemos. So we're maintaining an agile approach moving 
forward. Again, we have to codify it with the staff. I would 
like other Board members to weigh in as well.
    But with the staff we are taking this approach that, if 
you're familiar with the NTSB, who we were crafted after, they 
complete hundreds of accidents through the help of their 
Federal counterparts. And in my confirmation hearing and 
process, it was encouraged upon me to reconsider the degree to 
which we utilize our Federal counterparts to help us carry out 
our investigations.
    Mr. Long. And what's your personal role in closing out 
investigative reports? And how will this shift or change if the 
three CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate?
    Dr. Lemos. Just to make sure I heard the question, if they 
are not confirmed?
    Mr. Long. Pardon?
    Dr. Lemos. Just to confirm the question, you are asking 
what is going to be the impact if they are not confirmed?
    Mr. Long. No, if they are confirmed.
    Dr. Lemos. We will continue forward just as we are now with 
closing investigations. There will be some training time and 
some education when you have three new Board members at the 
same time. Obviously, that's a challenge to take on. But we 
will have increased advocacy and community engagement, and 
that's critical to the success of our agency.
    Mr. Long. OK. So I'm going to repeat the question to make 
sure that you got it and I got it, and that might have been the 
way that you answered.
    But my question was, what is your personal role in closing 
out investigative reports, and how will this shift if the three 
CSB Board nominees are confirmed by the Senate? What's your 
personal role in that?
    Dr. Lemos. My personal role, the difference when there's 
just a Board of one versus a Board of four, correct?
    Mr. Long. Uh-huh.
    Dr. Lemos. I will have other perspectives. We will debate 
the matters in a live forum. We will have other perspectives. 
That's going to be the difference in closing those out.
    Mr. Long. OK. I'm having a little trouble with the sound 
system in here picking up everything you're saying, but I 
appreciate it.
    The CSB needs the five Board members mandated in your 
enabling statute, and the Board members should have a broad 
range of applicable experience and expertise, including 
experience in the operations, processes, and procedures 
typically applicable in commercial chemical facilities.
    If you could create the most well-qualified Board, what 
applicable experience and expertise do you seek out in those 
Board members?
    Dr. Lemos. So the question is--and I'm trying to speak 
louder and into the mike, I moved it. If you can hear me?
    Mr. Long. It's part on my end, but that's fine. I've got an 
issue, so that's fine.
    Dr. Lemos. Excellent.
    So the type of experience that is mentioned in our enabling 
legislation really just describes the range: safety management 
systems, human factors, toxicology, those familiar with 
chemicals. It takes a range of backgrounds, and it's very rare 
for someone to have all of those together.
    Mr. Long. OK. Thank you. And I appreciate your being here 
today.
    And I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Tonko for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And certainly as the subcommittee chair on the standing 
committee of Environment and Climate Change, I have great 
interest in the operational qualities of CSB.
    So despite its significant impact on the safety of workers 
and communities, CSB has a history of governance challenges. 
Specifically, Board infighting and long stretches without 
steady leadership have undermined the agency, to say the least, 
over the years.
    These Board-level issues have led to significant challenges 
for staff at the agency, including high attrition, low morale, 
and difficulty attracting new hires. As we have heard today, 
three new Board members will hopefully soon be joining this 
agency.
    So, Chairperson Lemos, I know you would like to prevent 
history from repeating itself. So how do you intend to 
integrate and involve these new members so that the agency does 
not fall into that power-sharing squabbling that has hamstrung 
it in the past?
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question, which I believe is 
how do I intend to prevent a repeat of what has been occurring 
for--since the inception, really, of the CSB.
    I met the CSB at a time when it seemed to be more stable, 
around the 2005-2006 timeframe, and appreciated how they worked 
as colleagues together.
    So the first thing that I did when I joined the agency was 
realize that we have a pressing need to address the OIG's 
management challenges, and that was my top priority last year, 
and we finalized that, which was to provide the structure for 
the Board members to know what their roles and responsibilities 
are, to provide them the support staff, and to help them 
execute that. That is what I did.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    And, Chairperson Lemos, I assume you have examined some of 
the root causes of the friction that has undermined the 
functionality in the past.
    So can you share some of your insights into why the Board 
has had these management problems in the past and what you 
intend to do so that these mistakes are not repeated under your 
leadership, particularly given that new Board members will be 
arriving and arriving soon?
    Dr. Lemos. Well, it's possible that memorializing these 
changes in CFRs, such as the NTSB has, would help.
    In our benchmarking we use the DNFSB, we use the NTSB and 
other agencies in terms of how we structure decision making and 
budget making. Perhaps codifying that would allow for these 
Board orders, which are internal policy, to settle them.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
    Earlier this year, you approved a revised Board Order 28, 
which set new terms for Board member responsibilities, 
budgeting power, and other related areas.
    While I understand that this new Board order was intended 
to respond to some of the criticisms of CSB identified by EPA's 
Office of Inspector General, some of your critics have called 
this a power grab because the action was undertaken during a, I 
quote, ``quorum of one.''
    Will you revisit Board Order 28 once the new members are on 
Board?
    Dr. Lemos. So the question is whether we will revisit Board 
Order 28 once new Board members join.
    I want to establish that our Board orders, as I found them 
when I joined, were not in alignment with our enabling 
legislation. They were not empowering the Board members to 
actually carry out their functions and staff to carry out their 
functions.
    So what I did, if someone says it's a power grab, the 
changes in Board Order 28 have nothing to do with a quorum of 
one. It's simply allowing the Board to carry out their 
functions successfully and staff to carry out, with 
responsibility, their functions.
    Mr. Tonko. OK. So then let me ask this: Will you commit to 
ensuring that the new members are empowered to both carry out 
their duties and revise Board orders by a majority vote?
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. Board orders should be a democratic 
process.
    Mr. Tonko. So that you would commit to ensuring that 
they're all recognized and having their input?
    Dr. Lemos. All Board orders should be in compliance with 
the law and should be voted on to the extent that we have the 
room, right?
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you. Yes, thank you.
    Look, we all want to avoid the issues that have prevented 
CSB from performing effectively in the past. So I do look 
forward to seeing the agency get back to excellence.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now announces that the committee will be in 
recess for 10 minutes.
    [Recess.]
    Ms. DeGette. The committee will come to order.
    And the Chair now will note that Mr. Burgess has solved his 
technology problems by appearing in person, and she will 
recognize him for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair.
    Thank you, Dr. Lemos, for being here with us today. I will 
tell you, I have been looking forward to your appearance today 
because the experience I had with--it's not in my district, but 
just outside my district in the town of West, Texas, several 
years ago. I was interested in your responses to Mr. Tonko's 
questions, because that was largely the type of question I had.
    When I visited West, Texas, shortly after the accident, I 
mean, you name the Federal agency and they were on site. So you 
had the FBI, you had DOJ, you had ATF, you had--I didn't see 
Customs and Border Protection, but I suspect they were there 
somewhere. FEMA was very much in evidence.
    And all of these agencies collected at this Emergency 
Operations Center, and there's no Chemical Safety Board. And 
yet they were there, but they didn't interact with the other 
agency personnel who were there doing the investigation and 
taking--getting the evidence.
    In fact, when FEMA took me on an automobile trip through 
the neighborhoods that were affected, and seeing all the houses 
in an unusual type of situation because the roofs were lifted 
off the houses and they came right back down so there was no 
vertical--it was only the vertical displacement, no horizontal 
displacement. But, obviously, the houses were destroyed in that 
process.
    The Chemical Safety Board was not part of that, but they 
were in a trailing car, like several cars behind, and I never 
understood quite why, why we wouldn't all be working to the 
same end.
    Presumably, if the FBI finds something interesting, then 
the Chemical Safety Board might find it interesting as well, or 
the Chemical Safety Board might have a question that would be 
important for the law enforcement branch of the Federal 
Government to know.
    So can you help me there? Are you more aligned now where 
there's less likely to be that silo? Because it was almost like 
there was a physical silo around the Chemical Safety Board that 
day.
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you for that question.
    The siloing, just to repeat, the siloing, why was the CSB 
not working intimately with the other Federal agencies and 
local, and why was their presence not noticed? And that is 
something we have been focusing on by building stronger 
coalitions with our Federal counterparts and local.
    I did not understand that as well. When I joined the 
agency, it was very foreign to me as a process. So I can't 
explain why that had occurred in the past.
    But I can tell you that moving forward we have already 
started to interact much more closely, not just with our 
Congress and the local representatives, the local responders, 
immediately to ensure. And OSHA and EPA, we have contacts we 
started last year to say who's the regional, who's the Federal, 
here are the phone numbers. And that's the type of connection 
that we are building moving forward.
    Mr. Burgess. One of our counsels here on the subcommittee--
I don't think he is here today--but referred to the Chemical 
Safety Board, when I asked him a question about it many, many 
years ago, he said it's like the NTSB for chemical accidents.
    So you have the National Transportation Safety Board if 
there's an airline accident or train accident. The Chemical 
Safety Board performs that same function if there's a chemical 
incident, which seemed like a good idea.
    But if indeed patterned after the NTSB, they probably work 
pretty well with their counterparts in law enforcement, and in 
the case of air traffic, with the air traffic controllers and 
everyone who would be involved in providing them the data. It 
seems like that's a good model to follow.
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely, the NTSB is a good model to follow 
in that respect.
    One difference I will point out: In the chemical industry, 
it's much more distributed in terms of the regulation oversight 
than the aviation industry is.
    So if you look at the other transportation domains, you 
will see some of the same fragmentation and extra effort 
required to pull those entities together. Like a bridge 
collapse or a pipeline explosion, you're going to have other 
local entities.
    But it's a great model. We need to have that presence. We 
need to have that collaboration and strengthen it.
    Mr. Burgess. Well, I appreciate your testimony today and 
your service to the Safety Board.
    And I yield back.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Peters for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Some of our colleagues, we're hearing them say that the CSB 
should not be using its scarce staff resources to make 
recommendations or issue regulations to protect public health 
and public welfare. But that's a key component of the CSB's 
mission, and preventing future incidents has to remain a top 
priority.
    Prior to my time in public office, I worked at EPA for a 
short time on toxic substances and later spent 15 years as an 
environmental lawyer. I've got a keen interest in CSB's role in 
updating EPA's Risk Management Plan, or RMP, requirements.
    Under the RMP, known also as the Chemical Disaster Rule, 
industrial facilities are required to follow rules that help 
prevent accidental releases of chemicals that can cause death, 
injury, property or environmental damage, or require evacuation 
of surrounding communities.
    Now, EPA is now in the process of updating the RMP rule, 
and given CSB's years of identifying the root causes of exactly 
the kinds of chemical disasters the RPM is intended to prevent, 
I think CSB has an important role to play.
    Chair Lemos, I understand you sent a letter to EPA in July 
with high-level recommendations for how to update the RMP. Are 
you preparing to give more detailed recommendations during the 
public comment period on the proposed RMP rule?
    Dr. Lemos. I want to make sure I hear you correctly because 
it's a little bit muffled. But you're asking me if I'm prepared 
to make more specific recommendations to RMP than we have in 
the past? I know that we----
    Mr. Peters. Yes, as part of the public comment period.
    Dr. Lemos. So we were engaged in the listening sessions--
I'm hoping I'm understanding your question correctly--but we 
were engaged in the listening sessions over the past several 
months. I understand that OSHA is also going to have similar 
listening sessions for PSM. We reiterated three specific 
recommendations that have been open with regards to RMP for a 
long time and that are critical: two on chemical reactives and 
one on inherent safety design in the PSM process.
    Mr. Peters. OK. Among other things, I understand that you 
recommended that EPA consider mandating evaluations for 
inherent safety, which I gather means implementing inherently 
safer product technologies and practices that permanently 
eliminate or reduce potential hazards; for example, minimizing 
the amount of chemicals on a site. And I imagine that CSB has a 
long list of inherently safer technologies and practices.
    Are you prepared to provide all that information to the 
EPA?
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In fact, in preparation for the 
letter to the EPA regarding inherent safety, which we 
reiterated--and I'm a strong believer in the life cycle and 
design in inherent safety at all levels of the process--I 
counted how many--or I worked with our staff to count how many 
recommendations we've made to entities, industry, any 
recommendation that was related to inherent safety, and that 
sort of data I think would be very useful and powerful.
    Mr. Peters. Great. So closely related to the RMP program is 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's, OSHA's, 
Process Safety Management program. That PSM program is 
similarly focused on preventing the mishandling or release of 
highly hazardous chemicals. To my knowledge, OSHA has not 
announced its intention to update its program the way EPA is 
updating its RPM program.
    In the absence of an active effort by an agency to update a 
program like this, what do you see is the advocacy role for CSB 
to push for regulatory changes that could reduce the risk of 
chemical disasters for workers?
    Dr. Lemos. So some of the efforts--you're asking about 
specifics for PSM that we have been recommending, just to 
confirm?
    Mr. Peters. Yes. How would you want to effect the PSM, 
right.
    Dr. Lemos. So we, last year, myself and some of the new 
staff met with OSHA and EPA to speak about both of their 
programs and the most highly prioritized recommendations. After 
the explosion in Beirut, we also reiterated some of our 
recommendations for PSM that came out of the West, Texas, 
event.
    So that is the PSM modernization, and to take into account 
similar things that we're asking for EPA to account for as 
well, to include reactives.
    So we will do a comprehensive analysis. We have an advocacy 
team. And we will also look at what are the gaps in the PSM. We 
already have an analysis on that. I don't have it in front of 
me, but I would be absolutely pleased to provide it to you.
    Mr. Peters. I would love if you could provide it to the 
subcommittee. I just urge you to work closely with EPA as they 
update the rule and make sure they have all of the relevant 
information to prevent future chemical incidents.
    And my time has expired. I yield back. Thank you.
    Ms. DeGette. I surely thank the vice chair.
    I'm now pleased to recognize Mr. Palmer for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Ms. Lemos, my colleague Mr. Peters was talking about the 
EPA, and I want to ask some questions related to that in the 
context of who investigates the investigators.
    The EPA was involved in a couple of major chemical spills, 
the Gold King Mine in Colorado--which, frankly, the remedy that 
should have been afforded to the people impacted by that hasn't 
yet been afforded them. But there was another EPA-caused spill 
in Georgia along the--in Greensboro, Georgia, that EPA I think 
attempted to cover up.
    Does the Chemical Safety Board have a role or even a 
responsibility to engage in the investigations of spills like 
that where it's caused by another Government agency?
    Dr. Lemos. So I want to make sure I understand your 
question. I'm having a little difficulty hearing.
    Mr. Palmer. Yes, it was really long.
    Dr. Lemos. So you're asking if the CSB has a role in 
investigating accidents--and I didn't hear the rest of the 
sentence. Sorry.
    Mr. Palmer. Accidents caused by another Federal agency. In 
this case, the EPA, they caused the Gold King Mine spill that 
dumped millions of gallons of toxic water and polluted zinc and 
other chemicals, cadmium, lead, down the Animas River, that 
impacted Indian reservations, impacted everything pretty much 
downstream.
    A few weeks after that they were involved in another spill, 
in Greensboro, Georgia, which my understanding is they 
attempted to cover that up. It was just a few weeks, like I 
say, after the Gold King Mine spill.
    So who investigates the investigators? Would the Chemical 
Safety Board have a role in going in to investigate something 
like that?
    Dr. Lemos. So I don't know all the particulars for the 
events that you're describing, but if it meets our rules for 
deployment or in our scope, in the CSB scope, it is an 
inadvertent release that has significant impact for----
    Mr. Palmer. Reserving my time.
    Ms. DeGette. Would the gentlelady suspend?
    Please, all Members online, please make sure you're on 
mute.
    The gentleman may continue.
    Mr. Palmer. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Well----
    Dr. Lemos. I can answer.
    So the Chemical Safety Board has the responsibility to 
investigate. That doesn't mean the EPA does not investigate as 
well, similar to the NTSB and the FAA. I worked on both sides 
of the fence.
    But the CSB is an independent investigation that is not 
focused on the oversight or punitive element. It is to 
determine the root cause, as we've heard many of you say today.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of the EPA, they denied 
responsibility I think for the Greensboro spill. And I would 
just think that the Chemical Safety Board would have some 
responsibility. It might be a jurisdictional issue that would 
be argued.
    But sometimes it might not be a bad idea for those who are 
responsible for that, who normally would be investigating, to 
be at least under the--in some way under the investigative 
powers of another agency.
    Dr. Lemos. So there are some circumstances--and we're 
facing some of those today--where some parts of the EPA have 
jurisdiction because it could be of a criminal nature. Just as 
if there is a malicious intent, ATF would take over.
    So I'm not positive, but there are some circumstances where 
we defer to other Federal agencies in those circumstances. We 
still continue to investigate.
    Mr. Palmer. Well, I know you're a Board of one right now, 
but I think you may have been on the Oversight Committee when 
we were looking into the employee dissatisfaction, what was 
going on with the Board, and the retaliation against 
whistleblowers.
    Are there any plans in place to improve employee 
satisfaction, to protect whistleblowers and others who work at 
the Chemical Safety Board?
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. In terms of employee engagement and 
maintaining, I believe that having career staff stability, 
stability at the Board member level, stability at the 
leadership level, and commitment for funding from Congress is 
super important to helping staff members feel appreciated for 
their contributions and feel that their progress is meaningful 
to the world.
    Mr. Palmer. I thank you for your answers.
    Madam Chairman, in regard to my line of questioning about 
who investigates the investigators, I do think it's something 
that this committee might ought to consider looking into, 
considering the fact that I'm not sure that the remedies that 
were expected as a result of the Gold King Mine spill have been 
implemented to the satisfaction of the people who were impacted 
by it.
    And with that, I yield back.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman for the suggestion, and 
Mr. Griffith and I will discuss that.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Schrier for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And thank you for being here today, Chair Lemos.
    CSB has a long history of working with other agencies to 
conduct its investigations, as we've been discussing today. In 
fact the EPA, OSHA, Department of Homeland Security, DHS, all 
have some jurisdiction over chemical facility management. So 
it's critical that CSB maintain productive relationships with 
those agencies.
    However, CSB's role to investigate the root causes of these 
incidents is unique and distinct from the roles of EPA, OSHA, 
and others. So while there may be opportunities for 
efficiencies in working together, I am concerned that CSB's 
understaffing has led to an overreliance on findings from other 
agencies.
    So could I ask you, Chair Lemos, how do you see CSB's role 
versus that of the EPA, OSHA, and DHS when it comes to 
industrial safety?
    Dr. Lemos. The roles are very different. Working together 
and collecting information, each of those investigations are 
for different purposes, and the role of the Chemical Safety 
Board is an independent, nonregulatory investigation.
    This model works very well at the NTSB, where you take the 
information from the company, from the different Federal 
agencies. You don't rely on them for their conclusions. You 
take the facts, and with those facts, we come up with our own 
findings and conclusions.
    Ms. Schrier. And do you feel like you have the appropriate 
support to take that information and come up with independent 
findings? And I understand the fact finding together, but I 
would imagine you have slightly different angles. Can you talk 
about that a little bit, EPA versus OSHA versus DHS?
    Dr. Lemos. I don't know why I'm having a little bit of a 
challenge hearing. So the question is, can I talk about the 
difference in the perspective of the findings for those three 
different agencies?
    Ms. Schrier. Well, so if you go in together and you gather 
facts together, do you feel like--you're the only person on the 
Board--do you feel like you have enough support to 
independently come up with the recommendations?
    I mean, I guess here is how I would state that question: 
Like, how do you balance the efficiencies of working together, 
gathering that data together, and working with other agencies 
while also ensuring your own independence? And do you have 
enough support to do that?
    Dr. Lemos. We certainly are asking for more support. That's 
the theme that we gather today. I hope that everybody gathers 
that we need more support. OSHA and EPA certainly have far more 
staff to carry out their work.
    We exchange information. If we collect information, for 
example, and interview together, the information that we ask is 
not used for punitive purposes. So it has to be collected 
separately by those other agencies.
    Our staff is incredibly knowledgeable. They are able to 
sift through the facts and the circumstances, and they continue 
to ask additional questions. So it's not relying on any one 
source of report when we are working together and collaborating 
with our Federal counterparts, despite the fact that they're 
regulators.
    Ms. Schrier. Just because of my time constraints, also I 
just wanted to touch on the importance of public comment. And I 
wondered if you could comment on reinstating public comments, 
because we have heard that, according to the July 2021 
stakeholder letter, that United Steelworkers and other 
organizations did not have opportunities to provide public 
comment at two recent meetings, March 5 and April 2.
    Can you touch on that, tell us if that is true or not? Are 
you providing notice of your meetings? And if not, why not? And 
also, can you commit to providing a 60-day notice for when your 
meetings are coming up so that there is transparency and public 
comment?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes. So I'll be efficient.
    Two things. One is the notice. Sixty days is in our 
internal policies. I believe it's 2 days or 10 days, I think 2 
days in our CFRs. We have been doing a better job at providing 
advance notice.
    In terms of public comment, it's important, and, in fact, 
even during public meetings, we have been receiving public 
comments and responding to them, just not in the verbal format. 
We have emails when we respond to their questions.
    So I think it's really important to distinguish between a 
public meeting where we discuss Board issues, business issues, 
which is unheard of at the NTSB, frankly, and Board meetings 
where the public can have insight, similar to this meeting 
where the public can view and have insight into the process but 
not be weighing in.
    So I do believe in enhanced transparency, and that's what 
our public meetings are doing. We have been putting all of our 
public meeting notes and comments on the website, the 
transcripts in verbatim, my specific notes that we speak.
    So we will be addressing that, and I believe that 
additional Board members will help with that community 
engagement and public voice.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentlelady.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Dunn for 5 minutes
    Mr. Dunn. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    I yield my time to the ranking member, the Honorable Morgan 
Griffith.
    Ms. DeGette. The gentleman is recognized.
    Mr. Griffith. I appreciate that. Thank you. I appreciate 
it.
    Oh, let's go ahead and finish up that last question. Part 
of the question dealt with steelworkers, and you dealt with all 
kinds of things, but you didn't talk about that specific 
situation.
    Could you--because I think my colleague would like to 
know--can you specifically reference the complaint by the 
steelworkers that they didn't have an opportunity to be heard?
    Dr. Lemos. So I have had numerous engagements with the USW 
via stakeholder meetings on video as well as through letter. I 
haven't heard a complaint specifically, only from the USW, that 
they were not allowed to comment.
    Mr. Griffith. I suspect there will probably be some 
questions, followup, because it wasn't my area that I had 
prepared for, but I suspect there will be some questions after 
this hearing in regard to that matter.
    Let me move on. At the beginning of the questions, you were 
asked by Chair DeGette about your plans for removing the 
backlog and addressing incoming cases. You promised to submit 
that plan for the record.
    I'm curious about this plan. Did you approve some of it? 
Did you approve all of it? What was your role in preparing this 
plan to deal with the backlog?
    Dr. Lemos. Thank you.
    I have been pushing for a resource allocated plan since I 
joined the agency, and because it's important and because the 
community, not just our leaders here, but the community and the 
stakeholders deserve our accountability to the plan.
    Mr. Griffith. So as a part of that then, you did approve 
this plan that's coming forward?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Griffith. And can you share with us any of the details 
you remember of the plan that you approved?
    Dr. Lemos. Well, I can tell you the four that are coming up 
for closure, and I've tasked this plan and am working that with 
my managing director, who is sitting right behind me, who will 
be presenting that to you all.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. I appreciate that.
    Regarding extreme weather, setting aside that the statute 
is agnostic about causes that you investigate, how much is the 
climate extreme weather work you told Chair Pallone that you're 
doing--how much is that taking away from the investigations 
that you need to do and to complete?
    Dr. Lemos. So today we've only had one completed 
investigation that was attributed to extreme weather, which was 
Arkema. There are other investigations in the past that we 
could go back and find. We have one other currently which was 
due to extreme weather that's under investigation. That's 
BioLab.
    So as they come up, we're going to attend to them. So I 
can't say that we're--we're not taking a--time away from any 
other investigation.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. So I guess my--and maybe I misunderstood, 
That's certainly possible, which is why we have hearings to try 
to sort this stuff out.
    My understanding was that you all were also working on some 
things that people ought to be doing, recommendations to 
prevent extreme weather having consequences in the future for 
other facilities. Was I correct in that?
    Dr. Lemos. So there are no staff that are currently tasked 
to studying extreme weather or any other specific thing 
because----
    Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two 
investigations you just mentioned?
    Dr. Lemos. I'm sorry?
    Mr. Griffith. Except as an outgrowth of the two 
investigations you just mentioned?
    Dr. Lemos. Correct, correct, and our GAO report which we 
had--the GAO report which we had to engage with, and their 
report is coming out, and that involves extreme weather, 
climate change, and the EPA and the CSB and a number of other 
agencies.
    Mr. Griffith. OK. I just wanted to get that clarified.
    With that, I will yield back to my colleague, Dr. Dunn.
    Mr. Dunn. Madam Chair, I have no further questions. I yield 
back the remainder of my time.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Joyce for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette, for having this 
subcommittee hearing today.
    And thank you to Chair Lemos for appearing today.
    Government entities, like the U.S. Chemical Safety and 
Hazard Investigation Board, keep our constituents safe from 
industrial and environmental accidents. That is why it is so 
critical for the missions of these institutions to be well 
defined so that they can execute the tasks that are given to 
them.
    Chair Lemos, the CSB's mission--and I'm quoting from your 
mission statement--``is to drive chemical safety change through 
independent investigations to protect people and the 
environment.'' That's a fairly broad mission statement.
    What is CSB's process for writing a mission statement?
    Dr. Lemos. So I believe that mission statement, along with 
the strategy, was crafted by a previous Board member, and that 
this goes back to the process of the mission, the vision, and 
the strategy. Then that is up for renewal, in which case I 
sincerely hope to have other Board members to work through that 
with me.
    I can't tell you the genesis of that particular mission 
statement, but I will work on that, and I can get back to you.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you. I would appreciate the followup in 
that regard.
    My question--my second question for you, is that the 
government works best when it is small and yet effective. 
Attempts at government expansion or overreach inevitably end up 
in waste, low productivity, and failure of the original 
mission, even an ill-defined mission.
    I want to be clear that CSB's mission is critical, which is 
why it needs to be narrowly and clearly defined to give the 
best chance for success.
    If President Biden's three new CSB member nominees are 
confirmed, how do you see them changing the mission statement, 
as you just addressed, on the CSB-based backgrounds of the 
three new appointees?
    Dr. Lemos. I can't speak to how they will influence the 
mission statement, in which ways, because I haven't personally 
met them, but I can tell you that I will ensure a nonpolitical 
process and ensure that the mission is scoped appropriately, 
because already now, as you know, we need to prioritize which 
events we focus on.
    Mr. Joyce. Couldn't it be problematic that maintaining this 
wide-ranging mission statement could be interpreted by 
different members, depending on what the new member's agenda 
might be?
    Dr. Lemos. It's possible, yes.
    Mr. Joyce. Do you think it is imperative that a new mission 
statement is crafted, a concise and narrowly focused mission 
statement?
    Dr. Lemos. I believe that we need to be in alignment with 
our enabling legislation, which is pretty broad. I believe that 
through specifically scoping and detailing what we will 
prioritize will help the entire community.
    Mr. Joyce. On that note, the Senate legislative history 
states: ``The principal role of the new Chemical Safety Board 
is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and the 
circumstances that led up to the event and to identify the 
cause or causes so that similar events might be prevented.''
    Do you believe that the CSB is effectively carrying out 
that role currently?
    Dr. Lemos. I believe that we are working towards fulfilling 
our mission, but that we have a long way to go to fulfill that 
completely.
    Mr. Joyce. I concur. It seems like there is a long way to 
go.
    And we've already heard in this hearing about the backlog 
of accident investigations and the continued need for them 
going forward.
    Would the CSB, as it is currently proposed to be made up, 
be effective for those responsibilities along with the current 
obligations?
    Dr. Lemos. So the question is, if we staffed up according 
to the staffing plan, which we will provide, will we be 
effective in meeting our mission?
    Mr. Joyce. Yes.
    Dr. Lemos. Yes.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair DeGette. I think this is an 
important hearing. I thank you for convening it. I yield my 
remaining time.
    Ms. DeGette. I thank the gentleman, and I thank all of the 
Members.
    This now concludes the hearing. And I want to thank--again, 
I want to thank the witnesses for participating in this 
hearing.
    I want to remind Members that, pursuant to committee rules, 
you have 10 business days to submit additional questions for 
the record to be answered by witnesses who appeared before the 
subcommittee.
    And I'll ask the witness to respond promptly to any 
questions should you receive any and also to the commitment you 
made to submit the various plans.
    We want to insert in the record by unanimous consent a 
letter from the ACC and AFPM to me and to Representative 
Griffith dated September 28, 2021; a letter from Representative 
Pallone and others to the CSB dated May 20, 2021; a letter to 
the CSB to Representative Pallone and others dated June 10, 
2021; and a letter from 22 labor, environmental, community, and 
scientific organizations to CSB dated July 8, 2021. This is the 
letter several Members referred to as the steelworkers letter.
    And without objection, so ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Ms. DeGette. Chairperson Lemos, the letter from the 22 
organizations is comprehensive in their recommendations to many 
of the challenges you're facing at CSB. Does the agency plan to 
provide a formal response to that letter?
    Dr. Lemos. Yes. Thank you for clarifying that point, 
because that certainly helps the questions.
    We have already responded to them, but we would not respond 
prior to our continuing our conversation with you and being 
here today. Knowing that this was up and coming, we feel like 
that you are our priority to communicate with.
    But we already have responded and engaged back. In fact, we 
had engagements with them several times this spring and last 
fall. So I--we told them that we looked forward to continued 
engagement with them.
    Ms. DeGette. Super. I would ask if you could, please, 
Chairperson Lemos, if you do respond in writing to the 
organizations, if you could provide a copy to this committee, 
that would help us in our investigation.
    Dr. Lemos. Absolutely. We can immediately provide you a 
copy of our response after we receive the letter and any 
details moving forward.
    Ms. DeGette. We appreciate that. And, again, we appreciate 
your agency's continued cooperation. As you can see from both 
sides of the dais, we're all eager to help you in fulfilling 
your important public safety mission.
    And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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